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**Custer, Scott**

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# EVOLUTION OF ENFORCEMENT:

## United Nations Enforcement Actions Under Article 42 of Chapter VII

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Humanities,
University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctorate of Philosophy (International Relations)

Author: Scott Custer (2349645)

Supervisor: Dr. Malte Brosig

15 July 2024

## DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

This is to certify that this thesis has been prepared by:

**Scott Custer**
**2349645**

towards the degree of:

**Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in International Relations**

Entitled:

| |
|---|
| Evolution of Enforcement: United Nations Enforcement Actions Under Article 42 of Chapter VII |

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. No part of this thesis has been copied, plagiarized, or cited without proper acknowledgment.

Signature: 

Date: July 15, 2024

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation presents a comprehensive examination of the evolution of peace enforcement operations under the framework of the United Nations Charter's Chapter VII, Article 42. Through a qualitative research methodology, incorporating in-depth case study analysis and process tracing, the dissertation explores the changing actor constellations in peace enforcement, highlighting the shift from predominantly Member State-led operations to more complex arrangements involving Regional Arrangement and the United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO). By analyzing seven specific cases in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya, and Mali, the research identifies key causal mechanisms that have shaped the actor constellations of peace enforcement missions. The findings contribute to a nuanced understanding of the conditions under which peace enforcement operations are initiated and the strategic considerations that guide the international community's response to threats to peace and security. The study concludes by discussing the implications of these evolutions for future peace enforcement endeavors and the broader study of peace and conflict resolution within the field of International Relations.

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| AFDL | Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo |
| AFISMA | African-led International Support Mission to Mali |
| AMISOM | Africa Union Mission in Somalia |
| APSA | African Peace and Security Architecture |
| AQIM | al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb |
| AU | African Union |
| BCP | Baustoland Congress Party |
| BRICS | Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa |
| CAR | Central African Republic |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| CJTF-HOA | Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa |
| COW | Correlates of War Project |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| EASBRIG | East African Standby Brigade |
| ECOMOG | Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EUFOR | European Union Force |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FAR | Armed Forces of Rwanda |
| FARDC | Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| FIB | United Nations Force Intervention Brigade |
| FLS | Frontline states |
| FNI | Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes |
| GWOT | Global War on Terror |
| HRDDP | Human Rights Due Diligence Policy |
| ICGLR | International Conference on the Great Lakes Region |
| ICU | Islamic Courts Movement |
| IEMF | Interim Emergency Multinational Force |
| IFOR | Implementation Force in Bosnia and Hezegovina |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IGASOM | IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia |
| IMC | International Monitoring Committee) |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| JNA | Yugoslav Army |
| KLA | Kosovo Liberation Army |
| LCD | Lesotho Congress for Democracy |
| MDJT | Movement for Democracy and Justice |
| MIF | Multinational Interim Force in Haiti 2004 |
| MINUSMA | United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali |
| MINUSTAH | United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti |
| MISAB | Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic |
| MISCA | International Support Mission to the Central African Republic |
| MONUC | United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC |
| MS | Member States |
| MSF | Médecins Sans Frontières |
| MUJWA | Movement of Oneness and Jihad in West Africa |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |

| | |
|---|---|
| NPFL | National Patriotic Front of Liberia |
| NSS | National Security Strategy |
| OAS | Organization of African States |
| ONUC | United Nations Operation in the Congo |
| PE | Peace Enforcement |
| PITF | Political Instability Task Force |
| PK | Peacekeeping |
| POC | Protection of Civilians |
| QCA | Qualitative Comparison Analysis |
| RA | Regional Arrangement |
| RS | Regional States |
| SADC | South African Development Community |
| SADF | South African Defense Force |
| SFOR | Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| SMC | Standing Mediation Committee |
| SNA | Somali National Congress |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| TCC | Troop Contributing Country |
| TFG | Transition Federal Government |
| TNG | Transitional National Government |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNDPK | United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| UNDPO | United Nations Department of Peace Operations |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNITAF | Unified Task Force |
| UNOCI | United Nations Operation in Cote D'Ivoire |
| UNOSOM | United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSCR | United Nations Security Council Resolution |
| UPC | Union of Congolese Patriots |
| USC | United Somali Congress |
| WFP | World Food Program |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

# CHAPTER 1
# INTRODUCTION

"Covenants without the sword are just words, and of no strength to secure a man."

- Thomas Hobbes

*Just after dawn on the morning of August 28, 2013, two Ukrainian-piloted Mi-24P attack helicopters fired salvos of rockets and 30mm cannons into fortified positions dug into the hills of Kibati, approximately 10 kilometers north of the city of Goma on the eastern edge of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The targets of this aerial bombardment were members of the M23 militia group that was responsible for numerous deadly attacks on innocent civilians and international peacekeepers. With the echo of the initial rocket explosions still reverberating through the hills, a sustained barrage of South African and Tanzanian artillery began tearing into the M23 positions. As the M23 rebels attempted to defend their position and reply with their own artillery, ground forces from South Africa and Tanzania began maneuvering against them, forcing them to flee or be killed under the onslaught. While the battle for Kibati did not rise to the attention of the leading global media outlets, nor was it especially significant militarily to the decades-long conflict in the DRC, however, it was tremendously significant in the evolution of the United Nations' effort to restore and maintain peace and security throughout the world. On this hot, humid morning in August, the attackers in the battle for Kibati were members of the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), and this marked the first time members of a UN peace operation had been mandated to use offensive military force to defeat an enemy combatant. (Hofstatter, 2014)*

The United Nations (UN) was established at the end of World War II to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." (United Nations 1945, Preamble) Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the US Ambassador to the United Nations, said famously in 1958 that "the primary, the fundamental, the essential purpose of the United Nations is to keep peace." (Hanhimaki 2014) While the primary purpose of the United Nations may not be controversial, how the organization and its members accomplish this goal is a highly debated topic in modern international relations. Theoretical concepts such as collective security, global governance, and the responsibility to protect have contributed to the deployment of military forces in "peace operations" in response to breaches or threats to international peace and security. "Peace operations are not a panacea, but they are an indispensable part of the multilateral toolbox of the international community." (Irrgang 2023)

The Charter of the United Nations provides broad powers for the maintenance of order throughout the world as well as the restoration of peace should conflict arise. As delineated in the Charter, the UN Security Council is the primary organ designated with the specific responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. (United Nations 1945, Art. 24) While the overall theme of the UN Charter is the cooperation of Member States for the pacific settlement of disputes, it also enumerates powers for the UNSC to determine and respond to threats to international peace and security, up to and including the use of military force. (United Nations 1945, Art 33-42)

The bedrock of the United Nations is the mandate that all member States must settle

their disputes peacefully. Article 2(4) states that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Corollary to this is the premise of non-intervention in a nation's sovereign, domestic affairs. Members are expected to independently manage all issues within their territorial boundaries without intervention from the United Nations or other Member States. Article 2(7) provides that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

The exception to these principles, as alluded to in the last clause of Article 2(7) above, occurs in the event of international conflict. An entire chapter of the UN Charter, Chapter VII, is dedicated to actions "with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." Article 39 grants the UNSC the authority to determine threats and breaches of international peace and security. Additionally, a range of coercive measures, authorized under Articles 41 and 42 Chapter VII, allow economic sanctions and military force to impose the international community's will on a deviant State or sub-state party. These enforcement actions authorized under the auspices of Article 42, often labeled "peace enforcement," are the subject of this book.

The UN defines peace operations as "field operations deployed to prevent, manage and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risks of their recurrence." (UNDPKO 2008,

98) Much has been studied and written regarding the expanding use of force in complex, multidimensional peacekeeping operations. These studies have definitive merit as, for the last thirty years, there has been a significant increase in the authorization of the use of force to protect civilians and the mission. What this body of research has yet to do, however, is address the evolution in peace enforcement – a mission completely different than peacekeeping.

According to the UN's own doctrine, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are entirely separate missions that occur in different phases of a conflict with minimal overlap. The overlap that does occur is sequentially relative to the establishment of peace, not the force structure assigned to accomplish the mission (see Figure 1).





Figure 1-1 – UN Peacekeeping Operations ("Capstone"), pg 19

Peace enforcement is a strategic tool unique to the United Nations. It involves the legal use of military force, not in self-defense or requiring the consent of the parties in conflict but for the altruistic purpose of restoring peace. Peace enforcement is not peacekeeping, nor is it an expansion or robust offshoot of peacekeeping. As Howard outlines,

"peacekeeping and peace enforcement are two entirely different enterprises" (Howard 2015, 10), and this study examines peace enforcement in that light.


For the first fifty years of its existence, when invoking a Chapter VII response to breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, the Security Council almost exclusively relied upon Member States or coalitions of Member States to enforce the peace. In the late 1990s, certain Chapter VII mandates were authorized to a regional arrangement for the first time - NATO in the Balkans. Post 9/11, regional organizations, primarily in the form of NATO and the African Union (AU), continued to receive authorization from the Security Council to compel aggressors towards peace in several hotspots of the world. In the last decade, however, the evolution of peace enforcement took a giant leap. The Security Council, in contravention of all published UN doctrine, began mandating specific peace enforcement tasks directly to UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) peacekeeping missions.[1] The UN's impartial peacekeepers were now tasked with using military force to compel combatant parties toward peace.

This research project endeavors to analyze peace enforcement and to explain the causation in the evolution of the primary actors responsible for enforcing the restoration of peace. Over the last 70 years, three primary actors have been tasked by the Security Council with peace enforcement mandates: Member States (or coalitions of Member States), Regional Arrangements, and the UN's Department of Peace Operations. In some cases, these primary actors have operated independently, but more often, they have

1. In the 1990s the UNSC had granted UN peacekeeping missions enhanced authority to use force to defend themselves, civilians, and even the "mission." While ostensibly authorized under "Chapter VII", these authorizations were defensive in nature and not coercive – therefore not peace enforcement.

formed hybrid constellations of actors to command and control the peace enforcement operation. Throughout this book, we will refer to the various configurations of these three primary actors as actor constellations (see Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2: Peace Enforcement Actors




Peace enforcement actor constellations have evolved from strictly Member State-led missions to constellations involving Regional Arrangements, the UNDPO, and a combination of all three in various hybrid configurations (see Figure 1-3). The majority of 20th-century peace enforcement operations were led by a coalition of Member States, such as the cases of enforcement actions in Korea (1950) and Kuwait (1991). In this actor constellation, a single Member State leads a willing coalition of other Member States in accomplishing the mandate authorized by the Security Council. Originally ad hoc in nature and formed specifically to address the ongoing crisis, these temporary coalitions of Member States have more recently been replaced by existing collective security mechanisms that have volunteered to take responsibility for the peace enforcement mission, as in the case of NATO in Bosnia (1992-1995) and the EU in Libya (2011).

A second type of actor constellation is the Regional Arrangement-led mission. Similar to the first type, these operations are led by a regional arrangement that has legitimate

authority over the country in conflict and uses the members of its organization to field and lead a peace enforcement operation under the specific authorization of the Security Council. An example of a Regional Arrangement operating independently is the AU mission in Somalia (2007-2022), whereas Mali (2012-2023) and CAR (2013-) provide examples of a Regional Arrangement operating in parallel with a Member State.

The UNDPO-led mission is the third type of constellation, and these consist of operations authorized by the Security Council that fall directly under the leadership of the UN Department of Peace Operations. Similar to multidimensional peacekeeping missions, the UNDPO will request a certain number and type of military forces that are voluntarily contributed by Member States, often in numbers that are very small and in unit sizes that rely on the UN to provide command and control as well as logistics support. These forces fall under a UNDPO-appointed mission commander, normally a general officer from one of the larger troop-contributing countries, but not necessarily. An example of this type of actor constellation is the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC (2013-).

Hybrid structures consist of an actor constellation comprising some combination of the three primary actors. Based on the delineation of their command and control as well as the timing of their deployment, these hybrid constellations can be independent, integrated, coordinated, parallel, or sequential. (Jones, 17)





Figure 1-3. Typology of the Evolution of Actor Constellations in Peace Enforcement
MS=Member States; RA=Regional Arrangement; RS=Regional State; UN=UNDPO; TCC=Troop Contributing Country; | |=adjacent; >>=replaced by; +=integrated with; [ ]=PK force

## 1.1 Significance of Research

While there is a tremendous amount of research revolving around multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, the use of force in international relations, and the changing paradigm of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, in the 75-year history of the UN, there have been very few comprehensive studies on peace enforcement. This is mainly due to two factors. First, between 1945 and 1990, the Security Council authorized peace enforcement under Article 42 on only three occasions, two of which were major conflicts

involving dozens of nations (i.e., the Korean War and Desert Storm). As a consequence, these peace enforcement missions were most often examined as stand-alone operations rather than as a subset of peace enforcement. The second factor is that the more recent peace enforcement operations, those mandated during the 21-year period between 1992 and 2013, have most often been aggregated under complex peacekeeping or the catch-all term of "peace operations." The UN has perpetuated this categorization by listing the majority of peace enforcement actions on its list of peacekeeping missions, even while doctrinally separating the two mission types by unequivocally stating that "peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool." (United Nations 2008, 34). Under this umbrella, peace enforcement has often been discounted or misapplied, resulting in minimal comprehensive analysis focused solely on the specific mission of peace enforcement. Many scholars continue to view peace enforcement as a robust form of peacekeeping, ignoring the definitional and doctrinal distinctions that make them separate. While a simple search of the scholarship will return hundreds of documents providing a complete list of peacekeeping operations, even the most comprehensive search will not find a single repository or list specific only to peace enforcement missions – let alone any quantitative or qualitative analysis singularly focused on the evolution of peace enforcement.

This foundation-laying research to explore the evolving collective response to enforcing global peace and security is extremely important and adds considerably to the existing scholarship on peace enforcement that mainly focuses on doctrinal distinctions with peacekeeping, the requirement for international legitimacy, and the effectiveness of peace enforcement. The decline of global hegemonic powers and the rise in capabilities

of regional arrangements cannot help but significantly impact how the world responds to threats to peace and security. The Security Council has not authorized a major peace operation (peacekeeping or peace enforcement) since 2014; the world is beset by major wars in Ukraine and the Levant, as well as a global jihadist insurgency that continues to find new footholds in weak and failing states. Gaining a better understanding of the causal pathways that define these seemingly *ad hoc* collective responses to significant threats to international peace and security, as provided for in this proposed research, will establish a new cornerstone from which to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of various actor constellations and the best international approach to directly responding to the increasing conflicts requiring coercion by force to effect peace.

While scholarship specific to peace enforcement is limited, much of the existing literature is symbiotic and supportive, especially regarding peace operations, security regime complexes, and actor constellations. (Coleman 2007; Brosig 2013; Howard 2015; Karlsrud 2015; de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud 2016; Gorur 2016, de Coning, Aoi and Karlsrud 2017; Howard 2018) These provide the pillars of scholarship necessary to examine the explanatory conditions and develop hypotheses to explain the evolution of peace enforcement.

Exploring the causal pathways for the evolution of actor constellations leading peace enforcement operations from 1945 to 2020 is crucial for several reasons. Firstly, understanding the dynamics behind the involvement of various actors provides insights into the shifting geopolitical landscape and the complex interplay of interests that shape peace enforcement efforts. By examining the causal mechanisms driving the engagement

of different actors, such as coalitions of member states, regional arrangements, and UN-led missions, scholars and policymakers can discern patterns of cooperation, competition, and intervention strategies that have influenced the efficacy and outcomes of peace enforcement operations. Additionally, delving into the rationale behind the evolution of actor constellations sheds light on the effectiveness of multilateral approaches versus unilateral actions, the role of regional powers in conflict resolution, and the challenges associated with coordinating diverse stakeholders in addressing global security threats. Ultimately, deciphering the causal pathways for different actor constellations enhances our understanding of the complexities inherent in peace enforcement and offers valuable insights for designing more effective strategies to promote international peace and security.

### 1.2 Aim

This research endeavor aims to understand the causal pathways that lead to the emergence and evolution of actor constellations within peace enforcement operations. This novel approach explains how peace enforcement operations have evolved from predominantly Member State-led operations to ones more recently mandated as UN Peacekeeping missions or a hybrid constellation of multiple primary actors. This research will accomplish the following objectives:

- Compile through primary research the definitive review of all UN peace enforcement actions authorized under Article 42 since 1945. This compendium will map the universe of cases and identify actor constellations for each mission to show

trends, including a comprehensive historical matrix of the leadership, mandate, objectives, tasks, and force capabilities.

- Conduct a comparative case study analysis of seven peace enforcement operations in four countries: Somalia 1992-1994, Somalia 2007-2022, DRC 2003, DRC 2005, DRC 2013-Current, Libya 2011, and Mali 2012-2023. Using the mission's actor constellation as the outcome (dependent) variable, case studies will trace the explanatory and intervening variables to identify causal mechanisms and develop outcome-explaining hypotheses. These cases best reflect the actor constellation range of all peace enforcement actions.
- Determine the causal factors contributing to the evolutionary changes in actor constellations for peace enforcement operations.
- Develop and validate hypotheses, supported by existing IR theory, about how and why peace enforcement actor constellations emerge and evolve.
- Provide observations as to how future changes in the global order and nature of conflict may continue to impact and evolve peace enforcement.

### 1.3 Literature Review

Almost all published literature relevant to this topic can be divided into three main categories. The first are those studies focused on the use of force in complex peace operations, including scholarship targeted at humanitarian intervention and various aspects of peace enforcement. Second is the research specific to the recent evolution of African peace operations with special attention to the actors involved. Lastly are the case

studies and research involving the history, background, conflicts, and peace operations in the four countries selected for case study analysis: Somalia, DRC, Libya, and Mali.

*Use of Force in Complex Peace Operations*

The vast majority of existing peace operations scholarship provides exploration and in-depth analysis of complex, multidimensional peacekeeping operations without explicitly focusing on peace enforcement. (Fortna and Howard 2008, 291) As mentioned previously, no recent comprehensive studies are exclusive to the study of peace enforcement as a separate mission type. However, the existing scholarship on complex peace operations does offer some benefit for this proposed research, especially where authors focus on the expanded use of force or various changes in UN peacekeeping related to the application of force. An explosion of these studies occurred in the early 1990s, coinciding with complicated UN operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda, to name just a few, and underwent a subsequent resurgence in the early 2000s after the 9/11-induced shift in the discussion of international security. Early analyses of the triggers for UN peace enforcement actions include Pugh (1997), Jakobsen (1996) and Semb (2000). Findlay (2002) comprehensively traces the history of the use of force in UN peace operations, while Durall (2013) provides a cursory analysis of UN peacekeeping operations having express Chapter VII authorization to use force to accomplish their mandate. Berdal & Ucko (2014) and Peter (2015) outline the problems and prospects for the expanded use of force by the United Nations. *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order* (de Coning and Peter, 2019) provides a recent analysis across the spectrum of peace operations.

Perhaps of greatest relevance to this study is de Coning's (2017) examination of the doctrinal distinctions between the UN and the African Union in peace enforcement operations. Likewise, Howard (2015), Howard and Dayal (2018), and Gilder (2019) examine how the United Nations responds to increased mandates for peace enforcement and stabilization missions, and these articles have been extremely useful in advancing the study of peace enforcement. Boulden (2001) provides one of the first detailed overviews of early peace enforcement operations in the Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia, while Osman's *The United Nations and Peace Enforcement* (2002) examines the theory of peace enforcement relative to the end of the Cold War, and specifically the intervention in Kuwait. *International Organizations and Peace Enforcement*, by Coleman (2007), offers a comprehensive examination of international organizations' role in legitimizing military interventions with a specific focus on several peace enforcement operations, and is possibly the first inclusive examination of the spectrum of peace operations. Likewise, Graham and Felicio's *Regional Security and Global Governance* (2006) adds an initial typology for hybrid peace operations between the United Nations and regional organizations.

Another segment of existing scholarship relevant to this study is the research focused on the effect of stabilization and counterinsurgency on peace operations, as well as the evolution of humanitarian intervention. Friis (2010) demonstrates the similarities between peace operations and counterinsurgency, while Naden (2018) examines the failure of Use of Force mandates in various operations. Karlsrud (2015, 2017, 2019, 2019) examines the impact of counterterrorism and stabilization mandates, while Boutellis and Fink (2016)

confront the UN response to terrorism and violent extremism. Detailed assessments, especially of non-UN military operations such as ISAF in Afghanistan and comprehensive studies on various aspects of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, cast a wide circle around the peace enforcement arena without tackling the subject directly contemplated in this study. Badescu (2007) and Daalder (2007) examine the authority and evolution of humanitarian intervention, respectively, while Tzeng (2017) offers a detailed analysis of humanitarian intervention at the margins, which includes several peace enforcement operations. Cater and Malone (2016) discuss the origins and evolution of the Responsibility to Protect.

*Actors Relevant to African Peace Operations*

The second category of existing scholarship relevant to this study is the less numerous but quite detailed research into the specific actors involved in African peace operations. While not necessarily specific to peace enforcement, these studies are extremely helpful in understanding the actor constellations involved in complex peace operations. Brosig (2010) discusses the actors involved in peacekeeping while, in a subsequent work (2015), thoroughly analyzes the constellation of actors in his exploration of regime complexity in cooperative peacekeeping in Africa. Emmanual (2015) focuses on African peacekeepers as part of UN peace operations, while Terry (1998) and Gray (2006) discuss the role and obligation of NATO and Europe in peace enforcement operations. *The Future of African Peace Operations*, edited by de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud (2016), provides extremely useful insight into the actors and relationships involved in African peace operations, while Dobbins et al (2019) conducts an in-depth examination of African-led peace operations.

Scholarship that helps to better understand the combatant actors on the other side of the peace enforcement operation include Brooker (2010) and Jones (2014). Staniland (2014), Brooker (2010), and Rotberg (2003) provide insight into insurgencies, stateless warfare, and state failure.

*Country-Specific Research on Somalia, DRC, Bosnia, Libya and Mali*

In support of a greater understanding of specific peace operations in Africa, many case studies and analyses provide lessons learned and historical perspectives on specific UN missions. Of significant relevance to this study are the various studies and analyses of the evolving UN peacekeeping mandate and structure in specific operations in the Central African Republic (Karlsrud 2015, Carayannis and Lombard 2017, Howard 2019 ), Democratic Republic of Congo (Murphy 2016, Ishizuka 2016, Prunier 2009, Autesserre 2010, Reyntjens 2009, Tull 2016, Tull 2018, Hultman, Kathman & Shannon 2019, Stearns 2021), Mali (Albrecht 2017, Perito 2015, Charbonneau 2017, Frisell and Lackenbauer 2018, Tull 2021) and Somalia (Freear & de Coning 2013, Oloya 2016, Williams & Hashi 2016, Fejerskov 2017, Williams 2019, Venter 2018). Karlsrud (2015) examines the consequences a changed peace-enforcement mandate has had on UN peacekeeping operations in Central African Republic, the DRC and Mali, while Williams and Boutellis (2014) provide insight into partnership peacekeeping between the African Union and the United Nations.

*Literature Gap*

While there is a tremendous amount of research revolving around complex UN peacekeeping operations, the use of force in international relations, and the changing

paradigm of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, missing is a comprehensive study to create the specific universe of peace enforcement operations and to analyze the emergence and evolution of their actor constellations. Much of the existing literature supports such a study, providing the pillars of scholarship necessary to examine and prove the hypotheses proposed herein.

### 1.4 Research Questions

The objectives of this research are rooted in the desire to unravel the complexities of peace enforcement operations, specifically focusing on the transformation of actor constellations. The research questions guide investigating and analyzing the causal mechanisms underpinning these operations. The central research questions of this dissertation are as follows:

*1. What key causal mechanisms drive the formation of actor constellations in peace enforcement operations?*

This question is the overarching inquiry exploring the central causal mechanisms at play. It seeks to understand why and how actor constellations in peace enforcement evolve. By identifying these mechanisms, the study aims to provide a deep understanding of the processes shaping the composition and effectiveness of actor constellations.

*2. To what extent do the causal mechanisms impact the transformation of actors over the course of a peace enforcement operation?*

This question explores the change in actors during a peace enforcement mission. Why does the mission start as a Member State-led and then transition to a Regional Arrangement or UNDPO-led operation?

*3. What hypotheses can be developed from these causal mechanisms to support a greater understanding of how and why specific peace enforcement actors and constellations of actors are deployed?*

The answer drives at the core of this research, which offers to provide supportable hypotheses based on an analysis of the independent variables' impact on peace enforcement actor constellations.

These research questions collectively guide the dissertation in examining the multifaceted aspects of actor constellations in peace enforcement. By addressing these questions, the study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the causal mechanisms that drive the evolution of these constellations, ultimately contributing to the broader fields of international relations, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping.

## 1.5 Research Design

This dissertation is a theory-proposing study to advance new hypotheses explaining the evolution of peace enforcement. "In international relations, only case studies provide intensive empirical analysis that can find previously unnoticed causal factors and historical patterns." (Achen and Snidal, 1987) Given the number of cases and available data, the best research design methodology for this effort is an inductive approach using qualitative case study analysis. "Theory development from case studies is primarily an inductive process." (George and Bennett, 2005, 111) These case study analyses will incorporate theory-building process tracing across seven peace enforcement missions.

*1. Defining the Universe of Cases*

This study will include primary research and a comprehensive literature review to

identify all peace enforcement actions authorized by the Security Council under Article 42 since 1945. Precedent to this effort must be the delineation of an exact definition of peace enforcement against which to test potential cases and determine the definitive list of peace enforcement operations. The UN Archives provide a complete repository of UNSC original documents and Repertory of Practice reports, providing the specificity of primary information required for determining the complete case list of true peace enforcement actions.

*2. Theory Refinement and Variable Determination*

While theories are a critical component of explanatory, deductive research design (Van Evera 1997), as an inductive research endeavor, there are no established, proven theories from which to formulate theoretical expectations. "An inductive project develops a scientific answer to a research question on the basis of empirical analysis of explicated, initial assumptions." (Panke 2018, p. 3) As this is a heuristic approach to analyzing peace enforcement actions, there is little in the way of established theories for the research questions posed in this study. However, it is necessary to have an initial framework from which to begin and after a thorough survey of the literature on international relations theories on peace operations as well as all cases of potential peace enforcement, I have established a framework that is broad yet manageable.

The outcome (dependent) variable for this study is the specific actor constellation for each peace enforcement action. Constellations are formed by the Security Council authorization of a specific actor, or combination of actors, mandated to conduct a peace enforcement action. These actors include Member States (or coalitions of Member States),

Regional Arrangements, and a UNDPO-led force, and the responsible actor may transform over the course of the peace enforcement mission as determined by the Security Council. Actors can potentially operate independently or in a hybrid combination determined by one of four possible command and control structures: integrated, coordinated, parallel, or sequential. The actor constellation, as this study is referring to it, is the specific combination of actor and command and control structure.

As mentioned previously, there is a scarcity of research focused directly on peace enforcement. The same cannot be said of peacekeeping which "witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of scholarly literature" beginning in the 1990s. (Bures, 2007, 407) While Featherston (2000:191) noted a "lack of theoretical underpinnings for the field" of peacekeeping, this has begun to change with recent research into developing theories behind peacekeeping. That said, Oksaymytna and Karlsrud's recent edited volume *UN Peace Operations and International Relations Theory* (2020) provides a unique exploration of a range of international relations theories applied toward peace operations. While this book is not specific to peace enforcement, its examination of nine mainstream IR theories in the context of peace operations provides a structured framework directly applicable to this research. From their book and the various authors who have examined peace operations through various IR theories, five explanatory variables and seven intervening variables have been identified across four categories: conflict-specific conditions, interest level of the international community, host nation stability and support, and peace enforcement mission purpose and mandates.

Each of these variables will be examined thoroughly in the upcoming chapter on

methodology (Chapter 3). Still, given the complexity of peace enforcement, it is unlikely that any single explanatory variable will prove to be the sole causal mechanism for its evolution. Much more likely, a combination of variables will illuminate an explanatory pathway and allow for the development of discrete hypotheses, providing an explanation for the evolution in actor constellations involved in peace enforcement.

*4. Case Studies*

Case studies form the core of qualitative research. A case study is the "detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other event."(George and Bennett, 2005, 5) Process tracing involves within-case analysis to refine the potential cause by tracing the processes that may have led to a specific outcome, especially when there may be different causal paths leading to a similar outcome. "Theory building process tracing is utilized primarily when we know that there might be a relationship between a cause and outcome, but we are in the dark regarding potential mechanisms linking the two. (Beach, 2018, 16)

This research will conduct detailed case study analysis using process tracing of seven peace enforcement missions in four countries: Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya and Mali. The case selection technique used to select these seven cases satisfies both the typical and diverse methods and represents each of the different mission leadership representative of the recent evolution in peace enforcement. (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, 297)

Each case study will focus on tracing the decision-making route that led to the determination of the discrete actor constellation to implement, lead, and manage the

peace enforcement operation. As, by definition, these peace enforcement missions are mandated by the UN Security Council, the United Nations' published documents will serve as the primary data sources for this research. Specifically, this study will utilize Reports of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council as well as the Repertoires of the Practice of the United Nations Security Council to create an empirical narrative and identify the observable manifestations from which specific causal mechanisms can be inferred.

The expectation for the results of this theory-building process tracing is the detection of systematic causal mechanisms that have contributed to the evolution of actor constellations in peace enforcement. "Theory building process-tracing starts with empirical material and uses a structured analysis of this material to detect a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism whereby X is linked with Y." (Beach and Pederson 2013, 60) In conducting process tracing for these four identified cases, reflecting the variety in the recent evolution of peace enforcement actor constellations, this research will identify the chain of causal mechanisms that produce specific peace enforcement actor constellations.

### 1.6 Discussion of Chapters

This thesis is divided into nine chapters.

*Chapter 1*, the current chapter, provides an introduction to the study, a review of relevant literature on the use of force in peace operations, and the relevant actors involved in peace enforcement.

*Chapter 2* provides the context for how peace enforcement fits into the spectrum of peace operations and a formal definition of peace enforcement to be used throughout the study. This formal and rigid definition is critical to establishing the framework for what operations fit within the category of peace enforcement. Additionally, *Chapter 2* offers distinctions between what is and what is not peace enforcement and a detailed contrast between peace enforcement and complex peacekeeping. *Chapter 2* concludes by establishing the complete universe of peace enforcement operations from 1945 to 2020.

*Chapter 3* provides the methodology for how this study approaches understanding the evolution of peace enforcement. This chapter explains the inductive research process used throughout the study to formulate potential hypotheses explaining the evolution of peace enforcement. The outcome (dependent) variable and twelve explanatory variables are examined in detail, with clear expectations on how and why each variable can influence the decision to deploy a specific actor constellation. This chapter begins mapping the causal complexity of peace enforcement through an empirical analysis of the explanatory conditions for peace enforcement actor constellations.

*Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7* consist of the specific case studies for this research, specifically an analysis of peace enforcement operations in Somalia, the DRC, Libya, and Mali. Each case study utilizes process tracing to observe the independent variables to infer the existence of causal mechanisms for determining the specific actor constellation.

*Chapter 8* provides the empirical analysis and examines the causal paths of all case studies to propose potential hypotheses that have shown relevance in explaining the evolution of peace enforcement. Each of these hypotheses is examined and critiqued in

detail.

*Chapter 9* proffers a conclusion to the study by reflecting upon the causal mechanisms contributing to the evolution of peace enforcement, and how these mechanisms might impact future peace enforcement operations in the changing global order of the next decade.

# CHAPTER 2
# DEFINING PEACE ENFORCEMENT

## 2.1 History of Enforcement Actions

While the concept of peace enforcement is included in Article 42 of the UN Charter, over the past 75 years, the practical application of this concept has evolved considerably. As the complexity of peacekeeping operations expanded in the 1990s, especially in Africa and the Balkans, the terminology used to define these operations became increasingly important to ensure the proper authority and resources were applied to restoring and maintaining international peace and security. Today, the concept of peace enforcement as a specific operation or mandate is still somewhat nebulous and ill-defined.

The United Nations Charter is quite clear in creating the authority for the UN to maintain or restore international peace and security. Chapter VII of the Charter is devoted to outlining the process of responding to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." Specifically, Article 39 states:

> The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

While Article 41 authorizes the employment of economic and diplomatic sanctions, Article 42 explicitly authorizes the Security Council to use military force as a means to restore international peace and security:

> Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action

> by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

There is no confusion that the UN Charter provides the Security Council the authority to use military force in the enforcement of international peace and security, as the remaining articles of Chapter VII outline the specific steps and considerations for coordination between the Security Council and the militaries of Member States (United Nations 1945, Art 43-50). However, the mechanisms for implementing these enforcement actions have evolved over the decades.

Chapter VIII of the Charter outlines the procedures for using regional arrangements (Art 52-54). As the UN does not maintain any internal military capabilities, the vision has always been that the Security Council would delegate enforcement actions to willing coalitions or regional arrangements of Member States. Examples of this type of enforcement action are clearly seen in the Article 42 authorizations for Korea in 1950 (S/RES/82, 1950) and Kuwait in 1990 (S/RES/678, 1990). These actions pre-date the end of the Cold War - a significant turning point in UN involvement in global conflicts.

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s saw a simultaneous increase in intra-state conflict. The Security Council's response to restoring peace and security in conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and West Africa was to increase the role and scope of UN peacekeeping operations. (Day 2019, 5-6) The UN Department of Peace Operations, formerly titled the Department of Peacekeeping Operations until 2020, expanded exponentially during the 1990s. While peacekeeping doctrine evolved significantly during

this decade, the concept of peace enforcement was never fully defined and established. Peace enforcement became a catch-all for the complicated conflicts that could not be resolved through agreement but for which no one fully understood how to adequately respond militarily.

In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping." (A/47/277-S24111 1992) This ground-breaking report outlined for the first time a comprehensive approach to how the United Nations would respond to the complexities of restoring and maintaining peace and security in the post-Cold War era. This report also established the doctrinal foundation for UN peace operations. The lineage for terms such as *peacemaking*, *peace-keeping* and *peace-enforcement* can be traced back to this document.[2] (A/47/277-S24111 1992)

In addition to establishing the initial framework for peace operations doctrine, the *Agenda for Peace* is also responsible for the blurriness that has existed between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Boutros-Ghali specifically defined *peacemaking* as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter." He then outlined *peace-keeping* as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel." He also offered peace-keeping as "a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace." (A/47/277-S/24111 1992, 5) While

2. Note that the spelling of the terms *peace-keeping* and *peace-enforcement* with the "-" have subsequently been modified over the years to *peacekeeping* and *peace enforcement*. This dissertation will always use peacekeeping and peace enforcement unless specifically quoting previous terminology.

unforeseen at the time of publishing, Boutros-Ghali's definitions chiseled the crack in the doctrinal wall of peace operations by establishing "consent" as a prerequisite for peacekeeping while simultaneously offering peacekeeping as a solution in the "making of peace." Simply stated, if there is a requirement to "make" peace, then there is a logical assumption that the current status is one of armed conflict, and the concept of "consent" is not often found in the midst of armed conflict.

While not explicitly defining peace enforcement, the *Agenda for Peace* provides significant detail on how the UN should handle threats to international peace and security should "peaceful means fail." Boutros-Ghali proposes that Article 42 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides a detailed approach allowing for the "utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstance and with their terms of reference specified in advance" which "would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces" and whose "deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General."(A/47/277-S/24111 1992, 6)

It is clear that from the very beginning of the formal establishment of the United Nations peacekeeping doctrine, peace enforcement was considered separate and distinct from peacekeeping. In 1994, Boutros-Ghali refined his definition of peace enforcement in his Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization. This document reiterates the previous definitions of peacemaking and peacekeeping but adds "the concept of peace enforcement should be added here. It involves peace-keeping activities

which do not necessarily involve the consent of all the parties concerned. Peace enforcement is foreseen in Chapter VII of the Charter." (A/48/1 1994, 37)

The UN has always maintained that the Security Council has the authority to mandate enforcement actions. However, executing these mandates has historically been the purview of regional arrangements and/or Member States. In the 1995 *Supplement To An Agenda For Peace*," the Secretary-General captured the essence of enforcement actions.

> "One of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to empower the Organization to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression…In 1950, the Security Council authorized a group of willing Member States to undertake enforcement action in the Korean Peninsula. It did so again in 1990 in response to aggression against Kuwait. More recently, the Council has authorised groups of Member States to undertake enforcement action, if necessary, to create conditions for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia and Rwanda and to facilitate the restoration of democracy in Haiti. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council has authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, to use force to ensure compliance…and to deter attacks."

Through the 1990s, the pace of United Nations peace operations expanded rapidly. Between 1990-1994, the Security Council authorized twenty operations involving more than 75,000 peacekeepers. As the post-Cold War map evolved into the new millennium, the complexity of restoring and maintaining international peace and security increased exponentially. The spread of a post-9/11 global Islamist insurgency, as well as multiple failed states in Africa, has created an unstable landscape difficult for the United Nations to readily respond with its suite of solutions. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Syria each

require very different approaches to respond to their unique, dynamic, and extremely complex situations.

The concepts and doctrinal definitions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement solidified in the 1990s are now challenged by the complexity and intensity of post-9/11 conflicts. While various peace operations terminology may be adequately defined on paper, this is not always the case on the ground. The fact that scholars, policymakers, and military commanders generally agree on doctrinal definitions has not prevented confusion amid a complex peace operation. (de Coning and Peter 2019, 9) How are concepts such as impartiality and consent measured and tested? Is peace enforcement simply robust peacekeeping, or are they two distinct, sequential operations on the continuum of peace operations? Should blue-helmeted peacekeepers be given offensive enforcement tasks, or should these remain the domain of regional arrangements authorized by the Security Council? These questions have been easier to answer on paper than on the ground.

