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Towards effective self-help housing delivery: Contributions through network analysis in Nairobi,Kenya and Johannesburg,South Africa

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CHAPTER SIX: NETWORKS AND HIERARCHIES IN AN INTERVENTIONIST STATE – CASES FROM JOHANNESBURG

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter I assess the networks that are used to access various resources towards self-help housing in Johannesburg. The settlements studied are Diepsloot and Ivory Park. These are introduced in the subsequent sections. State interventionism in different aspects of housing impacts negatively on various ties that individuals use to access resources towards self-help housing. Significantly, the chapter shows that even the success of hierarchical organisations, intended to help access various housing resources in Johannesburg, depend on the operations of personal networks.

Section 6.2 examines ego-centric networks for self-help housing in Ivory Park and Diepsloot settlements in Johannesburg. The networks for access to resources by individuals in both settlements are relatively uniform, in terms of the levels of linkages, strength of ties and outcomes. They are mainly networks for survival, rather than housing production *per se*. In a few cases they are used for protection of illegal operators, like shack-lords. The ties are weakened further by the fact that housing interventions tend to ignore them. Rather than strong local ties towards housing production, what one encounters in the settlements are mobilised, interest-based groups whose activities are sporadic, reactive and with limited potential to produce housing.

Section 6.3 analyses networks for collaborative action in the Johannesburg case studies. It shows that there are wide differences in these networks. This is associated with asymmetry in the operations of civil society organisations in Diepsloot and Ivory Park, in favour of the latter. In Johannesburg, while civil society organizations (CSOs) are getting increased resources from the government to help deliver housing for communities, ties amongst individual members of these organisations and their linkages to community members are getting weaker. In fact the CSOs themselves are both weak and weakening. These organisations and their network characteristics are very different within and across the two settlements. This can also be attributed to

asymmetry in the operations of civil society and the differences of the networks of the various actors involved. Social entrepreneurship is weak in these two settlements. There are only a few actors, apart from the government, who are interested in broader activities that link the social and economic well being of the communities. There is also an asymmetry in access to (state) resources towards housing. On the whole, group-based ties towards housing development in the case study settlements are weak.

Section 6.4 looks at the general patterns of networks for access to various resources for self-help housing in Johannesburg. In terms of resources, the most vibrant networks are those towards access to finance. However, access to micro-finance and savings through local *stockvels* (local rotating savings and credit groups) is reducing in both settlements. Market hierarchies dominate access to labour, materials and technology. Market operations dictate the materials used. Consumption patterns favour market positions. There are virtually no organised local construction groups in either of the settlements, even to undertake small-scale construction. This is in spite of evidence of strong ties amongst local labourers from these settlements and small-scale contractors working at the city level. Supply of land, infrastructure and services are also mainly done through state/market hierarchies, with hardly any space for the operations of personal networks. I summarise my position in the concluding Section 6.5. I also make some recommendations for the case study settlements.

6.1.1. Introduction to Ivory Park, Johannesburg




Figure 6.1. City of Johannesburg, map, showing location of Ivory Park and Diepsloot
Source: author

Ivory Park is a planned, partly informal, low-income settlement, established in 1991 to provide site and service accommodation for informally housed population from Alexandra and Tembisa areas in Johannesburg (see Figure 6.1.). The initial residents came from Oakmore informal settlements, next to Tembisa, in 1990. They occupied serviced sites in Ivory Park.

Ivory Park has a population of about 240 000 (City of Johannesburg, 2003). From 1996, the government has built, 3 600 houses in Kaalfontein area, of Ivory Park and 600 within the site and service areas. Many parts are still informal. There are hundreds of housing units planned in all the three wards of Ivory Park. Housing

programmes include: the developer driven, individual beneficiary, capital subsidy housing ('RDP'); the People's Housing Processes (PHP); consolidation subsidy housing ("*Mayibuye"*); partly subsidised bond-housing; unsubsidised mortgage housing; and unassisted self-help housing.



Photo 6.1. Ivory Park Ward 78



Photo 6.2. Government offices in Ivory Park

The government also provides social amenities, e.g. the R13 million, Ivory Park Community Information Centre (the Lord Khanyile Multi-purpose Centre, see Photo 6.1). Government departments are active in funding different programmes there. For example, Department of Labour has been offering training opportunities in brick laying, carpentry, housing policy, entrepreneurial skills, small businesses development, quality and production control. Basic service provision in Ivory Park is better than most low-income settlements within Johannesburg. There is water borne sanitation in most of the settlement, including the informal sections. The government has developed a Taxi Rank in Ivory Park II. Commuter taxis from the city centre costs R 6.00 (US$ 0.95) a trip. There is a well-developed local commuter taxi transport.

Ivory Park is relatively well integrated socially, physically and economically to its immediate neighbourhood. It is linked to the larger Midrand region (see Figure 6.1) with low and medium density developments in Ebony Park and Kempton Park. It is part of, and not very dissimilar from, developments in the neighbouring Tembisa and the Ekhuruleni Metropolitan Council (see Figure 6.1).

6.1.2. Introduction to Diepsloot, Johannesburg

Diepsloot is located on the outer boundaries of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (see Figure 6.1). It was planned by apartheid authorities in early 1990s to regroup squatters in North Johannesburg (City of Johannesburg, 2003). Dieplsoot West was developed as a sites and services scheme, while the East evolved initially as an informal area. It also has the government's 'holding site', which is an informal transit camp for those being relocated from elsewhere to await government's serviced sites or subsidised houses in Diepsloot. The settlement is estimated to have a population of 56,000 people, 53% of whom are unemployed and 73% living below the poverty line (City of Johannesburg, 2003). It also has some government and market developed bond housing.

The state provides services and social amenities in Diepsloot. These are inadequate. In some cases, a single chemical toilet serves about 100 people. There is limited direct transport to Diepsloot from Johannesburg city centre. Transport to the city centre costs on average R 24.00 (US$ 3.8) daily. Lack of direct and affordable transport to

other parts of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality enhances Diepsloot's spatial segregation from the rest of the city.



Photo 6.3. A section of Diepsloot East



Photo 6.4. Burnt City of Johannesburg offices in Diepsloot

Diepsloot is a dormitory town, de-linked from most of the city, confirming predominant consensus on post-apartheid housing segregation. It is surrounded by empty private land. Its nearest neighbour is the gated up-market Dainfern

neighbourhood in Fourways (see Figure 6.1). The grassland in its immediate neighbourhood is privately owned. The separation of Diepsloot from Fourways is not merely physical, but also economic. Most of Diepsloot's residents do not have economic engagements with the shopping precinct in Four Ways, as it has expensive establishments, un-affordable to the locals. Further, employment in the offices in Fourways demands higher levels of education and skills than Diepsloot can provide.

In my interview the ward councillor observed that Diepsloot is an eclectic society, made up of different people, from different places, with little in common. The weak sense of community translates into apathy for public issues, disregard for local elected leadership, poor communication and misinformation. This creates room for the operation of mobilised civil society, which tends to be reactive. Some of the tensions that resulted are reflected in: the fights between Dieplsoot residents and Zevenfontein squatters encroaching on the vacant land within the settlement (Bobbert, 1994); fights between Diepsloot and Alexandra immigrants; unrest relating to rumours of relocation in July 2004; and taxi 'turf' wars. The latter resulted in burning down of the ruling party's (ANC) offices (see Photo 6.4).

6.2. Ego-centric networks in Johannesburg case studies

In this section I discuss ego-centric networks in self-help housing in Johannesburg. I interviewed 52 people from Ivory Park and Diepsloot. Out of these, 24 sketches of housing networks were developed. The central characteristics of these ties were isolated. They included entrenched networks amongst some individuals, and some superficial and weak ties amongst others. There were networks of survival amongst most of the members compared to networks for provision of housing. There are a number of shack-lords in both settlements. I was interested in pursuing the kind of ties that they used for protection. In this section I use three cases to illustrate these issues. I then discuss patterns of ego-centric networks emerging from the case study settlements. I also examine the spaces for exploitation and the role of mobilised civil society in Ivory Park and Diepsloot.

