

NETWORKS OF POWER

Political communication in two inner city Johannesburg CBOs

by
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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Wits
School of Governance, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management.

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5 November 2021

Declaration

I declare that this thesis titled 'Networks of power: Political communication in two inner city Johannesburg CBOs' is my own, unaided work. I have acknowledged and referenced all sources that I have used and quoted. I hereby submit it in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. I have not submitted this report before for any other degree or examination to any other institution.



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ABSTRACT

This research aimed to establish how two community-based organisations (CBOs) in inner city Johannesburg used communication to build political power in their political networks. As such, I explored theories on building, shaping, and transforming networks of power, especially with reference to Latour, and Deleuze and Guattari's concept of an assemblage. Assemblages are underpinned by the desire to make connections and therefore Deleuze and Guattari's concept of desire is helpful in revealing the connections between different elements of political communication. The departure point for this research was to examine how CBOs use political communication in networks of power or to generate networks of power. The research examined flows of communication among CBO members, their communities, and other audiences, using an a political communication machine/assemblage. The machine has five components, which were explored in depth in the chapters of this thesis. They are: desire, framing, aesthetics, communication tools and audiences.

Desire is not a lack but the creative, productive impetus for the organisations; using this theory to explore the two CBOs communications led to insights into the not only the material outputs and conditions of communication, but also both the rational and affective qualities of that communication. In terms of the study of communication, the conceptual framework allowed for the study of the different components working together to generate a communication flow, instead of simply relying on a static study of frames, or tools, or aesthetics or audiences. As such, the study reveals the dynamism in CBO political communication. Previous studies of South African CBOs have mentioned that before CBOs protest, they undertake extensive efforts to communicate with government; however, the previous studies did not elucidate what these extensive efforts consisted of, so this study has provided rich detail for further exploring the dynamic.

The two CBOs were markedly different in their structure and their efforts to communicate. The Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC), which tackles housing issues in the inner city, was well funded, and had offices. Their communication efforts were highly effective at building and retaining its core membership. However, they were not successful in connecting with the City of Johannesburg, because the city had locked them out of participatory spaces. One Voice of All Hawkers Association (One Voice) was highly fractious, some members exhibited micro-fascisms, and the organisation ran in somewhat of a haphazard pattern in its efforts to protect street traders. However, they were highly successful at micro-local politics, using subterfuge to undermine the city's trader administration system and preventing traders from being evicted. One Voice also sustained a large membership base over a long period of time, and this was mainly based on one-on-one communication. Their success was not based on a powerful political communication machine, but instead on the way they opportunistically managed micro-local circumstances.

The study showed that an effective political communication machine was important for growing solidarity networks. However, large parts of government could not be reached, regardless of what communication strategies the organisations deployed, since participatory governance spaces were either closed off or inaccessible.

KEYWORDS

Political communication ; Community-based organisations ; inner city Johannesburg ; desire ; framing ; collective action frames ; aesthetics ; communication tools ; audience

DEDICATION

To my children, Spencer and Skye: always seek knowledge.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study would not have been possible without the fellowship provided by the Life In the City project at the Wits School of Governance.

Acknowledgment must go to my excellent supervisor, Dr Darlene Miller, who continues to involve me in her development of ideas, and building excitement around the academic endeavour, and including me as co-author on a number of publications. More than a supervisor, she is also a warm and loving friend, and also hosted me at her home numerous times while I was in Johannesburg doing my fieldwork.

Further acknowledgment must go to my family, including my husband Peter van Heusden, and my children Spencer and Skye, who are always interested and engaged in all matters related to South African politics, and who have encouraged me when my energy is flagging, and celebrated every milestone with me. My husband, before and throughout the course of writing this thesis, has always challenged me intellectually and politically, and has provided a constant sounding board for the development of the ideas in this thesis. My eldest child, Spencer, is also a design student and happily shared her thoughts of organisational aesthetics with me. My daughter, Skye, helped me in the final stages before submitting this thesis, by rejecting and accepting editor's comments. Furthermore, if it were not for my mother Judith Mason fighting for me to go to university in the first place, I would never have completed my undergraduate degree. I am also grateful for the domestic work of Xolelwa Matinise, who kept the household running and sometimes looked after my children, without which I could not have juggled the challenges of producing a thesis with my other responsibilities.

This study would not have been possible without the members of the organisations in this study. The Inner City Resource Centre particularly provided funds for the Participatory Action Research Workshops and allowed me to use their office space to work in while I was in Johannesburg. The director, Shereza Sibanda, was always available with a warm hug, and a shared cigarette, and keen to share her vast political experience of South Africa. Thabani Nxumalo always cheerfully availed himself to help me access documents related to the ICRC, including press releases, protest memoranda, meeting minutes, photographs and video footage. Jabulani Sibanda and Philemon Makweng took me on walkabouts of the inner city and gave me their thoughts about political organising in the inner city. Emily Kolobe was invaluable in helping coordinate the PAR workshops, booking venues, helping to ensure that we had the relevant workshop materials, that meals were provided timeously, and that ethics forms and workshop programmes were printed.

With respect to One Voice for All Traders Association, Julekha Latib the organisation's secretary was the key touch point for engaging with organisation members. She was always warm and caring, and provided much insight about the organisation, its history and trajectory, as well as invaluable thoughts about the difficulties of organising street traders. Similarly, Frans Seema was always available for discussions about the organisation and the politics of street trade in the inner city.

Chrispin Kashindi took the lead in providing access to the Group for Refugees Without Voice, and provided powerful stories about the experiences of refugees and asylum seekers in inner city Johannesburg. His resilience in the face of tremendous difficulties was inspiring.

Many other members and steering committee members of all two organisations also contributed greatly to this study, but they are not named here due to privacy concerns.

My friend Koketso Moeti (and her two delightful children) hosted me on numerous visits to Johannesburg during my fieldwork. They provided a home away from home, and the children kept my spirits up after tiring days of fieldwork. Koketso is also a font of political wisdom, especially about community organising and political communication.

My friend, Emmanuel Sulle, and I have supported each other with encouragement and commiseration throughout the challenging process of both of us writing PhDs. He also ensured I had a source of income throughout the project, by passing consultancy work my way. Similarly, my friend Dr Gaynor Paradza has encouraged me throughout my PhD, checking in with me on a regular basis. She also passed work my way to sustain me through the PhD writing process. Furthermore, she invited me to join the Pahushamwari Hwedu Scholar Facebook group, a support group for African women scholars, which provided lots of encouragement, as well as inspiration from successful scholars.

Dr Chantelle Gray van Heerden provided comments on various drafts, and suggested suitable readings as I grappled with how to apply Deleuze and Guattari's thought to the South African political context. The South African Deleuze and Guattari conferences (and pre- and post-conference workshops) organised by her and Aragorn Eloff were fundamental to developing my understanding of the Deleuze and Guattari's theories and thinking. Gillian Kerchhoff also provided invaluable edits and comments on my long proposal to bring it towards completion.

My understanding of aesthetics and organisational branding has been strongly influenced by Rosie Campbell over the 26 years of our acquaintance, as we have worked hand-in-hand on various design projects. Her colleague Ronel van Heerden produced the graphic, which explains the relationship between the different concepts studied in this thesis.

The writing retreat offered by Wits School of Governance at the Wits Rural Facility in Mpumalanga from 20-25 August 2017 and led by Na-iem Dollie provided invaluable advice on academic writing. The other scholars who presented the workshops and commented on drafts, to whom I am thankful, are Gillian Godsell and Dioné Harley.

My cohort who took part in the Wits School of Governance Social Theory course at the outset of our PhDs has also provided invaluable support via our WhatsApp group, as well as sharing relevant documents for understanding what is required of us. These include: Odile Mackett, Mmakgoma Tshatsinde, Itai Kabonga, Keneiwe Sadie Mooketsane, Tinyiko Makondo, Mary Jane Obi, Irene Muthoni Mithia, Patrick Mutabwire.

Over the years, many comrades have shaped my political thinking in terms of social justice movements. Because they are many, I am wary of leaving anyone out, but feel moved to acknowledge Soraya Hendricks, Aysha Davids, Nomvuyo Tshabalala, Gertie Square, Prishani Naidoo, Ahmed Veriava, Heinrich Böhmke, and Franco Barchiesi.

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ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ANT	Actor-Network Theory
APF	Anti-Privatisation Forum
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CALS	Centre for Applied Legal Studies
CBD	Central Business District
CBO	Community based organisation
CCF	Concerned Citizens Forum
CJP	Central Johannesburg Partnership
COHRE	Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
FAWU	Food and Allied Workers Union
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
ICRC	Inner City Resource Centre
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IDP	Integrated Development Planning
JICP	Johannesburg Inner City Partnership
JMPD	Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department
JPC	Johannesburg Property Company
LED	Local Economic Development
LHR	Lawyers for Human Rights
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MMCs	Members of Mayoral Committees
MTC	Metropolitan Trading Company

NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NP	National Party
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
NUMSA	National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa
One Voice	One Voice for all Hawkers Association
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PAR	Participatory Action Research
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan
SACP	South African Communist Party
SAFTU	South African Federation of Trade Unions
SAITF	South African Informal Trader Forum
SAMWU	South African Municipal Workers Union
SANTRA	South African National Traders and Retailers Alliance
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SASSA	South African Social Security Agency
SECC	Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee
SERI	Socio-Economic Rights Institute
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign
TEA	Temporary Emergency Accommodation
UDF	United Democratic Front
US	United States
WC AEC	Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign
WIEGO	Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Communication through participation is enshrined in Section 152 of the Constitution of South Africa (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996), which provides citizen and community rights to be involved in governance. Community based organisations (CBOs) play a key role in delivering the kind of participation envisioned by the Constitution, because CBOs aim to tackle exclusion and discrimination in government by challenging government to meet community needs (Buccus et al., 2008; Hicks & Buccus, 2008; McEwan, 2003; J. J. Williams, 2006a). Besides the Constitution, several other policies focus on the necessity to hear CBO voices. For example, Integrated Development Planning (IDP), introduced in 1996, aims to create participatory spaces to encourage planning communication between municipal officials and the communities they serve (Buccus et al., 2008; P. Harrison, 2006; Lemanski, 2017). Therefore, understanding how CBOs communicate is relevant in understanding the South African political terrain.

Despite the express necessity for government to create opportunities for citizens and communities to communicate and influence policy, relationships between municipalities and communities can be fraught. Wafer and Oldfield (2015) identify a disconnect between the formal government institutions and community expectations for participation and democracy. The failure of communication between the government and participating communities creates political challenges in South African towns and cities (Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2014). It is unclear why some community communication attempts have limited efficacy, but several studies have identified problems with how and where government listens (Atkinson, 2007; Lemanski, 2017; Mirafab, 2004; Tapela, 2015; Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Nleva, 2010).

Research has focussed on how local government can improve communication, especially with regard to community participation in formal governmental structures (Allan & Heese, 2011; Atkinson, 2007; Chipkin, 2011; Goba, 2014; Imuezerua & Chinomona, 2015; Koelble & Siddle, 2013a; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Mbuyisa, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Sinwell, 2011a; Tsheola, 2012). However, Wafer and Oldfield (2015) argue that “misrecognition” occurs both on the side of government *and* on the side of citizens and communities. Therefore, I sought to explore whether weak communication efforts on the part of CBOs were also hindering the effectiveness and usefulness participatory communication.

As communication from the government side is already well studied, this study focussed on the community side of the relationship, with a particular focus on CBOs. For the purpose of this study, CBOs are defined as geographically-located organisations that work to bring about change in specific local circumstances (Bosch, 2003), and/or “any organization that has a distinct mission to provide specialized services to a defined population” (E. E. Anderson, 2010, p. 20). CBOs can play a crucial role in making visible and advocating for otherwise excluded groups. CBOs can include, inter alia, suburban ratepayers (which may not be focussed on excluded groups), those providing community-based health care, and more radical organisations fighting for improved service delivery (e.g. water, electricity, housing), or fighting to tackle alleged local council nepotism and corruption.

South Africa’s population is becoming increasingly urbanised (Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2014), so cities are an important site of study. Johannesburg, as the largest city in South Africa, provides a particularly rich, diverse terrain compared to other South African cities. The inner city, the focus of this study, is plagued by distinctive problems, given that many businesses and wealthy people have fled the inner-city for the northern suburbs of Johannesburg (for example, Sandton and Hyde Park) (Beall et al., 2014; Murray, 2008).

Throughout its history, inner city Johannesburg has been a site of contestation around who may live in the inner city and who may trade there (Matshikiza, 2008; Mbembe & Nuttall, 2008; Tomlinson et al., 2003b; M. Wafer, 2010; Wilhelm-Solomon, 2016). Racial dynamics have shaped inner city spaces (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2008; Tomlinson et al., 2003a), and more recently xenophobia has become a key part of South Africans’ political life (Everatt, 2011; Massey, 1983; Vidal, 2010; R. Walker et al., 2017). As such, CBOs that engage in the political life of inner city Johannesburg often address their activities towards those living in inner city buildings and those trading on the streets of the inner city, some of whom are foreign nationals. For the purposes of this study, I focussed on CBOs that support poorer residents and street traders, particularly in terms of how they challenge the political economy of the inner city, but including relevant relationships with other levels of government.

When CBOs participate in South African political life, they undertake political communication. Political communication is defined here as communication by which the message sender purposely aims to influence the social and political environment (McNair, 2017). As such, then, political communication engages with the structures of power. My

study focuses on the nature of CBO political communication, in terms of how CBOs seek to establish and build networks of power in an inner-city context.

Theorists have analysed power in various ways, such as Lefebvre's (1992) theory that power is exerted in and through space. So for example, in the city, power is often exerted in terms of who may occupy space – by the city government undertaking raids on inner city buildings and on traders (McMichael, 2015), and residents and traders resisting through 'illegal' occupation of space (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018b; Mayson, 2014). These attempts by the city to control space may also be regarded as an attempt to discipline bodies as described by Foucault (1977, 2008) wherein the city seeks to limit overcrowding and also limit the access to services (e.g. water, electricity, sanitation) people may access; furthermore the city exerts power through its expression of disgust towards the dirtiness of the inner city – and by extension dirtiness of people living there. Further, power is exerted in the city in the way that economic decisions are made, for example in Johannesburg, the city describes its main aims as attracting investment (Mashaba, 2019b) and it further limits the extent to which it invests in public services, preferring to outsource key services to formal businesses (McDonald & Ruiters, 2005a; Pernegger, 2016; Samson, 2010). Such efforts to promote investment and outsource services are a key way that a global neoliberal agenda shapes the political economy of the city (Harvey, 2011; Klein, 2008). In South Africa, more recent studies discuss the importance of matriarchal leadership (Miller, 2016), interrogate power and patriarchy, and the place of the 'rogue feminist' (Gqola, 2017) in resistance. In terms of my study of CBOs unpacking matriarchal leadership is key to understanding power within the CBOs in this study, as one of the organisations is women-led and women-driven, while the other one is *de facto* led by the woman who does the work, while the leaders of the organisation are men.


However, in this study my focus is on communication power, particularly the structures (assemblages) that allow communication to flow between the CBOs in this study and other power players in the inner city. According to Latour (2005a) and Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 2004), society is made up of assemblages (flowing network structures) connecting human and non-human things (abstract and material). Different assemblages produce different flows of power. In the current digital age, communication is one of the main assemblages through which power flows. Therefore, this study examined how CBOs build assemblages of political communication to leverage and build networks of power to bring about the social

and political changes they seek. In Deleuze and Guattari's (2004) terms, these assemblages can either be horizontal and underground (rhizomatic) or above ground, have a main stem with branch structure, and hierarchical (arboreal). In this study, I found that where organisations deployed more rhizomatic political communication assemblages (machines), they were more successful in reaching their audience. But where they used their political communication machine to target the hierarchical levels of government, they were almost entirely unsuccessful.

To understand their political communication, we need to understand CBOs' specific political desires which shape the choice of the communicated messages, the framing of the messages, the aesthetic and affective qualities of the communications, the tools used to communicate, and how these impact on the audiences reached by the communication (this schematic is shown in Figure 1 below). CBOs communicate in order to build the power to influence others (for example, government or solidarity networks). Therefore, in considering the political communication machine, in this study I explored how the two CBOs use different components of communication to build power. Power is both the thing that drives the machine and the product of the machine, such that organisations leverage their existing power to communicate in order to leverage more power-to-influence. Below I briefly discuss the different components of the machine.

Figure 1

The political communication machine



Authors own schema

As described by Deleuze and Guattari (1983), desire is not about making a demand to address a lack or an unfulfilled wish; desire is a machine (a desiring-machine or 'assemblage') that actively produces reality and shapes the world. As such, in inner city Johannesburg, different desiring-machines produce and transform the city as they 'connect' and 'disconnect' or plug into each other. For example, the desiring-machine of local government may produce a limit on the number of trading bays, while the desiring-machine of street traders may produce more trading bays by occupying different streets. Limiting or occupying trading bays are communicative actions that connect with each other. These are not static connections, but they produce flows and power relations. In this study, I unpacked how CBOs' desiring-machines plug in to the political terrain, and how desire plays out in their efforts to communicate.

Apart from CBOs' specific desires, the content of political messages is central to CBO political communication. The content of political messages is influenced by the frames chosen to create persuasive messages (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Snow & Benford, 1988), and the aesthetic appeal of those messages (Colvin et al., 2010; Dawson, 2012; Pointer et al., 2016). Frames are normative ideas by which people understand the world (Walgrave & Manssens, 2005). By prioritising "some facts, images, or developments over others" (Norris et al., 2003, p. 11), frames spread across society, often through the mainstream media (Walgrave & Manssens, 2005). Despite the normative and stable quality of frames, different political actors actively engage in framing contests in an effort to ensure others understand the world as they do (Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 2001; Vliegenthart & Zoonen, 2011). As political actors, CBOs also engage in framing contests. Referring back to the example of street traders, city officials may frame traders as illegal in occupying streets, while traders may frame the city as oppressive and discriminatory in trying to limit their activities. This study unpacked the frames used by inner city Johannesburg CBOs, to understand how the content of messages relates to the audiences they communicate with and the political desires they are enacting, and the extent to which the messages allow them to generate power.

Like frames, aesthetics influence how people see the world. Aesthetics connect to our emotional life, and produce sensations or affects such as awe, disgust, joy, anger, and fear (E. Burke, 1767; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994; Foucault, 1977; Hegel, 1998; Kant, 1987). As such, aesthetics do not simply influence how people think about the world, but how they feel

about it. In inner city Johannesburg, the aesthetic sensibilities of the municipal government often lead to the city's characterisation of it as a place of "crime and grime" (City of Johannesburg, 2013, p. 11). This characterisation suggests that the city is a frightening and disgusting place, but inner city CBOs may put forward a different aesthetic in their communication. Furthermore, in the era of mass communication, aesthetics are used to express political forms of power (such as status), and these are often expressed through the choice of brands (such as clothing, cars, smartphones) (Aaker, 1997). Therefore, in this study I explored how the CBOs gained power (or not) through the use of aesthetics, especially their organisational brands embodied in clothing.

In the political communication puzzle we also need to examine how the CBOs are communicating. In this regard, it is important to identify the tools or mediums that CBOs use to communicate (Tacchi et al., 2009; G. B. Walker, 2007). In recent years, literature has given a great deal of attention to the usefulness of particular tools and mediums – in particular, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The skills to use ICTs and have access to them does influence CBOs' ability to build networks of power (Enghel & Tufte, 2009), but these are just one component of political communication. In focussing on tools and mediums, some of the literature over-identifies this component, and neglects the other components discussed above. While the tools and mediums are significant, it is important to avoid technical determinism in thinking through how CBOs communicate (Couldry, 2015; M. Hassan et al., 2015a; Morozov, 2012; Roszak, 1986; Winner, 1996). Even if CBOs are using ICTs, it is important to examine how they "are actively contextualised and domesticated" (Pointer et al., 2015, p. 25). While this study examined the tools and mediums used by CBOs and the relevant impact on networks of power, this was balanced against other aspects of communication.

In Castells' (2010, 2015) concept of a 'network society', power is leveraged by challenging or building solidarity with different audiences. By examining the desires of the CBOs and the frames, aesthetics and tools they use, it was possible to trace how they connect to particular audiences. As such, after examining how the two CBOs communicated, I analysed which audiences they reached through their political communication strategies, techniques and tools.

Referring to Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, 2004) notions of machines and assemblages, the five points in Figure 1 may be regarded as components which join together to form a machine generating networks of power. However, these components are not static. If one thinks of the components as cogs in a machine, the machine cannot work unless all the cogs are moving. I theorised that if the five components of the political communication machine did not work together, political communication would not work optimally, and therefore would not generate sufficient power for the organisations. However, in this study I found that one of the CBOs barely used any of these communication components in their communication practices, yet they were able to leverage power with government (albeit only at a micro-local level). The second CBO effectively used all the components (albeit that there was room for improvement) but only succeeded in influencing solidarity networks, since the City of Johannesburg under Mayor Mashaba closed all participatory governance spaces to them. Even though the machines did not work as I expected they would, unpacking the use of the different components was key to understanding what and how CBOs communicate.

In South Africa, a wealth of literature looks at protest organisations (including CBOs and social movements). The studies focus on: (1) the causes of protest and the politics of CBOs (Alexander, 2010; Alexander & Pfaffe, 2014; Bond & Mottiar, 2013; Booysen, 2007; J. Brown, 2015; Runciman, 2012, 2016b; Von Holdt et al., 2011); how the media frame protest in South Africa (Chiumbu et al., 2016a; Cottle, 2008; Pointer, 2013, 2015; Wouters, 2015); and current communication tools of South African civil society organisations and social movements (Chiumbu, 2012, 2015; Dawson, 2012; Pointer et al., 2016; Wasserman, 2011). Existing studies on social movement and CBO communication mainly focus on the tools used, and sometimes the messages they put out, but neglect the other aspects of communication. In terms of the concepts shown in Figure 1, my study investigated communication practices in two CBOs in inner city Johannesburg, incorporating the study of tools and messages, but also looking at other aspects of communication. These aspects of communication form an assemblage, or a political communication machine, which is the focus of this study.

1.2 FOCUS OF THE STUDY

In this section of the chapter, I outline the problem to be studied, significance and purpose of the study, and the research questions.

1.2.1 Problem statement

The failure of communication between the government and participating communities poses challenges for governance in South African towns and cities (Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2014). Numerous studies have examined how local government can improve communication, especially with regard to participation in governance (Allan & Heese, 2011; Atkinson, 2007; Chipkin, 2011; Goba, 2014; Imuezerua & Chinomona, 2015; Koelble & Siddle, 2013a; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Mbuyisa, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Sinwell, 2011a; Tsheola, 2012). Because miscommunication occurs both on the side of government and on the side of citizens and communities (A. Wafer & Oldfield, 2015), in this study, I focussed on the community side of the relationship, with a particular focus on CBOs.

To meet the legislative and policy ideals of participatory governance in South Africa, CBOs need to be visible and successful in leveraging power to tackle the issues that affect the communities the CBOs serve. Political communication is a key way that organisations become visible and assert themselves in political networks. South African CBOs often only become visible to the public when they protest. Protests are often preceded by lengthy periods of failed communication attempts, and arguably result from citizen/community frustration with government (Atkinson, 2007; Tapela, 2015; Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Nleya, 2010). Due to the relative visibility of protests over other forms of CBO communication, they are an important and influential form of political communication. However, protests are not always effective: they are just as likely to be ignored or seen as negative. For example, South African protestors are often criminalised in government and media narratives (Chiumbu et al., 2016a; Pointer, 2015; Pointer et al., 2016). Because of the limitations of protest as a form of political communication, it is important to look at what other communication efforts CBOs are making.

1.2.2 Significance of the study

Existing South African literature looking at the CBO communication in participatory governance has tended to focus on the spaces in which communication takes place. For example, Miraftab (2004) argues that CBOs are expected to communicate in spaces created by government for consultation (invited space), whereas communities often create their own spaces for engagement (invented space). Studies on social movement communication in South Africa are also relevant because CBOs often form part of social movements. With respect to communication in social movements, studies focus on the tools/mediums of communication and who is doing the communicating (Chiumbu, 2012, 2015; Dawson, 2012; I. Steyn, 2016; Wasserman, 2007a).

In previous work (Pointer et al., 2016), I used a questionnaire survey to examine the political communication practices of CBOs in terms of their use of communication tools and mediums, their efforts to secure mainstream media coverage, and their perceived success in communication. While this study investigated the political communication of more than 20 organisations and provides a good overview, it does not provide an in-depth look at CBO communication. In this present study, I dug deeper into CBO communication by undertaking qualitative research in three case study organisations.

1.2.3 Study purpose

In this study, I identified the nature of the political communication efforts of three inner city Johannesburg CBOs. In particular, the study explored how the two CBOs are using political communication in networks of power to establish and leverage power to assist their constituents' political challenges. My research explored whether CBOs create dynamism and unique connections between humans, things, and strata in order to generate power.

As already mentioned, the constituents are inner city residents and inner city street traders. Their political challenges revolve around the right to live in inner city buildings and the right to trade in the inner city. In terms of these challenges, the study explored the CBOs' desires (i.e. active, productive and creative political processes), the content of their communication (frames and aesthetics), the tools/mediums they are using to communicate, and how these techniques and tools reach the CBOs' various audiences. These components, illustrated in Figure 1, are seen in this study as potentially creating a dynamic

political communication machine that produces networks of power. As such, the study investigated the machinic dynamism of political communication, when desires, frames, aesthetics, communication tools/mediums flow together to reach particular audiences and develop networks of power.

1.2.4 Research questions

The main research question for the study was: How are CBOs in inner city Johannesburg undertaking political communication in order to build networks of power?

To answer the question, I investigated:

1. Do the current activities of the CBOs, that reveal their desires in action, help them to generate power and if so, what is the nature of the power generated?
2. Are the frames the CBOs using in their political communication relevant to South Africa's political culture, and if so, how do the frames help them generate power?
3. Given that aesthetics are key to the political communication of advertising, which shapes people's desire to buy, and to the branding of South Africa's political parties, are the CBOs' aesthetics adequate in allowing them to compete for aesthetic attention, and thereby establish power?
4. Since much of modern communication focuses on ICTs as a means for establishing networks of power, to what extent are ICTs relevant to the CBOs and their efforts to leverage power?
5. Based on their desires, frames, aesthetics and tools, which audiences are the CBOs reaching, and what does this reveal about their relative power in the inner city?
6. How are desire, framing, aesthetics, tools and audiences connected by the CBOs to create a political communication machine, and is the machine effective in generating power to influence the political trajectory of the city?

1.3 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

In terms of this study, South Africa has a long history of CBO involvement in transforming South Africa from apartheid to the present. In light of this, this section of the chapter comprises (1) CBOs and political communication; (2) a brief overview of key issues of

contention in South Africa's political culture, and (3) a general overview from the founding of Johannesburg, through apartheid, and up to the present day.

1.3.1 CBOs and political communication

While, CBOs are often poorly defined, in this study, I focussed on CBOs that had some elements of social movements (membership based and aversarial) (as described by Madlingozi, 2007; Ranchod, 2007; Stokke & Oldfield, 2005), and in one instance had elements of an NGO (e.g. funding, office space, staff) (as described by Mueller-Hirth, 2009; Piper & Nadvi, 2010; Robins, 2008). Much of CBO communication bears resemblance to anti-apartheid communication strategies and tools, especially in the use of 'alternative media' such as newsletters, bulletins, pamphlets, leaflets and flyers, and bumper stickers for black consciousness groups, the UDF, communities, unions, and student organisations (Louw, 1989; Sparks, 2009; Tomaselli, 1986). Furthermore, CBO protest styles – a primary form of political communication from apartheid until today – largely remain unchanged, typified by performances of songs that originate in the struggle against apartheid ('struggle songs') and the toyi-toyi (a marching dance) (Cronin, 1988; Twala & Koetaan, 2006), as well as banners and organisational t-shirts (Tomaselli, 1986; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). Despite the similarities and continuities with the past, this study found that they were far less useful in the current era than they were under apartheid, likely because the political culture of the current era does not match the political culture under apartheid.

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1.3.2 South Africa's political culture

Political communication necessarily takes place within a particular political space in which power is contested by different groups, in different ways. For the CBOs in this study, I assessed how their political communication machine fits in or breaks with South African political culture. In South Africa, immediately post-apartheid, some of the key aspects of political culture were tied to notions such as the 'rainbow nation' (Gibson, 2004), 'African renaissance' (Maloka, 2001); and a human rights culture (Bohler-Muller et al., 2019). The post-apartheid euphoria quickly gave way to clashes between neoliberal and anti-neoliberal ideologies, with various social movements fighting against privatisation and corporatisation of social services (Madlingozi, 2007).

Racism has not decreased post-apartheid (T. Pieterse et al., 2018), and much of the economy is still owned by white people, which was broadly captured under the term 'white monopoly capital' (Desai, 2018; Filatova, 2018). Amid these tensions, both the African National Congress (ANC) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have argued in favour of 'radical economic transformation' (Desai, 2018; Notshulwana, 2017; Southall, 2018), but this sits uncomfortably alongside an emphasis on the need for entrepreneurship (Cant & Ligthelm, 2002; Preisendörfer et al., 2012). It also sits uncomfortably alongside the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) culture in which there is a growing chasm between black elites and ordinary black South Africans (Mattes, 2002).

Apart from the tensions around economics and wealth, a culture of violence dominates South Africa (including xenophobia (Dodson, 2010; C. Jonathan & Abel, 2015) and gender violence (Buiten & Naidoo, 2016)). Research suggests that xenophobia is becoming more widespread (Crush, 2021), and despite much campaigning to end the rape culture, South Africa has one of the highest rates of gender violence in the world (Fakunmoju et al., 2021).

Overall, these themes reveal a growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with respect to the post-apartheid era (Bundy, 2015; Maylam, 2019) but the CBOs in this study mostly did not adapt their communication strategies to the post-apartheid political terrain, except insofar as the frames they deployed were embedded in the political culture – especially the rights frame and the contestation of neoliberalism.

1.3.3 History of Johannesburg and the inner city

In this section, I focus on two aspects of Johannesburg's history: housing and street trade. These aspects closely relate to the work of the two CBOs I have studied, which are the Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC), who focus on housing and matters affecting inner city residents; and (2) One Voice for all Hawkers Association (One Voice), who focus on organising street traders.

Despite the two organisations tackling the issues separately, as I will show below, the three issues have intertwined and been a key source of contention throughout Johannesburg's history, and up to the present. For example, street traders often reside in inner city buildings and other inner city residents typically buy from the street traders. In discussing these crosscutting themes, my historical perspective focusses on the changing

political economy of inner city Johannesburg, as these receive the most attention in the literature and are most pertinent to the socio-economic issues the CBOs are tackling. In taking the research forward, while the study focussed on communication, my work also touched on any political and economic changes happening in the city over the course of the study.

Johannesburg is sometimes called eGoli (City of Gold), because it was established in 1886 as a gold mining town, and soon grew to be the economic hub of South Africa (Matshikiza, 2008; Mbembe & Nuttall, 2008; Tomlinson et al., 2003b; M. Wafer, 2010; Wilhelm-Solomon, 2016). The 1930s saw foreign capital rushing into the city, while increasing effort was put into removing black people from inner city residences (Bremner, 2000; Parnell, 1988). From the outset, the municipality tried to limit street trade, which gained impetus in around 1927 when black traders set up coffee stalls (Pezzano, 2016; Rogerson, 1986). Due to the labour demands of the gold mines, cheap labour was brought in from neighbouring African countries, Europe, and China, so Johannesburg has always been cosmopolitan (Everatt, 2011; P. Harrison et al., 2012; Massey, 1983; Matshikiza, 2008; Mbembe, 2008).

As apartheid spread, with increasing forced removals and forced racial segregation during the 1960s, the city started booming (Tomlinson et al., 2003b), with high-rise apartments and high-end shopping (De Jong, 2017, p. 3). As more migrants came to the city to work in the mines or the newly established manufacturing sector, mobile food stalls blossomed around transport hubs, despite municipal raids against the traders and city efforts to limit the number of traders on racial lines (Beavon & Rogerson, 1986).

However, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, inner city racial segregation began to break down (Bremner, 2000; Stadler & Dugmore, 2017; Todes, 2012). When rent control was lifted in 1978, landlords found they could charge black tenants higher rents than white tenants (Morris, 1994b), and black tenants then sublet so that the number of occupants per building increased. Due to growing unemployment and a more permissive business environment, street trade gained impetus (Emdon, 2003; Rogerson & Rogerson, 1997). With the increasing desegregation of the city, 'white flight' led to formal business moving to the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, leading to inner city decline (Morris, 1994a, 1994b, 1999a; Tomlinson et al., 2003b). The apartheid government capitulated and unbanned

various liberation organisations, and city government became shared between the ANC and the National Party (NP) under the Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber (Tomlinson et al., 2003b). Given the inner city decline, the city government increasingly switched from a language of race to a language of “health and urban sanitation” (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2008, p. 20).

After the end of apartheid in 1994, led by the ANC, policy efforts were made to reinvigorate the inner city, transform it into a ‘world class city’ (Bremner, 2000), while trying to address poverty (Didier et al., 2013). However, in practice, new developments have gone along with socio-economic exclusion (Bremner, 2000; Frenzel, 2018; Kluth, 2014; Koster & Nuijten, 2016), as evictions from inner city buildings, and increasing harassment of street traders and foreign nationals prevailed (Ah Goo, 2018a, 2018b; Emdon, 2003; McMichael, 2015; Rogerson, 2016a).

In 2016, an alliance between the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the EFF pushed the ANC out of mayoral office (Booyesen, 2016; Mokgosi et al., 2017). Although Mashaba said he would address “pressing matters that affect poor people” (Booyesen, 2016, p. 545), in practice this study has shown that he shut down participatory spaces for poor people and their organisations and focussed on trying to persuade the private sector to deliver some public goods. Therefore, with respect to the CBOs’ communication to local government, efforts to communicate have been increasingly ignored and even government’s invited spaces for participatory governance have been closed down, or the CBOs have been excluded from them. As other studies have observed, participatory governance in South Africa’s cities is not effective in incorporating the voices of civil society.

Subsequent to the fieldwork for this study, the city government again changed hands, reverting to the ANC on 4 December 2019. However, this only receives brief attention in this study, in terms of updates I have received from the two organisations. Specifically, after the return to power of the ANC, upgrading of street stalls has commenced across Johannesburg, however the status quo in terms of inner city housing has remained the same, with little access for CBOs to engage the city on housing delivery. However, with the Covid-19 pandemic hitting in 2020, all the CBO activities have revolved around relief efforts for the poor, which has limited the extent of direct political engagement with the city.

1.4 METHODOLOGY

In the methodology, I deployed case studies of two CBOs for qualitative evaluation of their political communication activities and strategies. I explored the three case studies through three techniques which were then triangulated to assess validity, similarities and differences. The three techniques were (1) Participatory Action Research (PAR), (2) observation of specific activities, and (3) 'object analysis' which involved (3a) frame analysis and (3b) critical visual analysis. These will be elaborated in more detail in the methodology chapter. Participatory Action Research involved three workshops, attended by members and office bearers of the CBOs, which explored the political communication machine in relation to organisational political communication activities and their audiences.

Observation took place at each organisation's office, attending events with office bearers at which they communicated, and going on walkabouts with office bearers (of e.g. inner city buildings, or street trading sites). For the frame analysis, since only ICRC has adequate records, I focussed on organisational documents, statements made at PAR workshops and statements made during observation. The aesthetic analysis was mainly based on analysing organisational branding, such as logos, t-shirts and banners, and the situations in which the branding was used. Regarding the tools they used, while tools were discussed at PAR workshops, I mainly relied on observation to establish which tools were being used. Regarding audiences, this involved observation, office bearers reporting to me about engagements they had, and office bearers following up with me in terms of the impact their engagement had.

Using this methodology, I amassed a large body of rich data, which was analysed in terms of how it relates to the political communication machine and how the different components work (or do not work), what it reveals about the effectiveness of political communication for CBOs, and particular power relationships generated through the communication.

1.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

For many CBOs, a key aim is to bring about social change, which usually involves speaking to those in power, that is, political communication. In relation to communication for social

change, it is important to think about how communication is and/or can indeed remake the world into a more holistic, equitable, sustainable, and compassionate whole. The structure of this section is based on the communication model illustrated in Figure 1, that is, the communication assemblage generating power for socio-political change. While this framework is broken into different components for the sake of exploration, as discussed earlier in the introduction, these concepts are not separate. They work as a machine with, for example, aesthetics and frames flowing together to create pathos and affect, or the choice of specific tools to direct communication at particular audiences. The links and flows between the concepts will be explored throughout the research process.

1.5.1 Desire

In this thesis, the concept of desire is based on the explication of Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (2004). For them, desire is not about wish fulfilment based on a lack, but is a creative process: desire is what we are in the process of creating. Of the two CBOs, ICRC had the strongest and most overt desire, in that it sustained political communication over time, and planned and strategised their political activity, finally achieving the sought-after product. Desire was contradictory and conflictual in One Voice, including micro-fascism (such as xenophobia) by some members and calls for unity among other members, such that they never agreed on a shared programme of action, and merely responded to crises as they arose. As such, the organisation was frequently in abeyance: regular meetings never took place (in part because traders could not leave their stalls to attend meetings as this would have impacted on their income).