### 2.2 Peace Enforcement vs. Complex Peacekeeping

The United Nations Charter, the core document creating and outlining the purpose and authority of the entirety of the United Nations, was signed on 26 June 1945 and consists of 111 articles divided across nineteen chapters. The first chapter is titled "Purposes and Principles," and Article 1 of the Charter lists the four purposes of the United Nations, beginning with the United Nations' first purpose "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and

removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." (United Nations 1945, Art. 1)

While the other purposes outlined in Chapter 1 of the Charter speak to tasks such as settling disputes, developing friendly relations between nations, and achieving international cooperation to solve global problems, it is clear from the very first sentence of the Charter that the primary mission of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security through the prevention, removal, and suppression of threats to the peace. This is the foundation for what is now commonly referred to as "Peace Operations."

Chapter VI of the UN Charter focuses on the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," and it is the wording of this chapter that is most associated with the UN's traditional authorization of peacekeeping missions. (Art. 33-38) Chapter VII, on the other hand, includes provisions for "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" and was originally invoked to authorize peace enforcement operations, historically conducted by coalitions of Member States or regional arrangements. (Art. 39-51) While these two chapters provide defined legal distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the reality is much more confusing. While Chapter VI may appear to provide the authority for traditional peacekeeping missions, the Security Council has never actually invoked its clauses in a peacekeeping mandate. At the same time, while Chapter VII appears tailor-made for peace enforcement mandates, since the mid-1990s, the Security Council has increasingly included Chapter VII authorities in peacekeeping missions occurring in dangerous environments. These inclusions have blurred the lines by

giving “peacekeeping” missions the use of force authorities historically reserved for “peace enforcement.”

Today, the United Nations’ efforts under the umbrella of peace operations consist of a range of activities, including conflict prevention and mediation, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping. (UNDPO 2023, What We Do) The first three activities (conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding) generally consist of diplomatic and economic efforts to lessen tensions, resolve disputes, and reduce the risks of conflict. The latter two activities (peacekeeping and peace enforcement) incorporate the deployment of military forces to establish and/or maintain peace. (UNDPO 2023, Terminology)

This spectrum of activities included under the concept of peace operations has historically been wrought with confusion and disagreement over the boundaries between the various activities and which component of the UN community is best suited for managing each effort. With the increasing complexities of intra-state conflicts over the last 25 years, these issues have become even more pronounced. According to the UNDPO website, “the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity.” (UNDPO 2023, Terminology)

The blurring of these boundaries is readily seen in the recent name change of the UN department overseeing these operations. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) was created in 1992 to supervise, coordinate, and manage UN-authorized peacekeeping missions. The role of this office was solidified by then-Secretary General

Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* and its supplements, which traditionally focused mainly on the "peacekeeping" task of peace operations. In January 2019, the UNDPKO changed its name to the UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO). (A/RES/72/262C 2018) With this change, the UNDPO has doctrinally expanded its role into peacemaking and peacebuilding and acknowledged the blurring of responsibilities for these various tasks.

Despite the expansion of the role of UNDPO, the core principles of UN peacekeeping operations remain unchanged. These principles are the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defense/defense of the mandate. (UNDPO 2023, Principles of Peacekeeping) These core principles create the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. As mentioned previously, peace enforcement consists of the coercive application of strategic military force to compel a belligerent party to comply with the ending of hostilities. The principles of consent and non-use of force are antithetical to peace enforcement. The mandates to "coerce" and "compel," by their very definition, imply the absence of consent. Likewise, strategic military force is the intentional application of combat power to destroy the will of a belligerent party. (USDOD 2019, II-4) Where peacekeeping is defensive in nature, peace enforcement is clearly offensive.

It is the offensive nature of peace enforcement that has created much angst and confusion in UN doctrine. The United Nations has historically been loath to participate in offensive military actions, and there continues to be much disagreement as to whether the UN should participate directly in peace enforcement. While the UN acknowledges the blurring of responsibilities under the various peace operations, its expanded definition of

peace enforcement is specific as to who conducts these missions by stating that "the Council [UN Security Council] may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter." (UNDPO 2023, Terminology)

In 1995, the Secretary-General offered that "peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to another." (A/50/60 1995, 9) In 2015, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations stated that "peace enforcement may seem to run counter to the basic principles of peacekeeping." (S/2015/1034, 3) The panel acknowledged the evolving dynamics of violence and instability in intra-state conflict, especially with regard to terrorist and criminal groups, and was concerned that the traditional tenets of UN peacekeeping may not meet the needs of future missions, especially where violence is directed at civilian populations. The panel concluded by stating that "there is a need for the United Nations to discuss whether the tension between peace enforcement tasks and the three basic principles of peace operations are irreconcilable" and asked the UN Security Council to "consider how to better distinguish between robust peacekeeping, especially to implement protection civilian mandates and peace enforcement." (S/2015/1034, 3-4)

Peace enforcement and peacekeeping are separate and distinct missions under the overall umbrella of peace operations. United Nations and Member State military doctrine have always defined these as separate operations. Yet, there continues to be considerable confusion, both philosophically and operationally, as to the exact line between the two.

(Dorn 2018, 5-7) Much of this confusion is often derived from the fact that peace enforcement is often viewed as an expansion of the scope of peacekeeping operations, and there has been disagreement as to where and how to draw this line. In other words, where does peacekeeping end and peace enforcement begin?

Simply stated, peace enforcement is the offense to peacekeeping's defense. Peacekeeping requires the parties' consent and impartiality and is based on the non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate. By their very definition, these mean that some form of "peace" has already been established - normally in the form of a mutually agreed ceasefire or more comprehensive conflict resolution agreement. In peacekeeping, the belligerent parties have consented to the intervention of an impartial UN peacekeeping force in order to supervise and monitor this "peace." This does not mean that there is no danger, nor does it mean that peacekeepers are not required to use force to protect themselves, civilians, or the distribution of humanitarian supplies. However, the entire posture of a peacekeeping mission is one of protecting the fragility of the newly agreed peace. "The limited use of force to protect a mandate authorized by a peace treaty or to enforce an agreed upon ceasefire does not equate peacekeeping with peace enforcement." (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 13)

Peace enforcement, on the other hand, is only required when at least one of the belligerent parties has not provided their consent to the peace process. Instead of *keeping* the peace, peace enforcement is about *creating* the peace. This is accomplished under Security Council mandate to apply military might to coerce the wayward actor(s) to provide their consent to the peace process. Belligerent parties must either defend

themselves against the peace enforcers or comply with the international mandate for peace.

The table below outlines the straightforward differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. While operationally the two missions may look similar, it is the answer to these basic questions that are the determining factor.

Table 2-1: Principles of UN Peacekeeping

| **Basic Principles of UN Peacekeeping Operations** | **Peacekeeping** | **Peace Enforcement** |
|---|---|---|
| Consent of all Parties | Yes | No |
| Impartiality | Yes | Not Necessarily |
| Non-Use of Force Except in Self-Defense of Defense of the Mandate | Yes | No |

While peace enforcement and peacekeeping are doctrinally distinct, that is not always the case on the ground. Blue-helmeted peacekeepers are often given tasks at the tactical level that are doctrinally exclusive to enforcement actions, while similarly, military members of Member States involved in offensive combat operations have been re-tasked with traditional peacekeeping assignments such as election monitoring, disarming former combatants, and institution-building. For the purposes of this study, it is important to acknowledge the doctrinal distinctions between peace enforcement and complex peacekeeping while examining the factors and conditions unique to the universe of peace enforcement actions authorized since the creation of the United Nations. As this effort focuses on the evolution of enforcement, it is critical to focus not on how policymakers or military commanders described their operations but on the specific characteristics that

define the mission as a peace enforcement operation. How an operation has been labeled is less important than its purpose, mandate, and operational characteristics.

For this study, peacekeeping operations are not peace enforcement and are therefore not included in the universe of cases. This bifurcation is critical, for despite being amalgamated by scholars for the last thirty years, they are entirely separate actions. Peacekeeping is the impartial intervention of an external military force with the initial consent of all parties to the conflict whose authority for the use of force is primarily restricted to protection. Peace enforcement is the UN Security Council-authorized military intervention of an external force to coerce one or more parties involved in the conflict to pursue peace by means they would not otherwise have undertaken.

### 2.3 What *EXACTLY* is Peace Enforcement?

The concept of peace enforcement was contemplated in the United Nations Charter in 1945, yet there have consistently been significant arguments over the specific definition of what constitutes peace enforcement and how it relates to other peace operations. The consensus among the United Nations publications, various military doctrines, and academic scholarship is that peace enforcement generally consists of the use of military force as a coercive action against belligerent actors to restore or maintain peace. As with most controversial terms, the devil is in the details. Specific words and their nuances can result in significantly different meanings. Additionally, scholars often define doctrinal terms using words and phrases that have the most specific meaning to the purpose of their study. As most studies involving the term "peace enforcement" either have focused on the

appropriateness, purpose, or effectiveness of the use of force or have examined peace enforcement as a component of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, a common definition of peace enforcement has yet to be established. Likewise, the parameters of the specific language often used to define peace enforcement have also not been thoroughly vetted. For example, is the use of military force in self-defense or defense of the mission considered a coercive action? Can belligerent actors also be non-cooperating parties to a peace agreement or must they be outside the scope of a peace agreement? Is peace enforcement an extension of peacekeeping in a hostile environment or is it a completely different operation requiring a separate mandate?

These types of questions have had UN staff, military leaders, and academic scholars at odds over what exactly constitutes peace enforcement. As mentioned previously, there has never been a definitive, comprehensive list of all peace enforcement actions - and this is primarily a direct result of the lack of a common understanding of what defines a peace enforcement action. Consequently, we must formally define the term "peace enforcement" for this study. This will ensure that this study is launching from a common reference point and that the specific words and phrases in the definition will help further define the particular parameters to allow us to differentiate peace enforcement operations from other types of operations.

According to the UN Department of Peace Operations website, peace enforcement "involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council. It is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to

act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." (UNDPO 2023, Terminology) The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations has further clarified this definition to state that "peace enforcement is defined as the actual or potential use of armed force as a strategic tool to force one or more belligerent parties to disarm or to return to the negotiation table." (S/2015/1034, 3)

The United Nations' definition of peace enforcement is further supported by the military doctrine of contributing Member States. NATO joint doctrine offers that peace enforcement consists of "a peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It is likely to be conducted without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties." (NATO 2014, 1-4) Quite similarly, US military doctrine states that peace enforcement is the "application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order." (USDOD 2018a, IV-1)

The academic community is also generally in line with both the UN, NATO, and US definitions of what constitutes peace enforcement, but very few have actually attempted to thoroughly define what exactly constitutes peace enforcement. Much of the research that touches on peace enforcement does so as part of a larger focus on the use of force, or on examining multidimensional peacekeeping operations. As such, the meaning of "peace enforcement" is often manipulated to support or contrast other aspects of peace operations without fully analyzing the complete definition of what constitutes "peace enforcement." In discussing the meanings of peace enforcement, Pugh stated that "analysis has been

bedeviled by confusing use of the term to mean different things at different times and in different military cultures." (Pugh 2008, 371)

In her book *International Organisations and Peace Enforcement*, Coleman describes peace enforcement operations as "forcible military interventions by one or more states into a third country with the express objective of maintaining or restoring international, regional, or local peace and security and by ending a violent conflict within that country." (Coleman 2007, 4)

Perhaps one of the best efforts at capturing the issues of doctrinal definitions of peace enforcement is de Coning's 2017 article on peace enforcement in Africa. (de Coning 2017) de Coning's article focuses specifically on the doctrinal distinctions between the United Nations and the African Union, and in doing so provides considerable enlightenment on how these doctrinal issues impact operational mandates and success. The African Union, as one of two regional arrangements that have led peace enforcement missions, does not doctrinally define peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The AU has instead focused its doctrine on *peace support operations*, and has outlined six scenarios that span the spectrum of peace operations for military advice to full-scale humanitarian military interventions. (AU 2003) While AU's election to not use traditional doctrinal terms in its policy framework somewhat adds to the doctrinal confusion, its framework mostly supports the underlying core concepts of the definitional distinctions unique to peace enforcement.

From these mutually supportive definitions, it is clear that peace enforcement actions comprise three distinct components. First, there must be an active conflict that threatens

international peace and security in which at least one of the belligerent parties has not consented to a peace agreement or ceasefire. Second, the action must have the authority of a legitimate international authority. Last, the operation must authorize the coercive use of strategic military force to end hostilities. While these three criteria seem straightforward, they, too, require further refinement.

Threat to International Peace and Security

The first test for whether an intervention can be considered peace enforcement involves the scope of the conflict it attempts to resolve. The simple answer to this question would be any armed conflict that threatens international peace and security. However, as with most simple solutions, the devil is in the details, for what exactly is a threat to international peace and security, and who decides whether or not the threat is exists?

Like any conflict, from the playground to interpersonal relationships to hostilities between nations, a threat can't be objectively defined by the participants due to their proximity and involvement in the situation. Consequently, assessment of any threat's scope can only be determined by an external entity, ideally an entity to which all parties to the conflict agree is an independent and appropriate authority. For playground conflicts, it could be teachers and school administrators; for relationship conflicts, it could be the police; and for armed conflicts, we are left with regional or international organizations with which the country or countries in conflict have some relationship.

The United Nations, built upon the foundation of collective security, is the sole and ultimate arbiter of threats to international peace and security. Article 39 of the UN Charter states that the "Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,

breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." By the very language of the UN Charter's, which 193 nations have pledged to follow, no other body or organization may determine the existence of threats or breaches to international peace and security. (Stein 2005, 13)

For the purposes of this study, only threats to or breaches of international peace and security, as declared by the UN Security Council in a resolution, letter, or other official document, are considered.

Legitimate Authority

The second test for peace enforcement rests on the legitimacy of the intervention's authorization. The sovereignty of nations is at the very core of the tenets of international relations, and it is only with the proper, legitimate authority that a peace enforcement operation can commence. However, the legal questions surrounding this concept are as old as the study of international relations itself. "There are few questions in the whole range of International Law more difficult than those connected with the legality of intervention." (Lawrence 1895, 116-117)

On the face of it, it would seem clear that the only legitimate authority for any military intervention is approval of the UN Security Council. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The Charter further states that, should the Security Council determine the existence of a threat to international peace

and security, the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." (United Nations 1945, Art. 42)

The Charter is also quite specific regarding the use of regional arrangements and the requirement for their actions to be authorized by the Security Council. Article 53 of the Charter states that "the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." The only exception to this relates to continued or renewed aggression by signatories who were also enemies during World War II - and for the most part, these would no longer apply.

There may be occasions when countries enter into multilateral treaties or regional arrangements with legitimate language that allows or even requires military intervention in specific circumstances. Similarly, Article 51 of the Charter expressly states that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." These actions may very well be considered legitimate under existing international law; however, they do not constitute an enforcement action unless properly authorized by the UN Security Council. These military actions, no matter what language is espoused for the purpose of the intervention, do not constitute peace enforcement unless properly authorized by the Security Council. (Chesterman 2001, 2)

Coercive Use Of Strategic Military Force To End Hostilities

The application of military force is a discussion dating back centuries, with Carl von Clausewitz famously stating that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means." (Howard and Paret 1976, 87) Simply stated, "war," or the application and use of military force, is predicated on achieving political goals. That said, military force generally has two primary strategic purposes to achieve these political objectives. (Troxell 2006, 219) Military power can defeat an adversary's ability to choose a specific course of action or coerce an adversary to change his actual or planned course of action. The purpose of coercion can be further divided into two components: deterrence and compellence. Deterrence is convincing an adversary not to take a specific action due to its perceived negative benefit for the adversary, while compellence is forcing an adversary to take an action it perceives is beneficial to its own goals. (Slantchev 2005, 3-4)

For the aim of this study, the two components of coercion outlined above provide a litmus test for gauging whether a specific action meets the stated requirement of mandating the coercive use of military force. The objective of compelling or deterring actors is a critical requirement to be considered a peace enforcement action. Mandated tasks such as creating a secure environment, neutralizing a belligerent actor, or repelling an invader are examples of the strategic use of coercive military force. (Tubbs 1997, 7)

However, acting in self-defense, the local protection of civilians, or the defense of the mandate would not be considered a strategic use of coercive force. These tasks provide for

the use of force at the tactical level - meaning force is authorized for the immediate safety of individuals, assets, and installations rather than being authorized to achieve a specific political objective.

Coercive use of strategic military force requires the absence of consent from the targeted actor in the conflict. Consent of the main parties to a conflict is a critical component specific to all peacekeeping operations. (UNDPKO 2008, 31) Peace enforcement, on the other hand, requires a non-permissive environment in which the use or threat of coercive military force is mandated to create an environment for peace. In peace enforcement actions, this is normally accomplished with a mandate to compel or deter one or more actors involved in the conflict. The concept of consent does not mean that all actors at every level fully support the intervention, nor does it mean that the operation is in a permissive environment. The UN's Capstone Doctrine differentiates between the consent of the main parties involved in the political dialogue of the conflict (known as "strategic consent") and the consent of government and non-state actors at the local level (known as "tactical consent"). While peacekeeping operations require strategic consent, today's complex peacekeeping operations often must negotiate the fragility of maintaining tactical consent among various factions and actors. The withdrawal of local consent, which creates a localized hostile environment for the peacekeeping force, does not transition peacekeeping into peace enforcement.

Peace enforcement actions require a conflict in which no formal peace agreement exists between all the major parties, as the principle of non-consent is a critical component of all enforcement operations. A signed peace agreement before a peace

operation almost always includes a consent statement authorizing the intervention of an impartial peacekeeping force – hence, not peace enforcement. However, this does not mean that a peace enforcement action cannot have the strategic consent of any of the parties; it simply means that it must not have strategic consent from at least one of the parties. Many of the peace enforcement actions of the past 75 years include the consent, often in the form of a written invitation, by the host nation's government to assist them in bringing about an end to a destabilizing conflict in their country.

### 2.4 What Is Not Peace Enforcement

Due to the complexities in fully understanding the scope of peace enforcement operations, it is of value to outline what is ***not*** considered peace enforcement. Several books and scholarly articles have labeled military interventions as peace enforcement operations that would not meet this study's definition of peace enforcement. These authors use a broader definition of peace enforcement and include operations that are either not authorized by the UN Security Council or that are peacekeeping operations absent a mandate for the coercive use of strategic military force.

Military Interventions in Support of National Self-Interests

Modern history is rife with international military interventions in which one nation uses military force to support its own national self-interest concerning another country. The United States military defines military intervention as the "deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy." (USDOD 2018, GL-13) Since the organization of the United Nations in

1945, dozens of these military interventions have resulted in significant armed conflict between Member States, many in direct contravention of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

Several of these military interventions have sparked a Security Council determination of a threat or breach of international peace and security, which would apply to this study. Recognizable examples include the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Less obvious are those military interventions that arguably were undertaken to resolve an internal conflict in another country. Operations such as the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the French Operation Licorne in the Central African Republic in 2002 are just several examples of operations with aspects that could be perceived as peace operations. However, the lack of UN Security Council authorization prevents them from being considered peace enforcement operations. Many of these interventions have been to bolster a friendly host-nation government or to remove a government disruptive to the local or regional interests. In all of these circumstances, *absent authority from the United Nations Security Council*, the real reason for the military intervention reverts back to national self-interest on the part of the intervener. While these may possibly be legitimate under the UN Charter's Article 51 self-defense clause, they do not rise to the level of peace enforcement.

Regional Interventions Absent UNSC Authorization

Another form of military intervention that is often incorrectly included as a peace enforcement operation are those actions undertaken through the mandate of a regional arrangement, yet without the authority of the UN Security Council. While regional

arrangements may undertake enforcement actions in support of the UN Security Council's directives, the UN Charter clearly states that all such operations must have formal Security Council approval. Article 52 of Chapter VIII states that "nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security." (United Nations 1945, Art. 52) However, while Article 52 grants the authority for the existence of such arrangements, it does not grant them authority to act without specific authorization by the UN Security Council. Article 53 of Chapter VIII specifies that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article."[3] (United Nations 1945, Art. 53)

Despite the clarity of Article 53, there have been numerous operations that have been considered by scholars as peace enforcement actions.

Table 2-2: Examples of Non-UN Authorized Enforcement Actions

| Target Country | Date | Mandating International Organization |
|---|---|---|
| Liberia | 1990-1997 | ECOWAS |
| Tajikistan | 1993-2000 | CIS |
| Central African Republic | 1997-1998 | IMC |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1998-1999 | ECOWAS |
| Lesotho | 1998-1999 | SADC |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 1998-2002 | SADC |
| Kosovo | 1999 | NATO |

3. Paragraph 2 goes on to define "enemy state" as only those states that were an enemy of a Member during World War II. Theoretically, this would allow regional arrangements to take enforcement action against specific states without UNSC authorization, but only against those nations they were at war with in 1945. No such occurrence has occurred in the research.

Each of the cases in Table 2-2 involves a military intervention authorized by a regional arrangement but absent formal approval by the UN Security Council. As each of the countries involved are signatories to the UN Charter, they have all agreed that regional arrangements must receive Security Council authorization before conducting an enforcement action. Consequently, while these interventions may have some standard of legitimacy under international law as either self-defense or in support of a host nation's domestic issues, they do not meet the test for peace enforcement, which can only be undertaken with Security Council authorization.

Peacekeeping Operations

As mentioned previously, peacekeeping is not peace enforcement. The evolution in peacekeeping operations through the 1990s and into the 21st century is the focus of countless scholarly articles, with "complex" and "multi-dimensional" peacekeeping becoming normal practice for modern peacekeeping operations. While multi-dimensional peacekeeping shares some characteristics with peace enforcement operations, these operations are not enforcement actions as contemplated by Article 42 of the Charter, nor do they meet the full definitions of peace enforcement. Therefore, peacekeeping operations are excluded from this study.

## 2.5 Defining the Universe of Peace Enforcement Operations

Determining the definitive universe of peace enforcement operations requires overlaying the established definition of peace enforcement onto the complete history of military interventions since 1945. Critical to the success of this study is the objective

inclusion of all enforcement actions meeting the previously determined definition of peace enforcement. The variety in definitions for peace enforcement, as outlined in the previous chapter, has prevented a consistent determination as to the exact list of all enforcement actions. A primary goal of this study is to rectify this and to provide the ultimate universe of all enforcement actions.

*Step 1 - Threats to International Peace and Security Under Article 39*

By thoroughly examining all published volumes of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, along with a specific review of each UN Security Council resolution referenced, a list was compiled of every determination by the UNSC of threats or breaches as defined by Article 39 of the Charter. To be included, the resolution must have explicitly recognized a "threat" or "breach" of international peace and security. Since 1945, a total of 611 Security Council resolutions contain language where the Security Council determined the existence of such a threat or breach in forty-five (45) separate threat areas (see Table 2-3). Some of these threats were noted in a single resolution, while most of them were re-iterated on an ongoing basis each time the Security Council passed a resolution dealing with that specific situation. In some cases, like Bosnia, DRC, Somalia, and Sudan, these threat determinations were repeated in dozens of resolutions over decades.

In almost every circumstance, the Security Council determined there to be a "threat" to international or regional peace and security rather than a "breach." While both terms are referenced in Article 42 of the Charter, they carry different meanings. In only three situations did the Security delineate a "breach" of peace and security: Korea (S/RES/82,

1950), Kuwait (S/RES/660, 1990), and the Falklands / Malvinas (S/RES/502, 1982). In Korea and Kuwait, the Security Council authorized an immediate peace enforcement action to be undertaken by a coalition of Member States.

Table 2-3: Threats to International Peace and Security Recognized by UNSC 1945-2020

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Afghanistan* | Croatia | Haiti | *Mali* | *Somalia* |
| Albania | Cyprus | Iran | Mozambique | South Africa |
| Angola | Djibouti | Iraq | Namibia | South Sudan |
| *Bosnia & Herzegovina* | *DRC* | Korea | North Korea | Southern Rhodesia |
| Burundi | *East Timor* | Kosovo | Palestine | Sudan |
| *CAR* | Eritrea | *Kuwait* | Rwanda | Sudan-Abyei |
| Chad | Ethiopia | Lebanon | Sahel | Sudan-Darfur |
| *Congo* | Falkland Islands | Liberia | Serbia | Syria |
| *Cote D'Ivoire* | Frmr. Yugoslavia | Libya | Sierra Leone | Yemen |

*Step 2 - Authorization of Intervention under Article 42 of Chapter VII*

A thorough examination of the Repertoire for each of the 611 UNSC resolutions resulted in 204 resolutions that included authorizations for the use of military force under Article 42 of Chapter VII. These 204 authorizations encompassed 36 unique enforcement actions in twenty-seven (27) different countries in which the UNSC authorized the use of force under Chapter VII either explicitly or implicitly.

Of the 36 interventions, all correspond directly with a specific war included in the Correlates of War (COW) project. The lone wolf that does not directly correspond to a COW entry is the 2007 intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The UNSC authorized three separate interventions into the DRC, and the first two correspond directly with Africa's World War of 1998-2002 as well as the Hemma-Lendu War. However, while the 2007 intervention doesn't match up directly, it is in response to the continued ethnic violence of the Hemma-Lendu War.[4]

4. While the COW Extra-State War data lists the timeframe of the Hemma-Lendu War from 1999-2005, it is clear from a historical analysis that violent conflict persisted well after these dates and continues to the present.

In numerous instances the Security Council determined the existence of a threat to international peace and security without authorizing an intervention. The reasons for this are outside the scope of this study, but the vast majority of these instances involve the Arab-Israeli conflict, Southern Rhodesia or South Africa.





Figure 2-1: Response to Threats to International Peace and Security
(Source: Repertoire of the Practice of the UN Security Council 1946-2020)

*Step 3 - Mandating Strategic Use of Coercive Force to End Hostilities*

While UN Security Council resolutions provide definitive answers regarding the first two criteria in the definition of peace enforcement, the language of Security Council resolutions is not specific enough to allow for a clear determination of whether the final component has been met—namely, the requirement for, and expectation of, the strategic use of coercive force. While it would seem appropriate to simply use the authorization of

Chapter VII's use of force to answer this, it is clear that historical nuances of Security Council politics and practices have muddied the inclusion of Chapter VII's authority in numerous resolutions. For example, during the Cold War, it was extremely rare for the Security Council to agree on using Chapter VII language, even if they intended to provide an offensive enforcement mandate, as in the case of the Korean War. Likewise, as multidimensional peacekeeping operations became more dangerous in the 1990s, almost every peacekeeping operation in the last 25 years has included Chapter VII authority, even when the Security Council did not intend for the strategic use of coercive force.

Table 2-4: List of Peace Enforcement Operations

| Operation | Art 39 UNSCR | Art 42 UNSCR | Strategic Use of Force |
|---|---|---|---|
| Korea 1950-1953 | 82 | 83 | Yes |
| Congo 1961-1964 | 143 | 161 | Yes |
| Kuwait 1990-1991 | 660 | 678 | Yes |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995 | 713 | 770 | Yes |
| Somalia 1992-1994 | 733 | 794 | Yes |
| Haiti 1994 | 841 | 940 | Yes |
| East Timor 1999-2000 | 1264 | 1264 | Yes |
| Afghanistan 2001-2015 | 1386 | 1386 | Yes |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003 | 1078 | 1484 | Yes |
| Haiti 2004-2017 | 1529 | 1529 | Yes |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2005 | 1078 | 1592 | Yes |
| Somalia 2007-2022 | 1474 | 1744 | Yes |
| Libya 2011 | 1973 | 1973 | Yes |
| Cote d'Ivoire 2011 | 1464 | 1975 | Yes |
| Mali 2012-2023 | 2056 | 2085 | Yes |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2013- | 1078 | 2098 | Yes |
| Central African Republic 2013- | 2127 | 2127 | Yes |

To ensure a consistent and comprehensive understanding of which operations meet the complete definition of peace enforcement, it was necessary to review the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council for each of the 36 unique enforcement actions, along with other primary mission documents found within the United Nations Digital Library and Official Document System. Examining these primary sources for each operation on the initial list shows that only 17 of these operations meet the full definition

of a peace enforcement operation. (see Table 2-4) These 17 operations comprise the complete universe of UN-authorized peace enforcement operations since 1945.

# CHAPTER 3
# METHODOLOGY

## 3.1 The Actors: Member States, Regional Arrangements, and the UN

This study specifically focuses on the causal mechanisms that have affected the evolution of peace enforcement actions over the last 75 years, from 1945 to 2020. In most peace operations, the selected actor has been a coalition of Member States, led by one leading State, banding together to accomplish the Security Council's mandate. On some occasions, rather than allowing the Member States to take the lead, the Security Council has authorized a Regional Arrangement to conduct the peace enforcement mission. In other cases, the Security Council has tasked the Secretary-General with accomplishing the mission using troops contributed by various Member States.[5]

As the dependent variable in this study, "actor constellation" is simply the term chosen to refer to the actor(s) charged by the UN Security Council to accomplish the mandates of the peace enforcement action. While every peace enforcement action has a unique constellation of actors comprising states, international organizations, NGOs, belligerent parties, multinational corporations, and other entities with the capacity to influence events, this study is not concerned with that and any correlation between the use of the term "actor constellation" is an inappropriate linkage for this research. While actor constellations in the international system can include a wide variety of actors, for this study, only three distinct actors are relevant. These include Member States, Regional

[5] Since 1992, these missions have been led by the Department of Peace Operations (formerly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations), internal to the organ of the Secretariat within the United Nations.

Arrangements, and the United Nations.[6]

This study uses the term Member State to refer to countries that are members of the United Nations. These countries have military forces and are capable of participating in coalitions of willing states to meet collective strategic and operational goals. The term "Member States" includes coalitions of Member States acting in concert to provide collective security in response to a threat or breach of international security. No distinction is made regarding the size of the coalition of Member States, as in most peace enforcement actions, a single Member State played the dominant role while others were supporting cast. In some circumstances, the coalition is ad hoc, while in others, it is a longstanding, formal organization such as NATO. The dynamic of the interplay within the coalition is outside the scope of this research and not relevant to understanding the causal mechanisms contributing to the evolution of peace enforcement.

As a unified actor operating independently in an enforcement action, Member States always refer to a coalition of multiple Member States. However, when Member States are deployed adjacent to another actor, there have been occasions when "Member States" refers only to a single state (for example, the French force in Cote d'Ivoire in a coordinated operation with UNOCI in 2011). Of the seventeen peace enforcement actions since 1945, coalitions of Member States have participated in thirteen operations. In six of these actions, Member States formed the only actor in the actor constellation.

The second distinct actor is a Regional Arrangement. For this research, regional

[6] States are the building block of the international system, and it is understood that while the military forces of States form all three distinct actors, what we are concerned with is the product these military forces combine to produce.

arrangements are "institutional arrangements formally created by three or more states, to pursue common objectives, through either legal or political agreements, based on some form of geographical space." (Burchill 2010, 224) Regional Arrangements, like the African Union or Organization of American States, are explicitly contemplated in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. (United Nations 1945, Art. 52-54) While operating under the authority and mandate of the UN Security Council, a regional arrangement force operates independently and answers directly to the regional arrangement under which it was constituted.

The concept, intricacies, and boundaries of regional arrangements have been well-studied, yet for the purposes of applying them to peace operations, their definition remains somewhat amorphous. Regional 'arrangements' and 'agencies' are explicitly referenced in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, yet these terms encompass bodies as varied as economic commissions, defense alliances, collective security agencies, and integration bodies. It is commonly accepted that the primary distinction between 'agency' and 'arrangement' relates to the legal form of the creation and management of the inter-governmental organization, with an 'agency' being a legal entity with a functioning secretariat and address and an 'arrangement' being an arrangement through the treaty-making of like-minded sovereign states. (Simma 2012, 694)

For the original UN Charter, the Egyptian delegation at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 proposed a definition of regional arrangement as

> "organisations of a permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which by reason of their proximity, community of interest (or) cultural linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, makes themselves jointly responsible for

> the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations." (United Nations 1947, 27)

This definition was not incorporated into the UN Charter, and consequently, there is no agreed-upon definition for what exactly constitutes a regional arrangement. For the purposes of this study, we will use the working definition offered by Graham in "Regional Security and Global Governance," with regional arrangements being "a union of states or an international organization, based upon a collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security under the control and within the framework of the UN." (Graham and Felicio, 2006, 88)

There is an important aspect of regional arrangements that must be resolved to properly examine the causal factors in the creation of peace enforcement actor constellations. In reviewing all cases of peace enforcement, it is clear that there are two distinctive categories of regional arrangements. These two categories are unrelated to the regional arrangement's purpose, structure, membership, or capabilities. Instead, the two categories relate to the jurisdiction of the regional arrangement.[7] There have been several instances, such as the peace enforcement operations in Somalia (2007), Mali (2012-2023) and CAR (2013-) where the regional arrangements of the African Union and ECOWAS

7. This research is not intended to be a legal treatise, and as such the definition here is not a legal one, but a common language one. The Oxford English Dictionary defines jurisdiction as "The extent or range of judicial or administrative power; the territory over which such power extends" and that is the meaning as used in this study.

authorized, organized, deployed, and led a military intervention force conducting a peace enforcement mission under the overall authority of UN Security Council. These peace enforcement operations comprised military units drawn from the member states of the AU and ECOWAS, respectively, and the mission was deployed inside a member country of the regional arrangement.

Distinctive from these operations are those in which a regional arrangement serves as the headquarters to deploy military forces outside of its territorial boundaries yet in support of UN Security Council actions to respond to threats to international peace and security. Examples of this type of deployment include NATO peace enforcement missions in Bosnia (1992), Libya (2011), and the EU-led Operation ARTEMIS in the DRC in 2003. In each of these cases, the regional arrangement deployed military forces in support of peace operations well outside the jurisdiction of its specific regional arrangement. In 1992, Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia were not members of NATO, and NATO was not responding collectively to a perceived threat to its borders or that of an alliance member. Instead, NATO deployed military forces for a peace enforcement operation in support of a humanitarian crisis under the authority of the UN Security Council. Likewise, in both Libya and the DRC, respectively, NATO and the EU organized and deployed a military force to respond to destabilizing threats in Africa, well outside the boundaries of Europe and the mandate of their respective regional arrangements. While these operations were conducted within the framework established by the UN Charter in Chapters VII and VIII, the regional arrangement acts more like a sponsoring organization than a true regional authority responsible for peace and security in the area under its control. As such, there is

very little difference between a military force sponsored by a regional arrangement and a multinational force or coalition of UN member states. NATO in Libya and EUFOR in the DRC are *de facto* Member State coalitions with a pre-organized leadership structure. As Jones outlined in his report for the UNDPKO,

> "if one examines force structure, command structure and financing, the EU's Operation Artemis looks more like a French-led Member State force, similar in most respects to the Australian-led Interfet, than it does like an operation composed of and commanded by a multilateral organization. Thus, differentiating by sponsoring organization – which is important in political terms – is unhelpful in categorical terms." (Jones 2004, 18)

Consequently, for the purposes of this study, regional arrangements that deploy forces outside the remit of their own regional territorial boundaries will be categorized as Member States.

In reviewing all seventeen peace enforcement operations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are the only regional arrangements that have participated in a peace enforcement operation while acting as a regional arrangement. Regional arrangements have participated in three peace enforcement actions and only once as an independent actor.

The third actor in this study of peace enforcement is the United Nations, specifically, a military force constituted through the contribution of UN Member States pledging support for a specific peace enforcement mission in which their troops will be under the authority and command of the United Nations Department of Peace Operations. Wearing blue helmets or berets, these troops normally remain organized by nationality at the tactical

level but are led at the operational and strategic level by a UN-designated joint staff comprising military officers from many contributing countries filling specific roles. A military commander is designated as the UN force commander to lead this ad hoc force, often on a rotating basis among troop-contributing countries (TCC), and reports directly to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General. While contributing Member States retain a modicum of authority and control over the use of their military forces, the Member States themselves are not directly in the command structure for the operation.

While ONUC was a UN operation thirty years prior to the UNDPO being formally organized in 1992, the use of the term "UN" for the third actor specifically refers to any peace enforcement action in which the Security Council authorizes the UN itself, the Secretary-General, or the UNDPO to conduct the operation (as opposed to Member States or a Regional Arrangement). From 1948 through 1992, UN peacekeeping, ceasefire monitoring or peace enforcement missions operated as an independent operation reporting to the Secretariat organ of the United Nations. In February 1992, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was created to supervise peace operations across the globe. On 1 January 2019, the UNDPKO was transformed into the UN Department of Peace Operations as part of the restructuring of the UN's peace and security initiatives. (A/RES/72/262C, 2018) The UN has primarily focused on peacekeeping operations, which are intentionally outside the scope of this study. There have been eight occasions when the UN has participated directly as an "enforcer" in peace enforcement operations, twice as the lone actor, five times alongside a Member State or Regional Arrangement force, and once alongside a UN peacekeeping mission.

## 3.2 The Calculus of Peace Enforcement Actor Constellations

Understanding peace enforcement actor constellations requires defining the calculus by which we will categorize each type of actor constellation. In examining the structure of all seventeen peace enforcement actions since 1945, there are seven unique combinations of the three primary actors (see Table 3-1). This research focuses on the mechanisms that caused these seven unique actor constellations.

