Dissertation submitted in full requirements for a Master of Arts Degree

International Relations Department

School of Social Sciences

Faculty of Humanities

University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa's Economic Foreign Policy: A Study of Slow Maturation

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Why Does South Africa Have a Slowly Maturing Economic Foreign Policy Between 1994 and 2018?

C2 General

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my mother, Mrs. F.R. Nemalili who has always and unconditionally, given me the advise of a lifetime: "*Be educated!*". These words echo into eternity in my mind and in my heart. In no particular order, I am deeply humbled and honoured to have people that extended their unwavering and steadfast support for me, in word and in deed, on this journey: Mr. Themba Kinana, Mrs. Leverne Le Pere, Mrs. Matilda Esi Aryitey, Mr. Fabrice Beya, Mr. Khwezi Ziqubu, Mrs. Phuthi Mahanyele-Dabengwa and my dearest brothers Mr. N.B. Nemalili, Mr. M. Nemalili and Mr. P. Nemalili, I love you dearly. To my supervisor, Dr. Tshepo Gwatiwa, thank you for the challenges, discussions, time, excellent intellect and most importantly, your resolute support. I have gained exceptional advisory and fellowship from you.

Eternally Grateful.

Soli Deo Gloria!

ABSTRACT

In the international environment, all state relations are guided by a foreign policy that conveys what a state intends to achieve through its relations with other states. Foreign policy is the means used to express a state's national interests internationally to other states whilst executing on its domestic policy making, strategies and decisions. Therefore, foreign policy is the translation of domestic national interests to an international audience for engagement. However, national interests vary according to what the state aims to fulfil abroad. They could be economic, social, security, political interests. Nevertheless, it remains critical that economic interests have always dominated the international relations arena. Thus, a convergence of foreign policy and domestic economic policy of a state are crucial for its international success that contributes to its economic growth within and beyond its borders. This convergence produces an economic foreign policy. An economic foreign policy then guides the decisions of policymakers and diplomatic practices of the state bureaucracy in achieving the state's national interests abroad.

The presence of an economic foreign policy in a state is important because decisions that different actors (state and non-state) make in the international environment have to be accounted for and guided by a policy in order to understand the reasoning and logic behind them. The absence of an economic foreign policy enables a state to operate on an ad hoc decision-making basis in the international environment and with outcomes whose impact cannot be measured nor monitored by the state itself or other states intending to form economic relations with it. South Africa, with its economic interests, goals and a foreign policy, has not yet produced a coherent, codified and well-expressed economic foreign policy for an international audience. Whilst the country has relevant actors and the right processes to produce an economic foreign policy, it has not brought one into maturity through the consolidation and unification of foreign and economic policies of the state. This is due to several domestic conditions in policy making, decisions and processes that prohibit the realisation of an economic foreign policy.

It is in these domestic foreign and economic policy making environments that the enquiry of this study is found to reveal the reasons why South Africa has not had a matured economic foreign policy since the new democratic dispensation of 1994.

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

USA – United State of America

UK – United Kingdom

DTIC – Department of Trade, Industry and Competition

DIRCO – Department of International Relations and Cooperation

NEDLAC - National Economic Development and Labour Council

DPME – Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

ANC – African National Congress

COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions

SACP – South African Communist Party

FPA – Foreign Policy Analysis

BRICS - Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IPAP – Industry Policy Action Plans

DA – Democratic Alliance

UDM – United Democratic Front

NLM – National Liberation Movement

NDR – National Democratic Revolution

SACOIR - South African Council on International Relations

NPC – National Planning Commission

BUSA – Business Unity South Africa

BLSA – Business Leadership South Africa

NDP2030 – National Development Plan 2030

DPRU - Development Policy Research Unit

SARB – South African Reserve Bank

DFA – Department of Foreign Affairs

DTI – Department of Trade and Industry

RDP – Reconstruction and Development Plan

WTO – World Trade Organization

AGOA – African Growth and Opportunities Act

NEC – National Executive Committee

NWC – National Working Committee

GNU – Government of National Unity

UN – United National

OAU – Organization of African Unity

SADC – Southern African Development Community

NAM – Non-Aligned Movement

EU – European Union

SAP's – Structural Adjustment Programs

GEAR - Growth, Employment, and Redistribution

ASGISA - Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa

CEC – Central Executive Committee

EFF – Economic Freedom Fighters

SAIIA - South African Institute of International Affairs

IGD – International Global Dialogue

TAC – Treatment Action Campaign

HIV – Human Immunodeficiency Virus

AIDS – Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

PCAS - Policy Coordination and Advisory Service

DEL - Department of Employment and Labour

BBC - Black Business Chamber

NP – National Party

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

PFMA – Public Finance Management Act

SONA – State of The Nation Address

MP – Member of Parliament

MPR - Ministerial Review Panel

PAC - Pan African Congress of Azania

NGP – New Growth Path

Chapter 1: The Comprehensive International Role of Foreign Policy

On 27 March 2017, former President Jacob Zuma abruptly recalled former Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, during an investor roadshow abroad, citing classified intelligence information. The roadshow included South Africa's biggest trade partners, the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK). At that time, the country's economy was not performing well and needed partnerships, re-investments, and the establishment of new international economic relations (Reuters, 2017). The most logical means to account for such a sudden decision was to refer to South Africa's foreign policy and its interpretation of economic relationships and pursuits with other states. This did not bode well on the market as the rand fell more than three percent (3%) following this decision (CNBC, 2017). Hudson argues that actors' singular and collective decisions, guided by a state's foreign policy, should be analysed to understand international relations (Hudson, 2005:1).

As South Africa's currency was also impacted due to the international community's reaction, there was no substantial policy-based account for why the President, as the chief custodian of foreign policy, took such a decision. Furthermore, there were no recorded consultative efforts between the Presidency, parliament, affected departments, political parties, and relevant non-state stakeholders – such as the business community who would accompany state actors to such international visits, too (Maynier, 2017). South Africa's economic partners were left with no answers or policy that could salvage the disappointment of being left without engaging with South Africa's national interests through Gordhan and his delegation in order to enhance economic relations. Singer upholds that a systemic analysis of domestic foreign policy in international relations would explain the decision-making, policy predictability, and reliability of actors (Singer, 1961:80).

In the South African case, no economic foreign policy adequately offered the predictability needed to its foremost international relations partners. Therefore, a probe in the domestic policymaking process of foreign and economic policy is essential to guide decision-making for any actor and establish frameworks in the domestic structures that enable a foreign policy and all relevant subset policies that can effectively engage and impact the economy internationally. That would create an international environment where South Africa's national interests, through an economic foreign policy, can be explained, predicted, and are reliable – especially where the economy is concerned.

Problem Statement

Observations from South Africa's Foreign Policy White Paper of 2011, government departments, parliamentary portfolio committees, academia and the press suggest that South Africa does not have a codified and well-expressed economic foreign policy. They render a fragmented tapestry of economic preferences in the foreign policy dimension, assembled by actors through structures in another fragmented tapestry of policymaking and decision-making. The process of making an economic foreign policy has faced various challenges that have impeded its development and maturity. A mature economic foreign policy defines and clear expresses a state's economic growth goals that must be achieved in the international arena. It also quantifies what these goals are and coherently expresses with whom (other states), through which means (organizations and institutions) will these goals be achieves; whilst giving an account of the rationale (political and economic) of the state's intent in doing so.

According to Marie Muller (Muller, 2002:1-2), a bureaucratic rivalry between the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the Department of Trade Industry and Competition (DTIC) for predominance in economic diplomacy undermines South Africa's ability to create a coherent economic foreign policy. Richard Calland (Calland, 1999:71) argues that parliamentary portfolio committees have become "rubber stamps" for the majority party in parliament. Statutory institutions such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), established to be a platform where multisectoral stakeholders express their policy inputs, have weakened due to a proliferation of actors therein (Makokera, 2015:119). This fragmented tapestry leaves South Africa without an international economic foreign policy that represents its national interests.

Moreover, bureaucrats in directly impact departments such as DIRCO, DTIC and professionals who can enrich foreign policymaking are excluded, abandoning the opportunities to bring more value to state policies altogether. Finally, state foreign and economic policies are influenced by socialist and communist political ideologies that hinder the adoption of more comprehensive and nuanced economic foreign policies (Southall, 2005:64-66). A mature foreign policy and all relevant subset policies that converge into foreign policy outside South Africa are hindered by this disintegrated domestic environment. Five (5) new economic strategic plans were adopted frequently under different administrations, creating policy challenges that a young South African state and economy may have struggled to meet (Department of Economic Development, 2010). Between 1994 and 2018, the South African government has on average changed its economic strategic policy framework every five years and six months. Consequently, government departments, policymakers, the business sector, and social partners had to respond to these strategic frameworks by triggering correspondent policymaking and alignment processes. That alignment process has not been enough to keep up with the frequent policy changes at national level. This slow alignment causes different actors to deliberate and make decisions on different state platforms, trying to craft non-convergent policies and attract international actors into relations with South Africa. Thus, conditions such as fragmentation, rapidly changing policy frameworks, actors with divergent economic preferences or interests, and state institutions that are disconnected hinder policy maturity.

Research Question and Hypothesis

The foregoing puzzle leads to the following research question: **Why does South Africa have a slowly maturing economic foreign policy?** The secondary questions are: What domestic agents (actors) are involved in economic foreign policymaking? How far reaching is their influence on policy outcomes? What institutional and structural environment(s), both economic and political, do these domestic agents interact in to make economic foreign policy? What impact do those domestic actors have on the structures as well?

Posing these questions helps identify and map actors and processes of economic and foreign policymaking. This entails mainly domestic environment of the entire process. This study will investigate and answer these questions.

Hypothetical Argument

The [informed] hypothesis of this study is that South Africa's economic foreign policy has matured at a slow pace due to five observed challenges. These most prevalent challenges create a policymaking environment that hinders a coherent and well-expressed economic foreign policy meant for the state's international relations.

The first challenge is the DIRCO-DTIC bureaucratic tension, where departmental rivalry, efforts and operational fluidity impede on economic and diplomatic efforts. This harms South Africa's international reputation by pitting its economic and foreign policies against each other. Second is the politicisation of the domestic policymaking process. The political process that precedes parliament's proportional representation also affects policy decision-making within portfolio committees, accountability towards the executive, and policy proposals that emanate from there. The third is the exclusion of critical actors from the domestic policymaking process. It refers to minority political parties being excluded from policy decision-making by the majority party in parliament; diplomatic professionals being overlooked for political appointments at the diplomatic corps; and the state being unable to attract the right talent to anchor policy functions across the board. Fourth, is the proliferation of (individual) actors and structures that influence the policymaking process. There are various state institutions of policy input, beyond the state and its statutory bodies such as NEDLAC, departmental advisory councils, think-tanks, and additional policy planning ministries such as the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME). Lastly, there are the influences of ideologies on domestic policymaking process. The tripartite alliance[1] of the ANC, COSATU, SACP has significantly influenced the government's economic framework. Between 1994 and 2018, these five challenges have had the greatest impact on South Africa's inability to develop a unified and well-coordinated economic foreign policy. These are foreign policy's significant contributors and their ability to command and input economic components into foreign policy is important.

Significance of Study

Due to its empirical analysis and findings of economic and foreign policy making from literature and interviews, this study is on the periphery of traditional international relations theories. This research contributes to a niche and emerging field of foreign policy that examines the domestic environment, processes, institutions, and actors of economic and foreign policy making. It explains into what economic foreign policies of middle power states fail or succeed and why they produce economic foreign policy the way they do. Most importantly, it reveals policymaking areas that may need restructuring or review, especially with states like South Africa, which still need to increase their economic growth efforts abroad. In turn, that would assist all stakeholders involved to improve the process of both economic and foreign policy making altogether.

[1] African National Congress (ANC), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and South African Communist Party (SACP) alliance established in February 1990 to create one representative voice of the black population.

Variables

This study uses policymaking structures and actors as independent variables. Both these independent variables will illuminate why economic foreign policy, the dependent variable, is observed in the manner in which it is in South Africa.

Foreign Policy as A Prelude To Economic Foreign Policy: A Synthetic Conceptual Framework

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) followed decades of broad theories on how to analyse interactions and decisions of states in the international arena (Bojang, 2018:1-2). One of the key characteristics of FPA is that it views the account of foreign policy decision-making as having multiple factors (multifactorial) and multiple examinable variables (multicausal) from multiple levels of analysis (multilevel). This multiverse offering many areas of analysis is good as it allows studies to analyse multi-disciplinary literature. However, complex this multiverse is, the analysis of this study is located in two places: structures of foreign policy making that involve processes, and actors that interact through state and non-state structural processes (Hudson, 2005:3). It is the intention of this study to establish a pattern of analysis in two ways: firstly, structures whose processes are not aligned to how state policy is produced (economic or political), and secondly, actors whose participation in decision and policy making impact the system differently from the intended outcomes.

According to Bojang, George Modelski defined foreign policy not only as the behaviour of one state to another, but also as a system of activities evolved by various actors for changing the behaviour of other states and adapt their own activities to the international environment (Bojang, 2018:1). Bojang described foreign policy as an ever-changing linkage between domestic and international politics. He added that sometimes one may take precedence over the other. Foreign policy is the means used to express a state's national interests internationally to other states whilst executing on its domestic policy making, strategies and decisions. Therefore, foreign policy is the translation of domestic national interests to an international audience for engagement. However, economics always intersect these two arenas. Therefore, the convergence of the economic and political in the international arena produces an economic foreign policy that contributes to a state's economic growth. Economic foreign policy is a unification of strategic cross-sectoral policies in the economic sector, given an international platform and audience through foreign policy relations.

South Africa does not have such a policy coded and expressed in written form, but there are a number of domestic policies and structures in existence that form the basis of its existence. South Africa's geo-political position in the international relations arena has been cited as that of a developing middle power based on its economic (mainly trade) activities with the rest of the global community (Bischoff, 2003:183-184). Notwithstanding such contextualisation, the country's position in the world has largely been a result of its continuous economic activities and how these have contributed to its economic growth since the new dispensation of 1994. Consequently, this elicits an enquiry on the level of maturity of its economic foreign policy and the structures and actors who enable its constant engagement with the domestic and international world.

Moravscik argued that foreign policy can never be understood outside of domestic interests, where actors and policy influencers express their preferences through various forms and channels (Moravscik, 1997:514-515). Thus, understanding the actors and institutional processes that produce these domestic economic preferences that become part of the state's broader economic foreign policy mandate requires investigating the domestic environment of economic and foreign policymaking. South Africa's supposed economic foreign policy is a loose amalgamation of interests expressed by different agents (government, businesses, domestic and international groups, civil groups and many more organisational formations) through state structures into state policy.

According to Dahl and Lindblom, South Africa's pluralistic approach in foreign policy has yielded positive outcomes[2] in several cases of conflict resolution within the African continent (Bischoff, 2003:184). This pluralist approach that began with the democratic transition through a consultative approach of political process inclusiveness, which is now state foreign policy, may have enriched international representation but not necessarily made the process of creating a coherent economic foreign policy seamless and fluent. Dahl and Lindblom argue that this pluralistic approach fuels the observed disintegration of domestic economic goals and how they are pursued abroad. This requires an analytical investigation to identify where in the process things go wrong. South Africa's foreign policyapproach has been underpinned by state actors working independently – in competition or in an uncoordinated manner – followed by inputs from non-state actors that were not embedded in normative and specifically frequent inputs

[2] Democratic Republic of Congo's MUNESCO Peacekeeping Mission, Abacha's Nigeria, Mozambique, Angola, Zaire–DRC and Burundi, Sudan.

into domestic economic preference processes. Thus, this study defines slow maturity as issues of concern that are not producing a codified and well-expressed economic foreign policy.

Definitions and Operationalisation of Concepts

Foreign Policy, A Precursor and Guide To The Practice of Diplomacy

In undertaking interviews in a field of foreign policy with limited literature, the answers tended to retreat to areas of the respondents' expert practice or knowledge, often relating to economic diplomacy. Therefore, this study had to often contextualise the difference between some common themes that fall under the foreign policy domain of international relations. Firstly, defining economic diplomacy as it was confused with economic foreign policy: that economic diplomacy is a practice derived from predefined foreign policy objectives in a state's economic domain. Csabay correctly defined economic diplomacy as a foreign policy practice and strategy that uses economic instruments to achieve foreign policy objectives (Csabay, 2019:432). This makes economic diplomacy a subset practice of economic foreign policy, amongst practices such as public diplomacy, trade, investments and many more. The policy informs and guides the practice. Subsequently, it also elevated economic foreign policy from subset policies like trade or industrial policies. Other policies such as state security also take a subset role to foreign policy in the international arena because whilst foreign policy is viewed as a policy to mainly enable economic growth, it also has other key strategic areas of the state to attend to. Therefore, in this study, economic foreign policy is not a practice but it is a policy that informs holistic economic strategy, goals, and practice of the state to an international audience.

Charles Chatterjee defined economic diplomacy as the practice not only concerned with providing negotiating techniques during trade exchanges and investments but also with the development of policy framework in addressing the international community (Chatterjee, 2020:v-vi). Therefore, the insights from economic diplomacy as a practice can influence foreign policymaking in the domestic environment. Economic foreign policy evolves as an administration integrates economic diplomacy into foreign policy. Thus, economic diplomacy in this study is not equated to economic foreign policy because it is a practice and not policy.

Political diplomacy anchors its practice on illustrating the character of a particular state. Gregory defines political diplomacy as "*an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilise actions to advance their* *interests and values*" (Gregory, 2011:353). Gregory's definition also centres on what a state's political identity is and what political ideology couples this identity. Thus, depending on what the states national interests are beyond its borders, it can employ political or economic diplomacy (simultaneously or one preceding the other) to advance its national interests in the international relations environment.

A Pluralistic Approach to Policymaking: Numerous Actors, Structures and A Diversity of Interests

Nuechterlein defines national interests as "*the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment*" (Nuechterlein, 1976:247). These perceived needs come from political decisions that bring together domestic actors to compromise and consolidate the state's best interests. He further argues that national interests are vast and not only found in one domain of the state: interests such as economic, defence, world order, and ideological interests are important national interests, amongst others (Nuechterlein, 1976:248).

Moravscik's definition of interests is when "*representative institutions and practices constitute the critical 'transmission belt' by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy*" (Moravscik, 1997:518). Thus, government policy is shaped by the interests and power of individuals and groups (both inside and outside the institutionalized state), who interact with state structures and policymakers to implement their economic preferences (Moravscik, 1997:518). Therefore, in the context of this study, economic preferences are those which state and non-state actors express as part of the process of economic foreign policymaking.

Dahl and Lindblom asked the following question: '*what are the conditions under which numerous individuals can maximise the attainment of their goals through the use of social mechanisms?*' (Dahl and Lindblom, 1976:xiv). Positing that the decision making that occurs in a democracy within government's framework is not made by the state only but also by non-state groups that use their influence and resources to affect the states' decision making. This is their analysis of pluralism in a democratic society. Cleaveland also cited Dahl and Lindblom's explanation of pluralism in a democracy as "*the important task of appraising basic social processes for economic planning*" (Cleaveland, 1954:387). Cleaveland agrees with Dahl and Lindblom that the state provides the political platforms and processes for political participation. However, those with unequal economic resources enter this domain and significantly influence state decision-making. They economise a political process, which he refers to as '*economisation*' (Cleaveland, 1954:387). Contrarily, in South Africa's case, the political government formation politicises the economic process that should produce economic foreign policy. For a process that ought to have a balance between political aspirations for citizens and practical economic policies & application, South Africa leans towards the former in its foreign policy approach.

Research Design and Methodological Orientation

This study is a single case study analysis with South Africa's economic foreign policy as the unit of analysis. It is a longitudinal study where variables are observed and analysed over a period of twenty-four (24) years between 1994 and 2018 (George and Bennett, 2005:82). The method of analysis focuses on actors to understand their decision-making and the practices in which they embark to contribute and participate in economic foreign policymaking. It also examines how a policy is conceived, promulgated, and implemented in the international relations domain. This method of following how policy is made and the structures it flows through allows the detection of where the root causes of misalignment are with actors or the structures they operate in. Experiences that are both logical and supported by knowledge are best for study analysis (Jackson, 2011:50-51). Knowledge derived from literature and interviews must present evidence in thereal world for a sufficient analysis. Consequently, every experience recollected by interview subjects was able to give an aggregated view of the study's enquiry into South Africa's economic foreign policy (Jackson, 2011:59).