In tracing the active creative processes undertaken by the organisations, I found that ICRC was unable to develop a creative process that effectively reached government. However, it had established and maintained a solidarity network that it regularly engaged with and could draw on when mass action was needed. This solidarity network was relatively stable, and was not based on the efficacy of the organisation in getting government attention, but rather on the community bonds and history they shared, and their ongoing caring relationships. Importantly, the organisation did not only establish the flow of desire through connections with people and organisations; it connected non-human objects such as paperwork, filing systems, computers, office space so that desire flowed consistently and systematically. However, their activities were not particularly novel in that they mostly relied

on techniques similar to apartheid-era political (albeit with some rudimentary social media engagement) and did not develop any new strategies. Instead it fell back on protest when other channels of communication were closed. Therefore, at the level of creating a rhizomatic assemblage, ICRC was able to produce an effective flow of desire. However, when it tried to confront the arboreal assemblage of government, it had no success.

One Voice focussed its politics on the micro-local level, focussing only on rhizomatic assemblages (albeit that the rhizomatic connections were with low ranking city officials such as their local councillor and the administrator of the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC) (a quasi-government structure that manages trading spaces). While the organisation was dogged with micro-fascisms (such as xenophobic members) their micro-local politics were rather more fruitful in securing their members' demands (to remain in their stalls and not be harassed or evicted). But unlike ICRC it did not try during the course of this research to engage with higher levels of local government, and had no strategy for making connections with government's arboreal structure.

Based on these findings, it is clear that the success of political endeavours is not entirely related to the strength of organisational desire. For example, ICRC has a strong desire with focussed activities but it does not succeed in being heard by the higher levels of local government where housing policy is made. However, its desire sustains a strong membership base. One Voice's desire is jumbled, but at micro-local level it succeeds in preventing evictions and harassment of its members (and some other traders in the vicinity). Because of this it maintains a strong membership base despite vast disagreement between members and between office bearers. Nevertheless, it is important to track desire through the other components of the machine, as I do below.

1.5.2 Framing

The CBOs in this study use overlapping frames to talk about the issues of the constituencies and members. Many of these frames operate within the "logic of membership" (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484), in that the organisations attract members by using resonant frames. Rather fewer of the frames operate with the "logic of influence", in that the CBOs were never able to influence the actions of higher levels of government or to influence the media to get coverage. The main focus of their frames was on collective action, i.e. asking both members

members and government to work together to solve problems. The organisations also deployed the poverty frame, diagnosing poverty as the source of members' many problems. ICRC also strongly deployed the rights frame, but recognised that even with Constitutional Court rulings in their favour, people's rights were still trampled on. Both organisations framed their activities in terms of government failures, which included the government's neoliberal thinking and decision-making, corruption, and the crime and grime frame (in which government was blamed for crime and grime). Significantly, the organisations rarely moved from diagnostic frames to prognostic frames, except insofar as they invoked the collective action frame, stating that the government should work more closely with them to resolve problems. This failure implies that the organisations are well aware of the problems of their members and constituents, but do not have well-developed solutions; they argued that through engagement, government would better be able to meet their needs.

Nevertheless, the frames they defined in the PAR workshops and during my observation, worked closely with their desire as a productive force in that their frames were deployed in an effort to produce political change. Many of the frames were effective (especially for ICRC) in attracting and maintaining a membership base, but they were largely brushed off and ignored by the arboreal heights of government.

1.5.3 Aesthetics

The chapter on aesthetics mostly relies on critical visual analysis of organisational branding, as well as my observation of the use of these materials. Drawing on the literature on aesthetics, I identified two foci for exploring aesthetics: (1) the originality of the visual aesthetics and its possibility to bring about new ways of seeing to challenge the status quo; and (2) the ability of the aesthetic to build solidarity with various audiences.

In terms of the ability of the organisations to create new ways of seeing, their aesthetics were not so successful in that they relied on common tropes. Despite having organisational branding, only One Voice members regularly used the branding by, for example, wearing their t-shirts to every event they attended, and even wearing the t-shirts in their office. ICRC only used its branding to make a vibrant public display at its protest, but did not otherwise wear its clothing. In terms of branding, the CBOs drew on aesthetics of similar organisations. For One Voice this means that their logos were at first similar in style and colour to those of

pan-African political parties, and later changed to reflect the colours of South African trade unions. Red t-shirts and banners linked the ICRC to organisations with a left-wing, red agenda but did not clearly distinguish themselves as unique in this political terrain. One Voice logos specifically linked them to African struggles through the map of Africa in their logo, ICRC's logo with high rise buildings located the organisation in the city. Both the logos used hands, in one form or another, centring them in human activity. While the branding did not create new ways of seeing, it did establish organisational solidarity in the case of One Voice and ICRC.

At the PAR workshops, organisations showed a good understanding of how the aesthetics of the elite opened the doors of power to elite, and they understood that their own aesthetics were often closing these doors to them. However, their branding was highly affective in linking members to each other; camaraderie was largely expressed through the wearing of organisational clothing, and in wearing it, members connected meaningfully with each other. As such, this study revealed the powerful importance of creating an organisation aesthetic to bring members together and develop a shared identity and sense of community. However, due to the nature of the aesthetic (i.e. not aligned to the aesthetics of elites), the aesthetic effort detracted from their efforts to reach higher levels of government.

1.5.4 Communication tools

For both CBOs, the tools were quite rudimentary, and did not extend to video-making or graphic design. As explained above with respect to aesthetics, both CBOs had organisational clothing and used banners as a key form of communication at protests and workshops. ICRC also went to a great deal of trouble to hand paint placards for its protests and demonstrations.

A key finding was that office space can be regarded as a tool, because organisations can use such spaces as places to connect with members and others in solidarity networks; they are also places for record-keeping and generating communication materials. For ICRC, the offices were well-established, with computers, internet, and printers. It had good record-keeping, and access to materials over the course of many years. The ICRC office had frequent drop-ins of people seeking help with rental issues, school enrolment, and access to clinics. One Voice acquired office space during the course of the study, but it did not have

furniture or office equipment, and the minimal records that had been kept were in plastic shopping packets at the homes of two members (one packet each). Because of its previous lack of an office, One Voice relied most on walking the streets among traders to make communicative connections, and one-on-one interactions with the local councillor and administrator at the JPC office. While in some cases members relied on WhatsApp to communicate, this was limited in that the chairperson and some committee members did not have smartphones.

Only ICRC had a functioning web presence, with an organisational website and social media accounts. However, these were not regularly updated, and usually only showed organisational activities and not the issues it was addressing or the police/private security action against their members. One Voice had a Facebook page, but during the course of the study did not upload any photographs or post any status. While both organisations had access to cellphone cameras, ICRC also had a separate digital camera and they habitually took photographs and kept these in its records. One Voice occasionally took photographs but these were not stored in a central place that was readily accessible for study.

In terms of using the mainstream media for communication, neither of the organisations was able to establish effective relationships with media practitioners, and therefore neither managed to get media coverage during the course of the study. ICRC tried to reach the media through press releases, and journalists attended the protests, but the organisation did not subsequently achieve any coverage.

Because of their rudimentary tool use the organisations were not able to establish networks of solidarity beyond their immediate locale (in the inner city). Only One Voice was able to reach out to the councillor and JPC administrator by going to their offices; however, it could not reach higher levels of government. ICRC deployed a wide range of tools in their efforts to attract the attention of the mayor, but it remained locked out of engagement opportunities. Only ICRC showed potential for taking on a social media strategy and making digital campaigns but at this stage it does not have the relevant skills to do so (it has the technical skills, but does not know how to apply the technical skills politically). Nonetheless, even if it had social media campaigns, it is not certain that it would have been able to have two-way communication with city officials in this medium.

These findings reveal that novel uses of communication tools are not a key part of any of these CBOs strategies. The most important feature of their communication is interpersonal interaction, whether at their offices, in the streets in trading areas, or in inner city buildings and informal settlements. Even for ICRC that has many communication tools at its disposal, the focus is on interpersonal communication, and the affective qualities of those communications. While authors such as Castells (2010, 2015) have heralded the political possibilities of the digital age, it is clear that these tools do not have clear value for the two CBOs in this study. Furthermore, the research shows that regardless of what communication tools organisations use, if they do not manage to open political spaces through desiring-production and by developing affective relationships, tools are useless. Tools only become meaningful for political organisations if they have a political understanding of how to use those tools.

Therefore, communications practitioners, for example, from development organisations, who seek to enter CBO spaces to train them on the use of particular tools will fail if they do not recognise the different strands of power in play, and if they do not recognise that the structure of power will not be easily shifted. As Walsh (2014) found with respect to training a CBO in video-making, such tool training efforts are hopelessly naïve if they do not connect to how people use communication tools in their daily life, and if they do not teach CBOs how these tools can be used politically to reach those in power.

1.5.5 Audience

For the purposes of this study, I delineated four groups of audiences that may be relevant to CBOs: government (loosely defined), members, solidarity networks, and the media. While different theorists disagree on which audience is the most important, each one holds value, and plays a significant role in terms of the CBOs' networks of power. Through observation, I determined which audiences the CBOs are targeting and, through Participatory Action Research, determined if this is the best option for each organisation.

1.5.5.1 Government, its police forces and hired security

With regard to its interactions with different audiences, both organisations attempted to communicate with government, in terms of city or national government officials, and/or the

police. While Cooper-Knock (2018) argues that the South African government is continually negotiating with the claims of others in either an amicable or antagonistic way, this study found that spaces for negotiation did not exist or had been closed down. ICRC found it difficult to connect with government officials, while One Voice had some success in talking to the local councillor and the JPC administrator, but also could not access higher levels of government.

Another aspect of government with which ICRC and One Voice came into regular contact was the police or security forces hired by the city (such as the “Red Ants”). In these cases, ICRC did not engage at all with the “Red Ants” but merely observed their eviction activities and spoke to evictees. One Voice frequently tried to negotiate with police in situations where the police were planning mass evictions. During the course of this study, it was successful in stopping mass evictions, but it was not so successful in stopping the police when they targeted single traders and confiscated their goods.

1.5.5.2 Supporting membership and building solidarity

Although all the organisations identified government as a key audience, given that the government was not receptive to their communication efforts, ICRC and One Voice focussed on their membership and solidarity networks. Castells (2015) views networks of solidarity as the primary audience for those who wish to build networks of power (albeit he sees this as being established through cyber-networkers). The office bearers from the ICRC and One Voice maintained their solidarity by going door-to-door or stall-to-stall through the streets of Johannesburg. Most of their framing activities, aesthetic, and tool use were geared towards the organisation’s membership and potential membership who provided the key opportunity for building power and influence. Additionally, in ICRC affective bonds were deliberately made and sustained through empowerment activities (especially for women). Whereas it was not possible to shift power in the government terrain, insofar as the members supported the organisations and the organisations supported their members, they were able to exert power. The members considered participation in the organisations as valuable, even if the organisations did not shift the political inequalities, and even if they did not win big political successes. Effective affective and political communication is therefore essential in building and maintaining membership.

Despite the positive aspects of membership building undertaken by One Voice, it also was a highly conflictual organisation, with members disagreeing on a range of issues, but most strikingly the xenophobia of many members, and the efforts of other members to push against the xenophobia. As I will show in this thesis, conflict and solidarity sit uncomfortably side-by-side, but other political issues may lead organisations to tolerate micro-fascist individuals or groups of individuals. (In Deleuze and Guattari's (1983) "micro-fascism" exists in all of us and is that leads us to 'rein in' our connections to others and limit all our creative possibilities that seem unruly, wild, impossible, and perhaps over-whelming. In this study, some members of One Voice attempt to 'comply' with the city in reducing the number of traders on the street and limiting competition between traders, by cutting of connections with foreign nationals and 'illegal' traders.)

1.5.5.3 Solidarity networks

In terms of solidarity with non-members, all the organisations focussed on collaboration with other organisations. ICRC made substantial efforts to maintain or build networks with donor organisations, like-minded NGOs such as PlanAct, legal support organisations (such as the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI) and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS)), issue-based organisations such as Earthlife Africa, and other CBOs working in related sectors (including One Voice). One Voice participated in various workshops and events organised by NGOs, but did not view these activities as overly useful, and were extremely critical of the kind of support that was on offer. Prior to my fieldwork, it had over the years worked with various trade unions but felt these did not accrue them any benefits.

While One Voice and ICRC had social media accounts, these were unlikely avenues for generating solidarity. In the case of One Voice, nothing was ever posted on its Facebook account over the course of this study, and it had few members on its Facebook page. In the case of ICRC, it did post press releases and announcements of its events and activities, but again it had not worked to build its audience on social media, and so was not reaching out to other possible solidarity audiences in this medium. Generally, no one commented on ICRC social media posts. As such, none of the organisations used social media to establish solidarity networks.

Although solidarity networks might seem important to CBOs, in this study only ICRC found them important. For it, the solidarity organisations could support each other, or they could receive support (e.g. from SERI and CALS). Its relationship with CALS had been especially important in the past in linking it to donor organisations. However, solidarity did not feature in a big way in its political communication efforts, and the communication mainly only took place when the need arose. ICRC thus had rhizomatic relationships, which were only activated when support, in one form or another, was needed. Overall, these rhizomatic connections were not a strong generator of power, but the supportive relationships sustained support over many years.

One Voice was highly disapproving of and disillusioned by attempts at solidarity with NGOs and trade unions. In the opinion of One Voice office bearers, for these organisations, One Voice members were merely warm bodies to up the numbers at events organised by the trade unions and NGOs. These organisations did not provide One Voice with any funds, office space, equipment, or access to computers; neither did they offer to support One Voice in rolling out their own campaigns. Their main focus, according to One Voice, was getting One Voice to support them. Therefore, for One Voice, the possibility of rhizomatic connections was not open to it; in its experience such organisations operated in an arboreal way, rather than treating One Voice as an equal partner.

Therefore, while it might seem that many civil society organisations could build effective rhizomatic connections for social justice, in practice, the relationships were often arboreal, with CBOs at the bottom of the pecking order. This points to a strong challenge and need for South African social justice organisations to establish much stronger rhizomatic connections, and move away from the hierarchies which persist on the South African left. For as long as CBOs are considered junior partners in social justice projects, and as long as CBOs are seen as less knowledgeable about politics, significant solidarity will not be built.

1.5.5.4 Failing to get the ear of the media

Despite the media being important political actors, the organisations were as unsuccessful in communicating with the media as they were with government. In the case of One Voice, through the course of this study they did not make any effort to connect with the media, although it reported that its previous efforts to do so had failed. However, ICRC sent press

releases and invitations to many media outlets, and at its protest on 14 November 2018, two journalists did attend but they did not report on the event thereafter. Therefore, despite the political power of the media, the organisations are unable to leverage that power to their advantage. Therefore, the media have become a low priority for South African CBOs because they experience a total lack of interest in community politics and the political lives of the poor.

Overall, ICRC and One Voice were strongest with respect to communicating with their members and potential members. Only ICRC has long-established, meaningful relationships with solidarity organisations. And only One Voice successfully secured government as an audience, and this was at the micro-local level, mainly with the JPC administrator.

1.6 CONCLUSION

This research aimed to establish how the two CBOs used communication to build political power in their political networks. As such, I explored theories on building, shaping, and transforming networks of power. The departure point for this research was to examine how CBOs use political communication in networks of power or to generate power. The research examined flows of communication among CBO members, their communities, and other audiences, as well as the machinic flows generated by the concepts depicted in Figure 1.

Of the two organisations, ICRC's political communication machine was most like the model in Figure 1 and was also the most stable machine. This strength was because it had a strong flow of desire through rhizomatic connections. In terms of consistent political action, it deployed various frames that aligned with South Africa's political culture and issues in the inner city. Its aesthetic showed a strong alignment with South Africa's social justice struggles, and it deployed a wide variety of tools. Because of the efficacy of its political communication machine, it had a strong membership base who were bonded in affective relationships. However, despite having all relevant components for a political communication machine, it did not establish two-way political communication between itself and the city government while Herman Mashaba was mayor, neither did it establish a relationship with the media. Even though the political communication has all the relevant components, it is not driven by a desire for innovation and creativity, and it may be that it is not able to achieve broader political power because it does not deploy communication more creatively. If the

content of its communication and its approach stirred up something new, it would likely have been more visible and could have leveraged political visibility to accrue more power.

Despite weak political efficacy in bringing about decent, affordable accommodation in the inner city, efficacy is not the most important factor for members: more important is the sense of community and the degree of affect between the members. Therefore, now that Mayor Mashaba is out of office, the substantial membership puts the organisation in a good position to take up any political opportunities that arise now that the ANC is back in office. Furthermore, given that it has access to social media, if it could develop a more innovative political strategy to launch social media campaigns, it would likely be able to expand its solidarity network, gain visibility and receive more attention in the public arena.

Like ICRC, One Voice also sustained membership, but in its case it did achieve small political gains for its members in preventing evictions and limiting police harassment. However, it is notable that this success was hardly because of an effective political communication machine: the organisation did not have a strong desire (because members disagreed with each other), the extent to which it deployed frames was limited, and it barely used communication tools except for interpersonal engagement. Nevertheless, the members' loyalty to the organisation was exhibited because members frequently wore organisational t-shirts. Its political communication machine was entirely rhizomatic, in that even when it engaged government officials, this was at a micro-local level and based on interpersonal relationships. However, as I will show in this thesis, its political success was more to do with subterfuge than political communication per se. Because it only extends its political activities at micro-local level, it does hold power in the terrain where its members' stalls are located and they are therefore satisfied with the level of political efficacy. Furthermore, because the organisation tolerates micro-fascism (especially xenophobia) among members, the membership is highly fractious and members tend to disagree on numerous topics.

Rancière (2010) argues that politics only occurs when people try to break with the 'sensible', which he defines as the ordinary day-to-day operations of power. Neither of the organisations tried to break with the sensible; they went along with the status quo – either the status quo of bureaucracy, or the status quo of social justice organisations. Their activities were routine, and easily subsumed by bigger structures of power. Furthermore,

despite multiple elements of the post-apartheid political culture unravelling as old alliances break down and new power brokers emerge, neither CBO adapted to the changes by developing new strategies or alliances. This lack of responsiveness to the new terrains do point to problems with their political communication.

If the CBOs want to develop political communication that reaches those in power and others who might work in solidarity with them, they will firstly need to find more creative ways of enacting their desire, because neither of them undertake anything particularly novel in their approach to communication. They need to align with (and perhaps subvert) existing powerful frames or generate new frames which create a new political logic. Since their communication only reaches audiences when it creates affective bonds, they need to find aesthetics that create affect for their audiences: if they want to increase their engagement with government, they need to find an aesthetic method that is both true to their membership and solidarity structures, but also resonates with government.

While the two CBOs have room to improve their communication strategies, the context suggests that even these improvements might not yield political success in terms of influencing government to make policy and implementation changes. It is nevertheless possible to strengthen solidarity networks in this way, and thereby become more visible, in order to actively take up more space in the political terrain.

Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Inner city community based organisations (CBOs) in Johannesburg are faced with problems created in the city's embryonic years, aggravated by apartheid, followed by capital flight from the inner city to the northern suburbs, and slow decline resulting from city government neglect. The inner city is also shaped by political contestation and South Africa's political culture. The CBOs are embedded in and actively create networks through which they challenge and enact power. In particular, the organisations in this study create solidarity networks among inner city residents (Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC)) and street traders (One Voice for All Hawkers Association (One Voice)). But the networks are not confined to members: among others, they include the city bureaucracy and officials, other organisations, police and private security forces, religious formations, and other social justice organisations, as well as the infrastructure and inner city spaces.

The challenges presented by inner city, and the shape and form of the CBOs' networks greatly influence the scope and potential of communication for the two CBOs. The political communication of the two CBOs is also shaped by apartheid repertoires of communication, including but not limited to protest song, dance, and aesthetics. In the next sections, I present the different influences shaping the two CBOs' political communications, first defining political communication and outlining the history of contentious political communication in South Africa. Since political communication is embedded in a political culture, I then present some of the main strands of South Africa's political culture, before recounting the history of Johannesburg up to the period covered by this study. I then explore the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, which is based on various network theories of power and in Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, 2004) and Latour's (2005a) theories of assemblage; I show how this theory relates to communication and power in inner city Johannesburg.

2.2 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

In this study, political communication is defined as communication by which the message sender purposely aims to influence the social and political environment (McNair, 2017). In recent times, much of the literature has focused on the mediatisation of political communication, that is, the way in which the mainstream media and social media have become integral to the operations of political groups, especially political parties, but including social justice movements (Hjarvard, 2008). Castells (2010) and Couldry and Hepp (2013) have highlighted how mediatisation now encompasses the digitisation of the political terrain, especially due to social media. Castells (2010, 2015) underscores the way in which social media allow mass political movements to connect across the globe and celebrates the potential of this. The 2010 Arab Spring is commonly seen as the turning point for citizens using social media to bring about pervasive political change since this was largely regarded as a Twitter and Facebook revolution (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011; Robertson, 2013; Wolfsfeld et al., 2013).

However, the extent of mediatisation and digitisation in South Africa is disputed, and Voltmer and Sorenson (2016) suggest that the mainstream media and internet usage is not as embedded in South African political culture to the same extent as Western countries, even though the most powerful voices in South African society transmit their messages via the mainstream media and social media. Indeed, while many NGOs in South Africa use social media, community organisations often do not regard this as important in their political struggles (Bosch et al., 2019). This lower level of mediatisation in South Africa is arguably a result of a large part of the population not having access or having limited access; although internet penetration in the country has gone from 47% in 2015 to 56.3% in 2020 (Clement, 2020). However, Bosch (2020) has highlighted how integral social media has become for the social and political everyday life of many South Africans, linking them to entertainment, leisure and consumption, as well as political discourse. In my study, while ICRC and One Voice had social media accounts, One Voice never posted anything to their account during the course of the study, and ICRC did not post anything which encouraged engagement, as I will discuss in the chapter on Tools.

Because of the focus on mediatisation and digitisation in the literature on political communication, the strongest emphasis in studying political communication is on the tools of

communication. As depicted in Figure 1 on page 4, the tools are only one component of communication. Another field of political communication that is strongly emphasised (as depicted in Figure 1), is the framing of political messages; insofar as framing is undertaken by social justice organisations, research has focussed on collective action frames. I found little recent literature on the aesthetics of social justice organisations, even though authors such as Rancière (2005, 2006) have pointed to the intimate connection between aesthetics and the political for changing how we view the world. Furthermore, audience studies have tended to focus on the extent to which audiences are influenced by the mass media (cf. Blumler & Katz, 1974; Hawkins & Pingree, 1980; Klapper, 1957; Swanson, 1979), and more recently the extent to which audiences are influenced by social media. For example, the undue influence of fake news that is distributed via social media and posited as the reason for the 2016 US election results (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). All of these aspects of political communication will be further discussed in the conceptual framework in Chapter 3. However, in the next section, I provide a historical perspective on social justice political communication in South Africa.

2.2.1 Political communication and social justice struggles in South Africa

In this section, I set out some types of political communication used in past social justice struggles in South Africa, especially focussing on the struggle against apartheid, but also highlight some continuities with the present.

From the past until today, organisations have used political communication to resist oppression and make their resistance visible. For example, *toyi-toyi* is a widely used communication tool in South African struggles (Cronin, 1988; Twala & Koetaan, 2006). It incorporates song, dance, banners and posters (either handmade or printed), and sometimes, a 'uniform' of participants wearing similar insignia such as t-shirts (Tomaselli, 1986; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). *Toyi-toyi* may be regarded as a desiring-machine meant to generate unity and discipline, and powerful feelings in those who take part (Cronin, 1988; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). It also tries to create fear in those in the immediate vicinity of the protest who are not participating, especially the police (Cronin, 1988). The aesthetic is military-like (Sitas, 1992; Vershbow, 2010), while framing is conveyed through songs, many of which are still sung today. The continuity of songs and dance from the past into the present suggest a frame in which struggles against oppression

and poverty and for social justice are connected (Twala & Koetaan, 2006). In the course of a protest there are several audiences, including the participants themselves, bystanders, the police and government (and in some instances big business). During the course of my fieldwork, only the ICRC undertook a protest, although both CBOs emphasised the importance of protest in the Participatory Action Research workshops (PARs).

Protests may be one of the most visible types of political communication, but they are not the only form of political communication. Boycotts have also effectively highlighted political challenges. Among the first boycotts recorded in South African literature was a pass law boycott organised by Gandhi in 1906 (Arkin, 1960). Boycotts are framed as a refusal, for example, the United Democratic Front's (UDF) refusal to take part in the 1984 election for a tricameral parliament, which created a hierarchy of white, then Indian and coloured, then black citizens (Bollens, 2000; Bundy, 1987; Sinwell, 2011b; Zuern, 2011). Some anti-apartheid activities included consumer boycotts of transport services, products or chain stores (Adler & Steinberg, 2000; Beittel, 1995; Botha, 1992; Bundy, 1987; Schumann, 2008; Swilling, 1987; Zuern, 2011; Zunes, 1999). From the literature, it seems that boycotts are not as relevant to current struggles but one well-known boycott highlighted by Sinwell (2011b) was a campaign against the 2009 local government elections, called 'No land, no house, no vote!', undertaken by the social movement Abahlali baseMjondolo. Another post-apartheid example of boycott is the NOPE campaign in which participants considered South African elections to be making a mockery of democracy, and therefore they mocked political party antics during the lead up to elections and encouraged people not to vote (personal communication, P. Naidoo). None of the CBOs I studied undertook a boycott during the course of this study.

Most protests and boycotts are preceded and supplemented by efforts to build solidarity using various other communication methods. Many apartheid-era boycotts and protests resulted from the organisation of street committees and civics (Bond, 1995). Street committees fed into community structures that became known as the civics (Runciman, 2016a), which in turn became important role-players in the UDF. Because street committees operated in-person and door-to-door, the key audience of street committees may be regarded as people living in the vicinity. Street committees were both a means to collect information and a means to spread information (Frederikse, 1987). Organising the civics sometimes involved "vigorous education campaigns", but there were not enough resources

to apply such campaigns across all civics (Mayekiso, 1993, p. 24). The framing of issues in street committees pointed to, on the one hand, the failures and illegitimacy of local government and, on the other hand, the necessity to unite against “the common foe of apartheid” (Bollens, 2000, p. 170). Civic structures continue to operate post-apartheid (McEwan, 2003; Runciman, 2016a, 2016b; Sinwell, 2011b) in the form of CBOs. While not a street committee per se, ICRC operates according to specific buildings in the inner city and has building committees; One Voice also organises traders in street blocks or at taxi ranks. For ICRC and One Voice, this type of organising is a key component of their political communication strategy.

Because alternative media in South Africa in the first part of the 20th century are barely documented (Downing, 2003), this subsection focuses on alternative media of the 1970s and 1980s. In this era, the media produced were often censored, banned or confiscated, and led to the arrests of those caught carrying such media (Frederikse, 1987; Tomaselli & Louw, 1987). Despite repression, alternative media were abundant; for example, printing presses produced newsletters, bulletins, pamphlets, leaflets and flyers, and bumper stickers for black consciousness groups, the UDF, communities, unions, and student organisations (Louw, 1989; Sparks, 2009; Tomaselli, 1986). In the post-apartheid era, from 2001 to about 2008, alternative media were regularly produced by IndyMedia South Africa, which formed part of the worldwide IndyMedia collective, and produced media about, inter alia, South African social movements (P. Naidoo, 2008). In this study, only ICRC produced these types of alternative media, especially pamphlets and posters in buildings advertising meetings.

The alternative media produced during the apartheid era were undertaken under the auspices of mass movements, local street committees, but also by individuals. This thesis draws parallels between the anti-apartheid media and struggles today, but also differentiates them in terms of the audiences chosen by the two CBOs, their desires, their messages, their aesthetic and tools. The CBOs' communication is also differentiated in terms of context: post-apartheid the political milieu in word, if not in practice, promotes participatory governance, as I will discuss in the next subsection.

2.2.2 Political communication post-apartheid: Participatory governance and civil society

As discussed in the introductory chapter, CBOs are conceptualised as a key stakeholder in policy production and policy implementation. Indeed, participatory governance, involving all civil society organisations and citizens, is enshrined in the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) as well as various other policies, such as Integrated development planning (IDP) at local government level (Buccus et al., 2008; P. Harrison, 2006; Lemanski, 2017). However, according to various literature (cf. Atkinson, 2007; Lemanski, 2017; Mirafteb, 2004, 2009; Tapela, 2015; Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Nleya, 2010; Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2014), participatory governance is not working effectively.

While in South Africa, participatory governance is meant to take place at all levels of legislative policy making and implementation, local government is often conceptualised as having the most potential for ensuring participatory governance is democratic (Béni-Gbaffou, 2008). Local level participatory governance in South Africa typically takes place at the ward level, with the ward councillor leading the ward committee. It is meant to enhance accountability between representatives and civil society, but the close relationship can also lead to clientelism as local councillors prioritise local initiatives based on the priorities of their supporters. This is particularly so in South Africa, where local councillors are not chosen by their communities but rather appointed by political parties and, therefore, their concern is remaining in favour with the political party rather than with local citizens and organisations. Because they are not chosen by the community, and sometimes do not even live in the community, local civil society organisations and individuals say their local councillors are not visible, do not take responsibility, and do not keep their promises (Molefe & Overton-de Klerk, 2019).

Local governance is meant to involve interaction and dialogue between government office bearers, business owners, and civil society, but instead the process is prone to elite capture, such that those who are better able to articulate their concerns are better able to achieve their political goals (Lemanski, 2017). In various political processes, “voices of the poor are actively rebuffed or ostracized ... [while] more consensual or perhaps less undermining of the overall development direction of the city, are more likely to be heard” (Lipietz, 2008, p. 154). It is also easy to remove disruptive elements from official meetings and legitimise more mainstream voices, so that those with the most transformative political

vision are excluded from decision-making processes (Papadakis, 2010). South African policy on local governance fails to take these inequalities into account.

When more disruptive citizens and organisations do manage to make headway with the local government structures, for example, through protests, this often leads to practices of informal governance. Informal governance strategies “bridge the ‘grey’ area of contradiction between the state’s intentions and the reality on the ground, which formal practices cannot address” (Pernegger, 2021, p. 1196). Informal practices can lead to a more responsive government that accepts that certain policies cannot be put into practice, for example, if a large group of people refuses to cooperate, or if policy requires payment that constituents cannot afford. Informal practices can also result from the local/city government failing to design a policy that addresses particular problems. For example, the City of Johannesburg has yet to design an inner city housing policy that meets the needs of inner city residents, because it “dismisses practices that do not conform to the preferred narrative” (Charlton, 2018, p. 1). Because informal practices can influence local governments to change direction, South Africans have “a more dynamic understanding of popular sovereignty, reflective of vibrant, complex, and contested political process” (Finn, 2021, p. 165).

Problems around participatory governance are especially striking in South African cities like Johannesburg and Cape Town. While Heller (2012) has argued that ANC party dominance has created problems with participatory governance in South Africa, notably in Johannesburg, when the DA was in control, similar problems existed (as will be shown in the thesis). One of the main problems with the way the City of Johannesburg is governed is that decision-making has been centralised in the mayor’s office and his 10-person executive structure (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008). The structure of governance is based on decisions taken in different departments, so geographic structures are barely considered in decision-making.

Instead of councillors acting on behalf of wards, they are seconded to the different departments (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008). If, for example, they are seconded to the committee on housing, they would not participate in the committee on water service provision. Therefore, they would have no influence on decisions about water, unless they used political connections to persuade another councillor in the water committee to take up a water-related issue on behalf of their ward. As such, the ward committees are only advisory and there are no formal channels to send messages from ward committees to the city government. They

have become ritualised spaces in which civil society puts the same issues on the agenda, month after month, with nothing changing (Katsaura, 2015).

Therefore, as will become clear in this thesis, if CBOs like the ICRC want to influence housing policy, they have to directly refer the matter to the housing committee rather than to the relevant ward councillor. These engagements with the city have been highly adversarial and the city has undertaken evictions from 'bad buildings', only to put evictees in alternative accommodation, which in turn becomes a 'bad building' (Pernegger, 2021). Arguably, "the City's engagements in legal challenges to the evictions of occupants of 'bad buildings' were relatively cheaper than funding solutions that dealt with the full extent of the poor's housing needs" (p.13).

By contrast, venues for street trading and taxi ranks in inner city Johannesburg are governed through the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC), which is a city entity that reports to the city council, but is run by a board of directors (Chikwema, 2018). In city policy, providing space for street and market traders is meant to generate revenue (Daniel, 2017), even though this is usually unrealistic (Pernegger, 2021). In some cases, traders' collectives have been pressed into participating in the governance of street trade (for example, collecting rent) (Daniel, 2017). Nevertheless, many markets are operating at a deficit, and traders are subjected to "fragmented and inconsistent management arrangements" (Pernegger, 2021, p. 1206). Such inconsistent practices are the result of state actors having a wide range of responses to street trade, from "animosity to empathy" (p. 1206). As I will show in this thesis, One Voice is able to use the inconsistent management practices to its advantage.

Given these problems with participatory communication, this thesis explores the extent to which the two CBOs are able to participate in governance in South Africa and in inner city Johannesburg. But, first, I will briefly reflect on the role and nature of CBOs as part of civil society in South Africa.

2.3 DEFINING CBOs IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

Defining CBOs is a difficult task because of the slippage in terminology about civil society organisations. The five types of civil society organisations addressed in the literature are social movements, CBOs (sometimes called community-based movements), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), religious organisations, and trade unions. I do not discuss trade unions and religious organisations below because there are no definitional issues and they are not directly related to the definition of CBOs.

However, in this thesis, it is important to show the link between social movements and CBOs, in that I have drawn heavily on various social movement theories to explain the activities of the two CBOs. Social movements have been variously defined, but I mainly rely on Tarrow's (2011, pp. 151–153) definition, that is, that social movements "require solidarity to act collectively and consistently; constructing identities around its claims. ... [by] identifying grievances and translating them into claims against significant others". In this study, both organisations attempt to build solidarity, act collectively, and construct their identity around their claims: in this way they are like social movements.

Therefore, it is not surprising that some of the South African literature conflates CBOs and social movements (Madlingozi, 2007; Ranchod, 2007; Stokke & Oldfield, 2005), while others argue that unless CBOs unite into a broader movement, they cannot accurately be described as social movements (Bond & Mottiar, 2013; Mottiar & Bond, 2011; Sinwell, 2011b). Ballard, Habib, Valodia and Zuern (2006) argue that a social movement consists of smaller organisations united under one umbrella. Similarly, Runciman (2016a, p. 620) argues that CBOs that are not connected to broader social movements are typically groups of "concerned residents", which have a ubiquitous presence in contemporary waves of struggle, but are trapped in local political terrains.

The idea of CBOs as joining social movements likely arises from two well-known South Africa social movements: the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WC AEC). In the case of the APF, CBOs such as the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) were members, and as such could send delegates to APF meetings (Madlingozi, 2007; Runciman, 2012, 2016a; Sinwell, 2011b). Community organisations in places such Tafelsig, Mandela Park, Valhalla Park, Delft, and Lavender Hill

had delegates in the WC AEC (Chiumbu, 2015; Miraftab & Wills, 2005; Oldfield & Stokke, 2004; Stokke & Oldfield, 2005), so arguably these are CBOs that joined a social movement. Regardless of the distinction between social movements and CBOs, Stokke and Oldfield (2005, p. 133) suggest that CBOs and social movements “are seen as adversarial collective actors that challenge state implementation of neo-liberalism”.

NGOs, as distinct from CBOs, have been described as being more service oriented, working in cooperation with the state. Mueller-Hirth (2009) sees NGOs as reformist and narrowing the space of public debate. While some NGOs may have lost their critical edge, both NGOs and CBOs may move between adversarial and cooperative with regard to the state (Robins, 2008). Instead of seeing the difference between social movements, CBOs, and NGOs as being in their relationship to the state, Robins (2008) argues that NGOs are funded and have good ties to donor organisations, whereas social movements and CBOs do not. Piper and Nadvi (2010) and Mueller-Hirth (2009) define NGOs as having staffed and professionalised organisations, while social movements and CBOs are membership-based.

In a study of South African civil society and its media use, Bosch et al. (2019) note that the type of organisation was also related to media use. For example, NGOs were more likely to use social media to contact the mainstream media and make connections with them, whereas CBOs were more likely to send a press release via email or fax. CBOs were less likely to use social media; a number even thought social media was irrelevant to their struggles. CBOs were also less likely to make effective media links and receive media coverage. Many NGOs had professional media and/or communication officers, whereas most CBOs did not have members with relevant skills. However, it was not entirely possible to link media and communications use and strategies to one type of organisation, even though trends were certainly visible in the study. These media and communication issues are further explored throughout this study.

Because of definitional blurring, and to bring about more clarity, in this study I have chosen to study organisations that do not have the scope and resources of umbrella organisations (usually called social movements in the literature). CBOs in this study are smaller, more focussed organisations which do not belong to a broader organisation. I also distinguish CBOs from NGOs in terms of Piper and Nadvi's (2010) and Mueller-Hirth's (2009) definition that NGOs are professional and staff-based, while CBOs are membership-

based. When I refer to the limited resources of CBOs, they may not be monetary, but often they are related to members' skills. In spite of opting for this definition, the practices of the organisations suggest hybridity between NGO and CBO, with ICRC having (only since 2015) active staff and accessing donor funding, but remaining membership-based. While these organisations may not amount to social movements, they are nonetheless embedded in solidarity networks, which sometimes extend their scope of action. Solidarity networks are the focus of the chapter on audience, later in this thesis.

