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JAMES MPANZA AND THE SOFASONKE PARTY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL POLITICS IN SOWETO

KEVIN JOHN FRENCH

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Johannesburg, 1983.

JAMES MPANZA AND THE SOFASONKE PARTY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL POLITICS IN SOWETO

FRENCH, Kevin John, M.A. University of the Witwatersrand, 1983.

This dissertation traces the life and career of James Sofasonke Mpanza, in particular since he became involved in local politics in Orlando in 1935.

His major political act was the organisation of a large squatter camp in 1944. On the basis of this he and the Sofasonke Party rose to power in Orlando. With the political climate resulting from the rise of national politics in the 1950's, his party lost its support but returned in the wake of state repression. He was drawn into state structures, but retained a widespread good reputation in spite of this.

This work seeks to demonstrate through a highly detailed story of Mpanza's carreer that only political power built on the organisation of working class demands is durable, but also only if this is accompanied by an ideology consistant with working class interests. It is the former on which Mpanza's reputation is based and the lack of the latter which led to his downfall.

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other University.

KEVIN JOHN FRENCH

25th July, 1983.

This is dedicated to the working
people of Soweto.

A1622



MR JAMES SOFASONKE MPANZA

Sold in Support of

MPANZA'S DEFENCE FUND 1/-

THE PRAISES OF J. SOFASONKE MPANZA

By James N. Gumbi (Translated by James S.M. Kumalo)

The little green snake which is killed on sight,
the little green snake which has long been entering different holes,
Until it fell into a big one,
From which, we are told, nothing returns,
But it returned, even today it is still here with us..

Once, in Durban, he was attacked by an Indian,
Who came to regret attacking those who shouldn't be,
He had poked a hornet's nest and was consumed by flames
Right up to his home-made shoes,
And the crocodile swallowed up Sofasonke,
Swallowed him right up to his head-ring.

And in the Crocodile's stomach he knelt and prayed,
Prayed to the living God, who heard him and answered,
And the Crocodile swallowed him for fifteen days and then spat him out,
Who can dare do what you did Sofasonke?
Swim in a crocodile infested pool, where one ate him up, and even ate the foam from his body.

The great Mpanza flood, which swept away men, women and children,
And said, "Come out, follow me and I'll build you houses on Municipal land,
And Magebhula cut up Municipal land, and that was that,
And built people houses out of sackcloth and filled a Municipal valley,
Ndaba, in all your years, Have you ever seen a house of sackcloth?

There, then is Sofesonke building people houses out of sack-cloth,
We will follow greyhaired Father Mpanza to the death,
Buffalo whom they chained and threw into prison,
He roared and the chains broke and prison gates opened,
Out he went, pranced about, and went right back to the sack city.
When he was at the Governor-General decreed that he be banished!

The police came for him and he headed for iXopo,
But on the way, he sneezed, and turned back home, to the sack city,
The great judge shouted in the loud voice of the law and said he must be brought back!
He turned at Standerton and retraced his steps.

The enemy gaped, but the family were jubilant,
The women and children sang the song "Zulus, Sothos, Xhosas unite!"
Buffalo who exploited the law in sack-city until your will was done, Sofasonke,
You forsook your comfortable house and went to live in cold sack-city
That's right, Ndaba! a general dies with his army!

Today we live in houses all through you, Sofasonke,
Famous One whose fame spread even to England,
Those who lacked houses took your example and went out and built houses out of sack-cloth,
Buffalo who exploited the law in sack city,
Having previously done the same in Durban.

Refer them, son of Mpanza,
Refer them to the law books, since they made the laws
Dove that feeds on pebbles like a crocodile
You great counter-puncher who makes them eat their own words,
They say I should praise you, but how does one praise a person so well

You great saviour who saved the men and women of Orlando on May Day
When Verwoerd raged till morning with his police at Orlando station,
And you hurried to the Commandant of the police in town,
And you said, "Sir, hurry go and stop your police
You had sent them to go and quell some trouble
But now they are shooting indiscriminately"
Sofasonke! You slippery one
Buffalo of many scars!

He escaped at Mfesane when the crocodile had swallowed and then spitted him out,
And escaped in Joburg when the Governor-General had banished him.
Prosecutor who prosecutes even his own mother-in-law
We'll follow you, grey-haired Mpanza to the death
Then the crooks will remain ruling our land.

BANTU WORLD, JULY 11, 1953.

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PREFACE

The essential purpose of this dissertation is to deepen knowledge of Soweto, its peoples and the issues in their lives in an accessible form. It seeks to deepen that understanding both by showing the historical developments and by introducing analytic points related to these developments. The concern with accessibility is what determined the heavy emphasis on empirical detail and where possible the words of the people concerned. It was also this which persuaded me to use the vehicle of the life story of Mpanza and his Sofasonke Party as the unifying thread in so many events of importance to Soweto people.

It is my belief that the role of the intellectual should be defined primarily by broader social needs and more specifically that it is the duty of the intellectual to serve the working class. With this in view the use of excessive jargon and explicit discussion of abstract theory have been avoided, although interpretation of events has been informed by theory.

I wish to thank my supervisors, Doug Hindson, for his support at difficult times, and Tom Lodge whose assistance, enthusiasm and encouragement found invisible expression on these pages. Thanks also to Colleen McCaul and Judy Maller whose support made the more trying moments more durable and who shared the anxiety and excitement in producing this. My appreciation must also go to Thea Jarvis who typed all of this and to many friends who contributed in many smaller ways. But recognition must also go to the many people in Soweto including members of the Sofasonke Party, who offered help and proudly encouraged me to write this story so that everyone can know about the history of their great city and the great man who lived in it.

A small part of this dissertation has been published before. A short essay on the 1944 squatter camp was published in Africa Perspective No. 21, in 1982 and a brief easy to read story of Mpanza's life in Learn and Teach Magazine No. 5, 1982.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.D.P.	-	African Democratic Party
B.W.	-	Bantu World
C.O.D.	-	Congress of Democratics
D.O.C.C.	-	Donaldson Orlando Communal Hall
J.C.C.	-	Johannesburg City Council
N.A.	-	New Age
N.A.D.	-	Native Affairs Department
N.E.A.C.	-	Non-European Affairs Committee
N.E.A.D.	-	Non-European Affairs Department
N.R.C.	-	Native Representative Council
U. wa B.	-	Umteteli wa Bantu

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Table of Dates of origin of townships.

Orlando Advisory Board Members

CHAPTER ONE : MPANZA'S EARLY LIFE AND THE ROAD TO ORLANDO, 1889 - 1934

> "There is a lovely road that runs from Ixopo into the hills. These hills are grass-covered and rolling, and they are lovely beyond any singing of it."(1)

On one of these hills, no more than sixty kilometers to the north east, lived the daughter of chief Mlotshwa Sibisi of Pinetown, wife of Ventile ka Mbihlana Mpanza of the Mtetwa clan. The Mtetwa clan were descended from Dingiswayo. He is said to have been the first man to introduce horses to Zululand. Ventile too, in the tradition of his clan, had known horses. (2)

But much had changed since Dingiswayo. While life remained much the same at the Georgedale Mission Reserve where the Mpanzas lived, the Durban to Pietermaritzburg road nearby was stirred to life. (3) They said that over the Drakensberg in the Boer republic gold had been discovered and that a whole city of black and white was growing up around the diggings. (4) The whites called it Johannesburg, but to most Zulu's it was known as Igoli - meaning "gold". They said there was money to be made and with taxes to pay many left to dig for the new bosses. The mines recruited skilled white labour from Europe, America, Australia and Canada. With their skills, these whites were able to get the better emerging jobs.

The blacks were less keen on the work. Most only went to earn enough to pay their taxes then returned to their families on the land. Not only did they do the less rewarding work but the whites had begun to exclude them when they elected the Diggers Committee on the 8th November, 1886 and formed the Sanitary Board in 1887. With their powers and funds limited by the Republican Government, this was the start of local government in Johannesburg and blacks were excluded. (5) Besides, the land yielded much to the traditional land-based blacks.

But with the advent of the gold mines new needs rapidly arose. Industries immediately related to mining, such as the manufacture of explosives, certain branches of engineering and the production of miners' boots, were soon established. It also stimulated coal-mining on the Rand.

There also arose for the authorities, the problem of administration and control of the mushrooming population.

Most blacks were temporary contract workers employed by the mines and housed in compounds. But with the growth of support industry they began to find alternative employment such as in the municipality and as domestic servants. Most blacks were thus left to find their own accommodation and they looked for places near their work. (6)

This freedom to choose where to live was not because the Government of the South African Republic preferred it that way or had no other ideas on the matter. Central to their policy of urban black control was the location which for example was compulsorily established in the Potchefstroom Municipal Constitution in 1884. But the haphazard eruption of Johannesburg left little scope for planning.

An attempt at planning was made when stands were sold for the village of Johannesburg on the 1st June, 1887 and areas were set aside by the Mining Commissioner for 'Coolies and Arabs'. This was some one and a half miles to the west of the village and later to be called 'Coolie Location'. Within a year blacks had also built shacks there. The Sanitary Board was then empowered to construct a 'Native Location' with revenue to be raised by means of a poll tax on residents for whom it provided housing. This was not followed through, but there was an attempt to contain squatting by banning the building of reed huts. (7)

The ripples of all this development were felt far and wide.

> "The most stagnant of colonial regions suddenly exploded into activity. Figures are hardly sufficient to describe the greatness of the changes that the smallest village and remotest kraal experienced ..."(8)

Millions of tons of food and mining equipment were needed. To answer this need thousands of South Africans of all races became transport-riders driving ox-wagons fromthe ports to the Transvaal.

> "This played a very important role in the transformation of farming because it drew the landless away from the land and indeed some landowners as well, for good money was to be made if one could gather together sufficient capital to purchase a wagon and a span of oxen." (9)

One of those who gathered the money together and bought a wagon was Ventile Mpanza. He avoided going to work and live in Johannesburg and while his family lived in their huts at Georgedale, Ventile went out to join the traffic on the Durban to Pietermaritzburg road and to carry goods to the Transvaal mines. He became a famous transport rider. (10) Then the Mpanza's lived well.

But this was not to last. With such a demand and profits to be made the railway lines were pushed on to the Witwatersrand as rapidly as possible. As they linked up to the mines from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban, work for the transport riders began to fall off. (11)

Many, who had invested in and become dependent on the wagon trade were left destitute. (12)

> "The splendid stepping ox, the pride of every farmer who had a well-trained team, became a lumbering beast that impeded progress ..." (13)

This contributed to the problems of rural poverty and the migration to the towns. (14)

For Ventile the Durban road nearby began to quieten and poverty threatened. At this time was born their fourth child and second son.

> "I, Sofasonke Mpanza, born May 15, 1889 - only three weeks younger than Hitler - had many blows in my youthful days." (15)

He was baptized on June the 9th in the same year by the Rev. Gluckner of the Lutheran Chuch in New Germany near Durban. The Rev. Gluckner remarked on the beauty of his second name 'Sofasonke', which means 'we shall all die together.' (16)

The many blows soon began to fall. Maybe the problems grew too much, but one day when James was only five his father went mad mysteriously and died a few months later in the Pietermaritzburg Mental Asylum. (17)

As if this was not enough, his older brother died a year later. Without a husband to provide, Mpanza's mother was forced to seek work as a domestic worker in Pietermaritzburg. (18)

Mpanza grew up in these rolling hills of Natal largely without the control and care of parents. With the other small boys he herded cattle and learnt to hunt birds and hares while his mother was away.

His first love was his dogs.

> "Sofasonke would never eat his food provided by his parents if he was not sure his dogs had been fed. His best company was two, three or four dogs that were properly cared for. When he hunted rabbits he shared the spoil equally with his dogs." (19)

Without the protection of a father, Mpanza had to learn to fend for himself. It was thus very early in his life that he developed the characteristic of a fighter. As a boy he was almost a bully. He delighted in beating up other boys. He would fight with determination to the bitter end and usually won. He showed the same determination in the games he played with the local boys.

When he grew older he moved to Pietermaritzburg to stay with his mother. There he befriended a man who worked with a trainer of race horses. Mpanza was fascinated by these animals. He was often helping at the stables and would be allowed to ride the horses. The thrill of those rides was to stay in his memory.

In Pietermaritzburg Mpanza's fortune changed for the better. Unlike many young blacks at the time he attended an Indian school. They often played with the white children from a neighbouring school. Mpanza learnt to speak an Indian dialect and also English which was a great advantage. (20)

As he learned and played, Mpanza was oblivious to the clouds of war gathering in the Transvaal. Far away where people went to dig for gold, the British and Boers were fighting and the outcome of that fight would not leave his future untouched.

When the war was over the Transvaal was under British control. The mines, interrupted by the war, now resumed production and the people began to return to Johannesburg. Because of the lack of provision of African housing a shanty-town began to develop on the west side of town. There were approximately 5 000 people of all races living in this area which was called 'Coolie Town'. The Council regarded 'Coolie Town' as a health hazard but were prevented by the white electorate from clearing it by moving its inhabitants to surrounding areas.

In 1904 there occured in this area something even stronger than the opposition of the white electorate - an outbreak of bubonic plague. The officials of the Council acted that very night. All inhabitants were cleared, and the whole slum was burnt to the ground. The Council agreed that accommodation must be found for the refugees, even if only temporarily. For the blacks and Indians this was provided on municipal land adjoining the sewage disposal works at Klipspruit, fifteen kilometers to the south west of Johannesburg. Corrugated tin shelters were provided by the Council as temporary shelters, and these were to be occupied for some thirty years. (21)

The following year (1905) the first municipally established township, Klipspruit, was developed here and blacks from overcrowded slum areas near to the centre of town were compelled to move there. (22) For the inhabitants this was expensive, far away and the housing was inadequate.

But there was little they could do. The Transvaal Municipalities Election Ordinance of 1903 excluded blacks from voting and set the precedent for an all-white franchise. (23)

The Transvaal councils had been given greater powers under the Crown Colony Government's Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1903. This authorised them to lay out locations, and to regulate "the housing of natives by their employers" and licensing of casual labour. (24)

Blacks had thus no rights in the running of the Government or the city and came under increasing controls.

The majority avoided going to the location and sought accommodation nearer their work. Sofiatown was established in 1905 with freehold rights for whites and blacks. Many were attracted to this as owners or tenants. (25)

Meanwhile, Mpanza returned from Pietermaritzburg for his fourth standard to the Georgedale Primary School. He was a bright pupil and did well in his studies particularly with the aid of his good English.

When a school inspector visited Georgedale he ordered the older children in standards 4, 5 and 6 to transfer to Edendale Secondary School, near Pietermaritzburg. (26)

Instead Mpanza went to Indaleni to train as a teacher. He passed the 3rd Class Teacher's Certificate Examination and was fortunate to be able to start standard 5 at Adam's Seminary near Amamzimtoti, with his mother's support. This school was later known as the Amanzimtoti Zulu Training College and was to be the school of many famous black leaders in years to come. (27) Mpanza was a good student there and in history greatly admired Napoleon Bonaparte as one of his heroes.

Here Mpanza achieved recognition as a soccer player. He played for his school team, the Amamzimtoti "Shooting Stars" in first division soccer. They were a top team in the local league. He soon rose to fame as both the captain and a leading defender, occasionally playing centre forward. He played with characteristic determination and was soon popular with the crowds. Many called him "Man o' Men" - Zahlehta ziye 'Matikulu. (28) It was also at this time that Mpanza developed a new interest.

> "Women had begun to notice me when I was at primary school, but it was not until I was at college that I began to appreciate them. I was a top scorer for the school's soccer team, Shooting Stars. My fans, mostly girls, used to call me 'Coy Coy Man' and shout 'Coy Coy' when I had the ball. Looking back now ... I fancy I was too sure of myself then, overflowing with exuberant self-confidence". (29)

For Mpanza the good times were not to last. Though a good student, his humble beginnings still made themselves felt. "But examination time came in December next year and mother could not raise the examination fees." (30)

In 1907, at the age of 18 he was compelled to leave school to support himself. His first job was for the Natal Railway and Harbours as a 'mabhalane' - a clerk. (31)

He worked there for one year then found a job in January 1908 as a clerk with a Mr. H.S. Broadbent in a firm of attorneys. He worked in Camperdown and lived in neaby Georgedale. (32)

This was Mpanza's first contact with law. He took to reading books of law and became well versed in legal procedure and jurisprudence. He made a special study of interpretations by Judges on cases affecting blacks. To his employers, Mpanza was a trusted clerk and interpreter and was at times allowed to give advice to some of the clients. This was a special assignment he enjoyed most. It was an opportunity to show his knowledge to people who came to the office. (33)

Mpanza's 'exuberant self confidence' and his school-time interests returned.

> "My new job gave me plenty of time for the local girls. I had prestige. I felt almost a chief, fearing neither man nor God. Not that the idea of a God ever occurred to me." (34)

But this was not all. One day a letter arrived for Mpanza that was to greatly alter the course of his life and thereby the lives of many others. The letter read;

"To all to whom these presents shall come, greetings:

whereas, under the provisions of the law entitled 'For relieving certain persons from the operation of Native Law', the Governer of Natal, by and with the advice of his executive Council is empowered to grant letters of exemption to any Native resident in the Colony; And whereas James Sofasonke Mpanza being at the present time dwelling at Georgedale, in the Division of Camperdown, has, in conformity with the provisions of the said law, I do hereby make known and declare that on and after the date of the publication of these presents in the Government Gazette the said James Sofasonke Mpanza shall be, and is hereby declared to be exempted from, and taken out of the operation of Native Law : and shall be, and is, thenceforth subject to the ordinary laws of the Colony.

Given by me, this ninth day of September, in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eight at Government House Pietermaritzburg, Natal.

Matthew Nathan
Governor

Registered this day, September 15th, 1908 : Herbert Millar, registrar of Deeds." (35)

Mpanza had now become an honorary white. (36)

But the young Mpanza was soon in trouble.

"It all started this way. I had been going out with a girl called Martha Bengu. One day in 1909 she jilted me for an African cop in the district. Yes me, James Sofasonke Mpanza, aged 20, and a 5-Pound-a-month attorney's clark and so, I fondly thought, above the police.

I couldn't take the snub. I went after her, assaulted her and forced her to love me all over again. But she worked for a clerk of the court. She reported me and in due course I was summoned to appear in court.

I confidently strutted into the dock, without even bothering to brief Counsel. The magistrate jailed me for a month without the option of a fine. I was furious, straight-way lodged an appeal and the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to a 1 Pound fine.

That was my first brush with the law. I was very satisfied with myself. Dangerously satisfied." (37)

This was a precedent for Mpanza in more ways than one. It was not to be the only time he went beyond the law and not to be the last that he sought to conduct his own defence in Court.

Absorbed by his good fortune and self-satisfaction Mpanza did not notice that around him disillusionment was creeping into black political thought. The Vereeniging peace treaty signed by the British and the Boers in 1902 did not bring with it hoped for reforms. Having gained what they set out to achieve, control over the gold-fields, the British were in a conciliatory mood. Self-rule was granted to the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. This was to entrench the racially discriminatory policies of the Boer Republics. Many blacks had come to believe that the war was being fought to establish British non-racial justice throughout South Africa. (38)

The treaty had been signed between the two warring factors with no consultation with blacks at all. This was an ominous sign of the path ahead, a path that led to Union in 1910.

It had been expected that in the Vereeniging Treaty the Cape System of limited black franchise would have been extended to the Boer Republics.

Disillusionment at this gave rise immediately to a number of new organisations among blacks. The African People's Organisation, predominantly coloured, was formed in 1902. Amongst black communities, local associations, usually with tribal homogeneity, established themselves in urban and rural areas. Colony-based organisations were also formed such as the Natal Native Congress. (39) In the Transvaal was the Transvaal Congress, a Bapedi Union and a Basuto Association. (40)

When the draft South Africa Act was released in 1907 as a proposed common law for all colonies in a single union, it was clear that the direction set by the Vereeniging Treaty was being followed. The black franchise was restricted to the Cape and only whites could sit in Parliament. (41)

There was immediate response from the black organisations. Regional conferences were held in 1908 from which sixty delegates were elected for a South African Native Convention which met in Bloemfontein in March the following year. (42)

Still believing in the liberal paternalism of the British Government, a delegation was appointed from the Convention to go to England in 1909 to argue the case for the extension of the Cape franchise system in time for the consolidation of the Union. (43) This failed and the British government took the easier path of abiding with the wishes of the established white colonial governments. Thus in 1910 the Union of South Africa was established without consultation and depriving blacks of democratic rights. Thus the ruling class in South Africa adopted a strategy that was to set the tone for racial oppression and capitalist domination. The ball was now in the court of the oppressed.

The new Union government was dominated by racists who made further threats of control and restriction on the black masses. Black leaders were alarmed and sought to heal the division which had weakened them by calling for a meeting to establish a National Congress. (44) On the 8th January 1912, close on 100 delegates met in Bloemfontein. (45)

> "Those who attended were the products of missionary education - ministers, teachers, clerks, interpreters, a few successful farmers, builders, small-scale traders, compound managers, estate and labour agents. They were not trade unionists, nor were they socially radical." (46)

In other words, they were mainly chiefs and professionals. The African National Congress was primarily concerned with constitutional rights and was conciliatory in attitude. The chiefs were given a prominent role in an upper house. Nevertheless as a nation-wide organisation in the context of a period of aggressive colonialism, it was a recognisable achievement. (47) In response to the unified offensive of the ruling class, the oppressed had rallied behind their own national organisation to establish the most enduring and consistent voice of black resistance. Thus by 1912 the major political bodies for the history of the South African struggle had been established.

A significant step was taken in the ruling class offensive with the passing of the Natives Land Act in 1913. This was to create the basis of the necessary urbanisation of the black population and exacerbate contradictions in the state's urban control policies.

Johannesburg continued to grow at this time but the black population was still comparitively small as was the ratio of women to men. But the second decade saw the influx of families which began to alter the urban environment drastically. Slums began to mushroom around the city centre. (48)

Meanwhile in Natal Mpanza, after his first taste of success in court, was finding himself in more trouble. He had left his previous job and was now working in Pinetown, near Durban. He began to abuse his trust. (49)

> "And so in the firm of D. St. John Stevens I began to embezzle money. I was found out, but Mr. Stevens was such a reasonable and understanding man that he asked me to stay. The matter was hushed up." (50)

Mpanza was allowed to receive fees from clients and issue the respective receipts. When temptation overcame him, he prepared himself for trouble in advance. He wrote out the receipts, but let his employer add his own signature to every receipt and although the employer issued so many receipts, the cash that saw its way to the bank was neglible. (51)

> "I had many women and I was swanky and proud. They and my attitude corroded my morals. I had left the firm a long time when my other frauds were discovered by Mrs. Stevens." (52)

Confronted with the facts, Mpanza denied having taken the money to such an extent that the police were called. (53)

> "I was duly charged and appeared before the then Native High Court, but, because I was exempted under Law 28, 1865, which placed me under the common law of the then Colony of Natal, I successfully took exception to the jurisdiction of this court. My trial was transferred to the Supreme Court. Then, as before, I defended myself." (54)

Using what little legal knowledge he had acquired, Mpanza fared well. He cross-examined his employer on every little detail and the employer found himself in trouble most of the time.

The most amusing part came when Mpanza said that all the receipts had the employer's signature which proved that he had taken all the money and not Mpanza. The lawyer could not get himself out of this trouble and he was even rebuked by the Magistrate.

Mpanza was finally convicted, however, on the evidence of an old woman who stuck to her story saying repeatedly that Mpanza had taken money from her and issued her a receipt. Pointing a trembling finger at Mpanza in the dock, the old woman said, "this very young man took the money from me." (55) He was found guilty and sentenced to twelve months with hard labour. (56) The Magistrate remarked that Mpanza could better use his talents in the legal profession as he had the making of a good lawyer.

> "The next nine months changed my whole life. I met for the first time hardened criminals.
>
> I entered jail arrogant and saucy. No warder could push me around. I was rewarded with solitary confinements." (57)

Mpanza found a new use for his active mind.

> "In jail I met an old friend, Dick Cele. Together we discussed a master plan. It was sweetly simple, and utterly ghoulish. We would simply eliminate Indian shopkeepers and take their money." (58)

They planned to destroy all evidence of their crime by burning the shop. The plot was discussed at length with other more seasoned prisoners. Mpanza also planned to rob the office of the lawyer who had sent him to jail. He said he knew where the money was kept. (59)

When World War One broke out Mpanza was given three months remission on his sentence and was now free to carry out his plans. He returned home to his mother's grass hut. His two sisters wept to see him again. His mother's hugging and kissing turned to anger as she threw him to the floor. He was dead drunk.

Mpanza invited his close friend Abna Sokhulu to join him in robbing his former employer. Sokhulu declined as he reasoned that there may have been changes in the lawyer's office in the previous nine months. Mpanza

walked out on him calling him a coward and went to Durban to recruit Cele for the job. Cele had been waiting for Mpanza's release.

They went to the lawyer's office one night but things had in fact changed and they failed to get the money. It was time for the second plan. (60)

On the evening of Friday, 1st August 1914, eleven days after his release, Mpanza and Cele claimed their first chosen victim, the Indian storekeeper in Georgedale. (61)

Walking with the shorter Cele, he went to the shop. They bought bread and a tin of corned beef, a piece of rope and a tin of paraffin. They were sitting eating their bread and beef when the Indian shopkeeper approached them. He asked what they were going to do with the rope.

> "I have just come out of jail. I am going to buy a goat to cleanse myself," replied Mpanza.

An employee of the Indian was watching the proceedings from the corner of the shop.

He was sent on an errand but returned in time to see Mpanza and Cele leaving the burning shop. He asked the two men to help him in putting out the fire, but Mpanza threw the empty tin of paraffin at him and told him to "get ....".

This man gave principle evidence when they were charged for the murder of the Indian shopkeeper. (62)

But at first the police were faced with a problem. It was clear that Mpanza and Cele had robbed the store but there was no sign of the storekeeper. Only a pile of ashes remained of his wood and iron store and attached dwelling.

> "I was sure Mpanza and his friend had murdered the Indian. But it is difficult to prove a murder without a corpse,"

tells the ex-police officer who was responsible for the investigation of Mpanza's crime.

Determinedly, the policemen called in a small army of constables.

> "I gave them the tea strainers and sieves - that sort of thing. We spent weeks on the job - sifting the entire building bit by bit."

Out of the ashes came a wedding ring, bits of a shoe. And then came their reward - and Mpanza's death sentence.

Surviving the blaze which had destroyed the entire building was a single finger.

> "That finger was enough to prove that the storekeeper was dead. Mpanza and the other man were arrested for murder. I laid out all the bits we had found with the finger right in the middle for the Judge to see,"

said the ex-policeman. (63)

This was not all the evidence available to the court.

> "But the most damaging was given by my former mates. Some described how we had discussed with them the plan to rob and murder Indian traders generally and destroy all evidence with arson,"

recalls Mpanza.

> "But two described how we planned to commit the crime on one Indian. It was this evidence that influenced the verdict. They sentenced us to death. I waited for the hangman to do his bit." (64)

At the trial, Mpanza denied any knowledge of Dick Cele. He also refused to be tried with him because Cele was a Native and he was an 'honorary white'.

He failed to convince the court that he did not know Cele, due to the evidence of the shopkeeper's assistant. But in his second bid he was successful so that they were both found guilty in different courts, Mpanza in the Supreme Court and Cele in the Natal Native High Court. It was 1915 when they were imprisoned pending execution in Pietermaritzburg. (65)

Mpanza refused to see the prison chaplain who visited him in jail. He complained when paraded outside his cell for photographs and told the warders to 'go to hell.' (66)

> "I prepared myself for death like a martyr. I had conquered my conscience, suppressing my guilt under a legal guiltlessness. My argument: I had not actually been seen at the scene of the crime. I fought from court to court, cocksure of my righteousness. If the full Natal bench failed to acquit me at least the Appellate Division would, I thought,"

he remembered. (67) But the appeal was not upheld.

Not defeated, Mpanza decided to write to the King of England of his fate. Abner Sokhulu recalls that as Mpanza put it,

> "he wanted to say farewell to his King and to tell him why he thinks his guilt had not been proved. He insisted that there had been no eyewitness evidence. And this was after the sentence of death had been confirmed by the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein."

Mpanza's life was in the balance for the six months he spent in the condemned cells.

> "They brought the news to me at breakfast one day. Dick was reprieved. A few weeks later my sentence was also commuted to life imprisonment."

But at the thought Mpanza protested.

> "You and your Governor-General can go to hell. I want to be executed now - now and be finished with it. This is not justice."

He continued,

> "for the first time I was afraid of the torture of eternal imprisonment, torture for a crime for which I knew I would suffer for the rest of my life. I was a coward seeking escape through death.
>
> They had to force me out of the death cell and immediately I started a hunger strike. By the eighth day I was too weak to resist forced feeding. I was bound hands behind back and had my mouth forced ope with forceps. A tube was thrust down my throat and food driven into my famished stomach."

Two months later Mpanza was moved to Durban Central jail where he was kept apart from all other prisoners. After a month he was transferred to Point Jail, near the quay in Durban where again he was returned to a common cell. Within a week the fighting Mpanza was in trouble again. He was caught by a white supervisor, smoking his first cigarette since his arrest the year before. Mpanza tells the story;

> "he pounced, holding me by the scruff of the neck. I turned quickly, caught him, lifted him onto a stone crusher platform, and tried to push his head into the teeth of the crusher itself. I failed, lifted him back, threw him to the ground and pressed his eyes hard with both thumbs.
>
> Three prison warders dragged me away, It had almost been my second murder. I was isolated, manacled, then three weeks later given ten strokes of the cane, and aching from the lashes, put in shackles for a month like a mad dog." (68)

From there Mpanza was moved to Toitspan Prison, Kimberley and back into more trouble.

> "A rather bossy supervisor decided I was a slow-coach and began pushing me around. Frenzied, I pulled out a sprag from the mine truck I was loading and landed it on his head with a nice crack. The result was ten strokes and more shackles." (69)

Mpanza was then moved to De Beers Prison and from there to Cinderella Prison in Boksburg where he was isolated for six months.

> "They never told me why. After this I joined other hard core prisoners and was put under the special care of a certain man, a specialist in toughness. My pocket ticket was marked black, indicating a trouble maker." (70)

This is how Mpanza found himself in 1918 when he was about to have an experience one night that would transform his entire life and influence him to the end.

> "First there had been some soul-searching sermons from the prison chaplains. I had found myself thinking - hard. Then that night I had a sudden attack of 'flu. As I lay in my cell I saw a vision on the

> wall. It was of a chaplain called Baker. The vision told me to re-baptise myself in repentance and cleanse myself of my sins. I do not know what caused this vision, but I feel certain it was a spiritual demonstration that the Gospel had reached into the depths of my soul." (71)

Mpanza began reading the Bible with interest and a new understanding. He began to think of his mother and sisters for the first time and of the sorrow and pain he had given them. He was filled with a fear that he was heading for hell. The thought of burning in hell brought him more fear.

> "He sincerely believed that his life was saved for a purpose approved by God and he at once decided to live for his people. And he believed also that to pursue his aim successfully, he had to read, follow and understand the lives of great leaders and personalities mentioned in the Bible. He had special admiration for Moses who led the children of Israel from Egypt to Canaan, land of peace and happiness and freedom." (72)

Mpanza continues,

> "I began to pray, begging forgiveness, with another long-term prisoner, Simon. I began preaching to other prisoners, telling them to repent. They responded." (73)

Mpanza persuaded others to his new found faith.

> "In our cell we prayed in relays of 30 minutes a man right through the night. We began with the lights-out bell, then as the bell rang each half-hour and the jail police called 'all's well', the man praying stopped and woke the next - and so until the morning. We did this for three years. Our cell became a veritable abode of the angels." (74)

Three years after his vision he was rebaptized by Missionary Baker. He had become convinced that infant baptism was against the scriptures.

This year was a turning point in Mpanza's life. It also witnessed a change in the lives of Johannesburg blacks. In the slums around the city an influenza epidemic broke out and the high number of deaths finally stirred the City Council to establish Western Native Township. Between 1918 and 1921, 207 houses were built. (75)

It was also during this year that the Urban Areas Bill was passed. It allowed the Governor-General to compel blacks to live in locations. It also introduced several new ideas which would eventually become part of the South African location system such as the separate native revenue account. More importantly it initiated representative local government policy for locations in the form of advisory boards, but made no attempt to define them. Powers were also granted to local authorities to exclude the unemployed from towns and to register service contracts.

> "These restrictions, and the comments of the Department of Native Affairs on them, reflect the beginning of real concern over the growth of African urbanization. (76)

Far away from all this, things were not going well for Mpanza. Mpanza's conscience was beginning to torture him.

> "It was as if someone alive was talking to me, reminding me: 'You, James Sofasonke Mpanza are a murderer.'" (77)

Mpanza fasted secretly for seven days, praying to God to assure him he had been forgiven by sending an angel as in the olden days. On the seventh day of his fast a prison cook tapped urgently on his cell window saying a boiler attendent was crying to see him.

> "I found the man weeping. His name was Sam. I had never seen him before. He held me with a shaking hand and said: 'God commands me to tell you that your sins have been forgiven.'
>
> I was afraid and looked in panic at the sky but it was clear, blue, peaceful. We knelt and prayed together. An hour later Sam quietly collapsed and died. I wept for the first time in my life." (78)

Mpanza's faith was now strong. He vowed never again to tempt God. He was given permission to preach to the prisoners and to teach a class about the 'spirit of the New Birth'. (79) He converted many prisoners, baptising them in a big bath previously used by the Reverend Baker.

At this time a new political body was set up with very different beliefs and aims, and which was to play an important role in much of Mpanza's political life. In July, 1921 the Communist Party of South Africa was established. The party's first manifesto appealed mainly to the white working class which was seen as the vanguard of the revolution as the industrialised proletariat. However, the determination was also expressed to break racial barriers. (80)

At first the Communist Party failed to attract many followers. With plenty of theory, they still failed to penetrate the black population in any significant way. The A.N.C. on the other hand, with no theory of social change had a considerably larger following. The Communist Party tended to accuse the A.N.C. of opportunistically blinding the Africans to their working class status and of thus preventing real liberation. (81)

Thus while the A.N.C. continued to organise around reformist issues in the early 20's, the Communist Party underestimated the power of African nationalism and remained largely white and few in number.