Table 3-1: Unique Actor Constellations

| Unique Actor Constellation | Peace Enforcement Operations |
|---|---|
| Member State peace enforcement force under unified command | Korea 1950-1953<br>Kuwait 1990-1991<br>Haiti 1994<br>East Timor 1999-2000<br>Afghanistan 2001-2015 |
| UN peace enforcement force comprising troop contributions from Member States | Congo 1961-1964 |
| Member State peace enforcement force parallel to UN peacekeeping force | Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995<br>Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003 |
| Member State peace enforcement force parallel to UN peace enforcement force | Somalia 1992-1994<br>Cote d'Ivoire 2011 |
| Member State peace enforcement force replaced by UN peace enforcement force | Haiti 2004-2017 |
| Regional Arrangement peace enforcement force of Regional States | Somalia 2007-2022 |
| UN peace enforcement force under unified command with UN peacekeeping force | Dem. Rep. of Congo 2013- |
| Member State peace enforcement force adjacent to RA peace enforcement force replaced by a UN peace enforcement force | Mali 2012-2023<br>Central African Rep. 2013- |

The deployment of a combination of our three actor groups has been referred to as hybrid peace operations (Jones, 2004, 17), and several scholars have studied these in relation to complex, multidimensional peacekeeping. (de Coning, Gelot and Karlsrud 2016; Tardy and Weiss 2017; Howard and Dayal 2017; Sherman, Sarfati and Dahir 2020) While the interplay between the actors in the conduct of their mission is outside the scope of this study, it is worth noting the commonly used terms as to how these actors function together. In his external study for the UN's Peacekeeping Best Practices, Jones noted that

"these hybrid missions can be categorized in terms of the formal relationships between the sponsoring operations." (Jones 2004, 17) He defines four categories of hybrid peacekeeping missions—integrated, parallel, coordinated, and sequential. *Integrated operations* are those that operate under a single, unified, or joint chain of command; *parallel operations* have separate, adjacent command structures operating independently of one another; *coordinated operations* are parallel command structures that coordinate all facets of the operations; and *sequential operations* are when one operation precedes or succeeds another (see Table 3-2).

Table 3-2: Actor Constellation Variations as the Outcome Variable

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Actors | MS | Member States & Coalitions of Member States |
| | RA | Regional Arrangements |
| | UN | United Nations |
| Command & Control | | Independent |
| | + | Integrated / Coordinated |
| | \|\| | Parallel |
| | >> | Sequential |
| Actor Constellations | MS | MS PE force under unified command |
| | RA | RA PE force under RA-designated command |
| | UN | UN PE force of contributed troops under UN-designated command |
| | MS \|\| [UN] | MS PE force adjacent to UN PK force |
| | MS + UN | MS PE force coordinated with UN PE force |
| | MS >> UN | MS PE force replaced by UN PE force |
| | MS \|\| RA >> UN | MS PE force adjacent to RA PE force replaced by UN PE force |

In his 2004 report to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Jones offers some possible reasons for why states are increasingly utilizing hybrid operations. He poses and answers the question of why states are "making increasingly frequent recourse to hybrid operations, putting their troops in these combined structures rather than solely in Blue Helmet operations." (Jones 2004, 19) All of his conclusions, however, are premised on Member States evolving to no longer wanting to place their forces under direct UN command. While this may make sense given that the report's audience was UNDPKO leadership, the presupposition of Jones' report is that peace operations are top-driven, with

the follow-on question being asked if these hybrid operations should be "resisted or embraced" by the DPKO. (Jones 2004, 19) Jones' fundamental question of "why" hybrid operations is less relevant to this study, which is focused on the question of "what causes" the change in operational actor constellations.

For our purposes, Dr. Jones' categories of hybrid operations offer an excellent typology for describing how the actors in the constellation work together, with one exception. As not all of our actor constellations include a combination of actors, we will also use the term *unified operation* to refer to the presence of only one of the three actors: Member States, Regional Arrangements, or the UN.

Table 3-3 depicts the specific actor constellations for each of the seventeen peace enforcement operations in chronological order from their date of Security Council authorization.

Table 3-3: Peace Enforcement Actor Constellations and Calculus

| Operation | Actor Constellation | Calculus |
|---|---|---|
| Korea 1950-1953 | Member State PE force under unified command | MS |
| Congo 1961-1964 | UN PE force comprising of troop contributions from Member States | UN |
| Kuwait 1990-1991 | Member State PE force under unified command | MS |
| Bosnia & Herz. 1992-1995 | Member State PE force parallel to UN PK force | MS \|\| [UN] |
| Somalia 1992-1994 | Member State PE force coordinated with UN PE force | MS + UN |
| Haiti 1994 | Member State PE force under unified command | MS |
| East Timor 1999-2000 | Member State PE force under unified command | MS |
| Afghanistan 2001-2015 | Member State PE force under unified command | MS |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003 | Member State PE force parallel to UN PK force | MS \|\| [UN] |
| Haiti 2004-2017 | Member State PE force replaced by UN PE force | MS >> UN |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2005 | UN PE force comprising troop contributions from Member States | UN |
| Somalia 2007-2022 | Regional Arrangement PE force of Regional States | RA |
| Libya 2011 | Member State(s) PE force under unified command | MS |
| Cote d'Ivoire 2011 | Member State(s) PE force coordinated with UN PE force | MS + UN |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2013- | UN PE force under unified command with adjacent UN PK force | [UN] UN |
| Mali 2012-2023 | MS PE force parallel to RA PE force replaced by UN PE force | MS \|\| RA >> UN |
| Central African Rep. 2013- | MS PE force parallel to RA PE force replaced by UN PE force | MS \|\| RA >> UN |

It is evident from a quick look at Table 3-3 that there has been a clear evolution in the actor constellations for peace enforcement. Nine of the first thirteen enforcement missions comprised single actors, whereas the last four missions have all had multiple actors. The

two most recent missions have involved a combination of all three actors. What has caused this shift? Is it a change in the international system, a change in the role of collective security, or changes in the specific conflicts these enforcement actions are designed to end?





Figure 3-1: Evolution of Actor Constellations

### 3.3 Explanatory and Intervening Variables

Five explanatory variables as well as seven intervening variables are introduced, drawn from various mainstream international relations theories, as the independent variables in this study. (Oksaymytna and Karlsrud, 2020) The spectrum of theories

includes the subsets of the main IR theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, as well as rational choice institutionalism and complexity theory. The explanatory and intervening variables selected are logically assumed to have an impact by showing if, how, and why these explanatory conditions influence the presence of a particular actor constellation.

Table 3-4: Explanatory and Intervening Variables

| Category | Explanatory Condition |
|---|---|
| Conflict-specific conditions<br>(Explanatory Variable) | ▪ Conflict Type<br>▪ Conflict Duration<br>▪ Disruptive impact of the conflict<br>▪ Belligerent objectives<br>▪ Belligerent capabilities and state sponsorship |
| International community interest<br>(Intervening Variable) | ▪ P-3 interest<br>▪ International military capacity<br>▪ UNDPO history in the country/conflict |
| Host nation stability and support<br>(Intervening Variable) | ▪ Stability of the host nation<br>▪ Invitation of the host nation |
| Enforcement mission purpose and mandates<br>(Intervening Variable) | ▪ Purpose of the enforcement action<br>▪ Inclusion of PoC and democratic governance mandates |

*Conflict-Specific Variables*

The challenge involved in using conflict as an independent variable is that the river is both a mile wide and a mile deep. There is simply so much data available that it is critical to carve out the appropriate information that is most relevant to this study. On the one hand, finding that niche of data is fairly straightforward. On the other hand, however, any narrowing of focus brings potential criticism for why other data was not included or purposely discarded. As with all research, the key is narrowing the research question so that the most relevant data is quantifiable and qualifiable. The opportunity arises in being able to stand on the shoulders of the giants who have walked similar paths and paved the road with valuable research from which to add another brick to the already towering

castle of scholarship on the subject of war and conflict. In examining many of the countless factors involved in armed conflict, the potential crisis-specific factors have been narrowed to four categories: type of conflict, purpose of the conflict, objectives of the belligerents, and level of violence.

Conflict Type

The type of conflict a peace enforcement action is focused on ending would seem relevant to understanding the evolution of peace enforcement. For this study, combining the typology used by the Correlates of War project and the UCDP-PRIO dataset is appropriate. The UCDP-PRIO provides four types of conflict: Interstate, Intrastate, Internationalized Intrastate, and Non-State. (Gleditsch et al 2002) COW uses a similar set of four: Inter-State War, Civil War for Central Control, Civil War Over Local Issues, Inter-Communal Civil War, and Non-State War Over International Borders. (Sarkees, Reid and Wayman 2010) The COW typology provides the best descriptors for the study of peace enforcement, except not distinguishing whether the Civil War has expanded across the internal border. In the case of the DRC, the COW typology is based on the major wars and not specifically on the post-war armed conflict that has raged for over twenty years. As a result, this label has been modified to account for the change in the type of conflict during the enforcement action. For added clarity, this study modifies the COW typology for Civil War by parenthetically adding whether it is Intrastate or Internationalized Intrastate. Additionally, the conflicts in two countries, Haiti and East Timor, are not included in the COW dataset. The descriptors for these conflicts are added for this study but are not pulled from the COW WarType variable.

In the 70 years of peace enforcement, only two of the conflicts have been inter-state wars: Korea (1950) and Iraq/Kuwait (1990). The remaining sixteen peace enforcement actions have involved intrastate wars of one degree or another.

Conflict Duration

The duration of a conflict prior to intervention is appropriate for understanding the length of time the Security Council has to determine the most appropriate actors for peace enforcement. Interstate wars that erupt overnight, as seen in Korea (1950) and Kuwait (1990), and are deemed by the Security Council to require immediate intervention, are more likely to be led by coalitions of Member States. Conversely, it is assumed that longer burning conflicts, especially civil wars brewing for years, allow the Security Council to build consensus for a regional arrangement or UNDPO-led peace enforcement mission.

Disruptive Impact

The UN's collective security function is designed to protect the whole from the individual, and as such the radiant impact of a conflict is relative to peace enforcement. "Internal conflicts are no longer considered to be just that – internal – the fear of repercussions on an international level (Misra 2008, 4) and, more recently, the fear of terrorism nesting in 'failed states' (Rice, 2005), has transformed these conflicts into a global problem." (Wilen, 2012, 2) This is not a study on the impact of armed conflict but rather a focus on the collective military intervention to stop the conflict. The disruptive impact is like an earthquake where the measurement is simply how far away the disruptive effects are felt, and this study has created a straightforward typology for assessing this impact: Local Disruption, Regional Disruption, and Global Disruption.

The variable of disruptive impact is assumed to influence the dependent variable, in concert with other conflict-specific variables, to the extent that conflicts labeled as creating Global Disruption are more likely to have interventions led by Member States, while those labeled Local or Regional have an expected actor constellation of Regional Arrangement or UNDPO.

Objectives of the Belligerents

The increased number of belligerents and the complexity of intrastate conflict have resulted in actors having divergent objectives within the greater sphere of the general conflict. (Brosche, Nilsson and Sundberg 2023, 145) This is especially true of spoiler actors, who may have completely opposing objectives to the main parties of the conflict. (Pinto Arena 2017, 60) The four descriptors of belligerent objectives include Secession/Self-Determination, Overthrow/Gain Control of Central Government, Establish Ethnic Superiority Over Local/Regional Area, Conduct Criminal Enterprise/Spoil Peace Process for Personal Gain.[8]

A belligerent objective is assumed to impact the actor constellation by influencing the level of interest and commitment of the P-3. Belligerents with the goal of secession and overthrowing the central government would impact the established global order. Belligerents undertaking an effort to topple a democratically elected and recognized government are assumed to raise the direct military intervention of the P-3, or a Regional Arrangement, where spoilers resorting to extreme violence to spoil a drawn-out peace

[8] Although using descriptors tailored for this study, this typology was generally formed based on *Networks of Rebellion* (Staniland 2014) and *Modern Stateless Warfare* (Brooker 2010)

process or for the gain of their specific ethnic group could be assumed to be met with the response of a UNDP-led peace enforcement mission.

Belligerent Capabilities and State Sponsorship

The capability of belligerent actors is tied directly to their level of sponsorship, with those groups sponsored directly by a state most often having the greatest military capability. (Staniland 2014, 4) Peace enforcement missions targeting belligerent groups with strong state support (internally or externally) are assumed to be more likely to be led by Member States, while weaker non-state actors without state support would be more ripe for a Regional Arrangement or UNDPO-led peace enforcement mission.

International Community Interest

International community interest in enforcing peace within a conflict is a given in any peace enforcement operation. As the responsible entity for the UN's collective security mandate, the Security Council must both identify threats to international peace and security and then authorize the operation with desired mandates. While the structural mechanisms and politics of the Security Council are outside the scope of this study, there is relevance in the requirement for the Security Council to agree on the deployment of a peace operation in order for one to occur. In all cases of peace enforcement, the P-3 (US, UK and France) have supported the mission, while China and Russia's interests have proven less important. With the Security Council's penholder system in place, the P-3 control the pen for all aspects of peace operations.

P-3 interests in a conflict can be assessed as related to national security, strategic/economic, or humanitarian. (Ifeoma 2011 103) US, UK and French interests in

African conflicts are not homogenous. UK and French colonial interests across the continent of Africa have certainly impacted their economic and strategic interests (Siradag 2014, 107 ), while US ideology has often driven its foreign policy since the end of World War II. (Westad 2007, 405) In the last few decades, the desire to mitigate human suffering has also factored significantly. (UNDPKO 2009, 19) Assessment of P-3 interests can be assessed based on the stated rationale by each of the P-3 countries for supporting the peace enforcement operation. The assumption is that the national security interests of the P-3 are more likely to result in a peace enforcement actor constellation led by a coalition of Member States, almost always involving one or more of the P-3 military forces in some capacity. The same is true of economic/strategic interests. However, in these cases, one would assume that only one of the P-3 members participates as the Member State, as US, UK, and French economic/strategic interests are not nearly entwined as their national security interests. Humanitarian interests, on the other hand, are assumed to be less likely to result in the dependent variable equaling a Member State and are more likely to be led by the UN with troops contributed from nations outside the P-3.

International military capacity is an assessment of the availability of P-3 military forces to participate in a peace enforcement operation. It is less likely that Member State coalitions led by the P-3 will become involved in leading peace enforcement missions if they are already deployed to a major conflict elsewhere in the world.

UNDPO history in a conflict is also a potential indicator of the actor constellation selected by the Security Council to lead a peace enforcement operation. Conflicts with

previous UN peacekeeping missions are assumed to be more likely to remain within the purview of the UN in some capacity.

Host Nation Stability and Support

Host nation stability and support are variables that impact the permissiveness of the operating environment and the difficulty of conducting a sustained peace enforcement mission. (Badescu 2007, 72) *Collapsed* and *failed* states are less likely to be able to provide support to an intervening force, while states considered only as *weak* on the failure spectrum have more capabilities to provide public goods and services. (Rotberg 2003, 4-7) Absent other factors, the assumption is that peace enforcement operations in collapsed and failed states are more likely to require the robust military and logistics capabilities that can only be found in a Member State-led force, or possibly the force of a well-organized regional arrangement that by definition is deploying from within the region adjacent to the conflict. A UNDPO-led force, on the other, likely consisting of troops contributed from a myriad of countries may only be viable conducting peace enforcement where the host nation retains is operating at a capacity where it is able to provide both security and public goods to support the enforcement effort.

Likewise, peace enforcement conducted at the invitation of the host nation is assumed to be a pre-requisite for regional arrangement and UNDP-led peace enforcement missions. Only the robust forced-entry capabilities of a Member State force supported directly by a P-5 military would have the capabilities of operating in a non-permissive environment against the wishes of the host nation. In addition to military capabilities, given the UN Charter's stated commitment to non-intervention in domestic issues (United

Nations 1945, Art 2-4, 4-7), while it is possible the Security Council would authorize a peace enforcement mission against the wishes of the host nation, it is assumed to be unlikely that the Security Council would delegate such a robust, war-like undertaking to the UNDPO.

Table 3-5: Explanatory Variable Metrics

| Variable | Assessment Range |
|---|---|
| Conflict Type | 1 – Interstate war<br>2 – Civil war for central control<br>3 – Civil war over local issues<br>4 – Non-state war across state borders |
| Conflict Duration | Length of time in years |
| Disruptive impact of the conflict | Local, Regional, Global |
| Belligerent objectives | 1 – Secession/Self-determination<br>2 – Gain control of central government<br>3 – Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area<br>4 – Conduct criminal enterprise/spoil peace process for gain<br>5 – Establish a base for global attacks |
| Belligerent capabilities and state sponsorship | Capabilities - Low, Medium, High<br>State sponsorship - Yes, No |
| P-3 interest | National Security, Strategic/Economic/Colonial, Humanitarian |
| International military capacity | P-3 at war, P-3 not at war |
| UNDPO history in the country/conflict | Previous mission, No previous mission |
| Stability of the host nation | Strong, weak, failed, collapsed |
| Invitation of the host nation | Yes, No |
| Purpose of the enforcement action | 1 – Repel invaders / stop civil war<br>2 – Remove illegal government / install legitimate government<br>3 – Establish security/stability over territory<br>4 – Create a secure environment for humanitarian operations<br>5 – Protect civilians in imminent danger of armed attack<br>6 – Neutralize/defeat/deter non-state actors and spoilers |
| Inclusion of PoC and democratic governance mandates | PoC – Yes, No<br>Democratic Governance – Yes, No |

### Enforcement Purpose and Mandates

The change in the stated purpose and mandates of peace enforcement missions can be expected to impact the decision of which actor constellation should lead the peace enforcement mission. Peace enforcement missions with mandates to repel an invading force, remove an illegitimate government, or force a State to withdraw would appear more appropriate for a Member State actor constellation, whereas providing a secure environment for humanitarian activities or supporting state authority over a given territory

are open to being accomplished by regional arrangements and UNDPO-led peace enforcement missions.

### 3.4 Expected Pathways for Explanatory Variables

Table 3-5 outlines the values associated with each explanatory variable. Relying on UN primary source documentation, including Security Council minutes, resolutions, statements, and reports of the Secretary-General, along with numerous personal interviews of UN civilian and military staff, as well as staff representatives of the P-3 governments, all seventeen peace enforcement operations was reviewed and assessed using the values from Table 3-5.

Table 3-6 includes the result of this assessment.

Table 3-6: Explanatory Variable Assessment for All Peace Enforcement Operations 1945-1990

| Operation | Actor | Conflict Type | Conflict Duration | Belligerent Objectives | Belligerent Capabilities | State Support | Disruptive Impact | P-3 Interest | P-3 Avail | UNDPO History | State Stability | HN Invitation | PE Purpose | PoC Mandate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Korea 1950-1953** | MS | 1 | 0 | 3 | High | Yes | Global | NatSec | Avail | No | Strong | Yes | 1 | No |
| **Congo 1961-1964** | UN | 3 | 0 | 1,2 | Low | Yes | Local | NatSec | Avail | No | Weak | Yes | 1 | No |
| **Kuwait 1990-1991** | MS | 1 | 0 | 2 | High | Yes | Global | NatSec | Avail | No | Strong | Yes | 1 | No |
| **Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995** | MS \|\| [UN] | 3 | 1 | 1,3 | High | Yes | Global | NatSec | Avail | Yes | Failed | Yes | 4 | Yes |
| **Somalia 1992-1994** | MS + UN | 2 | 2 | 3,4 | High | No | Regional | Hum | Avail | Yes | Collapsed | Yes | 4 | Yes |
| **Haiti 1994** | MS | 2 | 0 | 2 | Med | No | Regional | NatSec | Avail | No | Weak | No | 2,3 | No |
| **East Timor 1999-2000** | MS | 3 | 1 | 3 | Low | No | Local | Hum | Avail | No | Weak | Yes | 3 | Yes |
| **Afghanistan 2001-2015** | MS | 2 | 0 | 2,5 | High | Yes | Global | NatSec | Avail | No | Failed | Yes | 3 | Yes |
| **Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003** | MS \|\| [UN] | 4 | 5 | 3 | Low | Yes | Regional | Hum | At War | Yes | Failed | Yes | 3,6 | Yes |
| **Haiti 2004-2017** | MS >> UN | 3 | 0 | 2,4 | Low | No | Regional | NatSec | At War | Yes | Weak | Yes | 3,6 | Yes |
| **Dem. Rep. of Congo 2005** | UN | 2 | 7 | 3 | Low | No | Regional | Hum | At War | Yes | Weak | Yes | 6 | Yes |
| **Somalia 2007-2022** | RA | 2 | 16 | 2,4,5 | Med | No | Regional | NatSec | At War | Yes | Collapsed | Yes | 3 | Yes |
| **Libya 2011** | MS | 2 | 0 | 2 | High | No | Global | NatSec | At War | No | Collapsed | No | 5 | Yes |
| **Cote d'Ivoire 2011** | MS + UN | 2 | 8 | 2 | High | Yes | Regional | Col | At War | Yes | Weak | Yes | 5 | Yes |
| **Mali 2012-2023** | MS \|\| RA >> UN | 2 | 0 | 2,3,5 | Med | No | Regional | Col/Nat | At War | No | Failed | Yes | 3,4,5 | Yes |
| **Dem. Rep. of Congo 2013-** | [UN]UN | 3 | 14 | 3,4 | Med | No | Regional | Hum | Avail | Yes | Weak | Yes | 4,5,6 | Yes |
| **Central African Republic 2013-** | MS \|\| RA >> UN | 2 | 15 | 3 | Low | No | Regional | Col/Hum | Avail | Yes | Weak | Yes | 3,4,5 | Yes |

### 3.5 Process Tracing to Determine Causal Pathways

With a defensible definition of peace enforcement in place and expectations set for how the selected independent variables in this study are likely to impact the dependent variable, actor constellations, the table is set for the backbone of this research: the process tracing of selected cases to generate hypotheses explaining the evolution in peace enforcement. It has become accepted by qualitative researchers that "intensive analysis of the development of a sequence of events over time is particularly well-suited to the task of uncovering intervening causal mechanisms." (Levy 2008, 6) This dissertation involves process tracing (George and Bennett 2005, 6-7) of seven cases of peace enforcement selected to represent each of the seven different actor constellations used in peace enforcement between 1945 and 2020.





Figure 3-2: Theory-building process tracing. (Bold lines = direct inferences; shaded lines = indirect inferences; shaded area = what is being traced) recreated from *Process Tracing Methods* (Beach and Pederson 2013, 17)

"Process tracing has a comparative advantage in the empirical analysis of decision making at the individual, small group, and organizational levels." (Levy 2008, 11) As a hypotheses-building effort, the outcome (Y) is known, but the cause (X) is uncertain. "Empirical material is used to build a hypothesized theory, inferring that what is found reflects the observable implications of an underlying causal mechanism." (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 16) In this study, the outcome (Y) equaled the specific actor constellation listed in Table 3-3, where the potential cause (X) is derived from one or more of the independent variables listed in Table 3-4. Process tracing uses an empirical narrative of a specific case to observe or infer the existence of manifestations of the independent and intervening variables to identify causal mechanisms contributing to a specific outcome. (Figure 3-2) Causal mechanisms are most commonly defined as "a series of intervening variables through which an explanatory variable exerts a causal effect on an outcome variable (e.g., Falleti and Lynch 2009: 1146; George and Bennett 2005: 6; Gerring 2007b, 2010; Hedstrom and Ylikoski 2010; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Waldner 2011)." (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 36)





Figure 3-3: Causal Mechanisms

In each of the seven case studies for this dissertation, the focus will be on tracing the conflict-specific conditions (explanatory variable) through the actions of the international

community – specifically the P-3, the Host Nation, and the Security Council (intervening variables) to examine the causal effects on the peace enforcement's actor constellation (outcome variable). A simplified example is depicted in Figure 3-3.





Figure 3-4: Example of Causal Mechanism Observation

Case studies will generally follow the process outlined in UN training materials for the decision to deploy forces for a peace operation.[9] (UN DPKO/DFS CPTM 2017, 7)

- A crisis occurs, and the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, or any Member state requests the Security Council to address the situation.
- The Security Council assesses risks to international peace and security and considers a peace enforcement mission as a suitable response to the crisis.
- Strategic assessments of the crisis situation are conducted by the United Nations and possibly Member States. These can include technical assessment missions to the crisis area to analyze the situation on the ground.
- The Security Council decides to deploy a peace enforcement mission and adopts a resolution with a mandate.

[9] *While this process is specific to a peacekeeping mission, it remains relevant as a framework for this study.*

In following this decision-making process, each case study will identify the causal mechanisms created as the explanatory variables influence the intervening variables to impact the outcome variable. (Figure 3-4) Chapter 5's will analyze three discrete peace enforcement missions in the DRC as examples of three distinct constellations that the UN has deployed: adjacent to a Member State-led operation (DRC 2003), on its own (DRC 2005), and with a UN Force Intervention Brigade integrated into an existing UN peacekeeping operation (DRC 2013-). Chapter 6's case study of the 2011 Libyan conflict will trace a Member State-led operation as the sole actor, while the final case study in Chapter 7, Mali 2012-2023, examines a complex constellation of Member State peace enforcement operations deployed in parallel to a Regional Arrangement-led mission, with the RA mission succeeded by a UN-commanded mission.

# CHAPTER 4
# SOMALIA: FROM RESTORING HOPE TO FIGHTING FOR PEACE

The case studies on peace enforcement operations in Somalia, encompassing both UNITAF/UNOSOM II and AMISOM, serve as crucial examinations within the broader discourse on the evolution of peace enforcement mechanisms. These operations highlight the dynamic interplay between international mandates, regional engagements, and the exigencies of local conflict environments. Conducting a process tracing analysis on these case studies will allow for a nuanced understanding of the causal factors influencing the operational outcomes and strategic shifts in international peace enforcement strategies. This approach will dissect the complex causal pathways leading to the operationalization of these missions, including the international community's response to Somalia's protracted conflict, the strategic considerations underpinning these interventions, and the implications of these operations for future peace enforcement endeavors. Through this analysis, the dissertation aims to contribute to the scholarly understanding of how peace enforcement operations adapt to and are shaped by the multifaceted challenges of modern conflicts.

## 4.1 Unified Task Force / United Nations Operation in Somalia II 1992-1994

Somalia is synonymous with the terms failed state, modern-day piracy, Islamist insurgency, and extreme violence. It is also the site of two separate peace enforcement operations, fifteen years apart, each having a very different constellation of actors. Before dawn on the morning of January 27, 1991, the President of Somalia, Mohammed Sayeed Barre, fled Mogadishu as more than a half-dozen different militia groups pressed in from

all sides of the capital. (Oloya 2016, 27) With the collapse of Barre's totalitarian regime that had ruled Somalia for almost 22 years, violence spread rampantly throughout the entire country. By the end of 1991, the civil war became so intense that the three hospitals operated by *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF) were utilizing 1,000 liters of blood plasma per day to treat victims of the fighting. (Oloya 2016, 28) A severe drought at the same time caused widespread famine throughout the country, and the combination of civil war and starvation forced the displacement of millions of Somalis. (Bradbury 1994, 16) The humanitarian suffering was broadcast extensively on television throughout Europe and the United States. On January 23, 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously approved UNSC Resolution 733, declaring the situation in Somalia a threat to international peace and security. (S/RES/733 1992)

After recognizing the ceasefire signed by the major factions of the Somali civil war (S/RES/746 1992), the Security Council authorized the deployment of 50 unarmed UN observers - called the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). (S/RES/751 1992, ¶ 4) Simultaneously, six main UN organizations, consisting of WFP, FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, WHO, and UNICEF, continued their massive humanitarian relief effort throughout the country. Over the next several months, however, the security situation prevented these organizations from accomplishing their mission. The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council in July and August of 1993 recommended that UNOSOM be increased to include five additional security units (each containing between 500 and 750 troops), as well as up to 719 logistics personnel to secure and manage humanitarian convoys and distribution centers. (S_23829 1992; S_24480 1992) The Security Council

approved the Secretary General's recommendations, authorizing a substantial increase in the UNOSOM peacekeeping mission. (S/RES/775 1992, ¶3)

Despite the additional troops, UNOSOM faced extreme challenges and obstacles in their humanitarian mission as the security situation continued to worsen throughout Somalia. On November 24, 1992, the Secretary-General reported this deteriorating situation to the Security Council (S/24859 1992), and in his November 29th letter to the Council (S/24868 1992, 2-5), offered five options for creating the conditions for uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the starving Somalis. In this same letter, the Secretary-General informed the Council that acting US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger had offered to lead and contribute the bulk of the troops needed should the Security Council decide to substantially increase UNOSOM's robustness. (S/24868 1992, 5)

Mere days later, on December 3, 1992, all fifteen members of the Security Council voted in favor of UNSCR 794 (S/PV.3145 1992, 27), welcoming the offer of a Member-led task force to create a secure environment and authorizing "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." (S/RES/794 1992, ¶10) Acting under Chapter VII, this Unified Task Force (UNITAF) would have robust authority and military capability to create the conditions necessary to deliver supplies and provide medical support in the face of aggression by the various militias throughout the country. In less than a week, the first US Marines waded ashore on the beaches of Mogadishu, witnessed by dozens of international reports filming the occasion (Lancaster 1992). By early 1993, UNITAF would grow to a strength of 37,000 personnel contributed by 24 nations, including a contingent of more than 25,000 troops

by the United States. (Oloya 2016, 30) Almost as a side note, Resolution 794 would also authorize an additional 3,500 troops for the parallel UN-led UNOSOM mission. (S/RES/794 1992, ¶6)

| Box 4-1 | Key Events – Somalia 1992-1994 |
|---|---|
| **1991** | |
| Jan 27 | Mohammed Sayeed Barre, President of Somalia, flees Mogadishu |
| **1992** | |
| Jan 23 | UNSCR 733 declares situation in Somalia constitutes threat to international peace and security |
| Mar 27 | Ceasefire signed by major factions in Somali civil war |
| Apr 24 | UNSCR 751 authorizes UNOSOM – 50 unarmed observers along with massive humanitarian effort by FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, WHO, and UNICEF |
| Aug 24 | Secretary-General report recommends adding additional security units |
| Aug 28 | UNSCR 775 authorizes substantial increase in UNOSOM peacekeeping mission |
| Nov 24 | Secretary-General reports deteriorating security situation |
| Nov 29 | Secretary-General offers five options for creating the conditions for uninterrupted delivery of supplies to Somalis. Informs UNSC that the US Sec State has offered US troops to lead this mission |
| Dec 3 | UNSCR 794 authorizes US-led 37,000-strong UNITAF with robust enforcement mandate |
| **1993** | |
| Jan 8 | Ceasefire agreement signed in Addis Abba by all major warring parties |
| Mar 3 | Secretary-General recommends transitioning UNITAF to UNOSOM II |
| Mar 27 | UNSCR 814 authorizes UNOSOM II |
| May 4 | US-led UNITAF officially hands over responsibility to UN-led UNOSOM II with broad enforcement mandate |
| Jun 6 | UNSCR 837 authorizes specific targeting of militia forces and their commanders |
| Jul/Aug | UNOSOM II forces conduct numerous offensive operations against USC/SNA militia |
| Aug 8 | 4 US troops of UNOSOM II killed |
| Aug 27 | US deploys Task Force Ranger adjacent to UNOSOM II |
| Oct 3 | US helicopters shot down over Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down) |
| Oct 6 | President Clinton orders TF Ranger to cease all combat operations and depart Somalia |
| **1994** | |
| Mar 6 | Almost all UNOSOM II troops departed Somalia |
| Nov 11 | UNSCR 954 officially ends UNOSOM II mission |

The UN effort to resolve the Somali civil war continued, and on January 8, 1993, an agreement was signed in Addis Ababa by the fifteen major factions involved in the conflict. (General Agreement 1993) In addition to declaring a ceasefire, the parties agreed to participate in a National Reconciliation Conference managed by UNOSOM. The first session of this conference concluded on March 27, and appeared to contain positive developments for renewed peace in the country. (Addis Ababa 1993) The agreement

provided for creating a Transitional National Council and affirmed the need for the disarmament of the militias, rehabilitation and reconstruction programs, and the pacific settlement of disputes. The agreement also invited the United Nations SRSG, UNOSOM, and UNITAF to extend the necessary assistance to implement the agreement.

Despite a peace process that showed some promise, the lack of a central government combined with widespread and continued violence was significantly hindering the humanitarian effort throughout Somalia. Despite 37,000 troops spread across 40% of the country, many humanitarian tasks remained unaccomplished. Additionally, Bill Clinton succeeded George H.W. Bush as President of the United States, and he was keen to limit the length of involvement of US troops in UNITAF. (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 101) On March 3, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that UNITAF transition to UNOSOM II. (S/25354) Unlike the initial UN mission, this 2nd generation of UNOSOM would require robust authority and substantial military might, similar to UNITAF, and the Secretary-General's recommendation insisted upon Chapter VII enforcement mandates for UNOSOM II. Additionally, in support of the strides being made in the Addis Ababa meetings, the Secretary-General recommended adding significant nation-building mandates for UNOSOM II. The Security Council agreed with the Secretary-General's recommendations and authorized them with UNSCR 814 on March 26. (S/RES/814 1993)

On May 4, the United States officially handed over command of the mission in Somalia to Lieutenant-General Cevik Bir of Turkey. At this point, UNITAF fully transitioned to UNOSOM II. The US had retained military command of its troops assigned

to the operation—UNOSOM II's deputy force commander was US Army Major General Thomas Montgomery, with all US forces at that time in Somalia falling under his direct command—and the Secretary-General appointed Jonathan Howe as the new SRSG for Somalia. (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 110-112) Howe was a retired US Navy four-star Admiral and had most recently served as the National Security Advisor for President Bush from November 6, 1991, to January 20, 1993.

Instead of improving, the situation in Somalia quickly deteriorated soon after the transition to UNOSOM II, with UN military forces directly clashing with various militia groups. On June 5, USC/SNA militia forces attacked a contingent of UNOSOM II troops from Pakistan. Hiding behind women and children to disguise their intent, the militia forces brutally attacked the Pakistani troops, killing 24 of them and wounding 76 others. (Oloya 2016, 31) The Security Council immediately reacted to the heinous attack by unanimously passing UNSCR 837, condemning the "unprovoked armed attack" and authorizing "all necessary measures against all those responsible for the attacks," including the "arrest and detention" of the specific warlords involved. (S/RES/837 1993) While UNSCR 814 granted UNOSOM II broad enforcement authority under Chapter VII, Resolution 837 specifically authorized the specific targeting of militia forces and their commanders.

During July and August, US forces inside UNOSOM II conducted numerous offensive operations to identify and seize the leadership of the USC/SNA militia group, as well as continuing to create the security conditions necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Specifically targeting General Mohammed Farah Aideed and his top lieutenants in the

USC/SNA militia, US forces conducted raids across Mogadishu with the support of AC-130 gunships. (Hirsch and Oakley 1995,119-126) On August 8, four US military policemen were killed by a command-detonated mine, marking the first US deaths in the conflict. (Center for Military History 1994, 10) The US President reacted swiftly and immediately deployed a Joint Special Operations Task Force at the Secretary-General's request. Consisting of 450 special operations personnel from across the US Special Operations Command, Task Force Ranger, as this unit was named, reported directly to through the US Department of Defense chain of command and was not under the command and control of the UN-led UNOSOM II. (USSOCOM 1994, 1)

During the month of September, TF Ranger conducted six offensive operations against suspected USC/SNA militia targets. Coordinating directly and with the support of UNOSOM II forces, these missions attempted to kill or apprehend General Aideed and his subordinate commanders. (USSOCOM 1994, 3) On October 3rd, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission—a mission that would reverberate around the world and change UN peace operations forever. Directly targeting two of Aideed's top lieutenants, the October 3 mission launched TF Ranger heliborne and vehicle-borne forces into the Black Sea slum district of Mogadishu, the heart of Aideed's USC/SNA territory. As made famous by Mark Bowden's book Black Hawk Down (and the subsequent feature film of the same name), Aideed's forces ambushed the TF Ranger troops, downing two of their UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters while simultaneously attacking TF Ranger's ground convoy. (Bowden 2002) Attempting to rescue the downed helicopter crews, elements of TF Ranger became embroiled in an 18-hour battle with various militia forces in several neighborhoods of


Mogadishu, while US, Malaysian, and Pakistani forces of UNOSOM II attempted to support TF Ranger's withdrawal back to their secure compound at Mogadishu airport. The result of the battle was 16 killed and 57 wounded within TF Ranger, and an additional 4 killed (2 American), and 31 wounded of the UNOSOM II forces. Despite the heavy losses by US and UN forces, the Somali casualties were estimated to be significantly greater, with as many as 700 Somalis killed and a couple of thousand more wounded. (Center for Military History, 138-139)

Eighteen killed compared to seven hundred may seem like a lopsided victory, and it absolutely was—for the Somalis. Aideed and his USC/SNA militia were ready to accept their extremely high casualties, while for the Americans, the toll of eighteen dead soldiers was significantly more than the American public, and President Bill Clinton, were willing to bear to enforce peace in a troubled land more than 8,000 miles away on the continent of Africa. On October 6, President Clinton ordered TF Ranger to cease all combat operations in Somalia and all US troops departed Somalia in February/March 1994. Likewise, many nations contributing troops to UNOSOM II began to withdraw their forces as well, and by March 6, 1994 almost all UNOSOM II troops had departed Somalia. (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, 128-129) On November 11, 1994, UNSC Resolution 954 officially ended the UNOSOM II mission. (S/RES/954 1994, ¶ 1-2)

Analysis of Causal Factors

Tracing the process of the UNITAF/UNOSOM II peace operation in Somalia begins with understanding the crisis-specific factors of the conflict as well as the relative position the conflict held within the international system at the time. These explanatory variables provide the foundation for how the international community, specifically the P-3 and United Nations, responded to the crisis (see Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1: Explanatory Variable Assessment for Somalia 1992-1994




The collapse of the Somali state as a result of the multi-faction civil war for central control of the country caused a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. An estimated 300,000 Somalis died as a result of the famine in 1992, with 4.5 million of Somalia's 6 million threatened with severe famine and related disease. (UNDPO Somalia 2023) The end of the Barre regime left a complete vacuum throughout Somalia of all government services, and the widespread violence of the ongoing civil war combined with famine created a humanitarian crisis that forced the international community to respond.