However, as I will do in the next subsection, it is important to situate political communication and CBOs in the overall political culture of South Africa. Political culture has a strong impact on how CBOs conduct their work and the creative opportunities available to them (desire), the relevance of messages they put out, the relevance of the aesthetics they use, what tools are available to them, and which audience they are able to reach.

2.4 SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL CULTURE

Political culture is broadly defined as "politically relevant beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours" (Gibson, 2004, p. 9) that generate power. South Africa's political culture has largely been shaped by colonialism, apartheid and resistance to apartheid. As such, race, racism, and resistance are strongly embedded in South Africa's political culture. However, political culture is not a monolith: it is composed of competing beliefs, attitudes and behaviours (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993), which I will consider in this section.

Immediately after the end of apartheid, deliberate attempts were made to change the political culture, specifically with calls to build a rainbow nation. Those attempts are briefly discussed below, but since they have stalled and then failed, I go on to discuss other strands of political culture prevalent 25 years into democracy, including efforts to align South Africans with an African renaissance, inculcate a human rights culture, and develop a new political-economy. Emerging from the colonial and apartheid culture of violence, an ongoing culture of violence has dogged the post-apartheid vision for change, and new calls have emerged for decolonisation.

2.4.1 Manufacturing culture: The rainbow nation and African renaissance

Immediately post-apartheid, attempts were made using the 'rainbow nation' ideology to build a political culture that respects human rights (Gibson, 2004). The 'rainbow nation' ideology was embodied in ritual performances, such as Mandela's promotion of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, which saw South African faces colourfully painted with the new flag and singing the new national anthem (Steenveld & Strelitz, 1998). Political advertisements were flighted on television, promoting the changes and looking to the future with hope (Distiller, 2008). These rituals and myth-making sought to bring about a real change in power, from the racist political culture of apartheid to celebrating a democratic government, with all South Africans united under one banner.

However, more recently, 25 years into democracy, political actors are challenging the negotiated settlement that led to a rainbow nation ideology, and pointing to ways that persistent racial ideologies leave apartheid-era power relations largely intact (Chikane, 2018; Hurt & Kuisma, 2016). Indeed, black South Africans rail against numerous racist incidents, while many white South Africans declare that a genocide of white farmers is taking place (Bouvier, 2020; Crush, 2013; M. Evans, 2011; M. Steyn & Foster, 2008; Verwey & Quayle, 2012).

Another attempt to engineer a new political culture in the early years post-apartheid was driven by the language of an African renaissance (Maloka, 2001). Given that under apartheid South Africa was the last country to shake of the vestiges of white domination, it had taken a different political trajectory than other African countries. Therefore, in the early post-apartheid years, efforts were made to align South Africa's political culture with other African countries, noting that both colonialism and apartheid "had left behind devastating social and psychological legacies" (Tondi, 2018, p. 159).

The political vision, embodied in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), was that by working together, and reawakening culture and innovation, Africans could reinvigorate their economies and democracy (Chabal, 2002). However, in South Africa, despite eloquent speeches from then-President Thabo Mbeki, the African renaissance was never widely embodied in specific rituals such as wearing particular clothes, singing or dancing to African music. South Africa's role in the African renaissance

floundered because it required South Africans “to be more Africa literate” (Vale & Maseko, 1998, p. 286); by May 2008 xenophobic violence against foreign Africans swept across South Africa, marking an end to the illusion of South African unification with Africa (Zondi, 2008).

2.4.2 Human rights culture

Ushering in the post-apartheid era, the celebration of the negotiated settlement, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the Constitution inculcated rights language into South Africa’s political culture. The Constitutional Court is meant to “keep in mind the *imperative*¹ to transform the lives of all South Africans within the framework of human rights and other constitutional law imperatives” (Bohler-Muller et al., 2019). Successful campaigns were, for example, led by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) to secure HIV/AIDS medicine (Johnson, 2006), and by Johannesburg inner-city dwellers against eviction (Dugard, 2016). Despite winning some cases at the Constitutional Court, many of the rulings had limitations; for example, in the case of inner-city dwellers facing eviction the ruling was that (1) the local government must provide alternative accommodation (but the type of accommodation was not specified); and (2) that the local government must engage meaningfully with evictees before evicting them (but this did not include engagement with organisations such as the ICRC fighting against evictions) (Dugard, 2016). As I will show in the chapters on desire and framing, ICRC has repeatedly tried to engage with the Johannesburg City Council, demanding meaningful engagement as per the Constitutional Court judgement.

Similarly, when the Johannesburg City Council launched Operation Clean Sweep in 2013 against traders and confiscated all their goods, the Constitutional Court ruled that the city should compensate traders, but only because the city had acted against its own policies (De Vos & Webster, 2015). One Voice did not participate in this court case, but nevertheless continues to negotiate its way out of evictions and the confiscation of goods in some instances, as I will show in the chapter on desire and audience.

¹ Emphasis in original.

As Dugard (2016, p. 1152) points out, Constitutional Court “jurisprudence is less uniquely and dramatically transformative than one might have expected of a court with such an explicitly transformative legal design”. The Constitution is not a remedy for socio-economic ills, because its powers do not extend to determining claims for economic justice and challenging the country’s economic trajectory (Cachalia, 2018). Furthermore, even though the government may well be steadily rolling out socio-economic goods, the steady increase in numbers has often not been met with the quality of services citizens expect, and over which the Constitutional Court has little say (Bohler-Muller et al., 2019).

As such, Constitutional Court limitations have led to a political culture in which “faith in the constitutional project” sits uncomfortably with “a mood of disappointment and criticism drawing on critical race theory, postmodernism, poststructuralism, Africanist and Black Consciousness political traditions, and postcolonial theory” (Cachalia, 2018, p. 377). Part of the reason for the failures of the Constitutional project is that it is based in “political, conceptual and ideological predicates that not only violate the principle of historical justice but also stand in the way of a radical-democratic, decolonised and liberated future ... [which has left] white supremacy and coloniality largely undisturbed” (Modiri, 2018, pp. 304–305). Even though some Constitutional Court rulings may be regarded as a type of “judicial activism” (Mathebe, 2021), because the Constitutional Court has not provided a timeframe and costing mechanisms for the implementation of socio-economic rights, such rights are endlessly deferred to some future horizon.

Nevertheless, the rituals associated with Roman-Dutch legal traditions, and other legal practices of the Constitutional Court do reflect one seat of power in South Africa, with real material outcomes. And in my study, I found that ICRC frequently used the rights framing, albeit that it was moving away from this language since court cases were not resolving systemic housing problems.

2.4.3 Where politics and economics collide: Neoliberal subjectivities or pro-poor solidarity and protest?

South Africa’s political-economic culture is riven through with contradictions, ambiguity, and some efforts to overcome the schisms by looking for win-win solutions. From the outset of democracy, the agreement to adopt the Congress of South African Trade Union’s (COSATU)

Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) was meant to herald a pro-poor economic transition (Bond, 2000; Visser, 2004). The long-established tripartite alliance between the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU promoted the RDP but the labour-driven RDP was soon replaced with the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic plan. GEAR sought to cut government expenditure, build public-private partnerships, and attract foreign investors (Bond, 2000; Visser, 2004). The move from the RDP to GEAR proved highly contentious with some strong supporters – notably among big business, and more numerous but less powerful decriers. The move from the RDP to GEAR also exposed tensions between the need to move away from apartheid's authoritarian rule, while at the same time subjugating the country to the neoliberal global economy (Madlingozi, 2007). The result is that despite wide-ranging political changes, the economy has barely changed, and millions of South Africans are still excluded from the benefits of the formal economy (Friedman, 2019; Koelble, 2018).

Nevertheless, GEAR attempted to shift South African political culture: under apartheid black consumers *en masse* refused to pay for water and electricity services as a form of protest (Fjeldstad, 2004). The apartheid boycotts left black South Africans with huge arrears. While the post-apartheid government went some way to writing off these arrears, at the same time it tried to persuade South Africans towards a culture of 'Masakhane', which called on South Africans to build the nation together by paying for services (M. Burger, 1998; Timm et al., 1998; Timm & Jadwat, 1998; Von Schnitzler, 2008). Like the 'rainbow nation' ideology, the Masakhane campaign was an effort to produce a national culture uniting all South Africans, but also shifting government discourse from an "emphasis on democratic participation to one stressing citizen's fiscal responsibility" (Von Schnitzler, 2008, p. 907) and disciplining the poor (Veriava, 2019). It sought to break the back of a so-called 'culture of non-payment', but did not reflect the reality that many South Africans could simply not afford to pay (J. Burger, 2009; Von Schnitzler, 2008). As such, it was not successful in bringing about a new political culture (Fjeldstad, 2004; Timm et al., 1998; Timm & Jadwat, 1998). Indeed, by the early 2000s citizens were reacting with outright rebellion against payment, insisting that the Constitution entitled citizens to services, and resentment that the poorest were being pressured to pay (Van Heusden & Pointer, 2006). As I will show in my chapter on desire, ICRC continues this political culture into the present, arguing that many inner city residents simply cannot afford to pay for housing and services at the prices set by government and the private sector.

The Masakhane Campaign also came at a time when government was rolling out its policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Despite the aspirations of GEAR, the government was mindful of the need to deliver economic goods to address inequality (Hart, 2013; Wood, 2002), so BEE became a key policy initiative. However, BEE was quickly monopolised by new black elites – or ‘black diamonds’ (Juggernath et al., 2011), while most ordinary South Africans have not benefitted from the affirmative action policy (Desai, 2018; Tapscott, 2017).

The growing chasm between black elites and ordinary black South Africans (Mattes, 2002) sees a blown up glamour of black elites, in line with a popular soap opera, *Isidingo* – a “politics performed celebrity-style” (Miller, 2017, p. 94). This culture involves ritualised dress, in terms of expensive high-end fashion, expensive cars, iPhones, make-up and hair extensions for women, and visits to the gym, drinking Moët & Chandon, glamorous parties, high-end game lodges and overseas travel. In our second Participatory Action Research workshop undertaken during the course of this study, both organisations pointed to this culture as excluding and alienating to them, as I will show in all the chapters discussing the individual concepts in Figure 1.

The struggle against apartheid saw massive levels of solidarity, based on confronting a common enemy (Thörn, 2007), shared action (Check, 2019; Thörn, 2007), loyalty to each other (Buhlungu & Bezuidenhout, 2008), the affective labour of care and morale building (Desmond, 1986; Seidman, 2001), and destroying the morale of white South Africans (Drewett, 2016). However, new employment regimes, neoliberalism and globalisation have damaged solidarity culture, especially in trade unions, where individualism has damaged organisation and, in some cases, even led to violent conflicts (Buhlungu & Bezuidenhout, 2008; von Holdt, 2002). In terms of community struggles, Bähre (2007) also argues that neoliberalism and individualism have led to a breakdown in communal solidarity, with increased aggression and violence among family members. However, he goes on to say that solidarity is, in any case, not pure:

Solidarity is not opposed to conflict, nor does conflict necessarily take place outside of the realm of solidarity. Instead, rivalry, conflict, jealousy, and aggression can be at the heart of solidarity networks. The tendency to convey how helpful people remain when faced with the most depressing living conditions disregards these

conflicts ... After all, solidarity is the conflict about the parameters of inclusion.
(Bähre, 2007, p. 52)

Indeed, as I will show in this thesis, especially with regard to One Voice, conflict and solidarity sit uncomfortably side-by-side, and the discomfort in South Africa is particularly striking in the case of xenophobia. Growing xenophobia is challenging South Africa's political culture and, particularly, its Pan African politics. For example, whereas the trade union movement under apartheid united migrant labour, division is now greatly apparent (Buhlungu & Bezuidenhout, 2008). However, as Buhlungu and Buizendenhout (2008) and von Holdt (2002) point out, neoliberalism and globalisation have had a strong impact on how people perceive solidarity.

Vehemently opposed to the neoliberal, consumerist culture, and pushing back against the Masakhane Campaign and weakened union activity, the late 1990s and early- to mid-2000s saw the rise of 'new social movements' (von Holdt & Naidoo, 2019). These movements had the anti-apartheid flavour of being 'anti-establishment', as described by Thörn (2007). Off the back of national government's water and electricity privatisation plans and municipal government cost-recovery mechanisms (McDonald, 2002; McDonald & Ruiters, 2005a), the APF, WC AEC, and the Durban Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF) were born.

After years of fighting, they successfully resisted electricity and water privatisation, and removals from council housing, but did not halt municipal cost recovery efforts. They also did not change the neoliberal ideological and economic direction of the country; and since they did not exist outside the main metropolises, had limited reach (McKinley, 2016). However, they reinforced and revived the apartheid era political culture of pro-poor solidarity. Again, as I pointed out with respect to the Anti-Eviction Campaign (Pointer, 2004), solidarity culture is riven with conflict, but the affective labour of solidarity continues to define activists in the post-apartheid era and forms a large part of their reasons for taking part in the struggle. As de Swaan (1995, p. 25) explains, solidarity is based on who is more like you and less like you, which "provide the affective involvement or detachment". As such, solidarity continues to bring communities together in protest, as they identify common concerns around the spaces they occupy.

Much has been made of South Africa's protest culture, which is fairly derivative of apartheid protest culture (Ballard et al., 2006; Ngwane, 2011; Von Holdt et al., 2011), but the cause and meaning of the phenomenon of community protests remains contentious. Is it a rebellion of the poor, as argued by Alexander (2010)? Are these community protests merely 'service delivery protests' as put forward by the media (Pointer, 2015), or do they cover a range of local discontents (Day et al., 2018; Fakir & Moloi, 2011; Lau et al., 2010; H. Marais, 2011; Thompson, 2011)? What constitutes a violent protest (Alexander et al., 2018; Bohler-Muller et al., 2017)? Who is to blame when protests turn violent – the police or the protestors (Alexander & Pfaffe, 2014; Bohler-Muller et al., 2017; Kiguwa & Ally, 2018; Mchunu & Theron, 2013; Von Holdt et al., 2011)? Despite these many debates, peaceful protest is seen as an essential and legitimate part of South Africa's political culture, and even though disruptive and violent protests have less support, they are seen as effective political mechanisms for bringing about change (Bohler-Muller et al., 2017). Indeed, it is hard to imagine South African politics without the rituals of the toyi-toyi and apartheid struggle era songs being deployed, without red t-shirts, placards, burning tyres, burning public buildings, and road blockades. Protests continue to be a daily occurrence across South Africa (Alexander et al., 2018), and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future while the chasm of inequality is not repaired. However, during the course of my fieldwork, only ICRC participated in a protest, and this protest did not include any of the tactics typically described as violent (e.g. they did not burn anything or blockade any roads).

2.4.4 Myth-making flounders as the post-apartheid pact breaks down

Moving away from the neoliberal critique, more recent economic discourse has focussed on the dominance of white South Africans in controlling the economy and the overly-influential 'white monopoly capital' as a source of trouble (Desai, 2018; Filatova, 2018). Apartheid calls for political freedom have been overtaken by calls for economic freedom, particularly a far-fetched call for 'radical economic transformation' (Desai, 2018; Notshulwana, 2017; Southall, 2018). Many view democracy as failing, which is linked to a political culture in which "South Africans tend to associate the concept of democracy with a system of poverty alleviation rather than with a form of government" (Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002, p. 170). Whereas the rainbow nation myth seemed to sweep race under the rug, a new political culture, a backlash

culture, has emerged. It is impatient with the pro-investor policies that have played out since the end of apartheid, and points to ways in which such policies are pro-white.

At the same time, corruption and 'state capture' have come to own the leading party, the African National Congress (ANC) (Filatova, 2018). 'State capture' suggests that ordinary corruption has become more extreme to the extent that "private interests ... intrude in state affairs to the point of directly determining state policy" (Desai, 2018, p. 3). However, despite more and more examples of corruption and state capture being exposed, from the side of political elites, there is a political culture of impunity (Lekalake & Nkomo, 2016).

Alongside corruption, the 2012 Marikana Massacre where striking mineworkers were gunned down "inaugurated a series of ruptures ... throwing into question key industrial relations institutions ... and weakening COSATU" (von Holdt & Naidoo, 2019, p. 8). Two years later, in November 2014, the rupture was completed as the largest South African trade union, the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) split from COSATU. The break further weakened the union movement and the ANC tripartite alliance (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016; McKinley, 2015). The more radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have stepped into the breach, promising a new economic deal, especially for poor South Africans (von Holdt & Naidoo, 2019).

Meanwhile, since 2014, the South African economy has teetered on the brink of having its credit rating downgraded to junk status (Asmal et al., 2016; Karodia et al., 2014, 2017). Rising unemployment, especially among the youth, is creating both hopelessness and anger (Desai, 2018; Hurt & Kuisma, 2016; Ndedi & Kok, 2017; Tapscott, 2017). While the government pushes a dogma of entrepreneurship, few South Africans have access to the capital necessary to start a business (Cant & Ligthelm, 2002; Preisendörfer et al., 2012) and, in any case, many municipal governments are harsh towards informal business and street traders (Béni-Gbaffou, 2015). However, as I will show in this study, One Voice does, at a micro-local level, manage to leverage support for street trade with local councillors, which has led to upgrading of stalls in the period immediately following my completion of fieldwork. In the chapter on framing, I also show how One Voice used an entrepreneurial frame to claim trading space in Johannesburg.

All of these events suggest that multiple elements of the post-apartheid political culture are unravelling as old alliances break down and new power brokers emerge. Despite the

political terrain changing substantially, as I will show in this thesis, none of the CBOs adapted to the changes by developing new strategies or alliances.

2.4.5 Culture of violence: Racism, patriarchy, xenophobia

Not all aspects of South African political culture are in flux. One of the most striking and stubborn features of South African political culture is violence. In South Africa, violence comes in many forms and dimensions: anti-black racism is endemic (T. Pieterse et al., 2018); former President Zuma and Police Commissioner Bheki Cele argued that police should 'shoot to kill' suspects (Marks & Wood, 2010); police have shot and killed protesters, including schoolteacher Andries Tatane (Gqola, 2011) and the miners shot down at Marikana, with the new President Cyril Ramaphosa implicated in the massacre (Duncan, 2014); attacks on foreign nationals are frequent (Dodson, 2010; C. Jonathan & Abel, 2015); and gangsterism (involving male-on-male violence as well as violence against women and children) prevails in many black communities (Maringira & Masiya, 2018). In addition, South Africa has an epidemic of gender violence and violence against children across race groups (Heise, 2018; Moletsane & Mitchell, 2015; Mshweshwe, 2020).

Rape is linked to the violence of racism under colonialism, under apartheid, and still today (Gqola, 2015). Part of South Africa's political culture today has been described as a 'rape culture' (Gouws, 2017) that perpetuates colonial and apartheid "patriarchal hierarchies in post-apartheid South Africa" (Buiten & Naidoo, 2016, p. 538). Ritually, much of the violence, political and inter-personal, hinges on the ritual performances of masculinity (Buiten & Naidoo, 2016). Even in community politics, young men contest the rights of women to represent them, and see their political performance as a rite of passage (Langa & Kiguwa, 2013). Even when women are not silenced with violence, political organisations often see women doing the bulk of the work, while the men occupy leadership positions and have the public profile (Miller, 2016).

Fightback has come from the One in Nine Campaign, women in the #FeesMustFall student movement, who highlighted patriarchy and sexual violence in their own movement (Gouws, 2017; Miller, 2016), and more recently the #TotalShutdown women's strike (K. Naidoo, 2018). However, in South Africa's patriarchal political culture (Miller, 2017), gender violence and violence against children are treated with impunity (Seedat et al., 2009). The

police fail in their duties, for example, losing dockets, keeping victims waiting long hours when they report cases, disregarding victims' privacy, and negative investigation capacities (Van Zyl & Sinclair, 2006). Homosexual victims are further treated with disdain, discrimination and negligence (Thomas, 2013). In this thesis, reactions to patriarchy and women's equality affect the way ICRC takes on the political challenges they face, and influence the overall form and structure of the organisations, as I will reveal in forthcoming chapters.

Violent discrimination also affects migrants entering South Africa. As the number of foreigners entering the country and unemployment has grown, joblessness has led to a discourse that foreigners are stealing jobs, taking up informal trading spaces, and straining public services (Gordon, 2018; Hart, 2013; Solomon, 2019). Such xenophobic language saturates every level of South African political culture, with violence on the ground mirrored by statements from President Cyril Ramaphosa complaining that foreign traders set up business in the townships without licenses (Hlatshaneni, 2019). With officials in the Department of Home Affairs blocking asylum and refugee claims (Crush & McDonald, 2000; De Jong, 2017; Ekambaram, 2019; Jinnah, 2017; Landau & Freemantle, 2010; R. Walker et al., 2017), this is widely considered "one of the most dishonest government departments" (Rugunanan & Smit, 2011, p. 709). Xenophobic sentiments from politicians and police down to the general public have resulted in frequent attacks on foreigners, in some instances with xenophobic attacks sweeping across the country (Gordon, 2020). As I will show in this study, xenophobia and anti-xenophobia are key parts of the language of members of ICRC and One Voice, albeit that ICRC is primarily actively anti-xenophobia, while many One Voice members are actively xenophobic, especially in terms of the rights of foreign nationals to participate in informal trade in Johannesburg.

In contradiction with the xenophobic political culture, the student movements of #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall have called for decolonisation, and the re-centring of Africa in the South African education curricula.

2.4.6 Decolonisation

Apart from student protests against gender violence and promoting feminism (Miller, 2016), the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall student protest movements led to calls for free

university education and the decolonisation of South Africa (especially in Higher Education) (Mandyoli, 2019; Mangcu, 2014; Ndlovu, 2017; Zimbizi, 2017). As Hungwe and Divala (2019) point out, political decolonisation has already taken place in that colonial powers have handed over political power in the former colonies; however, the residues of colonialism remain in ways of thinking, and especially in education. For the students, decolonisation includes a more racially representative ratio of black to white staff and student body, renaming buildings and other spatial challenges, the removal of colonial and apartheid symbols (such as statues and art), and curriculum transformation (Miller et al., 2019). Specifically, students have pointed to the epistemic violence that needs to be dismantled (Heleta, 2016). Students and scholars have also highlighted how racism continues to permeate South African life, even down to the attempts to assert control over African hair (Mokoena, 2017).

These calls for decolonisation show that a new political culture is rising out of the student movements. However, the extent to which it will remain as a struggle located mainly in academic institutions or spread into ordinary political talk is yet to be seen. Also, given that calls for decolonisation sit uncomfortably beside xenophobic violence (Hungwe & Divala, 2019), it is unclear how the calls will shift South Africa's violent political culture.

2.4.7 Turning away and disillusionment

Belief in the negotiated settlement that ended apartheid has waned, and it is now often seen as an instrument for maintaining the racial status quo (Maylam, 2019) and short-changing transformation (Bundy, 2015). Belief in the ANC's ability to bring about a more equitable society is also waning. The 2016 local government elections saw a further loss of power for the ANC; it lost control of several metros to coalitions between the official opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) and other parties, especially the EFF (Booyesen, 2016). Despite the relative success for the DA in securing votes to win local government control, and despite it having some black leadership, the party is still seen as a white party that aligns with a neoliberal agenda and makes no effort to address inequality (Southern, 2011). As such, it does not pose a real threat to ANC dominance.

The national and provincial government elections of 2019 saw the ANC losing votes (although still winning the election), the DA losing votes to the Freedom Front amid a white

swing to the right, and the EFF showing a solid growth. As Cooper-Knock (2016) explains, the ANC's attempts to dominate the political terrain are increasingly contested. And as von Holdt and Naidoo (2019) point out, a new constellation of political power is emerging. While most of South Africa's social ills are an apartheid legacy (Von Fintel & Ott, 2017), many South Africans are dissatisfied with the slow progress in addressing inequality, such that most South Africans remain politically and economically marginalised 25 years after the first democratic elections (Koelble, 2018).

In summary, various attempts to engineer a new political culture in South Africa post-apartheid failed. While many South Africans may have held hope in the early post-apartheid period, current political culture is marked by violence, disillusionment, and individualist, capitalist culture on the one side, with pro-poor solidarity on the other side. Most powerfully, deep racial divides sustain one aspect of our political culture, from colonial times, to this point – 25 years into democracy. As will be discussed in the following chapters of this thesis, the organisations described herein have a pro-poor solidarity culture (in the case of ICRC it is opposed to neoliberalism), linked with a culture of human rights, which influences the audiences they target, their desire, their framing of messages, their aesthetics, and the communication tools they use. As I will show in the chapter on desire, ICRC is explicitly anti-xenophobia, while One Voice is riven with divisions over whether the organisation should include or exclude foreign nationals. Zooming in on my case study area – inner city Johannesburg, I will now consider how the political culture of South Africa has played out across the city's history, and how it is playing out at present.

2.5 INNER CITY JOHANNESBURG: PAST AND PRESENT

Johannesburg could be examined in numerous ways, such as looking at the role of mining in the city, or the history of resistance and insurrection in the city. However, for the purposes of this study, the focus is on the key issues covered by the CBOs in this research, that is, inner city housing and street trade. In discussing these themes below, I have mostly focussed on the changing political economy of inner city Johannesburg, as these receive the most attention in the literature. In taking the research forward, while the focus is on communications, my work will necessarily also look at how the political economy of the city changes over the course of the study.

2.5.1 Colonial and apartheid history of Johannesburg

First established in 1886 as a gold mining town, Johannesburg quickly grew into the economic hub of South Africa (Matshikiza, 2008; Mbembe & Nuttall, 2008; Tomlinson et al., 2003b; M. Wafer, 2010; Wilhelm-Solomon, 2016). Between 1895 and 1905, the relatively dense inner city residential belt surrounding the central business district was established (Beall et al., 2014). By 1910, the inner city provided a home for bank headquarters, finance houses, and mining companies (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2008).

Virtually from the outset, Johannesburg was inscribed with racial ideology (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2008; Tomlinson et al., 2003a). For example, in 1904, mass evictions took place and Indians' houses were burnt down, "justified by the threat of bubonic plague" (Wilhelm-Solomon, 2016, p. 381). Black people were only allowed to live in inner city mine labour compounds and servants' quarters (Du Plessis & Wilson, 2005, p. 14). Street trade, mostly mobile cafes run by white traders, was characterised by recurrent efforts by municipal authorities to repress and regularise trade (Pezzano, 2016; Rogerson, 1986). Around 1927, once black-owned coffee stalls appeared, the city council tried to control the number of traders operating in the city and began registering 'native pedlars' (Rogerson, 1986).

In the 1930s foreign capital rushed into the city (Bremner, 2000), and increasing effort went into removing black people from the inner city, especially from 1934 when the Slums Act was introduced (Parnell, 1988). By the 1960s, Johannesburg was booming (Tomlinson et al., 2003b). The inner city swung towards modernist architecture, with "high-rise luxury apartments and high-end shopping, affordable only to upper class whites" (De Jong, 2017, p. 3). Blacks, Indians and coloureds were moved out of the inner city, with blacks being particularly far removed to what later became part of Soweto (Wilhelm-Solomon, 2016). As the number of manufacturing workers rose from the 1930s until the 1950s, mobile food stalls near factories and transport hubs became more numerous (Beavon & Rogerson, 1986). The municipality tried to halt the burgeoning trade, conducting raids against unlicensed traders (Beavon & Rogerson, 1986).

By the late 1970s, despite ongoing laws to the contrary, racial segregation in the inner city began to break down. Rent control was lifted in 1978 (Bremner, 2000; Stadler & Dugmore, 2017; Todes, 2012). Despite voluble resistance from networks of right wing white

people and an initial concerted effort from the National Party, the government was not able to reverse desegregation, and the inner city increasingly became a so-called grey area (Du Plessis & Wilson, 2005; Elder, 1990; Morris, 1994b; Saff, 1990). Landlords employed various tactics to persuade poor white people to leave (Morris, 1994a), and took on more black tenants at higher rents (Bremner, 2000; Du Plessis & Wilson, 2005). While under the Group Areas Act, the government wanted to prevent desegregation and evict black people from the inner city, public interest lawyers and an organisation called ACTSTOP “resisted evictions, fought for better living standards ... [and] confronted [the government] with embarrassing publicity” (Elder, 1990, p. 264).

From the 1980s, and gaining impetus in the 1990s, the changing dynamics of the inner city led to business increasingly moving to the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, such that the inner city began to physically decline (Tomlinson et al., 2003b). For example, Morris (1994a, 1999a, 1999b) documents the decline of Hillbrow, an area that had more black residents than other parts of the inner city (Saff, 1990). At the same time, inner city street trade gained impetus due to increasing unemployment (Rogerson & Rogerson, 1997), and a more permissive environment was created by the Business Act 71 of 1991 (Emdon, 2003).

Once the ANC was unbanned in 1990, the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber began to make city policy by consensus (Tomlinson et al., 2003b), and the language of race transmuted to a language of “health and urban sanitation” (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2008, p. 20). City officials tried to stop economic decline through Local Economic Development (LED), through which local governments bring together business, NGOs, and community groups to decide how to budget to implement development strategies (Nel, 2001). A dual agenda emerged: on the one hand, addressing poverty (Didier et al., 2013), and on the other, trying to reposition the city to attract business and global capital (Bremner, 2000).

2.5.2 Post-apartheid history of Johannesburg

After the December 2002 local government elections, Mayor Amos Masondo formulated the Joburg 2030 Vision which established a range of incentives to accommodate investors through the Inner City Regeneration Strategy (Winkler, 2012). For example, in October 2004, the city promulgated an Urban Development Zone Tax incentive, giving tax breaks to

corporations that invested in commercial and residential property. It also implemented the Better Buildings Programme, evicting people from so-called bad buildings, writing off arrears, and selling buildings to the private sector, with the aim that some of these developments be turned into 'social housing' (Winkler, 2012). Despite 'social housing' purportedly being a project to house the city's poor, and despite such housing being state-subsidised, these properties continue to operate on a commercial basis, leading to rising rental prices, and further evictions (Mosselson, 2017).

Policy efforts focussed on reinvigorating and reviving the inner city with large scale projects such as creating fashion districts, art districts, and tourist facilities (Rogerson & Rogerson, 2015). For example, in the Maboneng precinct, industrial buildings were converted into "art galleries, retail shops, restaurants and office and residential spaces" (Ah Goo, 2017, p. 1). Despite an original vision that the poor and the wealthy could co-exist in the Maboneng area, evictions of poor people took place, security guards' beats marked out the area, and poorer people felt that the area was for white people and tourists (Ah Goo, 2018b). By 2019, many development projects in Maboneng were declared bankrupt and buildings were auctioned off (van Rensburg, 2019). Regeneration has also failed in many other inner city areas.

While the focus was on attracting capital, the inner city rapidly transformed into a hub of informal trade (Bremner, 2000). City officials, using the services of a coordinated team of South African Police Service (SAPS) officers, the Inner City Law Enforcement Task Team and a private security company euphemistically called the "Red Ants", tried to halt these activities by undertaking military-like operations and blitzes against traders and inner city residents (McMichael, 2015). New regulations led to the municipality raiding street traders, limiting them to designated areas, and setting standards for cleanliness and hygiene (Emdon, 2003). Criminalising residents of dilapidated buildings became "a legal tool to justify displacement, stripping any perceived rights of the occupants to have a voice in the redevelopment" (Albisa et al., 2013, p. 105).

However, when Mayor 'Parks' took office, the language of city documents began to change. The 2011 *Joburg 2040 – Growth and Development Strategy* emphasised equitably transforming the city to embrace migration and multiculturalism and encourage diversity (Office of the Executive Mayor, 2011). The strategy also focused less on policing and more

on human and social development, poverty reduction, and attracting pioneers. This new vision carried forward in the *Inner City Transformation Roadmap* of 2013, emphasised alleviating poverty, “building sustainable human settlements” and “achieving social inclusion” (City of Johannesburg, 2013, p. 3). While there was still concern about ‘crime and grime’, the city emphasised “a developmental approach to rehabilitation” alongside law enforcement (City of Johannesburg, 2013, p. 11).

But this language lacked substance as plans for change were endlessly deferred to the future (Rogerson, 2016b). While the city claimed to be establishing participatory engagement with trader organisations, in the form of an Informal Traders’ Forum, these did not occur on a regular basis, and officials set the agenda and stood at the front to ‘lecture’ traders (Matjomane, 2013). The falsity of this traders’ forum soon became apparent as in October 2013 the city undertook ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ in an attempt to clear inner city streets of both legal and ‘illegal’ traders (Albisa et al., 2013; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; McMichael, 2015). Matjomane (2013) describes how the conflict created by the city’s actions has increased tensions, especially against migrant traders, with locals making xenophobic accusations, claiming that foreign traders accessed stalls by paying officials bigger bribes, even when South Africans are renting stalls to migrant traders. This rising conflict between South African traders and foreign traders was powerfully evident in the thinking of some One Voice members, as I unpack in this study.

2.5.3 The Democratic Alliance takes over inner city government

Despite the shift in post-2011 city documents under Mayor ‘Parks’ Tau, in August 2016, he lost his mayoral seat. During the course of this study, the city was governed by a coalition between the DA and EFF, with the DA’s Herman Mashaba as mayor (Booyesen, 2016; Mokgosi et al., 2017). Despite this change of government, Mayor Mashaba’s vision did not differ markedly from the two previous post-apartheid mayors, in that he focussed on

A commitment to clean, prudent, open, transparent, efficient and accountable urban governance, combined with a focus on creating a business-friendly environment conducive to economic growth and job-creation, as well as with a commitment to

improved service delivery and an open war on corruption and poor financial management. (M. Pieterse, 2019, p. 60)

While the DA insisted that Mashaba should focus on “pressing matters that affect poor people” (Booyesen, 2016, p. 545), in practice he has focussed on attracting business and investment, thereby boosting the social and political capital of inner city housing developers (Mosselson, 2020). For example, the city announced that it would release the inner city’s ‘bad buildings’ to the private sector, 20% of which was meant for ‘inclusionary housing’ (City of Johannesburg, 2018). It has set aside R400 million to refurbish inner city buildings (Petterson, 2017). However, the city suggests that these new units will cost R2100 a month, making them out of reach for the poorest inner city residents who earn less than R3500 a month (SERI, 2018).

As Butcher (2016) points out, much of what is called ‘affordable housing’ in Johannesburg is actually only affordable to the middle-class. Most inner city residents continue to access housing through informal markets (at monthly rentals ranging from R350 to R2300, with many being illegal occupants (Dugard & Ngwenya, 2018; Malavolti, 2016). Affordable housing, social housing, and the new ‘inclusionary housing’ are priced beyond the ability of many inner city residents to pay (Mosselson, 2020), and no viable model exists to finance and develop housing for the poorest inner city residents (Robb, 2018). Furthermore, as only 20% of the housing stock will be given over to ‘inclusionary housing’, it is unclear what will happen to the other poor people who will be evicted from inner city buildings to make way for these developments.

In addition to not considering the inability of inner city residents to pay, numerous statements from Mashaba to the press, and a swathe of recent evictions point to a return to the Masondo era of blitzes and evictions. For example, the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (2019) recorded 39 raids between 30 June 2017 and 3 May 2018. While the Constitutional Court has underscored that people cannot be evicted without the city providing alternative accommodation (Strauss & Liebenberg, 2014; Wilson et al., 2015), the emergency accommodation is provided on a temporary basis, that then extends for long periods of time; and emergency accommodation is often of such poor quality that people’s quality of life deteriorates as a result of being evicted (Ah Goo, 2018b).

Despite the DA being in control of the city between 2016 and 2019, there were scant documents on how it proposed to tackle street trade. The *2017-2018 Integrated Development Plan Review* (Office of the Executive Mayor, 2017a, p. 12) argues that the informal economy generates jobs, and lessens pressure on the state to provide welfare. However, the plan also emphasised that it will enforce “business registration and compliance” (Office of the Executive Mayor, 2017a, p. 74). In its *IDP 2018/2019 Review* (City of Johannesburg, 2018), the city acknowledges that “[t]he informal sector employs almost 285 000 people in Johannesburg, with most of these jobs generated in trade”. However, in spite of referencing the upcoming release of an *Informal Trader Policy* (A. Stewart, 2019), no documents were released in the course of this study.

Bénit-Gbaffou (2018a, 2018b) argues that the policy vacuum helps create a veneer of progressive policy despite restrictive practices such as harassment of traders, confiscation of goods, and collecting bribes. The main way traders experience the *de facto* governance policy is through the mostly hostile Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) (L.-A. Jonathan, 2018). Police “use their own position of relative power to extract concessions, both material and symbolic, from street vendors” (Roever, 2016, p. 29).

Therefore, the public policies that do exist are “necessary public relations instruments” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018b, p. 12) which are difficult for traders to challenge, even though they are treated as a nuisance, crowding pavements and littering streets. Nevertheless, according to Webster (2017, p. 119), traders themselves are not wanting to overthrow municipal by-laws entirely; instead, “they are looking to adopt traditionally formal strategies – professionalization and litigation”. Through both their own organisations and election of block leaders, traders want public policies to be applied fairly, an end to arbitrary police action, and proper, consistent procedures for registering as legal traders (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018b; Daniel, 2017; Mmbulaheni, 2015). Despite these limited requirements, the City of Johannesburg has so far failed to provide recourse for traders whose stock is confiscated, or provide “basic municipal services, including water, sanitation and refuse removal” (Clark, 2018, p. 18).