While these new struggles and new traditions were being laid Mpanza was fighting his own battles in prison.

His chief warder was transferred to another prison. Mpanza was suddenly called into the reception office, handcuffed and sent off to Pretoria Prison for no apparent reason. While he was there he heard that a priest had complained to the new chief warder that Mpanza was creating dissension and disaffection among his flock and had urged his removal.

He was again placed in solitary confinement for six months. While thus confined, a feeling of depression came upon him and a conviction that he should make his message known to the world. (82)

> "As I meditated, the urge welled up within me to bursting point to continue my Gospel campaign. I felt, as I read my Bible, that if I could not preach to other prisoners, I must write." (83)

Mpanza asked the prison Governor for writing materials and prayed,

> "O God, if I am given permission to write this book I will understand that I am sent by you. Be with me Lord." (84)

Mpanza was given a pen and paper and got down to writing his only book, 'The Battles of the Christian Pathway", in 1924.

> "In writing the manuscript I was inspired throughout. I would read my Bible for about an hour, suddenly feeling the inspiration well up within me, pray and write." (85)

He handed the manuscript to the chief warder to publish only if he died in jail which he believed he would at that time.

More moves were afoot in the world outside which were to have consequences for Mpanza. In the wake of the government's earlier response to the rapid black urbanisation, in the Urban Areas Bill of 1918, the Transvaal Local Government Commission (the Stallard Commission) was appointed. The findings of this Commission laid the basic foundation of state urban black policy against which Mpanza would find himself fighting in later years. This policy was encapsulated in the following sentence from the report in 1922:

> "The Native should only be allowed to enter into the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to administer to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases to so minister." (86)

This principle of impermanence was to have far-reaching implications and was to be crystallised in the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.

This act also defined the first legislative framework covering many areas of urban black life. It provided powers for racial segregation in the Urban areas thus entrenching their requirement on local authorities to establish locations as residential areas for blacks. The responsibility for housing of blacks was placed on local Councils. A separate Native Revenue Account was required into which revenues contributed by local residents from rents, fines, levies and beer hall profits were to be paid. (87) Provision was made for the establishment of Advisory Boards to represent blacks' opinions. The law stated that for every location there was to be a board consisting of

> "not less than three natives resident within the area of jurisdiction of the urban local authority in addition to a chairman who may be a European."

The law stated further that,

> "the mode of election or selection of members of such boards, the procedure, the period and conditions of office and their duties and functions shall be defined by regulations made by the urban local authority under this act."

The local authority was required to consult with the advisory board before making or withdrawing regulations concerning the location. (88)

This act also introduced legislation for the first time entrusting to the local authorities the right to grant trading licences in the locations. This was both a concession and a control. Although being granted at all, trading rights for blacks were only allowed within the terms of the state's segregationist policy. (89)

The act also made the sale of liquor and traditional beer the monopoly of the local authority. (90)

This act was to lay significant predocnditions to Mpanza's activities and the events in which he became involved. In particular the advisory board legislation created the state's local organ through which most of his activities were focussed. Mpanza himself recognised the importance of this act and was later to know it well.

> "Sofasonke is popularly referred to by his associates as a man who can quote the Urban Areas Act of 1923, chapter and verse, with ease." (91)

The South African Native National Congress was opposed to the act as they had not been consulted in drawing it up. They objected most strongly to the clause denying property rights to Africans in the urban areas. (92)

A further significant step was to arise out of the victory of the Pact Government and the concessions which it granted to the white working class in the wake of the Rand Revolt. White workers were to have their

jobs protected against black competition. This was to have serious consequences for the Communist Party policy and to undermine their conception of the white working class as the revolutionary vanguard. (93)

In December 1924 the Johannesburg City Council opted to support the segregation policies of the government and had the whole of Johannesburg declared a proclaimed area under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. This removed residential rights from blacks in the Johannesburg area and compelled them to live in the locations. (94)

Attempts at slum clearance and the removal of blacks to the locations followed. Due to the shortage of accommodation in the locations and the extra cost, this policy was not very successful. (95)

Back in prison, a rumour reached Mpanza's cell one day of a move in religious circles to secure his early discharge from prison on parole. Then the Reverend Webb of the Methodist Church allowed Mpanza to conduct a service. He chose the Commandment, 'Honour thy father and mother' for his sermon. All the prisoners appeared to be gripped in a strange trance. Some fell on the floor and cried freely even before he had finished his sermon. Later they asked for bibles.

Mpanza was released from isolation and was made the prison hospital orderly.

> "I prayed for the sick prisoners night and day. It was observed by the prison doctors that fewer patients died when I was an orderly. Once we had a serious meningitis case the doctors said had no hope. With confidence in my faith I prayed for him, and he was healed. (96)

Negotiations for his discharge continued, with the Swiss Missionary Society in the fore. Then the arrival of the Prince of Wales in South Africa in 1925 brought an amnesty, and his sentence was commuted to 15 years.

1925 was also the year that the first advisory boards were introduced by the Johannesburg City Council. Certain representative bodies had existed in areas like Klipspruit, as early as 1908 and Western Native Township but this was the first official body. (97)

The structure chosen by the Johannesburg City Council was two appointed and four elected members with the township superintendent as chairperson. Only those in whose name a house was rented could vote for the elected candidates and of these only those who could produce a receipt showing that they had fully paid their rents up to the month preceding that during which the election took place.

In 1926 the Johannesburg City Council encountered a further obstacle to its 'slum clearance' programme.

> "The courts of law then decided that the proclamation of December 1924, under which, the whole slum clearance campaign of the council had been conducted ever since, was invalid. Clearly, the court held, the municipality had not yet provided adequate accommodation for Natives in its own locations and hostels; and until it had done so, no proclamation applying segregation provisions of the 1923 Act to the whole municipal area (as the 1924 proclamation purported to do) could legally be made; for the legislature could hardly have intended to compel Natives to leave their existing place of residence for alternative municipal accommodation which did not exist." (98)

The effect of the slum clearance without creating housing alternatives would only be to intensify another slum. (99)

The Council could only partially implement its segregation policies but it had indicated its intention to do so and the terms which would allow it to do so had been set.

Finally, in 1927 Mpanza was discharged on a two-year parole. But he was suddenly filled with fear of the outside world. He had nothing with which to start a new life.

But for him the miracles were not over.

> "God again provided in a miraculous way. I found myself suddenly leaving prison in a gentlemanly fashion, equipped with everything from bed linen to suits. A certain indeterminate sentence prisoner had told the authorities to present me with his entire kit." (100)

On his release Mpanza went to see his mother and sisters in Pietermaritzburg and Durban. His old mother shed tears in disbelief and pleasure to see him again. His sister Evelyn urged him to get married but since his conversion Mpanza had vowed not to marry, a vow he was not to keep.

This year also saw the Johannesburg City Council working toward fulfilling its requirements for the Urban Areas Act. Extensions had been made to Klipspruit and Western Native Township and Eastern Native Township had been developed. One thousand houses had been added to Western and four hundred built at Eastern. Work was concentrated on the townships away from the city centre. These developments enabled the Council to compel more blacks to move to the locations. This was not without resistance. Apart from the shortage of houses in the locations, blacks also resisted moving to the locations for another sound reason.

> "It is true that all things considered, location houses are much better than the accommodation provided by the slum areas which are extortion in regard to rents. But for a room that yields a monthly rental of 1 Pound 10 Shillings in slum areas, the occupants are saved much expense by those residing in locations. A native living in town at a monthly rental of 1 Pound 10 Shillings is better off by more than 1 Pound 15 Shillings than a native in the locations considering he has to pay only the rent while the other man has to pay 15/- a month travelling expenses, 15/- lunch in town and extra medical charges together with travelling expenses for wife and school children. (101)

Clearly there had been a large growth in the black population in Johannesburg. There were now 22 814 women out of a total of 136 695 blacks. This was a drop in the ratio of men to women from 23 to one in 1910, to 5 to one in 1927. There was thus a growing pressure for family accommodation (102)

The City Council responded to its growing obligations by establishing the Non-European Affairs Department with Graham Ballenden as its first manager. Its responsibility was the 'control, housing and welfare' of the City's black population. (103)

In 1928 Ballenden persuaded the Council to appoint the first Non-European Affairs Committee.[104] At this time in the central government the Native Affairs Department took over from the Locations Department.[105]

The growth of urbanisation and the state's responses were to have other repercussions. In response to an increasing urban black proletariat and the compromise of the white worker, the 1927 annual conference of the Communist Party resolved

> "to train 'cadres of class conscious native workers' and to form branches in the African areas."

To reflect this change in policy it was agreed to draw blacks into the administration and three blacks were elected to the central committee.[106]

The following year the A.N.C. after a brief flirtation opposed further association with the Communist Party under the influence of the chiefs.[107] The Communist Party meanwhile was taking a further step toward blacks in adopting its 'Native Republic' policy. This sought to mobilize black workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie into a national struggle for a 'Native Republic' as a stage in the struggle for socialism.

This new slogan, while losing white worker support, brough people like Edwin Mofutsanyana, J.B. Marks and Moses Kotane into the party.[108]

At this time in 1928 the Locations Advisory Board Congress was established with the object of

> "uniting all urban advisory boards and securing an improvement in conditions in municipal locations promoting co-operation and understanding between municipal authorities and the urban residents; and of making representations to Government and local administrative authorities."

The Congress was to be given official recognition and the delegates to the annual meetings were usually to have their expenses paid from the Native Revenue Accounts.[109]

After his release from jail, Mpanza lived for a while with a Tswana woman as his common law wife on a farm near Pretoria. It was allocated to him by the Government. Feeling wary of vengeful Indians, he feared to [110]

When he did return, he taught at a school in Pietermaritzburg and did missionary work.(111)

After a few years he wanted to return to Pretoria. He was helped by his brother-in-law who organised a very successful party for him which raised R24.

In Pretoria he was placed with a Swiss Mission.

> "I served for three years as an Evangelist in that congregation under a devoted white missionary, a great believer, the Rev. P. Dourquin. I had a happy life there. I preached with success at the Mental Hospital and many other places, such as the Railway Location, Pretoria, Lady Selbourne, etc." (112)
>
> "During the week I ran a one-teacher school of sixty pupils at the Railways Location and shared my R10 a month with poor mothers. At weekends I preached again to full houses."(113)

In Johannesburg the communist newspaper, the South African Worker was revived with more than half the articles in black languages. The Party also ran a night school in Johannesburg. Thewe two organs spread the communist influence. Headway was also being made in the locations. In Vereeniging, near Johannesburg a meeting outside the location attended by 2 000 people managed to recruit several hundred to the party. At Potchefstroom the party recruited virtually the entire location. A meeting there was interrupted by the police in spite of resistance from the 1 000 strong audience, a black speaker was arrested and charged. The Communist lawyer, Bunting, defended him and won the case which was attended by hundreds of blacks. A further meeting was held immediately after the court case during which white bystanders attacked the white Communist speakers. The blacks intervened on behalf of the Communists. As a result of this the Communist Party won almost total support from the location.(114)

The successes were to have other benefits for the Communist Party in future struggles on the Rand.

In about 1930 Mpanza moved to Bertrams in Johannesburg. Bertrams had the advantage of being close to work and an established community. (115)

There he worked for a while as a commercial photographer and as some remember him, a furniture salesman who had 'the gift of the gab.' (116)

> "I worked for a year as a canvasser for a furniture firm." (117)

Here he parted with the Tswana woman with whome he had had some children. It is said that he grew tired of her and ordered her to be sent back to Pretoria 'because she was not educated'. (118) Says Mpanza

> "I had a lover since 1930 but because we did not see eye to eye I did not want to marry her. We had four children together." (119)

The greater part of Mpanza's life in Johannesburg was spent teaching in Bertrams at the African Gaza School. (120)

> "I came to Bertrams and taught in Mr. Light's private school. I remained here until the place was demolished." (121)

Mpanza was very fond of music and traditional culture. His school competed in the first Transvaal Eisteddford organised by a Mr. Mark Radebe, and won the Ballendon Shield for choral music. The following year at a Pretoria competition, the school took the first prize in traditional music and was highly commended by the adjudicators for the remarkable talent shown in this prodcution. (122)

1930 marked the year of a more aggressive attitude on the part of the state. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act was amended.

> "empowering a local authority to require, in accordance with regulations, every Native, with certain exceptions, who resides, but is not employed, in the urban area, to remove therefrom." (123)

The argument for segregation for blacks in Johannesburg is explained thus:

> "To herd them in locations, as remote as may be from the residence of white men, is no doubt the simplest way to prevent a nuisance arising, from the point of view of either public health or of social contact; and such locations as the council provides should be as light a burden as possible on municipal funds. Finally, as regards the life lived by the Native within the locations, the most important aim of the council must be to maintain discipline." (124)

The Council was now in a position to overcome the obstacle to its segregationist policies imposed by the court decision of 1926 linking availability of accommodation to the removals. The Council's power to remove was now based on unemployment. In addition the Council took steps to make removals practically possible. They bought 1 300 morgan of land on the farm Klipspruit No. 8 some 15 kilometers to the south-west of Johannesburg and a competition was started for the lay-out of the township. (125)

> "It was to be designed to accommodate 80 000 people with administration offices, a public hall, a cottage hospital with dispensory and clinic, a central police station, a central post office and three district offices, a fire station, ten sites for schools, ten sites for religious purposes, shopping centre, a market and a community store. The township was to be called Orlando, after the then serving Chairman of the Native Affairs Committee, Councillor Edwin Orlando Leake." (126)

At least eight trains a day each day were to be provided for Orlando at sixpence per single ride. (127)

It was to be a 'model township' which from the Council's point of view meant easy to control. (128)

Building started in 1931. (129) Presenting Orlando as a 'model Native township' the people were told that 'it will be the biggest and finest in the Union.' But it was not welcomed with unreserved enthusiasm by all.

> "It is to be hoped that the City Council will avoid the mistakes made in the planning of the Western and Eastern Native townships. The smallness and the similarity of the cottages in these townships make them look ugly and slummy. The new Bantu have a sense of beauty and proportion. Like other peoples they appreciate variety." (130)

But with the country in the grip of the 'worst drought in living memory' and reports of starvation and sickness from most of the rural areas, people were flooding to the cities in search of work and sustenance and as the situation grew worse so did the pressure for housing in Johannesburg. (131)

There were also those, however, who were strongly impressed by the Council's plans.

> "This will undoubtedly be somewhat a paradise and to a greater extent enhance the status of the Bantu within the ambit of progress and civilization. It manifests the growing co-operation between the two dominant races domiciled in this Southern part of the African continent and shows clearly that some of our rulers have now realised that closer co-operation and brotherhood are the keys of harmony and peace." (132)

In October, 1932 the first 80 houses were completed and handed over to the Native Affairs Department. By the middle of the month over 35 families had taken up residence there and many more had made application for houses.

Some were pleased with the new houses.

> "Those who are now living there expressed themselves very satisfied - not only at the situation of the township - but the height and roominess and appearance of the houses.
>
> There seems to be no doubt that this township will be the most popular in the country. The houses are varied in design and colour, well-spaced, with a generous piece of land for each one." (133)

In order to promote interest in the new township, the City Council encouraged people to see it.

> "The City fathers are so anxious to make Orlando known to the Bantu people that they have arranged for a special train with the Railway Authorities for the purpose of making it possible for all those who wish to see Orlando to do so on Sunday, October 30th." (134)

But the 'City fathers' were not so anxious as to want just anyone to move to Orlando.

> "It is considered desirable that the advantages and conditions of residence should be made known to the better class natives," they said (135)
>
> "Only those who were legally married, not 'vat en sit' (living in sin) couples" were allowed. (136)

On October 30th, 1932 the inauguration ceremony of Orlando was performed by the Mayor of Johannesburg, Mr. D.F. Corlett. Three hundred houses had been built and seventy were occupied. Transported by two free trains and private cars, the ceremony was attended by 3 000 blacks. The day was spent displaying the township and picnicking in the area.

Mr. G. Ballenden, the Manager of the N.E.A.D. explained in his speech the conditions of residence in Orlando.

> "The rent for the two roomed houss he said was 25/- a month, for three roomed houses 30/-. Any approved person could buy one of the houses from the Municipality by deposing a quarter of the value and then paying L2.10/- a month. And one could build his own house, the Municipality being prepared to advance him a loan up to L250, the owner deposing a quarter of the amount." (137)

The initial response to Orlando was poor. The Rev. O.S.D. Mooki recalls,

> "The first houses were built in 1932. These two and three-roomed houses were unpopular among the people. They did not come here out of their own free will ... in 1932 most houses were still empty." (138)

The Council at first tried to persuade people to move. With further plans in mind, the authorities appeared benignly co-operative. W.B. Ngakane, another early inhabitant, recalls:

> "The houses were few, the City Council of Johannesburg was keen to get the people out of the backyards in town and they were actually inviting people to come to Orlando. They'd show pictures of a family sitting outside, happy, in contrast to the conditions in the backyards. They were saying, 'Come along, here are houses.' And people, some people would decided to come along, and when they got there, went to the

> superintendent, said, 'I want a house.' He says, 'Alright, you go in and select a house.' They were all lying empty. Person went and selected a house, and two weeks afterwards he would come back again and say 'No, I've seen a better house, and I want to change my house.' And all that was O.K." (139)

To the inhabitants of the already established vibrant communities near the city centre 'Orlando represented loneliness, lack of amenities, something akin to exile." (140)

> "You know, going to Orlando meant you were binding yourself to town life and lots of people hoped to return to the country one day.
>
> Rent was 17s.6p for a two roomed house in Orlando.
>
> Morabi parties could not take place in Orlando, because that community spirit was lost. The Orlando people were isolated from each other. In Doornfontein we lived closely together ... we helped each other in everything.
>
> People in Orlando became independent. People didn't want to go at first because of the distance - it was too far to walk to work. They had to take trams to town. They spent 2s.6p on transport and only earned 21s a month. They felt the pinch.
>
> Quite a lot preferred Doornfontein because selling beer there was a profitable business. In Orlando there were no customers - it was known as a place of hunger." (141)

Regardless, the Council pushed ahead with its plans. The next step was local representation.

By 1932, after seven years of existence in Johannesburg, there was already criticism of the advisory boards. This criticism was not directed at the advisory board system itself, but was rather seen as a problem of the behaviour of their members.

> "These Boards, properly and wisely used, can be of great help in the administration of the affairs of the locations.
>
> Unfortunately the manner in which their members are elected has brought in politics in that the section that is elected by the residents regard those appointed by the local authorities as 'good boys' who

> cannot serve the people because they represent the views of the local authorities in the meetings of the Boards. In some locations there is an open warfare between the two sections, and the result is that the Boards fail to function as they should." (142)

The members were also criticised for their elitism.

> "Advisory boards should co-operate with the residents - my visits to the townships have impressed me with the fact that Bantu intellectuals are a class of their own. They never get on smoothly together. The Advisory Boards which are composed of intellectuals who are supposed to know a thing or two better than the people they represent, seem to be completely out of touch with the people.
>
> From what little experience I know of these bodies they do not even get the opinion of the people as to what pressing matter they would like the Boards to tackle at once. No. They have no time to do this when their own opinions are so lofty and embrace all the needs of the people. That is why these townships are becoming well-ordered slums, that is; slums which exist where it was thought slums could not exist." (143)

This was moderate criticism which also argued for more co-operation from those members who opposed any proposal coming from the local authorities. As their side of the bargain, advisory board members should also perform their duty to maintain law and order in the locations. However, the Council's disregard for the boards was clearly noted.

> "But the fault is not one sided only. Most of the local authorities do not make proper use of members of the Advisory Boards; they regard them as mere pawns to be exploited not for the good of the location residents but for their suppression. It is on record that most of the members have complained 'that they serve no useful purpose and that no notice is taken of their representations.' This is a grievous charge against the authorities which cannot be overlooked." (144)

The Advisory Boards Congress, now in its fourth year, took up the issue. It passed a resolution:

> "that in view of the fact that local authorities do not act in accordance with the decisions of Advisory Boards, the Congress should request local authorities to consult Advisory Boards before imposing any regulations or restrictions on natives in urban locations."

and further

> "that the superintendents of locations should not be ipso facto chairmen of Advisory Boards." (145)

The result of the dissatisfaction was disillusionment with the advisory boards and wider-spread low-percentage polls in elections. (146)

As a result it had become the practice of the residents to establish fully elected bodies called vigilance committees. Anybody could vote for these, unlike the advisory boards which were restricted to registered tenants only. These would become an independent forum for the residents' demands and would then meet with the advisory boards to discuss grievances. They would also sometimes agree upon who should be voted into the boards and were very influential in carrying this out.

Against this background, the Council established the first advisory board in Orlando.

> "In the last week of Sunday 26th February 1933, Ballenden the Manager of the Native Affairs Department introduced the first members of the new board at a public meeting. The elected members were R.W. Msimang, John Sebobone, G. Kuluse and J. Hliso. The Council's nominees were T. Manqina and P. Chimeloane.
>
> Advisory boards are the only recognised body by the City Council and the Government. If there were any matter of grievance the township residents wanted to be rectified, the Council or the Government would only recognise the Advisory Board," said Ballendon.

Encouraging the residents to set up their own educational institutions Mr. Ballenden continued,

> "The mother does not keep the baby hugged to her breat forever but at the appropriate time gives it a chance to try its limbs. The same applies to the Africa, though like a child he will sometimes fall in the attempt."

He further introduced Mr. Oliver, formerly the Superintendent of Klipspruit, as Orlando's first Superintendent.

Ballendon concluded by criticising the 'foolish practice' of having a vigilance committee in addition to an advisory board. He said that the vigilance committees were composed of those who failed to be elected to the advisory boards. (147)

At this time the A.N.C. was badly disorganised being loose and decentralised. (148) It was thus not in a position, apart from ideological considerations, to take much of an interest in advisory boards.

The Communist Party on the other hand had steadily been building support in the locations and was looking for platforms to propogate its policies.

By 1933 complaints against conditions in Orlando were emerging. At a Johannesburg Joint Council Meeting several black speakers complained that while they are forced to live in Orlando, no schools are provided and transport to Johannesburg is expensive. (149)

While some still held that Orlando was 'destined to be a great Bantu City, greater than Zimbabwe of old' the discriminatory police raids and harsh regulations of the locations were questioned. (150)

The difference between the image of a wholesome and pleasant community projected by the Council and the harsh reality was becoming more obvious.

> "The township consisted of two or three-roomed identical houses, packed close together, and arranged in blocks alongside broad and red-earthed streets, which were quagmires in the rainy weather, and the home of dust-devils in the dry seasons. The houses were built cheaply and had neither floor nor ceiling, no water tap, and no separate cooking facilities. The backyard contained a water closet, and water was obtained at the street corner tap. In fact the area was little different from those elsewhere in the country, except perhaps, that they were more sturdily built. There was schooling for only a small minority of the children, and there were no parks, and no sports grounds."

While the average earning capacity of Orlando was L1 per week, between 16/- and 40/- was being spent on the rent and transport alone. (151) This was disproportionately high.

The population of Orlando toward the end of 1933 was about 3 000. This compares with Western Native Township at 12 000, Eastern Native Township at 4 000 and Klipspruit at 9 000. There were probably about 1 500 houses at Orlando at this time which means that at least half the houses were still empty. (152)

This assessment is strengthened by the election figures on the last day of 1933 for the 1934 Orlando Advisory Board. The poll was 'more than 700', which is the number of registered tenants. Of this only 250 votes were cast. Those elected were Arthur Madhlala (66 votes), John Mofokeng (64 votes), Edgar Mpati (58 votes) and Andrew Bokaba (34 votes). In addition the Council appointed Eliskim Tshabalala and Wise Poka to the board. It appears that for the previous year the Council had appointed the entire board to initiate it. By the second term of office then and in the first elections, the entire board was replaced. This signifies a substantial difference between the attitudes of the Council and the electorate from the start. The new board stated its intention to deal with the following issues.

> "(a) Government school at Orlando,
> (b) Hawking by non-residents to the detriment of local storekeepers, and
> (c) Rents." (153)

By 1934 the residents of Orlando were sufficiently settled in and committed to Orlando to initiate organised opposition to the local state control.

> "An enthusiastic meeting took place on August 5th at Orlando Township the object being to form a vigilance committee and appoint office bearers."

The already established Western Native Township Vigilance Committee was invited to attend and assist in establishing the Orlando committee. The chairman said the large attendance indicated the desire of residents for 'the right kind of progress.'

The decision was made to form an Orlando Township Vigilance Committee which was then elected. (154)

Early in 1933 the local authorities revealed their hidden hand. The chairman of the Non-European Affairs Committee revealed at a Council meeting that shortly after work began at Orlando, the Council had applied to the Minister to proclaim the whole of Johannesburg a white area under the Urban Areas Act. The provision of housing at Orlando was felt to have overcome the obstacle in the way of the 1926 ruling. The proclamation was opposed by a deputation of landowners from Martindale, Newclare and Sophiatown. After negotiations the Minister agreed to the proclamation excluding these three townships. (155) This made over 43 000 blacks illegally resident in Johannesburg. (156) It also tested and proved the Council's formula for further removals. For the three townships still excluded it would only be a matter of time and housing.

The first targets for removal were Bertrams and Lorentzville. After agitation from the white Bertrams and Lorentzville Vigilance Association, the Non-European Affairs Committee gave the assurance that it had

> "decided to cancel all location licenses in Bertrams, Lorentzville and neighbouring districts, and the natives must quit by June 30."

Another Councillor added that

> "the City Council was doing all it possibly could to encourage the native to move to Orlando Township on his own, but if he did not go on his own, they would make sure that he was put there." (157)

With so many houses standing empty, it is clear that coercion was necessary.

By the end of 1934 the Public Health Committee was finishing the clearing of Bertrams and Lorentzville and about to move on to Doornfontein. (158)

And so Mpanza came to Orlando.

> "I taught in Pretoria and Johannesburg schools until 1934, when Africans were ordered out of their backyard homes to seek houses at Orlando, the City's first big township." (159)

In Orlando he moved into one of the first houses built in Soweto, No. 957 Pheele Street, where he lived for the rest of his life. (160)

It is said that once there, 'Sofasonke did all in his power to encourage backyard residents to occupy Orlando East houses.' (161) In Orlando he was said to have been a hawker.

At the age of 45 then, Mpanza - fighter, lover of race horses, fluent in English, educated, keen on soccer, popular with women, holder of a certificate of exemption, astute and experienced with law, a criminal record, a persuasive preacher, a teacher, and a jack of many other trades who had lived among the working people for most of his life, - found a home in the new location of Orlando. With the removal of the people to Orlando went the Communist Party and the A.N.C. to work among this growing constituency. While the A.N.C. was weak, elitist and in disarray, the Communist Party was gaining a foothold among the masses and soon made moves towards the Orlando Advisory Board as a platform for its policy. The democratic Vigilance Committee had been established among the residents to protect their interests and there appears to have been some overlap between the Communist Party and the Vigilance Committee. The Location Advisory Boards' Congress had been formed, with official recognition as a national forum for Advisory Boards.

The Council on the other hand saw the township as the key to its segregationist policies in Johannesburg. In particular, this was a means to reduce the cost of and maintain control over black labour. With costs as their major concern, rather than the interests of the people, most of the amenities promised had been postponed. (162)

With these differing interests and the advisory boards as the contact point between the masses and the local state the basis of Orlando Township's struggles and the social components of that struggle, had been laid by 1934.

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CHAPTER TWO MPANZA FOUNDS THE SOFASONKE PARTY, SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND POLITICS IN ORLANDO. 1935 - 1943.

The South African economy experienced an economic upsurge in the thirties, particularly in the five years after 1933. There was a 70% increase in the G.N.P. There was also relatively little increase in the cost of living during this period. It was also a time, however, when the rural reserves showed a rapid deterioration in agriculture, as revealed by the Native Economic Commission of 1932. The overall result of these factors was the intensification of urbanisation and the start of a trend toward whole families moving to the cities. (1)

The black population of Johannesburg increased between 1926/27 and 1935/36 by at least 40%. (2) This was to have its consequences for Orlando.

Mpanza was soon noticed by the Orlando Vigilance Committee as a talented politician and was asked to join them. He learned quickly and soon left the Vigilance Committee to start his own party. The reasons behind this move were probably his dislike for the Communists who appear to have been influential in the Vigilance Committee, and probably also because he felt he could do better with his own party and style of politics which was more personality oriented.

He saw his party very much as aimed at the advisory board.

> "When advisory boards began, in 1935, I formed the Sofasonke Party." (3)

In the face of growing population pressure, housing was an early issue which his party focussed upon.

> "When he formed the Sofasonke Party he realised that he should have a programme and project around which he would be able to have a following. His project was 'Housing and Shelter for All.' This project which was an organising slogan appealed to his followers. He said the two-roomed houses in Orlando did not offer adequate accommodation for families and insisted that the two-roomed houses were matchboxes and inadequate for housing families. As a result larger houses were

> provided in Orlando West. When commenting on the four-roomed houses in Orlando West, he said these houses were better rat hovels as compared to the previous structure and went on to say that there was still room for improvement." (4)

This contrasts with the more optimistic view of Orlando expressed in the press closer to the time of Orlando's establishment.

> "The natives so liberally provided for, cannot help taking a real pride in their new homes and surroundings, and so long as the Johannesburg Council carry out their duty of providing the amenities of a civilized life to make this scheme attractive ... Altogether Orlando is a model township well worth emulating by other local authorities eager to pride themselves in having in their environs a happy, peaceful and progressive native community." (4)

With the Orlando Advisory Board only two years old, it was rapidly becoming the focal point of many differing interests. The Orlando Board was by now a member of the Location Advisory Boards' Association, a combined forum for the Witwatersrand advisory boards. Near the beginning of the year the Municpal conference of the Reef Mayors and Superintendents, obviously threatened by the tremendous influx of people, including families, put forward proposals to maintain and extend their control of the townships. They proposed;

> "1. Enclosing the entire location with a man-proof fence.
> 2. Stationing additional police in the location.
> 3. Limiting the number of women residents. (It was accepted that in every Reef location the women outnumbered the men and that many of them were engaged in illicit liquor traffic).
> 4. Prohibiting the practice of taking in lodgers.
> 5. Permitting only municipal-owned and erected houses."

In opposition to this the Witwatersrand Location Advisory Boards' Association in a meeting on the 23rd January, 1934 resolved:

> "1. that this meeting views with alarm and entire disappointment the decision of the Reef Conference of Mayors and Superintendents in the proposition of a man-proof fence for all Locations along the Reef, in that it does not stop illicit liquor traffic and other evils, but

does affect the circulation of money to the genuine trader and visits of respectable persons, and hence is tantamount to imprisonment and a disgrace to civilization.

2. That the purpose of good order and administration of law within the Location, a block system, such as that of Bloemfontein, should be introduced here and that the duties and functions of the members of the advisory board should be defined. [This was an important issue that was to reoccur. The Natives, (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 requires the City Council to define the duties of the Advisory Board - K.F.]

3. That this Reef Conference of Location Advisory Boards disagrees with the principle of limiting the number of women residents or of Native residents in urban areas, but alternately prays that the Municipalities should petition the Government to improve the conditions of life and service in rural areas, as that would stem the influx into urban areas.

4. The practice of taking in lodgers is compatible with native custom, therefore should not be interfered with.

5. The native community is bent on making urban areas their permanent home. This conference therefore urges the local authorities to set aside land for freehold occupation." (5)

At this time the Orlando Board was under Communist control. Communists also exerted some influence on other Boards as well. While working through the boards the Communist Party recognised their limitations. They criticised the boards for only representing the enfranchised minority in the locations, for having no executive power, for being subject to the unelected local superintendent and for not having their own budget even though their electors paid taxes, rent, lodgers fees, etc. into the Native Revenue Account.

However, while recognising that advisory boards were part of segregated townships, the Communist Party advocated the transformation of advisory boards into real organs of self-government. This would require the extension of the vote to all location residents from 18 years of age, the residents to conduct the election themselves, the advisory board to have full executive powers for the location, all members to be elected including the chairperson, the board to have its own budget of all

revenue from the location, and to have full control over an all-black police force.

They called for discussion of these points and for "a mighty struggle for self-government in the locations" if the government failed to comply with the residents' wishes.

The Council ignored the Board's opposition and continued to implement their controls, such as the "man-proof" fence. (6)

In spite of the fairly constant cost of living, in June 1935 it was proposed by the Council that the Orlando rents be reduced from 1 Pound 10 Shillings to 1 Pound 5 Shillings. Showing rare compassion, it was argued that as black wages were only 3 Pounds to 4 Pounds per month, the cost of clothes and transport would make this rent too much. It was also argued, and perhaps more to the point, that lower rents would make the township more attractive. (7) Clearly this was a move to reduce resistance to the Council's removal programme. The proposal was later approved. (8)

But the concession, such as it was, was also traded simultaneously for further Council control. News of the rent reduction was greeted with cheers at a meeting of residents organised by the Orlando Advisory Board. But the Board was also obliged to tell the gathering of the Council's intention to introduce a 'permit system' for entry to Orlando. This met with protest from the Board members and residents. (9)

Clearly the state's interest in the locations, following on from the Stallard principle, was in a cheap, manageable site for the reproduction of labour power. This was the motivation behind the Council's permit system and the Government's appointment of the Natives Urban Areas Commission in July 1935 to investigate the position of urban blacks and to

> "recommend the form which legislation should take.
>
> (1) To enforce the principle of limiting the number of Natives in urban areas to the labour requirements of such urban areas;

(2) To provide for controlling the entry of natives into urban areas;

(3) To provide for the withdrawal of superfluous Natives from urban areas." (10)

Responding to the Commission, the Reef and Pretoria Municipalities met in October to pass resolutions supporting the aims of the Commission and requesting that the influx of families be limited.

> "We consider that sufficient provision has been made by the local authorities of the Reef and Pretoria for Natives living under conditions of married life, and therefore that further Native families should be prohibited from coming to the Reef and Pretoria." (11)

As a further step the Johannesburg City Council successfully applied to have the limit of the proclaimed area around the municipal boundary extended from 3 to 5 miles. This was because new communities were springing up just outside the 3 mile limit.

