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A STUDY TO EXAMINE THE PERFORMANCE OF NEPAD'S INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE SHORT-TERM ACTION PLAN (STAP)

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A research report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Engineering.

JOHANNESBURG 2009

DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Master of Science in Engineering in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

……..

……day of……2009

ABSTRACT

The aim of this research is to examine the performance of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements in the implementation of the Infrastructure Short-term Action Plan (STAP). Specific reference is made to NEPAD's roads programme. This research is qualitative. Primary and secondary data is used for analysis. The various issues arising out of the analysis and interpretation of data are addressed.

The findings of this research indicate that the key causes of the identified implementation challenges include lack of institutional capacity, particularly in NEPAD's governance and management structures and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This problem is exacerbated by NEPAD's inordinate reliance on external institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme planning and implementation support, with negative implications for programme management, evaluation and communication. What has amplified implementation delays is NEPAD's apparent reliance on aspirational projects for implementation and aspirational project structures for implementation management/ coordination. Instead, when implementation challenges arose, NEPAD merely addressed the effects of problems, and even then only superficially.

In the short-term, the use of relevant project management methodologies may facilitate effective planning at the various stages of the project life cycle and efficient management of project management functions based on programme/project requirements. To support NEPAD's objectives for integrated regional development and integrated project implementation, transformational interventions will be required. In addition, relevant trans-sectoral and trans-disciplinary institutional mechanisms and arrangements may need to be integrated at the various levels of planning/management subject to situational or project specificity. The development of effective supranational authorities at regional/sub-regional levels including a strong role of the state with its broad-based institutional formations at national levels will help to enforce implementation of collective agreements that have implications for the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this research is to examine the performance of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements in the implementation of the Infrastructure Short-term Action Plan (STAP). In particular, NEPAD's role and relevance to facilitate effective integrated implementation management/coordination vis-à-vis the mandate of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is examined. This research is qualitative.

The findings of this research indicate that the key causes of the identified implementation challenges include NEPAD's inordinate reliance on exogenous factors for the development and implementation of its regional infrastructure programme as well as standardized and bureaucratic approaches to the management of development programmes, which have not worked previously in developing countries. Because of imprudent optimism of programme success, as a consequence of the reliance on external resources from partnerships with the institutions/institutional structures of the developed north, NEPAD failed to assume responsibility to systemically address the age-old underpinning structural problems to the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects, and to prioritise relevant programmes/projects for implementation to meet effective demand. This approach resulted in the over-simplification of constraints in the implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Instead, when implementation challenges arose, NEPAD merely addressed the effects of problems, and even then only superficially.

What has amplified the implementation delays is NEPAD's apparent reliance on aspirational projects for implementation and aspirational project structures for implementation management/coordination. As a result, NEPAD mandated institutional structures that neither possessed authority, nor institutional capacity to drive integrated implementation or implementation management/coordination of planned regional infrastructure programmes/projects: these institutional structures include NEPAD's own governance and management structures, and RECs. However, the much talked about lack of institutional capacity in RECs appears to have been used as a 'stalking horse' to deflect attention from NEPAD's lack of wherewithal to facilitate the development of regional infrastructure, or as a pretext to avoid addressing the underlying causes to NEPAD's failure to facilitate effective implementation of the Infrastructure STAP. In this respect, NEPAD has failed to learn from the lessons of past implementation failures of similar cross-border regional infrastructure programmes, such as the Lagos Plan of Action's

(LPA) Transport and Communications programme, and the Trans-African Highways (TAH) and "missing links" initiative. Significantly, NEPAD's inadequate communication regarding implementation progress/challenges has resulted in the questionable status of projects and impaired NEPAD's integrity in the eyes of development partners, media, and development analysts.

In the circumstances, it will be difficult for NEPAD to institute effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure without candid examination of mistakes made and commitment to the implementation of transformational interventions. In the short-term, the use of relevant project management methodologies may facilitate effective planning at the various stages of the project life cycle and efficient management of project management functions based on programme/project requirements. An integrative approach to the management of cross-border regional infrastructure projects may be used, for example, to combine inputs from various project management models (i.e., strategic, structured and systematic project management) and trans-sectoral, trans-disciplinary application areas based on project or situational specificity. Other relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements may be integrated at the various levels of planning/management subject to situational or project specificity. At regional/sub-regional levels, the development of effective supranational authorities will help to enforce implementation of collective agreements that have implications for the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects. At national levels, a strong role of the state with its broad-based institutional formations will be critical to institute and support the reform/development of inadequate institutions: commitment at national levels would also facilitate the effective coordination and implementation of collective agreements or trans-state transactions by the identified regional/sub-regional institutions.

DEDICATION

In memory of my dearly departed father, Mr Linda Myataza, 1933-1995

"…in life – the point of endeavour is not sustaining the apex of achievement. The point is falling from that apex and finding our way back, over and over."

Martha Beck

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ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS

AAP	(World Bank's) Africa Action Plan
ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMU/UMA	Arab Maghreb Union/*L'Union du Maghreb Arabe*
APF	Africa Partnership Forum
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development, Cooperation in Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DC	Development Corridor
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECA	(United Nations) Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDI	Electronic Data Interchange (systems)
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FAL	Final Act of Lagos (1980)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G8AAP	G8 Africa Action Plan
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HSGIC	(NEPAD) Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
HoSG	Heads of State and Government
IDP	Integrated Development Planning
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	International Finance Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPPF	(NEPAD) Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility
LLC	Landlocked Country
LIC	Labour Intensive Construction
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action (1980)
MDC	Maputo Development Corridor
MDG	Millennium Development Goal(s)
Mercosur	*Mercado Commûn del Sur*
MFI	Multilateral Finance Institution
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NICs	Newly Industrialised Countries

NDPs	National Development Plans
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NTB	Non-Tariff Barriers
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OBS	Organisation Break-Down Structure
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PMBOK	Project Management Body of Knowledge
PPIAF	Private Participation in Infrastructure Advisory Facility
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
RDC	Regional Development Corridor
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIA	Regional Integration Arrangement
RTA	Regional Trade Agreement
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDI	Spatial Development Initiative
SC	(NEPAD) Steering Committee
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSATP	(World Bank's) Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy
STAP	(NEPAD Infrastructure) Short-term Action Plan
TAH	Trans-African Highway
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TRIFSA	Transport Reform and Integration Support Facility for Africa
TRIMS	(WTO's) Trade-Related Investment Measures
TRIPS	(WTO's) Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
TTF	Trade and Transport Facilitation
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNECA	UN Economic Commission for Africa
UNECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
WB	World Bank
WBS	Work Break-Down Structure
WTO	World Trade Organisation

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

> "…NEPAD represents perhaps the most important initiative ever advocated for moving the African continent from crisis to renewal in the past forty years…it has much potential for success if implemented by the majority of African states…In many ways it represents the one last opportunity to get the global economy to take Africa seriously…However, the consequences for failure will be costly, and will undoubtedly return the continent to its marginalised status and prove the African pessimists right."
>
> **Kempe Ronald Hope Sr., 2002**

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) launched the Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP) during May 2002. NEPAD's Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) approved the Infrastructure STAP for implementation during June 2002; the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government (HoSG) subsequently endorsed the programme during July 2002 (African Union (AU), 2002b). NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP elaborates a combination of programmes and projects for implementation in various infrastructure sectors (i.e., energy, Information and Communications Technology (ICT), transport and water sectors). All the identified Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects are characterised by multiple development objectives planned for simultaneous implementation. For example, the transport programme identifies the development of regional transport infrastructure as a mechanism to facilitate regional integration, global/intra-African trade, capacity building and poverty reduction.

To support implementation, NEPAD mandated Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – through their Secretariats, Commissions, and technical units – to coordinate implementation management/coordination of the approved regional infrastructure programmes/projects (NEPAD, 2002c). Diverse and multiple institutional structures at various spatial categories – such as international, regional, sub-regional and national levels – were also assigned responsibilities and roles in the Infrastructure STAP at various stages of the project life cycle.

Ultimately, NEPAD planned for the identified regional infrastructure projects to be implemented at national levels, although implementation management/ coordination would be facilitated by regional and sub-regional structures.

NEPAD primarily sought external partnerships with international institutions for programme/project development, provision of sustainable financing, procurement of professional/construction services, and project implementation support. These partnerships include international finance institutions (IFIs), regional development finance institutions (DFIs), multilateral institutions, foreign/national governments, donors from the highly industrialised (northern) countries, and foreign private sector operators. NEPAD also sought internal partnerships with regional, sub-regional and national institutions/organisations for programme development, funding, implementation, and implementation management/coordination in order to give practical effect to the attainment of its (NEPAD's) vision for the development of domestic institutional capacity. As a result, the environment for implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP is characterised by complexity in project management functions (i.e., project scope, project organisation, cost, time and quality management): this complexity is particularly increased cognisant of NEPAD's objectives for "integrated regional development" and "integrated practical implementation" of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

In certain communiqués of HoSG who are NEPAD's founding members, strong expectations were also expressed of African institutions, organisations, and experts to elaborate the relevant development programmes/projects and implementation plans in support of NEPAD's vision for Africa's regeneration, including the development of regional infrastructure. Various pertinent international and regional workshops were also held, since the launch of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, to support implementation. It also appears that various regional programmes were launched by the various IFIs and multilateral institutions to support the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and other (NEPAD) programmatic interventions in the identified priority sectors

(Hope, 2006: 209-210). However, the afore-mentioned institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support appear to have elicited limited implementation progress, particularly in cross-border facilitation projects like the roads sector.

1.2 Definition of Terminology

The definitions of relevant terms/concepts are presented in APPENDIX A. In some cases, other definitions by select authors are included to illustrate different perspectives and to highlight the multi-faceted nature of the said terms/concepts. The operational definitions of the following terms/concepts are discussed: institutions; institutional structures; institutional mechanisms; institutional arrangements; institutional capacity; integrated implementation management; project management; project; programme; levels of management; physical and non-physical infrastructure; transit facilitation; spatial categories; region and sub-region; and "technical hair-splitting."

1.3 Statement of the Problem

1.3.1 Who or what is to blame for implementation delays?

The challenges with the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are complex and multi-faceted. Various reports (AfDB, 2003; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003; *Mail & Guardian*, 2007c; Mashele, 2006; NEPAD, 2003/2004; TCII & NEPAD, 2005) have generally attributed the lack of implementation progress in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP to the lack of institutional capacity. South Africa's former-President Mbeki, in support of this premise, made the following remarks:

> We are not going to achieve some of the programmes we have set (out) to (achieve) because of lack of capacity…Even if we do have the resources, the institutions do not have the capacity, and African renewal needs capacity…The embarrassing thing is that they (developed nations) have committed resources, but we do not have the capacity to implement (cited in Kotzé & Steyn, 2003: 104).

It appears that the lack of institutional capacity for implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects has generally impacted on NEPAD's integrity to produce the expected results. For example, Alfeld Haiko, Director: World Economic Forum (WEF) Africa, commented on NEPAD's failure "…in its duty to get infrastructure development projects off the ground, (and for) creating a stumbling block for economic growth" (*Sunday Times*, 28 May 2006).

He made the following statement:

> Businesses and others have tried to cajole Nepad *to be more responsive to the needs of the continent* (author's emphasis); but with patchy success…There's a sense of disillusionment about Nepad. It has lost steam, and is seen as an ethos rather than a programme of action. It has no implementation capacity…These projects have become a nice-to-have wish list, but very few of them are costed, are bankable, or have been subjected to feasibility studies (*ibid*).

According to Breytenbach (2004:154), the (South African-led) NEPAD Business Group also criticised the "slow pace of project implementation" at a meeting of the WEF meeting held in Maputo-Mozambique, during May 2004. Apparently (*ibid*), NEPAD's Secretariat refused to accept responsibility for the tardy implementation of its sectoral programmes, particularly the Infrastructure STAP. NEPAD has instead identified RECs as the weak links in the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP and its sectoral programmes/projects. According to NEPAD's Infrastructure Sectoral Review report (NEPAD, 2004a:2), the "lack of capacity and appropriate leadership by the… (RECs) is another serious challenge in the implementation of NEPAD projects."

The sentiments expressed in NEPAD's Infrastructure Sectoral Review report regarding the lack of capacity in RECs are not new. The lack of institutional capacity in RECs, which has over the years culminated in their slow pace to implement regional integration initiatives, has been widely acknowledged since the RECs were first established in the 1980's with the advent of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980 (see: Amoako, 2001; Anyang' Nyong'o *et al.*, 2002; Bond, 2002; Breytenbach, 2004; Buthelezi, 2001; Buthelezi *et al.*, 2001; Cheru, 2002;

Chibba, 2003; ECA, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Herbert, 2003; Hope, 2002; IAG & JA, 2003; Isaksen & Tjønneland, 2001; Kanbur, 2001; Kritzinger-van Niekerk & Moreira, 2002; Malewezi, 2001; Mandaza, 1990; Martin, 1990; Mbachu, 2003; Mills, 2000/1; Mills, 2002; Moshe, 2001; Muuka, 1998; Senghor, 1990; Sidiropoulos *et al.*, 2003; Willis, 2003; Zarenda, 2001). Various NEPAD reports (AfDB, 2003; NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2003/2004; TCII & NEPAD, 2005) have also consistently acknowledged the "lack of capacity" and "lack of resources" in RECs since the launch of the Infrastructure STAP. Therefore, one would have expected that NEPAD would take cognisance of the lack of institutional capacity in RECs during programme planning, in order to propose relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support programme development and implementation.

From the discussions above, however, it appears that there is lack of clear accountability between the various institutions/institutional structures for the performance of project activities. It is even unclear whether resources by the international institutions/institutional structures were made available at all to NEPAD, or other relevant structures, for the implementation of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Significantly, NEPAD's inadequate communication increasingly appears to exacerbate the problem: conflicting reports of implementation progress have been presented over the years at different forums (see: Mashele, 2006; Taylor, 2005). As a result, a lack of common understanding prevails regarding the role of the various institutional structures in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, and projects' status – i.e., whether or not the identified regional infrastructure projects existed at all or were ready for implementation.

However copious the information presented on sectoral programmes/projects in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and various NEPAD reports, some of the fundamental details to illustrate the links between NEPAD's policy strategies/ response actions, programme/project objectives, external/internal institutional environment, programmes/projects, and structures for project implementation or

implementation management/coordination remain ambiguous. For example, the details of practical steps taken by NEPAD's governance and management structures to ensure the timely progression of diverse sectoral projects through the different stages of the project life cycle are rather obscure. It is also unclear what practical steps NEPAD has taken to facilitate institutional capacity development for effective implementation. The afore-mentioned aspects are particularly concerning since the development of an enabling environment for the agreed development objectives to manifest was identified as one of NEPAD's primary roles in the Infrastructure STAP – i.e., to identify projects that had stalled for various reasons, and where NEPAD's interventions would make a difference (NEPAD, 2002c).

The absence of agreed frameworks or pre-determined measures to evaluate project implementation progress and success also add to the confusion, resulting in diverse expectations of projects' delivery. Also, some of the comments by development analysts on implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP appear as attempts to exonerate NEPAD/NEPAD's Secretariat from blame in the event of perceived implementation failure. Thus, the remarks attributed to Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade (another NEPAD founder) during NEPAD's multi-stakeholder three-year review conference, held in Johannesburg-South Africa during October 2004, are instructive of the possible lack of alignment between the outcomes of planning hierarchies at the various levels of management/planning and responsibilities/roles of the various institutional structures: they also highlight gaps in the links between planning hierarchies at the different levels of management, programme/project objectives, external/internal environmental analysis, programmes/projects, and institutions/institutional structures for project implementation or implementation management/ coordination.

1.3.2 What is NEPAD's role in relation to RECs and other institutional arrangements?

Significantly, the views articulated by some of NEPAD's founding HoSG suggest a diverse understanding of NEPAD's approach or role in the development of regional infrastructure, or even the nature and extent of challenges to implementation. For example, President Wade had the following to say about the lack of implementation progress in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP:

> We have not had one project that has been realised. It is time to reflect and to go back to the authentic Nepad approach…We are spending lots of resources on conferences and we still don't know our objectives (*The Star,* 23 October 2004).

As Mashele (2006: 7) further noted, "…as recently as 20 June 2005… (President Wade) would state that '[s]ince (sic) Nepad was founded (in 2001), its officials have spent $15m; they have not moved anything forward an inch and they will not move anything forward.'" Although President Wade seems to be the most vociferous critic of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP – a welcome approach in the context of large-scale regional/national (infrastructure) development projects that are often shrouded in secrecy because of the workings of bureaucratic international institutional structures, or IFIs, or multilateral institutions (see: Addison, 1997; *Mail and Guardian*, 08-14 June 2007), with the tacit support of national governments under the guise of 'national interest' – the relevance of Senegal to drive or address project implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP is unclear.

In theory, Senegal is responsible for coordinating NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme, together with the AfDB as the lead agency (Zounmènou, 2006; NEPAD, 2002f). In this context, how the interface between Senegal and NEPAD's Secretariat on the one hand, and Senegal/NEPAD Secretariat and RECs on the other is managed remains ambiguous. The example of Senegal above may also underscore the lack of collective engagement and agreement on the range of roles countries play in the implementation of NEPAD's

Infrastructure STAP vis-à-vis NEPAD's management and governance structures, RECs, and other regional/sub-regional structures.

It also appears that NEPAD's implementation challenges, and the associated concerns from various quarters, have remained unresolved despite the various meetings held at different levels of management/planning. These include the workshops/conferences and programmes established by various institutions or development partners to support the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP (see: Hope, 2006; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). In an interview with a West African TV channel, Africable, President Wade is reported (Ntingi, *City Press*, 17 June 2007) to have made the following remarks:

> I've decided no longer to waste my time going to meetings where nothing gets done. It's very agreeable to meet among ourselves but it doesn't drive things forward. Expenses adding up to hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on trips and on hotels. But not a single classroom has been built, not a single health centre has been completed. Nepad has not done what it was set up for.

The range of comments depicted above, including NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews (AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005), allude to a deeper malaise in respect of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP, with implications for project implementation progress. Cognisant of the well-documented lack of institutional capacity at the various spatial categories, in particular RECs, this *status quo* may impede the attainment of NEPAD's objectives for "integrated (regional) development" and "integrated practical implementation" of its regional infrastructure programmes/projects. It is also possible that the confluence of a combination of mutually reinforcing underpinning challenges in institutional, organisational, political, socio-economic, ideological, technical, and behavioural/attitudinal aspects has created an environment of intractable challenges for NEPAD's effective implementation of the Infrastructure STAP.

Previously, a range of authors have identified a plethora of institutional problems with respect to the development of Africa's infrastructure and its performance (see: AfDB, 1999; Adedegi, 2002; Amjadi & Yeats, 1995, Amoako, 1997; Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990; Anyang' Nyong'o, 2002; Bond, 2002; Calderon & Serven, 2004; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Estache, 2006a; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Hope, 2002, 2006; Howe, 2001; Lakshmanan & Anderson, 2000; Limão & Venables, 2000; *Mail and Guardian*, 2004a; Mills, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; N'diaye, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; OAU/AU, 2002; Onyeani, 1990; Patrick, 1998; Paul, 1990; Picciotto & Weaving, 1994; Rodney, 1972; Taylor, 2005; World Bank, 1994, 2000, 2002). Although the adverse institutional issues are well-documented, how they are interrelated and impact on the planning and implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects with multiple development objectives planned for simultaneous implementation, particularly in a context of integrated development, appears not so well-documented.

Using NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP as a case study, this research is an attempt to unpack how the characteristics of institutional mechanisms and arrangements in the development of cross-border regional infrastructure influence the management of the relationship between the outcomes of planning hierarchies at the different levels of management, external/internal institutional environment, programmes/ projects, and structures for implementation management for effective performance in the implementation/implementation management of programmes/projects. Therefore, the question for research is: how is NEPAD's inadequate performance in the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP linked to the institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate integrated implementation management/coordination of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/ projects? What is the relevance of RECs and the underpinning influences of the internal/external institutional environment on project delivery?

The following sub-questions are addressed in this research:

- What institutional mechanisms and arrangements has NEPAD established to facilitate the development and implementation of Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects?
- What are the peculiar characteristics of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements vis-à-vis general expectations of effective institutions (or institutional mechanisms and arrangements) in the provision of (cross-border regional) infrastructure? In other words, what are the lessons learnt from the previous implementation of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects similar to those mooted by NEPAD?
- What is NEPAD's role vis-à-vis the various institutional mechanisms and arrangements, and how are these roles related to the perceived lack of institutional capacity in RECs or lack of implementation progress?
- What do external/internal perceptions and assessments of implementation challenges reveal in respect of NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure? In other words, how has NEPAD developed its programme for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure, or addressed perceptions or evidence of tardy implementation?
- What has been left unsaid in the various assessments of NEPAD's performance that alludes to the underpinning causes of implementation challenges, and what generalisations can be made from the emerging patterns to develop an understanding of constraints to effective performance by NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements, or to facilitate effective integrated implementation management/coordination of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects?

1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Research

The aim of this research is to examine how NEPAD's inadequate performance in the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP is linked to the institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate integrated implementation management/coordination of the identified programmes/projects. The role of NEPAD, relevance of RECs, and the underpinning influences of the internal/external institutional environment on project delivery are also examined.

The objectives of the research are as follows:

(i) The first objective is to describe NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation/implementation management of the Infrastructure STAP. Examples of previous implementation of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/projects, similar to those mooted by NEPAD, are discussed: this is in order to, at a later stage, establish the lessons learnt and how these have been integrated – if at all – in NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support effective implementation.

(ii) The second objective is to examine implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Prevailing perceptions regarding the reasons for the lack of project implementation progress are juxtaposed with NEPAD's self-assessment from successive Infrastructure STAP reviews: this is in order to establish what perceptions and independent analyses of implementation challenges reveal, how they are related to NEPAD's responses, and what inferences can be drawn from this analysis.

(iii) The third objective is to establish the possible underpinning causes for the identified implementation challenges.

(iv) The fourth objective is to interpret data from the preceding chapters in order to determine the implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation of NEPAD's

Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects, specifically the roads programme. Suggestions for corrective interventions in the short-term are made.

1.5 Assumptions

(i) The first assumption is that NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, in particular the roads programme, is aligned to the mandates, development priorities and objectives of RECs in its centrality to *their* regional integration and trade agenda. This perceived alignment may explain the reasons for NEPAD's mandate to the RECs as the primary institutions to facilitate integrated implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP, in spite of their *current* apparent lack of institutional capacity to do so. This is because alignment between NEPAD's and RECs' programmes may elicit the requisite implementation support from the regional, sub-regional and national structures, facilitate the development of institutional capacity in RECs for current implementation and for future spatial expansion as well as provide the impetus for RECs to accelerate the implementation of the identified regional infrastructure projects so that they can meet their mandates for regional integration/sectoral cooperation.

(ii) The second assumption is that investments for projects in the roads sector will be made primarily at national levels by the public sector (see: NEPAD, 2002c; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). However, adequate project funding will depend on the allocation of adequate resources from national capital budgets (in the affected countries); harmonisation of national transport policies, regulatory and governance regimes; and institutional reforms/development at national levels to support regional/sub-regional prerogatives. Meeting the requirements depicted above will be determined by the extent to which the identified regional roads infrastructure projects meet the following requirements: inclusion in the national development plans (NDPs) and RECs' development priorities/initiatives for regional

integration; ability of the affected countries to fund the said programmes/ projects; and NEPAD's contribution to facilitate integrated implementation management/coordination, mobilise external resources for project implementation, and facilitate institutional capacity development at national and sub-regional levels. In addition, long-term political support and commitment to the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP by national governments and regional/sub-regional institutions will be critical for project implementation success.

(iii) The third assumption is that most, if not all, of the projects included in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP at its launch, during May 2002, had already commenced in one form or another. Therefore, implementation progress will not be inordinately delayed by factors outside the peculiar knowledge of NEPAD, AfDB, RECs, and various supporting structures for programme development and implementation management regarding the projects' status. NEPAD's main objective will be to unlock any existing blockages through the establishment of the relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation of the identified programmes/projects.

1.6 Methodology

This research is qualitative research. The research extensively reviews literature and analyses qualitative and quantitative primary and secondary data; the research also integrates descriptive data and explanation in various sections because of the different levels of development of the various concepts and phenomena studied. Inductive and deductive reasoning are used at various points of the study.

This research uses various analyses on NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, including NEPAD's self-assessments of implementation progress, as the basis from which to examine NEPAD's performance and implementation challenges in the Infrastructure STAP. Although the study attempts to provide causal explanations,

the mutually reinforcing multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary issues that impact on the development of cross-border regional infrastructure make it difficult at times to establish "temporal order" (i.e., where a cause must come before an effect (Neuman, 2000: 52)): this problem probably results from simultaneous causality and spurious relationships that occur between the variables studied. As a result, this research uses various frameworks to test for temporal order, verify causal links and eliminate some of the spurious relationships.

A "case-oriented approach" (Neuman, 2000: 148) is used to examine the previous implementation of large-scale regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/ projects in the regional (African) and international contexts. Examples from the previous implementation of large-scale regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/projects are used to establish and to illustrate how the causes and consequences of identified problems in the development of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure were addressed in circumstances that are similar to, or different from NEPAD's.

Therefore, this study analyses trends and patterns from historical data regarding the implementation of similar programmes in order to make generalisations about the occurrence of certain phenomena and to, at a later stage, suggest interventions germane to situational and project specificity in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, particularly the roads programme. Although the character of the research is *ex post facto*, the focus of corrective interventions will be to identify how similar challenges may be addressed in both ongoing and future implementation processes. This approach is different from that espoused in *ex post* studies: Hope (2002: 398) argued that these studies are by definition too late to facilitate corrective interventions in the phenomena studied.

This research also uses various models to elaborate a framework for an integrative approach to the development and implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure. These models include Turner's Seven Forces Model (1999: 70) as an ideal type of a structured approach to project-based management; Paul's (1990)

approach to the strategic management of development programmes is also used to identify unique characteristics in strategic management of development programmes/projects – i.e., the management of interrelationships between planning hierarchies, influences of the external/internal institutional environment, programmes/projects and structures for implementation/implementation management. The overlay of the afore-mentioned models in this research illustrates the complexity to manage NEPAD's (cross-border) regional infrastructure programmes/projects, and that different approaches may need to be combined in NEPAD's case subject to project and situational specificity.

The research uses a mix of evidence or data collection techniques including documents (books, journal and newspaper articles), existing statistics, non-resource-based knowledge, and observation. Qualitative/interpretative versions of content analysis are also used in order establish broadly the meaning of data or to verify some of the findings of the research (i.e., in the SWOT analysis of perceptions of NEPAD's external/internal institutional environment, analysis of perceptions of implementation delays, and analysis of the findings of NEPAD's self-assessment in the 1st and 2nd Infrastructure STAP reviews in order to establish their implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure).

1.7 Delimitations and Limitations of the Research

First, the study examines the performance of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements within the parameters of NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure, although multi-disciplinary frameworks are used for analysis.

Second, the focus of the research is generally on NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects in various infrastructure sectors, particularly cross-border regional roads infrastructure projects. NEPAD's roads programme is one of the sectoral interventions under the Infrastructure STAP. The planning frameworks,

institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management/coordination at the overlapping integrative and strategic levels of management in both NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and roads programme are all derived and cascaded from NEPAD's Strategic Framework at the integrative levels of management. However, the focus on NEPAD's roads programme in this research illustrates the interrelatedness or divergence of institutions at the various levels of management/planning, and in various infrastructure sectors as well as how the manner in which their interface is managed impacts on the practical implementation of programmes/projects to support the (effective) delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure at the operational levels of management.

Third, the questions posed in an earlier section above may not all be answered, or even addressed in this research report. Given the impact of the vagaries of the external/internal institutional environment on Africa's development landscape, this research attempts to establish lessons from institutional mechanisms and arrangements in other/similar regional infrastructure development programmes/ projects to make generalisations on NEPAD's. This research also attempts to identify, at a global level, some of the negative issues that contribute/have contributed to implementation failure of Africa's development programmes/ projects, using NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP as an example. Detailed examination of these afore-mentioned issues may be conducted in future research.

Fourth, the lack of consistency in NEPAD's communication and reporting on infrastructure projects may result in inaccuracies in the analysis of implementation progress. In a number of cases, the authors and ownership of reports and even programmes or outcomes of planning processes between NEPAD and its agencies are not so clear (such as NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). As a result, this study makes certain assumptions regarding the sources of data and ownership of planning inputs/outputs based on the author's interpretation of certain subjective and objective factors.

1.8 Structure of the Report

The remainder of the report is organised as follows:

Chapter 2 reviews the related literature in order to develop a framework for the understanding of the relationship between institutions and the structured/ integrative management of programmes/projects in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure. Examples of models are provided to illustrate how project management methodologies may be used to define the link between the various planning hierarchies at the different levels of management/planning, programme/ project objectives, external/internal institutional environment, programmes/ projects, and institutional structures for effective implementation management so that relevant interventions may be found to move NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects forward.

Chapter 3 describes NEPAD's strategic interventions for the development of regional infrastructure, in particular integrated implementation management/ coordination of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects. The institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are explained. Lessons from the previous implementation of similar regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/ projects in the African and international context are outlined in order to determine, at a later stage, their implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management/ coordination of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, in particular the roads programme.

Chapter 4 examines the external and internal assessments of NEPAD's performance and implementation challenges in the Infrastructure STAP. This is in order to establish the extent of implementation challenges, how they are related to or impact on each other, and what their implications are for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.

Chapter 5 examines the underlying issues highlighted by the stakeholder comments on projects implementation delays. These include planning, project management and stakeholder relationship management issues: their implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects are also examined.

Chapter 6 discusses concerns regarding the recommendations proffered in NEPAD's 1st and 2nd Infrastructure STAP reviews. In addition, earlier perceptions of the influence of the external/internal institutional environment on NEPAD vis-à-vis expectations/concerns of current performance are examined.

Chapter 7 examines the underpinning planning, political and socio-economic influences in NEPAD's responses in respect of its performance in implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP.

Chapter 8 discusses the influence of key underpinning structural constraints that NEPAD failed to address in programme planning and assessments of implementation challenges. Specific reference is made to the transport/roads sector to illustrate the implications of flawed decisions and actions at the higher levels of management/planning for the implementation of different regional infrastructure sectoral interventions at the lower levels of management.

Chapter 9 provides the summary and conclusions. Interventions to ameliorate the *status quo* in the short-term are outlined from a project management perspective.

2. INSTITUTIONS, PROGRAMMES/PROJECTS AND DELIVERY OF (CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL ROADS) INFRASTRUCTURE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews related literature in order to develop a framework for the understanding of the relationship between institutions and the structured management of programmes/projects in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure. First, *strengths* of and *opportunities* in adequate institutions to support the attainment of multiple regional infrastructure development objectives are examined. Second, *weaknesses* and *threats/constraints* in the external or internal institutional environment, particularly in the provision of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services, are discussed. Third, institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate effective integration of planning hierarchies at the different levels of management/planning, programmes/projects, and institutional structures for implementation management, particularly in the context of integrated development, are discussed.

The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 examines the role of institutions in the provision of regional infrastructure. A synopsis of the parlous state of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services is provided to illustrate the impact of inadequate institutions on infrastructure delivery. Section 2.3 discusses the causes of inadequate institutions on the development of cross-border regional infrastructure to support the attainment of multiple development objectives similar to those mooted by NEPAD. Examples of delivery in other infrastructure sectors are made from time-to-time to illustrate different views, or for emphasis. Section 2.4 explores how links may be developed between institutions, planning hierarchies at different levels of management, programmes/projects, and structures for project implementation/ implementation management to facilitate a structured/integrative approach to the management of projects. This is in order to establish how the effective use of relevant project management methodologies can support identified institutional

mechanisms and arrangements to foster a structured approach to the management of development programmes/projects in a highly politicised environment of trans-state transactions, which may also be characterised by the predominance of (inadequate) institutions at the various spatial categories. Section 2.5 is the summary and conclusion.

2.2 Role of Institutions in the Development of (Regional) Infrastructure

2.2.1 Impact of effective institutions in the implementation of development programmes/projects

The level of development of institutions at state and trans-state levels influences the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support successful implementation of (cross-border) regional development programmes/projects. Various authors (Baum, 1982; Baum & Tolbert, 1985; DBSA, 2004; Deng, 2002; (DFID, 2003; World Bank, 1994) have highlighted the centrality of effective and efficient institutions to maximise the impact of development interventions. Other authors (DFID, 2003; Lakshmanan & Anderson, 2000; World Bank, 1994) have also emphasised the role of effective institutions to support the development of institutional capacity in organisations. This includes the development of adequate institutional infrastructure, knowledge management, and human capital in organisations tasked with the role of supporting trans-state actions. In the context of infrastructure development, these afore-mentioned aspects are said (*ibid*) to increase the efficiency of physical and non-physical infrastructure assets in order to meet effective demand for infrastructure services.

Different institutional structures emphasise different aspects of institutional capacity in the provision of infrastructure based on their core business or situational specificity. For example, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (2004) has identified good governance as a key influence to ensure beneficial outcomes of infrastructure development initiatives at sub-regional or

regional levels. Furthermore, the DBSA (*ibid*) argued that sound policy and legal frameworks, institutional capacity development in the public sector, and broad-based stakeholder participation all contribute to the development of sound institutions. In the DBSA's case, sound institutions are considered integral "…to maximise the development impact of financial assistance" (*ibid*).

The DBSA's focus areas for institutional development are particularly pertinent for NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, where investments in facilitation and construction projects involve multiple institutional stakeholders with diverse development objectives and multiple structures for implementation management. In addition, complex funding arrangements in (cross-border) regional infrastructure programmes require effective governance regimes to maximise the impact of development assistance: this aspect is particularly significant since the institutional environment in development programmes/projects is typified by limited resources and capacity for implementation. In this respect, the levels of development at country levels play a crucial role in the development of adequate institutions and related institutional capacity.

Box 2.1: Relationship Between the Institutional Environment and Project Success

A sound institutional environment and effective performance of institutions is, in a circuitous manner, a function of the level of development in any country. For example, in SADC's bilateral agreement between Mozambique and South Africa (to resuscitate an old transportation corridor that had been abrogated by disuse,) the creation of *physical transport infrastructure* systems, such as the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), was facilitated through the concurrent development of appropriate institutional arrangements for implementation, operation, and management of the physical infrastructure assets. This approach was viewed as a pre-condition for the envisaged integrated and diversified complementary investments (by other sectors) to manifest in order to ensure sustainable economic development.

Yet, inadequate or inappropriate institutional arrangements, combined with complications of institutional mechanisms to minimise the blow to displaced workers in the process of transferring public-sector activities to private concessionaires, had the potential to limit the extent to which the MDC initiative meets expectations. In certain cases, the inappropriate institutional arrangements were traceable to the diversity in levels of development between the two countries (such as the inefficient state of Mozambican institutions after a long period of warfare). The development of institutional capacity for effective delivery of project objectives was paramount in this context. As Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 32) noted: "The ultimate success of the MDC may well depend upon the ability to develop *non-physical* infrastructure (emphasis in original) such as smooth border operations, good business logistics systems, and other knowledge and competencies in transportation and trade facilitation."

Source: Derived from Lakshmanan and Anderson, 2000, pp. 31-32.

The example of institutional arrangements in the implementation of the MDC, in Box 2.1, illustrates the symbiotic relationship between the level of development in institutions/organisations at national levels and their impact on institutional mechanisms and arrangements for effective implementation of trans-state "trans-actions," such as cross-border programmes/projects, in the delivery of regional infrastructure. The example of the MDC also highlights the trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary characteristics of institutions that support integrated implementation of development programmes/projects in the context of integrated development. Notably, the MDC's example underscores the complex requirements for integration of diverse spheres of institutional influence in the delivery of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure, within and across the various spatial categories where projects are implemented.

A cross-country study conducted by the World Bank (1994), to compare the performance of infrastructure services, established that effective institutional arrangements played a central role to support the development of the requisite efficiencies in the delivery of infrastructure services to meet effective demand. The study (*ibid*) also established that effective institutional arrangements played a critical role to ensure that infrastructure performance supports the delivery of development benefits. The aforementioned views validate the positive influence of effective institutions on infrastructure delivery.

When taken in conjunction with Bastani's remarks (1988: 67) regarding the fundamental role of adequate institutional capacity in the delivery of development projects, the findings of the World Bank's study highlight the close relationship between effective institutional arrangements and mechanisms *and* the success of infrastructure developments projects. Bastani's remarks (*ibid*) also circuitously emphasise the centrality of development projects as institutional mechanisms, or instruments, to translate (the state's) policy initiatives and interventions into practical delivery on the ground. The World Bank study (1994) also underscores the significance of an enabling institutional environment at national levels to support the attainment of planned development outcomes.

As the World Bank (*ibid*) argued:

> …there is great variation both within and across countries in the efficiency of providing infrastructure services…these findings indicate that the performance of infrastructure derives not from general conditions of economic growth and development but from the institutional environment, which often varies across sectors and within individual countries.

Contrary to the World Bank's view, the relationship between the adequacy of the institutional environment and the levels of economic growth and development at country levels is, however, not mutually exclusive as the MDC example, in Box 2.1, illustrates. A number of issues also emanate from the various definitions of institutions, presented in APPENDIX A, with implications for projects, in particular development programmes/projects. First, the definition proffered by Velasquez (2006) of institutions as "fixed patterns of activity" highlights the inherent challenges of co-existing contradictory actions, structures and behaviours between the fixed and transient endeavours in programmes/projects and their external/internal institutional environments. To the extent that Velasquez (*ibid*) describes the "patterns of activity" as "fixed" in business institutions may augur well for projects that are undertaken in predictable business environments, although such predictability is not assured. At the same time, whereas development programmes/projects are characterised by multiple (and often contradictory) objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation, in a business environment project objectives tend to be streamlined, focused, and therefore easier to attain.

In particular, the thesis proffered by Velasquez is debatable in the context of globalisation, where businesses operate in highly dynamic institutional environments across international borders. The principles, values, norms and rules that underpin trans-actions across international border may be fixed to the extent that they are designed to provide consistent guidance for individual and collective actions and behaviours in global institutions/organisations across international boundaries. Such guidelines, however, may be amended to suit situational or territorial specificity: they may not always be observed by all the parties. These afore-mentioned observations have implications for the participation of trans-

national companies (TNCs) or foreign private sector companies in NEPAD's regional infrastructure (development) programmes/projects, particularly so in countries that are characterised by weak institutions.

Second, the definitions of institutions used by Velasquez (2006) and Keohane (Møller, 2005), when juxtaposed with the issues raised by Deng (2002), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006), and Zounmènou (2006) in respect of the potential positive impact of integrating traditional institutions in Africa's development programmes/projects, highlight the diverse spheres of influence of institutions in development programmes/projects: the formal and informal, implicit and explicit, and fluid and doctrinaire rules that govern collective and individual behaviours and actions. The nuanced differences between institutions in trans-/ multidisciplinary and trans-/multi-sectoral contexts also allude to the challenges imposed by the confluence of diverse institutions in a project's environment in the development of cross-border regional infrastructure. This is especially so since the 'rules of the game' differ in various sectors, disciplines, and spatial categories.

Therefore, approaches or processes to attain common objectives may differ significantly, between and within institutions: these differences are attributable to the inherent diversity in the underpinning ideologies, norms, values, principles, methods and rules that define institutions. As a result, the DFID (2003: vi) argued that since the institutional environment is dynamic, it "presents a challenge to the traditional concept of the project cycle with its essentially linear approach of identification, design, appraisal, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation."

The various perspectives on institutions also underscore the need to reform both the internal and external institutions in order to facilitate efficient implementation of development programmes/projects to meet effective demand. Hence, the change from an external focus and the tendency to ascribe all of Africa's ills to colonialism – whilst avoiding to address the breakdown of domestic institutions which manifests in poor governance regimes to regulate individual and collective behaviours or actions – are some of the issues NEPAD's institutional mechanisms

for governance, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the AU's Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance ostensibly seek to address in a constructive manner, and through the relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for collective engagement.

This study however does not discuss the efficacy of these afore-mentioned instruments to address Africa's institutional failures, including their implications for the development of regional infrastructure. Suffice to say, the issues discussed above illustrate the range of complexities in the institutional environment that impact on integrated implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes, such as NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

The view of rigid/prescriptive planning processes, favoured in business environments as mechanisms for external control, is an important consideration in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, which relies primarily on the foreign private sector for implementation of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/ projects. According to Mintzberg (1994: 349), the need for control by a powerful "external influencer" encourages the adoption/imposition of prescriptive planning systems. As Mintzberg noted (*ibid*), the afore-mentioned systems typify large-scale institutional structures/operations: they are also preferred to manage the risks of capital intensive, large-scale investments. The environment in NEPAD's cross-border development programmes/projects is, therefore, influenced by a dynamic institutional environment across international borders and trans-disciplinary institutions. As a result, the planning and implementation of NEPAD's cross-border regional infrastructure projects may tend to denote the combination of tensions and contradictions in international relations including political and socio-economic institutions across international borders.

2.2.2 Synopsis of problems in the provision of cross-border transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services

2.2.2.1 Impact of inadequate institutions on the delivery of cross-border transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services

The parlous state of Africa's physical transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services is widely acknowledged (see: AfDB, 1999; Adjasi, 2006; Amjadi & Yeats, 1995; Amoako, 1997; Anyango, 1997; Cheru, 2002; Commission for Africa (CFA), 2005; Estache, 2006; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Guest, 2004; Hope, 2006; Lakshmanan & Anderson, 2000; Limão & Venables, 2000; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; OAU/AU, 2002; Ocran, 2006; Onyeani, 1990; Rodney, 1972; Soko, 2006; UN, 2002; UNECOSOC, 2003; Walters, 1998; Watson, 1998; World Bank, 1994, 2002). A significant part of the problem is attributed to the lack of internal linkages in Africa's transportation networks (Adjasi, 2006; AfDB & ECA, 2003; Bond, 2002; CFA, 2005; Hope, 2006; NEPAD, 2002c; Ocran, 2006; Rodney, 1972; Soko, 2006). As a result, the CFA (2005: unnumbered) argued that the lack of internal coherence in Africa's transportation networks results in higher transportation costs for Africa's goods and services than, for example, would occur in a typical Asian country.

To illustrate the afore-mentioned point, the CFA (2005), Jawara and Kwa (2004), and Adjasi (2006) noted that shipping a car from Japan to Abidjan costs US$1500, whereas moving the car from Abidjan to Addis Ababa costs US$5000. According to Hope (2006:207), the United Nations' Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) also had the following to say about Africa's transportation infrastructure: "Not only does…(Africa's inadequate infrastructure by any measure) hobble the growth of enterprises able to compete in world markets, but it also prevents global production networks from setting up facilities in Africa" Underlying the identified problems with Africa's infrastructure (either at regional, sub-regional, or national levels) are inadequate institutions and institutional structures for implementation: they inhibit the development and implementation

of effective interventions for the development of infrastructure at the various spatial categories.

In the transport sector, the ineffectiveness and/or collapse of relevant regional institutions/organisations for the delivery of regional transport/roads infrastructure products and services has resulted in the proliferation of diverse national sector policies, regulations and standards. Poor governance regimes, endemic corruption, and lack of institutional capacity to facilitate the development of adequate infrastructure stocks and services exacerbate the problem. As a result, the afore-mentioned constraints have manifested in the following characteristics or outcomes in the provision of physical and non-physical roads infrastructure:

- Decrepit roads infrastructure networks at national levels, some of which have links to regional/sub-regional networks (Guest, 2004; van Ryneveld, 2001);
- Lack of maintenance and missing links (AfDB, 1999; AfDB & ECA, 2003; Adjasi, 2006; CFA, 2005; Hope, 2006; NEPAD, 2002c; World Bank, 1994); and
- Lack of internal coherence, with adverse impact on the development of intra-African trade (Adjasi, 2006; Bond, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Hope 2006; Ocran, 2006; Soko, 2006). The implications of the poor state of Africa's transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services are illustrated in Box 2.2

Box 2.2: Poor State of Africa's Transport/Roads Infrastructure and Transit Facilitation Services

Generally, the deficiencies in Africa's transport/roads infrastructure have resulted in a broad range of negative sectoral, inter-sectoral, political, economic, spatial, financial, environmental and social impacts. In particular, the parlous state of Africa's transport/roads infrastructure, and the equally ineffective interventions for redress of the identified challenges have resulted in deleterious impacts on the following spheres of Africa's development: sectoral cooperation; implementation of regional integration initiatives; inter-African trade; sectoral development (in particular agriculture); development of Africa's domestic private sector and related medium-small enterprises; poverty reduction efforts, particularly through the use of employment intensive engineering applications and methodologies in the construction and maintenance of roads infrastructure; economic performance of landlocked countries; and restructuring of national and sub-regional economies.

According to NEPAD (NEPAD, 2002c: 40), the negative impact of Africa's poor transport infrastructure and related services is evidenced in all transport sub-sectors, but more so in the roads sub-sector: high costs, delays, and unreliability of road transport services pose serious problems across the board – particularly for Africa's landlocked countries. Long distances, compounded by poor physical roads infrastructure and inadequate transit facilitation services contribute to high transport costs. For example, NEPAD's report (*ibid*) estimates a road trip of 2042 kilometres between the ports of Mombasa and Bujumbura to take on average between 12-15 days; under ideal conditions, NEPAD argues that this trip could be covered in one third of the time. In mainland SADC, excluding Angola and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), NEPAD (*ibid*) estimates the total costs of border delays at some US$48-60 million annually. That the afore-mentioned challenges in physical roads infrastructure and transit facilitation have persisted for more than four decades gives even more cause for concern.

The decrepit, inefficient and poorly-integrated transportation systems, including the resultant high transportation costs, contribute to the perpetuation of negative impacts on Africa's development aspirations. These negative outcomes include extraordinary development limitations on landlocked countries, decreased inter-African trade, Africa's marginalisation in global trade, and perpetuation of colonial trade patterns that are reflected spatially in the existing transportation networks. Some authors or organisations (AfDB, 1999; Amoako, 1997; Howe, 2001; Kanbur, 2001) have also argued that the current approaches to the development of roads infrastructure do not result in direct, short-term benefits/effects or long-term impacts on poverty reduction and human development.

2.2.2.2 Impact of aid and donor finance on transport/roads infrastructure delivery

To exacerbate the problem, a report of the Commission for Global Safety (The Times News Service, *Sunday Times*, 22 April 2007) argued that Africa "…has the most dangerous road network, with 28.3 road deaths for 100 000 people every year compared with 5.6 deaths in Britain." This report argued that in developing countries more than 90% of deaths occur, and have soared, because of the poor design of roads constructed with foreign aid. As a result, the report (*ibid*) further argued that by 2015, "Road crashes are on course to overtake HIV/Aids…as the

main cause of death and disability for children aged five to 14 in developing countries."

Although the vagaries of donor finance and its adverse impact on Africa's (infrastructure) development are well documented, a former World Bank president *still* advised that more aid and investment in Africa needed to be directed "towards vital infrastructure like roads and railways, if the money… (Africa) has invested in its people is going to pay off" (Boyle, *Sunday Times*, 18th March 2007). However attractive the prospects of increased aid and foreign investment for the development of Africa's regional infrastructure assets, the associated conditionalities and prescriptions of the global financial architecture might exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the existing challenges in the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure. The CFA (*ibid*) also stated that the afore-mentioned problems, amongst other issues, resulted from the insistence by donors on "discrete Project Implementation Units (PIUs), which (have) often poached the most qualified staff from government." As the CFA (Para. 15, 2005: unnumbered) noted, donor assistance has undermined the development of institutional capacity, including the development of a capable private sector and governments that are accountable to their citizens for delivery.

In addition, the CFA (*ibid*) listed some of the constraints that contribute to the ineffective use of aid for the intended purposes to include the cumbersome donor requirements for "procedural, reporting, monitoring and accounting" measures that bypass national budgeting and accounting procedures, including the ubiquitous conditionalities for "tied aid" (i.e., the insistence that aid funding is spent on the products and services of the donor country). Regarding NEPAD, Amaizo (Breytenbach, 2004: 150) argued that although "the conditionalities are less publicised (but implicit in good governance)… (they) may redirect finances to projects that are primarily of importance to foreign direct investors rather than Africans in the rest of Africa."

Other problems in the administration of aid, which have persisted over the decades with impact on the delivery of planned infrastructure in the majority of African countries, include the following: the lack of commitment by the developed countries to the disbursement of pledged aid and the lack of consistency in the disbursement of aid – particularly in trade-related aid packages (ANC Today, Vol.4, #42, 2004; ANC Today, Vol.4, #45, 2004; ANC Today, Vol.4, #46, 2004; Business in Africa, 2004; CFA, 2005; Cheru, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; OECD & AfDB, 2001/2002; Oxfam, 2002), post-war reconstruction efforts (Patrick, 1998), and poor coordination by both the donors and recipient countries (CFA, 2005; Mkandawire, 2002; Patrick, 1998). According to the ANC Today (Vol.4, #44, 2004), Cheru (2002), and Patrick (1998), these afore-mentioned conditions have resulted in the inimical impact of aid on poverty reduction. The afore-mentioned inefficiencies have also hindered the development of institutional capacity for implementation of the identified development projects and for future spatial expansion.

2.3 Causes of Inadequate Institutions in the Development of Cross-Border Regional Infrastructure

2.3.1 Complexity of underpinning institutional mechanisms and arrangements

Some institutions, media, development analysts, and intellectuals have previously identified a plethora of constraints and challenges underpinning the development of Africa's infrastructure and its performance (see: AfDB, 1999; Adedegi, 2002; Amjadi & Yeats, 1995; Amoako, 1997; Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990; Anyang' Nyong'o, 2002; Bond, 2002; Calderon & Serven, 2004; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Estache, 2006a; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Hope, 2002, 2006; Howe, 2001; Lakshmanan & Anderson, 2000; Limão & Venables, 2000; *Mail and Guardian*, 2004a; Mills, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; N'diaye, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; OAU/AU, 2002; Onyeani, 1990; Patrick, 1998; Paul, 1990; Picciotto & Weaving, 1994; Rodney, 1972; Taylor, 2005; World Bank, 1994, 2000, 2002). The said problems mirror the overall institutional quagmire in

infrastructure development at the various levels of management/planning and spatial categories.

At the integrative/strategic levels of management or development/programme levels of planning, the identified problems in the delivery of Africa's infrastructure are attributed to the following mutually reinforcing broad categories of causes: weak institutional environment; inappropriate development planning approaches; legacy of entrenched colonial influences in trade that are reflected spatially in the existing transportation patterns; lack of inclusive stakeholder participation; lack of institutional capacity for implementation compounded by the inordinate dependence on external funding and expertise; and lack of sustained political support for the implementation of agreed programmes.

Although the adverse institutional issues are well-documented, how they are interrelated, and how their impact on the planning and implementation of programmes/projects has been managed appear not so well-documented; this is particularly so in the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects with multiple development objectives planned for simultaneous implementation. Details of some of the identified institutional issues are listed under Box 2.3

Box 2.3: Institutional Factors that Contribute to Poor Infrastructure Development and Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa

The poor performance of infrastructure projects and services in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the transport/roads sector, is attributed to the non-performance of various interrelated supply-side and demand-side factors listed below. Whilst these factors are mutually reinforcing, the list depicted below illustrates the categories of institutional causes of problems and related outcomes at the various levels of management.

Weak institutional environment

- Inappropriate paradigms that inform infrastructure development planning;
- Lack of appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks;
- Withdrawal of the public sector from infrastructure provision compounded by the negative effects of privatisation;
- Questionable reliance on the private sector to achieve equitable development outcomes;
- Minimal inter-African and inter-regional trade to induce increased demand and investment in regional transportation infrastructure and services;
- Inappropriate reliance on and application of prescriptions contained in the Washington Consensus and related structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which curtail state expenditure on basic infrastructure and utilities.

Inappropriate development planning

- Misallocated infrastructure investments;
- Poor development priorities resulting in lack of maintenance;
- Lack of focus on geographical and infrastructure characteristics to determine costs;
- Inadequate targeting of infrastructure investments to rural areas for direct impact on poverty reduction;
- Inappropriate, over-ambitious, once-off infrastructure projects with no capacity for implementation and spatial expansion;

Lack of inclusive stakeholder participation

- Lack of inclusive user involvement in the value-chain from decision-making to operation;
- Lack of wider consultation on, and ownership of development processes and outcomes.

Inordinate dependence on external sources of funding and expertise

- Crippling debt and balance of payments constraints;
- Lack of binding commitments from development partners and the international community;
- Unmet expectations of reliance on foreign private-sector investment;
- Donor involvement in new infrastructure investments, with the associated negative conditionalities (favourably biased towards donors and not recipient countries) resulting in the inordinate influence of donors on new infrastructure programme/project design whilst ignoring maintenance projects;
- Covert agendas of developed countries, some of which impact on the questionable relevance and appropriateness of infrastructure development interventions;
- Failure of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to sustain planned expenditure on infrastructure programmes and other development priorities.

Lack of capacity for implementation

- Lack of capacity for, and inadequate attention to implementation;
- Poor leadership;
- Lack of political will to implement regional agreements.

Governance failures

- States' failure or weak states;
- Poor political, economic and corporate governance;
- Widespread corruption, mal-governance and state capture in extreme cases.

Source: Derived from various sources including the following: AfDB (1999); Adedegi (2002); Amoako (1997); Anyang' Nyong'o (1990); Anyang' Nyong'o (2002); Bond (2002); Cheru (2002); Diescho (2002); Estache (2006a); Founou-Tchigoua (2002); Gelb (2001); Hope (2002, 2006); Howe (2001); Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000); Limão and Venables (2000); Mail and Guardian (2004a); Mills (2002); Nabudere (2002); N'diaye (2002); NEPAD (2001); NEPAD (2002c); OAU/AU (2002); Onyeani (1990); Patrick (1998); Paul (1990); Picciotto and Weaving (1994); Rodney (1972); Taylor (2005); World Bank (1994, 2000, 2002).

The problems depicted in Box 2.3 are compounded by poor political leadership in the implementation of development programmes/projects. Also, because of the failure by many African countries to develop infrastructure stocks and reach the "critical mass" required for increased investment, Estache (2006a: 10) has argued "…costly self sufficiency seems to be the norm to meet the demand of investors for infrastructure services." Estache (*ibid*: 11), however, noted that approximations in transport are much more complex because of the location of transport in space.

In addition, increased investment at national or regional levels is made difficult by the following circumstances.

(a) The majority of African countries do not have adequate domestic resources to develop transport/roads infrastructure, in particular national roads networks with regional implications. The potential for "free riding" in the delivery of regional infrastructure programmes/projects is therefore enormous. In this regard, Hope (2006: 222) recommended that capacity development to support Africa's infrastructure needs to "promote and allow for the pooling of resources with other countries, where this could lead to the development of infrastructure serving common needs." In this context, the role of regional institutions would be to coordinate the development of regional infrastructure stocks that fall within the realm of global public goods. The efficacy of regional institutions in this role would depend on whether or not they posses the authority, institutional capacity (including technical, financial and human resources), and political support and commitment from member states.

(b) The design and responsibility for the development of national networks with regional implications may be complicated by the trade imperatives that are linked to Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that African countries have entered into with the various countries or regional blocks from the industrialised countries of the developed north (such as the US's African Growth and Cooperation

Agreement (AGOA), or the EU-South Africa, or EU-ACP (Cotonou) Agreement), EU's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), or with some of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) (such as China) in south-south cooperation agreements. Moreover, issues pertaining to the development of cross-border regional infrastructure are the subject of dominant discourse on sustainable development finance of global public goods. The emphasis of these policy prescriptions is on Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and an increased role of the foreign private sector in the delivery of infrastructure products and services; these policy prescriptions introduce complex global institutional mechanisms and arrangements in the delivery of Africa's cross-border regional (transport/roads) infrastructure assets and services.

(c) Some aspects of technology, service provision and government procurement have also been brought under the ambit of World Trade Organisation's (WTO) rules (the so-called "Singapore Issues"), with implications for the development of regional infrastructure. These issues are linked to the controversial provisions of the WTO's institutional mechanisms, such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The afore-mentioned instruments have implications for access to affordable/borrowed technology by developing countries, and capacity development for domestic private sector operators to provide transport services and products as well as institutional reform/development in general.

For example, Jawara and Kwa (2004: 39) argued that the Singapore issues "…are essentially about removing any domestic legislation in developing countries that favours local companies over foreign companies"; they are also about ensuring the rights and unfair advantage of foreign companies over local/domestic companies (*ibid*). According to Jawara and Kwa (*ibid*), the imposition of the Singapore issues by the WTO is attributable to the "strong-arm tactics" of the powerful developed countries with the collusion

> of the WTO and the global financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank (who, they (*ibid*) argued, "carrotize" technical assistance and loans to pressure developing countries into acquiescing to these controversial WTO rules). In this regard, Jawara and Kwa (*ibid*) argued that the Singapore issues, in addition to the vagaries of trade facilitation, are tantamount to "self-legislated and self-regulated colonialism all over again."

The issues discussed above allude to an environment of increased complexity in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, particularly so cognisant of global rules and policy prescriptions of the global financial architecture with respect to sustainable financing of global public goods. This complexity suggests that the short-term effects and long-term impact of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure development on trade, regional integration, capacity development, and poverty reduction (i.e., NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation) assume much more fluid dimensions based on the context within which roads infrastructure programmes/projects are developed. In this regard, Lakshmanan and Anderson (2002: 7) have identified the development of relevant institutional capacity in organisations, in particular non-physical infrastructure, as critical to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of physical roads infrastructure assets and services. The afore-mentioned suggestions also underscore the significance of the development of a coherent and effective institutional framework for the effective and efficient delivery of infrastructure.

It is cognisant of this realisation that various authors (Bastani, 1988; Baum & Tolbert, 1985; DBSA, 2004; DFID, 2003; World Bank, 1994; Paul, 1990) have acknowledged the need for institutional reform/development to ensure the effectiveness of institutions and the adequacy of institutional capacity to support infrastructure delivery and performance. However, the underpinning linear approach of the stages of the project life cycle in a projects environment presents challenges for institutional reform/development (DFID, 2003: vi), or *vice versa*; this is particularly so cognisant of rigid requirements in project management

functions including the management of constraints and the inherent risks in all of the aforementioned. As the DFID (*ibid*) noted:

> With institutional development, interventions have to be informed by experience and developed as they go along. In addition, institutional development is often long term, requiring a willingness to maintain involvement over a decade or more. It thus lends itself to a process approach where, within the agreed overall objectives for institutional change, outputs and the activities required to attain them are defined more clearly as development proceeds. This requires particular attention to monitoring, to provide a framework for adapting interventions to take account of progress and of changing conditions.

2.3.2 Constraints to the implementation of Africa's development programmes/ projects

Whilst diverse views prevail regarding the causes of ensuing problems in the implementation of programmes/projects to deliver regional infrastructure, the African region appears encumbered with all the conceivable reasons for the identified constraints and challenges in the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure. These include the following interrelated issues (not in any order of priority):

- large size of the continent vis-à-vis the multiple fragmentation of borders;
- arduous physical/geographic constraints;
- small size of African economies and low levels of income growth in the majority of (non-oil producing) countries;
- semi-colonial links with developed countries exacerbated by the intricacies of asymmetrical relations and inequitable trade agreements with developed countries/their institutions;
- inadequate institutions;
- archaic management systems/inadequate frameworks to manage institutional relationships including the interface between the various spatial categories with implications for the implementation of development programmes/ projects;

- multiplicity of (inadequate) national transport policies, regulatory and governance regimes at sub-regional/regional levels;
- inadequate public-sector transport structures;
- existing low levels of infrastructure stocks, which deter foreign and domestic investment to increase infrastructure stocks;
- missing links or inadequate transport/roads linkages for internal coherence exacerbated by the prevalence of externally-focused transportation networks, which are reminiscent of colonial transportation and trade patterns;
- low levels of human development, which impede efforts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of physical infrastructure assets;
- non-existent or outdated technology resulting in failure to develop adequate institutional infrastructure in order to increase the efficiencies of existing infrastructure assets and to support the attainment of planned infrastructure development outcomes; and
- mal-governance, corruption, and massive externalisation of domestic resources.

These afore-mentioned issues circuitously exacerbate and are in turn exacerbated by the institutional maladies and lack of capacity for effective integrated implementation management and implementation of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects in the transport/roads sector. Some authors (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990; Bastani, 1988; Bond, 2002; Cheru, 2002; Deng, 2002; Dunham, 1978; Fair, 1987; Gore, 1984; Mabogunje *et al.*, 1978; Mills, 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Taylor, 2005; Todaro, 1985; Zenawi, 2002; Zounmènou, 2006) have argued that the breakdown of parameters set by institutions at the various levels of management and in/across the various spatial categories denotes institutional failure, with implications for development programmes/projects. In Africa's case, however, there is a prevalent tendency to attribute institutional failure to the vagaries of colonialism. For example, Deng (2002: 213) argued that institutional failure was instigated and perpetuated by the imposition (on Africa's development discourse,) of foreign values, rules and methodologies. As a result, Deng (*ibid*) argued that the consequential institutional failure undermines

(domestic) public policy that facilitates the implementation of effective development strategies.

This institutional failure, Deng's argument (*ibid*) goes, has manifested in Africa's inability to participate in the global political economy. As Deng (*ibid*) further argued, the working rules of collective action were broken down because of colonialism; the reciprocal relationships between the individual and community on the one hand, and between communities on the other were destroyed, thereby circuitously resulting in institutional failure, erosion of safety nets afforded by the community to the individual and pervasive poverty. Deng, however, failed to elaborate on the range of other reasons for institutional failure in Africa's context, beyond attributing this problem to the erosion of traditional institutions by colonialism. Other authors (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990:3) have argued that the erosion of Africa's institutions contributed to the prevalence of weak states, which were inherited at independence i.e., the legacy "that colonialism bequeathed to Africa" (*ibid*).

Similar arguments regarding the detrimental impact of colonialism were proffered previously by some Marxist or neo-Marxist scholars (Mabogunje *et al.*, 1978) in their analyses of institutional failure in developing countries, Africa in particular. Other scholars/authors (Bastani, 1988; Bond, 2002; Cheru, 2002; Dunham, 1978; Fair, 1987; Gore, 1984; Todaro, 1985) underscored the negative impact, particularly on developing countries, of various inappropriate mainstream (regional) development theories; or the negative impact of foreign methodologies on the development of institutional capacity for the implementation of development/infrastructure programmes and projects.

The argument of colonialism being the cause of institutional failure in African countries (Deng, 2002: 213), however, appears to ignore the role of the neo-colonial, patrimonial and neo-patrimonial African state in instigating and perpetuating institutional failure in Africa's contemporary development landscape. For example, the narrow mercantilism displayed by various African

countries/governments in their failure to implement regional agreements, the venality of African governments and political leaders, and the endemic patron-client relations that manifest in mal-governance and corruption in the majority of African states (Mills, 2002; Taylor, 2005; Zenawi, 2002) are, in addition to the legacy of colonialism, some of the causes of institutional failure. As a result, one may argue that the neo-patrimonial African state has resulted in the deepening of poverty and the failure of development programmes/projects in the majority of African states.

Some African scholars (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Zounmènou, 2006) have also highlighted as integral to Africa's development discourse the need to incorporate African values, culture and integrated management systems in the development of programmes/projects. The afore-mentioned scholars (*ibid*) suggested that this approach would facilitate the development of alternative indigenous development models that are underpinned by indigenous institutions, to effectively support the implementation of Africa's development programmes/projects. As Zounmènou (2006: 20) noted, African values form part of Africa's cultural system, which "embodies the Indigenous Knowledge System, the art of governance, as well as the economy of the communities" (*ibid*). In this regard, Zounmènou (*ibid*) argued that African values typify traditional institutions.

The arguments posited above have implications for the development of alternative approaches to Africa's development programmes/projects that are suited to situational specificity. Notwithstanding their merits or demerits, the suggestions proffered by Deng (2002), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) and Zounmènou (2006) regarding the significance of African traditional institutions in the development of relevant/effective interventions for sustainable development require further examination.

The views expressed above regarding the significance of traditional institutions for the attainment of effective development outcomes are, however, not new. For example, it appears that the recent successes of the East Asian emerging

economies, or NICs, in various regions of the developing world, which were previously *also* affected by colonialism, are underpinned by the development of effective interventions through the integration of (formal) western and traditional regional/national-specific institutions (Mills, 2002). In the case of Malaysia and Taiwan, the increasing adequacy of the countries' institutions to tackle development challenges has been attributed to the prudent combination of formal and informal institutions to facilitate and evince people-centred development approaches (*ibid*). In countries like Singapore, Mills (*ibid*) has argued that the effectiveness of the adopted development approach was based on the integration of the underpinning traditional Asian values. As a result, Mills (*ibid*) averred that NICs like Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong-Kong and Thailand have achieved prosperity through the shrewd balancing of technology, global integration and openness, human development, and economic empowerment of their people through a mix of western and traditional values.

It has also been argued (*ibid*) that the development approach followed by the NICs has minimised the negative impact of the 'discontents' of globalisation. However, Mills (*ibid*: 146) argued that the Asian financial crises underscored the need to reform both the domestic institutions of governance (in countries like Indonesia), and those of the contemporary global financial architecture (particularly in development finance and trade), in terms of the "…legitimacy, speed and efficacy of external policy prescriptions" (*ibid*). In this regard, the arguments advanced by Mills above illustrate the necessity for the alignment of interventions for institutional reform/development at the various spatial categories and levels of management, and how such interventions may be used to support the structured management/implementation of development programmes/projects.

Some of the adverse influences in the internal/external institutional environment on project implementation are presented in Box 2.4

Box 2.4 Adverse Influences in the Institutional Environment on Project Implementation

Various authors have highlighted a range of mutually reinforcing negative influences in the internal and external institutional environment, which impact on project implementation. Some of the negative influences, which have resulted in implementation failure of (Africa's) infrastructure/development programmes and projects, include the following:

- Legacy of disempowering colonial and neo-colonial influences on Africa's development initiatives (Bond, 2002; CFA, 2005; Diescho, 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, Rodney, 1972);
- Inappropriate contemporary approaches to Africa's integration with the developed north, or global political economy (Adedegi, 2002; Bond, 2002; Gelb, 2002; Mills, 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Taylor, 2005; Zounmènou, 2006);
- Inordinate reliance by African governments on the foreign private sector to deliver successful infrastructure development outcomes (Estache, 2006a);
- Inordinate reliance on external resources, such as funding and technical support: this reliance is reinforced and exacerbated by the onerous prescriptions of the global financial architecture and conditionalities for technical support and loans from the international finance institutions (Adedegi, 2002; CFA, 2005; Ekpo, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Guest, 2004; Jawara & Kwa, 2004; Mills, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Tandon, 2002; Taylor, 2005);
- Lack of institutional reform and/or development (CFA, 2005; DFID, 2003);
- Weak government policies, in particular the negative impact of economic policy failure on development programmes/projects and on institutional mechanisms and arrangements for infrastructure delivery (Bastani, 1988; World Bank, 1994);
- Poor governance regimes that are exacerbated by corruption and neo-patrimonial state relations, which manifest in patronage and rent-seeking activities (CFA, 2005; Gelb, 2001; Mills, 2002; Taylor, 2005; Zenawi, 2002);
- Lack of institutional capacity for project selection, preparation and strategic management of development projects (Paul, 1990);
- Lack of institutional capacity for implementation (Anyang' Nyong'o *et al.*, 2002; Bastani, 1988; CFA, 2005; DFID, 2003; Hope, 2002, 2006; N'diaye, 2002; World Bank, 1994);
- Attitudinal biases that are linked to the covert agendas of different stakeholders with adverse implications for projects' implementation (Adedegi, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o *et al.*, 2002; Bond, 2002; Thwala, 2001);
- Inadequate management of cultural difference in multinational projects to ensure projects' implementation success (PMI, 1996; Turner, 1999); and
- Adverse "developmental factors" – such as the persistent poverty, emigration of skilled human capital, deteriorating education system, weak governance systems, and HIV/AIDS epidemic – which have resulted in "capacity deficits" to implement development plans and projects to deliver products and services for sustainable development (Hope, 2006).

Previously, the DFID (2003) argued that the lack of real commitment for transformational change from stakeholders – especially those at senior levels – is one of the reasons that contribute to institutional failure. In environments of inadequate institutions, the lack of political will and stakeholder commitment to support transformational change usually manifests in the tendency to define and articulate implementation challenges in development programmes/projects in vague technical contexts. This approach may result in the exclusive proposal of technical interventions to address the identified problems, to the exclusion of addressing the underlying causes of institutional inadequacies or identified

problems. In particular, the afore-mentioned technical interventions are usually proposed arbitrarily and fast-tracked for implementation. In the majority of cases, such technical interventions can be compared to 'band aid' solutions to entrenched and endemic problems of development, resulting in implementation failure. As the DFID (*ibid*: iv) noted: "Technical interventions that leave unsatisfactory institutions intact will probably achieve nothing".

Moreover, the possible impact of the proposed technical/development interventions on existing (inadequate/fragile) institutions and structures for implementation is hardly examined during programme/project preparation and in strategies for project implementation or implementation management, in order to propose relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support project implementation. Thus, the DFID (*ibid*), and the World Bank (1990) have identified the lack of institutional reform/development and lack of institutional capacity as the key challenges to the success of development programmes/ projects. This is particularly so since, according to the World Bank (*ibid*), policy makers tend to ignore institutional aspects because of their multi-faceted characteristics.

Similarly, Baum and Tolbert (1985) and Paul (1990) argued that institutional aspects do not receive adequate attention in the management of development programmes/projects. They amplified this argument with the notion that institutional reforms circuitously encounter resistance when fragile institutions are overwhelmed by the imperatives of multiple development objectives (in development programmes) that are planned for simultaneous implementation.

In this regard, critical issues in this study are:

- How can the negative impacts of institutional failure be managed in order to facilitate the implementation of development programmes/projects to ameliorate the *status quo*? In other words, how can Africa's development programmes/projects, in particular NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, be implemented effectively cognisant of the complexities of the

external/internal institutional environment in which such programmes/projects are conceptualised and implemented?

- Specifically, in the short-term, how can the adverse influence of the prescriptions or conditionalities of external/international institutions (including global financial institutions, global trade rules, and so on) be managed so as not to stymie Africa's development agenda in the delivery of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure?
- What and how can positive aspects in African institutions be harnessed to facilitate effective delivery of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure, cognisant of the negative impact of the fragmented states and institutional capacity deficits on the attainment of collective/regional development objectives?
- In the long term, how can institutional reform/development be instituted in order to facilitate effective implementation of (cross-border) regional infrastructure programmes/projects, cognisant of the rigid requirements of the stages of the project life cycle and project management functions or resistance to change in the external/internal institutional environment?
- What effective interventions may be implemented in planned programmes/projects in the short-term in order to accommodate the constraints of project management functions, or those imposed by the stages of the project life-cycle, cognisant of the long-term requirements for institutional reform/development and the development of institutional capacity?

The questions posed above may not all be answered, or even addressed in this research report. Given the vagaries of the external/internal institutional environment in Africa's development landscape, this research will, however, establish institutional mechanisms and arrangements instituted in other/similar settings to facilitate effective implementation of the approved development programmes/projects.

