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1994-03-28
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UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED SOCIAL RESEARCH

Seminar Paper
to be presented in RW 7003 SEMINAR ROOM
AT 4.00pm 28th MARCH 1994

Title: South Africa: Democracy and Development in a Post-Apartheid Society

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No 354

South Africa: Democracy and Development in a post-apartheid society.

Tom Lodge

1.

Until the 1970s, South Africa represented a telling example of a fairly industrialised economy in which growth and development were facilitated by high levels of political repression. Gold mining almost from its start required huge numbers of cheap migrant labourers; gold's fixed price, the low quality of the ore and heavy capital outlays made a coercive labour system a condition of the industry's prosperity until the 1940s (1). The expansion of secondary industry during the Second World War enabled manufacturing to outstrip mining's contribution to GDP by 1945 (2). This development was accompanied by accelerating urbanisation and the establishment in the main cities of a relatively skilled and increasingly well organised African working class (3). In certain respects, the "Apartheid" programmes of the Afrikaner Nationalist government elected in 1948 were directed at reversing the economic and social gains achieved by urbanised Africans during the previous decade. Reinforced controls on black labour mobility, intensified territorial segregation of blacks and whites, the curtailment of black collective bargaining rights, the removal of Africans' already very limited access to the franchise, and the suppression of popular political organisations, all these helped to ensure the attraction of massive flows of foreign capital into import substitution industries which the government helped to boost with walls of protective tariffs. Between 1950 and 1970, annual real GDP growth averaged at 5 per cent (4).

In the 1970s, though, the economic costs of white supremacy began to outweigh the benefits. The denial of technical training to blacks underlay an alarming skills shortage. Low wages tightly limited the expansion of the domestic market. Increasing resources were required to staff and equip a huge public sector, much of it concerned with the administration of apartheid controls or with expensive economic projects conceived in anticipation of international embargoes on strategic imports. Moreover, controls notwithstanding, economic growth in the 1960s had nurtured a second rapid expansion of the African industrial working class, much of it in the main cities, despite the government's efforts to relocate labour and industries outside towns (5). This growth was matched by swelling primary and secondary school enrolments (6). By the early 1970s, black workers still lacked basic rights but with their skills, their growing literacy, and their numerical weight in the industrial economy, their bargaining power had become dramatically enhanced. During the next two decades economic recession, labour militancy, localised communal rebellions in black townships, guerilla insurgency, capital flight, credit restrictions, and the spiralling expense of militarised government all combined in 1989

to persuade the government to lift the legal restrictions on the black opposition and begin a negotiated democratisation.

This history seems to add confirmation to the contention that "it is not the structural correspondence between capitalism and democracy which explains the persistence of democracy" but rather "capitalist development is associated with democracy because it transforms the class structure" (7). Some theorists may argue that (political) "participation in the social order" is at certain stages in an economy's development a prerequisite for "sustained economic growth" (8), but if this is the case it does not follow that states and ruling groups concede power and rights voluntarily. In South Africa democratisation is taking place because "pressures from subordinate classes have (become) strong enough to make demands for their inclusion credible" (9). Historically, high levels of political repression facilitated capitalist economic development. In time, though, such repression became increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of social changes generated by industrialisation.

Pressure from subordinate classes was undoubtedly the crucial agency in determining political transition in South Africa (10). Any attempt to predict the outcome of this transition must first investigate the political predispositions of popular classes as well as the institutions with which they will engage before looking at the developmental tasks which will confront a democratised government. After considering the question of whether these tasks can be tackled under democratic conditions, this essay will address the more general question, which arises from this case study, of whether democracy can help to foster development in developing countries.

2.

How strong are democratic inclinations amongst most South Africans? For most of this century, extremely authoritarian government co-existed with more or less racially exclusive representative institutions. But though liberal rights and freedoms enjoyed by white citizens had little impact on the everyday lives of black South Africans they were not wholly meaningless to blacks either. Under National Party rule, the judiciary retained a measure of its former independence though, increasingly, of course, it had to apply racist legislation (11). A privately owned press allowed blacks a few significant channels for the expression of political ideas; despite censorship, mass daily newspapers from the late sixties helped to shape and give voice to popular feelings (12). In 1979, labour legislation instituted legal rights and obligations for black trade unions giving formal recognition to their role in a fifty year history of attempting represent black workers. Until 1959, a tiny minority of Africans voters had parliamentary representation in the form of four "native representatives" and three "native senators" (13). In the Cape until 1936, African participation in the common roll franchise was of considerable symbolic importance

to the African political elite. Popular political organisations, including the ANC and the Communist Party participated in township Advisory Board elections until the late 1950s (14). Coloureds only lost all their common roll franchise rights in 1972 (15). It is conceivable then, that even the very restricted experience black South Africans had of the rights and freedoms associated with liberal democracy, may have helped to influence their political values.

Black organisations can make claims of varying strength to liberal and democratic traditions. The African National Congress until 1960 represented a broad church accommodating socially conservative and radical nationalists, democratic socialists, liberal constitutionalists, and marxists of various persuasions. During the 1950s, while its leaders professed a quite sincere admiration for British political institutions, communists helped to draft a "Freedom Charter" with the intention of positioning the ANC on a non capitalist path of transition to socialism after the successful conclusion of a "national democratic" revolution (16). The Freedom Charter was adopted at the Congress of the People, a pageant-like gathering which voted unanimously on each clause of the draft. The document itself was written after a year-long campaign in which activists collected popular demands. Whatever the procedural shortcomings of the process, it did dramatically emphasise the ANC's commitment to a populist notion of people's sovereignty (17).

Until the late 1950s, ANC organisation was quite federal in character with each province constituting a fairly autonomous organisational unit; this helped to sustain ideological diversity. A new constitution drawn up by Oliver Tambo attempted to create a more centralised hierarchy, making junior leadership echelons subject to the authority of more senior bodies. Leadership at all levels was to be elected; at conferences, through a show of hands. In fact, leadership positions were contested less frequently in the 1950s than before, partly because of the ANC's habit of nominating "caretaker" officials to replace men and women who were legally banned from holding political office but who continued to exercise informal authority behind the scenes. This practice tended to detract from those ANC's constitutional procedures which were intended to safeguard internal democracy. On one occasion when ideological schisms threatened to disrupt a provincial congress, in the Transvaal in 1958, the dissenting faction were forced to withdraw by an assembly of loyalist "volunteers" armed with sticks and iron bars (18). On the whole, though, political disagreements within and between groups in black politics did not in this period lead to violence; quite apart from a strong moral commitment to peaceful conduct by a protestant missionary trained leadership, black organisations were too weak and small for the stakes involved in their competition with each other to be matters of life and death. Even so, at the time, the ANC attracted fierce criticism from liberal critics, particularly because the presence of communists in its leadership, who were accused of operating as a

manipulative caucus (19).

As an exile insurgent body, the ANC necessarily acquired a more disciplined and autocratic character; no leadership elections were held between 1959 and 1985, and the participants at the Kabwe conference were presented with a single list of candidates for the national executive chosen by the president, Oliver Tambo (20). The organisation became less tolerant of ideological diversity despite its continued protestations of serving as a "African parliament inclusive of all political persuasions" (21). Exile certainly accentuated the influence of the Communist Party whose members appeared to play a preponderant role in defining the organisation's intellectual life (22). Guerilla warfare in the 1980s helped to militarise the ANC's approach to political and strategic questions; this was especially the case after the formal adoption of an insurrectionary doctrine of people's war at the 1985 "consultative conference". Harsh treatment of mutineers and suspected traitors in the ANC's detention camps also weakened any remaining democratic impulses within the organisation. The ANC exiles returned home with a well developed set of authoritarian and bureaucratic reflexes. Back in South Africa, though, they encountered the very different political culture which had evolved during their absence.

In the 1970s and 1980s two successive waves of organisation building had endowed black South African communities with a unprecedently dense network of voluntary associations. The pioneers in this process were the trade unions started in the wake of the strikes which broke out in Natal in 1973. The university students and labour veterans who established the advice centres from which the unions proliferated drew on a critical understanding of South African labour history as well as international models for inspiration; in contrast to earlier Communist initiatives the 1970 unions emphasised tight factory based organisation, highly trained shop steward leadership, and a focus on workplace related concerns together with an eschewal of external political links. Leadership accountability, honest finances, and shop floor militancy were key attributes of this new unionism. These organisations, united from 1978 in the FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions) grouping concentrated on obtaining management recognition rather than altering state policy. Their militant economism helped to promote an ideology of "workerism". This stressed the importance of working class political autonomy and the dangers of workers joining or forming alliances with socially amorphous nationalist parties (23). Since 1985, with the merger that year of the FOSATU group with the ANC aligned "community" unions, the political posture of the labour movement shifted, with former "workerists" acknowledging the interdependence of shop-floor and community struggles. The new Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) rapidly assumed a leading role in the alliance of organisations which broadly acknowledged the ANC's moral authority, but trade union loyalty to the ANC was not without qualifications (24).