Ballendon, the manager of the Non-European Affairs Department claimed in his annual report that the recent proclamation of the whole of Johannesburg under the Urban Areas Act, and the removal of families from the proclaimed areas was being successful in greatly checking the influx of families to Johannesburg. He warned, however, that a clear policy would have to be adopted to prevent a further influx of families. (12)

With Doornfontein and Bertrams behind them, the Council still had, with the aid of the Slums Act of 1934, Sophiatown, Pimville, Martindale, Newclare and Prospect Township to clear. Again Orlando was to provide the solution. There were then 2 811 houses in Orlando, of which 591 were still unoccupied. The Council was, however, proposing the building of a further 1 000 houses for the black families to be moved from these areas. (13)

The population of Orlando was 12 000 in 1936 (14), but Johannesburg was about to see an unprecidented increase in its black population of 69% in the next decade. (15)

With the tightening up of state strategy for urban control had also come an attempt to revive black politics with the formation of the All-African Convention (A.A.C.) in 1935. It was intended as an umbrella body to which many organisations, including the A.N.C., would affiliate to oppose the Hertzog Land and Representation Bills of 1936. (16) As the A.N.C. was still badly disorganized, the A.A.C. looked like a possible successor to it as the leading black political body. The A.A.C. attracted a broad range of black leaders at its outset. In a rare case of involving himself in national politics Mpanza was elected to the Council Committee of the A.A.C. in December, 1935. (17)

Returning to its removal programme, the Council's first target was to be 12 000 people at Pimville. (18) Confident of its new regulations, the Non-European Affairs Department could claim by June 1936, that

> "The Department now exercises some form of control over all housing of natives within the Municipal area, and is gradually tightening up this control and compelling the improvement of housing conditions wherever found necessary." There were now 3 000 houses at Orlando. (19)

As leader of the Sofasonke Party Mpanza was elected in December 1935 to the Orlando Advisory Board for 1936, his first term of office. He won one seat for his party from the Communist Party.

> "My opponents were assisted by white lady comrades with transport, loudspeakers and expensive pamphlets, promising every imaginable unobtainable, but I steadily built up my reputation as their thorn in the flesh." (20)

Mpanza's party at a very early stage adopted specific issues around which to base their struggle. His avowed aim in joining the Advisory Board was to press the City Council to provide accommodation for the numerous sub-tenants in Orlando. (21)

In July 1936, the manager of the Non-European Affairs Department reported that 18 000 blacks were living in Orlando and that another 4 000 would be added when the 1 000 houses now under construction were completed. (22)

With the rapid growth of Orlando, the residents began to complain of the inadequate train service. The line ran from town through to Pimville and back, and trains were often full by the time they reached Orlando in the morning, making Orlando residents late for work. (23) The railways had meanwhile opened a station at Orlando known as "Mlamlankunzi" - the separator of bulls - in honour of Graham Ballenden who as manager of the Non-European Affairs Department was seen to mediate between the people and the Council. (24)

There was still resistance to moving to Orlando. Although anxious to move people out of the city, the Council still subjected them to an 'endless cross-examination' to see if they were suitable. The fact that the houses were without plaster or flooring and that two months' rent in advance had to be raised were a cause of further resentment. (25)

Ballenden was still showing concern about the influx of families to Johannesburg. He made public warnings against further migration. The Council had increased the number of planned houses from 1 000 to 2 000 but these were earmarked for families from within Johannesburg. New families he warned, would be returned at their own expense 'to the place from whence they had come.' (26)

With housing in Orlando already coming under pressure, the Council had begun condemming properties at Prospect Township. (27)

But eagerness to move people was motivating the Council to build more unfinished houses as rapidly as possible rather than improving the quality of life in the township as it stood. Orlando was falling far short of being the 'black Parktown' it was once thought to be. By late 1936 there were still no electric lights, (only 4 gas lamps in the whole township), the roads were not tarred, and the train service, as the only public transport, was still inadequate. (28)

With Advisory Board elections drawing near, election propaganda was being publicised.

> "The Communist Party of South Africa calls upon all Native residents of locations to realise the importance of the coming elections for members of the

> Advisory Boards. ... The members of the Advisory Boards should be our leaders in the struggle for:
>
> Better housing, lower rents, abolition of the lodger's fees, cheaper sanitary and water rates, better sanitary service, better water supplies, cleaner locations, freedom of movement for yourselves, your families and your visitors (abolition of the curfew), free education for your children, a cheap milk supply for your children, maternity homes for the mothers, hospital and medical services for the sick, cheap and efficient transport, the right to brew beer for personal comsumption, better social services and better social conditions for all." (29)

It can be seen that the issues seen by the Communist Party as appropriate for the boards to take up were very broad ranging although specific to the townships. Given the limitations of the boards as a power base the strategy of the Communist Party, although pursued through the boards, is not confined to the board's constitutional limitations.

> "The Advisory Board members have the ears of the Superintendent, the Municipality and the Native Affairs Department.
>
> If the Municipality and the Government does not listen to the Advisory members when they put forward your just demands, the Advisory members must call meetings of residents, lead deputations and demonstrations and compel the rulers to fulfill these demands. The Advisory Board members must be REAL LEADERS AND FIGHTERS FOR YOUR DEMANDS.
>
> Elect the best men; men who have proved themselves; men you can trust. Don't elect "Good Boys" of the Government and the Superintendents. Don't elect leaders and men who advise you to remain quiet under real grievances." (30)

The Communist Party strategy, even when involved in institutional struggles, relied on a base outside of these institutions, more specifically on mass activity. Their interest in Advisory Boards was greatly increased with the establishment of the Native Representative Council elections for which were based on block votes from the Advisory Boards. Outlining the joint demands of the Communist Party and the A.A.C., which were both national and working class demands, they continue:-

> "We can only achieve the demands by organisation (and) active struggle in the reserves, locations, factories, mines and places of employment. The members of the Native Representative Council must lay them before the government and resist all detrimental legislation." (31)

The Communist Party's line on participation in state structures was clearly stated by Basner addressing the Reef Advisory Boards about the Native Representative Council when he

> "pointed out that inside the Senate very little could be achieved without the mass organisation and backing of the Native people." (32)

Again

> "The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of South Africa, ... has come to the conclusion that in order to make use of and struggle against this law, which has been forced upon us ... leaders should be elected who will wage a relentless struggle both from within and without these Councils on behalf of the exploited and oppressed Africans." (33)

It can be seen from this that the Communist Party, while being prepared to work through state institutions never saw these as their only avenue, or as an alternative to mass organisation. It was rather one means toward the goal of mass organisation. This differs from Mpanza's objectives at this time which appear to be focussed almost exclusively on the boards.

The Orlando Advisory Board elections for 1937 took place on the 13th December. Pushing ahead with his populist politics using any available drawcards, Mpanza succeeded in winning the highest number of individual votes in what was his second Advisory Board election. The results were Mpanza 161 votes, John Mofokeng 103, J.B.D. November 96, and Samuel Letsatsi 86. (34) The other three were Communist candidates giving the Communist Party the majority again. Although successful, they complained that

> "On the whole the electors were too much occupied by personalities and not enough by political considerations." (35)

By now the Council had greatly increased its building programme for Orlando. 3 500 houses were planned for and under construction, and 955 additional acres were being considered for purchase as a site for more houses. (36)

The Council had resolved to expropriate Prospect Township but although building 300 houses a month at Orlando, there were as yet not enough houses to begin removals. Approval for the removal was received from the Minister of Public Health by July 1937. (37)

By mid-year resistance to the removals was largely broken and most 'slum-dwellers' were prepared to move to Orlando. (38) The township was ready to receive Prospect residents by August. During the first week-end of the month 467 families were moved in about 60 trucks with a further 248 families scheduled for the end of the month. This was about 2 000 people. By this time Orlando had 3 663 houses occupied, and another 3 000 either under construction or planned. (39)

With elections again approaching, the Vigilance Committees under the African Vigilance Federation, combining representatives from Orlando, Western Native Township, Eastern Native Township and Germiston, decided to field candidates in Western Native Township and Orlando. (40)

The Communist Party again complaining that the Boards were neglected, called for a more determined approach towards elections.

> "The municipal authorities were quick to take advantage of the backwardness of the existing political organisations, and to label these boards as 'non-political' and to pack them with docile and reliable natives, for the most part teachers, ministers of European denominational churches, court interpreters and shopkeepers: men dependent on a good report from the Superintendent for their livelihood and unable for economic reasons to take a firm stand against the vested interests.
>
> If radical militant elements stand for election and are elected to the boards they can express the grievances of the people and organise the location residents for deputations, demonstrations and strikes against the terrible hardships of the urban Native masses. They can lead the people in the struggle against the Pass Laws, poll-tax and beer raids, and

> affiliated to the Convention (A.A.C.) establish a direct connection between every urban centre and the Convention. They can do more than that. They can teach and organise the peasants and country people who look to the locations for a lead.
>
> Every election for the advisory boards must become a political struggle for the elimination of the 'good boys' and the reformists and for the election of revolutionary elements." (41)

In the elections on the 12th December, 1937 the Vigilance Committee candidate succeeded in comfortably taking three out of the four seats leaving only Mpanza from the previous year. The percentage poll was approximately 33%. (42)

The Communist Party appealed for unity and encouraged the formation of Vigilance Committees in other areas.

> "The people want unity, they want to be organised, and the advisory boards are the bodies for doing it. Unity of the advisory boards, together with the vigilance committees, will make the Councils sit up". (43)

Before 1938, the Council's screening and extra costs involved in living at Orlando tended to result in better off blacks moving there. From 1938 on as each black suburb near the city centre was destroyed, the inhabitants had to go to Orlando. The initial period enabled a higher proportion of the petit-bourgeoisie to become more established in Orlando. With trading territory free from white competition and market places provided by the Council, the fairly established petit-bourgeoisie was able to consolidate itself. A lot of those who followed after 1938 would have been both poorer and without housing and would have mainly been subtenants. (44)

To implement its policy of restricting the urban population to labour requirements, the Ministry of Native Affairs decided in July to conduct a census of the locations. They argued that the results of the census would be of great benefit to the black population and therefore appealed for co-operation. (45)

Nevertheless, the influx of families continued. These tended to settle on the fringes of the city in places like Kliptown where it was estimated that 800 - 900 families were living as tenants in houses owned by the residents. Many families were also illegally occupying land. Ballenden argued at the time that if families were restricted from entering the area the cost of housing the equivalent number of single men would be only about one quarter. (46) This shows the real interest of the Council in cheap labour rather than the more liberal and humanitarian image it has often projected.

More politicised people at the time were able to see the implications of the census for greater control. Not only would it reduce the Council's housing costs but it would also increase the stranglehold of the employers over the workers. The workers would then face the double threat of losing both their jobs and their homes in the urban areas if they did not behave as dictated by their boss. There was some attempt to organise opposition to the census and it appears that the Vigilance Committees were party to this. They advocated a refusal to answer the questionnaire. This resulted in 14 people being charged, although the charges were dropped against all except Gaur Radebe who was Secretary of the Western Native Township Advisory Board and a member of the Vigilance Committee. This was an act of victimisation as Radebe was also a member of the Communist Party and a rising figure in the A.N.C. (47)

The results of the census, however, were not quite what the Council expected. The census found,

> "(a) That there are no bodies of idle Africans in the towns whose services should be put at the disposal of the farmers, and
> (b) it has thrown some light on the extent of the housing shortage." (48)

By now Orlando had 6 000 houses with 3 000 more and four hostels planned, and had introduced street lighting. Money had been voted for floors to be provided. The population was approximately 35 000, which was policed by six white policemen and about twelve black constables.

> "Orlando has an excellent name with the police. The Police Commission of Inquiry in 1936 reported that it was one of the few Native townships under proper control." (49)

From the Council's point of view this was indeed a 'model township'.

By this stage the Council had moved people to Orlando from the following areas which it had successfully cleared of black residents;

> "Bertrams, Doornfontein, Spes Bona, Wolhuter, Central, Marshalltown, Ferreirastown, City and Suburban, parts of Fordsburg, Newtown, Vrededorp and Prospect Township." (50)

But the controls did not stop the drift into Johannesburg.

> "The influx of Natives to Johannesburg, particularly women and children is increasing and as no further accommodation is available at the moment in the Council's Native townships and hostels, these natives drift into residential areas, finding temporary accommodation with friends and relatives." (51)

There was now already a tremendous pressure on Orlando housing and in spite of city clearance and influx, the number of houses remained almost static from 1938 through to 1940. (52)

> "When the people were forced out of towns like Prospect Township which was one of the worst slums and they came to Orlando, soon there was no room. All the houses were occupied. But the City Council was forcing the people out of the back yards." (53)

The registered waiting list for housing was to climb from 143 in 1939 to 4 500 at the end of 1941. (54)

Even though housing had more than doubled since 1936, it had not kept pace with the increase in population but only served to lull the authorities into thinking the situation was under control. (55)

Mpanza who was quick to see the importance of the housing issue, claims to have been alone in fighting for this cause.

> "But at the time the idea had not come to our party to put up more candidates than myself and thus I was at one time the only non-Communist boardsman among the four. So I got no backing when, long before the war, I urged the City Council not to proceed with their

> move to make backyard dwellings illegal when they had not built enough houses in the location to accommodate the people." (56)

It was not strictly true that the Communist Party did not take up the housing issue. What is probably more the case, judging from earlier statements, is that housing was one of a number of broarder demands supported by them, rather than the central demand as it was for Mpanza. This would have stemmed not only from ideological differences but also from the short-term, rather immediate, and localised and personal nature of Mpanza's politics. Also his ability to exploit popular sentiments.

> "At public meetings, with his hat cocked at a jaunty angle, Mpanza was able to sway his audience. He spoke their language, the language of those who hungered for houses.
>
> Soon he was acknowledged as the leader of the people in Orlando. Whenever Mpanza arrived sitting proudly astride one of his horses there would be spontaneous applause. He was looked upon with reverence as the man who fought for and spoke on behalf of the underdog." (57)

The Communist Party meanwhile, had not remained static. It was having growing influence in the Transvaal A.N.C. The election of the president of the Transvaal A.N.C. took place in Orlando with a 'Moscow flag' on display. (58) Gaur Radebe was an example of the overlap of membership that was tending to occur, although he was shortly thereafter expelled from the Communist Party for petit-bourgeois tendencies.

But in spite of the Communist Party's influence, the A.N.C. before the war was still elitist in character and primarily concerned with 'peaceful propaganda'. As a nationalist movement, this was largely due to its limited social base as proletarianisation was not very advanced. (59) Of cours the A.N.C.'s political development was not linear, and this was also a period of a retreat to more conservative policies under the leadership of P.I. Sene.

A number of studies into the cost of living of black families in Johannesburg in 1939 showed a deficiency in wages of 2 Pounds to 4 Pounds per month. (60) This was only the start. From 1939 to 1945 the South African economy, affected by the war, began to go through changes which

had widespread ramifications throughout the country. The value of manufacturing output increased by 116% creating an insatiable demand for labour. At the same time the inflation rate soared by about 32% while wages did not keep up. (61) The attraction of possible employment, and the coercion of the continuing decline of the reserves and the increasing cost of living, resulted in a rapid intensification in the wave of black urbanisation.

There was also the problem of unemployment in some sectors of industry. Laid off workers were compelled to look for other jobs but usually at a lower wage. (62)

At Orlando train fares were becoming an increasing burden against relatively declining incomes, houses still had no ceilings, no floors and no electricity. Compared to other townships the rents were high (1 Pound for 2-roomed houses as compared to 14 shillings for the same in Port Elizabeth), about a quarter to one third of income instead of the Government's stated maximum of one fifth. There were less than half the necessary number of schools. (63)

A letter to the House of Assembly at the time states:

> "There is bitter discontent amongst the older Natives.
>
> If this is a model township, and the sixth largest town in the Union, then God preserve the Natives from the repitition of such a monstrosity ... I am driven to the conclusion that a collosal crime has been perpetrated by the white races against the Natives ... Johannesburg will reap what it has sown." (64)

To make matters worse the Council's grant for housing for 1940 was not forthcoming and building came to a stop. (65)

Noting the growing poverty the Council reduced rents in Orlando from 1 Pound per month for two-roomed houses and 1 Pound 5 shillings for three-roomed houses, to 4/- and 5/- per week respectively. (66)

The poverty was not entirely uniform as Orlando was able to sustain a growing number of businessmen. The most numerous were coalsellers, and

fruit and vegetable hawkers. There were 188 businesses in private houses. (67)

The Vigilance Committees were gaining influence at this time. They were generally more influential over the residents than the advisory boards and were regarded as more representative by the majority of residents. Nevertheless, they were still compelled to work through the boards which were the only officially recognised organ. The federation of vigilance committees was trying to extend its affiliates to include the whole of the Rand. It was hoped that this would put them in a stronger position to attain official recognition. (68)

During the year the Orlando Residents Association was formed with backing from the Communist Party and with a Communist member. (69) The party had only had two members in the Board for 1940. They fielded three candidates and one supporter of their programme for 1941.

> "They pledged themselves to work for:- lower rents, more power to the Advisory Boards, votes for African women, better houses - with floors and ceilings - and more houses too! And to build up and strengthen the Orlando Residents' Association, and to give regular reports from the Board to the people." The Communist Party candidates were E.T. Mofutsonyana, J. Masupha, and S. Moema.

Supporting their programme as an Independent Progressive was E. Mavimbela. (70) The three Communist Party candidates were elected along with H. Mdingi an independent. Mpanza is said to have been on the board every year except one before 1955 and since he entered the advisory board politics. This year he was excluded on a technical point. He was known for his training race horses in 1940. The results were J. Masupha 137, E.T. Mofutsonyana 130, S. Moema 129, and H.B.M. Mdingi 47. This was an about 10% poll. (71)

The success of the Communist Party in Orlando Advisory Board politics should be seen as a reflection of their relative efficiency and good organisation. Voters were frequently more impressed with personalities rather than ideologies but it is not likely that personality was a strong point in their favour in this case. Neither Moema nor Masupha ever attracted a very strong following on their own, and Mofutsonyana who was

the key Communist personality in Orlando and also to some extent Johannesburg, was not a good public speaker. His contribution was more intellectual than that of a popular rank and file or charismatic leader.

The Communist Party continued to further their alliance with the A.N.C. At the annual conference of the Johannesburg District Communist Party held in February

> "Great importance was attached by the Johannesburg Communists to helping the African National Congress to lead the African people in their struggle." They also pledged to fight for 'lower rents and better housing in the townships:-" (72)

Unconcerned about long term goals or national party programmes, Mpanza was less constrained in the means he was prepared to use to achieve his ends. W.B. Ngakane, a member of the A.N.C. since 1936 and an appointee to the Orlando Advisory Board since 1937, was unfortunate enough to make an enemy of Mpanza at about this time.

> "One day he tried to have me murdered because I opposed his methods of dealing with people. When I confronted Mpanza with some of the things he did - for instance after he was elected, if somebody went to him to go and represent him at the superintendent's office, he'd say, 'All right you have to pay a Rand or two Rands for a taxi to take me to the superintendent's place.' And then I said, 'You can't do this, it is not right. You asked them to vote for you.' I fell out of favour with him."

This eventually led to Mpanza arranging to have him killed. At a meeting in the Orlando Communal Hall Mpanza was insulted by Ngakane not immediately acknowledging Mpanza as chairman. This was customary as Mpanza had won the highest number of individual votes, but was not an official rule. Mpanza invoked strong feelings in the crowd against Ngakane who would have been assaulted if he had not remained calm and had backing from supporters.

> "The following Monday ... we attended the meeting and this was where he had ordered a murderer especially from Carletonville, from the mines there, a Pondo chap. I went to the meeting, not knowing there was trouble."

> Ngakane was in the boardroom with three others, waiting for Mpanza. Someone came in to warn them thre was trouble brewing. Another came in and said to Ngakane "We're going to fix you tonight." He then left and a huge Pondo came in with Mpanza behind him. Mpanza said to the Pondo,
>
> "You act quickly because I want to go home." Ngakane was trapped in the boardroom as there was only one door out. He told them he would fight back. As he kept them talking supporters of his armed with sticks arrived and he left with them. (73)

Although Mpanza and Ngakane were later to become close friends, it was actions like these which discredited Mpanza among the A.N.C. and the Communists and gave him a reputation of not being shy of using violence to achieve his ends. This was to lead to disunity in Orlando poliics at a later stage and to make Mpanza more vulnerable to the local authorities when he least needed to be.

It had become the practice by 1940 to keep 'unauthorised persons' out of locations through joint raids by the South African Police and municipal police. The raids were usually after 9 p.m. and caused considerable resentment and complaint. The advisory boards of all the locations in Johannesburg repeatedly demanded the suspension of the raids and after numerous discussions with the boards it was decided during 1940 to introduce another method. During the war, with a drain on the manpower and resources the state was wary of arousing dissension among blacks at home.

In June 1941 the Council proposed new legislation whereby the occupier of a dwelling could be called to establish their right to the dwelling or be removed. This was challenged in Court and while the appeal was being contested the Magistrate's Court declined to grant ejectment orders under the section. During this period, from 1941 to 1943, there was a heavy influx into the City, with many families included. (74)

With the pressure on housing the Council had no option but to relax the location regulations and turn a blind eye to lodgers and sub-letting. (75) Officially the population was 40 000 but there were

many more among the sub-tenants. The Council attempted to build another 750 houses to deal with the overcrowding. (76) But the Central Housing Board only granted a portion (300 000 Pounds) of the amount applied for (L800 000). Most of the money applied for was to have been spent on housing for Orlando West. The Council predicted, optimistically, that its plans would be delayed for at least a year. (77)

The Communist Party was quick to respond.

> "There are not nearly enough houses for the people in Orlando. People have nowhere to sleep. The houses are crowded, and three or more people have to be in one room. In addition, some have to spend the night on the verandahs. Over 3 000 have registered for homes - and only 750 homes are being built!
>
> This shocking position is due in the first place to the neglect of the Municipality."

At a public meeting on August 18th, 1941 Mr. Venables, the Assistant Manager of Locations in the Johannesburg Municipality, said that they could not build houses because the Government needed the money for the war.

But this is really a feeble excuse. Rich men are making millions of Pounds in profits out of the war. Let the Government take this money and use it to build homes for the people. If it was not for the African industrial workers in Johannesburg, the war could not continue at the front. It is also a part of the war to see that the workers here are properly cared for."

They also endorsed a mass meeting called by the Orlando Residents' Association to protest against the housing shortage and the behaviour of Mr. Venables in attacking the representativity of the Orlando Advisory Board. (78)

The Orlando Residents' Association in turn gave support to the previous Communist dominated board in the December elections. The three Communists were returned for 1942 but the independent was replaced by Mpanza (79)

Concerned to maintain stability in the urban areas and increasinlyg desparate for finance, the Council during May, 1942 took a significant step away from its policy of making the Native Revenue Account balance. They decided to meet deficits for improvements to Orlando from general revenue. (80)

It was of course not only the Johannesburg Municipality that was facing the housing crisis. Five hundred families are said to have built a shanty town next to Sharpeville Location outside Vereeniging in 1942. They were promised that housing would be built for them as soon as housing materials became available. Meanwhile they remained where they were. (81)

The Communist Party again fielded their Advisory Board candidates of the last two years in the Orlando elections. They were S.M. Moema, E.T. Mofutsonyana and J. Masupha (as an independent). To these they added A. Msitshana, the leader of the Orlando Branch of the Communist Party. They stood for

> "Better housing and lower rents; decent streets, street-lights and sanitary arrangements; more powers for the Advisory Boards and African representation on City Councils; the end of the permit system, lodger's fees and other undemocratic location regulations." (82)

In what had become an established pattern, Mpanza and three Communists were elected. (83)

The Second World War was a major concern of the South African ruling class in the early forties. Their attempts to pass the cost of the war onto the working class were mediated by their concern to ensure economic stability and black political loyalty to the war effort. The irony of a war for 'democracy' in an undemocratic South Africa also did not escape black political leaders.

This situation led to a more concessionary attitude in some respects. Workers in some sectors of the economy and more so skilled workers were able to take advantage of the situation, and despite of war legislation to the contrary, won higher wages through increased strike action. The

state responded with minimum wages in almost all the large industrial areas, but this in turn led to growing unemployment as capital sought to reduce overall labour costs. It was also true that some industrial sectors for example building, suffered badly under the war economy and this threw more workers onto the labour market. The overall affect was to widen the discrepancy between skilled and unskilled workers.

On top of this the consumer price index was to increase by over 30% reducing the value of wage increases, and food shortages intensified the impoverishment of unskilled and unemployed workers. This was due to drought and an over-optimistic forecast of maize production for 1942. This led to an over-commitment on the part of the state to maize exports which could only be met by exporting local reserves. The drought in turn threw greater pressure on the urban areas.

The overall effect was growing desperation among the increasingly urbanised black masses at a time when the state was attempting to appease opposition. - The result was growing militancy among the black masses. (84)

Responding to this in 1943 the A.N.C. drew up a new constitution which showed a move toward mass organization. It eliminated the Upper House of the Chiefs, provided for the democratic election of the posts of treasurer and secretary, and established a working committee which could act for the national executive and which would be within a fifty mile distance of national headquarters. This made it possible to have a standing year round organisation for the first time. These changes were to have positive consequences for Congress which was to regroup and take significant steps toward further growth. (85)

In Orlando the number of houses had increased by less than 200 in 1942, then remained static until 1944. (86)

Without response, Mpanza sought to bring the plight of the Orlando homeless to the attention of the authorities through the Orlando Advisory Board and through writing to the Minister of Native Affairs. He then looked for publicity by writing to the press.

"Natives in Orlando - Sir, - In 1932 the Johannesburg City Council passed a motion compelling all Africans to leave the central areas of the city and to reside in various established townships outside the city boundary. The Council moreover undertook to supply adequate housing facilities for the Natives affected. In consequence of this, houses in Prospect Township and Vrededorp were demolished in 1935 and Africans were sent to various established areas.

The municipality has failed in the attempt to house the Africans affected during the last decade, and, up to date there are 3 000 families desperately attempting to find houses who are unable to do so.

In view of the above unsatisfactory state of affairs and of the unhygienic and unhappy conditions arising therefrom, I suggest that under Sections 2 and 3 of the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 the Administor of the Transvaal be called upon to ask for the intervention of the Minister in order to satisfactorily settle the pressing situation in Orlando.

J. Sofasonke Mpanza.
Member of the Advisory Board,
Orlando." (87)

And again,

"Housing in Orlando. - At the outset I wish to say that it is appreciated that there is a war on, and that the war effort is of paramount importance and dwarfs all other considerations. Building materials and labour are at a premium, and everything available is rightly directed towards winning the war. Orlando Location is already over-crowded to an almost overwhelming degree, while in the city accommodation is also not available, because those Europeans who dare to harbour Natives in their yards are, together with the Natives in question, prosecuted for so doing. It would therefore not be out of place to discuss this lack of housing facilities, and to place before the authorities the facts, so that some temporary measure may be adopted to alleviate the distress which has been created.

J. Sofasonke Mpanza." (88)

While aware of the seriousness of the situation,

"The non-European housing problem in Johannesburg is assuming serious proportions, for many natives have recently brought their families into the town owing to conditions in the native reserves," (89)

and still awaiting the release of building materials by the Goverment, the Council responded with repression as soon as the results of the test case of the new regulations were heard.

In April 1943 the South African Police, assisted by the Civic Guards began a series of relentless raids on blacks in Johannesburg. With the raids still continuing the last published figures showed that nearly 11 000 people had been arrested in thirteen nights of raiding. Of these more than half were charged, the vast majority of whom were for 'a technical offence.' (90)

The Pimville, Western Native Township, Orlando and Eastern Native Township Advisory Boards were meanwhile holding joint meetings with the Non-European Affairs Committee of the Council, to discuss their grievances. (91)

Showing restraint Mpanza continued to write to the newspapers.

> "Accommodation in Orlando. It is hard for a native to understand the attitude of the Johannesburg local authority with regard to accommodation in Orlando or in any of the other townships owned by the City Council. The latter has rigourously enforced every provision of the Urban Areas Act favourable to itself, such as sub-sections 3 and 5 of Section 5, which empower the local authority to prosecute any European who harbours a native in his premises. The Native Advisory Boards will be failing in their duties if they do not take steps to approach the Minister of Native Affairs, under Section 2 Sub-Section 1 of the Act, to exercise powers vested in him by the said Section of Act 21 of 1923, as amended - Member of Advisory Board, Orland." (92)

With still no response, the Sofasonke Party now decided on a more militant course. Said Mpanza,

> "By 1943 my party decided it was time to act. The plan was to advise our followers to put up squatters shacks on municipal land. We were prepared to take the risks involved." (93)

Behind the scenes the Sofasonke Party began preparing its followers for action.

Black militancy was now finding expression in other developments. August 1943 saw the start of the Alexandra bus boycott.

A small group emerged out of the bus boycott who had worked closely together on this campaign and earlier in a struggle around education. These were Baloyi, Koza and Mampuru. They had become increasingly critical of the A.N.C. for showing little response to popular struggles of the time. Xuma was said to have remained aloof from the Alexandra bus boycott, for instance. AT the same time Basner, now ex-S.A.C.P., was feeling that there was a need for a militant mass organization to oppose such actions as the police raids of April 1943.

These people were drawn together to form the African Democratic Party (A.D.P.) on the 26th September when they published a manifesto under the names of Paul Mosaka, Self Mampuru, S.J.J. Lesolang and G.R. Kuzwayo with Basner and two other whites as members.

The content of their aims did not differ essentially from those of the A.N.C., the main difference being their stated interest in militant particiipation in mass resistance. In their aims then they were as out of step with the masses as was the A.N.C. at that time. They also stated their concern at the internal rivalries and splits within the A.N.C.

Unfortunately their organization was fraught with problems right from the start. Differences of opinion and political style emerged beteween Koza and most of the rest who were not capable of actually taking the steps they had boldly advocated.

Within the first two months of their existence they showed they were already intimidated against holding a planned mass demonstration simply by state scrutiny.

"Militancy had proved an empty boast." (94)

Koza was eventually expelled.

The A.D.P. included in its policies an intention to work through state structures such as the Native Representative Council and stressed the importance of white participation in the organisation.

The A.D.P. was never able to function on a national level and was mainly involved in and supported around the Johannesburg area.

Even so, they gained no seats in the 1943 Orlando Advisory Board election and the Board again consisted of three Communists and Mpanza. (95)

At this time the A.A.C. was also revived.

Yet another grouping was beginning to take shape involving some young men named Mbata, Nkomo, Roboroka, Tambo and others. They had had talks with Mampuru but were not happy with participation in the Native Representative Council elections or the involvement of whites.

The A.D.P.'s inability to initiate significant campaigns only enabled them to call for a day of prayer on the 8th January 1944 to be known as 'Atlantic Charter Day.' They called on blacks to solemnly turn to God. They concluded,

> "This is our New Year message to the African people. Salvation lies in your hands. Heaven helps those who help themselves. Observe the African Day of Prayer and fight for freedom." (96)

In Orlando meanwhile, the situation was deteriorating. Firstly, in February the white bricklayers at Orlando West downed tools after a demand from the contractor that they increase their output. They were antagonised further when they were fined for stopping work. In the face of the post-war skills shortage they were not in the mood for

arguing. (97) Secondly, heavy rains caused 85 houses to collapse at Pimville. The City Council took no steps to help the destitute who took shelter with friends. The Native Affairs Department had stated its intention to put up temporary block houses but no steps had been taken to build. (98)

The loss of the houses placed greater strain on an already impossible situation and with building grinding to a complete halt, breaking point had been reached. The official waiting list was 16 000. (99)

> "Now in Orlando there were people coming in thousands like in all cities. People were shifting perhaps because the wages were better in the towns than anywhere else. There were so many people that people were now sleeping on the verandahs of other people. We kept on appealing to the municipality of Johannesburg to give accommodation or build houses for these people because they were employed in town. But they wouldn't do anything," recalls Mofutsonyana. (100)

Mpanza wrote once more, in desperation, to the Minister of Native Affairs, pointing out that the Council did not allow blacks to live in the city, or elsewhere in prohibited areas, though it was unable to accommodate them. He therefore urged the Minister to intervene and exercise the powers vested in him by the Act by taking over the administration of Orlando Township if he was satisfied, after inquiry, that the Council was not fulfilling its obligation to the native residents. In so doing, Mpanza showed an astute ability to exploit the divisions between central and local government. Secondary industry, wanting to take advantage of a more mobile labour force, exercised considerable influence on the central government. This influence was shown in the central government's easier attitude toward influx control regulations and a reluctance to remove the squatters who were a labour supply to urban based secondary industry. (101)

What happened next was to become one of the most important acts of urban resistance and was to change the face of Orlando and the south western townships completely. It was also to place Mpanza and the Sofasonke Party in an unassailable position above their opponents in Orlando for many years and to give them a permanent place in the history of Soweto.

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CHAPTER 3 : SHANTY TOWN AND THE RISE OF THE SOFASONKE PARTY 1944 - 1945

> "The segregation provisions of the Urban Areas Act prevent the Natives from acquiring land and from buying, building or hiring houses except in the locations, where, in the case of Johannesburg, no land or houses are made available for us except houses built and owned by the Municipality. By applying the segregation provisions and not setting aside any land on which we may build ourselves, the Municipality has taken on itself the duty of providing us with houses. But it has not carried out that duty; there are no houses for us. Very well, then, we shall go and sit down on municipal land and wait for the Municipality to come and put a roof over our heads." (1)

This was Mpanza's argument for squatting. As we have seen the decision to squat was preceded by attempts on the part of the Communist Party, the African Democratic Party and in particular Mpanza to bring the housing crisis in Orlando to the attention of the Council and the Department of Native Affairs, but with no result. The squat was then not a spontaneous or sudden step as is incorrectly portrayed in the following.

> "But in South Africa, for the time being the conditions created by the war set off a series of revolts with a pattern of mass action led, not by the A.N.C. or its Youth League who were functioning on a different level altogether, but by elemental indiginous leaders thrown up by the situation.
>
> The greatests of such revolts began in 1944 when tens of thousands of Africans who had for so long been jammed into the dreadful slums around Johannesburg, followed a demogogic township eccentric, James Mpanza, in a spontaneous trek from Orlando to vacant municipal land nearby." (2)

Apart from the fact that the Youth League had not yet been formed at the time of the squat, that 'tens of thousands' is an exaggeration, that there was more to Mpanza than a 'demagogic township eccentric', as we have seen the decision to squat had already been made in 1943.