2.4 Link between Institutions, Programmes/Projects and Structures for Implementation Management

As the discussions in the sections above illustrate, the implementation of development programmes/projects is increasingly influenced by the external/ internal institutional environment including the nature of institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support implementation. As a result, a starting point or parallel process to facilitate effective implementation of development programmes/projects would be the reform/development of inadequate institutions. Since the development arena is dynamic, with multiple stakeholders who have their own development agendas and priorities, the discussions above suggest that some of the requisite inputs in Africa's development of programmes/projects are beyond the control of even the implementing internal (regional, sub-regional or national) institutional structures/organisations.

It appears the institutional environment in the delivery of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure is much more complex and politicised, with significant influence by external institutions of the developed north on the mapping of development objectives and desired outcomes in programmes/ projects. Significantly, the cross-border regional transport/roads sector intersects multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary spheres of influence thereby increasing complexity. Therefore, solutions must be found to facilitate a structured approach to the management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects within the ambit of limited internal/domestic resources. A critical question is: how can institutional, sectoral and project aspects be managed coherently to facilitate effective implementation?

The models for the structured management of development programmes/projects illustrated in this section are, at best, used to highlight some of the mechanisms that have been used to support integrated implementation/implementation management of projects. Admittedly, the environments in which such models have been used in the past may not be as complex as the present-day internal/

external institutional environments in which Africa's development programmes/ projects are implemented – including NEPAD's. The challenges in Africa's development landscape discussed in this chapter are, however, not insurmountable. Therefore, the models discussed below can be modified and/or used in combination with a range of trans-/multidisciplinary interventions to suit project and situational specificity. Since these models have been used successfully in diverse settings, and have universal applicability, they may also be used as inputs to the development of indigenous models for the management of Africa's development programmes/projects.

2.4.1 A case for the effective use of integrative project management methodologies

In the context of integrated development and integrated implementation management of Africa's cross-border regional infrastructure projects, *standard* project management guidelines seem inadequate for the task. Therefore, the structured and creative integration of relevant inputs from trans-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary knowledge areas may assist to develop *integrative* project management methodologies to overcome some of the structural challenges in institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate integrated implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure projects. In this regard, the role and capacity of institutional structures is critical to create an enabling environment for the planned integrated development interventions to manifest. In particular, some of the crucial aspects to support the effective development and application of integrative project management methodologies include the approach to planning, characteristics of institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management, substance of planning, and characteristics of institutional structures/organisations and organisational environments in which projects are implemented.

2.4.1.1 Approach to planning

The relationship between institutions, planning hierarchies, projects, and implementation management may be defined by the approach to planning. An approach to planning may either facilitate the forging of links between institutions, strategies at various levels of management, objectives, external/internal institutional environment, programmes/projects, and structures for implementation management: it may also entrench what Mintzberg (1994) referred to as "the great divide" in planning hierarchies, programmes/projects, and structures for implementation management.

Integrative project management methodologies, as some of the mechanisms for effective project planning and management, may facilitate the development of links between institutions, programmes/projects and structures for implementation management in order to facilitate effective implementation and implementation management of projects. Integrative project management methodologies also provide frameworks for analysis in order to link action planning with performance management as well as to facilitate the management of influences of the internal/external environment in so far as these impact on project management functions. The characteristics of these integrative frameworks, however, will be determined by the approach and attitude to planning in various institutions/ organisations for implementation of projects.

Since this study assumes NEPAD used the prescriptive model to the development of regional infrastructure, using Mintzberg's (1994: 26-27) analogy regarding the separation between key planning processes and implementation in prescriptive models, one may argue that integrative project management methodologies may provide effective mechanisms to bridge the gap between institutions, planning hierarchies, programmes/projects and structures for implementation management. Integrative project management methodologies enunciate through the use of relevant project management tools and techniques how integrative links can be developed and operationalized in order to bridge the gap between what Mintzberg

(*ibid*) referred to as the divide (in prescriptive models) between "strategy and tactics," "analysis and synthesis," "thinking and acting."

2.4.1.2 Characteristics of institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management

In project implementation management, the use of integrative project management methodologies facilitate the integration of formal and informal rules, formalised and emergent/intuitive management systems/behaviours with the organisational/ project structures that perform the work of projects. In this regard, integrative project management methodologies may be construed to contain elements of both the prescriptive and the descriptive/emergent models to planning. In projects, these models are either used on their own or in combination with other trans-/ multidisciplinary interventions at the various levels of management and stages of the project life cycle.

Some authors (Mintzberg, 1994; Turner, 1999) have emphasised the wisdom of integrating both formal and informal approaches to planning in the management of projects based on situational specificity and the project's requirements. To paraphrase Mintzberg (1994), the integration of emergent approaches, particularly in the development and implementation of programmes/projects, results from the realisation that effective strategies can emanate from various levels of management, particularly those that are closer to the coal-face of implementation.

2.4.1.3 Substance of planning

Accepting Turner's (1999) and Viljoen's (1997) views of the objectives, process and substance of the implementation stage, the development of effective links between conception/ideas, strategies, projects, and structures for implementation also depends on the substance of planning: these afore-mentioned links may be illustrated through the development of strategy and how this is operationalized. A

process that links institutions with planning hierarchies, objectives, internal/ external environmental issues, performance control and structures for implementation management is referred to by Mintzberg (1994: 336) as "strategic programming." Mintzberg (*ibid*) expressly recommended strategic programming for explicating, elaborating, and implementing a strategy that has already been formed. Mintzberg (*ibid*), however, argued that strategic programming is appropriate under certain conditions: i.e., capital intensity of projects; large scale of projects; a combination of large-size, hierarchical, elaborated or diverse organisational structures; powerful external influencers, and so on. (Some of the conditions described by Mintzberg are similar to those evidenced in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.)

The elements of strategic programming are also inherent in integrative project management models. At the same time, integrative project management models are also underpinned by the premises of prescriptive models to planning, primarily for purposes of analysis and performance management/control. Emergent approaches to the management of projects also form an integral part of integrative project management models and project activities at different stages of the project life cycle based on project specificity. The confluence of elements from the afore-mentioned diverse models illustrate the strong links between strategy, objectives, projects, and project structures for implementation management that evolving project management practice seeks to evince in integrative or structured approaches to the management of projects.

2.4.1.4 Characteristics of institutional structures/organisations and organisational environments

The characteristics of institutional structures/organisations and organisational environments in structures for implementation management are crucial for successful implementation. The concern about the organisational environment and human behaviour in organisations is particularly pertinent for present-day project management, particularly so in a context of integrated development. In the words

of Eric Gabriel, Vice-President Association for Project Management (Turner, 1999: xv), project management has evolved "from a systems-oriented methodology, through 'goal orientation', to project-based management. From a topic in which computers were pre-eminent, to one in which people, interpersonal and inter-group relationships predominate." This comment reminds us of how important human relations management and attitudes to work are for effective implementation of projects. In management literature/practice and in studies of organisational behaviour, these afore-mentioned issues have assumed growing importance over the past few decades. In this regard, a growing body of knowledge in project management, which draws from the vast management literature, illustrates the impact of the human element in organisational and project structures, and their implications for implementation and implementation management of projects.

As Mullins (Lynch, 1997: 729) argued:

> Managers need to consider how structural design and methods of work organisation influence the behaviour and performance of members of the organisation. The operation of the organisation and actual working arrangements will be influenced by the style of management, the personalities of members and the informal organisation. These factors may lead to the differences between the formal structure of the organisation and what happens in practice. Building an organisation involves more than concern for structure, methods of work and technical efficiency. The hallmark of many successful business organisations is the attention given to the human element: to the development of a culture which helps to create a feeling of belonging, commitment and satisfaction.

Turner (1999: 132), however, argued that the starting point or anchor for flexible approaches in structures for project implementation, what he terms the "versatile organization" (*ibid*), appeared to be the existing (formal) functional structures in organisations. The point made here is worrisome in the context of inadequate institutional structures/organisations and inadequate institutional capacity particularly in the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure development programmes/projects: if existing functional structures/organisations are dysfunctional, then the associated project structures for implementation

management will operate like rudderless units that float in a sea of complexity without guidance.

2.4.2 Guidelines to address the challenges of integrated implementation/ implementation management in development programmes/projects

There is paucity in general texts on how to overcome the challenges of integrated development, with implications for integrated implementation management of development programmes/projects with multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation. Thus, in addition to the prescribed standards for project management, or prescriptive models that emphasise performance management/control, effective project implementation planning and management in the context of integrated development needs to combine deliberate, inclusive, emergent, learning and flexible approaches based on project specificity and as the implementation process unfolds. In this context, critical concerns in the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects similar to those proposed by NEPAD are the following:

- How can the existing formal/functional structures in institutions/institutional structures such as the RECs, NEPAD and AU be used as anchors or reference points for project structures when the afore-mentioned organisational structures require radical transformation or reform/development in order to translate the new vision espoused by NEPAD into tangible positive development outcomes? The afore-mentioned question is particularly significant since these afore-mentioned institutional structures appear to not posses adequate institutional capacity (i.e., institutional infrastructure and human capital with the relevant competencies) to drive transformational change.
- What effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation management may be used to coordinate the planning inputs/outputs and activities of multiple, diverse institutional structures that operate in trans-sectoral infrastructure projects and trans-disciplinary application areas with influence on the implementation of cross-border

regional transport/roads programmes and in diverse spatial categories at international, regional, sub-regional and national levels?

- How can formal procedures be applied or modified to suit project/situational specificity when such procedures do not exist either at the institutional, or organisational levels, or spatial/sectoral categories – or in the event that the said procedures are inadequate to operationalize strategies for project implementation in alignment with NEPAD's new vision/mission?
- How can an enabling environment be created to support organisational/ project structures for integrated implementation management when some of the major influences in the project's external/internal environment are beyond the capability of project managers/project structures to influence or manage, how are such structures created in the first place and how do they facilitate effective integrated project implementation in the absence of an enabling external/internal institutional environment?
- What guidelines are available for the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects that involve multiple institutions, multiple and diverse institutional structures and stakeholders for implementation management/support that span over different spatial categories at international, regional, sub-regional and national levels?

The questions raised above appear to suggest that in addition to technical interventions, such as the use of integrative project management methodologies, the effectiveness of NEPAD's project implementation and implementation strategies will be determined by the extent and rate of institutional reforms/ development and the building of institutional capacity at the various spatial categories. In addition, institutions like the DFID (2003) and the World Bank (1994) have suggested that challenges that arise in the management of international projects in developing countries require flexible organisational or planning frameworks for their management based on project and situational specificity. The difficulty may be that flexibility becomes a misnomer in an environment where even structured approaches to implementation/implementation management appear non-existent. In NEPAD's context, the afore-mentioned

constraints appear to be exacerbated by the participation of multiple institutional structures/organisations of diverse scale/size, ideological orientation and capabilities as well as the proposal of multiple infrastructure programmes/projects of varying characteristics, size and from different infrastructure sectors that are planned for simultaneous implementation.

Various authors/institutions provide guidelines for the management of programmes/projects (including design and implementation,) within different contexts. Similarly, the standard requirements for effective project implementation are set out in the various project management procedures and guidelines: these include the international quality standards set out in PRINCE 2, ISO 9000, and project-specific standards set out in ISO 10006 (Turner, 1999) as well as the requirements for integration of relevant knowledge areas set out in the PMBOK (PMI, 1996). Turner (1999: 364-396) provides a broad introduction to the various standard project management procedures and systems. The bulk of project management literature, however, appears to focus on processes and methods – i.e., procedures, systems and (quality) controls – rather than the substantive aspects of project implementation management, which include collective engagement and people-centred management of the work of projects. In this regard, there is paucity of models and instruments for project implementation/management that overcome the distinction of, and facilitate integration in institutional, technical, organisational, and managerial/behavioural issues in projects, particularly in the context of integrated development.

For these reasons, the growing concerns (Turner, 1999; PMI, 1996) with the impact on projects of behavioural aspects have resulted in the integration of a vast body of knowledge and frameworks from human resource management and organisational dynamics in project management. In the context of integrated implementation management, a combination of various project management tools and techniques may also be used to facilitate the coherent integration of institutional, organisational, PESTLE, trans-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary inputs: this integration seeks to ensure the efficacy of project management

interventions in the context of integrated development/implementation management. This integrative approach may also facilitate the attainment of cumulative and broader development impacts that extend beyond the implementation of, for example, unique infrastructure projects. Thus, the combination of institutional, behavioural, management and technical interventions in integrated development has been identified as critical to project implementation success in previous analyses of development programmes (see: Paul, 1990; Picciotto & Weaving, 1994; Thwala, 2001).

In order to mitigate the negative impact of centralised decision-making in development programmes and projects, Picciotto and Weaving (1994) suggested inclusive stakeholder participation, and applying different management approaches to different stages of the project life cycle. Thwala (2001) also suggested the use of project management methodologies in dynamic institutional environments – similar to those in which NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and roads programme are implemented. This notion also takes cognisance of the dynamic external/internal institutional projects' environment, which is driven by overlapping stages of a project life cycle (although somewhat rigid in orientation) to deliver novel products and services (*ibid*).

Paul (1990: 33) argued that satisfying the preconditions of political commitment, availability of resources, leadership and strategic management by top management are critical for successful implementation of development programmes. For infrastructure development and maintenance programmes, Paul (*ibid*) also argued that standard systems, good management and control are critical. In addition, for harmonisation and regulatory programmes, similar to some of the elements of NEPAD's roads programme, Paul (*ibid*: 34) noted: "…political and bureaucratic bargaining may be critical." Paul (*ibid*), however, cautioned that prescriptions of "good management control," and "community participation," must not be generalised "without fully realising how key interventions will differ with the environment and the nature of different programmes." This afore-mentioned view takes cognisance of the unique nature of projects and their diverse requirements,

particularly so in a developmental context that often involves multiple and contradictory development objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation, and the participation of diverse institutional structures from international, regional, sub-regional and national contexts.

The Project Management Institute (PMI) also provides detailed guidelines on how the identified ten component processes of project management knowledge and practice it has identified interact, in order to produce novel work in projects (PMI, 1996). (These project management knowledge areas are referred to by the PMI as the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK); they include project integration, scope, time, cost, quality, human resource, communications, risk, and procurement management.) Within this context, the PMI briefly describes the influence of institutions and organisations on the performance of projects; it also identifies general management skills that are required as a basis for developing project management skills, and for use in projects based on project or application area specificity (*ibid*: 20-25). The PMI (*ibid*) conceded, however, that there may be other knowledge areas in project management in addition to the ones it proposes, whose relevance will be based on project specificity.

Turner (1999) also proposed comprehensive guidelines for a structured approach to the management of projects. The processes outlined by Turner (*ibid*) integrate the project, related management functions, and management process; these processes encapsulate the stages of the project life cycle in relation to the fundamental levels of management over which the project is managed. In this regard, some of the project management methodologies that are universally used to perform the work of the projects appear to create a structured environment for the development of creative processes of engagement and continuous learning in dynamic environments.

Strategies for implementation and sub-strategies for implementation management may be developed in this context in alignment with the articulated project objectives and project strategy for implementation, cognisant of the

projects'/situational specificity and the opportunities/constraints of the external/internal institutional environment as well as the organisational/ project structures for implementation management. Although flexible approaches to project organisation are increasingly adopted subject to situational specificity, Turner (*ibid*: 134) has argued that these emergent approaches to project organisation are still rooted within existing functional structures in the respective organisations.

2.4.3 Models to facilitate integrated management of programmes/projects

An example of Turner's "seven forces model" is presented in Figure 2.1 in order to illustrate a framework that links institutions, various hierarchies of planning at different levels of management (including strategies, programme/project objectives and external/ internal environmental analyses) and organisational/ project structures for project implementation management. (This study assumes that Turner's structured model for project-based management is used to explicate a strategy that already exists at policy/organisational levels at the integrative levels of management, which is cascaded over the strategic and operational levels of management/planning.)

Figure 2.1: The "Seven Forces Model" of Project-Based Management



Source: After Turner, 1999. *The Handbook of Project-Based Management*, p.70.

Box 2.5: Explanation of the "Seven Forces Model" of Project-Based Management

External Context – According to Turner (1999: 69), two forces are imposed by the external context:

- Sponsorship and schedule: The finance provided by the sponsor without which the project cannot begin. Much of the project definition will be driven by the available sources of finance and the expected benefit to the sponsor in return, with financiers wishing to minimise the risk especially in the choice of technology. The project's completion date is a key parameter in the project's viability, milestone scheduling, and strategies to mitigate project risks.

- External influences: The management of the influence of PESTLE factors on the project and on the parties involved is critical, as these external influences are a primary cause of many project overruns. Projects that need political support must ensure that the political issues are raised at the outset: political acumen is thus a critical trait that is required for people working on such projects. Effective stakeholder management and environmental impact analyses (EIAs) can be used to reduce potential opposition and to facilitate consultation with the diverse parties involved in or affected by the project from the outset.

Project Strategy - Two forces arise from within the parent organisation. These include the strategic importance given to the project and the strategy for undertaking it:

- Attitudes: These represent the importance attached to the project and the support received from all strata of management, from the leaders to the followers. The development of a clear vision or mission, the linking of project plans to business plans, and the active cooperation of functional and task managers to achieve the same objectives assist to build positive attitudes about a project. Ensuring that projects receive criticism from the specification stages, and as the process evolves, are some of the critical factors for the development of sensible projects.

- Project definition: This includes defining what the project is required to do, the approach to its design and technology expected to deliver it. A comprehensive project definition should be developed from the start to incorporate all the essential elements to the project's viability. A competent project definition can be achieved by:

  - setting clear and unambiguous project objectives;

  - defining realistic scope, cost, time, and performance criteria. These can be done through the strategic and milestone plans, which must be developed comprehensively from the start. If the project objectives change, then the scope definition and investment criteria must also be reconsidered;

  - setting functional strategies and assessing technical risks. The former require the determination of the design, the technology to be used, the method of its implementation and eventual operation best suited to achieving the project's objectives; the latter needs to be particularly assessed to obviate huge overruns that can result from technical problems;

  - Managing the design process by achieving a balance between meeting the schedule and making technological improvements on the design;

  - Managing resources and the context. As Turner (*ibid*: 83) notes, "…getting adequate resources, managing them well and ensuring that the context is supportive are at the heart of successful strategic management."

Internal Implementation: Three driving forces come from within the project:

- People: their management, leadership, teamwork and industrial relations. In many cases, significant institutional resistance must be overcome to ensure that the work of the project is accomplished. Considerable leadership and championing are thus required during the start-up phase to get the project started. Team work, positive management of conflicts and good communication are some of the essential aspects that need emphasis, particularly at the start-up phase. The composition of project teams should incorporate the technical and social perspectives;

- Systems: These include systems of planning, integration, reporting and control (of significant project functions including scope, quality, cost, time, risk, and other elements identified as appropriate) by which progress will be measured and managed;

- Organisation: This includes clarifying the roles, responsibilities and contractual relationships of the parties involved. Three issues must be considered at the earliest stages:

  - the relevant management structure i.e., either project, matrix, or functional structures. Implementing a matrix structure takes time: effort must be put into developing the appropriate organisational climate;

  - the extent of owner involvement;

  - the expected use of contractors, contract and procurement strategies need to be defined at the outset.

Source: Derived from Turner, 1999. *The Handbook of Project-Based Management*, pp.69-70; 80-86.

Turner (1999: 486-490) also identified problems in cross-border international projects to occur in the following areas:

- Culture;
- Distance (i.e., time zone, organisational behaviour, language and culture, professions);
- Organisation, management, and communication;
- Productivity and logistics; and
- Local legislation and regulation.

Paul (1990) emphasised the significance of strategic management in development programmes. This approach entails identifying the requisite synergies to develop congruency between the various planning hierarchies, internal/external projects' environment, project inputs, and structures for implementation management in order to support successful implementation of development programmes/projects. Some of the critical elements to facilitate integrated project implementation and implementation management that can be gleaned from models for strategic/ structured/systematic project management (see: Paul, 1990; PMI, 1996 & 2002; Turner, 1994) include the following:

- The integration of vertical and horizontal organisational and project hierarchies at the various levels of management;
- The explication of linkages between the internal and external projects' environment and their implications for project management functions at the various stages of the project life cycle;
- The articulation of clear linkages between *performance control* on the one hand and *action planning* on the other hand through the application of relevant tools and techniques such as the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS); and
- The development of links between programmes/projects and structural units in the hierarchy through tools and techniques such as the Organisation Breakdown Structure (OBS).

Thus, integrative project management methodologies may be described as depicting a practical link between what Mintzberg (1994: 78) termed "action

planning" (illustrated in hierarchies of what are supposed to be before-the-fact strategies and programmes) and "performance control" (illustrated in the hierarchies of operating plans, objectives and budgets) in prescriptive models. Significantly, an integrative approach to the management of cross-border regional infrastructure projects may be used, for example, to combine inputs from various project management models (i.e., strategic, structured and systematic project management) and trans-sectoral, trans-disciplinary application areas based on project and situational specificity.

2.5 Summary and Conclusion

The environment in which Africa's development programmes/projects are implemented is complex. In the development of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure, for example, the projects' environment is characterised by adverse influences of the external/internal institutional environment, inadequate internal institutions exacerbated by lack of institutional capacity, and asymmetrical relationships with institutions/institutional structures of the developed north. In the majority of cases, the afore-mentioned factors have resulted in endemic institutional failure in the majority of African countries, external control of Africa's development agenda, and the subordination of the will/development needs of Africa's peoples for the benefit of global financial multilateral donors, foreign private sector operators, and governments of the developed north. These afore-mentioned aspects have resulted in the perennial underdevelopment of institutions and lack of institutional capacity in the majority of African states. Yet, various studies have confirmed that strong institutions, including effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements, and capable institutional structures are critical for the efficient development of infrastructure to meet effective demand.

The discussion in this chapter does not suggest that the constraints and challenges inherent in inadequate institutional environments in the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure are insurmountable. What the discussion above

underscores is that at the various levels of management, integrated implementation management of regional development programmes requires astute understanding of the internal/external institutional environment and its implications for projects. Such understanding will assist in the development of relevant models for programmes/projects and appropriate strategies/ methodologies for project implementation/implementation management. The factors that depict pressures and resistance to projects as well as other internal/external environmental issues need to be clearly defined at the outset and managed over the various stages of the project life-cycle. At the integrative levels of management, long-term commitment and political will shall be required to reform and/or develop inadequate institutions in order to facilitate successful implementation of technical interventions/projects for the desired development outcomes to manifest.

3. NEPAD'S STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes NEPAD's strategic interventions for the development of regional infrastructure, in particular for integrated implementation management/ coordination of the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Lessons from the previous implementation of similar regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/projects in the African and international context are outlined, in order to determine, at a later stage, their implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management/coordination of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, in particular the roads programme.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 describes the institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrative implementation management/ coordination of the Infrastructure STAP. Section 3.3 outlines lessons from the previous implementation of similar regional cross-border transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes/projects in order to identify learning points for NEPAD. Details of the related programmatic interventions from the African and international experiences are presented in APPENDIX B. Section 3.4 is the summary and conclusion.

3.2 Institutional Mechanisms and Arrangements to Support Implementation

3.2.1 Project approach to integrated development of regional infrastructure

NEPAD adopted the "project approach" to the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP and its sectoral programmes (NEPAD, 2001: Para.188:55): this is albeit the argument that "the promoters of… (NEPAD) appreciate the dangers of a project approach to development" (*ibid*, Para.188: 55). NEPAD, however, failed to elaborate on the said "dangers" of the project approach, including their relevance for the development and implementation of its regional infrastructure programme/projects. At the same time, in a series of confusing statements, NEPAD described the proposed projects in infrastructure as "crucial to integrated regional development" (*ibid*). As NEPAD explained, the identified projects will "…strengthen country and regional development programmes" as well as "…go a long way in kick-starting the regeneration of the continent" (*ibid*).

This afore-mentioned view is confusing: although NEPAD stated its preference for a project approach to the development of regional infrastructure (although it is unclear how NEPAD defines a "project approach"), its references to "integrated regional development" and "country and regional development programmes" simultaneously suggested that regional infrastructure projects will be implemented within a programme approach. NEPAD's reference to "integrated regional development" is also ambiguous. It is susceptible to diverse interpretations based on one's frame of reference: it can be construed to refer to either integrated development, or regional integration, or both of the afore-mentioned concepts although they are not mutually inclusive. NEPAD's reference to integrated development in the context of projects also suggests the adoption of an approach that combines multi-/trans-disciplinary and multi-/trans-sectoral inputs in programme development, project selection, preparation and implementation based on bottom-up, or even a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches to planning and implementation of projects. Because of the complexity in planning

including the multiplicity of institutions, institutional structures and trans-state actors at the various spatial categories that integrated project implementation/ integrated development implies, a structured and integrative approach to the management of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects will thus be required.

Parallels may be drawn between the integrative approach suggested above and the approach depicted in Turner's model for the structured management of projects in Chapter 2. According to Turner (1999: 265), at the start of a systematic approach to projects, the emphasis at the top level is on identifying the project's context, the shared vision and the project strategy. In NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme, this context appears to be defined and cascaded from the integrative levels of management, where the premise for the development of regional infrastructure and related projects is outlined. There is no indication, however, of the developers of NEPAD's Strategic Framework having canvassed and/or integrated/aggregated upwards inputs from broad-based stakeholders or popular support *prior* the development of its programmatic initiatives and sectoral interventions.

As a result, wide-spread criticism or reproach was levelled at what was perceived as NEPAD's exclusionary and top-down approach to programme development (see, for example, Adedegi, 2002; African Civil Society Declaration on NEPAD, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o; 2002; Bond, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Nabudere, 2002). Hence, this study argues that NEPAD adopted *primarily* a prescriptive approach to the planning of regional infrastructure and related projects. NEPAD's prescriptive approach thus permeates significant decisions in a number of key areas in the development and implementation of its projects as will be discussed in the various chapters of this report.

In addition, some of the recommendations by various analysts also emphasised the significance of institutional aspects, particularly territorial integrity, for effective

implementation of NEPAD's projects (Hope, 2002; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003). For example, Kotzé and Steyn (2003: 5) argued that implementation success for NEPAD will hinge "…on the extent to which NEPAD can garner a common African identity" to support implementation processes. In addition, Hope (2002: 396) suggested that the success of NEPAD's initiative will depend on its ownership "by Africans themselves," and its implementation by "a number of African countries".

To the extent that the bulk of the standard project management literature focuses on projects as a point of departure, it fails to explain adequately how the links between policy/organisational strategies, internal/external institutional environment, development programmes/projects and structures for implementation management can be developed in a programme approach, particularly in a context of cultural diversity in the delivery of multi-national cross-border regional infrastructure. Therefore, how the relationships between NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions, articulated multiple development objectives, external/internal environment, programmes/projects, strategies for project implementation/ implementation management, and institutional structures for implementation management/coordination are defined and managed will be key determinants to operationalize NEPAD's approach for the development of regional infrastructure. In addition, NEPAD's approach to planning in all the stages of the project life cycle will be critical to facilitate the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of cross-border regional (transport/roads) infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation in an integrated manner.

3.2.2 Programme interventions

When NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP was launched during May 2002, most projects listed under the roads sub-sector were scheduled for completion by the end of 2005/6 (see NEPAD, 2002c: 184-191). The institutional mechanisms and arrangements underpinning NEPAD's approach to the development of regional

infrastructure are cascaded from NEPAD's Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) at the integrative levels of management to the Infrastructure STAP and roads programme at the overlapping integrative and strategic levels of management. In its Strategic Framework (*ibid*), NEPAD articulated the renewed commitment by Africa's political leadership to the "integrated practical implementation" of Africa's development programmes in the aftermath of the Cold War (*ibid*, Para. 42-43: 9). NEPAD's Strategic Framework also seeks to evince the collective commitment and determination by Africa's political leadership to "ensure… (Africa's) development by bridging the gap between Africa and the developed countries" (*ibid*, Para.55: 12).

Under the identified pre-conditions for development, NEPAD outlined the policy strategy/response actions and the key transformational principles planned for integration in all its programmatic interventions. Some of these proposed interventions include institutional reform/development, improvements in governance regimes (democracy, political, economic and corporate governance), and the development of institutional capacity to support the attainment of (NEPAD's) articulated multiple development objectives (*ibid*: Para. 79-98: 17-19). With the afore-mentioned programmatic interventions, one may conclude NEPAD espoused integrated development and a programme approach to the development of regional infrastructure.

As NEPAD (*ibid*, Para. 41: 8) argued, its approach was based on the recognition that the challenges facing the continent in the delivery of global public goods (such as the provision of cross-border regional roads infrastructure,) require an integrative perspective. As NEPAD (*ibid*, Para.194: 56) also enunciated: "The view of the initiating presidents is that unless the issue of infrastructure is addressed on a planned basis – that is, linked to regional integrated development – the renewal process of this continent will simply not take off." NEPAD (*ibid*) further argued that inherent externalities, or cross-border spillovers, require integrated coordination and management in order to optimise the delivery of

physical infrastructure and related services. According to NEPAD, effective delivery in this context would be based on the commitment of broad-based partnerships (including governments, private sector, and civil society) "to a genuine integration of all nations into the global economy and body politic."

3.2.3 Political support and commitment

NEPAD planned for the regional infrastructure programmes/projects identified in its priority lists to enjoy extensive implementation support internationally, regionally, sub-regionally and nationally. Thus, political support was expressed at the highest levels of management/planning and engagement: i.e., in NEPAD's Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001); at the AU Assembly of HoSG, held during 2002 in Durban-South Africa (AU, 2002b); at the Seventh Summit of NEPAD's HSGIC, held during 2003 in Abuja-Nigeria (NEPAD, 2003, Para.10: unnumbered); and in the G8 Africa Action Plan (G8AAP) (2002). According to the AfDB (2003: 46), the infrastructure projects on NEPAD's priority lists were planned to be "…highly visible indicators of NEPAD's activities and influence… (and to) benefit from a special NEPAD effort in terms of promotion; keeping them at the forefront of funding agencies' attention; special reporting on them at heads of state meetings; and focusing on them for raising finance."

However, the details of the interface between NEPAD's various priority sectoral programmes and the Infrastructure STAP on the one hand, and the links between NEPAD's priority sectoral programmes, its Infrastructure STAP and other regional/sub-regional/national infrastructure development plans, priorities and programmes/projects on the other hand have remained vague. These include details of RECs' programmes/programmes and national projects included in national development plans (NDPs), but which have a regional impact, which were included in NEPAD's programme for the development of regional infrastructure.

3.2.4 Institutional partnerships

To support the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of cross-border regional (transport/roads) infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation, NEPAD proposed diverse international, regional, sub-regional and national partnerships for implementation support. In this regard, NEPAD's proposals may be viewed as an attempt to break new ground, cognisant of the complexity presented by the diverse and multiple structures for implementation management as well as the dynamic external/ internal institutional environment in which the regional infrastructure projects are implemented.

For example, NEPAD sought external partnerships with international institutions for programme/project development, provision of sustainable financing, procurement of professional/construction services and project implementation support. These partnerships include the international finance institutions (IFIs), regional development finance institutions (DFIs), multilateral institutions, foreign/ national governments, and donors from the highly industrialised (northern) countries as well as foreign private sector operators. NEPAD also sought internal partnerships with regional, sub-regional and national institutions/organisations for programme development, funding, implementation, and implementation management/coordination in order to give practical effect to the attainment of its (NEPAD's) vision for the development of domestic institutional capacity.

The apparent predominance of international institutions in the planning of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, also underscored in NEPAD's statements regarding the role of the international institutions/institutional structures, lends credence to assertions (Breytenbach, 2004:147) that NEPAD is "the product of African visions shaped by African leadership as well as Western Financial Institutions." For example, according to NEPAD documents (NEPAD, 2002f), in a meeting held between NEPAD's founding/promoting presidents and the President of the World Bank as well as the Managing Director of the International

Monetary Fund (IMF), during February 2001, the World Bank gave its support to the proposed initiative for Africa's development; the World Bank agreed to the requests (presumably from NEPAD) for assistance as a technical partner, particularly in the field of infrastructure.

The World Bank also agreed to be a major partner in resource mobilisation and implementation (*ibid*). Similarly, the then-MD of the IMF, Mr. Horst Köhler, proposed that the IMF's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) be considered in NEPAD's processes/frameworks "a very useful contribution to Africa's development" (*ibid*: unnumbered). The afore-mentioned institutional mechanisms and arrangements were to have a significant impact on the planning, implementation, and implementation management of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme/projects.

As a result, NEPAD's endorsement of the instruments of the afore-mentioned IFIs – much to the consternation of civil society groups and analysts/African intellectuals (see Adedegi, 2002; African Civil Society, 2002; Bond, 2002; Cherry, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002) – is reflected in NEPAD's Strategic Framework document (NEPAD, 2001). NEPAD stated as follows: "The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* will support a PRSP Learning group to engage in the PRSP process, together with the World Bank" (*ibid*, Para.148:38). Similarly, NEPAD listed "the IMF-led PRSPs" as some of the partnerships between Africa, industrialised countries and multilateral institutions that would be maintained under the initiative (*ibid*, Para.184:52). Regarding the development of infrastructure in the context of regional integration, NEPAD (*ibid*, Para.193:56) clearly articulated the significance of the collaboration with institutions of the developed north, particularly the IFIs, as follows:

> The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* process has identified many energy, transport, telecommunications and water projects that are crucial to Africa's integrated development. The projects are at various stages of development and require funding. The next step is to accelerate their continued development in collaboration with the African Development Bank, the World Bank and other multilateral institutions"

Recent reports, such as the TCII and NEPAD (2005:20), have also indicated that NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP was developed as a joint effort under the auspices of the NEPAD Secretariat and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in close collaboration with the RECs, the World Bank, DFID, and the European Union (EU). According to Hope (2006: 207), the AfDB, World Bank and EU also made commitments to assist with the financing of new regional infrastructure and rehabilitation projects. In addition, the Africa Infrastructure Consortium, whose Secretariat is hosted by the AfDB, was also created by NEPAD institutions and the (international) development partners to facilitate the development of Africa's regional infrastructure (*ibid*). Indeed, NEPAD's institutional partnerships in the Infrastructure STAP depicted above seemed to give practical effect to NEPAD's vision, articulated in its Strategic Framework, that "The adoption of a development strategy…together with a detailed programme of action, will mark the beginning of a new phase in the partnership and cooperation between Africa and the developed world" (NEPAD, 2001, Para.204:59).

Also, the reliance by NEPAD's political leadership on African institutions, organisations and experts to elaborate the relevant development programmes/ projects and implementation plans for Africa's regeneration appears to have underpinned the (high) expectations of NEPAD's success. Thus, the comments made by South Africa's President Mbeki (one of the founders of NEPAD,) during NEPAD's first multi-stakeholder workshop held in Benoni-South Africa, during January 2002, demonstrate the level of trust and responsibility placed on Africa's institutions, institutional structures/organisations and individuals at various levels of management to drive the implementation of NEPAD's initiative including its related programmatic interventions, for the benefit of the African continent and its peoples.

President Mbeki made the following comments:

> As African institutions and expertise, it is only through you that this continent can succeed in overcoming past injustices and failures and make this the century

> of African development and prosperity. The burden now rests on your shoulders. The masses of our people, our governments and our development partners await the results of this workshop and anticipate the plans that must forever change their lives and enable all of us to carve our own way in the world (NEPAD, 2002a: 7).

3.2.5 Practical implementation support

Various pertinent international and regional workshops[1] have been held since the launch of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP in order to support implementation. It also appears the specific purposes of the different workshops were to map frameworks/guidelines for implementation, review implementation progress, identify challenges for implementation and propose the requisite interventions to facilitate effective implementation. One may surmise from the afore-mentioned activities that the primary objective of the afore-mentioned workshops was to prepare the mandated structures for integrated implementation management/ coordination at the regional or sub-regional levels, and for practical implementation at the national levels.

Based on the literature reviewed, however, an obscure relationship is illustrated between the inputs/outputs of the various workshops and planning outcomes: how the inputs/outputs of various planning hierarchies are linked to specific programmes/projects in various infrastructure sectors including the development, refinement and review of strategies for project implementation and implementation management/coordination remains vague. (This is particularly so to the extent that the afore-mentioned workshops occurred after NEPAD's programmes/projects in the Infrastructure STAP were already approved for

[1] Some of the workshops and project reviews include the following: the workshop on *Implementation of NEPAD* (Addis Ababa: Ethiopia, August 2002); the AfDB and/or NEPAD *Infrastructure STAP First Review of Implementation Progress and The Way Forward* (May 2003); the workshop on *Mechanisms for Capacity Building of RECs and Speeding Up Implementation of NEPAD STAP Projects* (Abuja: Nigeria, March 2005); the AfDB, NEPAD Secretariat and African Business Roundtable (ABR) seminar on *Fostering Private Investments in NEPAD Infrastructure Projects* (Abuja: Nigeria, May 2005); the *Participatory Workshop* (Tunis: Tunisia, July 2005); and the TCII and/or NEPAD *Infrastructure STAP Second Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward* (2004).

implementation.) It is even less clear how the inputs and outputs of the afore-mentioned workshops are linked to NEPAD's aims/objectives to facilitate integrated development (ID) in regional infrastructure including integrated implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects. The afore-mentioned views take cognisance of (NEPAD's) multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation.

It appears that separate regional programmes/projects were also launched by the various IFIs and multilateral institutions, to support the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and other (NEPAD) programmatic interventions in the identified priority sectors (Hope, 2006: 209-210). These programmes include initiatives launched by the World Bank, EU, and Africa Partnership Forum (APF). [The APF comprises a group of African countries and development partners: it includes the representatives of the G8 countries, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank, IMF, UN, World Trade Organisation (WTO), NEPAD, AU, AfDB, and RECs (*ibid*).] How these afore-mentioned programmes/projects are linked to NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, either as elements of programmes or once-off projects, remains unclear.

In addition, Hope (*ibid*: 222-224) identified various partnerships that were launched or strengthened to specifically support capacity development for the implementation of NEPAD's programmes and, generally, the implementation of development programmes in African countries and in RECs. According to Hope (*ibid*), the key institutions/organisations participating in the afore-mentioned partnerships for capacity development include the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), the World Bank – through both its assistance to the ACBF and its newly-created Operational Taskforce on Capacity Development in Africa – and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), through both its global programme on capacity development and its Southern Africa Capacity Initiative (SACI) that was launched during 2004.

The afore-mentioned institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, however, appear to have elicited limited implementation progress, particularly in cross-border facilitation projects like the roads sector. There are indications, however, of progress in the implementation of investment projects in the energy and ICT sectors as well as in multi-modal transport/roads development corridors (DCs) financed or implemented by the World Bank in the East African Community (EAC). According to the TCII and NEPAD report (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 12), for example, "considerable progress" was made to achieve financial closure on the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP), the Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation (RASCOM) Phase 1, the West African Power Pool (WAPP), the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP), and the development of generation and transmission capacity within *l'Union du Maghreb Arabe/*the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA/AMU). Regarding the ICT and energy projects as well as the EAC's investment projects in roads construction mentioned earlier, the specifics of this "considerable progress" are unclear from the literature reviewed.

3.2.6 Funding approach

NEPAD advocated the concept of partnership with international/foreign institutions and governments to finance the delivery of its regional infrastructure programmatic interventions. As NEPAD argued, this view recognised the inherent constraints (in Africa's region and individual countries) in relation to the interdependencies (international, regional, sub-regional, and national) that characterise the provision of global public goods, such as regional transport/roads infrastructure. The views articulated by NEPAD were in line with the contemporary discourse on development finance for sustainable development. These issues have long been discussed in various international fora resulting in the recommendations/outcomes of the Rio Summit of 1992, specifically Agenda 21: Chapter 33; the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000; the Zedillo Report of 2001; the Monterrey Consensus of 2002; and the WSSD of 2002 (see: DBSA, 2003).

NEPAD argued that critical elements of financial assistance from the international community, which impact on the delivery of Africa's regional infrastructure, need to include the following elements: increasing resource transfers and the effectiveness of ODA; increasing FDI; improving terms of trade; and resolving the debt burden in favour of African countries. According to Taylor (2005: 45), the "deal" between the developed and African countries/NEPAD on the aspect of funding for NEPAD programmes/projects is that in return (for increased disbursements/investment), "African countries will set up and police standards of good governance across the continent – while respecting human rights and advancing democracy."

Indeed, NEPAD arguments although vague on detail lend credence to Taylor's afore-mentioned assertions. As NEPAD (2001, Para.46: 22) argued:

> The changed conditions in Africa have already been recognised by governments across the world. The… (UN) Millennium Declaration, adopted in September 2000, confirms the global community's readiness to support Africa's efforts to address the continent's underdevelopment and marginalisation. The Declaration emphasises support for the prevention of conflict and the establishment of conditions of stability and democracy on the continent, as well as for the key challenges of eradicating poverty and disease. The Declaration further points to the global community's commitment to enhance resource flows to Africa, by improving aid, trade and debt relationships between Africa and the rest of the world, and by increasing private capital flows to the continent.

NEPAD, however, appears to still rely on the support/commitment of international community or its institutions to (even) keep its part of the deal. This issue raises concerns as to what Africa's institutions/institutional structures at regional, sub-regional and national levels will actually do or commit to, in order to create an enabling environment for the continent's regeneration and facilitate the effective implementation of NEPAD's programmes. For example, NEPAD expected a favourable response from the international community to ensure the improvement of Africa's infrastructure (*ibid*, Para.100: 22), and to translate the commitments made by both Africa and the international community into practice

(*ibid*, Para.46: 22). At the same time, and confusingly, NEPAD (*ibid*, Para.5: 1) appeared to denounce any perceived perpetuation of Africa's dependency by the developed north.

As NEPAD stated:

> The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* calls for a reversal of this abnormal situation (i.e. Africa's underdevelopment) by changing the relationship that underpins it. Africans are appealing neither for further entrenchment of dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions.

The details of funding for NEPAD's various individual regional infrastructure projects have remained vague. It is also doubtful whether the partnership envisaged by NEPAD with the developed north including its institutional mechanisms and arrangements shall, for example, elicit the resources at the scale and magnitude required to address the prevailing challenges and needs in cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation. NEPAD's reliance for funding on foreign institutions also raises concerns regarding the extent of external influence on the identification, design and implementation of regional infrastructure projects including the identity of beneficiaries from the implementation of said projects. Thus, NEPAD's strategy for project implementation may need to consider the development of creative instruments for domestic resource mobilisation, including exploring diverse approaches to funding to cater for the different infrastructure sectors – based on project, sector and situational specificity.

3.3 Lessons from the Previous Implementation of Regional Transport/ Roads Infrastructure Programmes

An overview of past (and current) approaches to the development of cross-border regional transport infrastructure and transit facilitation, and lessons learnt, are presented in APPENDIX A. Previous programmes researched in this study include the *Transport and Communications Plan of the Lagos Plan of Action*

(LPA) of 1980, the *Trans-African Highway (TAH) and "missing links"* initiative that was launched in the 1970's, and the EU's *Trans-European Networks (TENs)* regional transport infrastructure programme that was launched in 1994. Examples of initiatives by other global regional blocks to address similar problems in transportation and transit facilitation – such as the initiatives in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the *Mercado Commûn del Sur* (*Mercosur*), and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) – are also included.

A summary of lessons from the implementation of the afore-mentioned programmes/initiatives is presented below:

(i) The example of failed implementation in the LPA's transport and communications programme demonstrates that the successful integrated implementation of transformational programmatic interventions needs to be premised upon the reform/development of inadequate internal institutions, including the development of institutional capacity at the various spatial categories. These are some of the key preliminary conditions for broader integrated development technical interventions, such as development programmes/projects and related planned outcomes, to manifest. In addition, institutional reform and/or development need to occur within an enabling international, trans-regional, regional, sub-regional, and national institutional environment in order to facilitate the attainment of the articulated objectives. The active role of the state is critical in this context. As Mills (2002:169) argued, "…there are interventions that states can make without external assistance: examples are prudentiality, fiscal reforms, and corruption fighting." The LPA ignored the reform and/or development of inadequate institutions in favour of sectoral programmes/projects to achieve the goals of integration, but with limited success.

For example, the LPA's transport programme proposed the implementation of technical and institutional interventions in the transport/communications

sectors to facilitate the coordination and efficiency of transportation systems for internal coherence, increased intra-African trade, and regional integration. At the same time, the LPA relied on proposed or desired institutional reforms at the international levels, under the dictates of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), to support the attainment of its objectives. Corresponding institutional development at regional, sub-regional, and national levels was proposed to achieve the LPA's stated goals in the transport and communications sectors; internal institutions, however, were inadequate to support the attainment of the LPA's objectives, particularly so since the LPA failed to propose institutional mechanism and arrangements to enforce the requisite institutional reforms.

Governance issues were not addressed in the (overall) LPA's programme, resulting in wide-spread condemnation from the international community. According to various authors (Adedegi, 2002; Anyang'Nyong'o, 2002; Diescho, 2002), this omission precipitated the World Bank's response, in the infamous Berg Report, as a counter-proposal to the LPA. In addition, the LPA's sub-regional structures for integrated implementation management lacked the authority and power to enforce implementation of the agreed collective agreements at the regional/sub-regional levels, as well as to pronounce on national prerogatives that had resulted in diverse (and multiple) transport policies, regulatory regimes, systems, standards and practices. Notably, the LPA had no control over, or influence on the proposed reforms of external (international) institutions upon which it premised the attainment of its developmental objectives.

(ii) The systematic, rigorous and integrated definition of programme/project planning inputs/outputs is paramount in processes to support the attainment of planned outcomes in the delivery of programmes/projects to support the objectives of integrated development, particularly within a programme context. The EU successfully posited a rigorous integrated approach to planning, in order to determine the desired outcomes of the TENs initiative.

In comparison, the LPA's framework for integrated implementation and management was not adequately elaborated to map the proposed integration of inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary project inputs, as well as to illustrate the requisite institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the attainment of its objectives for integration.

(iii) The example of the TAH's initiative confirms the observations by the DFID (2003) that technical interventions which leave inadequate institutions intact may achieve nothing. The TAH's initiative neither proposed (nor proposes in its resuscitated form,) corresponding institutional reforms, nor the improvement of inadequate institutions to support the attainment of its objectives. In addition, the development of institutional capacity in regional structures for implementation management appears to have been ignored. As a result of the inadequate planning frameworks vis-à-vis programme design and strategies for project implementation and implementation management as well as the inadequate institutional frameworks for the management of relationships between the regional, sub-regional and national structures, haphazard institutional arrangements for implementation management ensued.

(vi) The interface between regional, sub-regional and national programmes needs to be clearly defined and institutional mechanisms and arrangements to plan and manage the interface need to be effectively developed and structured. The inadequate management of the interface between the structures for implementation and programmes/projects at the various spatial categories is evidenced in both examples of the LPA and TAH programmes. The multiplicity of overlapping programmes and structures to attain the same objectives, but without effective and efficient coordination, resulted in either the duplication of programmes or the inability to define critical missing links (in the TAH). This resulted in confusion, wastage of limited resources and effort as well as implementation paralysis.

(v) The EU's TENs initiative illustrates that institutional reform and development to support the provision of cross-border regional transport/ roads infrastructure and transit facilitation is a long-term process. It hinges on long-term political will and commitment, the development of institutional capacity to support the implementation of collective agreements, and committed support by all the stakeholders, in particular member states.

(vi) One of the key lessons illustrated by the EU's experience is the role of effective supranational structures to support project selection, preparation, and implementation as well as to enforce the implementation of collective decisions. In the EU's case, these activities were supported by effective legislation for the integration of TTF systems in alignment with the objectives for a common transport policy for the EU. The supranational authorities were delegated the requisite authority and powers to make laws, rules, decisions and their enforcement mechanisms. In the event that national prerogatives derailed implementation progress, the far reaching decisions of the EU's supranational authorities helped to bring the TENs programme back on track. In the TAH initiative, the lack of authority in structures for implementation, clarity with respect of roles and responsibilities, accountability and enforcement mechanisms were persistent problems. These problems resulted in the undermining of RECs and the curtailment of their influence by national governments wherein the ownership of both categories of roads networks (proposed in the TAHs initiative) resided.

(vii) The EU's experience illustrates that the combination of institutional reforms/development with transformational technical interventions and adequate institutional capacity are central to the successful implementation of improvements in cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation. The example of the EU's TENs initiative also illustrates that processes to develop regional transport infrastructure and transit facilitation do not begin and end with technical interventions: that is, programmes/

projects to develop physical infrastructure assets. Institutional reform and development are critical components of programmes to support the attainment of collective objectives in the implementation of technical interventions. These different programme elements and related projects need to be either implemented concurrently or prioritised appropriately within a programme approach, and based on situational specificity.

As Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 7) noted, in an improved transport and trade facilitation system, physical and non-physical barriers to transport and cross-border transit are reduced through a combination of several components. These include the development of physical infrastructure, such as complementary transport and communications infrastructure and facilities, and non-physical infrastructure, such as knowledge and competencies to increase the effectiveness of physical infrastructure in transport and trade facilitation. In addition, the adequacy of institutions is critical to support the implementation of technical interventions.

(viii) The active role of the state (enshrined in the EU's 'principle of subsidiarity') facilitates popular participation and ensures territorial integrity at the various levels of management and spatial categories in the selection, construction, and management of regional transport infrastructure projects. In the EU's case, these processes were enabled at the outset by the clear definition of programme goals and project scope. The identification of specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time bound (SMART) objectives at the outset also obviated confusion and scope-creep; it also facilitated the attainment of the agreed programme/projects' goals.

(ix) The mobilisation of adequate domestic resources is the bedrock upon which domestic programmes/projects can be successfully implemented, with external resource mobilisation augmenting internal efforts. In the EU's TENs initiative, programme/project implementation was supported by

adequate domestic resource mobilisation including self-financing instruments from the following sources:

(a) the EU's funds (contributing up to *10%* of total project costs in the form of co-financing for feasibility studies, fees for loan guarantees, interest rate subsidies, and direct investment grants in limited circumstances); and
(b) the member states (who contributed the remaining *90*% funding requirements together with the private sector in member states under Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)).

According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*), these afore-mentioned measures contributed to the successful attainment of stated outcomes of the TENs initiative within a complex institutional environment. In the LPA's transport and communications programme, the reliance on foreign funding vis-à-vis the lack of committed support from the global institutional and financial architecture – in contradiction to the LPA's articulated objectives for self-reliance and domestic resource mobilisation – determined whether or not projects to support the attainment of the LPA's objectives for regional integration in the transport and communications programmes were implemented.

(x) The trade profiles in various countries within and across the different sub-regions, and their impact on efforts to integrate transport regimes and TTF systems are critical to determine the success of cross-border regional infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes. In other international regional blocks, such as NAFTA, the similar economic and trade profiles of member countries (i.e., between the USA and Mexico) helped to address the identified challenges to ingrate TTF systems. According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*), this feat was achieved despite the different levels of development of the member-states and the associated institutional complexities. (For example, NAFTA epitomises a case of north-south cooperation and integration. As Mills (2002: 167) notes, Mexico is

economically closer to North America, but its cultural profile is that of a Latin American country.)

(xi) Institutional structures responsible for facilitating the standardisation/ harmonisation of relevant policy, sectoral, technical, governance and regulatory regimes need to be empowered with, and delegated the requisite authority and resources to perform their mandated role and associated tasks. This process, however, needs to be linked to relevant institutional reform and development. Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 15) indicate that in the case of NAFTA, efforts to address the variety of technical and safety-related regulations, which were developed by member states over the years, proved complex and multidimensional. This problem was attributed (*ibid*) primarily to the narrow mandates of the *independent review panels* established to address the most contentious issues via *inter-governmental negotiations*. According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*), considerable effort was often required to remove inconsistencies.

In the case of SAFTA and *Mercosur* (*ibid*: 39), special efforts were often required to overcome "historical intra-regional transport frictions." According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*), the hurdles encountered by SAFTA and *Mercosur* characterise the problems of developing countries that band together to form trade blocks, because of persisting semi-colonial links with north-America and Europe. In addition, the overview of the other sub-regional blocks by Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*) underscores the significance of harmonising technical and safety-regulation regimes (in addition to other transport policy prescriptions,) *as a precondition to be enforced at national levels*.

The significance of the LPA's regional Transport and Communications programme and the TAH initiative for NEPAD's roads programme is that they draw attention to the consequences of approaches that ignore to combine technical interventions with institutional reform/development and institutional capacity

development, particularly in the context of integrated (development and) implementation of regional development programmes. These afore-mentioned programmes underscore the implications of inadequate external/internal institutional environments for programme/project implementation, particularly so in the context of inadequate institutional capacity. The LPA's Transport and Communications programme also illustrates the complexities that ensue for programme implementation when principles of divergent ideological perspectives are integrated incoherently in attempts to address the inequitable power relations in the global political economy, particularly in an environment of inadequate institutional capacity.

The study by Lakshmanan and Anderson (APPENDIX A,) of interventions to improve cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services in other global regional blocks confirms that technical improvements in cross-border TTF systems require parallel reforms in the institutional environment (such as rules governing cross-border physical flows including the elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers). On the one hand, the findings of this study highlight the impact of efficient inter-sectoral interventions on the implementation of programmes/projects to ensure improvements in the provision of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services; on the other hand, they highlight the significance of the symbiotic relationship between technical interventions and the institutional environment to elicit the desired/planned transformational outcomes, and the need for simultaneous transformation and development thereof.

In this regard, the institutional mechanisms and arrangements adopted in the EU's TENs initiative are instructive. Although the reference to the EU's TENs initiative may seem inappropriate in the African context, given the regional specificity (such as the differences in the levels of development and institutions), this example illustrates the requisite interventions and best practice approaches to reach the levels of infrastructure development in Africa, which are comparable to

those of the developed countries that NEPAD (2001, Para.98: 22) aspires to. (Whether or not such levels of infrastructure development are appropriate – cognisant of regional, sub-regional and national specificity – is a moot point.)

3.4 Summary and Conclusion

In NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, the relationship between the various planning hierarchies, programmes/projects and structures for implementation management appears to be defined within the context of the peculiar characteristics of the diverse institutional structures and systems to manage institutional relationships – at the international, regional, sub-regional and national levels – rather than based on programme/project specificity. This approach increases complexity to determine a commonality of rules for implementation management of NEPAD's cross-border regional infrastructure projects. In particular, NEPAD's role in the development and implementation is unclear.

NEPAD also appears to not have unpacked the implications of the complexity of its conception of "regional integrated development" or "integrated practical implementation" in so far as the afore-mentioned concepts apply to its programme for the development of regional infrastructure as well as in relation to available institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management. NEPAD has also failed to explain in specific terms how its "project approach" to the development of regional infrastructure is linked to the concepts of RID and ID in general, and in relation to "integrated practical implementation" in the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure and/or its institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. This is particularly so since the espoused links between NEPAD's conception of ID and the identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects appear spurious, if not misleading.

NEPAD's notions for global integration/connectivity, openness and competitiveness as well as the management of institutional relationships with

development partners further confuse NEPAD's intent for the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. NEPAD's definition of integrated implementation also appears to derive from the classical economic doctrines, which have been used to define the stages of regional integration. Arguably, the concepts espoused by NEPAD for integrated development are loaded, both ideologically and practically, resulting in complexity to articulate an effective platform for effective implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ projects. A clearer understanding of the context for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure will thus be required for the effective translation of NEPAD's notion for RID and "integrated practical implementation" into practical interventions for integrated implementation management.

Given the extent and characteristics of NEPAD's proposed institutional partnerships with the industrialised countries of the north, the impact of diverse trade regimes on the integrated implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects needs further research to identify relevant learning points from other developing/developed countries. Such research may assist to facilitate appropriate interventions for the development of effective and efficient cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services within and between diverse countries, sub-regions, and regions as well as their related institutions. The adoption, however, of foreign methodologies from regional blocks in developed countries (such as the EU where regional integration and institutional reform are highly evolved,) without modification to suit Africa's regional or sub-regional specificity might prove detrimental to the region's aspirations for effective improvements in regional transport/road infrastructure and transit facilitation services. This is because of the huge disparities in levels of institutional development between the highly industrialised developed and developing countries, in particular Africa. These disparities are exacerbated by the diversity of trade profiles between African countries/sub-regions and the international community.

Similar impediments to cross-border transport and transit facilitation, such as those described in the case of NAFTA, EU, SAFTA and *Mercosur* above have prevailed in Africa's sub-regions for decades. However, the inadequate institutional environment, lack of funding, lack of institutional capacity, political will and long-term commitment for the implementation of transformational interventions has their entrenchment and perpetuation. Remarkably, some of the challenges highlighted in SAFTA's and *Mercosur*'s case are similar to those confronting Africa's sub-regions in transit facilitation. This similarity suggests that lessons from sub-regional blocks in other developing countries may provide invaluable inputs to the requisite transformation of inadequate institutions in the provision of transport/road infrastructure and transit facilitation services.

Such learning points may also facilitate the effective implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects in support of Africa's development agenda. The critical issue is, however, what institutional mechanisms and arrangements are relevant or will be effective at this stage in the development of Africa's (cross-border) regional infrastructure? The assessment of NEPAD's performance and implementation challenges in the Infrastructure STAP over the next chapters provides some of the clues to the question posed above.

4 ASSESSEMENTS OF NEPAD'S PERFORMANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the external/internal assessments of NEPAD's performance and implementation challenges in the Infrastructure STAP. This is in order to establish the underlying causes of the identified implementation challenges, how they are related to or impact on each other, and what their implications are for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.

Variable progress in the preparation of projects in the various infrastructure sectors has been reported. Notwithstanding some evidenced progress in some infrastructure sectors, such as the ICT and energy sectors, comments regarding implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP signify the prevailing attitudes/views regarding the relevance and/or health of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure, programmes/projects approved for implementation, and NEPAD itself. Whilst positive perceptions have implications for continued political support and increased resources for project implementation support, negative perceptions may further stymie implementation progress.

NEPAD's governance and management structures (in statements by various individuals in NEPAD's governance and management structures, NEPAD's published reports on implementation progress, and media interviews with NEPAD's officials), media, development partners, and various analysts have raised concerns with implementation progress of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP (see: AfDB, 2003; Breytenbach, 2004; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003; *Mail & Guardian*, 2007c; *Mail & Guardian*, 2007b; Mashele, 2006; NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2003/2004; NEPAD, 2004a; *Sunday Times*, 28 May 2006; Taylor, 2005; TCII &

NEPAD, 2005; *The Star*, 23 October 2004). Based on the comments of the various stakeholders depicted above, it appears that progress in the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP has been mired in implementation delays, which have been attributed primarily to lack of institutional capacity.

Because of the magnitude of complex patterns of causes and effects, which may be attributed to simultaneous causality as well as reciprocal-effect causal relations in the identification of constraints and challenges to the provision of regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services, this chapter juxtaposes the external/internal comments regarding the reasons for the lack of project implementation progress with NEPAD's self-assessment from successive Infrastructure STAP reviews: this is in order to identify causal mechanisms and areas of convergence/divergence or, at a later stage, what has been left unsaid (and possibly why), verify causal links, and eliminate some of the major alternative explanations or spurious relationships.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses comments by the various external and internal stakeholders with regards to the lack of implementation progress in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Section 4.3 analyses the findings and recommendations of NEPAD's "self assessment" in the 1st and 2nd Infrastructure STAP reviews. Details of implementation progress including challenges, constraints and recommended actions for the way forward are presented in APPENDICES C, D and E. Key issues or emerging patterns from the analysis of the findings of NEPAD's Infrastructure reviews are discussed. Section 4.4 briefly discusses the implications of the various assessments for implementation management/coordination. Section 4.5 is the summary and conclusion.

4.2 Comments by NEPAD Structures, Development Partners, Analysts and Media

Diverse reasons have been proffered for tardy implementation progress of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. The challenges depicted below have been proffered as some of the reasons for project implementation delays:

- Lack of institutional capacity for implementation including lack of resources and poor leadership in RECs (AfDB, 2003; Kotzé & Steyn, 2003; Mashele, 2006; NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2003/2004; NEPAD, 2004a);
- Failure by NEPAD to propose viable regional infrastructure projects for implementation (*Sunday Times*, 28 May 2006; Taylor, 2005), which are "more responsive to the needs of the continent" (*Sunday Times*, 28 May 2006);
- Lack of political will, resources, capacity, cooperation and support from member states (Mashele, 2006; *Mail & Guardian*, 2007c); and
- Lack of capacity in NEPAD's structures for implementation management/coordination. According to comments attributed (*The Star*, 23 October 2004) to some of NEPAD's founding HoSG, notably President Wade of Senegal, institutional capacity problems in NEPAD have been exacerbated by the lack of a common vision (within the NEPAD machinery,) and understanding of NEPAD's objectives for the development of regional infrastructure. These aspects, it is further argued, have resulted in project implementation delays and NEPAD's failure to posit viable projects for implementation.

Some analysts/institutions have generally identified the lack of institutional capacity in RECs (i.e., the REC Secretariats, rather than the community of member states constituting a REC,) as *the* primary reason for project implementation delays. For example, Mashele (2006: 7) stated that during 2004, NEPAD's HSGIC called for the "enhancement of the capacities of RECs for NEPAD implementation" because of the perceived lack of institutional capacity in RECs. Furthermore, Mashele (*ibid*) argued that the lack of capacity in RECs

subsequently resulted in changes in the type of infrastructure projects identified by NEPAD for implementation.

According to Mashele (*ibid*):

> Originally, the RECs were expected to lead the implementation of regional projects, although there is a discernible shift in favour of commercially viable projects run as PPPs. This includes taking responsibility for project development, in some cases, as well as for technical planning and implementation monitoring. The skills challenges posed by these responsibilities cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, the expected implementation capacity at this level (in RECs) is grossly inadequate.

Arguably, Mashele's assertions above underscore a number of fundamental issues that need clarification in respect of NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure, including their implications for implementation progress. These issues include the following:

- How has NEPAD managed expectations vis-à-vis reality?
- What are NEPAD's *actual* preferences for the development of regional infrastructure, why and how have these preferences (e.g., for PPPs) evolved over time from programme conception to implementation relative to the identified needs, constraints and challenges in the delivery of regional infrastructure as well as institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation identified by NEPAD?
- What are the implications of NEPAD's approach to project organisation management, project action planning and performance management? and
- What is NEPAD's role in the development of institutional capacity in terms of its articulated obligations in the Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001), particularly so when considering the extent and depth of external/internal institutional challenges that influence the performance of RECs.

The issues identified above are not addressed conclusively in this research. A range of technical, planning and project management constraints in different institutional structures and at different stages of the project life cycle have also been identified as contributing to project implementation delays. For example,

media reports (*Mail & Guardian*, 2007c) also specifically cite the lack of institutional capacity for "programme development," "technical planning" and "implementation monitoring" in RECs as some of the causes of project implementation delays. Other reasons proffered (*ibid*) include the lack of support by member states, and the lack of capacity (in member states and RECs) to manage projects through the various stages of the project life cycle.

What is not clear from the comments depicted above is how project "implementation" is defined in relation to the various stages of the project life cycle and project management functions. This clarification may assist to contextualise the articulated concerns in order to identify the relevant corrective interventions. For example, Mashele (*ibid*) has argued that the "challenges that face many projects being conceived lie in implementation." Mashele (*ibid*) has also argued that the problems with implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP were attributable to the lack of political will, funding and technical capacity (for implementation) in individual member states (rather than capacity constraints in NEPAD's Secretariat.) As Mashele (*ibid*) further stated, "…the main problem is technical capacity, planning and engineering." Mashele (*ibid*), however, noted that even NEPAD's capacity building programmes were constrained by the lack of commitment to NEPAD's programme by member states. Mashele also argued that even when the capacity building programmes were in place, Africa's brain-drain has resulted in the "inability to retain the much needed skills" (*ibid*).

According to media reports (*ibid*), officials from NEPAD's Secretariat also argued that the lack of cooperation amongst member states to facilitate the development of regional infrastructure, including the lack of harmonisation of regulatory regimes for economic integration within and between RECs, has resulted in implementation delays. In addition, the officials from NEPAD's Secretariat assert that the Secretariat "…is working at a national level, urging states to integrate the Nepad values, principles and projects into their own development plans and put money into their implementation" (*ibid*). For these afore-mentioned reasons, officials from NEPAD's Secretariat also identified the

need to "empower communities," facilitate community capacity building as essential to ensure a "leadership transformation process," which they argue recognises "leadership is at every level," and to "view development as a demand-supply situation" (*ibid*).

Some of NEPAD's founding HoSG (i.e., Presidents Mbeki and Wade,) and development partners have also made scathing remarks regarding the lack of implementation progress or lack of institutional capacity for implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Some of the afore-mentioned remarks are depicted in Chapter 1. Other authors have raised questions regarding NEPAD's integrity to produce the expected results, or to provide transparent reports on implementation progress. For example, Taylor (2005: 92) stated that during February 2004, NEPAD's Secretariat "claimed that the recovery plan was 'fast gaining momentum with scores of new sponsored projects'." Taylor (*ibid*) further noted that six months later, after three years of no investments into NEPAD projects, "the Nepad Secretariat suddenly, in October 2004 decided that it was not about promoting projects anymore" (*ibid*). During the multi-stakeholder three-year review conference, held in October 2004, NEPAD's Secretariat is reported to have "clarified" matters by stating: "You are not going to see any Nepad projects. Ours is to analyse, inspire and be a catalyst. To get things moving" (*The Star*, 23 October 2004; Taylor, 2005).

Similarly, Mashele (2006: 7) noted that four years after the launch of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, the "overall assessment of implementation reveals that most NEPAD (infrastructure) projects have not yet gone beyond a feasibility study." According to Mashele's report (*ibid*), the AfDB also indicated at the stage that NEPAD was "still trying to secure funding for feasibility studies." As a result, Taylor (2005: 92) argued that NEPAD Secretariat's statements during February 2004 regarding the escalating "momentum" in the financing of new projects "were rather disingenuous." For these afore-mentioned reasons, and possibly owing to NEPAD's conflicting statements in various forums, Taylor averred:

"…Whether or not Nepad projects exist seems to depend upon the audience" (*ibid*: 92-93).

Some of the comments on implementation progress detailed above also illustrate the possible negative implications for projects and institutional structures for project implementation/implementation management of media pronouncements, which appear to be based on limited application area knowledge of the mutually reinforcing institutional challenges in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects, or of the management of development programmes/projects in general. Suffice to say, the issues raised in the comments depicted above traverse a broad range of intra-/multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral spheres; this alignment further confirms the significance for NEPAD to create appropriate forums/platforms for collective engagement in order to facilitate effective integrated implementation/implementation management of NEPAD's cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects. The afore-mentioned issues also particularly illustrate the significance of inter/intra-/ multidisciplinary project teams to support the implementation/implementation management of NEPAD's regional infrastructure projects. In this respect, the development of relevant integrative project management frameworks and competencies will be critical.

4.3 NEPAD's Self Assessment: Infrastructure STAP Reviews

Details of implementation progress, based on the 1st and 2nd Infrastructure STAP reviews, are presented in APPENDIX C. Other transport sub-sectors are included for sector-wide comparison within the transport sector and with the other infrastructure sectors in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. This is to establish emerging patterns in the implementation of projects in the various infrastructure sectors/sub-sectors that constitute NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, particularly so since all the regional infrastructure projects compete for the same pool of limited resources: project preparation and integrated implementation management/ coordination are also facilitated by the same institutional structures.

4.3.1 Analysis of findings and recommendations of the 1st Infrastructure STAP review

During the 1st Infrastructure STAP review, the AfDB report (2003: 34-40) – ostensibly prepared in consultation with the RECs, NEPAD Secretariat and development partners – identified eight broad constraints to effective implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. These findings, with recommendations to address the *status quo*, are presented in APPENDIX C. Of the seven identified constraints to the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP (the eighth being "*inadequate knowledge and cooperation on shared water resources*" and therefore outside the scope of this study), five are directly related to NEPAD's prescriptive approach to planning.

NEPAD's use of the prescriptive planning model in contradiction to the professed (NEPAD's) aspirations for effective integrated practical implementation and integrated regional development, particularly so cognisant of the lack of institutional capacity to perform the requisite tasks, appears to have resulted in the following outcomes:

- inadequate programme/project design and implementation planning;
- perpetuation of a strong sectoral focus;
- lack of clarification of roles and responsibilities;
- inadequate communication between the identified institutional structures for implementation management/coordination regarding the programme/project plans and envisaged processes for implementation;
- inadequate strategy for project implementation;
- poor stakeholder-relationship management exacerbated by the lack of broad-based popular participation in various stages of the project life cycle; and
- complex institutional arrangements for implementation management/ coordination.

The remaining two of the seven identified constraints identified in APPENDIX C may be described as consequences of the first five. Notably, the AfDB stated in

the report (*ibid*: 34) that the 1st Infrastructure Review did not concentrate on the one constraint to implementation identified during the preparation of the Infrastructure STAP: *lack of stability in certain regions*. According to the AfDB (*ibid*), the lack of regional stability has undoubtedly affected implementation progress in certain RECs. However, similar to the comments on implementation challenges depicted in an earlier section above, NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review appears to have focused on technical and planning issues at the strategic and operational levels of management as well as on the internal organisational arrangements in REC Secretariats. (The findings of NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP regarding the REC Secretariats also include lack of institutional capacity including lack of institutional infrastructure and human capital with the requisite competencies to execute the requisite tasks in the implementation of NEPAD's programmes/projects.)

An internal reading of the report on NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review, however, conveys an overwhelming sense of confusion regarding the RECs' role in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. The view enunciated here takes cognisance of the overlapping roles assigned to RECs and member states for practical implementation and to NEPAD for integrated implementation management/ coordination of the identified regional infrastructure projects. As the RECs lack executing capacity (Breytenbach, February 2007: personal communication), their role in the practical implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure projects is however, not explained.

Similarly, NEPAD's role in integrated implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP vis-à-vis the similar mandate to RECs, or member states, is not explained. Instead, the 1st Infrastructure STAP review appears to have assigned all-encompassing responsibilities and roles to NEPAD's Secretariat to facilitate the resolution of the identified problems at the various spatial categories, stages of the project life cycle, and levels of management/planning. These afore-mentioned roles are depicted in APPENDIX C. Yet, the 1st Infrastructure STAP review, in contradiction to the all-encompassing

responsibilities and roles assigned to NEPAD's Secretariat in the same report, simultaneously narrowly defines NEPAD's role as that of mobilising political will and facilitating donor support/finance. The relationship between the afore-mentioned roles assigned to NEPAD is not explained.

The afore-mentioned contradictions in respect of the responsibilities and roles assigned to NEPAD remain unresolved in the AfDB's report (see: AfDB, 2003), or other related NEPAD reports reviewed for this study. Rather, various stakeholders appear to provide different definitions and interpretations of NEPAD's role in the Infrastructure STAP, based on either their subjective assessment of NEPAD, or the characteristics/nature of the forums at which NEPAD/NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are discussed. The critical issue then with respect to the allocation of certain responsibilities and roles during the 1st Infrastructure STAP review is as follows: did NEPAD's Secretariat at the stage of the review posses the wherewithal and authority to perform or affect implementation of the requisite interventions depicted in APPENDIX C?