The new unions supplied skills, experience, and models which could be applied to other forms of organisation. In the early 1980s, strategic decisions by activists and deteriorating social conditions in townships both helped to prompt the formation of local "civic associations", a movement which mushroomed to embrace even rural settlements in remote homelands. The growth of the civic movement was paralleled by the spread of classroom organisation and the subsequent construction of "Youth Congresses". Labour militancy, periodic upsurges of school rebellion, the revival of internal ANC networks by "prison graduates", and the re-ignition in 1978 of "armed struggle" all helped to stimulate organisation building and to politicise existing associational activity. Much of this organisation was intensely localised and participatory in character; taking its cue from the trade union experience it attempted to practice a form of direct democracy in which leaders and representatives were simply bearers of popular mandates. In practice, much of the history of the civic movement fell short of this ideal, especially after its deployment as a component in the United Democratic Front in the ANC's "ungovernability" campaign (25). In some locations, though, civic associations managed to establish a network of neighbourhood committees which represented rather impressive efforts at local popular empowerment (26). Their notions of democracy were informed by a conviction that democratic institutions could and should reflect the general will. As a "UDF Message" put it in "Grassroots", one of the most successful community newspapers which flourished at the time: "Our structures must become organs of peoples' power... Ordinary people (must) increasingly take part in all the decisions... Few people making all the decisions must end" (27). For a contributor to "New Era", a publication affiliated to the Cape Town UDF: "Democracy means, in the first instance, the ability of the broad working masses to participate in and control all the dimensions of their lives. This, for us, is the essence of democracy, not some pluralistic debating society notion of a 'thousand schools contending' " (28). In this vein, UDF leaders sometimes said they were opposed to the holding of a round table constitutional conference (29). Democracy was not negotiable. Now, whether the UDF and its affiliates succeeded in embodying "people's power" is a subject of continuing academic controversy (30) but this need not detain us here. What is significant is that a participatory democratic ideal was a vital ingredient of the activist culture nurtured in the 1980s and it persists in the minds of many supporters of the civic movement today who remain deeply sceptical about the benefits of liberal parliamentarianism (31).

If a democratic political culture depended only on high levels of popular political activity, than the habits and attitudes engendered by the township rebellion would hold out considerable hope for the future. Some of this hope would not be misplaced. The communal organisations constructed in the 1980s did help to change popular attitudes to unjust authority, to alter popular

expectations from government, and instill more egalitarian political values (32). Any minimal definition of democracy, though, must include freedom of political choice and political association. The participatory structures developed in the 1980s did not acknowledge the moral legitimacy of political differences; their pyramidal organisational structure reflected a view of the community as an organic unity. Competition between the followers different black political organisations has become extremely violent, claiming 4,364 lives in 1993 (33). Surveys have recorded high levels of politically intolerant predispositions amongst political elites, white and black (34); to judge from the treatment accorded by township youths to adherents of unpopular political parties in black communities, feelings are just as fiercely partisan amongst rank and file (35).

The passions and energies which underlay popular political assertions in the 1980s helped to sustain a rebellion of unprecedented duration and scope. Without an upheaval of this scale it is difficult to see how De Klerk's administration in 1989 could have decided to embark on the road to abdication. It is though, a long road, and for the government's opponents, it has meant making many concessions. From 1994 until 1999, at least, South Africa's political system will be that of a "pacted democracy", a power sharing arrangement which falls well short of the expectations engendered in the years of insurrectionary "people's power". Pacted democracies are the result of agreements between contending elites which do not have the capacity to decisively defeat each other. They have been a feature of Latin American transitions from authoritarian rule in which incumbents agree "to forego appeals to military intervention" in return for their adversaries undertaking to refrain from "efforts at mass mobilisation" (36). A feature of such transitions are explicit or at least tacit recognitions of the boundaries of policy contention. Such guarantees are obviously easiest to maintain if the incoming leadership has not depended upon widespread popular insurgency to bring about negotiations. Mass mobilisation can be decisive in breaking down domination but mobilised masses make a negotiated democratisation very difficult to sustain. In South Africa in 1989 a "social stalemate" (37) existed between a regime which could govern only through coercion and an opposition which lacked the coercive capacity to overcome the state.

In recognition of this situation, the government, its allies and its main adversaries have devised a pacted democratisation with seven key features (38). First, elections will be held on the basis of a proportional representation/party list system. This will enable minority political representation but the list system will strengthen the leadership of the major parties. Elected parliamentarians will be prohibited from changing their party allegiance during their terms. Secondly, an "interim constitution" will be in force immediately after the elections and for the subsequent five year term of the transitional

government. Parliament will sit as a constituent assembly and will legislate and vote upon a constitution. A two-thirds parliamentary majority must approve the constitution. The interim constitution reflects broad principles to which the final constitution must also adhere. The authority to interpret these principles will rest with a constitutional court whose members will be nominated by the Judicial Services Commission, not the government. The interim constitution provides for an executive president, chosen by a majority in the national assembly and deputy presidents representing those parties with over twenty per cent of the vote. All parties with more than five percent of the vote will enjoy cabinet representation. Ministers will be selected by the president after consultation of the deputies. The cabinet will attempt to make decisions through consensus but this is not a constitutional requirement. The House of Assembly will have 400 members, 200 from the parties' national lists and 200 from their regional lists. Thirdly, nine regional governments and assemblies, composed according to the same principles as the national assembly, will be assigned with specific responsibilities - for example, health, housing and education, and they will have the power to raise taxes. Disputes with central government will be resolved by the constitutional court. Each region will choose ten members of a national Senate. Fourthly, civil service pensions are guaranteed and Mandela has on several occasions publicly promised that there will not be mass dismissals of white public servants (39). Fifthly, the existing security forces will remain in place subject to their reform and amalgamation with the much smaller guerilla armies (40). Sixthly, a Charter of Fundamental Rights protects conventional liberal freedoms as well as including clauses which safeguard private property, guarantee mother tongue education, and endorse affirmative action. Finally, the ANC has committed itself to the retention of large scale private enterprise and the withdrawal of its historical commitment to nationalise "monopoly" industries (41). These agreements represent significant constraints on the power of the majority party, even if it succeeds in winning the two thirds of the vote needed for it to decide the final constitution by itself. These will serve to define and limit the ways in which the new government can implement social and economic reform.

The nature of the South African state will be a crucial consideration in any calculation of the success of the new government's programmes. Historically the state has been heavily interventionist, administratively pervasive, bureaucratically complex, and extremely large. Counting the homeland civil services but not the parastatal corporations, the government currently employs 1,200,000 people (42). Apartheid helped to cause considerable departmental duplication - for in many fields up to thirteen ministries share responsibility. Today, the public service is widely acknowledged to be overmanned. It is also considered to be inefficient; recruitment to its higher echelons ceased to be competitive in 1948 and employment in its lower reaches was for a long time determined by political and

racist principles (43). The central government civil service remains dominated by whites. White civil servants have for over a decade helped to frustrate reformist initiatives by government; politically and socially they tend to be conservative (44). The homeland civil services are notoriously corrupt; though they are mainly black in composition, senior white managers have been implicated alongside homeland citizens in a series of financial scandals (45). Financial incompetence and irregularities are not limited to homeland governments; in particular government agricultural control boards and developmental agencies have been conduits for the expenditure of huge sums on evanescent projects (46).

Even so, in relative terms compared to other African states and even states in other semi-industrialised developing countries, South Africa has fairly effective governance, in part a consequence of the state's high degree of social autonomy. For the most part, officials conduct their routine transactions with the public honestly. Tax collection is efficient as is the financial management of most central government departments. Until the mid-1980s, the government's administrative reach was extensive despite the breakdown of influx control, the system of passes which attempted to limit black urbanisation (47). The state's social presence is facilitated by highly developed communications. Until the 1980s, government welfare provision was expanding and its expenditure on health and education today continues to exceed the budgetary allocation to security (48). State sponsored research and development, though insufficient, still puts the country in a different league of technological and scientific capacity to the rest of the continent. Notwithstanding its bureaucratic shortcomings and the possible political hostility of many of its personnel, the state still represents quite an effective instrument for the implementation of reformist programmes.

3.