6.2.1. Entrenched versus weak networks of survival amongst the poor in Diepsloot

Joe Radebe lives in an informal area in Diepsloot, Section 1. He works as a security officer for Clinic Number 7, in Diepsloot. His wife runs a *'spaza'* shop in the informal section of the settlement. They live in the Reception Area – a temporary place, where those awaiting government housing are allowed to live in shacks. The family is on the waiting list for subsidised housing. Mr. Radebe is already stockpiling materials to extend the subsidy house once he receives it. He believes that if given a plot and money, he would build a better and bigger house than the government subsidised units. He has two additional shacks for rent.



Photo 6.5. Mr. Radebe's shack in Diepslooot

Peggy Khoza is a single mother of two who was relocated from Alexandra to Diepsloot in 2002 (see Figure 6.1). She was allocated a plot in the Reception Area, Section One, Diepsloot East. She applied for a Housing Subsidy and received a serviced plot, in 2001. She did not qualify for full subsidy – based on her monthly income. She later lost her job as a receptionist. She was told that she still does not qualify for the full capital subsidy as she is considered to be a previous beneficiary.

She could qualify for consolidation subsidy[1] however she has not received a title for her plot since it was allocated in 2002. She could also qualify for a top-up subsidy, but she was not aware of this. She is unhappy with her housing condition. There is a lack of basic services in most of the surrounding area. There is neither electricity nor streetlights in Section 1 of Diepsloot, where she lives. Taxi violence is rampant. Robberies and rapes are common. The Police Station is far, in Diepsloot West.



Photo 6.6. Ms Khoza's shack in the site and service area of Diepsloot

[1] The subsidy given to a person, in terms of the South African Subsidy Programme, who only received a serviced site under previous subsidy programmes and is in possession of the title deed for the property. A consolidation subsidy to construct or upgrade a top-structure on the property, or as a deposit for loan finance to upgrade or construct the top-structure

Mr. Radebe's networks towards acquisition of resources

Mr. Radebe is active in mobilised civil society in Diepsloot. An informal group he belongs to had taken drastic action in the past to reverse the housing conditions of the informally housed residents, through invasion of completed government subsidised houses, which were awaiting allocation. Through mobilised community networks, the group put pressure on government to deliver on services. Mr. Radebe accessed his shack through kinship networks. Inheritance and sale of shacks are common means of getting a foothold in the informal area. His networks give him a very positive perception of Diepsloot.

Mr. Radebe is connected to various players in housing in Diepsloot. In the first instance he is an employee of the Johannesburg Metro. He is aware of what is going on and of his entitlements. In fact he has been giving other community members advise on how to access subsidised housing. He is a useful conduit for access to information. He also has links with the informal section of Diepsloot where he has been living for the last 15 years. He seems sure that through his informal and political connections, he will continue building shacks and renting them out, even after receiving subsidised housing. Mr. Radebe's network supplies him with information, for example on how to access the privately owned bond housing in the area. Mr. Radebe has invited some of his relatives from KZN to live in Diepsloot, helping him build more ties. In a way, the formal and informal networks he has developed guarantee him a relatively better life in Diepsloot, means of access to the informal economy, means of access to the formal economy and a foothold in housing through the government subsidy programmes. Mr. Radebe does not let the government know exactly how much his household earns when applying for housing, due to a sense of entitlement. In his words: *"we also fought for the liberation, we are entitled to land and housing"*.

Ms Khoza's housing and survival networks

After losing her job as a receptionist, Ms Khoza explains that she invested her savings in a tuck shop at a school in Dieplsoot. She later got a job as secretary to the Headmaster in the same school. She was housed at the school, so she did not have to

live in her shack. She reported misuse of funds by the Headmaster to the School Chairman and later to District Education officials. As a result she was sacked by the Headmaster and thrown out of her accommodation. She had no one to turn to. The burning down of the ANC offices[2] had terminated communication between local residents of Diepsloot and the elected politicians. She knows some people in the local ANC Women's League. However the league steers clear from discussing housing issues. She had no links with any of the major civil society and political groupings active in Diepsloot, like South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). She says she currently has no means of communicating with government.

Ms Khoza suggested that had she lied about her income she could have received a fully subsidised government house. She complained about the disconnection between the City of Johannesburg and the Provincial Housing Officials with the people on the ground. Information is accessed mainly through rumours. This was also confirmed in my interview with the local Councillor, Ms. Salphina Mulanzi[3]. The housing office that exists in Diepsloot is purely a place to check how far one is on the waiting list, 'they do not answer any other questions'.

A comparison of Mr Radebe and Ms Khoza's network characteristics

Mr Radebe's network shows relatively reliable local linkages. He has good linkages with city officials through which information flows. The linkages with mobilised civil society, by their nature are spontaneous and do not deliver much. However they guarantee him the much needed security for his activities in the informal areas of Diepsloot. There is very little flow of resources in Mr Radebe's network towards housing *per se*, but they constitute livelihood networks. Some of his relationships in Diepsloot have been in place for at least 15 years; even personal networks take time to develop. Rabebe's networks give him have a very positive perception of Diepsloot. Contrary to general perception, he says:

[2] ANC party offices were burnt down in Diepsloot in July 2004. The reason for this incident was rumours that there would be forceful evictions of people from the informal sections of Diepsloot.
[3] Interview with Councillor Salhina Mulanzi on 20th August 2004 at the ANC Youth Offices, in Diepsloot West.

'We are living a good life here…we are almost like a rural area…you are free when you live here…hey man you are safe…People pack their cars open on the street… if they only give us stands we will do the rest…the government wants to give us houses…we do not need houses…I work, with a plot …with my savings and those of my wife…I can build…'




Figure 6.2. Mr Radebe's networks, Diepsloot




Figure 6.3. Ms Khoza's networks, Diepsloot

In the case of Ms Khoza one sees a disconnection between an individual resident and the rest of the community. She does not trust the politicians and has no idea where to get hold of them. Her background, in formal employment, makes her despise the ROSCAs and other local groups, arguing that these do not deliver much in terms of housing. Ms Khoza does not seem to be aware that consolidation on government allocated site and service plots is acceptable and can be approved by council as long the construction is of good quality. She is poorly linked to the rest of the community, so could not 'benefit' when there were housing invasions in her immediate neighbourhood. Her over-reliance on official channels for communication partly explains her predicament, she says:

> 'The ANC's offices were burnt down…We do not know whom to talk to…We get no responses, we do not know whether our messages reach [the officials]…people are just thinking for us as though we are children…we know what we want…people are dying…we are not satisfied with this government…If I tell the truth I am targeted…because I told the truth I killed

myself [suggesting that had she lied about her income she could have received a fully subsidised government house] …"

Her case illustrates how the means of delivery of housing that focuses mainly on the individual, ignoring the community context, does not only make the individual vulnerable, but also disconnects the individual from the rest of the community.

6.2.2. Networks for protection, the story of Mr. Sibisi[4]

Mr. Sibisi owns the shacks in Photo 6.7 in Diepsloot. The local authority has demolished most of the other shacks in that area, apart from his. His development is partly on public open space next to a primary school. He has many renters. He was worried of possible removal from the area by government. He was building his shacks through self-construction, assisted by local unskilled labourers. His developments covered an area equivalent to at least four plots (of 300m^2 each). It was difficult to verify how much land he owned in total in the settlement. But his position on land in Diepsloot is very clear, he says:

> 'This whole Diepsloot was owned by two white people…there are only 10 white people who own this land from here to Fourways…I have been here for the many years…they have been doing nothing with it…They keep these big [parcels of land] and no one asks them any question…I occupy a small piece here and you people from Wits [University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg] want to know why'.



Photo 6.7. Section of Sibisi's house, Diepsloot

[4] *not his real name*

Networks towards acquisition of resources




Figure 6.4. Mr Sibisi's networks, Diepsloot

Sibisi is a typical shack lord in Diepsloot. He owns commuter taxis and is deeply involved in taxi wars in Diepsloot. According to one of his tenants, Sibisi is supported by a network of thugs whom he uses to terrorise anybody who opposes him. His tenants were so scared of him that they would not speak in his presence. Sibisi, being one of the local power brokers, is also connected to and feared by local politicians. He is well known to the police and government officials. This guarantees him some short-term security of tenure.