The Somali civil war was both complex and lethal. Clan and sub-clan warfare spread

throughout the country, with more than fifteen different factions fighting for control. Three major factions, tied to the five major Somali clans, vied to control Somalia, while simultaneous inter-faction warfare increased the level of violence and exponentially added to the complexity of the battlefield. (Hall 2015, 5-8) While not sponsored directly by an external state, these militia groups were all heavily armed, having access to over $13 billion worth of weapons that had been imported into the country during the 1980s by the USSR, United States, Libya, and Ethiopia. (Poole 2005, 6) The leaders of these militia groups were more interested in gaining superiority over rival clan leaders and consolidating their wealth than they were in re-establishing a central government to support the people of Somalia. (Menkhaus 2014, 161)

This complex civil war and grave humanitarian crisis came on the heels of the end of the Cold War and the recent success of the United States in leading the international community in removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. As the UNOSOM I mission proved unable to support the ongoing humanitarian relief effort in the face of widespread violence by heavily-armed militia groups intent on fighting, this created intense pressure on the United States to intervene militarily. The issue of intervention became a political issue in the 1992 US presidential election between George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 36) As the UN missions in Somalia and Bosnia were failing, and confidence waned regarding the UN's ability to accomplish the mission in the face of the organized belligerents, the US government felt that it was uniquely responsible and capable of making a difference (Western 2002, 117-120)

Finding itself as the only remaining superpower at the end of the Cold War, the

President of the United States readily accepted the leadership role of spearheading the humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, explained the decision to intervene militarily was the fact that "the level of violence was increasing faster than the humanitarian effort to try to deal with the situation." (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 46)

> "But in the wake of the Cold War, in a world where we are the only remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility, it is our opportunity to lead. There is no one else…At times, real leadership requires a willingness to use military force…I determined that only the use of force could stem this human tragedy in Somalia." (Bush 1993)

With the United States offering to lead the peace enforcement operation in Somalia, Resolution 794 marks the first time the Security Council authorized Member States not under UN command to use strategic military force solely in support of humanitarian efforts in an internal civil conflict. (Philipp 2005, 534)

It is important to note that as Somalia, torn and devastated by civil strife, awaited international intervention, the capacity for responding to such conflict internal to the African continent was close to non-existent. Occurring a decade before the rejuvenated birth of the African Union in 2002, the major continental regional arrangement was the Organization of African Unity. Unlike the successor African Union with its African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Standby Force, the OAU had no pledged capacity to respond to regional crises, and its charter did not generally allow for interference in intrastate conflicts. The OAU Charter "has an inherent tendency to

encourage ineffectiveness and ineptitude. The conservative application of the concepts of 1) non-interference with internal affairs of states and 2) respect for the sanctity of borders has rendered the OAU completely ineffective." (Munya 1999, 539)

On the west coast of Africa, the Economic Community of Western States (ECOWAS) had recently become involved in Liberia's civil war by deploying the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Initially comprised of military forces contributed by five ECOWAS member states, the predominantly Nigerian force encountered significant hurdles in its attempt to establish a ceasefire in Liberia. Losing approximately seven hundred men in the process, the ECOMOG regional intervention was not generally considered a success. (Howe 1996,146) There was no equivalent regional arrangement in East Africa willing or able to contribute to solving the worsening crisis in Somalia, and with the UN falling short, the need for the US-led intervention was clear.

While the US accepted its role in leading UNITAF, it was never on board with the Secretary-General's broader mandate of nation-building throughout Somalia. President Bush emphasized to Boutros-Ghali "that the mission of the coalition is limited and specific," while Boutros-Ghali's response was to encourage the Security Council to pressure the United States to expand its role and duration as a traditional UN peacekeeping force would not succeed given the situation in Somalia. (S/24992 1992, 8-11) The resulting compromise led to the US-led UNITAF operating alongside the robust UN-led mission of UNOSOM II beginning in May 2022. Additionally, as the security situation spiraled out of UNOSOM II's control in the summer of 1993, the subsequent

deployment of TF Ranger was also parallel to the UN-led mission.

Table 4-1 outlines the specific explanatory variables of the Somali conflict. It establishes the causal mechanism through a combination of the intervening variables, which resulted in the outcome of a Member State-led peace enforcement operation adjacent to a UN-led peace enforcement operation. Opposing assessments of the commitment, adaptability, and objectives of the belligerent groups created a difference in vision between the US President and the UN Secretary-General, which clouded the mandate for the operation as well as the ability to conduct a smooth transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II. These strategic-level disagreements based on differing views of the belligerent actors and the operation's scope and mandate were the driving mechanism leading to the parallel leadership of the peace enforcement mission.

Table 4-1: Process Tracing of UNITAF / UNOSOM II 1992-1994

| Explanatory Variables | | Causal Mechanism | | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clan-based, complex civil war among numerous, heavily armed belligerent groups<br>No major or regional powers support any of the warring factions<br>Widespread famine and violent conflict create massive humanitarian crisis prominent on the world stage<br>Highly adaptable belligerent actors understand well the capability differences between US and UN forces and exploit this to their advantage | + | US readily accepts its role in leading international humanitarian intervention, including the use of military force<br>US recognizes that the collapse of HN government and heavily-armed belligerents exceeds the capability of the UN<br>US focused on creating the necessary security conditions, and then transitioning to UN control for subsequent nation-building<br>UN wanted US to expand its scope to include disarming belligerents throughout Somalia and assisting in nation-building tasks; while US felt this was a UN function | = | **MS + UN** |

The post-Cold War, unipolar international system may have been led by the United States, in its role as the sole remaining superpower, but there were limits to its commitment in resolving civil wars. The events of October 3, 1993, would forever change the structure of the international system as it relates to peace enforcement, especially in Africa. More than anything, the events of this day proved to the world that a small group of insurgents armed with inexpensive, readily available weapons could strike a blow that

the most powerful state the world had ever seen was unwilling to absorb. In essence, landing a technical knockout (TKO), with the dominant fighter choosing to leave the boxing ring rather than face another punch.

The UNITAF/UNOSOM II operations in Somalia represent a pivotal moment in the evolution of peace enforcement, illustrating the impact of complex civil wars, humanitarian crises, and the strategic decisions of international actors. The Somali case highlights the limitations of traditional peacekeeping in the face of armed insurgency and the necessity for robust peace enforcement mechanisms. The divergent visions of the US and the UN on the operation's scope and mandate underscore the challenges of coordinating international responses to complex emergencies. This case study underscores the importance of adaptability, clear mandates, and the need for comprehensive strategies that address both immediate security concerns and long-term nation-building efforts.

### 4.2 African Union Mission in Somalia 2007-2022

With the withdrawal of the United Nations' UNOSOM II mission at the end of 1994, Somalia continued its journey as a stateless nation with clan-based warlords vying for power and profits in their local areas. Major warlords ruled over their own local territories around Mogadishu, leaving smaller clans and warlords to exert control of their own areas throughout the countryside. The result was an absence of government throughout the country at every level and across all functional areas where governments normally provide a public good. (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 11-13)

Into this vacuum progressed a loose federation of small, localized Islamic courts to fill

the void in maintaining some form of control over communities. Although the general population of Somalia was not historically known as being devout, almost 99% of the population followed Islam, and local clerics attempted to use Sharia law to impose some stability and control after the collapse of the central government and in the midst of widespread violence and famine. (Barnes and Hassan 2007, 152-153) Meaning "the correct path," several nationally-recognized Somali scholars pushed the concept of Sharia as a mechanism to bring order back to society. (Elmi 2010) The number of these Islamic courts expanded greatly in 1994 and 1995, especially in and around Mogadishu. Both Aideed (SNA) and Ali Mahdi (USC) strongly opposed the expansion of the Islamic courts, fearful of increasing the power base of the various Muslim sheiks. However, despite warlord opposition, the Islamic courts proved enormously popular throughout Somalia. Several of these small, local Islamic courts began coordinating their efforts to restore order. In 2000, eleven of these Sharia courts throughout Mogadishu banded together to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to push the warlords out of their communities. (Barnes and Hassan 2007, 153)

The ICU focused mostly on providing judicial and social services, letting the new Transitional National Government (TNG) attempt to restore the central government for Somalia. Established at the Somalia National Peace Conference held in Djibouti on May 5, 2000, the TNG had many organs and agencies necessary for a national government to govern, including executive, legislative, and judicial structures. (Arta Declaration 2000) However, until it failed in 2004, the TNG proved incapable of providing even the most basic social services and was the national government of Somalia in name only during this

four-year period. (Le Sage 2002, 133-136) The ICU, meanwhile, continued to expand its popularity throughout the country.

| Box 4-2 | Key Events – Somalia 2007-2022 |
|---|---|
| **1994** | |
| | Islamic courts expand their control throughout Somalia |
| **2000** | |
| | Eleven Sharia courts band together in Mogadishu to form the Islamic Court Union (ICU) pushing warlords out of Mogadishu and establishing Sharia law throughout the area |
| 5 May | Transitional National Government (TNG) created at Somalia National Peace Conference in Djibouti |
| **2004** | |
| 10 Oct | Transitional Federal Government (TFG) replaces failed TNG at a vote in Nairobi, Kenya. Recognized only by Kenya and Ethiopia |
| 19 Oct | US establishes Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) |
| 25 Oct | TFG President requests large peacemaking force of 15,000-20,000 troops from the AU's Peace and Security Council |
| **2005** | |
| 5 Jan | AU Heads of State unanimously adopt Resolution Assembly/AU/Dec.65(IV), which welcomed deploying an AU Peace Support mission to Somalia (known as IGASOM) |
| 17 Mar | UN sends letter to AU stating that it will not fund the IGASOM mission or support a UNSC resolution mandating its deployment |
| 22 Mar | Italy and other EU members signal their support for IGASOM deployment |
| 20 Apr | US-EU meeting resulted in EU supporting IGASOM with US against. Mission does not deploy. |
| **2006** | |
| 5 Jun | Despite increased funding by CIA of Somali warlords, the ICU establishes itself as the de facto government of Somalia, with it's enforcement wing, al-Shabaab, the most powerful force in the country |
| 31 Jul | US seems to shift support towards approving a deployment to Somalia |
| 6 Dec | UNSCR 1725 authorizes IGASOM, but appears to create a loophole for foreign intervention in Somalia |
| 28 Dec | Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops surge into Somalia and seize control of Mogadishu, forcing ICU senior leadership to flee the country |
| **2007** | |
| 8 Jan | Ethiopian Prime Minister Zendawi informs US Secretary of State for African Affairs that Ethiopia will withdraw from Somalia in two weeks |
| 19 Jan | AU Peace and Security Council outlines its support of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) |
| 20 Feb | UNSCR 1744 authorizes AMISOM peace enforcement mission |
| 6 Mar | First AMISOM troops from Uganda arrive at Mogadishu airport |

In November 2004, Somalis adopted a new Transitional Federal Charter which created the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)—not to be confused with the now-defunct TNG. (Transitional Federal Charter 2004) The TFG was elected by vote in Nairobi, Kenya, and for the first two years of its existence the TFG ruled completely from outside the geographic boundaries of Somalia due to the inherent instability in the country. Like the TNG, the TFG ostensibly provided for the basic organs of government, including separate executive, judicial and parliamentary branches, and an attempt was made to incorporate the ICU into this new government by providing them a significant portion of the seats in

the initial parliament. However, maintaining the seat of government outside Somalia did not prove popular with many Somalis.

Cooperation between the TFG and the ICU proved tenuous at best and quickly devolved into open hostilities. At the time, the TFG was only recognized internationally by Kenya and Ethiopia, with the majority of the world withholding recognition until the TFG could prove it could operate within Somalia. (Ismail 2009) The TFG itself had minimal resources and absolutely no military or police capabilities. To pave the way for the TFG to return to power in Mogadishu, the security situation in the country would need to improve radically. An international military intervention was the only solution, and the TFG attempted to enlist the assistance of neighboring countries, regional organizations, and the UN to support creating the necessary security conditions for its return.

Ten years after the failed enforcement efforts of UNOSOM, UNITAF, and TF Ranger, the international community, specifically the P-3, had little stomach for sending ground troops back to Somalia. However, it is important to note that the United States and its allies were firmly embroiled in the collective Global War on Terror (GWOT) at this time. The Bush Doctrine, affirming that "if you are not with us, you are against us," was at its peak at this moment, with much of the world contributing military forces to missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In October 2002, the US established the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which formally stood up operations at its new base in Djibouti. (CJTF-HOA)

Until this time, Somalia had played very little, if any, role in international terrorism, and other than piracy in the Gulf of Oman, the violence endemic to Somalia had not

translated into any international incidents. Three individuals who participated in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were suspected of hiding out in Somalia. Still, there was scant evidence that al-Qaeda cells operated extensively in Somalia, and the Islamist terror group Al-Shabaab did not yet exist. However, after 9/11 and throughout the presidency of George Bush, the GWOT, and its accompanying counterterrorism policies and agenda would have primacy throughout all facets of US foreign policy, especially regarding an Islamic country with a collapsed government. (Williams 2018, 23-24)

In 2004 and 2005, the TFG reached out to two regional organizations, IGAD and the AU, in hopes of garnering support for a military intervention that would allow the TFG to return to Somalia and thereby be recognized by the international community as the rightful government. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was a Djibouti-based regional organization comprising eight nations on the Horn of Africa. Initially focused solely on regional drought and desertification issues, IGAD had expanded its role to include regional economic cooperation, food security, and political and humanitarian affairs, including conflict prevention. (Oloyo 2016, 43) While IGAD was focused strictly on issues related to the Horn of Africa, the African Union, whose membership consisted of all UN-recognized countries on the continent of Africa, was the formal regional arrangement for all issues affecting Africa. The AU's Peace and Security Council was especially interested in threats to international peace and security on the continent. It was to IGAD and the AU's PSC that the TFG hoped would provide the necessary muscle to allow it to assume its governmental responsibilities in Mogadishu.

(Williams 2018, 26-27)

Support for a protection and stabilization force comprising military forces contributed from East African nations quickly gained support in both IGAD and the AU. Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni became chairman of IGAD in October 2003 and immediately pushed for creating a robust military force capable of intervening in situations like Somalia. (Oloya 2016, 44) Dubbed the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), a planning element was established to flush out the specifics of creating this force capable of UN-styled peacekeeping operations. In October 2004, newly elected TFG President Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed addressed the AU's Peace and Security Council. He requested "15,000 to 20,000 peacemaking troops from Frontline States (FLS), Africa at large, brotherly Arab States, and the rest of the world including Indian Ocean countries." (Oloya 2016, 45) The AU encouraged the TFG to begin the process of establishing a peace agreement that would allow for such a deployment. On January 5, 2005, the AU's Heads of State unanimously adopted Resolution Assembly/AU/Dec.65(IV), (AU 2005, 26-27) which welcomed deploying an AU Peace Support mission to Somalia. This multinational African intervention force became known as IGASOM.

Fact-finding and planning teams were dispatched to Somalia, and an ambitious plan was created that envisioned two battalions, each with 850 fighting troops, with boots on the ground in Somalia by April 2005. Uganda and Sudan each agreed to supply one of the initial infantry battalions in Phase I, with other countries contributing additional forces in subsequent phases, and the deployment was expected to last nine months. While the AU did not feel that UNSC authority was required, they did require the Security Council to

modify the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by UNSCR 733. Additionally, the AU was looking to the West, particularly the United States, to foot the bill for the mission.

While the United States initially appeared to signal support for such a mission, it became evident that the US did not support putting ground troops in Somalia at this time. (Embassy Brussels 2005) On March 17, the US sent a letter to the AU's Council of Ministers stating that they "do not plan to fund the deployment of IGAD troops in Somalia and are not prepared to support a U.N. Security Council mandate for IGAD deployment in Somalia." (Mulama 2005, 1) While normally, such a statement made by one of the P-3 would cause a mission to be dead on arrival, several European countries were still very interested in seeking a solution. Italy, in particular, participated in several diplomatic meetings across Europe in late March 2005 to signal their support for the IGASOM deployment and with other EU nations on board, it appeared that IGASOM might be revived. (Embassy Rome 2005)

The EU appeared set on reviving IGASOM, which culminated in a major diplomatic showdown between the EU and the US. On April 20, a transatlantic consultation on Africa (COAFR) was attended by more than a dozen heavyweight diplomats from the EU, UK, and US. Anders Henriksson, Director for the Horn, East, and Southern Africa (DG DEV) for the EU Secretariat, reminded the Americans that the EU had remained involved in Somalia throughout the 1990s after the US had fled. Tim Hitchens, the UK Foreign Office's Head of the Africa Department (Equatorial), requested that the US state their position on the deployment to Somalia, and Ambassador Ranneberger, Principal Deputy US Secretary for African Affairs, responded that the United States opposed any deployment that involved

troops from frontline states, but remained vague as to exactly what type of force the US would support. The issue of frontline states was a recurring theme, as it was felt that there was too much history, tension, and animosity between Somalia and its neighbors to all military forces from these neighboring countries to serve as effective peacekeepers. The EU and US approaches were at a crossroads, and Hitchens summed up the dilemma by stating that the EU Plan was "yes, but…" while the American approach was "no, unless…" Even though the African nations appeared willing to bear the brunt of this operation, the US was unwilling to support the mission. Without a consensus, IGASOM stagnated with no firm plan for deployment. (Oloya 2016, 48-49)

The lack of a military intervention in 2005 to install the TFG did not mean that actions weren't being taken in Somalia, especially by the US Central Intelligence Agency and CJTF-HOA. The ICU, until this time, was almost solely focused on administering justice, health, education, and other public services to the Somali population. Alarmed at the unexplained disappearance and killings of quite a few ICU leaders, the ICU created a wing focused on defending their interests and striking back against their opponents among the TFG and the various warlords still operating throughout Somalia. One young Islamist militia leader, Aden Hashi Ayro, began clandestine recruitment, equipment, and training of a militia to "protect Islam and save the Somali nation from infidels." He gained the monniker "Party of Youth" or Hizb al-Shabaab in Arabic.

In early 2006, the CIA increased its funding and arming of Somali warlords and militias to combat the ICU. (Mazzetti 2006) However, similar to the widespread violence of 1991-1993, the infusion of capital gave the clan-based warlords increased capabilities to fight

each other as well as the ICU. The security situation amongst the various Somali factions spiraled out of control while the ICU's al-Shabaab steadily gained organization, weaponry, and power. (Embassy Nairobi 2006, Cable_ 06NAIROBI840_a) The tinderbox finally exploded in April and May as the Islamists seized more and more control over Mogadishu and its surrounding environs. By June 5, 2006, the entire city of Mogadishu was fully under the control of the ICU. The worst fear of the TFG, the AU, the Americans, and the UN had occurred - the ICU was now the de facto government of Somalia. (Williams 2019, 28)

ICU's ascendancy to power forced the United States to revamp its approach to Somalia quickly, and its new strategy was a complete reversal of its previous stance. Whereas the Americans previously opposed the intervention of frontline states in Somalia, the US's new position was to convince Ethiopia to launch an immediate military intervention into Somalia to destroy al-Shabaab and the ICU. Where their previous position seemed firmly rooted in the memory of their previous entanglement in Somalia in 1993, this new approach was entirely focused on the impact the ICU could have on supporting international terrorism.

Many were taken aback by the shift in the US stance. The UK, a fellow P-3 country, pushed back quite strongly at the new proposal for an Ethiopian intervention. UK's Secretary of State for International Development, Hillary Benn, was convinced that "involving frontline states in Somalia would be fatal." (Oloya 2016, 59) Uganda's President Museveni remained staunchly committed to IGASOM, confirming that a battalion of Ugandan soldiers was "ready and waiting." (Oloya 2016, 58) The EU

diplomats appeared to still support the IGASOM model of an African peace operation, while the US now favored direct military intervention by Somalia's direct neighbor to the west, Ethiopia.

Despite the opposing views, the US pushed forward with a draft Security Council resolution that was cleverly worded to seem to show support for IGASOM, while simultaneously and underhandedly authorizing the Ethiopian military intervention. (Embassy Addis Ababa 2006, Cable_ 06ADDISABABA2114_a) UNSCR 1725 appears to provide for the authorization of IGASOM in accordance with the IGAD Deployment Plan, which specifically excludes the use of frontline states. However, instead of just authorizing IGASOM, Paragraph 3 of the Resolution authorizes "IGAD and Member States of the African Union to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia," opening the door for Member States to act on their own. Additionally, Paragraph 1 of the Resolution included a clause affirming "creating the conditions for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Somalia." On the day UNSCR 1725 was unanimously approved by the Security Council, December 6, 2006, no foreign forces were as yet deployed to Somalia. In hindsight, it appears that the Americans may have craftily worded UNSCR 1725 to provide tacit authority for an Ethiopian military intervention. (S/RES/1725 2006)

Two weeks after the passing of UNSCR 1725, Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) surged across the Somali border, seizing the major city of Baidao before pushing swiftly to seize control of Mogadishu. (Embassy Addis Ababa 2006, Cable_ 06STATE202870_a) Supported closely by US intelligence and covert military, the Ethiopian tanks and armored vehicles quickly routed the ICU militia forces. (Rice and

Goldenberg 2007, 1) ICU's senior leadership fled the country, and the Ethiopians seized control over Mogadishu on December 28, 2006. By early January 2007, ENDF forces had captured the final ICU stronghold, Kismayo, creating the conditions for the TFG to enter Mogadishu and assume governance over Somalia. (US UN New York 2007)

As the TFG began the uphill climb to create a functioning government where one had not existed for almost two decades, the Ethiopian intervention was forced to transition from an attacking force to one focused on counterinsurgency. What remained of the ICU militias were increasing their organization and initiating an insurgency throughout Somalia, one in which the Ethiopians were loathe to become bogged down. In early January 2007, Ethiopian Prime Minister Zendawi informed US Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Fraser, that Ethiopia planned to withdraw its forces within two weeks time. Taken aback, the US scrambled to build a new mission to assume the ENDF's role in stabilizing Somalia so that the TFG could build its capacity. (Embassy Addis Ababa 2007, Cable_ 07ADDISABABA40_a)

With Uganda's continued commitment of supplying troops, the US went directly to the AU to build a coalition of countries willing and capable of quickly contributing troops. (US UN New York 2007) On January 19, 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council outlined its support of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) consisting of 9 infantry battalions (approximately 7,500 troops) to initially deploy for six months to support the TFG and create the conditions for long-term stability in Somalia. (AU 69th APSC Mtg 2007, 2) As the US and AU pressed various nations to contribute soldiers, the US had garnered support in Europe from the UK, Sweden and Norway, but the Italians

were staunchly opposed to the new mission - another 180-degree reversal similar to the American policy shift in 2006. The key issue at this point was funding, and pressure was placed on the EU to release the African Peace Facility funds earmarked for Somalia.

On February 20, 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously approved UNSCR 1744 authorizing the African Union's AMISOM peace enforcement mission. The meeting lasted ten minutes. (S_PV.5633 2007)


On the morning of March 6, 2007, an unmarked military cargo plane landed at Aden Abdulle International Airport in Mogadishu having made the flight from Entebbe International Airport in Uganda. (Embassy Nairobi 2007, Cable_ 07NAIROBI1127_a) Soldiers and equipment from the Ugandan contingent quickly disembarked the aircraft as the first troops on the ground from AMISOM. They likely stood on the tarmac in the same spot where 4,939 days prior, on August 27, 1993, US Army Rangers set foot in Somalia as part of TF Ranger.

Analysis of Causal Factors

In examining the crisis-specific factors that have changed between the 1992 UNITAF enforcement action and the 2007 AMISOM one, the one factor that is dynamically different is the main belligerent and their willingness to strike outside of Somalia. In 1992, while the security situation was dire, the violence was the result mostly of clashing clans of warlords using violence to gain wealth and power over their rivals. In 2007, the belligerent actor within the crosshairs of the intervening peace enforcement force had shifted from clan-based militias warring over local control to an Islamic jihadist insurgent group, al-Shabaab, that had shown a willingness to export terrorism to neighboring

countries in support of its goals. This factor, likely more than any other, has fueled the national security interest of the great powers, specifically the United States.

Figure 4-2: Explanatory Variable Assessment for Somalia 2007 - 2022




A decade after TF Ranger's failed assault on the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, the effects of that October 3rd battle would continue to resonate in the Security Council's decision-making process for a new peace enforcement action in Somalia. Since the withdrawal from Somalia, the P-3 had been very hesitant to participate in any large-scale peace enforcement action in Africa. (Hirsch 2011, 1) Additionally, in 2006 the United States, United Kingdom, and France were substantially engaged in varying capacities with large-scale military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. While Somalia was on the radar as part of the GWOT, there was no appetite for any of the P-3 leading a peace enforcement mission in the Horn of Africa.

With the great powers unwilling to intervene directly in Somalia, an alternative solution was available. ECOWAS, the regional arrangement for West Africa, had proven the viability of a regional arrangement collectively intervening in a civil war within its regional boundaries, with the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone. While the initial

ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in 1990 was fraught with difficulties, by the end of the decade the peacekeeping efforts in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were showing promise in bringing stability to both nations. (Arthur 2010) At the time of the US peace enforcement operation in Somalia in 1992-94, the Organization of African Unity (the precursor to the African Union) maintained no capabilities to conduct a military intervention, by 2003, the African Union (successor to the OAU) was intently focused on building the capabilities to conduct a collective military intervention as a top priority. (Parts 2018, 4-7) By 2006, under the umbrella of its African Peace and Security Architectures, the AU had already conducted peace operations in Burundi, Sudan, and the Comoros and was primed to undertake the expanded intervention in Somalia. (Williams 2018, 2) While it's clear that IGAD had a desire to intervene in Somalia, the AU was the regional arrangement favored by the P-3 and, subsequently, the UN Security Council for the new mission in Somalia. With this regional capability now existing, the P-3 could exercise their influence in establishing a new peace enforcement mission in Somalia without having to commit their own troops and reputation—hence the birth of AMISOM under the leadership of the African Union.

It is clear from the actions of the United States prior to the AMISOM mission that there remains great interest in Somalia on the part of the P-3. While they may not be willing to contribute large numbers of troops, they appear more than willing to continue to work behind the scenes by funding AMISOM and conducting clandestine counterterrorism operations in Somalia, often in direct coordination with AMISOM forces. Unlike in 1992, when the interest was primarily for humanitarian reasons, post-9/11 interests in Somalia

had clearly shifted to national security and the fear that Somalia would become a safe haven for international terrorists. Specifically, the goal in Somalia had shifted to "preventing the country from becoming a refuge for terrorist groups to plot attacks on the United States and destabilize the Horn of Africa." (Klobucista, Masters and Sergei 2022, 5)

While the initial peace enforcement operation in Somalia in 1992 was primarily to create the conditions to allow humanitarian operations, the importance of the humanitarian aspect of the AMISOM mission is secondary to the creation of the conditions to allow the return of the TFG to Mogadishu in hopes of stabilizing Somalia and preventing its continued use as a safe haven for Islamic terrorists. Unlike the 1992 intervention in which the United States wanted to quickly improve the security situation in the major cities and then turn everything over to the UN, the AU's intervention offered a longer-term approach to work closely with the TFG in rebuilding a functional Somali state that would improve stability in the region.

Table 4-2: Process Tracing of AMISOM 2007-2022

| Explanatory Variables | | Causal Mechanism | | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Somalia has been in a collapsed state of dysfunction for almost two decades | | P-3 has national security interest in Somalia, but no close colonial or economic ties; events of Oct 3, 1993 still fresh in everyone's minds | | |
| Ultra-conservative Islamist ICU gains control over much of the country, posing significant risks for neighboring countries | + | P-3 is not interested in leading a direct military intervention, as they are preoccupied in Afghanistan and Iraq. P-3 are supportive of a RA intervention, and willing to provide funding | = | **RA** |
| No major or regional powers support any of the warring factions. | | Newly-established TFG formally requests large-scale military intervention by the AU | | |
| Recent military intervention by Ethiopia significantly deteriorates al-Shabaab military capabilities | | AU has built a peace and security architecture focused on providing the capabilities to conduct peace operations | | |

Table 4-2 portrays the specific shift in conflict-specific variables that form the foundation for process tracing the causal mechanism leading to the outcome of Regional Arrangement. The explanatory variables of Somalia remaining in a state of collapse, along

with the rise of the ICU and the capability of its militant arm, al-Shabaab, to strike outside the borders of Somalia created significant national security interest for the P-3, especially in the midst of the Global War on Terror. While not willing to entertain direct leadership of a second peace enforcement operation in Somalia, the intervening variables of the P-3's national security interest combined with the AU's proven capability to deploy a robust military force caused the outcome of a Regional Arrangement-led peace enforcement operation.

The AMISOM operation in Somalia showcases a significant evolution in peace enforcement strategies, highlighting the dynamic interplay between regional actors, international interests, and the changing nature of threats. A shift from clan-based violence to the rise of jihadist groups like al-Shabaab underscored the necessity for a robust regional response, catalyzed by the AU's enhanced peace operation capabilities. The P-3's national security interests, influenced by global counterterrorism priorities, facilitated support for a regional arrangement-led intervention, reflecting a nuanced approach to peace enforcement that leverages regional capabilities while addressing international security concerns. This case exemplifies the growing reliance on regional bodies to manage local conflicts within a global security framework, marking a pivotal moment in the strategic orientation of peace enforcement operations.

# CHAPTER 5
# ARTEMIS TO FIB: HUNTING FOR SOLUTIONS IN THE DRC

The case studies on peace enforcement operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) present a unique opportunity to analyze the evolution of peace enforcement actor constellations within an enduring conflict in a single country. These operations, including the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), MONUC's transition to a peace enforcement mandate, and the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), illustrate the adaptability and challenges of peace enforcement mechanisms in addressing protracted violence and humanitarian crises. This analysis aims to elucidate the intricate dynamics involved, including the strategic decision-making processes of international actors, and examine the conditions that drove the specific actor constellations for each of the three peace enforcement operations.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo gained its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960. Officially named the Republic of the Congo-Leopoldville, within two weeks of its independence, the fledgling nation had ignited a crisis that the UN Security Council deemed to be a threat to international peace and security. In less than a year, on February 21, 1961, the Security Council authorized a peace enforcement action in response to this crisis. Since then, the nation has changed its name three times while also requiring three additional peace enforcement actions. The four peace enforcement actions in the DRC offer an excellent opportunity to study conflict in one specific country over multiple interventions spanning over fifty years.

The ONUC mission in 1961 offers insight into the early concepts of peace enforcement, however, from a case study perspective, it is the ten-year period from 2003-2013 that provides the most benefit for understanding causal mechanisms. Generally, the same armed conflict, albeit an extremely complex one in a very large country, we've witnessed three separate peace enforcement actions. Two of these missions were independent UN missions, although the UN's approach to the use of force was quite different in both cases. The third instance, in 2003, consisted of a Member State-led mission deployed adjacent to a UN peacekeeping mission. What caused the actor constellation in each of these cases to be different?

### 5.1 The 1st and 2nd Congo Wars and the Interim Emergency Multinational Force

After the end of the Congo crisis in 1964, Mobutu seized power for a second time and ruled Congo with an iron fist from 1965 until his ouster in 1996. As former Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart said of Mobutu, "during his time in office he managed to destroy the third largest – and potentially the richest – country in Africa." (Urquhart) Major armed conflict has raged in parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in one form or another, since 1996. The First Congo War (1996-97) witnessed a band of neighboring states coalesce to overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko (as Josef Desire Mobutu was now known). Laurent-Desire Kabila succeeded Mobutu with the help of Uganda and Rwanda, and when his foreign allies turned against him shortly after seizing power, the Second Congo War was triggered in 1998, temporarily splitting the DRC into at least four parts and raging

until 2003. These conflicts claimed the lives of an estimated 5.4 million people, more than any other conflict since World War II. (Stearns 2021, 4)

The seed for both wars in the DRC was the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In the aftermath of the slaughter of more than 800,000 Tutsis, more than two million Hutus, many of them genocidaires, fled west into eastern DRC where they were initially welcomed by Mobutu. The newly installed Tutsi-led government in Rwanda, aided by Uganda, launched a military campaign into the eastern DRC to bring to justice the perpetrators of the genocide. Pushing westward and allying with Congolese opposition leader Laurent Kabila, the Rwandan/Ugandan forces successfully defeated Mobutu's government forces and installed Kabila as the President of DRC. Fearful that his new allies may annex the mineral-rich eastern provinces of his country, Kabila expelled the Rwandan and Ugandan forces and enlisted the military support of Angola and Zimbabwe. (Stearns 2021, 32) This sparked what is often referred to as Africa's World War, with nine countries fighting each other on Congolese soil. Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. This paved the way for a lengthy peace process that would at least reduce the international aspects of the conflict.

The first response of the United Nations to the looming crisis in eastern Zaire[10] in 1996 was to quickly deploy a robust peace operation with Chapter VII enforcement authority to "use all necessary means" to allow for the reestablishment of the humanitarian effort in the face of widespread violence in the Kivu provinces of eastern Zaire. (S_PV.3713 1996) On November 15, 1996, the Security Council unanimously approved UNSCR 1080

[10] Laurent Kabila changed Zaire's name back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in May 1997

authorizing a Canadian-led multinational force mission that would deploy almost immediately to the affected area. (S/RES/1080 1996) The US and France had each committed troops, and while the Organization of African Unity (OAU - the precursor organization to the AU) was somewhat skeptical of another Western-led military intervention into Africa, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa agreed to provide troops and or support. Named Operation Assurance, the US was to provide the Deputy Force Commander under Canadian General Maurice Beril, and the first troops were set to be on the ground within a week. (Massey 1998, 7-8) However, as the deployment moved forward, the situation on the ground changed the need for humanitarian intervention. The day after the passing of UNSCR 1080, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), under the command of Laurent Kabila, attacked the Hutu Interahamwe and ex-FAR (Armed Forces of Rwanda) militias wreaking havoc in the Kivu refugee camps. (UN Human Rights 2010, 92-97) The immediate effect was to create a bubble of safety for several hundred thousand refugees to return to their communities in Rwanda or elsewhere, thereby alleviating the critical humanitarian crisis that had developed. The Member States committed to Operation Assurance, already gun shy of another intervention in Africa, shelved their deployment. (Massey 1998, 9)

Without this military intervention, the way was paved for Rwanda and Uganda to become directly involved in supporting Laurent Kabila's push to overthrow Mobutu and make the Zaire (DRC) government friendly towards their Tutsi-controlled neighbors to the east. This First Congo War was immediately followed by the much more devastating Second Congo War beginning in August 1998 "when Rwanda, Uganda and a series of

Congolese army units took control of large segments of Eastern DRC." (Weiss 2000, 1) The myriad factions involved in this second conflict, mainly divided along ethnic lines, wreaked widespread havoc throughout the eastern provinces, creating a wake of enormous humanitarian atrocities and devastation. (Ngolet 2011, 39-60)

| **Box 5-1** | **Key Events – DRC 2003** |
|---|---|
| **1964** | |
| 24 Nov | Mobutu becomes President of the DRC; a position he would hold for the next 33 years |
| **1994** | |
| 6 Apr | Rwandan President Habyarimana killed in plane crash, 100 days of Rwandan genocide begins |
| 4 Jul | RPF forces take control of Rwanda, ending genocide. 2 million Hutus flee to eastern Zaire |
| **1996** | |
| 18 Oct | Kabila officially forms AFDL to overthrow Mobutu; begins attacks against Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire |
| 20 Oct | AFDL joined in attacks by Rwanda and (APR) and Burundi forces (FAB); additional allies include Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe. This is considered the start of the First Congo War |
| 8 Nov | UNSCR 1078 declares eastern Zaire threat to international peace and security |
| 15 Nov | UNSCR 1080 approves a peace enforcement mission that never deploys (Operation Assurance) |
| **1997** | |
| 17 May | Kabila assumes the Presidency of DRC after overthrowing Mobutu, ending the First Congo War |
| **1998** | |
| 2 Aug | Second Congo War begins when Rwandan and Ugandan forces invade eastern DRC in response to Kabila ordering them out of the country |
| **1999** | |
| 9 Apr | UNSCR 1234 demands end to hostilities and implementation of a ceasefire |
| 10 Jul | Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed by the six warring nations ends the Second Congo War |
| 6 Aug | UNSCR 1258 authorizes 90 mil observers |
| 5 Nov | UNSCR 1273 extends observer mission |
| 30 Nov | UNSCR 1279 creates MONUC to observe ceasefire |
| **2000** | |
| 24 Feb | UNSCR 1291 extends and expands MONUC to 5537 military (500 mil obs) |
| **2002** | |
| 6 Sep | DRC and Uganda sign Luanda Agreement for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from eastern DRC |
| 4 Dec | UNSCR 1445 reiterates MONUCS PK mandate, concern over ethnic violence in Ituri |
| **2003** | |
| 6 May | Last Ugandan troops withdraw from Ituri province |
| 7 May | Hema UPC and Lendu militias fight to control Bunia; widespread atrocities; thousands mass at Bunia airport seeking MONUC protection |
| 15 May | 2 MONUC soldiers killed in Ituri |
| 30 May | UNSCR 1484 authorizes deployment of IEMF with PE authority to reinforce Bunia until 9/1/03 |
| 5 Jun | EU approves military deployment to DRC (Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP) |
| 12 Jun | Operation Artemis commences |
| 28 Jul | UNSCR 1493 expands MONUC mandate to include Chapter VII using all necessary means to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided (Ituri and where possible Kivus) |

Fast-forwarding to July 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the DRC and five regional nations: Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In response, the Security Council approved UNSCR 1279 authorizing the establishment of

the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) on November 30, 1999. MONUC's mandate was strictly as a peacekeeping force tasked with monitoring and observing the ceasefire and disengagement of the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement. Over the next six years, the Security Council would extend and modify MONUC's peacekeeping mission to include supervising and implementing various ceasefire agreement tasks. In June 2001, while maintaining the same military strength, a civilian police component was added while the military peacekeepers were given additional responsibilities to assist with the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRR) of armed groups. (S/RES/1355 2001, ¶29-32) Throughout 2001 and 2002, UNSC Resolutions 1376 and 1445 continued to expand MONUC's responsibilities and areas of focus by adding more civilian capacity building and oversight components, addressing gender-based violence and protection of children as well as broadening DDRR to DDRRR by adding repatriation to the list of tasks under MONUC's supervision. (S/RES/1376 2001, ¶12) and S/RES/1445 2002, ¶12) Throughout this period, MONUC remained strictly a peacekeeping force focused on implementing the Lusaka Agreement and not a peace enforcement mission.