For there can be no question that a strong state is a prerequisite for any strategy to lessen South African poverty. By themselves, market forces are unlikely to make good the consequences of decades of state reinforced material inequality.

In 1989, the Second Carnegie Inquiry into South African poverty published its report. As the most comprehensive survey of its type, its findings are helpful in defining the magnitude of the tasks which await a new government. In summary, Carnegie's investigators found that South Africa was probably one of the world's most socially unequal societies, with a "Gini co-efficient" rating of 0.66 in 1971, the highest of 57 countries measured; data for later years was not available. In 1970, the richest 20 per cent of the population owned 75 per cent of the wealth, though this income share had fallen to 61 per cent by 1980. Comparable shares for the richest minority in Brazil were 62 per cent and in the United States, 39 per cent. In 1980, 50

per cent of the population was existing below "minimum living levels", though this figure represented an improvement on the 1960 statistic of 80 per cent destitution. Sixty per cent of Africans fell into this category in 1980; and 81 per cent of Africans living in the "homelands". The latter group had risen in absolute numbers six fold in twenty years. For a comparatively wealthy country (GNP per head, US$ 2,340), South African life expectancy was in 1980 unusually low - 54 years. Sri Lanka, admittedly a special case with its excellent health services for a third world country, could boast an average lifespan of thirty years on the basis of GNP per head of US$360.

The Carnegie Report examined the manifestations and consequences of South African poverty in seven separate spheres: access to natural resources; work, incomes; unemployment; health; housing; education; and crime. On the land, Carnegie's researchers found an ostensibly prosperous farming sector making South Africa self sufficient in food and an important agricultural exporter. However even within white-owned commercial agriculture there was evidence of bad land management, overstocking, heavy erosion, and desertification. In black-occupied rural reserves, population densities hugely exceeded agricultural carrying capacities, especially after the forced resettlements of the 1960s. Much of this black rural population had no access to any land at all. Even so, considerable quantities of arable land were uncultivated because of the absence of economically active men and women in towns. Most "black" rural land is overgrazed. Dependence on firewood for fuel has accentuated ecological degradation; two thirds of South Africa's population are without electricity, despite the national generating capacity representing 60 per cent of Africa's electricity. Nor do most black people in the countryside have easy access to clean drinking water. At one extreme, white daily average water consumption is 200 litres; at another, Ciskeien rural consumption is nine litres. Water availability deteriorated sharply during the 1980s drought.

Amongst the ten million or so Africans who are economically active, in 1985 one million earned wages above "supplementary living levels ", mostly in manufacturing where real wages rose from 1970 onwards. Mining wages for a million workers improved dramatically in the 1970s but remained below other industrial wages as did the wages of 2 million agricultural labourers. Domestic servants experienced declining earnings in the 1970s, while 300,000 African state pensioners received pensions which rose 142 per cent between 1970 and 1981 but still remained very modest. All income recipients, though, were relatively privileged compared to the unemployed, estimated in 1981 to be 21 per cent of the economically active. Sample surveys carried out in cities in the 1980s suggested higher levels still: 56 per cent, for instance, in Port Elizabeth in 1985.

Black poverty is reflected in 15 per cent malnutrition in homelands, and according to different surveys between 1981 and 1985, African infant morality was between 94 and 124 per

thousand. African infant mortality in South Africa was significantly higher than in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Congo, Tunisia, Algeria and Zambia. Though infant mortality fell in Soweto and in several other urban centres, it appeared in the 1980s to be rising in the East Rand towns, the Eastern Cape and in homelands. African children died most frequently from pneumonia, gastro-enteritis, and poor nutrition. Compounding health problems was an increasingly acute housing shortage in the 1980s, reflecting rapid urbanisation as well as the unwillingness of the government to build urban housing for blacks in the 1970s. In 1985 the urban housing shortage was estimated to total 583,000 units; in the three years previously 41,000 houses were built in black townships. Average house occupancy in Soweto was between 17 and 20 people; in Alexandra, in northern Johannesburg, three people on average inhabited each room. In migrant labour hostels up to ninety men could share a single dormitory, with one toilet provided for every 22 residents.

In education, despite rapid increases in school enrolment in the 1970s, one third of the African population was found by the 1980 census to be illiterate, though 80 per cent of African children were officially calculated to be attending schools. The census probably under-counted the black population so the first figure was actually probably higher and the second lower. State expenditure on each black school child in 1980 was one seventh the per capita allocation for whites. Only one tenth of black school children managed to pass ten years of schooling with only 5,000 in gaining university entrance qualifications in 1978. Crime statistics also supply telling indices of social distress. Cape Town, one of the most violent cities in South Africa has a murder rate in absolute terms three times that of New York. On the Cape Flats in 1979 there were 1,328 cases of violent assault for every 100,000 of the area's inhabitants; the comparable number in the United Kingdom was 176. Crime rates in rural South Africa were probably higher (49).

Of course not all of this desperate statistical litany can be attributed solely to the inequalities of apartheid. Near zero growth rates in the 1980s, reflecting global trends, and average demographic increases of the African population of 2.8 per cent help to explain the expansion of poverty (50). An absolute fall in agricultural employment accentuated unemployment between 1960 and 1980. This was a consequence of mechanisation of white farms which was at least partly encouraged by government subsidies to white farmers. In most respects black poverty has been exacerbated if not caused by government policies, particularly with respect to population removals and racially skewed allocations of expenditure on public health, infrastructure, and education.

Recent research suggests a slightly more hopeful situation than the tormented picture which emerges from the Carnegie Report. It does seem that overall, between 1985 and 1990 blacks slightly increased their share of personal wealth, from 29 per cent to 33

per cent, with the white share declining from 59 to 54 per cent; black real per capita increased slightly in this period, this despite overall economic stagnation . "Gini coefficient" figures have probably declined since the very dated study cited in the Carnegie Report; South Africa's coefficient is believed to be comparable to other upper middle income developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico or Malaysia (51). This improvement may reflect the increasing component blacks represent of the total population as well as wage hikes in industry. Modern research finds smaller proportions of the black population live below minimum living levels than in the Carnegie Report, though the number of those living in destitution is thought to have increased between 1985 and 1990. Demographers believe that African fertility is on the decline and that "replacement fertility levels could be reached within the next generation" (52). But though such long term trends and forecasts may appear comforting, absolute indications of deprivation are likely to remain daunting for a long time to come. Economic growth in the order of 4 per cent is needed before the total numbers of the poor will diminish. Unemployment increased absolutely and proportionately in the 1980s; to merely stabilise unemployment figures, growth rates would have to exceed 8 per cent (53). Housing shortages are currently estimated at 1,200,000 units (54) and they are evident in the huge squatter camps which have mushroomed over the last decade on the fringes and in the interstices of every sizable South African town. School enrolments have increased and about 30,000 African school children gain university entrance matriculations but despite increased per capita expenditure (now one third of state expenditure on each white child) the quality of instruction in schools is widely believed to have deteriorated as a consequence of the political disruption of classroom discipline. The number of very poor people in homelands grew despite a slight fall as a percentage of the rural population (55). Urban health standards have almost certainly degenerated; a telling indicator was the appearance of a typhoid epidemic in Transvaal squatter settlements in 1993. Aids will contribute a fresh and unwelcome dimension to an already overburdened health-care system; HIV prevalence, today low by African standards, is expected to expand to embrace 8 per cent of the population of Soweto by 2005, that is, if an effective programme of treatment and public education is implemented (56). In summary, in 1994, South Africa is less socially unequal than it was twenty years before, but the absolute numbers of hopelessly poor people have grown despite a measure of redistribution in incomes and government expenditure.

Any new government will have to balance the requirements of programmes to diminish poverty with those policies which can help to promote growth. In addition, the government will be influenced by the imperatives of meeting the expectations of its most powerful constituencies and securing the loyalty or at least the acquiesence of the former beneficiaries of apartheid. Today a wealth of prescriptive literature suggests a set of ingredients for a "social market" compromise between equity considerations and those of growth (57). Within the framework of such a

compromise the most minimal strategy to address basic needs should include the reallocation of educational expenditure and the reorganisation of institutions to benefit African schoolchildren; expansion of primary health care; provision of electricity and clean water through public employment programmes; limited land reform and a redeployment of state agricultural subsidies; the promotion of mass construction of cheap housing; and the creation of safe neighbourhoods through better policing. Such a programme could relieve poverty significantly and might also help to stimulate growth. Each of its components merits brief discussion.