Far from spontaneous it was a well-measured and calculated step spearheaded by a leader with a very shrewd understanding of his constituency, of the significance of the issue at hand and a confident assessment of his following. Indeed, uplifted by the enormity of the

action planned, Mpanza for once appeared to trascend narrow party interests and invited the Communist Party and the A.D.P. to join his planning committee.

Not without reason, but badly misreading the situation the Communist Party rejected his approach.

The Communist Party was obviously suspicious of Mpanza in the light of their experience with him in the Advisory Board politics and his reputation for gangster-like methods in achieving his ends. They saw their local advisory board members as 'infinitely more advanced politically' and Mpanza's plans as 'election propaganda'. (3)

The result of discussion in Johannesburg Communist groups was that,

> "It was generally agreed that the party could not have been so irresponsible as to send thousands of people to set up hessian shanties at the beginning of winter, with all the resultant dangers, particularly to the children."

They did not believe that the camps could succeed in forcing the Council to provide housing and furthermore underestimated the extent of the crisis. (4)

> "We knew there were many people would did not have houses but not to such an extent." said Mafutsanyana (5)

The party were 'actively discouraging' the camps, and held that the correct line was to campaign against the landlords, and for higher wages to let workers obtain their own houses. They disassociated themselves from the squatter movement.

The A.N.C. was still restructuring around its new constitution and the Youth League was in the process of formation. Among the founders of the Youth Leaque were Lembede, Ngubane, Mandela, Nkomo, Mbata and Sisulu.

> "Night after night the young men met, and young women too; one of them, Albertina, a serious nurse with a noble brow, became Walter Sisulu's wife during 1944. They would all meet appropriately enough, since they

> were planning a new policy for Congress, in the office of its founder, Seme, where Lembede worked, or, in some ramshackle building in the buisiness area of Johannesburg, they met in the A.N.C. office, or perhaps in one or another's houses in Orlando, the expanding township crammed with innumerable little houses that looked like match boxes. Sometimes they talked all through the night. As their ideas caught on, new members were continually joining." (7)

The league was to be formed on Easter Sunday, 1944, a week after the squat was due to start. (8)

The A.N.C. therefore did not take part in the squatter movement.

The A.D.P. on the other hand, troubled by internal dissention, short on credibility and lacking the impetous to initiate its own campaigns, welcomed Mpanza's invitation. It was an opportunity to act out the militant politics for which they claimed to stand. They had been defeated in the previous advisory board elections and this was an opportunity to recoup their losses in alliance with the minority party in the board against the Communisty Party.

So it was that the ad-hoc committee of 8, which was formed to organise the squat, consisted of Sofasonke Party and A.D.P. members only.

> "The Committee called several meetings in the township to win support for its plans, and Senator Basener was invited to join the speakers." (9)

Undeterred by the lack of Communist Party support, Mpanza deliberately made known his intentions to the authorities.

> "Mpanza approached the chairman of the Non-European Affairs Committee (NEAC) and told him: 'Since there is no material to build houses, and meatime the Council has land, I am taking possession of the land and building shacks for the people who have no houses to live in until such time at the Council shall have material to build houses.'" (10)

Much of Mpanza's confidence in taking this stand was due to his legal understanding. The 1926 Court ruling against the Council argued exactly that the law could not have mean to allow for people to be removed under an Urban Areas proclamation if they had nowhere to move to. Mpanza's

argument was that , seeing that Johannesburg had been proclaimed under the Urban Areas Act, the Council was then obliged to provide the housing. This was never tested by Mpanza in Court.

On Saturday, the 25th March, 1944 the squat was started. Mpanza gathered hundreds of houseless people, mainly sub-tenants in Orlando but also 'those who were living with their wives in the backyards of White homes and were being arrested daily for living there illegally." (11)

> "Those with no houses were advised to collect as many sacks and poles, so to erect shacks to live in what could be called vacant land." (12)

To join the squat one had first to belong to the Sofasonke Party at a fee of 6 shillings and then pay 2/6 for admission to a site. Thereafter there was a fee of 2/6 per week for the running and policing of the village.

> "He was dressed as usual in regalia, which was partly suggestive of a tribal chief, and partly of a silver braided commissionaire. Mpanza addressed the gathering with exhortations, and announced that they were about to cross the River Jordan, and with that they crossed the veld to the chosen site." (13)
>
> "On my horse, I led a group of people to a vacant lot in Orlando West and started a squatters camp," Mpanza recalls. (14)

With his wife walking beside him, 500 families, among them many women with babies on their backs, followed Mpanza 'like the children of Israel followed Moses, as they led them out of bondage in Egypt to Canaan'.

> "Sofasonke nengwevu baba - we shall die together with our father," they sang as they walked. (15)

They started to prepare the sight for the camp and continued into the night by the light of a huge bonfire. (16)

By the next day about 250 shacks had been completed and occupied. With an 'air of feverish excitement' they continued to work, with those already in occupation making themselves more comfortable and the new arrivals choosing stands and preparing the site for construction with picks and shovels. (17)

> "It was on a fine Sunday that Mr. James Sofasonke Mpanza ran up and down the streets on horseback, holding the reins with one hand and two sacks and poles on his shoulders, shouting at the top of his voice till sunset, saying: 'all those without houses must collect their sacks and poles and go straight to the other side of the river.'" (18)

Most of the shanties were made of wooden poles with roofs and walls of hessian while some were just mielie stalks covered with leaves. A few were able to get corrugated iron sheets for theirs.

The shanties were all very small, there was very little room to move about inside and too low to stand in. Some were shared by two families. They cooked on brazziers in front of their home, fetching water from Orlando. Hessian, poles, firewood and coal had been bought by the committee to help develop the camp.

A protest meeting was held that day addressed by Mpanza and Paul Mosaka as a member of the Native Representative Council.

The squatters published a manifesto explaining the reasons for squatting saying that they had been living under intolerable conditions being 'crowded like grapes', that they had approached the authorities and were given promises which were not kept. They had finally communicated with the Minister of Native Affairs and asked him to use his powers to compel the City Council to provide houses but were unsuccessful. 'As a result of the Sofasonke Party finally decided, out of necessity, to lead this first exodus,' it said.

The squatters said that they would rather live out in the open in their shanties than continue in the overcrowded Orlando houses as sub-tenants where they were liable to ejection at any time, being illegal and forced to live with two or three families in one house.

The squatter leaders claimed that about seven thousand new houses were needed for workers employed in Johannesburg. They were determined to stay where they were even though they disliked the primitive conditions, until something was done about housing. (19)

> "The next day, Monday, a very big shanty town was unbelievably stretching far and wide. Flying machines roared in the sky to see wonders. The shacks increased by the hour." (20)

In spite of Mpanza's repeated appeals and warnings, the Council was shocked, and hesitant in its response. Their first impulse was to prosecute the squatters, but the government would not support this unless alternative housing could be offered. (21)

A special meeting of the Council's Non-European Affairs Committee was called on the Monday to discuss the growing squatter camp. The Council had clearly been aware of the acute housing shortage but, apart from the shortage of materials, it had not seen the situation as an emergency. This was partly because the Council held the view that most of the squatters had no right to be living in Orlando as they had been illegal sub-tenants. They also had never dreamed of the possibility of an organised movement.

But because the housing shortage in Orlando was so obvious, there was considerable sympathy for the organisers of the movement at the start.

The Council was also in a difficult position or in a 'cleft stick' as one of them put it. (22) It could not compel the squatters to return to the Orlando houses as sub-tenancy was illegal and was the object of the mass police raids of the year before. At the same time the Council feared that unless something was done, the movement might spread to other townships. Commented one councillor. "Whatever the Council does now, it will probably be criticised." Feeling helpless, the Council blamed the Government for not responding to its appeals for help with its housing problem.

> "We have been chasing the Government for years, trying to convince them of the seriousness of the position and the inability of the Council to remedy it without financial aid, but the results have been entirely negative. A recent deputation to Cape Town returned empty-handed." (23)

They decided that no action would be taken against the squatters until advise had been received from the government. (24) But the Committee was not satisfied with the response. Says Mampuru of the A.D.P.,

> "For three days we waited to see the reaction of the City Council of Johannesburg. When we realised that the Council was not taking this seriously, we decided to invite more sub-tenants, not only from Orlando, but from all other townships under the municipality of Johannesburg." (25)

The exodus was still continuing on Tuesday, the fourth day of the camp. A neat hessian and wood shack bore a sign "Boots and Shoes Repaired". Many shanties were still being built.

Meanwhile the Committee was continuing to supply the camp. 100 bags of coal were bought communally and were rationed among the inhabitants. People also queued for a half-pint ration of milk until it was finished. There was clearly broader identification with the squatters' struggle. It was widely seen as an act of black resistant. Two local shopkeepers donated 10 bags of mealie meal which was distributed that afternoon. Black visitors had so far donated 2 Pounds 5 Shillings to keep the community going.

Mpanza was predicting that the camp would grow to 10 times its present size. He argued that only 2 000 of the 7 000 houses in Orlando did not have two or more families in them and that some houses had as many as 12 people living in them, sleeping in the bedroom, the kitchen and the dining room. Said Mpanza,

> "The overcrowding of houses in 1944 is not new. It started in 1937 when Prospect Township closed down." (26)

In his search for a solution Ballenden had hurried discussions with the Chief Native Commissioner, the local Native Commissioner, the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg, the acting Deputy-Commissioner of Police and the joint Native Advisory Boards.

Meanwhile, still on Tuesday afternoon (the 27th) a number of sub-tenants from Orlando West had begun to move across. While men, women and children participated in the building, it was mainly done by women while their men were away at work during the week. As children returned from school, they eagerly joined in the work. Some of the houses were achieving greater sophistication with divisions in their shacks between living and sleeping quarters.

The camps administration under the committee was maintaining the strictest discipline. They stated that they were not out to make trouble, but simply wanted a 'fair deal' from the authorities. They continued to distribute coal, firewood and milk bought with the funds collected by the Sofasonke Party. Brewing of 'kaffir beer' was discouraged. (27)

The City Council meeting of that night was dominated by four hours of debate on Orlando squatters.

> "The Council eventually agreed to instruct the responsible Committee to consider proceeding immediately with all housing requirements on land available for the purpose, with such Government monies as are available and with its own financial resources; and that simultaneously the Government should be urged to make provision, by emergency regulations or otherwise, to place labour and material at the disposal of the Council."

Urged on by the squatters, the Councillors were in a more militant mood. Said one,

> "The time has come when we must stop asking for houses, we must demand them. We must stop passing resolutions; we must act."

Joyce Waring questioned the excuse of the shortage of material. She said houses were being built for private ownership in the city's better class suburbs and that she knew of a house where repairs costing 1 500 Pounds had been done. (28)

The next day, the Secretary for Native Affairs, D.L. Smit, announced that his Department was taking the Orlando exodus very seriously but could only say that they had begun an investigation.

The Camp continued to grow with people streaming in from Orlando West and elsewhere. The rate of influx was beginning to outstrip the supply of hessian, wooden poles and other building materials which were becoming scarce. (29)

With hasty consultations and conferences between the Council, the Orlando Advisory Board, which of course included Mpanza and Paul Mosaka, and with Government representations being made, another meeting was held on the 29th March, at which the Director of Native Labour was present. (30) The NEAC of the Council resolved that no prosecutions of the squatters would be institutions, provided that,

> "a. there was no further influx into 'Shantytown'.
> b. the squatters who were already there, excluding any who should be found not to be employed in Johannesburg, would be allowed to remain pending provision by the Council of other temporary accommodation; and,
> c. the Council would provide water and sanitary services both at Shantytown and in the proposed temporary camp." (31)

The Council also agreed to make an immediate start on the erection of permanent houses with the material available. (32)

The decision to erect temporary shelters followed the suggestion of a Councillor, who was a builder, that they could be made cheaply with breeze blocks. These would be made in moulds provided by the City Engineers Department. They would be ready within two to three days and could be 'dry packed' with an iron roof simply weighed down with stones. (33)

It was decided that the Chairman of NEAC and Ballenden, Manager of NEAD, would inform the squatter leaders of the conditions later in the week.

That evening at about 7 o'clock, rain threatened over Orlando and the whole squatter community assembled to pray that it would not come. No rain fell in the area that night.

By the next day, with the camp now nearly six days old, there were 1 500 families registered by the Sofasonke Party as resident in Shantytown. Every adult wishing to join the community was required to register in a little hessian covered hut before starting to build. On this morning there was a queue of about fifty women lined up outside this enrolment shack which became known as 'The Office'.

The organisers were providing simple sanitary facilities and the camp was untidy but clean. The search for building materials continued and scores of women were trudging the surrounding roads and paths bringing stakes and sacking with which to build.

Mpanza's expenditure on milk had now trebled from 2 Pounds on the fourth day to 6 Pounds on the 6th. The daily distribution of coal and wood was continuing and contributions from well-wishes supporting the establishment of the camp was still coming in.

Mpanza was finding it increasingly difficult to obtain hessian and sacking, but the building continued with increasing reliance on mealie stems.

> "Stakes are planted in the cleared ground. Cross bars are nailed into place and the women twine mealie stems in between the bars, just as their grandmothers did in the kraals."

The organisers and squatters were maintaining the strictest discipline. There had been no fights and brewing of beer was actively discouraged.

> "We are not here to break the law. We are here to obtain for ourselves our rights," said Mpanza. (34)

More support was coming in for the squatters. The Executive Committee of the Transvaal Interdenominational African Ministers Association (Johannesburg Branch) decided to appoint a Committee to organise a National Sunday Service to be held at 'Mpanza's Kraal' on the 30th April. They decided to advertise this and request all religious bodies in the Johannesburg townships to attend with

> "The main objective being to raise funds in order to help our brothers and sisters in their distress, with a view to providing for them shelter, food and fuel by enlisting public sympathy and assistance in the struggle for moral justice." (35)

By Friday the 31st, Shantytown already had a population of well over 6 000 with not all the squatters registered. What Mampuru estimated at 3 500 families. Mpanza estimated this would increase to 5 000 families or more than 20 000 people if all the sub-tenants moved out of the Orlando houses. (36)

Negotiations began on Friday between Ballenden and what the Committee of 8 now called itself, the Sofasonke Village Management Committee.

Almost from the start it was clear who was in control of the movement. The A.D.P. of course were formerly represented on the Management Committee and worked closely with Mpanza from the start. For instance, Basner was used by the Committee to conduct some of the negotiations with the City Council on behalf of the squatters. They were also directly represented in the Shantytown Administration. One of their paid oganisers, Nchee, was named Deputy Leader of the camp. But in practice they had very little say in what took place.

This was partly a failure in the quality of the leadership which was incapable of giving the lead once it came to action. But it was also due to the characteristic of Mpanza as a determined fighter.

> "He was not inclined to accept a secondary position in any organisation, nor to accept political tutelage from any organisation. He knew how to use methods, ranging from bluff and deception to violence to silence those who opposed his plans, and the A.D.P. members would have needed to be more astute to use the alliance in order to win the squatter to their point of view." (37)

In fact, by the time it came to negotiations, Mpanza was already in nearly every sense in control. This he had carefully organised.

From the start every adult wishing to join the squat had been compelled to join the Sofasonke Party and had paid a joining fee. Mpanza also collected all revenue from dues and trading rights. Thus all the camp guards were in his employ. The camp guards were there to give protection to property and person while the men were away at work. (38) They no doubt also provided strong-arm support for Mpanza in internal struggles. The camp was administered from the shack called The Office. From here Mpanza applied camp regulations and dealt with problems brought to him by the inhabitants. In spite of Nchee's presence, this put him in direct day-to-day control of all action in the camp. All statements and arguments presented by the squatter leaders, such as the 'Manifesto' bore his mark and in the final event the camp and the Committee of which he was chairman bore his name.

Outside the camp's politics, it was Mpanza alone out of the A.D.P. and the Sofasonke Party, who was on the Orlando Advisory Board and had already been party to the Council's consultations.

So it was that when it came to negotiating with the squatters, the negotiations were with him.

> "I was soon called by the manager of the Non-European Affairs Department. My Committee and supporters followed on foot, by car and all sorts of transport. The Council compromised, authorising me to supervise the shacks. They had seen the mood of the people. (39)

On the second day of negotiations, April 1st, agreement was reached. Mpanza and his Committee accepted the terms of the agreement and were given official recognition as the leaders of the squatters, and the official channel through which the Council would deal with the squatters. The Committee agreed to co-operate with the municipal police in preventing further influx into the camp.

Most importantly, it was also agreed that no prosecutions would be instituted against the leaders or any members of the community with regards to the migration. (41)

The Council still held back from actually accepting responsibility from administering the camp as the A.D.P. would have wanted. (42)

It was decided at the negotiations that the registered compiled by the camp organisers would be used by the Council as a guide for removals to temporary accommodation. There would also be a small charge for water and sanitation services for the temporary houses.

The exodus was still continuing while negotiations took place. People were moving across from Orlando to squat on the hillside. Two lorry loads of poles arrived and all kinds of transport were being used to carry loads of mealie stalks, sacks, corrugated iron and other materials for building.

Committee members and administrative staff hurried off to carry out their side of the agreement. (43)

This was the first big gain for the Committee of 8, but more so for Mpanza and the Sofasonke Party. With this, the prestige of the Sofasonke Party was greatly enhanced. The squatters were also given a chance to consolidate.

The following morning, Sunday, a meeting was held at which Ballenden told the people of Shantytown of the agreement with the Municipality. He was then accompanied by the chairman, Gray, and some members of the NEAC on a tour of inspection of the village. Their attention was drawn to a crowd of people who had been stopped from entering Shantytown, in accordance with the terms of the agreement. This group was addressed by both gray and Ballenden who told them that no further families would be allowed in. The group was not satisfied and threatened to start another, bigger camp. The Councillors had left by noon.

That afternoon, building continued and Mosaka said the Committee was having difficulty in stopping further movement into the camp.

> "We have no authority to stop them, and if we attempt to do so there will be trouble."

Another meeting was held in the afternoon attended by 5 000 people, mostly residents but also visitors. Mosaka addressed the gathering reporting on the meetings the Committe and he had had with the Council and the Manager of NEAD. He explained the terms of the agreement, and praised the conduct of the people which had made the Committee's work considerably easier than was expected. He assured them that they would be kept informed of the progress of further negotiations and urged them to continue in the orderly manner for which he had so much praise.

He read a resolution which had been drawn up, authorising the committee to start a relief fund and further authorising the Chairman and Secretary to deposit all monies with a banking institution, making provision also for withdrawals. The resolution was unanimously carried.

R.G. Baloyi, a businessman from Alexandra and the A.N.C. Treasurer-General, spoke and expressed his sympathy with the people of Sofasonke Village. He said that he had heard that the President of the African National Congress, Dr. A.B. Xuma, had given some money towards the fund. He would also make a personal contribution of 5 Pounds 5 Shillings. He wished them every success in their present plight.

Delegates from a meeting in Alexandra Township brought greetings and a donation of 2 Pounds 3s. 6d. from Alexandra residents. (44)

On the following day, now Monday the 3rd April, the assembling of the machines and material for making the breeze blocks began. The breeze blocks were to be made from ash, sand and cement. Each machine would have a productive capacity of 1 200 bricks per day, but as each house would require 3 000 blocks, a number of machines would be needed. (45)

Work was also begun on a road leading from railway lines serving Orlando West, to Shantytown.

Shacks were still going up on the hillside as the Council began replacing the simple sanitary facilities set up by the committee. (46)

Apart from those excluded by the agreement who were threatening to organise a 'protest march' (47) the camp was settling down to a quieter and more stable pace.

Over the ten days of its existence the squatter camp had mushroomed outwards. From a start of 500 families and 250 shacks, it had shown an average daily growth of 300 families per day since then. It had 4 000 registered families at its peak, i.e. 4 000 shacks.

The first houses were very densely packed and the later ones were also very close. This was done to provide protection and made accessibility by unwanted outsiders very difficult.

> "The houses of hessian are arrayed side by side with no lines of demarcation. It is one big family united by a strong will, to see their struggle through to the bitter end. Here, on this patch of ground, near the richest city in the country, in the midst of the noise

> of grinding wheels of trains carrying thousands of African workers into the city a few miles away, is a village where life is different. Water is drawn from a nearby stream; the sanitary arrangements are quite primitive; there is no individuality, all is communal. Below the dwellings, where the stream is wider, is the communal washing place. On either side of the stream, on the clean green grass are spread yards and yards of white linen and other articles of clothing. The women folk are determined that there shall be no dislocation of their industry. Their employers must have their clean linen just as if there were no Shantytown and they themselves will keep their family linen clean even though the sky be the only roof over their heads.
>
> In the centre of the settlement is the communal fuel depot. Yes! There is enough coal and wood for everybody. Shantytown is properly administered. It has its Headquarters in the ten over which James 'Sofasonke' Mpanza presides.
>
> James Mpanza is an elderly man, with an oval, emaciated face. He speaks with a chronic hoarse voice. There is a perpetual glimmer of light in his eyes. Around him centres the whole business concerning Shantytown. It is to him that more than 10 000 look for leadership; it is to him that they owe their newly found freedom, for these houses of hessian have given to the occupants a sense of proud ownership. As one resident said: 'I'd sooner have my own place here, than be crowded in one room over there,' indicating the place where he was living before coming to Shantytown."

Mpanza was maintaining order in the camp through his guards and would hear cases in the office.

The fuel depot was being run as a co-operative store by this stage selling coal and wood at less than 20% of Orlando prices. (48)

It had been hoped that work could have begun immediately on the building of permanent houses, but a week after agreement the Government had still not released building material. (49) However, the Council by then had two health inspectors on duty, water in seven standpipes, pail closets had been constructed and a daily pail and rubbish removal service had been instituted. To maintain control and check influx, a white inspector and thirteen black 'special constables' were appointed for duty in Shantytown. (50)

Shantytown continuedd to grow but with most of the subtenants already in and some attempt to stop further mass influx, there was only a trickle of newcomers. The camp was now about a mile long by 500 yards wide.

With the threat of cold weather to come the squatters had begun trying to protect their homes with mud. They were digging clods from the ground on the fringe of the township to pack against the hessian or mealie stalks.

The roads from Orlando and from the railway had been completed and the preparation of breeze-blocks was under way. There were seven moulds, each making blocks using clinker ash from the Orlando power station, at the rate of more than one a minute. Thousands were standing in the sun drying. It was estimated that 30 000 would be needed to build the shelters. People gathered to watch the bricks being made. (51)

This evidence of the Council taking steps to fulfil the housing part of the agreement, added to the relaxed atmosphere in the camp. The police on duty at the camp reported tha there had been no crime or trouble. (52)

The only dissatisfaction expressed was with the Council's decision to build only 2 800 temporary houses. It was felt that 4 000 were needed. There was also fear that given the discrepancy, not enough permanent houses would be built either. (53)

Embarrased by their failure to support the squatter movement and still reluctant to entirely concede the ground to Mpanza the Communist Party was forced to respond to the situation in some way.

They argued that they had supported housing demands through the Orlando Advisory Board for years and that even though Mpanza had not consulted the rest of the Board before starting the movement, despite his mistakes, they still supported the people in their sturggle. They had vigorously opposed a proposal by the City Council that the squatters be evicted and insisted that the Council should negotiate with them.

On stronger ground they responded to criticism emerging within the camp about the undemocratic nature of Mpanza's administration. They argued

that the Committee was not elected by the residents to run the affairs of the township. The whereabouts of the money collected by Mpanza was questioned. The also objected about reports that people were being evicted for not paying the weekly fee. (54)

The objection by the Communist Party members of the Advisory Board about not being consulted was a technical and face-saving point with little validity. While they were perhaps not formally approached as an Advisory Board, they had obviously been approached as the Communist Party. The Communists were forced to give Mpanza some credit. Said the Guardian,

> "Whatever might be said about Mr. Mpanza's conduct of his campaign, the outstanding fact is that through this bold and imaginative action, Shantytown has forced the Council at last to make a move. It is true that Mpanza should have consulted and sought assistance from his fellow members on the Advisory Board so that a democratic working committee of Shantytown's dwellers should be elected and a proper statement of income and expenditure should be issued."

The Communist Party turned to criticise the Council's response as inadequate and to use the issue as election propaganda for the Johannesburg Council elections.

> "Severe criticism must be expressed about the City Council procedure in this matter. Their measures may relieve a small proportion of the homeless now camping at Orlando, but they are completely inadequate to deal with the housing question as a whole. Shortage of materials is no excuse. In the wealthy suburbs, expensive houses and blocks of flats are being erected. Materials must be provided for the desperate poor at Orlando.
>
> "The Communist Party demands the immediate start of bold extensive sub-economic housing schemes. It calls upon the voters Johannesburg to reject in the October elections, ratepayers' candidates who through a year's callous neglect have created the present crisis and to return a workers' majority to the Council." (55)

Some of the breeze-block shelters were nearing completion by the end of the third week of April. They were 13 feet square with no fireplaces, chimneys or windows. A census was being undertaking so as to control the move to the shelters.

Mpanza was beginning to express disagreement with the move to the shelters. He argued that the people felt they should be allowed to build their own houses instead of moving to temporary shelters. He did not think that the people would suffer when the cold weather arrived as they had plenty of stoves and fuel.

He objected to the camp being called Shantytown. It was called Sofasonke Township and had a banking account and its own police force registered in that name. He said that township policemen were properly registered with the Native Affairs Department and employed by the township. They were paid a minimum wage of 6 Pounds per month plus allowances. There was now 500 Pounds in the bank.

He said that discipline was much better than in Orlando. Since the township was started there had been no cases of drunkenness and no fights. The blacks were all law-abiding people and the township was an example of what they could do on their own initiative. (56)

Although Mpanza and his supporter wanted the camp to be called Sofasonke Township or Sofasonke Village, it was also to be called Masakeng (Sacktown) and to stick with the name Shantytown.

Dissatisfaction with the shelters was not just from Mpanza. As they took shape there were growing complaints about the lack of windows and refusal on the part of some to occupy them. The Sofasonke Party undertook to hire private doctors from the party's funds to inspect the houses and give their opinion as to their habitability. When it was pointed out by a Council official that the shelters were only temporary, one of the squatters replied, "Yes sir, but how long is 'temporary'?"

The Communist Party continued to provide public support for the squatters. Occasionally there was also support from other parties. In the House of Assembly a United Party Representative with Shantytown in mind posed the question of when Blacks would be allowed to run their own townships in their own way. The Minister of Native Affairs, Major Piet Van der Byl replied in a manner that belied the degree of organisation shown by the Sofasonke Party in Shantytown.

> "As a whole, Natives have not reached the stage where they are capable of administering a large township under modern conditions. Wherever Natives have been allowed to develop a township without being under municipal control, the result has been disasterous." (57)

The first 100 temporary shelters were complete in the second week of May and almost ready for occupation. The Council was to continue constructing the shelters at a rate of three blocks of ten every two days till the demand was fully met.

There was still dissension in the camp between those who wanted to occupy the sheters as soon as possible and those who wanted to build their own homes.

Council officials argued that in spite of no windows there was adequate ventilation in the openings between the top of the walls and the asbestos roofing. There would thus be no danger of carbon monoxide poisoning from the use of braziers in the rooms.

There were already many applications for rooms at the municipal offices in Orlando. A fee of 5 shillings per month was to be charged to the inhabitants for santitation, water and rubbish removal services but there was no rent.

A meeting was to be held on the evening of the 9th May, to thrash out the general attitude of the squatters to the shelters as divergent viewpoints continued to emerge.

The split over occupation of the shelters led to the formation of a Vigilance Committee inside Shantytown in opposition to the Sofasonke Party. (58) It was also to contribute to more active conflict.

The Committee wanted to know if the squatters were to be paid compensation for the material and labour that had gone into making their shacks. They estimated that at 4 Pounds per shack they were due about 12 000 Pounds for the township. (59)

The success of the Shantytown squatters gave a new sense of pride and self respect to Johannesburg blacks. This in turn created a tension in the relationship between the local advisory boards and the Council. A meeting called by the NEAC to discuss the sensitive issue of black housing with advisory board members from Orlando, Pimville, Eastern and Western Native Townships and Shantytown representatives was adjourned when a board member immediately requested an apology from the Council Committee for wasting their time by coming late. Order broke down as the Township representatives continually interrupted the chairman to cheers from the others. The chairman then adjourned the meeting. (60)

By now the shelters were almost ready in sufficient numbers for the squatters to start moving in. They were to be required to demolish their shacks when they moved, to prevent another family from taking their place. The removal of Shantytown was also intended to leave a space on which to build permanent housing.

Food continued to be provided to what had become an established market by traders and vendors. Some shops were run from shacks and sold groceries, mealie meal, meat, fruit or tomatoes. Bread delivery vans arrived on a daily basis from Johannesburg and left empty. All traders, whether from inside or outside the camp were charged a levy. (61)

An attempt by the Committee to build a large central market place with split poles was stopped by the Native Affairs Department. (62)

Displeased by the defiant mood Shantytown was giving rise to, and with the shelters almost ready, the Council was keen to break the control of the township's leaders and to ensure that the movement be brought back under its control in the registered temporary housing.

As part of its offensive it started an official investigation into conditions in Shantytown, fed by the emerging disunity appearing from within the movement. The investigation was reporting that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction, that many were keen to move to the temporary housing but were afraid to move out of fear of reprisals. The Council was ensuring protection for those who chose to move.

There were also said to be complaints that the Shantytown Committee was charging too much for administration fees and that those who refused to pay were beaten with sticks. It was also alleged that some who had not complied with camp rules had been taken to an unoffical prison, had their wrists bound with rope and had been severely beaten.

Mpanza, answering to the mounting criticism, argued that the election of the committee had been confirmed at one of the earliest general meetings of residents. This meeting decided on the 2s.6d administrative fee and agreed that those who could not pay this much should pay according to their means. He said this was not a compulsory levy. He argued that the money was used for the emergency needs of the residents in cases of sickness and death. It was also to pay the camp 'officials' of whom there were now 28.

His administration also served the community through the central supply depot which provided goods at cost. All these traders, he assured, were in the employ of the Committee.

There was now between 900 Pounds and 1 000 Pounds in the Sofasonke Village bank account.

Mpanza's claims were contradicted by an independent deputation claiming to represent a large body of residents in the camp who visited the Johannesburg Star offices to air their complaints.

They said that the fee for administration was compulsory and that some who failed to pay had had their shacks pulled down. There were also collections of money made for various other items such as uniforms for women and to buy a car. There was also the trading licence levy.

> "They said that though residents in general appreciated what the officially elected committee was doing for thetownship, they would like to have some independent inspection of accounts to comply with the normal machinery for administering income and expenditure in such a big community.
>
> Many residents were ignorant and did not understand how or why the money raised by the committee was being spent in their interests. An independent inspection of accounts, of course, implied no reflection on the committee, but was a routine safeguard, essential in the interests of the committee and of the residents." (63)

Allegations that the Shantytown Committee was not democratic in structure were clearly true. But criticisms that it had not been elected by the residents (denied by Mpanza and endorsed by the deputation above) did not accurately reflect the strong support it obviously had as seen in mass meetings. Many of its resolutions were endorsed in this form of direct democracy.

However, it seems likely that Mpanza's bullying tactics, intrinsic to his personality since childhood and practised since before the start of the squatter movement, were continued as he reached new heights of power and influence. Nor were these methods to end here as will be seen.

With regards to the disagreement among the squatters over moving to the shelters, it is clear that there were dissenting views as the meeting called to discuss the issue and the formation of the Vigilance Committee evidences. It is also likely that there were threats against those who refused to tow the line.

But in spite of the internal dissension and the grievances expressed, there was overall support for Mpanza and his Committee which, although may have wavered at times, was to remain and grow.

The Council of course had other interests and through its investigation it sought to gather the necessary information to discredit the squatter leadership thus detracting from public sympathy when it came to re-imposing the Council's control of the squatters.

Mpanza responded to the investigation by saying that he would have welcomed an opportunity of being consulted and of being able to rebut evidence detrimental to the committee. He denied the allegations against him. He said, for instance, the money for uniforms had not been collected by his committee but had been decided among the women themselves and that some of the uniforms were ready and would be distributed shortly. He said that private trading had been stopped at the camp and those selling goods were the employees of the committee.

He also said that the Township Committee was entirely separate from the Sofasonke Party Committee which kept separate books and these were open to anybody's inspection. (64)

The Council nevertheless continued to sabotage the squatter leadership. A cheque sent to help the squatters buy blankets and coal, addressed to the "native chief of Shantytown" was forwarded by the Rand Daily Mail to the Manager of NEAD to be passed on. The Manager returned it to the donor saying that the squatters did not need it as they had a bank balance of more than 1 000 Pounds. (65)

By the 26th May, the first 200 breeze block shelters were ready for occupation and 201 families were moved from the eastern portion of Shantytown into the shelters. They were allocated according to numbers drawn from a tin. The families were shown to their rooms by municipal police and were assisted with trucks in moving their belongings to their new homes. As agreed, their 201 shacks were demolished as they left.

Twisting the blade, the NEAC held its enquiry in Shantytown that morning. The Chief Magistrate and the Director of Native Labour were to meet with Mpanza and his Committee. The Council had already prepared itself by consulting the Chief Native Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Police.

Mpanza did not appear at the meeting as he was 'indisposed'. With strong backing, alternative Council-provided housing becoming available and its 'investigation' underway, the Council had defined its strategy and was ready to act.

The Shantytown Committee was informed by NEAC that Shantytown,

> "Is to come under the strict control of the Johannesburg City Council, which will not tolerate any usurping of its powers by any body of natives."

Referring to the Shantytown Committee as 'self-elected', as though the NEAC in relation to the townships was not, they were,

> "bluntly told that the Council was going to enforce its authority in future as far as the township was concerned. The present committee in the township would not be recognised officially and had no administrative powers. Any grievances that the committee might wish to bring to the attention of the authorities could be done through the Superintendent." (66)

By moving people into the shelters and charging the fee of 5 shillings per month which was half of Mpanza's fee, the Council was whittling away his social and economic base and at the same time, the autonomy of the squatter movement. By discrediting Mpanza's committee the Council was also lending weight to the argument that blacks were incapable of running their own affairs as asserted by the Minister of Native Affairs in the House of Assembly.