One of the extreme difficulties in resolving the conflict and administering the ceasefire throughout eastern DRC was the existence of dozens of sub-conflicts brewing in the various provinces, cities, and villages. Many of these small conflicts were based on ethnic divisions, some going back generations, while others were caused by the more recent conflicts and mass migration of various ethnic groups. MONUC, with just over 6,000 personnel, was spread thinly across four sectors covering a nation roughly the size of

Western Europe. With a virtually non-existent transportation network throughout the country, MONUC's capabilities were restricted to bases in several major cities with the ability to respond to situations after they had happened.

One such sub-conflict erupted at the end of the Second Congo War and involved the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups in the recently created province of Ituri. The Hema were traditionally pastoralists, while the Lendu tended towards agriculturalism, similar in some ways to generalizations of Tutsis and Hutus. Like many of the ethnic tensions in the region, the origins of the conflict can be traced back to colonial times and, more recently, the 1973 law that allowed individuals to purchase land they did not occupy and evict the occupants after two years if not contested. The long-standing grievances between the two ethnic groups had erupted in violence on several occasions since the passage of the 1973 law. With the instability created by mass refugees as a result of the Second Congo War, combined with the abundance of easily accessible weapons, the Hema-Lendu powderkeg erupted again in 1999 as formal hostilities of the war ended, and Uganda withdrew more than 7,000 troops from the region. Confined to the Ituri district, in which MONUC had only a handful of military observers, the ethnic violence raged, with more than 50,000 killed and 500,000 displaced between 1999 and 2003. (BBC 2003)

In May 2003, amidst the wildfire of extreme Hema-Lendu violence, two military observers were savagely killed just north of Bunia in the Ituri district. (MONUC 2003) MONUC responded by dispatching 800 Uruguayan troops to the airport in Bunia. These MONUC reinforcements acted as a magnet for all of the displaced people in the area, with hundreds of thousands of people flocking to the airport and setting up in makeshift

camps. This concentration of at-risk people became targets and victims of the various ethnic militias roaming the area, and the situation became dire. (Homan 2007, 151-152) As a peacekeeping force and with neither the mandate nor capabilities to coerce or deter the circling armed militias, the MONUC forces proved wholly inadequate to stem the violence, and were at significant risk of being overrun by the more than 2,000 UPC rebels massing in Bunia. (Manseau 2008 42-43)

With the UN in desperate need of assistance to resolve the humanitarian situation evolving around Bunia airport in May 2013, France was open to leading an intervention effort. Secretary-General Kofi met with French President Jacques Chirac on May 10-11, at which time President Chirac indicated French willingness to lead a short-term mission in Bunia. There was some concern on the part of French planners that Uganda and Rwanda would view the French-led intervention as other-than impartial given France's colonial legacy and history of involvement in the region. (Ulriksen et al 2004, 511) As a consequence, France insisted that "(a) it was granted a UN Chapter VII mandate, (b) countries in the region involved in the fighting (DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) officially supported its intervention, and (c) the operation was limited in time and scope." (Homan 2007, 152)

On May 30, 2003, the Security Council authorized an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) with the unanimous passing of UNSCR 1484 on May 30, 2003. (S/RES/1484 2003, ¶1)

The IEMF was initially planned as a French-led force, and by the time UNSCR 1484 was approved, Operation Mamba, as the French were calling it, was already well into the

planning stages for deployment. However, President Chirac of France realized that this mission provided an opportunity to prove that the EU had the capability to operate autonomously from NATO under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) framework. (Homan 2007, 152-153) On June 12, the Council of the European Union approved the decision to launch its first fully autonomous crisis management operation outside Europe (European Council 2003). Retitled Operation Artemis, the now EU-led mission was comprised 90% of the original French force as well as smaller contingents from other European nations to include, among others, special operations units from the UK and Sweden as well as a Belgian medical team. The operational headquarters for the mission was established in Paris and included 80 military officers drawn from all European countries, while the force headquarters based itself in Entebbe, Uganda, to support the deployment into Ituri. (Homan 2007, 153-155)

The first French troops landed in Bunia in early June. They immediately clashed with both Lendu militia and the much stronger forces of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)—a Hema group—throughout June and early July. Declaring a 10-kilometer "weapons-invisible" zone encircling Bunia, there was no doubt of the Artemis troops' capability and willingness to employ coercive force.


The Europeans had set a time limit to withdraw their forces in September 2003, and the UN worked diligently to beef up MONUC with additional troops that could relieve the Artemis forces in and around Bunia. On July 28, 2003, the Security approved UNSCR 1493 to grant Chapter VII authority to MONUC and expand its mandate regarding contributing "to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian

assistance is provided" and authorized "MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems it within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu." (S/RES/1493 2003, ¶26) At this point, however, there was never an intention for MONUC to use coercive force strategically, and MONUC was still categorized as a robust peacekeeping mission rather than a peace enforcement action.

Analysis of Causal Factors

The deployment of the IEMF peace enforcement operation in June 2003 was a direct result of the conflict-specific factors of the Hema-Lendu War in Ituri province and the international community's desire to provide a short-term, narrowly-focused victory in the morass of the enduring cycle of violence that had plagued DRC for years. The process tracing of the conflict-specific factors and the decision-making process for the EU intervention amidst an ongoing UN-led peacekeeping mission show how these explanatory variables contribute to the causal mechanisms leading to a Member State-led actor constellation for this peace enforcement operation (see Figure 5-1 and Table 5-1).

Figure 5-1: Explanatory Variable Assessment for DRC 2003



The two Congo Wars had decimated the already fragile stability of the DRC, but by 2003, the direct foreign interventions in the conflict of DRC's neighbors had mostly been resolved with the Lusaka and Luanda Agreements. With less than 5,000 troops to monitor these agreements throughout the entire DRC, MONUC's deployment of 850 soldiers to Bunia to replenish the 8,000 Ugandan troops that had previously occupied the area had little chance of stemming the violence. Not only were the Uruguayan's undermanned, but they were also ill-equipped and trained to deal with the concentrated outbreak of ethnic violence. According to Lieutenant Colonel Waldemar Fontes, the executive officer of the Uruguayan battalion stated that his troops were not prepared for handling the conflict in Bunia "because they came to Congo expecting to be on guard duty" and if they had known in advance they'd be sent on a peace enforcement operation they "would have brought more offensive weapons, maybe grenades, rocket launchers, sniper guns – weapons more suited to launch offensive operations." (Block 2003, 1-2) The UN, however, felt that MONUC was up to the task of replacing the withdrawing Ugandan forces and maintaining peace in Ituri province. According to Colonel Fortes,

> "People inside the U.N. thought that the presence of U.N. troops would fix everything, as if it were some kind of magic solution to the problems here. But the Ugandan general in charge explained to us that when his troops left, somebody needed to replace them on the spot otherwise there would be a dangerous power vacuum. Of course, the Ugandan battalion had 8,000 men, and the Uruguayan Battalion, at its maximum capacity, had around 1,000." (Block 2003, 3)

Evidence shows that MONUC and the Security Council were caught off guard by the rapid Ugandan withdrawal, a "reluctant withdrawal" that appears to have been intended to create chaos as a perceived "reprisal for United Nations harassment," at least according to one senior Ugandan official. (Amnesty International 2003, 7)

The immediate requirement for the deployment of a robust military force capable of deterring, and defeating if necessary, the Hema and Lendu militias surrounding Bunia was outside the capabilities of the United Nations. Even if MONUC were to have its mandate changed to Chapter VII in May 2003, only the P-3 had the political commitment, military capability, and logistics capacity to undertake and sustain such an immediate deployment. Relations amongst the P-3 at that time were at a nadir, with France having opposed the US-led intervention in Iraq after having threatened to veto any Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. (Cogan 2004, 121)

On March 19, 2003, the United States and a coalition of thirty-six countries invaded Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. (Bush 2003) The US and UK were the largest contributors to the Iraq campaign, while the French elected not to participate. (Gordon 2003, 1-7) This factor cannot be stressed enough when assessing the interest of the P-3 and the potential shifting in the unipolar international system. On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared an overwhelming victory for the coalition led by the US and the UK, while France received no credit. (Bush 2003) US-France relations had taken a major blow over France's decision not to support the US in Iraq, and US and French diplomats were vying to re-establish working relations as leaders in the international community. On May 22, France supported, and the Security Council unanimously approved, the US and

UK-sponsored Resolution 1483 regarding lifting sanctions on Iraq, and one week later the US and UK supported the Security Council's unanimous vote on Resolution 1483, the authorization of the French-led IMEF.

Table 5-1: Process Tracing of DRC 2003

| Explanatory Variables | | Causal Mechanism | | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnic conflict between Hema and Lendu militias causes acute humanitarian situation in a specific province (Ituri) and focused on major provincial city (Bunia)<br>Crisis exceeds the capacity of the UN-force (MONUC) which is overstretched and overwhelmed<br>Neighboring countries (Uganda/Rwanda) have previously supported the rival militias but now show willingness to withdraw support<br>Belligerent capabilities are relatively low – more a danger to civilians and security-oriented peacekeepers than to a robust military force | + | Acute humanitarian crisis gains visibility in Europe and the massing of civilians at Bunia airport places UN force in precarious situation<br><br>US and UK fully engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. US and France relations at a nadir after French unwillingness to support Iraq intervention<br>France is willing to intervene militarily provided mission is short term and both Uganda and Rwanda agree to support intervention<br><br>The potential for a French intervention to be seen as rooted in colonial interests guides the EU to assume ownership of the peace enforcement mission<br><br>Disarming militia groups and establishing a weapons-free zone by the robust EU force sets the conditions for MONUC's peacekeeping mission to be more successful | = | **MS \|\| [UN]** |

As for crisis-specific factors, the IEMF mission to Bunia was an offshoot of the main internal civil war, mostly fought in the Kivu provinces to the south of Ituri. In Bunia, the Hema-Lendu War was the source of the conflict, which had different belligerent actors than the numerous armed groups operating farther south in the eastern DRC. Using a European force had three advantages over the original plan to reinforce the existing UN peacekeeping force. First, the UN peacekeeping force was not mandated or capable of conducting a peace enforcement mission requiring the coercive use of strategic force. The MONUC unit already deployed to Bunia was completely overwhelmed, and it was likely that adding more peacekeeping troops would not solve the problem. Second, the French forces were not only capable, but they were ready—able to be on the ground in mere days. Third, there were significant indicators that the belligerent actors around Bunia were

equipped, trained, and possibly led directly by both Rwanda and Uganda. Deploying a European-led force of 1850 soldiers completely changed the power dynamics in the area surrounding Bunia, and within weeks, the EU force had engaged with and deterred several of the belligerent groups.

The deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003 is an informative case in the evolution of peace enforcement operations. This intervention, precipitated by the acute humanitarian crisis in Ituri province, underscored the complex interplay of local ethnic conflict, the limitations of UN peacekeeping capabilities, and the strategic interests of international actors. The IEMF's deployment illustrates the critical role of a Member State initiative, in this case led by France and subsequently by the European Union, in responding to situations where the UN is unable to act effectively due to mandate constraints or logistical challenges. This case study highlights the importance of flexible, rapid-response capabilities in peace enforcement, as well as the necessity of securing regional and international legitimacy for interventions. The IEMF operation in the DRC represents a pivotal moment where the international community's willingness to engage in robust peace enforcement intersected with the practical challenges of executing such missions, offering valuable lessons for future peace operations.

### 5.2 MONUC's Period of Peace Enforcement

The MONUC mission continued across the DRC through 2004, with sporadic violence, ethnic tensions, and government corruption and dysfunction as the norm.

Despite having its mandate modified to include Chapter VII authority, the mission remained a peacekeeping effort without the intended strategic use of coercive force until the events of late February 2005.

| Box 5-2 | Key Events – DRC 2005 |
|---|---|
| **2003** | |
| 28 Jul | UNSCR 1493 expands MONUC mandate to include Chapter VII using all necessary means to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided |
| **2004** | |
| 1 Oct | UNSCR 1565 Further expands MONUC mandate and increases strength to 5900 (see tasks outlined in SG report 9/3/04) |
| **2005** | |
| 1 Mar | MONUC forces use attack helicopters in strategic raid against FNI militia |
| 2 Mar | President of Security Council condones Mar 1 PE action |
| 30 Mar | UNSCR 1592 officially expands MONUC to include Peace Enforcement mandate |
| 28 Oct | UNSCR 1635 extends MONUC to 9/30/06 and adds 300 troops to 6,200 |
| **2006** | |
| 25 Apr | UNSCR 1671 authorizes Eufor R.D.Congo to support MONUC through election cycle. Despite having robust capabilities the mission did not have a mandate for the strategic use of coercive force |
| **2007** | |
| 21 Dec | UNSCR 1794 extends MONUC to 12/31/08, and encourages MONUC to use all necessary means to support FARDC brigades disarm recalcitrant foreign and Congolese armed groups; however MONUC never planned to strategically use coercive force |

On February 25, 2005, the *Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes* in Ituri (FNI) attacked a MONUC patrol near the town of Kafe, approximately 85 kilometers northeast of Bunia in Ituri. Nine Bangladeshi soldiers wearing the blue helmets of UN peacekeepers were killed in the ambush. On March 2, the President of the UN Security Council issued a strongly worded statement condemning the attack and urging "MONUC to continue to strengthen its action in Ituri and in North and South Kivu." (S/PRST/2005/10*) While the Security Council would not officially expand the mandate of MONUC to become a peace enforcement mission until March 30 with the passing of UNSCR 1592 (S/RES/1592 2005), MONUC de facto became a peace enforcement mission with the Secretary-General's tacit approval of its response to the February 25 killings.

On March 1, 2005, MONUC conducted a strategic raid using Indian attack helicopters to support a ground assault by Pakistani, South African, and Nepalese soldiers upon the FNI headquarters in Loga, northeast of Bunia. The combat operation resulted in the death of more than 50 FNI fighters. UNSC Resolution 1592 left no doubt that MONUC was now officially a peace enforcement mission with the mandate to use coercive force to achieve its strategic objectives:

> Emphasizing that MONUC is authorized to use all necessary means, within its capabilities and in the areas where its armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of force to threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, from any armed group, foreign or Congolese, in particular the ex-FAR and Interahamwé, encourages MONUC in this regard to continue to make full use of its mandate under resolution 1565 in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and stresses that, in accordance with its mandate, MONUC may use cordon and search tactics to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the military capability of illegal armed groups that continue to use violence in those areas.


Over the course of the next six months, MONUC would clash repeatedly with various militias in both Ituri and the Kivus while conducting numerous cordon-and-search and area domination missions. (S/2005/603) By the end of 2005, MONUC had reverted mostly back to its role as robust peacekeepers while attempting to encourage Armed Forced of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) to take the lead in deterring the violence and apprehending the various gang and militia leaders. The next several years would see the Kinshasa-based government of Joseph Kabila significantly neglect the continued ethnic

and political violence in the eastern provinces, and MONUC would continue to attempt to manage the peace process as a UN peacekeeping force. By December 2008, MONUC had grown from 6,000 troops to an authorized strength of over 20,000 troops (S/RES/1856 2008). However, they ceased being a peace enforcement operation by the end of 2005 and reverted to complex peacekeeping.

Analysis of Causal Factors

MONUC's evolution from complex peacekeeping to a peace enforcement operation was a direct result of changes to the conflict-specific explanatory variable of belligerent objectives. This change is most evident in the transformation of militia groups into spoilers to the peace process for personal gain, and their targeting of UN forces in order to increase the status and wealth of militia leaders.

Figure 5-2: Explanatory Variable Assessment for DRC 2005




In July 2004, the Secretary-General issued a letter to the Security Council containing a report that "competition for control of resource-rich centres" has been a significant factor in prolonging and exacerbating the conflict in eastern DRC. (S/2004/573, 8) A detailed examination of the specific spoilers at the time, and specifically the FNI who ambushed

and killed the nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers, shows they were predominantly motivated by economic reasons to seek alliances, conduct attacks and participate in the peace process. (Fuamba, Yonekawa and Seegers 2013, 319-334; Tamm 2013, 31-33)

The isolated spoiler actions within the conflict changed the dynamic of the UN mission but did not create a significant humanitarian crisis above, which was already experienced in the drawn-out conflict. While these acts against the UN were substantial enough to warrant a change in mandate to peace enforcement, they did not add immediacy to protect civilians nor did they want a focus on stabilizing territory. Consequently, the existing UN force structure, previously enhanced in the aftermath of the IEMF peace enforcement operation in 2003, was deemed capable of completing this narrow peace enforcement operation in 2005.

Table 5-2: Process Tracing of DRC 2005

| Explanatory Variables | | Causal Mechanism | | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ituri militia group (FNI) ambushes MONUC peacekeepers, killing 12<br>FNI has been a participant in peace process, but various factions split off and proceed for personal gain<br>MONUC had previously increased the robustness of its forces in the aftermath of the IEMF intervention in 2003<br>Belligerent capabilities remain relatively low | + | P-3 interest is not impacted directly by death of UN peacekeepers<br>Militia group focusing on MONUC does not create an acute humanitarian crisis<br><br>MONUC forces have additional firepower, including attack helicopters | = | **UN** |

The case study of the UN peacekeeping mission's expanded mandate to include peace enforcement in the DRC in 2005 reveals the complexities of transitioning from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. This shift was driven by the evolving conflict dynamics, particularly the actions of belligerents that targeted UN forces and disrupted the peace process for economic gains. The strategic use of coercive force by MONUC, sanctioned by the UN Security Council, marked a significant change in the mission's

approach, emphasizing the need for robust responses to protect civilians and deter aggression. This case underscores the importance of adaptable mandates and the challenges of enforcing peace in contexts of economic exploitation and fragmented belligerent objectives.

### 5.3 Fighting Fire with Fire - The Force Intervention Brigade

The fourth and most recent peace enforcement action in the DRC marks a significant shift from actions undertaken willingly by coalitions of willing Member States or regional arrangements or the more recent situation where the UN has reluctantly expanded a mission's peacekeeping mandate to include peace enforcement to respond to a temporary change in the conflict (such as the case of MONUC in 2005). For the first time in 65 years of peace operations, the UN introduced the concept of the Force Intervention Brigade - a UN-led force with the sole focus of conducting combat operations directed against specific parties to the conflict for the purpose of bringing the conflict to conclusion.

On November 15, 2012, an estimated 3,000 fighters of the M23 rebel group launched a multi-prong coordinated attack to seize control of Goma, the largest city in eastern DRC. (Jones and Smith 2012) While M23 was just one of dozens of rebel groups and ethnic militias that had been instigating widespread violence throughout the provinces of eastern DRC for years, this latest attack was on an entirely new level. Using coordinated indirect fires from heavy artillery, the M23 fighters wore night vision and followed a detailed attack plan to quickly gain control of the city over the next few days.

Within the city, the government FARDC did not put up any resistance to the attack. Instead, the FARDC embarked on a campaign of rape and human rights abuse during their rapid withdrawal from the city. (Prakash 2022, 109) Approximately 1,500 blue-helmeted MONUSCO peacekeepers in Goma made some attempts to thwart the M23 attack but were unsuccessful in protecting the city. (Jones and Smith 2012) MONUSCO was widely criticized for its inability to protect the civilian population in and around Goma from both the M23 militia and the FARDC government forces. (Dixon 2012) More importantly, the failure to protect Goma created overwhelming resentment on the part of "the Congolese people towards the twelve-year-old, 20,000-strong UN mission" and led to violent demonstrations against MONUSCO in the wake of M23's seizure of Goma. (Boutellis 2012, 2)

| **Box 5-3** | **Key Events – DRC 2013-** |
|---|---|
| **2010** | |
| 5/28/10 | Extends MONUC to 6/30/10, changes name to MONUSCO and authorizes until 6/30/11 |
| 6/28/11 | Extends MONUSCO to 6/30/12 |
| **2012** | |
| 8 Oct | 4th IGGLR Summit approves concept of a Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) |
| 20 Nov | 3,000 M23 fighters seize control of Goma in eastern DRC |
| 20 Nov | UNSCR 2078 specifically condemns and targets M23 among other rebel spoiler groups |
| 24 Nov | 5th IGGLR also condemns M23 and recognizes commitment of South Africa and Tanzania for NIF |
| **2013** | |
| 24 Feb | APSC agrees on framework which identifies "window of opportunity" for a military intervention force |
| 28 Mar | UNSCR 2098 creates the Force Intervention Brigade, a peace enforcement operation in coordination with MONUSCO |
| 14 Aug | FIB operational in DRC with troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi |
| 28 Aug | FIB initiates combat operations against M23 rebels in eastern DRC |
| 5 Nov | M23 declares its armed rebellion over |

At UN headquarters, as well as in the halls of power throughout Africa, Europe and North America, this latest attack raised the level of how best to bring the never-ending conflict and humanitarian crisis in the DRC to a conclusion. Everyone was aware that the situation had been rapidly escalating, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen (if that

was even possible after sixteen years of conflict), and the $1.5 billion yearly cost of MONUSCO did not appear to be making any difference. The old adage of the definition of insanity as doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results seemed quite appropriate to the UN's approach to resolving the crisis in the DRC. Herve Ladsous, the head of the UN's Department of Peace Operations, emphasized that "it is not the mandate of MONUSCO to directly hit the armed groups … they have to be in support of the armed forces of Congo (FARDC)" and that the FARDC withdrawal created a situation where the MONUSCO forces had not authorization to act unilaterally. (Boutellis 2012, 2) While not necessarily accurate under UNSCR 1493's mandate, comments like these were a clear indication that the UN staff understood that change was necessary. The P-3's assessment of the situation is best summed up by French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius's comment that it was "absurd" that MONUSCO forces had allowed the rebels to waltz passed them, and urged an immediate review of the peacekeeping mission's mandate. (Plett 2012)

Just a month prior to the M23's seizure of Goma, the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) had held their 4th Extraordinary Summit in Kampala, Uganda to discuss new approaches to resolving the ongoing crisis in the DRC. (ICGLR 2012a) This was not a meeting of policy experts or bureaucrats, but instead brought together the eleven heads of state of the countries of central and east Africa. One new approach decided upon and approved by these heads of state included the concept of a Neutral Intervention Force.

Mandate the Chairman of the ICGLR to make the necessary consultations with

> Heads of State and Governments from the ICGLR, SADC and other African countries to mobilize contributions of the required 4,000 troops for the Neutral Intervention Force, the rest of the international community in order to obtain the mandate of the AU and the UN as well as raise enough logistical and financial resources. (ICGLR 2012b)

Not only did every head of state approve this document with their signature, but every one of the eleven Presidents initialed this specific paragraph. This concept of a neutral intervention force was not a new one in the concept of peace operations. Going back to the 1992 Agenda For Peace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had called for the establishment of "peace enforcement units" consisting of trained troops pledged by Member States and ready to deploy quickly with Security Council authorization to respond to breaches and threats to international peace and security. (UN A/47/277-S/24111 1992)

The response to the M23 attacks from 15-19 November caused a tremendous uproar across central Africa and through the halls of the United Nations. On November 20, the Security Council unanimously approved UNSCR 2078, condemning M23 and calling for an immediate response to stop the continued violence. (S/RES/2078 2012) Likewise, on November 24th, the 5th Summit of the Heads of State of the ICGLR issued a similar condemnation of M23 while also recognizing the offer of troops from South Africa and Tanzania for the Neutral Intervention Force. (ICGLR 2012b)

Another report relevant to the situation was issued during this tense period, on October 12 - four days after the ICGLR had issued their declaration regarding the need for a Neutral Intervention Force. The Group of Experts established by UNSCR 1533 (2004)

issued their final report regarding monitoring the arms embargo placed on DRC forbidding the introduction of weapons and munitions into the conflict. (S/2012/843) The group was tasked by the Security Council with finding out who, if any, were the external actors supporting the various rebel groups wreaking havoc throughout the eastern DRC. Two particular conclusions are extremely relevant to the M23 attacks that would happen just over 30 days after the report was submitted to the Security Council:

> The Government of Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice. The de facto chain of command of M23 includes Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and culminates with the Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe. (S/2012/843, 3)

And:

> Senior officials of the Government of Uganda have also provided support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcements in Congolese territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice, and facilitation of external relations. (S/2012/843, 3)

Based on these reports of the Group of Experts, both Rwanda and Uganda actively supported the same rebel group that they were advocating to deploy a military force to defeat.

The concept of the Neutral Intervention Force proved infeasible, as proposed by the ICGLR. The group did not have experience managing military operations, nor did they have the funding or logistics capability to support such an operation. Additionally, several members of the ICGLR were active participants in the Second Congo War, and if the UN's

Panel of Experts was to be believed, at least two of the members, Rwanda and Uganda, continued to actively support and direct rebel groups inside the eastern DRC. While the Security Council, especially the P-3, were not fans of the ICGLR plan, they did believe the general concept had merit. The fact that Tanzania and the SADC countries had agreed to commit troops was enhanced by the new *Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region*, signed at the AU on February 24, 2013, which identified a "window of opportunity" recognized the need for new concepts to address the perpetual cycle of violence and humanitarian crisis. (Peace and Security Council 2013) There appeared to be a political consensus among the African states for an intervention peace enforcement force, and all that was needed was to bring it under UN leadership rather than that of the ICGLR.

On March 28, 2013, the Security Council passed UNSCR 2098, which created an Intervention Brigade within the authorized troop limits of MONUSCO. Specifically, with this resolution, the Security Council decided that:

> MONUSCO shall, for an initial period of one year and within the authorized troop ceiling of 19,815, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, include an "Intervention Brigade" consisting inter alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma, under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups as set out in paragraph 12 (b) below and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities. (S/RES/2098 2013, ¶9)


Additionally, the Intervention Brigade was to "carry out targeted offensive operations" to "prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority." (S/RES/2098 2013, ¶ 12b)

Despite its authorization in March, the FIB did not fully deploy and become operational until August 2013. (MONUSCO 2013) On August 28, South African, Tanzanian, and Malawi forces of the FIB initiated combat operations against the M23 rebels in and around the eastern city of Goma. (Oliver 2013, 1) On November 5, the M23 rebel group agreed to lay down its weapons and end its armed rebellion. (Vogel 2013)

Analysis of Causal Factors

In 2005, the Security Council added an enforcement mandate to the UN peacekeeping mission of MONUSCO. For less than a year, MONUSCO engaged directly with various rebel groups that were spoilers to the peace process. As the violence decreased, the MONUSCO informally reverted back to its peacekeeping mandate. In 2012, with another spike in the violence and direct attacks on UN peacekeepers, the Security Council authorized the Force Intervention Brigade, an entirely new concept in peace enforcement.

Figure 5-3: Explanatory Variable Assessment for DRC 2013-



Other than the UN command structure, the fundamentals of the FIB deployment were quite similar to previous evolutions in a mission's actor constellation in which Member States directly provided this increased enforcement capability under a separate parallel command structure (for example, the IEMF in the DRC in 2003 or NATO in Bosnia in 1992). So what explanatory factors caused this new evolution?

In examining the process for deciding to use the FIB, there appeared to be very little change in the explanatory variables as compared to the previous iterations of peace enforcement operations in the DRC. The conflict was now in its fifteenth year with little progress, and the belligerent capabilities had only increased slightly. The massing of these capabilities by M23 to seize Goma was somewhat reminiscent of the increased violence seen in Bunia in 2003, but the difference in November 2012 was that militia forces had actually captured an important city, to the embarrassment of MONUSCO and FARDC. It is perhaps these slight changes in the explanatory variable over such a long period of time that is most impactful on the intervening variables: something needed to change if there was an expectation of obtaining better results.

While the intervening variables also changed little in regard to previous peace enforcement in the DRC, the time and belligerent capabilities factors are definitely impactful on the intervening variables. In 2003, low-capable belligerents created an acute humanitarian crisis that resulted in rapid deployment of a Member State-led intervention force to quickly stabilize the situation. In 2007, low-capable belligerents directly attacked the UN peacekeeping force, and while not creating an acute humanitarian crisis, the situation warranted the strategic use of coercive force to re-establish the authority and

capabilities of MONUSCO against these spoilers. In 2012, five years after the second peace enforcement operation in the last decade, the belligerent capability had risen to medium, and an acute humanitarian crisis had been created. Yet, none of the P-3 were interested in spearheading a second parallel enforcement mission beside MONUSCO in the DRC.

At the same time, the regional community around the DRC was keenly interested in providing a solution. The ICGLR had conceptually developed a viable solution in the form of the neutral intervention force, and the SADC countries of South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi had each committed at least an infantry battalion for this new entity. However, the appropriateness of a SADC-led intervention was questionable given the history of the previous Congo Wars, and neither the ICGLR nor SADC had the financial coffers to offer any support for such an operation. The AU, while supportive of the framework agreement in DRC, was stretched thin, leading ongoing peace operations in Somalia, Darfur, and Mali. Given the existing logistics footprint of the 17,000-strong MONUSCO throughout the DRC, as well as its inherent funding mechanisms through UN channels, establishing this new intervention force under UN leadership proved the easiest option. Additionally, despite being counter to UN peacekeeping doctrine stating unequivocally that the UN does not conduct peace enforcement (UN Capstone), this newly created Force Intervention Brigade had the potential to reinvigorate the international community's and the Congo people's faith in MONUSCO as part of the solution rather than part of the problem in the never-ending DRC conflict.

Table 5-3: Process Tracing of DRC 2013-

| Explanatory Variables | | Causal Mechanism | | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M23 rebels mass capability to seize Goma while MONUSCO watched, forcing FARDC to flee | | P-3 disappointed in UN, but unwilling to lead a parallel operation to stabilize situation | | |
| FARDC forces commit significant atrocities while withdrawing from Goma | + | Regional actors (ICGLC and SADC) offer new solution of neutral intervention force with troops committed by SADC | = | **[UN] UN** |
| MONUSCO's failure to protect people of Goma significantly decreases public confidence in MONUSCO | | Existing UN mission and UNDPO have a strong desire to increase their credibility | | |
| | | Host Nation supportive of UN-led force of SADC-committed troops | | |

In determining the causal mechanisms leading to a UN-led peace enforcement operation integrated into an existing UN-led peacekeeping mission as the actor constellation for the 2013 DRC mission, it's clear that the only real changes in causal factors were incremental changes to the conflict's length, level of violence and peace process. The fact that not much had changed over the past decade, yet acute humanitarian crises continued to arise, is in itself a contributing explanatory factor leading to influencing the intervening variables to produce the outcome of the UN-led FIB. The P-3's willingness to contribute funding but not troops, coinciding with the AU's ongoing commitments in three large peace operations, set the conditions for the creation of the FIB comprising SADC military forces under UN leadership.

The deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC in 2013 represents a pivotal shift in UN peace enforcement strategies, reflecting an adaptation to the complex realities of contemporary conflict zones. This case study examines the causal mechanisms driving the integration of peace enforcement within this new actor in UN peace enforcement. The FIB's creation, underpinned by regional and international consensus, underscores a critical evolution in peace enforcement, marking a significant departure from traditional UN peacekeeping doctrines.

This chapter on peace enforcement operations in the DRC dissects three pivotal case studies, revealing the intricate dynamics and challenges of international intervention efforts. The process tracing of each case examines the context of the explanatory and intervening conditions that drove the determination of the specific actor constellation for each peace enforcement operation.

# CHAPTER 6
# THE CASE OF LIBYA: ENFORCEMENT FROM ABOVE

The case study on the NATO military intervention in Libya in 2011 is a critical examination of modern peace enforcement operations, emphasizing the nuanced interplay of international politics, humanitarian imperatives, and the strategic use of coercive force. This intervention, underpinned by UN Security Council Resolution 1973, marked a significant moment in the application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, aimed at preventing mass atrocities against civilians. Analyzing this case through a process tracing methodology will allow for a detailed exploration of the causal mechanisms, including the international community's rapid response to the humanitarian crisis, the strategic decisions leading to the no-fly zone, and the underlying military campaign to topple the Gaddafi regime.

*Overview*

The peace enforcement action authorized by the Security Council for Libya in 2011 marked the first instance of collective military force being used without the invitation of the host nation and solely for the protection of the imminent slaughter of civilians caught up in an internal civil war. In the face of the pending collapse of the state of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya amidst widespread violence directed at the civilian population, the Security Council acted swiftly to allow Member States and Regional Arrangements to intervene militarily while simultaneously and proactively preventing the taking sides in the conflict and the deployment of an occupying ground force. The result was a robust NATO air campaign to limit the destruction of the warring parties and protect civilian population

centers from the conflict. This seemingly straightforward mission was not without significant controversy, however, as many felt the NATO-led peace enforcement operation was less a humanitarian intervention than it was to effect regime change. (Green 2019, 3-4)

As part of the Arab Spring movement, popular uprisings began in Libya in February 2011, calling for the ouster of longtime Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Violence escalated into full civil war, with numerous factions seizing territory in cities throughout Libya in direct, armed clashes with government forces. The conflict continued to escalate with widespread evidence of human rights abuse and civilians being caught up in the violent conflict. On 17 March 2011, acting explicitly under Chapter VII, the UN Security Council authorized Resolution 1973 which created a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized Member States

> "acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory." (S/RES/1973 2011, ¶ 4)

The effect of this Resolution was to authorize NATO to conduct a targeted bombing campaign throughout the country in support of the new Interim Transitional National Council and against pro-government forces loyal to Gaddafi. While no military troops were deployed on the ground, the enforcement of the no-fly zone and the strategic use of coercive use of force against armed factions is a clear peace enforcement action.

| Box 6-1 | Key Events – Libya 2011 |
|---|---|
| **2010** | |
| 18 Dec | Arab Spring movement begins |
| **2011** | |
| 15 Feb | Protests begin in Benghazi, Libya calling for ouster of Gaddafi |
| 22 Feb | League of Arab States condemns use of force against civilians |
| 26 Feb | UNSC adopts Resolution 1970, establishes embargo and refers Gaddafi to ICC |
| 17 Feb | Formation of the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi |
| 5 Mar | TNC declares itself as sole representative of Libya and calls upon international community to protect population |
| 7 Mar | Gulf Cooperation Council calls for UN to establish a no-fly zone, declares Gaddafi illegitimate and agrees to communicate with the TNC |
| 10 Mar | France is the first country to recognize TNC, while the AU rejects any kind of foreign intervention in Libya |
| 12 Mar | Arab League calls for UN to establish a no-fly zone, declares Gaddafi illegitimate and agrees to cooperate with the TNC |
| 17 Mar | UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1973 sponsored by US, UK and France authorizes peace enforcement no-fly zone over Libya |
| 19 Mar | Member state forces begin bombing government positions to protect civilians |
| 31 Mar | NATO assumes responsibility for Libyan air campaign |
| 14 Apr | The US, the UK and France announce bombings would continue until Gaddafi is removed |
| 8 Jun | NATO defense ministers agree to keep pressure on Gaddafi regime in crisis is ended |
| 27 Jun | ICC issues arrest warrant for Gaddafi |
| 15 Jul | US is 27$^{th}$ country to recognize TNC |
| 27 Jul | UK is 32$^{nd}$ country to recognize TNC |
| 22 Aug | Libyan rebel forces capture Tripoli, effectively ending Gaddafi's rule |
| 16 Sep | UNSCR 2009 reasserts NATO mandate to protect civilians in Libya |
| 20 Oct | Gaddafi is killed |
| 21 Oct | North Atlantic Council makes preliminary decision to end air campaign at the end of October |
| 28 Oct | North Atlantic Council confirms decision to end air campaign |
| 31 Oct | NATO air campaign over Libya ends |

The Arab Spring movement first hit Libya with protests in the eastern city of Benghazi on February 15, 2011. (Al Jazeera 2020) Government forces, at the direction of "Keeper of Arab Nationalism" Muammar Gaddafi, who had ruled Libya with an iron fist since 1969, cracked down violently on the protesters with numerous reports that "the regime was perpetrating arbitrary arrests, torture, and killings." (Chollet and Fishman 2015, 1) The result was an eruption of violent, chaotic civil war that quickly spread throughout all of Libya forcing Gaddafi to flee his stronghold in Tripoli and causing a widespread humanitarian crisis. (al-Shadeedi, van Veen and Harchaoui 2020, 10) On February 17, with revolutionary groups battling forces loyal to Gaddafi across the country, "local councils of revolutionary people of Libya" created the Transitional National Council to represent the interests of the Libyan people and attempt to move forward in establishing a

new government. (Introducing the Council 2013)

The worsening violence and humanitarian crisis took center stage across the globe, and the international community reacted swiftly. Within weeks of the uprising, the Gulf Cooperation Council denounced the crimes against civilians and declared that the Gaddafi "regime has lost its legitimacy" while simultaneously supporting the establishment of a no-fly zone and advocating for the UN Security Council to "shoulder its responsibility." (Al Jazeera 2011) On March 12, the 22-member Arab League approved an internationally mandated no-fly zone, knowing full well that only American and European nations possessed the military capabilities to implement such an action. Amr Moussa, the Secretary General of the Arab League, stated that "our one goal is to protect the civilian population in Libya after what has been reported of attacks and casualties in a very bloody situation." (Bronner and Sanger 2011, 1)

France and the UK seemed to immediately support the no-fly zone intervention, with France being the first nation to officially recognize the TNC, doing so on March 10. (Cowell and Erlanger 2011, 1) French President Nicolas Sarkozy was the leading proponent for military intervention in Libya, calling for Gaddafi's ouster well before other nations were willing to do so. After an initial hesitation, British Prime Minister David Cameron quickly followed in Sarkozy's enthusiasm. Both men were buoyed by domestic political pressures to act decisively on the Libyan issue. (Mueller 2015, 14) The United States, on the other hand, was much more reluctant to get involved in another military intervention in the Arab world. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was firmly opposed to a military intervention, expressing doubt about the ability to protect civilians from the air

without expanding into regime change while stating that Gaddafi's regime posed little threat to the national interests of the United States. He also outlined concern that an air campaign was premature without a realistic post-conflict plan. (Mueller 2015, 15) President Obama was somewhat ambivalent towards the issue, admitting at one point that it was a 51-49 decision and that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, a staunch supporter of the no-fly zone, swayed him to support an aerial intervention. (Becker and Shane 2016, 1)

With the P-3 on board, the Security Council swiftly moved to action. On March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing the imposition and enforcement of a no-fly zone and to take all necessary measures "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." All P-3 members sponsored the resolution: the US, UK, and France, and it is worth noting that while no member of the Security Council voted against the resolution, four countries abstained. The abstaining countries included Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia, and a common objection amongst these nations was the risk of becoming more deeply involved in an inherently domestic conflict and the absence of safeguards on limiting the use of force and potential expansion towards regime change. (S_PV.6498 2011, 4-7)

Within 48 hours of the Security Council's authorization, air forces of the United States, France, and Great Britain were engaging threats on the ground in Libya, targets almost exclusively consisting of forces to Gaddafi's regime. Within two weeks, on March 31, NATO had assumed full responsibility for the air campaign over Libya, known as Operation Unified Protector. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2015) The air campaign would continue unabated for seven months, overflying the rebel advances westward to


take Tripoli in August. In addition to enforcing a no-fly zone to prevent the bombing of civilian population centers by what remained of Gaddafi's air force, NATO conducted extensive air and naval strikes against Libyan "military forces involved in attacks or threatening to attack Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2015) Muammar Gaddafi, fleeing NTC forces, was in a large convoy targeted by NATO drones and aircraft outside the coastal town of Sirte on October 20. As his convoy was forced to stop, it was attacked by NTC forces, and Gaddafi was killed later that morning. (Blitz and Carnegy 2011, 1) Two days after Gaddafi's death, NATO made the decision to end the aerial peace enforcement operation on October 31. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2015)

Analysis of Causal Factors

Libya is an example of a peace enforcement action conducted specifically as an air campaign and involving no overt deployment of ground forces. Unlike other conflicts which develop over generations and often take years of widespread violence and disruption before the international community gains consensus to act, the international community's response process to the short, brutal rebellion in Libya was more similar to the interstate wars of Korea (1950) and Kuwait (1990). Within the thirty days of the first demonstrations in Benghazi on February 15, 2001, the first coalition planes were destroying Gaddafi forces under the umbrella of humanitarian protection provided by UNSCR 1973. Figure 6-1 outlines the explanatory and intervening variables leading to the

Member State-led peace enforcement operation.