Current governmental expenditure on education is high, about 7 per cent of GNP, and 24 per cent of the budget; the next government is unlikely to spend much more. White schoolchildren, ten per cent of the total, absorb about a quarter of the money spent on schools and about as third of the education budget altogether. Equalising per capita expenditure could release a substantial flow of funds to schools in black neighbourhoods; an increase of fifty per cent in state expenditure on township and rural schools, educational economists believe (58). It is possible that administrative rationalisation of thirteen education departments may produce financial savings in the long run but in the short term this is most unlikely. Improvements in African education are more likely to result from a systematic programme to upgrade African teachers, in particular equipping them with science and maths skills, employing the grossly under-used facilities in white teacher training colleges. The ending of class boycotts and teacher strikes in itself represents an important advance; in 1993, African urban schools were disrupted for forty per cent of the academic year. Resources in tertiary education should be directed at the black technical and scientific training; at the moment expenditure is skewed in favour of universities and within them arts and social sciences subjects. An educational system which can embrace all children of school going age and which produces larger numbers of matriculants with economically useful skills is not an utopian ideal, after all, most children already receive schooling of some kind or another. But it would require considerable social discipline amongst teachers, many of whom today are affiliated to one of the most militant public sector unions. Whites and black suburbanites would have to pay more for their access to public education if the high quality of the institutions their children attend is to be maintained (59).

The health budget could be reorganised in a similar fashion with reallocations directed at primary health care which presently takes up about 15 per cent of government expenditure on health. Present health spending is more than sufficient in total figures for a developing country; average per capita funding is ten times WHO recommendations, so there is plenty of room for rationalisation and redistribution within the present budget. The construction of a denser network of rural clinics and community health centres together with immunisation programmes

when combined with massive extension of clean piped water and sewage removal could decisively lower infant mortality within a short time within the present budgetary limitations, as experience in Zimbabwe and Namibia has shown (60). 25 per cent of the population are presently on private medical aid schemes and, indeed, money spent on private medical care just about equals the state budget. This degree of privatisation suggests that there would remain substantive private support for sophisticated curative medicine. At present the state subsidises medical aid schemes through tax concessions which favour higher income earners; this surely calls for revision so that employers would have greater incentives to supply benefits to larger numbers of low paid workers. The exodus of medical skills could be partially stemmed by withdrawing the present very substantial state financing of medical training in favour of a system which imposes a fuller proportion of costs on the students. Students would have access to loans which would include in their repayment provisions the obligation to work in the public sector.

Low paid public employment schemes might help to reduce the costs of extensions to electrification, piped water, and sanitation systems. Policy studies suggest that a doubling of the present rate of connection to the national electricity grid could be financed through administrative rationalisation of a byzantine bureaucracy, the revision of tariff charges (and the effective collection of these in townships), and a redirection of municipal expenditure (61). At present white ratepayers are virtually the sole beneficiaries of services which are partly paid for by commercial and industrial rates; townships do not have comparable tax bases to white-governed cities. The racial integration of local authorities will change this. Given the continuing predisposition of the larger municipal governments to spend huge sums of money on unnecessary infrastructure - Pretoria's city council, for example, recently announced plans to devote R200 million to digging a lake in the main business district (62) - it is obvious that local government could mobilise considerable sums for more useful project if it chose to. Mass electrification in the countryside would represent an especially visible improvement to people's lives and would of course considerably enlarge the local market for appliances. This could help to boost employment in a more substantial fashion than could be achieved by any other public works programme.

Similarly, a modest programme of land reform and financial assistance for small farmers would not necessarily require huge outlay of additional resources to what is presently expended by the government on agriculture. Some state land is available for redistribution and sizable expanses of commercial farmland in border areas have been abandoned by owners (63). Money to purchase land and establish black farmers might initially be derived from the scaling down and redirection of existing government subsidies. In fact white farms, since 1985, have experienced a sharp reduction of government support, but even so farmers are still accustomed to receiving generous help at times

of crisis. Four billion rands was spent on drought relief to white farmers in 1992 (64). White farmers are heavily indebted. Smallholder-oriented land reform may help to enhance the efficiency of agriculture generally (65).

It is difficult to see how the ANC will keep its electoral promise of supplying 1,000,000 houses to Africans in five years if by such pledges is meant the provision of huge public housing schemes. In the last few years, African housing construction has taken place at a rate of between 40,000 and 50,000 dwellings a year and most of the financing has come from the private sector - and hence directed at the building of middle class homes (66). Market forces by themselves are unlikely to increase the scale of construction to make serious inroads into the housing backlog. If the state built a million houses it would absorb virtually all the likely developmental funding at its disposal. State prescribed investments in low cost accommodation for pension funds and insurance companies may be one possible source of financing but of course would take up capital which might be deployed in more long-lasting forms of job creation. A more legitimate government might be able to make the traditional apartheid "site and service" schemes more attractive if these were combined with land title, access to cheap credit, and a range of imaginative architectural designs (67).

Creating secure neighbourhoods will require wide-ranging and expensive police reforms. South Africa is in certain respects underpoliced and its heavily mechanised and militarised police force is inadequately trained and equipped for a crime prevention role. It is also demoralised and poorly paid (68). Public expenditure on policing will have to increase and is likely to absorb any of the savings which might result from the reduction of the army.

The foregoing paragraphs suggest a minimal set of redistributive measures which would reduce the scope of poverty and inequality considerably without needing huge leaps in government expenditure or large flows of external aid. If they are properly directed, such policies could have a decisive impact on the lives of the present 40 per cent who receive only 5 per cent of total income (69). Skilful political leadership will be vital in any efforts to persuade organised labour to view social investment of this character as an acceptable substitute for wage hikes. For wage restraint amongst industrial and public sector workers must be one crucial precondition for growth in an economy in which wages count for 71 per cent of national income. The renumeration of government employees at present use up about half of government expenditure; raising this proportion would reduce funding available for social expenditure. Government revenues cannot be augmented by rises in personal taxation, even radical economists recognise that this has already reached desirable limits (70). The 100,000 or so managers and technocrats who run the economy have skills which are easily marketably elsewhere as current emigration statistics demonstrate; "soaking the rich" by reducing

their real incomes through higher taxation would very risky. Government borrowing cannot be the main source of development capital; though South Africa is under-borrowed internationally, public debt to local lenders is very heavy and uses up 17 per cent of the budget in interest payments (71). Though initially economic growth might increase as a consequence of public works programmes, in the long term it will have to be fuelled by the expansion of manufacturing exports and the inflow of foreign investment. Fuller incorporation into the international economy will mean adhering to GATT regulations which stipulate the abandonment of tariffs and import quotas. Not all factories will survive exposure to foreign competition (72). A more liberal trade regime may need to be accompanied by local currency devaluations and hence inflation. An outwardly oriented growth strategy will begin by imposing heavy penalties on urban consumers and industrial workers; effective delivery of social reform will be crucial if the government is to retain its public credibility.

ANC proposals for "Reconstruction and Development" more or less balance equity concerns with growth imperatives through a strategy of reallocation and rationalisation of existing resources. Understandably, its electoral appeals place more emphasis on expenditure than finance; the ANC is not seeking the votes of bankers and stockbrokers. Elsewhere, though, ANC spokesmen have already suggested that public expenditure will only increase slightly overall, that social investments will mainly be derived from the redirection of available resources, and that the civil service is already too large (73). Specifically, the ANC has pledged the redistribution of state land, a public works programme to provide clean toilets and water for all within two years, the doubling of electricity connections by the end of the century, the expansion of primary health care, with free access to curative medicine for the aged, the young, the disabled and the unemployed, the reduction of class sizes in schools and the provision of free textbooks, and popular extension of private home ownership facilitated by promptings to the private sector to supply finance. Parastatal corporations will be deployed to help the establishment of small businesses and ANC economic policies will seek to promote manufacturing exports. The organisation is committed to diversifying ownership, through anti-cartel legislation if necessary. Tariffs and protection will be reduced, though with "minimum disruption to employment". The ANC has more faith than most academic economists in the capacity of public sector investment to produce GDP gains; its programme predicts annual increases of 5 per cent as a consequence of social expenditure. Its policies are not calculated to entice external investors, promising "no special advantages" for foreign companies. Undertakings to reduce income tax for low income earners and to collect corporation tax more efficiently are in the same vein; here the influence of COSATU and SACP advisors may have had a decisive influence in the drafting of the "Reconstruction and Development Programme" adopted on the eve of the ANC's electoral campaign (74). Even

so, for a manifesto in a liberation election, the ANC's vision of "A Better Life for All" is hardly spendthrift (75).

4.

If surveys are to be believed, the ANC's proposals fall well short of popular expectations. A poll in September 1993 discovered that 80 per cent of its black respondents thought that government should supply free housing (76). Nationalisation was also a popular option and indeed, the National Union of Mineworkers recently renewed its commitment to public ownership of the gold mining industry. Specialists debate over the extent of land hunger (77), but the ANC's land reform proposals look very restrained when compared with those of the PAC which advocate the reduction through confiscation of "settler" owned land by two-thirds (78).