Instead, registration of traders has been privatised and is now vested in the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC), who collect rent from registered traders, decide who receives legal trading bays, and limits access to trading spaces (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018a; Daniel, 2017; Mbele, 2017). However, as Webster (2019, p. 69) points out “the

documentation of street traders is neither a priority ... nor is it the determining feature of the manipulation". A wide variety of registration systems are in place, including a smart card, lease agreements, and invoices as proof of rental payments; however, different traders have different documentation, and they also have different procedures for paying rent (Daniel, 2017; Mbele, 2017). Policy documents that refer to traders participating in decision making and being empowered "mask revenue objectives [of collecting rent] and coopt traders into meeting these" (Daniel, 2017, p. 127). Nevertheless, city officials have competing visions of the city, with some seeking to increase rights access for traders, while others seek to confine traders and limit their rights (Webster, 2019).

Given Johannesburg's history and its ongoing challenges, the CBOs in this research seek to address the weak incorporation of, and sometimes outright rejection of poor people in the city. However, despite the changing political terrain (for example, a different political party in government), the organisations did not change their political communication strategy and largely continued to approach communication in much the same way they always have.

The political and economic terrain in Johannesburg is in flux, however, actions of the DA government mirror those of the past. In June 2019, the city undertook further raids against street traders (Ngatane, 2019), and inner city residents and foreign nationals (Mabuza, 2019b, 2019a). These actions continue to impact on how CBOs organise themselves and the structure of these organisations.

Having established a picture of the politics of South Africa and the inner city, below I discuss the theories underpinning the work.

2.6 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: NETWORK THEORIES OF POWER

The departure point for this research is to examine how CBOs use political communication to intervene in networks of power or to generate networks of power. In outlining the history of inner city Johannesburg, I focussed on relations of power in terms of the inner city's changing political economy, for example, the impact of apartheid politics and the focus on global investment. The political economy of the inner city forms the backdrop against which communication takes place. However, as discussed in the section on political culture above, the dynamics of communication also take place in a contested terrain whereby, for example,

both neoliberal and poverty-alleviation economic impulses operate side-by-side, challenging and confronting each other.

The political culture embodies the ideologies, practices and symbols of dominant groups, and forms part of the contestation over meaning in South Africa. In his *Prison Notebooks*, written between 1929 and 1935, Gramsci (2011) argues that the dominant ideas of society (hegemony) are held by both force and consent, such that the status quo is maintained. In communication studies, these dominant ideologies or strains of talk continually construct and maintain the social world (Couldry & Hepp, 2017), such that certain ideas are widely shared or held in society. In *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky (1988) highlight how the elites, through economic control of the media perpetuate ideological dominance in modern society. Certainly, the media have “spill-over effects on political processes, institutions, organizations and actors” (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014, p. 377), particularly with communication increasingly dominated by the media. However, amid our society dominated by elites, it is possible for civil society to develop an alternative hegemony to overturn elite control.

More recent theories have highlighted the possibilities of the media for bringing about socio-political change (Cottle, 2006), especially with social media creating possibilities to increase “the capacity for reasoned debate and discussion” (Barnett, 2004, p. 58). This illustrates that despite hegemony, it is possible to leverage communication to challenge elite power. The South African political terrain does not reveal one hegemony that is difficult to challenge; instead different role-players exert contradictory positions. It is possible for policies to contain wording which promotes both poverty alleviation and profit motives. Politics emerges from the contestation between these impulses, rather than from a single dominant ideology.

We can view these contestations as creating a web or network of power, such that different role-players, ideas, rituals and symbols exert greater or lesser power at different times. I now turn my attention to the possibilities of networks in altering relations of power by building new structures, and connecting the new to political communication. Since networks of power have particular relevance to political communication studies, the theory focusses on networks. The literature review above has already set this context in highlighting the competing political cultures and tracking the history of inner city Johannesburg from the past

until the present. I have highlighted the political economy of the city that is increasingly focussed on bringing in investment, and the competing ideologies of meeting the needs of capital, on the one hand, and the needs of the poor on the other hand.

The research will examine flows of communication among CBO members, their communities, and other audiences, as well as the machinic flows generated by the concepts depicted in Figure 1 on page 4 – desire, framing, aesthetics, tools and audiences. In line with social theory on communication, the aim of communication is to impact on the socio-political reality (Couldry & Hepp, 2017), and networks offer a range of possibilities in this regard. The key theorists on networks in this study are Latour, who reveals how particular arrangements of power are created out of humans and things. Deleuze and Guattari similarly argue that linking humans and things generates power, and that it is possible to change power relations by rearranging people and things. In using these theories, I do not mean to suggest they are the only way to understand power, but they are a useful lens for thinking about political communication in CBOs.

CBOs are arguably embedded in networks of power. For example, within CBOs there may be existing power relations in terms of youth, gender, nationality, and home language. Externally there are numerous actors such as local politicians, school teachers and principals, places of worship and their officials, gangs, taxi drivers, police, shebeens, spaza shop owners and street traders, social workers, clinic workers, other CBOs and local NGOs, foreign nationals, neighbours. All the actors exert varying levels of power in the immediate political terrain. At a broader level, the national and international political cultures and the global economic milieu all affect local power relations.

Because of this embeddedness in networks of power, to bring about social change, CBOs engage with power and try to build their own power by developing solidarity networks, and contesting other powerful networks. Political communication is one important way to build solidarity (Castells, 2015). Castells (2015) argues that challenging domination requires people to connect with each other to construct alternatives. He mainly focusses on the connections between people and the role of the media (including new media) corporations in the creation of the networked society (2008, 2010, 2011, 2015), however, these are not the only possible ways of connecting, and ICTs are not the only things that can be connected to enhance social networks. Other non-human things are also crucial in making connections;

for example, in this study I found that office space was a crucial 'thing' in making for stable organisations.

As Latour (2005a) argues, in his Actor-Network Theory (ANT), humans and non-human actors play a significant role in networks of power; they form what he calls "assemblages" which are (permanent or impermanent) structures tied together in particular social and political arrangements. For example, the availability of sewage infrastructure or taps, passable roads, electricity, and telecommunication networks can affect the texture of power in a community. Non-human actors (objects) are active in the sense that, for example, "kettles 'boil' water, knives 'cut' meat, baskets 'hold' provisions" (Latour, 2005a, p. 71). As Latour argues, it is important to include objects in understanding the social and political because, for example, the types of houses in which people live determine the types of communication possible between different people living in close proximity. In the information age, access to specific technologies influences the extent to which one can communicate to a mass audience.

In terms of the government power that CBOs may be addressing or confronting, Foucault (2001, pp. 208–209) aligns with Latour when arguing that power is "a sort of complex composed of men and things". Whereas sociology and political science have often focussed on human relations, leaving out the other materials aspects implicated in power, it is the 'who' in conjunction with the 'what' that creates action and forms collectives. Many human actions are not possible without making use of objects. In conjunction with human action, objects can exert power: for example, a padlock or a razor-wired fence exert power by keeping people in or out, even when no human force is present to keep people out.

In exploring how CBOs may establish and use networks of power to create possibilities for social change, this research examined how CBOs bring together human and non-human actors to form communication networks and influence power. Although Castells (2015, p. 248) argues that "social change results from communicative action", it is impossible to ignore that power relations exist regardless of "[w]hether or not they pass through systems of communication" (Foucault, 2001, p. 338). As already discussed in terms of Actor-Network theory, for example, power is also established and exerted in terms of the political economy, and access to resources and terrains. So, while this research focuses on power established through communication, I acknowledge that power is also playing out elsewhere, including

as Lefebvre (1992) argues, the 'thing' of spatial relations, which presents itself as significant to both CBOs in this study, as they cross terrain on foot to organise people, and occupy spaces even if they are then marked 'illegal'. Further, power can be understood through the political economy of neoliberalism, as described by Harvey (2011) and Klein (2008): I have already outlined the role of neoliberalism in South Africa and in inner city Johannesburg, as well as the contestations against it; in this study, ICRC took an actively anti-neoliberal stance, arguing for public service provision of housing, water and electricity. Therefore, as I will show in this study, the politics of space and economy are the main substance of what the organisations communicate about and contestation occurs through communicative acts (arguably, occupation of space is also a communicative act).

However, Latour (2011) goes beyond merely material things in considering power to consider other things. For example, events and actions that people ascribe to a god, or spirits, or demons also form part of the network in that they have a real impact on how people see themselves and how they explain the world (Latour, 2005a). Foucault (2001) concurs, identifying such non-material things as famine and the weather. Regarding the terrain of inner city Johannesburg, Wilhelm-Solomon's (2017) paper precisely explores the non-material things through which inner city Johannesburg dwellers living in 'dark buildings' understand themselves and the world they occupy. They explain events such as a building burning down as being a result of inter alia ghosts, God, and Satan, as well as in terms of the role played by government, investors, South African city dwellers, and migrant city dwellers. All these things, by influencing people's thinking about sites of power, influence the assemblages they make to respond to power.

So, all of these actors may be implicated in how and what CBOs choose to communicate. For example, a CBO may choose to build solidarity networks by connecting with inner city Christians through the churches, or use traditional African rituals to bring people together. Hence, this research will not only focus on what is typically associated with communication, for example, meetings, (mainstream and social) media outputs, videos, logos. Instead, the study also looked at human, material, and non-material actors in the networks of CBOs in inner city Johannesburg. For example, how are buildings and streets, or spiritual life implicated in communication strategies and how are they leveraged to establish and exert power?

However, Couldry (2008, p. 101) is critical of Latour; he argues that while assemblages of people and things offer opportunities for changing power relations, Latour does not help us understand “how a network changes and perhaps becomes destabilized”. Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 2004) answer this question better, suggesting that the power of an assemblage may be destabilised, through flows between people and things. In *Anti-Oedipus*, they call assemblages “desiring-machines” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 2), which drive human desire for creativity and production. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, they argue that these assemblages are not fixed or ‘whole’, but are in a process of becoming, moving, and shifting. Deleuze and Guattari use the term “desiring-machines” and “assemblages” somewhat interchangeably, but with a slightly different emphasis: the focus of the “desiring-machine” is flows of power, whereas the term “assemblages” focusses on the (permanent and impermanent) structures of the machine. However, regardless of the term used, the assemblages dynamic and on the move, not just fixed, monolithic forms. Therefore, in this study I have examined the extent to which the organisations are dynamic and the extent to which the organisations are finding opportunities to exploit the dynamism.

For example, while many socialists, even today, focus on the power of the working class, Deleuze and Guattari reject “a linear class model of exclusive belonging” (Van der Pijl, 2009, p. 262), instead unpacking many influences that shape the identity of individuals and groups. For example, in some cases, street traders in inner city Johannesburg use both the language of poverty *and* the language of entrepreneurship; as I will show in the chapter on desire, street traders therefore mentally occupy a contradictory, non-linear space, where different sets of value compete. Such dynamism allows new connections between people and things, which can lead to new political and economic possibilities, or it can break the machine such that communication does not flow effectively. Things can also be ‘cajoled’ into work in opportunistic ways; for example as I will discuss later, the traders use the city’s language of ‘crime and grime’ to argue that the city council should employ waste reclaimers to clean up the trading areas. Thus, garbage becomes a negotiating tool in the communication between the traders and their councillor.

In this study, I have conceptualised a political communication assemblage which generates flows to produce communication and power (see Figure 1). While the concepts of desire, framing, aesthetics, tools and audience are central to communication, and therefore

the primary focus of this study, the political communication assemblage also connects to other assemblages, which may hinder or aid the flow of communication and power.

The flows generated by assemblages may also have other effects, besides production. These effects may be destruction, consumption, aesthetics, or informatics. Using another South African example, by destroying buildings, South African movements claim the power to destroy when they cannot claim power to construct relations in their preferred way (Runciman, 2016b; Sinwell, 2011b). Such destruction may break existing flows of power, but even this does not remain static. Deleuze and Guattari (1983) point to how broken flows may result in new flows to establish new relations of power. For example, Miller et al. (2019) argue that breaking the spatial arrangement of the classroom (e.g. university lecture theatres) may allow for new types of educational practices to emerge. Similarly, inner city street traders, by taking over pavements, break the flow of pedestrians through the inner city, but enhance the way traders communicate with customers, such that new relationships of power are established and exerted. By occupying pavements, street traders also force local government into communication about the use of space in the inner city.

While this thesis is based on examining political communication by CBOs, it is important to note Deleuze's caution in his essay *Postscript on Control Societies* (1992, p. 7): a key way that power is exerted in the cybersociety is through communication, especially the way access to information is controlled through passwords, and through the "*joys of marketing*²", which limit the horizon of desire to acquiring material goods in order to acquire prestige. Computer communication also controls access to spaces through the use of electronic cards. In this control society, it is necessary to make new assemblages. Insofar as the CBOs in this study are precisely locked out of ICT networks, their access to power is limited, which limits their horizon of desire.

In the previous era, in the age of discipline (Foucault, 1977), power was managed through regularised control of movement in a specific place, for example, in factories. Trade unions were able to devise strategies to overcome controls in factory spaces. However, in this new era, Deleuze (1992, p. 7) argues that those fighting for freedom and social justice need to "give way to new forms of resistance" appropriate to the digital age and the control

² Emphasis in original.

of and through communication. This essay was written before the internet had spread across the globe, and certainly before the social media era. While Deleuze was wary of the use of communication for overturning societies of control, since communication is pervasive, new movements have to find ways to undermine communication and technological control systems. And, therefore, this thesis explored the extent to which the CBOs in this study are able to use communication to undermine current systems of control, and the extent to which they use ICTs to do so.

2.7 CONCLUSION

My research explores whether CBOs create dynamism and unique connections between humans, things, and strata. For example, to communicate about socio-political issues in the inner city, it is important to connect people (audiences) with desire, framing, and aesthetics, as well as with the strata communication tools/mediums. Connecting the street, the lofty heights of Johannesburg's high-rise apartments, international migration, and political economy is highly relevant to some of the CBOs included as case studies in this research.

As mentioned in the introduction, the conceptual framework for this study may also be regarded as an assemblage of things and people, for example, audiences, documents, photographs, mediums of communication, and the 'thing' of the desiring machine. My research explored how CBOs and their networks generate messages, how these messages connect to relevant networks, and how these communication practices are useful in contesting or building power politically with respect to the political economy of inner city Johannesburg. In addition, the research explored the network of the communication assemblage created by the CBOs: the machine that combines desire, audiences, framing, aesthetics, and communication tools to bring about political change. These concepts are discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 INTRODUCTION

For many CBOs, a key aim is to bring about social change, which usually involves speaking to those in power, that is, political communication. In relation to communication for social change, it is important to think about how communication is and/or can indeed remake the world into a more holistic, equitable, sustainable, and compassionate whole. The structure of this section is based on the communication model illustrated in Figure 1 (on page 4), that is, the communication assemblage generating power for socio-political change. While this framework is broken into different components for the sake of exploration, as discussed in the introduction, these concepts are not separate. They work as a machine with, for example, aesthetics and frames flowing together to create logic and affect, or the choice of specific tools to direct communication at particular audiences. The links and flows between the concepts are discussed throughout the following chapters of this thesis.

Regarding different types of political communication, as I briefly discuss below, in the 20th and 21st centuries one of the most successful forms of political communication is advertising, so where relevant I point to literature on advertising. Because much of the literature on political communication by struggle organisations is written from the point of view of social movements, this section will point to social movement communication literature where relevant. Literature on CBO communication is often written from the point of view of international development agencies, but this has often focussed on participatory processes for generating messages, and training to use specific tools. Since my research focusses on the types of communication generated, not the process of generation, I will only touch on international development agency literature in terms of work around relevant communication mediums. While each concept is treated separately, in terms of networks of power, the concepts create an assemblage – a communication machine. The sections below cover the five central concepts of this thesis as depicted in Figure 1, that is, desire, framing, aesthetics, tools and audience.

3.2 DESIRE

Advertising is the most obvious form of political communication that focuses on desire. Advertising is political in that it turns people into consumers. It does not just prime audiences to buy a specific product, but can also make individuals see consumption as a way to constitute a sense of self, a self that chooses by making decisions about what products to buy (Elliott, 1997; Meijer, 1998; Savat & Harper, 2016). Because the political role of advertising is so far-reaching as to change peoples' perceptions of themselves, it is important for political communicators to explore advertising techniques to produce effective communication.

While advertising may well include factual material (Chandy et al., 2001), it mainly operates by codifying human desire and limiting human imagination to buying items or experiences in order to manufacture a positive sense of self (Savat & Harper, 2016). The desiring-machine of advertising can create an intense feeling of lack (Arrington, 1982), which flows into the desire to consume. However, Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 28) argue that we only experience desire as a lack because

[t]he deliberate creation of a lack as a function of market economy is the art of the dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs ... amid an abundance of production, making all desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied ...

Instead of this lack, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) argue that desire is a productive, passionate creative force that drives people to make connections. Desire flows through the assemblages by making connections, joining things together to produce the real (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). It may well lead to people connecting to consumer products in order to produce and create the self, but it may equally connect to other (sometimes abstract) things in order to create a sense of self, and also in order to take actions to create and produce new worlds. So, for example, a person may connect to various passions in order to attract like-minded others, or they may connect to a metaphysical experience, such as watching a sunset in order to feel/produce an elevated sense of connection to the world or universe. All these experiences, productions, creations of connections are the flows of desire embodied in action. While flows of desire may be trapped in the capitalist imaginary, they may also break free, generating a line of flight out of existing power relations by producing new possibilities through creativity.

In Deleuze and Guattari's (2004, p. 18) understanding of desire with respect to social justice organisations, both CBOs may be regarded as "war machines ... in opposition to the State apparatus". Despite its violent sounding name, the war machine is not necessarily violent: it is simply an apparatus for dispersing power. These organisations seek to connect with members or potential members, not following the lines provided by the state, but moving freely as nomads. These may or may not be nomads in the literal sense, but they find their own routes through the political terrain, not conforming to the path created by state bureaucracies.

In inner city Johannesburg, the state apparatus has through desiring-production pushed the agenda of making Johannesburg a "World Class African City" (Bremner, 2000; Murray, 2008; Rogerson, 2014, 2016a; Webster, 2015). The city government, in imagining 'world class' strives to connect "order, cleanliness, improvement to the aesthetics of the physical environment and participation in the economy that favours business interests" (Webster, 2015, p. 66). It further involves itself in desiring-production of Johannesburg as a global economic hub, connected to trade and investors across sub-Saharan Africa (Rogerson & Rogerson, 2015). By connecting these different flows of desire, in a production/creation process, desiring machines (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983)/assemblages (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004) generate intensities, which then generate new flows. For example, the efforts the city government has made to ensure that Johannesburg has an intense vibe as a place where the economic elite flash their expensive clothes, homes and cars.

But the city and its elites are not the only people involved in desiring-production. For example, ordinary citizens and the CBOs examined in this study attempt to build power by producing relationships with each other and with objects. However, the flows of desire do not automatically produce the chosen outcome but merge with and connect to other flows of desire. For example, as Winkler (2012, p. 171) points out, in seeking to secure payment for services from inner city residents, "Johannesburg officials are trying to cast residents in a moral order, where payment equates to 'good citizen' and "the 'right kind of tenants', with the right kind of habits and obligations". The city generates rationalities that attempt to control (make compliant) city residents, policing them with by-laws and embracing economic growth as the purpose of government. However, the demand that people pay for services or be cut off, produces a situation in which many inner city residents cannot access services and their buildings therefore become dilapidated (as explained by ICRC director Shereza Sibanda).

These economic aims of the city do not work the way city officials want: because the inner city residents cannot connect to the flow of money they cannot pay, and therefore the city's attempts at creating a neoliberal subject fail (Kiersey, 2011). As revealed in this study, the Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC) attempts to generate a different kind of inner city subjectivity: one that is able to create flows that keep people in their homes, despite their inability to pay, and one that creates the ongoing demand for affordable inner city housing.

By not paying, inner city residents may generate a machine of free access to housing (however dilapidated the housing may be), and may also generate a personhood/ subjectivity of a defiant citizen or a succumbing victim. The subject generated by the city's desiring machine might be a defiant outsider, or an outsider looking longingly, passively in. Regardless of their individual subjectivity, whereas Foucault (2008, p. 19) argues that the neoliberal subject is connected to city administration through "meters, pipes, wires, and official documents and certification", those disconnected from water and electricity become part of the city breaking down. While Virno (2003, p. 24) argues that thus deprived of access, the subject is "deprived of a public presence", the neoliberal machine in Johannesburg does not make residents invisible, but only recasts them as undesirables. Such subjects are "too poor for debt, too numerous for confinement" (Deleuze, 1992, p. 5), but by subjecting the inner-city poor subjects to market logics, the city is unable to manifest the smooth-running, clean city it attempts to produce.

However, not all flows are automatically positive or productive of new relations. As I will show in my chapter on desire, One Voice exhibits micro-fascist flows, putting forward limits on which traders may or may not be members of their organisation. For example, a number of members of the organisation argue that they should exclude foreigners, while others argue that 'illegal' traders should be excluded. These arguments about inclusion/exclusion are intensively felt; indeed desire flows through and creates intensities and affects. Production is not just about measurable outputs, but also about the sensations produced and whether these are energising or deadening. For example, ICRC members in this study experienced the joy of connecting with each other around a shared agenda and this motivated more activity, whereas One Voice members conflicted with each other, thus breaking the flow.

According to Deleuze and Guattari (2004), the flows between members in the ICRC may be regarded as rhizomatic, in that they spread out in a subterranean manner; the connections are horizontal, non-hierarchical. However, they also attempt to connect with the hierarchies of power in the form of mayor's office and inner city government; these are arboreal tree-like structures through which desire ceases to flow. Whereas horizontal flows are like streams and rivers connecting to each other, when the flow has to climb a tree, flow becomes difficult and stalls. Through its rhizomatic efforts, ICRC is able to build power, but is unable to disrupt power through its arboreal efforts.

With respect to communication, as explored in this thesis, connecting people (audiences), frames (powerful concepts), aesthetic objects, and the tools of communication, particular desires flow, particular assemblages are made (or broken), and this results in greater or less power for the two organisations. Each of these components in the assemblage of organisational desiring-communication also operate as machines on their own. So for example, the framing machine joins concepts to create powerful frames; however, to be effective, the frames have to connect with audiences to influence them. Similarly, the aesthetic capabilities of an organisation may affect how they connect to an audience, and the type of tools they use to generate the aesthetic.

In this study, it would be impossible for me to trace all flows and all desires. As Wafer (2010, p. 2) explains, a number of tropes about Johannesburg dominate:

[a] dystopian space, a space of crime, violence and dissolution, and a counter image of Johannesburg as a space of opportunity and progress ... this constant presence of multiple imaginings and realities, dichotomies, creates a city that is at once visible and invisible space, endlessly revealing and obscuring itself.

Because of the interplay between visibility and invisibility in mapping desire, I present the desires I was able to discern from each organisation. However, in discerning the flows of desire, I am connecting to them, and so, when I desire to present them, they are part of my own machinery and my own flow. As such, there is no pure concept of desire, I only discern what is made in me, what is freed in me, and what remains stuck.

As such, the chapter on desire is as much about my responses to each organisation and their communications efforts, as it is about the machinery each organisation unleashes. Related to the desires of members of the two CBOs, Lyotard (1993) makes the observation

that there are always oppressed people rising to affirm lives. They love affirming their lives, not the crushed ones. However, in this thesis, I describe both the crushing experience of the inner city, alongside the life-affirming aspects of the two organisations. As Hickey-Moody and Malins (2007) point out, production/creation – the flow of desire – is also about imagination: we must imagine others in order to impact on them, we must imagine the products we aim to produce, we must imagine the methods of connecting things (including metaphysical things) and the ways in which this will produce desired outcomes. The imagination of the organisations and their members mostly became apparent in three participatory action workshops, where participants openly discussed the minds and desires of others (e.g. city government), their own desires, and together explored how to connect the components of desire-audience-framing-aesthetics-tools in order to produce a communication machine for the organisation.

While the concept of desire is presented at the outset of the thesis findings, it is important to recognise that desire is present in all the concepts presented, and desire is both the input and output of the communication process, and flows throughout all the communication activities. Furthermore, because desire is not purely rational, although the rational may be part of the flow I have produced in writing this thesis, I am alive to the metaphysical and affective influences, such as passion, frustration, anger, belief in god or ancestors, ideology, intensities connecting people in organisations to the 'vibe' of Johannesburg, and more – that which Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 5) call the AND-AND-AND, not the OR-OR-OR.

Using my own imagination, in writing desire, I evoked the desire of each organisation. To make the concept of desire manageable-in-thesis, I have mostly separated these metaphysical, affective components into the chapter on desire; however, I also thread an understanding of desire through the chapters in an effort to reveal different aspects of the desiring-communication machine. Gould (2004) explains how due to the previous characterisation of mass action as irrational mobs with deviant psychology, a turn in social movement studies was to focus on political organisations as rational actors who coolly plot their course of action. She points out, however, that while depicting movements as irrational mobs is problematic, ignoring the deeply felt passions and pains of people in organisations leaves out much of the substance of organisations. In exploring desire, I acknowledge both the rational and non-rational ways in which desire flows through the organisations. While the

two organisations rely to a greater or lesser extent on standardised sets of actions such as sending emails, protest and meetings with officials (as described by Tarrow and Tilly (2009) with respect to social movements), the desire unleashed escapes these simple actions.

In the next subsection, I discuss the flows of desiring-communication through the establishment of frames of communication. In addressing frames, it is important to establish how the frames generate or break political flows of power, as frames are essential mechanisms through which power is disseminated in society (Entman, 2007).

3.3 FRAMING

In political communication, frames are important in that they shape how people think about the world. They are relatively stable “structures of meaning”, which people use to explain the world, issues and events to themselves and others (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 142). Despite their relative stability, frames are contested; they “are part of the collective struggle over meaning” (Vliegenthart & Zoonen, 2011, p. 112). Frames are generated, maintained and contested through dynamic, discursive processes (Benford, 1997; Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Gamson et al., 1992; S. D. Reese, 2007; Snow, 2008). Different actors try to frame issues and events differently to win framing contests and win over audiences to their viewpoint (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Entman, 1993; Gamson et al., 1992; Pan & Kosicki, 2001).

All organisations and people engage in framing to push forward their own version of reality and the world, but not all frames gain equal traction (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Frames used by political or economic elites are often most powerfully represented in society, which makes elites freer to act in their own interests (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Entman, 1993, 2007; Gitlin, 2003; Matthes, 2012). In contrast, activist organisations actively try to generate counter-frames in order to contest powerful, normative ideas (Payne, 2001; Shah et al., 2002). The voices and frames used by poor people and social justice organisations are largely not heard in wider society (Bullock et al., 2001). As such, a study of framing necessarily “involves an examination of power” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 217), which links us back to the concept of desire, which flows through our political lives.

The struggle over meaning can generate “relationships, problems, coalitions, and configurations of connectedness or power or both” (Mander, 1999, p. 3). The discursive process of developing frames involves diverse actors, some of which adhere to the same world view, some who are antagonistic, and some who are indifferent bystanders (S. D. Reese, 2007). As such, frames fit into or push against the broader political culture (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; S. D. Reese, 2007; Westby, 2002). So, for example, in South Africa the political culture of decolonisation challenges the political culture of the rainbow nation but, to some extent, aligns with the culture of the African renaissance in embracing similarities between former African colonies. Similarly, the political culture of neoliberalism pushes against social actors aiming to ensure equitable service distribution.

Framing has been studied through different fields of knowledge; in psychology, frames are seen as schemas through which people understand their problems and form their identity or sense of self (Benford & Snow, 2000). In media studies, frames are most often explored in terms of whose version of reality (frames) are being sponsored and whose ignored or actively discredited (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 2003; Harlow & Johnson, 2011; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Matthes, 2012). More pertinent to my study, frame analysis has been used to explore how activists and their organisations frame issues and events to build a collective understanding and a shared programme for action, commonly called ‘*collective action frames*’ (Aslanidis, 2018; Ayres, 2004; Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 2000; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Gamson, 1995, 2003; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; S. D. Reese, 2007; Snow, 2008; Snow & Benford, 1988).

Organisations develop collective action frames by identifying a problem and identifying who is responsible for the problem (*diagnostic frame*), and how the problem might be resolved (*prognostic frame*), then persuading others to take action (*motivational frame*) (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988). Typically, the diagnostic frame involves identifying a situation of injustice, i.e. *injustice frames*. The process of constructing injustice frames is complex in that identifying those responsible for the problem can result in ignoring the broader systemic problem; by contrast, focussing on the systemic problem can lead to abstraction (Gamson, 1995). Furthermore, activists cannot simply copy frames from one situation or issue to another; they “need to tailor the framing of grievances to their immediate context” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 9). Nevertheless, developing a strategic, resonant frame is

essential to individual activists identifying with a group and being willing to act in concert with the group (Aslanidis, 2018; Gahan & Pekarek, 2013).

The process of individuals connecting to a particular frame occurs when the organisation's frame aligns with their own understanding of the world and issues, i.e. *frame alignment* (Gahan & Pekarek, 2013). However, those who join together to make an organisation actively engage with each other to generate organisational frames as (Benford & Snow, 2000). This is a discursive, negotiated process in which some frames are adopted, some are rejected, some are highlighted as more salient, and some are relevant but not as salient. The process of negotiating frames can be highly contested, with some members agreeing on the diagnostic frame, but not agreeing on the solution (prognostic frame), or not agreeing on what kind of action should be taken (motivational frame).

In the process of negotiating frames to develop frame alignment, organisational members engage in *frame articulation*, i.e. they connect and align "events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623). The process of developing frames also involves developing coherence between "an array of symbols, images, and arguments [linked] together through an underlying organizing idea that suggests what is essential – what consequences and values are at stake" (Ryan & Gamson, 2006, p. 14). By highlighting and accenting some symbols, images, arguments, issues, events or beliefs over others, members then engage in a process of *frame amplification* (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Benford and Snow (2000) go on to explain that framing is a strategic process: different frames may be deployed to different ends, for example, raising money, growing membership, mobilising adherents, seeking media attention, or challenging the authorities. In the process of strategising, members must match their interests with the interests of their targeted audience. To persuade a wider audience, the frames must resonate with a broad audience's understanding of the world and their everyday experiences; in such a situation *frame resonance* takes place (Benford & Snow, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Ketelaars, 2016; Snow & Benford, 1988; Steinberg, 1998). Frame resonance depends on salience, i.e. how much importance people give to the issue (Benford & Snow, 2000). Resonance also depends on credibility, that is, the credibility of those sponsoring a frame, and the credibility of the diagnostic and prognostic frames in explaining the problem, often based on the

presentation of evidence. Resonance is also part of political culture in that those who share a political culture will largely accept frames that resonate with that culture, or reject frames that challenge their culture (Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Snow & Benford, 1988).

The process of synchronising the frames of organisation members with the frames of wider audiences involves two different logics: (1) the *logic of membership*, whereby members act in line with their organisation, and (2) the *logic of influence*, whereby groups “choose frames that allow them to exercise influence over decision-makers and policy-making outcomes” (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484). These logics result in ongoing discursive to-ing and fro-ing in organisations, in a dynamic process of realignment, that is, further articulating and elaborating frames (Snow, 2008).

In this dynamic process, organisations may also introduce new frames but then need to establish for the audience how the new frame connects to other frames that they are familiar with; this is known as *frame bridging* (Westby, 2002). Frame bridging can involve ideas and beliefs that are “ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected” (Westby, 2002, p. 288). So for example, an environmental frame might include a ban on plastics, but the ban on plastics could also bridge with those using a socialist frame in that the frame critiques capitalistic plastic production by multinational corporations.

Frame alignment also occurs by amplifying a frame by clarifying and invigorating the frame by emphasising the frame’s connection to “cultural values, beliefs, narratives, folk wisdom, and the like” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). In seeking to align frames, organisations may also seek to extend frames such that they may highlight issues that are beyond their primary concerns (Benford & Snow, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Snow & Benford, 1988). So for example, as will be shown later in this study, ICRC’s primary concern is inner city housing, but this also incorporates fighting xenophobia because many building occupants are foreigners. This frame extension allows the organisation to connect with occupants across different nationalities and cultures. Finally, frame alignment can involve frame transformation such that new understandings are generated about long-standing problems (Benford & Snow, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Snow & Benford, 1988). For example, in South Africa, the economic power of white South Africans has long been an issue, but the frame of ‘white monopoly capital’ is relatively new and allows for a host of problems to be clustered under the new frame.

With reference to Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* (2011), some authors have argued that frame alignment and resonance are a result of shared ideology, with the frames of the powerful being similar to hegemony (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; E. Reese & Newcombe, 2003; S. D. Reese, 2007). However, it is possible for frames to hang together without a shared ideology (Snow, 2008; Westby, 2002). For example, some people using the frame of 'white monopoly capital' may be socialists, arguing for redistribution of wealth along socialist lines, while other proponents of the frame may simply be arguing for black South Africans to have access to capital so that some black people may also run multinational corporations. Similarly, in South Africa, some people using the feminist frame may be arguing that the constructs of masculinity are linked to racial colonisation (decolonial frame), while others may simply be arguing that women should have equal access to the workforce, without critiquing race.

Furthermore, despite discursive links and logics that make frames hang together, frames involve an element of emotion and affect. Frame resonance and frame alignment is not an entirely rational process; instead frames may be chosen based on how they make members or audiences feel (Benford, 1997). It is not enough to create cognitive arguments; it is important to get "the heat into cognition", such that righteous anger at injustice motivates people to act (Gamson, 2003, p. 92). Because emotions are centrally implicated in human relations, those who are strongly unhappy with a given state of affairs may be drawn to each other to tackle the problem together; "anger and outrage are critical commentaries on what holds a political community together" (Macamo, 2012, p. 46). The emotive aspect may also involve generating sympathy for those affected by an issue or event (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Some of the power of framing comes from the intensity of conflict between the different actors (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). As such, emotion can result in moral outrage or moral conviction which creates opportunities for collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2011).

In summary, my thesis highlights the ways the CBOs develop frame alignment and frame resonance to connect to diverse audiences. As will be discussed in the chapter on framing, both organisations have strong diagnostic frames, but their prognostic frames and motivational frames tend to be weak. They rarely align and resonate with audiences beyond their membership, and even within some of the organisations, frames are not aligned and do not resonate across membership. In terms of the "heat" of the frames used, I explored the extent to which the organisations sparked connection using their frames, the extent to which

they allowed camaraderie to develop, and the ways they connected to the frames of the city government, particularly whether their frames were successful in influencing government and thus engaging in power.

Previous studies on CBOs in South Africa have shown that common frames include the rights frame (Lodge & Mottiar, 2016; Robins & von Lieres, 2004), and the framing of organisation members as victims (Campbell et al., 2010; P. Naidoo, 2010) or virtuous subjects (S. Walsh et al., 2008a). Many of South Africa's problems are also described using economic frames, although different sectors of society use different economic frames (e.g. capitalist frames and socialist frames). Recently, Bond (2017) has argued that framing struggles around the idea of the commons or collectivity may be more effective in South African struggles. Walsh et al. (2008a) have also argued that a frame focussing on the agency of the poor might also be more effective, even though poverty frames are often weak in societies that blame the poor for their own problems.

Research on community protests has also found that corruption frames are deployed to explain why local municipalities fail to deliver services; this is connected to broader corruption frames that have dominated the media and political consciousness in recent years. Given that one of the organisations in this study is promoting refugee rights, I also look at the xenophobic frames that hinder arguments for a society more embracing of national differences, and the anti-xenophobic frames deployed against xenophobia. The subsections below also look at the bridges between the frames, and how the bridging frames contribute to broader understandings of South African society.

It is also important to link the frames to the issues facing Johannesburg inner city. In particular, where appropriate, I will link the below frames to the frames used by the city. As such, the frame of 'the African World Class City' widely used by consecutive city governments will be discussed under the economic frame. The language of consecutive city governments that seek to attract investors will also be discussed under the economic frame. The 'crime and grime' frame will be discussed separately below, and this will also link to the language of the African World Class City.

The above frames are derived from the literature on framing and represent a fair selection of frames deployed by the two CBOs in their struggles to forward the interests of their members. As I will discuss in the chapter on framing, the rights frame was mainly

deployed by ICRC, whereas the corruption frame was mainly deployed by One Voice. Both CBOs used the poverty frame, but only ICRC used a macro-economic frame to challenge. Xenophobia was a hot topic for both organisations, with One Voice having many xenophobic members, while ICRC actively sought to counter xenophobic frames. ICRC deployed a gender frame to organisation advantage. Each of the above frames are explored in more detail in the chapter on framing, as well as the relative power of the frames deployed, and where power resides when the frames are used. Framing is at the core of how the two CBOs assemble collectivity.

As I will discuss in the next section, aesthetics are another communicative activity through which the two organisations build collectivity.

3.4 AESTHETICS

The concept of aesthetics might call to mind art, architecture, design, and advertising. Beauty is also typically embedded in the idea of aesthetics (Hickey-Moody, 2013), and many philosophers have tried to explain the concept of beauty and aesthetics. For example, Burke (1767) explores aesthetics from the point of view of beauty and the sublime, arguing that beauty is awe- and wonder- inducing, whereas the sublime creates fear. Kant in his 1790 *Critique of Judgement* (1987), argues that aesthetics begins with our sensory experiences, but that beauty is cognitively recognised when there is harmony between reason and imagination. He focuses on the ability to make judgements about taste and morality.