6.2.3. Insights from ego-centric networks for self-help housing in Johannesburg

In this section I look at some of the emerging patterns of ego-centric networks, including networks for survival and those for exploitation. I also discuss the

inefficacy of local political organisations and mobilised civil society, which individuals tend to turn to, for access to housing.

Patterns of ego-centric networks in Diepsloot and Ivory Park

There are several distinct patterns that emerge from the ego-centric networks in Johannesburg. One sees the survival networks of the poor who for a reason may not be eligible for any housing subsidy. The next pattern relates to the poor who are eligible for serviced sites and but no subsidies to construct the top structure. They use networks to cope with their housing needs in the short term. There are patterns relating to the down raider, who may be eligible/not eligible for a housing subsidy. These down raiders are very different from those in Nairobi, e.g. the Gatere's discussed in Section 5.2.2. The former tends to live in the settlements, even as they rent out spare units. The last are the slumlords. They use networks that guarantee their protection even as they construct housing units in public utilities or in areas where the government has put a moratorium on housing.

The last set of issues relates to 'shacklordism'. Many individuals use shacks to raise additional income. Individuals keep shacks for rental purposes, even after they have accessed the housing subsidy. Some use them to help relatives gain a foothold in the settlements. Most of these are supported by relational links. There are some 'slumlords' and down-raiders with good links with the city officials and politicians. The 'slumlords' also control their areas through vigilantes and commuter taxi gangs.

Civil society and political patronage

The weakening of social networks through the state housing programme and lack of spaces for negotiation in Ivory Park and Diepsloot have resulted in exploitation [you end up talking more about patronage than exploitation] and fragmentation of the local communities. Baumann (2003: 100; 101) faults a housing allocation system that 'does not take into consideration community dynamics, social networks, social capital, solidarity networks and social institutions' as the primary cause of these. The results are 'increased insecurity and vulnerability' (Baumann 2003: 101). In the case studies this is evidenced by increased operations of mobilised groups. Most residents of

Dieplsoot and Ivory Park rely on mobilised groups as there are not many organised groups.

The distinction between 'organised' and 'mobilised groups' is derived from Friedman's (1998) definitions of the two concepts within civil society. The former refers to the 'basic scaffolding of civil society' (*ibid*.:23), e.g. families, registered organisations, associations and churches. The later refers to rallying of certain sectors of civil society around a particular cause, which may be temporary and in most cases of political significance. Mobilised civil society, is not part of the established structure of civil society, but interacts with the organised civil society (Friedman, 1998: 23).

The NGOs and CBOs that I discuss in the subsequent section form part of the organised civil society in Diepsloot and Ivory Park. These groups are not strong enough to rally their communities around specific issues relating to housing provision. However, sporadic action is galvanised around civil society and political actors in these settlements, e.g. political protests against poor service delivery in Diepsloot and protests against slow delivery of housing that resulted in invasion of government developed capital subsidy housing in the same area. One key problem in Diepsloot is the lack of strong organised civil society that can consistently bargain with the state for sustained provision of housing to the poor in these neighbourhoods

There is political patronage that has emerged, particularly in Dieplsoot and to a lesser degree in Ivory Park, linked directly with housing and service provision. This pattern is related to the ties various individuals had developed hitherto and their current housing situations. For example, the initial people who were relocated from Alexandra onto subdivided plots and the *Mayibuye* schemes in Diepsloot tend to belong exclusively to the ANC. This is associated with their belief that the government would eventually solve their housing problems. Those who were relocated onto the congested 'holding site' from Alexandra and Braamfischerville tend to belong mainly to the ANC-aligned South African Congress of Civic Organisations (SANCO). Those who came from Randfontein and recent arrivals from Alexandra, who have been associated with house invasions in Diepsloot, are almost uniformly members of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). According to the

Councillor, Salphina Mulanzi, these groups neither talk to one another nor do they attend government meetings. Most of these groups survive on political patronage.

Political patronage in the two settlements is closely linked to ego-centric networks. At one level, individuals are able to be involved in various ways in the different state housing programmes as developers or suppliers of particular materials and services, even as employees, mainly because of their individual political affiliations. This case was very obvious in Dieplsoot, where I interviewed ANC Youth members who were able to be involved in various state housing processes in the area, principally because of the spaces for bargaining they were able to access through party affiliations. It is interesting that not all the ANC Youth were enjoying these opportunities, but few individuals mainly in the local party leadership. Again one sees access to opportunities being varied according to individual's egocentric networks even in cases where individuals belong to the same organisation. Access to opportunities was also differentiated along structural positions, with those occupying structurally superior positions in civil society being able to access more opportunities, particularly with regard to participation in the state housing delivery progrommes. Members of PAC in contrast had very limited spaces for participation in all the genre of housing in Diepsloot.

As reflected in Sibisi's networks, egocentric networks cushion individuals against the threat of evictions and demolition of illegal housing, enabling them to boldly invest in this type of self-help housing. Similarly this security enables leaders of groups to engage in housing developments outside of the local authority development control requirements without fear of demolition, as was done by *Masisizane* leaders before getting involved in the government's People's Housing Process. These reflect a situation where confidence to invest in informal housing is greatly boosted by the strong networks the ego may have developed. Similarly lack of these ego-centric networks weakens individual's confidence to improve their self-help housing. Ms Khoza's case reinforces this observation, where lack of these ego-centric networks translated into vulnerability and poor investments into her own housing.

Overall, the cases reviewed show the disconnections enabled through the housing subsidy system. Inadequate disclosure of financial status, wilful withholding of

information, lies, feeling of entitlement to housing regardless of income, emanating from having participated in political changes that led to the post-apartheid political order, etc. affect the accuracy of subsidy information. Political support is perceived by many people in Diepsloot as one of the ways that individuals access fully-subsidised housing or jump the queue in the waiting list. This is enforced mainly in Diepsloot by the opinions that government operations are non-transparent and that there are no clear channels of communicating with local people.

6.3. Analysis of networks for collaborative action in the Johannesburg case studies

In this section I discuss networks for corporate action in Ivory Park and Diepsloot. In my fieldwork in Ivory Park and Diepsloot, I looked at most of the local groups that were involved in mobilising the communities in one-way or another towards development in the two settlements. These included 15 groups in Diepsloot and 23 in Ivory Park (see full list in Appendix 9.7). Most of the groups had no significant involvement in housing. Only eight seemed significantly involved. These were: the Eco-city programme, the *Masisizane* Women's Cooperative, *Inzimi Mpumelelo* Cooperative, Ivory Park *Masakhane*, and *Kopano Ke Mantla* in Ivory Park, and *Izwe Lethu*, *Mayibuye* and *Danganane* in Dieplsoot. I discuss networks of four amongst these, to illustrate the key issues relating to networks of groups involved in access to self-help housing in these settlements. I discuss various insights emanating from these networks including: weak social entrepreneurship and bridges, asymmetry in the operations of civil society organisations and in access to state resources towards housing; and generally weak grassroots organisations in both settlements.

6.3.1. Networks around the Ivory Park Eco-city Programme[5]

The Eco-city programme was started in 1999 by an environmentalist, Annie Sagrue. Its focus was alleviation of poverty and environmental sustainability. The Midrand Eco-city Trust, a NGO was created by the stakeholders to drive the Eco-city

[5] I conducted several in-depth interviews with various parties involved in the Midrand eco-city, e.g. Solly Ramakgano, CEO, Eco-village Centre; Joe Baloyi, Manager, Mindrand Eco-city; Simon Mukhulu, Region 2 Housing Manager in August and October 2004. Most of the facts and figures were further triangulated after comparison with grey literature.

programmes. The day-to-day operations of the Eco-city are carried out through CBOs and cooperatives. *'Itheke'* and *'Ubuhle Bemvelo'* are youth and women cooperatives involved specifically in house construction. There are six others involved in various activities.

Networks towards acquisition of resources

Extensive networks developed by the founder of the Eco-city, Annie Sagrue, were instrumental in accessing financial support from numerous sources in South Africa and internationally. Success of organizations like the Eco-city is directly linked with the personal networks of the leadership, which are translated into fundraising opportunities. However dependence on single champions is a potential cause of future vulnerability.