Mpanza continued to operate as before but as the building of shelters continued a number of rival committees were formed, all planning to represent the residents of Shantytown. There were eventually six of these, including the Sofasonke Party. Most were not recognised by the Council. (67)

The difference in the objectives and policies of the A.D.P. and the Sofasonke Party became evident at this time. Members of the A.D.P. on the Shantytown Committee welcomed the Council's statement that it was to take control of Shantytown. They had even expressed regret that the Council had not assumed control of the administration at the time of the first negotiations. As said by Mampuru, they now felt that the Council's intention was

> "in harmony with the terms of the agreement entered into with the Council at the time of recognition and settlement." (68)

Mpanza on the other hand, opposed the Council's interference along the lines of a very practical and unsophisticated kind of Africanism which of course, also coincided with his self-interest. Shantytown was for Mpanza an example of black self-government.

But in spite of the A.D.P.'s collusion and the Council's propaganda against Mpanza's committee, in an indirect admission of Mpanza's

strength, the authorities were unable to take full control immediately and were unable to fully disregard the committee which would still present grievances to the Superintendent.

By mid-June with 200 rooms occupied and 100 more needing only roofing, the shortage of cement was seriously hampering building. At the same time cold and rain were causing terrible hardship in Shantytown. (69)

The 4 000 shacks were soaked through.

> "For two nights the rain has been dripping through the sack-cloth roofs and down the hessian walls of most of the shacks. The floors are churned-up mud and were from one to three inches under water all night.
>
> Mattrasses were wet through; there was not a dry spot to lie on; so the 4 000 families spent the night crouching over scanty fires in braziers or dozing fitfully in chairs in the wet. After the second sleepless night the men left for work from 5 o'clock this morning in the rain."

Those with umbrellas put them up inside their shacks as protection.

> "In shacks selected at random, the floors were deep in mud. In one typical hut a woman was trying to clear up the mess caused by the rain overnight. All the scanty household furniture was wet through. Food basins were full of water that had leaked through the roof. The solitary mattress had been folded up and wrapped in sheepskins to keep it dry. The woman said she, her husband and two children had sat up in the rain all night trying to cover up the furniture. Her husband wrapped his old overcoat over her and the children and left for work this morning in damp clothes."

Their groceries were soaked through.

By contrast those in the shelter, apart from some rain that leaked in through the joints in the asbestos roofing or through the chinks in the breeze-block walls, were dry and could sleep comfortably. (70)

This was the moment the Council was waiting for. Without any consultation with the Shantytown Committee, the NEAD announced on the 15th its intention to open soup kitchens for the Shantytown children

that morning. The City Engineer agreed to make available corrugated iron huts for accommodation and Ballenden had appealed to all missionary bodies who had school buildings and churches under their control in Orlando Township to make these available to women and young children as shelter against cold and wet.

Tenants in Orlando with spare room were also asked to help. They were encouraged to do so by the City Council considering a rebate in their rent. (71)

Taking advantage of the vastly greater resources available to them, the NEAC in addition sent 1 000 bags of coal to Shantytown to be distributed free to the most needy cases. Meat and vegetables were also bought and delivered to make the soup.

The soup kitchen, consisting of three big boilers, was set up that morning at the entrance to Shantytown, with a view to providing soup as long as the bad weather lasted.

By noon black staff of the NEAD were preparing beef and vegetables for the soup.

The Department also sent forty black employees to report on the condition of each shack and to draw up a list of those most in need who would have first claim on the Council's aid.

Several loads of old sacks were also dumped at the township entrance the previous night to reinforce the shacks.

There was not much rain on the night before and some sun shining as the relief work got underway. A van from the Public Health Department was drawn up at the entrance of the township and officials began vaccinating women and children against smallpox.

They also began building a market in the neighbourhood with twenty four stalls arranged around a courtyard. This would enable the Council to regain control over trading and prevent Mpanza from collecting revenue either from levies on private traders or through profit on a committee run store.

The public at large also made many offers of help with gifts of clothing, blankets and money. The Johannesburg Star was collecting much of this and handing it over the NEAD so circumventing the Township Committee in their bid to 'help'. (72)

Alarmed by the overwhelming scale of the Council's 'aid' which threatened his control and the squatters autonomy, Mpanza addressed a large crowd from the top of one of the lorries used to carry the coal to Shantytown. He told his followers not to give any of the coal to those who accepted soup from the municipality. He said he would kill the white man in charge of the distribution of the soup and then the people would took the 'pig soup'. The people wanted houses, not soup, he asserted. (73)

He said that the municipality was trying to smash up the organisation for which he had worked hard and that was why his followers would stop and punish anyone who takes soup. He again objected to the building of temporary houses. (74)

Mpanza's overzealousnous and lack of caution played into the Council's hands. There was a mixed response to his exhortations. Some agreed but others did not. Someone shouted,

> "We were brought here to Shantytown to die of cold, and our children need the soup to keep warm." (75)

On the morning of Friday the 16th June, Julia Mpanza addressed a meeting at the Mpanza's house in Orlando (76) and again in Shantytown.

> "'None of you must have that soup. We don't want soup. We have not come here for soup. We want houses ...'
>
> 'Ewe! Ewe!' shouted those in the audience.
>
> 'What must happen to those who do not honour their word?' she asked and there was silence. 'Well, I'll tell you! Such people will stand condemned as traitors ...'
>
> 'Yebo! Yebo!' the response was deafening. 'We pledge our support to the cause,' said another woman. 'For my part I shall have none of that mess. Curse it!'" (77)

While preparations were being made to distribute the soup, Mpanza passed by and said that the people did not want soup from the municipality, they wanted houses. He added that if the people took the soup, they would be killed. It was pig's food and the people did not want it. He then spoke to the black municipal staff who were cooking. (78)

Soon after midday about 150 people started lining up for the soup. As they did so a large crowd of women and men, waving sticks and holding stones came dancing and shouting towards the three boilers. Those queuing for soup moved away. The white officials and the black staff continued their work and told the people who did not want soup to go away. The dancing and shouting attracted a lot of attention and people came pouring out of the shacks to see. They gathered around the soup kitchen. (79)

> "Chanting and prancing to the rythm, a big crowd advanced towards the soup bins, a woman and a man at the head. Some brandished knobkerries and sjamboks, making threatening gestures ... 'Upset the pots!' someone shouted. 'That'll be the day', a woman whispered. She scooped up the soup and tasted it. As she did so another woman lunged forward towards her and attempted to upset the pot but a municipal policeman caught hold of her. It was enough! Stone, sticks and knobkerries flew overhead and the mob went wild." (80)

The white officials tried to calm the crowd and sent word to the Orlando office of what was happening. A call was sent through to Marshall Sqaure in Johannesburg and police were sent at once. But most of the crowd had got out of hand. A huge man armed with an axe was prevented from striking another by the white works foreman who caught his raised arm in mid-air and wrenched the axe away.

The foreman then organised a column of 175 people to stand between the people round the soup kitchen and the attacking party. While the fighting continued nearby, hundreds stood in the queue to get soup.

A man guarding a coal dump provided by Mpanza was surrounded by part of the crowd defending the soup and struck to the ground with blood pouring from his head. One of the white officials rushed up, carried him into an iron hut, and called for an ambulance, which took him to the Orlando

Clinic. Before he arrived there he was dead. His skull had been cracked by many blows. Stones were found in his pockets.

By then those in favour of soup greatly outnumbered those against and when 80 white and many more black policemen arrived, the latter scattered in all directions.

> "Soon the hillside near the town was black with flying and pursuing figures."

Part of the crowd then went and destroyed Mpanza's 'office'.

> "The cry was then raised that they should get Mpanza's regalia as chief of the township and burn that up, too. On Sundays Mpanza used to ride through the town on a spirited horse and wearing riding boots, pink riding breeches, a leopard skin coat, and a helmet with a long scarlet plume." - echoes of his childhood hero, Napoleon.

But they were pursuaded by Council officials not to go near Mpanza's house in Orlando.

The soup was distributed with the crowd affirming that they would not allow anyone to keep them from the Council's free coal and soup. (81)

When the fighting was over, apart from one dead man, another had his ear slashed off, a woman had been stabbed and hundreds were bruised by blows. Between 3 000 and 4 000 had been involved in the fight.

By sunset everything was quiet in the township. (82)

Orders were issued for the arrest of Mpanza and his wife and they were arrested at Mpanza's house in Orlando. (83) Police remained in the township the following day to prevent a recurrence. (84)

On the Monday Mpanza appeared in Court at a preparatory examination on the allegation of incitement to public violence and Julia and Zacharia Ngomezulu, Julia's father and one of the camp officials, on charges of public violence. Mpanza's case was remanded to June 28th and the other two to June 27th. (85)

Showing weakness in the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance, Mampuru took the opportunity at this time to begin to voice condemnation of Mpanza. He also condemned him for imposing the weekly levy of 2/6 without consulting the committee. He maintained that Mpanza's hostility to the Council administration of the camp was because he would lose an easy source of income. (86)

On the 22nd June Mpanza's receipt books and papers were seized for audit by the Union Department of Native Affairs. The books were found to be in such a state of disarray that no definite irregularities could be established. Mpanza was to claim that he was not charged because his books had been in order. (87)

By the next day the Council had completed another 100 shelters and was hearing tenders for the planned 2 600 permanent houses. Building was still being hampered by the cement and materials shortage. (88)

With the cold weather, the Council's relative massive 'aid' programme underway, open conflict in the camp, and another 100 families siphoned off, the rout of the Shantytown Committee and the Sofasonke Party had begun.

With the co-operation of the authorities and missionary bodies a relief centre was established in Shantytown distributing gifts and donations. (89) In view of the NEAD returning donations before because the squatters had 1 000 Pounds in the bank, this about turn in policy indicates that the change in the squatters charity status had more to do with the fact that now it was being conducted under Council supervision and not the Committee's rather than any material change in the squatter's conditions.

A midwifery clinic, accommodating 8 women set up by the City Health Department was added to the Council's programme. (90)

When Mpanza, Julia and Ngomezulu appeared in court again, there were two more camp guards charged with them. Sofasonke Party men and women filled the court wearing Sofasonke sashes.

Basner, as lawyer for the defence, aware of the Council's interests in destroying the autonomy of the squatter movement, argued that the fight was a put-up job by the municipality and that the last thing the municipal officials wanted was that the police should arrive. This was denied.

Cross-examined by Basner the foreman said he was not instructed to interview the Shantytown Committee but only to distribute soup. Basner was pointing to the Council's intention to subvert the camp's committee.

Evidence was given as the trial progressed recounting the events of the day of the riot. (91)

There was singing and shouting by the Sofasonke Party supporters outside the Court during lunch. (92)

Shortly after this the squatters who had started a Shantytown at Sharpeville Location outside Vereeniging, were also coming under attack from the Vereeniging City Council. They were ordered to move from the site they had occupied for the last two years. Not having done so, many were arrested and sentenced to two months imprisonment suspended on condition they move within forty eight hours. The A.D.P. intervened and advised the squatters to move but gather at the Native Commissioner's Office and ask for help. They were then allowed to resettle on land in the municipal location. (93)

Clinching their successes so far, the Johannesburg City Council assumed full control of Shantytown on the 28th August. They withdrew official recognition of the Shantytown Committee and would only receive complaints from the residents through the Superintendent. (94)

With the Management Committee now not recognised, the Sofasonke Party still went on to combine with the Shantytown Vigilance Committee to form the independent committee which was recognised by the Council for some time. (95) (Footnote).

By now Shantytown had attracted sufficient attention to require a response from the central Government. Major Van der Byl, the Minister of Native Affairs, paid a visit to Shantytown and he and his entourage threaded in single file through the labyrinth of narrow passages between the sackcloth hovels. (97) After the visit he called a meeting with the Minister of Labour and all Government Departments which might be helpful in hastening the City Council's efforts to provide housing and remove Shantytown. The Council was pleased with the results of this meeting. (98)

Meanwhile, under its new constitution the A.N.C. was attempting to build up its membership and branches. It had convened an anti-pass conference in Johannesburg in May, 1944. This had been followed by a demonstration of about 20 000 people in the city centre. (99)

The Orlando branch was little in evidence. Meetings were occasionally held in Orlando. (100) The Transvaal A.N.C. held a meeting there on the 9th September. When the railways placed a 10% war sur-charge on rail fares in October, the A.N.C. called meetings in Kliptown, Pimville and

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An argument about the nature and limitations of 'poor people's movements' by Piven, F. and Clowered, R. is presented by A. Stadler in Politics of Subsistance: Community Struggles in Wartime Johannesburg. I do not wish to include theoretical generalisations in the body of the text. In particular I have problems with the 'theory' as it suffers from a number of methodological as well as theoretical deficiencies. Firstly, it appears to be impirically induced generalisations drawn from liberal democratic examples. Thus it does not fulfill such criterion for theory as logically internal consistency, as well as consistency to an adequate methodology. Secondly, it fails to understand the fundamental contradictions in society which are class contradictions. It therefore fails to have a conception of political movements as movements in struggle more or less directly related to basic class contradictions and therefore makes unqualified generalisations about vacuous concepts like 'poor people'. It has no materialist concept of power nor a theoretical commitment to historical specificity. In this work I have tried to show in a more integrated way the actual playing out of the specific historical forces in a specific historical context. (96)

Orlando to protest against this. (101) Again the A.N.C. (Transvaal) convened a meeting of 'all progressive organisations' to protest against the ban on 'open-air meetings' on proclaimed land in the Witwatersrand area. There were arrests and meetings cancelled as a result of the ban. They argued that the ban was interfering with legitimate democratic and trade union activities. (102)

On the 19th of October, Mpanza was discharged on the charge of public violence. His wife Julia and three others were still on trial. (103)

This was another triumph for Mpanza. He returned strengthened to Shantytown using his victory to rebuild his party.

The Council, meanwhile, continued with its programme in Shantytown. The acting manager of NEAD held a mass meeting on Sunday the 22nd October, at which he said the residents of Pimville were entitled to a high priority in the allocation of new houses being built at Orlando West. He told the people of the Council's plans to combat the danger of an interitis epidemic. In particular he informed them of their proposal to cut two lines through Shantytown to serve as a firebreak and to give access to the interior and remote parts of the township for rubbish removal. After the acting manager's speech Mpanza also addressed the crowd. More confident at his legal success his attitude toward the Council was derogatory and he belittled the Council's efforts to help the people. He compared the Counil's administration of Shantytown to his more desirable administration. The Council was alarmed by his affrontary. (104)

Julia and Ngomezulu were then acquitted on the 26th of the same charge, while the remaining two were found guilty of culpable homicide arising from the death of the stabbed and battered man. They were each fined 10 Pounds or two months hard labour. (105)

Mpanza called a mass meeting on the next Sunday the 29th October at which he attached the Acting Manager's statement at the previous meeting, that priority would be given to Pimville for the housing being built. He undertook to see that the residents of Shantytown received first preference in the allocation of all new houses erected by the Council. He advised people affected by the Council's proposal to cut two roads

through Shantytown to refuse to vacate the shacks if so required by Council officials.

He said he was introducing a new system of membership cards for the Sofasonke Party and urged everyone to join him. He told the people assembled that the money he had previously collected was intended to purchase a farm beyond Pretoria for their joint benefit and informed them that for this purpose he needed more money. He also called for voluntary subscriptions which would also be used for 'cleansing' him so that he could again assume charge as Shantytown. He said he knew that people did not want whites among them. (106)

In October it was announced that Graham Ballenden, who had founded NEAD in 1928 and been Manager ever since, was about to retire. The Council put a request to the Communist dominated Orlando Advisory Board to sponsor a farewell reception for Ballenden. The elected members of the board, Mpanza and three Communists, decided against this. It was a rare occasion where for once the Council was looking for their co-operation instead of the other way around, an opportunity not to be missed. Their carefully worded reply shows years of frustration.

> "The farewell to Mr. G. Ballenden has been the subject of a lengthy discussion in the official meetings of the Orlando Advisory Board and was finally rejected for the following reasons:
>
> a. That in his whole carreer as Manager, Mr. G. Ballenden had very little respect for the views and recommendations of the Advisory Board Members who are the only legal, though powerless, representatives of the Africans in the township.
>
> b. That in spite of the fact that his recommendations went a long way with the City Council, who have always regarded him as an authority on 'Native Affairs', he was always ready to reject any recommendations made to him. Whilst he has been an 'efficient office' as far as the City Council is concerned, the Africans have very little to thank him for.
>
> c. From time to time the Advisory Board has made representations to Mr. Ballenden that Superintendents should not be changed without consulting the Board. The Board should be consulted and farewells arranged for them. But Superintendents are still changed without the

> Board being informed, and Mr. Ballenden has not even had the courtesy to reply to the Board's demands. For this reason, the Board feels justified in rejecting his own farewell.
>
> There is also the welcome to Mr. L.I. Venables, who is appointed as new manager. He is already named 'Nkoma ya Hlaba' by the Africans. Whilst the Board has not discussed him, the welcome has been rejected because it is deliberately linked with the farewell.
>
> We learn that the invitation is extended to the teachers, children and Ministers of Religion. We say nothing to the teachers. We want them to be their own judges. To the children and the parents we say that there are no playgrounds and parks for the children, because the man you intend giving a farewell, did not agree with the Board.
>
> To the Ministers of religion we say that only a few of the fortunate or European churches can thank Mr. Ballenden for the church sites he has given them but the rest of the unfortunate African churches have nothing to thank Mr. Ballenden for.
>
> Yes, you will have plenty of meat to eat in these meatless days and you will have plenty of beer to drink - beer that Mr. Ballenden refuses to recommend that you make at your own house, beer that according to the new Government laws you have the right to make, if only the Council agrees.
>
> There is no politically conscious African who can be happy to eat and drink under such circumstances. The unfortunate unconscious African will eat meat and drink beer, but the hardships of the Africans remain. No self-respecting African can go to this combined farewell and reception ceremony and be happy. We know that some Africans will go and bluff Mr. Ballenden, when he knows they are not sincere." (107)

With elections coming round again and with widespread popularity of the Sofasonke Party and A.D.P. in the Shantytown Committee, the Communist Party began its campaign at an early stage.

They argued that all members of the Advisory Board should be elected as the nominated members had voted against their motion of rejection of their farewell reception and had, in fact, published a leaflet against it. The Communist Party saw this as a lack of integrity and a dishonesty on the part of the nominees to their own people. The opposed anybody accepting nomination as the interests of the residents were diametrically opposed to those of the Council. They proposed that a strong militant

board could bring problems to the attention of the Council while at the same time expose the ineffectiveness of the boards. As this was what they proposed to do, they called on people to vote for the Communist Party in the next election. (108)

On the 17th November, new legislation was brought into effect to prevent squatting. It enabled a magistrate to take steps to effect the immediate removal of persons who unlawfully occupy land or buildings. (109) Within days this law was exercised when 100 military troop carriers and a large force of white and black police moved the 1 000 inhabitants form a shantytown in Alberton and all their property to Hammanskraal 45 kilometers north of Pretoria. All their goods were marked and moved, and at Hammanskraal they were immediately housed in tents, and were provided with cooked food. (110)

The Council was now feeling legally more secure and the effectiveness of the new legislation had been amply demonstrated. It had often been argued by Council members that the way to deal with the squatters was to nip any new developments in the bud with firm and swift action. This point of view seems to have been invalidated at Alberton. But what this point of view did not take into account was that most of the squatters at Alberton were unemployed. The state gave as its reasons for acting here and not in the Orlando case as being that because they were unemployed 'their removal therefore caused no economic dislocation'. (111) These economic factors which underlie legal ones were again to be demonstrated before too long.

By mid-November only 850 breeze block shelters had been constructed in Orlando. The cement shortage was preventing further building and the Council was looking for alternatives. There was still over 3 000 families in Shantytown waiting for accommodation.

The Council had gone ahead with its proposal to cut two roads through Shantytown and the occupants of the shacks which had to be demolished to make the first road, were moved into breezeblock rooms. Another main road was still to be made which would intersect with the first, so cutting Shantytown into four parts, giving the authorities easy access.

The Council decided to build log cabins as a substitute to the breeze block shelters to avoid reliance on cement. (112)

Perturbed by widespread growing unrest the state passed anew emergency regulation prohibiting meetings of more than 15 people, whether indoors or out of doors, in all locations. The Orlando Advisory Board was refused permission to hold a public meeting.

Under this regulation Paul Mosaka and M.R. Kumalo were charged for addressing a demonstrating crowd outside a courtroom. It was alleged that as members of the Workers Transport Action Committee they had been planning a procession into town.

In an act of solidarity Dr. A.B. Xuma sent a message to the Worker's Transport Action Committee saying that the arrests were a national matter, and he, in his personal capacity and as president of the A.N.C., was prepared to give the committee every assistance in any action they take. (113)

But the events which followed served to widen the rift between the A.N.C. and Communist Party on the one hand and the A.D.P. on the other.

The A.D.P. planned a march of workers from Orlando to town to protest increased rail fares. The march was a dismal failure, with only twenty people taking part. Apart from their more general critisms of the A.N.C. and the Communist Party, the A.D.P. criticised the latter for opposing the march. This drew scathing attacks from Mofutsanyana. Saying that the march was put forward in a sectarian way, Mofutsanyana criticised the Workers' Transport Action Committee, which organised the march, for appearing to think that it was sufficient to

> "run around with motor cars and loudspeakers shouting at the people to march."
>
> "If you add to their wrong and ill-considered approach the fact they continuously occupied themselves making public attacks on the Communist Party and the A.N.C., it will not be difficult to see why they have antagonised th people of Orlando to such an extent in this township with a population of over 70 000, only 20 people marched to town for one day only."

Although the Communist Party did not agree with the march, it had not opposed it and in fact some of the leading Communists even joined in 'the march of the 20.'

He criticised the policies of Basner and Koza as the top leadership of the Workers' Transport Action Committee and advocated support for the A.N.C., the Council of Non-European Trade Unions, and the Communist Party. (114)

This was not the end of it. With the A.N.C. beginning to pick up again, a strong annual conference was held in Kimberley in December, claiming organisational progress in the Transvaal.

Reporting on this, a newspaper very sympathetic to the A.N.C. Youth League, Inkundla ya Bantu, broadened the attack on the A.D.P. to extend to their role in Shantytown.

> "The A.D.P., of course, could not give a fair account of its failure. They did not tell the country that the cause of their failure to organise Orlando lay in the fact that they had messed things at Sofasonke Township at the time when they had the upper hand in the Sofasonke movement. Thus, at Orlando, few people now take them seriously."

Attacking their performance at Alexandra too, the article continues to point out their ineffectiveness.

> "The trouble with the A.D.P. was that when it came to words, it was very powerful - particularly with borrowed loudspeakers - whereas in action it could kick as effectively as a day-old chicken!" (115)

With 1944 drawing to a close and the Orlando elections due to take place on the 17th December the political pace was intensifying.

The contest was essentially between the Communist Party and the A.D.P. and Sofasonke Party alliance.

Still fairly arrogant about their politics the Communist Party published the following statement.

> "We must go on with the struggle for a better Orlando, but the time for for cheap electioneering promises has passed. We leave these to amateur political candidates who labour under the illusion that, if they get into the Advisory Board, they only have to speak and mountains will move. All support must be given to the Communist Party candidates - it is a labour victory! We have no separate interest from yours. We ask everyone to vote for E.T. Mofutsanyana, J.J. Masupha, S.M. Moema and E. Mavimbela." (116)

The political arrogance of some Communist Party members was aimed at the A.D.P. which the Communist Party maintained sufffered 'from all the faults of sectarianism, political inexperience and stupidity'. Against this it was held that the Communist Party candidates for the Advisory Board elections were 'infinitely more advanced politically.'

Mampuru threw the obvious weaknesses in their position back at them in a way that applied to the A.D.P. members but much more so to James Sofasonke Mpanza.

> "Can it be said that a man who interprets the feeling of the people correctly to the extent of asking 20 000 to defy the authorities and establish a Shantytown in municipal land without permission, is less politically advanced than one who regards such a move as mere election propaganda?" (117)

Mpanza meanwhile was busy organising among 'the people'. He called a meeting on the evening of Friday the 15th December at about 7.30 p.m. between the shelters and Shantytown.

Mpanza addressed the meeting in Zulu. It was also translated into Sesotho.

> "People, I have called you here to tell you what I have heard. As you know, we were promised that houses would be built for us. I am sorry to tell you that it is no longer so. These houses which are being built, which we thought were for us, are going to be given to Pimville, Orlando and Western Native Township. They are getting these houses through us and now you will grow old here in 'Shantytown' because you don't listen to me. I want you to listen to me, and let us do the same thing that we did when we came here to 'Shantytown'.

> As soon as these houses have been roofed, we must take our things and go into them. I want each family to contribute one pound so that when we have entered those houses as I have told, we shall take steps to appeal to Bloemfontein."
>
> Those who were present all agreed to contribute one pound.
>
> "As you know before I came here I had endeavoured to speak to my fellow members of the Advisory Board in connection with making means for the people to get houses. They agreed with me, but when the time for the Exodus came they left me as they were afraid, but I was not arrested. You must not be afraid. The position of Chieftainship is given to me like Jesus. Many people thought that I was arrested and yet I was not. The same as with Jesus. Many people thought he was dead and yet he was not.
>
> I speak this knowing that there are detectives about and that before the day breaks the white man will know everything. You must not be afraid. You must do the same thing tha you did when we came here. One who asks is never satisfied but the one who takes for himself is satisfied."
>
> There was great laughter and clapping of hands. Some people said 'Let us give the pound'. The meeting then closed. (118)

Alarmed at Mpanza's continued activism the Council passed a resolution stating its intention to deport Mpanza. In so doing they intended to violate one of the conditions of the agreement made on Saturday April 1st, which was that "no prosecutions would be instituted against the leaders or any members of the community with regards to the migration."

Support came for Mpanza from the Africanist Youth League which appears to have admired him, probably as an independant black leader and more specifically, they possibly saw him as an Africanist.

> "Mr. Mpanza's conduct throughout has been exemplary and responsible, in spite of the exeedingly difficult position in which he and his people found themselves." (119)

On election day then the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance was under considerable pressure - the A.D.P. from the Communist Party and the A.N.C., and Mpanza under threat of deportation. There was a much greater

interest in the election than was usual and a higher percentage poll. (120)

In what must have been a shock fo the Communist Party and for the Council authorities, the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance soundly defeated the Communists. They contested on a joint slate of two Sofasonke - Mpanza and Lucas P. Kumalo, and two African Democrats - G.G. Xolile and J.P. Mophiring. (121)

This showed very definite and strong support for the Sofasonke Party and A.D.P. and the actions they had taken. It was support in spite of negative propoganda against them from the Council, the hardship and the conflicts inside the camp. In particular, it was a personal triumph for Mpanza himself.

> "To those who know, there can be no doubt that but for his popularity the Democratic Party candidates would have been defeated." (122)

But although significant it was only half a victory. For the support it represented was that of registered tenants in the permanent houses of Orlando and Orlando West only. Because thousands of families were still living in Shantytown they were not registered voters as voting rights were restricted to those who could produce Council rent receipts paid up to the end of the month preceding elections. They paid no rent. To make matters worse, those who had moved into the shelters, although paying 5 shillings per month also could not vote as this also was not for rent but rather for sanitary and water services. The Returning Officer thus refused permission for the shelter dwellers to vote. (123) The test of the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. support in Advisory Board elections was to come a year later. The Council could console itself for the meantime with the belief that Mpanza was perhaps seen by the squatters at least as a brutal despot, if not by the residents in the permanent houses. After all, it was the squatters who had had first hand experience of his regime.

The Communist Party were now faced with clear evidence of the significance of their failure to actively support the Shantytown movement. While the board was of course not the sole target of their political organisation as they had consistently proclaimed, it was,

however, a useful platform and a reasonable indicator of broader political shocks. They had begun to pay the price for their mistake, but like the Council could also wait to see which way the Shantytown squatters would go when they could vote. With Communist presence in Shantytown at a minimum their stakes did not look promising.

The A.D.P.'s flagging credibility was further deflated when Mosaka and Kumalo of the Orlando Workers' Transport Action Committee appeared in court in January, 1945 on charges of organising the flopped march to town in contravention of the proclamation banning gatherings. They were acquitted on the grounds

> "That there was no evidence to show that a procession to town was being planned."! (124)

Meanwhile the Council's attempts to provide temporary shelter for the squatters was running into further difficulties. The log cabins erected as a cement-free substitute to the breeze-block shelters, proved to be a failure when they were flooded out by a heavy downpour on then ight of the 18th January. Only 44 had been erected so far and only 17 of these occupied.

> "The rain poured through as if there was no house here at all," said one of the women.

The breeze-blocks on the other hand stood up well to the rain. The inhabitants had made them more comfortable with soil and manure plaster and women were building verandahs outside their front doors. Some had decorated the walls. (125)

An attempt was made to waterproof the log cabins while trying to get further supplies of cement.

With the leaks and the cost of 400% more for log cabins than breeze-block shelters, the Council decided on 27th February to continue building with breeze blocks. (126)

In Shantytown,

> "some of the sacking and corrugated huts improvised by the Shantytown dwellers are so congested that it is impossible to wheel even a small barrow between them to clear away debris. In some places up to a dozen huts are almost pasted together in an unhealthy mass. By demolishing huts the authorities have now cleared four roads through the close-packed encampment."

In spite of congestion Shantytown was kept clean by a constant day and night service by four whites and 100 blacks. Thirty trucks removed rubbish every day and night-soil removal was carried out twice every 24 hours. (127)

At Orlando West progress was being made with the permanent houses but there was still a labour shortage. (128)

This shortage was in part due to white building unions preventing blacks from being employed as artisans. (129)

To make matters worse a dispute between the contractors and about 50 bricklayers over the men's daily output has resulted in the bricklayers stopping work. They were then sacked. The other aritsans, carpenters and plasterers, continued to work. (130)

There were more heavy rains on the 2nd of February which even penetrated the breeze-block shelters. (131)

In spite of considerable pressure on the Council and its attempts to defuse the situation by showing some progress in providing housing, no houses had been built in Orlando in 1943 and 1944. (132) Mpanza was able to exploit the housing shortage.

> "On Sunday the 18th day of February, 1945, at about 8.30 a.m. Mr. James Mpanza held a meeting of more than two thousand men, women and children at 'Shantytown' Square, where he addressed them. He said that he was sent by God to take the Bantu people to 'Shantytown', and he wanted to know from them whether these people are still following this messenger of God, if not he will leave the place in peace, but if they still wish to complete the duty that he is sent to do he would like them to take cards from him and pay their money to his Office in Shanty, for if they do this he was going to give them new houses, and do the job that God has sent him to do." (133)

By March 1945, almost a year later, Shantytown was down to about 2 000 families, half the original number.

The major problem had shifted from materials which were gradually becoming available, to the labour shortage. There was only about 1/10th of the skilled labour required at Orlando West. Building was also going on at Pimville where 100 houses were being built. (134)

There were further problems at the Shelters when a new block of twenty four rooms which had reached roof height, collapsed in the heavy rains. (135)

The labour shortage was being made worse at Orlando West as the joint executive of the building trade unions were maintaining a boycott against any of their members working there. This was because the 34 bricklayers had not been reimbursed for the working time they had lost during their dispute with the contractor.

Defeated in the Advisory Board elections the Communist Party remained active. A. Msitshana, Mofutsanyana, Moema and Masupha were arrested in Orlando when they organised a meeting to discuss the employment of blacks in skilled trades. At the meeting they said that building was going too slowly while 'the people' suffered. (136)

Mpanza too found himself in court again when 6 people were charged with trading illegally in Shantytown. The Council had erected a temporary market building on the outskirts of Shantytown and given licences to non-residents. This was intended to cut away some of Mpanza's revenue and prestige. However, as stalls inside the camp were more conveniently accessible and because the Council's market did not carry a wide range of items, the squatters continued to buy from their fellow squatters. The Council's response was to try to break their hold by prosecuting these traders.

Mpanza gave evidence that the traders were employed by the central depot run on a non-profit basis by the Shantytown Committee and that they were paid 2 Pounds per week. They only sold to Shantytown dwellers who were required to produce their 2s6d receipt before being allowed to buy. They were found guilty but discharged by a sympathetic magistrate as they were clearly managers and because he felt that the system did more good than harm. (137) Mpanza's intelligent petition on behalf of the traders and

his familiarity with the law must have counted in their favour. Once again he had proved his ability to protect his followers from the law.

Back at Orlando West there were a few more bricklayers at work and the situation was marginally improved. About 60 rooms were being completed per week at the shelters and this was being helped along with the use of black semi-skilled labour. 876 rooms had been completed by mid-April. This continued, with families being transferred from Shantytown as they built, and Shantytown shrinking as vacated shacks were demolished. (138)

Towards the end of May the cold weather began again. In what was a very rare occasion for the area, snow fell on the Rand covering the landscape in stark black and white and plunging the still 10 000 inhabitants of Shantytown back into a state of crisis again. The relief depot organised by four missions the previous winter was re-opened.

> "Last week melting snow penetrated the sackcloth 'roofs' of many huts, and the people had to sleep in damp beds or under damp blankets on the mud floors. Many families huddled over braziers, the women holding their babies in an all-night vigil to keep them warm." (139)

Relief measures were again instituted and with the experience of the previous year and at least half the squatters in the shelters, the situation was easier to control.

At Pimville too there were developments. By June, 28 of the 100 houses ordered had been completed and the first 15 families had been transferred from the tanks. These had been lived in as 'temporary' since the removals from 'Coolie Town' in 1904 and were only being replaced and demolished after 41 years. It was the Shantytown squatter movement that the Pimville tank dwellers could thank.

At Orlando West 76 houses had now been completed and 1 468 rooms at the shelters. An equal number of families had moved into them. (140)

With some of the promised housing beginning to materialise although very slowly, the start of the first phase in the struggle of the people of Orlando for better conditions had given a moral victory to them. While

of course adequate housing and the rate at which it was built were still issues of the forties to be fought out, gains had been made and the format of struggle had been established. This struggle was part and parcel of the process of urbanisation and more specificially of proletarianisation as the foundations of the industrial proletariat were being laid. This was their first major community based struggle, i.e. for houses. With a foot in the door, within the heart of the first successes of this phase, already the seeds of the next and higher phase of struggle were being sown.

The Council announced in June, 1945 that the rents for the new Orlando West houses were to be much higher. These were to be 3 Pounds per month for a 4-roomed house where the rents for similar older houses were 1 Pound 8s.6d.