This aspect of judgement-making has been deployed by artists and art critics as a language to create a hierarchy of art, to discriminate which pieces of art have distinction and which do not, and who has good taste and who does not (Böhme, 1993; Bourdieu, 1984). However, this notion of aesthetics is limited, because aesthetics are not only about the refined judgements of an elite few (Bourdieu, 1984). Aesthetic judgements are historically embedded, but also embedded in what social categories people identify with, for example, those who identify with the aesthetic of death metal would not usually be the same as those who identify with R&B. Aesthetic determinations do not need to separate “the real but meaningless matter and the meaningful but unreal symbol” (Latour, 2005b, p. 36). The determination of the meaning of an aesthetic is based on socio-political positions, and therefore, aesthetics and politics are enmeshed, creating an assemblage for communicating

about one's position in society, whether it be the elite aesthetics of luxury brands, or the CBO aesthetic of anti-apartheid style imagery.

Furthermore, just as we do not require "contemplative appreciation" to understand the affect of dirty dishes (Saito, 2007, p. 10), CBOs' aesthetic objects do not require contemplation to draw meaning from them: the members identify and connect with these objects, almost unthinkingly because they "read" them from their political context. In South Africa, even those political actors who do not adopt the brand objects and do not support the political bent of the CBOs, likely understand their meaning without contemplation. Because aesthetic production and political productions create assemblages – "a complex set of technologies, interfaces, platforms networks, media, and 'things'" which directly communicate with the public (Weibel & Latour, 2007, p. 104). In the case of the deployment of an apartheid-era aesthetic, government officials respond by criticising the disruption (Pointer, 2015), that is, linking the aesthetic disorderly bodies to that which must be made regular, disciplined and controlled. As Foucault explains in *Discipline and Punish* (1977), the discipline of aesthetics is used to control the appearance and movement of bodies (e.g. military and school haircuts, uniforms, the discipline of military marches). As such, "[a]esthetics have a definitive role in arguing for the innocence or guilt of a defendant, in favoring one political candidate over another and certainly in recruiting volunteers for virulent organizations" (Mandoki, 2007, p. xv). Hence, aesthetics become a form of control, by identifying categories of things and people as worse than the worst (Brinkema, 2014).

Nevertheless, opportunities always exist to break away from the pre-ordained aesthetics. While being socially embedded limits the possibility of rebellious creativity and opportunity to "bring forth another world" (Adorno, 1998, p. 1), "prior conditions is never actually sufficient to *determine*³ action" (Latour & Stark, 1999, p. 28). For example, a person cannot speak without the pre-existence of language, but they can use words to create new worlds and new meanings. While it is impossible for someone to produce outside of social conditions, they are not confined, but have a huge range of possibility to produce something new. Just because aesthetics were once used by Hitler to stir up "the seductive fascination of fascism" (Jay, 1992, p. 42), all political aesthetics do not automatically lead in the same

³ Emphasis in original.

direction. Aesthetics deconstruct structures and codes, allowing for recomposition and new creations (Guattari, 1995a). The potential for new creations is multiple and complex in that different people and collectives may respond differently at different times, generating multiple opportunities for action. In aesthetics, there is an “incessant clash ... against established boundaries” (p. 106). The sensations and affects allow one to break away from existing power relations by establishing new assemblages (or desiring-machines) with new potential (Gray van Heerden, 2017). Since affects cannot be mechanically produced, they allow for experimentation, new divergent practices, with “chaos perpetually thrown off center” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 260). As such, aesthetics is politically significant because it has the capacity to bring new thinking and new concepts into being (Porter, 2009).

Such divergent practices become possible when the aesthetic experience invalidates the ordinary hierarchies” and disrupts the “sensible” of everyday by making visible that which was previously invisible (Rancière, 2005, p. 14). Because politics breaks “the sensory self-evidence of the ‘natural’ order”, it is intimately bound with aesthetics which “reconfigure the fabric of sensory experience” (Rancière, 2010, pp. 139–140). In this rebellious form, aesthetics can connect us to “hope of ‘changing life’” (p. 116) and provide an opportunity for “free play” that suspends the ordinary workings of power. Through aesthetics, we can “escape every fetter of rule and regularity ... [the] strictness of conformity” (Hegel, 1998, p. 5). Aesthetics can liberate insofar as they create “a *bloc of sensations, that is to say a compound of precepts and affects*”⁴ that exceed the limits of ordinary lived experience (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 164).

I have already referred to the importance of affects in the section on desire above, and also with regard to framing the needs to influence people’s emotion in order to get the message across. Affect is also central in understanding aesthetics. By producing affects, aesthetics moves us into a realm beyond language and logic, and therefore beyond control. Affects are a regime of continuously varying intensities in transitions or passages between ideas, the passage between one state and another (Deleuze, 1978). As such, affects happen in no specific space but unfold within us (Bruno, 2014). Ideas and affects are linked, but not the same. For example, to be affected by love, we must first have an idea of a loved

⁴ Emphasis in the original.

object (Deleuze, 1978), but whereas the idea is pinned to the object, the affect flows and cannot be pinned down. Whereas our idea of an image is representational, we are affected by the image in the rise and fall of feelings, sensations, moods, and atmospheres. But because “affect emerges out of the muddy, unmediated relatedness ... compartmentalisms give way to thresholds and tensions, blends and blurs” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 4). Thus, affects are always immanent to things and relationships. Affects are unstable, contingent on impressions in local circumstances, and “[t]here is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings” (p. 39). So, for example, one might go from the sadness of witnessing injustice or experiencing alienation towards happy and joyful practices, such as solidarity (Berlant, 2010, p. 93).

Deleuze (1978) argues that affects can increase or decrease our ability to act in the world, with joy increasing our ability to act and sadness reducing it. When the affect is negative, we tend to withdraw from the affecting relationship; joy opens us, propels us to find commonality between ourselves and other bodies. As such, joy generates collectivity – the connection between ourselves and that which has affected us. Through our connections with other bodies, we can create common notions, which can move us to act together. As such, affect, insofar as it is joyful, allows us to build collectivity and solidarity, thus allowing us to exercise power (the power to act). When the movement from injustice and alienation is shared by others, affected by other bodies, and affecting other bodies, it provides opportunities for political change (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013). The movement can transform action, taking people into new territories, which disrupt existing power relations (Bertelsen & Murphie, 2010).

Insofar as affects and aesthetics go hand-in-hand then, aesthetics are not only useful when it generates the new; aesthetics also contain the political possibility of creating collectivities *and* the possibility of increasing the collective energy to act. Affect passes from one body to another as bodies affect each other, thus affect is about relationships (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010). For example, societies have used dance and music to “crystallise complementary segments of subjectivity”; that is, individuals were wrapped up in “collective identities” (Guattari, 1995a, p. 98). By sharing a collective aesthetic, aesthetic production always brings together subjects and objects into collective experience. In Africa, revolutionary aesthetics have been known to “induce action for social regeneration and struggle” (Ahura, 1985, p. 95). Affect operates as a kind of glue holding together objects

(bodies, things, ideas, practices, styles and values), insofar as these touch us (Ahmed, 2010). We gather around us objects, bodies, and ideas that we like. When we collectively share happiness based on objects, they circulate in society as social goods.

In South Africa from the 1960s and through apartheid, there is strong evidence of aesthetics being implicated in social and political scrutiny (Mashige, 1996). Ndebele (1986, p. 143) describes how apartheid protest aesthetics were highly organised spectacles of violence and brutality. However, many of the aesthetics used in apartheid political communication also aimed to create unity and solidarity (Cronin, 1988). South African political organisations typically have a strong intuitive sense of aesthetics, particularly in the moments of protest when they deploy political song and dance (*toyitoyi*) and organisational clothing to build solidarity and reveal themselves as a large, powerful group of people that cannot be ignored (Cronin, 1988; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). The aesthetic choices reveal “an awareness of what aesthetics can do” (Stoehrel & Lindgren, 2014, p. 243). The power of these aesthetics lies in creating affective responses, for example, feelings of unity and discipline, anger and fear (Cronin, 1988; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). In this light, images do not just convey messages through conscious, logical thinking. Affects – perceptions, feelings, sensations, atmospheres, moods, movements, transitions, intensities, potentials, values, encounters – cut through rational deliberation (Bruno, 2014; Deleuze, 1978; Jay, 1992; Massumi, 2002; Seigworth & Gregg, 2010).

In recent years, the increasing aestheticisation of trade in the form of advertising has encroached on and even dominates affective life. Hence, CBO branding enters the aesthetic terrain that is already overly determined by capital. Therefore, to achieve an aesthetic edge, the CBOs need to subvert advertising techniques and playfully deploy them to other ends (Savat & Harper, 2016). In generating affects, aesthetic offers the best hope for bringing people together to challenge the existing order.

Given both the persistent and the new aesthetics of political action in South Africa, this research looks at how aesthetics are being used by the case study CBOs. The research focuses on whether the CBOs are “bringing something radically new into existence” (Conway, 2014, p. 32), so as to push for radical change and/or whether the aesthetics lead to a sharing of affect that generates collectivity and increases the power of the organisations

to act. While the study of aesthetics and affect could be wide-ranging and include songs, dress, publication design and dancing, to prevent the study from being unwieldy, I zoomed in to look at the aesthetics of the material objects of the organisational brands. Therefore, to assess whether and how aesthetics were moving the organisations to act, I explored branding, which is a key focus of modern communication, as discussed below.

3.4.1 The aesthetics of branding

The most successful efforts in political communication in the last hundred years revolve around companies that, through advertising and marketing, have turned ordinary people into consumers (Elliott, 1997; Meijer, 1998; Savat & Harper, 2016). Viewing people as consumers is now globally pervasive, with even public service provision viewed as an interaction between government (in South Africa this includes state-owned enterprises) and service consumers, not government and citizens (McDonald & Ruiters, 2005a). Given the pervasive influence of businesses in creating a new identity for people, examining the political influence of business communication is instructive for other political communicators.

Businesses typically increase their power by establishing brands, which become vehicles for connecting audiences to the goals, values, and orientation of the business (Aaker, 1997). Brands are one type of object through which “communication, and the construction of meaning, take place” (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, pp. 15–17). While branding is most often studied in the field of advertising and marketing, it is now used more broadly in society, including by humanitarian and social rights organisations who aim to construct organisational morality (Vestergaard, 2008; Wai, 2003).

The activity of branding is well over a thousand years old and dates back to branding livestock to mark them as belonging to a particular owner (Fan, 2005). However, in the last hundred years, branding has gained increasing importance and significance having become a social and economic construct (Aaker, 1997; Airey, 2009; Fan, 2005). While there are many definitions of what constitutes a brand, it usually includes and combines names, terms, signs, symbols and designs that help audiences identify a particular organisation (Argenti & Druckemiller, 2004; Fan, 2005). Wai (2003) also links brand to organisational strategies, which aim to secure audience attention for a particular organisation.

Branding can be viewed as a way of creating an organisational concept. In line with Deleuze and Guattari's (1994) understanding of concepts, branding then becomes a machine generating blocs of sensation by connecting affects and precepts. The affects, precepts and blocs of sensation then "interact, resonate, or echo one another in significant ways" (Coonfield, 2006, p. 287). Regarding affects, organisations seek to establish positive associations with their identity (Argenti & Druckenmiller, 2004; De Chernatony, 1999) so as to establish "assumptions, attitudes, beliefs and values" with which audiences can identify (De Chernatony, 1999, p. 158).

In terms of precepts, particular rules guide brands: the size and shape of images/symbols, colours, fonts and text used. The brand rules are small packages of meaning that can convey a huge amount of information about an organisation (Argenti & Druckenmiller, 2004). As Vestergaard (2010, p. 170) argues:

Brands can be understood as logical structures that channel consumer perceptions, akin to metaphors or myths, and give meaning to products and services for consumers ... In this sense, a brand is the distillation of a product, service or corporate identity into a symbolic representation, a discursive construct.

However, branding does not only serve to promote and sell products and services. Elkington and Beloe (2010, p. 17) point out that organisations such as NGOs and CBOs in the twenty-first century must compete with corporations and governments for "mindshare". To compete, organisations such as NGOs and CBOs must increasingly move into the mainstream by building and strengthening their brand in order to distinguish themselves from the rest of the non-profit sector (Hasaj & Krymbi, 2013). Indeed, establishing a brand has become a key factor in determining how well the organisation is known and how widespread their message. Corporate strategies infuse humanitarian organisations, including "activist, non-hierarchical, grassroots structures" such as CBOs (Vestergaard, 2010, p. 169).

In making choices as citizens, people often associate their political activity with the brand of a particular party (Van Steenburg, 2015). Since "politics is time-consuming, alternately boring and scary, often contentious, often remote from the present and the concrete, and often makes people feel ineffectual, not empowered" branding can bridge the gap (Schudson, 2007, p. 238). In the environment of 'boring politics', effective branding can bring together political, economic, and cultural insights (Scammell, 2015, p. 7). Developing a brand can help a non-profit reflect its "unique social contribution ... [its] promise to target

audiences and stakeholders ... [and its] mission and values" (Hasaj & Krymbi, 2013, p. 353). It can also generate organisational loyalty and a sense of collective identity (Aaker, 1997).

Whether we like it or not, "modern democratic politics is a battle of competing images" (Scammell, 2015, p. 8). Organisations do not have to fight against the power of aesthetics deployed by corporations, but rather "learn to function ... on the same level" (Massumi, 2002, p. 234). We increasingly live in the realm of signs, symbols, and simulations (Baudrillard, 1994). Wearing or carrying the organisational brand in public allows the participant to express themselves in terms of the issue at hand, and their values in relation to that issue (Aaker, 1997). The brand also evokes emotions, trust and loyalty by establishing when its personality, aims and activities are congruent with the desires of the brand user (Aaker, 1997).

Insofar as brands rely on visual elements, colours and symbols can communicate effectively across language barriers and across cultures (Airey, 2009; Pittard et al., 2007). In a multilingual and multicultural society like South Africa, creating a shared brand identity is one way for a CBO to bring diverse people together and create a focus around which shared political and affective experiences can be built. Like all media, brands can travel across space and time to help develop "a shared understanding of the social world" (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 32) and "can create symbolic experiences of positive dynamics between (culturally) different groups" (Kipnis et al., 2013, p. 1187). Insofar as mediatisation is embedded in how we now construct the social (Couldry & Hepp, 2017), brands are part of the social through which identity and social relationships become intertwined.

To study the two CBOs' brands, I applied critical visual analysis, based on brand theory, that is, the name of the brand and associated text, symbols, colours, shapes, and symmetry/asymmetry. Each of these is briefly discussed below.

3.4.1.1 Branding, aesthetics and affect

Brand name is a key to brand personality (Seimiene & Kamarauskaite, 2014), but various visual components have also been established as key to creating brand personality (Adîr et al., 2014; Pittard et al., 2007). Visual elements have "a rhetorical value" that renders "visuals at least as powerful as words" (Bulmer & Buchanan-Oliver, 2006, p. 58). A central visual symbol of a brand is its logo – the "signature" of the brand (Adîr et al., 2014, p. 140). The

logo appropriates visual territory and establishes the sovereignty of the organisation as a single entity in a particular terrain (Heilbrunn, 1997). Effective logos “must have a marked ability to increase high identification and recognition” (Chen et al., 2015, p. 2). Logos can be regarded as symbols, which may be either naturalistic (displaying recognisable objects) or abstract (Machado et al., 2015).

The symbol forms a channel, linking the sender and audience (receiver) (Heilbrunn, 1997). Organisational symbols as have three functions: (1) a “descriptive function”, which sums up the organisation in a single story or myth; (2) an “energy-controlling function”, which directs the actions of those who use the symbol; and (3) a “system-maintaining function”, which confirms “organisational values and beliefs” (Hayes, 1998, p. 63). Symbols express the inherent beliefs of the organisation about itself, thus bringing together organisational ideology with an audience’s personal mental constructs. But, unlike language, symbols can sometimes cross national borders and be understood globally (Airey, 2009). Therefore, they may be more effective than brand name in connecting to audiences (Whan Park et al., 2013). When audiences attach to the brand, they are more likely to use the symbol in self-expression in their personal lives (Aaker, 1997). Symbols in logos can be naturalistic or abstract, with naturalistic logos can including biological/organic objects (e.g. leaves, hands, animals, landscapes), manufactured objects (e.g. houses, vehicles, machines, furniture), or cultural symbols (e.g. religious symbols, political party symbols, or national flags) (Machado et al., 2015). Abstract logos use lines and shapes to carry meaning (such as the Nike swoop conveying speed). Audiences are arguably more receptive to naturalistic and especially organic logos (Machado et al., 2015, p. 5).

Logos cannot stand alone, but must gel with an organisation’s visual identity. Visual identity is established through visual components such as (1) the logo shape (Fajardo et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016), (2) logo symmetry (Airey, 2009; Bajaj & Bond, 2014, 2018; van Grinsven & Das, 2016), (3) the colours (Bottomley & Doyle, 2006; Hynes, 2009; Labrecque & Milne, 2012), and (4) typefaces (Foroudi et al., 2017; Grohmann et al., 2013; Henderson et al., 2004). The visual elements can appear on various formats including promotional material, packaging, letterheads, clothing, and stationery (Bajaj & Bond, 2014). A key feature of logos is that they must be reproducible in different mediums at different sizes.

Logo shape refers to angularity, linearity, and roundness, as well as proportion and symmetry (Chen et al., 2015). Angular shapes induce associations with traits that express energy, toughness, and strength”, while round shapes “express approachableness, friendliness, and harmony” (Zhang et al., 2006, p. 796). Cultural factors also influence how the shape of a logo is received, with more individualist societies preferring angular shapes, and more collectivist societies preferring round shapes. However, audiences seem to have a marked preference for rounded or curved shapes (Silvia & Barona, 2009; van Rompay & Pruyn, 2011; M. F. Walsh et al., 2010; Westerman et al., 2012), which both organisations in this study used.

Symmetry has long been considered important in the study of aesthetics and is widely considered to be one of the strongest predictors of judgements of beauty (Pittard et al., 2007; Tinio & Leder, 2009). However, symmetry is not a necessity in brand and logo design: asymmetrical elements can “bolster perceptions of brands as exciting” (Bajaj & Bond, 2014, p. 402). Therefore, the choice to use symmetry or asymmetry depends on the brand personality the organisation wants to convey. For example, if harmony is a priority, a symmetrical logo might be preferable, whereas if the organisation wants to convey excitement, asymmetry may be preferable. Although symmetry may be easier to process, recognise, and remember, the complex processing of asymmetry can hold an audience’s attention for longer (Bajaj & Bond, 2018). Audiences may easily tire of the simplicity of symmetry due to familiarity, especially with repeated exposure (Tinio & Leder, 2009; van Grinsven & Das, 2016). Neither organisation in this study had a symmetrical logo, albeit that the asymmetry on One Voice’s logo appeared to be a design error. For ICRC, the asymmetry provides interest.

My study also looked at the “congruity of brand and colours contribute to brand meaning” (Schroeder, 2006b, p. 8). Brand colours are associated with hue, saturation and value of a colour (Labrecque & Milne, 2012) and are generally agreed to be culturally bound (Gage, 1995). Colour is also dependent on context; for example the green of leaves may be associated with life and growth, but a green skin colour on humans would indicate illness (Hynes, 2009). Regardless of the meanings of specific colours, because colours are culturally associated with emotions; they can “signal the brain to activate an effective response” (Foroudi et al., 2017) and induce moods, emotions, perceptions and behaviour (Aslam, 2006, p. 15). In this study, the use of colour in the One Voice logo revealed a history

of association with other political organisations, while ICRC's clothing colours also linked it to a particular political milieu, both conveying solidarity.

A final important aspect of branding, which I examined in this research, what the typefaces used by the organisations. Typefaces should be readable (Grohmann et al., 2013), "dress" written words (Foroudi et al., 2017, p. 181), and "directly convey meaning to readers" (Childers & Jass, 2002, p. 95). In this study, I examined the fonts used: (i) whether they were *serif* or *sans-serif*, vertical or slanted, symmetrical or not, as well as the used of uppercase and lowercase. Serif fonts have been associated with focus, being organised and calm, (Amare & Manning, 2012), "elegant, charming, distinct, beautiful and interesting" (2013, p. 390). Sans-serif fonts were considered "manly, powerful, smart, upperclass, readable and louder" and when the typeface is more natural it is considered "exciting, sincere, sophisticated, rugged and competent" (Grohmann et al., 2013, p. 392). Rounded typeface shapes are judged more positively, associated with sweetness and happiness, while angular shaped typefaces were associated with anger and bitter and sour tastes (Amare & Manning, 2012; Salgado-Montejo et al., 2014; Velasco et al., 2015). However, there is no systematic explanation as to why particular typefaces evoke particular emotions. As will be discussed in the chapter on aesthetics, the CBOs did not use typeface to convey meaning, having only used commonly used fonts with multi-purpose meanings.

I could not find any previous studies of branding in South African political organisations, albeit that Thörn (2007, p. 908) argues that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the anti-apartheid struggle deployed a strategy that "implies a visualization and an aesthetization of political action". In an unpublished article, Pauwels (2019, p. 3) describes how the aesthetics of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) political party, including "the party's dress code, consisting of red berets and other faux military gear" hark back to anti-apartheid struggles and underscore the party's antagonistic and adversarial politics. As I will show in my chapter on aesthetics, ICRC and One Voice to some extent align with the anti-apartheid and social movement aesthetic, establishing them as South African organisations. Their logos (with symbols, symmetry/asymmetry, shapes, colours and fonts), organisational garb, and banners set off an aesthetic which builds solidarity among organisation members.

Apart from their aesthetic qualities, organisation brands are part of the tools which establish the organisation. I discuss these and other tools in the next subsection.

3.5 COMMUNICATION TOOLS AND MEDIUMS

Communication tools facilitate the movement of messages from one person to another, from one to many, and from many to many. In terms of a communication assemblage, tools work together with humans, in space and time, in order to produce messages, which produce affects (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004; Latour, 2005a). These assemblages “empower collectives and individuals to represent themselves, and to do so on their own terms” (Vatikiotis, 2008, p. 115). Social movement communication techniques can be simple, such as popular songs and graffiti, to technologically complex, such as videography and social media (Pajnik & Downing, 2008). Regardless of the complexity of the technology, the technology and humans are what Latour (2005a) calls ‘actors’ working together in an assemblage that produces action: in the case of a communication assemblage, this action is communication. The combination of actors (human and tools) produce a powerful flow of action which impacts on the real. Understanding tools as only useful in an assemblage with other actors, avoids understanding the use of tools as deterministic or instrumental, which as I will discuss later in this subsection, relates to the naïve way ICTs have been conceptualised in the process of social change.

As already discussed in the literature review, under apartheid South Africans had a strong tradition of producing alternative media including pamphleteering, organisational t-shirts, alternative newspapers, photography, song, and toyi-toyi (Cronin, 1988; Tomaselli, 1986; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). Many of the apartheid-era tools of communication persist, especially the same songs (sometimes slightly adapted) and the toyi-toyi (Twala & Koetaan, 2006). However, these tools on their own did not produce change – they were part of the assemblage with a mass movement of people, collaborating and in solidarity. The chosen tools extended the possibilities for action of those resisting apartheid, but only because the tools were backed up by human action. Nevertheless, the tools and humans in action produced a powerful flow that built solidarity and resistance, and ultimately led to the downfall of apartheid. In this study, I assessed the extent to which the current CBO communication tools used mirror those under apartheid, and the extent to which their actions, in conjunction with the tools, were able to bring about social change.

Like the apartheid-era literature on the tools of alternative media, efforts to study the communication tools used by activists in the post-apartheid era have been limited. Where

such post-apartheid literature exists, it mainly refers to the tools used by social movements, such as the Treatment Action Campaign (Loudon, 2010; Wasserman, 2007a), the Anti-Privatisation Forum (Dawson, 2012; Wasserman, 2007a), and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (Chiumbu, 2012); these studies focussed on the movements' use of ICTs and mobile technologies. Naidoo (2008) also explored the use of ICTs (and other media) by IndyMedia South Africa, whose work focussed on supporting social movements and community struggles. More recently, a study undertaken by myself and others across four countries and published in a range of literature, looked at the variety of communication tools used by community activists in South Africa (Bosch et al., 2018, 2019; Pointer et al., 2015, 2016). However, this study merely documented activists' self-reported use of communication tools based on a qualitative questionnaire, but did not observe whether activists were indeed using tools as described, or how they were using them. As such, the study did not view the tools as an assemblage of action, and merely documented the tools in use.

Therefore, in this study, it was important to explore whether the tools are indeed being used and, if so, how they are being used, and how they extend the range of action for human actors. Aside from the South African apartheid and post-apartheid communication traditions and tools used, ICTs, the internet, and social media have grown in the popular imagination as agents of social change, for example, Castells (2010, 2015) strongly emphasises the transformative possibilities of technology for the oppressed. Research on the Arab Spring revolutionary movements have often emphasised the importance of Facebook and Twitter in organising action on the ground, and in communicating within countries and with the world about what as point out, was taking place (cf. Aouragh & Alexander, 2011; Harlow & Johnson, 2011; H. A. Hassan, 2011; M. Hassan et al., 2015a; Klischewski, 2014). However, the Arab Spring would not have been possible without existing civil society organisations on the ground (Altan-Olcay & Icduygu, 2012; M. Hassan et al., 2015b), emphasising the importance of an assemblage of people and tools in social justice action.

Despite the cautions about overstating the role of ICTs across developing countries, development agencies have frequently provided training and funds for CBOs to access and use a range of communication tools (Hemer & Tufte, 2012; Servaes & Malikhao, 2016). Such training typically focusses on diverse technical skills, including photography, video-making, radio, and website and social media skills, or on provision of computers, cameras

and video cameras, sound recorders, and office equipment such as printers and photocopiers (Tacchi et al., 2009; G. B. Walker, 2007). The bulk of literature from the early 2000s to the present has predominantly focussed on the use of ICTs by social change organisations such as NGOs, social movements and CBOs, so I present a brief discussion on the topic below.

3.5.1 ICTs and social change

Development agencies are often involved in providing CBOs with the resources to communicate about development challenges. Authors such as Enghel and Tufte (2009) argue that ICTs are essential to development communication. Technology is oft presented as being able to solve development challenges because it is able “to transcend the materialities of space and time” (Barnett, 2004, p. 2). Because of the assumptions about the importance and centrality of technology to communication in development contexts, development agencies have often provided specific technologies and/or training to use those technologies (Hemer & Tufte, 2012; Servaes & Malikhao, 2016; Tacchi et al., 2009; G. B. Walker, 2007). While development organisations often design communication messages using participatory processes (Servaes, 1996; Servaes & Malikhao, 2016), power relations vex the question of who has access to technological devices and who receives training in how to use those devices effectively. Since providing technologies and training does not necessarily shift power relations, the models of ‘communication for social change’ put forward by development agencies are tinged with technological determinism (Servaes & Hoyng, 2017). The models also ignore how CBOs are easily captured by local elites – those with ‘better education’, those with more power, and often those who speak European languages (especially English) quickly displace what Spivak (2010) terms the ‘sub-altern’ – the disempowered, most needy members a community – especially women.

As Walsh (2014) warns, a tool-based approach to improving CBO communication skills is problematically naïve and wilfully blind with respect to the networks of power in which CBOs operate. She describes a film project of her own in which she worked with activists in Durban and Johannesburg to develop films. The project also provided activists with equipment, but once she had left the community, film-making did not continue because it did not connect to the practical day-to-day realities of activists’ lives. Even if they had produced films, they would have had difficulty securing an audience without the relevant connections.

Apart from development agencies and the CBOs they support, another field of communication for social change focusses on social movements. Here again, the technological tools are often treated as a cure-all for social ills. For example, Castells (2015) celebrates the power of social media tools for building transnational social movements because they allow people to more easily connect to challenge domination and construct alternatives.

However, there is a difference between *collective action*, where people come together on the ground to partake in a joint activity, and *connective action*, in which geographically dispersed actors take similar actions across time (W. L. Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). For the CBOs in this study, collective action with members is an important component of their work, but they could also build solidarity – connective action – with non-members, either outside the inner city but in South Africa, or in geographically dispersed countries. But using ICTs can only lead to meaningful change if backed up by organising on the ground (Couldry, 2015; M. Hassan et al., 2015a; Morozov, 2012; Roszak, 1986; Winner, 1996).

Furthermore, the extent to which the internet is Anglo-centric limits the extent to which it is useful to those who do not speak English well (Hadland & Dongwon, 2008). Social media “are power-laden spaces where access to visibility is firmly tied to a broad spectrum of inequalities that significantly hinder their emancipatory potential” (Trillò, 2018, p. 116). Because not all individuals or all organisations have equal access to the conversations among movement elites, ICT use and social media often result in multiple monologues, rather than conversation, with conversation contributing more to building activist organisations (H. Hardt, 2008).

Bosch et al. (2018), in their study of South African activist organisations, found that while NGOs frequently use digital technologies, it was rare for more grassroots community organisations to do so. Chiumbu (2015) and Mdlalose (2014) have also pointed out that even when South African community organisations and social movements do use digital technologies, most members are excluded from this communication. Instead, organisational elites typically use the internet and websites to disseminate an ideology that may be alien to rank-and-file members. For example, in the case of the Anti-Eviction Campaign and Abahlali baseMjondolo, white, middle-class activists controlled the website content. Therefore, digital technologies do not automatically lead to democratised communication. In my study, only

ICRC used the internet and social media in their organising, and even they often bemoaned their lack of skills with, for example, using Facebook and Twitter to promote their work and build solidarity. Instead, the CBOs relied on older communication tools, that is, 'nanomedia', which I will discuss in the next subsection.

3.5.2 Nanomedia

Pajnik and Downing (2008) coined the term 'nanomedia' to describe these alternative tools of communication, which can range from popular songs and performance, pamphlets, posters, placards, graffiti, banners, t-shirts, through to technological media. The term is set up in contrast to mass media as a form of communication, and highlights how these alternative mediums can be used to build a sense of collectivity and solidarity. In South Africa "the use of nanomedia, as reported by activists, stems from a scepticism about the mainstream media's agendas [since] there is a strong sense among activists that the mainstream media is not really interested in the problems of the poor" (Bosch et al., 2018, p. 2166). South African activists reported using nanomedia to either attract the attention of the mainstream media, or to circumvent it. Nanomedia were also used by activists to organise, but they greatly depended on "word of mouth, going door-to-door, and walking among houses with a loud-hailer to call people to meetings" (Bosch et al., 2018, p. 2167).

Hardt (2008, p. 23) emphasises that mass media have often created "a closed system of expert conversations and decision-making practices, which have alienated individuals from the political process". However, nanomedia practices among activist organisations can help to re-establish or maintain conversation, which makes communication a social event and allows for a richness of communication in a to-and-fro of sometimes aimless meandering talk, but which nevertheless is "an expression of mutual interest in knowing and learning from the other" (H. Hardt, 2008, p. 24). The use of nanomedia can create a meeting point between "various marginalized social actors, groups and publics", creating space for "mutual recognition" (Vatikiotis, 2008, pp. 115–118). These nanomedia include the use of the body as a tool – bodies as "speaking, shouting, percussive, singing, and dancing communication instruments" (Downing, 2014, p. 331). In addition, the particular way space is used may be described as a tool, for example, where organisations gather to meet or to act are part of the materiality of communication (Willems, 2019). Thus, as I will show in the chapter on tools, the bodies of organisation members and the offices of the two CBOs, the

streets, homes, and trading stalls, are much more part of the salient communication tools than the internet and social media.

Based on organisation desire, framing, aesthetics and tools, the two CBOs in this study were able to reach certain audiences. The types of audiences will be discussed in the next section, including the public sphere as an audience.

3.6 AUDIENCES

My discussion of audiences in this thesis is embedded in work on social movement theory, because in their efforts to attract audiences, the CBOs in this study act somewhat like social movements, that is, like social movements, the purpose of the CBOs is to influence others to act differently. In terms of the others that the CBOs want to influence, I have called these audiences, that is, they are the recipients of the messages with whom CBOs attempt to communicate. In some of the social movement literature, audiences are referred to as 'targets' (cf. Dubuisson-Quellier, 2015; Van Dyke et al., 2004; E. T. Walker et al., 2008) but I have chosen to stay with the terminology of audience, as this is salient in terms of communication studies. Regardless of the terminology, Blee and McDowell (2012, p. 3) point out that social movements

try to affect different audiences for different purposes, how they decide what constitutes their audience is not well understood. We know little, for instance, about how social movements decide which audience is relevant at a particular time, or what social movements assume about their audience, or what aspects of audience they consider relevant when planning actions or developing strategies, or how social movements create multiple, simultaneous audiences with the same or different script of action.

As such, in my thesis chapter on audience, I extend the understanding of decisions South African CBOs make about their audience, and also contribute to international literature on social movement audiences.

Social movement activity is typically a contentious performance created to attract the attention of various others in order to influence them (Amine, 2013; Kanngieser, 2012; MacKenzie & Porter, 2011; Tarrow & Tilly, 2009; Tilly, 2008). Activists hope to "provoke change" and break their routines so that the audience "change their behaviour or attitudes" and become cognitively engaged and active themselves (Blee & McDowell, 2012, pp. 2–3).

Understood this way, 'performers' and audiences share a relationship insofar as the audience is receptive to the message or performance. However, audience action and receptivity is beyond the scope of this study, so I do not tackle this aspect in any depth.

In the discussion on desire above, I have focussed on the creative performance aspect of desire; the purpose of this section of the chapter is to link those creative activities to the intended audiences, and show how this contributes to the flow of the communication-machine. I focus on how the CBOs choose and perceive their audience and their interaction with that audience: what deliberations go into their choice of audience, how do they perceive the response of their audience, and does this lead to them changing or diversifying audiences?

Describing the actions of two US based organisations, Blee and McDowell (2012, p. 4) argue that social movements, as performers "construct audiences within a cultural or evaluative framework, seeing them as gullible or selective, self-interested or involved, receptive or demanding". As movements change their sense who constitutes their audience, they may think differently about what is possible and desirable to do. As such, "each specific target ... exhibits a unique set of strengths, weaknesses, and institutional capacities for response that may shape distinct patterns of action" (E. T. Walker et al., 2008, p. 36). In my study, therefore, I explored how the two CBOs are constructing their audience, how they see the audience, and how they act based on their perceptions of the audience.

In Habermas' (1999) terms, political actors enter the public sphere to undertake rational deliberation to influence government policies and action. However, political actors do not always engage on a purely rational level and their efforts are not only intended to influence government. To the different types of audience, I have drawn Deleuze and Guattari's (2004) theory of rhizomatic nodes and arboreal structures, and Latour's (2005a) Actor-Network Theory. I will then go on to talk through some of the types of audience encountered in the study, that is, government, members/potential members, solidarity networks, and the media, and discuss theory about those audiences.

3.6.1 Audiences as assemblages

In Latour's Action-Network-Theory (2005a), actors (which can be living beings or objects) act on each other or with each other to produce action. In terms of communication, we can

consider communication as an action, which involves people and things in an assemblage. The objects in the communicative action were already discussed above in the subsection on tools, but in this subsection, I focus on assemblages of people, which form the social. Latour (2011) posits that to understand any entity, you have to understand it as a network. The network is composed of connections between things (Latour, 2005a), for example, the connections between CBOs and their various audiences. As such, audiences and CBOs do not stand apart from each other, but are in a network with each other. The different audiences are elements, and each audience type may become “strategic through the number of connections it commands” and be less important when the audience has few connections (Latour, 1996, p. 372). So, for example, if a CBO cannot connect to government in spite of a great effort to do so, the lack of connections means that they are not part of the communication assemblage. Assemblages are dynamic, allowing “different actors to become part of the assemblage ... [and] others to leave” (Davies, 2012, p. 277). Therefore, if we see CBOs as engaging an audience, they may temporarily connect to one audience, then move away and engage a different audience. In seeking an audience, CBOs do not act alone; others are also acting, and these different actions shape the political terrain in which the CBOs are communicating. In my chapter on audience, I highlight the actions of the CBOs and their deliberations (or lack thereof) about the audience responses, revealing their understanding of the political terrain.

As discussed in the theoretical framework and in elucidating the concept of desire above, desire flows in ways guided by and generating different assemblages of power. These assemblages may be rhizomatic networks with power dispersed throughout, or arboreal (tree-like) assemblages with hierarchical flows of power. From the point of view of Deleuze and Guattari (2004), the different actors that make up the communication network may be regarded as nodes, through which communication flows. Communication can either flow rhizomatically, to develop communities of interest, or can adopt an arboreal, antagonistic position towards the state and market (Carpentier et al., 2003). A rhizomatic approach to CBO communication allows us to see CBOs as “fluid civil society networks” that connect to other civil society organisations and social movements (Carpentier, 2016, p. 5). For rhizomatic assemblages, each audience is a node of power, and the way they are connected in relation to each other results in particular flows of power. Rhizomatic connections allow communication to flow to heterogeneous actors with diverse internal

logics, struggles, and mobilisation strategies (Funke, 2014), such that the different actors can share assemblages and flows in some instances. As Davies (2012, p. 277) explains:

... assemblage is necessarily about some form of collective. This creates a sense of social life where agency is distributed across and through the assemblage. The processes that allow different actors to become part of the assemblage also allow others to leave – the processes of emergence and coherence mean that the assemblage is always in a dynamic state where different actors appear powerful at different times.