In South Africa, Ms Sagrue was able to use her networks to fund raise from both government and non-governmental organizations. The Eco-city initiative received R1.2 million (US$ 190 476.00) from the City of Johannesburg as core funding. The Department of Transport, gave R1.0 million (US$ 158 730.00) for a bicycle track. The organisation has constructed 29 houses from September 2004, through the Provincial Department's People's Housing Process (PHP) subsidies. An organic agriculture project covering 1000m^2 received a grant from the Provincial Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land (DACEL). The Department of Social Services supports a crèche and a feeding programme. The petrol company, Total South Africa, has funded organic food gardening. A local NGO, *Tholego* Learning Centre, sponsored an alternative technology demo-house.

Ms Sagrue has also been able negotiate for non financial support for the Eco-village. The former Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council supported the Eco-city grass planting along the roads. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) helped plan the Eco-city in collaboration with the Planning Department of the City of Johannesburg and the community. 100 youths were trained in construction by a local non-profit organisation, Shaft 17. Gauteng Tourism Authority has been training local Eco-city tour guides. Thermal Insulation Association of South Africa (TIASA), through an initiative bringing together Eskom, Owens Corning South Africa and

Sustainable Energy, Environment and Development Programme (SEED) were involved in a study of fuel consumption between houses with and without ceilings in the Ivory Park area in collaboration with the Eco-city.

Active marketing of the Eco-village through guided tours and Ms Sagrue's personal lobbying in international fora has attracted international support for the Eco-village. It accessed seed funding from an environmental NGO, Earthlife Africa. The Danish Agency for Environment and Development (DANCED) funded it to the tune of R11.0 million (US$ 1.746 million). DANCED together with the International Institute for Energy Conservation (IIEC) and SEED also funded four demonstration houses, a communal washhouse and a food garden. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) gave R1.8 million (US$ 286 657.00), for solar water heating. Later UNDP availed additional R6 million (US$ 895 000.00) for the project. Other donors include, UK's Department for International Development (DfID), Transfer of Energy, Momentum and Mass International (TEMM International), Afribike, Earthlife Africa and World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The question is: what types of individuals are able to attract and sustain such a high level of international funding? Ms Sagrue's is a case where ego-centric networks become useful in accessing resources for groups towards collaborative action.

Eco-city Network characteristics

This is a network with multiple centralities, necessitated by the need to link together different local organisations (see Figure 6.5). Its horizontal linkages with the community are currently quite weak because of the structured way in which the government has transformed these linkages. The group is relatively bureaucratic and structured, with domination of spaces for prescription over those of negotiation.

The ties have relatively brief walks, implying that the bureaucracy is not cumbersome. Since a number of the Eco-city programmes depend on the government's housing subsidy, the network currently depends on external bureaucracy for its operations. This limits its autonomy. My interviews revealed that the value of links were a lot stronger within the local cooperatives, but hardly existed across the individual

cooperatives, in spite of the belief of the Eco-city managers to the contrary. Linkages to the Ivory Park community at large were also weak.

In terms of social entrepreneurship, the whole Eco-city initiative is the brainchild of Ms Sagrue. She was the main link through which the initiative was accessing resources. When Ms Sagrue left the organisation for two years, between 2003 and 2005, the linkages that were used to access most of the resources were weakened considerably. Ties with some donors were broken. The manager who was appointed by the city to act in her position did not have the types and extent of contacts that Ms Sagrue had. A weakness of this network is that is its strong reliance on a single champion. Ms Sagrue has recently (in 2005) resumed her position in the Eco-city. This might restore some of the earlier links.

This network does not fully exploit existing local linkages in Ivory Park. It is characterised by unidirectional flows of financial resources. It is collaborative, dominated by spaces for prescription, leaving little room for negotiation by individuals. The group has strong local components and weak global component strength. It is characterised by many structurally equivalent actors in the local components, implying that the benefits to one another amongst members are limited, hence needing to rely on external resources to run most of its activities. Eco-city is a donor and state dependent group.

Sketch of the general housing network




Figure 6.5. Networks of the Ivory Park Eco-city

Impacts of the Eco-city network

The initiative has contributed to community organisation and provision of community facilities. There are nine cooperatives involved in different activities including construction. There are plans to turn the Eco-city into a community centre, managed by community members. Existing facilities include a crèche, a bicycle repairs yard, workshops, training spaces, offices, demonstration houses and communal washhouse with showers and toilets. It incorporates a public square and a playground. It has

delivered a 6-kilometre bicycle track linking schools in the area. A grass-planting project has improved the physical qualities of the area.

Eco-city has contributed to training of local people in various aspects of housing. 14 women belonging to *Ubuhle Bemvelo* Eco-construction Co-operative have been trained in building technologies. 100 youths have been trained by a Johannesburg organisation, Shaft 17, to build environmentally friendly houses. They have constructed 29 houses through the People's Housing Process (PHP) subsidies. There are also awareness-raising workshops in local schools and within the community.

Linked to training is job creation. In this regard the Eco-city planned to train youths and organise them into Section 21 companies, so that they can use their skills and expertise to bid for projects in the market. Some job creation has happened through the various projects, e.g. ceiling installation, waste recycling, construction by women and youth groups and grass planting. The Eco-city is to act as an incubator for projects, which are then to be taken out to the community for implementation. However, this is yet to happen.

The major achievement of the Eco-city is in its environmental interventions. These include: permaculture initiatives and storm-water retention ponds developed in Ivory Park. The programme has helped install hundreds of ceilings, geyser jackets, low-voltage light bulbs and solar water heaters. The Eco-city intended to undertake a national solar water-heating project for 500 homes supported by the Department of Minerals and Energy, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the tune of R6 million. Alternative construction technologies and materials have been piloted. These include: fibre cement roofed houses and compacted mud and straw construction. However, the community expressed disapproval with both technologies, suspecting that fibre cement roofing could contain some asbestos. Mud and straw construction was rejected because community members 'just didn't like it'[6].

The organisation has since dwindled in its capacity, linked with reduction in donor support. The government has had to step in to inject money into the programme to

[6] Interview with Jane Mabaso, on the 13th of August 2004, in Ivory Park II.

ensure that it does not collapse. Contrary to the original plans, the Eco-city, as an organisation, is difficult to replicate given that it is overly dependent on external support.

6.3.2. Networks of the *Masisizane* Women's Group[7]

Masisizane – 'let us help one another' - started as a *stokvel* (Rotating Savings and Credit Association) in 1991, under the leadership of the late Anna Mofeking, to help individuals who had accessed serviced sites in Ivory Park, Johannesburg, build their houses. It started off with 70 members, who paid a once-off membership fee of R 100.00. Thereafter members met every Sunday and contributed R 20.00 (US$ 3.10), which was used for buying building materials. This set *Masisizane* apart as it was the only *stokvel* in the settlement whose prime objective was housing construction. Construction was through shared savings and sweat equity. *Masisizane* built 300 houses as the *stokvel* movement from 1991 to 2002. Members were involved in auto-construction and weekly savings. In 2002, the group was accredited as a community support organisation for the Gauteng Provincial Administration's People's Housing Process (PHP) projects in Ivory Park. It was then transformed into a legally constituted cooperative. It was then able to access state subsidies to construct houses for its members who qualified for housing subsidy.

Although *Masisizane* built 260 units from 2002 to 2004 through state subsidies, several changes happened when it transformed from a local savings and credit scheme to a PHP housing support organisation. Members stopped saving and their involvement in auto-construction stopped. Membership fell by 90% in less than a year, from over 3,000, at the peak in 2002, to less than 250. A few members took charge of the new organisation and there was some dissatisfaction with the quality of work that the organisation produced. Internally, there was reduced communication amongst the members. In the midst of this, their leader, Anne Mofeking passed away, this weakening the organisation further. The organisation is no longer an effective

[7] This information is based on in-depth interviews with leaders of *Masisizane*, Mobre and Jotham Moyo, on the 12th and the 15th of August 2004, and also with discussions with Planact leaders in September 2004. Earlier discussions with *Masisizane*, including a talk with the late leader Anna Mofokeng were carried out by myself, together with the University of the Witwatersrand Masters Students in the Postgraduate Programme in Housing in May 2003.

vehicle for savings. However, it continues to help its members to access housing subsidies. It also continues to support the state's PHP projects in Ivory Park, in spite of clear lack of capacity to continue doing so.