The Communist Party immediately protested that in view of the low wages and the high cost of food, clothing, transport and other necessities, the new houses would be barred to the majority of black workers while housing needs were more acute than ever. Said Mofutsanyana, 'the new rents are a scandal.' (141)

There were some, however, who could afford the new rent. The war had hastened the rise of a black middle class of traders and professional men in the black townships and in Johannesburg itself. Their number was growing rapidly with already 500 black storekeepers on the Rand.

In Orlando in the Council's market close to Shantytown were the small but successful grocers and butcher shops, 'cash bazaars' and general dealers. There were also two bigger stores in Orlando. (142)

But although growing the interests of this group were not significant enough to meaningfully alter the fact of the inaccessability of these rents to the majority of blacks who were working class. Even the Council had to admit the facts. At a Council meeting the Chairman of the NEAC, James Gray, said that 32 out of 50 black families who had recently been moved into the new houses could not afford these 'sub-economic' rents. (143)

The Independent Committee took the opportunity to raise complaints about the rents being charged for the shelters, and about the allocation of new shelters. The superintendent responded by withdrawing his recognition of the Independent Committee, saying that he would only deal with the Advisory Board, on which the squatters were not directly represented as they had been excluded from voting. In so doing he simply returned to dealing with the parties which had constituted the original Management Committee, as it was the Sofasonke Party and A.D.P. who controlled the Board. (144)

The Council continued to build, completing another 200 shelters and 50 houses. (145) When these families had been moved there were only 1 000 of the original inhabitants left in Shantytown.

On the 15th July the Orlando Branch of the A.N.C. held its annual meeting. It was addressed by the Transvaal President, C.S. Ramohanoe, who said that,

> "Congress was doing its best to re-organise and the branches must take the day-to-day issues to the people. Committees must meet regularly and report to the Provincial Committee."

It was reported that a new A.N.C. branch had been started in Pretoria. While a step in the right direction, in focussing on day-to-day issues, Ramohanoe's speech still showed something of the elitist attitude of the A.N.C. Despite the fact that the collective action in the early 1940's owed little to the established political organisations, he still felt that the A.N.C. had 'to take these issues to the people' rather than learn from the lessons provided by popular protest.

Orlando A.N.C. Branch officials elected were D.Tloome, chairman; S. Msitshana, vice-chairman (also a member of the Communist Party); P.B. Moloi, secretary; Ngidi, assistant secretary; J. Majoro, organising secretary; and B.B. Ngculo, treasurer. (146)

Up to the elections the meeting went well. What followed was a micro-cosm of the poltical forces at the time and an indicator of what was to come.

> "As the conference was scheduled for 10 o'clock in the morning and did not begin until 1 p.m., nobody thought that any delegates could still be coming in the afternoon. But at 3 p.m. a group of African men, women and children were seen approaching the hall, with Mr. J.S. Mpanza, galloping in front on a white horse. As usual, he did not come in. He passed as his procession entered the hall.
>
> What happened then made one think that there are some Nazis amongst our people.
>
> Mr. L.P. Kumalo, the leader of the group, who is only equal to Dr. Malan and Dr. van Rensburg in his hatred of the Communist Party and the Jews, immediately demanded from the Chairman that the elections be re-opened.
>
> Mr. A.M. Lembede, who throughout the earlier part of the conference was lying low, now went over to the offensive. Mr. A. Msitshana became his target. He moved that the election of Vice-Chairman be reopened and contested again. The supporters of Mr. Kumalo were shouting 'Communist Jews!' until they were hoarse."

Mr. Kumalo, who was one of the candiates for the position of Treasurer, was five hours late, as he was still collecting his supporters, and organising them to come and join the Congress for the purpose of voting for him. When the Chairman announced that the election was over, the candidate became very unruly.

The Chairman, however, stuck to his guns. He had been trying very hard to be as democratic as it was possible with these unruly gentlemen. Their demand for the elections to be re-opened was out of order since some people had been waiting for the conference since 10 o'clock. The Chairman eventually ruled that the people who had been elected earlier in the conference were properly constituted office-bearers.

This made the opposition very wild. They demanded back the money they had contributed in membership dues." (147)

While there was some overlap between the Communist Party and A.N.C., apart from the absurdity of calling them Jews, the A.N.C. could hardly be called Communist. The alliance between the A.N.C. and Communists was, however, in an embryonic state but was only to mature in the early fifties. For the Sofasonke Party, the antagonism shown for the Communist

Party was nothing new but its condemnation of the A.N.C. was the forewarning of a more conscious divergence that was to follow.

The conference also revealed the latent tensions emerging from one of the fathers of Africanism in the actions of Lembede. This was the second instance where support had come for Mpanza from the Africanist Youth League which had been under Lembede's presidency since September 1944. (148)

> "In a very practical sense, Mpanza typified the 'Africanism' which Lembede was trying to express in his writings. Lembede tried to make this philosophy political - Mpanza acted it out in the streets, and on the veld." (149)

Lembede obviously saw the arrival of the Sofasonke Party at the meeting as support for his stand and given some of the crudities of the Sofasonke politics it points to some of the pitfalls to which Africanism as an ideology lends itself.

In Parliament the draft of the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act was being read which was proposing to officially allow balacks to help in the building of black housing only. (150) The state was desperately looking for a way to reduce housing costs and make available skilled labour.

It was anxiety over the rising cost of housing that was compelling the Council to try to recoup some of the cost from rents. In the face of the protest, obviously low wages and the Council's desire to bring the squatting problem under control, when the new rents were finally announced in August they were lower than was first stated. Rent for a 4-roomed house was 2 Pounds 10s. Furthermore, these rentals were 'only provisional' and the Manager of NEAD said it was hoped that reductions would be possible later.

As these rents were still high, the Council attempted to get around the problem, and that of sub-letting which was difficult to control. They would carefully select tenants for the new houses from among those of existing houses who required more space and were in a position to pay high rentals.

The Council also corrected the regulation which had excluded shelter dwellers from voting in the Advisory Board elections by defining the 5 shillings paid for sanitary and water services, as rent. (151)

Pressing ahead along established elitist paths of 'economic freedom' the A.N.C. conferred a meeting of black businessmen. The meeting was very much concerned with trading rights in the townships. The meeting agreed that

> "the All African Business Association be formed under Congress as a Department of Commerce of that organisation."

They sought to create a 'big, strong African National Chamber of Commerce.' (152)

At the A.N.C. (Transvaal) Annual Provincial Conference held on 29th September it was reported that there had been an increase in membership though not of branches for the year. This meant that established branches were swelling. However, Orlando was not amongst these. With branches divided between

> "(a) those which 'are active and on the way to progress and also taking the initiative in the struggle against oppression',
> (b) those 'which are not active' and
> (c) those which are 'very inactive'"

Orlando was among the last. (153) The A.N.C. was still overly concerned with policies which could not take it through to a mass base, although there had been some involvement in supporting or advising squatters at Alberton, Zuurbekom and Komatipoort, (154) and some interest in the anti-pass movement.

By October the last of the families had been moved out of the shacks and into the shelters and Shantytown was no more. (155)

In Orlando election time was coming round again. Keen to get an early start, the Communist Party held its second meeting to announce its candidates for the Advisory Board elections at the Shelters where residents could now vote on Sunday, 7th October. The Sofasonke Party set about actively sabotaging their meeting.

> "As the leaflets calling the meeting were distributed on Saturday, the 6th, a group of mischief makers styling themselves the Sofasonke Party, got to know about the meeting. They went round telling the people that they must come and sign for the new houses on Sunday at the same place where the Communist Party was holding the meeting.
>
> Early in the morning the people who were hoodwinked into the belief that they were signing for houses started queuing up in order to get the first chance. The leaders knew there were no houses, but that they were calling the people to come and interfere with the election campaign of the Communist Party. In oder to avoid trouble the Party speakers went to a different place, where they opened the meeting. The crowd rapidly grew, and this was too much for these would-be politicians. They attempted to incite the people against the speakers to break up the meeting, but failed. They started their own platform with one or two speakers but they soon got tired. At 2.30 p.m. the Communist Party speakers led a procession through the streets which terminated with cheers for the Communist Party." (156)

The Communist Party felt that it was receiving a favourable response from residents to its house to house canvassers. They were discovering many who had lived in Orlando for years and never voted. But the Party was having problems motivating its members.

> "Many comrades are not taking the election seriously, they do not go out canvassing at all. To expect 7 or 10 comrades to canvass over 10 000 voters is out of the question."

The Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance appeared to be undergoing a re-evaluation which Communist Party propoganda interpreted as weakness. (157)

The Communist Party also sought to propagate their policies with discussions and speeches in the streets. Their activities invoked a vitriolic attack from the newspaper Umteteli wa Bantu, sponsored by the Chamber of Mines, which favoured the outgoing Sofasonke/A.D.P. Board.

> "'For the past three weeks members of the Communist Party have been showing their loyalty by going from house to house cavassing for votes. In doing so, they have not been slow to draw their visibly scarlet party line across the locations.

> Processions are the order of the day. Men and women may be seen on Sundays moving up and down the streets in an attempt to convert people to their particular creed.' Talking about women, the article continues, 'It is a great pity that these noble creatures have allowed themselves to be used by the menfolk in these political games which are so much Greek to them [the women]! In the processions I have mentioned,' the writer goes on, 'the women provide the 'hear, hears' as the men make speeches. Some of these poor women don't quite know what this is all about. They have a hazy idea that their menfolk are seeking election to some parliament whose main purpose is to bring to them the free unrestricted brewing and consumption of Kaffir Beer.
>
> The retiring members of the Board have really done a magnificent piece of work.'" (158)

The Communist Party was quick to defend its Orlando Advisory Board candidates through its organ, Inkululeko.

> "Regarding the noble creatures who do not understand anything about elections, we consider this an insult to the African women. If African women were allowed to represent the residents of Orlando, they would do better than the out-going members of the board ...
>
> The outgoing members of the board who have now finally decided to stick together and go down as a bloak, are now nervous about the elections. The Orlando Branch of the Communist Party has gone all out, and the campaign has been intensified. The old song about the Communist Party being a Jewish party is so stale that nobody worries about it among the voters. Even the Shantytown recitation which was used last year to cover up the terrible political deficiencies, has now been wiped out but the endless taxations that even the Government has never asked for so frequently, the poor people at the breeze-block shleters have been paying more than any other people have ever paid for proper houses. The outgoing board knows better about it if not behind it."

The article accuses the old board of deliberately changing

> "the day on which the monthly meetings of the Board were taking place, and which was more amitable (sic) for the residents to come and listen to the debates of the board members, these meetings have once more been made private to the credit of the Boards." (159)

The Communist Party raised the question of the undemocratic way in which votes were cast. Apart from voting being restricted to tenants who could produce rent receipts for the current year and women being excluded, they questioned the actual voting procedure. This was done by voters calling out the names of the candidates they favoured to an election officer, who recorded their votes. The voters had no way of checking whether their votes had been correctly recorded and the township superintendent and police had tended to be present in the past.

This intimidated voters and deterred many from voting Communist for fear of the repercussions. There was also no check on the counting of votes. The Communist Party candidates were Mofutsanayana, Msitshana, Moema and Masupha. (160) They reflected the growing overlap between Communist Party and A.N.C. with both the first two being prominent A.N.C. men as well.

So strong was their campaign that before the elections people in Orlando were wondering whether they had any effective opposition. The opposition had not been canvassing, they held very few meetings, and published virtually no manifestos. The only candidate who published a 'small and unreadable Zulu manifesto' was Mpanza, asking the residents to vote for him and his 'boys'. (161)

The Sofasonke Party had decided to remain with the A.D.P. for the election. They fielded the same candidates as the previous year, namely Mpanza, Kumalo, Mophiring and Xorile.

> "Their election manifesto stressed two points: the possible extension of the passes to women when the control of these documents was transferred to the City Council, and the need to make the Council provide housing for a further 30 000 Africans. The manifesto also warned that the Council planned to 'solve the problem (of those without houses) by expelling them from Johannesburg.'" (162)

There was tremendous enthusiasm at the election on the 23rd December. There was a clear victory for the Sofasonke Party/A.D.P. alliance. This was a significant indication to both the Council and the Communist Party of the strength of the alliance's support. It was also an indication of the strength of the Sofasonke Party's base when it wavered before

deciding to stay with the A.D.P. Although they decided that there was still an advantage to be gained in keeping the alliance, the A.D.P. were rapidly becoming more of a liability than an asset.

The position of the Communist Party was clearer and the lesson of Shantytown had been unequivocally taught. Although remaining active the Communist Party were unable to recapture what popular support they had enjoyed in the thirties and early forties.

The Council for its part had made marginal gains during 1945 having constructed 198 houses in Orlando and having completed 4 042 shelters and 73 blocks of communal latrines. Shantytown had been removed and the original population of 20 000 brought under Council control as registered tenants of the Orlando shelters. (163). It also had plans for the removal of the man who it saw as the instigator behind the squatter movement as it feared what he might be planning next. This fear was made more pressing because of the Council's difficulties in finding companies to build for it and supply materials. With competition and still the shortage of materials, these tended to go to other long-standing and commercial interests. (164) This was slowing down the Coucil's ability to deliver the goods and increasing the possibility of further action on the part of the masses.

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CHAPTER 4 : MORE SQUATTERS, MPANZA FIGHTS DEPORTATION, THE A.N.C. REVIVING, AND THE SOFASONKE PARTY SUPREME IN ORLANDO, 1946 - 1949

Before the dust had settled after the elections for 1946, the Johannesburg City Council through its informers, alleged that Mpanza had already begun to organise a new squatter movement. N.E.A.D. claimed to have received numerous reports that Mpanza and other Board members were involved. (1)

An observer claimed that at a meeting on 17th January, 1946 they were told by Xorile to unite as one body.

> He said, 'you must understand there is no Communist Party, or Sofasonke Party: we must just all of us be one to fight against the Council.' Mpanza said, 'Now you tenants of this township must take out all your sub-tenants; kick them out; put them in front of your doors in the street. I, Mpanza, will go and fetch the Superintendent and authorities to come and see all the people outside in the street. You people must not say that it was we, the board, who are telling you to get out.' We went from there believing we were all one." (2)

Another affidavit claims Mpanza said further,

> "'If you hide the sub-tenants in your house, the authorities will not see them: get them out and the authorities will know they are there and the day all the sub-tenants are thrown out the Advisory Board will go and call the Superintendent and Council and say, 'look at your people outside in the streets.'
>
> There was a message sent round the whole township that all the sub-tenants must be thrown out. There were runners in the trains advising the people to throw out all the sub-tenants." (3)

On the 23rd January, Mpanza, Lucas Kumalo and G.G. Xorile called on the Manager of N.E.A.D. and informed him that they had been instructed by the tenants of Orlando that it was their desire -

1. (a) That the Council endeavour to obtain sufficient tents from the Defence Department for the housing of Orlando sub-tenants; or

(b) failing the provision of the tents, that the Council make land available in Orlando where sub-tenants could lease stands and build their own dwellings.

2. To present an ultimatum to the Council that unless a satisfactory answer to these proposals was received by not later than the 28th January, the tenants would sumarily eject all sub-tenants.

The Advisory Board members claimed to be merely carrying out a mandate, although the Council was suspicious of them. (4)

Meanwhile, say the Council reports, Mpanza continued to organise.

> "Yesterday, Friday, the 25th January, 1946, I went to Mpanza's house in Orlando at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. With me were five other women who also were anxious to find houses. When we arrived Mpanza asked me what I wanted and I said 'I want a house.' Mpanza replied 'I have no house.' Another woman stated, 'I have come to join.' Mpanza replied, 'Right, if you join give me some money.' The women paid 10/-. Other women followed suit and said they wanted to 'join' and also paid whatever they could afford. Two women paid 10/-, one paid 7/6, one paid 9/-, one paid 2/6 and I paid 5/-. After we had paid our 'tax' Mpanza gave us receipts. He then said to us 'I want you to understand that I do not promise to give you houses, but I need money to go to Pretoria and fight the authorities in order to get a house. To go to Pretoria I need money for my fare, and while I am away my children will starve unless I have money to buy them food in my absence. The money you paid me today is very little indeed, and will never be sufficient to cover all my expenses. You must understand that if you want me to fight for you, you must come prepared to pay me more money, but even if you should pay me 2 Pounds as some people do, I still cannot promise to give you houses, but all I can say to you is that if I win, you win with me, and if I fail, you fail with me, and you cannot ask me to return your money.'
>
> After this Mpanza said 'You are now soldiers. You have joined forces with me and you will die where I die.' We then repeated, 'Yes, Chief, we are your soldiers. We have joined with you - we shall die where you die.'"

Mpanza urged them to attend the public meeting on the 27th with the Council officials. (5)

A meeting was first called by the Council for the 26th to discuss black housing. This was chaired by the Mayor of Johannesburg and attended by three Council Committees, thirty six members of the Advisory Boards, the Chief Magistrate, the Director of Labour, the Native Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, representatives of the Residents' Committee, the Progressive Association, the Communist Party, the Independent Party, the Vigilance Association, the Teachers Association, and others.

Discussion lasted for three hours during which Advisory Board members also raised various social, economic and political injustices.

The Chairman summarised the outcome of the meeting by saying that there was a need for land so that blacks could build for themselves. He and other Councillors undertook to attend a mass meeting the following day, and that the problem would receive urgent attention. (6)

The mass meeting of 10 000 people took place on Sunday the 27th as planned at which the Council representatives explained that they were having difficulties in providing solutions to the housing problems but asked that the people suspend any action for thirty days while the Council gave the matter urgent attention. The black chairman of the meeting told the Council representatives that this had been agreed to and they then left. Mpanza who was at the meeting, however, had expressed dissent. The Chairman, as was the practice at such meetings, summarised the outcome as an overall agreement and wrote to the Council indicating so. This left an air of ambiguity as to what was actually resolved at the meeting. (7)

Another report by a Communist Party member says that on the same day Mpanza held another meeting, chaired probably by his ally Xorile, so as to retain control of the meeting. Mpanza said that 'Although the Communist Party was a large body it had been divided in South Africa.' He told the people of the Council's 'false promises'. If they failed to get the sub-tenants out, the matter was in their own hands.

> "What happened on the 28th January, 1946, is something that had been decided upon a long time before ... The people already knew that they had to go out on the 28th January, 1946. The meeting was merely a camouflage ... What is hurting me, is how long shall Mpanza go on riding the Communist Party and riding the Council. We, the Communist Party are still trying to stop him doing so, and today we have followers. Mpanza is afraid of nobody and certainly not the Communist Party. He knows that when he is in Orlando he is chief and says 'I am God.'" (8)

After an easy win at the elections and now more sure than ever after this public demonstration of support for him from Orlando East, West and the Shelters, Mpanza was beginning to take advantage of his position in order to continue undermining the Communist Party. The other smaller groupings in Shantytown which he had to contend with but which were now falling behind were the Basuto Advisory and Protective Committee, the Shantytown Vigilance Committee, the Shantytown Residents Committee, The Shantytown Independent Committee and the Shantytown Progressive Association. (9)

To this day there is uncertainty as to what exactly Mpanza's role in what followed was. Although the A.D.P. was still in alliance with the Sofasonke Party, Mpanza did not always inform his allies of his next move. Nor did he always stick with what was arranged. Says Xorile, talking of this incident,

> "it was difficult to work with Mpanza. After an agreement he would surprise you." (10)

Xorile did not know what Mpanza was up to on the eve of January 27th, 1946.

The Reverend O.S.D. Mooki who joined the Sofasonke Party at about this time, says Mpanza,

> "appointed one of his lieutenants, Chief Edward Kumalo, as leader of a second exodus." (11)

Whatever the truth is, on the night of the 28th January, in darkness and pelting rain, 2 000 to 3 000 people occupied by force forty or more half-completed and fifteen completed municipal houses at Orlando West.

Thirty to fifty people huddled together in a single house. Most of them were sub-tenants from Orlando who had been evicted. Members of the Orlando Advisory Board were at the scene that night and tried to dissuade them from occupying the buildings. In a change of heart Mofutsanyana was on the scene all night offering support.

The next morning they were warned by municipal officials that they would have to move, but they refused to do so. The squatters emphasised that they had been evicted.

> "Is it likely that we would walk out into the rain and the night without furniture, beds, cooking utensils or even something to make a fire?"

asked a woman with a baby strapped to her back.

A spokesman for the squatters added;

> "we cannot get back into the houses in Orlando because the occupiers will not let us. There are not enough houses here with roofs to accommodate us. The only way to shelter these poor people is to get tents at once, to have more breeze block rooms built and then to get on much more quickly with the building of the houses."

He and others said there had been up to sixteen people living in the Orlando houses and eight to ten in the breeze block rooms. As sub-tenants they paid 10/- or slightly more per month. (12)

Vendor's carts soon arrived to sell food and women began cooking over fires in front of the houses. (13)

The Council was dismayed that in spite of the agreed thirty days grace, the sub-tenants had been ejected only twenty four hours afterwards. One explanation suggested that the confusion about how the mass meeting had ended and the widespread publication of the resolution of the 23rd, led tenants to believe that this resolution was being put into effect so that evictions rapidly spread.

The result of this was that a crowd gathered in front of the Superintendent's office, numbering eventually 4 000 to 5 000. When weather threatened, they occupied the houses. (14)

Fed information by their informers and already suspicious of Mpanza, the Council felt that the exodus was a concerted move aimed at forcing it into an impossible situation.

This appeared to be confirmed by a Star reporter who found that the squatters could not give the address of the house from which they had been ejected. None had complained to the Superintendent as was usual in the case of evictions.

The Council was adamant instead that it was a concerted arrangement

> "in which either or both landlords and sub-tenants figured, or were inspired to move out by some influence behind the scenes ... It is alleged that one influence behind the scenes is a native who according to evidence accumulating in the files of the authorities, exploits simple minded natives in Orlando. The law-abiding natives consider his influence dangerous."

Unable to believe the degree of overcrowding, the Council was also convinced that at least half the squatters were not from Orlando houses, but rather from other areas.

Closer investigation showed that many of the squatters did not sleep out around the houses every night, but would go away after dark to spend the night at friends' houses, and then return shortly after dawn.

The occupation of the houses had wider ramifications as it led to fears among sub-tenants in surrounding townships that it would upset the quota system and Orlando residents would get more of the completed houses than was agreed they would be allocated. (15)

The Council hurriedly went into conference on the 30th January. It was hoped that quick action would contain the situation. But the Chief Magistrate opposed ejectment as the police did not have sufficient means to be able to clear the houses and then prevent re-occupation. This would only further weaken authority. There was also no alternative accommodation. The Magistrate advocated instead that action be taken against Mpanza, Xorile and Lucas Kumalo. The Manger of NEAD, Venables, and the Director of Native Labour agreed to go immediately to Pretoria to obtain a deportation order against Mpanza. They also wanted to warn the

other two. This course of action was endorsed at a Council meeting on the same day.

Meeting with Government officials in Pretoria, the Johannesburg Council delegates argued emphatically that if the squatters were ejected from the houses and prevented from re-occupying them, the whole movement would collapse of its own accord and the squatters would return to the houses they came from. This would particularly be successful if timed to coincide with the removal of Mpanza. The Council members saw the action as a trial of strength rather than emanating from legitimate grievances. Hence the call for force.

The Government would not agree to ejectment unless some alternative were offered, but it was unanimously agreed that with Mpanza's history and the warning given to him the previous year, that he should be removed. (16)

Back at Orlando West the ranks of the squatters were swelling as more sub-tenants joined them. (17)

On Friday, 1st February, Mosaka was invited to address a conference called by the Council to discuss the situation. He stated that from his investigations he was satisfied that allegations appearing in the press about subversive influences working behind the scenes encouraging the squatters, were correct. He agreed that the squatters had not been ejected by the Orlando tenants but had moved voluntarily. He said he was prepared to try to mobilize 'decent public opinion' to counteract these 'evil influences' which were exploiting the situation for private gain. (18)

Desperate for solutions, the NEAC decided to set aside 100 plots near Orlando on which blacks could build houses for themselves. They would be helped with materials but would not be allowed to build for other blacks. It was hoped that if this experiment was successful, more would be allowed. (19)

Mosaka, who as a native representative, had become the go-between for the Council and the squatters, also met with the Johannesburg Joint Advisory Boards and the special emergency committee of the Council. At this

meeting it was decided to let black representatives offer formulae for solving the Orlando problem. (20)

At Orlando West on the 3rd February, with an already delicate situation with the builders, the influx of squatters was threatening building even further. The builders were threatening to 'down tools' by the next day because of the 'unhygienic conditions' on the site caused by the squatters. (21)

On the same day the Superintendent read the Emergency Regulations to the squatters and warned them to vacate the houses. (22)

Repercussions in surrounding townships were beginning to surface. In Pimville a demonstration by women in front of the Superintendent's office complained that they feared losing their allocation of housing to the Orlando squatters. The Superintendent assured them that they would get their total allocation. (23)

On the 4th February, the squatters left the incomplete houses in Orlando West and about 1 000 congregated in and around the Orlando East Communal Hall. There they had access to water and sanitation. The move averted the threatened strike of the builders. (24)

Meeting with the Council's emergency committee on the 6th, Mosaka presented his formula to solve the recent squatter deadlock. This formula and the Council's reply were to be read to the squatters at the Communal Hall at 5 p.m. that day. They were also given an ultimatum to leave the area by 6 p.m. the following day.

Of Mosaka's formula the Council agreed that Pimville tenants would get their agreed upon allocation of houses and that they would discuss the allocation of houses with the Joint Advisory Boards. They disagreed with the suggestion that they provide temporary shelters as they did with Shantytown for reasons of 'public health, sanitation and priority on the waiting list.' They were instead determined to press ahead with the provision of permanent housing. Finally they agreed to add the names of the Communal Hall squatters to the waiting list. (25)

On the same day, however, an order for Mpanza's removal to the farm "Coldplace", in the District of Ixopo, Natal, was issued. (26) Xorile and Lucas Kumalo were also given a warning.

That evening the meeting was held at the Hall, attended by 4 000 to 5 000 squatters. They listened quietly and patiently as they were given the ultimatum to leave by 6 p.m. the next day. (27)

The Council was on edge. They were told that the squatters would refuse to leave. To make matters worse, in a statement of solidarity, sub-tenants from Pimville and Eastern and Western Native Townships, threatened to come out and squat in sympathy with the Orlando squatters. (28)

With a tone of desperation the chairman of N.E.A.C. said,

> "The Council will not be intimidated by these people. We cannot tolerate this situation any longer. In my opinion if the police remove the root of the evil, which is the agitators behind this movement, the whole matter will simmer down." (29)

As the day wore on and the tension mounted, so did the militancy of sympathetic sub-tenants from the surrounding township. They changed their statement to say that

> "if there was any fighting at Orlando they would come to Orlando and help."

As 6 p.m. approached there was great tension among the squatters and the crowd that came to see what would happen.

> "Just before 6 p.m. yesterday, the squatters, called together by a peremptory whistle, gathered round a choirmaster armed with a shield and a pick-axe as a baton, and sang their nightly chant ... 'We, Xhosas, Zulus, Sesutos, want a place to live.'"

Zero-hour passed without sign of the police and tension eased.

It was found out that Mosaka had called a meeting of about 600 tenants that day, at which they denied having ejected their sub-tenants. They agreed to take them back on condition that the Council give a written assurance that they would be allowed to extend their own houses at their own expense and to give the squatters space in their yards to erect temporary shacks. They also declared their support for the squatters. On the basis of this, Mosaka persuaded the Council to extend the ultimatum to Sunday, the 12th June while considering the tenant's offer. (30)

However, many of the squatters disagreed with Mosaka's proposal that they return to sub-tenancy and preferred to remain at the Communal Hall site.

Their objection was that sub-tenants were in a semi-illegal position in the township and had no vote in Advisory Board elections, such as is accorded to registered tenants. They disapproved of Mosaka negotiating on their behalf without being appointed by them. (31)

The next day the squatters continued to sit around the Communal Hall in damp drizzle. They were well disciplined and already had their own 'police boys' who wore red armbands with the sign 'S.V.' and controlled access to the fenced-off hall grounds. (32)

That night as they slept around the hall in the open, they were drenched in a heavy downpour. It rained again the next day, Sunday.

> "First one man put up a rough shelter along the fence, and then everyone started doing it."

They built about 150 shelters on the first day. These were made of sacking slung over poles. Meanwhile no action was taken on the extended deadline of Sunday, 6 p.m., as the Council was still considering the tenant's proposals. (33)

Meanwhile, unperturbed by his deportation order, Mpanza who was now the owner of some fine race horses, was participating in race meetings nearby. These were organised by the Orlando Horse Owner's Association of which he was an important member. The races were watched by many. (34)

By Monday the 11th, another 100 shelters had been added and people had dug furrows around their shelters to lead the water off.

The Council also rejected the tenants' proposals and a suggestion that the sqautters be moved into empty houses at Noordgesig. They argued that the houses were not empty but for 'coloureds' who also had a waiting list. (35)

On the 12th the Council succeeded by urgent representations and the lodging of further affidavits in persuading the Chief Magistrate to issue an Ejectment Order under the Emergency Regulations of 1944 passed especially to deal with cases of forcible trespass. The Superintendent of Orlando was authorised to remove the squatters from the hall, if necessary by force. There were by now 800 hessian shelters with more going up.

> "This morning, after gathering for the usual song-making which precedes each meeting, the squatters were addressed by one of their leaders. He told them that the white people might be coming out to evict them, and advised them to pull down the shelters and just sit about.
>
> A few minutes later he changed his mind and told the squatters to leave the shelters as they were, and to sit quietly and not to create any disturbance no matter what happens.
>
> Leaving an open circle immediately surrounding the hall, the natives have erected their shelters round the four sides of the fencing in rows two and three deep, in some instances leaving not even breathing space between each."

All arrangements to execute the order of removal were made but it was suspended at the last minute. No official explanation was given for the suspension. (36)

Mofutsanyana who was present suggested that they stage a march to town of all residents to see the Mayor and demand decent housing for all. This was greeted with great enthusiasm. He said that if the Orlando Communists and the present Board can get together on such an undertaking, they would rally the great majority of the people behind them.

> "We Orlando Communists will fight 'all out' against Mpanza's deportation. We do not agree with his methods and many of his policies. But he has been elected by the Orlando people. The principle of deportation is completely undemocratic." (37)

Mosaka was there with a member of the Orlando Advisory Board. He said that if the Government's Native Affairs Department had assumed responsibility in the matter of deporting Mpanza it should also assume responsibility for providing the squatters with homes.

A meeting of sympathisers was held at Mpanza's home that night to raise money to provide for his defence against the deportation order.

He had until the next afternoon to leave Johannesburg to go back to Natal, where he had come from.

The order was served on Mpanza by a Marshall Square detective under Section 5 of the Native Administration Act by which the Governor General might, whenever he deemed it expedient in the public interest, order the removal of any tribe, or portion thereof, or any black to any province or district within the Union upon such conditions as he might determine.

Mpanza had been given a rail warrant to Natal and he had been told that rail warrants would be issued to his family if he wished to take them with him. (38)

A letter from the Secretary of Native Affairs, enclosing a rail warrant told him he was being deported because he incited people to occupy land which was not their property. He could take clothes and property to the value of seventy five Pounds with him.

It was feared that the deportation of thousands more could follow. (39)

Representatives of various organisations met in the Communal Hall that night to protest against the deportation order and to demand immediate accommodation for the squatters. Never before or probably since has such a large and representative grouping from Orlando showed such unity on a single issue. A committee representing the A.N.C. (Transvaal), the A.D.P., the Communist Party, the A.N.C. Youth League, the African

Minister's Association, the Sofasonke Party, the African Trade Unions and the Orlando Advisory Board, afterwards issued a statement describing the deportion order against Mpanza as

> "undemocratic, high-handed and tactless, especially after the World War in which Africans participated and laid down their lives for the fundamental human rights which are now denied to Africans in the land of their birth."

The statement also expressed the opinion that the negotiations between the City Council and Mr. Mosaka revealed a keen desire on the part of blacks to arrive at a satisfactory settlement.

The Council on the other hand had rejected their proposals. (40)

Said Inkundla Ya Bantu,

> "Dr. Xuma has sent a wire to protest to General Smuts and so are other organisations preparing for co-ordinated action against this piece of tyranny borrowed from the Nazis." (41)

The Johannesburg District Committee of the Communist Party of South Africa sent a telegram to General Smuts and the Minister of Native Affairs, Major Piet van der Byl, protesting against the deportation of Mpanza as an

> "outrageous and undemocratic action against an elected representative of the largest native township in the Union."

They demanded the immediate withdrawel of the deportation order. (42)

With the Council failing to have taken action at Orlando, a new influx of people to join the squatters began on the morning of the 14th. The Council claimed to have found people from Witbank, Standerton, Kroonstad and Alexandra among the squatters.

> "If we go on like this the Johannesburg City Council will soon have to house the whole of the Native population of South Africa,"

said the Chairman of N.E.A.C. in panic. (43)

The Council feared the perceived conspiracy to be growing.

> "The organisers of the squatters appeared to have excellent lines of communication, both in the city and along the Reef, and little negotiation takes place, however sub judice, said an official, of which the squatters of their leaders are aware." (44)

Between 3 and 4 o'clock that afternoon Mpanza's attorney called on the Chief Native Commissioner for the Witwatersrand and told him that Mpanza was not prepared to leave and would test the validity of the order. (45)

The emergency committee of the Council was sent to Cape Town to see the Minister of Native Affairs. They were frustrated at the indefinite postponement of the ejectment order.

On the night of the 13th a large group of between three to five hundred people went in procession through Orlando Township waking up the residents with their singing and calling everyone to come and see Mpanza being taken away unjustly. The procession wound up at Mpanza's house where there was an 'indaba' with him and dancing.

The next morning there was again a demonstration of sympathy by a small group. (46)

The squatters around the hall continued to increase in number. The area within the Hall's grounds had become so conjested that people were lying outside the fence during the daytime. At night they all returned to the inside of the fence and mothers and babies were able to take shelter in the Hall.

The Council had appointed an employee to be responsible for the cleanliness of the camp. He estimated that it had grown by 250 shelters in the previous two days to 1 000.

Mpanza, who was supposed to have left Orlando by 5 a.m. that morning handed himself over to the police at Marshall Square at 9 a.m. He was accompanied by his lawyer and about fifty friends.