Curiously, even the interventions assigned to NEPAD/NEPAD's Secretariat to resolve the identified problems inadvertently or ultimately place the burden on RECs for their practical execution, despite the RECs' widely acknowledged lack of institutional capacity or executing capacity to perform the requisite tasks. For example, although NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review acknowledged the negative influences of the RECs' internal/external environment on implementation progress, the burden to resolve the intractable problems of the RECs' institutional environment is also inexplicably placed on REC Secretariats, who in any event lack the capacity to do so. As a result, one is left with the impression that NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review failed to examine the implications of its suggested corrective interventions to ameliorate the *status quo*. In the circumstances, the allocation of responsibilities and roles to the various (incapable) institutional structures to resolve the identified implementation challenges, while subjective and objective conditions in the external/internal

institutional environment that stymie the effective implementation or regional infrastructure programmes/projects remain the same, is curious.

The problem to address the identified constraints to project implementation in the Infrastructure STAP appears to lie with the contradictions or complexities of the "multiple logics" (Gelb, 2002) that underpin NEPAD's status/position – as both a facilitating mechanism, and a (pre-eminent) programme for Africa's regeneration – and how the afore-mentioned roles are related to, and impact on each other. Regarding NEPAD's role as facilitator, NEPAD appears to have adopted the role of either a supranational authority, or programme manager, or both of the afore-mentioned roles. The implications for RECs of NEPAD's status as a supranational authority or programme manager vis-à-vis NEPAD's mandate for RECs for implementation management/coordination are not spelt out. It is also unclear how the interface between the RECs and NEPAD's Secretariat will be managed in terms of the afore-mentioned overlapping roles. As a result, it is unclear from the afore-mentioned framework which institutional structure will be held accountable for performance/non-performance in project implementation: under the circumstances a disinterested assessment would most likely hold NEPAD (i.e., its governance and management structures) accountable.

Significantly, NEPAD's position as Africa's pre-eminent development programme appears to be defined in relation to its (NEPAD's) role as a facilitator or *vice versa*. As a result, NEPAD expected regional structures, RECs, and national governments to align their development priorities, programmes/projects, and resources with NEPAD's agenda. This expectation is also articulated by NEPAD's officials in interviews with the media, as depicted in an earlier section above. In this regard, the tail (NEPAD) appears to be wagging the dog, particularly in the context of NEPAD's assumed/assigned role as an integrative/ facilitating mechanism for the implementation of Africa's regional integration projects. Similarly, NEPAD and its lead agency, the AfDB, assume the roles of player, referee, and spectator in the Infrastructure STAP reviews.

The allocation of the afore-mentioned responsibilities and roles between NEPAD's governance and management structures on the one hand, and between NEPAD and other institutional structures on the other, and how the afore-mentioned roles are related and interface with each other, is confusing. As a result, it is unclear which structure is ultimately responsible for various project activities. Thus, the convoluted institutional arrangements depicted above ultimately obfuscate the allocation of responsibility and roles as well as accountability for project delivery – or lack thereof.

4.3.2 Analysis of findings and recommendations of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review

The 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005) identified overarching constraints to the timely and effective implementation of NEPAD's infrastructure STAP programmes. The details of the identified constraints are presented in APPENDIX E. Some of the findings of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review illustrate the negative implications of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP. Others illustrate the ineffective role of member states/ national governments, RECs and development partners – not only in NEPAD's programme, but in the implementation of Africa's development programmes in general. The TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*) also apportions accountability to the various institutions/institutional structures for the lack of implementation progress: it also provides details/feedback on the various project management functions. In this respect, the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review has attempted to provide a balanced approach to problem identification.

In addition, the TCII and NEPAD's 2nd Infrastructure STAP review addresses some of the afore-mentioned information gaps in the 1st Infrastructure STAP review i.e., the lack of specific information on implementation progress in the various infrastructure sectors. For example, details of some of the actual projects implemented under the various initiatives of NEPAD's roads programme (namely,

the regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes) are provided (see: APPENDIX D). The revised schedules for implementation of current projects are, however, not provided: this omission creates confusion, cognisant of NEPAD's persistent changes in programme/project scope as illustrated in the various priority lists, or amendments to the original lists of roads sector projects submitted by the RECs in 2002 (see: NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005), but which appear unrelated to the projects reviewed in the TCII and NEPAD report.

For example, the Infrastructure STAP originally listed under the transit facilitation programme a number of projects in different corridors. Besides preparatory processes detailed in the 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 66-67), implementation progress of the identified transit facilitation projects appears limited, if at all. At the same time, the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*) provides examples of "achievements" in physical roads infrastructure/road corridor and transit facilitation (investment) projects that were, however, not included in the original lists of projects submitted for approval under NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

As an example, in the DRC and Angola the AfDB, World Bank and EU are funding an Emergency Recovery Programme that includes a transport infrastructure recovery component, with an estimated budget of US$1.5 billion (*ibid*: 67). At the time of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review, the World Bank was apparently "considering financing a $100m road rehabilitation programme, which will include Benin, Burkina Faso and Ghana" (*ibid*). These afore-mentioned projects neither appear in any of the earlier programme/project priority lists approved by NEPAD's HSGIC (see in NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB, 2003), nor in any revised programme schedule in the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review.

Similarly, approximately nine investment corridor development projects in the roads sector in the EAC, funded and/or implemented by the World Bank, had apparently advanced to the implementation/construction stage at the time of the

TCII and NEPAD review (*ibid*). The afore-mentioned projects were apparently not included in the original Infrastructure STAP list. According to the information provided in the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*), about five corridor projects "replace the separate projects listed in the 2003 STAP"; the remaining four corridor developments are incorporated into the five corridor projects depicted above. The unexplained changes to the EAC's programmes/projects, and lack of detailed information on the projects' scope create further confusion. The subsequent inclusion of the afore-mentioned projects may also be attributed to NEPAD's confusing use of rolling-wave planning, which in this case amounts to scope creep as depicted in the discussions above.

In this respect, one may conclude that NEPAD erroneously refers to its management of an indeterminate project scope as "*rolling wave planning*"; the disruptive effect of introducing new projects on existing work and project organisation management (Baird, 1997: 7) appears to not have been explored. Thus, the confusing use of project management concepts/terminology may explain assertions by the AfDB (2003) regarding the "perfectly understandable confusion" by institutional structures, such as the World Bank and EU, in NEPAD's infrastructure STAP. However, the afore-mentioned structures ostensibly have a wealth of expertise in the management/implementation of development projects, which renders the assertions by the AfDB (2003) of their being perfectly "confused" questionable.

Therefore, an impression is created that NEPAD failed to pay particular attention to the various project management functions. An impression is also created that *only the investment programmes/projects in the roads sector funded and/or implemented by the World Bank, or similar institutional structure, are accorded priority*, since "remarkable" implementation progress has been reported in respect of these projects in the roads sector. In this respect, one may argue that the influence of funding agents/sponsors on programme/project selection and implementation progress is discernible. In addition, the secretive workings of IFIs such as the World Bank, referred to by Addison (1997), may have contributed to

this lack of transparency and confusion in respect of NEPAD's programme/project scope.

With respect to the roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects, besides the afore-mentioned World Bank/EU/AfDB projects, it appears that progress since 2002 – when NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP was launched – has been limited to (preliminary) intangible deliverables, as depicted in APPENDIX D. This assessment takes cognisance of NEPAD's assertions regarding the status of the projects submitted by RECs, which were ostensibly at advanced stages of preparation for implementation (AfDB, 2003; OAU/AU, 2002; NEPAD, 2002c). Yet, approximately four years after the launch of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, project deliverables in the roads sector appear to have only advanced to the *development stage*.

The afore-mentioned project deliverables include the approval of concepts for programme/project design; completion of certain studies; obtaining grants (by some RECs) for studies on harmonisation of technical standards and institutional arrangements on joint border posts (see: APPENDIX D). Some projects are still at the conceptual stage: these include contemplated surveys; and project proposals by RECs, although the same RECs lack the resources for the implementation of the said projects. In other cases, implementation progress on projects that some RECs have ostensibly focussed on cannot be ascertained (TCII & NEPAD, 2005): according to the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*), detailed records of the said projects are not available.

Similarly, an analysis of the detailed reports provided by the respective RECs in the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*: 112-134) reveals that in all the RECs, none of the "facilitation" projects in the roads sector have moved beyond feasibility studies. According to the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*: 69), in the transit facilitation programme, a "key initiative" was the completion of a survey conducted in 2004 to review current vehicle overload practices in sub-Saharan Africa. The TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*) identified the lack of funding as a

major impediment to the implementation of regional roads construction, rehabilitation and maintenance projects.

It is unclear, however, on what basis the TCII and NEPAD report made the afore-mentioned conclusion regarding the financing of regional roads infrastructure projects, particularly so since NEPAD failed to propose physical regional infrastructure roads projects (i.e., regional roads construction, rehabilitation and maintenance) in the original Infrastructure STAP (see: NEPAD, 2002c). Thus, an emerging defining characteristic of NEPAD's 2nd Infrastructure STAP review is the pattern of providing reasons for implementation delays in respect of projects that were never elaborated in the first place, or articulating certain positions on processes for collective engagement that were never undertaken/integrated in programme/project design in the first place, in contradiction with NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of management. Some of the recommendations depicted in APPENDIX E substantiate the assertions made above.

Similarly, the TCII and NEPAD report (2005) indicates that the funding constraints are exacerbated by the failure of African governments to meet their obligations in terms of the "agreed funding mechanisms" for the roads sector. In this respect, the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*) makes sweeping statements regarding the "agreed funding mechanisms": no evidence is found in the literature reviewed of concrete agreements with member states to support NEPAD's (unilateral) decision for national governments to fund NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes in the roads sector (with the exception of NEPAD's statements (see: NEPAD, 2002c) in respect of funding of projects in the roads sector by member states).

Since the majority of member states do not, in any event, have funds for the implementation of regional infrastructure projects, the implications of funding delays for the implementation of transit facilitation programmes as well as for protracted processes of collective engagement and identification of projects to

harmonise transport-sector policies, regulatory and governance regimes appear not to be addressed in the TCII and NEPAD report. Perhaps it is in recognition of the structural funding problems in member states, that the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*: 106) recommended the consideration of "an expansion of NEPAD IPPF (Infrastructure Project Planning Facility) to encompass facilitation projects".

The TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*: 98-100) also attributed the delays for the requisite institutional reforms to facilitate harmonisation of sector policies, regulatory and governance regimes to the lack of political will, lack of institutional capacity (including funding and human capital), and lack of commitment to collective agreements at national levels. Yet, the progress report summarised in APPENDIX D reveals that financial closure has been achieved for projects identified in the ICT and energy sectors including the related harmonisation of policies, regulations, liberalisation and associated legislative frameworks. Thus, the lack of consistency in the performance of different infrastructure sectors suggests that NEPAD may have attached different priorities to different sectors and projects, based on investor interests, sector investment trends and size of projects, resulting in differential effort for implementation support.

Regarding the harmonisation of sector policies, regulatory and governance regimes, the TCII and NEPAD report does not provide an explanation on what, and how the links between the afore-mentioned harmonisation processes and stages of regional integration will be managed and what the implications are for cross-border regional infrastructure facilitation projects, such as the roads programme, and whether harmonisation will, in any event, be feasible considering that regional integration in Africa's sub-regions/RECs is still at the initial stages. It is also unclear how NEPAD/RECs will address the lack of political will in member states, which may be fuelled by their narrow mercantilism to perpetuate the prevailing diverse and multiple transport regimes. In this respect, the influence of state-centrism, contradictory principles to manage institutional relationships between the various spatial categories, and entrenchment of the principle of

sovereignty (which proscribes "non-interference" in the internal affairs of sovereign states,) illustrate the difficulties that need to be overcome for NEPAD to facilitate effective implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure projects.

In SADC and COMESA, although it appears that some attempts are being made to address institutional impediments to integrated TTF systems (see: APPENDIX D), such interventions are pursued within the existing institutional framework. It is also unclear from the TCII and NEPAD report how far the initiatives to integrate TTF systems in COMESA and SADC have progressed. The TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*) also details (in its progress report on NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP) interventions in transit facilitation *that have been in existence since the 1980's, such as the COMESA Yellow Card and Customs Document*. It is thus unclear from this report what value NEPAD has added to these existing initiatives or why such initiatives are included in NEPAD's progress reports on the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP.

One needs to consider though that the support for the implementation of existing initiatives depicted above may be in accordance with NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure, i.e., to integrate and strengthen existing initiatives under NEPAD (NEPAD, 2002f). Support for the implementation of existing initiatives also conforms to the NEPAD Secretariat's mandate to avoid duplicating, replacing, or competing with other existing development initiatives or integration processes in the African continent (*ibid*). To the extent that NEPAD's role and value-adding in these initiatives is not explained, however, creates confusion. It is also unclear from NEPAD's progress reports what the interface or alignment is between these existing initiatives and NEPAD's "new" approach to the development of regional infrastructure; how the interface between existing initiatives and NEPAD's programmes/projects will be managed is also not explained; the implications of NEPAD's prescriptive approach to the development of regional infrastructure for the existing programmes/projects or institutional mechanisms and arrangements also appear not to have been thoroughly examined.

Therefore, the issues depicted above suggest that NEPAD may not have adequately thought through the practical implications of its policy strategy/ response actions, responsibilities/roles, and institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure. The critical issues that need to be explained in order to establish the purpose, role and relationship between the existing initiatives with NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes are the following:

- How are the existing initiatives in the development of regional infrastructure related to NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme or different sectoral interventions?
- How were the current initiatives originally conceptualised, which may have contributed to their tardy implementation or insignificant success, and what are the implications of previous programme/project conception, if any, for NEPAD's "new" approach – in other words, what are the lessons learnt and how are they integrated in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, it al all?
- Who has control and ownership of the development and implementation of the existing initiatives, and how will the interface with NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes be managed if separate NEPAD programmes exist in the various sub-regions or national levels?
- Where do the resources for the implementation of existing initiatives come from, what are the conditionalities, and what are the implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements?
- Is there a possibility for the sharing of resources and skills transfer in order to contribute to NEPAD's efforts for capacity building in regional, sub-regional and national institutions?
- Who benefits from the implementation of the existing initiatives and in what manner does support from NEPAD benefit the implementation of existing initiatives/programmes – if at all?

4.4 Implications of Performance Assessments for Implementation Management

The consolidation of the various assessments indicates that NEPAD's implementation challenges may be attributed primarily to the collective lack of institutional capacity in NEPAD's governance and management structures, RECs and member states. Curiously, the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review appears to let NEPAD off the hook on the following issues: failure to clearly define responsibilities and roles for the various institutional structures; failure to effective manage the identified projects through all the stages of the project life cycle; failure to manage stakeholder expectations and relationships; failure to agree upfront with the various institutions/institutional structures on what it (NEPAD) stands for/its role is in the practical implementation of identified projects, and to integrated them in decision-making processes; and failure to address the lack of institutional capacity in RECs and member states.

The recommendations of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews, however, raise some concerning issues in so far as they apply to RECs: they directly or indirectly shift the responsibility to RECs for implementation management/coordination and to manage institutional relationships, particularly in the more controversial facilitation programmes/projects to develop cross-border regional infrastructure. The facilitation projects, such as NEPAD's roads programme, entail institutional reform/development and harmonisation of sector policy, regulatory and governance regimes at national levels. The afore-mentioned activity areas impact directly and indirectly on regional integration, intra-African trade, poverty reduction and institutional/individual capacity development – NEPAD's articulated multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation. They are also at the heart of politics in the negotiation of collective agreements between member states and regional/sub-regional institutions or trans-state trans-actions.

In this regard, NEPAD's shifting of the enormous burden to address the deeply entrenched, endemic and intractable institutional impediments to the effective delivery of cross-border regional (transport/roads) infrastructure to the ineffective RECs is concerning. This is an area where the AU's participation and that of its organs should *also* be strengthened, particularly so given the lack of institutional capacity and authority in RECs to coordinate trans-state institutional reforms.

The lack of institutional capacity in RECs is also exacerbated by the proliferation of regional, sub-regional and national structures to address the same development concerns through a multiplicity of similar or diverse programmes/projects (AfDB, 2003; AfDB & ECA, 2003). Historically, and in NEPAD's context (NEPAD, 2001, Para. 93:20), concerns around the proliferation of national, sub-regional and regional institutions for the implementation of Africa's development or regional integration programmes abound. These concerns have resulted in suggestions to restructure, transform, rationalise, or harmonise the various overlapping sub-regional structures, or to appropriately streamline interventions in alignment with their spheres of effectiveness.

Table 4.1 outlines the consolidated key findings of the various performance assessments discussed under the various sections above.

Table 4.1: Consolidated Performance Reviews and Assessments of Implementation Challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP

Findings of 1st Infrastructure STAP Review (2003)	Findings of 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review (2004)	Stakeholder Comments on Implementation Delays (2003-2007)
• Lack of clarity as to what NEPAD really is. • Lack of clarity as to what is expected of the RECs and countries. • Lack of definition regarding linkages between countries and RECS. • Overlapping REC responsibilities. • Failure by RECs to keep abreast of "NEPAD Type" programmes in which they are currently involved. • Lack of alignment between REC programmes and NEPAD priorities. • Lack of financial and technical capacity in the RECs.	• "Lengthy and complex decision-making processes of RECs, which may have been appropriate for their traditional activities but which are not well suited to their new role as implementing organs of NEPAD within their regions. • Failure by countries to translate genuine political will into concrete actions to ensure compliance with regionally agreed protocols, conventions and sectoral policies. • Limited capacity within RECs to provide technical assistance to countries and to adequately monitor sectoral harmonisation programmes. • Limited institutional structures and capacity within RECs to develop bankable cross-border infrastructure projects. The RECs were not originally mandated for this role. • Limited financial resources within RECs, which is a result of the manner in which most RECs are funded and the insufficient level of financing…(which does) not reflect the 'new reality' of their significantly increased commitments associated with their new NEPAD role. • Lack of a coherent package of policies to support and encourage private sector investment in the STAP. • A lack of effective institutional relationships and coordination between the various stakeholders in the management and implementation of the NEPAD infrastructure projects and programmes. • Limited capacity within…(AfDB) and the NEPAD Secretariat to meet the growing demands for their services and support in relation to NEPAD and in particular the infrastructure STAP. • Systems and practices of development partners that have hitherto not always been fully aligned with NEPAD priorities and adapted to support the efficient and effective implementation of NEPAD infrastructure programmes and projects."	• Lack of institutional capacity for implementation even when resources are available; • Lack of institutional capacity in RECs, including lack of resources and poor leadership; • Failure by NEPAD to propose viable projects that are more responsive to the needs of the continent; • NEPAD's failure to "get projects off the ground," thereby creating a stumbling block for economic growth; • NEPAD's integrity to produce the expected results questionable; • Lack of political will, resources, capacity, and cooperation from member states; • Lack of a common vision and understanding of NEPAD's objectives in structures for project implementation (including NEPAD structures, RECs, Lead Agencies) despite numerous workshops undertaken to address the said issues; • Lack of support from member states, including lack of technical capacity, engineering and planning competences to manage projects through the various stages of the project life cycle as well as lack of harmonisation of sector regimes; • Lack of commitment by member states to implement capacity-building projects. Brain-drain exacerbates the problem to retain needed skills; • Failure by member states to integrate NEPAD's values, principles and projects into NDPs, and to use their budgets for project implementation; • Need to empower communities and for leadership transformation in communities, to ensure that infrastructure developments respond to effective demand.

Sources: Derived from AfDB (2003), *First Infrastructure STAP Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward*, pp.34-40; and after TCII and NEPAD (2005), *Second Infrastructure STAP Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward*, p.17

The consolidated assessments illustrated in Table 4.1, however, all focus on the effects of problems, rather than attempting to identify and address the underlying institutional causes of implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Only the external/internal stakeholder comments have, mustered courage to critically identify some of NEPAD's failings in the implementation of its programmes. The consolidated assessments, however, do provide a broad picture of the range of issues contributing to the implementation challenges at the different levels of management and in the management of the interface between the planning hierarchies, programmes/projects, influences of the external/internal institutional environment and structures for implementation management/ coordination: they also illustrate the issues highlighted in the previous chapters of this report i.e., the negative consequences or effects of NEPAD's prescriptive approach to the development of regional infrastructure. The issues highlighted in the 1st Infrastructure STAP review, for example, are particularly symptomatic of the outcomes of top-down, secretive and bureaucratic approaches to planning and implementation management of development programmes/projects.

In NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, such approaches have resulted in confusion on what NEPAD stands for, what it is meant to achieve, and how. Thus, the assessments of implementation in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP depicted above possibly illustrate the effects of the disconnect in the links between NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions, multiple development objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation, influences of the external/internal institutional environments, programmes/projects and institutional structures for project implementation/implementation management. Rather than the cause of problems being capacity deficits in RECs and member states, which were already prevalent in the afore-mentioned institutions/institutional structures when NEPAD's Strategic Framework or NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP were launched, the assessments depicted above ultimately indicate the following failures by NEPAD's governance and management structures:

- failure to posit relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to address the prevalent impediments in the development of cross-border

regional infrastructure, or the implementation of regional integration initiatives, with implications for the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP, in particular facilitation programmes such as the roads programme;

- failure to enforce consistent integration and implementation of the articulated response actions/policy strategies in the various infrastructure sectors (see NEPAD, 2001), which sought to address the identified capacity deficits and evidenced disconnect between strategy and implementation in Africa's development programmes/projects;
- failure to perform in their assumed/delegated roles and responsibilities in terms of their obligations for the development of regional infrastructure; and
- inordinate reliance on foreign/international institutions and development partners to resolve Africa's or NEPAD's capacity constraints in NEPAD's favour. In this respect, how NEPAD expects the development partners to realign their systems to suit NEPAD's agenda, cognisant of the intractable asymmetrical power relations between Africa and the developed countries/their institutions, can only be described as astounding. It is the symptomatic consequence of NEPAD's arrogating itself the position of the pre-eminent programme for Africa's regeneration and as a reference point for all development interventions on the African continent as depicted in the various reports (see: NEPAD 2001, NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2002f; AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005).

4.5 Summary and Conclusion

The discussions on the various assessments of implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and the related sectoral programmes, in particular the roads programme, suggest that since the failed implementation of the LPA's Transport and Communications programme (of 1980) and the TAH and "missing links" initiative (of 1970), discussed in APPENDIX B, little has changed with respect to the institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the implementation of Africa's infrastructure regional infrastructure programmes/projects: an endemic

collective denial to address the underpinning causes of problems in the delivery of cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation appears to persist.

An internal reading of the responses to project implementation delays and findings of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews suggests a pervasive lack of clarity on the programme scope, projects' status, implementation progress and roles and responsibilities of the various institutional structures for implementation management/coordination. In other words, the comments depicted above illustrate a lack of clarity regarding the essence of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP: i.e., what it aims to deliver, where, for whom, and by when. Thus, NEPAD appears to not have considered how policy strategies and programme/project objectives are linked to influences of the external/internal institutional environment, programmes/projects, strategies for project implementation/implementation management, and structures for project implementation or implementation management/coordination. Systematic consideration of the afore-mentioned aspects would assist in the evaluation of how action planning is related to performance control/management.

Some of the media statements depicted in this chapter come across as attempts to exonerate NEPAD/NEPAD's Secretariat from blame in the event of perceived implementation failure. Whether such "protection" is warranted, or even necessary, raises questions about the lack of understanding regarding the relevance of constructive criticism in development projects. Paul, (1990), for example, addresses the need for constructive criticism in development programmes/projects in order to facilitate implementation success. In the context of the concerns mapped above, the possible negative implications of NEPAD's prescriptive approach to planning and inadequacy of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated project implementation/ implementation management of the regional infrastructure programme have received scant attention, if at all.

For example, it appears a lack of common understanding prevails in the media or various analysts regarding the vagaries and vicissitudes of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure and their implications for project implementation. This lack of common understanding extends to the status of NEPAD's infrastructure programmes/projects that are proposed for implementation, and whether or not such projects were, in any event, ready for implementation – or whether they existed at all. Therefore, it is unclear how credible/beneficial assessment of NEPAD's implementation challenges can be made by the different stakeholders if, and when it is based on limited understanding of the range of concerns underpinning the development and implementation/implementation management of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

Other responses illustrate the underlying tensions between the various institutions/institutional structures, stakeholders and trans-state actors in the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. They also underscore what has been left unsaid said about the implementation/implementation management of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, such as the broader implications of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for NEPAD's and Africa's development agenda. Notably, the various performance assessments of NEPAD and implementation challenges of the Infrastructure STAP also highlight a number of underpinning institutional issues that appear to inform the prevailing attitudes towards NEPAD's implementation of the Infrastructure STAP. These issues are discussed in the next chapter.

5 ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED BY THE ASSESSMENTS OF IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the underlying issues highlighted by the stakeholder comments on projects implementation challenges. These issues include concerns around planning, project management and stakeholder relationship management: their implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP programmes/projects are also examined.

At first blush, some of the articulated reasons for implementation delays, discussed in Chapter 4, appear incoherent. Some of the identified issues also come across as a shopping-list of diverse reasons for implementation challenges; some of the articulated concerns appear to be accepted as fact, although presented without any substantiating evidence. Such factual data would include the systematic identification and analysis of how the identified problems have ensued as well as establishing how they are related to NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure. To some extent, the range of articulated concerns also illustrates the negative impact of inaccurate information (ostensibly) provided on the projects' status and the prevailing attitudes regarding project implementation progress. These concerning afore-mentioned outcomes are exacerbated by unmanaged expectations of NEPAD's performance, which appear to be based on indeterminate process flows, poor communication, and inadequate management of project management functions or poor articulation thereof.

What is also missing from the external/internal comments on implementation challenges depicted in the previous chapter is a systematic examination of how the identified implementation challenges are linked to either NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure

STAP, or the challenges and constraints of the institutional environment in the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure, or the exerting requirements for integrated development/integrated implementation management – particularly so in relation to NEPAD's proposals for the development of regional infrastructure, or any combination of the afore-mentioned issues.

The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 examines the underlying issues underscored by the stakeholder comments on NEPAD's performance and implementation challenges of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP programmes/ projects. Section 5.3 is the summary and conclusion.

5.2 Underlying Issues Highlighted by Stakeholder Responses to Implementation Challenges

The varied comments on project implementation challenges underscore a number of issues outlined below:

- Diverse perceptions regarding the relevance of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects and of implementation progress. These perceptions seem to mirror the ambiguous messages from NEPAD; they reveal/confirm the lack of clarity regarding NEPAD's role in the Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes.
- Ambiguous links between planning hierarchies, programmes/projects and NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation/implementation management.
- (Possible) lack of prior consultation between NEPAD, national governments and RECs on regional infrastructure programmes/projects for inclusion in the Infrastructure STAP, resulting in the lack of relevant implementation support from institutional structures in the various spatial categories.
- Misinterpretation of the progression of projects through the different stages of the project life cycle, which either reflects the lack of understanding of the relationship between planning hierarchies and project management

functions vis-à-vis the stages of the project life cycle, or the consequences of inadequate planning, or poor scope management or all of the afore-mentioned issues.

- Poor communication by NEPAD's governance and management structures resulting in their questionable integrity and lack of clarity regarding the projects' status.
- Inordinate attention on poor performance in RECs, to the exclusion of addressing the overall impact of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements on the development of regional infrastructure and on project implementation/implementation management.
- NEPAD's probable failure to link "strategy with tactics", or "thinking with action" (Mintzberg, 1994), resulting in disjointed implementation outcomes and inability to hold the relevant institutions/institutional structures accountable for projects' delivery, or lack thereof.
- Lack of clarity regarding the responsible structures for NEPAD's capacity building interventions at different levels of management and spatial categories.
- Negative implications of uninformed media reports for the effective development of corrective interventions to support the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects. The afore-mentioned issues are discussed below.

5.2.1 Diverse perceptions of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/ projects

Diverse perceptions regarding NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/ projects and implementation progress can be gleaned from the comments of various stakeholders, including NEPAD's structures at the various levels of management. NEPAD's inadequate programme/project communication and failure to manage diverse expectations of planned outcomes at the various stages of the project life cycle compounds the problem. This problem also appears to be exacerbated by ideological differences amongst NEPAD's HSGIC at the

integrative levels of management, thereby resulting in diverse understanding of the requisite planning and management interventions at both the integrative and strategic levels of management. As Mashele (2006: 11) stated: "… (President) Wade shocked his counterparts (Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo) when he said he had not seen a single NEPAD project." Yet, President Wade's statements should not have come as a "shock", if the progression and communication of projects through the various stages of the project life cycle was managed in a structured and transparent manner. Alternatively, the said "shock" emanated from the perceived public airing of "internal" concerns pertaining to NEPAD's haphazard planning and project organisation management by one of NEPAD's founding HoSG.

It is also possible that the diverse perceptions regarding the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP mirror the effects of NEPAD's diverse and contradictory conceptual frameworks on the elaboration of regional infrastructure programmes/projects. These conceptual frameworks, although not discussed in this study, may be gleaned from NEPAD's Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001): they are cascaded to the Infrastructure STAP. As a result, the ideological tensions and inherent paradox in NEPAD's Strategic Framework appear to have manifested in contradictory pronouncements by NEPAD's political leadership, or HSGIC, with implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme/project design and implementation management. Significantly, NEPAD appears to have overlooked the potential negative implications of "world-wide connectivity in the fields of technology, political power relations and global capitalism" (Breytenbach, 2002: 83) for NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure, which appears to be the *raison d'être* of NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure.

Arguably, the diverse understanding of the issues depicted below has contributed to equally diverse expectations for the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes:

(a) NEPAD's approach to planning, and how it impacts on the design of programmes/projects, strategies for project implementation/implementation management and structures for integrated implementation management/ coordination;

(b) Activities/deliverables of the various stages of a project's life cycle including the sequence of the stages themselves, the prioritisation of actions within and across the stages of a project life cycle and how these impact on project implementation in order to support the attainment of the articulated objectives;

(c) Status of NEPAD's infrastructure projects that were proposed for implementation and whether, or not, such projects were ready for implementation, or existed at all;

(d) Implications of inadequate institutions in cross-border regional infrastructure for implementation progress of projects and diverse organisational/project structures for project implementation support. Other factors include the lack of institutional capacity (including physical and non-physical institutional infrastructure and human capital with the relevant competencies,) at the regional, sub-regional and national levels to facilitate the integration of multi-sectoral, sector-wide and multidisciplinary programme elements and complex management systems, which are required for effective programme/project design and implementation management of large-scale programmes/projects with complex funding arrangements and multiple stakeholders, and how inadequate institutions have impacted on the afore-mentioned; and

(e) Significance of capacity assessment before/during programme/project development, in order to determine the appropriate project scope, institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support, and requisite institutional capacity for current implementation/future spatial expansion.

5.2.2 Limited understanding of the relationship between programmes/projects and NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements

The comments from the various stakeholders suggest some limited understanding of the relationship between NEPAD's planning hierarchies, programmes/projects, institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation, and diverse structures for project implementation/implementation management. For example, as Mashele (2006: 7) noted, "…as recently as 20 June 2005… (President Wade) would state that '[s]ince (sic) Nepad was founded (in 2001), its officials have spent $15m; they have not moved anything forward an inch and they will not move anything forward.'" Although President Wade appears to be the most vociferous critic of NEPAD – a welcome approach in the context of (infrastructure) development projects that are often shrouded in secrecy because of the workings of international institutional structures, or IFIs, or multilateral institutions (Addison, 1997; *Mail and Guardian*, 2007b) – the relevance or effectiveness of Senegal to address project implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP is questionable. (In theory, Senegal is responsible for coordinating NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme, together with the AfDB as the lead agency (Zounmènou, 2006; NEPAD, 2002f). How NEPAD's Secretariat features in this arrangement is vague.)

In this regard, the assessment of performance by the various institutions/ institutional structures, including member states and RECs, needs to be based on empirical understanding of institutional arrangements for project implementation/ implementation management in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, rather than being based on innuendo. Also, some of the internal/external comments on implementation progress illustrate NEPAD's difficulties to translate in an integrated manner the outcomes of its planning hierarchies and 'expectations' of the various institutional structures/development partners into implementable programmes/projects and effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management/coordination. The afore-mentioned comments may also be construed to illustrate NEPAD's failure to design coherent processes for

integrated implementation management/coordination, or for action planning and performance control/management in a manner that facilitates "integrated practical implementation" in the development of regional infrastructure.

5.2.3 (Possible) lack of prior consultation on projects with national governments and RECs

Linked to the views articulated above, NEPAD's comments regarding the necessity for countries to integrate NEPAD's "values," "principles" and "projects" into their plans and budgets – after the fact – suggest the (possible) lack prior negotiation/consultation with member states on the afore-mentioned issues. Programmes/projects, or frameworks for planning appear to have been prescribed in a top-down manner for implementation; the suggested (by NEPAD's statements) lack of co-determination of the underpinning principles for the development and implementation of regional infrastructure projects at/across the various spatial categories lends credence to this view. Such negotiation/ consultation on projects would, for example, facilitate the integration of inputs from national development plans (NDPs) including agreement on (regional infrastructure) programmes/projects for inclusion into national budgets. Similarly, the perceived lack of consultation with RECs and member states during programme development is also substantiated by an internal reading of NEPAD's "implementation actions" (NEPAD, 2002c: 89), where activities to mobilise RECs and other agencies for implementation in alignment with NEPAD's *already-approved* Infrastructure STAP are illustrated.

How NEPAD's governance and management structures, RTAs, bilateral trade agreements, and prescriptions of the global financial architecture contribute to the perceived circumscribed role of the state or RECs in decisions about NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes is a question for research. Thus, the apparent pressure from NEPAD's Secretariat for countries to integrate – after the fact – "NEPAD's values, principles and projects" into their NDPs illustrates the challenges for NEPAD to organically operationalize its prescriptive approach to

the development of regional infrastructure. Similarly, the fragmentation in inputs/outputs of planning hierarchies, programmes/projects and structures for implementation management suggests that NEPAD failed to consult RECs during programme/project development. Such consultation would facilitate alignment between the RECs' organisational objectives and development priorities with NEPAD's policy strategies and objectives for the development of regional infrastructure. In addition, consultation with other key institutional structures at the various spatial categories would assist NEPAD to establish the availability of resources for implementation of NEPAD's identified regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

To illustrate the points made above, the regional infrastructure programmes/ projects included in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are ostensibly drawn from REC programmes, which were already "…at an advance (sic) stage of preparation and that can be fast-tracked…(and/or) projects that have stalled for political reasons and where NEPAD's intervention could be expected to make a difference" (NEPAD, 2002c: 2). Yet, by no stretch of imagination may calling for a list of projects from RECs be equated to meaningful consultation at various stages of the project life cycle in order to ensure effective project implementation or implementation management/coordination. As a result, it appears from NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP Review reports (AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005) that the links between the projects included in the Infrastructure STAP and the RECs' programmes are anything but tenuous.

A critical issue, however, is that although NEPAD stated that NDPs would be a starting point/provide a point of departure for the analysis of needs to be addressed through the development of regional infrastructure interventions (NEPAD, 2001, Para.196: 57), NEPAD simultaneously adopted a regional perspective for project selection (*ibid*, Para.197:57). Ultimately, NEPAD appears to have failed to either deductively cascade its identified programmes/projects for integration into NDPs, or aggregate them upwards from NDPs and REC programmes/projects into region-wide/sub-regional programmes in alignment

with either a national or regional perspective. In other words, it is not clear what links exist between NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes and NDPs, or between the projects in NDPs/REC programmes and NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

The obscure linkages between institutions, institutional structures and programmes/projects at the various spatial categories are a recipe for implementation failure. As Turner (1999) argued, when a project manager imposes a project plan for implementation, project structures tend to ignore the plan and continue with their own. Small wonder then that, according to the comments by the officials from the NEPAD Secretariat, countries and RECs appear to have ignored NEPAD's plans and projects, and continued with their own plans.

It appears that NEPAD selected specific large-scale projects for implementation (although it is unclear from the infrastructure STAP reviews how the identified projects are linked to the RECs' programmes or NDP's). Also, it is unclear at times whether NEPAD or NEPAD's Secretariat are promoting the development of Africa's regional infrastructure in general, or whether there are specific regional infrastructure projects targeted for NEPAD's focused implementation support, or whether there exists a clearly-defined NEPAD regional infrastructure programme at all. It is perhaps cognisant of these afore-mentioned developments that De Waal (cited in Taylor, 2005: 92) was prompted to comment: "…there has been a tendency to put everything worthwhile going on in Africa under the Nepad umbrella."

Thus, rather than attributing blame to other parties, such as RECs and member states, NEPAD's Secretariat appears to have failed to examine the following issues: implications of its prescribed institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure; how project selection criteria and strategies for project implementation or implementation management/coordination are cascaded to and/or aggregated upwards from the NDPs and REC programmes;

and what the implications of the afore-mentioned are for project implementation. NEPAD's Secretariat also fails to illustrate whether concrete agreements were reached at all with the affected member states or RECs during the earlier stages of programme/project planning: the existence of agreed collective agreements would ensure that accountability for failed implementation of physical and non-physical infrastructure projects (including harmonisation of policies, institutional reforms and institutional capacity building,) is apportioned appropriately.

In this respect, the discussions above suggest that prior agreement and alignment of objectives and projects to ensure a balance between the objectives and development priorities of the various spatial categories and institutional structures were not finalised, if negotiated at all. Agreement on the afore-mentioned issues would also facilitate the provision of support for the implementation of development programmes/projects in NDP's; it would also facilitate NEPAD's effective contribution to regional integration initiatives in various infrastructure sectors. Indeed, the apparent lack of prior consultation with member states, negotiation and upwards aggregation/integration of national programmes/projects into NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP appear to be recurring impediments to effective implementation.

5.2.4 Misinterpretation of the progression of projects through the different stages of the project life cycle

Some measure of confusion regarding the relationship between the outputs of planning vis-à-vis the stages of the project life cycle and project management functions is illustrated in the comments by the various stakeholders. In addition, the clear assessment of impediments to the progression of NEPAD's projects at various stages of the project life cycle is obscured by the confusing use of planning/project management concepts and terminology in the media reports, or statements attributed to some development analysts. Notably, the suggestion that challenges in projects primarily "lie in implementation" ignores the implications

for project delivery/implementation of the integration of planning outcomes at various stages of the project life cycle and project management functions.

Thus, the erroneous assumption that only the implementation stage deserves focus (in Africa's development programmes) has probably resulted in scant attention being paid by NEPAD to planning – including the structured programme/project design and the development of effective strategies for project implementation or implementation management/coordination (i.e., programme/project development and implementation planning stages). As a result, some of NEPAD's major large-scale regional infrastructure projects display an incoherent process-flow of project activities, with implications for increased project risks during implementation.

For example, the report presented by NEPAD's Secretariat on the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) (see: Mashele, 2006:7) illustrates the singular lack of integrative alignment and attention to the development of a coherent process-flow of project activities at the various stages of the project life cycle, with implications for re-design, re-work, and implementation delays. In the report cited by Mashele (*ibid*), NEPAD indicated during April 2005 that land acquisition and engineering design were underway; full construction, both onshore and offshore, was scheduled for the 2nd half of 2005. According to the NEPAD report (*ibid*), 170km of pipe had already been manufactured, with the first shipment to the region (Africa/West Africa) scheduled for March 2005.

It is unclear, however, on what basis/assumptions significant resources were committed to the commissioning or manufacture of materials if the land acquisition and engineering designs were still not completed; or whether the materials mentioned above were already manufactured under certain contractual agreements, irrespective of whether or not they were suitable for the WAGP. It is also unclear whether NEPAD carefully considered the constraints (cost, time and quality) including the risks associated with delays in land acquisition or incorrect specifications, particularly so since geotechnical surveys and approved engineering designs were (presumably) still forthcoming.

Cognisant of the afore-mentioned issues, the increased cost implications of shipment and storage of materials, irrespective of the type of contract concluded with service providers, allude to project scheduling errors. One may thus conclude that the inherent risks in the fast-tracking and rolling-wave approaches to activity planning adopted by NEPAD (see: NEPAD, 2002c) may increase project implementation risks, particularly so cognisant of lack of institutional capacity for planning and implementation. In addition, NEPAD appears to not have considered thoroughly the inherent risks of inadequate governance regimes on programme/project development and implementation plans.

5.2.5 Poor communication by NEPAD's governance and management structures

The challenge for NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP to integrate diverse or similar multiple project interventions and institutional arrangements for implementation management/coordination of regional infrastructure programmes/projects is exacerbated by poor communication from NEPAD/NEPAD's Secretariat. Conflicting reports have been presented over the years at different forums, resulting in the lack of clarity regarding the projects' implementation status, or whether such projects existed at all. For example, Ruff (Taylor, 2005: 92) noted that when NEPAD projects were presented as "investment opportunities" to the finance and investment community "at a number of South African private banks" during 2004, they "all…only fell a little short of laughing at the complete non-viability of most of the projects contained therein."

Therefore, although lack of project viability is also cited as one of the reasons for implementation delays, the obfuscation in NEPAD's communication, however, impedes the development of relevant corrective interventions in the selection and preparation of projects. Significantly, NEPAD appears to not have adequately explored, or understood the implications of its inconsistent project communication on public perceptions regarding its performance or implementation progress of the Infrastructure STAP projects.

5.2.6 Inordinate attention on poor performance in RECs

Linked to the statements made above, it is unclear how the inadequate execution of NEPAD's regional infrastructure projects is *now* attributed primarily to the lack of institutional capacity in RECs. This is particularly so since one assumes that the lack of institutional capacity in RECs was in NEPAD's peculiar knowledge even before the Infrastructure STAP was developed. In addition, overlapping responsibilities and roles were assigned to NEPAD's governance and management structures, AfDB, and a host of other international, regional, sub-regional and national institutions at the various stages of the project life cycle and levels of management/planning (see: AfDB, 2003; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). NEPAD also appears to have assumed, or was assigned the role of a supranational authority, or project manager, or both the afore-mentioned roles (see: NEPAD, 2002c). In the afore-mentioned roles, NEPAD was made responsible for the overall implementation management/ coordination of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Yet, the probable inadequacies of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements in the delivery of regional infrastructure appear to have been ignored during implementation planning or NEPAD's self-assessments.

It appears, however, that the lack of institutional capacity at organisational levels in RECs is more a consequence of the adverse influences of their external/internal institutional environment. These influences include the exacting mandates to REC Secretariats to coordinate regional integration/sectoral cooperation initiatives, but without the institutional capacity to do so; the negative impact of overlapping regional integration arrangements on implementation of REC programmes; the influence on projects of protracted decision-making structures in RECs; and the lack of political will at national levels to support implementation of regional infrastructure projects in RECs (TCII & NEPAD, 2005), or collective agreements. The confusion arising out of NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure, including the identified institutional mechanisms and arrangements

for programme development and implementation support, add to the prevailing institutional impediments in RECs.

Significantly, NEPAD's HSGIC made prior commitments to address the afore-mentioned institutional constraints (see: NEPAD, 2001). This research assumes the proposed interventions by NEPAD's HSGIC were to ensure that RECs and other regional/sub-regional/national structures were not assigned roles (to facilitate implementation management/coordination of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP,) at their levels of incompetence. Therefore, the perceived failure in RECs or even national governments to deliver on their mandates in respect of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP indirectly and directly underscores the failure by NEPAD's HSGIC to effectively deliver on commitments in terms of their obligations for capacity building in RECs and in member states at national levels.

5.2.7 NEPAD's failure to link strategy with tactics, or thinking with action

NEPAD's statements regarding challenges to facilitate economic integration "…if there is no infrastructure linking the different regional economic communities, or common laws around customs" (*Mail and Guardian*, April 2007c) are valid. It becomes difficult, however, to envisage how NEPAD's mission, or articulated objectives, or policy strategy/response actions will be operationalized or translated into practice, when NEPAD failed to propose physical cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects, or to elaborate relevant projects in some infrastructure sectors – such as NEPAD's roads programme – for internal coherence (see: NEPAD, 2002c; TCII & NEPAD, 2005). With the exception of a few energy/ICT projects, NEPAD has not elaborated programmes/projects for institutional reform or development, or for harmonising transport policies, standards, regulatory and governance regimes at sub-regional and national levels. Yet, NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of management identified the afore-mentioned issues as some of the critical pre-conditions for integration into all of NEPAD's sectoral programmatic interventions (see: NEPAD, 2001).

In the same way, NEPAD's Secretariat fails to illustrate how its broad statements of intent (i.e., ensuring transformational leadership, community empowerment and capacity building, facilitating development processes that will respond to effective demand, and broad-based leadership development (*Mail & Guardian*, 2007c)) are/will be translated into practical actions with measurable outcomes. It is also not clear how the afore-mentioned actions to "empower communities", "develop and ensure transformational leadership" are/will be linked to the implementation of the identified regional infrastructure projects. Cognisant of the afore-mentioned concerns, it appears that the following scenario may have occurred: (a) officials in NEPAD/NEPAD Secretariat are either not *au fair* with the objective elements/substance of programmes/projects proposed in the Infrastructure STAP; or (b) there is a singular lack of clarity in NEPAD's structures regarding the cascade of NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions at the various levels of management/planning, and how these are linked to programmes/ projects in the various infrastructure sectors; or (c) proposals and/or concepts are arbitrarily introduced by various NEPAD officials in various forums, but without careful consideration of their implications for implementation of identified/approved projects or prevailing institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management/coordination.

At the same time, the views expressed by the officials from NEPAD's Secretariat i.e., regarding the need to "empower communities," to recognise that "leadership is at every level," and to adopt a different view of development as a response to effective demand – suggest the proposal of a learning and inclusive approach to planning (i.e., an "emergent" approach that integrates broad-based consultation and popular participation in NEPAD's programmes). Similarly, some of the delegates at the *Tunis Participatory Workshop for Accelerated NEPAD STAP Implementation*, held during July 2005 (TCII and NEPAD, 2005: 137) also suggested for NEPAD to "think 'out of the box' about procedures, to see where they can be improved to accelerate implementation of projects…create strong institutions to implement specific projects, capable of negotiating with all stakeholders." Thus, the afore-mentioned views possibly indicate some

recognition that NEPAD's prescriptive approach to planning of the Infrastructure STAP may not be relevant to all situations.

The emergent approach, however, is premised upon different parameters than those advanced in the prescriptive approach to planning adopted by NEPAD and cascaded to the Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes/projects, strategy for project implementation/implementation management, and institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management. As a result, the adoption of emergent approaches to programme/project development and implementation management planning of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme will require a paradigm shift, particularly from NEPAD's political leadership, administrative structures and partnerships. An emergent approach will also require the development of adequate institutional capacity to facilitate effective inclusive participatory processes for collective engagement in NEPAD.

As Mintzberg (1994: 227) argued:

> …strategy making (as a product of the emergent model) is an immensely complex process involving the most sophisticated, subtle, and at times subconscious of human cognitive and social processes…it must draw on all kinds of informational inputs, many of them nonquantifiable (sic) and accessible only to strategists who are connected to the details rather than detached from them…Strategies inevitably exhibit some emergent qualities, and even when largely deliberate, often appear less formally planned than informally visionary. And learning, in the form of fits and starts as well as discoveries based on serendipitous events and the recognition of unexpected patterns, inevitably plays a key role, if not *the* (emphasis in original) key role in the development of strategies that are novel…the process requires insight, creativity, and synthesis, the very things that formalization (in prescriptive models) discourages.

At the same time, one may appreciate the pressures underpinning NEPAD's adoption of a prescriptive model to the development of the Infrastructure STAP. These include the reliance on diverse institutions/institutional structures with different frames of reference, or who primarily use prescriptive models in their operations; diverse ideological underpinnings for the development of regional infrastructure; and pressure of short time-frames for programme implementation compounded by the lack of institutional capacity to coordinate and integrate

diverse multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary inputs. The afore-mentioned challenges may have precipitated the use of prescriptive models in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. The effectiveness of prescriptive approaches to planning, however, depends on (amongst other things,) the characteristics of programmes/projects, institutional environment, competence of structures to perform the requisite planning tasks, adequacy and control of institutional architecture as well as adequacy of planning.

Thus, the prescriptive approach may also not be wholly suitable in highly fluid contexts in development programmes/projects, where diverse inputs are required from various constituencies and stakeholders in order to facilitate the development of relevant programmes/projects and broad-based institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support. Hence, a combination of prescriptive and emergent/descriptive models may be required in institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation. Significantly, NEPAD's Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) proposes a new ethos to transform outmoded approaches, attitudes and behaviours that are no longer operative for Africa's situational specificity in the implementation of development programmes. Therefore, NEPAD's contradictory stance and apparent fixation with conventional systems and practices, which have in the past contributed to Africa's development crises, is puzzling.

5.2.8 Lack of clarity regarding the responsibility for capacity building

NEPAD identified capacity assessment and capacity building at country levels as a priority and pre-condition for the implementation of its various programmatic interventions (NEPAD, 2001, Para.86, 87, 89: 19). As NEPAD argued:

> State capacity-building is a critical aspect of creating conditions for development. The state has a major role in promoting economic growth and development, and in implementing poverty reduction programmes. However, the reality is that many governments lack the capacity to fulfil this role. As a consequence, many countries lack the necessary policy and regulatory frameworks for private sector-led growth. *They also lack the capacity to*

> *implement programmes, even when funding is available* (Para.86) (author's emphasis). It is for this reason that targeted capacity-building should be given a priority. *Programmes in every area should be preceded by an assessment of capacity, followed by the provision of support* (author's emphasis) (Para.87). The… (HSGIC) will mobilise resources for capacity building to enable all countries to comply with the mutually agreed minimum standards and codes of conduct (Para.89).

Yet, no evidence exists from the literature reviewed that capacity assessments were conducted at national levels prior to NEPAD's proposed capacity building interventions or even the development of programmes/projects in the Infrastructure STAP. Notably, capacity building for RECs was only included in NEPAD's "Top Twenty projects" during 2003 (see: AfDB, 2003) – a year after NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP was launched; similarly, the report on capacity building assessment conducted (on behalf of NEPAD's Secretariat,) by the ACBF in all the RECs was still not complete at the time of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review, during 2004 (see: TCII and NEPAD, 2005: 140). Therefore, it is unclear on what basis NEPAD Secretariat or development analysts allege that NEPAD has instituted capacity building interventions, when the proposed capacity assessments in NEPAD's Strategic Framework were not even conducted to begin with. It is also unclear from the comments depicted in the previous chapters how member states are now viewed as not committed to capacity building vis-à-vis the role assigned to, and commitment articulated by NEPAD's HSGIC to mobilise resources for the implementation of capacity-building programmes/projects and to monitor/enforce their implementation.

Several issues may be drawn from assertions by NEPAD or various analysts, but which NEPAD does not address conclusively in order to identify areas for corrective intervention. For example, the following issues are not addressed:

- have African countries steadfastly refused/ignored to implement funded capacity building programmes, or do they not even possess the capacity to implement funded capacity building programmes?
- How are NEPAD's capacity building programmes structured cognisant of the capacity constraints for their implementation?

- How are the said institutional capacity building programmes linked to NEPAD's prioritisation of programmes/projects and policy strategy/response actions for the development of regional infrastructure in various sectors, particularly so since the link between capacity assessments and capacity building interventions is not so clearly defined at the strategic levels of management?
- Since the issue of failure to implement (capacity building) projects, or lack of institutional capacity for implementation "*even when funds are available*" was first raised in 2001 in NEPAD's Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) as depicted above, and *again* in 2003 in President Mbeki's comments to explain reasons for the lack of implementation progress (see: Kotzé & Steyn, 2003), was it a foregone conclusion that NEPAD's (capacity building) programmes/projects will not be implemented at national levels? If so, what enforcement mechanisms did NEPAD's HSGIC propose or develop during programme development in order to ensure compliance at national or sub-regional levels, and if not, why not?

The questions posed above are not meant to exonerate member states or national governments from their responsibility to develop institutional capacity and to reform/develop inadequate institutions. They merely highlight the implications of the lack of alignment and agreement on programmes/projects between the various spatial categories, levels of management and institutional structures; incoherent development of programme elements resulting in ambiguous links between the various sectoral programmes; confusing or incoherent statements from, and lack of commitment by NEPAD's governance and management structures to the implementation of their own programme; and inadequacy of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate the development of common goals and objectives as well as the development of effective practical modalities to share limited resources.

5.2.9 Negative implications of media reports for programme/project implementation

There may be valid arguments that media reports on NEPAD's implementation challenges impose unreasonable pressures on the affected institutions/institutional structures, particularly so cognisant of the complexity of institutional issues to be addressed in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure. NEPAD must, however, shoulder the blame for the consequential fuelling of media/public perception of project implementation failure. From the onset, NEPAD's unregulated optimism towards the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP, in addition to setting ambitious schedules for project implementation, created unreasonable expectations in the media.

As a result, the afore-mentioned debacle has brought into sharp focus NEPAD's (possible) limited understanding of the requirements for effective development/ implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ projects or even development programmes/projects in general; how to address the vicissitudes of the internal/external institutional environment in which the Infrastructure STAP, or Africa's development programmes/projects are implemented; and what NEPAD really seeks to achieve in its programme for the development of regional infrastructure. The media's limited understanding of the onerous requirements and protracted time lines in the development of cross-border regional infrastructure add to sensational, if not inaccurate, reporting on possible implementation failures of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme. Inadequate communication regarding NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, fragmentary and opaque processes regarding the progression of different sectoral programmes/ projects through the different stages of the project life cycle, poor management of project functions, and inadequate information on the overall implementation status merely fan the perceptions of implementation failure relayed to, and by the media.

Addison (1997: 57) has cited studies that attributed the problem of communication in development projects to the potent combination of

"technocratic and secretive management" (of development projects) by multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and IMF. These communication problems, according to Addison (*ibid*) were exacerbated by "uninformed media reporting." As a result, Addison (*ibid*) argued that the rigid rules for project implementation on which media assessment of implementation success/failure is based ignore that development projects are "experiments." As Addison (*ibid*) further argued, the "misleading categorisation of projects as either 'successes' or 'failures' has reinforced the public perception that development is a confusing business although the priorities should be simple."

Addison's comments regarding media perceptions of development projects are particularly relevant in NEPAD's context, given the widespread interest in its performance. They also illustrate the inordinate influence of the methodologies and behaviours of IFIs or multilateral institutions on the implementation of development programmes/projects, with implications for NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Whilst not so explicitly stated, Addison also alludes to the complexity for implementation planning of development programmes/projects that rigidly adhere to the following parameters: (a) the stages of the project life cycle vis-à-vis the dynamic and unpredictable institutional environment; and (b) either of the various planning processes – such as the *prescriptive* models that posit formal procedures to planning, or the *descriptive/emergent* models that posit flexible, emergent, adaptive, integrative and inclusive learning approaches to planning. With the use of any or a combination of the approaches depicted above, however, structured frameworks for planning, management, and collective engagement in complex projects need to be developed and agreed up-front based on situational or project specificity, rather than imposed as reactive responses when unintended implementation challenges/consequences emerge.

Addison's categorisation of (*all*) development projects as "experiments", however, may inadvertently reinforce some of the reasons for implementation failures in public-sector programmes/programmes. These include the lack of accountability or performance control within the parameters of project

management functions (scope, organisation, time, cost, quality), and the lack of a clear definition/development of mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness of project management functions; failure to scrutinise and address the contradictions/ pressures posed by the complex external/internal institutional environments on development programmes/projects and institutional structures for implementation management/coordination in the context of a rigid project life cycle; and inadequate planning to support the effective delivery of novel projects within a programme context, subject to the parameters of the articulated constraints and situational/project specificity.

Cognisant of the afore-mentioned statements, a number of issues also need to be explained: at what stage does experimentation begin and end in development programmes/projects; and how is this experimentation linked to pilot projects (or are the said experiments and pilot projects the same), availability/disbursement of resources and delivery of products and services to beneficiaries, project roll-out and spatial expansion? Thus, suggestions that development projects may just be implemented in an open-ended manner simply because they are "experiments", or because they involve intangible social and human elements that cannot be easily subjected to quantification (*ibid*), are erroneous. How the questions posed above are addressed indicates the importance of developing adequate frameworks for programme/project design, implementation/implementation management and project communication.

5.4 Summary and Conclusion

The analysis of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project scope and organisation management at the various levels of management/planning in the previous chapters has revealed the following issues: NEPAD's allocation of responsibilities and roles to the various institutional structures was at the outset ambiguous. In turn, poor project organisation management appears to be exacerbated by inadequate project scope management. In addition, the relationship between planning hierarchies, project management functions (including

constraints,) structures for project implementation/implementation management and how they impact on each other is tenuous, with implications for project implementation.

In NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP or roads programme, however, a lack of clear linkages, or even omissions, prevails between NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of cross-border regional infrastructure, policy strategies/response actions, influences of the external/internal environment, programmes/projects, strategies for project implementation and implementation management, and structures for project implementation or implementation management/ coordination. As a result, the relationship between the programmes/projects and institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme/project scope and project organisation management is fragmentary.

Similarly, whilst comments by some analysts are arguably based on *their* understanding of the responsibilities and roles of the various structures for the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects, there is no evidence to suggest that a "discernible shift" has occurred in the characteristics of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects. In other words, NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP proposed at the outset large-scale regional infrastructure projects for implementation primarily by the (foreign) private sector, particularly in the ICT and energy sectors (see: NEPAD, 2002c); roles of national governments to finance infrastructure development were also prescribed in sectors like roads, although (foreign) private sector operators would be procured for the construction of the physical roads infrastructure networks (*ibid*).

Lead agencies such as the AfDB and other international institutions including the World Bank, EU and DFID provided the intellectual basis and technical support for programme development and project preparation (NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002f; TCII & NEPAD, 2005); they also provided funding and implementation support for regional infrastructure projects (*ibid*), which essentially appear to meet the requirements for global connectivity/integration, openness and

competitiveness, rather than for peculiar regional/sub-regional concerns for increased internal coherence, regional integration, intra-African trade, capacity building and poverty reduction. Therefore, suggestions that NEPAD later changed its model for programme/project design, because of lack of capacity in RECs, are misleading.

In the same vein, institutional arrangements for implementation management are not clearly defined at the integrative and strategic levels of management between NEPAD's HSGIC, countries, and regional/sub-regional structures for implementation management/coordination. Again, this problem appears to be exacerbated by NEPAD's inadequate approach to planning, communication, project scope and project organisation management, resulting in poor project integration management. In turn, poor project integration management has negative implications for stakeholder-relationship management and project implementation progress. This problem also appears to have resulted in the pervasive lack of trust regarding the ability of NEPAD's mandated regional/sub-regional structures, or of NEPAD, to deliver on the implementation of agreed regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

The issues discussed in this chapter underscore the importance of relevant approaches to planning and implementation of development programmes/projects. Such approaches are particularly important to guide the implementation of complex projects similar to those proposed by NEPAD. In addition, the significance of relevant management systems for regional integration/sectoral cooperation initiatives, as well as clarifying roles and responsibilities within the framework of appropriate structures for implementation and implementation management cannot be underestimated. These are some of the core elements of an effective integrative strategy for project implementation management. Some of the concerns with the recommendations of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews are discussed in the next chapter.

6 CONCERNS WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF NEPAD'S INFRASTRUCTURE STAP REVIEWS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses concerns regarding the recommendations proffered in NEPAD's 1st and 2nd Infrastructure STAP reviews. In addition, earlier perceptions of the influence of the external/internal institutional environment on NEPAD vis-à-vis expectations/concerns of current performance are examined. This is in order to establish the relevance of NEPAD's interventions to address implementation challenges, cognisant of the concerns regarding the recommendations of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews. This study also attempts to establish whether NEPAD learnt any lessons from the previous implementation of similar programmes/projects, or considered some of the articulated views from the earlier perceptions of NEPAD in its institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support in the Infrastructure STAP.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.3 discusses concerns regarding the recommendations of NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review. Section 5.4 discusses concerns regarding the recommendations of NEPAD's 2nd Infrastructure STAP review. Section 5.5 juxtaposes the afore-mentioned concerns against earlier perceptions of the possible influence of the external/internal institutional environment on NEPAD vis-à-vis expectations/concerns of current performance. Section 5.6 is the summary and conclusion.

6.2 Concerns with the Recommendations of NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP Review

A defining characteristic of NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP is the inordinate focus on the lack of institutional capacity in RECs, particularly technical capacity, although concerns around broader institutional issues are also raised to a limited extent. (A similar emphasis on technical issues at the strategic and operational

levels of management may also be gleaned from the comments by the various stakeholders regarding the project implementation delays.) The narrow focus on RECs, however, precludes the development of a balanced view on the range of underpinning causes to the identified implementation challenges in the external/internal institutional environment, in order to facilitate the proposal of relevant interventions to ameliorate the *status quo* at the different levels of management/planning.

Moreover, the narrow focus on (known) technical constraints in RECs gives the impression of some concerted avoidance to address the consequential pitfalls of NEPAD's probable poor programme conception and planning, including inadequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation or implementation management/coordination. Cognisant of the *known* lack of institutional capacity at the various levels of management and spatial categories, one may thus argue that in fact, the emphasis on lack of institutional capacity in RECs deflects attention from the probable inadequacies in NEPAD's conception and planning of the regional infrastructure programme. As a result, the recommendations to address the identified implementation challenges have tended to follow the prevailing patterns in NEPAD's skewed assessments of implementation challenges.

For example, NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review criticised the RECs for undertaking ambitious programmes/projects, cognisant of their lack of institutional capacity (see: APPENDIX C). The relevance of some of the REC projects in the context of NEPAD's "new" ethos was also questioned (*ibid*). Yet, the same concerns appear to characterise NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, specifically in the identification, development and implementation of the transit facilitation programme/projects under NEPAD's roads programme. Arguably, every identified problem for project implementation/implementation management directly or indirectly relates to NEPAD's non-performance (i.e., the non-performance of NEPAD's governance and management structures including NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme/project

development and implementation/ implementation management), although this study does not exonerate RECs from this evidenced non-performance.

A similar conclusion was reached in the analysis of perceptions in respect of implementation challenges discussed the previous chapter. This is because the extent of problems regarding the lack of institutional capacity in RECs was in the peculiar knowledge of NEPAD's structures, lead agencies and development partners before, during and after the development of the Infrastructure STAP. Thus, this study argues that NEPAD failed in its duty to facilitate the development of institutional capacity in RECs, or in member states, in terms of the objectives it set itself in the Strategic Framework. Significantly, the assertions depicted above regarding the lack of institutional capacity for the implementation/implementation management of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP appear to be clouded by erroneous diagnoses of the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions/institutional structures. The role and impact of programme/project conception and planning on implementation outcomes appears to be ignored in the assessments of performance and implementation challenges including the apportioning of responsibility for the identified implementation delays.

Mintzberg (1994: 284) illustrates the symbiotic relationship between formulation and implementation in order to demonstrate how (incorrect) diagnostics of implementation problems obscure the identity of culpable parties, who may in fact be conducting the assessment of implementation challenges, but with an interest in distorting the outcome of such diagnoses in their favour (i.e., what he refers to as "the thinkers, whether senior managers or central planers or the consultants who advise them, people who may have used their 'outright dominance' not only to create the problem in the first place but then to attribute the blame for it" (*ibid*)). Thus, Mintzberg has demonstrated, through a parody of the interplay between the different levels of management in projects, how the developers/formulators of plans tend to attribute blame for implementation failure to everyone else, presumably in indignation at their implied culpability/failure to institute relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project

development and implementation support. Mintzberg (*ibid*: 284-285) illustrates this interchange as follows:

> Seeing themselves 'atop' that metaphorical hierarchy, they point the finger at everyone else, 'down below.' 'If only you dumbbells had appreciated our brilliant strategies, all would be well.' But the clever dumbbells might well respond: 'If you are so smart, why didn't you formulate strategies that we dumbbells could implement? You knew who we are: why didn't you factor our incompetences into your thinking?'

The parody depicted above of the typical interface between the various levels of management in the implementation of projects when plans go wrong, particularly in the context of a prescriptive approach to planning, succinctly explains NEPAD's dilemma. Notably, problems of inadequate planning in the development of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP (i.e., obscure linkages between strategies, objectives, programmes/projects and structures for implementation/ implementation management), and inadequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management are simply presented in NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP Review as the consequence of poor communication.

Similarly, NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review recommends a bottom-up approach to projects, which is expected to evolve within a top-down, pre-determined and formalised prescriptive process to the development of regional infrastructure. At the same time, clear institutional mechanisms and arrangements are not mapped in order to foster an effective platform for the upward aggregation of projects. It is thus doubtful whether or not the AfDB (the developers of the Infrastructure STAP on behalf of NEPAD) explored in the first place whether the upward aggregation of projects was feasible within the framework of NEPAD's prescriptive approach to the development of regional infrastructure.

The issues discussed above illustrate some of the consequences of obscure linkages in prescriptive planning models identified by Mintzberg (*ibid*: 78) – i.e., the fragmentation between performance control on the one hand (that is mapped in the top-down after-the-fact hierarchies of operating plans, objectives and budgets), and action planning on the other hand (that is mapped in hierarchies of

what are supposed to be before-the-fact strategies and programmes). As Mintzberg (*ibid*) argued, in prescriptive models the links between programs and structural units in the hierarchy are generally ambiguous. As a result, Mintzberg *ibid*: 72) argued that even if the objectives are aggregated upwards from different structural units in a bottom-up process, the divide entrenched by the different planning hierarchies between the formulation of objectives and strategies is problematic: a medium for integration even where objectives are "aggregating up" within the context of strategies that are "cascading down" does not appear to exist. For these reasons, Eigerman (*ibid*) averred: "In a purely bottom up system, the integration of strategy across units (in prescriptive models) is achieved with a stapler."

Based on the recommendations illustrated in APPENDIX C, the interrelated concerns in relation to the delegation of certain roles and responsibilities to NEPAD's Secretariat to address the identified constraints are detailed below. The questions posed below also underscore the perpetuation in the recommendations of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP of the penchant in Africa's regional development programmes (such as the LPA's Transport and Communication's programme and TAH and missing links initiatives discussed in APPENDIX B) to delegate (overlapping) roles and responsibilities for implementation/ implementation management either to structures that lack the requisite capacity, or at their levels of incompetence:

- What authority has been delegated NEPAD's Secretariat to ensure that the HSGIC meets its commitments in terms of its obligations for capacity building;
- How will NEPAD's Secretariat ensure that donors/funding agencies meet their commitments for funding in terms of NEPAD's programme, particularly so since the issue of lack of commitment to funding agreements by developed countries and their institutions has, for decades, been one of the foremost intractable constraints to the implementation of Africa's development programmes/projects that rely on donor funding?

- How will NEPAD's Secretariat ensure that RECs independently develop capacity building plans, when capacity building under NEPAD's programme is linked to the role assigned to/assumed by NEPAD's HSGIC (i.e., to ensure the development of institutional capacity in regional/sub-regional structures and at national levels)?
- What capacity/authority does NEPAD's Secretariat have to enable it to address the issue of lack of support, cooperation, and funding from member states, particularly so since RECs depend on member states to approve/fund their (RECs') capacity building programmes/projects?
- Who will fund the development and implementation of the suggested capacity building programmes in RECs, particularly so since the RECs perpetually experience severe funding constraints, and how will the related issue of expected funding from member states be addressed – as member states also either have no funds, or withhold funding for capacity building, which would otherwise allow RECs to meet their obligations in terms of regional integration initiatives, or to tender competent performance in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP?
- What are the links between the proposed capacity building programmes at the various spatial categories (regional, sub-regional, and national) and the various sectoral programmes in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, how should the proposed or existing capacity building programmes be effectively coordinated in order to use available limited resources optimally, and how are the proposed or existing capacity building programmes linked to the proposed/assumed roles of NEPAD's governance and management structures, RECs and national governments/member states in capacity building?

The questions posed above illustrate broadly that indiscriminate delegation of roles and responsibilities to address the identified constraints might have been made to structures (such as the NEPAD Secretariat or RECs,) that do not posses the power, authority and capacity to perform the delegated tasks. Possible corporate governance infringements are also reflected in the close links between

NEPAD and the AfDB, particularly so since no clear Terms of Reference (ToR) appear to have been developed regarding what the AfDB would deliver vis-à-vis the deliverables of NEPAD's management and governance structures.

For example, NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP was prepared by the AfDB for and on behalf of NEPAD, or in association with NEPAD; the 1st Infrastructure STAP Review (AfDB, 2003), was also conducted by the AfDB for and on behalf of NEPAD, or in association with NEPAD. Since the structures that developed NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme – i.e., NEPAD and AfDB – are the same structures evaluating project implementation progress, the lack of an independent assessment by disinterested parties, or lack of checks and balances in NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support, or the development of a non-aligned framework to evaluate project implementation progress potentially stymie effective problem identification, analysis and the development of relevant corrective interventions.

Thus, by focusing on the capacity constraints in RECs' Secretariats, or in other regional/sub-regional structures responsible for integrated implementation management of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP (such as the AfDB and NEPAD Secretariat), the 1st Infrastructure STAP Review also *significantly* downplayed the relevance of the influences of the external/internal institutional environment at the international, regional, sub-regional and national levels, which has manifested in inadequate institutional capacity in RECs. Similarly, the examination of the possible inadequacy of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure is also ignored.

This approach is surprising, given that the impact of Africa's inadequate institutions at regional, sub-regional and national levels on the development and implementation of regional development programmes/projects, including the negative impact of the African state itself on the implementation of regional development interventions, has resulted in the underlying causes of problems in RECs. The afore-mentioned problems have arguably resulted in the RECs' failure

to effectively coordinate regional integration initiatives. In this respect, persistent concerns expressed over the previous decades (prior to NEPAD,) regarding the lack of institutional capacity in RECs, but without evidenced/successful interventions to implement corrective measures, raise a number of key questions:

- First, why were the RECs allocated the primary responsibility to coordinate integrated implementation management of NEPAD's regional infrastructure STAP in the first place, since their institutional/organisational constraints are well documented?
- Second, why were parallel programmes to develop institutional capacity in RECs not instituted at the outset, particularly so since the success of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP is critical to evince NEPAD's commitment to develop relevant solutions for Africa's regeneration?
- Third, since the challenges in regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation are beyond the capacity of RECs to address on their own without transformational changes in their broader external/internal institutional environment – including at regional, sub-regional and national levels – why were the proposed institutional reforms/development at the various spatial categories, in particular at national levels, not enforced?
- Fourth, given the limitations of technical interventions that are not supported by the reform/development of inadequate institutions (DFID, 2003:vi), would isolated capacity development projects in RECs help in any event, cognisant of the pervasive influence of entrenched inadequate institutions at the various spatial categories?

6.3 Concerns with the Recommendations of NEPAD's 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review

The 2nd Infrastructure STAP review also displays a proclivity for emphasis on capacity deficits in RECs. Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned, the recommendations of NEPAD's 2nd Infrastructure STAP review, depicted in APPENDIX E, are comprehensive. To the extent that said recommendations focus

on RECs, they cover the various facets of RECs' operations or their interface with the external/internal institutional environment and its impact on their participation in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. A number of the concerns regarding the recommendations of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review are depicted below (not all the issues are, however, discussed here):

(i) Some of the recommendations of the TCII and NEPAD report (2005), while relevant, extend beyond the spheres of the RECs' operations, including the implementation or implementation management/coordination of regional infrastructure projects. For example, some of the recommendations in the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*) are applicable to decision-making issues at the higher levels of management at national levels, in spheres of influence beyond the control of RECs. In other words, some of the recommendations are more pertinent to the management of intra-/inter-state relations in a multilateral context, or the internal management of individual states' apparatus.