Responses to these problems resulted in structural transformations of *Masisizane,* which weakens it as a network of local savers towards self-help housing. This also weakens ties amongst members of the organisation. Their powers to negotiate are compromised. Gauteng Province employed a Centre Manager in 2003 to lead the operations of *Masisizane*, making the role of elected leaders irrelevant. This Centre Manager is not answerable to the members, but rather to her employers. Further, she does not seem to be using her links to help the organisation in any way. After failing to recruit more members from the community, the organisation has now resorted to using employed labourers to construct houses. It has also employed a Technical Officer to oversee operations, which were hitherto overseen by the community. Housing development is now directed hierarchically, through a steering committee, which includes: the City of Johannesburg council officials, provincial officials and elected leaders. The short-term response to lack of technical capacity in the group was the secondment of a Cuban architect to work with the group – the architect has since left. However, there does not seem to be any long-term strategy to ensure that the group's capacities are improved.

Networks towards acquisition of resources

Masissizane developed ties with politicians, actors in government, NGOs, players in the market and community members. Between 1991 and 2002 *Masisizane* used its political clout to ensure no harassment in spite of the fact that group members were building unapproved single room units on plots with no titles. That has changed since 2002. It only builds using government subsidy on plots whose titles are in preparation. Initially community mobilisation and shack consolidation was realised through individual savings by a network of the poor. Then there were strong personal ties among group members. Now they do not save any more.

In honour of its late founder, the Institute for Housing of South Africa gave the group a brick-making machine in 2003, with a capacity of 1 500 bricks per day. *Masisizane*

buys most of its bricks from Congo, a local enterprise. Members buy pre-cast concrete raft foundations/floor slabs from Profond Contractors at R 5 600.00 (US$ 836.00) per unit. Members find this very costly, in spite of the fact that they get a top-up state subsidy for this purpose. This will be in the form of undisclosed personal assistance to individual leaders. Some ties developed by the previous leader have been lost. An earlier sponsor, Rooftops Canada, agreed to offer *Masisizane* technical assistance, through an NGO, Planact. *Masisizane* refused this arguing that Planact had conflicting interests as the latter, like *Masisizane*, was also implementing projects through the People's Housing Process (PHP).

One issue that comes through in the case of *Masisizane* is how individuals are able to use opportunities opened through networks of collaborative action for own benefit. In the previous case of the Eco-city, networks of an individual were being used to access resources for the group. However, in the case of *Masisizane*, the group created opportunities for individual members to use its networks towards their own benefits. To start with the leaders were amongst the initial beneficiaries of the groups efforts to build housing through the *stokvel* movement. The singular control of *Masisizane* by the founder leader, Anna Mofoking, has been perpetuated by a small group of current leaders, who are the major beneficiaries of the group's activities. Another interesting aspect is the personal assistance that had been promised to the leaders of *Masisizane* by the NGO Copak. These issues are not surprising at all, since networks are spaces for negotiation, those in stronger positions to negotiate, e.g. organisation's leadership, would end up with more benefits.

Masisizane's **network characteristics**

The network used by *Masisizane* to access resources is shrinking. There are weak links with local CBOs and NGOs. The single centrality of the network is because it is small and localised. The resources flowing through this network have been reducing and are currently unidirectional. Primary in-flows are restricted to government subsidies. Outflows are mainly to the market. They are directed at acquiring materials and labour towards construction of subsidised houses. The situation might change depending on how effective its other proposed activities, e.g. brick manufacturing, picks up. There are weak links amongst the members in spite of weekly meetings,

which are predominantly viewed as means of passing on information from the government to the community. In fact government interventions are really geared towards transforming *Masisizane* into a hierarchy. There are no connections with international donors and dwindling connection with local NGOs and CBOs. The network value amongst its members is low. Communication between *Masisizane* officials and other members is very weak. This was reflected in the complaints by some members that the officials were trying to avoid them.

Sketch of the general housing network




Figure 6.6. Networks of Masisizane, Ivory Park

Impacts of *Masisizane*

Masisizane delivers a very standard design, mainly a mono-pitch, 39m^2 house, made of concrete bricks, of about 150mm thick (see Figure 6.6). This is left for owners to finish. The quality of delivery is not very different from the capital subsidy houses, although the *Masisizane* houses are slightly bigger. Amongst my interviewees were a number of unhappy beneficiaries, e.g. Ms Masebula[8] who had decided to engage a lawyer because of what she considered shoddy workmanship. According to *Masisizane* leaders, this is partly because of 'unrealistic expectations' of some beneficiaries. In my view it is a consequence of poor communication between the leadership and the members, a result of the transformation of the network towards a hierarchy. Officials now seem to view members as customers rather than colleagues.




Figure 6.7. A comparison of typical house plans by Masisizane and the 'RDP'

Masisizane officials consider its major weaknesses to be lack of adequate finances and lack of local contractors in Ivory Park, whom it can subcontract to construct houses. The state considers the organisation's major weakness to be lack of technical and management capacity to support the state's housing programmes. Although these

[8] The name has been changed.

positions are largely correct, my analysis shows that abandonment of savings has resulted in weakening of local ties. In turn weak ties have resulted in loss of any spaces for participation and negotiation. This alienates members, who only stick with the organisation because they are on the waiting list for housing through the PHP. It is evident that most members leave as soon as they get their houses. Most non-qualifying members have already left the organisation. A shift from mobilisation and purposeful mutual support into a hierarchy is one of the major undoing of the organisation. Ties amongst the group's members and between the group and the community of Ivory Park are weak.

6.3.3. Networks of other PHP support organisations in Ivory Park and Diepsloot

There are cooperatives created by the Gauteng Department of Housing to enable community support for the People's Housing Process. They are not 'found linkages' as opposed to those in the original *Masisizane* and the Eco-city. In this section I discuss the ties around *Inzimi Mpumelelo*, in Ivory Park and *Izwe Lethu* in Diepsloot.

Networks of *Inzimi Mpumelelo*[9]




Figure 6.8. Networks of Inzimi Mpumelelo, Ivory Park

Inzimi Mpumelelo is a Gauteng Government initiated community support organisation for the PHP programme started in 2003. The group is involved in identification of potential beneficiaries for subsidised housing through PHP in the area. It is also involved in beneficiary training. Further, it is meant to work in poverty alleviation and income generation. It intends to make building materials for own use and for sale. It also intends to train members in brick-laying. Currently the group is planning to find ways of developing it's members skills through training. This is needed because in spite of having been allocated government subsidies to deliver housing through the PHP, even the officials did not seem to know much about that particular programme.

[9] Information based on my interviews with the founding members of *Inzimi Mpumelelo*, Petros Segabutla; Eunice April and Timothy Nduli at the PHP Support Office, next to the Police Station, Ward 77, Ivory Park on the 15th August 2004. Additional information from Lerato Shibambo, Diepsloot Consolidation Subsidy Programme.

Currently, *Inzimi Mpumelelo's* main relationship is with the Gauteng Province Department of Housing, who has allocated it 80 houses to build. The organisation is seeking collaboration with the Department of Labour to help in training. *Inzimi Mpumelelo* has few relationships with local NGOs and CBOs. A local NGO Copak has promised to capacitate its members on management of the cooperative model of development. At the time of the interview (August 2004), *Inzimi Mpumelelo* was beginning to communicate with community members about its activities. The engagement was limited to interesting community members in some aspects of construction, in the future.

Inzimi Mpumelelo is a typical cooperative created by the Gauteng Department of Housing. The intention was to create grassroots structures that could be used to support for the People's Housing Process. It is not based on 'found linkages' as opposed to those in *Masisizane* and the Eco-city. Its efficacy in the short-term is limited by many factors, especially lack of capacity. In the long term, it would be difficult to predict its performance, but it is clear many factors, especially those relating to leadership, community mobilisation and capacity, will play a major role. Another important factor limiting the efficacy of organisations like *Inzimi Mpumelelo* is too much dependence on the government's housing subsidy for their operations. In any event, organisations like *Inzimi Mpumelelo* are really hierarchies, dominated with formalism and spaces of prescription. They are yet to develop meaningful linkages and spaces for negotiation, which are defining features of networked groups. They only have weak linkages to the communities they are meant to have emanated from.