This method of researching and recording collective experiences over several years yields enough iterations of the observed challenges to analyse. It also tests the applicability of this body of work to the real world – which is the ultimate test for any academic work. The aim of this method is to give balance between written and experiential knowledge participating in complementary roles of the empirical nature of this study.

Data Collection

Desktop research and interviews were the main tools for data collection, analysis, and documentation. This was because this research focused on the structure-agent approach which gives an account on economic interest decisions, which affected foreign policy, were made within institutions and by people, thereby justifying the study's observed experience in decision-making as well (Peters and Fontaine, 2020:5). Sampling of relevant information came from official state documents emanating from Presidential strategic plans, parliamentary portfolio committee reports, DIRCO foreign policy documents and reports (including special reports), and DTIC trade agreements (including other relevant ministries). Additional sources of information included official speeches, organisational position papers of entities like the ANC (and opposition political parties), COSATU, SACP, business sector positions, NEDLAC, media publications and most importantly academic analysis.

This study also collected data through interviews. Each interview was digitally recorded and transcribed. After transcription, themes were compiled for qualitative analysis using NVivo software. The interviews included semi-structured and open-ended questions that required participants to reflect on their professional experiences. This approach ensured coherence in the information from both the semi-structured and open-ended questions. Most interviews began with the question "*Is there an economic foreign policy in South Africa?*". The questionnaire was aimed at former and current politburo at DIRCO, DTIC (ambassadors, chief directors, directors, trade attaches, trade policy personnel), any other government-based institutions such as parliament, political parties, academics, business leaders and advisory personnel (mainly economic) to government who frequently engage with the state on economic foreign policy matters. These views informed state approaches and broadened state domestic economic preferences.

Data Validity and Analysis

Bailey claimed that data validity had two characteristics. Firstly, the methods of data analysis and collection needed to substantially provide data that can be analysed for all the themes of enquiry; secondly, the accuracy of information needed to permeate through the research narrative (Bailey, 1982: 68). This study relied on data collected from the South African government, parliamentary portfolio committees, political parties, statutory bodies, credible online academic resources by the university and other publishers, and interviews conducted. That ensured data integrity. The data analysis required inspecting, decluttering, transforming, and modelling data, especially from interviews, to find useful information, suggest deductions, and support conclusions (Manheim, 2014).

Then the data was categorised into thematic categories, manually analysed, and qualitatively coded in NVivo. These thematic areas were identified and used according to the variables in this study; dependant variable being economic foreign policy formulation and independent variables being actors and the interactive structural processes thereof. The shift in economic preferences of state, semi-state, and non-state actors between 1994 and 2018 became a crucial intervening variable.

Chapter 2: The "Transmission Belt" of Economic Foreign Policy Making

The Agents of Economic Foreign Policy Making

There are several actors that have a significant impact on economic foreign policy because of their participation and influence in the economy. State actors have the most significant decision-making power in the economy because policy making is accorded to them by the constitution. The executive, ministers and ultimately the President. Political actors influence policy making their participation in political and legislative process in parliament, mainly political parties. Technocrats such as advisors and organizations that have direct input into policy making will be elaborated on in this section. Lastly, the business sector on its own and through organizing itself makes inputs into both economic and foreign policy making.

State Actors

According to Birkland, state actors are official actors in public policymaking because the law or constitution gives them power to make and enforce policies (Birkland, 2016:108). These state actors are the ones that bear the responsibility to practice economic foreign policy. Every Presidency begins with a strategic plan stating domestic economic priorities. The most influential agent in the process of foreign policy making, delivering political visions and economic strategic plans, is the presidency, which occurs in the beginning of every administration[3]. Consequently, domestic economic preferences from various inputting agents tend to gravitate towards the incumbent president's or leadership figure's vision to keep up with their relevance in the foreign policy value chain. This has been another undermining factor in policymaking, because the gravitation of foreign policy towards an incumbent President instead of separating political and bureaucratic influences on policy contributes to a schizophrenic policy altogether (Muresan, 2019:63-65). Under Nelson Mandela's tenure

[3] 1994 – 2005 (Under President Mandela): RDP = Reconstruction and Development Programme in 1994; GEAR = Growth Employment and Redistribution in 1996; 2005 – 2010 (Under President Mbeki): ASGISA = Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa in 2005; 2010 – 2018 (Under President Zuma): NGP = New Growth Path in 2010, NDP = National Development Plan in 2013.

(1994-1999), South Africa regained its membership and admission into crucial multilateral organisations and institutions, for expression of its economic interests internationally (South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, 1996). This was influenced by Mandela's global leadership and popularity. During Thabo Mbeki's presidency (1999 – 2008), policies that responded positively to international development (non-state) actors such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)[4] were put in place due to his specific foundations in the study of economics and his presidency's proactive role and activities in economic diplomacy (Evans, 1999:625-628). When Jacob Zuma came into power (2009 - 2018), an emphasis on south-to-south economic relations or diplomacy was augmented and seen through South Africa's membership in the emerging economies Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) formation (Shoba, 2018:173-174). Zuma, through his history in the ANC, had past affiliations with countries like Russia and China – whose mode of governance are still communist leaning and against a unipolar global world. This study will examine whether the economic foreign policy process kept pace with presidents and their economic strategies over time.

As President's are elected in consecutive administrations, they are also elected alongside ministries in respective government departments that are responsible for executing economic foreign policy, led by ministers. These ministers have always emerged from the ruling party, as it has maintained a significant majority of members in parliament eligible to become ministers. Firstly, DIRCO periodically releases white papers and reviews on foreign policy as the "*principal adviser on foreign policy issues*" (SA Foreign Policy White Paper, 2011). These policy publications communicate government's strategic approaches to matters of foreign policy. The last paper to-date (2022) to have been produces was the White Paper of 2011 by DIRCO, economic diplomacy was translated by the approach of South Africa being open to do business with all continents of the world. The White Paper then mentioned that "e*ffective policy development is essential for the survival and prosperity of any country in the global system*" whilst the policy paper is dated in 2011 and no subsequent policy updates have been developed points to a stagnant policy development process(SA Foreign Policy White Paper, 2011). On the other hand, DTIC claims to have the mandate of enabling a globally competitive South African economy through trade agreements. These trade agreements are realised through bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, Industrial Policy Action Plans (IPAP's), and domestic industry specific master plans (Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, 2021). What

[4] And their Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP's).

remains unclear between these sister departments is which one is responsible for (producing) economic foreign policy. If it cannot be located in one department, then what and where their responsibilities lie in the process of economic foreign policy making is worth questioning.

In parliament are portfolio committees whose members are representatives of political parties that have won sufficient votes to represent their constituencies therein (Parliament of South Africa, 2022). These committees, as legislative arms, are platforms of proposed policy consideration, accountability and oversight on the work done by their equivalent department in the executive of government. A special focus will be placed on the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and the Portfolio Committee on Trade, industry and Competition. This study will focus on how they have interacted with policymaking through bills (proposed policies) that needed their scrutiny from 1994 to 2018, including committee internal interactions.

Political Actors

The ANC-COSATU-SACP tripartite alliance also influences South Africa's foreign policy in a process that involves politically appointed advisors and councils The ANC anchored itself as a National Liberation Movement (NLM) ascended into the arena of state governance; it sees itself as a party for all South Africans, aiming to provide a "*Better Future For All*" (African National Congress, 2022). COSATU, as the biggest organisation that provides affiliation for trade unions, places emphasis on labour public policy and its effects on the workplace conditions of working-class citizens (COSATU, 2022). The SACP promotes Marxist-Leninist political thought – the alliance's political ideology (SACP, 2022). Having joined forces towards the ending of the apartheid government, the tripartite alliance set itself on becoming the most influential grouping in South African politics in the new dispensation. This formation has had a turbulent journey since 1994 based on ideological differences, the dominance of the ruling party, undermining of the partnership, economic policy inconsistencies and fundamental divergence in the founding principles of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) (Nzimande, 2006). This turbulence has had an impact on policy contributions towards South Africa's economic foreign policy.

Technocratic Actors and Organisations

In support of government actors are specialised technical actors referred to as advisors who are contracted by the state to provide advisory services on policy and decision making. They sit on various direct or adjacent structures such as commissions or councils on specific (economic) topics or general advisory platforms. For example, in 2015, DIRCO established a commission called the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) comprised of members of academia, labour, business and civil society to tackle foreign policy issues at DIRCO. Another advisory body was launched at the same time, made of former ambassadors, high commissioners and heads of missions of South Africa to other countries (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2015). The DTIC is an active government department at NEDLAC where businesses, labour and civil society sectors converge to discuss domestic economic policy. In this platform, economic interests of represented sectors are discussed, deliberated and translated to trade agreements in bilateral agreements with other countries, multilateral organisations and institutions (such as the World Trade Organization, African Union, BRICS, and others). Within the DTIC are advisors for different economic themes, whilst its parliamentary committee also has technical advisors (Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, 2022). The Presidency has had advisors and specific commissions over the years looking into focused areas of economic strategies, policies and approaches – such as the National Planning Commission (NPC), special economic envoys, amongst others. The list of advisory platforms and bodies supporting government is endless, but the effectiveness, consistency and policy-producing outcomes of these bodies is limited. This study envisions these advisors and councils with their own value in policy making, however their standing roles as policy advisors and making impeded on the roles of bureaucratic policy making staff members in government departments.

Moreover, these government agents engage with stakeholders that come from various sectors in the economy at NEDLAC – a statutory, pluralistic platform of multi-stakeholder engagement (NEDLAC, 1995). They also engage with the same stakeholders at different times and for different reasons, mostly to advance domestic economic preferences of various actors outside the state. This pluralistic approach in domestic foreign policy making is anchored on the inclusion of all relevant agents in economic foreign policy making. On the other hand, it reveals the multilevel, multisectoral and eventual proliferation of agents involved in the state's economic foreign policy. This complication tends to also be institutionalised as foreign policy making goes through layers of decision making in government departments, their advisors and adjacent policy engagement platforms such as NEDLAC. As inputting agents are changed, especially government agents with every administration, so does the foreign policy making process. That weakens the stability of functional processes of policy making domestically – ultimately undermining the stability and maturity of an economic foreign policy.

Business and Corporate Sector

Business has also played a unique role in shaping South Africa's main drivers of economic growth, especially in influencing economic investments and foreign policy. South Africa went from an economy that relied on non-renewables to an economy underpinned by a globally competitive and highly sophisticated financial and business services sector (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur and Ncube, 2014:3-5). Thus, Standard Bank, Shoprite, Vodacom, MTN, State Owned Enterprises, and other multinational companies demonstrate South Africa's business strength. Beyond NEDLAC, there are additional business platforms such as Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) and Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA) whose mandates respectively serves different business fraternities in Sub-Saharan Africa and domestically (BUSA and BLSA, 2021). The business sector does not postpone its investment policies and strategies in other countries for correspondent and favourable foreign policy from government. This makes South Africa's economic foreign policy lag behind business strategies and also risk an economic policy that is more reactionary than proactively.

Overall, there are a lot more agents or actors that this study can highlight. However, in the interest of a focused and coherent study, the above actors will be at the forefront of this study's enquiry.

The Structures of Economic Foreign Policy Making

Ham and Hill define policy in its base form as moving from a normative output of a political system to policy as a process that brings certain principles or ideas into practice (Ham and Hill, 1993). This definition illustrates the state's constant challenge of integrating in the domestic setting the ideologies of agents whose inputs produce economic foreign policy. For example, agents such as businesses may follow different economic principles than the state whose principles are broader than the pursuit of annual increased revenues. This presents a tug of war on which ideologies dominate or mostly influence the process of foreign policy making – prohibiting the state from presenting a single coherent ideology-based document that codifies its economic foreign policy. To this end, Ranson defines the purpose of governments' policies as being to '*codify and publicise the values that are to inform future practice and thus encapsulate prescriptions for reform*' (Ranson, 1995:440).

Chapter 7 of the National Development Plan (NDP 2030) of the National Planning Commission stated that: "*Because of this, foreign relations with African states are often tentative, with policymakers vacillating between leading and muddling through on issues of integration and cooperation*" (NDP 2030, 2011:239), referring to South Africa's policymakers having not acquired a full grasp on policymaking whilst they focus on functional issues.

On the other hand, economic visions such as the NDP 2030 promulgated from the presidency through the technocratic National Planning Commission would write down economic goals the state wishes to take over a long term and various sectors would respond accordingly. However, multilevel and multisector state processes should be triggered to produce subsequent thematic policies (foreign, monetary, fiscal, and more). For example, after the Finance Ministry's budget speech, it is clear who the agents are and the structures that determine a process of aligning fiscal policy. Furthermore, because of the direct relationship with the central South African Reserve Bank (SARB)[5], the processes of monetary policy and repo rate changes are also triggered when necessary[6]. This relationship may be closest illustration to what this study is advocating for between mainly the Presidency, DIRCO, DTIC, Parliament amongst other actors – a fluent, correspondent and proactive relationship whose processes swiftly attends to any state promulgations, external or international market forces, and economic visions the state wishes to achieve in the short, medium or long terms. These plural nodes (micro, macro, sectoral, country wide and global) of economic foreign policy input help represent various economic contributors within the state. The Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) of economic policy making and socio-economic research sums it up as follows: "*The process of economic reform began in 1994 with the transition to democracy, but structural transformation still has a long way to go*" (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur and Ncube, 2014:13). The DPRU asserted that, as actors came and went (government officials, business leaders, businesses, social organizations, etc.), and with new industries forming rapidly, the structures in place may not have reformed at the same rate to keep up with the policy making processes required to service new economic foreign policy objectives of the state.

[5] The role of SARB is to serve the economic well-being of South Africans through maintaining price and financial stability; and to protect the value of the currency in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth. https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/about-us

[6] The SARB uses interest rates to influence the level of inflation. National Treasury, in consultation with the SARB, sets the inflation target, which acts as a benchmark against which price stability is measured. The SARB then independently makes monetary policy so as to achieve this target. https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/what-we-do/monetary policy#:~:text=The%20SARB%20uses%20interest%20rates,as%20to%20achieve%20this%20target.

An illustration borrowed from Qobo and Dube regarding South Africa's increasing its economic diplomacy strength "*would require better coordination across the different agencies dealing with economic issues, enhanced interaction with industry and improved technical capacity within the foreign ministry to drive economic diplomacy*" (Qobo and Dube, 2015:8). They highlight several issues along the policymaking process pertaining to coordination, agencies dealing with economic issues, technical capacity within the foreign ministry (and the trade and industry ministry), and the driving of economic diplomacy.

Figure 1

Foreign Policy Making in South Africa, adapted (reproduced) from Carlsneas and Nel, 2006:45.



Carlsneas and Nel illustrated the area where the "*black box*" is located in the foreign policy making process in South Africa. They argued that, whilst the state has clearly defined processes and structures in which a foreign policy goes through, there is a "*black box*" whose impact on foreign policy making adversely impacts the entire formalised process (Carlsneas and Nel, 2006:45). Whilst the diagram above shows a focus on foreign policy, it is applicable to economic foreign policy as well because all state policies ought to largely follow this process. It is in the "*black box*" where the enquiry of this study is located.

Chapter 3: Literature on the Challenges of South Africa’s Economic Foreign Policy

The Bureaucratic Fluidity and Tensions between the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC) and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).

Muller echoed Graham’s sentiment regarding the apartheid’s regime practice of a pariah form of foreign policy, where foreign policy was exclusively between the Presidency and then Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Before sanctions on the apartheid state, foreign policy was executed like a zero-sum game led by the Presidency, where relations (political and economic) were mainly with western states and almost non-existent with African states and global south states (Muller, 2002:6). The organisational structure of the DFA focused only on bilateral economic relations and representation in the homelands domestically. An account of the nature of South Africa's foreign policy process at the end of the apartheid regime into the beginning of a new democratic state is key to understanding the precedence set by the former government, what the new government inherited, the change in actors in the foreign policy space, the change in state structures of foreign policy making due to the composition of the new government, and the impact these changes brought to the foreign policy environment, in particular economic foreign policy making.

In the immediate post-apartheid period, the DFA was headed by an ANC Minister and retained the Director General position (the chief executive over all administrative and operational functions of the department) from the previous administration in a new, open and consultative structure (Muller, 2002:14). However, the Director General resigned in 1997. That disrupted policy, especially in foreign policy. Siko claimed that DFA bureaucratic and leadership racial tensions were irreconcilable, causing elder civilians and skilled workers to leave. DIRCO lost talents, notably bureaucratic skills with extensive institutional expertise. This resignation provided the government with a unique opportunity to completely rewrite and overhaul how it undertook the administration, operations and efforts of its foreign affairs, including how its policies were made. The organisational changes at the DFA led to South Africa's universal foreign policy approach. South Africa’s universal foreign policy meant that it had no enemies but sought diplomatic and economic relations with states that wished the same for it, including states that previously had relations with the apartheid state (Siko, 2014:233). The opening up of the DFA and foreign policy service signalled the democratic practice of consultative policy making with critical players in the foreign affairs environment. The DFA was retained, and a new department was established in 1996 – the Department of Trade and Industry[7].

In determining their strategic directions and goals for the state, the DFA and DTI had to reassess their purpose (Siko, 2014:233). The new republic set two departments that could operate coherently in a mutual environment to compete. That birthed the competition between economic and foreign policy in the international arena because both these departments had to prove their importance to the state. Thus, DIRCO and DTIC had to play to their strengths to survive – hence, it is difficult for economic and foreign policy to align in South Africa. At the onset of the new government, the policy process was set outside of the DTI and the DFA. In the 1994 administration, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was the first strategic economic growth framework, was designated to an independent general ministry. Because of this structural origin of strategic framework, the DFA and DTI became executors of a policy that emerged externally. The DTI and DFA fluidity and tensions began when policy was developed elsewhere for them to implement to the same international audience, with two different goals. The DTI's focus on economic diplomacy and the DFA's on public and economic diplomacy for South Africa's holistic growth positioned the two departments on a collision course that would eventually become apparent. The bureaucratic competitiveness between DIRCO and DTIC was nothing out of the ordinary, as it had occurred before between the ANC and the F.W. De Klerk administration. Both the apartheid state and ANC needed the same international audience for two different reasons, immediately after the ANC was unbanned by the F.W. de Klerk administration: the state to revive economic relations[8] and the ANC for continued sanctions against an apartheid state (Nelson Mandela’s ANC National Conference Speech, 1991).

Several critical undertakings should be noted regarding these opposing pursuits by the state and ANC before 1994: firstly, the apartheid state was already predetermining some of the economic relations inherited in the new government of unity post-negotiations. This meant that

[7] Before 1994, the Department of Economic Affairs was abolished and re-emerged in 2009 as the Department of Economic Development mainly focused on economic policy, planning and development.
[8] New and old

the processes of implementation were already determined as well. Secondly, the apartheid government was the only legitimate representative of South Africa in this regard and not any ANC representatives. Thirdly, the precedence of a head of state driving economic foreign policy was set in motion, with De Klerk leading the revival of economic relations with the international community. Fourthly, the economic foreign policy process and production was driven between the Presidency and the DFA. "*Economic growth will require transparent and consistent economic policies*…" the ANC lamented, demonstrating the closed process of economic foreign policy formulation between the Presidency and DFA (Graham, 2012: 408). Lastly, competition politics would later become the prominent feature of ANC politics due to its highly factionalized support base and leadership structures, excluding its own members from within and in government and leading to its decline as a national liberation movement and governing party. Consequently, when additional departments that also participated in the process of economic diplomacy efforts, such as the DTI, were introduced, the institutional practice and processes of the state was unable to converge departments such as DIRCO and DTIC whose roles were complementary rather than competing. This could have had better and efficient economic outcomes if their complementary roles were adequately defined at the executive level of government.

However, for the ANC, the principle of economic growth was not enough to assert as a form of economic policy. Principles and ideologies guiding what, why, where, and with whom South Africa would have economic relations were absent in the ANC's own policies. Graham argued that the ANC, in exile for more than 30 years, held policy positions geared at opposing a regime, and they were about to become part of the regime they had not prepared for (Graham, 2012: 412-414). A transformation of the ANC was necessary. The ANC had to assume the posture of a shadow government before the 1994 elections in anticipation of a government of unity.