(ii) A perusal of the recommendations presented in APPENDIX E, to the effect that decision-making structures in RECs be restructured to ensure alignment with NEPAD's agenda, or that RECs and member states restructure their operations to fit in/suit NEPAD's agenda or the Infrastructure STAP's, gives the impression that the tail (NEPAD/NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP) is wagging the dog (Africa's development agenda/RECs/national prerogatives). As a result, a pertinent question is: what exactly is NEPAD, or what is the impetus for NEPAD's programme, cognisant of the afore-mentioned issues? Why would states' functions/operations and the mandates or priorities of regional/sub-regional structures for organising Africa's regional integration initiatives, or regional/sub-regional and national development objectives be realigned in accordance with the prerogatives of a development programme, or facilitating mechanism rather than the other way round? A similar concern was broadly raised in a previous chapter regarding the comments by officials from NEPAD's Secretariat reported in

the media – i.e., for member states to align their NDPs and budgets with NEPAD's agenda.

(iii) The roles and responsibilities of the various institutional structures for implementation management/coordination of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are still not clarified in the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review, since the findings and recommendations of NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review. Instead, the lack of clarity and overlap in roles and responsibilities appear to have been accepted as permanent features of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. In this respect, the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*: 108) stated that RECs should develop a framework to strengthen institutional relationships between stakeholders, which "should take into account the overlapping responsibilities of the NEPAD Secretariat, RECs and Member/Partner States."

Based on the recommendations of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review depicted in APPENDIX E, it is still unclear what the RECs' mandate is in respect of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Alternatively, it appears that even the RECs' mandate to coordinate regional integration initiatives was adapted or modified to ensure alignment with NEPAD's or the Infrastructure STAP's agenda. In such a scenario, what happens to the other functions of RECs to manage/coordinate regional integration/sectoral cooperation, or is it assumed or tacitly accepted that the RECs' mandates and related functions will be subsumed under NEPAD's programme or development agenda? And why does NEPAD appear to avoid, at all costs, clarifying the roles and responsibilities between the various institutional structures?

Although various suggestions are proffered in respect of the structure for the recommended framework for RECs to manage institutional relationships, as depicted in APPENDIX E, the issues highlighted in the recommendations of the TCII and NEPAD report relate more to the logistics and process, rather than the substance of the underpinning principles for the management of

trans-state trans-actions. The perceived omissions in this respect include the lack of clarification or elaboration of the implications of the underpinning institutional frameworks for the implementation/implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects by public sector institutional structures/organisations across the various spatial categories.

An explication of guidelines for the management of stakeholder relationships in regional infrastructure projects – which include partnerships between (foreign) private sector operators/institutions, foreign/national governments, and regional/sub-regional political structures (where RECs are (inexplicably) not involved,) – appears to be excluded from the proposed framework in the TCII and NEPAD report. In addition, it is unclear how the proposed institutional relationships' management framework is linked to NEPAD's strategies for integrated project implementation/implementation management, or lack thereof; or whether the development of the recommended framework delegated to RECs will supplant the requisite development (by NEPAD,) of effective/viable strategies for integrated project implementation/implementation management in alignment with situational and project specificity.

To illustrate the implications of the afore-mentioned concerns, NEPAD's Secretariat presented a report on the WAGP at the meeting of the HSGIC in Sharm Shaik: Egypt, on the 19th April 2005 (Mashele, 2006:7). According to NEPAD's report (*ibid*), the WAGP was "…'progressing well under the guidance and collaborative leadership of a Steering Committee of Ministers, Project Implementation Committee that comprises representatives of the four countries; and Senior Management of Sponsors and Project Team comprising representatives of the four companies who have invested in this project'". NEPAD's energy projects, such as the WAGP, represent one of the few infrastructure sector programmes in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, where visible implementation progress has been reported (TCII and

NEPAD, 2005). Yet, it is unclear how the institutional arrangements illustrated above are linked to NEPAD Infrastructure STAP's overall strategy or its institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management/coordination. It is also unclear how NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management of the various sectoral programmes are linked to the existing regional and sub-regional structures for implementation management/coordination of regional integration initiatives in the infrastructure sector.

(iv) The recommendation for RECs, or REC Secretariats, to increase the efficiency of decision-making structures (in RECs) is beyond the capability of REC Secretariats or project structures to address. As a result, an impression is created that either this recommendation is targeted at the wrong audience, or that the implications of the external/internal institutional environment in which RECs/REC Secretariats operate are ignored, rather than understood by NEPAD's structures/agencies, so that they may be integrated in the planning of relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management/coordination.

Given the inequitable power relations in REC structures, or between REC Secretariats and member states, it is also unclear whether REC Secretariats possess the power or authority to recommend that Ministerial Committees/Councils of HoSG change their *modus operandi* to suit the requirements of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects. It is also a remote possibility whether or not project structures/REC Secretariats would ever be mandated by the Summit of HoSG, or Ministerial Committees to explore modalities to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of decision-making in RECs. To illustrate the afore-mentioned concerns, an example of decision-making processes in RECs is presented in Box 6.1.

Box 6.1: Lengthy and Complex Decision-Making Processes in RECs

According to the TCII and NEPAD report (2005: 97), the decision-making processes in most RECs are cumbersome. They follow the following steps:

(i) "The relevant Technical Department prepares and circulates a paper on the subject at hand to the identified experts within all Member/Partner States.
(ii) A meeting, or series of meetings, of experts, usually after donor funds have been obtained for the specific workshop(s), then consider the subject and make recommendations for the internal management and thereafter the Council of Ministers to consider.
(iii) The Council of Ministers in their (typically bi-annual) meetings then consider and agree on recommendations to the conference of the Heads of State for adoption in their next meeting, which typically takes place once a year."

According to the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*), the afore-mentioned "processes form a critical path, and therefore, if one critical stage in this process is delayed (for whatever reason), then the next stage cannot happen and the whole process stalls. Such processes, many of which were designed prior to the RECs being designated as the implementing organs of NEPAD, are quite lengthy and complex. The result of these inefficient decision-making processes is that, too often, critical protocols and conventions can take years before they are finally agreed. This hampers policy harmonisation efforts."

Source: Derived from TCII and NEPAD, 2005. *NEPAD Infrastructure STAP – Second Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward*, pp.97-98.

The point made here is that NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews need to focus on the issues directly related to implementation progress of the identified regional infrastructure projects, as may be depicted in projects' activity plans. Although the various issues addressed by the Infrastructure STAP reviews in the RECs' external/internal institutional environment affect project delivery in/by RECs, some of the recommended actions are beyond the capability or control of REC Secretariats/project structures to address on their own without concerted collective action by the national governments/member states in RECs, Africa's HoSG/Ministerial forums in the various sub-regions, and AU organs. Therefore, the shopping list of issues depicted above suggests that NEPAD failed to draw and agree on detailed implementation plans including roles and responsibilities with the various institutional structures prior to implementation.

Moreover, the issues highlighted in the TCII and NEPAD 2nd Infrastructure STAP review regarding the inefficient processes for decision-making in regional/sub-regional institutions are long-standing and deeply entrenched. The inadequate operationalization of decisions is also linked to complexities of diverse legal, governance and legislative regimes at national levels. Thus,

the possible impact of inefficient decision-making structures or diverse policy, regulatory and governance regimes on proposed cross-border regional infrastructure projects should have been considered earlier on in programme development plans, so that more effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support project implementation could be proposed. To shift the responsibility for redress of the afore-mentioned governance structures/regimes to powerless REC Secretariats, after the fact, is tantamount to "papering over the cracks," as the underlying/structural causes of problems remain unresolved.

(v) It is unclear clear how RECs are to enforce commitment to regional protocols and collective agreements by member states: the issues regarding the lack of compliance to collective agreements are political, economic and institutional, rather than being a consequence of technical inefficiencies *per se* in member states (although technical/administrative inefficiencies also contribute to delays in the implementation of collective agreements). Similarly, one assumes that decisions around the restructuring of RECs would be made at the respective RECs' Summit of HoSG, after recommendations on the issue are submitted by the relevant Ministerial Committees; alternatively, at the AU Assembly of HoSG, if region-wide models are considered.

(vi) Other recommendations in the Infrastructure STAP reviews relate to mechanisms to facilitate commitment (either by RECs, or institutional/ project structures for implementation management/ coordination) to processes that were in any event eschewed during the development of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. These include the recommendation for the "implementation of community decisions relating to NEPAD's Infrastructure projects" (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 105). Yet, lack of popular participation has since inception been considered a defining characteristic of NEPAD's programme (see: Anyang' Nyong'o, 2002; African Civil Society Forum, 2002; Bond, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; Taylor, 2005).

For example, broad-based popular participation in the selection, preparation and construction of regional infrastructure, and ensuring the provision of infrastructure products and services to improve internal coherence are some of the response/actions articulated at the integrative levels of management in NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure (see: NEPAD, 2001). Yet, the afore-mentioned policy strategy/response actions have not been cascaded or integrated in programme/project development in the Infrastructure STAP and sectoral programmes, such as the roads programme. In other words, it is difficult to envisage how RECs will enforce commitment to processes that are not elaborated as part of the Infrastructure STAP's *modus operandi*. As a result, it is possible that this aspect refers to *intended* (future) institutional mechanisms and arrangements for collective engagement and future project identification, rather than dealing with the current concerns in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. This lack of consistency in assessment is confusing.

(vii) In addition, the entrenched reliance on external/international institutions or institutional structures for project implementation support, including financial resources and technical assistance, whilst at the same time ascribing implementation failures to the same exogenous factors, appears to create 'vicious cycles' of dependency and apathy. For example, on the one hand, NEPAD proposed to "end the scourge of underdevelopment that afflicts Africa" through African ownership and prudent stewardship of Africa's development agenda using the abundant resources at Africa's disposal (NEPAD, 2001, Para.6-7: 1-2). On the other hand, NEPAD proposed partnerships with the developed countries of the north (which have previously contributed to Africa's perennial underdevelopment and unabated extraction of Africa's resources), to support Africa's integration "into the global economy and body politic" (NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002f) including the development of Africa's regional infrastructure.

NEPAD articulated the afore-mentioned position despite extensive empirical evidence of the decades-long lack of beneficial support, in Africa's interest, by the developed countries and their institutions/institutional structures. As NEPAD argued: "… (NEPAD) is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations" (NEPAD, 2001, Para.8: 2). At the same time, NEPAD eschewed the previous role of "colonial powers" in the development of Africa's infrastructure for extractive purposes (*ibid*: Para. 99: 22).

As a result, the delivery on NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes appears to be bogged down by the cycle of dependency, exacerbated by NEPAD's inoperative institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support, particularly in the context of integrated development. Although NEPAD espoused the reform of the afore-mentioned unproductive relations, the contradictions and obfuscation in NEPAD's Strategic Framework appear to lend credence to the afore-mentioned concerns regarding NEPAD's inability to move beyond the rhetoric in order to facilitate successful project implementation.

The dependency on external resources (including funding and technical assistance) also appears to permeate all facets of NEPAD's development of regional infrastructure programmes/projects at the various levels of management and spatial categories. As a result, to illustrate the extent of this dependency and its implications for the implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/projects or institutional structures for project implementation or implementation management/coordination, the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 105) recommended that "RECs re-structure and streamline their operations to efficiently manage their dependency relationship with donors".

What the identified need for the realignment of the RECs' relationships with donors effectively means is that the negative manifestations of NEPAD's dependency on external resources, and the (inadequate) management of the ensuing dependency relationships have been neatly shifted (by NEPAD) to RECs. This assertion is made here particularly so since NEPAD is responsible for mobilising resources externally and, presumably, the management of stakeholder relationships that ensue from such agreements at regional and sub-regional levels. Moreover, the RECs are the same structures that have been identified (*ibid*) to lack the authority and wherewithal to astutely manage stakeholder/institutional relationships with donors.

Therefore, a number of concerning issues underscores the lack of autonomy in RECs, which appears to have been ignored in the TCII and NEPAD recommendations (*ibid*), with implications for the implementation of RECs' projects. First, it is unclear how the RECs can extricate their operations from donor influence, particularly so since donors appear to drive/fund REC operations; second, RECs (in theory) rely on member states for financial support – in turn, the majority of member states rely on donor-support for their funding including capital budgets, thereby perpetuating a vicious cycle of dependency. Where and how NEPAD or its proposed interventions for capacity building and resource mobilisation fit in the afore-mentioned relationships is not clearly explained.

Cognisant of the issues discussed above, an even more puzzling recommendation from the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review is that: "NEPAD and the RECs, with the support from the… (AfDB), should consider providing technical assistance and funding to countries to enable them to reform their administrative and legal frameworks, so as to achieve compliance with agreed regional decisions" (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 105). Yet, NEPAD and RECs are known to possess limited resources, to the

extent that they are unable to even independently fund/support their own administrative operations.

(viii) A number of creative initiatives in various RECs are highlighted in the recommendations of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review. Yet, if the various comments on NEPAD's implementation challenges discussed in the previous chapters are anything to go by, a view of REC Secretariats as hapless institutional structures tends to be conveyed. As a result, the contradictory examples of creative REC initiatives presented in the TCII and NEPAD 2nd Infrastructure STAP review report (2005) vis-à-vis the prevalent perceptions of lack of institutional capacity in RECs suggests either the incorrect utilisation of RECs' resources in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, or that the various regional/sub-regional structures coordinate activities for regional integration at incorrect levels of work, where their contribution is either not appreciated or understood.

An examination of the earlier perceptions of NEPAD vis-à-vis expected performance or concerns with recommended interventions is presented below.

6.4 Earlier Perceptions of the Influence of the External/Internal Institutional Environment on NEPAD vis-à-vis Expectations/Concerns of Current Performance

A detailed illustrative SWOT analysis of perceptions of the external/internal institutional environment on NEPAD is presented in APPENDIX F. The SWOT analysis is derived from a "random" selection of relevant comments during the early stages of NEPAD's launch (i.e., NEPAD's Strategic Framework with sectoral programmes for Africa's regeneration). The comments presented in APPENDIX E depict perceptions of NEPAD's external/internal institutional environment with regard to the expectations of NEPAD to facilitate effective delivery on its articulated programme objectives. The illustrative SWOT analysis uses Diescho's framework of a SWOT analysis: in its original application,

Diescho's uses this framework to analyse the political and socio-economic impacts of NEPAD (Diescho, 2002: 47-62). According Diescho (*ibid*: 49):

> Weaknesses are those factors that are inherent in the historical process and that, once they are overcome, will bear testimony to the commitment and tenacity of the drivers of the process. Threats are those factors that, unless they are understood and tackled with the necessary sensitivity and dexterity, at the right time by the right personages, can scuttle the whole agenda…Challenges (or opportunities) are those factors that in the face of risks offer real opportunities to move ahead in the context of clear targets and benchmarks.

In addition, this study superimposes over Diescho's political and socio-economic framework a conventional/generic framework proposed by Knutson (undated) for a SWOT analysis. According to Knutson (*ibid*) strengths and weaknesses deal with the *internal analysis*; opportunities and threats (or constraints) deal with the *external analysis*. In contrast, in Diescho's framework the various parameters of the SWOT analysis overlap between the internal and external analyses: this overlap may be construed to illustrate the interrelatedness of the impact of PESTLE factors in development programmes/projects. In addition, Africa's asymmetrical integration in the global political economy and the consequences of historical (colonial and neo-colonial) behaviours, attitudes, methodologies and development interventions still impose significant mutually reinforcing negative impacts on Africa's development agenda. Such impacts provide evidence of multiple and simultaneous causality to the identified challenges in the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

A summary of the broad categories of issues/comments depicted in the SWOT analysis in APPENDIX F is presented in Table 6.1 for convenience. This study uses relevant project management methodologies and planning frameworks to interpret the data.

Table 6.1: Summary of Illustrative SWOT Analysis of the External/Internal Environment in which NEPAD Programmes/Projects are Implemented

STRENGHTS	OPPORTUNITIES
• Reaffirmation of commitment by African HoSG to political, economic and corporate governance and related principles; • Collective ownership of, and active engagement by the political leadership in development processes; • Availability of strategic framework, development objectives, and detailed action plans in various priority sectors, with the invitation for inclusive participation by all stakeholder groups; • A strong sense of common identity across the African continent, which resonates strongly with the idea of a united Africa politically and economically.	• Strengthen democracy and human development across the continent ; • Strengthen leadership and management structures at sub-regional and regional levels; • Address long-standing political, and socio-economic structural constraints in African countries and sub-regions; • Provide inspired leadership and building blocks for ethical conduct that will strengthen efforts to improve political economic and corporate governance; • Promote and support the development of the African private sector including integration of the informal sector in development planning; • Ensure inclusive stakeholder participation from all segments of society; • Address gender discrimination and substantively promote women's empowerment; • Facilitate the development of infrastructure, in particular transport infrastructure and related services; • Mobilise domestic resources; • Prioritise interventions for institutional reform, institution building, and the development of leadership and management capacity.
WEAKNESSES	**THREATS/CONSTRAINTS**
• Lack of trust in the political and moral ability of political leadership to deliver on the articulated development objectives; • Activist orientation weak or lacking amongst Africa's political leadership; • Entrenched colonial mindset: "decolonization of the mind" needs to precede the dialogue between the African leaders and the international development partners, so that the former can advance the interests of Africa's people, communities, countries and sub-regions; • Lack of confidence in regional and sub-regional institutions to bring about *transformational* change; • Weak states, weak institutional environment and poor governance record; • Long-standing rivalries between the member states in regional blocks, and between the various sub-regional integration arrangements; • Poor development planning ability, lack of prioritisation, and poor communication; • Lack of engagement in development planning with all segments of society; • Lack of commitment by member-states to implement regional protocols and collective agreements; • Lack of financial resources, crippling debt, poor domestic resource mobilisation resulting in inordinate reliance on external sources; • NEPAD a "sophisticated begging bowl" that escalates the human development crisis and associated dependency burdens; • Transfer of inappropriate development models to Africa's unique circumstances; • Lack of readiness in various spheres of development, resulting in marginalisation from the global economy.	• Political conflicts, civil wars, lack of peace and security; • Continued poor governance in political, economic and corporate spheres; • Negative perceptions and damaged integrity of political leadership; • Lack of unity on NEPAD amongst the HoSG, compounded by political rivalry; • Lack of meaningful support and commitment by the international community to the attainment of the agreed development objectives; • Political leadership burdens and lack of goal-directed leadership behaviours; • The preoccupation with the 'South African factor' and related fears of political dominance; • Elitist tendencies and political patronage in appointments, and participation in programmes and projects; • Negative impact on NEPAD of dependency and external reliance for funding.

Source: Derived from various sources including the following: Adedegi, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990; Anyang' Nyong'o, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o *et al*, 2002; Bond, 2002; Buthelezi, 2001; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; ECA, 2002; Ekpo, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Herbert, 2003; IAG/ JA, 2002; Mills, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; Tandon, 2002. In addition, the author converted some of the negative comments into positive statements in order to illustrate some of the opportunities to support the implementation of NEPAD programmes.

The summary of issues/comments illustrated in Table 6.1 and detailed in APPENDIX F are self-explanatory. The purpose of the illustrative SWOT analysis in this study is not so much to interrogate the veracity or relevance of the various comments for NEPAD: rather, the illustrative SWOT analysis seeks to map the patterns emerging from the general perceptions of NEPAD's performance and the efficacy of its programmatic interventions since NEPAD's programme was launched up to the assessments of performance and implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP; how these afore-mentioned aspects are linked to the influences of the external/internal institutional environment in which NEPAD's programmes/projects are implemented including NEPAD's recommended interventions to ameliorate the *status quo*; and what the implications of the afore-mentioned issues are for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.

The overlay of the afore-mentioned frameworks for a SWOT analysis also seeks to establish which of the articulated concerns on NEPAD's performance/implementation challenges *primarily* relate to either the external or internal institutional environment, cognisant of the impact of multiple and simultaneous causality of PESTLE factors on development programmes/projects. This is in order to identify emerging patterns from the combined performance assessments, and to identify areas for intervention and prioritisation for future integrated implementation support of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral projects, if at all possible under the circumstances. Quantitative measures are not used in this exercise.

The issues identified in earlier perceptions of influences of the external/internal institutional environment on NEPAD, which have significance for the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, may be grouped in the broad categories discussed below.

6.4.1 Significant influence of the international community on NEPAD

An analysis of the pattern of broad categories of comments illustrated in Table 6.1 and APPENDIX F suggests that the range of articulated concerns on NEPAD related more to the *internal* rather than to the *external* institutional environment. As a result, NEPAD was urged to address as a priority the range of the identified internal/domestic institutional concerns rather than the evidenced preoccupation in the development/implementation of previous region-wide development programmes with the (external) prerogatives of the developed countries and their institutions.

The exception in the identified external concerns (under threats/constraints) refers to the "lack of meaningful support by the international community for the attainment of agreed development objectives." The articulated views on the role of the international community – regardless of their numerical significance in relation to the overall comments presented in Table 6.1 and APPENDIX F – illustrate the possible significant negative influence of international institutions on NEPAD and the development/implementation of its sectoral programmes/projects. The illustrated comments in this respect may be summed up as signifying the prevailing concerns regarding the potential adverse influence of "world-wide connectivity in the fields of technology, political power relations and global capitalism" (Breytenbach, 2004: 83) on Africa's development agenda, cognisant of the fragile institutions/economies in the majority of African countries exacerbated by endemic lack of institutional capacity.

6.4.2 Inadequate prioritisation of development interventions

One of the key opportunities highlighted for NEPAD was to prioritise its development interventions for implementation to address internal institutional concerns, rather than attempting "to do too much," cognisant of the endemic lack of resources and institutional capacity. Poor development planning including poor prioritisation and communication of development programmes/projects are

identified in APPENDIX F as some of the weaknesses in Africa's regional and sub-regional institutions, in addition to the lack of managerial skills that are exacerbated by poor management practices, which have significant implications for the implementation of NEPAD's programmes/projects. Therefore, the findings from the overlay of the two frameworks for a SWOT analysis suggest that NEPAD's priority to create an enabling environment for the development of regional infrastructure must be premised *primarily* on addressing issues that pertain to the internal (domestic) institutional environment, rather than focussing on the external (international) institutional environment according to the dictates of the Washington Consensus.

Based on the prevailing issues discussed above, and cognisant of the characteristics of NEPAD's implementation challenges in the Infrastructure STAP, the priority interventions for NEPAD include the need to do the following:

- focus on providing strategic direction and effective strategic management to the sequencing of relevant interventions to develop cross-border regional infrastructure;
- facilitate the rationalisation of overlapping regional integration arrangements;
- facilitate improvements in governance regimes, particularly at national levels;
- ensure that capacity assessments are conducted and monitor implementation of recommendations or the related programmes/projects;
- facilitate the development of institutional capacity at the various spatial categories including the development of leadership/strategic management capability including requisite competencies in institutional structures at regional, sub-regional and national levels;
- facilitate institution-building and the reform/development of inadequate institutions;
- facilitate the development of regional infrastructure for internal coherence to support the attainment of the articulated multiple objectives for regional infrastructure; and

- create an enabling environment to facilitate/support the development of relevant instruments for domestic resource mobilisation based on situational specificity.

The range of issues depicted above is within the competency of NEPAD's articulated policy strategy/response actions including the proposed interventions by NEPAD's governance and management structures to unlock the blockages for the implementation of NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions (see the relevant provisions in NEPAD, 2001). A detailed discussion on the afore-mentioned aspects is beyond the scope of this study. NEPAD, however, has displayed a proclivity for reliance on international institutions for the operationalization and implementation of its response actions/policy strategy for the development of regional infrastructure (see: Hope, 2006; NEPAD, 2001; TCII & NEPAD, 2005).

This reliance is evidenced even in areas where African states and institutions can, and need to take a leading role or assume primary responsibility for development processes and related outcomes in order to ensure implementation success of Africa's development programmes. For these reasons, an active role of the state and the development of state institutional capacity are critical. These afore-mentioned roles, however, need to be balanced with those of broad-based participation by various constituencies subject to project specificity: these constituencies include formal/informal business sector and institutions of civil society at national levels in order for the desired development outcomes manifest.

6.4.3 Negative impact of foreign institutions/institutional structures and methodologies on Africa's development agenda

Some of the comments illustrated in APPENDIX F reveal concerns regarding the perceived inordinate influence on the development of NEPAD and its Strategic Framework of foreign methodologies that are not suited to Africa's situational specificity. In this respect, the significant participation by institutions/institutional structures of the developed countries in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP appears to make a mockery of the political leadership's avowed commitment to African

ownership and control of NEPAD's/Africa's development agenda. For example, the concerns raised by various African experts indicate that the range of underlying problems to the implementation of Africa's development programmes/ projects, and the possible solutions to ameliorate the *status quo* are known.

For example, the lack of institutional capacity and strategic management capability in Africa's regional and sub-regional institutions is acknowledged in the range of comments depicted in APPENDIX F. However, one may conclude that the (largely-foreign) "sector-specialised agencies" NEPAD relied on to elaborate the regional infrastructure programmes/projects (see NEPAD, 2001) appear to have failed to competently analyse NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions in order to propose relevant programmes/projects for the development of regional infrastructure. In terms of project management best practice, a competent analysis of NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions would have ensured that the key influences in the RECs' and NEPAD's external/internal environments, including the related assumptions for programme development/implementation are rendered explicit. Their possible impact on NEPAD's pre-determined regional infrastructure programmes/projects and proposed strategies for project implementation and implementation management at the strategic levels of management would thus be thoroughly understood, with the relevant mechanisms to mitigate identified risks elaborated.

As a result, the adequacy of the afore-mentioned planning processes would also facilitate the design of relevant programmes/projects subject to situational specificity; the said programmes/projects would be supported by the development of feasible strategies for project implementation and implementation management. The afore-mentioned measures would also assist in the identification or development of relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support.

Based on the analysis of NEPAD's performance in the implementation/ implementation management of the Infrastructure STAP and roads programme,

NEPAD's governance and management structures also seem to have failed to competently manage the inordinate influence of the international institutional structures on programme development and implementation planning. In particular, NEPAD's governance and management structures appear to have failed to guide the development of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP according to the needs, constraint, challenges and dictates of Africa's sub-regions in alignment with NEPAD's articulated multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementations. NEPAD's governance and management structures also appear to have failed to facilitate and ensure competent quality control of the deliverables of the AfDB, World Bank, EU and DFID (or their consultants) in the planning and development of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP (the afore-mentioned structures provided the intellectual basis and technical support for the development of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP (NEPAD, 2002f, TCII & NEPAD, 2005)).

6.4.4 Circumscribed role of Africa's "emergent professionals"

Diescho (2002: 59) argued that the failure by (international/African) experts to elaborate relevant projects to suit situational specificity is one of Africa's development challenges. In NEPAD's context, it appears that Africa's experts are primarily to blame for their failure to support NEPAD's machinery to elaborate relevant development programmes/projects. According to Diescho (*ibid*), "For the most part, these experts are themselves job seekers who tend to describe the process for the leaders rather than subject the whole historical period that NEPAD symbolises to critical examination." These afore-mentioned issues may explain the lack of adequate examination and analysis of the underlying causes to the identified performance constraints or implementation challenges: they may also explain the insipid recommendations for corrective interventions.

In this study, African intellectuals, academics and technical professionals from diverse ideological, multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral perspectives who posit alternative ideas to those of mainstream/multilateral institutions or trans-state actors participating in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are collectively referred to

as “the emergent professionals.” Therefore, some of the comments illustrated in APPENDIX F reveal concerns by Africa’s emergent professionals at their perceived circumscribed participation in the drafting of NEPAD and its programmatic interventions, including the Infrastructure STAP. For example, the active role of technocrats and organised form of knowledge in the development of economic, political, social and institutional systems is not new. According to Senghor (1990: 26), technocrats played a critical role in the mapping of integration activities during the development of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), and in Central America. Their role was to craft institutional arrangements for mobilising broad-based stakeholder support as well as to provide intellectual justification for national cooperation and regional integration initiatives (*ibid*).

Arguably, NEPAD tended to favour in the development of its programmes inputs (mainly) from mainstream economists, foreign (mainstream) academics, senior government officials and diplomats. In addition, the participation of mainstream development institutions/bureaucracies, IFIs and DFIs with a strong sectoral focus predominate in NEPAD’s programmatic interventions. Yet, contemporary debates on development itself suggest that a sectoral focus may no longer be operative in the context of integrated development and integrated implementation management of regional infrastructure programmes/projects, particularly in the development of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure. Thus, the complexities of development in general, and in particular in the provision of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure, require diverse and broad-based interventions to effectively address the challenges of development.

The issue then is: do Africa’s emergent professionals not possess the courage to address controversial matters with respect to Africa’s development agenda? This question is complex and beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say, there are various schools of thought regarding the participation of African technocrats, or lack thereof, in the development of Africa’s development programmes. One school of thought (Anyang’ Nyong’o, *et al.*, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Wilmont,

2002) has argued that pertinent questions need to explore whether African *technocrats* are supported, and their contribution in turn accepted by African institutions, particularly government structures. In NEPAD's case, Anyang' Nyong'o, *et al*., (2002: 15) argued that the failure to involve African technocrats in the development of NEPAD's Strategic Framework undermined the symbiotic relationship between governments' and technocrats' institutions over policy development and implementation of policy interventions.

The evidenced schism between these key actors – government and technocrats – has been ascribed (Adedegi, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o, *et al.*, 2002; Diescho, 2002) to either of mutually reinforcing processes. First, it is the alleged by various African scholars (Adedegi, 2002; African Civil Society, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o, *et al.*, 2002; Bond, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; Wilmont, 2002) that there is an endemic rejection of *indigenous* skills, expertise and contribution by African governments, or a tendency by African governments to stymie broad-based dialogue and consultation over joint policy development. Again, this observation was made in response to the (perceived) exclusionary approach adopted by Africa's political leaders in the development of NEPAD and its related programmes of action.

Second, Senghor (1990) argued that in the African context, the role of experts is circumscribed because of the high level of politicisation of the "development" sphere. Based on empirical evidence in other developing countries, Senghor (*ibid*) argued that the circumscribed role of experts is prevalent in situations of underdevelopment. Similarly, Paul (1990) argued that as development programmes are policy interventions, political decisions need to be made over the allocation of resources and implementation arrangements: there is a tendency for political appointments and loyalty to assume precedence over competence.

Sometimes, the perceived exclusion by Africa's emergent professionals in Africa's development programmes manifests in robust debates that reveal ideological differences between the ideas of technocrats from the mainstream institutions (such as the UNECA and AfDB), but who have been actively involved

in elaborating Africa's development agenda for decades, and those who are perceived as outsiders (i.e., independent academics, intellectuals and professionals). The extrapolation of ideas from diverse ideological persuasions is not necessarily a bad thing, particularly so cognisant of the need for further development and operationalization of complex concepts, such as integrated development integrated implementation management, in and across different spatial categories.

The arguments depicted above, however, explain to some extent the reasons for the schism between Africa's political leaders and (independent) technocrats in the developmental terrain: the latter are perceived to articulate neo-Marxist or developmental perspectives, which go against the grain of the predominant orthodox/neo-liberal approaches favoured by multilateral institutions and imposed by IFIs like the World Bank and IMF on African governments. The articulation, by Africans of alternative perspectives on Africa's development that are not to the liking of foreign governments/institutions, however, does not condone NEPAD's reliance on foreign technical/intellectual support and expertise, whilst simultaneously eschewing African expertise. This view takes cognisance of NEPAD's articulated commitment to transform the internal/external relationships that have contributed to Africa's perennial underdevelopment, regardless of its dependence on external/foreign resources that have traditionally contributed to this development malaise (NEPAD, 2001).

Another school of thought (Onyeani, 1990: 106) highlighted as the cause of this schism the aloofness of African technocrats themselves to engage in processes of collective engagement and knowledge accumulation for the benefit of (African) society. This school of thought avers that the failure by African technocrats to take responsibility and accountability for implementation outcomes in development programmes/projects contributes to the current schism between political leaders and "emergent thinkers" in development planning and implementation. Yet, some have argued (Mbeki in *ANC Today*, Vol.4 #40, 08-14 October 2004) that it is through active and visible participation by Africa's

"emergent thinkers" to craft Africa's development agenda, rather than bemoaning *post facto* the absence of indigenous approaches to Africa's development initiatives, will prevailing perceptions (AU, 2004 cited in Mbeki, *ANC Today*, Vol.4 #40, 08-14 October 2004) of the imperceptible contribution by African intellectuals to the body of knowledge be challenged.

For this to happen, African governments need to embrace diverse thinking in development planning/management, in order to facilitate the elaboration of relevant alternatives to what has been presented over the past decades. Such overtures will ensure that the development of knowledge can be translated into relevant policy interventions in alignment with situational specificity: they will also facilitate the development of institutional capacity for planning, project preparation, integrated practical implementation/implementation management of development programmes/ projects and spatial expansion.

Although the arguments stated above may appear academic, they illustrate the persistence of complex phenomena in Africa's development agenda namely, the rejection of domestic expertise, dependency on (often) inadequate external expertise because of the lack of financial resources, and capital flight. Obviously, the participation (or lack thereof,) by African emergent professionals in supporting the planning and implementation of Africa's development programmes, such as NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, is informed by the confluence of systemic, corporate and individual factors. The negative aspects thereof have resulted in the evidenced situation where, according to NEPAD (2002i: 4), "…many of Africa's brightest and most qualified professionals leave to study and never return." Thus, processes to address this schism will go a long way to ensure that African emergent professionals make relevant contributions to crafting Africa's development agenda. Such efforts would, as South Africa's President Mbeki noted (*ANC Today, ANC Today*, Vol.4 #40, 08-14 October 2004: 5): "…bless Africa with a generation's creative genius that discovers its mission, fulfils it to its best, without betraying, diminishing, reducing or downsizing it – the mission to achieve Africa's integration and renaissance."

6.4.5 Ineffective links between planning hierarchies and implementation

In APPENDIX F, the identified strengths in respect of NEPAD's thinking or statements of commitment to Africa's development appear to illustrate a significant departure from weaknesses that undermined the implementation of previous African regional development programmes. Curiously, some comments identified as a strength top-down formulation of NEPAD's programmes with the subsequent invitation for popular participation during the implementation stages. A critical issue for the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, however, is: what sustainable institutional mechanisms and arrangements has NEPAD put in place to ensure that the outputs of its planning hierarchies are translated into practical actions to effectively support the attainment of planned development outcomes? The analyses of NEPAD's performance in the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP in the previous chapters and earlier sections above already suggest that NEPAD has paid lip service to the underpinning principles articulated in its Strategic Framework and approach to the development of regional infrastructure.

Thus, some of the identified strengths in NEPAD may turn out to be weaknesses because of the lack of effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements to translate planned implementation actions into concrete deliverables at the various spatial categories. In this respect, NEPAD's commitment to "collective ownership and active engagement by political leadership in development processes" will be critical to ensure sustained political commitment and support (at national levels). Paul (1990) described sustained political commitment and support as critical to the successful implementation of development programmes. In addition, the active involvement of political leadership in development processes ensures that the influence of their commitment is cascaded to the lower levels of management.

To paraphrase Mintzberg (1994: 256), political leaders need to immerse themselves in the daily detail, rather than abstracting themselves from it through the reliance on hard data presented in summary reports presented by technocrats.

This active participation would enable political leaders to "abstract the *strategic messages* (emphasis in original)" (*ibid*) from the experiences of practical implementation. The experiences from practical implementation would also provide a feed-back loop to policy formulation and implementation strategy development.

The statements made above, however, are idealistic in NEPAD's context: in theory, although NEPAD's HSGIC play an active role in the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP at all the levels of management/planning, in practice their active participation appears limited to the higher levels of management and planning of trans-state trans-actions, rather than direct involvement in programmes and projects. Thus, NEPAD's HSGIC appears to rely more on summary reports from the (NEPAD) Steering Committee (SC) – a structure that appears even more detached from the real action and coal face of project implementation or implementation management. Similarly, NEPAD's Secretariat also appears to rely primarily on the reports of other institutional structures (such as its lead agencies, consultants and other regional, sub-regional and national structures as its *modus operandi*,) possibly because of its limited capacity since it was established as a small structure. The influence of diverse ideologies exhibited by NEPAD's political leadership in their comments on NEPAD's performance, however, appears to permeate the various levels of management/planning, including the implementation of programmes/projects, whether or not the said leaders are actively involved in practical implementation.

And therein lie the proliferation of the pitfalls of what Mintzberg (1994) refers to as the "fallacy of detachment": the preponderance of NEPAD governance and management structures at all levels of management/planning, but without clear responsibilities, accountability and practical involvement in regional infrastructure programmes/projects obfuscates the clear delineation of real implementation concerns from dogma in the identified project implementation delays, in order to propose relevant solutions for their resolution. In the circumstances, political commitment is neither guaranteed, or adding any value. The views articulated

above, however, do not pre-empt the development of creative mechanisms for collective engagement to ensure that NEPAD's HSGIC establish closer links with the various stakeholders at different levels of management/planning.

To paraphrase Mintzberg (*ibid*: 287), such links may facilitate effective communication, assessment and reassessment of strategy as well as informed assessment of programmes/projects and implementation challenges by the leadership as the process unfolds, in alignment with NEPAD's prescriptive and centralised approach to the development of regional infrastructure. Alternatively, closer links between the development of strategy and implementation may also promote the development of alternative institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure in accordance with situational specificity, in order to support NEPAD's espoused imperatives for regional integrated development.

6.4.6 Poor delegation of authority and predominance of political structures in operational matters

One of the concerning issues in NEPAD's programmes is the apparent "delegation" of authority and responsibility by the AU HoSG amongst themselves (i.e., the AU HoSG to NEPAD's HSGIC) for implementation of NEPAD's action plan and related programmatic interventions. It is possible this issue has more to do with AU HoSG protocols, which have been cascaded to NEPAD's institutional arrangements for project organisation management. Also, NEPAD's HSGIC had already assumed critical responsibilities/roles for the implementation of NEPAD's programmatic interventions and projects – even before NEPAD's sectoral programmes/projects were developed. For example, functions of NEPAD's HSGIC in the implementation of NEPAD's programmes, described in NEPAD's Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) include the following:

- "Identifying strategic issues that need to be researched, planned and managed at the continental level;
- Setting up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of mutually agreed targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards;

- Reviewing progress in the implementation of past decisions and taking appropriate steps to address problems and delays" (NEPAD, 2001, Para.201: 57-58).

In NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, the implications for structures responsible for implementation management/coordination of the delegation of authority between HoSG and political structures/operatives are, however, enormous. Not least are the questions of what authority, roles and responsibilities are in turn delegated by the HSGIC to the various levels of management; and what are the implications of the afore-mentioned roles for NEPAD's strategy for integrated implementation management? Various institutional structures, including NEPAD's governance and management structures appear to be delegated roles and responsibilities in all the levels of management, or outside their levels of work, or both the afore-mentioned options.

The afore-mentioned problem may be attributed to the centralisation of programme/project actions in alignment with NEPAD's prescriptive approach to the development of regional infrastructure. NEPAD also appears to have compounded this problem by delegating authority within its governance/political structures or senior officials in multilateral institutions, as depicted in the issues raised in APPENDIX F, but who are all far removed from projects on the ground. This approach perpetuates the risks of the "fallacy of detachment" identified by Mintzberg in NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project development and implementation support. Thus, authority and flexibility in decision-making by project structures with the relevant delegated authority will be required during implementation phases.

6.4 Summary and Conclusion

NEPAD or the developers of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP possessed the relevant information to propose effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements to either mitigate the consequential risks of the negative impact of the inadequate internal/external institutional environment on the implementation

of the planned development programmes/projects, or to redirect some of the critical institutional aspects positively where possible. The expectations for the fulfilment of NEPAD's commitments have, however, not been met.

For example, some of the key recommendations of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews for action by RECs/REC Secretariats refer to issues that need to be addressed at different levels of management/planning and through various institutional mechanisms for collective engagement, including by Africa's political leadership at the regional and sub-regional levels as well as in member states that form RECs. However, unless the attitudes to collective engagement in NEPAD, RECs and member states change, and until the contradictions or complexities of the underpinning premises for Africa's regional integration and management of institutional relationships between the various spatial categories and institutional structures in conducting trans-state trans-actions are resolved (i.e., state centric, bilateral or multilateral contexts), shifting the responsibility to RECs to ensure compliance to collective agreements offers no guarantee that the desired changes will occur, or that planned development outcomes will be attained.

NEPAD, however, appears to not have heeded the earlier articulated concerns regarding the implications of its internal/external institutional environment for the implementation of its development/programmatic interventions. In the circumstances, NEPAD's interventions in the Infrastructure STAP seem to have travelled the well-trodden path in Africa's development landscape, rather than introducing transformational interventions. Although the internal/external environment in which NEPAD is implemented is the same as the RECs' environment, NEPAD, however, attempts to induce an artificial separation of the afore-mentioned environments through its detached analyses; NEPAD also selectively arrogates itself the status of an observer – although it is also the strategist, programme/project designer, participant, and appraiser of implementation progress. Thus, NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme design, project implementation planning or

integrated implementation management/coordination seem to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate its inability to facilitate effective integrated implementation management/coordination of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP in RECs.

Instead, NEPAD appears to have largely relied on institutions and institutional structures of the developed countries for programme/project delivery on its behalf. Therefore, accountability for the failure to deliver by foreign institutions/experts/ methodologies according to NEPAD's expectations and subject to Africa's regional, sub-regional and national specificity needs to be apportioned appropriately. For example, some of the comments in APPENDIX F indicate that the reliance by African institutions/institutional structures on all things foreign is a well-entrenched phenomenon in Africa's development landscape. In the circumstances, the responsibility for the outcomes of NEPAD's prescriptive approach to the planning and the inadequate planning of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP – regardless or cognisant of the lack of institutional capacity in regional, sub-regional and national institutions – must be placed squarely on the doorstep of NEPAD's governance and management structures, such as the HSGIC, SC, and Secretariat. The afore-mentioned structures appear to have failed to provide transformational leadership and competent management of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme.

Question is: why did NEPAD or the developers of the Infrastructure STAP ignore the issues raised or the constructive criticism proffered in the earlier responses to NEPAD's Strategic Framework, which would make critical inputs to programme development and implementation planning of NEPAD's programmatic interventions and detailed action plans such as the Infrastructure STAP? An analysis of NEPAD's responses from planning and political perspectives, including some of the possible underpinning causal factors to the identified implementation challenges and poor performance by NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements is provided in the next chapter: this analysis provides insights into the possible rationale behind some of NEPAD's untenable positions in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure.

7. UNDERPINNING PLANNING, POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON NEPAD'S RESPONSES

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the underpinning planning, political and socio-economic influences in respect of NEPAD's performance in implementation management/coordination of the Infrastructure STAP. Some of the causal explanations proffered in this chapter provide compelling insights into the possible rationale underlying NEPAD's challenges or responses regarding the RECs' performance in the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP. The discussions in this chapter also make generalisations on the implications of the management of intra-/inter-state relations for the implementation of NEPAD's cross-border development programmes/projects, or the management of Africa's regional development programmes/projects in general. The afore-mentioned issues overlap with some of the discussions in the previous chapters.

NEPAD's programme for the regeneration of the African continent, and by extension the Infrastructure STAP, have been conceptualised in an institutional environment characterised by intractable challenges for the implementation of development programmes/projects. NEPAD's governance and management structures, however, appear to have been imbued with a spirit of unadulterated and imprudent optimism of implementation success, based on the expectations and pronunciations of others. As a result, NEPAD failed to interrogate issues that have previously led to implementation failure of Africa's development programmes in order to execute requisite practical actions at the various levels of management in terms of their articulated obligations, within the capacity of institutions/institutional structures for implementation/implementation management. NEPAD also ignored the implications of the underlying causes to the identified challenges for the delivery of infrastructure to meet effective demand in the various infrastructure sectors. Instead, NEPAD's assessments and responses to implementation challenges dealt with the effects.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 explores from a planning perspective the possible underlying reasons for NEPAD's responses to implementation challenges, particularly in respect of the REC's inadequate performance in the Infrastructure STAP. The implications of the outcomes of planning processes at different levels of management for institutional structures for implementation management, and how these are related to practical implementation, are illustrated. Section 7.3 discusses from the institutional, political and socio-economic perspectives some of the underpinnings to NEPAD's inadequate performance, which may or may not be gleaned from the responses to implementation challenges discussed in the previous chapters. The possible impact of the legacy of entrenched detrimental practices, behaviours and procedural aspects in the planning and implementation of Africa's development programmes – particularly vis-à-vis the role of the state, inter-/trans-state transactions and economic performance – is discussed. Section 7.4 is the summary and conclusion.

7.2 Planning Perspective on NEPAD's Response to RECs' Performance

A planning perspective explains the management of different facets of the relationship between planning hierarchies and implementation outcomes in development programmes/projects, and how relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements provide effective links to support the attainment of planned outcomes. The implications for project implementation outcomes of the relationship between the nature of inputs/outputs of the different planning hierarchies at the various stages of the project life cycle (including levels of management,) and structures for implementation management/coordination are, however, almost always ignored in assessments of implementation progress (particularly so when implementation failure is contemplated). As a result, recommended corrective interventions tend to address the effects of problems (which occur during implementation), rather than addressing the underlying causes (which may occur from project conception and are cascaded over the various stages of the project life cycle,) including their impact on, or relationship

with structures for project implementation/implementation management. Perspectives on the implications of some of the planning approaches for structures for implementation management/coordination in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are discussed below.

7.2.1 Implications of prescriptive approaches to planning for implementation management

NEPAD appears to not have thoroughly considered the implications of its top-down planning processes on programme implementation, particularly of large-scale, multi-national cross-border regional infrastructure projects. Yet, when problems arose, as they surely would, NEPAD identified the already-vulnerable regional/sub-regional structures as the primary cause of implementation challenges. Mintzberg (1994: 25; 284-285) argued that when strategy fails, it is usual for those at the top of the hierarchy to blame those lower down for project implementation failure. Yet, as Mintzberg (*ibid*) argued, since strategy formulation and implementation – and by implication "thinking" and "acting" – are interrelated, the capacity for implementation should form an integral part in the consideration of strategy. Therefore, as Mintzberg (*ibid*) states, "…every failure of implementation is also a failure of formulation. If there is to be a separation between the two, so that one side thinks before the other side acts, then clearly, the capacity to act has to be taken into consideration in the thinking process." Mintzberg, however, argued that the problem lies not so much in "poor implementation" or in "weak formulation" (*ibid*: 26) *per se*, as in the artificial separation between the two processes depicted above.

Taking into account Mintzberg's perspective regarding the relationship between strategy/formulation and implementation, one may conclude that the challenges for implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, or related sectoral programmes, may be linked to the artificial separation between programme conception and implementation. This is illustrated in the inadequate approaches to planning and project organisation management: institutional inadequacies or lack

of institutional capacity for implementation/implementation management at the various spatial categories and institutional structures exacerbate the *status quo*. (In NEPAD's case, for example, the lack of institutional capacity at the various spatial categories and institutional structures at regional, sub-regional ad national levels was known at the time of project conception, and was therefore in the peculiar knowledge of the Infrastructure STAP's developers.)

Similarly, the inadequate approach to planning requirements of various stages of the project life cycle and project management functions may be traced to negative implications of prescriptive approaches to planning for the management of development programmes/projects. However, as planning does not occur in space, accepting that strategy/formulation and implementation are interrelated, then the characteristics of, and institutional capacity in structures for programme development and implementation/implementation management may circuitously be construed to *also* inform the outcomes of planning.

Accepting this premise then, the ensuing challenges for project implementation in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP may be construed as a manifestation of the dysfunctional relationship between the underlying thoughts and attitudes on the one hand, and decisions and actions on the other at the integrative and strategic levels of management. The identified implementation challenges are in NEPAD's case, arguably, instigated by NEPAD's prescriptive approach to the development of regional infrastructure, which is cascaded from the integrative levels of management; the prescriptive approach epitomises the (inherent) detachment of programme planners/developers at the integrative and strategic levels of management from the realities on the ground, with implications for action planning and performance management at the operational levels of management.

At the strategic levels of management, the problem to link strategy formulation/planning with practical implementation may be rooted in what Mintzberg (*ibid*) identified as the reliance of prescriptive models on the artificial separation between planning hierarchies and implementation structures.

Mintzberg (*ibid*) also argued that the formalisation and detachment inherent in prescriptive models allows the developers of plans to abstract themselves from the relevant details of conditions on the ground. Thus, the lack of clarification in roles and responsibilities in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP at the strategic levels of management appears to result from the said artificial separation between planning hierarchies and structures for implementation management/coordination, which is cascaded from the integrative levels of management.

Again, taking a leaf from Mintzberg (*ibid*) the detachment in prescriptive models, evidenced in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, also results in the failure of programme/project developers to tap into the innovation and creativity that comes with the broad-based participation evidenced in emergent/descriptive models. In NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, the detachment from conditions on the ground and the ensuing lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities is either amplified by, or results from the prevalence of the same integrative/strategic structures at all the levels of management. The characteristics of the afore-mentioned institutional structures themselves, as explained below, appear to have exacerbated the problems of what Mintzberg (*ibid*) identified as the "fallacies of detachment, predetermination and formalization" in projects, thereby increasing complexity for implementation/ implementation management.

For example, in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP the structures responsible for planning and implementation management/coordination comprise senior trans-state actors from public sector, political, diplomatic and multilateral structures as well as development partners at the higher levels of management (such as the integrative and strategic levels). As a result, the afore-mentioned structures seem far removed from events and actions on the ground at the project levels of planning/implementation. Using Mintzberg's explanation (*ibid*) of the implications of different types of structures for project implementation in order to draw analogies with NEPAD's project organisation management, the afore-mentioned structures may be described as relying on aggregated data for decision-making; they are also more likely to rely on (mostly) inappropriate economic,

political, international relations concepts to forecast or determine events that may occur or not occur during project implementation.

In addition, the afore-mentioned structures/trans-state actors appear to generally represent NEPAD's perceived status/importance in the management of institutional relationships or collective agreements between north and south, or between Africa and the industrialised countries, or between the various spatial categories (at international, regional, sub-regional and national levels) – rather than being properly constituted project structures with multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-disciplinary experts including project management professionals. As a result, rather than focusing on projects, the planning processes or forums for collective engagement in NEPAD's case have tended to evolve, in a number of instances, into protracted discussions on political trans-state trans-actions and matters of national interest (by various national representatives), which have implications for what/who is included/excluded in the Infrastructure STAP in terms of national interest or sub-regional concerns.

At times, the afore-mentioned forums focus on the enunciation and negotiation of individual national positions on the various matters under discussion, rather than the task at hand i.e., programme/implementation planning (author's personal experience during the following NEPAD/NEPAD-related meetings: 7th Meeting of the NEPAD Extended Steering Committee + G8, 14-17 May 2002, Maputo, Mozambique; Multi-country Meeting of the Medium Sized Project (MSP) of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), UNEP/GEF and select national representatives, 01-04 June 2002, Dakar: Senegal; NEPAD Implementation Workshop, 02-04 August 2002, Addis Ababa: Ethiopia).

Therefore, NEPAD's discussions on projects tended to reflect either diplomatic/ political concerns, or national/regional interests at the various spatial categories/member states that needed to be accommodated during programme/ project planning and implementation. As a result, all the participating structures in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP have appeared to perceive the levels of

management at which they operate as a measure of their status, or role of their respective constituencies in Africa's development agenda, rather than being a reflection of the links developed between institutional arrangements, action planning/performance management and structures for implementation management to ensure effective programme/project performance. NEPAD has also failed to elaborate or clarify these afore-mentioned relationships, either at programme or project levels.

Therefore, the formal, protracted decision-making and bureaucratic characteristics of institutional structures for implementation management/coordination in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP instigate, reflect or reinforce the prevalent artificial divide between strategy and implementation. In the scenario depicted above, programmes/projects, essentially the *raison d'être* for such meetings, appear to be mere side-shows to the political or trans-state discussions. The afore-mentioned outcomes may be aggravated by the conduct of personalities or behaviours of the participating personages at the various levels of management/ planning in so far as these aspects affect project delivery; or the lack of alignment between the diverse platforms for collective engagement at the various spatial categories and institutional structures for implementation management/ coordination; or any combination of the afore-mentioned issues.

Arguably, NEPAD's prescriptive approach to planning of the regional infrastructure programme has provided fertile ground for the manifestation of the afore-mentioned complexities, with implications for implementation delays. In the final analysis, the singular casting of blame on RECs as the primary cause of implementation challenges/delays in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP provides minimal or no explanation of the dysfunctional relationship between NEPAD's approach to planning (including its approach to project management functions) and institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate the development of regional infrastructure.

7.2.2 Sequence of project establishment interventions: a barometer for the extent of political support at various levels of management

A project management perspective may also offer explanations for NEPAD's failure to garner political support at national levels at the various stages of the project life cycle, particularly during conception of the Infrastructure STAP, and illustrate the implications of the afore-mentioned for implementation progress. According to Paul (1990), the sequence of programme establishment interventions, or the manner in which a programme is set up reveals the underlying degree of political support, with implications for the extent of political support for the implementation of development programmes/projects at the lower levels of management. Paul's analysis (*ibid*) may provide a different perspective on some of the reasons for the perceived lack of political support for the implementation of NEPAD's programmes.

To illustrate this dynamic, Paul (*ibid*) identified two options for project establishment interventions:

(i) The first option involves, as the initial step, a policy decision for a public intervention. Thereafter, a suitable leader is identified to plan, manage the programme, prepare the detailed strategy, and recommend programme plans. According to Paul (*ibid*), this option signifies "a high degree of trust in the programme leader by the political leadership and reflects the political leadership's willingness to share 'power' with the programme leader in the program's planning and implementation."

(ii) The second option also involves taking the initial step to make a policy decision for a public intervention; this step is thereafter followed by the detailed specification of programme goals and strategy development. Lastly, a programme leader or manager, who merely "steps in only as an implementor" (*ibid*: 25), is appointed. According to Paul (*ibid*), this option presents a "classic illustration" of the dichotomy between policy and implementation; or what Mintzberg (1994) referred to as the separation

between strategy and implementation, or thinking and acting. Paul (1990) noted this option also reflects a relatively low level of political commitment and support. As he argued, the "power" allocated to the programme leader is limited and "there is little appreciation of the need for interaction between policy and implementation by the programme leader" (*ibid*).

The sequence of programme establishment interventions discussed above is illustrated in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Sequence of Programme Establishment Interventions

Route A	Route B
Policy decision	Policy decision
Identification of key programme leader/manager	Specification of programme goals-strategy
Establishment of agency with broad goals-mandate	Establishment of programme agency
Specification of programme goals-strategy	Creation of organizational structure
Choice of adaptation of organizational structure	Appointment of key programme leader/manager
Implementation	Implementation

Source: Paul, S. (1990). *Strategic Management of Development Programmes: Guidelines for action*, p.26.

The programme leader may include natural or juristic persons such as individuals, or institutional structures; the institutional structures may, or may not be duly authorised with the *legal* capacity to act (such as NEPAD's HSGIC, SC and Secretariat, or RECs). In addition, natural persons may include political leaders, senior civil servants, advisors to political leaders, and other senior administrators in public-sector institutions. According to Paul (*ibid*: 26), the sequence of decisions flowing from policies to programmes and finally to implementation, as illustrated in Table 7.1, are two extremes of interventions to establish development programmes. In reality, Paul (*ibid*) argued that the sequence of interventions is likely to fall in-between, based on project's specificity. Route A, for example, is preferred in situations involving complex technologies: the elaboration of the requisite programme elements and their implementation requires a high level of technical expertise that political leaders are usually unfamiliar with (*ibid*).

7.2.2.1 Implications of the sequence of programme establishment interventions for NEPAD

Using Paul's analysis of the sequence of programme establishment interventions, and their implications for development programmes/projects, the following inferences may be drawn for NEPAD:

- First, NEPAD appears to have adopted a combination of the two options depicted in Table 7.1 at different levels of management/planning and stages of the project life cycle. At the integrative level of management, the various OAU Summit mandates to the Presidents Mbeki, Bouteflika, Obasanjo and Wade regarding the different policy interventions (see: NEPAD, 2002f; NEPAD, 2002h), the subsequent consolidation of the diverse strategies and programme goals in NEPAD's Strategic Framework, and the formation of NEPAD's governance and management structures (*ibid*) are comparable to the sequence of programme establishment interventions described under Route A. This sequence of programme establishment interventions suggests a high level of political support to NEPAD's founding political leaders, and the preparedness by the other OAU HoSG to share their power with the political leadership of the NEPAD (i.e., NEPAD's founding HoSG: Presidents of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa).

- Second, at the strategic level of management, the establishment of NEPAD's governance and management structures (including the HSGIC, SC and Secretariat,) and the various organisational structures for implementation management/coordination was finalised *after* the approval of the programme goals and strategy. This sequence of interventions is comparable to the second option in Route B. According to Paul (1990: 25), the sequence of interventions described under Route B *"…reflect(s) a relatively low level of political commitment and support. The "power" allocated to the programme leader is limited and there is little appreciation of the need for interaction between policy and implementation by the programme leader* (author's emphasis)*."* In NEPAD's case, the programme leader may refer to the

collective of NEPAD's governance and management structures, particularly so since the roles and responsibilities for the strategic programme and implementation of its sectoral plans appear to have been apportioned across the various levels of management (including the HSGIC, SC and Secretariat), rather than in the Secretariat alone with its internal organisational structures. This situation is confusing and may contribute to difficulties to apportion accountability for implementation challenges.

7.2.2.2 Comparison with the LPA's sequence of programme establishment interventions

The sequence of programme establishment interventions described in Route A is comparable to the one adopted for structures at the strategic levels of management in the development of the LPA (see: LPA, 1980). According to Adedegi (2002: 37), the development of the LPA was "…the culmination of a four-year long effort, initiated and led by the…(UNECA) to undertake an agonising review of the development paradigms and strategies that Africa had pursued since independence in 1960." Subsequently, the OAU resolved to call "on the Secretary General (of the OAU), in collaboration with the Executive Secretary of the…(UNECA), to draw up annually specific programmes and measures for economic co-operation on a sub-regional, regional and continental bases in Africa" (LPA, 1980: Para. 3(iv): 5). With the adoption of the detailed programme goals and strategy specified in the LPA and the FAL, the OAU then called for the establishment of structures for project implementation at the operational levels of management, such as the RECs and MULPOCs. The Summit of HoSG also mandated the OAU and its General Secretariat "to enlist the active support of the international community as well as of the relevant international organisations" (*ibid*: 7).

As illustrated above, the OAU's Secretary General and the Executive Secretary of the UNECA were mandated to ensure the establishment of agencies or structures "at national, sub-regional and regional levels to facilitate attainment of the

objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment" (*ibid*, Para. 3 (iii): 4), and to coordinate implementation on behalf of the African governments and peoples. The establishment of the identified structures for implementation was in alignment with the HoSG's resolution "to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance" (*ibid*, Para. 1: 4). In adopting the LPA and FAL, the African HoSG made emotive declarations of African ownership. These declarations were arguably also meant to demonstrate the levels of political commitment and support accorded the programme at the highest levels.

For example, the LPA's declaration read as follows:

> …we are conscious of the tremendous effort which will be required of us, individually and collectively, to attain the goals we have set for ourselves in these documents. We are confident that we have the determination to overcome the obstacles that may lie in our path and that our Organisation and its Secretariat will be able to enlist the active support of the international community as well as of the relevant international organisations (*ibid*: 7).

(The LPA's declaration bears some striking similarities to NEPAD's declaration, which reads as follows:

> This *New Partnership for Africa's Development* is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world (NEPAD, 2001, Para.1: 1).)

It is common cause that the LPA's implementation never took off: various analysts (Anyang' Nyongo', 2002; N'diaye, 2002) have acknowledged that in over 20 years since the LPA's inception, not much was achieved in practical terms. Mkandawire (2002: 106) argued that the reliance on the institutional mechanisms of the developing countries for implementation and, in particular, financial support contributed to the LPA's failure. For the same reasons, various African intellectuals have raised concerns regarding NEPAD's inordinate reliance on the institutional mechanisms and arrangements of the developed countries for

implementation support, as depicted in the detailed SWOT analysis presented in APPENDIX F and discussed in Chapter 6.

The discussion above suggests that NEPAD's sequence of project establishment interventions at the various levels management may be used as indicators of the levels of political support for the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and related programmes. Significantly, the example of the sequence of programme establishment interventions in the LPA vis-à-vis NEPAD suggests that political commitment and support in Africa's development programmes/ projects, either at the integrative or strategic levels of management, or both, offer no guarantee for successful implementation. Thus, other collective interventions are required at the various levels of management and spatial categories for successful project implementation, particularly at national levels, subject to situational and project specificity.

In the development of cross-border regional infrastructure, some of the key interventions that may be considered at the various levels of management, in addition to political support and commitment, include the following: active role of the state; transformational leadership; institutional reform/development; broad-based and popular participation in development programmes/projects, which includes active participation by business and public-sector institutions/ institutional structures as well as civil society formations; adequate domestic resource mobilisation in order to facilitate effective project conception, development and implementation in relation to situational specificity; simplified project objectives within the capacity of institutional structures to implement subject to the available resource envelopes; adequate planning at the various stages of the project life cycle; and effective management of project management functions and institutional relationships between trans-state actors and various spatial categories.

Various permutations of the afore-mentioned interventions may be combined subject to project and situational specificity. In particular, broad-based and

popular participation appears to provide the rationale, impetus and monitoring mechanisms for the effective and efficient implementation of development projects within, and between the various spatial categories. Rarely, if at all, will development programmes/projects that have failed to ensure broad-based and popular participation be implemented successfully – and in a sustained manner too.

The various interventions depicted above also denote the requisite ingredients in the implementation of development programmes *for change* based on collective self-reliance at, and between the various spatial categories. Therefore, the prevalent citing of lack of political support/commitment at national levels as one of the primary reasons for tardy implementation in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, in addition to lack of institutional capacity in RECs, appears to ignore omissions of other key ingredients for successful implementation, as depicted above. In any event, according to the sequence of programme establishment interventions depicted above, the manner in which NEPAD's programme was developed, and its structures constituted, ensured that it would have limited political support at national levels (or other spatial categories) because of its prescriptive and disempowering processes on the institutional structures that would ultimately perform the work of projects on the ground.

7.3 Political and Socio-Economic Perspectives on NEPAD's Responses

7.3.1 Management of development programmes/projects vis-à-vis the role of the state

Political and socio-economic analyses of NEPAD's performance underscore the negative impact of Africa's political economy on the implementation of development programmes/projects. The afore-mentioned situation is intensified by the adverse role of the neo-patrimonial state in the implementation of Africa's development programmes/projects. For example, similar to the planning perspective proffered above, some analyses have attributed implementation failure

in Africa's previous development programmes to the endemic lack of popular consultation. The perceived "elitist" trans-actions in development programmes/ projects, which are underpinned by the prevalence of patron-client relations and corruption, are cited as the reasons for project implementation failures or the elaboration of programmes/projects with little relevance to address the identified development needs, constraints and challenges on the ground.

Some authors have viewed NEPAD in similar fashion. As Taylor (2005: 18) argued, the lack of inclusive planning has manifested in the proposal of "elitist programmes" by some few detached technocrats or African HoSG. Thus, the prevalence in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP of inoperative or discredited modes in the management of Africa's development programmes/projects suggests that NEPAD has made minimal efforts to address some of the entrenched underpinning causes to project implementation failures at the various spatial categories.

These afore-mentioned causes include the failure to reform/develop archaic or inadequate institutions and to develop the requisite institutional capacity to facilitate successful project implementation. According to Taylor (*ibid*: 76), the prevalent failure in institutional reform/development in Africa's development landscape is attributable to the imperative to maintain corrupt patronage networks and client relations in Africa's neo-patrimonial state. As Taylor (*ibid*) asserts: "What is avoided...by hook or crook, is structural reform and policies aimed at broad-based development." However, the role of neo-colonialism, which is perpetuated by inadequate institutions/institutional structures in fomenting and abetting neo-patrimonialism and the related corrupt patronage networks, appears to be ignored in arguments to establish some of the underpinning causes to the failure of Africa's development programmes.

Cognisant of the arguments depicted above, it is possible that NEPAD has viewed any enforcement of (or efforts to facilitate) institutional reforms/development at the various spatial categories, particularly at national levels in alignment with its

(NEPAD's) articulated policy strategy/response actions, as too contentions. This is because of the potential to create frictions in inter-state relations and trans-state trans-actions at the various spatial categories, or in the fragile relations between regional/sub-regional structures and member states through the enforcement of the requisite measures for effective delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, particularly so in the absence of a legally binding institutional framework for such enforcement mechanisms. (The afore-mentioned view takes cognisance of the implications for such interventions of the principle of sovereignty, which underpins inter-/trans-state relations in Africa's political and socio-economic landscape, and (presumably) impacts on the development of cross-border regional infrastructure projects.)

In this regard, by failing to enforce the planned and requisite institutional reforms/development and capacity building at national levels, NEPAD appears to have simply acquiesced to national prerogatives that are inimical to effective interventions for the development of regional infrastructure. Under the circumstances, delegating the functions for institutional reforms/development and capacity building to RECs, or recommending that RECs develop binding "legal frameworks" with supranational status, enforcement mechanisms and powers of sanction to compel member states to comply with collective agreements (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 105) merely delays requisite action to ameliorate the *status quo*. It is also possible NEPAD's action signifies its lack of power/relevant authority to enforce institutional reform/development at national levels (in addition to its lack of institutional capacity including resources to perform its delegated/assumed tasks).

Therefore, the recommendations in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews that RECs perform roles beyond their levels of authority or capacity provides an effective mechanism to obscure NEPAD's limitations in its assumed/professed roles as a facilitating mechanism, or mobilizer of political will and effective platform for collective engagement in Africa's development trajectory. The "capacity deficits" (Hope, 2006) and institutional failures in RECs provide a

plausible explanation for the fallibilities of NEPAD's governance and management structures in the implementation failures of the Infrastructure STAP. In other words, the weak institutional structures, or the acknowledged lack of institutional capacity for implementation in RECs or member states provide credible justification for implementation delays in NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

An internal reading of NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure suggests that the scenario depicted above was a foregone conclusion. It is also possible that covert agendas of international institutions/ institutional structures – who may desire to maintain the *status quo* in order to serve their narrow mercantilist interests, or the inhibiting provisions of certain collective agreements and funding constraints have contributed to NEPAD's inability to facilitate the requisite institutional reforms/development and capacity building at the various spatial categories. Some analyses also suggest that the lack of implementation progress may be condoned by the development partners, or at least ignored despite the rhetoric to the contrary, in order to perpetuate the *status quo* i.e., Africa's perennial underdevelopment for the benefit of others. (According to Taylor (2005: 76), the failure to reform/develop inadequate institutions and to develop institutional structures characterises the charade in traditional relations between Africa's ruling elites, donors and IFIs.) It is also possible that any combination of the afore-mentioned issues has resulted in NEPAD's failure to enforce the reform/development of inadequate institutions.

Thus, the afore-mentioned failures to integrate NEPAD's intra-/multi-sectoral and intra-/multidisciplinary response actions during the development of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP appear to confirm Taylor's argument above. Similarly, NEPAD's failure to ensure/enforce the consistent cascade or integration of key elements of its response actions and pre-conditions to development contradict NEPAD's articulated commitment (NEPAD, 2001) to the implementation of transformational development interventions to change the conditions that underpin the *status quo* in Africa's development agenda. The afore-mentioned failures may

also be construed as a dereliction of duty by NEPAD's governance and management structures, to supervise programme development in terms of their obligations in NEPAD's Strategic Framework.

7.3.2 A continuation of previous practices and behaviours in the implementation of development programmes/projects?

The lack of commitment in NEPAD to implement agreed regional development plans, programmes or projects is not new. Previously, the lack of commitment by Africa's (political) leadership to the effective implementation of *their* development plans has been identified as one of the perennial poor leadership behaviours to blight Africa's development landscape (Adedegi, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Mills, 2002; N'diaye, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; Taylor, 2005). As President Wade of Senegal argued (cited in Taylor, 2005: 43), "The previous projects (in Africa's development programmes) were made to be put in drawers! There wasn't even an attempt to implement them. Not even the slightest attempt!" Similarly, one commentator in *Food Security* (*ibid*: 44) had the following to say about Africa's implementation failures of regional programmes/collective agreements: "African Governments have largely failed to act on African-initiated programmes and plans. They have failed to act on the decisions reached at different levels of their own continental meetings, including summit conferences." Yet, NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP appears not to address the range of issues that underlie the identified failures in a holistic and coherent manner, within a framework of integrated development.

NEPAD, in its Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001), undertook to address this afore-mentioned perennial lack of commitment to the implementation of collective agreements. Thus, the frustration displayed by President Wade at NEPAD's failure to ensure implementation progress of the Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes/projects provides some insights into the slow pace of transformation in the implementation of Africa's development programmes, or the lack of change from unproductive behaviours that have

previously blighted the implementation of Africa's previous development initiatives.

Taylor (2005: 44) also argued that the afore-mentioned concerns by President Wade dispelled notions advanced in some quarters regarding the "heroic efforts" made by African HoSG to ensure the implementation of their programmes. Arguably, the afore-mentioned concerns instead confirm the inherent risks for implementation in regional plans/projects developed or supported by Africa's HoSG, or Ministerial Committees in RECs. Of concern is that the discussions above also suggest that even the consistent cascade of NEPAD's response actions/policy strategy may achieve nothing: the fundamental (adverse) premises for the management of Africa's development programmes/projects at the various spatial categories still remain the same.

To reiterate, some of the key response actions in NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure, which the developers of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP failed to consistently integrate into all the various infrastructure sectors in order to facilitate the development of institutional capacity for current implementation and for spatial expansion, include the following: institutional reform/development; broad-based and popular participation; institutional capacity assessment; and institutional capacity building at the different levels of management and spatial categories (see: NEPAD, 2001). In the circumstances, it is difficult to envisage how NEPAD will attain the development objectives it has set for itself, given the failure to ensure the implementation of its own strategic policy directives in the different sectoral interventions or at the lower levels of management.

The vagaries of the external/internal institutional environment in which the development programmes/projects are implemented exacerbate the *status quo*. As Taylor (*ibid*: 46) argued, as an example, the strictures of democracy, and good governance promoted by NEPAD are unrealistic in Africa's context. According to Taylor (*ibid*):

> …the logic and modus operandi of neopatrimonial rule and the dominance and nature of extractive economies in Africa, and their relationships with the international system, mean that Nepad's strictures on good governance and democracy cannot be implemented without eroding the nature of the postcolonial African state and undermining the positions of incumbent elites – an unlikely position…Essentially, what is argued is that Nepad (and studies endorsing its credibility) ignore the reality that power in African politics must be understood as the utilization of patrimonial power and not the performance of legitimacy drawn from the sovereign will of the people. In other words, in spite of the façade of the modern state, power in most African polities progresses informally, between patron and client along the lines of political reciprocity, is intensely personalized, and is not exercised on behalf of the public good. 'The state itself remains the major vortex of political conflict precisely because it presides over the allocation of strategic resources and opportunities for profit making'…And the extractive and often enclavist nature of many African economies serves to create a situation whereby broad-based economic activity and long-term planning for development militates against the imperatives of neopatrimonialism…In short, to have an Africa based on the enunciated principles of Nepad would actually erode the material base upon which the neopratrimonial state is predicated. And yet Nepad seems to advance the idea that the very same African elites who benefit from the neopatrimonial state will now commit a form of class suicide. The possibility seems improbable.