The assemblage notion of political engagement shows that the terrain is not one of orderly deliberation, but instead communication flourishes “in random patterns as a result of complex interactions,” like a rhizome, “expansive and powerful” (Kent & Lane, 2017, p. 573). Dialogue is a “process of relational interaction” (p. 574), which fosters decentralised communication and co-creation. Dialogue has no beginning and end point, but is always in a ‘middle place’, moving from one connected node to another (Funke, 2014). In this research I map the nodes and the relational interactions and the flows between those nodes and the CBOs.

However, it is also possible for communication to become trapped in arboreal assemblages; “just as desire is stifled by ordering mechanisms, so the potential of the rhizome is stifled by root-tree structures” (Lawley, 2013, p. 39). Thus, when communication flows into an arboreal structure it can become a dead end, and it does not allow for power relations to shift. For arboreal assemblages, the audiences are branches off the main trunk, with power concentrated in the trunk. In this study, for example, that could be government, as a central pillar with different branches of government (and quasi-government) branching off. The mass media have both rhizomatic and arboreal aspects, in that they seek to draw on many sources and connect to diverse audiences, but nevertheless operate in a hierarchical way, favouring some sources over others, and having a hierarchical structure within each media house. Each of these types of audience will be discussed below.

3.6.2 Groups of audiences for activist organisations

While the social movement literature has often assumed that the main target of communication is the state (Blee & McDowell, 2012; McAdam, 2000; Tarrow & Tilly, 2009; Tilly, 2008; E. T. Walker et al., 2008), a variety of other audiences have been identified, specifically, the general public (McCarthy et al., 2004; Warner, 2002), potential members

and supporters (Blee & McDowell, 2012; Caiani, 2014; Della Porta & Diani, 2014; Funke, 2014; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Ohlemacher, 1996, 1996), corporates (Schurman, 2004; E. T. Walker et al., 2008), and the media (Blee & McDowell, 2012; Gamson & Meyer, 2004; McAdam, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2004).

For the purposes of this study, I delineate four groups of audiences that may be relevant to CBOs: government (which includes various branches of government, and government functions outsourced to companies), members, solidarity networks, and the mainstream media. While different theorists disagree on which audience is the most important, each one holds value, and likely plays a significant role in terms of the CBOs' networks of power. As I will discuss in the chapter on audience, this study established that the main audiences the CBOs targeted were local government and their own members. While some efforts were made to develop solidarity networks, the organisations were weak on this front. Also, only ICRC specifically targeted the media, and all the organisations complained that the media were not receptive to them.

3.6.2.1 Government and quasi-government structures

With respect to government as an audience, a system of policing allows government to try "to reserve a monopoly for themselves" regarding what happens in a city and a country (Foucault, 2001, p. 475). Arguably, politics exists mainly in these situations of conflict between state structures and those demanding change (Rancière et al., 2001; Tilly, 2008). As such, the arboreal structures of the state break the flow of desire, instead of being receptive to it (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). Therefore, as an audience, the state may be actively against the messages that organisations like social movements and CBOs are communicating, and the population may need to wrest the decision-making monopoly from government.

However, not all arms of government or quasi-government structures are equally accessible/inaccessible and antagonistic. For example, as McCarthy et al. (2004, p. 307) point out with respect to the US,

the small number of national legislators means that access to them is highly competitive, but state and local legislators are more accessible. And the large number of policy bureaucrats who work in far-flung offices of the modern democratic states offer many points of very low-cost access ... many of them [social

movements and similar groups] *actually do attempt to spread their interpretation of injustice in this manner.*

Furthermore, when discussing the state, it is not helpful to conflate courts of law with police or with the offices of the mayor (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). The state is not a monolithic, stable structure, but is “being made and remade at the margins” by the way people engage with their spaces and the imposed rules that govern those spaces (Das & Randeria, 2015, p. S12). Therefore, in my chapter on audience, I have identified which specific arms of government are targeted, the CBOs’ perceptions of those specific arms of government, and the rationale for choosing them as a target.

Government does not simply stand over the population. People can negate government’s rules. When the government becomes an audience for a CBO, CBOs act as agents with a “repertoire of political expression”, some of which may be adversarial (J. Brown, 2015, p. 18), but some of which may attempt to be cooperative. While the South African state can be violent, in practice, the government does not only operate by exercising violence (Cooper-Knock, 2018). Instead, the government is continually negotiating with the claims of others. In such negotiations, the state will sometimes actively avoid conflict and prefer to be amicable and create consensus (Cooper-Knock, 2018; Pernegger, 2016).

In this study, however, none of the arms of government sought to build consensus. The CBOs did not generally see the government as adversarial (except with regard to the police) but believed in the possibility of influencing government. However, they also all agreed that the government was uncooperative and unresponsive, and even deceitful (expressing interest to placate, rather than to act), barely creating opportunities for dialogue. In the case of One Voice and the Johannesburg Property Company (a quasi-government structure), One Voice was able to exert some influence; however, this was based on expediency, not consensus. After the change from an ANC government to a DA government just prior to my study starting, ICRC had lost all influence with the city offices and had been actively excluded.

However, contentious performance and confrontation with authorities and elites are not the only for social justice organisations; other activities are also necessary, especially building a membership base, as I will discuss in the next subsection.

3.6.2.2 Membership

For any social movement or similar organisation, such as a CBO, a key aim is to build membership so that it can exert power en masse. This involves ongoing communication to elaborate ideologies and frames, mobilise and socialise, and engage in self-development and develop a shared identity. The assemblage of members is a structure for developing recruitment networks, without which its potential cannot be realised (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; McAdam et al., 2004). Sustaining an organisation such as a CBO requires regular contact between members and creating a sense of belonging (Carpentier et al., 2003). This involves ongoing, active construction of the organisation and the identities of members (Carpentier et al., 2003), through decentralised communication and relationship building (Kent & Lane, 2017).

Through interaction in face-to-face groups, social networks with a shared interest can develop into organisations through which collective action can be activated and sustained (Tarrow, 2011). The interpersonal communication creates normative pressures and incentives for solidarity, and ultimately seeks to transform feelings into action (Cerulo, 2010). Social justice organisations are best defined as taking on “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 9). Through ongoing communication, members address shared problems and express support for similar values and principles, but this is not enough to create an organisation/movement. Instead, the organisation develops out of dialogue (and consensus on framing) and ultimately agreement on joint action towards chosen targets (Della Porta & Diani, 2014). Through ongoing dialogue, members forge and break connections, observe, contribute or withdraw in non-linear ways and through complex interactions (Kent & Lane, 2017, p. 573). Despite resulting from random communication patterns, however, some homogenous ideas, values and culture create the critical mass, which is the starting point of collective action (Ohlemacher, 1996).

As such, developing a membership and attracting new members mainly takes place at an interpersonal level of communication, and different members must, through communication, find common ground. Once the organisation is established, new members are also attracted via face-to-face or one-on-one communication with other members, who identify the shared interests. In the CBOs in this study, ICRC and One Voice members, staff, and committee members actively go out into their communities to maintain regular

interpersonal contact. The shared history and understanding of their similar concerns binds the members together through emotional bonds, akin to friendship.

However, organisations such as CBOs can strengthen their activities, not by just attracting individual members, but by creating alliances with other similar or related organisations. A series of networked organisations can take on a shared agenda and/or a shared ideology to undertake shared action without the necessity of the tight bonds of membership, as I will discuss in the next subsection on solidarity networks.

3.6.2.3 Solidarity networks

Resilient movement building depends on developing many relationships with similar political organisations (Funke, 2014). Networks of solidarity can be seen as a primary audience for those who wish to build power (Castells, 2015). By making rhizomatic connections, organisations can bridge diverse positions, values and struggles to develop a network of loosely related groups and organisations. Whereas within members of one organisation some homogeneity is necessary to hold together coherently, solidarity networks must accept and embrace “the heterogeneity of actors and struggles, internal networking logics and mobilization strategies” (Funke, 2014, p. 30). The bonds that hold groups together in a solidarity network may be strong or weak, and are likely to be in flux “depending on shifting circumstances” (Della Porta & Diani, 2014, p. 25).

Although connecting with individuals as members in face-to-face and/or one-on-one communication is important to build membership, it may be “more efficient” to recruit “blocs of people through existing organizational infrastructures” (McCarthy et al., 2004, p. 294). Instead of competing for public attention using their own frames, organisations can equally jointly gain attention by actively embracing each other around shared issue agenda. For example, CBOs could connect with religious organisations, NGOs, other CBOs, and local politicians: “increasing communication and the coordination of flows among groups” can also lead to more individuals being ready to take part in collective action (Caiani, 2014, p. 369).

While with respect to street traders, Matjomane (2013) suggested that solidarity networks are of primary importance if they want to play a significant role in Johannesburg, in my study I found that One Voice was fairly insular. While it did connect with other organisations and attend the events of other organisations (especially NGOs and a trade

union coalition), it did not develop a shared agenda or a shared course of action. While ICRC actively sought to build its solidarity network, it had difficulty doing so (beyond EarthLife Africa) because it was often unable to find common cause with others. As I will explain in the chapter on audience, developing solidarity networks is complex, requiring affective skills and, as with membership, also a level of interpersonal interaction, and even friendship.

Apart from the contentious relationships with elites and the positive affective relationships of membership and solidarity networks, much of social movement literature from the US and Europe points to the importance of the media as an audience for social movement performance, as I will discuss in the next subsection.

3.6.2.4 The media

For the media to disseminate news, journalists must first observe and interpret events themselves; therefore they must first be an audience before sharing media spectacles. Media also offer, within bounds, some political actors the opportunity to amplify their contentious performances by making such spectacles more widely available, and therefore attracting a larger audience. As an audience, the media are not just channels of information, but are political actors who help “to distribute political power to particular groups, causes, or individuals” (Entman, 2007, p. 166). Media actions result in both arboreal and rhizomatic flows, in that the media are hierarchical and can reach those in power, but also serve to connect individuals and groups to each other (Harms & Dickens, 1996).

When talking to the media as audience, CBOs are in a hierarchical relationship with the media in that the media exert more power as they exert a gate-keeping function on what reaches a wider audience. The power of the media to distribute and confer power is increasing in what Hjarvard (2008, 2013) calls an increasingly mediated world that operates according to media logics. However, like access to government, access to the media for social movements and CBOs often involves contentious performances. As audience, the media are particularly interested in viewing “drama and confrontation, emotional events with people who have fire in the belly, who are extravagant and unpredictable” (Gamson & Meyer, 2004, p. 288).

Studies of social movements in the west emphasise the importance of getting media attention, arguing that it is an important stepping stone to access other audiences (Benford & Snow, 2000; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Klüver et al., 2015; McAdam, 2000, 2004; McCarthy et al., 2004; Snow, 2008). However, a previous study of CBOs in South Africa suggest that because they do not have easy access to the media, and because the media hardly cover their activities, some no longer try to get media attention (Bosch et al., 2019; Pointer et al., 2016). In my study, I also found that the media were not important audiences for the two CBOs: only ICRC made any effort to contact the media; only one media house attended its protest, and no media covered the protest.

In this study, I was able to discern which audiences were most relevant to the two CBOs, which will be further discussed in the chapter on Audience. However, in order to reach their chosen audience, CBOs need to craft their messages in a way that appeals to that audience, that is, frame the message, as I will discuss in the next section.

3.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has covered the key concepts relevant to my study of the political communication by CBOs in inner city Johannesburg. The concepts are structured around Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, 2004) and Latour's (2005a) notion of an assemblage of people and objects which form machine-like connections. Deleuze and Guattari specifically emphasise flows as the central function of the machine, and in this chapter I have shown the flow between the different concepts. Although the chapter has a starting point and end point, this is quite arbitrary as the flows do not happen in any specific order, and it is rather the movement between the nodes that I have captured. For example, the productive, creative desire of the CBOs is linked to the frames and aesthetics they choose and the tools they use to reach a particular audience. However, equally, the decision to reach a particular audience might influence the specific frames, aesthetics or tools chosen (for example, the organisations may choose different frames, aesthetics or tools to gain the attention of government and to gain the attention of their membership). Similarly, the relationship between desire, frames and aesthetics is that they generate rational logical flows as well as affective flows, so that audiences are influenced by both informational and emotional aspects of communication.

Ultimately, depending on how effectively the CBOs utilise desire, framing, aesthetics and tools to mobilise audiences, the power of political communication can be generated, or break down. In this study, neither of CBOs used all components effectively, as I will discuss in the individual chapters based on each concept. For example, One Voice did not have a consistent desire in that micro-fascist tendencies break solidarity; ICRC had strong desire, used good frames, and used a large variety of tools; however, it was still not able to reach its primary audience (Johannesburg city council) because the city was totally opposed to hearing them.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the methodology used to gather data, before moving on to the findings and discussion in chapters for each concept.

Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The research strategy is based on the need to gather information around the five concepts in Figure 1 on page 4 and involved a qualitative exploration of two CBOs' communication practices. The case studies provided an in-depth look at CBO communication as it unfolded at ICRC, GRWV and One Voice. The case studies were examined using three main qualitative methods, i.e. (1) Participatory Action Research (PAR); (2) observation at specific times (sometimes events); and (3) 'object' analysis (the objects include documents and other forms of communication which use framing and/or aesthetics). All data for the study was triangulated based on these three methods, although object analysis was mainly only used in the study of frames and aesthetics. In triangulating the data, I saw it as a flow, similar to the flow of the political communication machine; as such I explored similarities and disjunctures between the different sets of data.

Outputs included data such as PAR workshop flipcharts, organisational documents and materials such as logos and organisational clothing, and subjective field notes taken during observation of events. For example, data on audiences included self-reported audiences unpacked in the PAR workshop and audiences in observation. In some cases, where it was not possible to gather enough data using one method, other methods supplemented the data. For example, in the frame analysis One Voice had almost no documents for frame analysis, so I had to rely on the spoken words used during events and activities and self-reported frames identified in the PAR workshops.

Data was analysed by comparing and contrasting the data uncovered using the three methods. For example, the frame analysis of documents was compared to the spoken messages heard during observation at organisational events and activities; the unpacking and self-reporting on concepts was compared to actual practices noted during observation.

To begin this chapter, firstly, I have unpacked the history and interest of each organisation in order to get a sense of the case studies (sample). Secondly, I describe in detail the key methods, how they were used in the study, and what problems were encountered with deploying these research tools. The third section reflects on the process of

triangulating data and the processes that were followed in analysing the data. I then reflect on the ethical challenges encountered in the study, and the limitations of the study.

4.2 CASE STUDIES FOR UNDERSTANDING CBO COMMUNICATION

Case studies in research aim to unpack what each case can contribute to knowledge in a particular field. Each case can be seen as a system with certain features, some of which fall inside the boundaries of the case and others go beyond the features of the case (Agrosino, 2005). As discussed by Yin (1981), case studies are useful for exploring current knowledge in context. Multiple cases can be examined at one time in order to explore similarities and differences between them, and the analysis would aim to find general 'laws' that occur across cases (Della Porta & Diani, 2014; Yin, 1981). The pattern matching possibilities of multiple case studies "helps raise the level of confidence in the robustness of the method" (Zainal, 2007, p. 2).

Nevertheless, as Simons (1996) elaborates, case studies create a knowledge paradox, in that there is a tension between unique and generalised knowledge. Stake (2005) points out that care must be taken when generalising not to ignore what is specific to each case. In choosing two case studies, my research established what was common in how CBOs communicate, but also the specific challenges for each CBO.

Della Porta and Diani (2014, p. 6) argue that for quantitative research, cases should be selected randomly, but with regard to the qualitative approach of this study, cases were chosen because they are "theoretically relevant". McDonough and McDonough (1997, p. 204) concur that the chosen cases must be representative and able to contribute to knowledge about "whole populations". In my research, the case studies offer insight into CBOs in inner city Johannesburg, and each organisation tackles key issues related to the development of inner city Johannesburg (i.e. housing and street trade). I also chose these case studies because, unlike NGOs, they have quite a weak public profile (based on media hits), but serve established networks of people, and make efforts to communicate with government.

4.2.1 A brief overview of the Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC)

The ICRC has been involved in preventing evictions from Johannesburg's inner city buildings since 2005 (S. Sibanda, pers. comm., 13 October 2018). However, its previous incarnation, the Inner City Forum, unsuccessfully tried to stop an eviction in Bree Street in the inner city in 2002, and in 2003 successfully stopped an eviction from Junel House in Nugget Street in the Central Business District (CBD) (Wilson, 2011). From 2015 onwards it was able to secure regular funding, and therefore moved into their offices and hired some staff. As such, it operates as a NGO in some ways, but because it still relies on its membership base, I have identified it as a CBO.

The organisation "strives to assist the inner city poor with access to housing, water, electricity, education and human rights, by empowering the poor with knowledge and skills to advocate and lobby relevant authorities, and challenge their policies" (ICRC, n.d.). By assisting inner city communities with housing and legal matters, it operates as an advice centre in an environment where popular and collective mobilisations are rare, except when evictions actually take place (Tshuwa, 2016; Wilson, 2011). The organisation operates in a number of inner city areas, connecting with building committees in Hillbrow, Yeoville, Berea, Braamfontein, Joubert Park, Newtown, Kensington, Troyeville, Rossetenville, Turffontein, Jeppestown, Bertrams, Malvern, and Bellevue (Tshuwa, 2016), as well as various inner city informal settlements such as Booyens (S. Sibanda, pers. comm., 13 October 2018). The ICRC has a patchy relationship with the City of Johannesburg, having had some success based on relationships with specific people, but losing traction when those bureaucrats are redeployed.

Alongside attending local government meetings in an effort to influence policy, the organisation links to non-governmental organisations like the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI), the University of Witwatersrand-based Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), and PlanAct (S. Sibanda, pers. comm., 13 October 2018). It has also worked with the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) (Tshuwa, 2016), a private sector interest group that liaises with the City of Johannesburg (Tissington, 2013). In 2008, alongside the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), it successfully petitioned the Constitutional Court to stop the City of Johannesburg from evicting people from inner city buildings without providing alternative accommodation (Tshuwa, 2016; Wilson, 2011).

The organisation was a useful case study because it has existing infrastructure (computer and internet access, and office space), broad membership of inner city residents, and a history of successfully stopping evictions. However, over the years, the organisation has received little coverage in the mainstream media, and its website and social media accounts are rarely updated (during the course of this study, the website became defunct, and was only reinstated in December 2020 - outside the scope of my fieldwork). The contrast between its political activities and its public profile (in terms of communication visibility) made it important to look at, on the one hand, which communication activities are leading to its success in stopping evictions and, on the other hand, why the organisation lacks public visibility.

During the course of this study, I encountered about 500 members at a protest march (these were only those who could get there in the middle of the week during the day). There were also five permanent office staff, and one temporary staff member employed for the duration of protest planning. ICRC also has a steering committee of about ten members, and they meet as necessary, but at least once a month.

4.2.2 A brief overview of One Voice of All Hawkers Association (One Voice)

Established in 2007, One Voice organises through 20 area representatives across Johannesburg, covering about 2 500 members (Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014, p. 118). One Voice aims to root out corruption in street trading bay allocation, stop harassment from the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JPMD), and “promote autonomous management by trader organisations themselves” (Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014). While One Voice periodically resorts to protest, it also cooperates with the city to persuade them to register illegal traders.

The organisational terrain of street traders in inner city Johannesburg is quite complex, as several organisations’ memberships overlap because members move around opportunistically depending on which organisation they perceive as securing them the most advantage (Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014). Nevertheless, One Voice is one of two organisations that have the biggest footprint among street traders; the other two being the South African National Traders and Retailers Alliance (SANTRA) and the South African Informal Trader Forum (SAITF) (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016).

While the literature suggested that One Voice is protest-prone (Matjomane, 2013; Pernegger, 2016; Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014), during the course of the study, One Voice did not have any of its own protests. Bénit-Gbaffou (2016) found that One Voice leaders are less literate than those of SANTRA and SAITF, and I found that this meant few documents had been produced by the organisation, and there was no record-keeping activity in the organisation. Record-keeping was hindered by the lack of office space; however, during the course of the study they secured an office space, albeit in Lenasia (part of Johannesburg, but not in the inner city).

The organisation has received little media coverage, and I only found nine articles in which it was mentioned (three of which were after my fieldwork was complete, and which focus on government's shutting down of street traders during the Covid-19 pandemic). One Voice has no website; it does have a Facebook account, setup in 2016, but after this was set up no statuses have been posted to the page.

During the course of this study, I encountered about 150 members by walking the streets of inner city Johannesburg with the chairperson, and by observing a contentious meeting where some former members argued with current members about who were the real committee members. I found the organisation quite fractious, with competing demands and points of view even among the committee members, providing a rich ground for exploring the complexity of political solidarity.

4.3 RESEARCH METHODS TO EXPLORE CBO COMMUNICATION

As mentioned above, three key methods were used to explore CBO communication, i.e. (1) PAR; (2) observation; and (3) object analysis. The results from methods were triangulated to generate an in-depth picture of the two CBOs' communication work.

With regard to exploring the items covered in the conceptual framework, all five concepts are covered in the next five chapters, in which I describe the PAR workshops and researcher exploration using observation. In addition, framing and aesthetics were explored primarily through frame analysis and critical visual analysis. While aesthetics extends to many objects and performances (such as song), I focussed my critical visual analysis on organisation branding, which includes t-shirts, caps, banners and logos.

4.3.1 PAR to evaluate CBO communication

Brydon Miller, Greenwood, and Maguire (2003) highlight that PAR should strive to be a democratic process, which unpacks practical knowledge, with the aim of bringing about change in terms of identified challenges. As such, PAR seeks to be respectful of the different types of knowledge offered by different stakeholders and aims to build trust and collaboration to resolve problems. By valuing the knowledge of different stakeholders, PAR seeks to challenge power inequities and undermine knowledge monopolies (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008; Michael, 2012b; Tacchi & Lennie, 2014). It also aims to “break down the false divide between theory and practice” (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 2). PAR does not strive for objective research, but is guided by the goals and ideologies of participating stakeholders, recognising the political nature of knowledge-making (Cameron & Gibson, 2005; Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005; O'Brien, 1998).

While PAR can lead to essentialising local, indigenous knowledge (Cameron & Gibson, 2005), in this research, PAR brought together local organisational knowledge and my knowledge by exploring the concepts in three PAR workshops. Bringing together the different types of knowledge allowed for mutual enquiry (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005), and instead of seeking objective truth, allowed for an “insider perspective” and an “outsider perspective” (Yu, 2013, p. 207).

In practical terms, in the first workshop, I described the five concepts, and then participants explored the concepts reflecting on their own existing work in relation to their desires as organisations. In the second workshop, I fed back to the organisation the findings, and the organisations then reflected on each of the concepts again, responding to critiques of their work. The second workshop also included an analysis of the communication techniques of the City of Johannesburg and other elites. In the third workshop, the organisations developed new strategies for taking their communication forward.

To ensure the process was fully participatory (Tacchi et al., 2003), the workshop plans were determined in conjunction with the leadership of each organisation, and these were also adapted through the course of each workshop, as more time was spent than allocated on some activities, and less time was spent than allocated on other activities. Also during the course of the workshops, participants suggested changes to the agenda, and these were all implemented.

The workshops sought to create a cartography of relationships between the concepts and power (in terms of nodes and ties), and unpack the story of each CBO in relation to their communication work (Caiani, 2014; Gerlach, 2015; Michael, 2012a; Ringrose & Coleman, 2013). The data generated from the PAR workshops were in the form of materials generated from the workshop activities, such as flipchart paper and drawings. These were coded in line with the conceptual framework, and analysed in terms of how the five concepts create flows in CBO networks of power.

However, difficulty was experienced with regard to workshop participants as some participants attended on some days and not others, and not all participants participated in all the workshops, creating continuity issues. This was overcome by both participants and researcher recapping each previous day at the start of the next day, and each previous workshop at the start of the next workshop. Each workshop was conducted over two days, on the following dates: 21-22 September 2018, 21-22 February 2019, and 15-16 May 2019. Below I list some of the kind of activities we did; I discuss them per workshop, but if I did an activity multiple times across the different workshops, I only describe it once.

4.3.1.1 Workshop 1: Establishing existing communication activities and strategies

A range of activities were conducted in Workshop 1, including an initial introduction to the workshop as relevant to my thesis, in which the participants mapped the concepts. We also undertook plenary discussions (e.g. on desire), making placards for a mock protest (focussing on framing, but also elucidating an aspect of tools), a fashion walk and subsequent group work (highlighting aesthetics), selecting the most relevant tools and ranking them, and undertaking a SWOT (strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats) analysis with respect to audiences. These are discussed in more detail below.

Mapping the concepts

At the outset of the first workshop we created a large (lopsided) star-shaped map of the five key concepts on the floor of the workshop venue (see Figure 2). The participants divided into random groups and each group circled around the star, brainstormed and wrote their ideas on the coloured cards – one colour for each concept (Figure 3). After laying out the cards, we discussed the concepts in more detail in a plenary.

Figure 3

Star shaped map



Figure 3

Participants' interpretation of the map



On the second day of the first workshop, the map was left out, and for subsequent workshops we laid out the map again. This re-laying of the concept map allowed participants to recall the concepts and issues discussed for each concept on the previous day/at the previous workshop. This served two purposes: jogging the memory of participants, or recapping the workshop for the benefit of newcomers.

In the workshops, the CBO participants (1) tackled their personal and organisational desires in terms of what they were actively working to create; (2) identified key messages already in use and how they might be changed; (3) identified aesthetics in use and how this might be improved; and (4) identified which tools they were using, which they would like to gain more skills for, and which they would like to use for the first time; and (5) identified relevant audiences and selected the most relevant, then discussed how they want audiences to feel as a response to their messaging. Each of these explorations are discussed separately in Chapters 5-9.

Unpacking desire: Plenary discussion

In order to explore desire more, we held a plenary discussion so that the organisations could properly grasp what the concept meant to them. I tried to ensure that all participants spoke, but did not press anyone who was reluctant. The discussion was based on the exploration of concepts as depicted in Figure 1 (on page 4). The questions for the plenary were not planned beforehand because I was not sure what would emerge from the concept brainstorm. However, we discussed how the formal aspects of organising that they had identified in the brainstorm related to the more emotive concepts they had identified. These findings are discussed in the chapter on desire.

Unpacking organisational frames: Mock protest

In Workshop 1, I had planned to identify existing frames by getting the organisations to write their own newspaper headlines; however they felt unsure with this suggestion, and rather suggested that they write protest placards. I agreed with this suggestion and the CBOs designed their own placards. After they had designed the placards, instead of the planned plenary report back, each organisation launched into a mock-march, singing and toying, followed by the mock reading of a memorandum to a government official as a form of highlighting their framing. This mock protest activity was also undertaken in Workshop 3, where participants identified the new frames they would use in their communication strategy going forward. The frames chosen are discussed in the chapter on framing, but they are also discussed in the chapter on tools when I discuss protest as a communication tool.

Identifying aesthetics by exploring affect: Fashion walk

Before the workshop, participants were asked to dress in clothing that expressed their identity and bring music that they loved. Most participants did dress up but few brought music, so Thabani Ndlovu from ICRC found music on YouTube and acted as a DJ; a wide variety of music was played including pop, gospel, and hip hop. I undertook the first fashion walk to demonstrate the activity to the participants. Each person then undertook a fashion walk, like models on a runway ramp, shouting out how they felt when wearing the clothes. Everyone applauded and encouraged each other during the walk, and they repeated the affective words the 'model' was shouting out. To finish off this activity, the participants divided into their organisational groups, and wrote in two columns on flipcharts what feelings

they had and what they wanted their audience to feel. This activity is reported in the chapter on aesthetics.

Identifying organisational tools: Brainstorm

The participants stayed in their organisational groups and identified the tools they were already using (by also checking the list in the star on the floor as depicted in Figure 3), and they then ranked them according to how they perceived their relevance, and according to which tools the organisation used the most. The findings from this activity are discussed in the chapter on tools.

Identifying audience: SWOT analysis

In their organisational groups, and based on the audience section of the colourful star (in Figure 3), the participants selected their most relevant audiences. They then undertook any analysis of which audience (1) they had a strong impact on/relationship with; (2) which audience they had a weak impact on/relationship with; (3) which audience they perceived as presenting them with an opportunity; and (4) which audience was a threat to them. A SWOT analysis was again conducted in Workshop 3, so that the organisations could identify which audiences to target.

4.3.1.2 Workshop 2: Exploring the communication strategies of political elites/opponents

The activities undertaken in Workshop 2 included a marketplace activity, document analysis, creating collages and drawing, role-play and storytelling. These activities are described below.

Exploring the desires on inner city government: Marketplace activity

After the recap of the concepts using the star in Figure 3 above, I pasted three flipchart sheets on the wall with questions on them, as follows:

1. What kind of city does the government say it wants?
2. What kind of city are they creating?
3. What kind of city do they think you are creating?

Individually, the participants then moved between the sheets brainstorming their answer to the questions. After everyone had a chance to write on the sheets, we held a plenary discussion to explore the issues in more detail. This activity is explored more in the chapter on desire.

Exploring government frames: Document analysis

In the framing activity, I handed out newspaper articles (on housing rightss) and city documents (about street trade) to participants. They divided into groups and explored the frames that the government uses, by answering the following questions:

- What message is government putting out?
- What do they think of your message?
- How does that make you feel?

The answers to the questions were reported back to a plenary.

Exploring the aesthetics of city elites: Visual activity – collages and drawing

In this activity the participants divided into groups, but not based on the organisation they belong to. Participants were given a pile of magazines, scissors, glue and a sheet of flipchart paper. They then went through the magazines searching for images that represented the kind of people they thought that the city government would listen to.

Once they had finished their initial collages, I asked them to think about logos that they know about, and without consulting the magazines try to draw the logo. They were then asked to draw their own organisational logo.

When they reported back to a plenary, they listed adjectives related to the images in the collage. We then discussed the elements of the logos that they remembered and what adjectives they would apply to these; they then compared their organisational logo with the logos they had drawn, and discussed how they thought their own logo matched the ones they found memorable. The results from this activity are reported in the chapter on aesthetics.

Exploring tools: Role-play

In this activity, in their groups, the participants came up with a role-play about the kinds of communication tools they thought city councillors and other elites were using. Each group then acted out the role-play that they had come up with, which highlighted different tools. Afterwards there was a plenary discussion in which participants compared their own tool used to the tool used by elites.

Exploring audience: Storytelling

The participants divided into pairs and were asked to tell a story about an encounter they had had in the past with someone in power. I listed the kind of people they may have encountered (such as police, city officials, other government officials, school headmasters, or landlords) but told them they could also come up with their own ideas. To help them tell their stories, I asked the following questions:

- Who did they have an encounter with?
- Did the person listen and take action?
- Why did they listen/not listen?
- How did it make the participant feel?

After they had shared their story in pairs, each partner briefly reported to the plenary how their partner had answered the above questions. I wrote the answers on flipchart paper, and after the reportback, we discussed common encounters and themes of the stories. The participants then also reflected on how empowered they felt in these encounters. The findings from this activity are discussed in the chapter on audience.

4.3.1.3 Workshop 3: Developing an organisational communication campaign

The activities in Workshop 3 focussed on planning a communication strategy going forward. As a result, the participants mostly broke into groups based on the organisation they belonged to and identified what desires they had, what messages they planned to use in future, any changes they wanted to make to their organisational aesthetic, the tools they would use, and the audiences they wanted to target. Activities included a visioning exercise, an exercise exploring frames (identifying their own messages and the messages of their

audiences, and identifying a new message), the Five Hats exercise, listing the top three tools each organisation was using (referring back to the tools on the five point star in Figure 3).

Identifying desires for the future: Visioning exercise

In this activity, I asked participants to close their eyes and think through what was important to them in their lives right now: what problems they were grappling with, what was going well, and the kind of relationships they were involved in. I then asked them to think about the political problems they were trying to address through their organisational work, and think about their relationships with the people inside and outside the organisation that formed part of the political environment. I then asked them to connect with their desire by thinking about how they were solving the problems for each organisation. I asked them to think about the other people who were as involved in the action plan, and what their own role was. I asked them to visualise where they would be in a year from now and concentrate on how that would make them feel. After a few moments, I then asked them to open their eyes, stand up and stretch.

We then went into a group visioning exercise, where each participant explained their individual visions to the group, and the groups identified shared areas, and prioritised what was most important to the organisation. I asked them to bear in mind the problems we had identified in the second workshop regarding how their own vision was different to the vision of those in power that they wanted to address. I pointed out that their own vision had to take account of the obstacles. At the end of the activity, the organisations produced a vision statement about what they planned to do in the coming months. More details on this activity are explained in the chapter on desire.

Identifying new frames: Generating new messages

In the next activity, the organisational groups were asked to reflect on a new message they wanted to use going forward, based on their vision statement and based on how receptive they thought their audience was to its existing messages (based on Workshop 2). The groups reflected on four questions and presented the answers in a grid. The questions were:

- What are your current messages?
- What are your friends' messages?

- What are the messages of your opponents?
- What message will you put out for your campaign?

The grid is shown below:

Current messages	Opponents' messages
Friends' messages	New message

The flipcharts were then presented back to the plenary. More details of this activity are explored in the chapter on framing.

Generating a new aesthetic: Five coloured hats

In this activity, based on the issues we had previously discussed about the organisations' aesthetics, the participants were asked to explore their previous aesthetic and come up with a new one. To conduct this activity, each group was given cardboard hats in different colours, and was asked to write answers to different questions on each hat. The questions and colours were as follows:

- On the blue hat they listed facts about their aesthetic.
- On the yellow hat they wrote what was good about the aesthetic.
- On the pink hat they wrote the problems with the aesthetic.
- On the red hat they wrote their feelings about the aesthetic.
- On the green hat they developed creative ideas for a new campaign aesthetic (which involved drawing pictures of logos and t-shirts).

They then shared their hats with the plenary, by pasting them on the wall, and different members of the groups each sharing one hat. More details on this activity are shared in the chapter on Aesthetics.

Identifying useful tools

In this activity, the organisations referred back to the star in Figure 3 above, and identified which were the top three most important tools for their campaign. More details on this activity are shared in the chapter on tools.

Campaign planning

The afternoon of the second day of Workshop 3 was dedicated entirely to creating specific plans for their campaign. The specifics of this activity are not outlined in the thesis, as they were confidential to each organisation. Nevertheless, the planning activities were laid out on flipchart paper using a table as follows:

Activity	Purpose	Timeline	Outcome	Person responsible

4.3.1.4 Summary of value of workshops

Apart from the specific workshop activities, Tacchi and Lennie (2014) provide a useful framework for undertaking PAR with regard to CBO communication, detailing that PAR should be holistic, complex, critical, emergent, and learning-based. Tacchi and Lennie's (2014) model was used to guide workshop planning in the PAR component of my research. Workshops identified what desiring-machines are at work, how are they framing their messages, what the aesthetic qualities of their work are, which tools/mediums they are using to communicate, and which audiences are relevant to each CBO.

Regarding the holistic component, the research sought to understand the "wider social, cultural, economic, technological, organizational and institutional contexts within, and in relation to which communication ... takes place" (2014, p. 305). In all the workshops, each activity was undertaken in such a way that the organisations applied themselves to their specific contexts, such that all the activities implicitly contained the question: "How does this work/not work in your context?" For ICRC, this meant analysing the content in terms of housing in the inner city, including the living conditions and livelihood circumstances of inner city residents, the problems of evictions, and the blocked access to city government. For One Voice this meant analysing the content in terms of street traders in the inner city, the problems of access to trading bays, harassment from police, and only local councillors and local offices of the Johannesburg Property Company being available and receptive to

communication. Furthermore, One Voice explored the difficulties of communication within the organisation due to poor access to communication technology and office space.

In terms of complexity, PAR for communication studies should recognise that communication may take place in the context of social conflict, and this could influence the outcome of communication activities (Tacchi & Lennie, 2014). The critical perspective recognises and addresses issues such as race, gender, caste, ethnicity, and age which can lead to power differentials among PAR participants. At the first workshop, social conflict emerged between some One Voice members, some of who were xenophobic and others who were upset by xenophobic comments, which led to some shouting. The topic of xenophobia also came up in the second workshop, but this interaction was more deliberative than the engagement at the first workshop. The shouting at the first workshop was dealt with by allowing the participants to thrash it out, and then calling the competing participants to get their lunch and put the disagreement aside. The tension between One Voice members quietened. This is discussed in the forthcoming chapters, but especially detailed in the next chapter on desire.

A gender balance existed among One Voice and ICRC members. In terms of One Voice, the women at the workshops were vocal in their contributions, with one woman standing up for foreign nationals, and also contesting male perspectives in the group activities. The contestation in the group activities was handled by incorporating two sides of the argument, and creating negotiated outputs. In ICRC, some of the women had never attended a workshop before and were initially shy about their inputs, but by encouraging them to take leadership roles such as handling report-backs, they grew in confidence. The growing confidence was also due to the encouragement of the ICRC director (a woman), who made space to hear the women's inputs in all the group activities. By the end of the second day of the first workshop, two women who were particularly shy at the start spoke about their own growth through the workshop and their enjoyment of their new-found voices.

A final power discrepancy in the workshops was that two participants could not speak English very well. However, this was overcome by myself ensuring that translation happened and by checking that their voices were also being heard in all the activities. Due to her uncertainty with English, and also her difficulty with handwriting, one of the participants needed additional support in filling in the consent form, and this was overcome by translated

explanations from another organisation member, and by them handling the handwriting on the form.