The DTIC's mission is to broaden economic involvement for economic growth while aligning state economic objectives with economic policies (Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, 2021). The originating entity of such economic policies is not specified. DIRCO's mission is "*to promote South Africa's foreign policy objectives, including advisory to government on foreign policy matters*" (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2021). In both these departments and their missions, it is impossible to ascertain the custodian and originator of an economic and foreign policy nor the existence of any. Therefore, both departments are within their mandates to focus mutually on their core specialisations and missions – even if they are in competition. However, this study suggests that economic and foreign policy convergence should result in coordinated and coherent economic pursuits in domestic and international relations. What stands classified as economic policies at the DTIC, this study asserts that they are commercial trade agreements that originate from bilaterals with other states or from multilateral trade platforms such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), BRICS and the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) by the Unites States of America, amongst many other platforms. In essence, commercial agreements are ascertained through commercial diplomacy.

Former Ambassador of South Africa to Argentina, Gert Grobler argued that "*economic diplomacy is not a task of DTI and other economic departments but that at HQ [DIRCO headquarters] and in each of our approximately 110 plus missions abroad, economic diplomacy must become our daily bread and butter and top priority. This was especially true since there were DTI representatives in only about 35 of SA's foreign missions.*" (Fabricius, 2021:12). He added that missions, in their nature, were a function of DIRCO, but the equivalent support from the DTIC needed alongside these missions was around one third. Conversely, it would uphold that, where DIRCO saw value in having missions, DTIC may not have derived the same value in trade or economic terms. For whatever departmentally unique reasons this imbalance existed between the DTIC and DIRCO, it necessitates the assertion that, if an economic foreign policy existed, these two departments would have aligned economic interests and values in a balanced approach in state missions abroad.

Beyond the bureaucratic fluidity and divergent efforts in these two departments, there have been department-specific weaknesses that also contribute to the chasm that prohibits coherence and the ability to operate from the same national script. Within DIRCO, some institution-specific challenges have affected South Africa's international relations. The major weakness is the inclination to work independently and in isolated divisions at leadership and operation levels of the department (DIRCO Ministerial Panel Report, 2019). This asserts that the information flow, convergence and coherence, even within DIRCO, have been lacking throughout the years – proving that DIRCO has functional areas that work and others that need more improvement for efficiency. Fabricius noted that South Africa's missions were still headed mainly by political appointees whose background and skills still needed to derive economic returns to South Africa. This practice was "*debilitating*" since it relied on patronage to employ excess politicians whose domestic employment could not be defended (Fabricius, 2021:20). However, the political will to develop, maintain and coordinate policymaking should be developed across government without question.

At the DTIC, Qobo observed that South Africa’s trade policy had not been reviewed since 2010, and reckoned that, with the continuously changing economic climate globally, it needed frequent reviews. DIRCO has indicated that the DTIC had not been dedicating equal resources (staff members and working tools) resulting in lost economic opportunities. Some of the reasons cited were a slow response from DTIC or, in some cases, non-responses, including not sharing the same economic sentiment about opportunities that DIRCO had identified. The DTIC prioritised economic diplomacy over public diplomacy. Even while DIRCO offered economic diplomacy courses, the DTIC's training and experience did not fit DIRCO's bureaucrat training goals. Fabricius explained it well, saying: *“While the diplomatic academy has a module on economic diplomacy, it is not adequate to prepare South Africa's diplomats to represent the country in the complex and challenging global economic environment. There is no mechanism to strategically define and monitor South Africa's efforts in economic diplomacy. Other countries set annual targets measured and reviewed as part of performance appraisals for diplomats.”* (Fabricius, 2021:9-10). Thus, DIRCO, DTIC and other relevant departments should conduct a mapping exercise of all countries and regions to determine economic opportunities where cooperation could be established or strengthened. This should also include identifying the compatibilities of these countries with South Africa's economic priorities and national interests (Fabricius, 2021:11).

Under the Zuma administration, he decided to deploy an opposition leader, Tony Leon, from the Democratic Alliance (DA) as an ambassador to Argentina. Leon's experiences as an ambassador and a public and economic diplomat convinced him that South Africa still needed to define itself through its national interests and global international relations. An anonymous western diplomat, assessing South Africa's economic foreign policy, said that the state needs to seriously reflect on developing a foreign policy agenda that clearly defined its national interests before considering structural adjustments and departmental changes (Leon, 2013:47-48). The Presidency's 25-Year Review of Government acknowledged that *“The development of a single, comprehensive economic strategy on international relations, with components on trade, investment, diplomacy, and more, is yet to come about.*” (Presidency 25 Year Review Report, 2019:228). Conversely, the ANC, in its 2017 elective conference, which was normatively preceded by a policy conference, stated that "*The Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation should ensure that* *they improve their coordination concerning economic diplomacy*" (African National Congress, 2017). Therefore, until this separatist and competitive approach to these two departments is solved, economic foreign policy will remain immature and undeveloped.

In summation, from the old apartheid government to the new democratically elected government, there was a complete administrative transformation in how foreign policy was undertaken - from closed coordination between the Presidency and the DFA, to a more open foreign-policy approach in which the Presidency, DFA (DIRCO) and DTI (DTIC) undertook economic diplomacy efforts for the state. However, this free engagement of departmental actors lacks a central or converging institutional residence from which economic foreign policy should originate. Furthermore, this created fluidity in command of economic diplomacy between the DTIC and DIRCO, which set them on an institutional collision course that has consistently created tensions in executing economic diplomacy. These tensions have ranged from an imbalance of support, trained and skilled resources between the two departments, a lack of clearly defined national interests, and divergent economic priorities. Subsequently, it set a competition of survival between the departments, which has enabled competing economic and foreign policies internationally, over the years. Without the convergence of policies, economic foreign policy cannot mature into a codified and coherently expressed policy.

The Perversion of Political Structures and their Processes Against Economic Foreign Policy

The Presidency sets domestic economic priorities in a strategy plan at the start of every administration, and government departments implement them (South African Department of Public Service and Administration, 2003). Some of these implementation strategies that affect foreign policy have had to be adopted through bills in Parliament, such as the DTIC's *Protection of Investment Act* of 2015 or DIRCO's *Foreign Service Bill* of 2019. However, Parliament, a constitutional institution of policymaking, is much more complex than the organizations that offer it economic and foreign policy inputs. Parliament is best understood through its work in portfolio committees and their statutory powers, roles and responsibilities. According to the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, portfolio committees undertake the following: "*They consider bills, deal with departmental budget votes, oversee the work of the department they are responsible for, and enquire and make recommendations about any aspect of the department, including its structure, functioning and policy. The work of* *committees is not restricted to the government. They may investigate any matter of public interest that falls within their area of responsibility*." (South African Parliament, 2022). These statutory responsibilities were introduced in the new Parliament in 1994, a contrast to the old, private and closed Parliament – particularly the work of portfolio committees where hearings were held in private, and committees were "*rubber stamp*" mechanisms and platforms for the former government's policies (Calland, 1999:68). This structural change and decision by the new government demonstrated inclusivity due to the nature of South Africa's multiparty Parliament, which has been based on a proportional representation system, and characterised in portfolio committees as well. South Africa's multiparty democracy has subsequently been led by a majority party since 1994, and the same majority has been reflected in portfolio committees (South African Parliament, 2022).

Consequently, the majority of one party gives executive control in the selection of committee chairpersons. Since 1994, opposition parties have always opposed not only the composition of portfolio committees but also the practice of almost all chairpersons emanating from the majority party as a political risk. The uniqueness of portfolio committees is also in its chairpersons and their ability to drive diversified inputs, advisory and consultation on policies presented. The chairpersons have been the bridge between the committee, its advisors, public participation, the departments the committee mirrors in the executive, the accountable minister, and the citizens. While committee chairpersonships are statutory posts, some people exploit them to establish their political careers. However, as members of the executive, the chairpersons would be better able to perform their duties knowing what the portfolio committee expects of them (Calland, 1999:71). If a chairperson has been ambitiously career driven or chairs along majority party lines, it frustrates policymaking when proposals emanated from outside of political party lines – defaulting to the rubber-stamping behaviour that Calland mentioned, enabled by majority votes in the portfolio committee.

Therefore, since 1994, the greatest risk in any portfolio committee's policy proposal decision-making has been the high likelihood of rubber-stamping majority political party proposals, especially if chairpersons and members "tow" political party lines. This has been the most significant political risk in South Africa's Parliament, which creates an environment against healthy policymaking in the legislative arm of government. An additional risk is that smaller opposition parties have also been at a disadvantage in policy decision-making due to the lack of voting numbers – enough to influence policymaking outcomes. The majority party can override consensus-based legislative and democratic norms in Parliament to pass its agenda.

Therefore, opposition and minority parties depend on the majority party to influence any policy that goes to Parliament. By implication, the inputs of minority parties may never find expression in any economic or foreign policy. During his presidency, Mandela intervened between portfolio committee chairpersons and ministers with different policy viewpoints because party-line suggestions were deemed undemocratic (Nelson Mandela The Presidential Years, 1996). Portfolio committee performance was highest when the chairperson was not from the same political party as the executive department's minister (Calland, 1999:82).

Parliament's representation has largely reflected external political processes that have impacted its institutional procedures and outcomes. Thus, the external political environment that affects legislative outcomes should be investigated to determine its impact on Parliament. What makes political risk the most significant risk against policy outcomes in Parliament are the actors and processes they go through before finding representation in Parliament. All political parties represented in Parliament have their processes and structures of political representation through voting for their leaders periodically. Individuals that emerge as leaders in political parties ascend to represent these political parties and their constituencies proportionally in Parliament. From branches, party-wide conferences, policy conferences, provincial and national elective conferences, all political parties in South Africa have largely followed the same cadence of mass popularity voting for their leaders. It is worth illustrating the flow of political party decisions regarding policymaking and influencing. However, investigating every party would serve the same purpose, as they have used the same modus operandi over time. Therefore, a focus on the ANC as the majority party in Parliament would elaborate on the influence in policymaking of the party that occupies the majority in Parliament.

Below is an illustration of the decision-making flow of the ANC’s (economic foreign) policy making and influence. The ANC is configured so that it impacts any policymaking process politically before it enters state processes, in government and Parliament.

Figure 2

African National Congress' Influence on Policymaking



The illustration above does not show lower-level (local and provincial) political processes that lead to national results. It has been worth noting the process leading to national representatives eventually making it into government. Every five years, credentialed branches elect new leaders at policy and elective conferences. Starting with a top six (president, deputy president, chairperson, secretary general, deputy secretary, and treasurer), then an NEC (the highest authority-bearing organ leading the ANC) of eighty additional members whose policy function has partly been "*as a recommendation-making body on any matter of policy, whenever it deems necessary, but the NEC must convene a National Policy Conference at least six (6) months before the National Conference to review policies of the ANC and to recommend any new or to amend any present policy for consideration by the National Conference*." (African National Congress, 2022). Lastly, a National Working Committee (NWC) that executes the "*decisions and instructions of the NEC", moreover* to "…*ensure that provinces, regions, branches and all other ANC structures, such as parliamentary caucuses, carry out the decisions of the ANC*." (African National Congress, 2022). Any party that gains a majority in Parliament by winning votes is expected to implement its policies into government. As NWC members are elected to Parliament and its committees, this study asserts that they will follow the political party's policy directives as it is the party that seconded them to parliament or government. This applies to opposition parties as well. Thus, any majority party in parliament cannot always enable an environment and conditions that favour the creation of an economic foreign policy if it is not aligned to its political goals or when it compromises its policymaking influence.

Therefore, within any political party, conduits of party decisions are policy writers who are esteemed and elite personnel whose predispositions influence policies in a particular direction. Peters and Fontaine posited critical questions when they asked: "*How much does the institutional structure within which decisions are made matter, as compared to the influence of individuals who actually make these decisions*" (Peters and Fontaine, 2020:5). They argued that notable figures who shaped a state's foreign policy should be profiled. Under Nelson Mandela, there was no clear economic foreign policy, but a sub-council of the Government of National Unity (GNU) gave directions on matters concerning foreign policy. In 1993, an ANC foreign policy working group had drafted an ANC approach on matters concerning foreign policy. This was where the human rights approach to foreign policy was birthed (Graham, 2012:416). This working group mostly comprised of members emerging from academia, politicians, activists and foreign policy experts[9]. A human rights approach to foreign policy was a product of domestic dynamics in which the ANC leaders and other organisations fought for freedom and were successful, on the premise of human rights. Mandela being at the helm was a walking symbol of human rights. This approach may have given an ANC-led government (particularly Mandela) credibility and impetus domestically and internationally, but as another source of foreign policy input into (economic) national interests, it has caused long-term foreign policy dissonance.

In promotion of its human rights led foreign policy, South Africa gained re-admission into various multilateral organisations and institutions. These included the Commonwealth states, the United Nations (UN) and its specialised multilateral institutions[10] – including joining several multilateral groupings in the form of G77, Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Additionally, South Africa began negotiations to join the European Union (EU). These re-admissions gave South Africa access to seventy-eight states immediate missions abroad. They further ensured the increase of diplomatic corps missions abroad from less than fifty to

[9] Members of this group included, among others, Peter Vale, Rob Davies, Alan Hirsch, Gary van Staden, the brothers Aziz and Essop Pahad, Thabo Mbeki, Welile Nhlapo, Sankie Mthembu and Stanley Mabizela.
[10] Such as the International Labour Organisation; ILO, World Health Organization; WHO and more.

ninety-eight (South African Foreign Policy Discussion document, 1996). Beyond an indication of good diplomatic relations, this had been the occasion to codify domestic economic interests that would be pursued abroad to generate a return on such diplomatic investments[11]. Therefore, the formulation and expression of national economic interests had been weakened in the process of pursuing chiefly human-rights-influenced political relations. Although dormant, the approach of politics always preceding economic relations would further undermine the importance of an economic foreign policy in the long run. As per Naidu[12] "*You can't have permanent friends in international politics. You can only have interests that shift and change*." (Naidu, 2022). Economic foreign policy is a kind of policy that ought to have economic interests as the end. Foreign policy efforts should benefit the domestic economy by economic gains from abroad, whether through public, economic, or commercial diplomacy.

After Mandela, President Mbeki found South Africa immersed in international affairs. South Africa had undertaken loans from the Bretton Woods institutions[13] that had obligatory commitments in the form of Structural Adjustment Program[14] (SAPs) to fulfil and maintain its economic interests in the international community (Bond, 2019:86-89). The open pursuit of economic interests in the new dispensation had begun. It was during Mbeki's reign that the office of the President gained prominence once again in matters concerning economic diplomacy. By reinforcing the tradition of domestic political and economic strategic plans in announcing GEAR, the Presidency attained a leadership role in so far as economic foreign policy was concerned. With subsequent political and economic strategic plans such as RDP, GEAR, ASGISA, NGP, their pronouncements have been made from the Presidency, similarly concentrating economic policy command to the Presidency.

Thabo Mbeki's 2007 ousting as ANC president began the trend of polarising leadership campaigns during national conferences, which shocked South Africa's political landscape (Lodge, 2014:2-3). The core of Mbeki's ousting had been central to economic foreign policy. His policies on GEAR and ASGISA were deemed more neo-liberal generally, leading to the

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[11] Return on Investments (ROI)

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[13] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)

[14] SAPs are economic policies for developing states to adhere to when they borrow money from Bretton Woods institutions.

liberalising of trade and health policy on HIV/AIDS as well – which was initially influenced by his cautious criticism of the science behind the epidemic, prohibiting the opening of the foreign drug market at the time. Closer to home, Mbeki's approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe had not met expected outcomes in terms of a possible leadership change in Zimbabwe. All these major, extensively-publicised economic, health and African conflict resolution foreign policy positions were highlighted more against Mbeki's presidency over what was done right elsewhere. Mbeki was accused of running what is referred to as a "*kitchen cabinet*" in government and centralising many government functions in the Presidency, including policy decision-making (Lodge, 2004:201). This displeased ANC activists and ideologically aligned SACP and COSATU partners. The ANC's policy, as written by a few individuals in its subcommittees, to be adopted by its broad membership and alliance partners became more apparent. In the process of modernising the ANC, it systematically diminished the role and relevance of the party's activist base in the policymaking process, creating the environment that enabled Mbeki's ousting. From then on, the politics in the ANC and government became factionalised – both in the party and state. The ANC had begun having opposing politics within itself (Lodge, 2014:14). Consequently, it perpetuated the exclusion of certain leaders from the policymaking process by virtue of their factional choices. No matter how much an individual leader had knowledge and expertise about economic and foreign policy matters, their political choice determined their participation in any policymaking and economic foreign policy process.

Similarly, under President Zuma, the tradition of strategic economic plans and spillage of ANC factional battles into government continued. However, the focus of South Africa's foreign policy relations shifted to south-south relations. South Africa joined BRICS as part of its foreign policy pivot toward emerging economies. Zuma took to convince fellow ANC members that BRICS would be the new economic power hub in future, in the quest to influence foreign policy decisions that would be undertaken in the ANC and in government (Bond, 2019:83). South Africa still pursued its normative foreign and trade relations with western states whilst new pursuits were channelled to a different international audience in the south. These sudden changes in economic foreign policy directions under every administration may not have been in sync with the state's ability, its institutions and various interest groups in economic foreign policy making to adapt accordingly. Thus, preventing an economic foreign policy in grasping the direction of the state's national interests and limiting its maturity.

In conclusion, Parliament has mainly reflected the political processes of political parties therein. This has been observed more in multiparty democracies that a ruling political party leads where its policies take the lead in government execution over a balance of policy positions inputed by other parliamentary actors such as opposition parties. In South Africa, ANC members in government and Parliament have a mandate to implement ANC policies, which has allowed them to permeate portfolio committees, government departments, the Presidency, and foreign policy. This is expected. However, if policies have always emerged from a political party into Parliament, then to formal state law or policy, there ought to be a concern about the politics that influence them. Zuma's south-to-south focus on economic foreign policy demonstrated this. Moreover, within political parties are elite personnel and specific leaders with specific ideological inclinations, who became policy writers and influencers, as revealed during Mbeki's close-knit cabinet approach. Due to policies born out of factional competition within a political party such as the ANC (to the exclusion of other policy writers and influencers, including opposition parties), the timeliness and maturity of an economic foreign policy being established and the process of its making has been impeded significantly throughout different administrations. As former deputy minister, Dr. Aziz Pahad, reported: "*There is a connection between the decline of South Africa's external influence and the negative tendencies that have bedevilled our national politics*." (Ministerial Panel Report, 2019).

Structural Political and Bureaucratic Exclusions Impeding On Quality Policy Outcomes

The 2007 ANC national conference showed the negative effects of competition and factional politics on South African party politics. Since then, leadership races in the ruling party and other parties are led by competing figures who compete on policy approaches and the direction of the political party. Three structural transformations were necessary for the ANC to compete effectively in the new democratic electoral environment post-1994: (1) 'breaking with the past', (embracing the precepts of open competition within itself and with other political parties), (2) restructuring the party's internal organisation (forming a democratic, centralised decision-making structure in the NEC and NWC), and (3) independently devising strategies to persuade voters (without the reliance on getting votes through satisfying the demands of its activist base and the tripartite alliance). This would begin with the party leadership having centralised power inside the party '*early, rapidly, and decisively*'. If a transforming organisation did not centralise (and neutralise internal opposition) before transforming policy programmes, electoral strategy, and parliamentary behaviour, then the new leadership remains susceptible to losing to internal adversaries: '*where powerful opponents to reform remained in the party, there would be a potential to defeat party regeneration – by sabotaging leadership decisions, mobilising dissent within the party, or refusing to implement leadership decisions'*. This centralised approach to political party processes and government would also limit the broader and pluralistic mode of policymaking finding full expression through making it *"increasingly difficult for parliamentarians to perform legislative and oversight functions*" (Butler, 2005:722-723).

Beyond the evolved creature that the ANC had become as a ruling party in government, the prospects of future beneficiation through patronage had long taken over internal leadership races. Voting for the next leaders is a cost-benefit action focused on medium- to long-term returns. Once lines of support are drawn between leaders and their followers, the triumphant leader translates long-term returns to positions in government and its statutory organisations, including placements and business contracts in business organisations. The chief propellor of such divisive factional politics originated from policy positions or approaches to the economy – particularly economic policy (Lodge, 2014:4-5). GEAR's strong neoliberal principles permitted a relatively open market and less central government control, which conflicted with the COSATU and SACP's communist and socialist ideologies of the ANC's tripartite coalition allies. GEAR introduced macroeconomic-led policymaking. Subsequently, introductions of ASGISA, NGP, and NDP2030 throughout the years never received the full approval of COSATU and SACP, as they asserted the ANC drew away from the principles of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) that brought the tripartite alliance together. In this regard, the NDR's initial convictions deteriorated over time (Pillay, 2011:59-72). In 2010, the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of COSATU published a political discussion paper that reviewed the alliance's political health. In agreement with the sentiments of this study, COSATU and SACP were aggrieved by their exclusion from key strategic committees, where alliance partners had traditionally participated equally. The ANC's NEC Economic Transformation Sub-committee excluded COSATU, indicating that it had taken its own path for the country's economy. COSATU was most concerned about its removal from all NEC sub-committees, which would reduce its influence and participation in national policy contributions (COSATU CEC Political Discussion Paper, 2012:17). An instance of this declined confidence and outright dissent was the SACP's decision to run for local government elections in 2016, as a challenger or alternative to the ANC. It was a clear sign of a broken relationship whose contributions to policy would be secondary to internal alliance conflicts (Makhafola, 2017).