Moreover an ANC-led coalition will encounter formidable difficulties in implementing even a fairly conservative "growth through redistribution" programme. A necessary first condition is a streamlined, cooperative, and competent civil service. This may be quite difficult to attain . Quite apart from the question of the bureaucracy's present political proclivities, there is the disruption and inefficiency that might result from badly managed affirmative action (79). The new government will be under massive political pressure to create jobs through the expansion of public service. Political opposition could also hinder progress. Coalition partners may well resist cuts in the quality of schooling and health care available to whites. They might also resist efforts by the state to regulate private patterns of investment. Cuts in commercial agricultural subsidies will further alienate 67,000 white farmers, most of whom have already signalled their opposition to power-sharing Political rivalries which divide the labour movement may assume a more dangerous significance when the ANC attempts to negotiate limits to wage claims with its electoral partner, COSATU. Public works schemes even if they do succeed in creating 300,000 jobs, as the ANC has promised, will hardly dent unemployment statistics: 3,000,000 people between the ages of 16 and 30 have no jobs and more than 80 per cent of the 16 to 19 year old group are not working. Surveys demonstrate that nearly half the PAC's support comes from youths aged 17 to 24; the ANC should expect substantial defections of its own young supporters to its more radical rival as expectations of the new government are disappointed over the next five years (80). Even youth organisations which are nominally affiliated to the ANC have frequently defied ANC attempts to bring them to heel (81).

Will the twin tasks of addressing social injustice and promoting growth be completed under democratic conditions? As already noted, the new constitution embodies a fairly restrictive form of representative democracy with its stipulations for a coalition cabinet and deputy presidents from minority parties. Its Charter

of Rights is weighted in favour of "first generation" freedoms, that is individual civil rights and minority safeguards. As one commentator has observed: "the push for a bill of rights comes not from the heart of the freedom struggle, but from people on the fringes" (82). Land reform advocacy groups and trade unions opposed the inclusion of the Charter's property clause. Explicit and tacit guarantees of existing property relations are indeed an affront to democratic principles; as Adam Przeworski has argued, "it is within the nature of democracy that no one's interests can be guaranteed" (83). Human rights lawyers are concerned about what they see as implicit threats to press freedom and academic autonomy in the constitution. Representation by parliamentarians selected by party leaderships will remove any element of their accountability to electors. Neither will regional governments have any form of constituency representation.

The ANC is likely to win a large majority in the election and it is almost certainly going to command a sufficient proportion of cabinet posts. If it feels compelled to, it will be able to dictate policies to its partners (84). Even so, ANC leaders probably know that coalitions function best through consensus (85). Already, in the Transitional Executive Council, a caretaker body established at the end of 1993 to supervise the conduct of government during the elections, ANC representatives have demonstrated their willingess to support unpopular policies, backing high pay rises for senior civil servants and agreeing to the retention of preventative detention.

At present, the main threats to democratisation come from conservative political elites, white and black, and their organised political followings. Though both the authoritarian right and the neo-traditionalist Inkatha movement have the capacity to make the elections extremely violent they do not have the resources nor the depth and spread of support to constitute a serious long term threat to political stability. A crucial consideration here is the army's disinclination to support any right wing insurgency. In any case some of the Right's support is likely to dissipate in the aftermath of voting when more exaggerated fears prove chimerical (86). More serious challenges to democratic stabilisation would be mass protests and upheavals requiring authoritarian measures on a large scale and over a long period to contain them; these are more likely to come from the left than the right, especially from organised labour and mobilised youth, if the pace of social reform is too slow. Such challenges are not inevitable; for a while at least they can be averted by imaginative leadership and by public faith in the democratic process itself - if people feel that they can make meaningful choices in elections than they are less likely to contemplate rebellion. Democratic regimes are in certain respects less vulnerable than authoritarian administrations. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out: "processes and procedures... can in substantial measure substitute for the dearth of more deterministic economic and sociological conditions of democracy in Third World nations" (87). The presence of COSATU

representatives in government may help to ensure the loyalty of the better organised sections of the labour movement and may help to facilitate the establishment of institutionalised forms of corporatism between government, business and labour (88). Ironically, however, the very popularity at the polls of the ANC may be the undoing of democracy. A nationalist movement which can meet the aspirations of the burgeoning African middle class through affirmative action and enforced corporate "unbundling" and at the same time retain the support of the most powerful labour unions through the deployment of government resources would represent such a formidable political force. It might always be able to out-manoeuvre electoral opponents whose support was derived from more vulnerable or marginal groups. One serious temptation for the ANC in power will be to sacrifice democratic principles and developmental goals to political expediency and to draw upon strong statist traditions in South African political culture to reconstruct the dominant one party system under which the country has been governed for so much of its history.

5.

What insights does this South African case study contribute to a more general understanding of the relationship between democracy and development? Most of the comparative and theoretical discussion of this topic is directed at confirming whether a certain level of development is a necessary or at least a helpful condition for the establishment and stabilisation of democracy. Quantitative and comparative studies have isolated different clusters of variables which correlate with the presence of mature democratic political systems, amongst them: overall wealth, industrialisation, urbanization, literacy, large middle classes, strongly organised working classes, relative social equality, protestantism, low levels of military expenditure, and high degrees of economic dependence for trade and investment on democratic powers (89). The South African experience serves to confirm many of the generalisations which arise from these findings, and, like any case study, it cannot suggest any significant objections or modifications to the contentions which arise from quantitative research. The few examples of poor and predominantly rural democracies notwithstanding, it is widely recognised that most democracies exist in developed capitalist economies which exhibit the features mentioned above.

A more interesting discussion concerns the question of why the characteristics of developed capitalist economies seem to facilitate the establishment of democratic government. First, there are those arguments which suggest that entrepreneurial classes if left to themselves construct political institutions which parallel or reflect the freedom of the market; hence, liberal democracy is most likely to come about with the political ascendency of an industrial bourgeoisie and more generally a large middle class (90). More recently, comparative studies have focused on "the organised working class (as) the most important force in establishing democracy" (91). This is a thesis which

the South African case would certainly strengthen. By itself, the emergence of a "diverse, complex, and interrelated economy" (92) did little to further the development of democracy in South Africa. South Africa was by the 1950s an already substantially industrialised country; contrary to a popular supposition repeated recently by Samuel Huntington, Apartheid was certainly "compatible with a complex, wealthy, urban commercial and industrial economy" (93), at least for a considerable period of time. Political and industrial organisation of subordinate classes was one decisive factor in favour of democratisation as were externally imposed economic constraints; neither of these were entirely predetermined by levels of economic development Whether organised working classes are seeking liberal democracy or not is beside the point; in their efforts to gain greater access to power and resources that is what they usually get.

There is much less consensus and indeed much less consideration concerning the issue of whether democracy facilitates development. An implicit assumption of many of the empirical surveys is that democracy arises from the social changes which result from economic development. Comparative historical studies tend to reinforce this contention (94). It does seem much more difficult, though, to reverse the argument and then to produce widely valid generalisations. Democracy might have helped and may continue to help to foster economic progress at certain developmental stages in individual economies or at particular moments in world history. The arguments for suggesting that democracy usually or generally facilitates development seem quite weak. For example, under ideal circumstances it is easy to see how democratic government can help to promote economic competition, vigorous entrepreneurs, rapid social mobility, and even, perhaps enhanced labour productivity (95), but none of these sources of economic dynamism are completely incompatible with authoritarian government and sometimes they may require authoritarian government to exist at all. If radical social reform, for example, is needed to create more competitive and efficient agriculture, than the kinds of liberal democracy which arise from "pacted" transition may be ineffectual. Economic modernisation of relatively poor and underdeveloped societies may impose heavy social and economic costs (96) on potentially powerful groups. Another theory is that economic decision-making is more efficient if it is contested rather than left in the hands of autocratic elites (97). This may be true in an extremely complex economy but there is no intrinsic reason, as is sometimes suggested, why such elites should be corrupt or self serving to the point of being economically inefficient or why they should be unable to devise policies in the national interest. That democratic political institutions are a pre-requisite for economic health has now become a dogmatic orthodoxy among developmental agencies who often equate democratic institutions with liberal, that is, minimalist government. This kind of argument usually underlies the prescriptions imposed on third world economies by multilateral lending agencies. These usually simultaneously force governments to impose great

hardships on their main constituents (by abandoning industrial protection and reducing state employment) while at the same time cutting back on welfare provisions (98). Enfeebling states is an odd way to encourage democracy.