Cognisant of the discussions above, one may conclude that NEPAD's conflicting statements regarding the RECs' performance allude to (concerning) diverse rationale for the RECs' participation in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Such rationale may have little or no relation to the desire for effective implementation of regional/sub-regional infrastructure projects, or the development of institutional capacity for implementation of current pilot programmes/projects and future spatial expansion at the various spatial categories. The more concerning of such rationale may be to obfuscate the role and non-performance of NEPAD's governance and management structures in the delivery of regional infrastructure in terms of their articulated obligations.

Similarly, one may argue that NEPAD's implementation of the Infrastructure STAP, in particular cross-border facilitation programmes/projects like the roads programme, may be premised upon erroneous assumptions regarding the needs to be addressed and sources of implementation support. This may have has resulted in NEPAD's proposal of irrelevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for

implementation support, thereby resulting in some of the outcomes depicted below:

- selective cascade of NEPAD's response actions/policy strategy in order to suit the prerogatives for global integration/connectivity, openness and competitiveness at the expense of supporting the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives in alignment with the requirements for integrated development;
- ineffective prioritisation of programmes/projects;
- erroneous sequencing of project establishment interventions, which may militate against broad-based initiatives to address the identified challenges and constraints in the development of regional infrastructure, in particular cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation, cognisant of the limited resources and lack of institutional capacity;
- inadequate delegation of relevant authority to empower institutional structures to do the work of projects; and
- inefficient project scope and project organisation management.

NEPAD's articulated global efforts also seem destined for nought without a systematic assessment of the influence of the complex institutional environment on the implementation of regional/sub-regional programmes/projects, in particular NEPAD's, to inform the requisite support at national levels. This is because NEPAD appears to not have addressed the underlying influences to the identified constraints to the provision of regional/sub-regional infrastructure in a coherent manner, particularly at national levels. NEPAD also appears to have failed to manage the interface between the various spatial categories, particularly between sub-regional and national levels, in so far as it impacts on the implementation of its plans. In the circumstances, the assertions made by NEPAD's officials in Chapter 4 regarding the NEPAD's/Secretariat's efforts to build states' capacity and to ensure adherence to NEPAD's values in support of project implementation at national levels are questionable given the tenuous relationship between national programmes/projects and NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

As a result, the persistence of the age-old challenges that have blighted the implementation of Africa's development programmes, including the intractable lack of institutional capacity at national levels, raise the spectre of implementation failure in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. As Clapham (*ibid*) argues, "…if…functions cannot be efficiently performed, as is unquestionably the case for a large number of African states, then developmental policies which depend on them will fail." Therefore, the focus on lack of institutional capacity in RECs obfuscates the range of underpinning causal factors to implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP: it deflects attention from the tenuous relationship between NEPAD's programme and various spatial categories, in particular at national levels. Thus, the lack of committed political support at national levels does not augur well for the effective implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

7.3.3 Paradox of low intra-African trade for the development of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure

Poor intra-African trade presents a paradox for the development of regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects. As a result, there currently exists minimal incentive for African countries to invest in the development of regional roads infrastructure networks, or cross-border TTF systems in order to support NEPAD's (or their) aspirations for regional development/integration. Just as NEPAD argued that there can be no trade without (transport) infrastructure (NEPAD, 2002c), investment in roads infrastructure for internal coherence appears uneconomical in the current environment of insignificant intra-African trade; or where basic economic and physical infrastructure to increase the individual countries' productivity is lacking; or where the trade benefits are not equitably distributed amongst member-states in a sub-regional block, or REC, in order to facilitate cooperative sub-regional support for the development of improved transportation networks.

Circuitously, inefficiencies in the provision of Africa's cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure contributes to increased transaction costs, poor intra-African trade, the exclusion of various groups from trans-state and trans-regional entrepreneurial activities as well as Africa's marginalisation in global trade. Poor intra-regional trade, however, is caused by a number of complex factors, including dissimilar trade profiles between the various countries and sub-regional blocks as a consequence of the diverse FTAs and RTA with institutions/countries of the developed north (such as the EU's Cotonou Agreement, TICAD I & II, OECD, multilateral/bilateral donors, USA-AGOA, Franco-Africa Partnership, and so on). In the short-term, the tied aid in trade-related packages (e.g., provision of aid to support export promotion, sourcing of goods and services from donor countries, and so on), impede effective interventions for the removal of barriers to cross-border movement of goods and services in alignment with Africa's plans for regional integration as well as for internal coherence. Therefore, a significant question is: What burning platform will create a compelling need and commitment from African governments to invest in intra-/inter-regional roads infrastructure?

A significant dimension, however, is that the implications of poor regional transport infrastructure for informal trade, the mode of survival for the majority of Africa's citizens, appear to be ignored in NEPAD's roads programme. Soko (2006: 20-21), for example, argued that non-tariff barriers hinder informal trade and the development of small and medium size enterprises (SMMEs). In this regard, the use of conventional transport theory and related models (that presumably underpin NEPAD's approach to the roads programme) may stymie the development of informal trade and its contribution to the development of cross-border regional infrastructure to meet effective demand.

For example, inputs/outputs of informal trade are not accounted for in conventional transport theory, which uses complex mathematical modelling to analyse the existing transport systems vis-à-vis the prevailing trade patterns (in the context of transit facilitation). The (conventional) models used in the

conventional transport theory only recognise formal inputs based on past performance. For these reasons, some authors (Castells, 1977) have previously criticised the focus of conventional transport theory on *manifest demand*, coupled with its inability to measure *latent demand*. The presumed use of conventional transportation models for the design of NEPAD's regional transport/roads infrastructure projects, given the endorsement of "tried and tested" approaches to the design of NEPAD's transit facilitation and regional roads infrastructure projects (NEPAD, 2002c), may perpetuate rather than transform the current fragmentary transportation patterns.

The problem to design relevant programmes/projects, however, may also be related to the lack of reliable informal trade data that can be used for transportation modelling in order to provide adequate justification (to potential investors) for funding cross-border regional roads infrastructure for internal coherence. Informal trade data would also be useful for national governments and RECs to identify additional sources of revenues, and a larger tax base from road levies; it may also assist to unlock potential investment by national governments in specified inter-/intra-regional geographical areas in order to support the long-term integrated development of "production" and "reproduction spaces," and therefore facilitate the creation of transportation networks for internal coherence.

Thus, alternative independent income streams have the potential to alleviate some of the pressures for reliable road funding at sub-regional and national levels. In addition, an independent revenue base increases the possibility for improved provision of various transport types to cater for diverse users, and to support the implementation of complementary investments in other socio-economic projects. Therefore, adequate institutional mechanisms need to be developed to collate informal trade data that will support the development of relevant cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services. In this regard, the ability to assess effective demand, given the complexity of information-gathering processes involved, emerges as a key influence for the

analysis and design of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure programmes/projects.

The contribution of various stakeholder groups is critical in this context. A study to analyse actions by politicians, users, service providers, and other stakeholders in the water sector (Wambia, 1987) provides valuable insights into the complex interrelationships between institutional arrangements, power structures and policy outcomes to ensure the desired efficiencies in the provision of infrastructure. The study, however, established that adequate capacity is required for the task; also, some relevant information is difficult to obtain. As the study asserts: "…the ability to get adequate information on power groups within a society is difficult and time consuming and the ability to analyse it in a concise manageable fashion is cumbersome" (*ibid*: i).

A conclusion drawn from the discussion above is that NEPAD's development of cross-border regional roads infrastructure and related services needs to take cognisance that different efficiency measures assume different levels of significance for different users. Such efficiency measures, however, are all interrelated and mutually reinforcing; they are subject to the nature of interventions to address the identified challenges and needs.

Thus, NEPAD may not have adequately explored a number of possibilities for the development of efficient cross-border regional roads infrastructure in order to support the attainment of it's articulated multiple objectives. NEPAD's approach, instead, appears to cater exclusively to the needs of the dominant groups (i.e., IFIs and foreign private sector companies), thereby entrenching the inequitable power relations between Africa and the developed countries/institutions. For these reasons, the further exploration of suggestions posited above would facilitate relevant programme/project design and the development of institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management that are more inclusive and representative of the various segments of African society than what is currently provided under NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and roads programme.

The discussion above also highlights the need to prioritise programme elements and related projects to facilitate integrated development of intra-African trade and cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure. As a starting point, the initial steps of harmonising the various transport-sector policies, regulatory and governance regimes in various member states in a REC may instigate the requisite institutional reforms/development in the transport sector at the various spatial categories in all the sub-regions of the AU. Given the tendency of transport policy, regulatory and governance regimes to entrench national prerogatives, it is possible that processes to ensure commitment to harmonisation at national levels will be complex, emotive and protracted. This view also takes cognisance of the time consuming processes for collective engagement to effect harmonisation, which may result in possible delays to develop and implement cross-border regional transport/roads projects. Inadequate transport-sector regimes may also impede the implementation of relevant socio-economic downstream interventions to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services and vice versa. In this context, strong political will be required to implement far-reaching transformational interventions and to facilitate the development of relevant enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance to collective agreements by member-states.

7.3.4 Impact of low productivity and poor economic growth on the development of regional (transport/roads) infrastructure

NEPAD's link of regional infrastructure development with productivity suggests the prioritisation of the development of regional infrastructure as a precursor to improving Africa's productivity and, by implication, economic growth. As NEPAD (2001, Para. 98: 22) stated:

> If Africa had the same basic infrastructure as developed countries, it would be in a more favourable position to focus on production and on improving productivity for international competition. The structural gap in infrastructure constitutes a very serious handicap to economic growth and poverty reduction. Improved infrastructure, including the cost and reliability

> of services, would benefit both Africa and the international community, which would be able to obtain African goods and services more cheaply.

NEPAD's position, depicted above, appears to ignore the role of institutions in the development of infrastructure: it also reflects a modernist bias on economic growth at the expense of the improvement of the quality of life for the majority of Africans – the objective of development. For example, Rostow's growth theory used measures of material productivity, such as the GDP, as indices to measure economic progress (Fair, 1982: 6). The theory ignored other non-material indices that, for example, focus on the maximisation of social welfare (*ibid*). As a result, NEPAD's tenuous link of Africa's productivity with the development of regional infrastructure may be construed as equating development with economic growth. In this respect, NEPAD's position appears to nullify the espoused integrated development measures to support the attainment of it's articulated multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure. NEPAD's position is also inimical to the development of a holistic approach to address the constraints and challenges in cross-border regional roads infrastructure to support the objectives of integrated development.

Significantly, NEPAD's stance appears to reveal a selective analysis and interpretation of structural constraints in the provision of regional infrastructure at the various spatial categories, and of Africa's poor productivity. NEPAD's stance also appears to contradict its articulated prerogative for the development of regional infrastructure namely, poverty reduction (NEPAD, 2001; 2002c). In this regard, poverty reduction appears to be an add-on, or it is used as a mechanisms to elicit support from institutions/institutional mechanisms and structures of the developed north.

NEPAD's views are, however, typical of reformist thinking about the redistribution of income. As McCarthy (Fair, 1987: 37) explained: "…the importance attached to redistribution and greater equality is not the result of viewing equality in income as a goal in its own right, but rather of the objective to eradicate poverty." Similar views have been espoused in the contemporary global

debates on finance for sustainable development of global public goods encapsulated in the UN's Millennium Declaration, Zedillo Report, and the UN's MDGs (see: DBSA, 2003). These afore-mentioned premises have been incorporated in NEPAD's Strategic Framework.

As a result, NEPAD appears to link poverty reduction with the development of the whole economy, without making attempts to elaborate or institute institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support pro-poor development interventions in the development of regional infrastructure – amongst other requisite pertinent political, spatial, socio-economic interventions to reform/develop inadequate institutions. This perspective ignores Africa's specificity. As argued by Onimode (cited in Ekpo, 2002: 168), Africa's challenges are structural as they are also historical: they evolve from the weak nation-states inherited from colonial governments, exacerbated by the neo-colonial and post-SAPs crises (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990; Cheru, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Gelb, 2001). These crises inhibited the development of efficient, capable states that could deliver progressive development outcomes on behalf of their citizens, as measured through material and non-material indices.

In addition, neo-patrimonial state relations, autocratic regimes, mal-governance and corruption have exacerbated the *status quo* (Gelb, 2001; Mills, 2002; Taylor, 2005; Zenawi, 2002). As a result of the afore-mentioned issues, including a host of other related political, spatial, and socio-economic concerns, African states are characterised by the ineffective employment of factors of production. The afore-mentioned issues have resulted in Africa being consigned to the periphery of development. Significantly, NEPAD acknowledged the prevalence of the afore-mentioned issues and their deleterious impact on Africa's development landscape (see NEPAD, 2001, Para.18-26:4-6). Yet, the simultaneous acceptance and denial in NEPAD of the negative consequences of uneven development, globally and regionally, is confusing. It permeates NEPAD's proposals for the development of regional infrastructure and even the characteristics of NEPAD's underpinning principles for Africa's development: these proposals have placed global

partnerships and shared responsibility at the centre- stage of Africa's development trajectory, whilst espousing Africa's determination for self-reliant management of its development agenda.

As NEPAD (*ibid*, Para. 6-7:1-2) stated:

> We are convinced that an historic opportunity presents itself to end the scourge of underdevelopment that afflicts Africa. The resources, including capital, technology and human skill, that are required to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained human development effort and the eradication of poverty, as well as a new global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest. Across the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves to be conditioned by circumstance. We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope. Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights, people-centred development and market oriented economies are on the increase. African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership. These developments are, however, inadequate and need to be further expedited.

Yet, income disparities between the rich and the poor countries have never been as wide. According to Cornwell (Kotzè & Steyn, 2003: 71), the world's economy has experienced unparalleled growth over the past 30 years: GDP has increased from US$4 trillion to US$ 23 trillion; the GDP share of 20% of the world's richest countries has grown from 70% to 80%. Over the same period, the number of people living in poverty has increased: the world's GDP share of the 20% poorest countries has declined from 2.4% to 1.4% (*ibid*). According to Guma (*ibid*: 77), 20% of the world's richest countries receive an 82% share of global exports, while the poorest 20% receive only a 1% share; 20% of the world's richest countries attract 75% of global FDI; the world's poorest 20% attract a measly 1% of the world's FDI. The afore-mentioned perspectives indicate that income disparity and polarisation between the rich and poor countries of the world are worsening.

Similarly, Kotzè and Steyn (*ibid*) noted that economic growth in Africa has declined steadily since 1998. For example, in 1997 the combined total GNP for all forty-eight sub-Saharan economies, with approximately 760 million inhabitants,

amounted to approximately US$ 315 million: this was estimated to be comparable to Belgium's GNP over the same period, but with only 10 million inhabitants (Ekpo, 2002; Mills, 2002; World Bank, 2000). Over the same period, the median GDP was estimated at just over US$2 billion – about the output of a town of 60,000 in a rich country (World Bank, 2000). Likewise, Mashele (2006:1) noted that although the African continent houses approximately 12% of the world's population, it produces less than 5% of the world's income; Africa currently accounts for less than 3% of global trade.

Africa's negligible contribution to global economic growth is also evidenced in its share of votes in global decision-making forums. For example, Boyle (*Sunday Times*, 17 September 2006: 3) averred that in the 24-member IMF Board, all 48 sub-Saharan countries hold less than 5% of the vote: on the other hand, other powerful emerging economies (such as China, India, Turkey and Mexico,) hold 6,5% of the IMF vote; the USA holds 17% of the vote. According to Schepers (2003: 32), the share of world trade in the WTO's Group of 90 (G90), which brings together the world's least developed economies including the majority in Africa, has hardly improved since 1986. In essence, the indices depicted above reflect Africa's ineffective and inefficient employment of factors of production, inequitable global political power relations and adverse effects of global capitalism on weak African economies, resulting in their poor performance and disempowerment in global economic structures.

The nature and quality of factors of production at the various spatial categories are particularly critical for effective projects' identification, preparation and successful integrated implementation management, particularly in the context of integrated development, where different competencies are required. In the context of conventional approaches to support the broader objectives of development, trade-offs must be made regarding technological approaches and institutional alternatives to achieve holistic development objectives. So far, the contradictions and failures of development arising out of ineffective policies, poor implementation capacity of development programmes, and low levels of human

development in Africa's sub-regions/countries are evidenced in the multifarious negative effects of underdevelopment.

As a result, a range of mutually reinforcing causes of low productivity in addition to poor infrastructure at the various spatial categories, have contributed to Africa's underdevelopment. As Todaro (1985: 90) noted, "…*low productivity, low incomes and low levels of living are mutually reinforcing phenomena* (emphasis in the original). These factors constitute what Myrdal termed 'circular and cumulative causation': low incomes lead to low levels of living (low income, poor health and education, and so on), which keeps productivity low, which in turn perpetuates low incomes, and so on." Thus, rather than NEPAD's emphasis on transport infrastructure as the antidote for Africa's poor productivity and related development burdens, integrated multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-disciplinary interventions will be required to address Africa's poor productivity and consequential marginalisation in global trade/forums. These interventions include a focus on human development as the "missing link" in indices to measure development (Breytenbach 2002a), institutional reform/development, and the development of institutional capacity at the various spatial categories, particularly at national levels.

Similarly, NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of management (NEPAD, 2001) as well as the articulated multiple objectives for the development of regional transport infrastructure (NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c) articulate NEPAD's intent for integrated development. Similarly, NEPAD's choice of priority sectors and programmatic initiatives for implementation in its Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) was presumably meant to facilitate integrated development. Although NEPAD's proposal of the afore-mentioned sectoral interventions appears to address the afore-mentioned concerns with respect to integrated development, integrative links between the various initiatives are tenuous, if any; a strong sectoral focus appears to underpin all NEPAD programmes, thereby negating NEPAD's articulated objectives for integrated regional development.

Arguably, as NEPAD's primary concern and the *raison d'être* of its programmatic interventions is poverty alleviation, in the context of conventional approaches trade-offs that emphasise poverty reduction and improving the quality of life thus become particularly important. This matter is, however, not simple: various schools of thought emphasise competing, at times contradictory, interventions for poverty reduction. In integrated regional development, cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure projects are conceptualised and implemented in an environment where creative and integrated multi/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-disciplinary solutions must be found to address the mutually reinforcing constraints and challenges in the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure and transit facilitation services.

For these afore-mentioned reasons, the programmes/projects in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP – which appear to prioritise global integration/connectivity, openness and competitiveness – reinforce the perceived neo-liberal agenda and strong sectoral focus in NEPAD's roads programme, with negative implications for the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives for integrated regional development and for poverty reduction. Thus, in the absence of integrative frameworks at the integrative levels of management in NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure and in the Infrastructure STAP, it may prove difficult to implement cross-border regional roads infrastructure programmes/projects to support the attainment of NEPAD's multiple development objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation in a coherent and integrated manner at the strategic and operational levels of management.

7.4 Summary and Conclusion

The issues discussed in this chapter illustrate that NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and the related sectoral programmes/projects for the development of regional infrastructure have been conceived in a complex internal/external institutional environment: the internal structural constraints and adverse institutional factors that have, for decades, contributed to poor infrastructure development and

performance in sub-Saharan Africa still remain the same. Asymmetrical relations with the developed countries, rules of global institutions in trade – including FTAs, EPAs, and RTA with institutions of the developed north – and prescriptions of the global financial architecture remain a problem for the implementation of Africa's development programmes/projects to meet effective demand. It would, therefore, be difficult for NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP to address the vicissitudes of Africa's adverse internal/external institutional environment without parallel trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary interventions at the various levels of management/planning.

Instead, NEPAD ignored to address some of the fundamental underlying influences to implementation challenges, which were in its peculiar knowledge. As a result, NEPAD appears to have succumbed to the inadequacies of its prescriptive approach to planning, particularly in the context of development programmes. NEPAD also failed to plan project interventions or planning processes to suit situational specificity, and to factor the lack of institutional capacity in programme conception; when problems arose, as they surely would, NEPAD instead attributed implementation challenges to the lack of institutional capacity. As a result, NEPAD appears to have fallen foul of its internal organisational inadequacies, inordinate reliance on others for implementation support, but also of the failure to address intractable challenges in the external/internal institutional environment that have, for decades, stymied efforts to develop regional (transport/roads) infrastructure.

For these reasons, the explication of structural impediments in the institutional environment region-wide and at sub-regional levels in RECS may provide a backdrop for the development of relevant interventions to facilitate effective integrated implementation management/coordination of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects. An examination of NEPAD's articulated pre-conditions for development in its Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) is also crucial to establish how NEPAD originally planned to address the inadequate institutional environment at the various spatial categories in the RECs' and

NEPAD's internal/external environments in order to facilitate effective implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/projects: what were the priorities for intervention and gaps for future action? These are some of the areas for future research into the development of effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation/implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes and projects.

Similarly, an astute assessment of the internal/external institutional environment in which REC Secretariats operate will assist NEPAD's governance and management structures to understand the RECs' and their own (NEPAD's) limitations and opportunities to propose relevant interventions for the development of cross-border regional infrastructure. A structured approach to integrated implementation management of regional infrastructure programmes will thus depend on the role of regional, sub-regional and national institutions and structures to support the development of regional infrastructure; the sustained active role of the state is critical in this regard, as opposed to the sullen distance (by national governments and structures) implied in NEPAD's reports. Openness about some of the key limitations and challenges to effective implementation that may be addressed internally at the various levels of management, as a starting point, would help. Some of these issues are addressed in the next chapter. Significantly, the related projects may also be used to initiate the requisite institutional reforms/development.

8. WHAT NEPAD HAS IGNORED: UNDERPINNING STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS

8.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the influence of key underpinning structural constraints that NEPAD failed to address in programme planning and assessments of implementation challenges. Specific reference is made to the transport/roads sector to illustrate the implications of flawed decisions and actions at the higher levels of management/planning for the implementation of different regional infrastructure sectoral interventions at the lower levels of management.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 discusses the impact of the legacy of inadequate states' apparatus on the implementation of regional infrastructure projects, in particular cross-border regional infrastructure such as roads programmes/projects. Section 8.3 examines how NEPAD's attitudes, such as oversimplification and unregulated imprudent optimism, have contributed to inadequate planning and management as well as poor prioritisation of interventions for effective delivery of the identified projects. Section 8.4 examines the influence of exogenous factors on the development of regional infrastructure. Section 8.5 discusses the implications of the reliance on external resources for implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Section 8.6 is the summary and conclusion.

8.2 Legacy of Inadequate States' Apparatus to Support Implementation of Regional Infrastructure Projects

8.2.1 Lack of funding in member states

Under the roads sub-sector, NEPAD allocated national governments the primary role to finance infrastructure, "…subject to rationing and prioritisation on the basis of economic criteria" (NEPAD, 2002c: 43). According to NEPAD (*ibid*), the

funding approach proposed for the roads sector is different from proposals in other transport sub-sectors (such as railways and ports,) in which the required investments are linked to the reform of PPPs. NEPAD, however, neither mapped an integrative nor strategic framework to increase roads transportation revenues at national levels, so that the affected member states may contribute to funding the portions of cross-border regional infrastructure projects within national borders. Instead, the AfDB/NEPAD identified a role for NEPAD to seek agreement among countries, RECs, and external supporting agencies for additional financial support of 10-15% of the road investment programs of the respective countries to be mobilised for regional programs within an agreed (unarticulated) framework (NEPAD, 2002c: 52).

It is possible NEPAD's failure to map a clear framework for reliable funding of cross-border regional roads projects resulted from the assumed delegation of such responsibilities to RECs and professional associations at sub-regional levels (*ibid*: 53). It is also possible NEPAD expected detailed actions at operational/national levels to be mapped by the relevant institutional structures as the implementation process evolved – subject to the availability and accuracy of information. This expectation was, however, neither predictable nor assured. Again, the results of poor planning in the omissions depicted above cannot be downplayed i.e., to link policy strategies, planning hierarchies, programmes/projects and structures for project implementation/implementation management in a structured framework for effective delivery.

Therefore, in what seems a bold step by national governments to fund the development of regional roads infrastructure lies the double-edged sword of *willingness* versus *ability*: the majority of African countries rely on donor funding for the implementation of their national development programmes, or even for their capital budgets, with implications for the implementation of planned development programmes/projects. For example, Founou-Tchigoua (2002:157) noted that even pledged donor funds are included in national budgets, yet the actual disbursed resources are not known. Some authors (Cheru, 2002) have

attributed the inordinate reliance on external funding, in the majority of African countries, to the unsustainable debt burden and poor economic growth.

Others (Mkandawire, 2002; Tandon, 2002; Taylor, 2005) attribute the lack of funding for national development programmes to poor domestic resource mobilisation as a result of corruption, mal-governance, massive externalisation of domestic resources, and inadequate instruments for domestic resource mobilisation. As a result, the consequential balance of payments constraints in the event that pledged funds are not committed results in the failure by some countries/RECs to implement the planned development programmes, or even projects for post-conflict reconstruction in affected countries (Patrick, 1998). Yet, even the management of disbursed funds by national governments has been described as, at best, precarious due to lack of institutional infrastructure to absorb and efficiently utilise donor funding (Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Patrick, 1998).

Others (AfDB, 1999; Watson, 1998) have previously argued for an increased private sector role to ameliorate the evidenced constraints of limited government financial resources. For example, Watson (1998) identified inadequate institutional incentives for improving infrastructure and infrastructure services as one of the main reasons for poor performance in transport. He argued that establishing a new culture in the provision of infrastructure would require a paradigm shift in government's understanding of its role i.e., to effectively manage transport provision and to increase the financing (and implementing) role of the private sector. These revised responsibilities, Watson (*ibid*) suggested, would go hand in hand with a re-think on the nature of partnerships between government and the private sector: these include PPPs between various tiers of government, local entrepreneurs, and foreign partners in order to build the trust that is essential for cooperation in improving the products and services provided (*ibid*).

Whilst these afore-mentioned suggestions may be relevant at national and sub-national levels, the institutional environment and related partnerships with respect

to the implementation of (cross-border) regional infrastructure projects are much more complex because of the magnitude of the proposed projects, exacerbated by the multiplicity of competing development partners and diverse institutional structures for implementation management at the various spatial categories. Watson's proposals also appear to have been made within a particular ideological perspective i.e., that which seeks to circumscribe the (active) role of the state in the provision of infrastructure.

In NEPAD's case, the institutional arrangements and management of relationships at the strategic levels of management are made more complex by the inordinate reliance on international institutions/institutional structures for programme/project activities and implementation support. This reliance has precipitated the participation of multiple and diverse institutional structures including state-actors from the various special categories, apparently without an adequate framework for project organisation management. As Estache's (2006a) comments regarding the evidenced failure of the (foreign) private sector to deliver according to expectations reinforce the need for Africa's national governments and regional/sub-regional institutions need to develop self-reliance in the financing and development of their infrastructure assets. NEPAD, however, has failed in the assessments of implementation challenges to address the inordinate reliance on external funding as a primary reason for project implementation delays: this would facilitate the development of institutional mechanisms and arrangements for reliable self-financing of cross-border regional infrastructure projects from domestic resources.

8.2.2 Use of inaccurate data for planning cross-border regional roads networks

The inadequacy of planning frameworks for programme/project design is exacerbated by the use of inaccurate data for network planning. For example, NEPAD (2002c) identified DCs as the focus of the roads programme. DCs are more amenable to private sector financing through concessions, greenfield developments and management contracts (see: Estache, 2006a). For these reasons,

the DCs are facilitated through the mechanism of PPPs and related vehicles, which have been promoted by NEPAD, AfDB and World Bank. NEPAD's identified DCs are also more amenable to donor and foreign private sector financing.

The identified sectoral interventions in the Infrastructure STAP (including the roads programme) are by NEPAD's admission (NEPAD, 2001) short-term projects and pilot projects, although NEPAD (*ibid*) stated that these projects are part of ongoing programmes. The veracity of the afore-mentioned statements is questionable, particularly so since NEPAD failed to illustrate in the Infrastructure STAP how its identified projects are linked to broader (regional or national) programmes. However, it has been observed in some quarters (du Pisanie, 2001; SATCC, 2000; UN, 2003; World Bank, 2003) that inconsistencies and duplication are a common feature in the definition of Africa's regional transport and development corridors.

Similarly, with reference to SADC, although du Pisanie (2001) identified a set of adjusted regional development corridors (RDCs), given the prevalent use of inaccurate data and consequential duplication of networks, he conceded that the lack of consistency resulted in confusion. Moreover, inaccuracies in network planning resulted in duplication of effort and wastage of limited resources (*ibid*: 51). As du Pisanie (*ibid*: 2) noted:

> The identification of actual RDCs in SADC is ambiguous, since different sources indicate different numbers of RDCs and in some cases attach different names to the same corridor. In other cases, the same name is attached to routes that are far apart. In addition, overlap of corridors may occur in a single publication.

The persistence of this problem is concerning, particularly so since one of the reasons for implementation failure of the TAH and "missing links" initiative has been attributed (AfDB & ECA, 2003) to inadequate data and poor definition of roads networks. Therefore, inaccurate data and poor network planning may have contributed to confusion regarding which, and how the identified DCs in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are linked to national and regional development

plans so that their implementation may be supported by the relevant institutions/institutional structures within the available resource envelopes.

8.2.3 Failure to address ineffective state-ownership of transportation systems

The dependence on external resources and inaccuracies in network planning are compounded by the ineffective state-ownership of transportation systems, which NEPAD failed to address. NEPAD's intransigence in this regard is concerning, particularly since NEPAD (2002c: 86) delegated the responsibility for the practical implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure projects to national structures. According to Mbeki *et al.* (2001/2: 177-179), in the SADC region the inadequacy of state-ownership patterns persists despite prevailing evidence, since the 1980's, that donor funding and limited government expenditure was not conducive to the development of sustainable transportation systems. Similarly, SATCC (2000) argued that the dominance of transportation networks by ineffective state-monopolies has resulted in chronic mutually reinforcing problems: under-investment in transport by governments in the (SADC) region, lack of maintenance, infrastructure development backlogs, inadequate resources, minimal new capital investment, inefficient management systems, and so on. The SATCC's report (*ibid*) also noted that regional governments have realised that existing forms of ownership are no longer sustainable, although no remedies appear to have been proffered to ameliorate the *status quo*.

Similarly, sector-wide state-ownership of transport structures, and the dominance of key transport apparatus by one country (i.e., South Africa) have been cited (Mbeki *et al.*, 2001/2; SATCC, 2000) as key challenges in the management of SADC's transportation networks, with all the challenges these ownership patterns entail. As a result of South Africa's sector-wide dominance, Mbeki *et al.* (2001/2: 177-179) argued that the extent to which the management of South Africa's transport networks and multi-modal logistic chains is efficiently executed has an impact on the entire region.

The SATCC's statement depicted above, however, amounts to a generalisation of a complex issue: there needs to be differentiation on whether the contentious issue is ownership of transport structures by the state, or whether it is the ineffectiveness of these transport structures and transportation systems because they are owned by the inefficient state apparatus. This differentiation may elicit different interventions that are also linked to a clearer definition of the role of the state and other parties in the provision of transformational transport infrastructure products and related services, the reform/development of inadequate institutions at national levels, and the development of institutional capacity in the relevant institutional structures. Whether corrective interventions or institutional reforms/ development in this regard are implemented in the majority of SADC/African countries is doubtful, with the exception of a few countries. It is also unclear to what extent governments in SADC are cooperating around transport issues, despite the existence of protocols on trade and transport to this effect.

In particular, poverty reduction has been described (NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c) as NEPAD's primary challenge. Significantly, an analysis of the cascade of NEPAD's development objectives vis-à-vis the prioritisation of NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions for the development of regional infrastructure suggests that any short-term, direct contribution of roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects to poverty reduction have been sacrificed on the altars of the prevailing prescriptions of the global financial architecture. Therefore, NEPAD also failed to address how national governments that are unable to contribute to poverty reduction through transport/roads infrastructure developments would do so under NEPAD.

The issues discussed in this section have immense implications for the attainment of the transport/roads sector's multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure, such as regional integration, trade, capacity building, and poverty reduction. If the state's apparatus is weak and incapable to deliver on project plans in the majority of African countries, then how could NEPAD expect delivery on its regional infrastructure programmes/projects without prior or parallel

interventions to develop the requisite institutional capacity at national levels? Since institutional capacity development is a long-term process, what were the implications for implementation of the identified projects; how were the alleged or proposed capacity development programmes (Mashele, 2006; TCII & NEPAD, 2005) linked to the immediate planned implementation?

8.3 Over-simplification Resulting in Imprudent Optimism of Successful Implementation

8.3.1 Ambitious time frames for implementation

NEPAD's implementation scheduling for the roads programme reveals ambitious and unrealistic targets for implementation: almost all the identified projects were planned for implementation over a four-year period from 2003-2006 inclusive (see: NEPAD, 2002c). The same time-frames were depicted (*ibid*) for other transport sector-wide projects, with the exception of an air transportation project – the *Global Navigation Satellite System* (scheduled for implementation during 2003-2007), and the *Railway Interconnection Feasibility Study for ECOWAS Countries* (scheduled for completion in 12 months from the end of 2002). An activity schedule illustrated in the Infrastructure STAP document (NEPAD, 2002c: 89), reveals a similar orientation towards unrealistic time frames, as depicted below:

- Activities relating to implementation planning were scheduled for completion by the 15th December 2002, approximately *six months* after the STAP was launched;
- Implementation of (regional) facilitation/sector governance (including policy, regulation, and institutional reforms) projects was scheduled for completion by the 31st December 2005, approximately *three-and-a-half years* after the STAP was launched; and
- Implementation of projects to establish/strengthen institutional capacity (such as regulatory frameworks) was also scheduled for completion by the

31st December 2005), approximately *three-and-a-half years* after the STAP was launched. The responsibility for implementation of all the activities listed above was allocated to both member states and RECs, but who it was known/accepted (NEPAD, 2001, NEPAD, 2002c) lacked the institutional capacity to perform the planned project activities.

It now appears that lengthy time frames for financial closure of investment projects have constituted critical impediments to implementation progress. For example, the TCII and NEPAD report (2005: 99) averred that the delays and process failures at any stage of the project cycle can have a detrimental effect on infrastructure developments under NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP in any particular region. According to the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*), the consequential risks of inadequate project preparation are more pronounced in transit facilitation projects, where the attainment of free movement of goods and people still has many hurdles to overcome. The report (*ibid*: 95) also noted that because of complex, protracted planning processes, a typical facilitation project (such as regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects) can take from six to fifteen years or more to implement. During this process, the report (*ibid*) argued, the rationale for the projects and assumptions on which project development, funding, and implementation planning were based might change, thereby introducing further delays.

To illustrate the afore-mentioned processes, Figure 8.1 provides an overview of critical stages and timelines in typical facilitation projects (such as the transit facilitation projects,) illustrated by the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*).

Figure 8.1 Critical Stages and Timelines in a Typical Facilitation Project



Source: After TCII and NEPAD, 2005. *NEPAD Infrastructure STAP – Second Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward*, pp.95.

It is unclear from NEPAD's reports at which stage, or approximately, the identified projects were, when NEPAD planned implementation schedules. Also, the TCII and NEPAD report does not indicate what planning processes may be implemented in parallel, and whether or not complex processes for collective engagement at national levels require the linear progression of the afore-mentioned steps in order to mitigate implementation risks. Similarly, investment projects, such as the corridor developments adopted under NEPAD's roads infrastructure programme, involve equally onerous processes for planning and collective engagement. These processes are illustrated in Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.2 Critical Stages and Timelines in a Typical Investment Project



Source: After TCII and NEPAD, 2005. pp.96.

The examples of timelines for project preparation in both facilitation and investment projects illustrate the daunting challenges of institutional mechanisms and arrangements that need to be overcome to facilitate the completion of preliminary steps for effective implementation of agreed regional infrastructure projects. This situation appears to be exacerbated by the influence of unarticulated agendas, and the complexity to plan the interface between formal/informal institutional mechanisms and arrangements at international, regional, sub-regional and national levels in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure projects.

As a result, processes that are much more localised in individual business organisations, such as conducting a feasibility study or drafting procurement procedures, are much more difficult to conclude in inter-/trans-state trans-actions that involve multiple countries and stakeholders (who may include IFIs, donors, civil society organisation, international institutions/ structures, regional/sub-regional structures, and national governments as well as private sector operators/ professional organisations), who all adopt diverse approaches to planning and are affected by planning differently. More often than not, the positions adopted by countries in sub-regional agreements are also influenced by political biases, differences in ideology, diverse alliances and allegiances, and the requirements of, or commitments to diverse RTAs and FTAs with the developed countries or their institutions.

Small wonder then it sometimes takes more than three years to prepare terms of reference (TOR) (see, for example, the ECCAS's Dousala/Brazaville Corridor (TCII & NEPAD Review, 2005: 66)). Yet, after such protracted processes of collective engagement, collective agreements often fail to be implemented at national levels because of lack of political will and commitment as well as lack of institutional capacity for implementation. For these reasons, institutional reforms and development, as well as the development of institutional capacity are crucial steps to support the attainment of NEPAD's articulated objectives for the development of regional infrastructure, and to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of technical interventions such as regional infrastructure projects. In this regard, the analysis of implementation processes in NEPAD's roads programme suggest that many a promising initiative may flounder on the altars of the protracted and politically charged processes for collective engagement, cognisant of the diverse legislative and governance regimes as well as the characteristics of the diverse structures for implementation management at the various spatial categories.

The identified constraints in project time lines depicted above are exacerbated by the lack of institutional capacity to support the attainment of agreed objectives.

For example, problems regarding the lack of harmonisation of transport-sector policies, standards and governance regimes have persisted for decades: various countries and sub-regions have over the years developed a multiplicity of policy, regulatory and governance regimes in various sectors and disciplines that are intersected by transport infrastructure. As some authors (Lackshmanan & Anderson, 2000) have argued, these regimes are not easily amenable to change, cognisant of the underlying political and economic prerogatives at national levels for the perpetuation of the *status quo*. Thus, the unrealistic scheduling evidenced in NEPAD's roads programme gives even more cause for concern.

Moreover, it appears that the negative implications of the lack of resources and institutional capacity for implementation were not considered by the developers of the Infrastructure STAP in scheduling time-frames for implementation. This assertion also takes cognisance that all the projects under the roads programme were scheduled for simultaneous implementation. The requisite activities for project preparation, when combined with the reality of lengthy timelines for facilitation and investment projects established by the TCII and NEPAD (2005), lend credence to the assertions by various authors (Baird, 1997; Baum and Tolbert, 1985; Burke, 2003; McCutcheon, 1997; Paul, 1990; Turner, 1999; van Der Merwe, 1995; Viljoen, 1997) that adequate planning is critical at all levels of the project's life cycle for successful project implementation: longer periods were required for implementation planning than was provided for by the developers of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

Others (personal discussion with Peter Hirschowitz, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, WITS, 18 September 2006) have suggested that because of the complex institutional environment, rather than displaying a rigid focus on the attainment of key milestones (as would be defined in project plans,) in the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes, or development programmes in the African context, one needs to celebrate the small steps completed towards moving a project or consultation process forward. Although the flexibility suggested by Hirschowitz above may either be congruent

or incongruent with certain social institutions and norms, depending on situational or project specificity, it also confirms the implications of the complexities in the reform/development of the institutional environment for the project life cycle and *vice versa.*

For these reasons, the DFID (2003) argued that institutional inadequacy and the dynamism of the institutional environment poses extreme difficulties for implementation, especially in the context of the rigid traditional project life cycle. This afore-mentioned statement is particularly significant in an environment where even informal institutions are not so well-developed to ensure implementation progress in the event that formal institutions are not well-defined, or have been eroded. Therefore, mechanisms may need to be developed to align the project cycle with the reality of the implications of diverse formal and informal institutions in the external/internal projects' environment.

8.3.2 Poor programme/project communication

NEPAD's inadequate communication has resulted in questionable projects' implementation status, thereby introducing other challenges for project implementation. For example, there is evidence of inadequate interpretation and integration of the requirements of diverse project cycles (adopted by various institutions or different sectors) resulting in disparate communication of implementation progress. The contradictory progress reports on the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, presented by NEPAD's Secretariat and its Lead Agency, the AfDB, are just some of the examples. On the one hand, NEPAD (2004/2005) reported that significant strides in implementation were made during the financial year 2003/4 (a year later from the last NEPAD report of 2002/3 wherein minimal progress was reported). Similarly, NEPAD's report in the Infrastructure Sectoral Programme Review (NEPAD, 2004b: 1-2) confirmed the "remarkable progress" made in the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP. As NEPAD (*ibid*) stated:

> There was remarkable progress in the implementation status of projects for infrastructure, considering that …STAP was developed only in 2002. Since March 2003 a number of pipeline projects have progressed following approval by the Boards of the… (AfDB) and the World Bank.

On the other hand, the AfDB (2003: 8-9) indicated that implementation progress was slow, when measured against the activity schedule drawn up at the launch of the Infrastructure STAP during May 2002. The AfDB (*ibid*) acknowledged the lack of clarity in respect of roles and responsibilities as one of the reasons for implementation delays in the different RECs. As the AfDB report (*ibid*) stated:

> The first year of implementation of the STAP has been a learning process for the RECs, for NEPAD and for their development partners. There has been a certain degree of *perfectly understandable confusion and misunderstanding regarding roles and responsibilities* (author's emphasis). Understanding of roles, responsibilities and procedures has evolved at different rates across RECs; this is reflected in different rates of progress in the implementation of the STAP across RECs (*ibid*).

At the same time, one may understand NEPAD's optimistic sentiments regarding the "remarkable progress" in the identified projects. For example, a simplified version of the World Bank's project cycle (Baum, 1982: 5-18) illustrates that approval of a project by the World Bank's Board of Directors is a key milestone in the project cycle of World Bank-funded projects. This is particularly so since the processes entailed in the World Bank's project cycle comprise "rigorous phases of project identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiation" (*ibid*: 5) before a project is presented to the World Bank's Board of Directors and approved. The afore-mentioned processes may take years to complete. Therefore, assuming that the AfDB adopted a project cycle similar to the World Bank's for NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, then the perception of "remarkable progress" appears justified.

What NEPAD had suggested though through its various statements is that the identified regional infrastructure projects were already either at the implementation stage or advanced stages prior to implementation. Thus, the different versions on project implementation progress provided by the AfDB and NEPAD, depicted above, have resulted in confusion with respect to the

infrastructure projects' status. In this regard, the veracity of NEPAD's and AfDB's reports on the project's status is questionable.

The assertion made above refers, in particular, to the lack of consistency in reporting between the AfDB's 1st Infrastructure STAP review (AfDB, 2003), and other relevant NEPAD documents (NEPAD, 2004/5; NEPAD, 2004b). In contrast, in the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review, the TCII and NEPAD report (2005: 16) noted that projects across the spectrum of interventions, whether harmonisation, or facilitation, or investment projects "…are still taking too long to be implemented." The challenges identified in the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*), for example, also related to the complex characteristics of the large-scale, cross-border Infrastructure STAP projects.

The afore-mentioned challenges are prevalent in projects from the traditional, heavy engineering sectors, such as the water, energy, transport, and telecommunications (WETT) industries (Turner, 1999: 2). According to Turner (*ibid*), some of these projects have lengthy development periods – on average ten years or more from project conception to financial closure: they involve large teams and require multiple sponsoring organisations for implementation support. Therefore, the afore-mentioned constraints should have been anticipated by NEPAD, and effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements for their management developed within a coherent project plan/strategy and implementation management framework.

It is thus unclear how comments in the TCII and NEPAD 2nd Infrastructure STAP review, with respect to implementation delays, are linked to NEPAD's original project selection criteria and the original scope of programmes/projects approved by the HSGIC during June 2002. (For example, the Infrastructure STAP emphasised the selection of "…projects that are at an advance (sic) stage of preparation and that can be fast-tracked…projects that have stalled for political reasons and where NEPAD's intervention could be expected to make a difference" (NEPAD, 2002c: 2).

It is also unclear what mechanisms and arrangements NEPAD put in place for action planning and performance control at the various levels of management and stages of the project life cycle, and why NEPAD's HSGIC has failed to take "appropriate steps to address implementation delays" in adherence to its (assumed) mandate as illustrated in NEPAD's Strategic Framework. It is also unclear why NEPAD/NEPAD's Secretariat provided conflicting reports on the actual projects' status vis-à-vis the reports provided by the AfDB and TCII and NEPAD report, as illustrated by various analysts and authors (see: Mashele, 2006; Taylor, 2005) in chapter 4 of this report, to the extent that some authors (Taylor, 2005) questioned whether NEPAD's projects existed at all.

For example, the report of the TCII and NEPAD 2nd Infrastructure STAP review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005), conducted during 2004, also confirmed the lack of implementation progress in some sectors, in particular the roads sector. Similarly, the implementation of roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects appears limited to (preliminary) intangible deliverables, since 2002 when the Infrastructure STAP was launched. The author's assertion takes cognisance of the status of the projects purportedly submitted by RECs, which were ostensibly at "advanced stages" in preparation for implementation (AfDB, 2003; OAU/AU, 2002; NEPAD, 2002c). In addition, the cost estimates prepared for NEPAD's transport programme arguably created expectations to the investors and the public alike regarding the identified projects. Yet, approximately four years later since the launch of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, project deliverables in the roads sector appear to have only advanced to the development stage: this includes the approval of concepts for programme/project design; completion of certain studies; obtaining grants (by some RECs) for studies on harmonisation of technical standards and institutional arrangements on joint border posts.

With the exception of the EAC's roads infrastructure project funded/implemented by the World Bank, the majority of RECs' projects are still at the conceptual stage (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 112-134). The project's status at the time of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review included contemplated surveys; submission of project

proposals by RECs although the same RECs lack the resources for their implementation; feasibility studies; and programmes/projects that are still planned. In other cases, implementation progress on projects that some RECs have ostensibly focussed on cannot be ascertained: detailed records of the said projects are apparently not available (*ibid*). Thus, given the conflicting reports illustrated above, it is unclear whether NEPAD understood the substance of the various progress reports, or whether NEPAD merely appended its name to reports prepared by others on its behalf without the requisite quality control by NEPAD's management structures.

The inconsistencies in NEPAD's reporting on the projects' status may also be attributed to the lack of comprehensive project plans and strategies against which to measure implementation progress. The project plans would, for example, also illustrate how the interface between the diverse institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme/project development and implementation is managed. Without specific details on the actual projects, where they are implemented, measurable performance indicators (including detail work plans, milestone plans, responsibility charts, and measures of actual performance by the different RECs against the original targets approved by NEPAD), meaningful assessment would be, at best, almost impossible. The inconsistencies in NEPAD's reporting may also illustrate the diverse perception, interpretation and use of plans by diverse institutional structures – such as professional organisations, project structures and political organisations as illustrated above. Lack of relevant project management competencies to facilitate adequate management and a clearer understanding of the projects' progression at various stages of the project life cycle appears to have exacerbated the problem of poor NEPAD's communication.

8.3.3 Failure to conduct institutional capacity assessments

Institutional capacity assessment has implications for project actions at various stages of the project life cycle. According to the EC's Project Cycle Management

Guidelines (EC, 2004: 99), the results of an institutional capacity assessment inform decision-making on the following issues:

- "Identification and selection of institutional partners;
- Defining the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders with respect to management, coordination, and financing arrangements;
- Modulating the scope of the project (including financing levels) to take account of capacity constraints;
- Determining the project's institutional/organisational capacity building objectives and strategies, including realistic time-frames and resource requirements; and
- Designing an appropriate sustainability strategy for the project."

In NEPAD's case, institutional capacity assessment would facilitate the development of the programme/project scope, relevant institutional arrangements for project organisation management and strategies for project implementation or integrated implementation management/coordination subject to the identified capacity constraints or opportunities. However, at any stage of programme development at the different levels of management, there are no indications from the literature reviewed that NEPAD conducted focused institutional capacity assessment at the various levels of management, infrastructure sectors, institutional structures, and/or spatial categories in order to facilitate effective implementation of its programmes in alignment with NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of management.

As a result, one may argue that the lack of institutional capacity in NEPAD's institutional structures for implementation management (including lack of effective leadership, clearly defined project structures, effective systems for communication, and poor/limited strategic management ability,) are some of the key reasons for NEPAD's failure to facilitate integrated implementation management of the Infrastructure STAP. Yet, NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of management (NEPAD, 2001) included the following measures: facilitating intra-African trade; rationalising the institutional framework for economic integration; harmonising policies, regulations and governance regimes across national borders; mobilising domestic resources; and prioritising institutional capacity assessment and capacity building in order to

enhance the effectiveness of regional structures, including existing regional organisations.

Although NEPAD did not illustrate how the afore-mentioned strategic actions would be prioritised or phased over the various levels of management in the various sectoral interventions, capacity assessment and capacity building were accorded priority for all the programmes. As NEPAD (*ibid*, Para. 87: 19) stated, "…targeted capacity-building should be given a high priority. Programmes in every area should be preceded by an assessment of capacity, followed by the provision of appropriate support." Thus, the prioritisation of institutional capacity assessment and capacity building seemed to illustrate NEPAD's recognition of their implications for programme/project planning at the various levels of management and, ultimately, project implementation success. This view takes cognisance of the possible burden of measures to support the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation, on fragile institutional structures with inadequate capacity for implementation.

Some authors (McCutcheon, 1999: 10) have previously recommended the implementation of pilot projects, within a programme approach, to facilitate the development of the requisite institutional capacity. Accepting this premise, in NEPAD's context this would also entail the development of a coherent sub-regional/regional framework within which to integrate multiple projects at the various spatial categories within a programme approach, to ensure the alignment of objectives and to facilitate the prudent usage of limited resources for implementation. (This view takes cognisance of the negative implications of the proliferation of similar or disparate projects in the various sub-regions of the AU, described under APPENDIX B, to address the same challenges in regional infrastructure and transit facilitation.) In addition, the programme approach would facilitate the development of institutional capacity for future spatial expansion.

In NEPAD's context, however, it is difficult to ascertain whether the proposed projects form part of programmes, or not, because of the apparent obfuscation

regarding the projects' status and inadequate use of planning concepts for project scope management. In this respect, NEPAD's HSGIC failed in their duty to facilitate institutional capacity assessment and targeted capacity building as well as to mobilise resources for capacity building interventions at regional, sub-regional and national levels as detailed in NEPAD's Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001: Para. 83-84: 18; Para.87, 89:19).

8.3.4 Failure to facilitate capacity development in RECs vis-à-vis expectations of delivery

Linked to the issue of capacity assessment discussed above, NEPAD failed to facilitate capacity development in RECs cognisant of their mandate in the Infrastructure STAP. According to the report of the 1st Infrastructure STAP Review (AfDB, 2003), the issue of capacity building in RECs appears to have been addressed approximately a year into "implementation" (during 2003) – and integrated into NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP as one of the new priority projects. At the time of the 2nd Infrastructure STAP Review, during 2004, the ACBF's report on the assessment of capacity-building needs in RECs (to provide technical assistance to countries and to monitor programmes for sector policy harmonisation and programme development,) was planned for finalisation by end August 2004 (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 140) – approximately two years into the "implementation" of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral projects.

The capacity building assessment conducted by the ACBF, however, appears to have focused on select elements of the RECs' mandated role to facilitate integrated implementation management/coordination of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes – i.e., providing technical support/ assistance to countries. The selective capacity building in RECs and, where it is proposed, the apparent overlap with the role of member states and other regional institutional structures, such as the AfDB, brings us back to the question of what the RECs were actually supposed to do in the implementation/ implementation management of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Also, whether NEPAD would

have been able to effectively develop institutional capacity in RECs (in time) for implementation of its regional infrastructure projects, and whether RECs would have been able to perform their mandated tasks under NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP are questions for future research.

For example, was/is the REC's role in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP limited to providing technical advisory services to member states, such as assisting affected member states to apply for funding, agree on common standards (such as minimum design and axle load standards) and procurement of design, construction, and project management services, similar to the roles identified in the TAH for RECs to support the implementation of cross-border networks with a regional profile, as illustrated in APPENDIX B? Would the RECs be able to effectively perform the afore-mentioned roles without the reform/develop of inadequate institutions and the effective development of institutional capacity at national levels? In any event, what capacity is available in RECs to perform the role of technical advisors to member states in NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme, particularly so since the lack of institutional capacity in RECs is widely acknowledged?

What are the implications of the WTO's instruments, such as the TRIPs and TRIMs for the RECs' performance in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure (i.e., since the RECs do not have executing capacity, will they rely upon the procurement of foreign technology and professional/construction services for implementation either on their behalf, or on behalf of member countries, or NEPAD – and who bears the costs for the delivery of the afore-mentioned products and services)? Similarly, what are the implications of the WTO's TRIMs with respect to the limitations this instrument imposes on government procurement, i.e., will the RECs bear the responsibility to procure foreign contractors and service providers as a means to mediate conflicts in respect of international agreements that affect individual member states, or at national levels vis-à-vis the empowerment of national entities and domestic private sector (whose role in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure

appears circumscribed under the prescriptions of the afore-mentioned global rules and contemporary positions on the delivery of global public goods, which appear to benefit (large-scale) foreign private sector interest)?

What is the essence of NEPAD's use of the "principle of subsidiarity" (NEPAD, 2001) in the context of transport infrastructure, i.e., is it meant to get the AU or NEPAD "off the hook" in the event of implementation failure/failure to manage stakeholder relationships and popular participation at national levels, since lack of institutional capacity in RECs was already known? In other words, were the RECs, or their lack of institutional capacity used as a 'stalking horse' in NEPAD, particularly in the Infrastructure STAP, in order to deflect attention from NEPAD's (possible) lack of wherewithal to facilitate the development of regional infrastructure, or as a pretext to avoid addressing the intractable underlying causes of implementation challenges in the internal/external institutional environment? Was NEPAD's promotion of the 'principle of subsidiarity' as the mechanism for decision-making on regional infrastructure, and the management of interfaces on projects between the various spatial categories merely a ploy to obtain funding from multilateral donors, including FDI, whilst at the same time using the protracted processes for collective engagement at national levels to deflect concerns, by same international institutions, in respect of delays for institutional reform/development at national levels (i.e., allow member states to maintain multiple and inadequate transport policy, regulatory and governance regimes that perpetuate the pursuance of narrow mercantilist national interests) because of the alleged/real lack of institutional capacity in RECs?

Cognisant of articulated concerns regarding the lack of capacity in RECs, what is also not explained in both NEPAD Infrastructure STAP reviews is the relevance of the Transport Reform and Integration Support Facility (TRIFSA), which is located with the AfDB to support project preparation and implementation, to ameliorate implementation delays. This facility was established during 2002/2003 with C$ 10 million funding from the Canadian government (NEPAD, 2003/2004), presumably at NEPAD's instigation. It is therefore unclear what the direct

benefits of TRIFSA are to RECs, rather than the AfDB, vis-à-vis their mandate in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Similarly, if the RECs were assigned the responsibility for project preparation, what then is the essence of the Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF) that is located within the AfDB, and how is this instrument related to the afore-mentioned TRIFSA, which is also located at the AfDB? Is the IPPF's primary objective to prepare projects "with a strong PPP component" for which the RECs are said to be inadequate (TCII & NEPAD, 2005)? Is there an overlap of roles and responsibilities between the AfDB and RECs in respect of the IPPF and who carries accountability for delivery in this context?

And why is the AfDB being capacitated by NEPAD instead of RECs, rather than the other way round, where the AfDB would facilitate the development of institutional capacity in RECs in line with its responsibilities as a development finance institution (DFI)? Also, what is the AfDB's obligation to develop capacity in RECs in terms of its traditional mandate as a DFI, as suggested in NEPAD's Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001)? What are the roles of the RECs in the execution of various responsibilities vis-à-vis the overarching roles assigned to NEPAD's structures to facilitate implementation management of NEPAD's STAP, as discussed in the previous chapters? What are the RECs' practical roles vis-à-vis national governments/structures in the implementation of the identified cross-border regional roads projects in NEPAD's roads programme, for example?

The issues raised above underscore the prevailing uncertainties with respect to the relationship between NEPAD, RECs and other structures for implementation management/coordination. They also accentuate the obfuscation in NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation support. Thus, an impression is created that NEPAD avoided addressing contentious issues, such as failure to reform/develop inadequate institutions in the various spatial categories, particularly so given their impact on the implementation of the identified regional infrastructure projects. Therefore, RECs' appear to be casualties of NEPAD's machinations in the inadequate management of project

management functions in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. The RECs also appear to be scapegoats of NEPAD's inadequate management of various institutional relationships and trans-state transactions including the prescription of inappropriate institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.

Similar to the issue of institutional capacity assessments discussed in an earlier section above, NEPAD's HSGIC failed to institute adequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements to monitor/evaluate implementation progress in alignment with NEPAD's articulated vision and objectives as well as to propose enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with agreed capacity-building agreements, at either regional/sub-regional or national levels. In this respect, NEPAD's HSGIC abrogated their responsibility in terms of their articulated obligation to facilitate/ensure the execution of the capacity-building interventions to effectively support the implementation of NEPAD's programmes/ projects.

8.4 Inordinate Influence of Exogenous Factors on the Development of Regional Infrastructure

Baum and Tolbert (1985: 6) argued that the influence of exogenous factors has resulted in a new understanding of the notion of "development," including the interrelatedness and interdependence of development processes. They further argued that this new understanding of how development is interrelated directs the manner in which a country's (sub-regions or regions) resources are managed. The argument posited by Baum and Tolbert (*ibid*), however, fails to address how asymmetrical power relations between the developed and developing countries influence this new understanding of development, and how such notions impact on the management of institutional relationships in development projects in developing countries.

It is also unclear how Baum and Tolbert's argument may be applied or linked to recent notions of integrated development and its ideological underpinnings, and

what outcomes may be expected from such interrelationships. Previously, the influence of exogenous factors, particularly the different ideologies in the developed countries, has resulted in the inordinate influence of conventional thinking and action, dominance of international institutions/structures and reliance on external resources for implementation of Africa's development programmes with deleterious consequences. The afore-mentioned issues have contributed to the proposal of programmes/projects that are tangential to the identified development needs, constraints and challenges as well as lack of institutional capacity development at the various spatial categories.

NEPAD failed to address, or effectively manage the influence of exogenous factors on the Infrastructure STAP, with negative implications for the development of regional infrastructure. Instead, NEPAD appears to have been seduced by and inordinately relied on exogenous factors for the practical manifestation of its vision, thereby abdicating any responsibility or accountability for effective integrated implementation/ implementation management of the Infrastructure STAP. These issues are discussed below.

8.4.1 Influence of conventional thinking and action

In terms of the thesis advanced by Baum and Tolbert, one may argue that the link between the new understanding of development and the adverse impact of exogenous factors on Africa's development programmes gave rise to NEPAD in the first place. Regarding the implementation of NEPAD's cross-border regional infrastructure programmes, NEPAD's thinking needed to illustrate the relationship between the new understanding of development and its (NEPAD's) aspirations for integrated development and implementation/implementation management of regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Thus NEPAD needed to evince the delicate balance for strategic management of interrelationships between its articulated response actions/policy strategies, influences of the external/internal institutional environment in various spatial categories, programmes/projects, institutional structures for project

implementation or implementation management/coordination and various stakeholders who are either sponsors/beneficiaries of, or are affected by NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes.

One may surmise, however, that NEPAD's professed new thinking about the interrelatedness of development presupposes a static evolution of the institutional environment where traditional roles of dependency on the largesse of international institutions/multilateral donors persist as a result of fiscal crises, lack of institutional capacity and inadequate institutions in the majority of African countries: this thinking appears to have had a deleterious impact on the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. For example, contemporary development finance models promoted by the IFIs, upon which NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme is premised, prioritise aid and FDI as the key components to finance sustainable development; the provision of increased ODA and FDI also underpin the prevalent proposals for global partnerships for sustainable development (DBSA, 2003).

Various authors, depicted below, have illustrated the ineffectiveness of aid and FDI to address Africa's development needs, including the development of regional transport/roads infrastructure. Thus, some of the key exogenous factors with possible impact on the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme include the following:

- Declining aid transfers and lack of consistency in the disbursement of aid, particularly in trade-related packages and post-war reconstruction efforts (ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4, #42; ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4, #45; ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4, #46; Business in Africa, 2004; Cheru, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; OECD & AfDB, 2002; Oxfam, 2002; Patrick, 1998. The declining ODA is exacerbated by its poor coordination (Mkandawire, 2002; Patrick, 1998), with inimical impact on poverty reduction and on the development of the requisite institutional capacity for project implementation and spatial expansion of development projects (ANC Today, Vol.4, #44; Cheru, 2002; Patrick, 1998).

- Inequitable and deteriorating terms of trade exacerbated by unilateral/bilateral trade preferences (Adedegi, 2002; IAG/JA, 2002; ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4 #45; ANC Today, 2004, Vol.4 #46; Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990; Gelb, 2001; Bala *et al*, 2003; Bhagowat, 2005; Cheru, 2002; Ismail, 2002; Mills, 2002; Moshe, 2001; Oxfam, 2002; Rodney, 1972; Schepers, 2003/4; DFID, 2002; Tandon, 2002).

- Unsustainable levels of external debt (recent debt-relief initiatives appear to have been largely ineffective in *some* African countries because of inadequate institutions and lack of requisite institutional reforms/development). Previous debt-relief initiatives were rendered ineffective by the unwillingness of the developed countries to resolve the matter in favour of Africa (Cheru, 2002): this phenomenon appears to have persisted even with recent debt-forgiveness initiatives announced by the G8 and IFIs during 2005.

- Uneven patterns in FDI flows resulting in the exaggeration of their benefits in unmanaged contexts (Breytenbach, 2002(b); Cheru, 2002; Founou-Tchigoua, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Mkandawire, 2002; Mills, 2002; Oxfam, 2002; Tandon, 2002; DFID, 2002). As a result, expectations of increased FDI flows in the majority of African countries have not materialised, with adverse implications for the implementation of planned development programmes/projects.

- Negative influences of TNCs in their relations with African countries (Business in Africa, 2003/2004; Cheru, 2002; Kaufman et al, 1998; Mail and Guardian, 2004 (b); Oxfam, 2002). As a result, the needs and priorities of TNC appear to have influenced the choice and prioritisation of projects in African countries. In the majority of cases, the TNCs play a significant role in influencing the direction of investment flows, resulting in their staggering impact on the world economy (Oxfam, 2002; Bende-Nabende, 2002). Yet, their investment and employment practices are, in the majority of cases, "…unencumbered by anything other than weak voluntary guidelines" Oxfam (2002: 4).

- In some cases, the activities of TNC's have fostered state capture (Kaufman *et al*, 1998), or violent conflicts and political instability (Mail and Guardian, 2004 (b); Oxfam, 2002) with negative impacts on existing infrastructure or planned infrastructure developments.

- Externalisation of domestic resources, thereby making Africa a net exporter of capital to the developed countries (ANC Today, Vol.4, #44; Mkandawire, 2002; Tandon, 2002; DFID, 2002). According to Cheru (2002), in various African countries, the combined influences and impacts of the afore-mentioned negative consequences have instead exacerbated the reliance on external resources, resulting in "externalisation of decision-making and loss of sovereignty" (*ibid*: 19).

As a result, the extent to which NEPAD has emphasised external institutional mechanisms and arrangements as the primary routes for funding, programme development, management and implementation/implementation support of the Infrastructure STAP gives cause for concern: it perpetuates the *status quo* of inordinate dependency on external resources for the implementation of Africa's development programmes, which has resulted in the stranglehold of the negative influences of exogenous factors on Africa's regional infrastructure development agenda.

The issues discussed above reveal the inherent contradictions and covert agendas in NEPAD's statements of prioritising the "reform of the ODA delivery system" and for seeking "increased ODA flows in the medium term" (NEPAD, 2001, Para. 148: 38), whilst simultaneously propagating individual and collective self-reliance by African countries (*ibid*: Para.1:1), which are inimical to the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure, and to integrated development. For example, even though NEPAD stated that the roads programme will be financed by national governments (NEPAD, 2002c), there persists an inordinate dependency by African countries on the institutional mechanisms of the developed countries for development finance, technology, human capital, and technical support. The proclivity for external reliance in the

Infrastructure STAP and its sectoral programmes, however, stands in stark contrast with NEPAD's articulated vision: for African countries to individually and collectively take responsibility for the attainment of their desired development outcomes (NEPAD, 2001, Para.1:1).

In this respect, one would have expected African countries to be propelled by lessons from previous experiences and prevailing adverse conditions in the external institutional environment as the basis for change, in order to create a "burning platform" to address internal structural constraints and propose transformational interventions for the development of regional infrastructure. Such a process, however, would require long-term commitment by Africa's political leadership and member states to redirect their energies to address internal impediments, develop sound institutions/institutional capacity from the bottom up, reform/develop inadequate institutions, and embrace a transformational ethos to Africa's development.

In particular, the issue of transit facilitation projects appears to be shrouded in complex dynamics that are linked to international/regional trade agreements and global rules in trade and related services. For example, Soko (2006: 21) indicates that the issue of trade facilitation was included in the WTO's negotiations in 1996 as part of the so-called "Singapore issues." In the package of agreements concluded at the end of July 2004, the developed countries made specific commitments to assist the least-developed countries (the majority in Africa,) with technical support and capacity building so that they can meet their WTO commitments to address non-tariff barriers to trade and transit facilitation. Thus, it is possible that the developers of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP selected and prioritised projects with increased propensity to qualify for donor support under the WTO's 'July Package': hence, the proposal of development corridors (DCs) in NEPAD's roads programme, despite their acknowledged limited contribution to poverty reduction – NEPAD's primary objective.

Cognisant of the links between the WTO's 'July Package', 'Singapore Issues' and other related institutional mechanisms and arrangements, NEPAD's prioritisation of DCs appears to explain the initial exclusion of critical roads construction, maintenance and rehabilitation projects from the roads programme (see: NEPAD, 2002c, AfDB, 2003, TCII & NEPAD, 2005). But, it is also possible the developed countries reneged on their commitment for increased funding and technical support in terms of the WTO's "July Package," thereby leaving NEPAD's proposed regional roads infrastructure projects/DCs in the lurch. Inadequate institutional capacity in sub-regional and national institutions/institutional structures as well as possible intransigence by national governments, however, also offer other possible explanations for the afore-mentioned omissions in NEPAD's regional roads programme. These afore-mentioned issues have not been addressed in NEPAD's assessments or, where they are, have been couched in diplomatic/vague language that obscures their significance and negative impact on the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

Therefore, NEPAD's failure to effectively manage the influence of exogenous factors on programme/project design in the Infrastructure STAP, specifically in facilitation projects such as the roads programme and the development of domestic institutional capacity, may have adverse implications for the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation. In this regard, the historical, political, economic and social origins of Africa's current development challenges, compounded by weak institutions and a plethora of internal structural constraints, illustrate that the development of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, particularly the roads programme, will require an effective integrative approach to its management: this will be premised upon the development of (internal) institutional capacity and institutional reform/development at the various spatial categories.

Ultimately, one assumes that the adverse influences of the external institutional environment will increase complexity of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management. Regarding the roads sector, the

prevalence of policies of the developed north in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP may obviate any potential contribution of NEPAD's roads programme to facilitate the development of regional roads networks for internal coherence; it may also stymie domestic efforts to facilitate a dignified exit for the majority of Africa's people from the clutches of poverty and degradation through the use of employment intensive technologies in the construction and maintenance of roads infrastructure.

8.4.2 Dominance of international institutions/structures

The identified inadequacies in NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation of the regional infrastructure projects appear to be exacerbated by the pressures of the global political economy and its institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integration of, and cooperation with African countries, sub-regions and region. For all intents and purposes, the prevailing relationships between African countries and international institutions/ institutional structures have tended to mirror the asymmetrical relationships with the developed countries of the north. As a result, NEPAD's project scope and institutional arrangements for project organisation management appear skewed in favour of international institutional structures, resulting in external bias in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

This external bias, particularly in the roads programme, is concerning. For example, regional infrastructure development plans have implications for structural organisation at various levels of management and spatial categories: at national levels, relevant sections of regional infrastructure need to be included in NDPs and national budgets; at sub-regional levels, project prioritisation and implementation support need to be considered against the backdrop of regional integration plans, development priorities and collective agreements. At the various stages of the project life cycle, strong institutions and adequate institutional capacity are required to facilitate the requisite processes for effective development of infrastructure.

According to Founou-Tchigoua (2002: 161-162), however, "NEPAD is very confused about the problems of economic integration and pan-Africanism." He argued that whilst NEPAD appeared to ignore in its plans the development of domestic institutional capacity, "…the institutionalization of participation by the G-7 in important decisions…(was) included" (*ibid*). As a result, Founou-Tchigoua argued that the inherent patterns in NEPAD's engagement with institutions/institutional structures of the developed north "…will always hinder the creation of a Southern front" (*ibid*: 162). Founou-Tchigoua (*ibid*) cited the following incident as one of the examples to substantiate his assertions regarding NEPAD's (perceived) accommodation of external interests:

> At the Abuja Summit of the HSGIC, in October 2001, African Heads of State discussed an EU proposal to have permanent representation in the new organisation. At the Dakar Conference on the financing of NEPAD, the investors, essentially the TNCs…decided to 'institute an international coordinating structure in order to better collaborate with the NEPAD Managing Committee and to promote other actions in favour of the important initiative (*ibid*).

Similarly, Taylor (2005: 42) underscored the external bias in the Omega Plan, which may have resulted in the lack of consistency to cascade NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions and multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure from the integrative to the strategic levels of management[1]. As Taylor (*ibid*) argued:

> Wade's (OMEGA) plan was highly problematic. It involved obtaining repayable treasury bonds from the developed world to finance what was essentially a pan-continental infrastructure scheme that, Wade readily admitted and advertised, would advantage Western contractors and

[1] [Senegal's Omega Plan was merged with the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP), spearheaded by Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Bouteflika of Algeria and Obasanjo of Nigeria, resulting in the New Africa Initiative (NAI). The NAI was subsequently re-named NEPAD. The MAP was a product of successive OAU mandates, the first being the mandate of the OAU Extraordinary Summit in Sirte: Libya, during September 1999, for Presidents Mbeki and Bouteflika to engage Africa's creditors on the total cancellation of Africa's external debt. At the OAU Summit in Lomé: Togo, during July 2000, the afore-mentioned three HoSG (Presidents Mbeki, Bouteflika and Obasanjo) were mandated to engage the developed North with a view to developing a constructive partnership for the regeneration of the Continent (NEPAD, 2002f). According to NEPAD (*ibid*), the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU, held in Sirte: Libya on the 01-02 March 2001, gave a mandate for the merger of the initiatives developed for Africa's recovery and development – OMEGA Plan, NAI and UNECA's Compact – to ensure that a single, coordinated plan was presented by Africa to its international cooperating/development partners.]

> businesses. As Wade asserted, 'I will show how the West will benefit. To carry out this infrastructure work we will need foreign and European firms, which are technically more advanced than ours and which can build roads much faster than we could do…two thirds of the resources I'm talking about would go to Western companies to do the work.'