***Izwe Lethu,* Diepsloot[10]**




Figure 6.9. Networks of Izwe Lethu, Diepsloot

Izwe Lethu is the PHP support cooperative in Diepsloot. The Gauteng Province started it in 2003. It has recruited some members after being registered in 2004. It had been allocated 80 subsidies. It was intended to replace the City of Johannesburg's PHP support in Diepsloot, which itself has been responsible for construction of some 200 units in Diepsloot. The main reason advanced why *Izwe Lethu* was preferred by Gauteng Province's Department of Housing in delivery through PHP instead of the City of Johannesburg PHP support, is simply because the province wants to use formal cooperatives as opposed to existing groups.

[10] Interviews with Jacob Mataung (RDP Housing Diepsloot), Agrippa Thabede (PHP Support Centre Community Liaison Officer, Diepsloot), Pumzile (City of Johannesburg PHP) on 1st and 2nd February 2005.Interviews with Salfina Mulanzi (Ward Councillor, Dieplsoot) on 20th August 2004 and 26th January 2005. Additional information from Peter Dube (resident), Susan Modise (Chairperson SANCO, Diepsloot), Bongani (Fundamlinzi Cooperative) on various dates.

It is noteworthy that for the two years that *Izwe Lethu* has been in existence it is not well known to the residents in Diepsloot. It is yet to deliver its first housing units. It is poorly connected to the residents of Diepsloot and other local CBOs working in the area. It is also poorly connected to political organisations operating in Diepsloot, such as SANCO and the PAC.

6.3.4. Insights from studies of networks for collaborative action in the two settlements in Johannesburg

In this section I discuss five emerging issues from studying networks of collaborative action in self-help housing in Diepsloot and Ivory Park. Firstly, I explore the fact that networks of most of the groups are weak. Related to this is the lack of capacity amongst local groups to undertake housing development; capacity could be improved through stronger ties. Thirdly, I discuss the impact of the state's attempt to organise local groups on group members' ties. Fourth, it is clear that groups in Ivory Park have more access to government's resources compared to their counterparts in Diepsloot. I situate this in the tendency to have variance in access to resources on the basis of the strength of ties. Lastly, I discuss the problem of single champions showing that they actually form vulnerable bridges to external networks.

General positions in literature as to why local groups are weak

Weakening of grassroots organisations in housing development in South Africa is well recognised in published literature. State action is the most predominant factor that is cited for this. To start with, the overall development paradigm pursued in South Africa is neo-liberal, with a focus on market enablement. It de-emphasises the role of grassroots organisations, particularly in housing development (Jones and Datta, 2000: 411, 412). As a consequence, the state and market sectors monopolise various housing processes (Jenkins, 1999: 439). The civil society's *modus operandi*, which is preferred by the current government, and even earlier during apartheid, was a narrow developmental one. In the apartheid are this was intended to de-radicalise local residents (see Huchzermeyer, 2001: 83, 84). That might still be true of the current ANC government. There are also divisions occasioned by individualistic

opportunities enabled through the state's project-linked capital subsidy programme, with very limited space for community participation (Huchzermeyer, 2001: 75) and mutual help. Initially the state housing programmes had assumed existence of strong local communities, and required "social compacts" in housing projects (see for example Spiegel, Watson and Wilkinson, 1996: 15, 16). This requirement has since been dropped, weakening community involvement and capacities in project planning and implementation (see Bond, 2000: 149; Jenkins, 1999: 438, 439). Indirectly, the government has also been blamed for loss of local leadership as community leaders leave to be deployed in government structures (Bond, 2000: 149; Bond and Tait, 1997: 27).

There are other factors, apart from state action, that have been cited in the literature as contributing to weakening of civil society and grassroots organisation. One of them is focus on initiation of programmes rather than on maintaining capacity to ensure smooth running of daily operations of these programmes (Napier, 2003: 336). Jenkins (1999: 438, 439) observed that there was diminishing funding for the voluntary sector in South Africa, where NGOs and CBOs have not even been strong in the first place. Funding for the voluntary sector has not improved much, hence the over dependence on the state as seen in the three cases from Ivory Park and one from Diepsloot. Studying these groups from a network perspective confirms that most are still quite weak.

Lack of capacity and low institutional thickness amongst local groups

Most of the local groups in Ivory Park and Diepsloot do not have adequate capacities to undertake development. The cases illustrate different points relating to capacity. In the case of the Eco-city, its mandate, operations and the sheer amount of money it received as support required a very sophisticated management system, which the organisation could not develop by reliance only on local members. The state's response was to employ a manager and other staff to oversee its operations. However, most of these do not have the connections that the founder, Annie Sagrue had. They have also not employed their networks to help the group access more resources.

In the case of *Masisizane,* there are two issues that emerge. Its operations became a lot more complicated when it started supporting the state's housing programme (PHP). However, this transformation from a *stokvel* to a cooperative was also occasioned by loss of members, and human resource, even though most of it was only semi-skilled. This was not helped by the death of its founding leader. The state's response was to employ a manager to oversee the group's operations. This manager has no ties to the local community. The relationship between the manager and members is formal and prescribed, resulting in disconnection and communication breakdown. Like in the case of the Eco-city, the manager has not used her links to benefit *Masisizane* in any way.

Inzimi Mpumelelo and *Izwe Lethu* have a slightly different problem. They are new organisations. Their leaders have very little knowledge of housing issues. Additionally, both were established as hierarchies, rather than being developed from existing local ties. They rely heavily on state support even in very basic operational and management issues.

There are some organisations that have been working in Ivory Park, helping local groups improve their capacities. They include: COPAC, Rooftops Canada, Planact and Tembisa-Ivory Park Empowerment Group. While most local groups readily accept any kind of support extended to them, slightly established ones consider these capacity-building NGOs as competitors. While financial support is readily accepted, other forms of support, e.g. capacity building is not always welcome. A case in point is that of *Masisizane* who refused support from Planact, arguing that the latter was also implementing projects through the PHP. There is conflict of interest amongst developmental NGOs and other developmental local organisations. In fact Planact has since reconsidered its developmental role, choosing to focus instead on its traditional support role to local organisations.

The other issue that one encounters in relation to capacity of local groups is that of thin institutional thickness. Amin and Thrift (1994) outline the four pillars of institutional thickness as: presence of strong institutions at grassroots level; high degree of interaction amongst local institutions; collaborative action – awareness of local organisations that their mutual activities are part of a collaborative enterprise –

and development of structures of domination and patterns of coalition. The groups, which I studied in Ivory Park, showed very little institutional thickness. There was no collaboration and cooperation amongst them, even in relatively neutral issues of mutual interest, like access to materials and building technology. This implies that benefits of sharing of information, cross-capacitating and collaborative action amongst groups were absent.

State attempts to organise local groups versus weakening of ties

Linked with general lack of capacity in the grassroots for housing production is the issue of the state's attempts to organise communities towards housing and the consequences of this. The community organisations get government support in terms of funding, staffing, training and project allocation. As a consequence, they are not rooted in existing community structures. They are neither independent, nor self-sustaining, nor even representative in a democratic sense.

The various organisations whose networks were analysed earlier represent developmental community organisations, which are totally dependent on the state for their survival, while simultaneously disconnected from the very communities that they are meant to be part of. This is true even for the Eco-city and *Masisizane,* which were started by other actors for other purposes than support for the state's housing programme.

Government officials seem to be steering clear of community organisations they cannot control. A case in point is the Midrand Development Company (MIDEV). It was initiated by the defunct Midrand Local Council. MIDEV catered for design, management and development of PHP in Ivory Park. It seemed, from my interviews with council officials, that MIDEV had enough links to secure donor funding and support from the private sector to implement housing and infrastructure programmes, a capacity that current cooperatives being set as support organisations do not have. In spite of this, the organisation was discontinued, as the then Provincial Director of

Housing, Mr. Sibusiso Buthelezi, preferred to use newly created community-based cooperatives instead[11].

Asymmetry in access to state's resources and in the operations of civil society

An issue that arises when one compares networks of collaborative action in Diepsloot and Ivory Park are the various asymmetries manifest in the settlements. I have identified three, directly related to resource flows. These are asymmetries in operations of civil society organisations, asymmetries in access to state resources and asymmetries in access to information.