In South Africa the promotion of economic growth will certainly inflict social costs. These might well be managed better in a political system in which access to political power is quite socially restricted; this may be one of the developmental benefits of South Africa's compromised "transitional" democracy. It would be very dangerous, though, if South African political progress followed the path taken by other African countries where democratic commitment has been measured by restrictive government and market primacy (99). South Africa's relative industrial strength and economic sophistication has been built by a strong interventionist state, not market capitalism. As this essay has attempted to demonstrate, that strong state is still needed to foster the conditions for the measure of social justice which will make the sacrifices required by economic advance acceptable.

Footnotes and References

1. The most persuasive analysis of the cost sensitivity of the mining industry and hence its need to subjugate labour is in Yudelman, David, 1983: The Emergence of Modern South Africa, State, Capital and the Incorporation of Organised Labour on the South African Gold Fields, 1902-1939, Greenwood Press, New York, 134-159.

2. O'Meara, Dan, 1975: "The 1946 African Mineworkers Strike", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, July, 149.

3. Though wartime African trade unionism was still very weak. For an analysis of the "weakness of the African working class as a whole in this period" see: Robert Fine and Dennis Davis, 1991: Beyond Apartheid: Labour and Liberation in South Africa, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, pp. 12-18.

4. Lewis, Stephen, 1990: The Economics of Apartheid, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 16.

5. The black urban population expanded from 1.6 million to over 5 million between 1950 and 1970 (Price, Robert, 1991: The Apartheid State in Crisis, Oxford University Press, New York, 29). Africans employed in manufacturing increased from 357,700 in 1960 to 617,200; in the same period white employees in industry grew only by about 25 per cent, from 208,900 to 276,900 (Greenberg, Stanley, 1980: Race and State in capitalist Development, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, p. 425.

6. African school enrolment jumped from 1,005,200 in 1955 to 2,524,140 in 1969 to 4,000,000 in 1976. On these, 89,000 were attending secondary schools in 1969; by 1975 this figure had leaped to 318,568. Source: Hirson, Baruch, 1979: Year of Fire, Year of Ash: the Soweto Revolt, Zed Books, London, 63 and 98.

7. Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D Stephens, 1992: Capitalist Development and Democracy, Polity Press, Oxford, 7.

8. Pourgerami, Abbas, 1991: Development and Democracy in the Third World, Westview Press, Boulder, 10.

9. Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D Stephens, 1992: Capitalist Development and Democracy, Polity Press, Oxford, 259.

10. National Party leaders today deny that political reform was the consequence of such pressure, claiming that the today's changes were anticipated by policy directions taken in the early 1980s. In fact, no constitutional blueprint produced by NP strategists in the 1980s ever envisaged universal suffrage on a common roll for a non-racial assembly. Of course there were other compulsions and promptings than popular insurgency which helped to determine government decisions; sanctions, credit restrictions, and long term economic forecasts were all important, as well as the changes in international relations following the fall of communist governments. Many of the economic difficulties, though, were linked to the failure of the government's efforts to legitimise its authority through piecemeal reform. Popular revolt never threatened to overthrow the state but it made it increasingly difficult and costly for the government to maintain order and nearly impossible for it to improve infrastructure and social services.

11. The relationship between judiciary and the executive is discussed in: Sachs, Albie, 1973: Justice in South Africa, University of California, University of California Press, 1973 , 244-263.

12. For readership statistics see Charney, Craig, 1993: "Black Power, White Press: Literacy, Newspapers, and the Transformation of Township Political Culture", African Studies Seminar Paper, University of the Witwatersrand.

13. On native representative elections see: Basner, Miriam, 1993: Am I an African? The Political Memoirs of HM Basner, University of the Witwatersrand press, , Johannesburg, 67-98; Roth, Mirjana, 1986: "Domination by Consent: Elections under the Representative of Natives Act" in Tom Lodge (ed.), Resistance and ideology in Settler Societies, Ravan

Press, Johannesburg, 144-167.

14. On advisory board politics: Baines, Gary, 1990: "The New Brighton Advisory Board, c 1923-1952: Its legitimacy and legacy", paper delivered to Fifth Triennial History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand.

15. Coloureds could vote for special white parliamentary representatives in parliament from 1956 until 1968 and in Cape Town participated on a common roll in municipal elections until 1972.

16. Hudson, Peter, 1986: "The Freedom Charter and the Theory of National Democratic Revolution", Transformation, 1. Communist ideas about future political institutions were hardly hegemonic, though, among African leaders at the time. Nelson Mandela, recalling his feelings when visiting Britain for the first time in 1962 is illuminating: "It was an exciting experience for me. You must remember that I was brought up in a "British" school and at the time Britain was the home of everything that was best in the world. I have not discarded the influence which Britain and British history and culture exercised on us. We regarded it as the capital of the world and visiting the place, therefore, had this excitement because I was visiting the country which was my pride" (John Carlin, "Love Affair with Britain", The Star, 1 May, 1993).

17. A celebratory but vivid account of the Congress of the people is supplied in Suttner, Raymond and Jeremy Cronin, 1984: 30 years of the Freedom Charter, Johannesburg, Ravan Press. For a more detached analysis see Rich, Paul, 1991: "The Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter", AFSAAP Conference, University of Western Australia, Perth.

18. Gerhart, Gail, 1978: Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an ideology, University of California Press, Berkeley, 178; Fairburn, James, 1991: "The Split in the ANC, 1958", Searchlight South Africa, 7, 60-64; Pogrund, Benjamin, 1990: How Can man Die Better...Sobukwe and Apartheid, Peter Halban, London, 86-88.

19. Patrick Duncan, "Open letter to Chief Luthuli", Contact, 2 May 1959; Ngubane, Jordan, 1963: An African Explains Apartheid, Praeger, New York, 1963, 162-173; Van Rensberg, Patrick, 1962: Guilty Land, Jonathan Cape, London, 157-158.

20. Ellis, Stephen and Tsepo Sechaba, 1992: Comrades against Apartheid: the ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile, James Currey, London, 150.

21. Oliver Tambo, quoted in Johns, Sheridan and R Hunt Davis, 1991: Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: the

Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990, Oxford University Press, New York, 310.

22. For example, Sechaba, the ANC's journal, was edited by SACP members from its inception.

23. Foster, Joe, 1982: "The Workers' struggle: Where Does FOSATU Stand", South African Labour Bulletin, 7, 8.

24. COSATU adopted the ANC's Freedom Charter in 1987 but it did so with the understanding that the Charter provided only a set of "minimum democratic demands" which did not in any way diminish COSATU's commitment to "economic transformation based on working class interests" (Marx, Anthony, 1992: Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960-1990, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 205). Seven years later, James Motlatsi, president of the powerful mineworkers union, indicated that COSATU's alliance with the ANC remains quite conditional: "An alliance is not a marriage. We have, from time to time, to check that the conditions that require it are still operative" (Paul Bell, "Question now is, what about COSATU?, The Star, 11 August, 1993).

25. Jeremy Seekings has argued that "Civics attracted support through their tactical pragmatism and "reformism" rather than their ideological or programmatic radicalism. They negotiated with local state officials and in some cases with township councillors. Such pragmatic tactics produced results, with rent increases postponed and evictions suspended. Civics' support declined when they made national political concerns their priority or adopted uncompromising tactics" (Seekings, Jeremy, 1992: "Civic Organisation in South African Townships" in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds), South African Review 6: From Red Friday to CODESA', Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 233-234)..

26. Notably in Alexandra and some of the townships of the Eastern Cape. One of the most successful centres of street level organisation was the small town of Cradock in the Eastern Cape; for a description see: Mufson, Steven, 1990: Fighting Years, Beacon press, Boston, 110-113.

27. Grassroots, February 1986.

28. Anon., 1985: "Sowing Confusion", New Era, March, 38.

29. Anton Harbor, "Who'll talk to PW?", Weekly Mail, 30 August 1985.

30. See: Mayekiso, Mzwanele, 1993: "The Legacy of People's Power", Southern African Review of Books, 5, 6, 24-27; Karen Jochelson, Karen, 1990: "Reform, Repression and Resistance in South Africa: A case study of Alexandra

Township, 1979-1989", Journal of Southern African Studies, 16, 1, 1-32.