The example depicted above reinforces perceptions of lack of transformation in NEPAD's relationship with institutions/institutional structures of the developed world, as the microcosm of Africa's relationship with the developed north. For these reasons, IAG and JA (2003: 9) argued that albeit NEPAD's pronouncements of a "new partnership," Africa's irrefutable reality of integration into the global order on unequal terms cannot be ignored. The IAG and JA (*ibid*) further argued that the "viability of initiatives such as NEPAD and the AU depend critically on whether they are able to obtain buy-in from OECD countries, both in terms of agreement on the basic concepts and in terms of resource provision." Yet, obtaining buy-in from various key stakeholders, or simply acquiescing to the prerogatives of the more powerful groups, as President Wade's assertions depicted above, NEPAD's pronouncements and project prioritisation suggest, are two different things.

Similarly, accounts by various African intellectuals – which illustrate either NEPAD's surrender to, or dominance of NEPAD's development agenda by the international development partners – lend credence to the assertions made above, with implications for domestic implementation support. According to Adedegi (2002: 39):

> …in the Omega Plan which together with the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) constitutes the NEPAD, it had been suggested that the management and administration of the African initiative should be entrusted to a board of directors comprising debtor and creditor representatives, IMF, World Bank, European Union, Japan, USA and Canada. This is worrisome. It will exacerbate neo-colonialism rather that advance the cause of economic decolonization. In other words, NEPAD should aim to cut Africa loose from the noose of both multilateral and bilateral financial institutions rather than tighten it. It should not be predicated on the assumption that its goals will be unattainable without tightening further the colonial umbilical cord.

Thus, rather than partnership based on cooperation, NEPAD appears to have simply acquiesced to the prerogatives of the developed north. As a result, there is evidence of indisputable dominance by the development countries and their institutions in the development of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Arguably, this dominance has influenced the objectives, development priorities, project selection, and pace of project implementation to develop regional infrastructure. Therefore, obtaining buy-in of from the OECD countries, on their terms (such as the associated conditionalities, tied aid, and so on), is tantamount to a poisoned chalice for Africa's development agenda: it impedes the development of institutional capacity in various segments of society for effective future delivery of regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

African countries must also shoulder responsibility for the failure to develop institutional capacity to support implementation of development programmes/ projects. For example, the failure to develop a strong private sector has also been attributed to the nature of neo-patrimonial relations in African states. Taylor (2005: 79) argued that there are political reasons for the failure to develop a capable private sector: "…'because a strong private sector represent[s] a threat to the ruling group, little [has been] done to promote the advance of indigenous private capital'…Where the ruling elites have sought to encourage African business, it has 'tended to go primarily to those with political and bureaucratic connections.'" Taylor (*ibid*) argued that the political considerations in the development of indigenous private sector capacity "dampen any development of a nascent and independent – and more crucially, *efficient* (emphasis in original) bourgeoisie in many parts of Africa, further exacerbated by the continent's notoriously unreliable and degenerated transport and communications networks." Thus, NEPAD's perceived adherence to the demands of international institutions (along the lines of prescriptions of the Washington Consensus and global financial architecture) appear to be practical manifestations of the inequitable power relations between Africa and the developed northern/OECD countries as well as a reflection of internal structural/institutional inadequacies.

The prevailing development or trade agreements between the regional/sub-regional institutions, national governments and developed countries/their institutions may further complicate the *status quo* as: they may determine the nature and extent of participation by the international institutions/structures in NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme. This participation by diverse institutional structures possibly alludes to complexity of institutional arrangements in NEPAD's plans for the development of regional infrastructure vis-à-vis international agreements. Arguably, any conditionalities prescribed by the international structures in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP will perpetuate the lack of institutional capacity in regional, sub-regional structures and national structures. The negative implications of the afore-mentioned conditionalities may, circuitously, be exacerbated by the lack of (domestic) institutional capacity to support the development of regional infrastructure projects.

8.5 Reliance on External Resources for Implementation Support

According to Paul (1990), availability of adequate resources is one of the pre-conditions for project success: it facilitates the creation of non-transferable physical infrastructure assets, the acquisition of transferable assets (such as technology and equipment), and the development of institutional infrastructure including human capital with relevant competencies to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of physical infrastructure assets. The afore-mentioned considerations are of paramount significance for the success of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Given the lack of institutional capacity in the majority of African countries, NEPAD's expectations for assistance by the developed countries (NEPAD 2001: Para.8:2) arguably had their genesis in contemporary global discourse on financing for sustainable development (see: DBSA, 2003:28-40): the international community proffered unequivocal support for the provision of global public goods in developing countries. This support is subject to certain preliminary conditions being met, such as good socio-economic management, governance, and an increased role of the (foreign) private sector in the delivery of regional infrastructure (DBSA, 2003; Taylor, 2005).

Empirical evidence and anecdotal observations (Business in Africa, 2003/2004; Cheru, 2002; City Press, 03 April 2005; Guest, 2004; Onyeani, 1990; Oxfam, 2002; Estache, 2006a), however, indicate that the lack of adequate resources for development projects negates the building of domestic institutional capacity for sustainable development of Africa's physical infrastructure assets. In NEPAD's roads programme, for example, this situation is compounded by the inordinate dependency on foreign firms or TNCs (engineering and construction companies,) and IFIs for procurement of resources to develop the requisite physical infrastructure assets. In some cases, (*Mail and Guardian*, 2004b; Oxfam, 2002) foreign investment and associated activities have resulted in inter-/intra-state political instability, and the fomenting of violent resource wars in African countries. In addition, the activities of TNCs have, according to (Oxfam, 2002: 4), increased polarisation and environmental degradation. In countries like Equatorial Guinea, it is alleged (*Mail and Guardian*, 2004b:12) that the activities of TNCs (to foment political instability and corruption,) have inhibited the construction of new roads and the maintenance of existing ones. Therefore, NEPAD appears to not have adequately explored the implications of its reliance on external support for the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP and its sectoral programmes, or attainment of its multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation.

8.5.1 Implications of global policy prescriptions for sustainable development finance

The design of NEPAD's roads programme, including other sectoral interventions under the Infrastructure STAP, are arguably influenced by contemporary (global) debates on sustainable development finance for the provision of global public goods, such as regional transport/roads infrastructure. Thus, a number of issues flow from NEPAD's statements regarding the financing of regional infrastructure through external funding arrangements, which need to be interrogated. First, the erroneous expectation that some benevolent external forces will be committed to the development of Africa's infrastructure, presumably because of historical

incidents (NEPAD, 2001, Para.46: 9), has arguably resulted in significant challenges for the design and implementation of NEPAD's roads programme. This approach has arguably influenced the choice of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support.

Second, NEPAD's expectations of foreign private-sector support reflect the resurgence of an age-old phenomenon, since the 1980's, where African governments expected unsuccessfully for the (foreign) private sector to resolve infrastructure crises and related institutional inadequacies in African countries (Estache, 2006a). The resurgence of this expectation in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, therefore, goes against the grain of NEPAD's own assertions to develop individual and collective self-reliance in the quest for Africa's regeneration (NEPAD, 2001, Para.1:1). Yet, ideas abound (Mkandawire, 2002: 105-118) for Africa to develop capacity in self-financing, based on domestic resource mobilisation.

It also appears that NEPAD's faith in considerable foreign private-sector involvement in the delivery of regional infrastructure is based on the hope that national governments (that have either no, or inadequate institutional capacity), or the under sourced NEPAD machinery (see Table 5.5, Chapter 5) shall provide the necessary regulation based on prescriptions of the global financial architecture. Yet, empirical evidence (Estache, 2006a; World Bank, 2006) on the challenges to enforce contracts in African countries illustrates the implications of inadequate institutions at national levels for NEPAD's expectations. The afore-mentioned issues are significant because of NEPAD's inordinate reliance on the foreign private sector for investment and construction of physical regional roads infrastructure projects. Therefore, NEPAD needs to prioritise the development of institutional capacity, mobilisation of domestic resources, stakeholder commitment to transformational change, and sustained political commitment/ support to support implementation of programmes/projects for sustained delivery for sustained delivery. Wide-ranging institutional reform/development at national levels will be critical to support the effectiveness of technical interventions.

For example, institutional reforms undertaken by Rwanda to enforce contracts involved entire legislative and judicial reforms (World Bank, 2006:51). In addition, this process required a range of interventions to facilitate and support integrated implementation: the development of human capital with the relevant competencies; strong political support from the highest political levels to overcome obstacles and resistance to change; transformational leadership; persistence; consistent management of behavioural aspects; effective communication; and commitment from all sectors of society to beneficial change. (According to the World Bank (*ibid*), in Rwanda, President Kagame drove the process of institutional reform.) The interventions depicted above lend credence to assertions (Mills, 2002) that African countries can make certain domestic interventions, such as improving governance regimes, without requiring foreign support.

Regarding technological assistance, the majority of African countries rely *mainly* on external invention and innovation, with the exception of a few countries. Yet, under the WTO's TRIPs, it has been estimated that Africa's reliance on foreign technology will cost an estimated US$40 billion annually in royalties and other intellectual property payments (*ANC Today*, 2004, Vol.4, #46: 10), thereby making development interventions in African countries difficult. As Mark Weisbrot (*ibid*) argued:

> By tightening the enforcement of patents and copyrights, the TRIPs agreement will make it much more difficult, if not impossible, for developing countries to industrialise in the way that countries such as South Korea and Taiwan did, on the basis of borrowed technology, while at the same time draining tens of billions of dollars of scarce capital from South to North, for royalties and other intellectual property payments.

Thus, NEPAD appears to not have considered thoroughly the negative implications of its reliance on external resources for the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, so that creative instruments for domestic resource mobilisation or indigenous private-sector capacity in and between the various African countries may be developed. The effectiveness of institutional mechanisms and arrangements to address the identified challenges is, however,

predicated upon the development of an enabling institutional environment and committed support to broad-based transformational change at national levels. So far, according to UNCTAD (Founou-Tchigoua, 2002), the policy and regulatory environment as well as institutional failure have hindered, in particular, the creation of an enabling environment for (indigenous) private-sector participation in Africa.

8.5.2 Implications of reliance on donor funding and FDI for project implementation

At the same time, Africa's/NEPAD's political leadership appears to have failed to demonstrate the requisite courage for transformation of Africa's development landscape because of conflicting behaviours regarding Africa's development trajectory under NEPAD. According to Wilmont (2002: 54), these conflicting behaviours have manifested in, for example, the demands by African leaders for an annual investment of $64 billion in NEPAD programmes, when 40-50% of Africa's domestic savings are repatriated annually. Wilmont (*ibid*) further argued that the annual brain-drain of Africa's intellectuals and experts goes unchecked in similar fashion – because the policies instituted by African leaders devalue the talents of Africa's intellectuals and experts. At the same time, the same leaders "import expensive purveyors of fallacies such as that Africa is short of experts" (*ibid*). Therefore, the development of Africa's regional infrastructure under NEPAD appears to be weighed down by the reliance external resources, rather than NEPAD breaking new ground by fostering the development of self-reliant financing, with external resources augmenting internal efforts.

NEPAD's reliance on external investment for implementation of Africa's regional infrastructure programmes/projects, particularly FDI and (foreign) private sector participation for construction and engineering services belies the painful lessons of false promises, during the 1980-1990's, to finance the development of Africa's infrastructure. According to Estache (2006a) these false promises have resulted in the current crisis in the provision of Africa's infrastructure. Arguably, NEPAD's

inordinate reliance on external resources for the implementation of regional infrastructure has perpetuated the adoption of inappropriate conceptual frameworks, models for programme design and strategies for project implementation and implementation management with previously resulted in failure to develop Africa' infrastructure assets to meet effective demand.

One of the preferred financing instruments in NEPAD's model for the development of regional infrastructure is ODA. Yet, the argument that aid can create or even sustain development outcomes at the level required to broaden and deepen Africa's development agenda has been widely refuted (Oxfam, 2002, Mkandawire, 2002, Tandon, 2002). Similarly, Tandon (2002) argued that NEPAD's approach and responses to the issue of ODA reveal a myopic and naïve understanding of the political economy of reform. Since time immemorial, African intellectuals have raised concerns regarding the predominance of, and dependency on donor financing for the development of Africa's infrastructure projects (Mandaza, 1990).

Some of the afore-mentioned concerns, however, have sub-regional specificity (such as SADC's inordinate reliance on donor funding for implementation of its development projects). With the passage of time, Mandaza's questions (*ibid*: 151) regarding the possibility, or not, for African countries to develop capacity to translate donor funding for Africa's beneficial development have become a self-fulfilling prophesy: African countries appear unable to extricate themselves from the inordinate dependency on donor funds for the implementation of development programmes/projects. Thus, NEPAD has ably demonstrated the intractable nature of aid dependence under its "new" approach to Africa's development. Lack the institutional capacity at national levels to fund the implementation of domestic development programmes perpetuates this malaise.

ODA, for example, has been associated with ubiquitous conditionalities, some of which effectively couch mechanisms for capital flight. In the majority of cases, ODA has previously amounted to funding institutions of the developed countries

via the 'recipients' in developing/African countries through "tied aid" – a phenomenon that includes provisions for trade with, and technical support from the developed countries as the conditions upon which concessionary loans, grants and aid are granted.

Similarly, Jawara and Kwa (2004) argue that in global (WTO's) trade negotiations, some of the conditionalities include the surreptitious extrication of support from the developing countries for positions that favour developed countries in return for aid/ODA, at the expense of the developing countries – Africa in particular. (Hence, Jawara and Kwa (*ibid*) argue that the World Bank and IMF "carrotize" loans and technical assistance to developing countries.) Cheru (2002) also argued that aid conditionalities are tantamount to the cession of control of Africa's development processes to the 'benefactors' from the developed countries. In development programmes, donor conditionalities have previously manifested in inappropriate approaches to development, project design and strategies for project implementation. Moreover, project interventions that are reliant on donor funding often ignore its negative implications for the development of institutional capacity for spatial expansion.

A critical concern is the impact of increased ODA disbursements on inadequate institutions. For example, the poor absorptive capacity in the majority of African countries – either for donor funds or concessionary loans – has often resulted in disbursed funds either not being used or not used for the intended purposes. This phenomenon is ascribable to both the lack of institutional capacity and macroeconomic constraints, exacerbated by "political interference, corruption and other governance concerns" (Estache, 2006a: 9). As Estache (*ibid*) noted, "Once it is accepted that the public sector will be the main actor and that donors will have to scale up their commitments, everyone needs to accept that the dramatic scale-up in aid risks overwhelming fragile institutions."

Estache (*ibid*) further argued that the current funding environment imposes particularly stringent requirements on both African governments and donors to

implement the requisite institutional reforms. Cognisant of NEPAD's "deal" with institutions of the developed north (Mills & Oppenheimer, 2002; Taylor, 2005), concrete practical plans to implement the requisite improvements in governance regimes will also be required in order to facilitate increased disbursements of donor funding. These requirements will further burden Africa's fragile institutions. In this regard, arguments for increased aid to implementation of NEPAD's programmatic interventions provide no guarantees that such aid will be effectively used for the articulated purposes – and in an efficient manner too.

Similarly, NEPAD's reliance on FDI for resource mobilisation to support the development of regional infrastructure has raised a range of concerns regarding NEPAD's decisions on funding instruments for the development of regional infrastructure. For example, Tandon (2002) argued that the negative constitutional and political implications of NEPAD's reliance on FDI to support the attainment of development objectives, which include access by the poor to basic infrastructure services, cannot be ignored. Even for the large-scale regional infrastructure developments, which may be driven by purely economic imperatives, Estache (2006a: 13) provides compelling evidence of foreign private sector failure, since the 1980's, to deliver at a scale similar to that required by NEPAD.

As Estache (*ibid*) averred, foreign private-sector finance to meet Africa's infrastructure investment needs did not exceed 10% during the 1990's. Historically, the transport sector has fared worse, especially when compared to the ICT and energy sectors, as illustrated in Estache's analysis (*ibid*). As a result, Estache had the following to say about Africa's reliance on foreign private sector participation on the development of Africa's infrastructure: "If government had not internalized the hope of increased private sector financing of infrastructure, Africa's infrastructure problems may not have been as dramatic" (*ibid*: 6). NEPAD neither appears to have heeded lessons of history, nor planned for the eventuality mapped above.

8.5.3 Implications of reliance on DFIs for project implementation

Because of macroeconomic constraints, the majority of African countries rely on DFIs, such as the AfDB and DBSA for concessionary loans. However, the fiscal rules governing operations of DFIs appear to penalise infrastructure investments with long-term cost-recovery. The preference in DFIs for short-term cash flows encumbers their (DFIs) effective contribution in the development of projects with long-term timelines. For example, Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate on average time-frames for financial closure on investment projects of ten years or more; according to the TCII and NEPAD report (2005: 151-152), the cumulative time-frames for facilitation projects, from project conceptualisation to full implementation, can amount to 15 years or more. In this context, the downside is the possible preference by DFIs for projects that generate short-term cash flows irrespective of the broader development impact of such projects. Such preferences result in 'cherry picking' (by the IFIs and DFIs), and the selection/design of projects that meet investor needs, rather than those that address broader developmental concerns. As a result, for the majority of African countries, the viable alternative to support implementation of development programmes/projects is ODA.

The lack of commitment to ODA agreements by the developed countries, however, is legendary. A case in point is the failure by the majority of the OECD countries to meet the UN target for 0.7% of the developed countries' GDP that was made since the 1970's, in line with the recommendations of the Brandt report (Business in Africa, August 2004: 9). Similar commitments to scale-up ODA – first during 2002 under the Monterrey Consensus (DBSA, 2003), and second under the Africa Commission report (CFA, 2005) – appear to not have yielded tangible response from the international community. Whilst there has been a dearth of alternative development finance instruments to fund Africa's infrastructure development, the increasing dependence on ODA and FDI has been found to stifle self-reliant development of infrastructure assets (Estache, 2006a). Thus, it is possible that the lack of donor funding, in addition to limited FDI

inflows and unfavourable DFI conditionalities are some of the reasons for the for identified implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. This is in addition to the failure by African governments to contribute to the development of regional roads infrastructure, as originally depicted under the Infrastructure STAP.

Some authors (Founou-Tchigoua, 2002: 163) have concluded that the contradictory underpinnings of NEPAD's programme, particularly in the light of the inordinate external dependency for funding of its sectoral priorities, such as regional infrastructure, can only point to ominous intentions: "…that NEPAD and the OECD are building a deceptive partnership, which is simply an indigenised version of management of excessive debt." The afore-mentioned assessment, therefore, cast doubts on NEPAD's integrity regarding its commitment to the attainment of its articulated multiple objectives for regional infrastructure, which are planned for simultaneous implementation. Founou-Tchigoua's assessment above relays an ominous message for the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, particularly so cognisant of NEPAD's origins from the OAU Sirte mandate to negotiate with Africa's creditors, during September 1999 (see: NEPAD, 2002f; NEPAD, 2002g).

8.6 Summary and Conclusion

The analyses of some of the mutually reinforcing underpinning causes of challenges in the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and roads programme reveal a static evolution in NEPAD's identification of mutual interests and management of relationships with the developed countries. Whether this outcome is a consequence of the prevailing lack of institutional capacity, or embedded notions of the colonial utilisation of space vis-à-vis the interests of developed countries, or whether it is a combination of the afore-mentioned is a moot point. The point is, in the management of projects, *whoever* funds, operates, and manages infrastructure assets has significant influence on project design, implementation planning, and construction of physical infrastructure assets.

Therefore, if foreign governments, their (foreign) private sector and institutional mechanisms predominate in NEPAD's infrastructure planning processes, then the resulting spatial patterns in Africa's transportation networks will continue to reflect *primarily* their interests at the expense of Africa's national, sub-regional and regional prerogatives. NEPAD, however, appears to have lacked the courage to address ignoble patterns in the development of Africa's regional infrastructure, particularly cross-border regional roads infrastructure.

In Africa's development landscape, the inequitable power relations with institutions/institutional structures of the developed north have gained substance from the inordinate dependency of African countries on the developed countries for institutional infrastructure (including funding for capital projects and budget support, technology, human capital and technical support,) and for basic survival because of fiscal crises and lack of institutional capacity at national levels. This status quo has reinforced and perpetuated the impact of traditional notions of development albeit under different ideological persuasions, although the underlying premises still remain the same. Thus, in the context of Africa's integration into the global political economy, and by extension NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, the premises of traditional thinking about development appear to still remain the same.

Given the inordinate reliance on external resources, it is doubtful NEPAD mobilised domestic resources for immediate implementation, either at regional, sub-regional, or national levels, in accordance with the original time-frames for implementation. National support for practical implementation would, for example, be reflected in the inclusion of the relevant sections of the identified regional projects in NDPs and capital budgets at national levels. This process would also encourage the disbursement of funding from national treasuries for project implementation – where funds are available; it would also facilitate the necessary political and popular support for the projects at national levels.

Thus, a host of the identified endemic and debilitating challenges in regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation may be addressed in the short-term from internal resources, with significant impact on sectoral performance. The assessment made above has implications on the extent, depth and relatedness of integrated development interventions in the various sub-regions or member states in RECs, and how the related institutional issues can be addressed concurrently. An integrated development perspective will also facilitate the coherent integration of planned regional roads infrastructure and other interrelated inter-sectoral interventions in NDPs into the regional transport/roads programmes. The development of regional domestic resource mobilisation instruments/institutional mechanisms may also assist to extricate NEPAD or African countries from the clutches of the global financial architecture and inordinate influence of institutions/institutional structures of the developed north; the mobilisation of domestic resources may also assist to provide reliable funding and an incentive for countries to support agreed regional infrastructure developments.

Therefore, only African governments can individually and collectively drive the process to reverse the evidenced burdens in the provision of Africa's regional infrastructure, particularly cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services. Other external efforts may supplement, rather than supplant internal efforts. The active role of national governments is critical in this context: to facilitate the building of relationships that engender mutual respect and support with the relevant institutions at sub-regional and regional levels. This quest will only be achieved through active investment by African countries in the development of their/regional infrastructure assets, including physical and non-physical infrastructure.

Also, the impetus and requisite support for the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure plans at sub-regional/regional levels will be facilitated through the active involvement of various stakeholder groups within the national or sub-regional/regional contexts i.e., in the planning, funding, implementation, and management of programmes/projects for the development of cross-border

regional infrastructure and transit facilitation services, rather than the emasculation of broad-based participation evidenced in NEPAD.

9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

9.1 Concluding Remarks

Various commentators, including NEPAD's governance and management structures, have generally attributed the identified challenges in the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP to the lack of institutional capacity in RECs. In addition, some development analysts, NEPAD's officials, and media reports also identify the lack of political will, resources, capacity, cooperation and support from member states as contributing to project implementation delays. Within the range of the articulated concerns regarding tardy implementation, the failure of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements to facilitate integrated implementation management of the Infrastructure STAP has received scant attention, if at all.

It appears the concerns regarding the implementation delays in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, including NEPAD's self-assessments of implementation progress, are based on NEPAD's projections for delivery of unique regional infrastructure projects: these afore-mentioned assessments have failed to interrogate, in the first place, the feasibility of NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure cognisant of regional/sub-regional specificity, and to establish the impact of the internal/external institutional environment on the effective implementation NEPAD's programmes/projects. Thus, the adverse perceptions of implementation failure, or delays, appear to have been instigated by the unreasonable expectations for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure created by NEPAD in the first place. These expectations appear to have been based on erroneous assumptions, by NEPAD's management and governance structures, on the following key issues:

- essence of, and requirements for integrated development, regional integrated development in a context of globalisation and existing collective agreements/institutional relationships at, and between the various spatial categories and integrated project implementation;

- measures of effective demand for (cross-border) regional infrastructure products and services in order to support NEPAD's articulated multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation;
- relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the attainment of objectives to facilitate regional integrated development and integrated project implementation;
- capacity in institutional structures for project implementation/ implementation management in alignment with NEPAD's articulated objectives for regional integrated development and integrated project implementation;
- planning requirements, which in turn appear to have been informed by unarticulated objectives for the development of regional infrastructure, lack of clarity on the viability of the identified projects and their levels of readiness for implementation, and incorrect estimates of the time it would require to prepare the projects, plan for their implementation, and implement them;
- sources and availability of resources – in particular funding, knowledge capital and technical support to facilitate/support effective programme/ project development and implementation/implementation management;
- characteristics of the institutional environment at the various spatial categories, its readiness to facilitate/support integrated implementation/ implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects in order to support the objectives for regional integrated development, and the potential impact of the current institutional relationships and collective agreements across international borders on the delivery of agreed projects subject to articulated constraints;
- relevant multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-disciplinary inputs required to facilitate effective and efficient development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure in order to support the attainment of NEPAD's articulated multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation;
- levels of political support and commitment at regional, sub-regional and national levels; and

- support from development partners, international institutions/institutional structures which appear to be determined by the centrality of global institutions in Africa's development agenda.

As a result, the comments by the development partners, analysts, media and NEPAD leadership/officials allude to the lack of a common understanding, or lack of clarity regarding the purpose and role of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP: i.e., what it aims to deliver, where, for whom, and by when. In addition, how project activities/action planning and performance control/management are linked and how the responsibilities and roles of the different institutions/institutional structures to support NEPAD's programme for the development of regional infrastructure are defined remain ambiguous. The apparent absence of agreed frameworks, or pre-determined measures to evaluate project implementation success adds to the confusion of diverse perceptions regarding project implementation progress or challenges.

One of the defining characteristics of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews is the pattern of providing reasons for implementation delays in respect of projects that were never elaborated in the first place, or processes for collective engagement that were not undertaken/integrated in programme design in alignment with NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions at the integrative levels of management. Similarly, a lack of common understanding prevails regarding the status of NEPAD's infrastructure programmes/projects that are proposed for implementation, and whether or not such projects were, in any event, ready for implementation – or whether they existed at all. This lack of clarity regarding the projects' status signifies the negative implications of poor communication: it also underscores the adverse implications of prescriptive, secretive workings of bureaucratic structures, such as the IFIs and other global/regional institutions, for Africa's regional development programmes.

Therefore, it is difficult to envisage how RECs will enforce commitment to processes that are not even elaborated as part of the Infrastructure STAP's *modus*

operandi or implementation of unprepared projects – or those which might not even exists. In this respect, the inordinate focus on RECs' inadequacies to facilitate effective integrated implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP is curious: it is tantamount to passing the buck for the inadequacies of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements as well as possible implementation failure. It is also unclear clear how credible/beneficial assessment of NEPAD's implementation challenges can be made by the different stakeholders if, and when, it is based on limited understanding of the range of issues underpinning the development and implementation/implementation management of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. The lack of up-front agreement on how the projects' success will be judged, or effective communication on the projects' status exacerbate the problem to identify clear patterns of causality in the assessments of project implementation challenges.

Significantly, the various assessments of project implementation delays, including the analysis of possible underlying causal factors, illustrate that NEPAD has failed to consider the impact of the underlying structural constraints during programme conception, development, or implementation planning. Therefore, one may argue that the identified challenges in implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, or related sectoral programmes, are linked primarily to NEPAD's poor programme conception, prescriptive approach to planning and chaotic project organisation management: *they are not a reflection of institutional inadequacies or lack of institutional capacity for implementation/implementation management at the various spatial categories and institutional structures alone*. However, the various assessments of implementation progress, including the recommended actions, reveal a tendency to focus corrective interventions on the effects of problems, as opposed to addressing the underlying causes of problems. The key findings of this research are summarised below.

9.2 Key Findings

The key findings of this research include the following issues:

9.2.1 Poor leadership and ownership of programme

Arguably, NEPAD's decisions at the integrative and strategic levels of management set the tone for the neo-liberal approach to the development of regional infrastructure, prescriptive approach to planning, strong sectoral focus, and over-simplification of constraints and challenges in the implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/projects. These afore-mentioned premises appear to have resulted in the lack of alignment between NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions, influences of the internal/external institutional environment, programmes/projects, and institutional structures for implementation/implementation management. As a result, despite claims by NEPAD's leadership in the Strategic Framework (NEPAD, 2001) to institute transformational interventions, intractable problems in the delivery of Africa's (cross-border) regional infrastructure still prevail. These include the following issues: weak institutional environment; inappropriate approaches to development planning; legacy of colonial influences in trade that are reflected spatially in the existing transportation patterns; lack of inclusive stakeholder participation; lack of institutional capacity for implementation compounded by the entrenched inordinate dependence on external resources; and lack of sustained political support at national levels for the implementation of agreed programmes at regional/sub-regional levels.

The evidenced poor leadership and ownership by NEPAD of its own programme appears to have contributed significantly to the perpetuation of the afore-mentioned challenges. As a result, NEPAD's governance and management structures have failed to create an enabling environment for integrated implementation management of the Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes. Suffice to say, the lack of strong leadership appears to be one of the

major shortcomings in the implementation of Africa's development programmes, and in efforts to chart directions for collective self-reliance in Africa's development trajectory (see: Adedeji, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o *et al*, 2002; Bond, 2002; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; Gelb, 2002; Herbert, 2003; Hope, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Mills, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; Tandon, 2002). Therefore, the characteristics and overall implications of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure need to be thoroughly examined: their roles and responsibilities as well as obligations arising out of the afore-mentioned need to be rendered explicit, cognisant of the constraints and challenges of external/internal institutional environment in which Africa's development programmes are implemented.

For example, Adedegi (2002: 39) cautioned that institutional arrangements in NEPAD, such as partnerships with the developed world, might "compromise…cardinal principles… (of) self-reliance, self-sustainment, socio-economic transformation, holistic human development and democratisation of the development process espoused in some of the previous (failed) African initiatives." Therefore, references by NEPAD's political leaders to "going back to the authentic Nepad approach", discussed in Chapter 1, suggest either a misunderstanding of, or oblivion to impediments in NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.

Therefore, any future actions for the development of cross-border regional infrastructure need to be supported by an informed understanding of the situational specificity in which decisions are made and supported, wherein regional infrastructure development programmes are conceptualised, prepared and implemented. The development of relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support effective project conception, planning, and implementation management will be critical in this respect.

This process includes reviewing strategies at the various levels of management in order to establish how they are linked to inputs/outputs of planning hierarchies,

programmes/projects, and institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation support to minimise or avoid repeating past mistakes. Where necessary, such a process would allow for the crafting of corrective interventions in the underlying precepts at the various levels of management in order to facilitate successful integrated implementation management subject to situational and project specificity. As Browett and Fair (Fair, 1987: 57) noted, "…it is very difficult to achieve change in a system if the parameters of a system remain the same."

9.2.2 Inordinate focus on institutional inadequacies in RECs

The findings of this research are different from the general perception of exclusive lack of institutional capacity in RECs to perform their mandate for integrated implementation management/coordination of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP as the primary reason for implementation delays. For example, NEPAD's 1st Infrastructure STAP review (AfDB, 2003) identified the lack of institutional capacity in RECs to discharge their obligations, vis-à-vis the expectations of NEPAD, as one of the key constraints to the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme. The 2nd Infrastructure STAP review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 14), however, identified a range of institutional constraints and challenges at the various spatial categories and levels of management/planning, with implications for implementation progress. These include, but are not limited to, the lack of capacity in RECs, and the lack of political will including resistance by national governments/member states to fully implement the requisite institutional reforms (including reforms to legislative, regulatory and governance regimes in order to support harmonisation in transit facilitation projects,) despite the existence of decades-old regional agreements to this effect.

As the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*) argued:

> …lack of institutional stakeholder buy-in, bureaucratic and institutional resistance to reforms, legal complexities and a lack of political willingness to implement genuine reform continue to hinder efforts to facilitate the movement of people and goods across borders within the continent.

In addition, the TCII and NEPAD Infrastructure STAP review (*ibid*) cited inadequate project preparation, funding constraints, ineffective stakeholder/ relationship management, lack of commitment to collective agreements, and inability by the development partners to modify their systems and practices to suit NEPAD's development priorities. The prevailing general perception and collective acceptance of lack of institutional capacity in RECs as the reason for implementation delays of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects is, therefore, concerning.

The narrow focus on RECs' inadequacies potentially limits the development of relevant corrective interventions to ameliorate the identified programme/project implementation challenges. This is particularly so since the lack of institutional capacity in RECs was in NEPAD's peculiar knowledge at the time the RECs were mandated (by NEPAD) to coordinate integrated implementation management of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. For these reasons, the obfuscation highlighted in the discussions regarding the causes of, and accountability for project implementation delays raises the spectre of previous failures in the implementation of Africa's development/regional infrastructure programmes. The emphasis on lack of institutional capacity in RECs also appears to be used as a stalking horse, or mechanism to deflect attention from the inadequacies of NEPAD's conception, planning, and management of the regional infrastructure programme.

In addition, NEPAD has linked proposals for integrated implementation of regional infrastructure interventions in the different sectors to regional integrated development: the afore-mentioned spheres (i.e., "integrated development," "sectoral integration/cooperation," and "regional integrated development") are fraught with unresolved complexities at ideological, spatial and practical levels with implications for programme design and strategies for project implementation/implementation management at the lower levels of management/ planning. NEPAD, however, appears to assiduously avoid addressing the underpinning causes to the identified implementation challenges, hence prevalent

postulations regarding the lack of delivery in RECs to ensure the attainment of the desired implementation outcomes (TCII & NEPAD, 2005) – yet RECs do not have the capacity to do so.

Therefore, the sentiments expressed in the various assessments of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP regarding the lack of institutional capacity in RECs possibly obscure the unwillingness or lack of know-how on NEPAD's part to address the identified implementation challenges, or their underlying causes, effectively. In the circumstances, the RECs' inability to articulate their position or defend their integrity regarding the ensuing concerns in respect of implementation challenges in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP also signals *their* powerlessness and lack of institutional capacity to effectively manage institutional relationships between the various spatial categories and institutional structures. NEPAD's stance, however, is even more indicative of poor leadership in blaming the RECs for implementation failures, rather than identify effective mechanisms for their support. As Maxwell (2001: 47-48) averred, "…*as the challenge escalates, the need for teamwork elevates* (emphasis in original)… (yet) One mistake…people repeatedly make is to focus on their dream and too little on their team…"

9.2.3 Negative implications of prescriptive models for integrated implementation plans

Prescriptive models have traditionally proved inadequate to integrate the different planning hierarchies, thereby exacerbating the dilemma for integrated implementation. Moreover, the driving forces in integrated development are the requirements for broad-based collective engagement, which integrate trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary approaches to effectively address the challenges of development. Therefore, the articulation, integration in planning frameworks, and integrated implementation of the afore-mentioned requirements may not be suited to the controlled processes that characterise the corporate sector, bureaucratic organisations, or institutional structures with a strong sectoral

focus that characterise NEPAD's prescriptive institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support implementation of the Infrastructure STAP.

For example, Mintzberg (1994: 297) argues that "empty platitudes" inherent in prescriptive strategy development fail to provide "…simulation of complex managerial processes… (or reflect) any understanding of the reality and so remained essentially devoid of real content." Moreover, regarding the failure to develop any effective strategy in prescriptive models, Mintzberg argues that the process of "integrating decisions at a point in time" is not strategy making, but simply "*planning's approach* to strategy making (emphasis in original)" (*ibid*: 12). As a result, NEPAD failed to ensure that the requisite planning and related actions were performed at the various stages of the project life cycle, in order to ensure that links were developed between NEPAD's policy strategy; development/ programme objectives; influences of the external/internal institutional environment; NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects; and development priorities, objectives and programmes/projects of institutions/ institutional structures for project implementation/implementation management. As a result, NEPAD appears to have relied on 'empty platitudes' for programme development and implementation support. Significantly, it remains unclear whether NEPAD's response actions for integrated development constitute a policy strategy or a check list of aspirational implementation actions.

Notably, the lack of institutional capacity for planning at regional, sub-regional and national levels militates against the exclusive use of prescriptive approaches to planning in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Given the lack of institutional capacity to perform the requisite work at the strategic levels of management, a concern in this study is that the identified frameworks for integrative project management, which are based on prescriptive models for planning, may not on their own provide adequate guidelines for the management of complex projects, particularly in a spatial and ideological context similar to that presented by NEPAD.

For example, Turner's framework for a structured approach to project management (Turner, 1999), or even the guidelines outlined by the PMBOK (PMI, 1996), appear to be premised on prescriptive models of the design or planning schools of thought. These guidelines/models have been used universally for environmental analysis, quality and performance control. Their effectiveness, however, may be stymied in the context of inadequate institutions and lack of institutional capacity to support the requisite rigorous planning processes. In addition, although the PMBOK (*ibid*) addresses project integration management, this integration is proposed at the level of individual projects, rather than being applied to integrated development as a concept.

Similarly, the framework proposed by the PMBOK may be inadequate for the concurrent implementation of multiple, trans-sectoral projects across international boundaries in RECs, or at national levels in the majority of African countries. This is particularly so since the PMBOK appears to be underpinned by the assumption that adequate institutions and institutional capacity in structures for project implementation already exist to facilitate the integration of its various knowledge areas. Yet, in the majority of African countries, the relevant institutions may not exist or are underdeveloped. As a result, the structures for implementation management of cross-border multinational projects may not possess the requisite institutional infrastructure and human capital with the relevant competencies – assumed to exist in conventional project management guidelines or models – in order to facilitate integrated implementation or integrated implementation management/coordination of the identified projects. This is particularly so since politics, socio-economic imperatives, political power relations, requirements for territorial integrity, technology, and global capitalism appear to drive the implementation of Africa's cross-border development projects at all the stages of the project life cycle. Thus, different management skills, systems and frameworks for integrated project implementation and implementation management may need to be developed subject to project and situational specificity.

The point of the argument above is that development programmes/projects are implemented in a much more complex internal/external institutional environment with diverse constituencies than that presupposed by NEPAD. Notions for integrated development/implementation increase complexity. In this respect, linking the development programmes/projects to the objectives and priorities of institutional structures that manage/coordinate their implementation, or structures that are responsible for their implementation, provides better chances for their success than the imposition of unique, large-scale regional infrastructure pilot projects with no links to NDPs and RECs. The afore-mentioned concerns suggest that NEPAD needs to adopt an astute and prudent combination of diverse planning and management frameworks based on the specific requirements of projects and situational specificity. The use of such frameworks, however, needs to be premised upon integrative planning and implementation management frameworks in order to ensure overall alignment with objectives for integrated development or integrated implementation.

In other contexts in the global arena, frameworks for collective engagement have been developed for adoption by institutional structures at different spatial categories in order to accommodate the dynamism in the global institutional environment, whilst retaining individual organisational identity or territorial integrity. Initiatives within this context take cognisance of the prevailing challenges of development in the context of globalisation, and the recognition that old methods of addressing development, infrastructure provision, poverty reduction, and doing business in individual organisations may no longer be operative across international/national borders. (Examples of the afore-mentioned frameworks include the UN Global Compact, which was developed to facilitate cooperative engagement between the UN, governments, labour, business and civil society organisations as the representatives of broader communities (UN, 2004). Similarly, the Caux Round Table Principles for Business were launched to facilitate “a truly global, ethically-based business system” (Goodpaster, undated), cognisant of the unique requirements of diverse business organisations, and the need for accessibility of this framework to diverse cultures globally.)

9.2.4 Incompatible interface between the "project approach" and "regional perspective"

It is unclear how NEPAD aimed to balance its "project approach" to ensure alignment with a programme context at regional/sub-regional levels, particularly so since the identified regional infrastructure projects do not appear to be designed as part of a programme. Similarly, NEPAD's simultaneous adoption of a "regional perspective" as the starting point for the development of regional infrastructure increases confusion, particularly so cognisant of the differences between large-scale regional infrastructure projects in individual countries (i.e., energy projects) and multinational cross-border regional infrastructure projects (i.e., transport/roads projects). In other words, how is NEPAD's "project approach" related to the "regional perspective"?

For example, how will the application of the regional perspective co-exist with the "principle of subsidiarity" in relation to decision-making, project selection, management of institutional relationships between the various spatial categories, and allocation of resources to projects? This is particularly so since popular participation in project selection, construction and management was one of the key actions proposed by NEPAD in the development of regional infrastructure (NEPAD, 2001, Para.103: 23). In other words, how will regional and sub-regional structures address the issue of implementation support/funding from national governments, within the context of a regional perspective that appears to circumscribe the role of the state and national structures/formations in project selection? Therefore, the analysis of how the afore-mentioned issues are interrelated and how they have collectively impacted on the characteristics of institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP needs further examination.

9.2.5 Lack of institutional capacity

One would have expected NEPAD to emphasise, at the outset, institutional capacity assessment and the development of institutional capacity to support the implementation of pilot projects in the short-term and for spatial expansion in the long-tem, particularly so given the objectives of the identified projects: to "kick-start" Africa's development. Instead, at the integrative levels of management NEPAD predetermined at the conceptual stages (during the development of NEPAD's Strategic Framework) the institutional partners, financing arrangements, project scope, and institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation support and management/coordination, seemingly without having conducted the proposed institutional capacity assessments.

The afore-mentioned institutional mechanisms and arrangements appear to have been based on NEPAD's inadequate understanding of the internal/external institutional environment and expectations of support from development partners vis-à-vis NEPAD's objectives for the development of regional infrastructure. It appears, however, that NEPAD's (inadequate) understanding of the institutional environment at the integrative levels of management was not subsequently verified during programme development in the Infrastructure STAP, resulting in erroneous assumptions being made and cascaded to the Infrastructure STAP at the various levels of management/planning and infrastructure sectors.

The lack of institutional capacity assessment also appears to be linked to NEPAD's prescriptive approach to planning: this approach has instead facilitated the top-down elaboration of programmes/projects that focus on NEPAD's narrow interests for global connectivity/integration, openness and connectivity, in contradiction to the range of response actions depicted in NEPAD's Strategic Framework for the development of regional infrastructure and NEPAD's various sectoral programmes. The lack of institutional capacity assessment also appears to be linked to NEPAD's inadequate prioritisation of requisite interventions to facilitate effective integrated implementation management/coordination of

NEPAD's infrastructure STAP. In this regard, NEPAD's HSGIC appear to have failed in their mandated/assumed role to facilitate and oversee institutional capacity assessment at the various spatial categories, so that effective plans would be elaborated for implementation relative to the identified capacity constraints.

As a result, the analyses of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and roads programme reveal an endemic lack of institutional capacity for effective implementation or implementation management/coordination of the identified projects, let alone for integrated implementation. It also appears that the lack of institutional capacity is exacerbated by NEPAD's inadequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme/project development and implementation management, particularly in the context of integrated development and integrated implementation management/coordination proposed by NEPAD. In addition, inadequate institutions, complex and inadequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements to manage institutional relationships at the various spatial categories as well as intractable constraints in the external/internal institutional environment in RECs appear to have exacerbated the problem of lack of institutional capacity for the implementation of NEPAD's projects.

Arguably, the lack of institutional capacity appears to have resulted in the inordinate influence on NEPAD's strategic decisions, of idealistic foreign and inoperative economic doctrines and methodologies, rather than the espousal of practical approaches including relevant programmes/projects for the development of cross-border regional roads infrastructure. It is thus possible that the lack of institutional capacity has also contributed to NEPAD's adoption of the prescriptive approach to planning, although the lack of institutional capacity to do the requisite detailed planning entailed in this approach circuitously contributed to poor planning. Thus, capacity assessment at national levels, in respect of the wherewithal of states' apparatus to facilitate harmonisation of sector policy, governance and regulatory regimes, for example, appears to not have been conducted at all. Capacity assessment in RECs also appears to overlap with the AfDB's role in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, thereby creating confusion.

Similar practises, as depicted above, characterised the failed implementation of previous regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects (such as the TAH and LPA's transport programme discussed in APPENDIX B,) where institutional capacity was not assessed before the proposal, approval, and roll-out of programmes for implementation. As a result, this research has identified the lack of institutional capacity as a significant constraint in the implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes/projects: it affects programme/ project design as well as the determination of the relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for project implementation and implementation management. (In project management, constraints in the management/ implementation of projects are generally identified as time, cost, and quality. Thus, one may argue that certain levels of institutional/organisational capacity to effectively implement projects are assumed to exist at the time projects are approved for implementation. In Africa's development programmes/projects, however, conditions are different and such assumptions may not hold: projects generally appear to be planned and approved without establishing the requisite capacity for implementation resulting in implementation failure. For these reasons, the EC's Project Cycle Management Guidelines (2004:99) have identified the importance of institutional capacity assessment in development projects. Similarly, the explanation of processes entailed in the World Bank's institutional appraisal (Baum, 1982) underscores the importance of institutional capacity assessment and development for project implementation success.)

Thus, the 1st NEPAD Infrastructure review overlooked the fundamental structural causes of the problems it sought to address: it only treated the superficial symptoms by recommending technical interventions, whilst leaving inadequate institutions/institutional structures intact. For these reasons, it may well be that the recommendations of the AfDB report (2003) had little palliative effect on some of the fundamental reasons for the failure of African institutions – i.e., institutional structures trying to do too much but with no capacity for implementation.

Therefore, the recommendations in the illustrative SWOT analysis, depicted in APPENDIX F and discussed in Chapter 7, underscore the significance of NEPAD to address internal institutional capacity deficits/constraints as a priority, rather than focusing on the management of institutional relations with donors and development partners.

9.2.6 Inadequate project organisation management

The inconsistencies with respect to the levels of work in which many regional, sub-regional or national institutions operate to implement regional infrastructure programmes (or even other development programmes) appear to result from inadequacies in project organisation management. For example, NEPAD does not explain in the AfDB's report (2003) how institutional structures that ostensibly possess a wealth of experience and expertise in the implementation of similar development programmes, such as the World Bank and AfDB, got entangled in "perfectly understandable confusion and misunderstanding regarding roles and responsibilities" (*ibid*: 35)in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP.

This is particularly so since, in explaining how the World Bank's project cycle evolves, Baum (1982) argued that the requisite processes at the various stages of the project life cycle involved experienced multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary technical specialists and projects staff, "who are expected to have a broad understanding of development issues and the capacity to make sound, independent judgements" (*ibid:* 5). Cognisant of the expected high levels of application area expertise and experience in projects facilitated by the World Bank's staff, it is possible that the "perfectly understandable confusion" (AfDB, 2003:35) displayed in NEPAD's projects either illustrates the inadequate use of relevant project management methodologies for project organisation management, or the negative implications for project implementation of the diverse institutional structures in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, or both of the afore-mentioned issues.

The 2nd Infrastructure review also stopped short of addressing the more controversial issues in NEPAD's project organisation management: the 2nd Infrastructure review shifted the responsibility to RECs to develop a framework to manage institutional relationships in processes over which RECs evidently have no control. It also recommended technical interventions in order to ameliorate the identified problems. Therefore, the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review failed to address the issue of inadequate institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support integrated implementation management of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and associated sectoral programmes/projects.

For example, NEPAD's 2nd Infrastructure STAP review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 106-108) confirmed the prevalence of overlapping institutional arrangements, which arguably contribute to the obfuscation around roles and responsibilities of various institutional structures at various spatial categories in the implementation of regional development programmes. However, instead of recommending practical instruments to resolve the identified overlaps, or inconsistencies in project organisation management, the TCII and NEPAD review (*ibid*) recommended the development of a framework (by RECs) for the management of institutional relationships. This position was adopted by all the affected parties or their representatives (such as NEPAD Secretariat, AfDB, RECs). Such a stance is, however, to be expected given the *apparent reluctance* in regional, sub-regional and national institutions to resolve overlapping regional integration arrangements in the short-term. It also appears there is a measure of reluctance to articulate what the identified structures for implementation/implementation management are actually expected to deliver, or to ensure accountability for project deliverables in the relevant institutional structures.

The multiplicity of diverse institutional structures for project implementation support and implementation management/coordination exacerbates the problem for project organisation management, particularly so in the absence of strong supranational structures to guide consistent programme planning and support NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated

implementation management/coordination. Thus, it is possible that the planning inputs from different institutional structures have also contributed to NEPAD's adoption and cascade of diverse and contradictory messages, with negative implications for the design of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP programmes/ projects including institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management.

9.2.7 Delegation of critical project activities to aspirational project structures

Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned constraints, there is an evidenced (in the recommendations of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP,) delegation of overlapping roles and responsibilities for implementation/implementation management to structures that lack the requisite capacity, or assigning tasks to institutional structures at their levels of incompetence, or to *intended* or *aspirational* project structures. Likewise, NEPAD's failure to posit a structured approach to project organisation management has resulted in the indiscriminate delegation of roles and responsibilities in NEPAD's various Infrastructure reviews to structures that do not posses the power, authority and capacity to address the identified constraints (such as NEPAD's Secretariat or RECs). Some of the recommendations of the Infrastructure STAP reviews, while relevant, extend beyond the spheres of the RECs' operations; some of the recommendations in the TCII and NEPAD report (2005) are more pertinent to the management of states' apparatus (at national levels,) in spheres of influence beyond the control of RECs. Such proposed interventions result in confusion regarding the purpose and role of NEPAD, or its institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.

Such practices are prevalent in the management of Africa's regional development programmes/projects. Similar practices characterised the LPA's Transport and Communication's programme (of 1980) and TAH and "missing links" initiative (of 1970), discussed in APPENDIX B. Thus, the discussions on the various assessments of implementation challenges of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and

the related sectoral programmes, in particular the roads programme, suggest that since the failed implementation of the LPA's programme and the TAH and "missing links" initiative, little has changed with respect to the institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the implementation of Africa's infrastructure regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

The issues highlighted in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP reviews (AfDB, 2003; TCII & NEPAD, 2005) are not unique to Africa or programme/project implementation of regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation in the African context. As a result, the previous implementation of similar projects in the international context provides valuable lessons for NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme. The mechanisms to ameliorate the identified challenges between the international experience and NEPAD's, however, differ markedly. For example, the EU's TENs initiative emphasised institutional reform/ development; harmonisation of diverse and multiple transport sector policies regulatory and governance regimes; active role of the states in the planning, financing and implementation of agreed transportation networks; and support by strong, competent supranational authorities with the authority to act.

The afore-mentioned interventions helped to increase the effectiveness of technical interventions. In addition, the EU's TENs initiative illustrated that institutional reform/development is a long-term process: it requires the active participation and commitment of all stakeholders, particularly at national levels. Also, the effective implementation of agreed infrastructure projects requires the commitment of adequate domestic resources at national levels for the planned development outcomes to manifest. Almost all of the afore-mentioned conditions/success factors are neither met in NEPAD's roads programme, nor in the Infrastructure STAP.

9.2.8 Inadequate scheduling

NEPAD, including its lead agencies responsible for the development of the Infrastructure STAP, must shoulder the blame for creating unreasonable expectations of the immediate realisation of physical regional infrastructure projects. This is because most of the reasons for implementation delays proffered in the various comments above were already prevalent in Africa's development landscape and in the implementation of regional integration initiatives before, and at the time that NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP was developed. In fact, one may argue that NEPAD's initiative for Africa's regeneration was *also* conceived precisely to address the afore-mentioned impediments to the effective implementation of programmes/projects, which were developed to support the realisation of Africa's development agenda to facilitate a better future for its peoples. Therefore, NEPAD or the developers of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP possessed the relevant information to propose effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements to either mitigate the consequential risks of the negative impact of the inadequate internal/external institutional environment on the implementation of the planned development programmes/projects. The expectations for the fulfilment of NEPAD's commitments have, however, not been met.

Some of the stakeholder responses to NEPAD's implementation challenges reveal a limited grasp of the implications of time-consuming and at times delicate (requisite) political, funding, technical and governance processes that must be integrated in the planning for the development of large-scale regional infrastructure projects, in particular cross-border regional infrastructure and transit facilitation projects. The timelines in relation to the afore-mentioned multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral activities are, in the majority of cases, protracted and politically charged.

For example, project preparation processes may include the following steps/elements:

- Protracted funding negotiations with multiple sponsors in order to obtain funding. Such negotiations and the characteristics/priorities of sponsors determine the characteristics of project elements, project scope, project constraints and risks, service providers, and stakeholders;
- Lengthy processes for collective engagement with various sectors of society/institutions at national levels and other relevant institutions/ institutional structures at the different spatial categories;
- Complex trans-state political negotiations at the levels of states, or RECs, involving multiple departments in each of the participating member states, in order to finalise bilateral/multilateral protocols for the implementation of the identified projects, apportion the project's work and benefits, and identify the requisite complementary investments to ensure integrated development; and
- Harmonisation of policies, regulatory and governance regimes including the associated institutional reforms and/or development.

Therefore, it takes a while to see the physical manifestations of planning in the development of cross-border regional roads infrastructure. This is particularly so in the event that multiple countries with diverse policy, sector, regulatory, governance and macro-economic regimes are participating in the implementation of the identified regional projects in a multilateral context.

The time frames allocated for NEPAD's HSGIC to mainstream institutional reforms in the areas of democracy, political, economic and corporate governance (i.e., six months) are too ambitious or may even be deemed idealistic for the requisite for institutional reforms. The author's view on this aspect takes cognisance of the erosion, over a number of decades, of Africa's institutions through the legacy that colonialism bequeathed Africa, neo-patrimonialism, mal-governance, and endemic corruption. For these reasons, NEPAD's focus on institutional reform and development as well as institutional/individual capacity building, from the outset, would be critical for the envisaged regional infrastructure development outcomes to manifest.

NEPAD's ambitious time-frames have also obviated processes for popular participation, where such processes were to be instituted. In some cases, it may even prove difficult for some of the fragile or underdeveloped states, or NEPAD's HSGIC, to promote participatory decision-making in the development of regional infrastructure projects: the related institutions are either weak or non-existent in some African countries.

9.2.9 Inordinate reliance on external resources

NEPAD's prerogative for the development and implementation of the Infrastructure STAP is illustrated in the inordinate dependency on external resources (including funding and technical support). As a result, NEPAD has identified donor support (including the negotiation of donor relations), support from the (UN) multilateral system and international community, and increased FDI inflows as some of the key elements to support the development of regional infrastructure. In addition, NEPAD has identified the support of a benevolent global financial architecture and commitment to global governance as some of the critical institutional mechanisms to support the attainment of its objectives for the development of regional infrastructure. NEPAD's inordinate reliance on external resources or exogenous factors for the development/implementation of regional infrastructure programme/projects is erroneous.

The afore-mentioned situation gives the impression that even the implementation of projects identified under the roads programme, which are planned for funding by national governments, is conditional on their attracting donor finance or foreign private-sector investment. As a result, global financial institutions, such as the World Bank, appear to have an invasive influence on project scope and prioritisation of regional roads networks. Given the extreme levels of institutional inadequacy at national levels, the additional financing burden of the identified NEPAD projects also increases implementation risks irrespective of the projects' merits and their benefits to national and regional development agendas. Thus, NEPAD's stance suggests an abrogation of responsibility in favour of short-term

quick wins that benefit foreign private sector investors and global financial institutions at the expense of addressing internal structural constraints at national levels that may stymie the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure projects in the long term.

For example, in the majority of African countries, the limitations to improve roads infrastructure stocks are linked to macro-economic distress, fiscal and monetary constraints, debt, reliance on foreign private sector investments and related funding constraints to support planned infrastructure investments. Presumably because of the afore-mentioned problems, NEPAD reserved the development of PPPs for certain categories of projects, such as investment projects. Yet, facilitation projects that address NEPAD's key objectives for regional integration, inter-African trade, capacity building and poverty reduction will be financed through domestic funding instruments or donor support.

Similarly, TCII and NEPAD (2005: 14) accedes that it is now generally recognised that investment in the roads sector will be made primarily by the public sector; private-sector participation will be targeted at performance-based contracts for greenfields developments, asset management, and roads maintenance. The TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*: 15), however, acknowledges that so far, private sector participation in Africa's infrastructure investments has been limited for a number of factors, such as the "perception of a poor investment climate, high cost, high risk, shortage of risk capital for project development, and limited availability of instruments and structures to mitigate risk." The afore-mentioned concerns have been raised previously by some authors (see: Watson, 1998); yet, the pace of reforms to address these concerns is excruciatingly slow.

Some of the negative implications of the external sources of finance on programme design illustrate the need for NEPAD/Africa's institutions to develop effective domestic instruments for sustainable financing of regional infrastructure developments and implementation support. In the current dispensation, for the planned positive development outcomes to manifest under NEPAD, effective use

and management of aid for the development of regional infrastructure will require transformational changes in the ethos of both the donors from the industrialised countries and the recipient African governments.

As a result of NEPAD's inordinate reliance on external interventions to support the implementation of its trans-/multidisciplinary and trans-/multi-sectoral programmatic interventions, the possible proposal of diverse interventions by different institutional structures at different levels of management and across international boundaries may ensue. The inordinate influence of international institutions and institutional structures in NEPAD's regional infrastructure development agenda also increases the potential for the proposal and prioritising of inappropriate interventions for the development of regional infrastructure. In addition, a wide scope of diverse interventions may overwhelm fragile regional/sub-regional institutional structures. The inordinate reliance on external resources also has implications for programme design and strategies for project implementation/implementation management to support the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives as well as to develop institutional capacity for spatial expansion. Thus, a related concern is whether the ability exists (in Africa's regional and sub-regional institutions) to propose programmes/projects to reverse the entrenched colonial spatial patterns in regional transport infrastructure, cognisant of NEPAD's reliance on private foreign finance, credit, and aid for regional infrastructure improvements.

9.2.10 Adverse impact of complex global rules/trade agreements

The elaboration and operationalization of NEPAD's strategy for the implementation of the Infrastructure STAP and related sectoral programmes appears to reflect the pressures of the WTO's prescriptions or its institutional mechanisms, such as the TRIPs and TRIMs. This includes rules pertaining to financing, government procurement, provision of services, and access to technology. Complexity in Africa's development landscape has also increased because of globalisation: rules of global institutions, such as the WTO and IFIs

including the World Bank, IMF and IFC have far-reaching implications for the implementation of regional, sub-regional or national infrastructure projects, particularly since these afore-mentioned institutions more often than not tie financial support and technical assistance to trade-related packages and export-promotion incentives. Yet, the processes for collective engagement in global trade and related sectoral interventions also have a life of their own, with implications for the implementation of projects within limited time-frames.

Therefore, included under the considerations of NEPAD's strategy for project implementation are the prescriptions of the global financial architecture, diverse imperatives for regional integration, obligations of member states in RECs and across overlapping RIAs with respect to RTAs and FTAs with the developed countries and/or their institutions, and external/internal pressures for implementation progress of the NEPAD initiative itself. These afore-mentioned institutional mechanisms and arrangements have diverse and exacting requirements that may particularly burden fragile institutions, with implications for the effective implementation of the identified programmes/projects.

Other pressures on the elaboration and implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure projects include requirements of neo-liberal prescriptions for world connectivity, openness and integration; FDI imperatives for market access, efficiency and access to resources vis-à-vis internal concerns with poor productivity that are linked to structural constraints including the small size of African economies; and development of infrastructure networks (particularly regional transport/roads) that facilitate cost effective and competitive access of African exports to external and internal markets. Other influences include considerations for the capital intensity and size of projects vis-à-vis the nature, multiplicity and size of participating organisations in NEPAD's regional infrastructure initiatives and anticipated returns on investment. Therefore, the capacity of projects structures for programme/project development and implementation management counts.

The associated administrative requirements to comply with global rules are cumbersome, particularly so in the context of inadequate institutions. This situation is exacerbated by the lack of institutional capacity at regional, sub-regional and national levels. Lack of alignment or contradictions between the requirements of global rules and national interests also require prudent and astute management, negotiation, and careful balancing of interests in order to achieve the work of NEPAD's projects. Whether territorial integrity – a significant principle in NEPAD's aspirations for Africa's regeneration – is attainable under such conditions is debatable.

NEPAD, however, appears to not have factored the impact of the afore-mentioned issues in its programme/project planning at the various stages of the project life-cycle. Instead, NEPAD appears to have replaced rigorous planning and astute management of influences of the external/internal environment with imprudent and unadulterated optimism of programme/project success based on the proposed partnerships with institutions of the developed north. Thus, the understanding of the implications of the global political economy for the development of Africa's regional infrastructure assets is significant for the understanding of some of the underpinning causes of problems in the implementation of the identified programmes/projects in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. Such understanding will facilitate the development of appropriate policies and financing instruments for the effective development of regional infrastructure in order to support the transformation of African economies. Different approaches to and uses of planning may also need to be adopted with implications for NEPAD's project implementation management systems.

9.2.11 Failure in integrated implementation management

The various definitions of integrated development detailed in APPENDIX A articulate subtly varying notions of expected outcomes of integrated development, subject to situational specificity. As a result, the seemingly diverse understanding of integrated development in NEPAD's context, and the extent to which the

objectives of integrated implementation management are articulated, or met, appears to arise from the diverse frames of reference of different institutional structures at the different levels of management, the different systems/principles to manage institutional relationships at the various spatial categories, the different models for regional integration, and the unique requirements of NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation. In this respect, NEPAD's governance and management structures failed to propose a consistent framework for integrated development of integrated implementation/implementation management in the development of regional infrastructure.

The complexity in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP is exacerbated by the challenging context for integrated development in Africa's development landscape, which includes diverse and mutually exclusive ideologies regarding approaches to regional integration or sectoral cooperation. In addition, the harmonisation of diverse policy, regulatory and governance regimes in various member states will require political will/commitment and concerted effort from the various stakeholders and trans-state actors to ensure effective integrated coordination and implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure projects. The multiple institutional structures for implementation management/ coordination, which appear to be led by international institutions/institutional structures in NEPAD's partnerships for project implementation support, add to the complexity – particularly so since the afore-mentioned institutional structures appear to operate under premises that are inimical to notions for integrated development in Africa's situational specificity.

The problem with NEPAD, however, appears to go deeper than the lack of a common understanding of concepts or approaches to the integrated delivery of development or (cross-border) regional infrastructure programmes/projects. It appears that there is even lack of a common understanding of the objective and substance of programmes/projects identified under NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, and how these are linked to the planned outcomes for integrated practical

implementation and integrated regional development. (For example, in the facilitation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects, such as NEPAD's roads programme, the complexity arises from the following factors: the multiplicity of actors and diverse development interventions to attain the same objectives; different frames of reference for all the role players; magnitude of development constraints and challenges across international borders; and influence of PESTLE factors and related institutions across the various spatial categories – particularly so cognisant of the diversity in levels of development of member states at regional/sub-regional levels.)

The implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/projects is also influenced by the legacy of historical and contemporary approaches to development programmes/projects that are often underpinned by a strong sectoral focus. This environment increases complexity for the implementation of integrated development initiatives. It also increases complexity to implement effective approaches for integrated implementation management of regional development programmes/projects, particularly so since the institutional structures and proposed regional projects are also underpinned by a strong sectoral focus. As a result, the effective integration of multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-disciplinary inputs will be required in the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure programmes/projects, in alignment with NEPAD's articulated multiple development objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation.

The success of integrated practical implementation or integrated regional development in regional infrastructure programmes/projects is, however, more of a function of the effectiveness of the relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support the attainment of objectives for integrated development of regional infrastructure. In addition, the characteristics, capacity, or ethos of institutional structures/organisations tasked with project implementation or implementation management/coordination will play a significant role to facilitate effective integrated development, rather than the efficacy of technical

interventions alone. In this regard, institutional reform and development of inadequate institutions as well as the development of institutional capacity to support the attainment of objectives for integrated development is paramount.

In addition, multi-/trans-sectoral and multi-/trans-disciplinary inputs will be required to facilitate the development of integrative linkages in planning hierarchies, together with the relevant programmes/projects for integrated development/implementation. Nevertheless, the complexity of the external/ internal institutional environment in which NEPAD's roads programme, for example, is implemented will require a minimalist approach in the short-term – which is less overwhelming to fragile institutions. This suggested approach needs to support the development of adequate institutional capacity for spatial expansion in the medium-term to long-term, and to ensure the adequate sharing of available resources (as NEPAD originally intended in its Strategic Framework,): it may also facilitate the development of building blocks for vertical and horizontal integration of NEPAD's policy strategies/response actions, development objectives, influences of the external/internal institutional environment, programmes/projects, and institutional structures for project implementation/ implementation management. In this regard, the analysis of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP, or roads programme, raises a range of issues that transcend the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure, with implications for Africa's development agenda as a whole.

9.2.12 Failure in communication

NEPAD's communication of implementation progress/challenges and/or projects' status may at best be described as inconclusive: it has resulted in the questionable status of projects and impaired NEPAD's integrity in the eyes of development partners, media, and development analysts. In cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure projects, the requirements for coherent coordination and effective communication to support the implementation are critical. This is

because in multinational projects that involve multiple sponsoring/implementing institutions/organisations across international borders and complex internal/ external institutional environments for implementation of regional development programmes, the potential for distortion of messages is increased. These afore-mentioned dynamics are illustrated in the detailed SWOT analysis of perceptions of NEPAD presented in APPENDIX F.

In NEPAD's case, the complexity of the external/internal institutional environment is exacerbated by the pressure to facilitate the attainment of multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation. In addition, the inadequate planning and preparation of programmes/projects, multiplicity of diverse structures and inter-state actors increase complexity and associated challenges for project implementation. To paraphrase Mintzberg (1994), how the afore-mentioned institutional structures and trans-state actors perceive planning, use planning, or are affected by planning has implications for programme/project implementation or implementation management.

The afore-mentioned project technical interventions do not supplant the requisite processes, in NEPAD's case, for collective engagement and communication at and across the various levels of management and spatial categories, in order to develop an effective strategy for project implementation. Broad-based inclusive participation in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP will facilitate the development of a common vision and allow for consensus building on the way forward. A broad-based inclusive approach to the development of regional infrastructure will also assist NEPAD to garner the much-needed emotional/practical support and commitment to the implementation of the identified regional infrastructure projects. Agreement on the proposed implementation processes to support the integration of trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multi-disciplinary inputs for programme/project implementation will also facilitate the effective and efficient multi-usage of limited resources, particularly in the context of integrated development.

Given the unique characteristics of NEPAD's regional infrastructure projects, where international, multinational, institutional and trans-state actors are involved, other relevant multidisciplinary frameworks may be integrated in the development of appropriate strategies for programme/project implementation planning, project scope and organisation management. Therefore, an effective communication strategy becomes imperative.

9.2.13 Failure to learn from the lessons of past implementation failures

The identified challenges in the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP underscore NEPAD's failure to learn from the lessons of history regarding the implementation failures of previous regional transport/roads infrastructure development programmes/initiatives. For example, after decades of grappling with the same challenges in the provision of cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services, NEPAD appears to have replicated the same mistakes in its approach to the development of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects. The parameters of NEPAD's approach include the use of "acceptable" orthodox economic policies, so-called "economic heresies," "universal truths," and "sophistries" (Robinson, 1971: vii), which were previously identified as having "…little relevance to the problems to which they pronounced" (*ibid*). As a result, NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure appears to have limited applicability to the identified challenges and constraints in the development of cross-border regional infrastructure in a dynamic institutional environment.

This problem is exacerbated by NEPAD's unrealistic expectations of institutions/ institutional structures of the developed north for implementation support, which has resulted in impracticable arrangements regarding the management of institutional relationships (i.e., between African states; and between Africa, development partners, and bilateral/multilateral donors) in so far as they impact on the selection, preparation and implementation of regional infrastructure projects. The afore-mentioned challenges are exacerbated by the multiplicity of

projects with no clear links/interface with programmes, lack of collective engagement in programme/project development and management systems, and ineffective structures to coordinate/manage implementation or implementation management. Previously, the ensuing challenges in the afore-mentioned areas contributed to the implementation failures of the LPA's Transport and Communications programme as well as the TAH and "missing links" initiative.

The development of large-scale projects similar to those proposed by NEPAD requires extensive institutional capacity, which is typically found in large bureaucracies such as the EU and the World Bank. As Dunham (1978: 11) argued, such large-scale projects (previously) presented a greater degree of "administrative complexity…more bureaucratic (organisational structures)…with an in-built tendency towards formalisation which creates problems of access for weaker groups." It is perhaps for such reasons that Stöhr and Tödtling (Gore, 1984: 158) described the manifestations of regional development planning to depict "…increasing functional and spatial integration of interacting systems of growing size, complexity and controllability."

The standardised and bureaucratic approaches to the management of development programmes have not worked previously in developing countries: it is therefore curious why NEPAD opted for this approach. These approaches, however, allowed for a certain measure of external control by international institutions/institutional structures on development programmes/projects at the various spatial categories in developing countries, Africa in particular. The reality then is that contrary to the objectives of people-centred development, the people as the drivers and beneficiaries of the proposed development processes have been emasculated by the confluence of prescriptive, bureaucratic and secretive institutional mechanisms and arrangements that fail to support the development of regional infrastructure.

Notably, NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for implementation management/coordination mirror the institutional frameworks introduced during the LPA of 1980 to facilitate coordination of regional integration initiatives, with ineffective results.

It is hoped that lessons from NEPAD's interventions in the Infrastructure STAP, particularly the roads programme, will serve as building blocks to address the extensive, debilitating problems in roads infrastructure and transit facilitation discussed briefly in this chapter, and to develop institutional capacity for effective integrated implementation management and for spatial expansion in the medium-long term. In this regard, the effective use of *integrative* project management methodologies may assist to minimise complexity in planning. In addition, other planning frameworks/models and institutional mechanisms for collective engagement and integrated development may be used in combination, to develop effective links between strategy and implementation as well as to link programme/project objectives, action planning, and performance management to the purpose, development objectives, programmes/projects, and structures for integrated implementation management/coordination.

9.3 Recommendations

The issues discussed in this research report underscore complexity in NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme. These issues suggest that extensive planning, and effective management of regional infrastructure developments – which include effective communication, negotiation and consensus-seeking – will be required in order to develop a common vision for effective implementation support. This will facilitate broad-based commitment and support to the delivery of regional infrastructure programmes/projects than what has been provided in NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements. Thus, a thorough understanding of what, and how the causal variables that impact on the conception, preparation, implementation/implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects have been managed, and by

who, may facilitate the development of relevant corrective interventions to support future integrated implementation management/coordination of regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

Furthermore, an understanding of the diverse premises for planning and implementation of Africa's development programmes/projects may facilitate a better understanding of how intractable challenges in the external/internal institutional environment impact on the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. This understanding may also allow for the effective apportioning of accountability for implementation failure, or success: it will also facilitate the development of relevant corrective interventions where problems are effectively identified. Although development concerns and needs will be different at different levels of managements, sectors and spatial categories, the alignment of thinking facilitates convergence, rather than divergence; it facilitates unity of purpose and commitment to collective agreements at various spatial categories, rather than the evidenced pre-occupation with national interest or narrow mercantilism in regional, sub-regional and national institutions for coordinating regional integration initiatives.

Thus, the development of prudent policy strategies by national governments, and their elaboration into relevant programmes/projects that are supported by effective strategies and structures for project implementation/implementation management will be required to facilitate the attainment of planned development outcomes in the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure projects, similar to those mooted by NEPAD. In addition, effective institutions and institutional structures will be required to support the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects at, and within the various spatial categories (i.e., regional, sub-regional and national levels).

In the context of integrated development and integrated implementation/ implementation management of development projects with multiple objectives and multiple inputs from multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary contexts, one may

argue that the objectives and substance of implementation planning need to be planned for integration at the outset. In this regard, the inputs and outputs of planning in project implementation strategies need to integrate decisions at institutional, trans-sectoral, trans-/multidisciplinary spheres and structures across the different levels of management, rather than adhering to the rigid dictates of hierarchical planning processes or operational silos that predominate in prescriptive models.