A collection of money from the squatters was made for Mpanza's defence. Each shelter was requested to provide 5 shillings, and 18 Pounds was collected on the first day.

Mpanza appeared in the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court on the 15th, charged with failing to comply with the order. The case was remanded to the 18th February. Bail was fixed at 10 Pounds. (47)

The response of the squatters to the failed ultimatum of ejectment was to see it as an attempt to trick them to leave the Hall. It hardened their resistence. With numbers continuing to swell, the encampment had now acquired the name of Hessian Town.

The Communist Party was now openly supporting the squatters. This was some distance since its first rejection of the Shantytown movement. The Communist Party slogans were, 'Houses for Everybody'; 'Accommodation for the Homeless'; and the 'Defence of Mpanza.'

They took the Sofasonke Party to task for its approach to this matter. As usual the Sofasonke Party was cutting its own path.

> "Unfortunately some of Mr. Mpanza's supporters are devoting themselves exclusively to collecting money for a legal defence fund. They fail to realise that this is a political matter, not merely a legal one. If Mpanza is deported even the small democratic freedoms now enjoyed by Non-Europeans are in grave peril ...
>
> Not the lawers, but the people's unity can prevent this action of the Government and thus defend African freedom." (48)

The Executive Committee of the A.N.C. Youth League added their voice to the protests against the deportation by sending a telegram to the Prime Minister on the 16th.

> "The A.N.C. Youth League protests against the deportation of Mpanza and demands the immediate withdrawal of the deportation order. The action is unwarranted and constitutes a violation of the principles of democracy for which thousands died." (49)

Back at the Hall the name of Edward Kumalo was beginning to emerge as one of the leaders of this movement. While it is clear that he was one of the leaders a question mark again remains on his relationship to Mpanza. He had been a Sofasonke supporter and was to receive support from Mpanza again at a later stage. He also gave evidence to a Government commission that he was merely a front man for the elected Orlando Advisory Board members and that they were behind the squatter movement. He said that their attempts to persuade the squatters to leave the houses at the start of the movement, and return to sub-tenancy were prearranged to disguise their involvement. Later he broke down and retracted this statement. The truth remains hidden.

Fearing that congestion would lead to complaints, Kumalo appointed a group of women armed with kieries and assegais to stop new squatters from entering the Hall grounds. They attempted to prevent any further shelters being erected.

On the steps of the Communal Hall was the headquarters of the 'Mpanza Defence Fund'. With the levy of 5 shillings on each shelter, 35 Pounds had been collected in the morning of the second day of the Fund. Some families preferred to leave rather than pay the 5 shillings. Those who had paid were given pink heart-shaped badges with a smaller heart in blue in the middle. (50)

Mpanza's trial began on the 18th. The Court was flooded with Sofasonke and other supporters and had to be moved to a larger room.

He was handed a letter from a woman sympathiser which read;

> "I wish you all the best today and remember that luck favours the brave."

Mpanza denied that it had been his intention to occupy the Orlando West houses. He said that on the contrary, he had warned Orlando residents at a normal weekly Advisory Board meeting that the Emergency Regulations of 1944 would enable the government to act against the squatters and that this would cause trouble.

He said that as an Advisory Board member he had delivered the ultimatum of the 23rd January to the Council as it was his duty to be 'the mouthpiece of the people.'

He claimed that rather than being the force behind the occupation of the houses, the people actually resented his attempts to pacify them and point out the Council's difficulties. (51)

On the same day as the start of the trial the Council received confirmation of their order to eject the Hessian Town squatters. This had been decided upon during the Emergency Committee's talks with the Minister of Native Affairs but was not disclosed until confirmed. (52)

The Council was now in a position to implement its long awaited for strategy in what it perceived as a trial of strength between subversive elements and itself. This strategy was to remove the 'agitators' and eject the squatters and keep them out long enough so that they would all go back to where they came from. This was supposed to solve the squatter problem. The Council seemed unable to see the cause of the problem as being genuine grass-roots grievences, a problem of basic necessities for the masses.

The order of ejectment was read to the squatters at 11 a.m. while Mpanza's court-case took place in town and many had gone to town to see the trial. Four hundred white policemen were watching from outside the grounds and two hundred black municipal police and labourers stood inside the grounds as the squatters were told they had fifteen minutes to leave the grounds with their household goods.

The Native Commissioner told the squatters that the Government had asked him to advise them to:

> "Obey the order. Leave the grounds quietly and of your own accord. Then go quietly back to where you came from."

Against such odds, and with probably most of the leadership away, the squatters capitulated. A woman jumped up and shouted;

> "Let there be no fighting. Let us get out goods and move out."

They got up quietly, gathered up all they could carry of their possessions and hessian houses, and left in a solemn procession by the main gate.

Within half an house Hessian Town was no more. Thousands of people from the Orlando houses watched in silence as municipal workers demolished the remaining shacks.

Many of the squatters crossed the road and dumped their belongings under bluegum trees on a common opposite the Communal Hall. They sat there waiting for further instructions from their leaders.

Some went off to see if they could return to the houses where they had lived as sub-tenants before. Others from outside Orlando took their possessions and went back to where they had come from.

But most remained on the common.

With tension in the air, armed white police were kept on standby at various points in Orlando.

At 1.45 p.m. Edward Kumalo addressed the squatters on the common saying that if necessary they would stay there for three weeks or more if they could get no other place to go to. There was no attempt to build shelters. (53)

The Council threatened to charge them under common law if they did so. (54)

The Council's only response by way of a solution was to reiterate its intention to set aside leasehold for blacks to build their own houses. Instead of 100 such lots they were now considering 250 for a site called Dube. (55)

With Mpanza's case continuing, he maintained in court that as he held a letter of exemption issued to him in 1908, the deportion order did not apply to him as he was not subject to Native Law. The case hinged on this and the fact that Mpanza was not given an opportunity to answer to the charges against him. The trial continued. (56)

By the 20th only about half of the Hessian Town squatters were left under the bluegum trees. They sat around their bundles of belongings, some using black umbrellas for shade against the hot sun.

Unable to understand the grass roots defiance and determination, the Council maintained that the squatters leaders were preventing them from leaving. The municipality continued to keep the area clean and prevent the squatters from erecting any shelters or comforts. (57)

By the next day the squatters had begun to regroup. Their numbers began to increase and they spread further out under the trees. The leaders had begun a census. At a table in the centre of the encampment, badges were feverishly being made. The badges were to indicate who had paid their membership fee of 5 shillings. There were still no shelters.

There were reports that there were moves in Sophiatown and Martindale to set up similar squatter organisations. A meeting had been arranged in Sophiatown for the afternoon of the 23rd February. (58) It was postponed on that day.

With his court case continuing Mpanza maintained an interest in what was happening in Orlando. He even found time to enter three of his horses in a gymkhana in the township. (59)

Many of the squatters were leaving the common at night to sleep in houses in the township, then returning in the morning to swell the numbers during the day. (60) Basner addressed a crowd of about 1 000 on the 24th.

> "I am going to advise not only the people of Orlando, but the people of all the other townships to do the same as you have done. I ask you not to give in, and not to do anything which might lead to a disturbance."

He told the crowd that the Council had stipulated that those who would be allowed to build at Dube had to earn between 16 Pounds and 26 Pounds a month. The Dube scheme was mean to provide homes for the squatters. When he asked for anyone in the crowd in earned 16 Pounds a month to raise their hands, there were no hands shown. (61)

On the 25th February, in a crowded courtroom, Mpanza was found guilty of failing to obey an order issued by the Governor General. He was fined 2 Pounds with the alternative of seven days in prison. Bail of 2 Pounds was allowed pending appeal which was to be noted within 24 hours. The Magistrate claimed that the exemption only referred to 'Native tribal laws' and not to laws especially affecting natives, therefore he was not exempt. He added that it was difficult to believe that Mpanza was not behind the recent squatter actions and that there was provision in the law to compel Mpanza to comply with the order for removal. The defence argued that this should not be done pending appeal. (62)

At 5.30 a.m. on the morning of the 28th February, Mpanza awoke to the sound of policemen knocking on his front door. He was placed under arrest and taken to Marshall Square. (63) From there he was taken under escort to the station.

Maintaing the offensive, Venables, the Manager of N.E.A.D. addressed the people encamped under the bluegums and told them officially that Mpanza had left, explained to them that they would gain nothing by remaining where they were, and advised them to return to the places they had come from. (64)

The Transvaal A.N.C. issued a statement on the same day calling for land and the right of black artisans to build houses for blacks. The statement shows that the Transvaal A.N.C. had by this stage realised the importance of this grass roots initiative. It also shows how widespread squatter action had become.

> "Congress regards the exodus at Orlando and the Shanty Towns at Vereeniging, Bloemhof, Pietersburg and Benoni as a prelude for a mass movement for decent accommodation." (65)

That afternoon Mpanza was escorted to the station and sent off on the 3.40 p.m. train for Ixopo in Natal. (66)

Desperately his lawyers applied for an interim interdict calling on the Minister of Native Affairs and others to show why they should not be restrained from putting the removal order into force. It was obtained too late to stop Mpanza leaving.

In his petition Mpanza argued that he had made no preparations for immediate or sudden compliance with the order, pending his appeal. (67)

An urgent order was issued for Mpanza's return. Mpanza was taken off the train at Standerton that night and headed back to Johannesburg. (68)

The next afternoon application was made in the Witwatersrand Division of the Supreme Court for an order for Mpanza's immediate release. Pending the decision of the proceedings, an undertaking was tendered that he would take no steps, directly or indirectly, to create or further any public disturbance or to absent himself, or evade the ultimate enforcement of the order of removal, if found valid. The court was again crowded with supporters. (69)

The Council's strategy was going horribly wrong. As desired the squatters had been evicted and action taken against 'their leaders'. The squatters although evicted had not 'gone back to where they had come from' as was expected and the main 'agitator' in their eyes had escaped deportation. Although Mpanza was kept in prison, it was still a powerful moral victory in the eyes of the community. He had defied the authorities once more and escaped unharmed. Almost as if an unseen hand had intervened, he had been brought back in the last hour.

Under the blue gums in Orlando tension was mounting. The squatters had been camping in the open for over two weeks while Municipal police kept their strict and watchful eye on any attempts to build shelters.

> "The workers would go to town, and their womenfolk mostly stayed behind awaiting the Council's word under the trees, and at night they slept in trenches dug in the ground, with blankets on top. This went on for some time. Women lived there under those trees with a few of their pots, etc., waiting to such an extent that none of them had a lighter complexion, bearing all weather changes. Heat, wind, and what have you. All of them dark. The Salvation Army Church was open to those with children." (70)

During the later afternoon of the 8th March a storm broke over Orlando.

Determined to stick to their strategy the N.E.A.D. responded when they saw threatening weather, by preparing for repressive measures to enforce the law. They arranged for 250 sanitary and other labourers to meet at a road camp in Orlando, and for 120 black municipal police to gather at the municipal offices in the township. When the rain began to fall the two parties converged on the squatter's camp and the Superintendent of Orlando, Col. T.W. Armitage, went by car to warn the leaders to advise the squatters not to put up any shelters but to 'go back to where they came from' should rain fall.

An argument between the leaders and officials ensured, which was cut short when the command came for the municipal force to break down any shelters in the camp. By this time about 100 shelters had been erected, and other were going up.

The municipal force made two sweeps through the camp, pulling down the shelters.

Some scuffles ensued, but there was no real trouble, and at the end of the second sweep all the shelters had been pulled down and the municipal force prepared to depart.

The labourers left for the road camp and the black municipal policemen marched down the road between the Communal Hall and the camp.

> "As they reached the gate of the Communal Hall a woman shouted out something in Sesotho and rushed at the police. In a moment hundreds of native men and women joined in. Using knives, sticks, stones and irons heated in the braziers, they attacked the police from every quarter. The police were forced back gradually defending themselves with their sticks. The squatters state that some police were also armed with pieces of iron, which, they alleged, were used on the squatters.
>
> The police, with their staggering wounded, retreated into the hall, and barricaded all entrances. One policeman was left behind lying on the ground with his head battered in and his throat cut ..." (71)

One policeman was killed and fifteen injured. The squatters kept watch on the building all night to see that no police could escape. Mosaka had persuaded them to release the injured and at about 10 p.m. they 'granted permission' to the authorities to do so. This was done by 1 a.m. The squatters were jubilant and spent most of the night 'war dancing'. Fourteen squatters were taken to hospital. The sixty policemen who remained trapped in the hall were 'liberated' the next morning by more than 200 S.A.P. They advanced in three columns and met with no opposition. (72)

Senator Basner, Councillor Mosaka and the elected members of the Orlando Advisory Board sent a telegram to the Prime Minister protesting against the Municipality's actions and requesting an enquiry. (73)

Meanwhile, Mpanza was granted an interdict in the Witwatersrand Supreme Court preventing his removal from Orlando pending the decision of an appeal. He was therefore released. (74)

> "His release on bail on the 11th March, 1946 was made the occasion for a huge demonstration of rejoicing, thousands of Natives marching in procession through the location and filing past him while he sat in state." (75)

No doubt their victory over the Municipality also contributed to their rejoicing. Mpanza kept away from the squatter camp after his release. (76)

Mpanza was drawing increasing interest and recognition from many people at this time.

> "He has a family of three, a small shrill voice and is five foot six inches high. At first sight he looks a very tired man, and unimpressive figure, but on closer acquaintance one cannot but be impressed with the man's resourcefulness and profound knowledge of human nature." (77)

Not all reports were favourable. A statement by a woman missionary worker on the 15th March who was both hostile to and threatened by Mpanza, reveals also something of his image and ways of operating in Orlando at the time.

> "Mpanza now claims Divine origin and Divine authority and purports freely to give dispensation from the conventions of Christian or native tribal morality, and to dissolve customary unions at the wish of either party. He has recently had photographs of himself made available for sale to members of his party at 10/- each, which party members are expected to put up in their rooms if they have houses, or if not, in some position in the vicinity where they are squatting and to which they are expected to pray. Mpanza does not hesitate to make capital out of every possible incident in support of his claim to have supernatural powers. He frankly boasts that he was sentenced to death for murder but claims that his sentence was commuted to penal servitude for life, and he was subsequently released because of his medicine. He also claims that he was discharged from the prosecution last year arising from the riots at Shantytown for the same reason. He made use of the coincidental breakdown on the night the movement started, the 28th January last, of my motor car and that of the Superintendent of Orlando locatoin and flooding of the motor car of Manager of the N.E.A.D. in a river, as a further proof of his supernatural powers, claiming that it was he who had brought this about and thereby prevented interference with the movement.
>
> Mpanza's claims are implicity believed by the natives who can only see that so far as he has been able to do with complete impunity what none of them has ever believed possible and this belief has been enormously strengthened by his recent release by the Supreme Court pending the hearing of his appeal against his conviction for failing to obey the Governor General's order of deportation. He has stated to his people, not that he is released pending the hearing of the appeal, but that once again his magic powers have procured his complete acquittal. On his return after being released on Monday 11 March, 1946, Mpanza was given an enormous reception and processions were organised through the location during the whole afternoon and part of the evening. In the course of the celebration Mpanza was openly hailed as 'King' and it was freely stated that the Council is now finished in Orlando. Afterwards Mpanza sat in state in front of his house and allowed an enormous crowd of his followers to file past and gaze upon him, for which they were afforded the privilege of paying him sums that they could spare not being less than half-crown."

She estimated that Mpanza had collected 5 000 Pounds since the Shantytown movement and about 2 000 Pounds from the present movement. (78)

Consolidating their position the squatters, reportedly now numbering 3 000 families, defied the municipal authorities and erected between 400 and 500 shacks, and six bell tents. Two men were reported to have died as a result of the fight with the police and many were suffering from

conjunctivitis as a result of the use of teargas by the police. 'Sofasonke guards' were reported to have collected money for the funeral of one of the men. Rains on the 21st had prompted this wave of building, and anger and triumph had encouraged the growth of the camp. New families were ariving daily. (79)

The Council was losing control of the Orlando area. In a tone of mounting hysteria, the chairman of the N.E.A.C. said;

> "The composition of the squatters has changed since the movement started. What was originally a superficially peaceable demonstration (however illegal and however organised for private ends) has now attracted to itself a large percentage of lawless elements of the native population. Intimidation is being practised to such an extent that it is bearly possible even for those who wish to leave the movement to do so. The situation, in fact, has all the elements of terrorism and mob rule." (80)

These accusations were to be made again in Council evidence to the Moroka Commission where it was alleged that in 'acts akin to terrorism' people were forced to participate in the squatter movement, especially women in the last stages of pregnancy and with newly born children, to enlist public sympathy. The Council raised many objections to the camp administrators such as punishment for not obeying camp regulations, expelling non-members, etc. Says Stadler,

> "If such acts were 'akin to terrorism' they were remarkably similar to the methods employed by the Government and the Municipality in controlling blacks." (81)

Of course the attacks were extended to include the inevitable 'Communist threat'. It was true that Communists were involved at this stage. Said Mofutsonyana,

> "The Squatter movement came to the Communal Hall of Orlando. Mpanza was already with his movement over there. We immediately captured those people and started to help them. Our people were very busy in town helping the squatters. They were collecting clothing and so on because they were sleeping on the open veld." (82)

The Communist Party's approach to the squatting movements was different to that of the leaders. They tended to introduce broader demands. This was noticed by the Council.

> "At this time, the emphasis of the negotiations with the self appointed squatter leaders as well as with other native leaders changed from complaints about inadequate housing to claims for freehold ownership of land, better political representation and so on. In short, the native leaders merged the city's housing deficiency with the general political and economic difficulties of the Natives." (83)

However, an investigation by the S.A.P. found no information to support the allegation that the camp was organised as a 'demonstration of lawlessness' or that it was organised by the Communist Party, although the Communist Party got involved immediately the movement was started. (84)

Also contradicting the Council's view was a survey by a group called the Orlando Relief Fund who found that the squatters were previously sub-tenants in Orlando and that they were forced to relinquish their rooms because of unbearable overcrowding with twenty to thirty people living in a three roomed house. (85)

Countering the Council's irrational attacks the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued the following statement.

> "We view the actions of the Labour Party, which controls the Johannesburg Municipality, as a betrayal of the working class principles which it avows. We demand the cessation of terrorism and violence against the inhabitants of Orlando and the immediate provision of shelters and housing for them." (86)

The Communist Party had been deeply embarrassed at this time by the actions of one of its members who had been rapidly rising to the top echelons of the party. Boshoff had accepted a brief from the state to appear on behalf of the Native Affairs Department in its attempt to have Mpanza deported. This, plus their defeat in the Orlando Advisory Board elections, badly damaged the party in the black areas. It highlighted the gap between black and white members. The Communist Party had to suspend Boshoff and demand the withdrawal of the deportation order. (87)

Desperate, the Council was again forced to negotiate to try to bring the situation under control. They reached an agreement on the 24th of March with the Orlando Advisory Board, again Mpanza, to set aside land on which only those who lived and worked in Johannesburg might build their own houses. (88)

As they went to the negotiating table, the first signs of the follow-up to the Orlando squatters' successes appeared on the scene. On the same day of the agreement about 200 people marched out of Pimville to Orlando under the leadership of Abel Ntoi and camped near the uncompleted houses in Orlando West. They demanded housing. They claimed also to have been evicted by landlords and to be the Pimville Sub-tenants Association. They were worried about the allocation of the new houses. (89)

Mpanza's appeal came before the Supreme Court on the 26th March. Judgement was reserved. (90)

There were now over 6 000 squatters in Orlando. The Communist Party were involved in relief work in the camps and in making deputations to the authorities. (91)

The A.N.C. Youth League, becoming more active, were holding monthly meetings at this stage. (92)

On the 2nd April, Mpanza's appeal was dismissed in Pretoria. His defence asked for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division. The case was stood over to the next day. (93)

In terms of the agreement with the Council, on the night of the 2nd April, the Orlando squatter camp opposite the Communal Hall was surrounded by 400 policemen, forming a cordon so that a census could be taken of all those in the camp. This would enable the Council to register those working in Johannesburg. It was also agreed to legalise sub-tenancy so that if vacancies occurred in Orlando, the squatters could take up sub-tenancy there. (94)

On the 3rd, Mpanza was granted leave to appeal to the Appellate Division subject to the following two conditions,

(1) That Mpanza undertook to leave Orlando by April 9th and did not return, pending the decision of the Appelate Division; and

(2) That the records be filed with the registrar of the Appelate Division by May 1st. (95)

The removal of people to the new emergency camp called Jabavu began almost immediately. Military trucks were used to transport the squatters to Jabavu. Those without work were separated out to be sent back to their places of origin by the government. They were kept in transit in the Communal Hall grounds. (96)

The Communist Party were active among the squatters and pointed to dissatisfaction with the temporary arrangements made. There was antagonism toward Mosaka who was seen as partly responsbile for this. There was tension between the Council and the Communist Party. The Council claimed that the Communist Party was hampering their efforts. The Communist Party claimed that the census had already shown that the Council's allegations about the squatters coming from other areas had been 'won't works' were disproved by the fact that the vast majority of squatters were moved to Jabavu. There had been a notable absence of this kind of statement since the census, they argued. (97)

Meanwhile, the Council's housing was proceeding at a slow pace. Only 198 of the 2 350 contracted for houses had been completed with only ten a month being built. They attempted to speed up the surveying of Dube. (98)

At Orlando West the new squat was growing steadily, now numbering about 2 000 people. (99)

According to the conditions of his right to appeal, Mpanza left Orlando on April 9th for an unknown destination. He left a message to say he was dropping out of politics. Julia who stayed behind at their house would not say where he had gone to. (100)

With Mpanza gone the Orlando Advisory Board lost some of its coherence and there was a fall-off in their attendance at board meetings. The Communist Party, dissatisfied with the Board, repeatedly demanded a statement from them to be presented to the public accounting for money collected from the squatters. The Communist Party was quick to point to dissatisfaction with the Board's performance.

It was also known that the Orlando Advisory Board had agreed to the census of the squatters and Orlando residents at a secret meeting between it and the Municipal authorities. (101)

The A.N.C. (Transvaal) Working Committee came out in support of Mpanza on 6th May, 1946. It was decided to take a stand on the issue of the deportation law, to contribute 50 Pounds to Mpanza's defence and to make an appeal for more money. (102)

More support came for Mpanza when a pamphlet was published primarily under the initiative of the A.D.P., signed by Basner, Mosaka and the full Advisory Boards of Eastern Native Township, Orlando, Pimville and Western Native Township. It was called 'To the Citizens of Johannesburg - The Truth about Shantytown.'

In it they criticised the labour-dominated Council for deporting Mpanza and the destruction of Hessian Town by force. They pointed to the harsh conditions and lack of housing in Orlando and attacked the Council's attempts to blacken Mpanza's character and other leaders of the 'Shantytown movement'.

> "The truth is that Mpanza has the loyalty and support of more Africans in Orlando that any other member of the Advisory Board and that his deportation has caused great resentment throughout the African community."

By May there was more coherence in the authorities' strategy. A warning was issued by both the Government and the City Council to the Orlando West squatters to leave the houses within one week.

The Pimville Sub-tenants Association responded with a letter to the authorities saying that they wanted to leave but didn't know where to go. (103)

After deciding at a meeting on the night of the 20th May to resist their removal, the squatters were taken by surprise the next morning by an early morning raid. 400 police stood by while the removal of 3 000 people in 100 3-ton troop carriers was begun. (104) It was found that very few were not employed in Johannesburg. (105)

On the 11th June, Mpanza's appeal against the charge of failing to comply with the order of removal was allowed in the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein. The Magistrate's fine of 2 Pounds or seven days with hard labour was set aside. Mpanza was again free to live where he wished. (106)

On the 23rd a feast was held by Mpanza for all those who supported him during his trials.

> "As early as 10 a.m. a crowd had already gathered at Mpanza's house for this memorable occasion which was marked by the slaughtering of an ox. Men and women with the Sofasonke Party's badges were singing throughout the morning and afternoon until 3 p.m. when the actual celebrations began.
>
> Later in the day, the crowd had a little rest during which roasted meat was given to them as other food was not yet ready.
>
> It was after this that men and women rose and sang with great pride their song, 'Sili Winile Icala eBloemfontein - We have won the case at Bloemfontein.' Those who did not take part in the singing and dancing joined in the shouts and cheering of the Sofasonke women as they sang this song.
>
> At this moment a man eloquent in praises, praised Mr. Mpanza in Sesotho. In his praises, he made references to Mr. Mpanza's heroism. Mr. Mpanza, this man said, 'is a man who has done a lot for his people - a kind of man of the Abathethwa tribe, a man who has nothing to do with other people (sic). He is a kind man to his people irrespective of race.'
>
> When this man was praising, the women were cheering him with the usual 'molilietsane'.
>
> Late in the afternoon, Sofasonke Mpanza returned home from training his horses as he is an owner of valuable race-horses. When he came, the crowd gave him a great cheer.

> At this juncture the long awaited moment of feasting came. As in the country, meat was served in big dishes to all who were present. This was done by giving a dish to each group representing various locations in and outside the Reef. People enjoyed themselves with this meat and other foods prepared for the day as it was Mpanza's desire that everyone from child to father should have the best of the day. After the feasting, more people came from the location dressed in African fashion as in the old days. Carrying sticks and singing folk songs, these men kept everybody amused. On the other side, women of all tribes were dancing and singing songs in praise of Mpanza.
>
> Towards sunset Mr. Mpanza addressed the gathering. Everybody stood quietly as 'Magebhula' spoke to the people.
>
> 'If I was wrong to secure for you rooms when some were sleeping outside as a result of having no accommodation, then God must be my judge. When I suffered, I was not doing so for my family, but I was doing so for all the people in general,' said Mpanza amidst loud cheers. He was here referring to the Shantytown exodus.
>
> He went on to say that many were pleased the day he was asked to go out of Orlando. 'Ha e ee tau,' said some of them. He told the gathering that throughout his long trial up to his success he relied on God. He knew that if God did not wish him success, all the money collected in his aid would avail nothing. At this moment he asked the people to sing 'Uyesu unamandla'. He himself joined in the singing of this song.
>
> Most of his speech he based on quotations from the scriptures. He quoted stories from Daniel and the other men of old. After this speech the day's rejoicing came to an end, although some people still remained, long after dark." (107)

Sounding a warning note, the Youth League sympathetic Inkundla Ya Bantu showing an astute understanding of the issues, commented on the outcome of the trials.

> "From this fact we should learn the lesson that united action will always triumph. If the community had not backed Mr. Mpanza solidly he would not have probably been in a position to meet the heavy expenses entailed in a case of this type. Mr. Mpanza's victory is a signal triumph for the whole African community. The more we fight together, the more we shall win. We won at Alexandra Township because we fought together. We

> have won in the Mpanza case because we fought together. Even bigger issues should be faced by the community acting in unison." (108)

There was further evidence of the Youth League's activism when Nelson Mandela gave a talk in the Leake Hall in Orlando on June 28th on 'Native policy' in the Union tracing it back to the Northern provinces before Union. (109)

Continuing with his horse racing, Mpanza was involved in an altercation with a railway policeman over a delay in transporting some of his horses. He was acquitted on charges of using obscene language on railway premises, resisting arrest and contravening railway regulations by trespassing. (110) There were at this time signs of growing political activism in Orlando.

On the 21st July the National Anti-pass Council held an anti-pass rally in Orlando. August 4th was set as a preliminary demonstration day and within three months from the next conference, there was planned to be a mass struggle, culminating in a national stoppage of work and in the burning of passes. This was unanimously accepted at the Orlando meeting.

Speakers were Thloome (Transvaal A.N.C.), Lethata representing the Orlando Anti-pass Council, Walter Sisulu representing the A.N.C. Youth League and S. Konoeny and S. Moema of the Communist Party.

Representatives also came from the Orlando Residents' Association, Shantytown Independent Party, and the Orlando Anglican Church clergy. (111)

Not only was the activism in the townships, but also at work. On 4th August, a meeting attended by well over 1 000 delegates of mineworkers decided unanimously to embark on a general strike of all blacks employed in the gold mines. The strikes began on the 12th August with over 70 000 mineworkers going on strike. The A.N.C. was involved in organising the African Mineworkers Union.

Frustrated by the Government's attitude towards them in the wake of the strike, the Natives' Representative Council voluntarily adjourned in protest on the 15th August. (112)

Meanwhile, another squatter movement sprang up adjacent to Jabavu on a private farm called Volkshaven consisting of about fifty four families. Hessian shelters were erected. On the 23rd August they were forced to move to the adjoining farm called Albertyn. Edward Kumalo, who had been the leader of the second Orlando squat and who had been excluded from Jabavu, emerged as the leader. (113)

Yet another squat was started early in September at Newclare. They were few in number and were quickly stopped with pass arrests by the police. (114)

Pimville added another movement on the 7th September, when about 800 families led by Oriel Monongoaha began squatting on the site where the old tanks had been. (115)

By the 12th there were about 10 000 squatters in the two camps at Pimville and Albertynsville, about half in each. The former was very well organised, but they both followed the basic pattern of the first squat at Orlando. (116)

The sudden growth of the squatters' movements prompted the council to lower the standard of the houses being built at Orlando and to decide to build semi-detatched houses instead. (117)

The Council obtained an interdict ordering the squatters out of Pimville but had difficulty implementing it. They moved under pressure fifty yards away across the Potchefstroom road which was outside Pimville. This created uncertainty in the authorities about the interdict. (118)

On the 19th September Mpanza's case was upheld and the judgement given that his certificate of exemption made the order of removal not applicable to him. (119)

> "Mr. Mpanza, being no other than a poor man, travelled to Bloemfontein on horseback; I don't know how long it took him to reach that place. He won the case there and came back home on horseback, to settle a little peacefully." (120)

On the 22nd September the Pimville squatters moved across to Orlando. The camped on a hill near the Orlando West houses, around a white flag. (121) Many were ex-soldiers and one of the leaders, S.S. Komo was chairman of a branch of the Springbok legion, a non-racial ex-serviceman's organisation with strong Communist links. (122)

The Council now decided to make it clear to the Government that the squatting problem was beyond their control and that they should intervene. (123)

The Orlando West squatters grew to about 3 000 families living in hessian houses or bell tents. (124)

At a meeting of the Orlando squatters, one of the leaders, Moseli, was alleged to have said that,

> "the Government is beaten, because even the Government of England could not stop people from squatting."
>
> "He likened the Government to a man who has a cornfield which is invaded by birds and who 'chases the birds from one part of the cornfield to another part of the cornfield.' He was also alleged to have said: 'We squatters are the birds. The Government sends it policemen to chase us away and we move off and occupy another spot. We shall see whether it is the farmer or the birds that get tired first.' He also said, 'The Communist Party would assist in recovering damages from the City Council for the poles and hessian which had been burned.'" (125)

At a meeting at Bloemfontein in October called by Xuma, the President of the A.N.C. the adjournment of the N.R.C. was discussed and a resolution was passed calling upon blacks to boycott any elections conducted under the Natives' Representation Act of 1936. (126)

Meanwhile the Council was attempting to get an order to eject the Orlando West squatters.

In response to this about 1 000 of the squatters paraded through the city on the morning of the 15th October with banners bearing the slogan, 'we want houses'.

They formed up outside the New Law Courts in orderly fashion and delegates went in to attend the proceedings. (127)

On the 23rd October, the camp at Orlando West split when a group under Komo broke away from the larger group under Monongoaha, to set up a camp called Tobruk. (128)

Evidence was given by a N.E.A.D. constable that there were widespread rumours that the Johannesburg municipality was providing land where blacks could build their own houses. Many were leaving the rural areas to take up this opportunity. The rumour had been heard as widely as Dundee in Natal and Memel in the Orange Free State. (129)

The N.E.A.D. made frantic efforts to deny the rumour but the influx from all over the Union and even the Protectorates gained momentum. Said the N.E.A.D.,

> "Johannesburg is threatened with an invasion of natives on a scale which may well reduce the native problem in the city to chaos." (130)

On the 4th November a group of 27 families tried to settle on the farm Zuurbekom but were stopped by the police. (131).

On about 1st December, Schreiner Boduza led 600 - 800 families from Alexandra to camp near Monongoaha's and Komo's camps. (132)

The annual Advisory Board elections were now due and attention was being turned to them. There was tremendous excitement. The two main parties were the Communist Party and the Sofasonke Party. The Communist Party candidates were A. Msitshana, Mofutsanyana, S. Lesolang and Moema, and the Sofasonke Party candidates were Mpanza, L. Kumalo, J.J. Masupha and the Rev. O.S.D. Mooki. (133)

The Sofasonke Party had finally broken its alliance with the A.D.P. There had been growing dissatisfaction with Mosaka during the year and the A.D.P. was generally proving incapable of sustaining its position.

> "The colourful dress of Mpanza, despite all the ridicule it evoked, was nearer to the people than the staid respectibility of the A.D.P. leaders. Mpanza offered the dignity of 'going it alone' - Mosaka and Mampuru, by contrast, belonged to the white man's world." (134)

Also, with the A.N.C. beginning to gain momentum, the gap that the A.D.P. had temporarily filled was fast disappearing. The A.D.P. had failed to link the local campaigns it had been involved in with larger political problems. Locally it had lost control of the squatter movements to the Sofasonke Party and other local leaders and nationally there was the A.N.C. The A.D.P. declined over the next two years then ceased to be. (135)

The election was held on 22nd December. There was great interest in the election and,

> "huge crowds, in the grips of the elections fever surged to the polling booths."

People arrived at the booths in packed lorries.

> "Followers of both parties wore contrasting uniforms in order to avoid confusion. Mpanza in an animal skin hat, led the Sofasonke Party in the procession around the location. Riding on his charger, and followed by several supporters also mounted, he and his followers presented a spectacle which drew the attention of crowds of people.
>
> Polling this year was done at booths placed at Orlando East and Orlando West. Long before the results were announced, crowds thronged before the communal hall where the returning officer was to make the announcement.
>
> The Communist Party suffered heavy defeat, the results being J.S. Mpanza, (S.P. 1422 votes), L.P. Kumalo (S.P., 1223 votes); J.J. Masupha (S.P., 1154); Rev. O.S.D. Mooki (S.P., 1148)." (136)

This was the Communist Party's third defeat at the hands of the Sofasonke Party and cause for a reappraisal of their position on the squatters.