31. A UDF discussion document reflected this scepticism: "Not only are we opposed to the present parliament because we are excluded but because parliamentary type representation in itself represents a limited and narrow idea of democracy... The rudimentary organs of people's power that have begun to emerge in South Africa... represent in many ways the beginnings of the kind of democracy we are striving for" (Horowitz, D, 1990: A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society?, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, pp. 21-22). An official from the Atteridgeville-Saulsville Civic Organisation in Pretoria told one researcher recently that "Civics must survive the transition because the government must hear the voice of the people loudly. Democracy will mean nothing in real terms without the continued struggle of popular movements" (Johnny Steinberg , "A Place for Civics in a Liberal Democratic Polity", unpublished paper, Albert Einstein Institution's Civil Society Project, December 1993, 15).

32. This seems to be reflected in the recent work of researchers who have investigated public attitudes to political issues and institutions in small communities. See, for example, Mkhabela, Sam, 1994: "Democratization in Rural South Africa: the case of Marite, 1986-1993", B A Honours (Political Studies) Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand.

33. Altogether 18,000 people have died in political violence since 1983, most of them in strife between black political groups though police shootings have also been responsible for a proportion of these deaths. Source: The Star, 17 February, 1994.

34. Kotze, Hennie, 1993: "Political (in)tolerance: a survey", Die Suid Afrikaan, 43, 27-29.

35. Happy Nkhoma, "Sipho and the DP meeting", The Star, 11 August 1993; Mbulelo Sompetha, "Youths pour petrol over DP supporter at meeting", Sunday Times, 8 August 1993; Jovial Rantao, Black NP candidates allege intimidation, The Star, 17 February, 1994. Pm warnings by South African National Civic Organisation officials to the Democratic Party to cease canvassing voter support in townships: The Star, 25 February, 1993, 28 February 1993 and 5 March 1993.

36. O'Donnel, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, 1988: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Volume 5: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 39.

37. The phrase was first used with respect to South Africa by Moses Mabhida, general secretary of the South African Communist Party in 1985.

38. For an astute analysis of ANC-government negotiations: Rantete, Johannes and Hermann Giliomee, 1992: "Transition to Democracy through Transaction", African Affairs, 91, 515-542.

39. There would have to be some early retirements of senior civil servants, Mandela told a rally in Cape Town "But there should be no injustice. Nobody should lose the privileges and advantages of the job he occupies. Nobody should lose his pension as a result of having to retire early". The Star, 23 March, 1992. See also: "Mandela's pledge on job security hailed", The Star, 11 March, 1992, p. 11.

40. As one observer has put it: "A deal has now been struck, the essence of which is that the SADF will loyally serve the new government on condition that the government does not seek to tamper with SADF institutional integrity" (John Carlin, "SADF, MK understand each other", The Star, 13 October, 1993).

41. "Although the clause on mining is still in the Freedom Charter, we have made the shift away from nationalisation". Nelson Mandela, quoted in Patrick Laurence, "Nationalisation and the ANC", The Star, 19 January, 1994, p. 12. See also: Jacqueline Myburgh and Shaun Johnson, "The ANC and the N-word", The Star, 17 October, 1991. Mandela has also promised that "private land would not be touched in the process of redistribution" (The Star, 20 September, 1993).

42. The Star, 9 November, 1993. The salaries of public servants account for approximately half the government's expenditure (Wassenaar, A, 1989: Squandered Assets, Tafelberg, Cape Town, 73).

43. This was probably less the case in the 1970s and 1980s than in the preceding two decades. After the victory of the National Party in the 1948 elections the civil service and the army and police forces were systematically reorganised to exclude from higher positions non-Afrikaners and Afrikaners who were not National Party supporters. For a description of this process as it was applied to the Union Defence Force: Rocky Williams, "Night of the Midnight Riders", The Star, 8 January, 1994.

44. See Ottaway, Marina, 1993: South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order, Brookings, Washington, 30-32, for a description of how health administrators hindered government efforts to desegregate hospitals. Civil service opposition to

even very limited reform is one reason often cited to explain (and sometimes justify) the militarisation of South African administration in the 1980s. See Roherty, James, 1992: State Security in South Africa: Civil Military Relations under P W Botha, M E Sharp, Armank NY, 78-87.

45. See: "Homeland graft shocks", The Star, 26 November, 1993; Justice Malala, "Sun setting fast on Ramodike's reign", The Star, 1 October, 1993; Norman Chandler, "Gazankulu and Venda also in financial difficulties", The Star, 15 October 1993; Jacques Pauw, "R15-m chemical contract exposed", The Star, 16 April, 1992; Justice Malala, "Huge gravy train scandal in Lebowa", The Star, 29 September, 1993.

46. For examples: Norman Chandler, "R17-m Egg Board white elephant", The Star, 29 November, 1993; Commission of Inquiry into Development Aid: Report to the State President, RP 73/1992, 146-147; Special Report of the Auditor General concerning the Independent Evaluation of the Mossgas project, RP 113/1991. In the case of the Department of Development Aid, Justice Pikard found that wastage and dishonesty within the central government administration may have absorbed about R1 billion annually in the late 1980s. Independent accountants argued that R1.6 billion was lost in the Mossgas project as a consequence of incompetance and secrecy.

47. Influx control was abolished in 1986, some years after it has ceased to effectively curtail black migration from the countryside. In 1983, for example, 1,400,000 people were living in squatter camps around Durban situated in areas no longer subject to effective influx control regulation. these people represented about half the population of the Durban region. See: Greenberg, S, 1987: Legitimising the Illegitimate, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987, 77.

48. In the 1991/1992 budget expenditure on social services represented 38.78 per cent of total government expenditure compared to 19.5 per cent spent on security. Source: SA Barometer, 5, 6, March 29, 1991, 89.

49. Wilson, Francis and Mamphela Ramphela, 1989: Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge. the Report of the Second carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, W Norton and Co, New York, 1989.

50. Knight, J B, 1988: "A Comparative Analysis of South Africa as a Semi-Industrialised Developing Country", Journal of Modern African Studies, 26, 3, 475.

51. Pottinger, Brian, "The Myth: Growth makes whites richer", Sunday Times, 22 September, 1991, 17; Charles Simkins, "Demography and Income Distribution", paper delivered at an

Urban Foundation Strategy and Policy Unit workshop, 11 May 1993.

52. Mostert, W P, 1990: "Recent trends in fertility in South Africa" in W P Mostert and J M Lotter, South Africa's Demographic Future, Human Science Research Council, Pretoria, 73.

53. M D McGraph, "Jobs, unemployment and social mobility", paper delivered at an Urban Foundation Development Strategy and Policy Unit workshop, 11 May 1993, p. 2.

54. UF Focus, Housing Policy Unit, March 1993, no. 1, p. 1.

55. Norman Bromberger, "Some economic aspects of rural African life", paper delivered at an Urban Foundation Development Strategy and Policy Unit workshop, 11 May 1993, p. 4

56. David Robbins, "Dicing with the Aids algebra", The Star, 12 May 1993.

57. For examples: Adam, H and K Moodley, 1993: The Negotiated Revolution, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 177-187, 210-214; Lipton M and C Simkins (eds.), 1993: State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg; Berger, P, and B Godsell (eds.), 1988: A Future South Africa, Human and Rousseau, Tafelberg, 1988, 200-239; Nurnberger, K (ed.), 1991: A Democratic Vision for South Africa, Encounter Publications, Pietermaritzberg, 446-452, 529-540; Simkins, C. "The Good News and the Bad News of Economic Stability", Sunday Times, 31 March 1991.

58. Donaldson, Andrew, 1993: "Basic needs and social policy" in Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins, State and Market in Post Apartheid South Africa, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 306.

59. Most white suburban schools are already partly privatised through the "Model C" system in which parents pay fees which supplement government financing. Much the same procedure maintains fairly privileged public schools in suburban districts in Zimbabwe. It is socially inequitable but it has been an effective measure in winning white acceptance of majority rule in that country.

60. The example of the Zimbabwean health centre scheme in which 210 rural centres were built between 1980 and 1985, increasing the total level of national services by 58 per cent at a cost to government of $17,6 million is encouraging. Here much of the construction was funded and undertaken by local communities (Herbst, Jeffrey, 1990: State Politics in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe University Press, Harare, 166-192. Namibia has also managed to increase public access to health care while keeping expenditure

constant (The Star, 24 February, 1994).

61. Michael Morris, "Bringing power to the people", The Star, 8 November, 1993.

62. The Star, 1 November, 1993.

63. Fenyes, TI and J van Zyl, 1990: "The occupation/depopulation of white rural areas", Development Southern Africa, 7, 495-516. ANC spokesmen believe that 13 million hectares of state land await redistribution. Mandela has pledged that "private land would not be touched in the process of redistribution" (Joe Latakgomo, "Landed with a Redistribution Problem", The Star, 20 September, 1993.