Project management models and methodologies in this context provide a link between strategy, planning and implementation: at an operational level, these translate to the integration of tactics, action planning, project structures for implementation management, and performance management/control. In other words, project management models and methodologies provide a vertical and horizontal integration of decision-making, planning hierarchies and project activities at different levels of management, programmes/projects, and structures that perform the work of the projects. Thus, project management methodologies may be described as illustrating a practical link between what Mintzberg (1994: 78) termed "action planning" (illustrated in hierarchies of what he argues are supposed to be before-the-fact strategies and programmes) and "performance control" (illustrated in the hierarchies of operating plans, objectives and budgets) in prescriptive models.

(i) Pertinent questions that may be addressed in order to propose relevant corrective interventions include the following:

- What are the programme/project objectives and how are these linked to the constraints and challenges in the external/internal institutional environment including the elaboration of programmes/projects; are the projects feasible and within the capacity of states and sub-regional structures to implement within the available resource envelopes; how are these afore-mentioned planning hierarchies linked to strategies for project implementation and implementation management?

- What management system is proposed for integrated implementation management of the identified programmes, and has the identified system been developed in association with the relevant stakeholders in order to obtain buy-in and consensus as well as to ensure support for the attainment of articulated programme/project objectives in the different sub-regions?
- What are the implications for integrated implementation management of the underlying principles to manage institutional relations between the various states in trans-state trans-actions, and what are the implications of principles for cooperation between the institutional structures at various spatial categories for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure?
- What roles and responsibilities are assigned to the various structures mandated to facilitate integrated implementation management/coordination; what is the role of the state in order to ensure alignment between cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects with policy interventions, NDPs, and development priorities in member-states; and what existing or new structures need to be created or strengthened in order to facilitate or support integrated implementation management of the identified regional infrastructure projects?

(ii) The key areas with impact on institutional structures, which require NEPAD's careful consideration, are the following:

- Establishing links with policy/organisational strategies, objectives, programmes/projects, and influence of external/internal environments and structures for implementation management in order to effectively link action planning with performance control;
- Considering the characteristics, objectives and development priorities of institutional structures for implementation management/coordination in order to ensure alignment with the strategies for project implementation and implementation management in a context of clearly defined responsibilities and roles;

- Monitoring and actively managing the impact of behavioural aspects (i.e. personalities, attitudes) and competencies of people who lead, or are assigned to do the work of projects in terms of their "role definition" vis-à-vis their "role set" (Handy, 1993), and enforcing corrective mechanisms where necessary. These afore-mentioned aspect are particularly pertinent in the context of international projects that involve multiple and diverse multinational institutions, institutional structures and stakeholders in and across international borders/various spatial categories;
- Establishing the link between the purpose and objectives of individual project team members/institutional structures, and determining how their motivation and emotional commitment are linked to project performance in the context of predetermined objectives and evolving internal/external conditions; and
- Understanding and actively managing the impact of the confluence of a combination of systemic, corporate and individual issues on the performance of structures for integrated implementation management, particularly in the absence of coherent frameworks for collective engagement in the development of cross-border regional roads infrastructure projects.

(iii) Expediting the implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP projects may depend on such factors as the following:

- Combination of transformational leadership and strategic management of the impact of the external and internal environment on projects;
- Willingness by national governments and political commitment to address the challenges and constraints to implementation of regional infrastructure projects in a holistic manner subject to situational specificity;
- Active role of the state's broad-based institutional apparatus in project selection and implementation;
- Relevant approach to planning subject to situational and project specificity. In particular, the relevance and effectiveness of planning processes at the various spatial categories and levels of management/planning, and the

adequacy of institutional capacity to scrutinise and modify NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions in order to elaborate relevant programmes/projects for implementation are paramount;

- Attention to projects' characteristics in order to establish relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management;
- Adequacy of project preparation and implementation planning;
- Availability of domestic resources for implementation (including funding, technical capacity and human capital with the relevant competencies); and
- Sustained committed political support for implementation, particularly at national levels.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGY

This section defines operationally the terms or concepts used in this research. In some cases, other definitions by select authors are discussed in order to illustrate the different perspectives, highlight the multi-faceted nature of the identified concepts or terms, and explain how the identified diverse variables underpinning such terms and concepts are interrelated and impact on each other in so far as they relate to this research. The terms and concepts defined in this section include the following:

1. Institutions;
2. Institutional structures;
3. Institutional mechanisms;
4. Institutional arrangements;
5. Institutional capacity;
6. Integrated implementation management;
7. Project management;
8. Project;
9. Programme;
10. Levels of management;
11. Physical and non-physical infrastructure;
12. Transit facilitation;
13. Spatial categories;
14. Region and sub-region; and
15. "technical hair-splitting".

1 **Institutions**: The terms "institution" and "organisation" are often used interchangeably. There is, however, a general pattern to narrowly define institutions as organisations. As a result, the associated policy, legal, political, cultural, economic, technical, social, spatial, environmental, leadership, management, governance and regulatory frameworks that characterise institutions, and within which organisations operate, are de-linked. In some cases, either the association between the organisation and the afore-mentioned institutional frameworks is used synonymously to illustrate parts of a (multifaceted) system, or it is completely ignored.

A discussion on the various definitions of institutions follows. Some of the issues addressed in the discussion below highlight the implications of institutions for development projects. Other views articulated in the discussion are relevant to the development of a broader understanding of the conceptual, technical, political, socio-economic and spatial underpinnings in NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure, particularly so cognisant of NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation. In particular, the issues highlighted in the discussions also allude to the implications of the international institutions for the development and implementation of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme. (This view also takes cognisance of the multiple and diverse institutions/ institutional structures for programme development and implementation support in NEPAD, with implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management.)

1.1 Related Definitions

The *Oxford (Advanced Learner's) Dictionary – International Student's Edition* (2005: 774) defines an "institution" as: "…a large important organization that has a special purpose…a custom or system that has existed for a long time among a particular group of people…" In contrast, according to Møller (2005: 6), "…(the) concept of institutions is broader than that of organisations, and institutions may or may not include organisations." Thus, the narrow view of institutions including the limited understanding of their impact on development in general, and on infrastructure development specifically, stymies the exploration of a wide range of possible interventions to support the implementation of development programmes/projects, particularly cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ projects similar to those mooted by NEPAD.

Various authors (Deng, 2002; DIFD, 2003; European Commission (EC), 2004; Møller, 2005; Velasquez 2006) have defined institutions as collective forms of action to guide or support the activities, conduct and behaviours of individuals or organisations. In the afore-mentioned context, institutions are viewed as mechanisms and arrangements that are underpinned by the values, principles and culture of the society in which they are determined, in order to guide individual and

collective behaviours. It appears, however, that institutions carry different connotations for either individuals or groups, thereby signifying the implications of institutions for individual behaviour/action in groups and vice versa. Commons (in Deng, 2002: 213,) explained the role of individuals in an institutional environment when he argued that institutions denote "collective action in restraint, liberation, and expansion of individual action." In this framework, Commons (*ibid*) elaborates the link between institutions and individual action to signify trans-actions between individuals. As Commons argued, this perspective denotes a "shift from commodities, individuals…(and) exchanges to transactions and working rules of collective action" (*ibid*).

For Ruttan and Hayami (*ibid*), institutions are enabling instruments of governance to regulate individual behaviours in groups. DeRienzo (*ibid*) took this argument further when he clarified the relationship between the "institution" and "community" to signify a critical link between institutional mechanisms and arrangements to guide collective action. As DeRienzo (*ibid*) argued: "…(if) a community is a collection of people united around common goals, then institutions are those vehicles created by the community to achieve shared purposes, be they educational, commercial, industrial, recreational, cultural, or religious." Davis and North (*ibid*) also defined an institutional environment as a "…set of fundamental political, social, and legal rules that govern economic and political activity" (*ibid*). Although referring largely to a business or corporate context, Velasquez (2006: 12) defined institutions in relation to group trans-actions i.e., as systems of "relatively fixed patterns of activity" designed to organise and support society to achieve common goals.

Various disciplines or sectors appear to have their own peculiar or unique explanations of traits that characterise institutions, although the overall frameworks in subjective or objective explanations are the same. For example, in international relations, Bull (Møller, 2005: 6-7) identified the following features as defining institutions: "…the balance of power, international law, diplomacy…managerial system of the great powers, and war as well as the state itself." Similarly, Keohane (*ibid*) argued that institutions are similar to regimes with their "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge." Using a definition derived from North, the UK's

Department for International Development (DFID, 2003: i-iii) defined institutions as the "rules of the game." According to the DFID (*ibid*), institutions include not only the "…formal rules, (and) informal constraints …(such as) norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct," but also "incentives and enforcement mechanisms." The DFID (*ibid*) provides some practical examples of the relationship between institutions and their application at various spatial categories, including the implications for development programmes of their cascade at the various levels of management. As the DFID (*ibid*) argued: "Institutions…may be formal – legal systems, property rights, enforcement mechanisms; or informal – customs, traditions. They may also operate at different levels – international (eg. (sic) WTO rules), national (eg. laws, constitutions), social (eg. norms of conduct, status of women), family (eg. inheritance rules). They may nest within larger institutions – eg. village-based collective institutions nested within the policy institutions of government." The DFID's example of the cascade of institutions suggests that interventions to reform/develop institutional frameworks, or institutions themselves, need to facilitate alignment between such interventions at the various levels of management and different spatial categories, in order to effect sustainable transformation of the institutional environment in any specified spatial category.

Baum and Tolbert (1985) defined institutions as the totality of mechanisms and arrangements for the development of an enabling policy environment at the identified spatial categories i.e., at national/country levels. Previously, Baum (1982: 12) used an example of the World Bank's activities, in the context of its project life cycle, to illustrate the significance of institutions for the implementation/ management of development programmes/projects at the various levels of planning/management or stages of the project life cycle. Baum's example (*ibid*) also highlighted the implications of institutions for the various participating institutional structures/organisations, particularly so in respect of the levels of institutional capacity required to facilitate the planning and implementation of development programmes/projects (i.e., political support, technical/financial resources, leadership and managerial competencies and stakeholder-management skills).

Box A.1: The World Bank's Project Cycle

Baum (1982:5-18) explains how the World Bank's project cycle evolves: it comprises rigorous phases of project identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiation and presentation to the Board of Directors, implementation and supervision, and evaluation. Experienced multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary technical specialists and projects staff, "who are expected to have a broad understanding of development issues and the capacity to make sound, independent judgements" (*ibid:*5) support projects' preparation as the various phases of the project cycle evolve. They are also required to assess the potential impact of institutional issues on the project's success as part of the project's appraisal.

The institutional appraisal is not only concerned with determining the ability of the structure to implement the project, but also to understand the cultural context of institutional arrangements with the objective of facilitating sound institution building for successful implementation and operation. In this regard, institutional appraisal covers not only the organisational arrangements of the borrowing entity, such as "its organization, management, staffing, policies, and procedures, but also the whole array of government policies that conditions the environment in which the institution operates" (*ibid*:12). According to Baum (*ibid*:13):

> Institutional appraisal is concerned with a host of questions, such as whether the entity is properly organized and its management adequate to do the job, whether local capabilities and initiatives are being used effectively, and whether policy or institutional changes are required outside the entity to achieve project objectives. These question are important for traditional project entities; they are even more important (and difficult to answer) for entities charged with preparing and carrying out the new-style projects intended to benefit the rural and urban poor where there may be no established institutional pattern to follow. The Bank's experience to date has not yielded any ready-made solutions for putting together an institution that can effectively and economically deliver goods and services to large numbers of people…and that can motivate them to change their behaviour" (*ibid*: 13).

At the stage of negotiations, which typically involves the World Bank and the borrowers (i.e., countries), loan agreements specify how the project's activities and those of the ministries involved will be coordinated, with detailed schedules for project implementation to ensure the project's success. After completion of the negotiations stage, an amended appraisal report (substantiated by the World Bank President's report and the loan documents) is submitted to the World Bank's Executive Directors for approval. This process marks the end of this phase of the project's cycle prior to implementation (*ibid*: 17-18).

Source: Derived from Baum, W.C. 1982. The Project Cycle, *The World Bank*, pp.5-18.

Cognisant of the discussions above, ***institutions*** may be defined in this research to include the structures, formal and informal systems, rules and regulations for collective engagement that influence, guide and regulate individual or collective action/behaviour in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects in order to support the attainment of the articulated programme/project objectives for the benefit of society. (In this study, *individual* includes natural or juristic persons; the latter include institutional structures/ organisations that perform the work of institutions.) Institutions may also be construed to include frameworks, mechanisms and arrangements for action across

the various spheres of influence, disciplines or sectors in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure: these include the political, economic, social, technical, cultural, traditional, financial, legislative, legal or regulatory spheres. Institutions also articulate the frameworks and modalities for collective engagement in and across the various sectors/participants in society – such as the public sector, private sector, civil society, individual organisations or state/trans-state actors across the various spatial categories – in order to facilitate integrated development of regional infrastructure through the relevant institutional structures, mechanisms and arrangements.

In the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, global institutions play an active role in regional, sub-regional and national programmes/projects in alignment with the prevailing policy prescriptions for the provision of global public goods. As a result, the interface between institutions and institutional relationships in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure transcends national, sub-regional, regional and international boundaries, with implications for the management of stakeholder/institutional relationships in the implementation of development programmes/ projects.

2. Institutional structures: *The Oxford (Advanced Learner's) Dictionary – International Student's Edition* (2005:1468) defines "institutional" as "connected with an institution"; it defines "structure" as "the way in which the parts of…(something) are connected together, arranged or organized; a particular arrangement of parts." In this study, institutional structures are also referred to as "organisations." The DFID (2003), European Community (EC, 2004), Møller (2005), and Velasquez (2006) also articulate the existence of a symbiotic relationship between institutions and organisations: according to the definitions of the afore-mentioned authors, institutions provide the framework and platform for organisations to perform the work for which institutions have been designed. As the DFID (2003) and Møller (2005) explain, institutional structures/organisations have a physical presence or identity, which may include any combination of the following aspects: offices, staff, letterheads, or web pages.

The EC (2004: 96), in defining the parameters of organisations in relation to institutions, argued that the organisational framework is embodied in the collective

of vehicles created by society to regulate collective action, namely the institutions. For the EC (*ibid*), formal and informal rules as well as regulations that characterise institutions provide the linkages with the organisational structure individual organisations/institutional structures. For example, according to the DFID (*ibid*: ii), "Organizations encompass political bodies, such as political parties or parliaments; economic bodies such as firms or businesses; and social bodies such as churches and schools. They usually have discrete boundaries, a budget, and a structure." Møller (2005: 6) explained this analogy further when he stated as follows: "Organizations usually require regimes or institutions in order to function, but they add to these a formal shape as well as a physical presence."

The DFID (2003) provided a similar distinction between institutions and organisations, but added that the significance of institutions was to enable organisational improvements. The DFID (*ibid*) further stated that the frameworks provided by institutions (aptly termed 'the rules of the game') "shape the incentives that drive behaviour…performance, and expectations about rights and obligations. They have a major influence on economic development, and on the success and sustainability (or lack of it) of specific projects and programmes." Within this context, the DFID (*ibid*) noted that organisations "adapt their tactics," and "play to" the externally set rules, but they are not the same as…those rules." The DFID (*ibid*: 3) also made a distinction between institutional and organisational reform/development within the framework explained above. The DFID argued, however, that in both institutions and organisations reform or development "are concerned with the process and content of change" (*ibid*).

Cognisant of the definitions above, in this study ***institutional structures*** may be defined as the organisations, establishments, formations, bodies, agencies, units/departments, or entities that are linked to institutions. The work of institutions is performed through the institutional structures/organisations, within the framework of rules, regulations and modalities for collective engagement or management of stakeholder/institutional relationships set by institutions at and across the various spatial categories.

3. Institutional mechanisms: may be defined as the tangible or non-tangible systems, instruments, behaviours and processes through which the work of

institutions is performed in order to support the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects. Institutional mechanisms include the machinery, infrastructure, methodologies, tools, knowledge, competencies, principles, and values that facilitate performance of the work of institutions, institutional structures/organisations. Institutional mechanisms also include policies; regulatory and governance regimes; systems of rules and procedures; systems of cooperation; and processes or systems for collective engagement to manage institutional relationships or to facilitate cooperation and trans-actions with multiple institutional structures, stakeholders, and trans-state actors at/across the various spatial categories in order to execute collective agreements to deliver cross-border regional infrastructure. Also included are planning, management, communication, governance, legislative, legal, cultural, production, trade and consumption systems that impact on collective and individual trans-actions in the delivery of cross-border regional (transport/roads) infrastructure.

At the level of programmes/projects, institutional mechanisms facilitate the development of links between the institutions, institutional structures/organisations and development programmes/projects at the different levels of management/ planning and at the various spatial categories at which decisions and actions are taken to support the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. Institutional mechanisms also facilitate the translation of ideological perspectives into practical modalities for collective engagement and trans-action at the various spatial categories and levels of management/planning in order to deliver cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

In the context of integrated development and integrated implementation management, particularly in cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ projects, institutional mechanisms are essentially multi-/trans-/inter-sectoral, and multi-/trans-/inter-disciplinary; their influence in such contexts is non-linear, diffuse, and integrative. Thus, NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) or NEPAD's/African Union's (AU) Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance are examples of trans-disciplinary institutional mechanisms with relevance to the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure. Other examples of global institutional mechanisms with relevance to the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure at the various spatial categories

include the World Bank's Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs); the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); the United Nation's (UN) Global Compact; and the Caux Round Table Principles for Business.

Development programmes/projects themselves may also be construed as institutional mechanisms: according to Paul (1990), development programmes are the instruments through which the state delivers on its policy objectives. Project management methodologies, tools and techniques may also be construed as other examples of institutional mechanisms that are universally applied to manage programmes/projects at the various levels of management/planning. Project management methodologies also provide the practical modalities to actualise the vision of institutions/organisations in the planning and implementation of (development) programmes/projects. To achieve the afore-mentioned outcomes, project management methodologies facilitate the development and articulation of links between strategies, objectives, external/internal environment, programmes/ projects and institutions/institutional structures for project implementation or implementation management; they provide links between action planning and performance management/control in order to achieve the work of project/s.

4. Institutional arrangements: Davis and North (Deng, 2002: 213) define an institutional arrangement as "…an arrangement between economic units that governs the ways in which these units can cooperate or compete." Cognisant of the definition above, in this research, institutional arrangements may be defined as the *structuring of agreements for cooperation* between institutions, institutional structures and mechanisms at the various spatial categories in order to deliver the work of the identified development programmes/projects in the development of cross-border regional infrastructure. The institutional arrangements thus include the *articulation of links* between specific trans-state trans-actions and programmes/ projects at the different levels of management/planning or spatial categories in order to achieve common objectives. Also included in the definition of institutional arrangements is the articulation of formal and informal links between development programmes/ projects and trans-state actions/actors; the *application of institutional mechanisms* for collective engagement between institutional structures across

various spatial categories – such as international/regional/sub-regional and national laws, conventions and protocols to execute specific (infrastructure development) programme/project activities; and the *use of common/agreed* principles, customs, culture, long-standing behaviours/attitudes/practices (that are accepted by society as the norm), and emergent modes for collective engagement across the various spatial categories in order to support institutional structures/organisations to perform the relevant trans-actions vis-à-vis the specified requirements of programmes/projects to develop cross-border regional infrastructure.

The trans-actions may be tangible or non-tangible: such as how the relationship between various institutions and different spatial categories on the one hand, and between institutions and institutional structures on the other hand is defined or managed in order to collectively support the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects; the linking or assignment of institutional structures/organisations and related trans-state actors to clearly defined cross-border regional infrastructure programme/project activities; the choice of international and domestic partnerships to undertake specified responsibilities and roles at the various levels of management/planning, spatial categories and stages of the project life cycle; and the linking of partnerships or institutional structures to institutional mechanisms for collective engagement in order to deliver the work of projects.

At the level of the individual organisation, institutional arrangements may include the internal configuration of levels of management or project organisation management in trans-national project units for the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure (i.e., linking institutional structures or trans-state actors to the performance of specific responsibilities, roles or project activities). This includes the definition of links and mechanisms/agreements for cooperation between the internal/external organisational structures, or project units or trans-state actors; the hierarchical/ vertical structuring of programme/project activities, roles and responsibilities; the approach to the mobilisation and management of resources by institutional structures vis-à-vis the prevailing institutional architecture and trans-state relationships with other institutional structures/spatial categories performing the work of the project; the approach to the management of behaviours/attitudes to the work of the organisation in relation to other institutional

structures, so that they can collectively perform the agreed work in the related development programmes/projects; and the approach to the management of internal/external relationships and stakeholders for effective implementation and management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

At the project level, institutional arrangements may include the approach by the participating (trans-state) institutional structures to jointly deliver/manage project activities and project management functions at the various stages of the project life cycle in order to deliver the work of the projects. How these afore-mentioned aspects are linked to, or integrated at the various levels of management/planning with relevant trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multi-disciplinary interventions by the various institutional structures in integrated project implementation and integrated implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/ projects defines the character, effectiveness and success of institutional arrangements.

5. **Institutional capacity**: Hope (2006: 210) defines capacity as: "…the competency of individuals, public sector institutions, private sector entities, civil society organisations, and local communities to engage in activities in a sustainable manner that permits the achievement of beneficial goals such as poverty reduction, efficient service delivery, good governance, economic growth, effectively facing the challenges of globalisation, and delivering the greatest possible benefits from such trends as rapid changes in information technology and science."

The definition of capacity depicted above, however, appears to minimise the significance and role of the state, as an institution in its own right, in its duty to bring about beneficial change and to ensure the attainment of sustainable development outcomes on behalf of the citizenry. For example, the DFID (2003) advances a significant argument that institutional reform/development supports the development of institutional capacity required to attain the objectives of development. According to the DFID (*ibid*: iii), recent studies indicate that "institutional factors have been a key cause of poor development performance." Arguably, the state needs to play a leading role to facilitate institutional reform/development in order to effect transformational change. The DFID (*ibid*) also avers that institutions are often manifestations "of the rich and powerful," with

the result that they (institutions) “commonly discriminate against the poor,” In this regard, the DFID (*ibid*) notes that the key capabilities governments require to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will require improvements in the broader institutional environment. For the DFID, the process of institutional reform or development includes the development of technical competencies taking into account capacity development at the institutional, organisational, and individual levels. An example of the DFID’s capacity building context, in Figure A.1, illustrates how this process is cascaded at the various levels of management.

Figure A.1 The capacity building context



Source: After DFID, 2003. Promoting institutional and organizational development, p.(v)

In this study, institutional capacity may be defined as the wherewithal of institutions, institutional mechanism and arrangements, institutional structures/ organisations and trans-state actors/individuals to facilitate or effect the delivery of policy interventions, such as development programmes/projects, for the planned development interventions and related outcomes to manifest. These interventions include the development of an enabling institutional environment; the effective conception, planning and implementation of regional infrastructure programmes/ projects; and the effective management of regional infrastructure programmes/ projects through the use of relevant trans-state actions, institutional mechanisms and arrangements in order to provide sustainable products and services in the provision of cross-border regional infrastructure. Institutional capacity at the level of institutional structures/organisations includes the adequacy of institutional infrastructure and human capital (with the relevant competencies) to facilitate the development of and translate planning processes and management systems into practical inputs and outputs at the various levels of management/planning for the effective and efficient delivery of regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

The development of institutional capacity at the levels of the individual state or organisations is influenced by external and internal factors. The e*xternal factors* include the influence of political, economic, social, technical, environmental and legal (PESTEL) factors. Also included are the opportunities/constraints provided by trans-/multi-sectoral and trans-/multidisciplinary interventions at international, regional, sub-regional, and national levels. The afore-mentioned PESTEL factors impact on the availability of resources and the nature of relationships with key stakeholders including partnerships and strategic alliances at the various levels of management and spatial categories in order to support the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

Internal factors include the following mutually reinforcing issues: the adequacy of internal organisational structures/arrangements; the availability of resources (technical, financial and human capital); and the adequacy of institutional infrastructure (policies, procedures, systems, knowledge and skills) including the influence of factors such as leadership, management, attitudes to identified programmes/projects, organisational behaviour, motivation, and communication in order to enable effective and efficient delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure/development programmes/projects. Included in the determinants of institutional capacity is the impact of perceptions of institutions and institutional structures, either by external/internal stakeholders or other disinterested parties, in so far as this affects the work of institutions/ institutional structures. The effective and efficient management of the afore-mentioned factors reflects on the capacity of institutions and institutional structures to support the effective and efficient delivery of cross-regional infrastructure projects.

6. **Integrated Implementation Management**: The concept 'integrated implementation management' is likely to be defined or understood differently by different people based on their frames of reference. In this study, the definition of "integrated implementation management" is derived from NEPAD's proposals for "regional integrated development" and "integrated practical implementation" in its approach to the development of regional infrastructure. As NEPAD (2001, Para.194: 56) averred: "The view of the initiating presidents is that unless the issue of infrastructure is addressed on a planned basis – that is, linked to regional

integrated development – the renewal process of this continent will simply not take off." NEPAD (*ibid*) also argued that inherent externalities or cross-border spillovers in the provision of regional infrastructure require integrated coordination and management in order to optimise the delivery of physical infrastructure and related services. In addition, NEPAD argued that effective delivery of regional infrastructure would be based on the commitment of broad-based partnerships (including governments, private sector, and civil society) "to a genuine integration of all nations into the global economy and body politic" (*ibid*: Para.4:8).

This study also takes cognisance of NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions for the delivery of regional infrastructure including the diverse multiple objectives for the development of regional (transport/roads) infrastructure that are planned for simultaneous implementation i.e., poverty reduction, capacity building, regional integration, and global/intra-African trade. Thus, this study envisages that implementation plans to support the attainment of NEPAD's multiple objectives will set the scene for the development of an inclusive multi-/inter-/intra-sectoral and multi-/inter-/intra-disciplinary environment in which to operationalize NEPAD's proposals for integrated development (ID) in the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. As NEPAD argued, as opposed to the previous unsuccessful attempts to implement "continent-wide development programmes, today a new set of circumstances lend themselves to integrated practical implementation" (*ibid*, Para. 42:9) of its strategic programme of action. NEPAD further argued that in the "new phase of globalisation (which) coincided with the reshaping of international relations in the aftermath of the Cold War", and with the increase of democracy in many African countries (*ibid*, Para.43: 9), the adoption of an "integrative perspective" would thus facilitate this process in recognition of the challenges facing the continent in the delivery of global public goods (*ibid*, Para. 21: 8).

This study also takes cognisance of the diverse sectors and disciplines that are integral to NEPAD's articulated pre-conditions for development, in so far as they impact on the delivery of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. (The afore-mentioned pre-conditions include the peace, security, democracy and political governance initiative; economic and corporate governance initiative; and sub-regional and regional approaches to development. NEPAD recommended that the

aforementioned pre-conditions be integrated in all its programmatic interventions, including the regional infrastructure programme.) In addition, this study takes cognisance of NEPAD's detailed sectoral priorities and cross-cutting programmes (such as human development including reversing the brain drain; agriculture; gender mainstreaming; environment; and science and technology initiatives), which also have implications for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure and *vice versa*. Thus, the diverse spheres of influence intersected by NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme define the parameters for, and contribute to our understanding of the context for integrated implementation management of NEPAD's identified projects. The afore-mentioned spheres also allude to complexity.

This study also refers to the concept "global public goods," in a regional context, in order to propose a holistic conception of integrated implementation management in NEPAD's context. The afore-mentioned concept carries connotations for the influence of global institutions in domestic programmes for the delivery of regional infrastructure, or NEPAD's. The prescriptions of international finance institutions (IFIs) in the development of global public goods also provide an indication of the characteristics of institutional mechanisms and arrangements that may be considered under NEPAD's programme for the development of regional infrastructure. In addition, this study takes cognisance of the contemporary definitions of the concept "human security[1]" as a measure of the multifaceted role of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects in the context of globalisation, global/intra-African trade, and poverty reduction. The afore-mentioned parameters are juxtaposed with the global focus on poverty reduction and human security in order to develop a holistic perspective of ID and the nature of institutional mechanisms and arrangements that will be required to facilitate the

[1] For example, the evolving definition and conception of 'human security' in the aftermath of the Cold War has been described (Lamin, 2006: 1) to incorporate issues that impact directly on the lives human beings and their freedoms, such as "freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity." The afore-mentioned desired conditions may also be construed to encapsulate NEPAD's imperatives for the development of (Africa's) cross-border regional infrastructure, both as an objective of development and as a human right. As NEPAD (2001: Para.43) argued: "The new phase of globalization (has) coincided with the reshaping of international relations…associated with the emergence of new concepts of security and self-interest, which encompass the right to development and the eradication of poverty." In addition, NEPAD states that a new wave of "democracy and state legitimacy" that is sweeping the continent has resulted in the re-definition of these concepts to include accountable government, a culture of human rights, and popular participation as central tenements of development (*ibid*). NEPAD also argued as follows: "…the numbers of democratically elected leaders are on the increase. Through their actions, they have declared that the hopes of Africa's peoples for a better life can no longer rest in the magnanimity of others" (*ibid*).

attainment of these objectives in the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure.

In this regard, one may argue that integrated implementation management of NEPAD's cross-border regional infrastructure is underpinned by additional concepts of "democracy," "human security," "transformational leadership," "African ownership," "inclusive/popular participation," "self interest," "collective/self-reliance," and "accountability" in order to enable Africa's regional, sub-regional and national institutions/institutional structures to collectively and individually deliver on agreed development objectives. In an environment of globalisation and regionalism, particularly in the provision of global public goods such as cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure, concepts such as "common or shared interest" (CFA, 2005) supplement the afore-mentioned concepts.

Since NEPAD adopted a "project approach" to the development of regional infrastructure (NEPAD, 2001), this study also takes cognisance of the definition of "project integration management" (PMI, 1996) in order to illustrate how multi-/inter-/intra-disciplinary and multi-/inter-/intra-sectoral inputs/outputs may be integrated in a project management context. According to the PMI (*ibid*), project integration management describes a context where inputs of project management functions and related knowledge areas are integrated in the management of projects, in order to deliver the work of projects to attain the agreed objectives. Thus, the definition of integrated implementation management in this study underscores the integration of theoretical, institutional, spatial, behavioural, inter-/intra-/trans-/multi-sectoral and inter-/intra-/trans-/multidisciplinary aspects in a context of participatory and broad-based processes of decision-making, collective engagement, and trans-action in the planning and implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure development programmes/projects. The effective integration of the various spheres of influence described above, which has influenced NEPAD's conception of integrated implementation management of cross-border regional infrastructure, will be determined by, and circuitously determine the nature of NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of regional infrastructure.

The various definitions discussed below assist to improve our understanding of the diverse underpinnings in NEPAD's context for, or conception of integrated implementation/implementation management of regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

A.6.1 Other related definitions

Various definitions and debates on the origins and application of the concept ID articulate the ideological, substantive, objective and process issues, which also influence the design, implementation, and management of Africa's regional integration initiatives. Some definitions of ID provide possible explanations to the individual characteristics or combination of NEPAD's multiple objectives for the development of regional (transport/roads) infrastructure. The definitions discussed below also provide some insights into NEPAD's conception of how the identified multiple objectives would be integrated into a coherent approach in order to facilitate the development and implementation/implementation management of regional infrastructure programmes/projects.

Other definitions of ID illustrate the possible links between NEPAD's interventions in the development of regional infrastructure and the various models for regional integration in RECs, with implications for the proposed concept (in this study) of *integrated implementation management* as an approach to the management of regional integration initiatives, and as an instrument for effective implementation management of regional infrastructure programmes/projects. In other words, the concept *integrated implementation management* has wider applicability in Africa's development landscape, beyond the confines of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme: the concept as defined in this study builds on the existing institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the management of development programmes/projects at the various sectors, disciplines and spatial categories.

Other related concepts considered in this study, in order to illustrate the diverse requirements of NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions and multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure, include the following: "regional planning and development" (Fair, 1987; Gore, 1984); "integrated rural development" (IRD) and "integrated rural development planning" (IRDP) (Paul,

1990). The afore-mentioned concepts denote the integration of the ideological, theoretical, spatial, institutional, political, socio-economic, sectoral and technical aspects in integrative approaches to development or development management. As Paul (1990:10) argued, the concepts IRD and IRDP also prioritise popular participation and decision-making at the lower levels of management, cognisant of the dimensions and multifaceted nature of development. Ultimately, Paul (*ibid*) noted that the definitions of IRD, for example, identify the poor as the recipients of the equitable distribution of development benefits; in IRD the challenge to propose appropriate interventions lies in determining with clarity the desired outcomes, and how these will be attained (*ibid*). The afore-mentioned concepts appear to dove-tail with key aspects of NEPAD's conception of ID, particularly so since NEPAD's primary objective is to reduce poverty.

The concepts "integrated development planning" (IDP) and ID have previously been applied to illustrate the integration of participative and broad-based development planning and management systems as well as to illustrate how institutional, spatial, multi-/inter-/intra-sectoral and multi-/inter-/intra-disciplinary inputs may be incorporated in development programmes/projects based on situational specificity. For example, the DBSA (2005: 11) defines IDP "in a South African (national) context" as: "A participatory process to integrate economic, sectoral, spatial, social, institutional, environmental and fiscal strategies in order to support the allocation of resources between sectors and geographical areas and across the population in a manner that provides sustainable growth, equity and the empowerment of the poor and marginalised." The emphasis on the spatial context in the DBSA's definition of IDP suggests that a combination of diverse cultural, spatial and institutional elements, in addition to any combination of PESTLE factors, may induce different planning and implementation processes or development outcomes based on situational/project specificity.

Some scholars (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006: 41) have attributed RID to Pan-Africanist epistemology, both as an ideology and as a regional policy guide for sectoral cooperation and regional integration. The afore-mentioned sentiments, however, appear to disregard the influence of the inherited foreign methodologies (at independence from colonial rule in the early 1960's) on Africa's approaches to regional integration and sectoral cooperation. According to Senghor (1990), the

concept ID (as it applies to regional integration in Africa,) is traceable to the evolution and application of the *functional* and *neo-functional* theories of regional integration in Africa's regional integration discourse. The integration of the functional and neo-functional approaches arguably lent credence and provided technical substance (i.e., the political and socio-economic variables) to the adoption by the newly-independent African governments of the *gradual functionalist approach to regional integration* (*ibid*).

As Senghor (*ibid*: 18) argued: "…at independence, African governments inherited a spirit of, an approach to, and a methodology for organising cooperation. These were to have long-lasting implications in the post-colonial era." Arguably, foreign methodologies have had a lasting influence on present-day notions of RID and on the dominant precepts underpinning Africa's regional integration and sectoral cooperation initiatives, including NEPAD's regional infrastructure programme as will be discussed in this study.

Sectoral integration as in the context of functional and neo-functional approaches to integration is, arguably, dissimilar to some of the contemporary definitions and applications of ID: a strong sectoral focus and a high degree of specialisation underpin the former. As Senghor (*ibid*: 20) stated, in the functional and neo-functional approaches, "Functions are linked together in a network of organisations each of which is structured to cater for particular needs. The organisational system as a whole is expected to be responsive to the changing nature of these functions." It appears, however, that even within the afore-mentioned context, certain technical/institutional elements of the functional and neo-functional approaches to regional integration have been distorted in Africa's case by the predominance of politics and national interest in regional integration initiatives; this *status quo* is exacerbated by the circumscribed role of technocrats. As a result, certain (inherited) practices in Africa's development landscape signify the lack of underpinning integrative influences between and across sectoral interventions, spatial categories and institutional structures for managing regional integration initiatives.

Arguably, Ndlovu-Gatsheni's afore-mentioned assertions regarding the ideological and policy content for regional integration elucidate the lasting impact on Pan-Africanist ideology of the incorporation of functional and neo-functional

approaches to regional integration in Africa's development agenda, as explained earlier by Senghor. The perpetuation of the gradualist approach has also been entrenched by Africa's continued adoption of the Westphalian 'principle of sovereignty' in the management of institutional relationships between and amongst member states. Some authors have also argued that to the extent that Pan-Africanism underpinned the activities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Diescho, 2002:35) and inspired the latter AU (Møller, 2005:15) reflects the continued integration of historical ideologies in Africa's contemporary approaches to sectoral integration and regional integration initiatives: contradictions thus seem inevitable, particularly where ID is considered in the context of globalisation and the related dominant neo-liberal prescriptions.

Bende-Nabende (2002:10) also argued that many international economists have provided different definitions of "integration." This diversity is illustrated in the examples of definitions of integration proffered by Balassa, Pinder and Vadja[2] (*ibid*). According to Bende-Nabende (*ibid*: 11) international economic integration denotes "a state of affairs or a process involving attempts to combine separate national economies into larger economic regions." The process depicted above may assume any of the following sequential forms of integration: "sectoral integration," "preferential trade/tariff areas," "free trade areas," "customs unions," "common markets," "single markets," "monetary unions," "complete economic unions," and "complete political unions" (*ibid*). In the context mapped above, Bende-Nabende (*ibid*) argued that "regional economic integration" or "regionalism" concerns the geographical/regional economic co-operation/integration.

[2] Bende-Nabende (2002:10) cites Balassa, who defined integration to depict progress in the various stages of regional integration – from "trade integration" (i.e., the removal of barriers to trade), to "factor integration" (i.e., the liberalisation of factor movements or free movement of goods and services), to "policy integration" (i.e., the harmonisation of national economic policies), and to "total integration" (i.e., the complete unification of the afore-mentioned policies). According to Bende-Nabende (*ibid*), Balassa's definition was criticised for conforming to the principles of classical economic doctrines, which are perceived as less applicable to the economies of the developing countries, or economies typified by "a considerable degree of state intervention" (*ibid*). Pinder (*ibid*), defined "economic integration" to denote "both the removal of discrimination between the economic agents of the member countries, and the formation and application of coordinated and common policies on a sufficient scale to ensure that major economic and welfare objectives are fulfilled." This definition was criticised for its generality (*ibid*). Vajda (*ibid*), distinguished between "market integration" (i.e., "the guarantee of the sale of each other's products within the framework of the social system of participating countries"), and "production and development integration" (i.e., a process that involves "raising to an international level and programming the production of those branches of industry, which cannot be developed to an optimum size within national boundaries").

The definitions of "integration" depicted above reveal some alignment with NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure; the afore-mentioned definitions also appear to be aligned to NEPAD's policy strategy/response actions and multiple objectives for the development of regional infrastructure. Some dissonance may be experienced with the application of the models for "integration" depicted above to the practical experiences of regional integration in the various RECs, with implications for NEPAD's institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the development of cross-border regional infrastructure. (For example, McCarthy (*Mail & Guardian*, 08-14 June, 2007) noted that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has adopted the conventional (or classical) model to integration: this model prescribes "a linear process of consecutive stages in the integration of goods, labour and capital markets and, finally, monetary and fiscal integration" (*ibid*). Cheru (2002) also provided a different perspective of models to regional integration adopted by the various RECs. In addition, the gradual functionalist approach to regional integration, which was adopted by Africa's political leaders after independence in the 1960's, still underpins Africa's approaches to regional integration and sectoral cooperation initiatives.) The diverse definitions of "integration," and how they are integrated in NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure have implications for implementation or implementation management of NEPAD's regional infrastructure programmes, particularly so cognisant of NEPAD's prescriptive framework for the development of regional infrastructure. Also, some complexity may ensue in the application of prevalent models for regional integration to programmes/projects.

It is against this background of the multiple and complex spheres of influence that this study has formulated a broad-based conception of the key elements that constitute integrated implementation management of NEPAD's cross-border regional infrastructure programmes and projects. The inclusive framework for integrated implementation management in this study attempts to incorporate NEPAD's diverse and contradictory elements in its approach to the development of regional infrastructure as well as to address the major issues that impact on the effective delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure. The effectiveness and efficiency of planning interventions, and how well NEPAD implements its planned

actions, will be determined by the success of NEPAD's approach to the development of regional infrastructure.

Therefore, in this study ***integrated implementation management*** may be defined as a participatory project management system in the implementation of cross-border regional infrastructure programmes/projects. This system integrates the relevant institutional, spatial, organisational, behavioural, trans-/inter-/multidisciplinary, trans-/multi-/inter-sectoral inputs at, and across the various levels of management, spatial categories and stages of the project life cycle in order to support the attainment of NEPAD's articulated objectives for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. In this regard, parallels may be drawn between integrated implementation management and a thread that weaves parts into a whole in order to ensure that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" (Covey, 1989; Maxwell, 1998).

A combination of prescriptive and descriptive/emergent planning approaches as well as a combination of vertical and horizontal, rather than linear management systems and processes, are envisaged to support the attainment of the articulated outcomes based on the programme/project requirements and situational specificity. With specific reference to NEPAD's roads programme, the envisaged approach to integrated implementation management takes particular cognisance of the spheres of influence intersected by the regional transport/roads sector: this is in order to develop the relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for integrated implementation management of cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects in alignment with NEPAD's policy strategies/response actions and multiple objectives that are planned for simultaneous implementation.

At the various levels of management/planning and practical implementation of projects, the integrative processes may be facilitated by the structured use of relevant project management methodologies. Effective integrated implementation management will be linked to the integrated management of project management functions (i.e., project integration management). Other relevant disciplines are included for effective project integration management and to demonstrate the trans-/inter-/multidisciplinary management context. These afore-mentioned disciplines are defined in the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) to include

project human resource management, communication management and procurement management. (Project management functions include the management of project scope, organisation, constraints (time, cost, quality) and the risks inherent in all the afore-mentioned.) In addition, other relevant trans-sectoral and multi-/inter-/trans-disciplinary and multi-/inter-/trans-sectoral frameworks that are critical to the facilitation and implementation of regional integration initiatives will be determined for integration by the programme/project requirements at the various spatial categories, based on situational specificity. This approach to integrated implementation management also aims to facilitate effective external/internal environmental or institutional analysis including the integration of the inputs/outputs of planning hierarchies into action planning and performance management/control of project implementation. Effective integrated implementation management will also facilitate the integration of complex institutional mechanisms and arrangements that span international, regional, sub-regional, and national realms of activity or influence at various levels of management/planning and stages of the project life cycle in order to deliver the work of the identified programmes/projects.

7. **Project Management***:* according to the PMI (2000), project management is defined as: "The art of directing and coordinating human and material resources throughout the life of a project, using modern management techniques to achieve predetermined objectives of scope, cost, time, quality and participant satisfaction." Peter Morris (Burke, 2003: 3) described project management as: "…the process of integrating everything that needs to be done (typically using a number of special project management techniques) as the project evolves through its life cycle [from concept to handover] in order to meet the project's objectives."

   In this study project management may be defined as the structured and effective employment of resources (physical, geographical, human capital, technical, and financial resources), which includes the coherent use of relevant institutional mechanisms and arrangements for collective engagement, in order to facilitate the implementation of agreed cross-border regional infrastructure projects to support the attainment of set project objectives and to meet stakeholder expectations. The management process typically uses relevant project management methodologies at the various levels of management/planning and stages of the project's life cycle in

order to define, plan, prepare, and execute the work of the projects as encapsulated in the predetermined qualitative and quantitative objectives and project management functions (i.e., project scope management, project organisation management, time, cost, quality and the risk that permeates all of the afore-mentioned). In the delivery of cross-border regional infrastructure, the project management system integrates knowledge areas covered in the PMBOK as well as other relevant international/regional/sub-regional/national frameworks and/or institutions based on the projects' specificity.

8. **Project**: the PMBOK (PMI, 1996: 4) defines a project as: "…a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product or service. *Temporary* means that every project has a definite end. *Unique* means that the product or service is different in some distinguishing way from all similar products or services." Turner (1999: 3) defines a project as: "…an endeavour in which human, material and financial resources are organized in a novel way to undertake a unique scope of work, of a given specification, within the constraints of cost and time, so as to achieve a beneficial change defined by qualitative and quantitative objectives." Projects are also construed (PMBOK Guidelines, 2004: 1) as a means of organising activities that cannot be implemented within the organisation's normal operational parameters: that is, as a means of achieving the (organisation's) strategic plan.

   Deriving from the definitions above, in this study a project may be defined as a policy intervention to deliver a unique scope of work or undertaking in order to bring about transformational change through the attainment of articulated quantitative and qualitative objectives for the development of (cross-border) regional infrastructure. The project comprises a defined scope of work, with a clear beginning and an end. A series of interrelated, structured activities that incorporate institutional, sector-wide, trans-/multidisciplinary and multi-/trans-sectoral inputs/outputs form the totality of a project. The project is managed by a defined project structure/organisation. Specified milestones, including monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, provide measurable checkpoints throughout the project's life cycle.

   The definition of projects referred to in this study does not include interventions described by McCutcheon (1999) as ad-hoc, or once-off, or crisis interventions

(such as drought or flood relief). Rather, the projects must form part of a programme and should meet the criteria for sustainable development and feasibility: according to Baum (1982: 7), "…a *prima facie* test of feasibility…(is) that technical and institutional solutions are found at costs commensurate with the expected benefits."

9. **Programme**: the PMBKOK Guidelines (2004) define programmes as a group of related/discrete projects that are managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits and control not available from managing them individually. The programmes may also include elements of (related) continuous work; they may also include a series of repetitive or cyclical (supporting) undertakings that fall outside the scope of the discrete projects within a programme (i.e., marketing, human resource management, finance and administration functions in an organisation, which affect the performance of programmes and related projects). According to Paul (1990: 12), "Irrespective of classification, development programmes are 'instruments' of public policy and 'intermediaries' between the beneficiaries at the grassroots and national or regional governments…Development programmes are usually conceived at the national level and operate through sub-programmes designed to cover different geographic regions such as states or different functions and groups of services."

In this study, a programme may be defined as a portfolio of projects, which combine interrelated and discrete projects or related undertakings: it includes elements of continuous, inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary inputs and diverse management processes in order to support the attainment of specified short-term and long-term regional infrastructure development objectives. The elaboration of various projects within the programme and the nature of management systems for integrated implementation management of the programme will be determined by the articulated vision, strategy and objectives at the integrative and strategic levels of management. For example, Paul (*ibid*) illustrated that a programme to develop sustainable agriculture may include the following interrelated distinct projects, multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary and recurring undertakings: provision of agriculture extension services, development of appropriate credit facilities to small farmers, construction of infrastructure such as storage facilities and rural roads, research, and institutional capacity development projects.

In cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services, the programme elements or related projects may include the construction and maintenance of physical and non-physical infrastructure services, harmonisation of transport/roads sector policies, regulatory and governance regimes, development of instruments for domestic resource mobilisation, research, institutional/individual capacity development, development of measures to ensure road safety, implementation of pro-poor multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary projects linked to the cross-border transportation network, and development of integrated TTF systems.

10. **Levels of management**: using Turner's (1999) definition, levels of management may be defined as the integrative, strategic/administrative, or tactical/operational levels at which decisions and actions on projects are taken. The afore-mentioned levels are described by Turner (*ibid*: 16-18) as the three fundamental levels of management that form one of the dimensions of project management. As used in this study, the levels of management also correspond to the planning objectives at the development, programme and project levels. (Some confusion may, however, ensue as NEPAD's levels of management overlap – in and of themselves and over the different levels of planning.)

11. **Physical and non-physical infrastructure**: the definitions adopted in this study are taken from Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 7):

    (i) ***Physical Infrastructure****:* in the context of transport and transit facilitation, physical infrastructure may be defined as "…transport sub-systems such as physical infrastructure and facilities, which are combined with and complemented by information sub-systems such as communications infrastructure."

    (ii) ***Non-physical infrastructure****:* in the same context as (i) above, non-physical infrastructure may be defined as "…knowledge and competencies applied to physical infrastructure in transport and trade facilitation within specific legal, economic, financial and governance frameworks. Elements of the non-physical infrastructure system, developed to create the desired changes and improve transport and trade facilitation, include the following aspects: overall governance of transport and trade facilitation, business logistical systems,

quality of financial coordination, and systems of governance of physical flows."

12. **Transit Facilitation**: may be defined as the employment of physical and non-physical infrastructure in transport and trade facilitation, such as roads transportation, multi-modal transport logistic chains, and related knowledge, skills and systems in order to facilitate cross-border movement of goods, services, and people. The process refers essentially to trans-state, inter-regional, intra-regional and extra-regional activities and trans-actions to remove formal and informal barriers (in transport) to the movement of goods and people. This process includes addressing the physical and non-physical infrastructural, operational and facilitation deficiencies in cross-border transportation; it also includes efforts to harmonise policy, regulatory and governance regimes at national levels in order to facilitate the efficiency of cross-border transport activities at sub-regional and regional levels.

13. **Spatial Categories**: may be defined as the physical/geographical spaces at national, sub-regional, regional, and international levels; these spaces are identified in this study as the units for analysis. In Africa's context, various criteria (described below,) are used either individually or in combination to delimit spatial categories: these criteria include a combination of geographical, political, economic, ideological and behavioural considerations. This *status quo* leads to confusion to the extent that in the delimitation of physical spaces, the various criteria sometimes overlap in substantive and objective terms.

14. **Region and Sub-region**:
    - *Region* is defined as the African continent (the continent-wide, geographic space);
    - *Sub-region* is defined as the activity space of regional economic communities (RECs) such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), *l'Union du Maghreb Arabe*/Arab Maghreb Union (UMA/ AMU), and so on. To the extent that RECs are determined more by political and economic notions for affiliation, rather than the geographic proximity of contiguous

member-states alone, and to the extent that membership (of RECs) by the various states overlaps considerably, the definition of sub-region in this study assumes the dimension of an "imagined geographical community," rather clearly defined and homogeneous physical spaces.

15. **"Technical hair-splitting"**: this term has been used (Todaro, 1985) to refer to the prevalent unproductive administrative practices in developing countries, where a task/tasks that can be competently performed by one person or a single unit/department or organisation is/are split amongst various people, units, or organisations thereby leading to confusion, lack of accountability, low levels of productivity, low morale, and under-employment.

APPENDIX B

PREVIOUS AND CURRENT INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL TRANSPORT/ROADS INFRASTRUCTURE

This appendix describes previous and current interventions to develop (cross-border) regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services. Examples of international experience are also included. These afore-mentioned examples illustrate the impact of the institutional environment on programme/project implementation; they also underscore the positive impact of the relationship between an adequate institutional environment and relevant technical interventions to support the attainment of desired outcomes. The following initiatives are discussed:

(a) The *Transport and Communications Plan of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)* of 1980;

(b) The *Trans-African Highway (TAH) and "missing links"* initiative that was first launched in the 1970's;

(c) The previous and current *UN programmes, multilateral/bilateral donor and REC interventions* to address various challenges in regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services, with specific focus on the plight of landlocked countries;

(d) The *EU's Trans-European Networks (TENs)* infrastructure programme, an initiative launched in 1994 to fill the gaps in transportation networks in the EU region; and

(e) The examples of cross-border regional roads infrastructure development in other global regional trade blocks, which sought to address similar challenges in transportation and transit facilitation as those identified in NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP and in various African RECs. The global regional trade blocks discussed in the Appendix include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the *Mercado Commûn del Sur* (*Mercosur*), and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA).

B.1 The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), 1980: The Strategy for the Transport and Telecommunications Decade for Africa.

The LPA focused on the joint transport and communications sectors in recognition of their critical role in Africa's economy. The LPA's strategy underscored the need to facilitate integrated development of these afore-mentioned infrastructure sectors, because of their complementary influence on the development of other sectors including the socio-economic integration of Africa and the promotion of intra-/ extra-African trade (LPA, 1980, Para.205: 58). A resolution – first mooted and adopted at the ECA Conference of Ministers of Transport, Communications and Planning, in March 1977 – called for the declaration of a Decade for Transport and Communications. This resolution was endorsed by the following institutional structures: first, the UN Economic and Social Council (UNECOSOC); second, the General Assembly of the UN, which proclaimed 1978-1988 the Transport and Communications Decade for Africa; and third, this resolution was (subsequently) adopted by the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government (HoSG), in July 1979 (*ibid*, Para. 206: 58).

The LPA's Transport and Communications programme (hereinafter referred to as "the LPA's transport programme") comprised a strategy that focused primarily at facilitating the attainment of the following outcomes:

- increased intra-African trade, access and internal coherence;
- harmonisation of regulatory regimes;
- technical standardisation;
- reduction of non-tariff barriers to facilitate movement of goods and people;
- increasing the efficiency of transport and transit facilitation systems;
- institutional capacity building including the development of human capital;
- domestic resource mobilisation to attain the articulated objectives (*ibid*).

The 1979 OAU Summit of HoSG endorsed the principal goals of the strategy that member states should work towards. These goals, detailed in Box B.1, were first defined by the ECA Conference in 1977.

Box B.1: The Lagos Plan of Action (1980) – Principal Goals of the Strategy for the Transport and Communications Decade for Africa.

The principal goals of the strategy for the Transport and Communications Decade for Africa were:

a) Promotion of the integration of transport and communications infrastructures with a view to increasing intra-African trade;
b) Ensuring the co-ordination of the various transport systems in order to increase their efficiency;
c) Opening up of the land-locked countries and isolated regions;
d) Harmonisation of national regulations and reduction to a minimum of physical and non-physical barriers with the aim of facilitating the movement of persons and goods;
e) Stimulating the use of local, human and material resources, the standardisation of networks and of equipment, research and dissemination of techniques adapted to the African context in the building of transport and communications infrastructures;
f) Promotion of industry in the field of transport and communication equipment; and
g) Mobilisation of technical and financial resources during the decade, with a view to promoting the development and modernisation of transport and communication infrastructures in Africa.

Source: After OAU, 1980. *Lagos Plan of Action*, p. 58.

The LPA's transport programme mapped steps to facilitate the attainment of its articulated objectives for integrated development. Initially, these steps focussed on the following aspects:

- addressing sub-regional and regional constraints that include fragmented systems;
- reforms to policy and regulatory regimes to ensure harmonisation of cross-border TTF systems;
- creating improvements in communications and transport physical/non-physical infrastructure, to ensure efficiencies of integrated data exchange (IDE) systems; and
- development of non-physical infrastructure, such as knowledge and human capital, to support the attainment of identified objectives.

The LPA's transport programme was planned for implementation in two phases over a period of eight (8) years. This programme was also linked to the LPA's trade agenda to promote, specifically, intra-African trade and to develop collective

self-reliance in trade with other developing countries. These objectives were to be achieved by "systematically" exploiting, exploring and harnessing the potential for collective "trade and economic cooperation…with *other developing regions and countries* (author's emphasis)," in order to address the inequitable power relations in international economic relations (*ibid*: 68). The model that informed the design of the roads sub-sector projects, most of which formed part of main trunks and feeder roads, was aimed at promoting linkages between national networks and those of neighbouring countries. The long-term objective was to provide an effective network for the efficient movement of goods, people, and communication *within and between member states* (*ibid*).

The LPA's transport programme also reflected the objectives of integrated development: it encompassed a multi-sector and multi-disciplinary focus that posited inter-sectoral linkages between transport, communications and trade. To support the attainment of the afore-mentioned objectives, the LPA's vision for the transport programme extended beyond the Africa region to mobilise intra-regional cooperation with other developing countries (*ibid*). The LPA's approach was designed to garner collective self-reliance amongst African countries on the one hand, and between African countries and other developing countries on the other hand as envisaged under the dictates of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) for which, according to Todaro (1985), there was growing acceptance in developing countries. The elements of the NIEO are detailed in Box B.2.

Box B.2: Elements of the New Economic International Order (NIEO)

According to Todaro (1985: 560), the NIEO can be traced to the analyses of dependency theorist during the 1950's and 1960's; it received political endorsement at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974. The concerns of the developing countries the NIEO sought to address dealt with their *de facto* economic colonization after the end of formal political colonization (*ibid*). Some of the articulated concerns included the following:

- the legacy of the colonial project and its negative effects, which manifested in insignificant global trade that still reflected overwhelming colonial trade patterns, particularly with former colonial powers;
- the inordinate dependence (by developing countries) on few primary commodities for export earnings;
- the dominance of foreign investment as the primary mechanism for financing development; and
- the inordinate reliance on technology from the developed countries, which had 98% of the world's research and development capability, and 94% of all patents (*ibid*).

The NIEO emphasised collective self-reliance, and greater cooperation amongst *developing* countries. The selected agenda items of the NIEO, with respect to the commitments sought from the developed world, included the following:

- Attaining the UN ODA targets (from the developed countries) of 0.7% of GNP on an unconditional, long-term, continuous basis;
- Provision of technical assistance for development (by developed countries) and eliminating the brain drain to avoid "reverse transfer of technology";
- Renegotiating debts of the developing countries to obtain "cancellations, moratoriums, rescheduling of debt to 'soft' terms over a longer period of time, or interest subsidisation;
- Undertaking special measures to assist landlocked, least developed and island developing countries;
- Improving terms and conditions of trade by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and ensuring improved access to world markets;
- Strengthening economic and technical cooperation among developing countries via economic integration at sub-regional and regional levels, trade, financing fields and sectors industry, technology, transport and communications;
- Reforming the IMF to ensure a stable flow of development assistance through the use of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and to "maintain 'the real value of currency reserves…by preventing their erosion from inflation and exchange rate depreciation";
- Increasing transfers of resources through the World Bank and the IMF "to make additional capital available to the poorest countries on highly concessionary terms;
- Establishing mechanisms for the transfer of (modern) technology which is essential to enable developing countries to reach their development objectives; and
- Regulating and supervising the activities of trans-national enterprises and eliminating restrictive business practices, as set out in the proposed NIEO international code of conduct for trans-national corporations.

Source: Derived from Todaro, 1985. *Economic Development in the Third World*, p.560-561, and Appendix 17.1, pp.68-571

Notwithstanding the detailed plans for harmonisation proposed in the LPA, the mechanisms to address the underlying inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary issues that inform policy, governance and regulatory regimes at national levels were not spelt out. In the first place, the pursuance of national prerogatives appears to have caused the persisting dilemma in Africa's regional transport and communications operations since independence in the 1960's. As Cheru (2002: 133) notes: "…each country has its own cumbersome transport regulations, custom requirements, charges and levies. All these factors add up to high transportation costs for exporters and importers." The failure of the LPA to institute practical

institutional mechanisms and arrangements to address, at national levels, impediments to the implementation of collective regional agreements in the transport-sector is just one of the practical examples where lofty plans, which are underpinned by impressive principles, are proposed in Africa's development programmes without articulating practical mechanisms to implement even the first steps.

It is also not clear from the literature reviewed what processes were instituted to monitor progress on the implementation of the LPA's transport programme. Also, it does not seem documentation exists of the lessons learnt, by sector. It may well be that the lack of proper documentation characterises all previous African development initiatives. For example, Adedegi (2002: 37) stated that the LPA "…was a culmination of a four-year long effort, initiated and led by the UNECA (ECA) to undertake an agonising review of the development paradigms that Africa pursued since independence in the 1960's." It is not clear, however, whether the outcomes of such a review were published. Thus, the lack of documentation and transparency on the evaluation of Africa's development programmes poses dire consequences for the availability of feedback loops and relevant data to inform future planning processes; this information gap also highlights the questionable ownership of Africa's development agenda by African institutions.

A review of the related literature suggests that some of the key constraints with impact on the management of the programme's scope and organisation functions (including the constraints) can be summarised as follows:

(i) First, it is not clear whether the ECA, or its Inter-Agency Committee and Multinational Programming Centres (MULPOCs) – that were established to facilitate implementation of the LPA's agenda, possessed the requisite political legitimacy and institutional capacity for implementation. It is also questionable whether the ECA's MULPOCs had the capacity, authority, and political support to pronounce on national prerogatives in transport

policy, regulatory and governance regimes including systems and standards.

Governance issues, in particular, were not included at the LPA's integrative levels of programme development (Anyang' Nyong'o, 2002: 24). Thus, the requisite governance requirements could not be cascaded to the lower levels of management during implementation processes at the higher levels of management, as the institutional frameworks did not exist. Moreover, the entrenched systems' fragmentation, in addition to the narrow mercantilist national interests that underlie national transport and communications policy and regulatory regimes, were arguably tangential to the overall stated goals of harmonisation and increased inter-African trade.

(ii) Second, the delegation of key roles to national governments and institutional structures for the implementation of a regional programme's elements, but who often lacked the political will and institutional capacity to implement collective agreements, appears to have been the Achilles' heel of the LPA's programme and its sectoral interventions. Based on the experiences of other trading blocks in developing countries, such as SAFTA (Lakshmanan & Anderson, 2000), and the patrimonial nature of the African state (Gelb, 2001; Taylor, 2005; Zenawi, 2002), it is reasonable to surmise that national governments were interested in maintaining the *status quo*: this would be to pursue national policy objectives, abetted by their narrow (in the regional context) prerogative of 'national sovereignty' (that was enshrined in the OAU Charter and also adopted by the AU). It is also possible that the reversal of this situation was hindered by the absence of capable, supranational institutions with the relevant authority and power to monitor implementation progress, and enforce collective decisions.

(iii) Third, the time frames scheduled for phased implementation of the LPA's transport programme, over a period of *eight* years, were overly ambitious. This assertion takes cognisance of the deeply entrenched complexities in

technical and safety regulation of cross-border physical flows. Moreover, Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000) have argued that the associated regulatory regimes at sectoral, sector-wide and inter-sectoral levels are not easily amenable to change, with propensity to delay harmonisation plans.

(iv) Fourth, the dereliction of duty by member states, to politically and financially support the regional or sub-regional institutions tasked with the development of institutional infrastructure and human capital, in order to ensure the efficacy of TTF systems and other inter-sectoral interventions, appears to have been ignored by both the OAU and ECA (the latter which developed the LPA on behalf of African HoSG).

(v) Fifth, the ideological difference between the developed countries (including their institutions, such as the Bretton Woods institutions), and the purported socialist principles of collective self-reliance espoused by the LPA undermined its acceptance to the international development financiers. As Anyang' Nyong'o (2002: 24) noted, "Given that the West was generally hostile to arguments in favour of the NIEO, it was not surprising that they paid scant attention to the LPA and FAL (Final Act of Lagos)." It is possible that the argument advanced by Anyang' Nyong'o explains the lack of financial support by governments of the developed north to requests by African governments (LPA, 1980, Para.15: 7; Mkandawire, 2002: 116) for implementation of the LPA and its programmatic interventions. In this regard, one may argue that the LPA promoted institutional mechanism that perpetuate external dependency in Africa's development initiatives were, whilst it simultaneously cajoled African governments to "…cultivate the virtue of self-reliance" and emphasise domestic resource mobilisation (*ibid*, Para. 14(iii): 7).

Without debating the merits or demerits of the LPA's transport programme, to the extent that immense problems in regional roads transport infrastructure, trade and transit facilitation that it sought to address still abound, one may surmise that its success was minimal, if at all. As N'diaye (2002: 42) noted, "…(the LPA) was an

idealistic plan even though the analysis was pertinent. Its idealism meant that it could not be implemented." It also seems that the principles of "collective self-reliance" amongst African and developing countries that the LPA promoted had negative implications for the overall implementation of the various sectoral interventions; this is particularly so given the West's reluctance to support such objectives at the time, as some authors (Adedegi (2002; Anyang' Nyong'o, 2002) have argued.

In addition, Mkandawire (2002: 116) argued that the reliance on external resources negatively impacted on the implementation of the LPA, "…whose own political understanding of the development of the African continent was immediately undermined by the assumption that aid would play an important role." Thus, the LPA's programme seems to have been stymied primarily by the negative influences of the external institutional environment on inadequate internal institutions and inadequate institutional mechanisms, arrangements and capacity for implementation, over and above the inordinate reliance on external funding.

B.2 The Trans-African Highway (TAH) and "Missing Links" Programme: 1970's - Current

B.2.1 Definition

According to the AfDB and ECA (2003: 3), the Trans-African Highway and "missing links" programme (hereinafter referred to as "the TAH") was originally conceived in the early 1970's: its aim was to establish a network of paved all weather roads of good quality in order to achieve the following objectives:

- provide as direct routes as possible between the capitals of the continent;
- contribute to the political, economic and social integration as well as to facilitate cohesion in Africa; and
- ensure the development of road transport facilities between important areas of production and consumption.

According to the AfDB and ECA (*ibid*), the physical layout of the roads network turned out to be a compromise: between the development of networks that supported the attainment of the afore-mentioned objectives, and the use of available financial resources to improve roads serving important population and production centres at national and regional levels. Consequently, it appears that the objective of providing the most direct routes between capitals was neglected. These routes, commonly referred to as the 'missing links', now form sections of the TAH network. Roads that do not meet the technical criteria described above are included in the TAH as well as existing routes that, according to the AfDB and ECA (*ibid*: 3), are "…teetering on the brink of deterioration beyond repair." Also, roads for which no contracts were concluded, although financial closure was attained, are also included under the TAH programme.

Suggestions were recently made (NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB & ECA, 2003) to revive the TAH programme under the banner of NEPAD. However, there are possible overlaps and potential for duplication between the TAH and NEPAD's roads programme, thereby indicating a greater need for coherence in programme/project planning and implementation management arrangements. The AfDB and ECA report (2003: 3) has also referred to inconsistencies in data and documentation on the network. Moreover, lack of clarity regarding the authorised structures responsible and accountable for defining components of the TAH appears to be a persistent problem. This institutional gap also applies to structures to determine the required provisions and agreements to amend the network. According to the AfDB and ECA (*ibid*), RECs traditionally identified sub-regional networks that are critical to advance political integration and socio-economic development of a sub-region. However, the AfDB and ECA (*ibid*) notes that the lack of authority in RECs (to control decision-making processes in project design, and prioritising projects to ensure the attainment of articulated collective objectives,) has resulted in national governments incorporating certain sections to the TAH, although such networks do not coincide with sub-regional priorities. This has resulted in the existing alignment of the TAH being contested, resulting in the promotion of several alternative alignments (*ibid*).

B.2.2 Approach to programme development

B.2.2.1 Funding requirements

There is no indication from the literature reviewed of original cost-estimates for the TAH programme. Current funding requirements to complete the TAH are estimated at approximately US$4.2 billion (AfDB & ECA, 2003; Estache, 2006a). However, the AfDB (World Highways, 2003: 17) notes that even available funds, amounting to US$200 million and which constitute 16% of total disbursements, are still not allocated because of institutional inadequacy: according to the AfDB (*ibid*), there are no prepared projects for which to disburse the available funds.

B.2.2.2 Approach to programme design

Institutional mechanisms and arrangements to support implementation of the TAH programme are restrictive and not coherently structured to ensure an integrated approach between the various spatial categories. The approach to programme design seems to be determined by ownership of networks vis-à-vis national priorities including the potential for the availability of funding (or foreign investment) for implementation. The TAH programme essentially takes cognisance of two types of road networks: *internal country links* not extending to a border, and cross-border road networks that *link countries*. With respect to the *internal country links*, national government priorities prevail. The involvement of RECs in this category of networks is only limited to "keep the issue alive" (AfDB & ECA, 2003: 5), and to actively review possible funding options available to national governments.

Regarding the *inter-country connections* (*ibid*), ownership *also* remains firmly with the individual countries. However, projects receive strong support from the respective RECs because of the *regional development profile* of this category of networks. According to the AfDB and ECA (*ibid*), the upgrading of the inter-country connections has increased potential to attain reasonable economic returns and to attract funding assistance from multilateral structures, such as the EU and

the AfDB. For this category of projects, RECs also provide advisory services and assist affected member countries to apply for funding, agree on common standards, and procure design, construction and project management services. Arguably, ownership of ***both types*** of networks identified above rests with the member countries.

According to the AfDB and ECA's report (2003: 6), it also appears that the possibilities for RECs to influence developments regarding the missing links *differ* between the different types of missing links. This *status quo* has been attributed (*ibid*) to the possible influence of unresolved issues regarding minimum standards, fragmentation in transport policy and related regulatory instruments, lack of harmonisation of technical and safety regulations, and onerous funding requirements for different sections of the TAH. Also, it appears that before any serious discussions on priorities can be taken, the afore-mentioned institutional issues must be prioritised through collective engagement at national, sub-regional or regional levels, in order to identify least cost solutions relative to total project costs. The RECs' overall influence and significance in this process appears to be curtailed by the multiplicity of institutional structures and arrangements for implementation.

Also, the intractable process to harmonise technical and safety-regulation is exacerbated by the lack of private-sector capital for this type of projects. As a result, the role recommended (*ibid*) for RECs is that of sub-regional technical advisors on minimum design and axle load standards for the TAH. Based on financial possibilities, the matters under RECs' spheres of operation are escalated for deliberation at the regional level. This process facilitates the prioritisation of least-cost solutions and projects with limited total costs at all the various spatial categories, such as national, sub-regional and regional levels. The AfDB and ECA (*ibid*) also recommended, as *desirable*, a similar process of *gradually* harmonising the axle load and total weight regulations between RECs.

B.2.3 Progress in implementation

The AfDB and ECA report (*ibid*) has identified the following challenges with influence on implementation progress:

- minimal or lack of progress to implement sub-regional and regional agreements, and protocols, often "…with political agreements and interventions from the highest levels of government a pre-requisite for sustainable solutions" (*ibid*: 7);

- a plethora of non-physical barriers for which the TAH could be used as a focal point to address;

- lack of financial support from member countries for establishment of multinational administration structures (such as the TAH Bureau that was proposed without success by the ECA in 1993). Preference seems instead to be for planning and coordination at national and sub-regional levels. As a result, the AfDB and ECA report recommended the establishment of "…a simple institutional structure to handle the fairly modest set of activities at regional level" (*ibid*: 14). Whether this modest structure is suitable within the context of its envisaged activities, given the complexities of cross-border regional infrastructure and transit facilitation described above, is debatable; and

- negative influence of national prerogatives in transport policy, which affect sections of the TAH falling within the borders of individual countries. As the AfDB and ECA (*ibid*: 12) noted:

> "The Governments of Africa, through their relevant ministries and responsible road authorities, consider decisions regarding what road to build, rehabilitate, and maintain and at what time *a purely national issue* (author's emphasis)."

B.2.4 Recommendations of the AfDB and ECA report

The AfDB and ECA (*ibid*), have made recommendations to expedite progress in the implementation of sub-regional and regional agreements. These recommendations emphasise activities at strategic and operational levels, but with a strong sectoral and sector-wide focus. They include the following elements:

- Adopting measures to foster "competition among different corridors connecting the landlocked countries." These measures are planned to focus on increasing efficiencies to improve technical and safety regulation, customs management and clearance procedures. Also included are cost-containment and improved physical infrastructure/facilities in multi-modal logistic chains;

- (Suggested) consideration (*ibid*) by financing institutions to extend conditionalities to commitment (by the recipients of funding) to reduce non-physical barriers. The AfDB and ECA's report (*ibid*) suggests that this requirement would include, for example, that recipient countries commit (in return for funding,) to reduce delays in border crossings and borders, or route closures resulting from political or security concerns; rationalising and streamlining road blocks; and improving transport facilitation measures; and

- Adopting a *bottom-up approach* to transport and trade facilitation, similar to the approach adopted by SADC. This approach is premised upon assigning specialists from the public or private-sectors to identify and analyse problems as well as to propose concrete solutions for approval at ministerial levels. According to the AfDB and ECA (*ibid*); this proposed approach is different from the prevalent approaches of starting with a decision at ministerial levels, and then cascading it to the lower levels of management for implementation.