Van Nieuwkerk posited that the transition from apartheid to democracy was elitist and consequently led to the exclusion of legitimate participants of foreign policy decision-making within the state. After Mbeki's second term in 1999, it was only a closed-knit circle of colleagues at the helm of foreign policy decision-making, with prominent officials in the Presidency playing a pre-eminent role in coordinating government policy as well (Giollabhuí, 2016:8-9). However, what crippled the DFA mostly under Mbeki was the high appointments and resignations of director generals – four in ten years (Nieuwkerk, 2006:39). The Presidency appointed three government-wide legal, political, and economic advisors to keep the department functional. The Presidency increasingly promoted trade and investment, reincarnating former President de Klerk's role in economic diplomacy from the Presidency. Foreign policy decision-making was centralised in the Presidency, creating duplicate policymaking mandates for the DFA, DTI, and the Presidency. Because of the multi-participants or individuals between the ANC, COSATU and SACP in the policy environment, those who converged in the ANC at Parliament became increasingly frustrated at the approach of Mbeki governing as president. In his second term at the ANC's 2007 national conference, he was then overthrown. Since then, leadership and followers of the ruling party have been politically polarised. However, most importantly, it determined the kind of policies (including foreign and economic policy) they shall be aligned to once they are voted into power. As Tony Leon put it "*Balancing factions might have been useful for party-unity purposes but was fatal when it came to moving forward the country and its economy*" (Leon, 2021:9).

The Systematic Exclusion of Opposition Parties within Parliament

This exclusion effect is also observed within portfolio committees in Parliament, where policies ought to be deliberated and assessed. In South Africa's democracy, whose chief participants (with votes) in Parliament are political parties, it would be expected that all policies that come out of state processes would be an amalgamation of the inputs of a multiparty democracy that has factored in the needs of the society it serves.

In 1996, the DFA continued its open, consensus-seeking approach to foreign policy by inviting a cross-sectoral contingent of mainly academics. That became a norm in the policymaking process of the DFA. The most significant contributors to foreign policy in Mbeki's time were think-tanks such as the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and

International Global Dialogue (IGD). This then questioned the role of Parliament or portfolio committees, where the inputs of opposition parties ought to balance the proposed policies of the ruling party. Post Mbeki, the government adopted a practice of commissioning and outsourcing expertise that ought to have been embedded as everyday policymaking practice in Parliament. Leon wrote that, in 2014 alone, 53 bills were *"steamrolled"* through Parliament, but only 20 were adequately discussed within a total of 28 hours altogether. He further asserted that "*all decisions of consequence were debated outside parliament, in the inner sanctum of ANC national executive and subcommittees*" (Leon, 2021:71).

Beyond the exclusion of the labour and socialist fraternities in the tripartite alliance, the centralisation of policy decision-making for the elite few in the ANC, with policy decision-making centred in the Presidency; the economic cluster and think-tanks in both Mbeki's and Zuma's administrations; the exclusionary nature of policy decision-making altogether, have all not yielded progressive results for South Africa's economic foreign policy.

Exclusion of Civil Society, Business and Technocratic Actors

South Africa's pluralistic foreign policy has received diverse inputs from several platforms over the years. These platforms and institutions link state and non-state economic activities engagements. As Fabricius posited: "*The business community and researchers and academics should be brought into the formulation of foreign policy*" (Fabricius, 2021:8). In 1994, NEDLAC was constituted in an Act and started operating in 1995 – as a body that would converge the inputs of proposed government policies, business, labour and civil society as social partners that would cohesively influence and consult on government policies, with economic and social policies at the centre of its agenda (NEDLAC, 1995). NEDLAC proceeded well in its diligent work, but it also met difficulties because the latter governments did not recognise it for the value it brought to policy decision-making in the country. This came after the National Treasury bypassed NEDLAC for the Employment Tax Incentive Bill. Former Executive Director, Alistair Smith, lamented that the Labour Relations Amendment Bill that was agreed upon through consensus at NEDLAC was undone in Parliament. Smith also indicated that politics was also becoming a major motive of NEDLAC's consensus-led resolutions being undermined at government level. After his sentiments of NEDLAC feeling like a *"stepchild"*, it led to Smith's eventual resignation in 2013 (South African Government Media Statement, 2013). At NEDLAC, the community constituency bemoaned that it was excluded from economy-led deliberations in the negotiating forum. Similarly, NEDLAC's government convenor referred to an antagonistic labour relations approach that was not prioritising the country (NEDLAC Annual Report, 2014). A recorded instance of civil society groups that were triumphant in impacting economic foreign policy during Mbeki's tenure was when Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) won in ensuring government could open the international market for HIV-AIDS drugs distribution within the South African market, in public health institutions (Treatment Action Campaign, 2016).

Therefore, an exclusion from within the tripartite alliance, because of the ANC's sudden neo-liberal approach to economic growth domestically and internationally, had been present from the onset of the new democracy – diverting from the principles of the NDR pact. This exclusion continued to ripple, where the embedded practice of factional leadership races over the years drew lines on who would be part of economic foreign policy making once their preferred leader won the party's leadership and, by political consequence, state presidency. This meant that the prominent policymakers under the new president in government were an elite group that aligned with him during his party leadership race. Moreover, key policies that would impact the economy and the markets would be overdue singularly owing to a president's final decision making power to a proposed policy, even from civil society. Into government, the decision-making on foreign policy was kept closely knit, eventually overlooking statutory bodies such as NEDLAC instituted by government to gather economic preferences from social partners. During Zuma's administration, NEDLAC's effectiveness was relegated to redundancy leading to the executive director's resignation. The same elite policymaking culture within the government degenerated over the years. Whilst the centre in the Presidency held, everywhere beyond this point, institutional and statutory structures and actors were being relegated to irrelevance and unproductivity. All these impediments mean that economic foreign policy remains an abstract concept instead of a coherent and codified policy.

The Proliferation of Actors That Derails the Economic Foreign Policymaking Process

Alden and Le Pere offered insights into a form of pluralist approach that foreign policy takes in South Africa by arguing that entities outside of the state bureaucracy also made inputs into the economic and foreign policies of the state (Alden and Le Pere, 2006:53-54). Pronouncements relating to the state's international and economic interests have normatively started outside the state, in the ANC, then translated into government departments for proposal as government policy; debated in parliament and portfolio committees therein; once approved or voted upon, then sent to the President's desk for promulgation into an act of Parliament – a law of the land (Parliament of South Africa, 2022). Nonetheless, the state has proven to be a complex machinery of actors and structures whose processes are not as simplistic as highlighted. However, there has been a presence of parliamentary, departmental, and presidential advisors who contribute to foreign policy making as well. Whilst policy advisory services have been a critical capability that the state needs, especially from external objective sources, there has been a thin line between advisory to the state and outsourcing state functions to various entities outside the state. In 1994, there was a ministry known as the Economic Policy Planning department, which swiftly perished when Mbeki's administration commenced. During Mbeki's tenure, policy planning was directed by the Presidency through a division called the Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) Unit, which coordinated policy planning in government departments with frequent (monthly) meetings between itself and department-based policy makers. This centred policymaking capabilities away from departments into the Presidency, and to the exclusion of parliamentary participation (van Nieuwkerk, 2006:45-46). Mbeki then lost his ANC presidency in 2007 and subsequently his state presidency in 2009. Three years later, in 2010, the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services unit also perished. Because the Presidency handled policymaking and coordination, this left a vacuum.

In 2010, under Zuma's administration, the National Planning Commission (NPC) was instituted in the Presidency to lead the state's strategic economic planning across key sectors. The planning commission produced the state's strategic economic growth framework or guideline, which departments, public and private institutions, the labour fraternity, social partners, and civil society would work towards. It was named the NDP2030. In the commission's elaborate publications set in chapters, chapter seven focused on foreign policy by outlining how South Africa should position itself, and the role it should play domestically, continentally, and internationally. All strategic economic growth plans emerged from the Presidency until the planning commission was enacted (National Planning Commission, 2022). It is formations such as these that give rise to undermining questions on whether state foreign policy was a representative, framework, process and execution of national interest contributed to by all relevant stakeholders, or a product of elite groupthink in the Presidency through a planning commission. Moreover, questions on the origins of economic policy planning, whether it should emerge from a commission or within direct structures of the state.

Furthermore, the Zuma administration instituted a Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) whose aim was to make government ministries more cohesive and accountable, to foster a culture of policy planning – including monitoring and evaluating the impact of their policies (Presidency of South Africa, 2018). Thus, with every administration, economic policy development has always been highly influenced from the Presidency through a ministry accounting to the Presidency only. The highest office's heavy influence on policymaking, especially on economic policy, limits the ability of other state actors from influencing policy according to their specialised areas, thus limiting the ability to produce a comprehensive economic foreign policy because DIRCO and the DTIC's involvement are minimal.

This plurality of actors within state structures has also been mirrored by actors outside the state who also have had an impact on economic foreign policy: the business fraternity. Sen and te Velde further defined state-business relations on economic policy as facilitating information exchange, checking government policies, and reducing policy uncertainty (Sen and te Velde, 2009:1269). NEDLAC was one such statutory organisation. This entity falls under the Department of Employment and Labour (DEL). However, other government departments, such as the DTIC are also represented, and labour through COSATU's presence in the entity's executive council. The ministers of DEL and DTIC are executive members of NEDLAC's council. Catherine Grant Makokera posited it adequately, arguing that "*The relationship between a government and the business community in any given country is often a complex one that reflects many different factors, including history, race or class dynamics, politics and specific sectoral concerns. For this reason, it is difficult to generalize as these interactions are specific to national contexts and differ depending on the nature of the issue under consideration*." (Makokera, 2015:119). It bears the question why DIRCO is not represented as a stakeholder in domestic economic policy on this forum as well because state economic policy ultimately translated into economic foreign policy internationally.

There are other non-state organisations, such as BUSA (launched in 2004) as a "*cross-cutting organised business interests in South Africa*" with an executive seat at NEDLAC and also represented South Africa's business interests at international platforms such as the G20, BRICS Business Council, SADC Private Sector Forum and Business Africa, amongst many others. BUSA's presence in these platforms has mainly been to promote South African national economic interests. BUSA's executive council also consisted of captains of industry in the significant business sector (BUSA, 2022). NEDLAC also has an executive seat in the BUSA executive council. As per Makokera's insights, BUSA was not without its difficulties as a platform of representation, as the Black Business Chamber (BBC) decided to break away to represent its specific constituency directly at NEDLAC, citing a lack of adequate representation on issues of economic transformation. Mutual trust within organisations and between business formations and the government was critical in maintaining the credibility of such establishments and all policy recommendations (Makokera, 2015:124-125). If business organisations such as NEDLAC are not performant due to consistent internal conflicts and proliferation, their advisory role and effectiveness to government policy is compromised. As a result, economic policy recommendations from this platform of policy inputs are compromised as well.

Maxfield and Schneider noted that businesses and affiliate organisations engaged with the state for transparency, reciprocity and credibility (Maxfield and Schneider, 1997). NEDLAC, BUSA, and BLSA have a common convergence of economic policy influencing and advocacy with similar key strategic stakeholders: government, labour, other businesses and civil society. Therefore, if all these organisations, including NEDLAC as a statutory body, serve mainly the same functions, it would logically be feasible that a statutory body like NEDLAC may appropriately express economic (international) policy advocacy to all relevant government departments. But it has not. The DTIC consults NEDLAC through a specific sub-committee of the Trade and Industry Chamber known as the Technical Sectoral Liaison Committee (Teselico), which focuses purely on trade and not broader economic matters. This method of utilising specialised technical committees can be traced back during deadlocks during negotiations, where technical committees of non-partisan specialists were called in to broker the issue of local government autonomy in what would become the nine provinces of the new South Africa (Department of Justice, 1993). With the proven productivity of these technical committees at NEDLAC, it can be argued that this technical committee would fulfil the same functions and responsibilities if it were still part of the DTIC internally. Budgetary constraints of hiring such highly skilled experts may limit the department's other statutory commitments. However, the production of adequate economic policy should equally important to a department such as the DTIC.

Any business continuity interruption at NEDLAC, such as dissolutions or irreconcilable conflicts, may harm important and valuable contributions to government economic foreign policy. Essentially, the government should limit the outsourcing of economic and policy functions to external organisations even within statutory entities. On paper, these processes appear built to function seamlessly. However, in 2014, NEDLAC's annual report highlighted that it had become irrelevant and called on to reform with the assistance of government, business, labour and civil society – the same stakeholders it services (NEDLAC Annual Report, 2013-2014). The irrelevance originated from doubts over whether NEDLAC represented all economic interests in all their complexity. Nevertheless, even if NEDLAC reformed or self-corrected, it did not absolve it from any future conflicts, mainly internally, due to the spectrum and the high number of stakeholders it represents and their interests.

Former NEDLAC executive director, Mr Alistair Smith, elaborated that *"NEDLAC is South Africa's apex social dialogue structure. NEDLAC aims to promote consensus between the social partners on policy and legislation. In doing this, NEDLAC plays an important part in the policy and law-making processes in South Africa that seeks to complement Parliament's legislative and policy processes through social dialogue."* (People's Assembly, 2014). *"Parliament however has the sovereign right to determine on any policy and legislative issues, whether or not there is agreement from all social partners,"* Smith said, when asked if MPs and government departments adopted NEDLAC's policy and legislative recommendations (People's Assembly, 2014). Therefore, if the sovereignty of final decision-making sat in Parliament, why would the additional layer provided by NEDLAC be necessary for the economic policymaking process? Organizations such as NEDLAC bring about a unified voice of the constituencies represented therein, like the business sector. However, there are other bodies, though independent, such as BLSA and BUSA, that do the same. Government, by its choices, then endorses them by engaging them bilaterally and outside of the ambits of NEDLAC, creating a further proliferation of economic policy inputs into government and leading to fragmented inputs from various actors.

The empirical evidence (the business sector example) above reveals that South Africa's economic foreign policy making process is fragmented by coordination or multi-layering inputs and representation, among other concerns. Another inquiry would arise as to why the function of a statutory body like NEDLAC was not internally embedded in Parliament's functions, even though this is Parliament's primary function[15]. This is an issue of coordinating various stakeholders and state capacity in bringing together a representation of all relevant

[15] The core functions of Parliament include making laws, overseeing the work of the executive and state institutions, facilitating public participation, international participation and cooperative governance. https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/national-legislature-parliament#:~:text=The%20core%20functions%20of%20Parliament,international%20participation%20and%20cooperative%20governance.

stakeholders and sectors in economic foreign policy making. This indicates one area of policy making immaturity, which suggests that there are other areas where policy making lacks efficiency. It is in these areas of deficit where the enquiry of this study is found and the rationale as to why the state has fragmentation in its economic foreign policy processes. So, this diverse approach to domestic economic policymaking, within and outside government, has revealed mandate duplication and complicated basic economic policy formulation. This complication tended to be institutionalised, as economic policy making goes through layers of state bureaucracy met by multiple organisations representing various economic sectors – with engagements between government and business continually taking bilateral and multilateral forms. As these inputting actors or variables were evidently changed with every administration, so did the process that needed to produce economic foreign policy making, which weakened the stability of functional processes of policy making domestically – ultimately undermining the existence, stability or maturity of an economic foreign policy.

The Ideological Tug of War in South Africa's Foreign Policymaking

Alexandra suggested that the fundamental assumption of socialism was based on a society whose political economy was expressed as a sum of collective needs, ideas and relationships (Alexandra, 2015:986-986). As sanctions against the apartheid government were being lifted pre-1994, into the new dispensation, South Africa observed new and expanding industries emerging in the economy. Exports and import volumes increased exponentially, particularly with commodities and manufactured products – leading exports and primary commodities leading the imports volumes (Moore, 2001: 921-923). It is argued that the neoliberal ideology that Mbeki embraced in his administration led to this economic development. Reynares argued that neoliberalism is founded on the premise of the reduction of state intervention, giving way to an incentive structure for economic actors to increase productivity (Reynares, 2017). Since 1994, South Africa has experienced a tug-of-war in ideology[16] and practice, affecting economic and foreign policy outcomes between socialist, Marxist-Leninist and neoliberal positions[17]. Therefore, it has been challenging to fixate its economic foreign policy in a singular domain that guides the country's approach whilst pursuing economic interests internationally. These

[16] An ideology is a view about what ought to be thought, said and done about politics in terms of a sole criterion, and where this view is contested by views dependent on rival criteria within a situation which is constituted by the continual contestation of criteria (Alexander, 2014).
[17] Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the Opening of the Debate in the National Assembly, on "Reconciliation and Nation Building, National Assembly Cape Town, 29 May 1998. A state of two nations http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0529.htm

multiple ideological origins disorientate the core principles of establishing an economic foreign policy.

However, the origins of the most significant ideological influence on economic and foreign policy have been traced to the tripartite alliance. In understanding where the three organisations have stood individually, their ideological foundations ought to be identified. First, the ANC, a liberation movement, is positioned as a broad church whose aim has been "*to unite the African people and spearhead the struggle for fundamental political, social and economic change*" (African National Congress, 2022). It is an all-encompassing church that does not discriminate against any human being based on colour, gender or nation group, according to the Freedom Charter (ANC, The Freedom Charter, 1995). The ANC has held a consistent leadership role in the alliance since its establishment. Secondly, the SACP, whose identity was birthed from the ideology that the Marxist-Leninist economic system would be the most beneficial social and economic dispensation of a new South Africa post-1994 – heavily influenced by the Soviet Union regime in countries fighting colonialisation in most of the 19th century (Kunert, 1991:1-3). Lastly, COSATU, a collective of cross-sectoral trade unions, is committed to "*One Industry, One Union, One Country, One Federation*", related to the struggles of the working-class people of South Africa (Craven, 2016:ix-1).

At the first consultative conference after the unbanning in 1990, Mandela emphasised sanctions as a critical weapon against the apartheid government, whilst Mbeki's administration believed in a phased-out approach to sanctions. Due to the ANC's Marxists ideological inclinations, western countries felt cautious in adhering to the advice of socialists that may implement communist/Marxist-Leninist policies once they were in power. After all, the ANC had echoed its socialist sentiments for years, drawn from 1955's Freedom Charter, until it had to prepare to take up government responsibilities in 1993 (African National Congress National Conference, 1993).

Subsequently, there was a sudden change in the ANC's international relations posture to advocate for international support for themselves and not sanctions against the NP government. The ANC suddenly changed its international relations narrative to garner support for itself as an organisation prepared to govern and not sanctions against the NP government. The ANC's decision to use militant language and posture of sanctions as weapons had not served it well, because the international community, especially the EU[18] and USA, were looking for strategic

[18] With the exception of Nordic countries and France.

economic partners in the African continent, and South Africa was their ideal choice. The ANC had to posture itself as a capable government in waiting should it win the 1994 elections. This sudden change in position by the ANC led to establishing its foreign policy working group[19]. Though the human rights approach from this group exponentially improved the ANC's reputation post-1994, it was not a stance that was unanimous in this working group nor in the movement. Mbeki opposed this approach, as it could not be sustainable for an emergent democracy whose fundamental approach and narrative ought to be economic growth (Vale, Davies and Christie, 1993).

Janis contended that motivating to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group could deteriorate decision-making quality (Janis, 1982). That, reaching a consensus in order to derive progress in foreign policy, may not provide the best outcomes. The ANC’s sanctions narrative was one such example. He explained that it is because decisions made become determinants of action that follow, which equally lack in quality as the decision that preceded it. Ultimately, the quality of the decisions made in such circumstances may not be the best in producing the optimum outcome. In reviewing Janis, Hart stated that, "*According to Janis, groupthink stands for an excessive form of concurrence seeking among members of high prestige, tightly-knit policymaking groups. It is excessive to the extent that the group members have come to value the group (and they are being part of it) higher than anything else. This causes them to strive for a quick and painless unanimity on the issues that the group has to confront.*" (Hart, 1991:247). Though Graham alluded to dissenting opinions of a human-rights-led foreign policy approach, it can be asserted that swiftly producing a foreign policy position that appealed to the international community than sanctions was of utmost importance for the ANC's foreign policy working group. Therefore, a consensus had to prevail. Moreover, it shows that the ANC, within itself, was decisive on ensuring that a unified narrative prevails over dissenting views and approaches (Graham, 2012: 417). Conceivably, the ANC needed to reinvent itself swiftly as well. The foreign policy approach of human rights may have been the right rebranding it needed at the time, though not sufficient for its long-term foreign policy strategy that had to produce economic results. It at least garnered political support, but economical support and relations were still mainly directed towards the NP government, granted that the NP were the government of the day.