Figure 6-1: Explanatory Variable Assessment for Libya 2012




The Libyan civil war of 2011 occurred at a time when the international community was uncertain about how best to handle these new conflicts. (Kaplan, 2012, 186-188) While the theoretical tenets of self-determination and non-intervention in domestic issues remained strong, the world was keen to prevent the tremendous human suffering within each conflict—it wasn't quite sure how to do that. By the start of the Arab Spring movement, the now ten-year-old GWOT, plus the numerous extended conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, had somewhat exhausted the principles of collective security. The warring factions in both conflicts were not yet willing to discuss a negotiated resolution, Member States were not jumping at the idea of deploying ground troops to coerce the belligerents to stop, and the Security Council was loath to authorize a military force that was unlikely to resolve the conflict. (S_PV.6491 2011; S_PV.6498 2011)

By 2011, United States' hegemony had entered a period of uncertainty during the protracted Global War on Terror (Fukuyama, 2021), and American policy makers were strongly opposed to additional military entanglements, especially in a Muslim country.

(Etzione 2012, 45). Simultaneously, the United Nations had become somewhat overcommitted - leading fifteen peace operations at the time of the first Arab Spring protests in Benghazi in February 2012. (UNDPO 2024) While not democratically elected, Gaddafi had ruled Libya since 1969 and, as the uprising began, was the longest-tenured leader in the world (exclusive of figurehead monarchies). The rebellion was not an ethnic secessionist movement, nor did it fit the traditional mold of a push for the right of self-determination against a colonial ruler. Instead, the conflict was a civil war for central government control.

The belligerent actors in the burgeoning Libyan civil war were numerous and diverse. Initially divided as being either loyal to the Gaddafi regime or allied with the TNC to overthrow the regime, as the rebellion progressed into full-fledged civil war, each side fractured into many allied factions. “The rebel forces that overthrew Qaddafi were highly fragmented, and the idea of a unified “rebel army” was purely fictional.” (Chivvis and Martini 2014, 13) The same was true of Gaddafi’s loyalist forces, for although initially based on existing military structure and using military weapons and munitions, the loyalist forces split into various brigades or smaller-sized units and mostly fought independently across the breadth of Libya. (International Crisis Group 2011, 1-6) At the height of the 2011 conflict, more than 200 belligerent armed groups operated throughout Libya. (Mezran and Lamen 2012, 2) The capabilities of the belligerents, while varied, is assessed as “High” as many had access to substantial weaponry. Both Loyalist and anti-Gaddafi forces used armored vehicles, artillery and other explosive weapons that wreaked havoc in the urban population centers where much of the war was fought. (Goncalves 2020, 2-3)

Additionally, although aged, Libyan government military forces retained a significant air defense missile capability that would have been effective against the air forces of neighboring countries but was no match for the modern air forces of NATO. (Kopp 2011, 1-2) As the forces loyal to Gaddafi were comprised predominantly of Libyan military units, this inherently identifies these belligerent actors as "State-supported."

The Libyan conflict is considered to have a "Global Impact" and is deemed of "National Security" interest to the P-3 as it occurred within easy reach of the borders of Western Europe. Only a few hundred miles separated Bosnia from Germany and Italy by land, while Libya was a similar distance by sea from Italy and Greece. The same distance from Boston to Baltimore separated the people of Western Europe from mass atrocities being inflicted on civilian populations in both conflicts. While the conflicts themselves were rooted in different causes, the tremendous toll inflicted on the civilian population of both countries was identical in its ruthlessness. This, more than any other factor, played a decisive role in forcing the Security Council to intervene militarily in the form of a peace enforcement action.

Gaddafi fled his seat of power early in the war, dissolving any semblance of government structure. The intervening variable of state stability is easily pointed toward "Collapsed." With the peace enforcement operation targeting Gaddafi's forces to prevent their attacks on the civilian population, it's a given that the operation commenced without the host nation's support. That said, the TNC, established in February 2011 and formally recognized by France and the GCC in March as the legitimate representative of Libya, did invite the establishment of an internationally-led no-fly zone.

The ability to use air power to enforce the peace was also a significant factor in the P-3 decision to support military intervention. In Libya, given the openness of the desert terrain, air power offered the ability to decisively strike and deter armed groups from assaulting predominantly civilian enclaves. While the Security Council's authorization for Bosnia mandated the creation of a secure environment for humanitarian operations, the peace enforcement action in Libya was specifically focused on protecting civilians under threat of armed attack. This speaks somewhat to the evolution in norms regarding supporting humanitarian activities versus a specific mandate to unequivocally protect civilians from the conflict. The ghosts of Srebrenica had become quite vocal in the halls of the UN by 2011.

Table 6-1: Process Tracing of Libya 2012

| Explanatory Variables | | Causal Mechanism | | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civil war for central control where the international community is supporting the secessionist forces against the despotic government<br>Credible reports of atrocities and war crimes being committed by government forces<br>Significant humanitarian crisis with 500,000 displaced amidst the widespread violence. Arab regional arrangements supportive of UN intervention<br>Conflict is very close to several EU countries: 200 miles to Malta, 275 miles to Italy | + | The situation in Libya created a significant national security threat/interest for France, UK and other countries of the NATO alliance.<br>An air campaign without overt deployment of troops is a viable method of peace enforcement to prevent attacks on civilian population centers<br>NATO is the only credible military force capable of conducting a sustained air campaign to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians<br>Eliminating Gaddafi is an attainable end state for the peace enforcement operation – resolving the conflict with a democratically-elected Libyan government is not. | = | **MS** |

The conflict-specific explanatory variables in the case of Libya in 2011 created an alignment of intervening variables that included a significant national security interest amongst the P-3 to implement a no-fly zone that would prevent attacks upon civilian population centers, as well as enhancing the conditions for the newly-recognized TNC to topple the Gaddafi regime. As NATO is the only realistic military option available to

accomplish the mandate of UNSCR 1973.

The NATO military intervention in Libya in 2011, as outlined in the case study, represents a pivotal moment in the evolution of peace enforcement operations, highlighting the complex interplay of international norms, national security interests, and humanitarian imperatives. The intervention, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 without the host nation's invitation and primarily aimed at protecting civilians, underscores the international community's readiness to strategically employ coercive military force in the face of egregious human rights violations. This case illustrates the shift towards a more interventionist stance in international relations, where the protection of civilians and the prevention of mass atrocities can override sovereignty under certain conditions. The Libyan intervention by a coalition of Member States (NATO), driven by the P-3's national security interests, sets a precedent for future peace enforcement actions, highlighting the critical role of international consensus.

# CHAPTER 7
# THE CASE OF MALI: MULTIPLE ACTORS ON A CHANGING BATTLEFIELD

The peace enforcement operation in Mali presents a significant case in the study of international military interventions and their evolution. This operation, characterized by the involvement of various actors, including regional coalitions and United Nations forces, provides a rich context for analyzing the dynamics of peace enforcement in a complex conflict setting. Conducting a process-tracing analysis of the Mali operation will allow for an in-depth examination of the causal factors, such as geopolitical interests, the role of extremist groups, and the impact of international support, that influenced the course of the intervention. This analysis is critical for understanding the challenges and successes of implementing peace enforcement strategies in Mali, offering insights into the broader implications for peace operations in similar conflict environments.

## Overview

Mali provides the culminating case study as it offers insight into the latest evolution of actor constellations involved in peace enforcement missions. While the enforcement action in Somalia in 1993 established a precedent for deploying a Member State operation astride a UN mission (UNITAF/UNOSOM II), Mali presents a situation where a Member State (France's Operation SERVAL) was deployed alongside a regional arrangement (AFISMA), which was, in turn, transitioned into a UN mission (MINUSMA).

The roots of the conflict in Mali date back to Malian independence from France in 1960 and ethnic Tuareg rebellion in the north of the country against the new Mali government installed in Bamako, the national capital in the southern portion of the

country. The Tuareg clan spanning present-day Mali and Niger were disappointed in not being granted a separate state for their ethnic group. Racial, economic and linguistic tensions resulted in at least three substantial Tuareg rebellions from 1962-1964, 1990-1996 and 2006-2009. (Thurston and Lebovich 2013, 3) After several years of relative stability, civil war broke out in Mali in January 2012 when Tuareg armed groups attacked government forces in several towns and attempted to declare independence for the northern regions of the country. (Flood 2012, 1)

As witnessed in a significant number of the ethnic-based civil wars in Africa, the belligerent actors in the Mali civil war of 2012 are not easily categorized or understood. The Tuareg ethnic group equates to roughly 10% of Mali's population and is not represented by a single group; in fact, there are almost a dozen different factions sympathetic to the Tuareg cause. Several of these groups trace their lineage to previous rebellions, such as the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) and *Alliance Touaregue Nord Mali Pour Le Changement* (ATNMC – North Mali Taureg Alliance for Change), while others, including the primary combatant groups of the *Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l'Azawad* (MNLA – National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) and Ansar Dine were created just prior to the outbreak of the January 2012 hostilities. (Thurston and Lebovich 2013, 9-14 and Mullenbach 2023, 2) Many of the militant Tuaregs now fighting in Mali were recently returned from positions in support of Muammar Gaddafi's military forces in Libya. (Thurston and Lebovich 2013, 5)

Of great concern to the United States and France was the expansion of well-organized violent extremist organizations into the region, several linked directly to Al Qaeda, which

appeared to especially take hold in northern Mali. At the top of this list in early 2012 was al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM). Founded originally as an Algerian Islamist extremist group calling itself the *Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat* (GPSC – Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), this group had pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and changed its name to AQIM. (Moyar 2015, 9) The result was that while the Tuareg rebellion was an inherently internal domestic issue within Mali, the involvement of a major global Jihadi terrorist group was alarming to the international community. "Key international actors, including the United States and France, largely agreed on the threat but were divided over what to do about it." (Chivvis 2016, 3) As the P-3 were paying close attention, in April 2010 a regional Joint Military Command was established in Tamanrasset, Algeria by Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. (Ammour 2012, 3)

| **Box 7-1** | **Key Events – Mali 2012-2023** |
|---|---|
| **2010** | |
| 18 Dec | Arab Spring movement begins |
| **2011** | |
| 15 Feb | Protests begin in Benghazi, Libya calling for ouster of Gaddafi |
| 22 Aug | Libyan rebel forces capture Tripoli, effectively ending Gaddafi's rule |
| Sep | Tuareg militants in Libya begin returning home to northern Mali |
| 16 Oct | Ag Mohamed Najem establishes MNLA |
| **2012** | |
| 16 Jan | MNLA initiates attacks on government forces in 3 northern towns, first of a series of attacks across Mali |
| 22 Mar | Mutinous Mali soldiers, displeased with the fight against the Tuareg rebellion, seize power in Bamako |
| 1 Apr | MNLA captures Timbuktu and declares independence of northern Mali as the "Azawad" |
| 8 Apr | Mali president resigns; rebels agree to ECOWAS plan for transitional government |
| 5 Jul | UNSCR 2056 declares threat to peace and security and notes ECOWAS/AU plan for stabilization force |
| 1 Sep | Mali transitional authorities formally request military intervention force from ECOWAS |
| 28 Sep | ECOWAS requests Security Council authorization for a peace enforcement force |
| 12 Oct | UNSCR 2071 authorizes S-G to provide support to ECOWAS/AU planning for intervention force |
| 11 Nov | AU approves military intervention plan |
| 20 Dec | UNSCR 2085 authorizes deployment of international forces to Mali, including AFISMA |
| **2013** | |
| 11 Jan | French Operation SERVAL begins with airstrikes |
| 17 Jan | First AFISMA troops from Nigeria deploy to Mali |
| 7 Mar | AU requests to transition AFISMA to a UN-led operation |
| 25 Apr | UNSCR 2100 establishes MINUSMA as the follow on to AFISMA |
| 1 Aug | French replace Operation SERVAL with Operation BARKHANE |

The Tuareg rebellion continued to increase in violence between January and March 2012, with MNLA and Ansar Dinn rebel groups seizing much of the northern portions of Mali amid widespread disruption and displacement of more than 60,000 civilians. (Lewis, 2012) Continued Malian army defeats led to a coup d'etat by disgruntled members of the military ousting the President for his inability to handle the crisis in the north. (Thurston and Lebovich 2013, 5) An agreement was reached ECOWAS and the mutinous soldiers to cede power to the Speaker of the National Assembly of Mali. (ICG Report 2012, 37-39)

The UN Security Council declared the situation in Mali to be a threat to international peace and security on July 5, 2012, while simultaneously noting the ECOWAS/AU plan for deploying an initial military stabilization force in Mali. (S/RES/2056 2012) On September 1, the new Mali transitional authority in Bamako requested military intervention on the part of ECOWAS, with ECOWAS formally requesting the Security Council to approve a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation to be led by ECOWAS. This request of the Security Council was approved on October 12, 2002, through Resolution 2071, which also directed the Secretary-General to provide military and security planners to ECOWAS and called upon Member States to provide assistance to the "Armed and Security Forces of Mali…to restore the authority of the State of Mali over its entire national territory, to uphold the unity and territorial integrity of Mali and to reduce the threat posed by AQIM and affiliated groups." (S/RES/2071 2012, ¶ 9)

ECOWAS, AU, and UN planners came to the consensus that the robust requirements and peace enforcement mandates required of the upcoming peace enforcement operation would be best suited being led by the AU rather than the much smaller ECOWAS. The

strategic concept for this new force, now able to draw military forces from throughout Africa rather than just relaying on contributions from the West African members of ECOWAS, was approved by the AU's Peace and Security Council on October 24. (African Union 2012) On December 20, 2012, UN Security Council Resolution 2085, acting explicitly under Chapter VII, authorized the African Union-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) "to support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations, including AQIM, MUJWA and associated extremist groups, while taking appropriate measures to reduce the impact of military action upon the civilian population." (S/RES/2085 2012, ¶ 9b)

In response to UNSCR 2085, France deployed a military force named Operation SERVAL prior to the arrival of AFISMA troops based on the deteriorating security situation and almost immediately directly attacked rebel forces to support the retaking of captured territory. The wording of UNSCR 2085 is somewhat vague in its authorization for a Member State to participate directly in the enforcement action, but a Security Council press release of January 10, 2013, recalling their authorizations of UNSCR 2085 and reiterating "their call to Member States to assist the settlement of the crisis in Mali and, in particular, to provide assistance to the Malian Defence and Security Forces to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations and associated groups." (SC/10878-AFR-2502 2012) Lest there was any doubt as to Security Council authorization for the French intervention, UNSCR 2100 specifically welcomed "the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist and armed

groups towards the south of Mali." (S/RES/2100 2012, 1)

Taking a bit longer than the French to deploy, AFISMA launched its deployment of military forces alongside the French troops of Operation SERVAL, with both forces coordinating their assistance to fulfill the mandates of UNSCR 2085. The first AFISMA troops, soldiers from Nigeria, arrived in Bamako on January 17, 2013. (BBC 2013, 1) Over the next two months, AFISMA would increase its troop levels to 6,500 with an additional 3,500 French troops operating independently as part of Operation SERVAL.

By March 2013, with several successful missions conducted by both the French and AFISMA forces to reestablish government control over northern towns, the Commissioner for Peace and Security for the African Union formally requested that AFISM be transitioned to a UN-led operation. (S/2013/163 2012) On April 25, 2013, the Security Council authorized the creation of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by unanimously approving UNSCR 2100, which transformed AFISMA into a UN-led peace enforcement operation. (S/RES/2100 2012, ¶7)


A separate transformation occurred within the French operation. Since its inception, Operation SERVAL has specifically focused on assisting the Malian Defence and Security Forces to recover areas in northern Mali under the control of terrorist and rebel groups, as well as aiding the Malian authorities in creating the conditions for delivering humanitarian assistance. On August 1, 2014, the French replaced Operation SERVAL with Operation BARKHANE. Unlike SERVAL's focus on stabilizing Mali alongside AFISMA, BARKHANE was strictly a French counter-terrorist operation and included operations throughout the

Sahel region. (Roca 2012, 5)

Analysis of Causal Factors

The case of the peace enforcement action in Mali was selected for its recency and the fact that its actor constellation comprises all three independent actors. In sharp contrast to the simplicity of a single-focused coalition of Member States deploying to repel North Korean forces from South Korea in 1950, Mali offers a complex situation involving a failed state, multiple armed ethnic groups, and a modern Islamic jihadist insurgency. Like the conflict itself, the peace enforcement action in Mali is disjointed and seems to evolve with no clear direction as to where it might head next. Figure 7-1 outlines the explanatory and intervening variables for the peace enforcement operation in Mali.

Figure 7-1: Explanatory Variable Assessment for Mali 2012 - 2023




The structural factors surrounding the conflict in Mali are very relevant to the dynamics of how the specific actor constellation evolved for this peace enforcement action. Its obscureness as a landlocked country of West Africa does not appear to hide a strategic

bevy of natural resources, nor is the country's stability traditionally all that relevant to even its neighbors, let alone the world's major powers. To most of the Western world, Mali was unknowingly the home to what had euphemistically become the most remote place on Earth—Timbuktu. Given this, the civil war in Mali should likely have remained a domestic issue, perhaps requiring the political intervention of ECOWAS or the AU, the regional arrangements with jurisdiction over Mali. However, underneath the surface, Mali poses significant strategic interest to the P-5. The Taureg-inhabited areas of northern Mali have significant natural resources, and "one of the drivers of the Mali Crisis is the international competition over mineral resources -especially uranium - in the Sahel." (Farhaoui 2013, 36)

In 2012, however, the conflict dynamic of an Islamic separatist movement with ingredients for the imposition of Sharia law and the export of jihadism to neighboring countries was a recipe that the international community was primed to stop. With a military coup occurring amidst the widespread success of the Islamic separatists in capturing multiple population centers in the north of Mali, the P-3 and the Security Council remained focused on finding an immediate resolution to ensure the stability of the country and protect civilians against widespread ethnic violence.

ECOWAS was the first to respond to the crisis, quickly responding to the coup ousting of President Touré and initiating planning for a military intervention force comprised of contributions from ECOWAS states to bolster the Malian capital and assist in the negotiated return to constitutional rule. (World Peace Foundation 2016, 1) The P-3, however, did not reach an immediate consensus for responding to the situation. The

United States viewed the situation in Mali as primarily an internal struggle for democratic peace, with the impact of Islamic terrorists being of lesser priority. "The Tuareg are not terrorists, and the grievances of the Tuareg should be resolved peacefully and not through military actions." (Carson 2012, 5). This resulted in the US push to exhaust diplomatic, humanitarian, and capacity-building measures prior to executing a military intervention.

Unlike the United States, which looked at the situation in Mali primarily as one of many humanitarian crises throughout the world, France viewed Mali as a genuine priority. (Chivvis 2016, 75) President Francois Hollande had recently taken office in May 2012, and Mali was considered a "very, very high priority for the president." French government officials reported that intense concern about threats in Mali and across the Sahel were the drivers for France's desire to withdraw their military forces from Afghanistan and Kosovo. (Chivvis 2016, 76) France maintained significant economic, colonial, and societal ties with Mali, and an African-led military intervention seemed the most appropriate solution to resolve the crisis.

France and the United States disagreed not only on whether the restoration of democracy should take precedence over military intervention but also on whether an African-led force could accomplish the mission. US officials challenged whether regional militaries could succeed in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the austere conditions of northern Mali. "It was troubling to hear heads of state talk about a West African Force that didn't exist." (Chivvis 2016, 83) Additionally, two countries that did have robust military experience fighting in the harsh conditions of North Africa, Chad, and Mauritania, were not members of ECOWAS.

With the military intervention expanding from an ECOWAS-only mission to one fielded by the AU, in early December 2012 the French proposed a Security Council resolution authorizing an AU-led peace enforcement operation in northern Mali. Calling the French plan "crap," US official countered with a proposal for a regional peacekeeping force without Chapter VII authority deploying to southern Mali to train Malian forces. (Crumley, 2012, 1 and Chivvis 2016, 84-85) The US's stance appeared to be in the minority, with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stating that "there are 15 members of the Security Council, and at the moment 14 share France's view." (Crumley 2012, 1)

On December 11, Mali's acting Prime Minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra, was arrested by the military leaders of the March 2012 coup and forced to resign, an incident further resolving France's commitment to a military intervention. (Nossiter 2012, 1) Less than ten days later, the Security Council unanimously approved UNSCR 2085, authorizing the deployment of the AU-led AFISMA as a peace enforcement operation. UNSCR 2085 was co-sponsored by ten members of the Security Council, including all three members of the P-3: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (S/2012/946 2012)

The Member State-led Operation SERVAL was deployed in parallel with AFISMA, but this was not the plan when UNSCR 2085 was passed. On the morning of January 11, 2013, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian phoned Leon Panetta, the US Secretary of Defense. Le Drian informed Panetta that France had just begun a unilateral deployment of French military forces to conduct combat operations against terrorists in northern Mali. (Chivvis 2016, 1) Attempting to thwart the upcoming AFISMA deployment, insurgent forces attacked south toward Konna and Diabaly and appeared only days away from

taking Bamako. Interim Mali President Traoré requested immediate assistance from French forces, who immediately deployed forces from nearby Chad while informing the Security Council of their intentions under a broad interpretation of UNSCR 2085. (S/2013/17) AFISMA would speed up its deployment timeline as well, with the first Nigerian forces arriving in Bamako on January 17. (Folasade-Koyi 2013)

While the French Operation SERVAL and the AFISMA mission shared the same Security Council mandate, they had very different objectives on the ground. AFISMA focused on supporting the Malian authorities in southern Mali. At the same time, the French and Chadian forces of SERVAL conducted offensive military operations against Tuareg and other armed insurgent groups in the north. (Moyar 2015, 39-40) Within months, both the President of ECOWAS and the AU's Peace and Security Council were advocating for the UN to create a stabilization mission into which AFISMA would transition. (World Peace Foundation 2016, 4) In April 2013, the Security Council authorized MINUSMA, which would subsume AFISMA and deploy in parallel to Operation SERVAL. Complicating things further, the French transitioned SERVAL into a new operation, BARKHANE, which focused on expanded counterterrorism operations in Mali and neighboring countries.

The transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA was not without tension, and the AU PSC took the unprecedented action of sending a formal complaint to the UN. (World Peace Foundation 2016, 4) The AU was concerned that the UN was doctrinally straddling the fence between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, negatively impacting the logistics and support for AFISMA. (Williams and Boutellis 2014, 274) Additionally, the AU

questioned the UN's anticipation that MINUSMA would not conduct combat operations based on the success of the French, AFISMA, and Malian troops in reducing "the capacity of terrorist forces to threaten the civilian population." While not especially important to the Mali operation itself, this doctrinal disagreement could have significant implications for determining the actor constellations for future peace operations. Since 2010, the UN has conveniently forgotten its stated doctrine that the United Nations does not conduct peace enforcement with the Security Council authorizations for Haiti, DRC, Mali, and CAR.

Table 7-1: Process Tracing of Mali 2012-2023

| Explanatory Variables | | Causal Mechanism | | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civil war over colonial-driven local issues with a variety of belligerent actors seeking self-determination and secession<br><br>Influx of Jihadist terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda capable of significantly disrupting the Sahel region<br>Significant humanitarian crisis with 400,000 displaced amidst the widespread violence<br><br>Military coup toppling the recognized government in response to perceived government failures in responding to the civil war | + | P-3 disagrees on appropriate course of action. France, with strong strategic, economic and colonial ties advocates for a strong military intervention. The US, placing less strategic importance on Mali, pursues support of democratic governance initiatives<br>ECOWAS and AU are firmly involved in both diplomatic negotiations and willingness to deploy a peace enforcement force for a limited duration<br>Consensus is built with P-3, by expanding peace enforcement from ECOWAS to AU and including democratic governance initiatives, to deploy an AU-led peace enforcement force<br>France makes unilateral decision to support request by Mali government to deploy a counterterrorism operation ahead of, and alongside, AFISMA<br><br>France and AU agree that the UN is the appropriate organization to assist Mali long term once Malian authorities regain control of the country | = | **MS \|\| RA >> UN** |

The norms of protection of civilians continue to progress and be solidified in the language of both USNCR 2085 (authorizing AFISMA and the parallel French-led mission) and UNSCR 2100 (creating MINUSMA). It is also clear in UNSCR 2100 that while the Security Council is planning for AFISMA and Operation SERVAL to remove the necessity of MINSUSMA to conduct combat operations to protect civilians, it still intentionally includes this PoC mandate for MINUSMA, as well as assisting Malian authorities recover

territory from armed groups and creating the security conditions for humanitarian operations.

As seen in Table 7-1, conflict-specific explanatory variables play a significant role in driving the causal mechanism toward the formation of the specific actor constellation for the peace enforcement operation in Mali. France's close colonial and economic ties to the region, coupled with the P-3's continued focus on curtailing the expansion of global Jihadist terrorism and ECOWAS/AU commitment to African-led intervention in local crises, form a causal chain that resulted in the hybrid force for this peace enforcement operation. Process tracing clearly shows that this parallel deployment of Member-State (France) and Regional Arrangement (AFISMA) were not planned in advance and were the result of a rapid change to the explanatory variables of belligerent objectives. The approach of MNLA and Ansar Dinn forces just north of Bamako in early January necessitated the immediate deployment of French combat troops already forward deployed in nearby Chad. The AU did not maintain this rapid deployment capability, necessitating the resulting outcome of parallel Member State and Regional Arrangement-led peace enforcement missions.

The reluctance of Member States and Regional Arrangements to become bogged down in a lengthy capacity-building mission and their agreement that the United Nations is best suited to lead these complex missions once the most significant threats have been thwarted from the causal mechanism driving the transition from Regional Arrangement to UN-led peace enforcement mission.

The Mali case study concludes that the actor constellation in peace enforcement,

comprising Member States, Regional Arrangements, and the UN, is shaped by specific conflict-related explanatory variables. France's engagement, driven by historical and economic ties, and the international community's concern over jihadist expansion underscore the complexity of forming peace enforcement missions. This hybrid force emerged not by premeditation but as a response to evolving threats, demonstrating the agility of Member States and the strategic adaptability of Regional Arrangements and the UN in peace enforcement. The transition to a UN-led mission, prompted by the desire to avoid protracted involvement and leverage the UN's capacity for complex missions, reflects a strategic consensus on managing peace enforcement's long-term challenges.

# CHAPTER 8
# EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The post-Cold War era has witnessed a significant evolution in the landscape of peace enforcement, marked by the increasing complexity of conflicts and the diversification of actors involved in peace enforcement operations. The previous four chapters provided detailed case studies of seven specific peace operations covering the discrete range of unique actor constellations in peace enforcement operations since 1945. This chapter undertakes an empirical analysis to dissect the evolving nature of peace enforcement, focusing on the constellations of actors that have come to lead these operations. This analysis seeks to unravel the explanatory and intervening variables that shape the formation and outcome of specific actor constellations in peace enforcement endeavors.

This dissertation argues that understanding these actor constellations and their underlying causal mechanisms is crucial for explaining the varied outcomes of peace enforcement operations. It posits that the interplay between explanatory variables (such as the nature of the conflict, the objectives and capabilities of belligerents, and the disruptive impact of the conflict) and intervening variables (including the interest level of the P-3, the history of the UN in the conflict, and purpose of the enforcement mandates) can significantly affect the actor(s) that lead these operations. The first section of the chapter focuses on establishing the causal conditions through an analysis of the explanatory and intervening variables. With a greater understanding of the interplay of these variables, the second section of this chapter provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the causal mechanisms, examining the prevalence of conditions across the universe of outcomes: the

specific actor constellations leading the peace enforcement mission. This section will show how the changes in explanatory and intervening variables over the universe of peace enforcement operations since 1945 have directly led to the determination of the actor leading the peace enforcement operation. The final section of the chapter is the most critical for the dissertation – the development of hypotheses from these causal mechanisms that show how and why specific peace enforcement actors and actor constellations are formed and evolve.

The seven process-tracing case studies in Chapters 4-8 explored seven different actor constellations and traced the explanatory and intervening variables' impact on determining this constellation of actors. Chapter 4's examination of the two case studies in Somalia was representative of a Member State-led peace enforcement deployed in coordination with a UN-led enforcement mission and a Regional Arrangement-led operation fifteen years after the first one. Chapter 5's analysis of three discrete peace enforcement missions in the DRC showed the three distinct constellations that the UN has deployed: adjacent to a Member State-led operation (DRC 2003), on its own (DRC 2005), and with a UN Force Intervention Brigade integrated into an existing UN peacekeeping operation (DRC 2013-). The case study of the 2011 Libyan conflict traced a Member State-led operation as the sole actor (Chapter 6), while the final case study, Mali 2012-2023 (Chapter 7), examined a complex constellation of Member State peace enforcement operations deployed in parallel to a Regional Arrangement-led mission, with the RA mission being succeeded by a UN mission.

Two caveats are appropriate before delving into the discussion of the actors and variables. This study is focused solely on peace enforcement. It does not attempt to analyze any aspect of UN peacekeeping missions other than in the context of directly coinciding with a peace enforcement operation in a given conflict. The presence of a UN peacekeeping mission before a peace enforcement operation is identified as one of the seven intervening variables that can impact the determination of the actor constellation for peace enforcement, but that is the extent to which UN peacekeeping is analyzed in this research. Three cases involve UN peacekeeping missions adjacent to a peace enforcement operation (Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995, DRC 2003, and DRC 2013-), and these are identified as part of the actor constellation outcome for that case. As this study is limited to the determination of the peace enforcement actor constellation rather than the effectiveness or accomplishments of the actors, any transition to a UN peacekeeping mission is outside the relevant scope of this effort.

The second caveat involves the case of the peace enforcement operation in the Congo 1961-1964. While definitively peace enforcement, the unique circumstances surrounding the deployment of a UN-led military force in the wake of Congo's newly granted independence is an outlier case whose inclusion in this chapter's empirical analysis of explanatory variables does not contribute to a greater understanding of the evolution in peace enforcement. In fact, with only seventeen total cases in the universe of peace enforcement, it does the exact opposite – clouding the analysis with data that is not expository. Occurring at the height of the Cold War under the direction of the highly influential but controversial Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and thirty years before

the creation of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation and the next peace enforcement operation, the Congo case has significant potential to detract from the analysis of the other sixteen cases. It has, therefore, been set aside and not included in the empirical analysis of the causal mechanisms for the evolution of peace enforcement.

### 8.1 Establishing Causal Conditions

In this section, the aim is to determine the causal conditions by analyzing the prevalence and influence of explanatory variables on the intervening variables within the realm of peace enforcement operations. Chapter 3 proposed twelve independent variables, five explanatory and seven intervening, to determine the causal pathways leading to specific actor constellations leading peace enforcement operations. By systematically examining the influence of the explanatory variables on the intervening variables, this section establishes the foundation for highlighting how changes in both explanatory and intervening variables have directly led to the determination of the leading actor in such operations. The analysis will examine how conflict-specific factors (explanatory variables) influence case-specific conditions (intervening variables), including international community interest levels, historical involvement of the UN in the conflict, host nation stability, and the intended purpose and mandates of the peace enforcement missions.

Table 8-1 displays the prevalence of the five explanatory conditions across all sixteen cases of peace enforcement. The conditions for each explanatory variable are collated by the specified P-3 type of interest in the conflict: National Security,

Colonial/Strategic/Economic, or Humanitarian as first described in Chapter 3 and analyzed in the previous case studies.

Table 8-1: P-3 Interest and its Explanatory Conditions

| Explanatory Conditions | National Security | Colonial / Strategic / Economic | Humanitarian |
|---|---|---|---|
| # of Cases the Specific P-3 Interest Level is Present | 8 | 3 | 5 |
| Conflict Type | | | |
| Inter-state war | 2/8 | 0/3 | 0/5 |
| Civil war for central control | 4/8 | 3/3 | 2/5 |
| Civil war over local issues | 2/8 | 0/3 | 2/5 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 0/8 | 0/3 | 1/5 |
| Conflict Length | | | |
| ≤2 years | 7/8 | 1/3 | 2/5 |
| >2 years | 1/8 | 2/3 | 3/5 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 1/8 | 0/3 | 0/5 |
| Gain control of central government | 7/8 | 2/3 | 0/5 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 1/8 | 2/3 | 5/5 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 2/8 | 0/3 | 3/5 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 2/8 | 2/3 | 0/5 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | | |
| High | 5/8 | 1/3 | 1/5 |
| Medium | 2/8 | 1/3 | 1/5 |
| Low | 1/8 | 1/3 | 3/5 |
| Disruptive Impact | | | |
| Global | 5/8 | 0/3 | 0/5 |
| Regional | 3/8 | 3/3 | 4/5 |
| Local | 0/8 | 0/3 | 1/5 |

For P-3 interests categorized as national security interests, civil wars for central control and conflicts under two years are most prevalent, especially where belligerent capabilities are assessed as high and there is global disruptive impact. Both examples of interstate war (Korea 1950 and Kuwait 1990) fall into the P-3's national interest. Conversely, wars with less-capable belligerent groups or being only locally disruptive do not appear to meet the threshold for being of national interest to the P-3. Colonial/Strategic/Economic interests are exclusively seen in civil wars for central control, with a mix of conflict lengths, but are seen only in those conflicts having a regional disruptive impact. Humanitarian P-3 interest is spread across different conflict types and

lengths, with a notable presence in civil wars over local issues and non-state wars across state borders.

Table 8-2 focuses on the availability of P-3 military forces as an intervening condition with an impact on the supply side of a decision by the P-3 to intervene and lead a peace enforcement operation. This intervening condition posits that during times when the P-3 militaries are committed to fighting a war, they are less likely to be willing to lead a peace enforcement operation elsewhere.