64. Lipton, M, 1993: "Restructuring South African Agriculture" in Lipton M and C Simkins, State and Market in Post Apartheid South Africa, 369.

65. World Bank, Experiences with Agricultural Policy: Lessons for South Africa, Washington, 1992; World Bank, South African Rural Restructuring Programme, Washington, 1993; World Bank, Options for Land Reform and Rural Restructuring in South Africa, Washington, 1993. One implication of the Bank's disparaging view of South African commercial agriculture is its belief that the introduction of market conditions will by itself promote redistribution. The ANC is less predisposed to characterise white farming operations as incompetant and more inclined to view state intervention as neccessary in any reallocation of land to black farmers.

66. Cooper, Carole, et al, 1989: Race Relations Survey, South African institute of race Relations, 195.

67. De Beer, Frik, 1993: Housing Policy in South Africa: A View from below, Africa Insight, 23, 2, 112-120.

68. Starting salary in 1992 for a constable was R484.51. Poor renumeration together with high levels of stress was reflected in a rising suicide rate and 15,000 resignations annually from a force of about 100,000. 224 officers were murdered in 1992. The ratio of police officers to total population, 2.6:1,000, is about half the average which is normal in Western Europe and North America. Police inability to curtail crime effectively has led to the growth of a huge security industry; in 1988, private security firms employed 300,000 people (sources: Annual Report of the Commissioner of the SAP, RP-67, 1993; Grant, Evadne, 1989, "Private Policing", Acta Juridica, special issue: "Policing and the Law; "SAP: salaries and resignations", SA Barometer, 4, 10, 8 June, 1990).

69. Knight, J B, 1988: "A comparative analysis of South Africa as a semi-industrialised developing country", Journal of Modern African Studies, 26, 3, 491.

70. The ANC's Macro-Economic Research Group report, "Making Democracy Work", comments that the rate of personal income tax is too high and has resulted in an unfair burden on the middle to upper middle class salary earners and on skilled and semi skilled workers. (The Star, 4 December, 1993).

71. John Spira, "SA's burden of debt", The Star, 30 September, 1993.

72. South Africa is likely to experience heavy job losses in the textiles and transport equipment sectors, representing nearly 9 per cent of the industrial workforce if GATT regulations are enforced (Africa South and East, 38, February 1994, 18).

73. "ANC pledges fiscal discipline", The Star, 29 March, 1993; "ANC spells out plan for state spending", The Star, 15 March, 1992

74. "Reconstruction and Development Programme", 6th Draft, 13 January, 1994. For indications of tensions within the ANC over the direction economic policies should take: "ANC gives assurance on foreign loans: Ramaphosa view "not policy", The Star, 3 October 1991.

75. African National Congress, A Better Life for All, Marshalltown, 1994. ANC policy proposals have elicited a mixed reception. The medical profession in general is critical of the health proposals ("Where's the spoonful of sugar" Financial Mail, 28 January 1994, 77-78) because of their bias against the private sector. ANC plans for education, on the other hand, prompted mild praise from National Party spokesmen who asserted that they were in line with the Government's own Education Renewal Strategy.

76. Brian Pottinger, "Polls Apart", Sunday Times, 14 November, 1993.

77. John Sender, for example, argues that a relatively small number of black people want to farm on a commercial scale; for most rural people the preferred option would be secure and well-paid employment. The land needs of the rural poor could probably be met through the re-distribution of 200,000 ha., Sender thinks, half an acre or so on which each family could grow food for consumption and a little extra for sale, while remaining chiefly dependent on wages ("Getting in touch with reality", Financial Mail, November 5, 1993, pp. 24-28). Other researchers dispute this view. Richard Levin has found that 77 per cent of respondents in a survey in the Eastern

Transvaal would like to to participate in a land reform programme ("Comparative Perspectives on Land and Agricultural Reform in South Africa", publication forthcoming).

78. Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, The land Policy of the PAC of Azania, Discussion Document, Johannesburg, November 1992, p. 12; Pan Africanist Congress, Election Manifesto: It's PAC for True Liberation, n. d. (1994), 6-9: "A PAC government will not buy our land from the settlers - the settlers bought no land from our people" (p.8).

79. Affirmative action within the civil service might involve transferring senior administrators from homeland services to central government; it need not require external recruitment. The ANC and other mainly black political organisations have sent small batches of their members to the British Civil Service College (the Star, 31 October, 1993) but the scale of this exercise suggests that political leaders expect that new appointments and overhaul of leadership will be made quite slowly ("Civil service change to be slow but sure", The Star, 11 November, 1993). Two developments might change this: resistance to reform amongst middle echelon bureaucrats and pressure from within the ANC's own ranks by its recently acquired supporters and allies in homeland administrations. Black business elites have also adopted a fairly restrained policy to affirmative action. The Black Management Forum, for example, wants blacks to hold 30 per cent of senior management posts by the year 2,000 (Sunday Times, 14 November, 1993). Foreign investors, especially American corporations, may feel compelled to adopt more ambitious targets. Even moderate quotas, though, may encourage white managers to leave the country in large numbers. Certain companies have already reserved whole levels of employment for blacks only and whites are "increasingly being relegated to contract or temporary employment" (The Star, 24 August, 1993, 7).

80. For detailed reports of an extensive investigation of youth attitudes see The Star, 21 May, 1993, 11. Survey evidence suggests that youths comprise a considerably larger proportion of the PAC's support than in the case of the other major political parties (see: [redacted] The First Election: Baseline Survey Report, Johannesburg, October 1993, "Party Strength in Age Sectors".

81. Kaizer Nyatsumba, "Bitter Harvest", Towards Democracy, 3, 1993, 20-27.

82. Albie Sachs, "Towards a Bill of Rights in a Democratic South Africa", paper presented at an ANC seminar on constitutional guidelines, Lusaka, March, 1988, 4.

83. Przeworski, Adam, 1986: "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy" in O Donnel, et al, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Volume 1, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 59. Przeworski's argument is that institutional guarantees, involving political procedures and processes (proportional representation, for example) can be quite effective in protecting interests without offending democratic principles in the way that substantive guarantees would.

84. Most recent opinion polls include those published in The Star, February 4, 1994 and the Sunday Times, 16 January, 1994.

85. See Joe Slovo on the need for a period of "maximum togetherness" in David Breier, "Parliament's Acts of Faith", Sunday Star, 7 November, 1993, p. 6.

86. For discussion of the threat posed by right wing armies: Tom Lodge, "Extra Military Armed Formations and Civilian Political Violence", South African Defence Review, Institute for Defence Policy, 15, March 1994.

87. Huntington, Samuel P, 1991: The Third Wave: prospects for Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London, 260.

88. On the possibilities of constructing "some form of social democratic corporatism", see Stadler, A W, 1993: "Political Economy of Post Apartheid South Africa" in A Johnston, S Shezi, and G Bradshaw (eds.), Constitution-Making in the New South Africa, Leicester University Press, 132-133; Maree, Johann, 1993: "Trade Unions and Corporatism in South Africa", Transformation, 21, 25-54. Ironically, given union antipathy to cartels, it may be more difficult to develop corporate decision making structures in an economy in which ownership is more diversified.

89. The classic work in this genre is Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some social requisites for democracy", American Political Science Review, 1959. A recent study in this vein which suggests a correlation between democracy and external economic dependency is Alex Hadenius, Democracy and Development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

90. Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture", American Political Science Review, 1988, 82, 4, 1220.

91. Stephens, John, 1984: "Democratic transition and breakdown in Europe. 1870-1939: a test of the Moore thesis",American Journal of Sociology, 94, 5.

92. Huntington, Samuel P, 1991: The Third Wave: Prospects for Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University

of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London, 65.

93. Huntington, 1991: The Third Wave, 98.

94. Bilahari Kausikan has argued that East Asian countries would not be enjoying their current economic success if they had not experienced the authoritarian administration of a "communitarian" social system (Foreign Policy, 1993, 92). Another member of Singapore's government has written about the "inherent gridlock" of American democracy as a barrier to effective economic policies (Mahbubhani, Kishore, 1993, "The Dangers of Decadence" Foreign Affairs, September, 15).

95. Pourgerami, Abbas, 1991: Development and Democracy in the Third World, Westview Press, Boulder, 10.

96. Barrington Moore's The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Beacon Press, Boston, 1966) remains the most powerful statement of the argument that liberal democracy under Third World conditions may constitute a barrier to economic and social development.

97. Pourgerami, 1991: Development and Democracy in the Third World, 71-72.

98. Herbst, Jeffery, 1990: "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa", World Development, 18, 7, 949-958.

99. Ake, Claude, 1991: "Rethinking African Democracy", Journal of Democracy, 2, 1, 37.