[19] Peter Vale, Rob Davies, Alan Hirsch, Gary van Staden, the brothers Aziz and Essop Pahad, Thabo Mbeki, Welile Nhlapo, Sankie Mthembu and Stanley Mabizela.

As per Janis and Hart (1991), the ANC's decision to use human rights as the core of its foreign policy would prove to be deficient in quality in the future, especially in the economic domain. The ANC needed two crucially important things ahead of the negotiations and elections: influence in economic matters of the country and voting numbers through the one-man-one-vote rule. Influence in economic matters would further nuance their economic foreign policy positions. The tripartite alliance provided this platform due to COSATU's labour presence in companies operating in South Africa (domestic and foreign). This political choice was accompanied by the strategic decision-making that the alliance's numbers, affiliation and influence (amongst other factors) would certify a victory against the apartheid government at the polls and in future provide a firm political centre in the country (Craven, 2016:xi). The record of relations within the tripartite alliance has, over the years, showed that the founding principles of the alliance in the NDR have continuously been threatened by the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies by an ANC-led government – as has birthed contention in this alliance, over the years (Basset & Clarke, 2008:789-796).

The alliance found a middle ground in their varying political ideologies through the NDR policy framework (African National Congress Youth League, 2009:3-5). The NDR would then guide the alliance decisions, especially economic frameworks of what would become an ANC-led government. However, with time, the divergent ideological clashes would become more apparent. Below is an illustration of how the alliance had positioned itself to influence South Africa's political, economic and social policy making. It illustrates from Figure 3 where COSATU and SACP members fit:

Figure 3

Title: The Tripartite Alliance's Influence on Policymaking



"*Neoliberal approaches have tended to advocate the separation of policy from politics, deliberately excluding 'popular' actors who might otherwise expect to have some of their demands reflected in government programmes*" (Basset & Clarke, 2008: 789). Basset and Clarke opined that the ANC had moved away from ideological policy leanings to empirical economic approaches. An ideological battle has constantly created tensions throughout the years in the alliance and has diminished its influence in the macroeconomic policy framework of South Africa. GEAR, as promulgated by then President Thabo Mbeki in 1996, was an outcome of economic policy direction aimed at reducing inflation and inherited fiscal deficits, while increasing capital flows (investments) in and out of the country, amongst many other issues (Department of Finance, 1996). The SACP, in particular, did not receive this well, as it firstly was not consulted nor included in the process of policymaking. Secondly, GEAR had no resemblance of any communist ideology it so much believed would be accommodated in an ANC-led government. The SACP also condemned that GEAR was produced by a small team of technical experts, to the exclusion of alliance partners, even in the ANC. However, the SACP raised two matters that further showed that the alliance was not mutually beneficial. Firstly, it did not have the skills to produce macro-economic policy. Secondly, producing such kind of policies was not a politically neutral matter and thus needed the alliance's consultation (Cronin, 1998). Conversely, COSATU objected to an economic growth framework that deviated from the tripartite's communist ideological approach (Mashele and Qobo, 2017:37). Mbeki's GEAR and ASGISA policies supported Basset and Clarke's claim that neoliberal policies separated policymaking from politics. However, the tug of ideological war with the alliance kept the ANC from comfortably continuing in its neo-liberal approach to economic policy making and growth. This has slowed the maturation of domestic economic policy into international economic foreign policy.

Politically, there has been alignment of SACP members who have always been elected as government officials (ministers) throughout different administrations and voting along ANC lines in Parliament[20]. COSATU, on the other hand, has been instrumental mainly in the business sector by promoting working class representation and wage bargaining efforts. Both COSATU and SACP have members in the ANC, with SACP members able to stand for government positions and COSATU members for ANC NEC leadership positions. The reconciliation in ideological differences and fluidity of members amongst the three organisations continues to be the undoing of this alliance and its impact on South Africa's economic and foreign policy. The alliance did not absolve the ideological and economic independence of each organisation. However, politically, the lines had long been blurred. The varying ideological standpoints and economic stances of the ANC, COSATU and SACP continue to contribute to declining confidence in the alliance as well.

ASGISA, Mbeki's growth framework in his second term (starting 2004), focused on complementing GEAR's infrastructure investment deficits with extensive capital investments into the economy. SACP's former economist, Neva Makgetla, wrote that that ASGISA did not have the multiplier effect needed to reach and impact various sectors of the economy (Legassick, 2007:473-475). In 2006, Blade Nzimande, Secretary General of the SACP, criticised ASGISA's inability to deliver the targeted results, leaving behind adverse outcomes such as stunted growth, increasing gini coefficient, shrinking employment absorption

[20] Dr Blade Nzimande, a longstanding member of the ANC and secretary general of the SACP, has held ministerial positions (Higher Education, Science and Technology) throughout the new dispensation. Thulas Nxesi, Jeff Radebe, Rob Davies and Ben Martins were also ministers in the ANC government. https://www.groundup.org.za/article/need-remember-history-and-plan-political-homes/

(Legassick, 2007:479). To this end, Mbeki was ousted in the following year, 2007, at the ANC's national conference.

Altogether, between 1994 and 2018, South Africa changed economic growth frameworks every 5.5 years, prohibiting a sustainable continuance of any economic and foreign policies. This is due to the internal contentions of the tripartite alliance and an ANC-led government that was not producing the desired results of its economic growth frameworks. The tripartite's political influence and power over policy cycles in South Africa through internal structures such as policy and national conferences, and external structures such as voting majority in Parliament, slows the maturity that economic growth frameworks could potentially birth economic foreign policies that are adequately nuanced and have matured over time. The ideological centre that brought these organizations together pre-1994 has not been the same one that maintained the alliance post-1994. More pronounced criticism of mainly the ANC has emerged over the years, from COSATU and the SACP, as a way of dissenting the direction the ANC has taken since assuming the responsibilities of government.

Chapter 4: An Analysis of the Five Challenges That Impede on the Maturity Of South Africa's Economic Foreign Policy

Overview of the Interviews

According to most respondents, South Africa has no economic foreign policy. This supported the study's hypothesis that there are many problems, flaws, and fragmentations in foreign policy making, notably in the economic domain, that have hindered economic foreign policy's maturity. Those that acknowledged the presence of an economic foreign policy referred to it as economic diplomacy and the work at the DTIC on trade and industrial relations. It is the view of this study that the work of the DTIC on trade and industrial relations is actualy commercial operations that are subsets of economic diplomacy, which is informed by economic foreign policy which the study clarified. Ultimately, the interviews also captured some of the policy environment conditions and variables that heightened the concerns on the maturity of economic foreign policy into a codified, coherent and expressed policy.

The Absence of National Interests: A Cause of the Bureaucratic Fluidity and Tensions between DIRCO and the DTIC

The presence of foreign policy and economic growth strategic frameworks[21] cannot be disputed, as these have existed over the years in South Africa. However, what they communicate has not been clear. Protea[22] argued that "*There is a disconnect between policy goals on the economic side and what you would call more general foreign policy and diplomacy*". Protea posited that it was because there was an institutional and bureaucratic disconnect wherein the two policies are not made from the same place and thus could not find coordination at institutional and bureaucratic level. The lack of routine-level coordination in the bureaucracy and institutions of DIRCO and the DTIC creates an environment where the strategic goals of economic policy are set without a view of foreign policy and vice versa, which maintains the individuality and longstanding competition between these two policies instead of their convergence. Therefore, as this status quo continues in the bureaucracy and institutions of the two departments, it is unlikely that an economic foreign policy will be produced unless effective institutional changes are implemented. Because the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services department was dissolved shortly after Mbeki's departure, routine-level policy coordination became vacant and departments were left to strengthen their areas of expertise whilst unable to coordinate themselves competently. This leads to the de-institutionalization of the way on which policy (economic policy for an international audience) ought to be produced and implemented, especially between the two departments, hence its absence.

This inefficient approach particularly from DIRCO allowed other departments such as the DTIC that also participate in economic activities beyond the state's borders to assume its position, overshadowing DIRCO. The DTIC's role as a champion for economic diplomacy for South Africa is a result of DIRCO deferring its role concerning economic diplomacy abroad, including the Presidency's proactive participation in economic diplomacy, as per Muller in chapter 3. This also shows that the role of the Presidency continues to be at the forefront – although expected, as chief custodian of policy – weakening DIRCO's role in driving foreign and economic policy abroad.

[21] RDP, GEAR, ASGISA, NGP, NDP2030

[22] Dr. Protea (anonymous) is a seasoned International Relations lecturer in a forerunning university in South Africa and a well published author, a political and IR analyst in multimedia platforms and NDP2030 participant.

Without routine-level coordination, specifically between DIRCO and the DTIC, the skills needed to maintain this coordination become corroded overtime. Professor Qobo[23] argued that capabilities in the economic domain needed to be improved to adequately produce and align economic policies to the activities undertaken by DIRCO domestically and abroad. This was a result of insufficient attention given to building DIRCO as an institution that develops, undertakes and implements policy in its work. In analysing DIRCO further, this study concluded that the nature of DIRCO is multifaceted in that it undertakes much of the state's cross-sectoral functions abroad. They must be directed by a multidimensional policy that covers political, economic, and security issues amongst many others and enhances the state's international standing. However, not enough institutional human capital possessed these cross-sectoral, especially economic skills. Therefore, the bureaucratic cadence to maintain a strong economic command on international issues and policymaking has decayed over time. Hence, the DTIC's specialised strength in the economic domain gives it a greater role to play internationally. With a weakened foreign policy and heightened economic policy strengths, an economic foreign policy is bound to never emerge due to such imbalances.

Furthermore, Ambassador Nhlapo[24] argued that any professional service ought to underpin bureaucratic-level civil servants. He highlighted that there was no need for politics at certain levels of state bureaucracy which only required a professional service to deliver on the state's strategic directions. It can be argued that a professional service provides a form of business continuity even when political appointments change with different administrations. A professional bureaucracy does not leave the operational and administrative work of policymaking vulnerable to political contestations and competition at higher levels of the department. What prolongs the life of any policy is the consistency of skills and institutional retainment of knowledge and human capital. Nhlapo's observation, coupled with the high frequency change in economic strategic frameworks (every 5.5 years), as per chapter 3, paralyses the ability of an economic foreign policy to be produced. Springbok[25] resonated with Nhlapo by highlighting how there was a need for a well-functioning bureaucracy at DIRCO that would have a good command of policy development, implementation and execution of

[23] Professor Qobo is an Associate Professor and Head of School at the Wits School of Governance. He is an expert on political economy, strategy, and geopolitics with an involvement in government advisory roles as well.
[24] Ambassador Welile Nhlapo is a former National Security Advisor at Office of the President leading South Africa's peacekeeping mission on the continent in the DRC, Sudan, Burundi. He is also an advisor to DIRCO.
[25] Mr. Springbok (anonymous) is involved in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Directorate at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and a contributor to South Africa's 2011 Foreign Policy White Paper as it stands currently.

economic diplomacy in particular. Over the years, the diplomatic academy at DIRCO had regressed in robustly training imminent ambassadors and diplomatic staff, especially on economic policy and diplomacy related work, he argued to Qobo's sentiment. The academy had core technical and economic courses taught, however these were phased out as the priorities of DIRCO changed with different administrations. The most prominent factor in the bureaucratic fluidity between DIRCO and DTIC was that employees within these departments did not know where their work concerning economic diplomacy started or ended. More specifically, the overlaps were not defined and coded for employees to know whose responsibilities were to undertake certain tasks, especially in the domestic economic setting. This observation of DIRCO revealed that most of the economic related work was left to the DTIC or other departments that contributed to the economic domain of foreign policy – asserting this study's assessment of DIRCO's weakened and relegated position as a forerunner in internationally focused economic policymaking (Chabane, 2022).

When administrations become more political than bureaucratic, policy development is left to the periphery of state activity. On a well-defined and functional bureaucracy, Springbok posited that "*bureaucracy instils rationale in politics*", arguing that, due to political processes, some diplomatic representatives had no background of institutions. Their first time within policymaking institutions was their election into Parliament, without having run any state-based bureaucratic division nor participated in any productive economic activity. This study asserts that this is the inherent deficiency of a political system that rewards mass popular voting over meritocratic rewards. The deficiency in such a system is that policymaking value and quality is displaced towards the highest votes received at the polls. It is the politics of dominating the polls, and not offering and producing nuanced and substantive policies.

Beyond the domestic bureaucracy, Parks[26] of COSATU said that the state was destroying itself by failing to send career or professional diplomats (while sending politicians) abroad. Such state leaders cannot adequately contribute to domestic policies then coherently portray them to an international audience. There is a strength to politicians which is in public diplomacy. Whilst it is crucial to creating and beginning international relations, they ought to translate economically as well. Because there will always be a mixture of political and bureaucratic appointments. Thus, the balance of their expertise and what they can deliver for the country ought to put more value in policymaking that will guide both politicians and professional

[26] Mr. Matthew Parks is the Parliamentary Coordinator at COSATU. He coordinates COSATU's work regarding policy inputs at South Africa's parliament.

diplomats on national interests abroad. Furthermore, to Fabricius' sentiment of political appointments being a form of disguised unemployment, Parks indicated that, where South Africa was not deriving economic engagements (mainly trade and investment) was where the state had mainly sent political appointees.

Towards the end of the apartheid regime, the Presidency working closely with the DFA were the only prominent agents and structures who formulated foreign policy and thereafter its practice. Chabane[27] elucidated that, what perpetuated the ad hoc relationship between DIRCO and DTIC is that, at ministerial level bilaterals with other countries, DIRCO normatively heads up the political committee whilst DTIC heads up the economic committee. Therefore, post-1994, an environment where the institutionalisation of economic foreign policy was enabled could not be realised, as the Presidency and DTIC played dominant roles in economic activities whilst DIRCO was left in the periphery as an executor. Qobo and Protea argued the following regarding Mbeki and Zuma's administrations: in Mbeki's tenure foreign policy was "*heavily centralised*" in the presidency, and in Zuma's administration a "*de-institutionalising the state*" was the order of the day. Because of this, the opportunity of foreign policy to fully mature – to also incorporate a holistic economic undertaking – has not been present. Hence, it is challenging to point the presence of one as there if no specifically coded and coherently expressed economic foreign policy. Whilst political leadership is of utmost importance through the Presidency's active participation in foreign policy, it has been unclear if the centralisation or de-institutionalisation of foreign policy making was purely influenced from therein. Implementation has mostly been a compensation for the lack of capabilities and skillsets at DIRCO or complementing the limited role of the DTIC in establishing international relations led by state-level economic foreign policy.

South Africa's establishment of numerous missions during Mandela's tenure was a commendable strategy of initiating relations internationally. This was in response to the ANC's support by countries abroad, which enabled an environment for economic relations as well. Ismail[28], a top DTI official under Minister Trevor Manuel and President Mandela, argued that

[27] Mr. Chabane is a Director at Department of International Relations and Cooperation responsible for Bilaterals in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

[28] Professor Faizel Ismail is the Director of the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town (UCT). He also serves as an advisor at the DTIC. He has served as the Ambassador Permanent Representative of South Africa to the WTO (2010-2014). He was also South Africa's Special Envoy on the South Africa-USA AGOA negotiations between January 2015 and June 2016. Prior to this he was the Deputy Director General for International Trade and Economic Development (ITED) in the Department of Trade and Industry. As South Africa's Chief Trade Negotiator, since 1994, he led the new democratic South Africa's trade negotiations

solidarity with other state and non-state actors internationally led to these missions. This rationale, although noble, by the newly formed government of Mandela, did not set South Africa on a path to establish productive relationships nor did it derive them from any institutional policy direction. Therefore, some of these international relations never matured to take advantage of the possible economic ties they could have subsequently enabled. Nhlapo opined that this continued into subsequent administrations through South Africa's efforts to bring peace and security to some war-torn countries on the Africa continent, such as Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – as they did not derive any peace dividends (post war economic gains). Because of the absence of an economic foreign policy which encompassed and connected the stream of peace and security into post-war economic gains, opportunities were lost. Whilst some of the outcomes gave South Africa an excellent reputation of conflict resolution, it did not benefit it economically. This study does not claim that every peace-keeping operation must be rewarded or accompanied by economic rewards, but when clear chances occur to help rebuild another nation after a conflict, they should not be abandoned but also form part of our foreign policy's economic domain. This is where the policy-led and institutionalised processes of coordination between DIRCO and DTIC ought to have been at its height. That disjointed coordination disadvantages South Africa's efforts on the continent to bring peace, as it is usually western multinational companies that undertake the responsibilities of economic nation building (bringing in companies that will re-establish basic needs and utilities such as retailers, gas/fuel, financial services, amongst others) than the South African economic fraternity who ideally ought to have first pick on the areas of foreign economies they intended to participate in as they rebuild.

Bergmann[29], in his experience as shadow minister of DIRCO in parliament, painted a picture of the enormous costs associated with widespread missions that were not generating the adequate economic returns back to South Africa. In contrast, Parks said that, there is no logical and policy-led reason why some of South Africa's missions abroad were closed. He made an example of South Africa closing its Finland mission, where one of the world's most reputable telecommunications mobile and infrastructure company, Nokia, originates. That was a failed opportunity to expand on the country's already-thriving telecommunications industry. In these

with the European Union (EU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and several other bilateral trading partners including the US, India, and Brazil.

[29] Mr. Darren Bergmann is the Democratic Alliance's former shadow minister of International Relations and Cooperation in parliament. A former chief whip of the DA and current portfolio committee member on DIRCO. He is also the treasurer of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum.

two contrasting views of the opening and closing of South Africa's missions abroad, there are no economic foreign policy-based accounts at DIRCO that justify such actions by the state. If there was an economic foreign policy, it would have guided and accounted for such decision-making.

Two unique respondents stood out in offering insights as to why it was hard for South Africa to consolidate an economic foreign policy from its numerous policies and strategic frameworks. General Holomisa[30] believed that certain events drove the ANC-led government to abandon the RDP strategic framework under the tripartite alliance and adopt a neoliberal "*stocks and bonds*" economic policy. Tshimomola[31] argued that a focus on DIRCO and the DTIC was too limited because true economic policy was actually determined at the National Treasury department. Whilst referring to the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), Act No. 1 of 1999, Tshimomola highlighted that "*treasury can unilaterally decide on economic policy without having to consult that much*". These unique responses offered two alternate ways to account for a lack of economic foreign policy in South Africa: firstly, the economy reacts to external economic factors (stock and bonds); secondly, DIRCO nor the DTIC are participants nor originator of any domestic economic policy. This study then undertook to investigate the PFMA and the National Treasury's jurisdictions pertaining to economic policy development in South Africa. True to Tshimomola's assertions, the PFMA states that the National Treasury's first function is to "*promote the national government's fiscal policy framework and the co-ordination of macro-economic policy*" (Public Finance Management Act 1999:13). To coordinate does not entail ownership of producing macro-economic policy. Thus, this study further probed into the National Treasury itself to discover that central to its function is the Ministry of Finance being at the heart of South Africa's "*economic and fiscal policy development*" (National Treasury, 2022). In responding to part of this study's enquiry on where economic policy was developed from, and in the absence of any economic policy production at DIRCO nor DTIC, a clear answer was offered at National Treasury. Furthermore, National Treasury had an Economic Planning Department where economic policy is determined and developed. In reaching out to this department, this study was denied an interview.

[30] General Bantu Holomisa is the leader of the United Democratic Movement (UDM) in parliament. A member of the portfolio committee on International Relations and former deputy minister in South Africa's government.
[31] Dr. Gumani Tshimomola is the Head of Research for the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). He was at the Public Affairs Research Institute at the University of Sussex. He is also a former budget and policy analyst at National Treasury in the South African government.