Generally, civil society organisations in Johannesburg tend to operate in areas where there is already a robust presence of other players, from the state, market and civil society sectors. Thus one sees a more vibrant involvement of civil society organisations in Ivory Park compared to Diepsloot. I held interviews with several CBOs and NGOs that I was told were involved in aspects of housing in Diepsloot. However, it was my assessment that their involvement was not substantial. Members of the ANC Youth League had provided labour for the construction of RDP houses in the area. They had amongst them people trained in building construction, tiling, painting, etc., but they were not an organised group 'as they were still waiting for support'[12]. The ANC Women's League and SANCO, similarly have many members interested in construction. *Vuru* Extension 7 AIDS Group; Diepsloot Waste Recycling Company; *Nompilu*; SANCA; HIPPY and *Tikkun Ma Africa* are some of the NGOs and CBOs in Diepsloot. None is directly involved in housing.

Related to the asymmetry in operations of civil society and grassroots organisations is asymmetry in access to state resources by various low-income settlements. In the literature, Bond and Tait (1997: 27) noted an inequitable allocation of state resources amongst different low-income groups, linking these with the developer driven approach to low-income housing. The developers avoid 'trouble areas'. The 'trouble

[11] Personal communications with the former Provincial Director of Housing, Mr. Sibusiso Buthelezi, between 2002 and 2004.

[12] Interview with Abraham Mabuke (ANC Ward Committee member; Coordinator ANC Youth League, Diepsloot and Coordinator Youth Council) at Diepsloot West, ANC Youth Offices, on the 10th of October 2004.

areas' ironically also tend to be the most marginalised (see also Bond, 2000: 149). This approach to development tends to perpetuate unequal access to state resources, hence disgruntlement of some communities, like Diepsloot, which are relatively poorer than other low-income areas (see also Beall, Crankshaw, Parnell, 2000: 116). This asymmetry is not likely to change as long as the current urban development paradigms exclude equity, in pursuit of market centred, neo-liberalism (see McDonald, 2002: 300; Bond, 2000:122; Pottie, 2003: 135; Huchzermeyer, 2001a: 310; Huchzermeyer, 2002a: 96; Bond and Tait, 1997: Jenkins, 1999: 435; Jones and Datta, 2000: 410; and Khan, 2003: 77-84).

The third level of asymmetry is related to information. While there seem to be clear channels of communication in Ivory Park, from meetings of ward councillors, through fliers by the Area Two Housing Managers, to different organisations involved in housing, there is no equivalence in Diepsloot. With political divisions and a single Ward Councillor, who lost her offices in fire, information from the government does not reach residents of Diepsloot. While residents complain that only those who are politically connected get to know what is going on, the ANC leaders accuse residents of failing to attend public meetings.

This asymmetry of access to information is not limited to the relationship between the state and civil society, but extends to organisations that have been started by the government in the settlements. It is instructive that the City of Johannesburg employees in PHP Support Centre in Diepsloot had no idea what would happen to the centre once the Provincial Government-initiated cooperatives start functioning. The province-initiated cooperatives, *Izwe Lethu* in Diepsloot and *Inzimi Mpumelelo* in Ivory Park, were not informed either. They did not fully understand the difference between PHP, which they were meant to have been implementing, and other housing programmes. The irony is that the government was apparently holding regular meetings in both settlements to discuss the same issues[13]. This might be conceptualised as vertical asymmetry, where the lower rungs of the government hierarchies tend to have very limited information. This informational asymmetry is an intrinsic attribute of hierarchies. There is need for the different levels of the

[13] Interview with Simon Mukhulu, Region One and Two Housing Manager, at Region Two offices in Ivory Park on the 13th of August 2004.

hierarchies to have adequate information to fulfil their mandates. One cause of this type of asymmetry is very high levels of dependence, particularly by the lower levels of government and government initiated local organisations.

Social entrepreneurship and single bridges: lessons from two champions

The cases of Eco-city and *Masisizane* present the story of two important champions, Annie Sagrue and Anna Mofokeng. They founded and led two organisations with extensive networks within civil society, the market and the state, as discussed earlier. Annie Sagrue had networks she developed through international environmental activism that she was able to draw on to access funds for the Eco-city programme. Anne Mofokeng had extensive networks locally and internationally, which she had built as an advocate of the poor, through such organisations as Slum Dwellers International (SDI). Both champions were not only bridges that linked their organisations with networks through which much needed resources could be accessed; they were also social entrepreneurs who were able to exploit their contacts towards improvement of socio-economic conditions of their members, and indeed the larger Ivory Park community.

Both leaders left: Mofokeng passed away, while Sagrue left the Eco-city between 2003 and 2005. There seem to have been loss of support for these two organisations (*Masisizane* and Eco-city) from donors and local members. The quick intervention of the state was to appoint managers for the two organisations. These were not able to maintain access to resources that Sagrue and Mofokeng had access to. In both cases the intervention by the state does not seem to have arrested the downward trend of the organisations, marked by reduction of membership. Ironically, both organisations have increased opportunities for access to resources through the state's housing programmes. The issue here is that while the bridges are useful in bringing in development, sustainable development and growth can only be realised through broad empowerment of community members generally and group members in particular. Too much reliance on one champion creates strong but vulnerable ties. There is need to reinforce the bridges, by building a critical mass of people who can take the place of the social entrepreneurs who are acting as single bridges between networks. This is referred to as 'the strength of weak ties' in network terminology.

6.4. Exchange networks in self-help housing in Diepsloot and Ivory Park, Johannesburg

In this section I discuss the general patterns of networks, towards delivery of housing, that were observed in Ivory Park and Diepsloot. The focus is on the resources exchanged. Networks play a role in access to finance, labour, materials and technology in both settlements. Land is also mainly accessed through state/market hierarchies with the role played by individual-to-individual exchanges being very limited. Local collective access to land was non-existent in both settlements. Infrastructure and services in both settlements is accessed exclusively through state/market hierarchies, with no space for local networks.

6.4.1. Networks and hierarchies in access to finance

There were three broad patterns of networks towards finance in the Johannesburg case studies (see Figure 6.10. and 6.11.). The first involved linkages between community members and organisations, with not-for-profit organisations, the state and international donors. This pattern was observed in parts of Ivory Park and to a limited extent in Diepsloot (see Figure 6.10. section A), although it is becoming weaker. The second pattern was composed of ties amongst local individuals and micro-financiers (see Figures 6.10 and 6.11 sections B and E). Information on finance in this case was based on networks, but access to finance was very hierarchical. The last pattern was made up of individuals accessing finance through different savings groups and individual linkages (see Figures 6.10 & 6.11 sections C and F). This last pattern is also reducing in scale and scope in both settlements, and was dependent on strong local networks for its operations.




Figure 6.10. Networks towards access to finance for self-help housing in Diepsloot




Figure 6.11. Networks towards access to finance for self-help housing in Ivory Park

Almost all the groups discussed in the previous Section 6.3, namely: the Eco-city programme, *Masisizane* Cooperative, *Inzimi Mpumelelo* and *Izwe Lethu* accessed finance in the manner illustrated in the first pattern (figure 6.10 and 6.11, Sections A and E respectively). They accessed finance from international donors, philanthropists, the private sector and the government. One of the issues that come out from the earlier analysis is that the amounts of finance they were able to access was very varied, with the Eco-city programme being able to access much more international and state finance, while *Izwe Lethu* had accessed very little. One issue worth noting is that the

capacity of these organisations to attract finance depended on personal links of key actors in the organisations. Another issue that I noted is the asymmetry in the operations of the funding and donor agencies, supporting stronger more established organisations which were already working with the state, while avoiding newer, weaker ones.