Table 8-2: P-3 Availability and its Explanatory Conditions

| Explanatory Conditions | Available | At War |
|---|---|---|
| # of Cases the Specific P-3 Availability is Present | 9 | 7 |
| Conflict Type | | |
| Inter-state war | 2/9 | 0/7 |
| Civil war for central control | 4/9 | 5/7 |
| Civil war over local issues | 3/9 | 1/7 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 0/9 | 1/7 |
| Conflict Length | | |
| ≤2 years | 7/9 | 3/7 |
| >2 years | 2/9 | 4/7 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 1/9 | 0/7 |
| Gain control of central government | 4/9 | 5/7 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 5/9 | 3/7 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 2/9 | 3/7 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 1/9 | 2/7 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | |
| High | 3/9 | 2/7 |
| Medium | 2/9 | 2/7 |
| Low | 4/9 | 3/7 |
| Disruptive Impact | | |
| Global | 1/9 | 1/7 |
| Regional | 8/9 | 6/7 |
| Local | 0/9 | 0/7 |

A review of Table 8-2 shows that the explanatory conditions are generally spread equally across cases where the P-3 military is available and at war. This is a cursory indication that no single or combination of explanatory conditions directly influences the P-3's availability to participate in the peace enforcement operation. While the intervening variable of availability of the P-3's military forces may still impact the outcome, as will be examined in the next section of this chapter, there are no informative conclusions to be

drawn from Table 8-2 as to the influence of explanatory conditions on the availability of P-3 military forces.

The involvement of the UNDPO in a conflict is a potential contributing factor influencing the formation of a peace enforcement actor constellation. Table 8-3 presents the explanatory conditions against the presence or absence of a UNDPO peacekeeping mission in the country.

Table 8-3: UNDPO History and its Explanatory Conditions

| Explanatory Conditions | Yes | No |
|---|---|---|
| # of Cases the Specific UNDPO History is Present | 9 | 7 |
| Conflict Type | | |
| Inter-state war | 0/9 | 2/7 |
| Civil war for central control | 5/9 | 4/7 |
| Civil war over local issues | 3/9 | 1/7 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 1/9 | 0/7 |
| Conflict Length | | |
| ≤2 years | 3/9 | 7/7 |
| >2 years | 6/9 | 0/7 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 1/9 | 0/7 |
| Gain control of central government | 3/9 | 6/7 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 6/9 | 1/7 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 5/9 | 0/7 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 1/9 | 2/7 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | |
| High | 3/9 | 4/7 |
| Medium | 2/9 | 2/7 |
| Low | 4/9 | 1/7 |
| Disruptive Impact | | |
| Global | 1/9 | 4/7 |
| Regional | 8/9 | 2/7 |
| Local | 0/9 | 1/7 |

While mostly equally divided across the sixteen cases, it is clear that UN peacekeeping missions prior to peace enforcement are less likely to occur in the first two years of a conflict and conflicts with a global disruptive impact. Neither peace enforcement operations involving inter-state wars had a previous UNDPO mission. However, the UNDPO mission did occur in peace enforcement operations involving the other three types of conflicts relevant to this study. Additionally, pre-peace enforcement

UNDPO peacekeeping missions were equally spread across conflicts exhibiting the full spectrum of belligerent capabilities. While the majority of these cases with UNDPO history occurred in conflicts with belligerent goals of establishing ethnic superiority or spoiling the peace process for gain, the other three types of belligerent objectives were present to a lesser degree in other conflicts with a prior history of UNDPO peacekeeping.

Table 8-4: State Stability and its Explanatory Conditions

| Explanatory Conditions | Strong | Weak | Failed | Collapsed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| # of Cases the Specific State Stability Designation is Present | 2 | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| Conflict Type | | | | |
| Inter-state war | 2/2 | 0/6 | 0/5 | 0/3 |
| Civil war for central control | 0/2 | 3/6 | 3/5 | 3/3 |
| Civil war over local issues | 0/2 | 3/6 | 1/5 | 0/3 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 0/2 | 0/6 | 1/5 | 0/3 |
| Conflict Length | | | | |
| ≤2 years | 2/2 | 3/6 | 3/5 | 2/3 |
| >2 years | 0/2 | 3/6 | 2/5 | 1/3 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 0/2 | 0/6 | 1/5 | 0/3 |
| Gain control of central government | 2/2 | 3/6 | 2/5 | 2/3 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 0/2 | 3/6 | 4/5 | 1/3 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 0/2 | 3/6 | 0/5 | 2/3 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 0/2 | 0/6 | 2/5 | 1/3 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | | | |
| High | 2/2 | 1/6 | 2/5 | 2/3 |
| Medium | 0/2 | 2/6 | 1/5 | 2/3 |
| Low | 0/2 | 3/6 | 2/5 | 0/3 |
| Disruptive Impact | | | | |
| Global | 2/2 | 0/6 | 2/5 | 1/3 |
| Regional | 0/2 | 5/6 | 3/5 | 2/3 |
| Local | 0/2 | 1/6 | 0/5 | 0/3 |

Table 8-4 presents data on the prevalence of explanatory variables in peace enforcement operations in relation to the state stability of nations in conflict, categorized as strong, weak, failed, or collapsed. In strong states, inter-state wars and belligerent objectives to gain control of the central government are present, with high capabilities and global disruptive impacts. Weak states are characterized by a mixture of civil wars for central control and local issues, with a balance of conflict lengths and mixed belligerent

objectives. Failed and collapsed states see civil wars for central control, with longer conflicts and a mix of belligerent objectives, capabilities, and disruptive impacts.

Table 8-5: Host Nation Invite and its Explanatory Conditions

| Explanatory Conditions | Yes | No |
|---|---|---|
| # of Cases the Host Nation Invitation was Present | 14 | 2 |
| Conflict Type | | |
| Inter-state war | 2/14 | 0/2 |
| Civil war for central control | 7/14 | 2/2 |
| Civil war over local issues | 4/14 | 0/2 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 1/14 | 0/2 |
| Conflict Length | | |
| ≤2 years | 8/14 | 2/2 |
| >2 years | 6/14 | 0/2 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 1/14 | 0/2 |
| Gain control of central government | 7/14 | 2/2 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 8/14 | 0/2 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 4/14 | 0/2 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 3/14 | 0/2 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | |
| High | 6/14 | 1/2 |
| Medium | 3/14 | 1/2 |
| Low | 5/14 | 0/2 |
| Disruptive Impact | | |
| Global | 4/14 | 1/2 |
| Regional | 9/14 | 1/2 |
| Local | 1/14 | 0/2 |

Table 8-5 displays the prevalence of host nation invitations in peace enforcement operations and their correlation with various explanatory conditions. In cases where an invitation was present (14 of 16), civil wars for central control were the most common conflict type, occurring in half of the cases. Longevity of conflict showed a fairly even split, with slightly less occurrences in conflicts lasting over two years. Host nations inviting peace enforcement were most likely to be fighting belligerents intent on establishing ethnic superiority and gaining central government control. High belligerent capabilities were less common than medium or low. Regionally disruptive impacts were the most prevalent. In cases without a host nation invitation (Haiti 1994 and Libya 2011), both

were civil wars for central control less than two years old and in both of these cases, the host nation government had been declared illegitimate by the international community.

Table 8-6: Peace Enforcement Objectives and its Explanatory Conditions

| Explanatory Conditions* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| # of Cases the Specific Peace Enforcement Objective is Present | 2 | 1 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Conflict Type | | | | | | |
| Inter-state war | 2/2 | 0/1 | 0/8 | 0/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 |
| Civil war for central control | 0/2 | 1/1 | 5/8 | 3/4 | 4/4 | 1/4 |
| Civil war over local issues | 0/2 | 0/1 | 2/8 | 1/4 | 0/4 | 2/4 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 0/2 | 0/1 | 1/8 | 0/4 | 0/4 | 1/4 |
| Conflict Length | | | | | | |
| ≤2 years | 2/2 | 1/1 | 5/8 | 3/4 | 2/4 | 1/4 |
| >2 years | 0/2 | 0/1 | 3/8 | 1/4 | 2/4 | 3/4 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | | | | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/8 | 1/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 |
| Gain control of central government | 2/2 | 1/1 | 5/8 | 1/4 | 3/4 | 1/4 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 0/2 | 0/1 | 4/8 | 4/4 | 2/4 | 3/4 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 0/2 | 0/1 | 2/8 | 1/4 | 0/4 | 2/4 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 0/2 | 0/1 | 3/8 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 0/4 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | | | | | |
| High | 2/2 | 0/1 | 1/8 | 2/4 | 2/4 | 0/4 |
| Medium | 0/2 | 1/1 | 3/8 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 1/4 |
| Low | 0/2 | 0/1 | 4/8 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 3/4 |
| Disruptive Impact | | | | | | |
| Global | 2/2 | 0/1 | 1/8 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 0/4 |
| Regional | 0/2 | 1/1 | 6/8 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 4/4 |
| Local | 0/2 | 0/1 | 1/8 | 0/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 |

*Peace Enforcement Objectives Conditions Key:

*1 - Repel invaders / stop civil war*
*2 - Remove illegal government / install legitimate government to power*
*3 - Establish security/stability over territory*
*4 - Create a secure environment for humanitarian operations*
*5 - Protect civilians in imminent danger of attack*
*6 - Neutralize/defeat/deter spoilers to peace*

The six categorized objectives for each peace enforcement operation are laid out in Table 8-6, with the assessed conditions of each of the five explanatory variables. Enforcement missions to repel invaders or stop civil war were exclusively present in inter-state wars less than two years old with highly capable belligerent groups intent on gaining control over the central government and causing a global disruption. There is only one case of peace enforcement with the overt objective of removing an illegal government or installing a legitimate government to power (Haiti 1994), and this occurred in a civil war for central control less than two years old with a moderately capable belligerent force

having a regional disruptive impact. It's worth noting that two other enforcement actions considered to have a similar but unstated objective (Libya 2011 and Cote d'Ivoire 2011) had very similar explanatory conditions, except for having highly capable belligerent actors.

The remaining four types of peace enforcement objectives are less conclusive in the visible influence of specific explanatory conditions. Enforcement actions to establish stability over territory or create a secure environment for humanitarian operations are more likely to occur in civil wars for central control less than two years old and having low-to-moderately capable belligerents in a regional disruptive conflict. Peace enforcement with the objective to protect civilians in imminent danger of attack has only occurred in civil wars for central control, while missions to neutralize/defeat/deter a spoiler group have never occurred in conflicts with a global disruptive impact or against highly capable belligerent groups.

The last table in this section involves the combined intervening variable consisting of cases with a specific mandate either for the protection of civilians (PoC) or to support the ideals of democratic governance (DemSpt). Similar to Table 8-2 on the availability of P-3 military forces, while this intervening variable was included at the outset of the study, its presence has not proven to have relevance as an explanatory condition. PoC mandates have been included in all peace enforcement operations initiated after 1994, and there does not appear to be impactful conclusions to be drawn. Similarly, the inclusion or absence of a mandate to support democratic governance has not proven to be influenced in a significant manner by any of the explanatory conditions, nor has it shown to

contribute to the causal mechanisms for determining the actor constellations for peace enforcement.

Table 8-7: PoC and Support for Democracy and its Explanatory Conditions

| Explanatory Conditions | PoC = Yes | PoC = No | DemSpt = Yes | DemSpt = No |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| # of Cases the Specific PoC or Support for Governance is Present | 13 | 3 | 12 | 4 |
| Conflict Type | | | | |
| Inter-state war | 0/13 | 2/3 | 1/12 | 1/4 |
| Civil war for central control | 8/13 | 1/3 | 7/12 | 2/4 |
| Civil war over local issues | 4/13 | 0/3 | 3/12 | 1/4 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 1/13 | 0/3 | 1/12 | 0/4 |
| Conflict Length | | | | |
| ≤2 years | 7/13 | 3/3 | 7/12 | 3/4 |
| >2 years | 6/13 | 0/3 | 5/12 | 1/4 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 1/13 | 0/3 | 1/12 | 0/4 |
| Gain control of central government | 6/13 | 3/3 | 7/12 | 2/4 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 8/13 | 0/3 | 6/12 | 2/4 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 4/13 | 0/3 | 3/12 | 2/4 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 3/13 | 0/3 | 3/12 | 0/4 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | | | |
| High | 5/13 | 2/3 | 4/12 | 3/4 |
| Medium | 3/13 | 1/3 | 3/12 | 1/4 |
| Low | 5/13 | 0/3 | 5/12 | 0/4 |
| Disruptive Impact | | | | |
| Global | 3/13 | 2/3 | 3/12 | 2/4 |
| Regional | 9/13 | 1/3 | 8/12 | 2/4 |
| Local | 1/13 | 0/3 | 1/12 | 0/4 |

The detailed tables of this section of the chapter established the intricate relationship between the explanatory conditions and the intervening variables, identifying the influence of certain explanatory conditions across the sixteen cases of peace enforcement. While these conclusions are not dispositive, they establish the framework for the causal pathways in determining peace enforcement actor constellations. As such, this was an important and necessary step before ultimately examining the causal mechanisms at the end of this chapter. Before doing so, however, the next step is to examine the prevalence of causal conditions within the framework of the universe of peace enforcement actor constellations.

## 8.2 Actor Constellations and the Prevalence of Causal Conditions

The three actors leading peace enforcement operations are Member States, Regional Arrangements, and the UN. Before analyzing the prevalence of conditions with regard to actors, it is helpful to first describe and examine the discrete constellations that actors have formed in the universe of sixteen peace enforcement operations.[11] While there are eight distinct actor constellations that have been utilized (Figure 1-3 and Table 3-1), a close examination shows that there are only three situations in which actors deploy for a peace enforcement operation (Table 8-8). In three of these cases, a UN-led peace enforcement force succeeded the peace enforcement force (Haiti 2004-2017, Mali 2012-2023, and Central African Republic 2013-).

Table 8-8 Unique Actor Deployment Situations

| Deployment Situation | Calculus | Enforcement Actions |
|---|---|---|
| MS, RA, or UN is deployed as the sole actor for the operation | MS | Korea 1950-1953 |
| | | Kuwait 1990-1991 |
| | | Haiti 1994 |
| | | East Timor 1999-2000 |
| | | Afghanistan 2001-2015 |
| | | Libya 2011 |
| | | Haiti 2004-2017 |
| | RA | Somalia 2007-2022 |
| | UN | DRC 2005 |
| MS is deployed alongside another actor: RA or UN | MS + UN | Somalia 1992-1994 |
| | | Cote d'Ivoire 2011 |
| | MS \|\| [UN] | Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995 |
| | | DRC 2003 |
| | MS \|\| RA>>UN | Mali 2012-2023 |
| | | Central African Republic 2013- |
| UN is deployed or transitioned into an existing UN peacekeeping mission | UN | DRC 2005 |
| | UN[UN] | DRC 2013- |

*Member State (MS) as Peace Enforcement Actor*

The Member State actor is the most prevalent actor in the history of peace enforcement operations. Thirteen of the sixteen cases involve a coalition of Member States as the

[11] While the total universe of peace enforcement cases is seventeen, as previously noted the occlusion of Congo 1961-1964 leaves sixteen cases as the universe for this chapter's empirical analysis.

primary actor in the enforcement mission. MS comprise the initial deploying enforcement force in the first nine cases between 1950 and 2005. In seven of the sixteen cases, MS is the sole actor.

In six other cases, MS has led peace enforcement operations alongside another actor, either a Regional Arrangement (RA) or the UN. In two of these six, the MS force was coordinated directly with a UN peace enforcement force, while in two other cases, the MS force was deployed parallel to a UN peacekeeping mission. In the remaining two of these six cases, the MS force was deployed parallel to an RA peace enforcement force, which transitioned into a UN peace enforcement force.

*Regional Arrangement (RA) as Peace Enforcement Actor*

A Regional Arrangement has led a peace enforcement operation in three distinct cases. The RA force was the sole actor in only one of these three cases. Twice, the RA force has deployed in parallel to an MS force, and in both of these cases, the RA force transitioned to a UN-led peace enforcement mission. All three Regional Arrangement-led enforcement actions have occurred in Africa. While ECOWAS, IGAD, and the ICGLR are regional arrangements that have proposed peace enforcement operations, only the AU has led a deployed peace enforcement operation.

*UN as Peace Enforcement Actor*

The UN has participated in the actor constellation of seven peace enforcement missions. In two cases, the UN-led force has deployed in coordination with an MS-led force, while in three other cases, the UN-led force has been a follow-on force to another actor: once for an MS-led mission and twice for an RA-led operation. Interestingly, while

the UN-led force was a true follow-on force, relieving the MS-led mission in place, as a follow-on force to a Regional Arrangement, the RA-led forces were "re-hatted" as new members of the UN-led force.

Of the remaining two cases, one was a UN-led peace enforcement force transformed by a Security Council mandate into a peace enforcement operation (DRC 2005) and subsequently transformed back into a peacekeeping force once the mandate to use coercive tactics to deter the use of force by a non-state armed group. The final case (DRC 2013) saw the integration of a UN-led specialized intervention brigade with a peace enforcement mandate into an existing UN peacekeeping mission.

### 8.3 Empirical Analysis of the Causal Mechanisms

The previous two sections of this chapter provided a greater understanding of the variables involved in the study and the actors. This section focuses on the empirical analysis of the causal mechanisms by building upon this understanding through the examination of the variables in relation to peace enforcement actors and their constellations. The important analytical question is: what combination of conditions leads to what outcome? Which conditions have little or no influence on the dependent outcome variable versus which are causally relevant? This section will first outline the prevalence of conditions concerning actors and then explore the combinations of conditions that form causal mechanisms that influence specific actor constellations.

Whereas the case study analysis traced the process of the twelve variables from the beginning to end of a case to shed light on which variables exhibited influence over the determination of the outcome, empirically analyzing the prevalence of conditions

regarding actors is best worked in reverse. For each case, the outcome (the actor constellation leading the peace enforcement operation) is readily apparent, with this aspect of the study being to identify conditions causally influencing these outcomes. Consequently, examining the frequency with which specific conditions exist within the universe of cases is relevant. Using the methodology of Chapter 3, in which explanatory conditions influence intervening conditions to ultimately provide the causal mechanism determining the actor constellation, in working backward from the outcome, it is first necessary to examine the intervening conditions. Table 8-2 displays the prevalence of intervening conditions for each of the three actor types across the universe of sixteen cases.

Table 8-9: Prevalence of Intervening Conditions by Actor

| Intervening Conditions | # Cases | MS | RA | UN |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| P-3 Interest | | | | |
| National Security | 8 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| Colonial / Strategic / Economic | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Humanitarian | 5 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| P-3 Availability | | | | |
| Available | 9 | 8 | 1 | 3 |
| At War | 7 | 5 | 2 | 4 |
| UNDPO History | | | | |
| Previous/ongoing UNDPO mission | 9 | 6 | 2 | 6 |
| No previous UNDPO mission | 7 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| State Stability | | | | |
| Strong | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Weak | 7 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| Failed | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Collapsed | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| HN Invitation | | | | |
| Yes-Invited | 14 | 11 | 3 | 7 |
| No-Not Invited | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| PE Purpose | | | | |
| Repel invaders / stop civil war | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Remove illegal government / install legitimate government to power | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Establish security/stability over territory | 8 | 7 | 1 | 3 |
| Create a secure environment for humanitarian operations | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Protect civilians in imminent danger of attack | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Neutralize/defeat/deter spoilers to peace | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| PoC Mandate | | | | |
| Yes | 13 | 10 | 3 | 7 |
| No | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Support Democratic Governance Mandate | | | | |
| Yes | 12 | 10 | 3 | 5 |
| No | 4 | 3 | 0 | 2 |

Table 8-9 outlines various intervening conditions impacting peace enforcement operations by Member States (MS), Regional Arrangements (RA), and the United Nations (UN). These conditions include political interest, availability of military forces, historical engagements (UNDPO History), state stability, host nation invitation, the purpose of peace enforcement (PE Purpose), mandates for protecting civilians (PoC), and supporting democratic governance.

Member State-led operations often reflect direct national security interests, with colonial/strategic/economic (C/S/E) and humanitarian interests being less prevalent. In all seven cases where national security interests held sway, the peace enforcement actor constellation contained only a single actor: six times led by Member States and once by a Regional Arrangement, with no direct involvement of the UN as part of any national security-based intervention. France was the lead Member State in all three PE operations with C/S/E interests, while humanitarian interests were shared equally between Member States and the UN.

Member State-led operations are notably influenced by the host nation's invitation, showcasing a preference for operations where there's a clear mandate and invitation, aligning with their national interests and international security concerns. Member State-led PE deployed equally to conflicts with a previous UNDPO peacekeeping mission and those without UNDPO involvement. Peace enforcement with the purpose requiring the intervening force to repel an invader, remove an illegitimate government, or install a legitimate government to power were all led by coalitions of Member States. Operations with other purposes were spread across operations involving all three actors.

Regional Arrangement-led operations show a distinct pattern, focusing less on humanitarian and national security interests and more on immediate regional security and stability concerns. These operations are more likely to be driven by the direct impact of neighboring state instability, reflecting a regional commitment to security and political stability. All cases of Regional Arrangement participation included an invitation from the host nation and mandates for the protection of civilians and support of democratic governance.

UN-led operations are strongly influenced by the international community's humanitarian concerns and the mandate to protect civilians. These operations most often occur in conflicts with weak state stability, emphasizing the UN's role in addressing global security challenges that transcend national interests. Without the inherent robust capabilities of Member State-led operations, UN-led PE is less inclined to occur in conflicts where the host nation’s stability has deteriorated to the point of failure or collapse. The UN's engagement reflects a strong commitment to humanitarian assistance and the promotion of democratic governance, especially in conflicts where previous UN peacekeeping missions have proven unsuccessful.

The prevalence of these seven intervening conditions as outlined in Table 8-9 underscores the complex dynamics influencing peace enforcement operations, revealing how different actors prioritize various factors based on their mandates, capacities, and interests. While Table 8-9 focused on the intervening variables, Table 8-10 displays the prevalence of the five explanatory conditions for each of the three actor types.

Table 8-10: Prevalence of Explanatory Conditions by Actor

| Explanatory Conditions | # Cases | MS | RA | UN |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conflict Type | | | | |
| Inter-state war | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Civil war for central control | 9 | 7 | 3 | 5 |
| Civil war over local issues | 4 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Conflict Length | | | | |
| ≤2 years | 10 | 10 | 1 | 3 |
| >2 years | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Gain control of central government | 9 | 8 | 2 | 2 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 8 | 6 | 2 | 5 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 5 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | | | |
| High | 7 | 7 | 0 | 2 |
| Medium | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Low | 5 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| Disruptive Impact | | | | |
| Global | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Regional | 10 | 7 | 3 | 7 |
| Local | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Table 8-10 delineates the influence of various explanatory conditions on peace enforcement operations conducted by Member States (MS), Regional Arrangements (RA), and the United Nations (UN). These conditions encompass conflict type, length, belligerent objectives and capabilities, and the disruptive impact of conflicts. The data presented in the table highlights how different actors are engaged across various conflict scenarios, reflecting their operational focus, strategic interests, and response mechanisms to conflict dynamics.

Member State-led operations tend to engage more in conflicts where the government's control is at stake, indicating a preference for interventions with significant political or strategic interests. Interstate wars are the exclusive domain of Member State-led peace enforcement, while the data suggests that MS operations are less frequent in non-state wars across state borders, perhaps due to the complex nature of such conflicts, which often require broader international consensus or mandate. Member States are more

inclined to intervene in conflicts less than two years old, especially where the belligerent capabilities are deemed to be high.

Regional Arrangements are exclusively involved in civil wars for central control of the government, and their engagement is notably higher in conflicts with a regional disruptive impact. These underline the RA's vested interest in maintaining regional stability and security.

UN-led operations show a broader engagement across various conflict types and lengths, reflecting the organization's global mandate for peace and security. It may also indicate that UN-led peace enforcement occurs in conflicts that either don’t rise to the level of interest for Member States to intervene or have proven to require more complex, longer-duration interventions than Member States are willing to bear. UN interventions are particularly noted in conflicts with low belligerent capabilities and where the belligerent objectives comprise establishing ethnic superiority or conducting criminal enterprises, indicating a focus on protecting civilians and supporting state stability in localized areas within a conflict.

With the three actors forming the building blocks for actor constellations, the analysis of Tables 8-9 and 8-10 underscore the differing strategic orientations and operational priorities of MS, RA, and UN in peace enforcement, influenced by the specific nature of conflicts and the broader objectives of peace and security. The prevalence of these explanatory and intervening conditions thus plays a crucial role in determining the involvement and approach of each actor in peace enforcement operations. Where the assessment of the variables in Tables 8-1 through 8-7 established the foundation for this

study's empirical analysis, and the examination of these variables' influence on the three distinct peace enforcement actors constructed our ground floor, to go higher, we must apply this same empirical analysis of the causal mechanisms for actor constellations.

Tables 8-11 and 8-12 display the prevalence of intervening and explanatory conditions across all eight distinct actor constellations that have led peace enforcement operations between 1945 and 2020. When analyzing the influence of intervening conditions on peace enforcement by different actor constellations, it's essential to consider how these conditions—such as national security interests, historical engagements, state stability, and host nation invitations—affect the strategic decisions leading to each actor constellation. A comprehensive analysis would compare the prevalence of these conditions across different constellations (e.g., MS, MS+UN, RA, etc.) and assess how the presence or absence of these conditions contributes to the formation of the specific actor constellation. This approach allows for a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted dynamics at play in the creation and deployment of a peace enforcement mission.

Table 8-11 examines the prevalence of intervening variables across different actor constellations in peace enforcement operations. It breaks down occurrences of various conditions like P-3 interest, UNDPO history, state stability, host nation invitation, peace enforcement purposes, mandates for protection of civilians, and support for democratic governance, in relation to each of the eight unique peace enforcement actor constellations. The data shown in each cell represents the number of occurrences of each intervening variable out of the total cases where that actor constellation was present,

offering a detailed perspective on the conditions most associated with each actor type in peace enforcement contexts.

Table 8-11: Prevalence of Intervening Conditions by Actor Constellation

| Intervening Conditions | # Cases | MS | MS+UN | MS>>UN | MS\|\|[UN] | MS\|\|RA>>UN | RA | UN | UN[UN] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| P-3 Interest | | | | | | | | | |
| National Security | 7 | 5/6 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 1/2 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Colonial / Strategic / Economic | 3 | 0/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 2/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Humanitarian | 6 | 1/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 1/2 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| P-3 Availability | | | | | | | | | |
| Available | 9 | 5/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 1/1 |
| At War | 7 | 1/6 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 0/1 |
| UNDPO History | | | | | | | | | |
| Previous/ongoing UNDPO mission | 9 | 0/6 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 2/2 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| No previous UNDPO mission | 7 | 6/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| State Stability | | | | | | | | | |
| Strong | 2 | 2/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Weak | 7 | 2/6 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Failed | 4 | 1/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 2/2 | 2/2 | 0/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| Collapsed | 3 | 1/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| HN Invitation | | | | | | | | | |
| Yes-Invited | 14 | 4/6 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 2/2 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| No-Not Invited | 2 | 2/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| PE Purpose | | | | | | | | | |
| Repel invaders / stop civil war | 2 | 2/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Remove illegal government / install legitimate government to power | 1 | 1/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Establish security/stability over territory | 8 | 3/6 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 1/2 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Create a secure environment for humanitarian operations | 4 | 0/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 1/2 | 2/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Protect civilians in imminent danger of attack | 4 | 1/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 2/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Neutralize/defeat/deter spoilers to peace | 4 | 0/6 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 1/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| PoC Mandate | | | | | | | | | |
| Yes | 13 | 3/6 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 2/2 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| No | 3 | 3/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Support Democratic Governance Mandate | | | | | | | | | |
| Yes | 12 | 4/6 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 2/2 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 0/1 |
| No | 4 | 2/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 2/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 1/1 |

In cases where a Member State acts alone, national security interests dominate. A Member State (or Member State-led coalition) as the sole actor in the constellation is much more likely to occur when the P-3 countries are not already at war and at the beginning of the outbreak of conflict. While an invitation from the host nation seems preferable, it is not mandatory given that two of the six cases occurred without the host nation's approval (Haiti 1994 and Libya 2011). When the enforcement purpose is to repel

an invading force, stop a civil war, or remove an illegitimate regime to allow the legitimate government to accede to power, Member States always respond as the sole actor.

Conversely, when Member States operate alongside the UN or a Regional Arrangement, other factors like colonial and humanitarian interests, historical UN involvement, and state stability come into play. These multi-actor constellations always operate with the approval of a weak, failed, or collapsed host nation while covering the full range of peace enforcement purposes other than those targeting the government.

Regional Arrangements as sole actors or in conjunction with UN forces show different patterns, such as the presence or absence of a UN mission in the past. Working in parallel with a Member State, Regional Arrangements have deployed exclusively at the request of failed states to establish security over territory, create a secure environment for humanitarian operations and/or protect civilians in imminent danger of attack. Operating as an independent actor, Regional Arrangements have only ever deployed to a collapsed state to establish stability over territory.

The United Nations as a peace enforcement actor has only occurred in conflicts where previous UN peacekeeping missions have failed to stop the violence against civilians and where the P-3 has a significant interest in resolving the humanitarian crisis. In every case with the UN as an actor, UN participation has always been at the invitation of the host nation, the majority of which were failed or collapsed states. Without exception, the UN actor has had a mandate for the protection of civilians, whether operating solely or as part of a multi-actor constellation, with the enforcement purpose of

creating a secure environment for humanitarian operations, the protection of civilians in danger of immediate attack, or the neutralization/defeat/deterrence of armed spoilers to the peace process.

In the seven cases where the P-3 had national security interest, six involved a Member State as the sole peace enforcement actor with one being led by a Regional Arrangement. Both times that a peace enforcement force intervened without an invitation from the host nation, the only actor was Member State. The same is true for the two occasions a peace enforcement action was initiated in response to an interstate war.

With a greater understanding of the influence intervening conditions have on actor constellations, Table 8-12 focuses on the influence the five explanatory variables exert on peace enforcement actor constellations. The prevalence of these conflict-specific factors is expository in the presence of the specific constellation of actors within each case. The logic of Table 8-12 mimics that of Table 8-11 in that each cell represents the number of occurrences of each explanatory variable out of the total cases where that actor constellation was present in one of the sixteen peace enforcement operations being analyzed.

Member States intervene as the sole actor exclusively in burgeoning conflicts less than two years old, and almost always when the belligerent groups attempt to control the central government (5 out of 6 cases). Solo Member State-led actor constellations are more likely to occur when the belligerent's capability is assessed as high with a globally disruptive impact by the conflict. When the Member State deploys alongside an RA or the UN, whether in coordination or parallel, these are also almost exclusively in conflicts for

control over the central government. However, with these multi-actor constellations, the conflicts trend toward being longer in length, and the belligerent groups are less capable, having a regional disruptive impact rather than a global one. The objectives of the belligerents in these cases are also more varied, including establishing ethnic superiority over a local area, creating a base to launch global attacks or acting as armed spoilers to the peace process.

Table 8-12: Explanatory Conditions by Actor Constellation

| Explanatory Conditions | # Cases | MS | MS+UN | MS>>UN | MS\|\|[UN] | MS\|\|RA>>UN | RA | UN | UN[UN] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conflict Type | | | | | | | | | |
| Inter-state war | 2 | 2/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Civil war for central control | 9 | 3/6 | 2/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 0/1 |
| Civil war over local issues | 4 | 1/6 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 1/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 1/1 |
| Non-state war across state borders | 1 | 0/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 1/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Conflict Length | | | | | | | | | |
| ≤2 years | 10 | 6/6 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| >2 years | 6 | 0/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| Belligerent Objectives | | | | | | | | | |
| Secession / self-determination | 1 | 0/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 1/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Gain control of central government | 9 | 5/6 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 0/2 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Establish ethnic superiority over local/regional area | 8 | 0/6 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 2/2 | 2/2 | 0/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process for gain | 5 | 0/6 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| Establish base for global attacks | 3 | 1/6 | | 0/1 | 0/2 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | | | | | | | | |
| High | 7 | 4/6 | 2/2 | 0/1 | 1/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Medium | 4 | 1/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 1/2 | 1/1 | 0/1 | 1/1 |
| Low | 5 | 1/6 | 0/2 | 1/1 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 0/1 | 1/1 | 0/1 |
| Disruptive Impact | | | | | | | | | |
| Global | 5 | 4/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 1/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| Regional | 10 | 1/6 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 1/2 | 2/2 | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| Local | 1 | 1/6 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/2 | 0/2 | 0/1 | 0/1 | 0/1 |
| | | | | | | | | | |

Regional Arrangements have led peace enforcement operations only in the case of civil war for central control of a government. These interventions tend to be in conflicts that have festered for longer than two years, and in no circumstances have the belligerents been highly capable or had a globally disruptive impact.

Likewise, the UN is more likely to be part of the actor constellation when the belligerent capabilities are low. However, sometimes, the conflicts have moderately

capable belligerent groups, and the conflict has lasted more than two years. The UN has never been the solo lead actor when belligerent capability is High. The two times the UN participated in peace enforcement with a highly capable belligerent group (Somalia 1994 and Cote d'Ivoire 2011), a robust Member State-led force deployed alongside the UN to reduce or thwart the belligerent capabilities. UN-led missions often contain belligerent actors intent on establishing ethnic superiority or conducting a criminal enterprise as a spoiler to the peace process. In both cases where the UN was the sole actor in the constellation, the strategic use of coercive force was targeted at armed belligerent groups acting as minority spoilers to a very involved peace process with dozens of factions.

The table is also useful in assessing the outcome based on specific explanatory variable conditions. When the belligerent objective has been to gain control of the central government, a Member State or Regional Arrangement has been an actor from the beginning of the peace enforcement operation. On the three occasions, belligerents worked to establish a base for global attacks, the peace enforcement actor was either a Member State, Regional Arrangement, or both, and the host nation's government was either in a failed or collapsed state. With the exception of Somalia 2007-2022, the five other cases in conflicts exceeding two years in length have all involved the UN in some capacity – four times as a peace enforcement actor and once as a peacekeeping force.

### 8.4 Developing Hypotheses from Causal Mechanisms

The data analysis conducted in the previous section aids in understanding the causal factors influencing the complex decision-making processes behind forming these actor

constellations in peace enforcement operations. Armed with a greater knowledge of the conditions related to the actor constellations, it is now possible to further explore the combination of causal conditions as the driver for specific actor constellations with the goal of developing hypotheses to explain the evolution of actor constellations in peace enforcement.

Which combination of conditions leads to Member States as the lead actors in peace enforcement? From the empirical observation, we can see that emergent conflicts (those less than two years old) that are of national security interest to the P-3 most often result in peace enforcement operations with Member State as the lead actor. The combination of these two conditions occurs 7 times in the 16 cases, with all seven cases resulting in Member State as the actor constellation. Of the 9 cases where the Member States were the sole peace enforcement actor, all but one occurred in emerging conflicts one-year-old or less, and seven of the nine were of national security interest to the P-3. Accordingly, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

*H1: If the P-3 has a national security interest in an emergent conflict, then it is very likely the peace enforcement actor constellation will be a coalition of Member States.*

Table 8-13: Hypothesis 1

| Operation | Conflict Length | P-3 Interest | Actor Constellation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Korea 1950-1953 | 0 | National Security | MS |
| Kuwait 1990-1991 | 0 | National Security | MS |
| Afghanistan 2001-2015 | 0 | National Security | MS |
| Libya 2011 | 0 | National Security | MS |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995 | 1 | National Security | MS \|\| [UN] |
| Haiti 1994 | 0 | National Security | MS |
| East Timor 1999-2000 | 1 | *Humanitarian* | MS |
| Haiti 2004-2017 | 0 | National Security | MS >> UN |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003 | *5* | *Colonial/Strategic/Economic* | MS \|\| [UN] |

The combination of these two conditions leads to a very high probability of the expected outcome (Table 8-12). As observed in the case studies, this is likely the result of the P-3's

exclusive capabilities to rapidly deploy and sustain a peace enforcement force when they determine that the conflict poses a national security threat for the United States or Europe. A corollary to the first hypothesis reflects the two cases in which the type of conflict included interstate war.

*H2. If the conflict is an interstate war, then it is almost certain the peace enforcement actor constellation will be a coalition of Member States.*

Table 8-14: Hypothesis 2

| Operation | Conflict Type | Actor Constellation |
|---|---|---|
| Korea 1950-1953 | Intrastate War | MS |
| Kuwait 1990-1991 | Intrastate War | MS |

The condition of interstate war combined with the purpose of the enforcement action to repel the invading force requires the intervention of a robust military force, the type of force suited to a coalition of Member States. Another observable set of causal conditions driving the actor constellation is the combination of belligerent capability and disruptive impact of the conflict. By assigning numerical values to the assessed condition of belligerent capability (1=Low, 2=Moderate, 3=High) and disruptive impact (1=Local, 2=Regional, 3=Global) as depicted in Table 8-15.

Table 8-15: Hypothesis 3

| Operation | Belligerent Capabilities | Disruptive Impact | Score | Actor Constellation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Korea 1950-1953 | 3-High | 3-Global | 6 | MS |
| Kuwait 1990-1991 | 3-High | 3-Global | 6 | MS |
| Afghanistan 2001-2015 | 3-High | 3-Global | 6 | MS |
| Libya 2011 | 3-High | 3-Global | 6 | MS |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995 | 3-High | 3-Global | 6 | MS \|\| [UN] |
| Cote d'Ivoire 2011 | 3-High | 2-Regional | 5 | MS + UN |
| Somalia 1992-1994 | 3-High | 2-Regional | 5 | MS + UN |
| Haiti 1994 | 2-Moderate | 2-Regional | 4 | MS |
| Mali 2012-2023 | 2-Moderate | 2-Regional | 4 | MS \|\| RA >> UN |
| Somalia 2007-2022 | 2-Moderate | 2-Regional | 4 | RA |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2013- | 2-Moderate | 2-Regional | 4 | [UN]UN |
| Haiti 2004-2017 | 1-Low | 2-Regional | 3 | MS >> UN |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003 | 1-Low | 2-Regional | 3 | MS \|\| [UN] |
| Central African Republic 2013- | 1-Low | 2-Regional | 3 | MS \|\| RA >> UN |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2005 | 1-Low | 2-Regional | 3 | UN |
| East Timor 1999-2000 | 1-Low | 1-Low | 2 | MS |

As such, we can propose the following hypothesis:

*H3: The greater the belligerent capability and the more disruptive impact of the conflict, the more likely the peace enforcement operation will be led by a Member State*.