Tacchi and Lennie (2014) point out that PAR should allow for emergent qualities, by recognising that communication processes are dynamic. Communication research, therefore, should not lead to a static understanding of communication processes. PAR also needs to be realistic to “increase the usefulness of evaluation results, which should focus on intended, unintended, expected, unexpected, negative and positive change” (2014, p. 307). In this regard, since the workshops explored the dynamic relationship between the concepts, and activities built on each other, plenty of space was created for the unexpected and new ideas. The second workshop focussed the most on evaluation since I presented my own initial findings and the organisations evaluated their own communication strategies in relation to the city’s communication strategies.

Finally, in seeking to promote action, PAR should allow “continuous learning, mutual understanding, empowerment, creative ideas, and thinking” (Tacchi & Lennie, 2014, p. 308). Many of the workshop activities specifically sought to explore participants’ creativity, through creating placards, drawing pictures, singing, and dancing. These creative activities made for lively workshops, increasing the levels of participation. The variety of activities also meant that different participants were given different moments to shine, depending on their unique abilities.

The workshops provided rich data, and gave clear insight into what the CBOs said they were doing (first workshop), their responses to my evaluation and therefore deeper analysis of their work in relation to the city’s communication activities (second workshop), and a clear way forward in terms of developing a communications strategy (third workshop). All of the workshops were written up in workshop reports which were shared with the CBOs for comments and for onward sharing with their other members and, in the case of ICRC, donors. Funding for the workshops was provided by ICRC as they are the only organisation with funding and they saw the workshops as enhancing their own work and understanding of communication; the ICRC team also provided administrative support.

PAR was supported by an observation of each CBO, whereby I observed organisational communication practices in action, as explained below.

4.3.2 Tracking communication practices: Observing the CBOs

The main aim of the PAR methods was to gather and reflect on the knowledge CBOs already have. However, the workshop space was artificial, and could not provide insight into the texture of how the CBOs communicate. In order to gain insight into how the CBOs communicate in practice, I undertook observation work, focusing on organisational observation. Observation involved going with CBO members to events where they were communicating, and observing their communication practices in situ. Because observation involved going to events and activities, I did not target a specific number of people for observation. Instead, I noted down which members participated in the events, only observing those who had given permission via the consent forms. Furthermore, I attended a different number of events for each organisation, based on when we were mutually available.

For ICRC, their main focus throughout the time of my fieldwork was on organising a protest, so I participated in planning meetings, and accompanied them in walking around the inner city to inform participants about the upcoming protest. I also observed them in their office space, examining the work they were doing with respect to the protest. I also went to the protest and made observations at the protest. For One Voice, they took me on a walkabout of the inner city to connect with traders and for me to meet traders, I went to their office and observed activities at the office (including a confrontation between members and ex-members), and also attended an Oxfam event to which they had been invited. They also attended one of the ICRC's meetings about the protest, but this is discussed under the subsection on ICRC.

As Tacchi et al. (2003, p. 3) argue, observation allows the researcher to examine the "social relationships and process" within which an organisation may be doing its work. Through observation, I especially wanted to see which audiences the CBOs were connecting with most in practice, and how those connections played out, uncovering "differential relations, the bindings that hold these relations together, and the way they are also fragile and can fall apart" (Davies, 2009, p. 21). I also took note of messages conveyed by those observed, any aesthetic matters (such as clothing worn and banners produced), and the tools they used (if any) in the activities and events. Observation took place at various venues, to create a larger picture of how one place fits into the larger communication system (Davies, 2009).

Such observations were not objective, as this is not possible (Foley & Valenzuela, 2005), but by taking notes and writing about the event immediately after the fact, I gathered information about sights, sounds, and spaces, and evaluated the events through introspection (Foley & Valenzuela, 2005). Although technology makes it possible to record and analyse events in terms of captured material, this can privilege the 'view' of technology at the expense of lived experience (Agrosino, 2005). So, instead of relying on technology, I rather looked at what Drysdale (2016, p. 3) calls the "affective response" or "embodied thrill". As such, my written records aimed to evoke the events through sensory details, which made clear the CBOs' desiring-machines working in practice, the frames and aesthetics they used in messaging, the tools they used to make their work possible, and the audiences the organisations reached or attempted to reach in their activities.

Apart from my own perceptions of events, I also collaborated with the CBOs around observation. After each event, I discussed the event with members, in an effort to capture their own synaesthetic experiences and perceptions. As Agrosino (2005, p. 732) points out, this allows researchers to establish a "considerable rapport between the researcher and the host community". Such rapport was essential to this study as my aim was not just to evaluate CBO communication for myself, but to involve the CBOs in evaluating their own work towards developing and improving their own communication strategies. In the case of ICRC, this was fairly straightforward as we shared an analysis of their activities. For One Voice it was difficult to get a full picture as only the anti-xenophobic participants shared their insights, and the participants were highly critical of each other, blaming each other for organisational failings. GRWV was also difficult to engage with in analysing the events after they happened, as all of the members were quiet and soft-spoken and did not readily engage in conversation. Furthermore, communication became extremely uncomfortable for me after they made various patriarchal/sexist remarks at one of the church services I attended, as I will discuss in the chapter on Desire.

Once I had collated observation data by writing descriptive narratives of events as I saw them unfold, I coded the data in terms of the five concepts in Figure 1 (on page 4), then, in the analysis, I compared and contrasted the information collected using the other methods, in order to identify similarities and differences. For example, I compared the self-reported information practices that the CBOs described in the workshops with my observations to confirm similarities or unpack discrepancies in the data. I also analysed the data in terms of

trends for each organisation in terms of the five concepts, that is, how were they typically communicating in terms of their desires, message framing, aesthetics, tools and audiences? The findings and analysis from my observations are discussed in Chapters 5-9 of the thesis, depending on the specific concept analysed.

4.3.3 Generating knowledge from the communication archive: Object analysis

The aim of object analysis is to reflect not just on the communication activities of the present, but on the history of communication in each CBO. I call this object analysis because, while the frame analysis relies on text documents, critical visual analysis can look at a range of objects. Texts for frame analysis included letters to various audiences, pamphlets, placards, memoranda presented at protests, press releases, annual reports, and sometimes reports or funding proposals to donors. Objects for critical visual analysis included organisational logos, clothing, and banners. In my original research plan, I also planned a critical visual analysis of the organisations' photographs, but organisations did not have many photographs or the photographs were of such poor quality that I could not provide a useful analysis.

4.3.3.1 Frame analysis

In the frame analysis, I gathered text documents from each organisation, especially their printed publications, organisational mission and vision, and written material on websites or social media. For all two organisations, I compared the messages framed in printed documents and those communicated at the PAR workshops and during my observation. Gathering documents for frame analysis proved most challenging for One Voice because prior to the study they had not had an office for storing documents, and no one was responsible for keeping records, thus I could only access 14 documents, and most of these were simply pamphlets announcing a meeting. I therefore had to depend more on the messages put out at events and activities, as well as the messages identified at the PAR workshops. ICRC had better record-keeping; thus I was able to gather 37 different 'documents', which included their organisational pamphlets, invitations to meetings and workshops, press releases, protest memoranda, posts on social media and placards carried at their protest. I also compared this messaging to that presented during observation and PAR workshops. GRWV also did not have many records of its communication activities, but after trying different approaches in terms of what documents could be useful, I managed to

gather 11 documents. I also drew on their messaging explored in the PAR workshop and in their awareness campaign. Table 1 shows a breakdown of documents collected for each organisation and their spoken words at specific events.

The literature reveals many methods for undertaking frame analysis, including detailed coding of deductive and/or inductive frames, identifying keywords or phrases, and rhetorical analysis. In this study, I focussed on identifying common frames in the literature on collective action framing - frames related to the South African political culture, and frames used by city government. However, I was also alive to any new frames that might emerge. I chose this method as I mainly wanted to examine the extent to which the organisations were using well-known frames. Six frames were found through document analysis, the PAR workshops and in my observation, that is, (1) the rights frame, (2) the economic frame, (3) the poverty frame, (4) the corruption frame, (5) the crime and grime frame, and (6) the xenophobic/anti-xenophobic frame. These are discussed in the chapter on framing.

Table 1: Number of documents analysed by organisation and type

Document type	ICRC	One Voice
	Number of documents analysed	
Press releases	4	0
Pamphlets	4	3
Memoranda	5	3
Placards	10	0
Workshop materials	0	0
Donor reports	0	0
Funding proposals	0	0
Constitution	0	0
Reports (funding reports & annual reports)	0	0
Input into other forums	1	2
Social media	3	0
Letters	2	3
Membership meeting/workshop invitations	8	3
SUBTOTAL	37	14
Events for observation	4	3

4.3.3.2 Critical visual analysis

Bal (2003, p. 9) correctly states, “[t]he act of looking is profoundly ‘impure’”, because it is a function of both biology and interpretation, affective responses, cognition, and intellect”. The impurity does not mean, however, that it is not possible to understand verifiable aspects of an object. Critical visual analysis can provide descriptions of colour, texture and form, identify the genre, and provide a view of the object from a historical or cultural perspective (Schroeder, 2006a). Objects, or what Biehl-Missal (2013, p. 356) calls “visual artefacts”, create sensory and aesthetic experiences, and generate “atmospheres”.

In this study, I focussed on organisational branding, including clothing, banners, and logos. The first step of analysis involved pure description of the artefact, that is, colours, symbolism, balance and symmetry, and shape. The second step involved putting the visual objects in context; for example, how were brand materials used in practice? Thereafter, in the third step, the organisational brand materials (logos, clothing and banners) were subjected to critique based on the literature on organisational branding, in terms of what makes a good brand. Fourth, since it is not possible to unpack the truth of an object, I followed Rose (2001, p. 4) in examining affective qualities such as “pleasure, thrills, fascination, wonder, fear or revulsion”. The final stage of analysis was to compare the materials to the literature on aesthetics (discussed in the conceptual framework) based on two factors: (1) the novelty of the visual material (and whether it was able to bring about new ways of seeing); and (2) the possibility for the material to build community and solidarity. The findings from this aspect of the research are addressed in the chapter on Aesthetics.

As for framing analysis, the critical visual analysis connected with the CBOs’ own understanding. For example, in PAR asking them to explore particular artefacts themselves, and bringing forth their own interpretation and affective responses. After events that I observed, I also explored how the CBOs perceive the impact of using a particular artefact.

4.4 DATA ANALYSIS

I have already discussed analysis from the three different methodologies individually, that is, (1) for the PAR workshops, I coded outputs in terms of the five concepts in Figure 1 (on page 4), and pulled out themes from the data; (2) for the observation, I coded the data

according to the five concepts and identified themes as well as any ways in which my observations contradicted what was said in the PAR workshops; (3) for the object analysis, I deployed critical visual analysis and frame analysis. These data analysis methods were applied across the course of the study, and continuously assessed across the course of fieldwork (PAR and observation).

For example, analysis of data from in Workshop 1, my observations, and the object analysis fed into Workshop 2 (which evaluated the research findings). Based on the data analysis of Workshop 2, Workshop 3 was planned, and then Workshop 3 data was analysed. In all cases the data analysis was individual for the different methods, and then triangulated across the course of the study, such that continuous analysis was undertaken through triangulation to identify commonalities and differences emerging from the different data sets.

Triangulation is a key way to confirm the findings of qualitative research, as triangulation allows the researcher to identify patterns and differences that emerge from the different research methods (Ayoub et al., 2014; Ettlinger, 2014). As argued by Stake (2005, p. 454), triangulation is “a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying repeatability of an observation or interpretation”. In particular, triangulating PAR with observation and object analysis allowed me to assess the similarities and differences between each organisation’s perceptions of their communication, and those derived from my own observation and analysis.

In triangulating the data, I developed an assemblage of methods, to allow “a tentative and hesitant unfolding” (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 5) of the networks of power of the three CBO’s. As John Law (2004, p. 8) describes, research methods should allow us to apprehend a multiplicity, acknowledging that “the world cannot be properly or finally caught in the webs of inquiry found in science or social science”. As such, although the triangulation found contradictions and similarities in the data emerging from the three methods, the study is based on my subjective interpretations, which were then either confirmed or denied by the CBO participants in the study.


Results from triangulation were reported in Chapters 5-9, but were also used to collate the Conclusion (Chapter 10). The collation involved finding the connections between the different concepts in Figure 1 (on page 4), as in, for example, how does each organisation’s use of framing connect to their use of aesthetics, or how does the audience connect to the

tools used? This part of the analysis saw communication in a holistic way, with the different components assembled differently for each organisation, creating different kinds of flows of power.

The final stage of analysis compared and contrasted the data from both organisations to identify any common themes, and the implications of these for CBO communication in South Africa. The aim of this final stage of analysis was to unpack if there was any generalisable knowledge that could help us understand CBO communication in South Africa in a better or new light; this analysis is also presented in the conclusion of the thesis.

4.5 RESEARCH PROCESS

Although I planned a linear process, in practice this was not possible, as research activities were driven by the schedules of the two CBOs. I had planned the following sequence (Figure 4) for the first stages of work:



In practice, observation started before the first workshop as there were interesting meetings and events taking place, which provided rich data. For example, a steering committee meeting where they decided to undertake a protest, and a walk through the inner city with One Voice to meet traders. Furthermore, I undertook more observation after the second workshop because I identified gaps in the research, and again felt interesting events/ activities were taking place that provided rich communication material. A further change was

that I quickly completed the critical visual analysis, and therefore wrote the aesthetics chapter first, then following the sequence in the writing plan.

The changes did not impact much on the overall research project, as the research process remained reiterative, allowing me to move back and forth between data collection and analysis. The research was always intended to work with the organisations in terms of their agenda and needs, and the changes made them active partners in the research process.

4.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A number of ethical issues arose during the course of this research. One key ethical consideration was my position as a researcher, being a white woman researching predominantly black organisations. As such, there were barriers to understanding my research subjects, especially in terms of gender, culture and language. For example, not all of the workshop participants spoke English and, thus, other participants acted as translators. However, this was ameliorated because many of the workshop activities were group work followed by reportbacks; thus in the group work, people spoke their own languages, but wrote up their analyses and reported back in English. This overcame many of the language barriers at the workshop.

Most of the events I attended for observations were also conducted in English. For example, some One Voice members, who were Muslim, did not speak African languages so all One Voice meetings were conducted in English in any case (i.e. not for my benefit). In one instance an ICRC meeting would have been undertaken in a mix of African languages (as is common in Johannesburg), but they instead spoke in English for my benefit. While at these meetings participants would have preferred to speak in their own languages, they spoke English quite fluently so it did not overly hinder understanding. All organisational documents provided by the CBOs were in English, so this did not create a barrier.

My biggest ethical challenges were presented by remarks from One Voice members, which went against my own values and political positions. The first of these issues emerged at the first workshop, where some of the members of One Voice were xenophobic, which resulting in a xenophobic outburst at the workshop. I had not foreseen this problem, because

some One Voice members were at pains to say that they had foreign nationals as members. However, as the research progressed, I found that some One Voice members were xenophobic and others were not. After the small outburst of xenophobia at Workshop 1, myself and other participants diplomatically resolved the issue and the conflict quietened down. At subsequent workshops, we set rules of engagement and agreed that participants would be respectful towards each other and not make offensive remarks, including xenophobic comments. In the second workshop the topic came up again, but it was handled calmly through discussion. In writing this thesis, I also felt ethically conflicted as, due to my close relationship with some One Voice members, I wanted to present the organisation in a positive light; however, I realised it was important to be true to what had been revealed to me, so have discussed this at some length, especially in the chapter on desire.

I did not encounter anyone who was reluctant to talk to me because of my gender. Participants were generally open and welcoming as they saw that the research would enhance their own understanding of political communication. Both CBOs said women were important constituents in their work, and key members of ICRC and One Voice are women.

Another key ethical consideration was that the research studied CBOs in politically sensitive environments; however, the organisations were not exposed to any risks as a result of the research. For example, the organisations did not receive the ire of the city government, and did not experience an increase in police/private security force action. No evictions occurred in any of the buildings I visited (ICRC), and no police or private security harassed traders where I had gone on a walk-about for observation (One Voice). None of the sites of my visit have been photographed and while I did name some streets from my walkabout of the inner city with One Voice, all the traders in this area were legal traders with allocated stalls, so they could not face any harassment as a result of this research. Describing my walkabout with ICRC, I also included the street names, but did not name any of the building or flat numbers in the buildings we visited. I have also consulted all the CBOs regarding what is and is not safe to report in this study, while ensuring that the voiceless are not silenced through this process (Gillan & Pickerill, 2012).

As Milan (2014) and Gillan and Pickerill (2012) point out, because the research actively involved CBO members in data gathering, analysis, and reflection, this was somewhat time-consuming for the organisations. I was clear about expectations, goals, timeframes, and

schedules from the outset, to ensure that the organisations did not feel that they were wasting their time, or that their time would be better spent on other activities. Since the CBOs derived benefit from evaluating their own communication practices and developing strategies, they indicated that the time spent on the research activities was not onerous, but enlightening.

With respect to the CBOs covered in this study, I sent each CBO an invitation to participate in the study, with an explanation of what the study was about. An organisational official from each CBO signed a form saying that they agreed to participate in the study. Before the research commenced, the research was explained to relevant office bearers of each CBO. In writing and verbally, I individually explained to participants the nature and purpose of the research, as well as their rights in respect of withdrawing consent and complaining to the ethics committee if the need arose. Regarding the privacy of the two CBOs' members, everyone who participated in the study signed a consent form; most of the participants agreed to be named in the study. However, I did not find it necessary to name many people in the study, except insofar as they were office bearers for the organisations, who are public knowledge; for example, the Director of ICRC, and the Secretary and Treasurer of One Voice.

With respect to observation of organisation members in meetings with others, before the meeting commenced, I announced that I was there but only to observe the members of the CBOs I was studying. No objections were made about my attendance at these events during the course of the study, and instead I was welcomed to the events. The project received ethics clearance from the Wits Ethics Committee.

4.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Because the study is based on case studies, generalised findings are tentative. While comparisons between the organisations have led to some broad conclusions about political communication by CBOs in South Africa, these are not definitive, and most likely would not apply to every CBO in South Africa (especially as the organisations presented quite different communications profiles). Since the study assessed two organisations, I did identify some common threads, which are likely applicable to many CBOs in South Africa. The study

findings cannot be generalised to the study of CBOs in other countries, but might provide a fruitful comparison for studies undertaken in other countries.

The study also did not evaluate the efficacy in communication based on changes during the course of the study. A longevity study would be needed to assess changes over time, and thereby establish the efficacy of changes. Therefore, although the CBOs produced strategies in Workshop 3 in the PAR process, the study does not look at the rollout of the strategies and any resultant improvement or breakdown in communication with various audiences. However, the study did examine the elements of communication based on the concepts in Figure 1 (on page 4), as well as the relative power the organisations had in terms of their ability to build solidarity and influence change.

Because the study is based on my subjective interpretation, other researchers might find different elements relevant to CBO political communication in South Africa. However, by referring all findings back to the CBOs, I have made every effort to ensure the accuracy and relevance of the study findings.

4.8 CONCLUSION

This study incorporated three methodologies in collecting data to overcome the problems of verifiability arising from using only one method. Discrepancies between the data sets were identified and reported, while similarities were used to confirm the relevance of the data. Apart from reporting on findings, the data were used to draw overall conclusions about the nature of political interventions by CBOs in South Africa in terms of how organisations communicate their political aspirations.

Chapter 5 DESIRE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, the concept of desire is based on the explication of Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. For them, desire is not about wish fulfilment based on a lack, but is a creative process: desire is both the process of creation and what we are in the process of creating:

... what exists in fact is not a lack, but passion ... Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are the counterproducts within the real that desire produces. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 37)

With respect to the CBOs in this study, I attempt to follow their passions, unpack their creative processes, and explore the potential of what is being created to effect a change in power relations in inner city Johannesburg. Each of the two organisations may be said to be a desiring-machine (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983), or assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004), which is based on the connections between things and people. Because the assemblage or desiring-machine is always made up of many things/people, desire is always collective, and functions collectively through connections. These connections generate processes of production, and these processes of connection generate a flow (in the case of political communication, this is a flow of power). In this chapter, I focus on the creative process (or lack thereof) of communication production for each CBO and the flows that are generated (or broken) through their communication activities. The chapter also highlights the flows between the different concepts depicted in Figure 1 (on page 4).

In the community context of South Africa, political communication has mainly been studied in terms of the possibilities of connection using technologies. For example, Bosch (2003), drawing on *A Thousand Plateaus*, explored the rhizomatic connections that constitute the community radio station, Bush Radio. As discussed in the conceptual framework, rhizomatic connections are those that are non-hierarchical, but operate in a web with the different rhizomes pulling organisations in different directions, while also creating new ways of functioning. These rhizomatic connections are developed through desire, but also generate new desires. In her work, she also discusses the term desire as a point of

departure for setting up the various structures culminating in the formation of Bush Radio. However, her thesis does not explore the concept of desire in depth.

Naidoo (2010) studied desire in Orange Farm, Johannesburg, but her work was not about Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, 2004) concept of desire; her focus was on 'the making of the poor' subject in terms of Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (2001). She argues that

in post-apartheid South Africa the making of the poor and poverty unfolds as a space of subjectivation/ subjectification, that is, a terrain where experiences of oppression and resistance, and social investments of desire (e.g. in cultural practices, morals, beliefs and values) meet and define common meanings, symbols, languages and practices (p.20).

This definition of desire does focus on the process of production but it is not communication production – it is production of a sense of self through social circumstances. While in my thesis, desire also involves the production of an organisational subject in each CBO (as will emerge in the chapter below) this is not the focus of my thesis.

Both authors point to the importance of desire as a key political organising concept in South Africa. Whereas social movements in South Africa have mostly been studied in terms of their internal structures and articulations of political ideas, linking their struggles to neoliberal analyses, my thesis is interested in the creative components of communication that intangibly influence power relations. As explained throughout Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (1983) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (2004), desire is like a creative life-force or energy flow connecting and moving through all matter and living things. In terms of this thesis, then, I examine desire as the flow of a creative life-force/energy through both organisations. These desires relate directly to political communication, in that through desire, political communication desiring-machines are built. The desiring-production process involves connecting things to each other; these things may be human, animal, plant, mineral, but also moods, emotions and affects, the metaphysical. None of the things being connected are static; in motion, they produce flows, for example, the flow of blood through the body, the flow of air creating wind, and the flow of a river. When desiring production, these flows are combined to generate new flows, such that desire is a shifting, moving process.

In looking at the CBOs' political communication in this study, desire is a key concept, holding the other concepts together. Desire is not about wish fulfilment, but about the generative, creative power of the organisations and how this flows into and with other

communication activities. This chapter assesses the generative and creative capacity of the two CBOs to leverage political power through communication. The generative and creative capacity flows through everything the CBOs do and, as such, desire is the thread flowing through this thesis. Communication is made up of the flows of desire, the flow of language in terms of the frames they use, the flow of affect through aesthetics, the flow created by the tools of communication, and how this flow arrives at audiences (as depicted in Figure 1). In explicating desire as a flow, we can understand organisations, not as static structures but as moving and shifting over time and in response to the political environment.

We may see the concepts in the Figure 1 (on page 4) as operating in machine-like concert, but unlike the physical industrial manufacturing, the machine does not produce identical products each time. Instead, the machine merely produces flows, some of which offer lines of flight out of the current political milieu, and some of which break down so that the organisations' plans and aims do not take flight, but instead lead to dead ends or destructive pathways. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 5) explain,

... there is always a flow producing-machine, and another machine connected to it that interrupts or draws off part of this flow ... Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flows.

As such, desiring productions are “forever [at] risk of ... either collapsing into the cliché of repeating the same well-worn formulas, or they risk becoming so unconstrained and chaotic that they fail to say anything” (Bell, 2008, p. 7). As Guattari (2015, p. 232) explains in his essay on *The Group and the Person*, “the limits of the imagination” are the fundamental problem for political organisations, and the fundamental limit to their possibilities. However, imagination can also produce a line of flight that challenges existing power structures and leads to a shift in power relations. Deleuze and Guattari focus their theoretical efforts on the micro-politics generated and restored through creativity (Bell, 2008). This chapter attempts to explore that creativity in terms of what the organisations claim to produce and what they actually produce.

As described in my theoretical proposition, power is generated by the connections (assemblages) between people and things to create a desiring-machine. In this thesis, the particular desiring-machine under study is the communication machine. Throughout this thesis I will explore the connection between desires, individuals, their organisations, their frames, their aesthetics, the tools they use, and which audiences the flow reaches. In this

machine, there is no starting point or end point, but I have chosen to start with desire, as this is the generator of the machine. However, this is not to say that desire is the most important part of the communication machine; like the other concepts/components in this study, it is just one of the necessary parts for the communication machine to build organisational power. By understanding desire, we can focus attention on the moving, shifting terrain of political communication in South Africa today.

In studying the CBOs described in this thesis, individual desires flow into organisational desires, and organisational desires flow (or in some instances, do not flow) into practices to shift power relationships. In order to address oppression of, inter alia, inner city residents, street traders, refugees and asylum seekers, organisations must develop flows between themselves and others. Different flows of desire and different desiring-machines operate in organisations, but the focus in this study is the desiring-communication-machine.

The communication machine works through action and, in discussing the desires of the two CBOs in this study, I explore the actions that they take and how these actions communicate. For example, when CBO members take the action of attending meetings, the desire expressed is to connect with others in order to communicate. These connections are rhizomatic in that they attempt non-hierarchical communication (rhizomatic connections will also be further discussed in the chapter on audience). In this chapter I will explore desire in terms of the CBOs' members' conceptualisation of organisation, what type of organisation results from the flow of desire, and what type of political communication transpires. I highlight the desires of the CBOs as they were articulated through the PAR workshops and in the course of my observation. However, as this chapter will reveal, some of what the CBOs articulated in the workshops was not put into practice, in my observations. Their actions therefore point to other, sometimes conflicting desires.

Given that this study is focussed on organisations that seek to address problems in inner city Johannesburg, one of the main connections the organisations make is to the milieu of the inner city, and so in this chapter I describe my own perceptions of the organisational desires, and how these flow with, against, and through the inner city. Because desire is a flow, it therefore cannot be captured, and I can only experience desire as it flows – or breaks – with my own flow of desire. Desire is also not rationally separated into neat boxes; as it would seem in Figure 1 (on page 4); it includes physical and non-physical things, some of

which are intangible. The 'measurable' things are the desires articulated by organisation members at workshops and elsewhere, and I will start the chapter with the articulations at the participatory workshops.

I will then describe, using stream-of-consciousness, the practices and flows I witnessed during my observation, in order to explore the intangibles of desiring production/communication. As such, the second part of the chapter focusses on journeys I undertook with some of the organisation members, which include sights, sounds, tastes, smells, physical sensations, moods, ambience, as well as more 'rational'/factual assessments. The purpose here is not to present a definitive picture, but rather for desire to open up onto the subsequent chapters in this thesis, such that we may track the flow of desire through the communication machine, depicted in Figure 1.

In tracking desire, I have connected organisational articulations and practices to South Africa's political culture (and its history of political communication) and the milieu of Johannesburg described in the literature review. In taking the measure of the two organisational types, I also connect back to the typologies of activist organisations discussed in my literature review (social movements, NGOs and CBOs). I have also adopted a practice of "thinking with theory" (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013), by plugging Deleuze and Guattari's theories into the data, and seeing what transpires. These threads will be elaborated further in the discussion and conclusion to the chapter.

5.2 ARTICULATING DESIRE IN PAR WORKSHOPS

As mentioned above, the main place where organisation members articulated their desires in the course of this study was at the three PAR workshops. In these workshops, some activities focussed on the theme of desire, and it is through this activity process that members articulated their desires. Below I talk through the different activities and the kinds of desires elucidated in the workshops. However, in the workshops, desires were not just reflected in activities, but in asides by organisation members, particularly when some organisation members articulated frustration with other organisation members, or when members of different organisations clashed. Therefore, while I will focus on each workshop separately, I will present a narrative of salient points in the workshops rather than focussing on each individual activity.


5.2.1 Workshop 1: Establishing existing communication activities and strategies

In the first workshop, after introduction and an icebreaker, I went through the purpose of the research and the workshop, first talking through the consent forms, and then introducing the concepts of communication that I intended to explore. For each concept, I gave a brief explanation/definition and invited questions after presenting each concept. For desire, I explained that we were not talking about sexual desire, which brought about laughter, nor about things wanted that participants did not have. I explained that it was about the activities they did in their day-to-day lives in order to make their life, and influence the lives of those around them.

After the explanations, I invited participants to explore the communication machine by setting out a star on the floor with string, and handing out cards of different colours – one colour per concept. Participants then divided into groups, and each group tackled all five points of the star separately, brainstorming for each concept and writing their ideas on card. The resulting output is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5

Exploring the communication machine



themselves with such a procedural view of organisation. One Voice was much more loosely bound and had very few paper records of its work, had lost documents of its constitution, and had no particular procedures for doing things. In terms of the literature on pro-poor organisations discussed in my literature review, it is apparent here that CBOs vary in the level of formality and, as I will discuss below, some of the organisations have achieved a level of formality to the point that they receive funding. Using the procedures and paperwork, ICRC's creative impulses were towards being seen as official organisations by those in power. While One Voice is a registered organisation, it did not rely on procedures and paperwork to generate recognition from those in power.

For ICRC, this group of desires was a network between people and things; procedures and paperwork connected members to each other, but also connected the organisations as bodies rightfully engaged in South Africa's political life. Latour (2005a) and Deleuze and Guattari (2004) regard this network of connections as an assemblage. For example, the organisation is an assemblage of the procedures and paperwork which are like a connective tissue, holding people in the organisational formation. These desires also speak to ideals: that members and leaders should be obedient to the papers created by the organisations.

Thus, according to the exploration of desire at the workshop, an organisation is made of those with a common purpose and common practices, as expressed through their paperwork and procedures. These papers and procedures also serve to discipline members towards specific stated goals and ways of acting; thus organisation members are not just guided by their own internal impulses but by particular strictures laid down in organisational rules. While some may regard paperwork and procedures as dulling creativity, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) point to the necessity of corralling desire towards specific productions, as otherwise desire produces a kind of frenzied schizophrenia, or descent into chaos.

However, for One Voice, it was not the paperwork which connected members; it was rather their shared identity as traders that brought them together. Indeed, they had lost much of the paperwork, including their own constitution. Because the organisation did not have an office (they acquired one subsequent to this workshop), they had no place to keep records, such that any paperwork available relied on individual storage. Nevertheless, organisation members expressed some disgruntlement about such failures in their organisation, blamed it on poor organisational leadership and called for 'new leadership'. Thus One Voice members

revealed a simmering disgruntlement that persisted throughout the workshops. As I will show later in the chapter, this simmering disgruntlement showed a fracturing of the organisation, and a power struggle, as well as an organisation looking inward, not out. The fractures did not lead to the organisation becoming defunct, but in a determination to hold despite the conflict.

On a more abstract level, desires are related to qualities that members should have; none of these qualities are measurable, but they also form part of the connective tissue binding people into an organisation. Qualities such as 'consideration', 'admiration', 'creativity', 'empathy', 'sincerity', 'faithfully', 'prospects', 'motivate', 'progress', 'active', 'empower', 'advocacy', 'sharing', 'improvement', and 'impartial' were greatly valued. This relates to South African solidarity culture and maintaining organisational morale and sustainability. As such, these qualities are part of the affective labour which sustains South African organisations; describing the community level structures of the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, Van Heusden and Pointer (2006, p. 108) argue that affective labour "involves the creation of communities and collective subjectivities".

Workshop participants (organisational and steering committee members, and staff) felt that they 'owned' such qualities, and these were a large part of why they were involved in the two CBOs. Importantly, these affective qualities are not only contained in the individual, but are about that which moves between individuals. This is the flow of desire, creating intangible connections. The words chosen in this activity by the participants point to their recognition of what Brown and Pickerill (2009, p. 25) call "need to sustain activism through *emotional reflexivity*". These emotional qualities are part of social and cultural processes, but also, insofar as they are felt in the body, they are about individual energy understandings and energy levels. The recognition of these factors in exploring desire also shows that members are aware of what Brown and Pickerill (2009) call strategic deployment.

In exploring desire then, workshop participants connected paperwork and procedures to intrapersonal and interpersonal qualities members ideally have. Such qualities propel the organisation forward, through affective flows from one member towards other members, and from members to those outside the organisation who may be facing difficulties. This understanding of desire matches with Latour (2005a), Foucault (2008), Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 2004), and Deleuze's (1978) notion that affective qualities are part of the 'things' that

connect assemblages. All of them argue that understanding the social, political and power relations involves 'seeing' the invisible, intangible things that are involved in production and reproduction.

Notably, Deleuze (1978) sees the positive affective qualities as creating the joy, the increase in the body's power to act, the increase of the creative impulse. Such a creative impulse is the life-blood of organisations so that they can respond to changing political dynamics with new strategies and plans. The CBO members suggested that these qualities were essential to how they saw themselves and their role as activists, generating positive flows that allow for greater solidarity. Indeed, as I will highlight again in the chapter on aesthetics, ICRC regarded its role as making people feel happy: they want their members and government to be happy with a new affordable, inclusive housing plan for the inner city.

Regarding outputs of the desiring/communication-machine, the focus was on positive outcomes arising from organisational work, such as 'victory', 'success', 'change', 'win', 'achieve', 'breakthrough', and 'prosperity'. The activity revealed that the members indeed saw desire as an active process, involving organisational practices, personal and interpersonal qualities, and outcomes. Together these function as organisational desiring machines. However, achieving goals does not stand alone; as Deleuze (1978) describes, such positive outcomes increase the power and will to act, and so the success does not become an end point, but part of the continuing process of activism.

A discussion followed the activity in which some participants expressed the belief that desire was the first and fundamental part of the communication machine, in that desire provided the impetus for organisational action, including communication. One participant also connected the desiring machine to outside others, stating: "It's not just about our desires; we must feel that desire, yes! But we must also know what others desire, so that we can work together." As such, participants felt that their own desires must connect to the desires of others if the organisation was to successfully build solidarity. Talking about desire allowed the organisation members to connect with and reflect on their own impetus and the flows generated.

The desires traced in this activity point to the essential components of communication for the the CBOs, that is, practical matters of paperwork and plans figure strongly in their communication efforts. At the same time, the CBOs strongly identified the qualities required of communicators if their communication efforts were to be successful – these are the affective qualities identified above. As such, when focussing on desire, the organisations identified various components of the communication machine: while they did not use that language, the concepts they introduce are like the rhizomes in a network, connecting things (material and affective) and people to generate the flow of communication.

After the first activity on desire in the workshop, the participants moved into groups divided according to organisation, and were asked to explore their organisational desires in more depth. In this second activity on desire, it became apparent how the assemblages were functioning (or not functioning) creatively to generate the flows of desire, or lines of flight in the direction of political transformation. This will be discussed in the next subsections.

5.2.1.1 Inner City Resource Centre: Affect and practicality – a smooth running machine

ICRC's key desiring-communication machine produced efforts to connect with government, albeit with local government, not national government. The key connection between members was a shared vision of pro-poor service delivery and economics, particularly affordable housing, water and electricity in the inner city. Aligning with South Africa's anti-capitalist economic and political culture (Van Heusden & Pointer, 2006; Veriava, 2019; Von Schnitzler, 2008), ICRC could be described by some sectors of government as having a 'culture of non-payment' because it contests the affordability of housing, water and electricity for inner city residents. The organisation actively argues against the efforts the city puts in place to deal with housing matters, especially the efforts by the city government to boost its relationship with private sector investors and only deliver housing to those who can afford rent of about R2100 a month (Mosselson, 2020; SERI, 2018).

Successive city governments have sought to develop Johannesburg into a "World Class African City" by encouraging private investors (Bremner, 2000; Moyo, 2020; Murray, 2008; Rogerson, 2014, 2016a; Webster, 2015). ICRC actively pushes against this agenda and argues for a pro-poor agenda for the city. In microcosm then, ICRC participates in South African anti-capitalist economic-political culture, and sees itself as challenging Mashaba's

return to the eviction blitzes of the Masondo era (SERI, 2019). However, as I will discuss later in this chapter, ICRC, like the city government, does have a vision of inner city regeneration, a clean city, functioning smoothly. The dispute rather revolves how to go about achieving the vision, and how inclusive the inner city should be for poor residents. As such, ICRC directs its creative efforts towards challenging the status quo and also towards building the organisation through solidarity.

As for other similar organisations, ICRC works to establish a solidarity culture through what de Swaan (1995, p. 25) calls “affective involvement or detachment”. At the workshop, the organisation highlighted how it was working to organise a protest march in an effort to connect to local government by handing over a memorandum to Mayor Mashaba. The desiring machine was potent in terms of an assemblage of commitment from participants to make the protest march a success, the amount of organising going on in ICRC, dedication of staff and steering committee members, and financial and other material resources allocated to oil the machinery. The creative energies for producing solid membership and solidarity were well-used. As such, the communication machine had a strong flow, generated by passion and flowing into practical plans to open up the political terrain.