The second pattern (Figure 6.10 & 6.11, parts B & E) is characterised by unregulated micro-finance available in different parts of Ivory Park and Diepsloot. According to some interviewees, the interest rates are sometimes as high as 40%. The loans are not packaged specifically for housing, thus repayment periods are very short, between six months to four years. The diagrams also show weak linkages to banks. There is limited bank finance, e.g. through the People's Bank. Again the problem is that this is an expensive source of finance. Very few residents have borrowed from these sources and added to their own savings to build houses. Some of the people interviewed in Diepsloot had accessed micro-finance out of the settlement. There are a number of working people in Ivory Park, who have invested, their savings in home improvement. Some interviewees said they were able to get small bank loans for other things, and then divert the funds into housing. This came with the problem of short repayment periods, which were required for this. Information on where to find micro-lenders seemed to have been dependent on individual networks. However access to micro-finance and bank loans was not dependent on individual ties, both were done through conventional hierarchies.

The third pattern (Figures 6.10 & 6.11, sections C and F) was the most dependent on strong local networks. It was made up of small groups of individuals, mainly women, saving predominantly through Rotating Savings and Credit Schemes (*'stokvels'*). My interviews revealed that several people who had been members of these *'stokvels'* had stopped saving through them, mainly because of the perception that the state was meant to provide for their needs. None of the ones found in Ivory Park and Diepsloot saved specifically for housing. The groups saved small amounts every week or two (R 10.00 or R 20.00) and most of this went towards consumables. This was very similar to the amounts that similar groups were saving in Nairobi, in a very different political economy. I discuss the implications of this in the next chapter.

Few interviewees, in Ivory Park, accessed finance through employment related credit. Three interviewees, in Dieplsoot, had used part of their child support grants to improve their shacks, which were initially too small to accommodate them and their children. The scale of these means of access to finance seemed insignificant.

6.4.2. Discontinuities in the supply of labour, materials and technology

There are three main patterns identified in relation to access to labour, materials and technology (see Figures 6.12. and 6.13). The first pattern involves the formal state self-help through the PHP and consolidation programmes (see Figures 6.12 and 6.13, sections A & D). It has elements from the private sector, state and in some cases foreign professionals, working with local contractors, and to a limited extent using local material suppliers. In few cases trainers and self-builders are involved in housing production through the programmes. In this pattern, labour is accessed mainly through local not-for-profit organisations. The pattern is generally hierarchical, with some limited spaces for negotiation, depending on the extent of involvement of the self-builders. The second pattern relates to individuals, often guided by local contractors to get some sort of plans for their houses (see Figures 6.12 and 6.13, sections B & E). They use local labour and personal ties to get their houses built. The pattern relies on networks, but is small in scope and impact. The last pattern is composed of weak linkages of individuals, buying plans from 'plan sellers' and using local labour to construct (see Figures 6.12 and 6.13, sections C & F). These are dominant mainly in Diepsloot, specifically in the *mayibuye*[14] programme.

[14] In the *Mayibuye* programme, minimally serviced stands are laid out on vacant land for rapid occupation. The service level is minimal, sometimes only including water reticulation and storm water drains. The government then improves these gradually. Individuals build their own shacks, which they improve on their own over time or through the state subsidy programme.




Figure 6.12. Networks towards access to labour, materials and technology in Diepsloot




Figure 6.13. Networks towards labour, materials and technology in Ivory Park

The first pattern (see Figures 6.12 and 6.13, sections A & D) shows that labour, materials and technology in Ivory Park and Diepsloot are still predominantly accessed through state/market hierarchies, with limited spaces for local actors. In the market based 'RDP' housing delivery approach, labour, materials and technology is accessed through a developer, who acquires rights to develop the 'RDP' houses in a contractual agreement with the Provincial Department of Housing and the city of Johannesburg. A main contractor, who is also meant to subcontract to local contractors, leads the construction process. Subcontracting, in both settlements, has been impractical because of lack of organised local construction groups. Apart from this arrangement

there is another arrangement, driven by the Province, where cooperatives are developed as support organisations for the People's Housing Process (PHP). The PHP subsidy is channelled through the support organisations. These organisations may employ local labour or choose to construct through sweat equity, with the Province and city staff approving the various stages of construction and releasing subsidy funds accordingly. This arrangement has not taken root properly though, particularly in Diepsloot. However, the city of Johannesburg is acting as a support organisation, while awaiting the young cooperatives to develop. A few, as discussed in section 6.3, have already been given subsidies to construct 'PHP houses'. However, access to labour, materials and technology through groups involved in PHP has not made use of local networks; they still function like (weak) government hierarchies. In my interviews, the main reason given for the weak ties with grassroots was that there were no organised local groups involved in construction.



Photo 6.8. A seven roomed house next to a shacks on a site and service site in Diepsloot

The second pattern (Figure 6.12 & 6.13, Sections B & E) is quite small but is becoming increasingly important, particularly in Ivory Park. In this case individuals, often working people, access labour, materials and technology, directly through

professionals, ‘plan sellers’, local labourers or contractors. Some have their plans approved by the City of Johannesburg. This network offers a variety of housing solutions, reflected in local architectural styles and aesthetics (see photo 6.8). It delivers better quality products than the state driven hierarchies or the informal networks.



Photo 6.9. Shack with foundation awaiting top-up subsidy in Diepsloot.

Other issues also become evident when one studies networks of labour, materials and technology in Diepsloot and Ivory Park. With regard to labour, they include: lack of connection between contractors and small-scale labourers in the formal and informal areas; low levels of construction skills and expertise; and little space within the market for the small-scale labourers and contractors to operate. Even practices in the self-help arena are tilted in favour of the formal, more established, contractors and skilled labourers, because of the requirements of the government subsidy programmes and development control. As a result, materials and technologies favoured by mainstream market are privileged over local initiatives. Significantly, this also affects local micro-enterprises supplying the construction sector. This sector is ill developed in my Johannesburg case studies compared to Nairobi (I discuss this comparison in more detail in the next chapter). This is because in Johannesburg major players in the

private sector source their materials outside of the settlements where they are working.

6.5. Conclusions

Even in the context of a very hierarchical approach, networks still play a role in the supply of self-help housing in Johannesburg. It is evident that the state's housing programmes are disrupting individuals' networks by ignoring both the networks that individuals are already using to access resources and networks that individuals who are being relocated have developed in their previous settlements. However, there is evidence that collective problems amongst recently resettled residents, as seen in Diepsloot, are creating opportunities for individuals to develop new ties, which may have potential for use in housing.

Ego-centric networks in the two settlements are stronger than those of groups. However, the former are used predominantly for survival, rather than production of housing. Analysis of ties amongst groups show that although they are expected to operate hierarchically, the strength and ability of groups to access resources depends on specific ties that key actors within the groups are able to develop and sustain – both internally within the group and externally. The external linkages are realised mainly through the bridging function of individual actors. These linkages enable groups to access resources which are located in other networks. The analysis shows that there seems to be no clear correlation between the resources accessed by some groups and groups' housing outcomes. Further, analysis shows that the actors inserted by the state to manage these groups do not bring their networks to bear on access to resources for the groups; these actors are weaker than local champions. This was reflected both in the cases of *Masisizane* and the Eco-city Project. In addition, some groups are vulnerable because of dependence on single champions acting as bridges.

State incorporation of local groups into its housing programmes is resulting in increase of financial resources of the groups, but weakening of ties among members, and by extension, weakening the capacity to provide housing through self-help. New organisations started by the state are operating as weak hierarchies with few linkages

to the local communities they are meant to be part of and to serve. Significantly, weak networks of the key actors in these new groups as in the case of *Izwe Lethu* also limit groups' potential to access various resources towards housing. There is no collaboration towards collective action amongst local groups, a problem that could be dealt with through stronger coordination of local self-help programmes. The Department of Housing could strengthen this coordination role through the PHP support centres, which are being established.

In terms of the resources themselves, most are accessed through state/market hierarchies, primarily because the state is interventionist. Finance is accessed mainly from the state and the market, although as shown in the case of the Eco-city programme and *Masisizane*, local and international networks also play a role in this. Land in both settlements is accessed through state/market hierarchies, as there is no secondary market in the areas. Labour, materials and technology in the mainstream self-help housing developments are accessed through hierarchies. Potential of access to labour, materials and technology through local networks is weakened by lack of local construction groups and rigidity of development control. Local labour and construction groups could be developed by the government, specialising in local construction and not necessarily intended to develop later into mainstream private sector construction. Infrastructure and service provision in both settlements is beyond the scope and capacity of local networks in their current state. These are better supplied by state hierarchies.