Table 8-15 shows a clear correlation between these two explanatory conditions and the resulting actor constellation outcome, and the case studies in this research provide insight into the combinations of these conditions proving causative. Libya 2011 and Mali 2012 pointed to how the increased capabilities of belligerents in the conflicts, as well as the disruptive impact of the civil war globally and regionally, were driving considerations for the deployment of a Member State-led peace enforcement operation. Conversely, the relatively low capabilities of the belligerent actors in the DRC 2005 case (seen in Table 8-15 as having one of the lowest scores) oriented the Secretary-General and the Security Council to look to the UN for resolutions. In the middle, DRC 2013-, with a more moderate score considering the Regional disruptive impact and Moderate belligerent capabilities, led to a more robust UN Force Intervention Brigade to supplement the existing UN peacekeeping force on the ground.

While the first three hypotheses build on observations regarding Member State-led peace enforcement, we must also ask which combination of conditions is leading to Regional Arrangements as a lead actor in peace enforcement. The most relative causal mechanism driving the inclusion of Regional Arrangements includes the explanatory variables of conflict type and disruptive impact combined with the intervening variables of host nation invitation, PE purpose, and Protection of Civilian mandate (Table 8-16)

Table 8-16: Hypothesis 4

| Operation | Conflict Type | Disruptive Impact | HN Invitation | PE Purpose | PoC Mandate | Actor Constellation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mali 2012-2023 | 2 | Regional | Yes | Establish security/stability over territory | Yes | MS \|\| RA >> UN |
| Central African Republic 2013- | 2 | Regional | Yes | Establish security/stability over territory<br>Protect civilians from attack<br>Neutralize NSAs and spoilers | Yes | MS \|\| RA >> UN |
| Somalia 2007-2022 | 2 | Regional | Yes | Establish security/stability over territory | Yes | RA |

Thus:

*H4. If a host nation invites a peace enforcement operation with a PoC mandate to establish security/stability over territory in regionally disruptive civil wars for central control, then it is extremely likely that the actor constellation will be led by a Regional Arrangement.*

With only three of the sixteen analyzed cases having a Regional Arrangement as an actor in the constellation, it is somewhat difficult to assess the strength of Hypothesis 4. However, the combination of these four specific explanatory and intervening conditions provide a very likely causal mechanism to determine the presence of Regional Arrangement within the peace enforcement actor constellation. All three times these four variables are set to these specific set of conditions a Regional Arrangement is present. Changing the conflict type to a different type of war, or the disruptive impact variable from Regional to Global results in a Member State-led actor constellation with no Regional Arrangement present. When the PE purpose changes to a condition including creating a secure environment for humanitarian operations or protecting civilians from attack while removing the mandate to establish security/stability over territory, the actor constellation adds a UN actor while the Regional Arrangement actor is absent (Somalia 1992-1994 and Cote d'Ivoire 2011). The same PE purpose variable modified to include a mandate to

neutralize/defeat/deter NSAs and spoilers likewise adds the UN actor and removes Regional Arrangement.

Which combination of conditions is leading to the United Nations as a lead actor in peace enforcement? The UN-led force as an actor in peace enforcement occurs in seven cases. In two cases, the UN is the only enforcement actor, in two others it operates parallel to a Member State-led PE force, and in three other cases it assumes control of the PE mission from either a Member State (Haiti 2004-2017) or a Regional Arrangement (Mali 2012-2023 and Cote d'Ivoire 2013-) It is worth noting that the only current peace enforcement operations are UN-led missions. Based on the empirical observations, two hypotheses are proposed that explain the causal conditions leading to UN-led actors in the peace enforcement actor constellation:

*H5. If the Security Council provides a peace enforcement mandate to neutralize/defeat/deter non-state actors and these actors conduct criminal enterprise and/or are spoilers to the peace process, then the actor constellation is likely to include the UN as a lead actor.*

H5 is a specific combination of causal conditions geared toward the transformation in multi-faction civil war, especially in Africa, where non-state armed groups prioritize their ongoing criminal enterprise and spoil the peace process for the enrichment of the group. These threats are always on the lesser end of the disruption scale and don't rise to the level of national security interest for the P-3. Consequently, they are ideally suited for UN-led peace enforcement operations. This combination of causal conditions occurs in all three of the enforcement actions where the UN is the sole actor in the constellation (Haiti 2004-2017, DRC 2005, and DRC 2013-).

The second combination of conditions causing the transition of a peace enforcement actor constellation to become UN-led includes the increasing condition of the length of the conflict and the decreasing condition of its disruptive impact. Table 8-17 shows both variables and their corresponding actor constellations.

Table 8-17: Hypothesis 6

| Operation | Conflict Length | Belligerent Capabilities | Actor Constellation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Korea 1950-1953 | 0 | High | MS |
| Kuwait 1990-1991 | 0 | High | MS |
| Afghanistan 2001-2015 | 0 | High | MS |
| Libya 2011 | 0 | High | MS |
| Haiti 2004-2017 | 0 | Low | MS >> UN |
| Haiti 1994 | 0 | Med | MS |
| Mali 2012-2023 | 0 | Med | MS \|\| RA >> UN |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995 | 1 | High | MS \|\| [UN] |
| East Timor 1999-2000 | 1 | Low | MS |
| Somalia 1992-1994 | 2 | High | MS + UN |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003 | 5 | Low | MS \|\| [UN] |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2005 | 7 | Low | UN |
| Cote d'Ivoire 2011 | 8 | High | MS + UN |
| Central African Republic 2013- | 15 | Low | MS \|\| RA >> UN |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2013- | 15 | Med | UN[UN] |
| Somalia 2007-2022 | 16 | Med | RA |

All sixteen cases are sorted according to length of conflict. Only two of the seven cases of UN-led peace enforcement occur in emergent conflicts less than two years old, and both of these are in conflicts where the belligerent capability is Low (Haiti 2004-2017) progressing to Medium (Mali 2012-2023). The case of Somalia 1992-1994 shows two years for conflict length, but this is derived from the point of collapse of the Barre regime in January 1991, over two years before the UNOSOM II mission began. At the bottom of Table 8-17, UN-led actors comprise four of the bottom five slots with the greatest length of conflict. Accordingly, the proposed hypothesis is:

*H6. The greater the length of the conflict and the lower its disruptive impact, the more likely the actor constellation will transition to a UN-led actor constellation*

While the previous six proposed hypotheses were specific to the causal conditions driving certain actor constellations, the last hypothesis is oriented towards explaining the

combination of conditions that generate parallel operations that have occurred in four of the sixteen operations. This is especially relevant to understanding the evolution of peace enforcement actor constellations, as two parallel operations have occurred in the most recent three authorized missions. The three variables aligned to create this causal condition for parallel operations include the stability of the state, host nation invitation, and PoC mandate (Table 8-18).

Table 8-18: Hypothesis 7

| Operation | State Stability | HN Invitation | PoC Mandate | Actor Constellation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan 2001-2015 | Failed | Yes | Yes | MS |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995 | Failed | Yes | Yes | MS \|\| [UN] |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo 2003 | Failed | Yes | Yes | MS \|\| [UN] |
| Mali 2012-2023 | Failed | Yes | Yes | MS \|\| RA >> UN |
| Central African Republic 2013- | Failed | Yes | Yes | MS \|\| RA >> UN |

Thus:

*H7. Failed states inviting a peace enforcement operation with a PoC mandate are more likely to have actor constellations with multiple actors deployed in parallel operations*

In four of the five cases in which these combined conditions exist, four of them have resulted in parallel operations between multiple actor constellations. The one case that doesn't support this conclusion (Afghanistan 2001-2015) is actually a parallel operation between a Member State-led peace enforcement mission (ISAF) and the US-led military intervention to defeat al-Qaeda as part of the Global War on Terror.

As this dissertation is a theory-proposing undertaking, one of the main objectives of this research is to develop testable hypotheses to explain the formation and transformation of peace enforcement actor constellations. This chapter delved into the empirical analysis of peace enforcement actor constellations, examining the prevalence and influence of explanatory and intervening variables across peace enforcement operations since 1945. It

systematically assessed the causal conditions that determine the leading actors in these operations, focusing on the interplay between conflict-specific factors and case-specific conditions, including the international community's interest levels, historical UN involvement, host nation stability, and the mandates of peace enforcement missions. This analysis proposed a set of testable hypotheses on how specific peace enforcement actors and constellations are formed and evolve, contributing significantly to understanding the dynamics of peace enforcement operations.

# CHAPTER 9
# EVOLUTION OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Peace enforcement operations, as defined in Chapter Two, have become a pivotal tool in the international community's arsenal for responding to breaches and threats to peace and security. The shift towards a more multifaceted actor landscape in peace enforcement is reflective of broader changes in international relations, including the increasing apathy of the P-3 to become entangled in protracted peace operations, the rising assertiveness of regional organizations in security matters, and the UN's evolving approach to peacekeeping and peace enforcement under the purview of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Armed with the knowledge of “how” this change occurs, as examined in Chapter 8, we can now turn our sights toward an examination of the “what” and “why” of peace enforcement actor constellations. Using the analogy of an art studio, the previous eight chapters of this dissertation have assembled canvases on easels, a select stock of paint and brushes, and a set of individual painters. Through our comprehensive examination, we have a knowledge and understanding of how each painting was completed over time, with some of the paintings still incomplete. Now, with Chapter 9, it is time to describe all of the paintings in the studio. How did individual paintings impact the creation of new ones? What can be said about the entirety of the paintings? Why did they evolve, and what story do they tell? And most importantly, can we make judgments as to what future paintings in this specific studio might look like?

## 9.1 The Essence of the Evolution

The United Nations heralded and codified the concept of collective security in the wake of World War II. Under its auspices, the first peace enforcement operation was undertaken in June 1950 to stem the North Korean invasion of democratic South Korea. Over the next 70 years, sixteen additional peace enforcement operations would be initiated, with two currently ongoing. The hypotheses proposed in Chapter 8 outline the specific conditions that drive the formation and transformation of actor constellations in peace enforcement, but is there an evolution in the actors enforcing the peace as this study first proposed in Chapter 1?

A snapshot of all 17 enforcement operations (including Congo 1961-1964 which was discarded as an outlier for the empirical analysis in Chapter 8) occurring over the 75-year period of 1945-2020, shows that 14 were initiated during a 21-year span between 1992-2013. Of the last eight operations, all initiated within a relatively short period of nine years between 2004-2013, six involved the United Nations as actor and three involved Regional Arrangements. The three cases involving Regional Arrangements have been the only three occasions that Regional Arrangements have formed part of a peace enforcement actor constellation. As of March 2024, two of these last eight PE operations were still ongoing.

Chapter 8 showed how conflict and case-specific factors shape the actor constellations – so it is logical that as these conditions manifest themselves differently across conflicts, so too will the actor constellations. Looking at the list of peace enforcement actor constellations over time (see Table 3-3), a clear dividing line appears in

2004 regarding the consistency of the actors involved in the constellation. Between 1945 and 2004, a 59-year period, a Member State led every peace enforcement mission except for Congo 1961-1964.[12] Beginning in 2004 with the UN assuming the role from the US-led coalition as sole peace enforcement actor in Haiti, the UN has been involved in six of the next eight peace enforcement operations. Prior to Haiti, the UN had only been a peace enforcement actor in two of the nine cases: Congo 1961-1964 and Somalia 1992-1994. Using this 2004 dividing line, nine PE operations occur in the 58-year period above the line (1945-2003, hereinafter "Era 1"), while eight peace enforcement operations begin in the nine-year period below the line (2004-2013, hereinafter "Era 2").

Bifurcating the cases into two eras allows for some interesting comparative analysis. Let's examine the conflict-specific factors first. Across all 17 cases during the 63 years that peace enforcement operations have been initiated (1950-2013), the average conflict length before the peace enforcement intervention was 4.1 years. However, Era 1 averaged a conflict length of one year, while Era 2 averaged 7.6 years prior to attempting to enforce the peace. The belligerent objectives in these intrastate conflicts have also changed in frequency between the two eras. In Era 1, belligerents in only one case conducted criminal enterprises and/or spoiled the peace process for gain (Somalia 1992-94), while this belligerent objective was observed in four cases during Era 2. This condition is associated with the UN as lead peace enforcement actor, correlates with belligerents that have low/moderate capabilities, and supports the more frequent inclusion

[12] Congo 1961-1964 was disregarded in the Chapter 8 empirical analysis as being an outlier case and an argument could easily be made that it should not count in this conclusion either.

of the UN in Era 2 over Era 1. Likewise, highly capable belligerents, as well as conflicts that are globally disruptive, drive Member State-led actor constellations. The evolution in the conditions outlined in Table 9-1 between eras supports the corresponding changes in actor constellations.

Table 9-1: Conflict-Specific Conditions Over Time

| Condition | Era 1 (1950-2003) | Era 2 (2003-2013) | All (1950-2013) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conflict Length | 1 year | 7.6 years | 4.1 years |
| Belligerent Objectives | | | |
| 4-Conduct criminal enterprise / spoil peace process | 1/9 | 4/8 | 5/17 |
| Belligerent Capabilities | | | |
| High | 5/9 | 2/8 | 7/17 |
| Low | 3/9 | 3/8 | 6/17 |
| Disruptive Impact | | | |
| Global | 4/9 | 1/8 | 5/17 |
| Regional | 3/9 | 7/8 | 10/17 |

Case-specific factors, the intervening causal conditions, are also supportive of this evolution of actor constellations between the two eras. In Era 1, the P-3 had a national security interest in six of the nine peace enforcement operations, while in only two of the next eight peace enforcement operations (Era 2) elevated to the level of national security threat for the P-3. Similarly, peace enforcement mandates to repel invaders, stop a civil war, remove an illegitimate regime, or install a legitimate government to power[13] occurred four times in Era 1, and not once in Era 2. If we add the mandate to create a secure environment to conduct humanitarian operations to these two,[14] at least one of these three conditions under PE Purpose is observed in each of the first five peace enforcement operations. However, PE Purpose #1 and #2 have not been seen in any peace enforcement mission since Kuwait 1990-1991, and #4 has only been mandated in two of the next twelve cases (Mali 2012-2023 and CAR 2013-). Lastly, a mandate for the

[13] PE Purpose #1 or #2 in Table 3-6
[14] PE Purpose #3 in Table 3-6

protection of civilians has been included in every peace enforcement since 1999, while included only twice in the six cases before 1999.

During the Global War on Terror, France took the lead in Member State-led peace enforcement operations, deploying four times either alone or leading an EU force (DRC 2003, Cote d'Ivoire 2012, Mali 2012-2023, CAR 2013-), and once as a member of NATO (Libya 2011). Simultaneously, the capabilities of Regional Arrangements, specifically the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture, have added significant capability to respond to African crises.

### 9.2 Why the Evolution in Peace Enforcement?

The previous chapters have focused on identifying the causal pathways that determine specific actor constellations in peace enforcement operations, and the first section of this chapter has shown *how* changes in these conflict- and case-specific conditions over time have contributed to the evolution of peace enforcement. With the essence of this evolution outlined, we are now driven to explain *why* this evolution in actor constellations has occurred so that we can better understand the future of peace enforcement. To this end, we again look toward the explanatory and intervening variables. Chapter 3 explained that the twelve variables selected for this research were based on the main international relations theories of liberalism, rational choice institutionalism, and complexity theory. It is now appropriate to come full circle and assess how these theories have relevance to the evolution of peace enforcement.

Two recent scholarly works in particular have provided substantial insight into this very question of the relevance of a range of international relations theories on peace operations. While not specific to peace enforcement, this dissertation would be remiss in not utilizing the valuable erudition produced by various recognized experts. *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order*, edited by de Coning and Peter (2019), and UN Peace Operations and International Theory, edited by Oksamytna and Karlsrud (2020), have significantly furthered the scholarship on how different international relations theories and a changing global world order impact peace operations.

Looking to the twelve trigger variables selected for this study, three theoretical areas have the most relevance. First, theories related to the changing nature of warfare, particularly those focused on understanding the most common type of war: intrastate conflict. These theories could assist in explaining the shift in peace enforcement from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts, as well as how the ethnic civil wars of the 1990s impacted the conflict-specific conditions used in this research. Shifting to the seven intervening variables of our study, a second category of theories, those related to the structure of the international system, are apposite. Great power politics and how the US, UK, and France define their national interests affect at least two intervening variables related to the P-3 interests and availability of their military forces. Lastly, theories related to institutional structure and norms provide an understanding of the decision-making process of international institutions and regimes and the norms and principles that are most important.

Recent theories on the change in intrastate conflict and civil wars have shifted focus in response to evolving global patterns of violence, the nature of conflict, and the international community's response to such crises. Scholars have noted

> "structural changes in the nature of conflicts, such as the proliferation of so-called "new" or "hybrid" wars—the growing incidence of intra-state violence associated with fundamentalist non-state groups, ethno-political tensions, rebel separatism, armed resistance to authoritarian regimes, and non-state criminal groups, all of which are often associated with new dynamics in the conduct of war as well as increasingly fragmented battlefields." (Abdenur 2019, 47)

These theories often emphasize the role of non-state actors, the impact of globalization, the spread of technology, and the importance of regional dynamics. Examining these recent theories points to an evolution in the conflict-specific conditions under which the bulk of peace enforcement operations were deployed in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The "New Wars" theory, popularized by Kaldor and other scholars, suggests that "during the last decades of the twentieth century, a new type of organized violence developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe." (Kaldor 2012, 1). Accordingly, contemporary conflicts became characterized by blurring lines between war, organized crime, and large-scale human rights violations. These conflicts often involve a range of actors, including state forces, paramilitary groups, and terrorist organizations, and are fueled by identity politics, failing states, and economic globalization. This theory implies that peace enforcement must go beyond traditional military engagement to address underlying issues such as governance, economic inequality, and identity-based divisions. (Kaldor 2012, 185-188)

The complex underpinnings of the New War theory would explain the shift from Member State-led peace enforcement to more multilateral approaches, including Regional Arrangements and UN-led forces. The fact that peace enforcement is not conducted in a vacuum and is often preceded or followed by a UN peacekeeping effort impacts the inclusion of actors that are not strictly focused on warfighting or that create credibility for a transition to consent-based peacekeeping after the need for the strategic use of coercive force has ended. Likewise, setting the conditions for improved governance and economic stability within a host nation may be best understood by regional arrangements that sponsor those ideals collectively throughout their geographic region.

Other, more tangential theories on the changing nature of conflict, such as the concepts of modern stateless warfare (Brooker 2010) and networks of rebellion (Staniland 2014), have not only helped better understand the specific explanatory conditions such as belligerent group capabilities and objectives but also identify the progression of change occurring in these conditions over the last thirty years. The rise in fragmented, belligerent non-state actor groups adopting different tactics and technology requires a similar evolution of the actors designated to enforce peace. Not only do these affect the actors forming the constellation, but also substantially impact the internal force structure deployed.

The mainstream theories addressing great power politics and global order are the second international relations theory category that explains the evolution of peace enforcement. For the first 45 years of the UN, the global system was guided by the bipolar tension of the Cold War. Emerging from this was a unipolar world dominated by US

hegemony in which the international governance system was dominated by one ideology. "Neo-liberalism became the global norm, and global institutions like the UN became agents for the dissemination, implementation, and enforcers of this ideology." (de Coning 2019, 301)

> "For much of the twentieth century, the discourse on peace and security took place between the East and the West, tempering the UN's ability to get involved in intra-state conflicts. With the end of the Cold War and the newly found agreement in the UNSC, peacekeepers began addressing fallouts from civil wars and assisting post-conflict states in their reconstruction." (Peter 2019, 3)

Over the last twenty years, the paradigm has shifted to one divided North-South, with the emergence of several African regional arrangements willing and able to assume a role in peace enforcement and troops from South nations providing the bulk of troops for UN-led peace enforcement. As one former force commander summarized, "The willing are not capable, and the capable are not willing." (Weiss and Kuele 2019, 1) That said, the P-3 has continued to hold almost total sway over when and how a peace enforcement operation is mandated. As shown in Chapter 8, the security interests of the P-3 are the most important drivers determining the actor constellation of peace enforcement, and their involvement in this shift in the global order has contributed to the evolution of peace enforcement. Each of the P-5 has rigid political interests, including national security doctrines and strategies, that guide their national interest in any prospective peace enforcement action. These interests, which have remained coalesced for the most part among the P-3, have recently shown significant divergence with Russia and China.

Two specific National Security Strategies, published by Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have done much to shape the involvement of the US in peace operations. Bill Clinton's final National Security Strategy, published in 1999, stated that "Americans benefit when nations come together to deter aggression and terrorism, to resolve conflicts, to prevent the spread of dangerous weapons, to promote democracy and human rights, to open markets and create financial stability, to raise living standards, to protect the environment – to face challenges that no nation can meet alone." (Clinton 1999, iii) He went on to specifically define the US's important national interests to include

> "interests [that] do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live…crises with a potential to generate substantial and highly 2 destabilizing refugee flows. Our efforts to halt the flow of refugees from Haiti and restore democracy in that country, our participation in NATO operations to end the brutal conflicts and restore peace in Bosnia and Kosovo, and our assistance to Asian allies and friends supporting the transition in East Timor are examples." (Clinton 1999, 1)

For the first time in a US President's national security strategy, it was specifically stated that "it often will be in our national interest to proceed in partnership with other nations to preserve, maintain and restore peace." (Clinton 1999, 18)

After the 9/11/01 attacks on the United States, US national interests shifted towards fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In his 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush reiterated the duty to protect American interests.

> "It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the

> threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack." (Bush 2002, 15)

By 2006, President Bush had specifically focused on terrorism and "using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of support." (Bush 2006, 9) The United States, while committing its military forces to fight the Global War on Terror, placed other crises of a humanitarian or strategic nature on the back burner.

In France and the UK, similar national security documents show the transformation of their interests corresponding to the shift in global order. The French national security strategy, called the "White Paper," was published in 1994, 2008 and 2013 in response to changes to their nation security interests. Similarly, the United Kingdom adopted new national security strategy documents in 1998, 2008, and 2010. Like the US, the shift in both countries went from involved international community partners able to respond to global crises in support of humanitarian and democratic initiatives, to being concerned with the global rise of non-state actors, Islamic terrorism, and transnational threats.

These structural changes to the international system directly impact the causal conditions for peace enforcement. The P-3 interest, P-3 availability of military forces, emergence of regional arrangements, and often the stability and cooperation level of

nations in crisis have all changed significantly as the global order has transformed between 1989 and the end of the Global War on Terror.

The final category of IR theories impacting the evolution of peace enforcement are those theories attempting to explain changes to the structure of international organizations and regimes. Two of these theories have tenets relevant to the evolution of peace enforcement: liberal institutionalism and complexity theory. Each of these theories has been vigorously studied and applied to various issues in international relations and examining them in detail is unnecessary for their relevance to this study. What is relevant however, is the specific relationship each of these theories has to explaining the evolution of peace enforcement.

Liberal institutionalism, an offshoot of the mainstream theory of liberalism, focuses on the role of domestic and international institutions and arrangements in facilitating cooperation through formal and informal roles, principles, norms, and procedures. (Monteleone and Oksamytna 2020) With the UN Security Council playing such an instrumental role in peace enforcement, it is immediately evident the significant impact liberal institutionalist theories have on its decision-making. Cooperation between the US and European states between 1991 and 2008 was an "enabling factor" when it came to peace operations (Monetleone 2011, 265-289) This cooperation influences other members of the Security Council, reflective of the majority of peace enforcement resolutions being approved affirmatively by all fifteen members. According to Monteleone and Oksamytna when the US and European states combine to support a peace operation, "their persistent grouping becomes capable of attracting other Security Council members and of increasing

the political cost of using the veto for other permanent members." (2020, 85) Five of the first six peace enforcement missions did not have unanimous approval of the Security Council (East Timor 1999 being the exception), while nine of the last ten enforcement missions have been unanimously approved.

Complexity theory, applied to international relations, views the international system as a complex adaptive system where numerous actors interact in non-linear ways, leading to unpredictable outcomes. "Complexity theory is primarily concerned with explaining change in complex systems." (Hunt 2020, 252). Outcomes in complex systems are more difficult to determine as the interactions between actors are dynamic and non-linear and include both horizontal and vertical hierarchies. Change is not necessarily determined by simple cause and effect. Brosig posited a form of "restricted complexity" as applicable to peace operations where rather than a simply open or closed system, a semi-open system exists where a large but defined group of actors operate without a centralized authority but within a space of limited functional linkages. (Brosig 2019, 1016-1017) With the expansion of both the numbers and types of belligerent non-state actors in the 1990s, along with increased capacities of regional arrangements as well as their willingness to become involved, we can observe this restricted complexity in the transformation of actors within peace enforcement cases, such as the transition from a Member State or Regional Arrangement-led operation to a UN-led operation (Haiti 2004-2017, Mali 2012-2023, CAR 2013-). It can also be seen in the evolution of peace enforcement actor constellations over time, with primarily single-actor constellations consisting of a coalition of Member

States evolving into more complex missions involving all three peace enforcement actors: Member States, Regional Arrangements, and the UN.

### 9.3 What Direction is the Evolution in Peace Enforcement Likely to Continue?

The changing world order over the last decade, characterized by a shift towards multipolarity, rising nationalism, and increasing rivalry between major powers, significantly impacts the future evolution of peace enforcement. Theories on the future world order suggest various potential trajectories, including a more fragmented international system, the emergence of new centers of power, and the possibility of a new form of Cold War. These shifts have profound implications for peace enforcement, especially in light of the United Nations Security Council's challenges in approving resolutions due to differences between Western countries and Eastern powers, notably Russia and China. Here's how these dynamics could impact the future of peace enforcement:

*Fragmentation and Multipolarity*

As the world moves towards a more multipolar order, the influence of traditional powers is diluted by the rise of new state and non-state actors. This fragmentation makes achieving consensus within international institutions like the Security Council more challenging. Peace enforcement efforts may become more regionalized, with local powers or coalitions taking the lead in their respective spheres of influence. (Abdenur 2019, 58) This could lead to a more decentralized approach to peace enforcement, where regional

organizations play a more significant role, potentially leading to varied strategies and outcomes based on regional dynamics and interests.

The rivalry between Western countries and Eastern powers, particularly in the context of Russia and China's opposition to Western-led initiatives in the Security Council, could lead to the return of the Cold War stalemate on the Security Council due to the veto authority of permanent members. “The Security Council’s political processes and operational tools appear ill-designed to address a new generation of conflicts complicated by major power competition.” (Gowan 2018, 10) This P-5 impasse would stymie the authorization of peace enforcement operations and lead to impotence of the international community. Military interventions undertaken without the Security Council’s authorization could undermine international interventions' legitimacy and legal framework. This could also lead to competing peace enforcement efforts, where different groups of countries support different sides in a conflict, exacerbating tensions rather than resolving them. “Without the council to act as a clearing house for major power cooperation, P5 members would also be more likely to treat civil wars and regional conflict formations as spaces for competition as they did in the Cold War.” (Gowan 2018, 13)

*Evolution of Norms and Practices*

The changing world order and the challenges faced by the Security Council might lead to an evolution in the norms and practices surrounding peace enforcement. There could be more emphasis on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, especially in cases of mass atrocities where international outrage may overcome a Security Council member’s willingness to exercise their veto in support of their own strategic interests.

However, this would require a delicate balance to ensure that interventions are genuinely humanitarian in nature and not used as pretexts for pursuing national interests, as many have argued was the case in Libya in 2011.

Continued difficulties in achieving consensus within the Security Council may encourage developing and utilizing alternative mechanisms for responding to breaches and threats to international peace and security, especially when there is a requirement to create and enforce peace. These could include increased reliance on regional organizations to assume the role currently held by the Security Council (outlined below) as well as changes to the UN Charter and structure of the Security Council to adapt to a fragmented world order. Recent conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza have created significant discussion regarding the Penholder practice regarding peace operations, as well as the veto authority granted to each permanent member.

*Increased Reliance on Regional Organizations*

With the Security Council potentially paralyzed by vetoes (or threat of veto) from its permanent members, the international community might increasingly turn to regional organizations (e.g., African Union, ASEAN, and the European Union) to address conflicts within their regions. These organizations could offer more tailored and culturally sensitive approaches to peace enforcement and have a vested interest in restoring peace and security to their region. However, their effectiveness will depend on their capacity to mobilize and deploy within conflict-specific time constraints, the willingness of regional Member States to contribute resources, and their ability to gather wealthy Member State commitments for financial and logistical support.

Recent ad hoc security initiatives like the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram represent a significant shift towards more flexible and regionally-focused peace enforcement strategies outside the authority and supervision of the UN Security Council or UNDPO. (de Coning, 2019, 306) "The deployment of AHCs represents a robust trend on the African continent and beyond, and they are becoming the preferred format for interstate security cooperation." (Brosig and Karlsrud 2024, 772) The G5 Sahel, for instance, is an institutional framework for coordinating regional cooperation in development policies and security matters in West Africa. The MNJTF, on the other hand, is a combined multinational formation comprising units from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, aimed at countering the threat posed by Boko Haram and other extremist groups in the Lake Chad Basin region. Both structures operate legitimately within the UN construct of Article 51 self-defense and Chapter VIII regional arrangements.

These initiatives represent a move toward regional ownership of peace enforcement operations, with states in volatile regions taking the lead in addressing their security challenges. This can lead to more effective operations, as regional forces often better understand the local context and dynamics. Such initiatives may enhance the collaboration between the UN and regional organizations. The success of ad hoc initiatives could inform UN strategies, leading to more UN support or endorsement of regional peace enforcement efforts. As Brosig and Karlsrud (2024) point out in their recent study, the increased deployments of Ad Hoc Coalitions lead to de-institutionalization within existing international organizations, which is also significant for future peace enforcement operations.

*More Hybrid Models of Peace Enforcement*

The parallel deployment of Member State and Regional Arrangement-led missions in Mali and the Central African Republic, as well as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC, are models of hybrid operations that are very likely to continue in future operations. Ad hoc security initiatives, such as the MNJTF and G5 Sahel, could easily become the fourth actor in peace enforcement actor constellations, influencing the mandates of future UN peace enforcement operations tailored to specific regional threats, such as terrorism and transnational organized crime. While the UNDPO may be sidelined due to Security Council stalemates, the UN system could expand its role under the authority and funding of the General Assembly for programs complementary to enforcing the peace, such as the World Food Program and UNHCR, and could shift toward providing more logistical, financial, and technical support to regional initiatives, helping to build the capacity of regional organizations to lead peace enforcement operations. Additionally, as seen in both the G5 Sahel and MNJTF, individual Member States, the P-3 in particular, could focus their efforts on building the capacity of these ad hoc security initiatives. It is not inconceivable that Russia and China could do likewise in furtherance of their individual national interests.

*Increased Importance of Non-State Actors*

In a fragmented world order, non-state actors may play a more prominent role in peace enforcement, including NGOs, private military companies, and transnational advocacy networks. These actors could fill gaps left by traditional state actors, offering resources, expertise, and innovative approaches to peace enforcement and conflict

response. However, their involvement will also raise questions about accountability, legitimacy, and effectiveness. The changing world order and the resultant shifts in Security Council dynamics could potentially lead to a more complex, multifaceted approach to peace enforcement.

*Hybrid Warfare and Non-State Actors*

The rise of hybrid warfare and the prominence of armed non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and private military companies, have changed the landscape of intrastate conflicts. These actors employ a mix of conventional and unconventional tactics, including cyber-attacks, propaganda, and the use or targeting of civilians as part of their strategy. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for peace enforcement, which must adapt to counter hybrid threats effectively and protect civilian populations. Violent extremism and transnational crime are likely to continue to pose a significant threat to international peace and security. (Boutellis and Tieles 2019, 169-173) As these further blur the lines between crime and conflict, the international community would need to expand legitimate mechanisms for responding to these threats, and this arsenal will likely include some form of peace enforcement.

The rapid advancement of technology and the proliferation of information warfare have introduced new dimensions to intrastate conflicts. Cyber operations, social media manipulation, and the spread of misinformation can fuel violence and undermine peace efforts. In addition to needing to account for these changes in the conflict environment, the actor constellations for future peace enforcement may be altered by these factors. It is not out of the realm of possibility to see private military companies in the role of peace

enforcers, and information management and the ability to influence civilians in the conflict have already proven of critical importance, factors that are likely to increase in the future.

These recent theories indicate a shift towards understanding intrastate conflict and civil wars as multifaceted phenomena requiring a comprehensive approach to peace enforcement. While the conditions within which peace enforcement operations are formed are certain to change, the causal pathways outlined in this dissertation are likely to remain relevant and explanatory for future enforcement missions. The hypotheses proposed for the impact of specific combinations of causal conditions will continue to allow for a greater understanding of the future evolution of actor constellations.

### 9.4 What Value Does This Dissertation Offer for the Study of Peace Enforcement?

The dissertation on the evolution of actor constellations within peace enforcement offers significant value to the future study of peace operations in several ways. By conclusively defining peace enforcement, this research offers the first comprehensive list of all cases of peace enforcement since 1945. Some may challenge the completeness of only including seventeen cases as peace enforcement, and sparking a debate on the definition and scope of peace enforcement is exactly why this study is important to future scholarship on peace operations. This is not semantics. Continued research into peace enforcement as a discrete form of peace operation, separates it from both consent-based peacekeeping as well as military interventions undertaken outside the UN's authority. Future research will be able to focus on these definitional rifts to expose strengths and

weaknesses in our international systems' response to future conflicts requiring the strategic use of coercive force to restore international peace and security.

The January 2024 deployment of the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC) is an example of a regional arrangement deployed as an international military force to assist the host nation combat armed groups within its borders. While authorized under Article 51 of the UN Charter's self-defense clause and not considered peace enforcement as it was not authorized by the Security Council, this deployment shows the shift away from the UN actor – the Force Intervention Brigade – to an Ad Hoc Coalition outside UN authority. Is this a result of the failure of the Security Council to adequately to respond to a crisis older than most of the soldiers deploying to it? Or is it an expected evolution away from traditional mechanisms of peace enforcement? Hypothesis #4 of this study certainly provides a valuable starting point to launch such an inquiry.

By providing a discrete set of theory-based variables to determine the causal pathways for the formation and transformation of actor constellations within peace enforcement, this effort provides a foundation of knowledge upon which future studies can build. The measurable hypotheses proposed in Chapter 8 inform the direction of peace enforcement's evolution, providing a theoretical framework for understanding the changing nature of conflict and the implications for peace enforcement. This study explores the implications of peace enforcement for regionalism and ad hoc security initiatives, offering insights into how regional arrangements contribute to the peace enforcement landscape and the dynamics of regional security complexes. As an inductive,

theory-building endeavor, this dissertation was meant to open the discussion on peace enforcement, not end it.

The seven hypotheses offered in this research are potential filters for future decision-makers in their process for responding to new threats to international peace and security. The current situation in Haiti, where the perennially failed state is on the verge of another collapse and where two previous peace enforcement operations have failed to provide a stable security situation, is creating numerous questions on how best to respond yet again. Understanding the evolution of actor constellations as examined in this study could likely prove beneficial to those tasked with formulating new solutions to the long-standing problems of Haiti. Given that Haiti does not have the robust regional frameworks that have been forged in Africa over the last three decades, the solution appears to fall squarely on the UN Security Council.

Examining where peace enforcement has occurred and where it has not, such as in the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, and Gaza, the dissertation identifies patterns and trends that influence the initiation or absence of peace enforcement efforts. Applying the methodology of this research toward assessing the causal conditions for the twelve trigger variables identified in this study for these more recent conflicts that continue to pose a threat to international peace and security may provide greater insight into gaps in the international community's ability to respond to future breaches and threats to international peace and security.

By proposing what the next steps in the study of peace enforcement should be, the dissertation lays the groundwork for future research endeavors. It suggests examining cases

where PE could have been enacted but was not, thus identifying gaps and opportunities for further exploration and understanding. The definition of peace enforcement, identification of the complete universe of peace enforcement cases since 1945, and methodology for examining peace enforcement actor constellations should form the foundation for future studies to build upon. This knowledge is useful for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners involved in peace operations, as it offers a foundation for developing more effective and adaptive peace enforcement strategies to address the evolving landscape of global conflicts.

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Interview List (Ethics Clearance: H21/11/49)

Former senior staff member, MINUSMA, May 2023

Former senior staff member, MONUSCO, August 2022

Former military staff member, MINUSMA, May 2023

Former military staff member, EUFOR/TCHAD, August 2022

Former senior staff member, UNPROFOR, August 2022

Former senior staff member, UNDPO, September 2022

Senior staff member, UN Department of Peace Operations, October 2023

Former U.S Army officer and military commander, UNITAF, March 2022

Former U.S. Army officer and military commander, UNOSOM II, February 2024

Former U.S. Army officer and military commander, US Military Observer Group

Former U.S Army officer, TF Ranger, March 2022

Former military commander, Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, March 2022

Senior analyst for Africa, Congressional Research Service, September 2022

Senior staff member, US State Department, February 2024

Former ambassador, US State Department, February 2024

Academic expert on Somalia, December 2023

Academic expert on peace operations, March 2023

Academic expert on peace operations, August 2022

Academic expert on peace operations, February 2024

Academic expert on peace operations, February 2024