However, the co-ordination of this macro-economic policy by National Treasury prompted the broader understanding of the key strategic departments that interact with economic and foreign policy in government. In the executive of government, there are different clusters of cabinet ministries that interact with economic and foreign policy. Below are ministries that were part of the economic and international relations clusters in Mbeki's and Zuma's administrations (South African Government, 2014). In summary, these are the actors in government that have been influential in formulating domestic economic policy under the Mbeki and Zuma governments.

Figure 4

Common Ministries in the Economic and International Relations Clusters



MacPherson[32], from his experience as a former shadow Minister of the DTI, argued that it was not clear what South Africa economic policy was even before the consideration of an economic foreign policy. He added that an economic policy needed to be established first for the DTIC and DIRCO to know how they ought to coherently undertake their duties domestically then internationally. Thus, with the above ministries, there has not been any economic policy that guides the collective efforts of these ministries that can be referred to. Furthermore, with South Africa's foreign policy paper of 2011, there is no guidance on what the roles of these departments are in undertaking international economic activities. General Holomisa, as a current member of Portfolio Committee on International Relations in parliament, argued that "*South Africa's foreign policy is a haphazard policy. We do not have a coherent foreign policy*

[32] Mr Macpherson served as Shadow Minister for Trade and Industry for the Democratic Alliance in the Fifth Parliament (2014-2019). Currently serving as a member of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry in South Africa's parliament

that we can write home about." Consequently, this reflects poorly on the efforts by these departments in the economic and international relations clusters that have not been able to produce an economic foreign policy that guides South Africa's engagements with other international state and non-state actors. In DIRCO and the DTIC's case, there is an inability to produce an economic policy by the collective economic cluster domestically, before it translates to an economic foreign policy for an international audience.

Therefore, the most prevalent sentiment amongst interviewees was the idea of South Africa establishing and codifying a common understanding of its holistic national interests. Respondents were not sure if any national interests existed to guide what kind of policies would be established and deliver on what those interests are. Protea referred to a longstanding national interest white paper at DIRCO whose process of production and publication was not forthcoming. Qobo indicated that the "*lacuna in foreign policy*" was due to the lack of establishing what exactly South Africa's national priorities were. Ambassador Nhlapo argued that, even in security terms, economic diplomacy ought to be driven by a set of national interests, but these did not exist. General Holomisa believed that a country's national interests must inform economic foreign policy to address inequality. An overwhelming majority of respondents beyond the above, coming from different backgrounds, enlightened this study to this phenomenon of national interests and how South Africa desperately needed to undertake this task first so that any policy, strategic framework, activity and tool for economic development may be informed by such national interests.

To comprehend DIRCO's and the DTIC's bureaucratic tensions and fluidity, it became clear that political leadership was crucial to the economic foreign policy's existence and development. In South Africa's multiparty democracy, the ruling party and its alliance partners would be where the political leadership would initially be provided from a policy perspective, as per figure 3 in chapter 3; furthermore, for the presidency to also contribute to political leadership that does not blur the constitutional mandates, roles and responsibilities of ministries when it comes to policymaking, coordination and execution. However, in the absence of political leadership due to a hyper-focus on political dominance, especially in the ruling party, leadership that drives policy production is lost in translation.

Conclusively, this section presented from the respondents that the bureaucratic tensions and fluidity at DIRCO and the DTIC had many variables that impacted their ability to produce an effective economic foreign policy. The variables crucially begin at an economic policy that is determined outside of their domain at National Treasury. Therefore, this relegates DIRCO and the DTIC to implementors of policy and not originators nor participants of its making. Furthermore, the economic diplomacy domain at DIRCO has been lacking in skills, capacitation and technocrats, leaving this expertise at the DTIC – which also has had a handful of people with the required skillset. The weakness of the DTIC is being a specialised focus on domestic trade, investment and industrial policy which does not cover the composite of economic policy in areas such as security, amongst others. The establishment of numerous missions had not derived returns on investment for South Africa in some countries nor was the state able to translate conflict resolution to peace dividends for its successful work on the African continent. The government's economic and international relations clusters have failed to create, coordinate and implement economic policy that improves South Africa's foreign relations. All of this is due to a lack of strategic political leadership and an absence of clearly defined and coded national interests that will inform the state’s economic foreign policy. Thus, the identification of an economic foreign policy ought to be influenced by national interests of the state that guide the policymaking process across government.

The Legitimate Politicisation of the Domestic Policymaking Process: An Antithesis to the Depoliticisation Project

Politics is defined as a plural adjective that emanates from the word ‘*polis*’ which refers to the organisation of people in speaking, acting and deciding collectively (Cavarero, 2002:506). At state level, it pertains to settings where various actors formally organise themselves for participation in statutory structures of official public policy decision-making (de Nardis, 2017:341). Therefore, politicisation in the context of this study shall refer to the multi-actor contestation of public policy decision-making through statutory structures and processes. On the other hand, depoliticisation refers to the process of removing the (collective) political character of decision-making (Burnham, 2001: 128). Flinder and Buller defined depoliticisation as the "*the range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos[bureaucrats] that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a particular issue, policy field or specific decision*" (Flinder and Buller, 2006: 295-296).

Tshimomola asserted that what has been observed throughout the years in South Africa’s economic policy making domain was actually depoliticisation and not politicisation. In South

Africa, both politicisation and depoliticisation have existed throughout the years. However, formal politicised processes have been overshadowed by an entrenched culture of depoliticisation. The political nature of a multiparty democracy implies that politics will always exist at different levels of society, within and outside of the state. Politics as the collective contestation of ideas, policies, decision-making and more will always be part of state political processes. Therefore, there can never be an apolitical process of policy decision-making in South Africa; it will always be political, Springbok asserted (Sprinbok, 2022). Beginning with the tripartite alliance, that had the cadence of its political processes before 1994. Once the NDR was established and adopted in the alliance, it (the alliance and its policy positions) gained access to the state, its politicised structures and processes through the ANC as the governing party post 1994. The alliance's politics changed in 1996 when the ANC launched its GEAR economic framework, which bypassed alliance policy contestation and strayed from the NDR. This deviation permeated to the most influential bureaus internally as well when meetings of the tripartite alliance were no longer taking place but only secretary generals were meeting. A process that had been consultative and collective had become exclusive, just as in Mbeki's kitchen cabinet presidency.

From the onset of policy decision-making with the highly contested GEAR, the political culture of contestation shifted to incorporate several variables beyond the normative popular vote. The alien and undemocratic culture of selling votes for post-election beneficiation or patronage enabled the hyper-populist culture that was concentrated on ANC positions with strong state decision-making power (either with positions in government, parliament or business contracts). So, the ANC's factional culture of contestation was predicated on a cost-benefit analysis of what a vote for a given leader would achieve in the medium-to-long term. Nhlapo noted a very distinct feature of the ANC conferences becoming to be known as "*elective conferences*" instead of what they had been originally termed even before 1994: "*national conference*". He highlighted the fixation on the politics of elections instead of policy debates and discussions as one of the fundamental flaws in contestation politics within the ANC.

This symptom of elective over policy-led contestation in the alliance made its way overtly to government and parliament during Mbeki's tenure. His institutionalisation of the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), especially in the presidency, became one of his administration's significant weaknesses. One of this department's responsibilities was to coordinate policy from across government departments – an additional layer of policy coordination to already what department's such as DIRCO and DTIC were already doing concerning their own policy objectives. However, Chabane argued that this proved to be a challenge in government and in parliament because it displaced policy decision-making from departments and parliament into the presidency, led by what was alleged as Mbeki's cabinet which had the majority of his faction in cabinet. In 2005, shadow Minister of Trade and Industry from the Democratic Alliance, Enyinna Nkem-Abonta, lamented that the unit was a ministry for centralisation of power by Mbeki and had way too much power for an unelected body in government overseeing the economy and economic cluster, with a strategic projects budget of R165 billion. "*The creation of an economic super-ministry, however, is an outdated idea that will result in the overcentralisation of power and more bureaucratic red tape,*" said Nkem-Abonta (Mail and Guardian, 2005). This centralisation of power can be characterised as depoliticisation because of the normative policy coordination function being duplicated and commanded centrally from the presidency instead of being driven by relevant departments as echoed in their mission statements. By the time Mbeki departed the ANC and state presidencies, his policy decisions were centralised in his office rather than influenced by government departments and parliament – limiting policy decision-making across government, parliament and the tripartite alliance. This ushered the politics of factionalism and policy decision-making that was removed from normative state structures. Depoliticisation was introduced into state structures and processes.

During Zuma's tenure, DIRCO witnessed more political appointees emerging from outside the politicised process of appointing ambassadors and high commissioners abroad. According to Springbok, there once existed a policy that required ratios of career diplomats versus political appointees, where career diplomats had to be always in the majority for business continuity even with the changes in administrations every five years. Fabricius[33] shared the same sentiment by saying that "*under President Zuma, calculations showed that about 83% of ambassadorial appointments were political.*". The individuals' talent, abilities, and ability to represent South Africa's political and economic interests abroad were not considered. However, with the displacement of policy decision-making from departments into the presidency, it meant that non-state actors could become state representatives abroad. An economic foreign policy would further guide the kind of appointments of state foreign representatives abroad within a politicised process. In light of this, state relations become more skewed towards political over economic relations abroad. Ahead of 2012, when the NDP2030 was being

[33] Mr. Peter Fabricius is an independent journalist and analyst on foreign policy issues, writing mainly for the Daily Maverick, a South African newspaper, and the Institute for Security Studies.

produced by the National Planning Commission (NPC) in the presidency, chapter 7 of this strategic document was highly contested, especially in the executive. The then minister in the presidency for the NPC, Trevor Manuel, highly contested an unpublished version of chapter 7 that focused on South Africa's posture on foreign policy including economic diplomacy. Protea highlighted that he unilaterally called for this amendment to the chapter with little to no input from DIRCO. This corroborated the displacement of normative collective (interdepartmental) processes of policy formulation and decision-making to an ad hoc approach based on individual sentiments and preferences. A state founded on highly politicised processes and structure was becoming slowly depoliticised with each subsequent administration.

A frequent shift in ministers (ministry executives) and director generals (accounting officers) throughout the Mbeki and Zuma administrations also hindered economic foreign policy maturity. As administrations changed, and with executive reshuffles occasionally occurring during a single administrative period, it meant that any policy process would be affected. If the appointment of ministers and director generals by the president was along the lines of factional politics from within the ruling party, then departmental leaders would be appointed with a new political head. When they no longer aligned with the President's objectives, they would either reshuffled, sent abroad or dismissed altogether. Professor Qobo indicated that with new ministers came a constant shift in international relations at DIRCO – that one minister could be interested in one geopolitical region and the focus changed to another region with an incoming minister. The department's bureaucracy adjusted to changing strategic directives and policies at a slower pace than minister or director general changes that had happened overnight during Zuma's term. It took longer for the bureaucratic staff in government to align. Nhlapo posited that new administrations would be shaped by the politics "*from within the governing party and not the economic demands or legal realities of the country*" . Furthermore, personality clashes and trust deficits occurred frequently enough to stall economic and foreign policy maturity. When Minister Gordhan, it was along factional lines and a trust deficit between a sitting President and member of his cabinet overseeing a critical economic ministry, National Treasury. This fuelled the depoliticised ad hoc decision-making that affected South Africa's economic diplomacy efforts abroad. This study does not claim that economic foreign policy will perfect actor decision-making or policy-making processes. However, it argues that such a policy would guide, give account and limit the depoliticisation that has permeated throughout the entire government.

Because one party dominates portfolio committees, Parliament makes poor economic and foreign policy decisions. Mr. Jacaranda[34] believed that parliament did not significantly advance the state's trade, industrial, or broader economic policy. This is caused by South African politics being based chiefly on election by popularity and secondarily the true reason leaders participate in politics. Popularity in politics and politicised processes are inseparable, and they cannot be divorced from elective contestation in any organisation that purports to represent people in formal government structures. Therefore, popularity will always remain an inherent part of the politicised process. The reason why leaders participate in political processes can only be truly reflected in the decisions they make once they are in office. Many respondents claimed that parliament's decisions reflected the majority party's goals rather than policy scrutiny, debate, and recommendations. This reflection was through the 'strength in numbers' that the ANC has had in parliament, which enabled policy to pass through without much contestation. This is a process that restricts consultative approaches to collective decision making – which leads to depoliticisation. Whilst decisions are through legitimate processes and structures, actors empowered to further develop policy and make decisions do so for their own (organisational) interests over national interests. The respondents observed that the inherent popularity contests that occur outside of parliament in political parties were producing members of Parliament that had no acumen in matters concerning policymaking, especially in the economic and foreign policy domain. And whilst politicians could apply themselves to these domains without being subject matter experts, members were not rising to the occasion that contributed to better policy decision-making (Macpherson, 2022). Additionally, not only were ANC members voting along the party lines, another layer of factional lines within the ANC was entrenched in policy decision-making within parliament.

It is expected that the majority party will vote for its policies, but policymaking flaws occur when policies are not matched with national interests. Errors occur when the majority party has more members to defend the indefensible just to pass its policies (Chabane, 2022). This subduing by the majority party using the formal voting procedure in parliament illustrates a fundamental weakness in a structure where policy decision-making may be distorted for political purposes. While political structures were built to facilitate strong politicised processes, people engaging policy through official mechanisms were damaging the outcomes of formalised structures. This form of policy decision-making, especially in parliament, cannot

[34] Mr. Jacaranda (anonymous) is a corporate leader at Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA).

sustain a healthy and efficient policymaking culture. It remains a system where the ruling party is still sensitive to partisan politics than a non-partisan approach.

Jacaranda noted that there had been no significant instances where members had voted against what the executive had presented as trade or industrial policy in Parliament. He argued that it was due to the executive being drawn from the same parliament where the majority party had dominance in all structures of parliament. He reckoned that, if there had been a different system that perhaps involved opposition parties controlling the NCOP and National Assembly in parliament, some politicised contestation would give accountability a platform of expression. The inability of the public to directly elect their representatives directly into Parliament would only leave the assumption that they represent South Africa. Moreover, the majority party being in government and in the executive, with the same party having to make itself accountable through parliament, presents a challenge that needs to be resolved, especially at party level.

Conversely, Professor Ismail argued that opposition parties also needed a different form of maturity that does not see them only opposing the governing party but also contesting policies at their core principles without inferring models from other countries which are constituted differently from South Africa. Moreover, being an opposition party for the sake of opposition only was not what Parliament needed in order to produce better policies on the other side of debates. He elaborated that, from a foreign policy perspective, opposition parties did not need to support external countries or geopolitical adversaries in order to get the domestic government to move on a policy or matter. Even though this may create robust debate, it turns parties against their own country's national interests. He also inferred that was the case at times with the business fraternity as well.

During Mbeki's tenure a lot of displacement in policy decision-making was observed, owing to a centralisation of policy coordination and vetting through the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services unit in the presidency. Zuma ascended to a structure whose processes had been displaced and depoliticised already. Thus, his administration never set off on the right foundations but continued in a distorted structure and process of mainly economic policy making. Furthermore, in perpetuating this displacement and continuing with what had become a culture of centralising power and factionalism within the ANC, the Zuma Administration was plagued with a further distortion of how policy decision-making could not mature in already-derelict economic and foreign policy environments in government. This showed that the centralisation and depoliticisation initiative had entered all the major politicised processes and structures in the state, with actors utilising authority to comply to the political mandate of the governing party or executive department. Moreover, with highly frequent resignations of executive leadership in successive administrations. Thus, in initially claiming that the process that enabled economic foreign policy making as politicised, this study's respondents revealed that it was a depoliticisation characterised by centralising power and using constituted structures for superseding formalised political processes. Therefore, a healthily decentralised and politicised state had become unhealthily centralised and depoliticised as observed throughout the years of consecutive administrations. In essence, politicisation had always been under the shadow of depoliticisation.

Boundaries and Barriers that Exclude Critical Actors from the Domestic Policymaking Process

The depoliticisation project created another layer of governance and excluded essential strategic actors whose work required their contributions to the domestic economic foreign policy making process. This exclusion entails decision-making authority being taken away from actors legitimated to make those decisions, longstanding policies that are not updated to fit the ever-changing international relations environment, and domestic actors and the environment they operate in being continuously weakened through the influence of non-state actors.

To comprehend DIRCO's value, its position in government decision-making should be established to determine whether it should be repurposed to play a more comprehensive role that can improve economic policymaking. Beyond individual ministries, government has had an approach of clustering ministries that participate in different socio-economic sectors. DIRCO is only represented in the international cooperation, trade and security cluster (South African Government News Agency, 2014). DIRCO being in only one cluster relegates it to policy implementation rather than policymaking. Economic foreign policy necessitates DIRCO's centrality to the process and its participation in the domestic economic cluster as well. This enables the department to translate South Africa's national and economic interests better to the international community without making it exclusive to the DTIC. Ambassador Nhlapo said DIRCO was "*not even consulted*" and just "*scribbled*" a few things into a national economic growth framework for Chapter 7 of the NDP2030 framework. This echoed Protea's sentiments that this chapter of the NDP was unilaterally directed from the presidency's planning commission. Therefore, DIRCO's exclusion from the economic cluster impedes on its policy development participation and influence in domestic policymaking. Its omission from actively engaging in a strategic economic growth framework like the NDP2030 consigns it to policy execution rather than policymaking. Therefore, DIRCO can only make execution decisions and not policy decisions where it should constantly be making policy inputs based on its expert understanding and knowledge of the domestic and international environments.

What further weakens DIRCO's position in government is the system that gives provinces powers similar to federal powers to make, implement and execute on their own foreign policy goals. According to the South African constitution of 1996, Chapter 14 (schedule 4 and 5), there are no powers given to the provinces that enable them to undertake any foreign policy or international relations work. The constitution does not recognise provinces as subjects of international law. The closest constitutional powers given to provinces on foreign policy are on matters concerning trade, and they can undertake them without the involvement of the national government. South African provinces can separately pursue commerce and investment to develop their provincial interests with counterparts abroad (Geldenhuys, 1998:4-5). This weakens and sometimes challenges DIRCO's ability to truly coordinate the country's national interests because DIRCO could direct its efforts to certain directions whilst provinces are pulling in different directions. Qobo commented that DIRCO was "*an institution that was already struggling to assert itself*". Furthermore, Makokera[35] said that there was a lack of formal strategy and approach from government and its agencies – be it national, provincial or even city level.

This uncoordinated national approach to actors within the foreign policy environment presents risks and policy contradictions that may put South Africa in difficult positions. An analogy to elaborate on this unique complexity is that: South Africa may take a policy, security or trade stance against country X as a response to how it wants to align itself internationally to strengthen its positions, whilst a province could override this to either undertake trade and investment relations with provinces or cities in the same country. Sovereignty is indivisible. Thus, whatever a province does abroad to strengthen the economic position of the province is seen in South African terms and not provincial terms. This precarious public policy position

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has the potential to put the country at risk but also significantly lessens DIRCO's authority internationally in matters concerning South Africa's economic foreign policy. Similarly, the DTIC is also affected as provinces can sign trade and investment agreements without going through the national departments as well.

Parliament and its portfolio and select committees have also been sidelined in economic international policy making and influence. Due to skills, partisan politics, and capacity issues, many respondents, including DIRCO and DTIC portfolio committee members, believed these committees had regressed in scrutinising and deliberating on foreign and economic policy. The country then became reliant on only the executive to create and implement policy and on the judiciary to take any recourse on adverse policy impacts. Protea argued that, when things are not running well in departments, instead of them being resolved, checked and accounted for in parliament they were being accounted for in the courts of law – which excludes parliament from effectively undertaking its duties in the policy process. This eventuality of parliament's exclusion in the policymaking process had been contributed to by the depoliticisation project that could function without much need for parliament except its ability to streamroll policies, as per Leon. For years, policy decision-making and authority had been moved from parliament to the presidency. Opposition parties, because of their minority numbers, could not sufficiently challenge this. Thus, they are also excluded.

It is also hard to attract critically-skilled human capital into the economic and foreign policy environments of government when several variables indicate that they would be better off in other environments. Macpherson pointed out that the remuneration for highly educated and skilled individuals is higher in the private sector than in the public sector. He argued that "*If you want to have economists in parliament, you're going to have to pay economists' salaries*". In countering Calland's arguments on parliament being a rubber-stamping mechanism for the majority party, majority of correspondents argued that the ANC needed to be held accountable for the quality of members it brings into parliament because of their inability to be effective MPs that apply their minds to the work of the committees. Mainly opposition parties added that the significant views heard in the portfolio committees are that of trade unions and academics who are more socialist in ideological leaning than more balanced views from different schools of thought in a diverse society (Macpherson, 2022).