The measures recommended by the AfDB and ECA report, however, appear to superficially address the symptoms rather than the underlying causes (such as institutional inadequacy) at the various spatial categories. This report makes this

assertion cognisant of institutional inadequacy and lack of capacity for implementation at national levels, but where ownership of decision-making processes, approaches to design including arrangements for funding and implementation reside. The underlying problems at national levels, when not addressed, escalate to crises when attempts are made to develop road infrastructure and transit facilitation at sub-regional and regional levels. The AfDB and ECA's recommendations also appear to be limited to managing crises within the existing institutional frameworks, rather than proposing transformational interventions for institutional reform and development in order to support the effective provision of cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services.

The AfDB and ECA's technical recommendations also appear to downplay the dire picture that the same institutions so eloquently articulate in their analysis of the following issues: the underlying causes to the parlous state of non-physical and physical transport infrastructure at national, sub-regional and regional levels; the range of challenges confronting the TAH programme; and the inability of RECs to authoritatively address the *status quo*. What also emerges from the AfDB and ECA report is that the perpetuation of problems in the provision of regional transport infrastructure and transit facilitation services is attributable to the lack of political will and commitment to change at national levels for their resolution. This is so since it is with the national governments that ownership and decision-making regarding national and cross-border transportation networks resides. Also, the identified problems are exacerbated by the diverse national transport policy instruments and regulations including the proliferation of rules arising out of multifarious national, sub-regional and regional bilateral FTAs and RTAs. Under the intractable conditions mapped above, the TAH's example of implementation failure illustrates a key observation by the DFID (2003: iv): technical interventions that leave inadequate institutions intact may achieve nothing.

B.2.5 Lessons from the TAH

The TAH initiative is relevant in NEPAD's context for the following reasons: the TAH initiative has been resuscitated; and there are suggestions (NEPAD, 2002c; AfDB & ECA, 2003) that the TAH programme must be encompassed within NEPAD in order to expedite its implementation. However, it is not clear how far the thinking and institutional environment that underpins the TAH will be transformed under NEPAD's umbrella, to avoid emulating previous implementation failures.

B.2.5.1 Impact of institutions, organisations and institutional capacity

In the current global political economy, the AfDB and ECA's recommended approach to the (resuscitated) TAH appears to ignore the possible influence of the diverse and dynamic external/internal institutional environment on cross-border regional roads infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes/projects. For example, positive influences include the possible beneficial impact of properly managed international institutional arrangements to instigate rapid changes on the domestic political and socio-economic environment, particularly so in the context of globalisation. To this extent, the role of the RECs to advise their principals (i.e., member states) on the appropriate institutional mechanisms and arrangements for the desired benefits to manifest seems to be constrained by the adverse internal institutional environment. This includes the negative impact of inequitable power relations between national governments and sub-regional/ regional institutions and institutional structures, the (at times) disruptive influence of member-states on RECs' decisions, the predominance of political agreements in technical spheres, and lack of institutional capacity at national, sub-regional and regional levels. (The latter includes lack of physical and non-physical infrastructure, funding, limited administrative competence and wherewithal to make sustained transformational contributions to support the attainment of the articulated strategic objectives.)

Yet, the AfDB and ECA (2003: 8) identify RECs as the appropriate structures to play a central role in the TAH initiative, ostensibly because of their experience in managing stakeholder relationships and in providing technical advice. As the AfDB and ECA (*ibid*: 14) note: "…(the RECs') close contacts with individual countries, interest and competence in technical matters in the road infrastructure sector are generally appreciated by member governments." This suggestion, however, contradicts the well-documented structural crises in RECs: these crises are compounded by poor leadership in member-states and lack of institutional capacity (technical, financial and human capital) for implementation. The allocation of additional complex responsibilities to RECs thus belies their well-documented institutional inadequacies. Notably, observations regarding the lack of capacity in RECs appear to ignore the impact of the often inappropriate, flawed and contradictory ideologies that underpin policy interventions in the transport sector at national levels, which the RECs are often powerless to influence or change in favour of sub-regional/regional agreements.

B.2.5.2 Institutional arrangements

The programme design and institutional arrangements for the TAH need to be reviewed if it is resuscitated. For example, the planning framework for the TAH requires a holistic approach that will facilitate the development of appropriate interconnected urban hierarchies, rather than treating production or consumption centres, or capitals, as mutually exclusive spatial enclaves. In this regard, the development of adequate institutional capacity in and across the different spatial categories and levels of management will be required. In this context, the role of institutional structures at the various spatial categories would be, for example, to facilitate integration of project scope and project organisation management. Also, their role would be to ensure a planned interface with NEPAD's roads programme and to re-define the overlap of functions between the political, technical, and administrative mechanisms at national, sub-regional, and regional levels. Therefore, roles and responsibilities of various institutional structures in the various spatial categories would need to be clearly defined. Such interventions

need to be supported by institutional reform and development at the various spatial categories.

It is, however, concerning that the AfDB and ECA report (2003) views the process of harmonisation in the TAH as *desirable* rather than *imperative*: the complexity in harmonising and streamlining cross-border transport regimes results from the preponderance of multifarious national transport-sector regimes. Therefore, the influence of harmonisation of policy, governance and regulatory regimes on project design as a critical condition for the success of cross-border transport and transit facilitation is significant. Moreover, the recommendations by the AfDB and ECA report (*ibid*) for the "gradual" harmonisation of axle loads appears to replicate entrenched approaches to Africa's regional integration, such as the gradual functionalist approach to regional integration (see: Senghor, 1990: 17-31). However, the success of the "gradualist approach" has, at best, been limited. In this regard, the harmonisation of transport policies, standards, regulatory and governance regimes are critical components of the initial steps to support institutional reforms that will facilitate improvements in regional transportation. Such institutional reforms will determine the success of technical interventions at the levels of programmes and projects.

Thus, the example of the TAH indicates the need for a paradigm shift – in the delivery of cross-border regional transport/roads programmes and projects – at the different spatial categories, institutional structures and levels of the management. In a regional and sub-regional context, care must be taken to prevent the predominance of national prerogatives in transport policy, including the related regulatory and governance regimes, as tools to pursue the narrow mercantilism of national governments in the transport sector.

B.3 Other Regional Interventions

In the Africa region, various international agencies, donors, regional/sub-regional institutions, and RECs have implemented or proposed a multiplicity of

overlapping programmes to address the challenges in regional transport infrastructure and transit facilitation as well as other challenges in various sectors or disciplines related thereto. These programmes include the UN's Transport and Communications Decades in Africa (UNTACDA) I and II to address the problem of land-locked countries, the RECs' separate programmes and, recently, the proposed programmes under NEPAD. There is, however, an overlap in the various programmes designed to attain similar or diverse objectives. In this regard, it is not clear whether there is a coherent framework within which the various programmes/projects are conceived, prepared, and implemented to support the goals of integrated development. For example, the following interventions have been mooted or implemented by institutional structures at, within, and across the different levels of management and spatial categories:

(i) The related programmes in UNTACDA I and II. These programmes were adopted by African leaders to increase the efficacy of transport and communications systems (Amoako, 1997: 3). The long-term objective was to establish efficient integrated systems in the transport and communications sectors, as a basis for the physical and market integration of Africa (*ibid*). The TAH was one of the earlier initiatives originally formulated in the early 1970's in this context (AfDB & ECA, 2003). In addition, various inter-REC coordination structures (involving key stakeholders such as the donors, development partners, UN machinery, and AU) have been mooted by the UN to operate under an AU-designed mechanism (UNECOSOC, 2003: 8). Their (proposed) mandates include the harmonisation of continent-wide policies, strategies, and programmes as the envisaged basic framework for inter-REC coordination. It is not clear from the literature reviewed whether these processes are only planned for the transport sector interventions or across various sectors in an integrated approach.

(ii) Specific REC interventions are also implemented on a case-by-case basis. Examples in this regard include the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology (ratified in August 1996), and the SADC Protocol on Trade (also ratified in August 1996). These REC interventions

demonstrate a strong sectoral focus. Other similar technical interventions to harmonise "inter-state road transit" were adopted by the member states of *l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine* (UEMOA) in 2001 (NEPAD, 2002c: 46). The UEMOA interventions, which demonstrated a strong sectoral focus, comprised the harmonisation of transport regulatory aspects, inter-state border control physical infrastructure, and monitoring of non-physical barriers on inter-state roads (*ibid*). In addition, a plethora of other separate REC programmes are being implemented to attain similar objectives.

(iii) Similar roles are also assigned to different (international) structures to fund, provide technical assistance, and/or promote efficient cross-border trade and transit facilitation in the Africa region. These structures include the UNECA, UNCTAD, WTO, World Bank, and World Customs Organization (*ibid*). However, the interface between these current UN programmes and NEPAD's roads programme is not clear, if at all. Moreover, there is lack of clarity regarding processes, if any, to build on successes of previous initiatives and lessons learnt.

(iv) Member states and national governments have been assigned key roles and responsibilities to ensure successful implementation of other agreed and follow up programmes under the UNECOSOC/ECA Programme for Landlocked and Transit developing countries. These programmes are to benefit both the landlocked and transit countries (UNECOSOC, 2003). However, it is not clear how these initiatives have performed, and whether or not they have been evaluated to establish their effectiveness.

B.4 International Experience

According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000), in other international regional blocks – such as the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, *Mercosur*, and SAFTA – effective institutions (together with the related institutional mechanisms and arrangements) played a decisive role in the successful implementation of sub-regional/regional

transport and transit facilitation projects. Institutional interventions included the development of enabling policy, governance and regulatory regimes for the member-countries to implement integrative transport and trade integration initiatives (*ibid*).

B.4.1 The EU's Trans-European Networks (TENs) initiative

According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*: 19), the EU, as the oldest and most highly evolved regional trading block, embarked on a transportation process that compelled member states to relinquish jurisdiction over a broad range of economic, social, and environmental policy issues. Given the large number of national borders within the EU area (then comprising 15 countries with a combined population of 375 million), the integration of transportation markets and infrastructure as well as the harmonisation of transportation policies were important preconditions for achieving the free movement of goods and people. The establishment of *a common transportation policy* was stated as a goal in the EU's founding documents.

The TENs initiative was announced in 1994 as a major infrastructure programme to specifically fill the gaps in (then) European transportation networks. The programme was planned for implementation over a 15 year-period, at an estimated cost in excess of €400 billion. However, national prerogatives stood in the way of harmonisation. As Lackshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*) stated:

> Little progress was made, however, in the area of transportation policy over the first three decades of the EU's existence because of the presence of state-owned suppliers of transportation services and the desire by member governments to use transportation policy to promote their separate national economic programs.

According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*: 22-24), the EU followed an inter-sectoral and sector-wide integrated phased approach in order to facilitate and expedite the attainment of the agreed objectives. This approach (including the development of the process and prioritisation of activities,) was supported by

effective institutional mechanisms and arrangements. The process depicted below was followed:

(i) The preliminary process focussed on market access, interoperability, and common work rules for transportation employees. This process required the enactment of "major new legislation," which dealt with air, marine, road and inland water transportation over a five-year period between 1987 and 1992.

(ii) The EU Commission then focussed on issues of interconnection. This aspect entailed transformation of fragmented production and consumption patterns, to facilitate ease of management in complex logistics and value chains. This process was supported by the enactment in 1993 of a White Paper, which emphasised a goal enshrined in the 1992 Treaty of the European Union: i.e., (to call for) the development of integrated and complementary information, transportation and energy networks. The EU's supranational structures supported project selection in line with the objectives of the TENs initiative and disbursement of funds for approved projects. They had authority to overrule national decisions. Projects were selected for their contribution to the objectives of the TENs initiative.

(iii) EU funding was provided for up to *10%* of total project costs in the form of co-financing for feasibility studies, fees for loan guarantees, interest rate subsidies, and direct investment grants in limited circumstances. The remaining *90*% funding gap was filled by member states and the private sector in member states under PPPs (*ibid*: 23-24).

Box B.3: Institutions of the European Union

The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1958, established the European Economic Community (EEC) as the predecessor of the EU. A distinguishing factor of the EU is that it is equipped with a set of powerful supranational institutions that can make policy and even override the policies of member states. These supranational institutions include the following:

(i) The most conspicuous of the EU institutions is the European Commission (EC), which is essentially the executive branch of the EU. There are 22 Directorates-General within the Commission, with mandates for specific areas of administration such as external affairs, industry, environment, fisheries, and transport.

(ii) In addition to its administrative responsibilities, the Commission initiates all EU legislation. Bills are passed from the Commission to the European Parliament for approval and amendment.

(iii) Final approval of legislation is by the Council of Ministers. Legislation relating to the Common Transport Policy would be approved by transport ministers of the (then) 15 member-states of the EU. The Council of Europe, comprising the heads of government (Prime Ministers or Presidents) from each member state only takes up very high level issues.

(iv) The EU also has its own judicial institution, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has the critical responsibility of ruling on whether or not the laws and actions of national governments are consistent with EU laws, or whether or not the laws implemented by the EU according to the legislative process described above are consistent with the Treaty of Rome and all later treaties. For example, in 1985, the ECJ ruled that the European Commission had failed to act appropriately to implement the Common Transport Policy required under the Treaty of Rome. This ruling related specifically to the opening up of national transportation markets to suppliers from other member states. The ruling marked a major turning point after which the Commission and Parliament became more active in all aspects of transportation policy. Thus, the ECJ played a critical role in breaking down traditional national prerogatives that stood in the way of a Common Transport Policy for 30 years.

(v) In the case of air transportation, the European Commission put forth an argument for regulatory reform that was opposed by all member states in 1979, but which was to come into force after almost a decade of debate and litigation.

Source: Excepts derived from Lakshmanan and Anderson, 2000. pp. 20-24.

B.4.2 Lessons from the international experience

B.4.2.1 Institutional issues

In the examples of the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, Mercosur and SAFTA, Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*) confirmed the significance of *prioritising* institutional reforms and developing appropriate institutional arrangements in cross-border transport infrastructure and transit facilitation programmes, to ensure successful implementation of the agreed programmes. In addition, the overview of the other sub-regional blocks (*ibid*) underscores the significance of harmonising technical and safety-regulation regimes (in addition to other transport policy prescriptions,) as a precondition to be enforced at national levels.

In the afore-mentioned examples of international regional blocks, these measures sought to ensure successful implementation of cross-border trade, transport and

facilitation initiatives. They also sought to avert the detrimental influence posed by the predominance of entrenched national prerogatives. For example, in the EU's case, traditional national prerogatives stood in the way of a Common Transport Policy for 30 years (*ibid*: 24). The identified impediments were *only* effectively addressed pursuant to intervention by powerful supranational authorities of the EU (Box B3). These supranational authorities created a burning platform to facilitate change, and to ensure successful implementation of the agreed multinational transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation projects.

The institutional mechanisms and arrangements of the EU also ensured that managed openness (presumably at regional and national levels) was balanced by the development of effective systems in order to ensure territorial integrity at lower levels of management in member states. For example, Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*: 22) argued that whilst the EU's supranational authorities gave it "…a degree of authority that is greater than other regional blocks, its power…(was) limited by the *principle of subsidiarity* (emphasis in the original), which prevents the EU from interfering in decisions that can be taken effectively at national levels."

The implementation of the EU's programme to achieve common transportation policy was described (*ibid*: 24) as "painful"; it still remains incomplete 50 years since the inception of the EU's antecedents (*ibid*). However, member-states demonstrated strong political commitment in support of common goals. Other measures included the implementation of inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary processes to support transportation objectives. These are described by Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*) to include the following:

- the effective use of information and communications technologies (ICT) to support the development of efficient roads infrastructure and TTF systems;
- the development of adequate institutional infrastructure including the development of relevant non-physical infrastructure assets (such as knowledge and human capital) to increase the effectiveness of the physical infrastructure assets; and

- the commitment of adequate funding by national governments, which helped to ameliorate some of the administrative constraints. National governments employed various domestic and international financial instruments to fund capital investments. But, these funding arrangements were premised primarily on domestic resource mobilisation to support the implementation of agreed interventions.

B.4.2.2 Funding arrangements

The funding arrangements depicted in the example of the EU's TENs initiative are different from those employed by the majority of African countries, sub-regional and regional institutions, described in the examples of the LPA and TAH initiatives in earlier sections above. In the African context, regional infrastructure projects are seemingly identified and approved for implementation without first establishing the sources of funding (which are linked to the determination of appropriate instruments for resource mobilisation). The perennial lack of commitment to funding of regional/sub-regional projects from the national budgets of member-states and their PPPs has entrenched a culture of dependency on external sources of funding. The risks inherent in this dependency possibly manifest through the lack of attention to financing aspects of regional infrastructure projects at the outset, during project conceptualisation.

Increasingly, individual countries are reported (AfDB & ECA 2003: 8) to consider donor funds (including concessionary grants and non-concessionary loans from the international finance institutions (IFIs)) as the sources of funding for capital investments in national physical infrastructure development and maintenance programmes. This dependency has significant negative implications for programme/project design, ownership of development processes, and political issues.

B.4.2.3 Standardisation/harmonisation of relevant policy, sectoral, technical and regulatory regimes

In the case of NAFTA, Lakshmanan and Anderson (2000: 15) indicate that efforts to deal with the variety of technical and safety-related regulations developed in various member states over the years proved to be complex and multidimensional. This problem was ascribed (*ibid*) primarily to the narrow mandates of the independent review panels established to address the most contentious issues via inter-governmental negotiations. According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*), considerable effort was often required to remove inconsistencies. In the case of SAFTA and *Mercosur* (*ibid*: 39), special efforts were often required to overcome "historical intra-regional transport frictions". According to Lakshmanan and Anderson (*ibid*), the hurdles encountered by SAFTA and *Mercosur* characterise the problems of developing countries that band together to form trade blocks, because of persisting semi-colonial links with north-America and Europe. In this case, issues that needed to be addressed to harmonise trade and transport-sector regimes included the following:

- the inward-oriented trade regimes;
- the pervasive role of the public sector;
- the insignificant role of trade in national incomes, which resulted in low trade intensity;
- the low proportion of intra-regional trade to total trade, as a consequence of historically stronger colonial-era trade and financial links; and
- a plethora of impediments to transport and trade facilitation.

B.5 Conclusion

The significance of the LPA's regional Transport and Communications programme and the TAH initiative is that they draw attention to the consequences of approaches that ignore to combine technical interventions with institutional reform/development and institutional capacity development, particularly in the context of integrated (development and) implementation of regional development

programmes. These afore-mentioned programmes underscore the implications of inadequate external/internal institutional environments for programme/project implementation, particularly so in the context of inadequate institutional capacity. The LPA's Transport and Communications programme also illustrates the complexities that ensue for programme implementation when principles of divergent ideological perspectives are integrated incoherently in attempts to address the inequitable power relations in the global political economy, particularly in an environment of inadequate institutional capacity.

The studies of interventions to improve cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services in other global regional blocks confirms that technical improvements in cross-border TTF systems require parallel reforms in the institutional environment (such as rules governing cross-border physical flows including the elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers). On the one hand, the findings of this study highlight the impact of efficient inter-sectoral interventions on the implementation of programmes/ projects to ensure improvements in the provision of cross-border regional transport/roads infrastructure and transit facilitation services; on the other hand, they highlight the significance of the symbiotic relationship between technical interventions and the institutional environment to elicit the desired/planned transformational outcomes, and the need for simultaneous transformation and development thereof.

APPENDIX C

DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATIO PROGRESS: INFRASTRUCTURE STAP AND ROADS PROGRAMME

1st STAP Review: 2003	2nd STAP Review: 2004	Roads Infrastructure Projects: STAP Review, 2004	Transit Facilitation Projects: STAP Review, 2004
• 52 Facilitation Projects: 46 percent of the projects were being implemented; • 18 Capacity Building Projects: 33 percent of the projects were being implemented (16 projects in 2004); • 36 Investment Projects: 22 percent of the projects were being implemented; • 18 Studies Projects: 16 percent of the projects were being implemented (17 projects in 2004) • A NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF) has been established with the support of C$ 10 million from the Canadian government. This multi-functional facility will be used for project preparation purposes. Plans are underway to mobilise contributions for additional funds from other development partners. The AfDB hosts NEPAD's IPPF. • The NEPAD Secretariat is consulting key development partners and IFIs/DFIs (including the AfDB, World Bank, EU Commission, and DBSA,) on studies and regional infrastructure projects scheduled for 2004 / 2005.	• **ICT Sector:** Progress was reported in most regions on key areas, such as harmonisation of policies, regulations, liberalisation and the associated legislative framework. The Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation (RASCOM) had achieved financial closure. The identified key challenges relate to the provision of sufficient technical skills to move the projects forward, and to manage the transition to fully liberalised markets. • **Energy Sector**: Considerable progress was made in a number of regional projects, such as the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP), which achieved financial closure; the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP); and the development of generating and transmission capacity within UMA/AMU. The key challenges identified in the 2nd Infrastructure STAP review (TCII & NEPAD, 2005) relate to the "…continued development of the power pools and sustainable power trading mechanisms, restructuring of utilities, attracting partners for sustainable IPP development and the realisation of the Grand Inga Project." • **Transport Sectors:** • **Air Sector**: The sector displayed wide variation in both the	• The corridor concept is accepted in most regions. Road corridor programmes under current implementation include Programme Routier One (PR1) – Accra/Ouagadougou/Bamako; and Mombassa/Nairobi/Addis. • The EAC has focussed on securing investment for the development of the East African Road Network Programme (EARNP). The programme, which replaced the individual corridor projects originally listed in the 2002 STAP, consists of five corridors across the region. Since 2003, the required improvements were identified by member states; funding and procurement procedures were agreed to. • A World-Bank funded study on road concessioning in Corridor 1 – Mombasa/Katuna, has been completed. • Plans are underway for an ECCAS-sponsored feasibility study for a corridor linking Doussala/Brazzavile, to form part of the Trans-African Tripoli/ Windhoek (TATW) road. Difficulties in communication, between ECCAS and Congo, hamper progress on the project. Terms of reference of reference (TOR) are being prepared.	• **One-stop border posts**: SADC has concentrated on the establishment of unified procedures and systems within the existing legal framework, rather than the construction of new facilities. Projects supported by SADC include the pilot one-stop border post initiatives at Mutare and Chirundu, which include training and harmonised documentation. • EAC is working on two initiatives to strengthen road transit within the region: the first initiative with the East Africa Business Council (EABC) will be to promote the reduction of trade barriers including simplification of border crossing procedures; in the second initiative, a pilot scheme at Malaba has been developed, in conjunction with SADC and COMESA. This pilot scheme follows a second study the EAC conducted, in 2004, on the implementation of one-stop border crossings. Phase 1 of the pilot scheme will be funded by the USAid. • ECOWAS and UEMOA have sponsored several studies on the legal aspects and the organisational structure one-stop border posts. Several draft multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements have been drawn in line with the Customs Inter-State

• Discussions are underway with the US Trade Department Agency, to undertake studies on some projects including the Ports of Mombasa, Djibouti, and Dakar; the COMESA Border Crossing / Customs Facilitation, and SADC Upper Airspace Control. • The Treaty that relates to the Yamoussoukro Decision, to liberalise African Air Space has still not been implemented (in the majority of African countries), despite being in existence for more than 10 years.	implementation of reforms and the willingness of member states to comply with the agreed requirements of the 20-year old Yamoussoukro Decision (YD) to liberalise markets and enforce decisions at all levels. According to the TCII and NEPAD review report (*ibid*: 16), the YD had called for all African countries to be fully compliant by 2002. However, the main obstacles identified by the review resulted from the failure by member states to honour commitments in terms of collective decisions. Instead, various countries seemingly insisted on the pursuance of historical restrictive policies and agreements which had been superseded by the YD. According to the TCII and NEPAD review, the failure to implement the YD is made much more difficult by NEPAD's failure to support RECs/AU institutions to mobilise political will for its implementation. • **Road, Rail and Maritime Sectors**: These sectors displayed wide variation in the quality of infrastructure and in implementation progress. Common problems in respect of project implementation were identified: some of these problems relate to financing, legal, and institutional constraints to overcome.	• A Fougamou/Doussala corridor that will form a second link in the TATW road has been proposed. However, ECCAS lacks the resources to manage the project. • ECCAS is also sponsoring a feasibility study for a new rail/road bridge linking Brazzavile – Kinshasa. • An Emergency Recovery Programme funded by the AfDB, EU, and World Bank is planned for Angola and DRC. The programme has a transport infrastructure recovery component with an estimated budget of US$ 1.5 billion. • ECOWAS has identified a 20,000km priority road network comprising the Trans-West African Highway, the Trans-Sahelian Highway and other roads linking landlocked countries to seaports and other important trade links. • A survey will be conducted to prepare a road infrastructure improvement programme. • The World Bank is considering funding a US$ 100million road rehabilitation programme that includes Benin, Burkina Faso and Ghana. • UMA has focused on the completion of the Maghreb Highway linking Nouakchott/Casablanca/Algiers/ Tunis/Tripoli/Messad; development of the Mauritanian road network; and EuroMed Project. UMA has, however, not maintained detailed records on the projects, although progress has been reported in respect of the first and third projects depicted	Road Transit Declaration (ISRTD). A number of special facilitation committees have been established and workshops have also been held. • ECOWAS has obtained a Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) grant of approximately US$ 1million from the Japanese government. Six TOR have been prepared for studies in the following areas: (i) Axle load control and harmonisation in West Africa; (ii) Harmonisation of vehicle technical inspections; (iii) Road tracking system; (iv) Computerised interconnection of customs system; (v) Port security audit; and (vi) Institutional arrangements on joint-border posts. • **Other transit and trade facilitation instruments**: A wide range of COMESA trade and transit facilitation instruments have been operational for a while: Yellow Card (a regional Third Party Motor Vehicle Insurance); COMESA Carrier Licence; COMESA Customs Document; and high frequency land radio communications. • **Overload Control**: Few projects have been established so far to examine overload control. • A survey was conducted in 2004 to review current vehicle overload practices in sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly all the countries that provided information on the survey were from

		above.	SADC and COMESA. • Following the recommendations of the survey, the World Bank-managed sub-Saharan African Transport Policy (SSATP) programme is financing a study of issues affecting the implementation of overload control in COMESA. These issues include: harmonisation of weighbridge equipment; weighing procedures; acceptance of tolerance limits; the use of Overload Control Certificates; and practical management of weighbridges. The results of the study will be used to prepare Model Guidelines and Procedures, for use by member countries.

Source: Derived from: *NEPAD Annual Report* 2004/5; *NEPAD Infrastructure Sectoral Programme Overview*, October 2004; *NEPAD Infrastructure STAP – Second Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward*, TCII/NEPAD Report, 2005, pp.66-70.

APPENDIX D

1st Infrastructure STAP Review (2003) – Constraints to Implementation Progress and Recommendations

Constraints	Recommendations
1. Lack of clarity as to what NEPAD really is: • Lack of clarity regarding NEPAD's status, its objectives and its envisaged contribution towards the implementation of STAP; • Lack of clarity regarding the responsibilities for implementation and funding arrangements for projects included in the STAP; • Expectations that NEPAD would acquire and disburse funds from special sources, thereby obviating the need for RECs to follow normal procedures to source funding from bilateral and multilateral agencies; • There was confusion regarding the roles of NEPAD and the AfDB in the implementation of the STAP; • Compounding the problem of lack of role and responsibility clarification was the involvement of multiple players at different institutional and spatial levels including "…countries, RECs, African technical institutions, not to mention a plethora of foreign partners" (AfDB, 2003: 35). According to the AfDB (*ibid*), the perception that "…NEPAD leadership, Heads of State and the Secretariat were preoccupied with ensuring that NEPAD was understood and well-received *outside of Africa* (authors emphasis) in order to obtain the backing of the international community" (*ibid*), may have contributed to the pervasiveness of this problem.	"NEPAD Secretariat would intensify its efforts to: Clarify for RECs and countries the role that NEPAD expects to play in the implementation of the STAP with regard to mobilising political will and facilitating obtaining of donor support and financing" (AfDB, 2003: 35).
2. Lack of clarity as to what is expected of the RECs and countries: • There was confusion regarding the expectations of NEPAD on RECs and countries in the implementation of STAP. According to the AfDB, it was difficult to establish whether the confusion was ascribable to lack of effective communication with RECs at the top levels, resulting in the lack of accurate messages filtering to the relevant internal (lower-level) structures within RECs, or whether communication failure resulted from RECs being "slow to formalise their activities with respect to NEPAD" (*ibid*).	"The NEPAD Secretariat would intensify its efforts to: Clarify for RECs and countries the role that NEPAD expects them to play in the implementation of the STAP with regard to identifying and preparing projects, mobilising funding and carrying out projects; Encourage the RECs to establish formal procedures to deal with NEPAD; and Encourage Heads of State to formalise arrangements for NEPAD coordination in their respective regions" (*ibid*: 36).
3. Lack of definition regarding linkages between countries and the RECs: • Inadequate thought was given to the management of REC/country relations, resulting in different processes of implementation adopted: (i) Countries on one hand implemented projects that should be in STAP without the RECs' awareness; (ii) On the other hand, RECs promoted projects without the necessary buy-in from their member states. (iii) In some sub-regions, such as ECOWAS, countries established NEPAD Coordinating Units without defining the relationships (and interface) between these units and the existing ECOWAS Coordination Units.	"NEPAD would intensify its efforts to encourage the RECs to: Establish procedures for coordinating with the countries to ensure that the countries are well aware of the challenges and opportunities of NEPAD, so that both countries and RECs can play their proper role and maximise synergies." (*ibid*).
4. Overlapping REC responsibilities: • Overlapping REC's responsibilities including multiple memberships (by countries,) in more that one REC hampers implementation of the STAP. As a result, RECs (possibly) either duplicate each other's activities, or fail to address pertinent issues under the mistaken belief that another REC is addressing them. This *status quo* resulted in the squandering of limited resources or missed opportunities.	The NEPAD Secretariat would encourage the overlapping RECs to: • Jointly examine their programmes with a view to identifying: (i) Areas where one REC has a clear comparative advantage and can play a leading role; (ii)Areas where both have capacity and joint programmes can be developed; and (iii)Areas where neither has capacity and it needs to be developed, or an alternative technical partner found. • Set up explicit joint teams and joint programs in areas where both intend to work on a topic *(ibid*: 37).

5. Failure by RECs to keep abreast of "NEPAD-type programmes" in which they are not directly involved: • Lack of awareness, by RECs, of the scope of programmes and projects undertaken in their respective sub-regions, although the existence of a number of projects that the RECs were not aware of was known to consultants in the infrastructure environment; • Lack of incorporation of a number of donor-sponsored, cross-cutting initiatives (such as the World Bank's SSATP, which specifically supports road management through its Road Management Project,) into the planning processes of RECs and NEPAD during the development of their own programmes for the STAP.	"The NEPAD Secretariat would encourage the RECs to: • Identify programmes for which alternative technical agencies can provide leadership, permitting the RECs to concentrate their scarce resources on technical areas where no alternative source of expertise exists; • Include such programmes and projects in the STAP; • Establish procedures for liaising with these agencies to ensure that the RECs are well informed regarding the programmes and projects that are being undertaken in their areas of influence" (*ibid*: 38).
6. Lack of alignment of REC programmes and NEPAD priorities: • There was lack of alignment between the REC's programmes with NEPAD's, to enable interconnected performance of their designated role in terms of NEPAD; • RECs needed to reassess their programmes, to ensure alignment of their activities with NEPAD's agenda and priorities, as opposed to the pursuance of "legacy" programmes that were undertaken for historical reasons: "…some RECs are still working on programmes and projects that derive from Heads of State and ministerial resolutions that can be up to twenty years old, but which are no longer a priority in today's circumstances" (*ibid*)	The NEPAD Secretariat would • Encourage the RECs to: (i) Take steps to align their programmes with NEPAD priorities; (ii) Undertake a review of "legacy programmes" to ensure that resources are not being devoted to non-priority programmes; (iii) Approach their authorities – Heads of State and Ministers – to validate any re-alignment of priorities. • Encourage Heads of State or Ministers to promote such an exercise (*ibid*).
7. Lack of financial and technical capacity: • A chronic shortage of financial and human resources due to cumulative funding constraints over a number of years resulting from the following factors: inadequate revenue from Community Levies and predetermined share of customs; and reliance for budgetary allocation from member states "…many of who are in a parlous state and cannot pay" (*ibid*). • Lack of financial resources has resulted in the RECs implementing hiring freezes, or retrenchments (or both options under extreme circumstances). Even under moderate conditions, the Infrastructure STAP review established that RECs fail to attract and retain high quality staff as the salaries are often too low. • Flawed institutional mechanisms and arrangements for programme design and implementation management compound the problem. (i) RECs undertake over-ambitious programmes, usually accumulated over many years through a multiplicity of unfunded mandates from their political authorities. The relevance of these programmes in changing circumstances is not reviewed; (ii) There is lack of human capital development to enhance the ability of staff to deal with the requirements of the current complex environment in the development of infrastructure; and (iii) Out-dated bureaucratic procedures and technological instruments result in low morale and productivity. The afore-mentioned factors constrain the RECs' ability to deliver on NEPAD's mandate.	"The NEPAD Secretariat would: • Encourage Heads of State to ensure that the RECs have adequate resources to meet the responsibilities that the Heads of State expect them to perform under NEPAD; • Use its good offices to influence Ministers of Finance to meet their financial obligations to RECs; • Encourage the Heads of State and Ministers to avoid assigning unfunded mandates to the RECs; • Encourage the RECs to develop financial and human resource development plans to meet the additional requirements of NEPAD; • Encourage funding agencies to do everything possible to support the RECs in this endeavour" (*ibid*: 39).

Source: Derived from AfDB. 2003. *NEPAD Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP) – Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward*, pp.34-39. (The review's findings and recommendations, summarised where possible, are detailed in this table as close as is possible to the original text in the AfDB's Report, to avoid possible distortions as a result of the author's interpretation of data.

APPENDIX E

2nd Infrastructure STAP Review (2004) – Constraints to Implementation Progress and Recommendations[1]

Constraints	Recommendations
1. Long time-frames for project implementation Unduly long time-frames for facilitation or investment projects, even when allowing for the relatively lengthy gestation periods in the development of infrastructure projects. From project conception to financial closure, it takes on average 10 yrs or more for both types of projects without practical implementation. The reasons for this problem are interlinked and mutually reinforcing as discussed in the various sections below.	**1. Make RECs' decision-making more efficient and effective** "At a minimum, RECs should examine and, where appropriate, reform their decision-making processes and operating mechanisms to ensure they are efficient and streamlined to meet the requirements of their current NEPAD mandate without compromising transparency and democratic accountability."
2. Difficulties to deliver necessary sectoral reforms at regional and national levels • A number of barriers and bottlenecks preclude necessary reforms to national policies, practices and regulatory mechanisms in line with collective agreements at regional and continental levels (i.e. conventions, protocols and treaties) including the following: (i) Lengthy, complex and cumbersome decision-making processes in RECs due to multifaceted and inefficient processes of consultation that must be followed; (ii) Failure by national governments to timely implement regional agreements, because of the following impediments: - protracted institutional mechanisms and arrangements for collective engagement at national levels; - inadequate institutional frameworks, mechanisms and structures to translate collective agreements into implementable plans and programmes; - Lack of political will to translate collective agreements into practical actions; and - Lack of institutional mechanisms at national levels – across all infrastructure sectors – to ensure compliance with regional agreements; (iii) Limited financial, technical and human resource capacity within RECs to support sectoral harmonisation programmes.	**2. Facilitate the translation of political will into concrete actions** To ensure collective agreements that are binding to all the affected parties, a legal framework should be established that clearly identifies the respective responsibilities and obligations of RECs and countries with respect to the implementation of collective decisions on NEPAD's infrastructure projects. For the afore-mentioned to happen, • RECs need to be delegated authority and effective powers to enforce agreements and sanction member states in the event of failure "to implement ratified decisions and non-adherence to specified time-frames"; • Within a REC, a legal regime needs to be developed to enable an appropriate regional institution, such as the Council of Ministers or Council of Heads of State and Government to be transformed into a supranational body with vested powers to enact regulations and issue binding directives to member states (such a structure already exists in UEMOA, EAC and is planned for ECOWAS); • NEPAD and the RECs, with support from the AfDB, need to consider providing technical assistance and funding to countries so that the countries are enabled to reform their administrative and legal frameworks to comply with the agreed regional decisions. • RECs, in collaboration with countries, should take steps to "address the 'Communications Gap' and tackle the deadening hand of vested interests" by developing and implementing an effective communications strategy with existing and potential stakeholders as well as citizenry in member states, in order to maintain ongoing dialogue with respect to the NEPAD agenda.

[1] Source: Derived from TC Infrastructure Limited (TCII) and NEPAD, 2005. *NEPAD Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP) – Second Review of Implementation Progress and the Way Forward*, Continental Synthesis Report, pp. 95-110. According to the TCII and NEPAD report, the second Infrastructure STAP Review, held in 2004, was conducted with the cooperation of RECs, the AfDB NEPAD unit, and the NEPAD Secretariat. The review's findings and recommendations, although summarised to some extent, are recorded in this annexure as close as is possible to the original text in the TCII and NEPAD report, to avoid possible distortions as a result of the author's interpretation of data. The TCII & NEPAD report (*ibid*) also integrates in its findings and recommendations issues raised in various workshops and related reports on implementation of NEPAD's Infrastructure STAP. The workshops, cited in the TCII and NEPAD report (*ibid*) include the following: "Workshop on Mechanisms for Capacity Building of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Speeding Up Implementation of NEPAD Short Term Action Plan (STAP) Projects", March 2005, Abuja: Nigeria; "Report prepared by the African Development Bank for the NEPAD Summit on Accelerating Implementation of NEPAD Programmes", 7-8 March 2005, Abuja: Nigeria; and the "Seminar on Fostering Private Investments in NEPAD Infrastructure Projects organised by the African Development Bank In Collaboration with the NEPAD Secretariat and the African Business Round Table (ABR)", 15 May 2005, Abuja: Nigeria.

Constraints	Recommendations
3. Lack of dedicated regional project preparation facilities Institutional structures, within RECs and countries, have inadequate technical and financial capacity to consistently identify, prepare and implement bankable cross-border infrastructure projects, particularly those with a PPP component. Although the RECs possess certain technical skills, and have demonstrated the ability to facilitate consensus-building processes with national and regional governments, they lack the necessary skills and resources to prepare and implement major cross-border projects, because they were not traditionally mandated to perform the roles assigned to them under NEPAD.	**3. Accelerate the preparation of bankable cross-border projects** To meet this objective, dedicated regional project development and implementation units (PDIUs) equipped with the relevant human capital and appropriate funding instruments, including grant funding, need to be created. A similar structure is planned for implementation in ECOWAS (see proposed approach in TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 107).
4. Limited capacity within RECs Most RECs lack the capacity to provide technical assistance to countries for sectoral harmonisation programmes	**4. Boost the capacity and resources of RECs** Additional resources need to be committed and availed to the RECs to enable them to provide technical assistance to countries with respect to sectoral harmonisation programmes, and monitoring compliance therewith. COMESA and ECOWAS have effectively facilitated harmonisation in the ICT and aviation sectors respectively. Expansion of NEPAD's Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF) should be considered to encompass facilitation projects.
5. Limited financial resources within RECs: • Almost all RECs lack financial resources to fulfil their mandate as NEPAD's implementation organs; • Projects are often stalled because RECs lack funding for basic administrative overheads such as experts' meetings, recruitment of critical staff, or to purchase IT equipment (unless they appeal to development partners for funding). Four principal aspects to this problem were identified as the following (TCII & NEPAD, 2005: 101): (i) Failure of RECs' funding mechanisms to adapt over time to appropriately reflect current needs; (ii) Failure of contributions from member states to increase in real terms over the years; (iii) Non-payment of contributions by member states including delays or deficits where payments by member countries are made; and (iv) Inability by RECs to cover shortfalls with borrowings as they cannot raise loan capital in their own right.	**5. Increase the financial resources of RECs** Member states should be encouraged to provide the RECs' Secretariats with regular funding so that they can at least support the execution of basic functions/activities in RECs. RECs' funding should also be restructured to facilitate the development of the requisite capacity for the implementation of NEPAD's programme. The structuring of RECs' funding also needs to be reviewed to facilitate alignment with the "new realities in terms of the REC's (sic) commitments under NEPAD"

6. Lack of a coherent package of policies to support and encourage private sector investment	**6. Produce a coherent package of policies to scale up Private Sector Participation (PSP)** The recommended package of policies includes the following key instruments/mechanisms: • Rationalise legal and regulatory regimes relating to infrastructure development, with the future objective to ultimately create a common model for Africa; • Create innovative instruments and structures to lever funds from within and outside Africa for investment and early stage project development work; • Ensure that innovative, flexible, complementary and accessible financial instruments to mitigate risk, that are appropriate to special challenges of African infrastructure projects, are made more widely available; • Establish dedicated Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV's) for pan-continental projects, with parallel public sector structures to drive facilitation, harmonisation and capacity building aspects; • Develop durable policies and structures to facilitate consistent engagement at all levels with the private sector, such as improving the independence, credibility, efficiency and enforcement powers of the judiciary and implementing sectoral reforms to achieve competitive and well-regulated markets; • Establish partnerships with the private sector through risk sharing and inventive project structures such as Transfer Operate Transfer (TOT).

7. Weak or ineffective institutional relationships between the key stakeholders: Lack of institutional structures, amongst all key stakeholders (at national, regional and continental levels) to facilitate the development of efficient and effective liaison and monitoring mechanisms both on general NEPAD-related matters and on sector or project-specific issues. In the event that such institutional structures are established, they are set up in a piecemeal and inconsistent manner, thereby inhibiting the development of robust, strategic, continent-wide institutional relationships to ensure better coordination of programmes and projects.	**7. Strengthen institutional relationships between stakeholders** As agreed at the Workshop on Mechanisms for Capacity Building of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Speeding Up Implementation of NEPAD STAP, held in Abuja: Nigeria (March 2005), the RECs (with the assistance of the AfDB and NEPAD's Secretariat) will define and support the creation of a co-ordination framework to enhance institutional relationships with various stakeholders. • Furthermore, focal points need to be established in RECs, countries and NEPAD Secretariat to enhance both coordination and communication; • The stakeholder co-ordination framework should take into account the overlapping responsibilities of NEPAD's Secretariat, RECs, and member states in order to avoid duplication of effort and confusion about responsibility (the lead agency) for each project; • The creation of internal Task Forces, holding of internal workshops and video-conferencing facilities is recommended to facilitate and enhance inter-REC communication, facilitate and resolve leadership of coordination activities where projects cut across RECs; • To help alleviate institutional capacity constraints, the Abuja workshop recommended the creation of pooled knowledge bases, data banks and emphasised the sharing of information between all the stakeholders, such as the RECs with NEPAD Secretariat and AU Commission, RECs with RECs, RECs with member countries, as well as with the development partner community; • The Abuja Workshop also identified the need for each REC to establish a database of its projects and keep it up-to-date; the NEPAD Secretariat should establish a web-enabled continental database, linked to all the RECs databases, with details and status of all the projects in the Infrastructure STAP
Constraints	**Recommendations**

8. Limited capacity within the AfDB and NEPAD's Secretariat Limited capacity within the AfDB and NEPAD's Secretariat to meet the growing demands for their services and support in relation to NEPAD, in particular the Infrastructure STAP	**8. Expand the capacity of the AfDB and NEPAD Secretariat** Both the AfDB and NEPAD Secretariat should carry out an assessment of their mounting workloads vis-à-vis the Infrastructure STAP programme in order to formulate appropriate strategies, and to put in place adequate resources and internal structures to meet the growing demand for their services and facilities under the Infrastructure STAP. RECs made the following specific recommendations to expand the capacity of the AfDB: (a) The AfDB should • Create a Regional Integration Division within the AfDB; • Establish appropriate regional funding instruments and facilities; • Adopt a proactive approach to bring to the market innovative financing approaches and risk mitigation instruments to catalyse a scale-up of private sector participation; and • (Post the Gleneagles G8 Summit and the Africa Commission Report) Develop policies, structures and facilities in order to take a leadership role in mobilising funds from within and outside the continent for infrastructure development. (b) No specific recommendation were made in respect of the NEPAD Secretariat

9. Development partner systems and practices do not always align with NEPAD priorities The "traditional" funding model by donors, while crucial to the development of infrastructure across the continent, is not always suited to the efficient preparation and implementation of regional infrastructure programmes and projects for the following interrelated reasons: (i) **Complexity of donor funding and associated conditionalities** - First, the deleterious impact of protracted and inflexible donor funding processes on timely project implementation; - Second, associated conditionalities for complementary social reforms or related inter-sectoral interventions in recipient countries, often with little or no relevance to the overall policy objectives that inform the affected project; and - Third, funding eligibility criteria may exclude one country in a regional project. (ii) **Fractured funding approach:** The multiplicity of donors with varying systems, different criteria and approval processes result in delays, with negative implications for project implementation management or timely attainment of various programme elements. - These delays also increase the risk in the management of project management functions; - Executing diverse accounting procedures and requirements confuses the few REC officers who are expected to understand and manage all the underlying requirements, procedures and preferences of different donors, with negative impact on staff motivation; - Implementation of overlapping projects with similar objectives – owing to project funding by different donors – results in the development of competing programmes/projects and institutional arrangements that are targeted at the same goals; (iii) **Lack of focused programme and project definition** due to inordinate reliance on various donor institutions for programme and project development associated with the funding.	**9. Align donor systems and practices with NEPAD priorities** Cognisant of NEPAD's challenge to the existing donor-recipient relationship, by placing the responsibility for Africa's development squarely on Africa's shoulders, a pooled fund should be created in each region, through which development partners can contribute collectively to support regional development efforts. This proposed approach could address the current problem of competing and poorly defined projects as well as provide a shared 'pot' of funds for RECs to use for approved projects. The benefits of this proposed pooled fund are as follows: • Enhanced coordination between donors; • Administrative simplification; • Cost savings for all the parties, including both REC Secretariats and the (donors) development partners, as RECs will cease to make separate funding applications for each project component; • Enable RECs to have a more coherent and holistic development planning approach; • The production of relevant annual budgets that take all sectors and areas into account; • Rational prioritisation and planning of programmes and projects to ensure that mobilised resources are directed into priority projects, such as those identified in STAP; and • Facilitate more studies being transformed into workable implementation action plans as a result of secure funding.

APPENDIX F

DETAILED SWOT ANALYSIS OF (PERCEPTIONS OF) NEPAD'S INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT[1]

STRENGHTS	OPPORTUNITIES
Reaffirmation of Commitment by African HoSG to Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance and Related Principles: • Admission, by African leaders, that leadership failures contributed to the current development crisis (as detailed in NEPAD's Strategic Framework); • Renewed effort including articulated political will and commitment to address the continent's poor governance and development challenges; • Reaffirmed commitment by African Heads of State and Government (HoSG), to the principles and core values contained in the NEPAD/AU Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance (2002); AU Declaration on the Implementation of the NEPAD (2002); and acceding to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – institutional mechanisms that seek to improve democracy and governance on the continent as well as the implementation of collective decisions; • Delegation of authority and responsibility by the African HoSG to the NEPAD governing structures to ensure implementation of the NEPAD Initial Action Plan; • Visible leadership, and active participation of a "new generation" of leaders and HoSG – who are not associated with autocracy, inordinate largesse, corruption, and maladministration – to make NEPAD work;	**Strengthen Leadership and Management Structures at Sub-regional and Regional Levels:** • Use NEPAD, which is baggage-free unlike the AU with its inherent contradictions and links to its predecessor the OAU, to fully drive the AU's economic success; • Utilise the potential collective strength and unity in alignment of purpose, strategy, and commitment to delivery by African leadership (AU); specifically the Heads of State who are NEPAD's sponsors and promoters (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa); the governing and management structures namely, the 20-member NEPAD HSGIC, the SC, Expanded SC and the Secretariat located in South Africa; • Avoid trying doing too much, in too short a space of time. In this regard, NEPAD cannot – and must not – be presented as a 'cure for all' for the continent's problems; it must be used in a focused and goal-directed manner in spheres of influence where the collective African leadership and its peoples can be most effective to make a difference, and to provide strategic direction and management; • Create a "democracy surplus" at sub-regional levels, which currently is placed at a "democracy deficit".

[1] Source: Derived from various sources including the following: Adedegi, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990; Anyang' Nyong'o, 2002; Anyang' Nyong'o *et al*, 2002; Bond, 2002; Buthelezi, 2001; Cheru, 2002; Diescho, 2002; ECA, 2002; Ekpo, 2002; Gelb, 2001; Herbert, 2003; IAG/JA, 2002; Mills, 2002; Mkandawire, 2002; Nabudere, 2002; NEPAD, 2001; NEPAD, 2002c; NEPAD, 2003/4; Tandon, 2002. In addition, the author has converted some of the negative comments into positive statements to illustrate some of the opportunities available to support NEPAD implementation.

Collective Ownership of and Active Engagement By Political Leadership in Development Processes:

- Collective leadership engagement of the international community, to support Africa's efforts to regenerate the continent, in an open, transparent, and forward-looking manner, as building blocks to transformational change in favour of the continent and its people;
- Passion for NEPAD to succeed, as exhibited by its leadership: the five Heads of State who are NEPAD's promoters; the 20-member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC); the management structures including the Steering Committee (SC); the expanded SC that is made up of representatives of the twenty HoSG including Secretary Generals of RECs, AU Secretariat, and representatives of the ECA and AfDB; and the Secretariat based in Midrand: South Africa;
- NEPAD a *reference point* and the *development framework* for international engagement on Africa's development.

- **Availability of Strategic Framework, Development Objectives and Detailed Action Plans, with the Invitation for Inclusive Participation by All Stakeholder Groups:**

- Development of an *initial* integrative Strategic Framework, for further elaboration of sectoral priorities, with an invitation to all the peoples of Africa and various stakeholder groups, to participate in the implementation of action plans and foster continuous improvement of NEPAD;
- Development of a detailed strategic Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (STAP), with detailed Action Plans in the various infrastructure sectors (namely, Transport, Energy, Water, and ICT), and linked to time frames for delivery;
- Ongoing review of the Infrastructure STAP, to update the process and review progress on projects' implementation in various designated Regional Economic Communities (RECs), to identify challenges and constraints, lessons learnt, re-evaluate projects' prioritisation, and recommend broad principles and specific future action.

Address Long-Standing Political, and Socio-Economic Structural Constraints in African States and Sub-regions:

- Re-examine core challenges with the African State that is so weak, fragmented, and arbitrarily defined, including the single most divisive factor of inherited colonial boundaries that the OAU and its successor the AU chose to honour – the colonial boundaries. After all, Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar in 1966, and the sky has not fallen; nor has the earth caved in, as a consequence thereof;
- Address the inherent contradictions, in the multiple and overlapping membership of RECs and other sub-regional bodies.

Provide Inspired Political Leadership and Building Blocks for Ethical Conduct:

- Avoid wavering and reneging on commitments made to Africans, and the rest of the world, on improving governance in Africa and making innovative institutional mechanisms (in the African sense) like the APRM to work – efficiently and effectively;
- Avoid planning the future of cooperation and integration arrangements by merely extrapolating from the past, but to rapidly move forward – strengthened cooperation and integration is necessary to move Africa forward;
- Develop self-acceptance by the current breed of leadership, so that they can unleash and leverage their demonstrated capacity for collective engagement for the benefit of themselves first, their countries, and the African continent;
- Imbue Africans with the indomitable spirit to seize the moment and break new ground, and carve indelible positive impacts, for future generations – inch by inch, step by step, and mile by mile;
- Cast aside fears and doubts on issues and challenges that might currently appear insurmountable – like the crippling debt, insignificant aid, unfair rules of trade, and debilitating poverty – and soldier on self-reliantly: after all, the pyramids of Egypt and the mosques of Mali were not built in one day, and they are some of the architectural wonders of the world;

Common Identity: • There is a strong sense of common identity across the African continent; • African leaders like to meet together; • The idea of a united Africa and African common interests still resonates strongly.	• Manage divisive influences on NEPAD, especially amongst the HoSG, by utilising and strengthening existing AU structures, and also empowering other normal channels of engagement like regional / sub-regional ministerial committees and fora with inputs from various stakeholder groups; • Provide inspiring, consistent, high-level political leadership that repeatedly emphasises the imperative of unification; • Be involved, by 'going down to the trenches', so as to invent a world for the majority of Africans that would otherwise not be: by developing an informed understanding of where we are, learning from lessons of the past, and aiming for attainment of the basic tenements of 'self- reliance' and 'self- sustainment' – that were espoused in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA, 1980-2000). **Promote and Support the Development of the African Private Sector:** • (For African leadership) Mobilise, engage, facilitate, and support the development of an empowered African private sector, that can invest and actively participate in the re-building of the continent, for its benefit first, the peoples of Africa, and future generations – to ensure that funds disbursed in projects remain in, and are further re-invested in Africa; **Ensure Inclusive Stakeholder Participation:** • Make the process more inclusive and participatory; • Reach out to the ordinary people of Africa, including institutions of civil society – to inform, and involve them in the total value-chain of NEPAD activities – in order to promote empowerment, enthusiasm, and cooperation (and foster emotional, political, and economic support for NEPAD from the ground), that will also ensure checks and balances in planning of development processes and implementation of related programmes; • Address the Achilles' heel of communication and marketing of NEPAD, to the masses, so as to "capture and electrify the imagination of the African masses without whose support and internalisation …(NEPAD) cannot be sustained in the long run"; • Involve a *wide array* of multi-disciplinary African intellectuals, professionals

	and experts including ordinary people in the development and implementation of NEPAD – instead of limiting engagement to politicians, senior civil servants, senior members of the diplomatic corps, and *economists.* Successful integrated development planning and implementation management requires multi-disciplinary approaches, inter-sectoral cooperation, and involvement of people from different segments of society: i.e., project managers, statisticians, geologists, engineers, town and regional planners, political scientists, nutritionists, scientists, human resource practitioners, accountants, youth, people with disabilities, and the old; • Institutionalise NEPAD in all spheres of African society, and with all stake-holder groups, so that it is not seen as a "political leaders' programme" that translates into negative and counter-productive tendencies to adopt 'wait-and-see' attitudes by everybody else. **Address Gender Discrimination and Promote Women's Empowerment:** • Spearhead efforts to address gender discrimination in decision-making, and other spheres of society, and meaningfully involve women in NEPAD's planning processes including particularly in the implementation of related programmes, beyond the scant rhetoric and token appointments; • Visibly support women's political and socio-economic empowerment in African countries. **Facilitate Development of Infrastructure, in Particular Transport Infrastructure and Related Services:** • Satisfy the demand for infrastructure services, particularly in the areas of electricity, water supply, transport (including ports and airports), and telecommunications; • Facilitate the development of basic physical infrastructure, especially road and rail infrastructure, and to cooperate jointly with other African states and non-state stakeholders in the development of physical infrastructure and transport services to maximise the efficiency of cross-border transport and communication;

	• Acquire a certain minimum technical capacity to identify and prepare infrastructure development projects, including the capacity to undertake feasibility studies; • Secure internal financing for the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects particularly at the sub-regional level; • Free Africa's highly mobile forces from the clutches of constraints imposed by colonial boundaries. **Mobilise Domestic Resources:** • Strengthen intra-regional finance and investment. **Facilitate Appropriately Prioritised Interventions for Institutional Reform, Institution Building, and the Development of Leadership and Management Capacity:** • Pay careful attention to the requirements of institution-building, and examine relevant best practises in management and institution-building; • Examine standards for developing leadership capacity, and management selection processes; • Adopt basic rules of management, of linking goals to a clear map as to who will act to implement them; • Prioritise: the NEPAD's full text (Strategic Framework, 2001) mentions every known African problem, with no indication given of what should, could happen first; • Develop strategic management capacity that uses best-practise approaches from various disciplines, to benefit implementation of projects within programmes.

WEAKNESSES	THREATS/CONSTRAINTS
Lack of Trust in the Ability of Political Leadership to Deliver on Articulated Development Objectives: • Lack of breath and depth in activist orientation amongst African leaders, except a few: this is required to deal with the "ills of illiteracy, poverty, underdevelopment, the spread of opportunistic diseases like HIV/AIDS, corruption, and the general malaise of moral degeneration and chronic mimicry in post-colonial societies"; • Empire building, patronage politics, and rent-seeking activities; • Questionable leadership and African ownership of NEPAD in the first instance; and of the leadership "fitness" to rule. **Entrenched Colonial Mindset:** • Lack of "decolonisation of the mind", which is critical to precede the dialogue between Africa and its development partners, so that a transformed "new" mindset would lead appropriate efforts at economic decolonisation; • Entrenched belief that Aid can develop the continent's economy; • The tendency for African leaders to exhibit fear and resentment towards their own nationals, or race groups, resulting in the inability to meaningfully utilise the resource base in their own backyards: they prefer instead to accept at face value advice from outsiders – whose advice is regarded as fine and scientific, primarily because it comes from outsiders, hence the brain drain of many capable Africans. **Lack of Confidence in Regional and Sub-Regional Institutions to Bring About *Transformational* Change:** • Lack of teeth, in both NEPAD and AU, to deal with member-states who violate the norms of democratic practice and good governance; • Inherent contradiction in the notion of a Peer Review Mechanism, within a system where state sovereignty and non-interference in another state's affairs is sacrosanct;	**Political Conflicts, Civil Wars, and Lack of Peace and Security:** **Continuing Poor Governance (Political, Economic, and Corporate) and Lack of Commitment to Collective Agreements:** • Failures in addressing excesses of African leaders including non-adherence to collective agreements and commitments; • Inability of Africa do deal with member states who violate the norms of democratic practice and good governance; • Failure of external actors to devise and implement acceptable policy regimes; • Low quality of governance, instability, overvalued exchange rates, high levels of taxation, and excessive regulation. **Negative Perceptions and Damaged Integrity Of Political Leadership:** • High level of political demoralisation across the continent, and a clear lack of confidence in political institutions and political leaders; • Negative perceptions that mostly the same African leaders, who have plundered and pillaged Africa for their own personal enrichment and aggrandisement, are now re-packaged and presented as reformed, to the point where the leaders even acknowledge responsibility for (their) past failures, and are now ostensibly committed to inspired leadership and the development of their people; • Negative perceptions that NEPAD's HSGIC is made up of discredited members who include corrupt long-serving autocrats, states with shaky commitments to multi-party democracy and human rights, undemocratically "elected" presidents, and leaders of unstable states plagued with military rebellion or religious / ethnic violence, or others who have in the past instituted armed insurrections against political opponents – with the assistance of multinational oil companies; • Aloof, elitist, pompous, power-mongering, and self-important notions of African leaders and their followers, including the senior civil servants who are their advisors;

- Lack of unity: long-standing intra-rivalries between members of various regional blocks – SADC, COMESA, AMU, ECOWAS;
- Evidenced lack of commitment by member-states to implement protocols and various multilateral agreements aimed at facilitating Africa's regional cooperation and integration arrangements;
- Lack of serious commitment by individual African states, as important cogs in the NEPAD wheel, as to how they will devote their own resources to the programmes of NEPAD;
- 'National interest' a strong motivating force to the detriment of sub-regional and regional initiatives;
- Relatively weak political constituencies and economic interests backing integration, deriving from the poor quality of governance and diverse levels of economic development in African countries.

Weak States, Weak Institutional Environment, and Poor Governance Record:

- Weak States, with the highest number of so-called 'failed states' in the world perceived to be in Africa;
- 'State capture' and non-existent governance systems and institutional mechanisms in a number of countries fail to inspire the trust and cooperation of the populace;
- High extent of dysfunction and abuse of institutional mechanisms, particularly public sector organisational structures, in many African countries;
- Lack of a liberal value-system by the leaders and their followers;
- Severe curtailment of individual freedoms by the state;
- A number of Africa's so-called "big states" (including Nigeria, DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan) have performed particularly badly since independence, with incidents of
- Lack of commitment, by African Leaders, to build people-oriented economies and to serve their people to ensure improvement in the quality of life (in their countries first);
- Lack of humility in African leadership, and the ability to subjugate self-interest in favour of common goals and agendas;
- Absolute corruption of leadership and lack of conscience and empathy for their citizens, who are in the main poor.

Lack of Unity on NEPAD Amongst the Heads of State, Compounded by Political Rivalry

- Political and territorial rivalries;
- Reported incidents of disagreement on some of the principles NEPAD espoused, some of which were linked to the perceived erosion of states' sovereignty. These were construed, in NEPAD's early stages, to reveal the lack of unity on NEPAD amongst the OAU/ AU HoSG at sub-regional and continent-wide levels namely:
  - the Libyan leader, Gaddafi, publicly criticised NEPAD as a neo-colonialist venture;
  - some HoSG questioned the "right of the development partners to demand 'good governance' as a basis for economic cooperation with Africa," when in their own countries their governance records were flawed; and
  - assertions attributed to President Mkapa of Tanzania (in a symposium organised by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation in Kampala, on the 11th April 2002), where he allegedly said: "When development aid or loans are made conditional to certain domestic decisions regarding political, economic, or social systems, is this a breach of the United Nations Charter (on sovereignty), or is it not…the way things are going, we in Africa will soon have no image beyond geography, no identity besides colour and no decency except flags."
- Lack of unanimous support of NEPAD by African leaders, exacerbated by

economic collapse, social and political unrest, state decay, and open civil war of varying intensities with implications for the implementation of regional development programmes/projects;

- There is a core problem within the African state: the state (and its leadership) is weak and insecure; its response to development challenges is through patronage, divide-and-rule tactics, and external aggression towards its neighbours.

Poor Development Planning, Prioritisation, and Communication:

- Multiplicity of development initiatives and institutions with overlapping structures, lack of clearly defined roles, responsibilities and interfaces (such as in the AU, NEPAD, CSSDCA and RECs); lack of clear allocation of responsibilities within the NEPAD process;
- Lack of prioritisation in NEPAD – "if it's known, it's not communicated to the public";
- Coyness and incorrect analysis and categorisation of the African market, that in NEPAD is described as "vast" and "growing" instead of "stagnant" and "backwards";
- Lack of inter-sectoral cross-pollination, and inclusive involvement of other stakeholders outside of government, multilateral or government-aligned structures;
- Communication gaps with no effective engagement of civil society structures by NEPAD; this is compounded by the weak co-ordination capacity in NEPAD's Secretariat, cognisant of dozens of bodies that must be engaged internally and externally;
- Poor communication of the NEPAD initiative, with minimal effort to harness and garner emotional support from ordinary people to guarantee its success;
- Limited operational effectiveness of the NEPAD Secretariat (in its earlier days) because of the failure by African countries to second staff or to offer practical assistance;
- Overlaps between the structures and functions of the AU, NEPAD, CSSDCA

rivalry for resources and funding from the international community to address competing national concerns (and needs), instead of the agreed NEPAD-related programmes;

- Threats to unity, progress, and support of NEPAD and its programmes because of a major short-coming in its evolution: the process is perceived as to not have evolved as a product of hard-nosed thinking and dialogue amongst African leaders (and intellectuals), but as an obsession of a few, who started to market the plan before there was sufficient buy-in.

Lack of Meaningful Support and Commitment by the International Community to the Attainment of Agreed Development Objectives:

- Competing development initiatives with other developing countries outside the African continent alternatively, diverted attention to global challenges and negative externalities such as the "fight" against terrorism and the war in Iraq;
- Fatigue at lack of effectiveness of various institutional interventions, to address Africa's development crises;
- Waning interest of development partners and donor fatigue;
- Negative perceptions of the APRM as a peer learning function akin to the comparatively mild technocratic OECD peer reviews;
- Lack of commitment and support from International Finance Institutions and banks – who previously participated in and facilitated looting of funds from Africa – to cooperate in repatriating what was stolen before;
- Negative implications for progress and availability of committed support structures because of negative perceptions by OAU/AU staff of NEPAD's Secretariat staff as a threat; these negative perceptions are exacerbated by delays in the Secretariat's integration into the AU structures, as agreed by the HSGIC when the Secretariat was initially established;
- National governments not ceding some state sovereignty to ensure attainment of regional objectives, which is partially ceded anyway, given the inordinate reliance on donor funding.

(Conference for Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa).

Lack of Financial Resources, Poor Domestic Engagement and Resource Mobilisation Resulting in Inordinate Reliance on External Sources:

- Unsustainable and crippling debt exacerbated by low levels of domestic savings, low domestic and foreign investment exacerbated by capital flight in the form of foreign savings and investments, to the extent that Africa has earned the dubious distinction of being a net exporter of capital;
- Lack of economic growth due to stunted role of markets by the hostile political and cultural environment, exacerbated by the interference of the state;
- Unfavourable balance of payments due to excessive imports of technology, manufactured goods and technical know-how at prices way in excess of export earnings;
- Lack of market access and unfavourable/declining terms of trade, with foreign earnings limited to low-priced raw materials;
- Dependence on doubtful or highly mobile external sources of funding in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) for development projects (and the entire NEPAD programme itself);
- Lack of clarity and questionable strategic assumptions regarding the depiction of Capital Flows for the NEPAD programme;
- High dependence of African countries on concessional finance from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries for their basic budgeting requirements;
- Lack of financial resources and inordinate dependency on external sources, characteristic of the "begging bowl" syndrome;
- NEPAD a "sophisticated begging-bowl";
- Preoccupation to establish partnerships with the developed north, instead of first establishing a firm foundation for a workable integration of programmes within

Political Leadership Burdens and Lack of Goal-Directed Leadership Behaviours:

- Ambitions of individual leaders may work to the detriment of collective leadership decisions;
- Some of the members of the AU, because of their negative image and perceived lack of integrity, should not be allowed to play a leading role in NEPAD: "How can African leaders who are clearly part of the problem, be part of the solution";
- Lack of acknowledgement that, in addition to colonialism, the politics of liberation have underdeveloped Africa; this necessitates that the AU not play a leading role in certain spheres, because of its membership burdens that have created some of the current problems facing the African continent;
- Myopic, megalomaniac tendencies of African leaders;
- Leadership surrounding themselves with political party loyalists, chance-takers, and sycophants, who prey on leaderships' insecurities and manipulate their fears to get jobs;
- Lack of 'common-room culture', where every individual can participate as equals in the search for truth and solutions; this has been traded for obsession in African leaders with upstaging one another at the expense of collective leadership;
- Lack of urgency on the part of African leaders, who instead display tendencies to waste time in self-praise, backslapping, and celebrating themselves, instead of getting on with the job;

The Preoccupation with the 'South African Factor' and Related Fears of Political Dominance:

- Negative perceptions of South African hegemony;
- The potential to alienate other African leaders and Heads of States, because of South Africa's (SA) incorrect characterisation of NEPAD (by South African commentators the media) as President Mbeki's initiative;

Africa, as a basis upon which to seek additional support from outside;

- Little effort to sell NEPAD to people of Africa, as opposed to extraordinary efforts to obtain acceptance and buy in from the G8 and other external institutional mechanisms;

- Lack of concerted efforts to address structural problems, such as Africa's high levels of externalised expenditure, by introducing instruments that would stem the seepage to improve domestic resource mobilisation;

- The inexplicable embracing by NEPAD of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), whilst admitting that they have failed, and centralising them on a competitive bid in efforts to attract FDI. NEPAD has pursued this approach in the face of empirical evidence of the social crises SAPs have engendered (as documented in the findings of the research project by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network – SAPRIN).

Human Development Crisis and Dependency Burdens:

- Endemic illiteracy, general illness, and communicable diseases;

- Debilitating poverty and associated dependency burdens;

- Unfavourable preponderance of inadequately skilled and trained human element;

- Shortage of management skills exacerbated by poor management practices;

- Lack of a mature and well-informed civil society in the majority of African countries (non-existent in some countries). With appropriate capacity and a facilitative environment, a capable civil society would interrogate the proposed development issues and keep leadership on its toes.

Transfer of Inappropriate Development Models to Africa's Unique Circumstances:

- Negative perceptions that Africa is marketed to the international community "according to the same old tune, penned by Europeans when they marketed Africa to and for themselves, replete with its 'song-and-dance' and scantily-dressed people dancing for guests at airports";

- Comments regarding NEPAD, to the effect that for the "first time that Africans are taking their destiny in their own hands"; these assertions incorrectly imply that that nothing was done before to address developmental challenges on the continent, until President Mbeki arrived on the scene;

- The perceived over-enthusiasm, over-optimism, ignorance and even national arrogance by South Africans with respect to the development of NEPAD can derail some of the plans, if such attitudes continue unchecked;

- The so-called regional aspirant-hegemonic role of South Africa, ranging from military, economic and political terrains undermines SADC's potential;

- Fuelling of SADC rivalries namely, Angola's seeing itself as a regional power, linked to its long-standing hostility towards South Africa;

- Hostility arising from perceptions that South Africa is trying to take over and "re-invent the wheel by claiming to have discovered the cure for Africa's ills when so many have tried and failed";

- Perceptions that since NEPAD was formulated in Pretoria – with reference initially to Washington, Davos, and the G7 – it can never be "owned" by African people and it is not going to be successful.

Elitist Tendencies and Political Patronage in Appointments, and Participation in Programmes and Projects:

- The crippling reality of politics of patronage in Africa, where positions, roles and material well-being are distributed to loyal members of the ruling political parties only; in Africa, these political parties have subsumed everything in life, some even surpassing religion and becoming the line that determines whether one is relevant or not in life;

- Lack of grass-roots support.

Negative Impact of Dependency and External Reliance for Funding on NEPAD:

- Negative impact on Africa's credibility due to ambivalent and inconsistent

• NEPAD an attempt at 'Africanisation' of the European Union (EU) experience; **Lack of Readiness Resulting in Marginalisation from Participation in the Global Economy:** • African countries remain increasingly on the margin of the global economy; • Low growth in merchandize exports, due partly to policies that discouraged such growth; • Reliance on and primary exporters of a narrow base of traditional commodity sectors, that are negatively affected by the related deterioration of terms of trade; • African countries are primary exporters of capital, resulting in Africa having the lowest savings rate in the world, at 16% of GDP; • Failure to industrialise; • Economic stagnation and political security upheavals; • Limiting of diversification and expansion in trade by colonial networks and associated tariffs, usually directed towards, and for the benefit of the former colonial power.	approach to the developed north: asking for aid, at the same time attacking the very institutions for subjugating Africa to colonial domination and underdevelopment; • Negative political implications of perceived accountability by NEPAD's processes and African states to external parties because of reliance on aid; • Failure to learn from lessons of history: that domestic resources are central to any sustained development efforts; and external dependence is likely to lead to levels of economic dependence that are not politically sustainable and are unlikely to be the basis for credible policy initiatives; • Effects and long-term impacts of such external reliance for funding on the viability and credibility to NEPAD's processes; • Impact of external dependence on self-esteem, dignity, and credibility of Africans; • Failure to understand that as long as Africa is an expense on the balance-sheet of developed countries, they will keep it in a state of underdevelopment; • Failure to concede that it is unlikely that non-Africans will allocate the necessary resources and attention required for the task outlined by NEPAD, with implications for failure; • Threats of external dependency to national sovereignty and an onerous burden on both nation-building and democracy; • The possibility that NEPAD's approach to liberate Africa could well turn out to be the final and utter submission to the rule of the international institutions/institutional structures, such as the IMF/World Bank and WTO.

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