By January 1947 the total squatter population numbered 70 000, one fifth of the total black population of Johannesburg. The Council had failed to build any more houses in the previous twelve months. (137)

The Council's only solution was to take the offensive by creating another emergency camp next to Jabavu for 'controlled squatting', to break the power of the leaders. This was called Moroka and was to be the home of 26 000 families. (138)

On the morning of 3rd January at 3.30p.m. 200 policementdescended on the Orlando West squatters and moved the more than 2 000 people under Baduza back to Alexandra in 200 military vehicles. (139)

In spite of this, 28 families attempted to establish another squat on the farm Zuurbekom on the 14th January but this was broken up by the S.A.P. and the City Council. (140)

The Council believed that two more large scale squatting movements were being actively organised in Johannesburg including people from Martindale, Newclare and Sophiatown. The Council was close to despair. Said the Manager of N.E.A.D.,

> "The situation is quite beyond any power of any local authority. There are already 25 000 squatters in Orlando, 5 000 on the farm Albertyn on the Council's boundaries, 6 000 in Alexandra, 6 000 ex-squatters in Jabavu still under hessian and 21 000 ex-squatters from the original 1944 movement still housed in breeze blocks in Orlando. The further threatened movements would have the gravest consequences."

The Council called on the Government to introduce emergency legislation. (141).

Willing to try anything, the Native Commissioner addressed the squatters who had been returned to Alexandra and offered free passage to anyone going home to the reserves. One squatter replied,

> "They only want to send us to the territories to force us to become cheap labour for the mines." (142)

The Council felt that the issues at stake in the squatter movement had now become much larger and that the Government should be involved. (143)

Meeting in January, the Communist Party was coming to a similar conclusion.

> "Originally the Party opposed the formation of Shantytowns. However, underestimating the growing political significance of the movement - the District Committee has erred by continuing to discourage the formation of Shantytowns.
>
> Paying tribute to the militancy and solidarity of the squatters, the Committee now recognises that their action and initiative in challenging the African's Ghetto's Laws - the Native Land Acts and the Urban Areas Act - constitutes an important contribution to the struggle for the national liberation of the African people."

The Party attempted to act on its new resolution and organised an umbrella body for the squatters.

> "New threats are being made to deport squatters to Basutoland and Swaziland. This led to squatters uniting in the Joint Shantytown's Co-ordinating Committee (JSTCC) which has leading representatives from Orlando West, Tobruk Township - the ex-servicemen's camp - from Albertynsville, Alexandra and Jabavu."

The chairman of the Committee was S. Bhoduza, Secretary was E.T. Mofutsonyana and treasurer, O. Monongoaha. (144)

Mpanza had very little to do with it.

The Communist Party pledged its support for the new body.

> "The Committee heartily welcomes the action of the leaders of the various Shantytowns in uniting in the Johannesburg Joint Shantytowns Co-ordinating Committee, to demand land where they can build their own homes. It expresses its wholehearted support for this demand, and pledges all possible assistance. It demands that the National and Local authorities accept responsibility for the squatters; that they subsidise and assist them in erecting homes; that civic, educational and other amenities, transport and health services be provided."

On 25th January a large demonstration was held. It had been called by the Joint Shantytowns Co-ordinating Committee. After a meeting in a Newtown Market Square, 7 000 squatters, mostly women and many with babies on their backs, marched down Jeppe, Eloff and Commissioner Streets carrying scores of banners reading 'give us land to build our homes!' and singing. They assembled in front of the City Hall where they were addressed by Dr. Y.M. Dadoo and squatter leaders.

The meeting passed a resolution declaring that the

> "tragic and acute overcrowding and housing shortage and the pressure which led to the erection of the 'Shantytowns' was due to the criminal neglect of the City Council and the Union Government to provide housing and their segregation and cheap labour policies." (145)

Apart from this, there is little evidence that the Co-ordinating Committee undertook any further joint action and the movement praiseworthy as it was, was a bit late in the day to be effective.

> "The Committee represented the Party's attempt to enter a movement which they belatedly saw to have social significance, but the problems of which could not be known to them from personal experience. In any case it was too late: Within six months all the squatters (except those from Albertynville), would be moved to Moroka and would lose their group identity." (146)

Attempting to stabilize the Jabavu camp and to formalise relations with it through accepted channels, the Council hurried to introduce an advisory board. Elections were to be on 2nd March. The Communist Party responded by announcing its intention to boycott the elections as the start of the implementation of the A.N.C.'s 1946 boycott resolution in Bloemfontein. (147)

As part of its intensified assault on the squatter leaders, Mpanza's certificate of exemption from Native Law was removed in late February. He had already been notified on the 9th September, 1946 of the Government's intention to cancel it. The reason stated was that he took a leading part in organising the possession of the vacant Orlando West houses.

> "In his reply to the Native Commissioner, Mr. Mpanza points out that it is not true that his Sofasonke Party took possession of the Orlando houses; that as a member of the Orlando Advisory Board he is an elected representative of the people of Orlando and has always acted on their behalf and that if he is accused of lawlessness he invites the Commissioner to appoint a commission to investigate whether this is really so. Reference is also made to his conviction as a

> murderer. But Mpanza says that if the Governor-General did not think fit to withdraw his exemption certificate in 1915 when the murder was committed, so thirty two years after the event it is doubtful whether this can be a true reason for the present action" (148)

With Mpanza beleagured by the mounting hostility of the authorities, Julia Mpanza continued to be active.

On the 8th March, hundreds of women from all race groups marched through the streets of Johannesburg under demands of freedom and equality. Prominent in the procession were Julia Mpanza and a number of women from the Shantytowns. The Sofasonke women had always played a very important part in the party's actions and were in many ways the backbone of the movement. Now they were making demands of their own. (149)

Shortly after the 'doctor's pact' involving the Indian Congress and the A.N.C., a large demonstration took place in Newtown Market Square on the 9th March. Of most immediate concern to this gathering was the desperate situation in the squatters' camps. (150)

This showed the increasing concern amongst the larger political parties over the squatter movement. There had been some frustration over the A.N.C.'s slowness to respond, particularly from the Youth League.

> "Congress has shilly-shallied and missed a golden opportunity to crystallise the shanty town movement into the spearhead of the African's fight against oppression and the discriminatory land policy. Shanty towns grow every month around Johannesburg and to this day Congress has no plan of how to deal with them." (151)

Congress was at last beginning to look more directly at the plight and potential of the masses.

On the 6th June 1947 new regulations were gazetted amending the 144 act, empowering local authorities to establish emergency camps for homeless persons, with heavier penalties for squatters, and for confiscation of money, collected from them by unauthorised persons. (152)

The Council was starting to have the power it needed to finally bring squatting under control.

Speaking in the House of Assembly, the Minister of Health said that the underlying principle of the plan was that henceforth the squatter movement should be controlled by the authorities instead of being left to spontaneous, sporadic eruptions, or worse still, to organisation and control by unlawful elements. (153)

This was the authorities' policy in a nutshell. The main concern was one of control. The actual responsibility of providing housing was secondary.

News of the agreement between the Council and the Government to establish the camps led to an influx of blacks hoping to be included in the schemes. (154)

The Council now concentrated on bringing all the squatters into the controlled camps.

A struggle began in Alexandra where those squatters were boycotting applications for sites at Moroka. They wanted everyone to go as a group regardless of whether they employed or not. (155)

On the 29th April the S.A.P. took control of Tobruk. More than 300 people were arrested as unemployed. (156) 16 appeared in court charged with arson, assault and common assault. Police kept a patrol at both the Alexandra and Tobruk camps, 'to maintain order.' (157)

The removal of the Tobruk squatters began on the 5th May with mixed response from the squatters. Monongoaha's camp (Oriel) were reluctant to be screened and attempted to maintain the boycott on an all or nothing basis in uniformity with the Alexandra squatters' stand. (158)

A heroic struggle on the prat of the Oriel squatters during which Monongoaha was arrested followed. The Shantytown Co-ordinating Committee submitted a memorandum to the Johannesburg City Council opposing the smallness of the stands at the emergency camps and the high rent, and protesting against the screening.

> "We African people are regarded as 'work cattle' who are to be housed only as long as we are serving some useful purpose to the employers. Restrictions on residents are unheard of in any democratic country or with respect to any other section of the people." (159)

Repressive steps were also taken against the Communist Party. Since the African Mineworkers' Strike they had been subject to considerable harrassment. This had not improved their performance at the December elections in Orlando. There had been raids on the party offices, a trial of 52 members of the Communist Party and A.N.C. (in which all were discharged), more raids on the party offices and the trade union, Guardian and Springbok Legion offices. This was followed by charges against Central Executive Committee members. (160)

Although Mpanza had triumphed in the face of the charges against him and had risen even further in popularity, it had still become difficult for him to directly intervene in grass roots militancy. The withdrawal of his certificate excluded him even further. The new regulations made it difficult for the party as a whole to make any extra-constitutional interventions. Within the orbit of advisory board politics, however, they were safe.

The Sofasonke Party was very low key in the first half of 1947. They sought to fulfil their role through the Advisory Board through accepted channels. For example they took up the issue of congestion in the trains through an interview with the Railways Systems Manager and were rewarded with four additional trains. They agreed to have regular meetins with him. (161)

They also took up the question of ownership of houses. The Council had agreed to give Orlando houses to the residents after fifteen years.

> "This promise was made in 1932 and in 1947 we approached them and said their time was up. But we were asked if we had any proof of their promise and we did not. The authorities said they could not have made such a blunder,"

said the Rev. Mooki. (162)

On 6th June the Transvaal A.N.C. held an emergency conference in Johannesburg in oppostion to the Native Trade Union Bill. At this meeting a resolution was passed calling on all black urban and other Advisory Boards to adjourn indefinitely in support of the adjournment of the N.R.C. as called by the A.N.C. the previous year. There was opposition to the decision. Native representatives spoke against it. It called for the immediate implementation of the boycott. (163)

In what looks like an unprecedented act of solidarity with the broader political movements, on the 11th June, the Orlando Advisory Board voted by four elected, i.e. the Sofasonke Party votes, against 2, to adjourn indefinitely until the Council defined the functions and duties of the board and provided in the Urban Areas ACt. These had not been defined in 15 years they said.

> "The Board has been made a mere toy in the eyes of the people they represent and have become a mere sham."

The following day a meeting of over 1 000 Shantytown supporters of the Sofasonke Party was held in the Communal Hall, which endorsed the action of the board.

As failure to attend three consecutive meetings of the board disqualified a member, the residents waited to see whether the Council would try to use this provision to get a new board functioning. (164)

Looking more closely at their demands it appeared that their dissatisfaction is not with the board per se but rather that it should have greater powers.. This differs greatly from the consistently held position of the Communist Party that the boards should be used and exposed, and can only be platforms for mass mobilization.

Meeting nearly two weeks after calling for the boycott, the Transvaal A.N.C. executive committee reversed its decision on the grounds that no mandate had been obtained either from chiefs or the electoral committees, members of the N.R.C. had not toured their constituencies to organise the boycott, and the body representing the advisory boards of all the locations (the Locations Advisory Board Congress) had not been consulted.

Apart from wanting to continue with the efforts to negotiate with the Government over the N.R.C., the committee stated that the resolution on the boycott of advisory boards would be unworkable. This was because in many cases the local authorities had the power to appoint members to the boards to carry on the place of any members who adjourned indefinitely. (165)

The A.N.C.'s boycott resolutions were never fully accepted or implemented with discipline.

> "For all the past talk of boycott and resolutions passed in both the A.N.C. and the A.A.C., there had not only been Xuma's personal defiance of a boycott of the Roayl Family's visit to Zululand in 1947, but Matthews and Moroka had remained members of the N.R.C. Furthermore, the Communist Party had broken the boycott of elections and put up candidates (in 1948)." (166)

Looking back at this period Mandela writes;

> "The 1947 boycott resolution of the A.N.C. was correct, in spite of the fact that no effective country-wide campaign was carried out to implement this resolution. It will be recalled that at the time, in an endeavour to destroy the people's political organisations and to divert them from these organisations, the United Party Government was fostering the illusion that the power of the Natives' Representative Council, the Bunga, the Advisory Boards, and similar institutions would be increased to such an extent that the African people would have an effective voice in the Government of the country. The agitation that followed the adoption of the boycott resolution by the A.N.C., inadequate as it was, helped to damage the influence of the sham institutions and to discredit those who supported them."

Explaining this further he says,

> "... for the boycott is in no way a matter of principle but a tactic weapon whose application should, like all other political weapons of the struggle, be related to the concrete conditions prevailing at the given time." (167)

By the 24th June the removal of squatters from Tobruk and Oriel had been completed, and a start made on moving the Alexandra squatters to Moroka. (168)

Steps were taken to remove the squatter leaders from their followers. They were not allowed to live in the same place. (169)

For the Orlando Advisory Board the boycott issue was not over. At a four hour meeting in Orlando on about the 20th July, which had been addressed by the four elected members, they were being criticized for their actions.

> "At first it was thought that the Orlando Board's decision was in line with the action of the N.R.C. but it was later believed that though the board might have copied the action of the Council, the reasons for its decision were mainly local."

They were severely attacked by W. Pela, a nominated member of the board, but whose criticisms were not without some force.

> "W.S. Pela said he thought the majority decision by the board was unwise. The majority had stated that the police had arrested unlicenced hawkers in the township and that the N.E.A.D. had allocated certain houses to families on its waiting list without reference to the board as had been the practice in the past. For these reasons it was contended that the board should adjourn indefinitely until the council defined its powers and functions as provided by the law.
>
> Mr. Pela pointed out that the powers and duties of the four Advisory Boards falling under the City Council had been stated in terms of the Act and were circularised to all members of the boards in May, 1945, for comment.
>
> In September last year a conference was held at which the boards, as well as other Native organisations were represented. After some debate it was decided that the discussion of the draft locations regulations should be held over pending the findings of the then recently appointed Fagan Native Laws Commission.
>
> Mr. Pela said that the Orlando board's decision was unilateral and without reference to the other three Advisory Boards - Pimville, Western and Eastern Native Townships. It was contrary to the September decision to wait until the Government had formulated its policy in the light of the Fagan Commission's report, when that was promised." (170)

Pela's criticisms are important as they show that the Sofasonke Party's decision to boycott was for reasons specific to its own conditions, that it was not a fundamental dissatisfaction with the board system itself and that the Sofasonke Party had no reservations about acting on its own without consultation with other relevant bodies and for local interests. They were also now less directed toward mass unified action. These factors were to continue to be a problem in Orlando's local politics.

But even with these considerations the problem cannot be laid at the feet of the Sofasonke Party entirely. At least during the forties the Sofasonke Party tended to have a much closer relation with the rank and file than any other party.

Another meeting was held on 20th July at Orlando West at which the boycott issue was discussed. This was reported on by G.W. Xala, the Honourary Secretary of the Orlando West Residents' Association.

> "The Orlando residents were unanimous in their support of the action taken of the Orlando Advisory Board in adjourning sine die, the only dissentient being a Council nominee who recieved no support for his counter-motivation criticising the Orlando Advisory Board's action.
>
> The following resolution was adopted.
>
> 'That this meeting of Orlando West residents fully supports the action by the Orlando Advisory Board in adjourning sine die, but would like the board to add that it also sympathises with the action taken by the A.N.C. and the N.R.C. in boycotting all elections under the Native Representation Act of 1936.'" (171)

Concerned about the boycott the N.E.A.C. made an effort to improve its relations with the boards. It held a meeting with them on the night of 24th July. It was decided that quarterly meetings would be held and that any member of the boards would have access to the chairman of the committee on urgent matters provided that the superintendent and the manager of N.E.A.D. were first informed of the matter for discussion. (172)

The attack on the legitimacy of the boards, while not uniform, had wider effects than Orlando. Two out of the three elected members of the Alberton Advisory Board resigned in September due to the Council's

refusal to give them copies of the regulations and the repressive attitude of the authorities toward them and the people of the location.

> "The chairman of the board uses us only to suppress our people," they said.

Becoming more active the A.N.C. Youth League was able to call a well attended meeting at the Orlando Leake Hall of people from all along the Reef. (173)

At an A.N.C. (Transvaal) Annual Provincial Conference for 1947 held on the 25th and 26th October, the Secretary was able to report on significant steps towards broader involvement of the A.N.C. in popular political issues. The Secretary was a member of the Joint Shantytowns Co-ordinating Committee and President Xuma had claimed to have been instrumental in the boycott of Moroka by the Alexandra squatters and the subsequent rent boycott there. It was also reported that several advisory boards had adjourned completely in response to the call to boycott state structures. Included among these were Vereeniging, Bethal and Orlando. (174)

In December it was election time again. 1947 had been a significant year. The state had finally acted in unison with the Council and together they had introduced the necessary legislation and taken the necessary action to not only bring the squatter movements under control, but also to prevent their reoccurence. Only 582 houses had been built that year. While a significant increase, it was still only a drop in the ocean. (175)

The homeless people had been suppressed but not without a fight. There had been the attempt to stop the Council from breaking unity in the camps by separating out the unemployed. Shortly after arriving in Moroka a protracted rent boycott began with strong mass support. There had also been a riot in August during which three white policemen had been killed.

The state had responded as could be expected. A new wing of the police was established called the "Flying Squad" which was armed with twelve Sten sub-machine guns and other arms, was motorised, and consisted of forty trained men. Their purpose was specifically to deal with riots. (176)

The state also responded to the riot with a Commission of enquiry under the chairmanship of H.A. Fagan. The commission reviewed the entire squatter movement.

Of the bodies involved in the activism of the mid-forties around Johannesburg, which included the squatter leaders, the A.D.P., the Sofasonke Party and the Communist Party, most had either disappeared for lack of support or had come under a degree of repression, as the state struggled to reassert itself to bring the situation under control. Most of these bodies had been forced to retreat. The only organisation which had escaped relatively unscathed was the A.N.C. which had also had the least direct involvement. Its numbers were growing and there were new energies coming to the surface through the efforts primarily of the Youth League. It was the organisation which showed the most promise.

This was the situation when the Advisory Board elections came round again in December. The A.N.C., which had not looked in any serious way to the boards as a site of struggle, was still largely boycotting. The Communist Party, the Sofasonke Party's old enemy, licking their wounds in the wake of state action, was supporting the boycott and did not contest the Orlando elections. The Sofasonke Party candidates of the previous year, Mpanza, Masupha, L. Kumalo and the Rev. O.S.D. Mooki were returned unopposed. (177)

In January 1948 the Communist Party broke the boycott, as did Xuma and fielded Mofutsanyana for the N.R.C. elections. Mpanza was nominated as a candidate by his own and one other board. (178)

Mpanza restricted himself to maintaining control of local politics on a smaller scale, as usual not always with constitutional means.

He appeared in the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court in February on a charge of public violence when it was alleged that a gang under his leadership, called the 'skelm gang', intimidated inhabitants of Orlando Township who were not members of the gang.

He was charged with having caused a riot and the break-up of a meeting of the White City Residents Association on January the 18th. He conducted his own defence.

A witness said that thirty blacks had arrived during the meeting armed with kieries and dangerous weapons. Later Mpanza road up on a horse with a sjambok in his hand and said he would spoil the meeting if it was not stopped. He told his thirty followers to beat the people at the meeting, saying,

> "Who gave you instructions to hold this meeting in Orlando? I am the King of this Orlando, and nobody else." (179)

With the N.R.C. election campaigns underway, Mosaka and Mofutsanyana were competing for the Transvaal and O.F.S. seat. An issue in their campaining had become Mosaka's suggestion to the Council during the Shantytown struggle, that Mpanza be deported. This had come to light during the Fagan Commission. (180)

The A.N.C. Youth League held its fourth annual conference in Orlando in early April. Among the delegates were Tambo, Mandela and Sisulu, a strong grouping emerging, from Orlando. (181).

By May Dube was ready and the Council invited applicatins for sites (182)

It was also in May that the Nationalist Party came into power and began to implement its policy of 'Apartheid'.

The Fagan Commission reported in September 1948 and concluded about the Moroka disturbances that

> "The cause of all the difficulties was the direct or indirect result of the housing shortage." (184)

The Commission also concluded that the Council was hopelessly wrong about the proportion of squatters who were employed in Johannesburg and at one time had wanted the Government to take all the squatters away.

> "The results of the subsequent inumerations showed that, had this been done, the effect on the economic life in Johannesburg would have been like that of a major strike." (183)

Apartheid was seen for what it was by the national political organisations and condemned. It was the focus of a great deal of discussion at the time, nationally, and in Orlando as well.

At a well-attended meeting in Orlando with Mpanza in the chair, the topic of 'apartheid' was discussed. Mpanza outlined to the meeting his understanding of 'apartheid'. The meeting agreed to accept this policy,

> "provided adequate land for cultivation and grazing farms were given to blacks. In addition, tractors and boring machines should be supplied." (185)

This was a time of changes, of new alignments, of taking decisions. The Sofasonke Party's response to apartheid was a conditional acceptance.

> "Sofasonke believed that the Apartheid was a stupid, costly and backward policy. He said - practically there was nothing progressive in the theory of Separate Development. He said he could only accept the separate development theory if the Nationalist pursues Apartheid to its logical conclusion. As it is, this is a Convenience Theory propounded by the white man for the humiliation and inconvenience of the black man." (186)

The advent of the Nationalist Government was to have profound effect on the politics of resistance, especially in its effects on the Youth League. It broadened the acceptability and strength of its ideology of 'African Nationalism'. It also forced the Youth League to look to the masses for the power to challenge the Nationalists. In so doing it brought themn into closer co-operation with the Communist Party in a willingness to develop mass action. This in turn created increased personal contact between members of the Youth League and the Communist Party and moderated the anti-Communism of the former. (187)

While these new alliances and forces developed Mpanza continued with his own personal interests on his home ground. Orlando held the biggest race meeting it had ever seen at Orlando on November 6th with entrants from as far afield as the Free State, Standerton, Vereeniging and the Reef.

Mpanza was a leading race horse owner and the Secretary of the Club. (188)

But the boards as a whole were not dormant. Responding to the Council having taken over the Pass Laws and enforcing the compulsory endorsement provisions of the law without consulting the boards, the Western Native Township Advisory Board called for a joint meeting of the Orlando, Moroka, Pimville and Eastern Native Township Boards to discuss this. (189)

In December Mpanza was very confident of his position in the coming elections. He had changed the name of the party to 'Magebula Party', although it soon returned to its former name. He explained why he was confident.

> "My Party, the 'Magebula Party', recently had an interview with the Native Commissioner and representatives of the City Council, in connection with mass arrests for passes and liquor. We objected to indiscriminate employment of African convicts on farms,"

he said.

> "Mr. Mpanza said that his party pointed out that arrests for beer were wrong in that Africans regarded beer as part of their ritual. 'This is in keeping with our religion,' he added.
>
> He thought it was useless, therefore, attempting to convince a people that beer was bad while they attached religious importance to it.
>
> 'In any case,' he went on 'European liquor was stronger than kaffir beer. I see no reason to arrest location brewers of light beer while Europeans may have stronger liquor. Mass arrests of our womenfolk has acquainted them with gaols and criminals.'
>
> Mpanza asked: 'What does the word 'pass' mean when our people in the location are arrested for passes? Houses are raided and even people asleep are woken up and asked for passes.'
>
> Objecting to police raids for passes in the locations, Mr. Mpanza said that these people once convicted, are sent to work on farms.

> 'I asked the Native Commissioner to give us some trust farms together with tractors and necessary implements so that those who cared to, could go out and live there. They would then be away from town, free from pass raids and be able to till the soil voluntarily for a living.'
>
> He said he had seen the Director of Native Labour who offered land in Kuruman. He objected to this and pointed out land in Pretoria district.
>
> 'On being told that the trust farms in the Pretoria district were over populated, I sought to know where and how Apartheid would be carried out. I have had no answer to that question', he said."

His party candidates were the same as the previous year. (190)

The Communist Party had returned to the fray this year as they had abandoned the boycott. There was also an indication that the A.N.C. was beginning to take an interest in Advisory Board Elections with a strong rumour that they were putting up candidates at Krugersdorp. (191)

A report appearing in Bantu World at the time captures much of the excitement of the election and explains much of the dynamics of Orlando Advisory Board politics and part of the reason for the success of the Sofasonke Party against the Communist Party.

> "Sunday, December 19th was Election Day at Orlando, and for colourful pageantry, excitement and high-pressure-vote-catching-sales talk, the Etonswill election of the Picwickian days, by comparison, was a very tame affair. Since the beginning of last week the parties seeking election - for we have parties too at Orlando - were haranguing the residents through loud-speakers on the relative value of their respective 'policies'. The people, it seems had been sufficiently aroused by these pre-election speeches; for as early as 6 a.m. on Sunday columns began to emerge from the different sections of the locations all converging towards one focal-point - the polling stations.
>
> The election of members to the Native Advisory Board in Orlando is not merely a matter for the enfranchised alone, whole families declare a national holiday from all domestic chores and go abroad gaily clad in the finery of their respective parties. So election day here is a fancy dress parade, a gala occasion. Yes, feelings do run high at times but the worst that ever happens is a contest in vective.

> In this year's election there are three parties in the field - the Sofasonke Party, the 'Liberals' (a new one) and the Communists. Supporters arrived in lorries and private cars whilst advance columns paraded the streets carrying banners and election cards. To the accompaniment of popular tribal songs and chants they danced tirelessly from early morning to dusk. Men and women and their children wore multicoloured blankets and now and again you came across a man dressed only in the traditional 'beshu' of the Zulu, complete with knob kerrie and shield and sporting a large feather headgear.
>
> It became quite clear from the outset in which direction the loyalty of the electors lay. The majority carried Sofasonke cards and whenever one of the candidates of that party visited any one of the polling stations, excitement broke loose, but the highlight was the arrival of Mr. James Sofasonke Mpanza, that colourful leader of the original Shantytown movement.
>
> All the votes must go to Mpanza argue the people; for is it not to him we owe the impetus that has been given to Native housing in recent years? Significantly enough at this very same time other people further down the road begin to sing the party song: 'We shall die together' composed by Mpanza himself for he is a musician as well as being a party leader.
>
> It is thus not the soundness of the 'policy' of one party as against another's that matters with the people of Orlando, nor can they be divided along tribal lines. What do they know of the ward system promised them by the Liberal Party? They are just not bothered. They never vote on policy. They are a hero worshipping crowd with whom the personality of the individual weighs a good deal.
>
> Just now, Sofasonke is their hero and anyone who embraces civic aspirations must come to terms with this astute leader.
>
> As for the Communist opposition, it might never have been there at all for all the people of Orlando care. Their 'policy', less still their propaganda makes no impression on the voters. So, once more the Sofasonke Party has been returned to power by a majority of 4 623 over the Liberal Party and 4 023 over the Communist Party." (192)

This situation is aptly summed up by Harris.

> "A people often deserve better leadership than they receive, but the leadership does reflect the state of political consciousness at the time." (193)

While there were still some squatters in the original camps, such as the 844 families at Albertynsville, and occasional smaller groupings started, for example the 150 families who squatted on McDonald's Ground near Klipspruit in February 1949, (194) by May of that year the Council regarded the movement as clearly passed. The Chairman of N.E.A.C. reviewed their achievements with satisfaction.

> "For a long time these people had lived under lawless conditions, brooking no interference from the authorities. The rule of law was at a discount and criminal and illegal practices were the order of the day.
>
> In less than two years, the Council has resolved this heterogenous collection of people into a law-abiding community, house-proud and actively engaged in improving their dwellings and living conditions. I know of no precedent for such conditions in this country, and it is an achievement of which we may be proud." (195)

After years of neglect, repression and attempts to make the homeless people 'go back to where they came from' rather than accept responsibility for their living conditions, the Council now wished to claim credit for having established something of what the homeless people had been fighting them for, for nearly a decade!

With the Nationalist Party now in Government the repression of the Communist Party had been intensified. No doubt in the protection of 'democracy', an elected Communist member of Parliament, Sam Khan, was prevented from addressing meetings of the residents of Alexandra, Newclare and Moroka, by the banning of the meetings. The response at the meetings showed a strong and growing recognition of the Communist Party's contribution to the struggles of the black people.

At Alexandra the crowd persisted in spite of being attacked and assaulted by the police. As Kahn was leaving without attempting to address the crowd, the police charged the crowd again, injuring more people.

At Newclare there was a similar scene. He left immediately after reading the banning order. The crowd refused to leave the area. When the police ordered them to disperse they replied that if they had no right to speak, then neither did the police and demanded that only God should address them. After being forced back by the police, the crowd began stoning passing white motorists and a police van.

At Moroka the meeting dispersed when they heard it was banned. (196)

Observing events in the townships the Manager of N.E.A.D. in his annual report on 30th June 1949 noted that troubled times were ahead.

He reported that racial tension had increased during the year and that an important factor in this was the acute housing shortage which forced the majority of blacks to live in grossly overcrowded conditions. 'The situation is explosive! There was the inevitable fear of 'agitators' taking advantage of the situation for their own political ends.

> "Natives particularly are developing a feeling of nationalism and all Non-European groups are displaying increasing intolerance towards the other groups.
>
> Officers of the Department find their conduct and administration increasingly questioned and criticised by Non-Europeans. European officers find that their duties demand more than ordinary tolerance and restraint if they are to preserve harmonious relations with the Non-European population." (197)

The Orlando Advisory Board continued to discuss issues like the accommodation for teachers at Orlando High School, the extension of trading shelters at the Orlando shelters, the rent for the stalls and street names for Orlando. They also protested strongly against the proposal to demolish the breeze-block shelters at Orlando as they became vacant because they eased congestion in Orlando to a considerable degree. (198)

The Council had begun building houses at Jabavu next to the controlled camp and moved the first forty families from the breeze-block shelters to these houses on the 16th August. The houses were being built at a rate of sixteen a day and about 1 000 of the 5 000 contracted were almost completed. There were about 5 000 families living in the breeze-block

shelters at the time. The Council was anxious to demolish rooms as they left 'for health reasons'. They also said with probably more honesty, that they were concerned that the shelters would be reoccupied as they were vacated. The Department of Native Affairs told the Council not to demolish the breeze-blocks immediately, (199) to which the Council later agreed. (200)

Still plagued by raw materials and manpower shortages the Council managed to build 5 233 houses between 1947 and 1951. (201)

The growing political tensions were having other effects. Concerned at the upsurge of crime and the growth of gangs, in particular the mainly Basutho 'Russians' there was a move toward the establishment of vigilante patrols called the Civilian Guards. It was felt that there was insufficient protection from the police. (202)

At the A.N.C. meeting on December 16th and 18th it was announced by the Transvaal that the Orlando Branch had been divided into two to form East and West Orlando branches. This was to cope with the growth of Orlando West. The Eastern Branch was still reported to be inactive, while the West had a lively membership of 60. (203)

With the Youth League under Oliver Tambo's presidency since January (204) and with Moroka as President and Walter Sisulu elected to the position of Secretary General of the A.N.C. in December, the Youth League was able to push through the acceptance of its Programme of Action by the parent body.

> "The Programme of Action called for civil disobediance, strikes, boycotts and stay-at-homes and thus unequivocally committed the A.N.C. to a new strategy based on extra-legal tactics, mass action, and the principle of non-collaboration. (205)

The conference embarked on the Programme of Action with a call for a one-day strike as a protest against apartheid. (206)

The Locations Advisory Boards Congress was simultaneously holding its annual conference in Port Elizabeth. The President of the Congress disallowed a motion calling for support for the A.N.C.'s one-day strike

as they had not been approached 'through the correct channels'. The motion and its rejection on a technicality revealed stirrings in the Advisory Board's Congress as well and a tension between old leadership and new ideas. (207)

Back in Orlando elections were being held at the same time, on the 18th December.

The two main contending parties were the Sofasonke Party and the Residents Association led by S.M. Moema, who was not standing as a Communist this year.

> "Early on Sunday morning Orlando was filled with people moving to the voting stations at both Orlando West and East. The results were announced late in the afternoon at the Communal Hall.
>
> During the whole morning and afternoon, voters, some in motor cars and lorries and others marching through Orlando, worked hard to win the elections for their parties.
>
> The Sofasonke Party, in lorries and motor cars with their flags, was sure of winning the election and this they did by an overwhelming majority. Interviewed earlier in the day by the Bantu World reporter, Mr. Mpanza said he was confident of success.
>
> The Sofasonke Party had organised well for the day. There were lorries, cars and a loudspeaker band, while women and children marched through the streets of Orlando singing songs in praise of Magebula who moved among his supporters wearing a hat made of feathers as on the days of old. His wife also played a leading part in the processions. The principal songs of the Sofasonke Party supporters were 'Vouteli Sofasonke, uvouteli nyaniso.' (a vote for Sofasonke is a vote for truth)'." (208)

The results show the overwhelming support for the Sofasonke Party. They also show that some of the other squatter leaders had now been drawn into the ambit of Advisory Board politics.

Twelve candidates stood for election and these were the results:

Mpanza, 1 547 votes; L.P. Khumalo, 1 307; O.S.D. Mooki, 1 299; J. Masupha, 1 263; S.M. Moema, 493; D.J. Malefane, 489; T. Cuku, 430,

At Newclare there was a similar scene. He left immediately after reading the banning order. The crowd refused to leave the area. When the police ordered them to disperse they replied that if they had no right to speak, then neither did the police and demanded that only God should address them. After being forced back by the police, the crowd began stoning passing white motorists and a police van.

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F.F. Ngubane, 424;

S.N. Bhaduza, 62; T.M. Mokete, 56; S.S. Komo and S.D. Masitenyane 55 each. (209)

Not everyone was impressed with the Sofasonke victory.

> "The Sofasonke Party has again got its men onto the Advisory Board. They've sure got what it takes to be elected. A few songs to move the gullible crowd; they've the finger to point at Shantytown, which is a nice easy cushion of laurels to rest upon when they've once got through the election-gates. We only hope that when these 'die-all' vigilantes promised the people their best services they did not do so on condition that those who would have to reap the wild winds, clear the stones and briars from the path of the Board members, or line their pockets." (210)

While the housing struggles had been contained by 1949, they had by no means been solved. As the Secretary for the Department of Native Affairs said,

> "The most pressing need of the Native community is adequate housing. Only by the provision of adequate shelter in properly planned native townships can full control over urban natives be regained." (211)

At the end of 1949, it was relatively quiet in Orlando, but with new forces building up in the wake of the Nationalist Party victory, it was the lull before the storm.

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