This exclusion was also witnessed in the lack of coordination in presidential visits abroad, which were not anchored on policy nor any form of coordination but were a result of decisions that were not part of the normative economic system of South Africa's international relations promotion. Makokera recollected from her numerous visits abroad, as part of the presidential delegation (during Zuma's administration) together with business representatives, that it was clear that there was a lack of formality in the work that was being done. She said that it was very much an informal environment they operated from. And because of this, opportunities for biased and vested interests to distort certain decisions emerged. She added that, in such environments, the state was left open to the influence of particular economic factions within the ruling coalition. Firms would also get "*the upper hand*" in certain initiatives and their particular influence in decision-making as well. It is uncertain what roles departments like DIRCO or DTIC were playing in such international visits (apart from executing them), as the direction relations, trade and investments were being influenced by non-state actors to the exclusion of official and legitimate state actors. Furthermore, it is also uncertain where this external influence is originating from; whether from ANC factional groupings, individuals with direct relations to decision-makers in government, or business representatives who aggressively asserted themselves in government.

Over the years, the state's cross-functional, exclusionary culture has kept many essential strategic actors out of its economic and foreign policy machinery. Businesses, particularly multinationals, have internally capacitated themselves with the skills to expand beyond South African borders on their own. This is because not all businesses have the ability and inclination to navigate through the turbulence of politics and bureaucratic inefficiencies in government, particularly at DIRCO which should enable such opportunities. The disadvantage in this is that, like provinces, sovereignty is indivisible. Thus, when South African multinational business pursue their business interests abroad, they are also representatives of the country. Whatever experience consumers engage with in other countries, in these businesses, will always be attributed to South Africa as a country. Therefore, it is crucial for South Africa's economic foreign policy that DIRCO chiefly increases its efforts in coordinating incoming and outgoing economic flows of business-led activities through a guided economic foreign policy.

Mandela's vision for NEDLAC to be the core of pluralistic policymaking has faded with NEDLAC's legitimacy and relevance is put into question. Firstly, the representation of its constituencies: whether they were truly representing the sectors they claimed to represent and their interests – beginning with the labour fraternity. COSATU's inability to attract new unions and to acquaint itself with the new emergent labour class (semi and skilled labourers, the bureaucratic middle class) has hurt its affiliations, ultimately affecting the broader federation.

The union's survival depends on its ability to adapt to a new working class and represent them economically, socially, and politically in the workplace. However, COSATU has not proven to have conquered this slow disease that has been eating away at its affiliations and individual members. Because educated workers can express their concerns and understand most of the complexities of their remuneration packages and job conditions, they need unions less (Buhlungu, 2010:100-102). Regrettably, COSATU has moved away from pursuing the interest of this new emergent working class and settled for its fight for survival only within the tripartite alliance (Buhlungu, 2010:96). The most destructive tensions within COSATU came from its significant trade unions that fell under its banner had affected its organisational culture and influence in policy decision-making. The period between 2009 and 2014 was a definitive one which ended with *"the expulsion of the federation's biggest affiliate at the time, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), and COSATU's general secretary, Mr Zwelinzima Vavi"* (Craven, 2016:ix). Therefore, within COSATU as well, the biggest contingent of unionised labour has not been included anymore as part of its representation into policy inputs. Since South Africa's economy was heavily dependent on mining, this greatly reduced COSATU's economic influence. Another significant labour contingent that has not been included is the casual labour fraternity, whose employment is through agencies and not directly insourced nor are part of any unionised structure. The way their employment is set up makes it hard for them to be unionised in COSATU to influence policy. Kim, and van der Westhuizen agree that COSATU excludes many workers, especially in manufacturing and services industry. Thus, it only represents a fraction of South Africa's actual labour force (Kim and van der Westhuizen, 2015: 90). COSATU's influence and bargaining power are therefore significantly reduced. Moreover, it is difficult to regard COSATU's policy inputs at NEDLAC as cumulative inputs of the labour sector, as they exclude majority of the working class of South Africa.

Protea highlighted a significant observation that also indicates that, as the years unfolded, NEDLAC was operating with operational staff who had no executive policy decision making power. In the games, there are two levels of decision-making: one higher level represented by executives with the authority to make decisions, then a lower level of individuals who do not have decision-making authority but are more operational. The lower-level representatives from all sectors were convening with no real authority to make policy inputs nor decisions during NEDLAC meetings. This prolonged the time it took to compile policy inputs and to have decisions made based on these inputs that would be part of economic policy. Kim and van der

Westhuizen argued that there was a lack of technical skills and capacity at NEDLAC altogether. Issues ranged from strengthening the position of the secretariat to poor implementation of detail policies and the undermining of NEDLAC as a socio-economic policy engine by government department and parliament (Kim and van der Westhuizen, 2015:95-96). As per Alistair Smith's sentiments, NEDLAC was treated as a "*step-child*" of policymaking decisions. This is another key institution that DIRCO has been excluded from. DIRCO has no representation on this platform. Whilst it is domestically focused, most of domestic economic policy always translates into economic foreign policy which would require DIRCO's coordination. However, it is the DTIC that is represented here. Through its international trade attachés, it coordinates matters of trade.

Convincingly, DIRCO's lack of assertiveness into the domestic economic policy making environment further weakens its position as a department that must lead economic foreign policy making efforts rather than being an implementer of policy. This is evident it its participation in only one government cluster, especially during Zuma's administration – the international cooperation security and trade cluster. The economic cluster in which DIRCO is not represented is where economic policy is influenced from. Thus, it could have been beneficial for DIRCO to be part of the process in the domestic setting as well. DIRCO's lack of representation at NEDLAC is also an indication that its domestic involvement in matters of economic policies is minimal. With a weak parliament portfolio committee, DIRCO has struggled to fulfil its economic and foreign policy mandate. The most fundamental constitutional promulgation that weakens DIRCO's domestic and international position is the ability of provinces and cities to undertake their own trade-related initiatives on their own, with the oversight of the national government in an international environment that does not divide a state's sovereignty.

The broader government environment lacks the ability to attract skilled human capital that will come and capacitate the economic and foreign policy decision-making capabilities In statutory bodies such as NEDLAC economic policy is influenced and decided upon for recommendation to parliament; the representation thereof, particularly of labour where unions have been in continuous contention and the mining sector as the biggest labour representation the country and casual workers have not been included. This questions COSATU's representation of the labour force at NEDLAC. Moreover, its eventual irrelevance was caused by the lack of technical skills to implement policies and by key decision-makers leaving deliberations to lower-level representatives with limited policy decision-making authority. Therefore, economic foreign policy would never mature in conditions such as these.

Lastly, Makokera recalled that, due to foreign policy's concentration in the presidency in both Mbeki and Zuma Administrations, the informal manner in which international presidential visits were undertaken were undermining South Africa's economic foreign policy efforts abroad – as there were clear signs of influence from non-state actors such as the ruling party and its alliance, factionalism, and private firm interests influencing decision making to be distorted at government level. This excludes businesses that could not navigate a highly depoliticised approach in international trade and investment. Thus, these businesses chose to expand independently and establish internal skills to support and facilitate their activities abroad without state involvement. The exclusion of critical actors in legitimised processes of government has contributed to the underdevelopment of economic foreign policy in South Africa.

The Multistakeholder and Consultative Approach to Policymaking Enabling the Proliferation Of Actors in Policy Making

In a free and democratic state, how different organisations decide to establish and represent their interests is up to their own accord. However, it is different when organisations have a direct or indirect impact on the outcomes of a state's public policy making process. Zoning into foreign policy, Ismail said that *"your foreign policy is only as strong as your domestic policy and the coherence of your domestic policy. So, if you are not being coherent at home, you are going to be weak abroad"*. This strength and coherence are highly dependent on who the domestic actors are and their interests in the economic and foreign policy environments. However, there is also a clear observation on the biggest influences on policy based on the outcomes and positions those certain policies uphold. In the South African context, there are multiple participants in the domestic process of policymaking and structures in which policy flows through.

The signals of where economic and foreign policy are headed emanate from the ANC in its policy positions as outcomes of its consultations with its tripartite alliance partners. Ambassador Nhlapo illustrated a high-level flow of policy from the ANC. The ANC releases its annual January 08 statement; then there is an ANC Lekgotla (gathering) comprising of ANC NEC members together with alliance representatives in the NEC; then a government cabinet

Lekgotla follows, where majority of the participants are the same as the ANC Lekgotla; lastly, a State of The Nation Address (SONA) is formulated for promulgation to the nation. The observation over the years is that there is a diversion from the January 08 statement to the SONA promulgations because other influencers in that process come in to change the priorities and policy positions of the original statement. Nhlapo argued that this undermined the consistency of the ANC as a significant policy shaper in the country. However, this may also be viewed as the ANC's nature of a broad church that accommodates a spectrum of viewpoints and policy positions that touch on the major socio-economic issues of the country. This hampers policymaking, especially if the main actor that needs to affect economic and foreign policy is giving mixed signals in policymaking from themselves to government.

General Holomisa argued that it was companies with significant market value in 1994 that shifted the ANC's core nationalisation economic policies to more neoliberal policies. He asserted that the tripartite has never agreed on a macroeconomic policy for the country. Therefore, this confuses South Africa's international economic desks abroad on what is the overall approach of the country to economics actually is. Mandela's administration had to convince big businesses that the state would not control all commerce and that they would have some freedom to operate in the country. At the time, this was a nation-building exercise and also a strategy for economic stability. Moreover, it created a relationship between government and business that cultivated a "*patriotic bourgeoisie*" from the business sector, lest they be left to their mercantilist way of doing business (Ismail, 2022). It was equally crucial for businesses to align to the country's new policies, as businesses are also executors of the country's economic foreign policy abroad. Clearly, South Africa's main economic and diplomatic pools are business representatives working abroad and their alignment to national interests that fit with their interests. These business representatives continue to undertake their business pursuits with South Africa's backing, without much feedback on their work and experiences to domestic policymaking – except at NEDLAC, where there is also limited representation of the broader business fraternity. Only major businesses are represented through Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA, 2022). These business experiences are beneficial in shaping economic foreign policy because they form part of South Africa's economic pursuits to an international audience. The guidance from state policy will ensure a coordinated and coherent international approach.

In government, Professor Mohale[36] indicated that cabinet and MPs were too many for a country with a population size of 61 million. He noted that China, with its 1.3 billion people and second-largest economy, has half as many public representatives as South Africa.

There are also duplicate efforts and mandates with commissions, committees and experts commissioned on policy inputs within government. In policy planning and solutioning, these formations override the core business of departments. Additionally, these statutory formations had no relationships with the departments. Ambassador Nhlapo cited the DPME and the NPC in the presidency as policy institutions that were not fulfilling their mandate for comprehensive policy formulation and implementation. He said that the NDP2030 produced by the NPC was the weakest economic strategic framework that has been produced thus far by the country. In investigating further on this line of thought, this study discovered that there was a Ministerial Review Panel (MRP) instituted within DIRCO, towards the end of Zuma's administration; it gathered inputs of different stakeholders (with representation from government, private and public institutions, civil society and social partners) on the needs, renewal and performance of South Africa's foreign policy direction (DIRCO Ministerial Review Panel Report, 2019). This mandate was similar to NEDLAC's mandate – another duplicate. However, this committee did not fulfil the mandate needed to transform foreign policy due to a change in administration. The DPME, in its statutory mandate, was also tasked with this mandate in its national planning coordination responsibilities. To review whether or not departments were performing according to the policies and mandates they ought to implement. Furthermore, both the DPME and the NPC had a duplicate planning statutory mandate.

It is clear from the respondents that government needs to provide political leadership in restoring the legitimacy of institutions such as NEDLAC, and senior leaders of all economic stakeholders involved needed to return to taking this platform seriously. However, in classifying the respondents into segments, it was clear that labour did not trust the business fraternity to fully put the interests of the country first. Business and opposition parties believe that NEDLAC is "*dysfunctional*" or "*dead*". Professor Mohale added that NEDLAC was being bypassed in favour of direct stakeholder engagement. For example, if business needed an agreement with labour, they would go directly to labour and vice versa, bypassing other NEDLAC stakeholders and having a major economic impact. To Makokera's point, it was

[36] Professor Mohale is a Chancellor of University of Free State, Professor of Practice at the Johannesburg Business School's College of Business and Economics, and Chairman of the Bidvest Group Limited, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) and Arcelomittal. He is a published author and respected business leader who has held chairmanships and directorships at some of South Africa's top companies.

quite evident that there is a chasmic trust deficit between the stakeholders at NEDLAC. Within the business organisations and consultancy segments, there were respondents who felt that NEDLAC was still functional and needed administrative strength to deliver effective stakeholder engagements. This culture of too many actors in the domestic policy making space can be traced back to the tripartite alliance: as the alliance and individual organisations in the alliance weakened, the ripple effect goes into government, trade unions and the institution of NEDLAC as well.

What was clear from the respondents was that there were instances where decisions were taken completely outside the state. Makokera indicated that, beyond the factionalism in the ruling party, individuals and particular businesses had a heavy-handed influence on what the decisions would be during presidential investment visits abroad. What also emerged was a culture of "*tenderpreneurship*", where business owners elicited government business contracts for short- and long-term financial gains. Professor Mohale also said that, under the Zuma Administration, brazen decision-making was being made in the quarters of the close associates of the president that were not in the government or any statutory institutions.

The state has not been able to coalesce the many actors with different interests around a common economic policy. Nevertheless, this is due to the lack of a national interest that state actors can align with to further their own objectives. Since 1996, the tripartite alliance has been unable to find common ground on macroeconomic policy. That left COSATU and SACP to push for their own economic policy positions, revealing the alliance's weakness—they had a political treaty but no economic agreement. As businesses have been key in advancing South Africa's economy abroad and shaping the country's economy towards an open economy, they remain key stakeholders of economic policy execution domestically and internationally. However, this role of business as an economic driver has also brought much distrust from the labour fraternity, especially at NEDLAC, because business has been seen to always put its mercantilist or capitalist interests ahead of the country's interests. NEDLAC as an institution has mixed views from cross-sectoral respondents because government has "*juniorised*" it, as per Professor Mohale; this has weakened and brought its legitimacy into question in the business fraternity and to other political parties in parliament as well. NEDLAC has echoed that it has been treated as a "*stepchild*" by government, and departments have had less need for policy discussions at NEDLAC. It was mostly respondents at operational level at the DTIC, business associations and consultancy that believed that NEDLAC still had a chance of survival or needed a regeneration from all stakeholders to return to its glory days under Mandela's and

Mbeki's administrations. Finally, in government there have also been too many actors who duplicate the policymaking efforts that normatively should be undertaken by departments such as committees and commissions. The NPC in the presidency is one such formation. DIRCO itself has had a review panel and reports given on forward-looking policy and operational inputs, which questions the role of a department such as the DPME in the presidency, once again. Beyond the presidency, departments and NEDLAC, provinces also have their own prerogative to undertake their own trade policies and initiatives internationally with their counterparts. This continues to be the case in South Africa because the actors and the policy decision-making processes have remained the same throughout the years without yielding any progress towards the production of a coherent, well-expressed and codified economic foreign policy.

Political Ideological Influences: The Foundations of Policy Schizophrenia

Before 1994, there were records of ideological differences that were observed in the ANC. As an illustration, the Pan African Congress of Azania (PAC) of Robert Sobukwe broke out from the ANC to become its own movement in 1959, and later its own political party (Chabane, 2022). Levi defines ideology to be "*conceived of as a set of normative values and relatively enduring beliefs. The values refer to ideas about what ought to be.*" (Levi, 1970:3). Levi makes a clear distinction between ideology and (national) interests that normatively refer to specific beneficial goals. He separates the two but asserts that they go hand in hand. He argued that an ideology is for man to converge the reality of the world around him to guide his behaviour. He elaborated that hope, expectation and faith would entail ideas about what a future reality ought to be, but beliefs were part of an ideology and must relate to principles, to fundamentals, and to aspects of reality that can be generalised – which lack the certainty of knowledge (Levi, 1970:3-4). The values and beliefs of an ideology – in contrast to national interests which have become objects of foreign policy – have no specific referent, according to Levi. This placed frameworks such as RDP, GEAR, ASGISA, NGP and NDP2030 as values and beliefs of an ideology since they had no reference to a set of values or enduring beliefs. These were aspirational frameworks on where economic growth would take South Africa. Whilst from

2011 Foreign Policy White Paper, it can be deduced that human rights and Ubuntu[37] were core ideologies on which foreign policy was based.

Tshimomola argued that, in the tripartite alliance, the only entity that could be argued to have an ideology was the SACP because it was the only organisation with an idea that had a position on how the resources in the country could be commanded and distributed amongst citizens: a state commanded economy through its communist ideology. He said that this kind of ideology may signal to investors from abroad what form of resource distribution policies they would be dealing with once they choose to invest in South Africa. The ANC has no ideology because it is a broad-church organisation that accommodates people of all ideological backgrounds, and its ideologies therefore have no centre to hold onto. Conversely, COSATU has no ideology that labour followed in South Africa besides fighting for fair compensation for workers. The basis of the ANC and COSATU's ideologies are from the SACP.

There is a lack of strategic planning in the alliance's economic domain hindered by an enduring marriage to solidarity politics in the international community. Even the country's solidarity politics have not matured to bring further development of South Africa's economic interests abroad, especially in communist countries. Throughout the years, the tripartite alliance has not undertaken the introspective exercise of defining its economic interests and how they ought to be pursued in South Africa and internationally. Its main focus has been on the internal politics that retains the culture of patronage through an ANC-led government. Therefore, because of its significant influence in foreign policy making in the country, the ripple effect or a lack of adequately-defined national economic interests from the alliance is not clear. The decline of the ANC throughout the years will also decline the alliance, as it is the dominant party in the alliance. Additional sentiments that Protea shared were that foreign policy is an area that need not be dominated by politics, as it is not an election issue; it should be driven mainly by economic interests in the international arena. Another way in which the ANC-SACP's ideological influence permeated the economic domain domestically was seen on who led the trade and industry portfolio in the executive. Protea argued that, observed over time, it was being led by the communist leaders of the alliance, with individuals like Alec Erwin, Rob Davies and Ebrahim Patel. Makokera saw this translation of ideology to execution as an act of outsourcing economic approach or *"firmly giving control of key aspects of economic policy to*

[37] "South Africa is a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country that embraces the concept of Ubuntu as a way of defining who we are and how we relate to others. The philosophy of Ubuntu means 'humanity' and is reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others." South Africa Foreign Policy White Paper, 2011

ministers, leadership and champions that come from the SACP and COSATU.". Therefore, the contention of ideology in the kind of economic foreign policy that South Africa should produce is facilitated by communist and labour inclined leaders.

Beyond the dominance of Marxist-leaning experts in parliament, in the executive, a communist-leaning approach to trade is obsessed with imposing domestic taxes on imported goods to defend the domestic market and promote domestic demand for domestic products (Macpherson, 2022). However, this approach of a communist protectionist state was only protecting a few players domestically and driving rent-seeking behaviour that increased domestic prices of the protected products. Whilst this affirms the role of the state in guarding the domestic market (though protecting only a few companies domestically) against international companies and capital flight out of the country, it also goes against the broad-church philosophy of the ANC and government whilst affirming the socialist philosophy of the tripartite alliance – contributing to further ideological contradictions. Therefore, in trying to cultivate a vibrant economy domestically by limiting international players in certain industries, the domestic economy ends up catering for a few players in industries protected by state policy. Economic policy becomes immature in being domestically protectionist in some industries that are trying to attract investments in other industries. This sends mixed policy signals to an international audience.

The broad-church approach of the ANC is an ideology whose flaw is exposed when economic policy must be codified and expressed. The accommodation of socialists, capitalists and labour would be challenging for the ANC because it would be difficult to hold one policy position without excluding the policy positions of the different ideological members of the broad-church. Hence, the absence of an ideological position in foreign policy as well. Therefore, the ANC cannot confidently express its economic policies to one ideology because it asserts a mixed-economy policy. Thus, a mixed economy was the best that could be done to accommodate everyone. Makokera argued that the presence of business in the economy as a key actor from 1994 had always impacted the economic ideologies that the ANC-led government undertook and still do because the government must account for every economic actor in order to derive policies that will accommodate them all.

Thus, when the study enquired on what the alliance policies such as GEAR, ASGISA, NGP and the NDP2030 were, respondents did not attribute them to economic policies but to "*visions*", "*goals*", "*aspirations*", and "*beliefs*". Whilst Macpherson attributed these to goals, he argued that they should be followed by an economic policy to achieve them. Tshimomola also argued that these "*beliefs*" do not provide a coordinated and coherent process that determines how the country's resources will be distributed to benefit its citizens: the economic input and output process. According to Professor Ismail, government can formulate strategic economic growth frameworks, but business will not apply them unless they share the same vision. Therefore, a mixed economy and mixed ideological approaches were the only plausible way to convene all economic and social stakeholders domestically to rally behind government's vision and goals for the economy.

GEAR was the ideological point of inflection in South Africa's economic and foreign policy. It was the evidence that the ANC-led government had departed from the communist Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that the alliance settled to be the strategic framework that would bring economic growth for the country. From there on, ideological contentions and contestations became an inherent part of South Africa's economic and foreign policy processes and deliberations, as different actors tried to assert how their approach to the economy and foreign policy was best placed to grow the economy. Therefore, in the midst of constant contentions on economic approaches, it is hard to settle on an a single-minded and purposed economic policy domestically that will translate internationally as well.

Chabane attributed these strategic frameworks as outcomes of ideological contentions particularly in the tripartite alliance. COSATU's strong contention after the NGP brought about the broader consultative approach that produced the NDP2030. These contentions were also influenced by the way the three organisations in the tripartite alliance interpreted the international environment, which is not the same. These interpretations must somehow find expression in policy positions in economic and foreign policy. Over the years, South Africa's foreign policy has undertaken policy positions in the international arena that had stark differences, such as being part of the Non-Aligned Movement then later joining BRICS. The domestic inconsistencies were prevailing internationally, in organisational membership decisions. Mbeki's foreign policy focused on deepening African political and economic links, whereas Zuma's focused on entrenching south-to-south relations with South Africa's new international partners. From a trade perspective, BRICS had not materialised significant economic exchanges for South Africa to justify its membership within the multilateral institutions (Mlangeni[38], 2022). Therefore, this study's assertion is that, in the absence of a clear economic foreign policy, this schizophrenic approach to international organisations and institutions will persist to disadvantage South Africa's economic positioning internationally. A critical consideration is that South Africa has not reviewed nor released a foreign policy document or stance since 2011, which does not coincide with the rate of change in economic growth frameworks that change every 5.5 years. The 2011 Foreign Policy White Paper asserts an international environment that is changing rapidly. However, the department – the chief advisor to the President on matters concerning foreign policy – is not reviewing the country's stance according to this rapidly-changing international environment.

The Democratic Alliance argued that the ideology that ought to anchor South Africa's foreign policy anywhere in the world ought to be that of human rights (Bergmann, 2022). This is an area of strength, and it is how South Africa had reintroduced itself to the world post-1994 using the Mandela legacy sufficiently. This study find this view limited because a strict following of a human rights approach to foreign policy would have meant that the country also expressed its position against its significant trade partners with questionable human rights records, which may cost it economically. Bergmann said that foreign policy should not be a place of ideologies guided by the past and its loyalties, but a place of choosing the principles in which to engage the international community and being consistent with these principles. He added that, without an approach that is guided by a well-coded and expressed foreign policy, the country exposes itself to aligning with countries that negatively impact South Africa's unique position in the international environment. In the principles that Bergmann refers to, there is no centre-holding as South Africa has north-to-south, south-to-south and many other international organisations whose political ideologies fundamentally differ from South Africa. For the ANC to be a broad church and then execute economic and foreign policy through using a neo-liberal apparoach of a semi-open market approache is a dichotomy against its own communist and socialist support base. Parliament and legislative processes were poorer because of this, and economics needed more pragmatic and practical approaches from a balance of various schools of thought that steer away from ideological centres.

Contrary to other respondents, Springbok argued that ideology would always be part of foreign policy, and that it can never be neutral but needed to be balanced with realistic evaluations of

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where the state was at the time in which it made a foreign policy related decision, especially relating to the economy. Therefore, in having a vision of where the country needed to be, it needed to make decisions in which national interests are made alongside ideologies.

Consequently, the SACP – the only organisation with an ideology in the tripartite alliance – has failed to influence the country's economic interests from its ideology core. The ANC as the leading organisation in the alliance did not have an ideology but maintained a broad-church approach that did not give it a core to operate from, thus leaving its ideology very fluid throughout the years. The broad-church had to go hand in hand with a mixed neo-liberal economy for any policy to progress both domestically and internationally, as most of the respondents highlighted this. Respondents that argued otherwise could not settle on the ideology that drives South Africa's foreign policy interests abroad but on goals, visions, beliefs and aspirations. Unfortunately, many presidents have pursued varied foreign policy goals without consistency, which has hindered progress for the country. Outside the tripartite alliance's internal ideological disputes, there were ideological disputes with other economic players whose convergence has been impossible due to the lack of unifying ideas, goals, aspirations, and beliefs on South Africa's identity domestically and internationally. This reverberated back to the lack of national interests that all economic and foreign policy actors could convene on and support. Moreover, with each administration the foreign policy positions were being guided by different goals and a rapidly changing international environment which did not correspond with the domestic frequent changes in economic growth strategic frameworks. Additionally, it was clear that the chasm of ideological differences between business and labour would always bring about a lack of trust between these two fraternities; this increased the chasm of convergence behind an overarching national ideology and, eventually, policy approaches. This has also been witnessed at NEDLAC. Whilst it was clear that the state wished to embed itself more in the trade and commercial activities in the economy, these areas worked differently from what the state aspire them to be. Therefore, South Africa has, over the years, augmented the role of solidarity ideologies in foreign policy over pragmatic foreign policy making, and decisions that bring about a balance of its interests and international relations with other nations. Thus, this contributed to the inability to bring about a mature economic foreign policy for all actors to rally behind.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

The economic domain of any country is a cross-sectoral area that impacts each and every public and private organisation, institution, platform, interest groups and, most importantly, citizen of a country. It is to their betterment that policies should reflect their collective needs. No country is able to achieve this betterment on its own. Therefore, every country must engage with the rest of the world in the international arena to find suitable partners that will help it achieve this goal. Consequently, a country must assign its international relations department the duties of constantly engaging the international community in order to achieve the goals of bettering the lives of its citizens. Chief amongst its responsibilities is to portray the national interests of the country abroad in hope for both political and economic relations to succeed. It is through an economic foreign policy that this can be achieved, as every pursuit abroad should be guided chiefly by policy, then principles and goals of a country's national interests. These only come about when the domestic environment has undertaken the heavily-administrative, back-and-forth efforts of producing an economic policy. This economic policy is then given an international audience through the means of a foreign policy whose aim is to drive a balance of economic and political engagements that ought to yield return on investments back into the country. An economic foreign policy driven with a singular purpose of development and cross-sectoral impact in various industries is what every country needs to succeed internationally. As Bojang posited, foreign policy is the convergence of domestic and international politics in the economic domain (Bojang, 2018:1).

It is important for government to heed the learnings of this study of a need to have a coded, coherent and well-expressed foreign policy, as they provide a diagnosis in the domestic environment of some of the hindrances to coherent economic and foreign policies, with the potential to grow the economy at an advanced rate than previously observed. South Africa has the structures for an economic foreign policy to be established such as a proportional representative parliament, a functioning executive supported by bureaucracy and advisors with extensive experience. A comparison of mainly economic and foreign policy documents will highlight the places where both policies converge. This convergence puts together a base for economic foreign policy to be established. It equally has the actors to execute on a wide ranging of international matters facing the country today. These matters need to be frequently reviewed, realigned, placed sufficiently, or converged to enable an efficient and capable administration. Thus, the analysis and recommendations offered in this study are the beginning of what the country desperately needs for economic growth because, if not attended to, the global beacon of hope that South Africa once was will be part of a fleeting moment in history that never fulfilled its potential and took its place in the world.

However, the process of domestically converging economic and foreign policies is often met with actors and structures whose efforts are not as efficient as written in public documents. This study focused on South Africa's economic foreign policy between the years 1994 and 2018. It explained how actors, institutions, and organisations interact and make policy decisions.. With five challenges that were the focus, it emerged through interviews that there were more challenges in South Africa's domestic policy making environment that were further impeding on the organic maturity of an economic foreign policy. There were two that stood out: national interests and political leadership. Firstly, an overwhelming majority of respondents said that an economic foreign policy needs a country with clear and defined national interests for both economic and foreign policy actors to base their goals and objectives on. National interests contributed to a form of cross-sectoral identity for the country in the domestic and international environments. Secondly, political leadership was mentioned to have been weakening with consecutive administrations throughout the years. Political leaders were argued to have been consumed more with political contestations, dominance and indirect governance of the state than building a capable, skilled and professional state and institutions that would enable a bureaucracy that has a firm command of both economic and foreign policy development, implementation and execution. Countries in history have not and will continue to not operate in isolation unless fully self-sufficient, and South Africa is far from being fully self-sufficient – if that is even a rational and attainable goal. In South Africa's context, it was clear that a foreign policy that did not acknowledge the role of the international community in 1994 would have been misplaced in its interpretation of how international relations functioned. South Africa's weakness was in translating solidarity and political relations abroad into strategic, economic return on investments of the many missions that had been opened across the globe, as well as multilateral platforms and international organisations joined by the Mandela Administration. The triumph of a human-rights-led foreign policy and agreeable friends in the international community did not sufficiently translate to the much-needed economic development that South Africa could have elicited. Therefore, this study and its respondents argued that South African foreign policy is naturally disposed to maintaining relationships rather than strategically engaging in comprehensive economic diplomacy that is based on an overarching and guiding national economic policy.

Nevertheless, the five challenges that were offered and analysed in this study remained significantly relevant as both the literature and interviews revealed. For an economic foreign policy to succeed in the international environment, the domestic environment needs to enable fluent policymaking structures, institutions and actors whose decision-making is anchored on the sole purpose of giving a state prominence and stature internationally. Hudson's multi-level foreign policy analysis concentrated this study's enquiry into the domestic setting and its activities focusing on two independent variables – structures and actors, whose impact on the dependent variable (economic foreign policy) was observed and analysed. The five challenges highlighted had an interchange between being impacted by the structural configuration of institutions & organisations and also by actors that made decisions on the platforms of these institutions and organisations. In the first challenge, the bureaucratic placement of economic diplomacy between DIRCO and the DTIC created tensions on (1) where this responsibility is administered from between the two departments, and (2) fluidity as to where it starts and ends in the two departments. This impacted the actors therein, whom some of the respondents were active members at operational level at the two departments. Their account of tensions and fluidity included economic skills and human capital imbalances, a bureaucracy lacking professional or career diplomats, and an economic strategy set by National Treasury rather than them. This structural configuration in government relegated both these departments to executors of policy. However, this study argues that, with their daily interface with economic foreign policy, their contributions to national economic policy would be advantageous.

In the second challenge, what this study asserted through literature as politicisation was later discovered to be depoliticisation during the interviews. As per Tshimomola illuminated more literature that offered appropriate contextualisation, it appeared that politicisation – which is the legitimate process of collective contestation of interests and policy decision-making by domestic actors – was actually in the shadow of depoliticisation where an indirect governing relationship within state structures was established by legitimate actors to derail the outcomes of policy decision-making. The thread of this depoliticisation was observed beginning with the tripartite alliance, whose decisions – particularly in the economic domain – were limited to few elite members. This permeated into government structures as well, where foreign policy was seen to be centralised and executed more from the presidency than DIRCO. Furthermore, even within government, policy making and coordination during Mbeki's tenure was given to the

PCAS unit in the presidency, whilst the NPC undertook these duties in Zuma's. This reduced the scope of what DIRCO could do, and it reduced the role of parliament in participating in the policy process domestically. And with time, both parliament (reduction of opposition's role diminished due to the ANC's majority) and DIRCO were in the periphery of foreign policy participation because the depoliticisation project was also making use of its influence to impact the outcomes of policy positions in organisations such as the ANC that was blemished with internal factional contestations (far beyond the expected popularity voting for leaders). Therefore, institutions such as portfolio committees in parliament were politicised, and appointees of DIRCO were becoming more political as opposed to skilled career diplomats. The actors in the system were being relegated for alternative governance delegates.

Thirdly, the depoliticisation project gave birth to a culture of excluding critical actors that could contribute effectively to the domestic policy making process. DIRCO's very own placing in government testifies to its structural exclusion. In the cabinet clusters, DIRCO was only in the International Relations, Security and Trade Cluster; it was not involved much in provincial and local government economic relations abroad. The only environment DIRCO has been confined to is the international environment. However, this study learned through literature and interviews that this culture of exclusion had permeated every constituted institution of policy making domestically. At parliament, the major actor – the ANC – was voting along party lines in portfolio committees. At NEDLAC – a statutory body of economic policy actors – engagement involving government, labour, business and civil society was struggling to have consultative consensus. DIRCO is not represented here either. Eventually, NEDLAC found itself in a battle of irrelevance, resulting in its ineffectiveness. In writing yet another economic growth strategic framework, the NDP2030, DIRCO was the least consulted regarding inputs into a chapter focusing on international relations because the NPC in the presidency had jurisdiction over policy making and influencing. The informality of presidential investment state visits, especially under Zuma, proved further that foreign policy decision making was commanded by actors that were in the inner sanctum of influence personally with the presidency or that specific businesses enjoyed the returns of the state's efforts abroad.

The fourth challenge, which seemed contrary to South Africa's multistakeholder consultative way of policymaking participation, was that there were actually too many actors involved in the foreign policy and economic environments. The focus of this challenge was on the policy coherence of actors and structures domestically. Since 1996, when the ANC-led government introduced GEAR, the tripartite alliance has been unified politically but not economically.

Moreover, in the alliance, policy positions changed frequently in the policy process flow between the alliance and the broadcasted SONA addressees. This also goes into parliament where committees offer their attention to unbalanced ideological inputs from external advisory organisations and a state where both the cabinet and economic clusters are bloated. Furthermore, constitutionally, lower-level government in the provinces and local government are able to undertake their own trade relations internationally. At higher levels of government there are two institutions under the presidency – the NPC and DPME. They duplicate the administrative work of departments and parliament. Operationally, at DIRCO, a Ministerial Review Panel (a NEDLAC equivalent) was established with a focus on international relations only. These are actors this study could acknowledge, but there are more – such as commissions, committees, advisories – that feed into state institutions that have not been covered adequately in this study. These actors and structures make and facilitate decisions in multilevel, multifactor, and multivariable contexts that significantly impact economic or foreign policy.

The last challenge is the ideologies that also impact on the country's national interests, strategic objectives, goals, visions, and aspirations. No respondent could locate an exact ideology that South Africa followed. This meant that, from the head of government, political leadership of the country (including opposition in parliament), business, labour and citizens, there was a need to define where and what ideological identity South Africa undertakes its economic and international relations from. Without any ideology to point at, it was important to note that much of the direction needed for economic foreign policy stemmed from this area of importance. Any of the strategic economic growth plans (RDP, GEAR, NGP, NDP2030) had not shown to stem from an ideology; they rather showed a combination of mixed economy strategies. Furthermore, the country needed to see beyond solidarity friendships and peripheral ideals such as pure communism or socialism – which have not been successful anywhere in the world. Moreover, this study does not argue for pure capitalism either but a balance of a system of ideals and principles that enable a productive and effective economic foreign policy. Whilst this paper is not advocating for a pure ideology to guide South Africa's foreign policy, it however argues for an ideology that will expound on the answers to 'why', 'what', 'when', 'how' and 'with whom' South Africa will achieve the goals, aspirations, vision and beliefs of its economic foreign policy.

In attending to these five major and other minor challenges will South Africa establish a purpose-led, globally competitive, sustainable and ever-relevant economic foreign policy.

Recommendations

As this study offers recommendations below, majority if not most may need further research that is more elaborate than the limited scope that this study has offered

The Bureaucratic Tensions and Fluidity between DIRCO and DTIC

- It is clear that South Africa's foreign policy lacks national interests that are the first point of its identity and the purpose which anchors its outlook of the international relations environment. These interests ought to be followed by a description of how, when and with whom (domestically and internationally) these interests will be achieved: a strategy.
- It should then be followed by clearly-defined roles of DIRCO and DTIC, pertaining to economic diplomacy (separation and convergence), and reviewing their role as participants of economic policy making together with National Treasury. This will augment their roles and provide further understanding of the variables that engage in economic growth. A balance of human capital with elite expertise in the command of economics has to be established between the two departments.
- DIRCO needs to implement the metric of key performance indicators (KPI's) for heads of missions and their teams as a way of translating missions abroad into revenue-generating entities for South Africa. Thus, the costs of keeping a mission may be justifiable and logical if it is economically active and not only existing for administrative duties (visa and passport issuing). Furthermore, these KPI's can be strategically directed across industries (technology, security, manufacturing, etc.) or in industries that are unique to the country where a mission is based.
- The state must undertake a comprehensive audit of the skills profile of its workforce, against the interests, goals and roles that the state can offer. This is to build a capable state and a professional service, especially in the economic domain at DIRCO. Political appointees should be kept at the lowest threshold possible (reintroduction of the 70/30 ration or any appropriate ration) to give way to a professional diplomatic corps. Political engagement at high level may be taken by the Chief Diplomat, The President, or his/her representative.
- Domestically, DIRCO must assert itself more. Foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy. Therefore, its involvement in domestic economic policy making is

important for a deeper understanding of economics and to translate this to the international community.

- Through the sentiments of scholars, ambassadors, journalists, parliamentarians and politicians, there has been a foremost need of a newly-elected democratic government in 1994 to describe the national interests of South Africa overtly. These national interests would then guide what the state's economic foreign policy ought to be.

The Politicisation Of The Domestic Policy Making Process

- Withing the party in majority in parliament and its members in portfolio committees in parliament, mechanisms against "policy rubber-stamping". The problem in South Africa is not the system but the actors in the system. This study proposes that portfolio committees should comprise a balance of members who are career diplomats and those who are political appointees. The ratio can be determined in the majority party camp. This will minimise the political risk of the majority party overwhelming smaller parties by always voting along partisan lines in parliament. This creates opportunities for proposed policy to be properly debated, scrutinised and reviewed before becoming law.
- The additional layer of factionalism or factional voting within a party, or mitigating spill over effects from the majority party into parliament and the executive, must be attended to at party level. This study has no clear solution to this political quagmire.

The Exclusion Of Actors In The Domestic Economic Policy Making Process

- The presidency must decentralise power to allow ministries to undertake work such as putting together economic strategic frameworks.
- DIRCO ought to be represented in the economic cluster if it is to translate domestic economic goals to the international environment.
- The constitutional provision of provincial and local government undertaking trade relations must be reviewed, as this may present schizophrenic sovereignty abroad, especially in cases where there is domestic disagreement.
- Government remuneration for highly critical skills needs to be equally competitive with the private sector so that skilled actors can be attracted monetarily, at the least, for them to offer their productivity to the government.
- The resuscitation of NEDLAC is important. Senior government and business leaders should combine efforts in rebuilding its legitimacy and relevance again by attending

key strategic meetings, binding themselves according to policy recommendations from this platform and executing on them. Furthermore, DIRCO should be represented here as well.

The Proliferation Of Actors In The Domestic Policy Making Process

- The reasserting of portfolio committees' role in driving accountability and oversight on executive policies should be retrained in parliament. The government should redefine the roles of the following entities in as far as their participation in domestic economic policy is concerned. Where their jurisdiction starts and where it ends:
    - The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)
    - Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME)
    - National Planning Commission (NPC)
    - Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)
    - Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC)
    - National Treasury,
    - Councils, Committees and Commissions (especially within departments)
    - The Presidency
- The size of cabinet should be reviewed and revaluated further.

Ideological Influences On The Domestic Policymaking Process

- Economic growth strategic frameworks (GEAR, ASGISA, NGP, NDP2030) should last longer than 5.5 years – which is the standing average currently.
- A more frequent review of DIRCO's foreign policy should be the norm in light of a rapidly-changing international environment. This will give an opportunity to weigh if certain precepts like a human-rights-led foreign policy are still applicable.
- The tripartite alliance should explore more possibility of independence of individual organisations – where the true test of their ideologies are tested against their own base. Thus, COSATU and SACP should consider running as political parties in the voting polls. This will minimise solidarity politics in the way South Africa undertakes its foreign policy.
- The country's (mixed) economic policy must be codified and expressed: how the country's resources will be distributed to benefit its citizens, the economic input and output process.

- Policies should be weighed against where the country truly is economically: a developed state or a developing state. The beliefs, aspirations and goals of the country must be measured on achievable objectives in the short, medium, and long term than only defining them according to the long term when the state is fully developed.

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