In addition, organisation and steering committee members at the workshop articulated a strong will to connect with One Voice around a shared agenda, revealing their desiring production geared towards building solidarity with others. ICRC also sought to extend the power of its desiring machine by connecting to other organisations, including EarthLife Africa which shared its interest in a sustainable and affordable electricity service delivery, and the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI) and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) at the University of Witwatersrand who provided legal assistance to those in danger of eviction in the inner city. In terms of SERI and CALS, ICRC provided the organisations with access to inner city residents, while SERI and CALS gave ICRC support to take concerns up in the courts, including the Constitutional Court. Again, the organisation has created and continues to regenerate its connections to organisations in solidarity, to build a powerful communication machine. Its efforts to holding together an assemblage of its own activities and material resources, with the assemblages of other organisations, generates a rhizomatic network, with a resultant strong flow or communication through productive, creative relationships.

These relationships were strong in practice and an ongoing part of the organisation's productive communication machinery, which had already led to successful outcomes for inner city residents who had been evicted or who were facing eviction. While the literature points to a damaged solidarity culture in the post-apartheid era (Bähre, 2007; Buhlungu & Bezuidenhout, 2008; von Holdt, 2002), ICRC nevertheless sees itself as a solidarity organisation, drawing on the traditions of apartheid solidarity culture, such as confronting a common enemy (Thörn, 2007) (investors and city government), and shared action (Check, 2019; Thörn, 2007). While the ultimate goal of ICRC was connecting to government to change the political terrain on housing, the organisation identified its rhizomatic connections of solidarity as the main source of its own power. Thus, in building its networked communication machine, ICRC made both practical and affective relationships.

ICRC staff and steering committee also put tremendous effort into visiting individual buildings and informal settlements to talk to building and informal settlement residents about their issues and rights, and developed programmes of action to tackle the issues. Again, this reflects the apartheid era solidarity culture of loyalty to each other (Buhlungu & Bezuidenhout, 2008), and the affective labour of care and morale building (Desmond, 1986; Seidman, 2001; Van Heusden & Pointer, 2006). Here, the ICRC connects the buildings and streets of inner city Johannesburg to their organisational assemblage, thereby extending its footprint. These activities also point to the creative energy of the organisation continually replenishing itself and its members through the flow of the political communication-machine, from staff and steering committee through streets and to members. This will be discussed further when I describe the events I observed later in the chapter.

The ICRC expressed a strong desire for building and strengthening the organisation. As such, part of the organisation's creative machinery was geared towards empowering members, especially women, through meetings, skills training and empowerment workshops. This emphasis on women's empowerment is unusual in CBOs, where women often do the work but are silenced (Eriksson, 2007; Jolaosho, 2017; Miller, 2016; Pointer, 2004). However, this focus was a direct result of ICRC's woman leadership (Shereza Sibanda), who had actively built separate women's committees within the organisation. In developing a women's agenda within the organisation, ICRC demonstrates communicative creativity in workshops for women, and particularly encouraging women to raise their own

voices. Thus, even within ICRC production went towards raising a multiplicity of voices, which flowed into its overall campaigning, through the communication machine.

During the PAR workshop, ICRC participants expressed a great deal of camaraderie, affection, and encouragement with each other, highlighting the ways in which ICRC was used to using and creating affective, morale building organisational activities. The affective qualities of ICRC were an essential part of its political communication machine, flowing into practical activities, demonstrating a strong desire in the organisation. This speaks to the care work done by women in ICRC, but also the creation of a culture of care such that the men also took on affective labour. Miller (2016), in describing women's leadership in South African civil society organisations, speaks of a protective shroud which flows from one woman to another, such that power flows through organisations under the guidance of women. While Shereza Sibanda has led ICRC for a number of years, during my fieldwork, I also saw her pushing forward other women to play leadership roles.

ICRC participants at my series of workshops also saw the workshops as strengthening and empowering members to think about communication practices, and orient the organisation to improve communication. This attitude to the workshops revealed how ICRC makes every effort to connect new machinery to its own assemblage in an effort to extend the power of its own flow of desire.

Organisation members indicated that they did not devote much of their energy and resources in trying to connect with the media, and they found the media uninterested in their activities. Even when they had in the past made efforts in this regard, the media remained unresponsive. The difficulties of connecting with the media was a key gap in the organisation's efforts to build a powerful desiring machine; however, I will discuss this more deeply in the chapter on Audience. As discussed in the literature review, the relationship with the media is not surprising given that CBOs in South Africa frequently have difficulty building relationships with media (Bosch et al., 2019).

Overall, ICRC had a well-functioning desiring-communication machine, an assemblage of numerous connections of audiences, practical activities, material objects such as paperwork, and affective relationship. This assemblage was focussed on building organisational power and securing successful outcomes for organisation members; as I will show in the my description of observed events, this developed into a campaign and protest

march to the office of Mayor Mashaba. The organisation staff, members, and steering committee expressed strong passion and energy for the work, and also had clear programmes to ensure their efforts were productive.

While the ICRC operated for many years without funding, its current ability to mobilise funding (which was first achieved in 2015) was both a result of its work, and a factor that helped the organisation continue with staff and resources. Looking at the typology of organisations discussed in the literature review, ICRC is a hybrid organisation, walking a line between all three types of civil society organisations discussed: in its ability to mobilise significant numbers of people, it operates like a social movement as described by Madlingozi (2007), Ranchod (2007), and Stokke and Oldfield (2005). However, in terms of Runciman's (2016a) definition, ICRC might be described as a CBO because it organises groups of concerned residents of inner city buildings. As per Stokke and Oldfield (2005), the organisation cuts across definitions of CBOs and social movements because it adopts an adversarial position. However, given its strong relationship with two donor organisations and its ability to access donor funds, as well as having several staff, the organisation fits within Robins (2008), Piper and Nadvi (2010), and Mueller-Hirth's (2009) definition of an NGO.

The flow of ICRC's activity creates a hybrid organisation that is responsive to members' problems and able to address immediate problems rapidly. The organisation's donors specifically focus on strengthening ICRC's capacity to campaign, and as such, the flow of funding supports its existing and ongoing desiring-production, and also its political communication machine.

5.2.1.2 One Voice: A machine of break-flows

In the workshop, One Voice could not agree on any specific organisational desires. The discussion between different workshop participants was tense and argumentative. Apart from disagreement about a shared programme, personality clashes frustrated efforts to arrive at a common programme, which pointed to an inhibited flow of desire, because the 'shroud' of leadership is not passing to different members, and everyone is going in different directions. These clashes reveal a dysfunctional flow in the organisation, in that desire does not move through the assemblage of individuals, but is continually breaking.

One of the members, Julekha, came to me several times to complain that other members were not listening to her. My efforts to break the tension by encouraging the group to give everyone a chance to speak, mostly failed, because group members were at odds with each other about what their organisation should be doing. Julekha may well have been correct that it was because she is a woman: certainly she was most active in doing the work of the organisation and other organisation members referred any work to be done to her, but her opinions were frequently not heard. In South Africa's patriarchal culture, the silencing of women's voices and the expectation that women do the work in political organisations, while men take the credit, is common (Jolaosho, 2017; Langa & Von Holdt, 2012; Miller, 2016). Men contest the rights of women to represent them or their organisations, and seek to reaffirm their masculinity through organisations (Langa & Kiguwa, 2013). Whereas as Miller (2016) describes matriarchal leadership as a shroud that passes from one person to another, the leadership of One Voice has been vested in one man from the beginning. This is the crowning of one individual that "emphasises the social distance between leader and follower" (p. 285).

One desire that all the workshop participants agreed upon was that they needed to remove their (absent) chairperson and vote in new leadership for the organisation. However, no one had a clear plan of action to make sure this happened, and no one was actively undertaking activities to replace the One Voice leadership. As such, this was merely a desire as wish fulfilment, rather than desiring-production. The stated wishes of organisation members do not gel with its desire-in-practice, which instead creates a dispiritedness among organisation members, builds resentment, and leaves the organisation floundering to develop a positive path. Based on the workshop activities, One Voice seemed not to be producing a line of flight that helps it escape the status quo, and rather, through its actions and lack of action, serves to maintain the status quo. At the workshop, communication was not flowing effectively between members, let alone any outside players the organisation may have wanted to target. (However, the picture acquired from observation is markedly different to the picture that emerged from the workshops.)

These conflicts within One Voice are part of what Bähre (2007) calls "reluctant solidarity" in the title of his article. It similarly points to my previous experience as an activist in the Anti-Eviction Campaign that solidarity is not pure, but full of conflict, and generating positions which simultaneously build solidarity and make outsiders of some members

(especially women) (Pointer, 2004). Furthermore, at the coalface of economic interest solidarity breaks down, as explained by Buhlungu and Bezuidenout (2008) and von Holdt (2002) in their studies of South African trade union solidarity. As neoliberalism has rolled out in South Africa, new social relations were established and, whereas solidarity was necessary under apartheid, individual self-interest became more prevalent in South African society in the post-apartheid era. The rules governing traders rely on developing an “entrepreneurialisation of the self” (Steck et al., 2013, p. 147), which pushes back against cooperative efforts. While the organisation members speak of building solidarity and power, their efforts to grow businesses are placed at the forefront of their creative activity, leading to an organisation that is not as creative in developing strategies to improve the long term lot of inner city traders.

The conflict is also because the city government uses divide and rule tactics (Matjomane, 2013). For example, the city discredits traders’ organisations, claiming that they have no membership (because the organisations do not succeed in getting members to government meetings, since members cannot leave their stalls). Different branches of the city government have also been accused of favouring some traders’ organisations over others, and only providing trading spaces for one organisation’s members. One Voice has not come together to develop a strategy to overcome the discredit the city government applies towards it. It is equally unable to gather members for organisational activities, as it is unable to create an impression of a strong organisation to engage the city.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) describe how it is not just the desire for flow that results in the particular shape of society, but also in terms of what they call ‘break-flows’, whereby certain machines must break down in order to make possibilities for other machines to come online: “The desiring-machines themselves are the flows-schizzes or the breaks-flows that break and flow at the same time” (p. 315). Therefore, the assemblage of activities that make up One Voice is forever under threat of totally breaking down. In One Voice, the break-flows result in a malfunctioning organisation, but since the organisation continues to hold together, the break-flows make for a complex organisation and a complex process of negotiation, indeed, continual negotiation around the agenda of the organisation. In terms of the communication machine, the break-flows of communication machine mean that the organisation does not develop an overall campaign and the flow of communication does not clearly flow in one direction or another. At the workshop, communication seemed

more like a whirlpool than a flow, making the organisation swirl around the same issues but without a line of flight outward.

However, the break-flows are also generated by the city government and the organisation has to constantly work around the government's tactics. As such, many of the disagreements within One Voice are tactical disagreements about how best to further the interests of the organisation, while also furthering the interests of individual members. The creative energies of organisation members are not aligned, so One Voice perpetuates an organisation that can only loosely be called an organisation as there is no shared agenda for action. In terms of desiring production, the organisation members are continually looking inward at the problems of their organisation rather than facing outward, desiring production in the terrain of inner city government.

Regarding disagreements in One Voice, competition over the limited legal trading spaces provided by government are at the forefront of issues. Organisation members did not agree about whether to include illegal traders in their membership, with some members saying it was important to keep growing by taking on the illegal traders so that One Voice could secure stalls for them. However, other organisation members complained of unfair competition from illegal traders, who had the advantage of not having to pay for their stalls, and also working on the periphery of the markets where they were better able to access passing trade. Even within themselves, members were conflicted. For example, as one member explained to me in an aside, regarding illegal traders,

I do feel sorry for them, because they're like us just trying to do something for their families. And we need to build our organisation for everyone. But they're taking our business, and they don't care about us. So I'm very sorry to say, we need the securities to come and get rid of them.

This reveals a conflict within one person about the desire to build an organisation that unites traders, and the day-to-day concern about their own income and their need to build their own business. On an affective level, they were jealously guarding their own territory, and fiercely threatened by the potential loss of income. Over the course of the study, they repeatedly expressed these conflicting desires, often seeing themselves as someone who supported the poor and wanted development to improve the traders' lot in life, but also as someone with a struggling business, in which they were not making any money. Such internal conflict pointed to a stalled creativity, a break in the flow, with the result that the

member does not know how to act, was unable to identify the best course of action for themselves and for members of One Voice. However, One Voice relied heavily on this member to organise members and deal with their issues. Because of their inner conflict they did not exercise a leadership role in the organisation, despite doing much of the work.

In their reaction to illegal traders then, we see the member's desire to cut themselves off from certain connections, to block or break the flow of inclusivity. Some theorists such as Freire (1970) on the left would argue that this conflict shows a "false consciousness", and that the member would change their actions and views if they were fully aware of where their interests lie (Buchanan, 2014a). Instead, it is the flow of desire itself that generates the conflict – their desire is to run a successful business and for the city to provide adequate trading spaces; as such their desiring-production produces and reproduces the dilemma. At the same time, to call this a "false consciousness" is to suggest there is some absolute truth or clear path out there that will resolve the dilemma (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). Instead, it is possible to be strongly aware of the dilemma without it resolving into one clear "consciousness". Since the member was unable to resolve the conflict, like the rest of the organisation, the member was not able to come up with one clear message of their own. The water was always being muddled, churned up, and the inner turmoil in the individual was similarly mirrored by other members, such that the organisation's voice/communication-machine kept turning back on itself.

Given the conflict in this member, it was not surprising that the organisation members could not agree on which type of membership they should connect with, and who could be considered One Voice's real members. The desire for solidarity leads to the continuation of the organisation, while the individual desire for business success continually breaks down solidarity. This may be regarded as what Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 348) call "desiring fascism", in that their desiring production repeatedly veers into reproducing their own oppression:

... a group can be revolutionary from the standpoint of class interest ... and even remain fascist and police-like from the standpoint of its libidinal investments.

While, arguably, traders' class interests might lie with the poor, One Voice seems to be police-like in trying to limit the number of traders entering the sector. As discussed in the literature review, B  nit-Gbaffou (2018a, 2018b) found that street trader organisations

sometimes sided with local government to limit the number of traders, and these organisations are not opposed to the city's efforts to manage trade in the inner city. In One Voice, there is no clear commitment to working with the city government's policing efforts, but there is nevertheless tension regarding what position to adopt to manage traders.

A knock-on effect of the disagreements around illegal traders was that One Voice members could not agree whether their relationship with the police and security guards should involve persuading the police to be more understanding of illegal traders and less harsh on them, or whether to encourage the police and security guards to clamp down on illegal traders. While the members wanted a closer and more positive relationship with the police and security guards, since they had different goals in mind, no clear message could be communicated. In this regard, the organisation had no programmes one way or the other, and individual members merely went their own way, negotiating their own relationships with police and security guards in the area around where they worked.

Despite the disputes, in the workshop, the participants did arrive at some agreement that they wanted safety and equal enforcement of the law around their trading areas. They argued that whereas security companies were concerned with protecting government interests, monitoring CCTV cameras, and responding to government instructions, security should rather give attention to the fact that traders' goods and customers' belongings were often being stolen by opportunistic criminals. Thus, all members agreed that security companies were not doing enough to protect traders and their customers from muggings and theft. However, they also had no clear idea of how to communicate this to the police and security guards, and felt that they would not be heard if they tried. This backs up findings by Bénit-Gbaffou (2018a), Daniel (2017), and Mmbulaheni (2015), that traders want equal and fair treatment for policing and public policies to be applied, and an end to arbitrary police action, but that traders organisations are not anti-government or anti-police per se. In addition, because they do not know how to address the matter, desire does not flow – they do not produce action beyond sharing an opinion, so creativity and production are stalled.

Another area of contention was whether or not to work with the city government. While prior to 2013 the city government sent up an Informal Traders' Forum (Matjomane, 2013), creating what Miraftab (2004) calls 'invited spaces', traders organisations had a negative experience of the forum, claiming that the city controlled the agenda and favoured some

trader organisations over others (Matjomane, 2013). As members of One Voice reported, the DA government had made sporadic efforts to set up such a forum, but again, the space is mainly to inform traders of the city's plans rather than to hear traders' suggestions and complaints. While some members viewed it as essential to attend these events, other members said they had attended many such events that were fruitless and a waste of time.

The members who saw the events as useless felt that local government was just using traders in these meetings to rubber stamp its own plans instead of taking on board traders' issues and responding to those. Again, no organisational position had been adopted and members did whatever they wanted in terms of attending the meetings or not. This lack of an organisational plan and lack of agreement again pointed to the creation of a hollow organisation. However, One Voice members participating in the workshop did express some shared goals with respect to government, such as holding officials accountable, encouraging the government to develop a coherent programme for traders, and that they be faithful public servants. Workshop participants were fed up with a government that, in Pezzano's (2016, p. 500) words keeps traders in "a constant uncertain 'state of exception' between legality and illegality, [which] enables officials to exercise their power in order to exploit vendors". However, they did not develop any desiring production to address the issue, and it merely stayed a wish, not a creative pursuit.

While One Voice members participating in the workshop articulated that they sought inclusive participation, recognition of their organisation in the community, and progressive development, a further dispute soon erupted, and spilled over to the rest of the workshop, in heated exchanges about xenophobia. One Voice members could not agree on whether they were an inclusive organisation that encouraged membership from foreigners, or exclusive. While several members felt that there was no room for xenophobia, one of them argued that foreign traders were unfair competition for South Africans' efforts to lift themselves out of poverty. The disagreement became extremely loud and continued for about 20 minutes, with neither side really listening to each other, nor listening to myself or ICRC members who attempted to intervene. Eventually, after making no headway with each other, the argument petered out as participants focussed on getting their lunch and eating. After the dispute died down, over lunch, one One Voice expressed his own inner conflict regarding foreign traders. He did not regard himself as xenophobic, and was inspired by Pan African thinking; in relation to membership by foreign nationals, he remarked:

Of course, we cannot exclude them. They are part of us, and they have also got rights. But most of the time they are not interested in One Voice, and they do have their own networks, so they are not part of us. They don't want to support us, they are not with us.

Although in this case the One Voice member was blaming foreign nationals for not being involved, it was clear that the issue generated tension and conflict in himself. Previous research has found that xenophobic tensions exist in all traders' organisations (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018b; Grant & Thompson, 2015a; Matjomane, 2013; Moyo et al., 2016; Peberdy, 2016), but none of the studies I found have reflected on the conflict within individuals about the matter. On an affective level, for traders the xenophobia is motivated by feelings of desperation in terms of their own survival difficulties. South African traders who have sympathy for foreign migrants are also sympathetic to xenophobic remarks made by other traders, and this leaves the matter unresolved and an ongoing source of tension in One Voice. Those who are sympathetic to foreign traders do not form enough of a bloc to hold back the xenophobic voices of other traders. Instead they have stymied the flow of desire to build solidarity among all traders and focussed on South Africans instead, because they are solely invested in their organisation as it is.

In Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (1983), a large part of the book is dedicated to exploring why people desire fascism; in their terms, fascism involves cutting off possibilities for the new. As Hickey-Moody and Malins (2007, p. 15) explain,

Flows of desire move through the body and the socius in at least two different directions ... those which produce social structures, hierarchies and repressions, [and] those which go against the strata, for revolutionary micro-flows and lines of escape.

The issues emerging from the activities, and the discussions expressed in asides from the activities, reveal that traders are in a bind because their individual need to secure an income puts them in competition with other members of the organisation, which undermines some of the solidarity. This is exacerbated by individuals' desires to define themselves as separate from illegal traders or foreign nationals. In the long-term, their interests as traders are to unite to build an organisation that can push for government to create a more supportive environment, creating micro-flows and lines of escape. However, in the short term, the immediate pressures of needing to make sales and reduce competition put their long-term and short-term interests at odds with each other, creating desires which perpetuate existing

capitalist social structures, maintain hierarchies and create repression. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 215) explain that these micro-fascisms do not emerge because people are “tricked by an ideological lure”. Instead, they are shaped by the circumstances in which people find themselves, the “complex assemblages” of the world around us.

In One Voice, the desiring productions expressed in the workshops have collapsed into micro-fascism and “self-destructive chaos” (Bell, 2008, p. 7). As such, “only a tangle of strings – poverty, suffering, debt, family relations, notions of citizenship and rights, generosity, fear, uncertainty and so forth – forms what we call ‘solidarity’” (Van Heusden & Pointer, 2006, p. 120). In terms of the communication machine then, even within individual members, there is a multi-sided tug of war, such that the machine tosses and turns but generates only small moves in one direction or another.

As I will show in the subsequent chapters, this tension floods over into the frames used, the type of aesthetics chosen being at odds with their members, and the audiences they target. These tensions reveal a desiring machine/communication machine, which is unable to resist the repression of street traders created by the city, except on a micro-local scale. Because the members, as individuals, have difficulty reconciling their different impulses, it is difficult to build an organisation to represent shared, non-conflictual relationships. As found by University of Witwatersrand students (2014) with respect to all street trader organisations, One Voice is not a solid structure. Its fragmented nature is apparent in a lack of a collective awareness, contradictory interests, and poor ability to develop strategic thinking.

However, it may still be seen as an organisation in that it does provide traders with some practical support, as I will make clear when I present my observations on events below. Sometimes it seems as if it is only old cobwebs holding the organisation together, but when faced with real difficulties, traders come together in an assemblage to explore common solutions. As such, while the conceptual base of communication in the organisation is like a whirlpool or washing machine, at times the machine does stop churning and as the water drains away, a flow is created, such that united action takes place, and clear communication occurs between the members and Johannesburg Property Company, which governs trading spaces in Johannesburg. As I will show below, the second workshop contained areas of

agreement and conflict, with xenophobic comments also arising from some members of ICRC, but in the second workshop saw a strong fight-back from anti-xenophobic participants.

5.2.2 Workshop 2: Exploring the communication strategies of political elites/opponents

As explained above, the first workshop involved the CBOs looking inward at their own communication practices. At this stage in my investigation, I was getting to know the organisations, and was mainly observing without intervention. However, by the second workshop, I had not only conducted the first workshop, but had also undertaken observation of the organisations' events. Therefore, at the second workshop, after an ice breaker and a recap of the previous workshop, I repeated the purpose and nature of the research, and then presented some initial findings. After the introduction, the workshop did not focus on individual organisations, but instead focussed on how the CBO-government assemblage was flowing or break-flowing. The workshop also did not provide creative solutions to the problem, as the strategy process was reserved for the third workshop.

Although I started off the workshop with an initial exploration of my findings on desire, I will not go into what I said at the workshop, as that is not the subject of this chapter. After discussing what I had observed about the functioning of their desiring machines, I explained that in order to come up with a communication strategy, they also needed to understand the desires of those outside themselves. In particular, we spoke about their place in the inner city and their relationship with the inner city government, in a market place activity.

Whereas the previous workshop had several break-away sessions, where people divided up according to their organisation, at the second workshop, groups were not made on organisational lines. In terms of the activity on desire, the organisations worked together to develop an understanding of the city's desire and the impact of the city's desire on their own desiring-machines.

5.2.2.1 Marketplace: The desiring city

In the marketplace activity, I put three sheets of newsprint on the wall with different questions. Participants randomly moved from one sheet to another writing their thoughts to answer the questions, which were:

- Chapter 1 What kind of city does the government say it wants?
- Chapter 2 What kind of city are they creating?
- Chapter 3 What kind of city do they think you are creating?

The participants' responses are discussed below.

5.2.2.2 What kind of city does the government say it wants?

Based on the words written on the flipchart paper, participants said that the government says it wants a world-class city that is vibrant and suitable for business, clean, and crime-free. Some participants also said that the government says it aims to be a responsive city, responding to the needs of its citizens and being pro-poor. However, others said the government wants to attract investors, and so the poor are not the focus of their plans, but only the rich. Furthermore, the participants said the city said it wanted to be a place for entrepreneurs, but at the same time said informal traders were making the city dirty.

The participants' responses match the literature regarding communication from inner city Johannesburg. For example, from when Amos Masondo was mayor (from December 2002), the language of a 'World Class City' was prevalent (Bremner, 2000; Murray, 2008; Rogerson, 2014, 2016a; Sihlongonyane, 2016; Webster, 2015), and it was clear that the workshop participants had heard this language being used. The city also spoke both of inner city regeneration, giving tax breaks to investors (Winkler, 2012), and its purported strategy of social housing for the poor (Mosselson, 2017).

Workshop participants were also clear that when the city government spoke of a 'World Class African City', they seemed mainly concerned with knocking down 'bad buildings' and replacing them with fancy buildings that no one can afford. As in the literature (Murray, 2008), the participants saw the government projects as a fantasy that just created problems for them, and as empty words that never matched the realities. This vision of a World Class City is "an integral part of the political power strategies for urban change" (Sihlongonyane, 2016, p. 1619), which allows for the roll out of commercial enterprise as the driver of economic transformation. In this discussion, ICRC was clear that it resisted neoliberal subjectivities in that it rejected the market-based approach and instead pushed for 'affordable housing', which would provide shelter for even the poorest inner city residents.

Rogerson (2016b) explains that the city government uses progressive rhetoric about local economic development (LED) and the need to develop a developmental plan for traders. However, these words do not translate into better practices with regard to managing street trade. Apart from the language of entrepreneurship and empowerment in its LED plans, the city also emphasises the need to manage street traders and keep the number of traders to a minimum (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015, 2018a, 2018b; Grant & Thompson, 2015b; Matjomane, 2013; McMichael, 2015; Murray, 2008; Pernegger, 2016; Pezzano, 2016; Rogerson, 2016a; Tissington, 2009; Webster, 2015; Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014).

The language of crime and grime is also highlighted in the literature where, for example, Tomlinson et al. (2003b, p. xii) argue that Johannesburg had developed “an image of a crime-ridden and deteriorating city”. Post-apartheid, dystopian images of the city have become commonplace (M. Wafer, 2010). In this aspect, the workshop participants tended to agree that the city was dirty and crime was a problem.

Workshop participants were clear that the city’s stated desires did not match its in-practice desire. For example, although it stated it wants a clean city, participants argued that the way government operates prevents improvement to the inner city, as I will discuss below. They saw the city’s communication and practices as contributing to the problems of the city, in that the city wanted to address those from outside the inner city and bring them into the inner city, instead of addressing those in the inner city and working with them to make the inner city better. As such the communication desiring-machine of government with regard to the inner city was completely at odds with the CBOs’ communication desiring-machines, and the two machines could not easily connect. What the city government said it wanted meant that the communication machines of the two CBOs could not easily plug into the government machine, and a flow was not easily generated between them and the government.

5.2.2.3 What kind of city are they creating?

Participants felt that the government was creating a ‘madness city’, full of crime and being a gangster paradise, with no housing and people sleeping on the streets. They also said the city was lying and corrupt, suitable only for aliens and zombies. According to the words participants wrote on the flipchart paper, the government was creating a ‘slum’, a ‘pigsty

city', a 'dirty and smelly city', a 'dark city'. The government was also escalating xenophobia and creating a xenophobic city. In particular, in discussion after the flipcharts were covered in words, ICRC members explained how the policy of evictions from 'bad buildings' was creating informal settlements and street people who had nowhere else to go. They also explained that the city policy of cutting off electricity and water was contributing to the deterioration of the buildings. For example, one participant asked:

How can we keep the buildings clean if we don't have water? How can we keep criminals away if we can't see at night?

As Ah Goo (2018b) explains, efforts by the city government to populate the city with the 'right kind' of people inevitably has a harmful effect on existing poor residents. For example, development in the Maboneng District led to evictees seeking "refuge under a freeway on-ramp ... for approximately two months, as a significant number of them had been rendered homeless and there was no alternative accommodation available to them" (p. 172). Apart from the homelessness and informal settlements described in the literature and by the ICRC, Ah Goo describes the emergency shelters provided for the evictees, where it was difficult to breathe due to poor ventilation, and men and women lived in two dormitories divided by sex. Such new forms of homelessness and dereliction are a direct result of the city's investment policies and the resultant evictions. While the Constitutional Court has afforded inner city residents with some protection, in practice they live in "laissez-faire conditions ... [which] have provided opportunities for occupation [but] the same conditions have manifestly resulted in increasing vulnerability of residents" (Dugard & Ngwenya, 2018, p. 1177).

On the issue of xenophobia, while in the first workshop the discussion of xenophobia had led to a vociferous outburst, in the second workshop, conflicting views were expressed, but calmly with each side listening to the other. In particular, those expressing xenophobic sentiments referenced criminal activities by foreign nationals. For example, one workshop participant from ICRC complained:

These Nigerians are selling drugs. My son and his friends are getting drugs from these Nigerians.

Those opposed to xenophobia highlighted that all sectors of society had criminal elements, and that foreign nationals came from difficult circumstances and we should treat them with dignity. I will discuss this further in the chapter on framing, where I present the

arguments in more detail. However, in terms of desire, different desiring machines were operating among members of ICRC and One Voice. For ICRC, this did not have a marked effect on organising, because the women's group that forms part of ICRC had several foreign national women, and educating people about the concerns of foreign nationals forms part of the agenda in the women's group. For One Voice, the conflict was much stronger; however, at this second workshop the members attending were much more sympathetic to foreign nationals (the member who stirred up xenophobia in the first workshop did not attend the second workshop).

From the discussion on the workshop, it was clear that some members were aligned with comments by the then-mayor Herman Mashaba. The mayor had previously told foreign nationals to get out of the city and, as Akinola (2018) explains, xenophobia is largely driven by the state and state actors. The government gives people 'permission' to complain about foreign nationals, and members of government often blame foreign nationals for problems, especially problems with service delivery. For example, according to media reports, Mashaba (Cox, 2019a) and former Minister of Health Aaron Motsoaledi (Callow & Hazvineyi, 2019) have blamed foreigners for putting a strain on the health system. So when the workshop participants accused the Johannesburg government of fuelling xenophobia, they were clearly accurate.

In exploring this question, it was clear that the activities of the city, the kind of city it was creating, was exactly the reason why the CBOs needed to exist. The city government's practices, its desiring machinery, flowed directly into the desiring machinery of the two organisations, such that much of their own communication machinery was geared towards responding to government's problematic statements and actions.

5.2.2.4 What kind of city do they think you are creating?

Participants felt that the government blamed them for the problems and on the flipcharts wrote that government saw them as creating 'a pauper city', a 'dirty city', a 'drug city', a 'crazy city', a 'kak city', a 'makaka [shit] city' that was not open for business'. In short, the workshop participants felt that they were being blamed for the dilapidated and dirty state of the inner city. Inner city residents and traders were viewed as criminals, against which the city saw the necessity for frequent raids and clampdowns. As McMichael (2015, p. 1265)

points out residents and traders are seen as producing “all kinds of illegality and unregulated activity [which] are depicted as potential threats to the maintenance of a stable urban geography”. With respect to trading, Rogerson (2016a, p. 209) points out that the city views “informal trading [as] inherently illegal and associated with crime, grime and congestion ... [which] constitutes a direct threat to the economic life of the city”.

The workshop participants strongly felt that they were blamed for the city’s problems, whereas they saw themselves as victims of the city’s problems. For example, one workshop participant said:

They want to blame us but the government isn’t doing its job! We paid our rent, our water, electricity. But the landlords didn’t pay the city. Now they want to blame us. They want to call us criminals, but we just want a place to stay.

Another participant pointed out:

They got Pikitup to clean the city – they got a big contract, but they don’t clean. The only ones that clean are the waste-pickers and they don’t even get paid.

Several participants then voiced that they did not know how the government would listen given that they only saw poor people as criminals. As a result, several workshop participants expressed demoralisation and frustration, but remained determined to keep fighting. For example, Shereza of ICRC said:

They don’t want to see us really but we won’t let them [close their eyes to us]. We will keep telling them we are here. We’re not going anywhere. They must engage us.

In this light, despite the desiring production of the city being detrimental to poor residents, the CBOs continued with a desiring production of making themselves visible using whatever measures they can, even if it was nothing more than staying in place and refusing to move.

As such, much of the CBOs’ creative energies were deployed to stubbornness in the face of the powerful forces set against them. Even if they could not succeed in getting their messages across and bringing about the inner city regeneration they envisaged, this ‘not-going-anywhere-ness’ expressed a vitality of resistance, and showed that the flow of desire continued to rejuvenate organisation members.

The workshop participants easily identified how the government and its policing was a machine breaking their own flow of desire. However, as I will show in the next subsection and in the description of events I observed later in the chapter, the break-flows did not stop the organisations from acting. Their desiring production directly entailed communication between themselves, solidarity organisations and inner city government, as well as their resources and affective arrangements. Their flow of desire was strong enough that they could continue to survive, hold together as an assemblage.

5.2.3 Workshop 3: Developing an organisational communication campaign

In the third workshop, after starting with an icebreaker, I again went over the purpose of the workshop and then put newsprint on the walls for each concept and asked people to brainstorm the meaning of each concept based on previous workshops. On the sheet summarising the concept of desire, and the subsequent discussion of the concept, participants reflected that their wishes and actions were aligned in working for 'inclusivity', a 'clean city', 'equality', 'affordable housing' in the inner city, 'education', 'services for all' households, 'care for orphans', 'shelters', and 'storage for traders and their goods'. After discussing the five concepts, I then explained that the third workshop intended to help participants develop action plans to carry their visions forward in practice. Therefore, we started with a visioning exercise in which participants thought through their personal visions and how these connected to the organisation vision.

5.2.3.1 Activity 3: Visioning and desire

In this activity, I asked participants to close their eyes and think through what was important to them in their lives right now: what problems they are grappling with, what was going well, and the kind of relationships they were involved in. I then asked them to think about the political problems they were trying to address through their organisational work, and think about their relationships with the people inside and outside the organisation that formed part of the political environment. I then asked them to connect with their desire by thinking about how they were solving the problems for each organisation. I asked them to think about the other people who were as involved in the action plan, and what their own role was. I asked them to visualise where they would be in a year from now and concentrate on how that

would make them feel. After a few moments, I then asked them to open their eyes, stand up and stretch.

We then went into a group visioning exercise, where each participant explained their individual visions to the group, and the groups identified shared areas, and prioritised what was most important to the organisation. I asked them to bear in mind the problems we had identified in the second workshop, regarding how their own vision was different to the vision of those in power that they wanted to address. I pointed out that their own vision had to take account of the obstacles.

5.2.3.2 ICRC vision for affordable housing and women's involvement

At the end of the activity, the groups emerged with a vision statement that they presented in a plenary discussion. As there were more ICRC members at the workshop than members of other organisations, they made up two groups; one group tackled housing as their focus and the other group tackled gender issues. As such, they came up with two vision statements. The first was for "an inclusive, integrated inner city with affordable housing, clean and safe environment", while the second was "to be part of decision-making on women in the office of the presidency".

The group on housing arrived at their vision quite smoothly, since their visions seemed aligned, and there were no disagreements or points of contention in the group. In terms of desire, participants (organisation members) were able to create harmonious working relationships, where they found a unity of purpose. However, in spite of the second workshop where they had identified a mismatch between their own vision and the vision of the city, the participants had not altered their vision at all from the organisational mission statement. As such, in terms of the desiring machine of organisational production, they risked "collapsing into the cliché of repeating the same well-worn formulas" (Bell, 2008, p. 7). When we address the other concepts in Figure 1 (on page 4) in subsequent chapters, to some extent we will also see how the organisation fell back on well-worn traditions and formulas. Despite wanting a new dispensation in the inner city, they did not have a new, creative vision for bringing it about. As such, they did not develop a new communication machine, but relied on talking to the same audience, with the same messages, using the same aesthetics and the same tools.

Nevertheless, the vision is not desire – the vision may more correctly be aligned to ‘need’; this need arises from the will to life, the will to a life well-lived. As such their vision is not their desire, but the manifestation of desire in the real. As Gao (2013, p. 408) argues, “If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality.” In this instance desire is producing the reality of a vision for ICRC and its members, and in its productive efforts, what the organisation makes is real, even if it does not achieve its ends.

Referring to the discussion above about their refusal to be invisible, the stubborn vision continued to produce the refusal and the demand for change, such that an assemblage exists linking members and the outside world. The danger of repetition, however, is that they do not conceive of anything creative and new. I will discuss the production in more detail later in this chapter, when exploring my observations in the lead up to their protest targeting Mayor Mashaba.

Regarding the second ICRC vision for women, the women in the organisation see their experiences and opinions as valid and, therefore, believe that they should be part of national discourses around women’s issues. The ICRC’s activities with women have produced women who are confident and sure of their own voice, however, it is an ongoing process to persuade power brokers to listen to their voices. In this case, we see the flow of desire, from the women’s leadership of ICRC, to the workshop activities they undertake with women, the building committee meetings well-attended by women, flowing towards a vision of further empowerment. In the women’s activities undertaken by the ICRC, we see women’s power being enhanced. As Gao (2013, p. 410) explains, drawing on Deleuze,

... when bodies connect with other bodies to enhance their power they eventually form communities or societies. ... Social wholes take desires in order to produce interests, coded, regular, collective and organised forms of desire.

The women members of ICRC had connected with each other, formed a community within the organisation, and developed a shared vision in line with their interests. In acting on this shared vision, the members had developed a line of flight out of the oppressive conditions of life in inner city buildings, and towards having a strong and powerful political voice. However, their communication vision focussed on the arboreal heights of government, (the Office of the Presidency) rather than on strengthening their own bonds. And, as I will

show in the chapter on audience, had no clear idea how they would reach such arboreal heights.

As such, their desiring-production and their vision were at odds with each other because they had not focussed on the realities of day-to-day work, but on an imagined future. While the exercise had sought to develop vision, their vision was not grounded in the real, and did not take account of the possibilities of creating an assemblage between inner city women and the Office of the Presidency.

5.2.3.3 One Voice's vision for clean-up

For One Voice, as in the first workshop, engagement around a shared vision was quite conflicted, but it was not as acrimonious as in the first workshop. Participants seemed to enjoy the vibrant contention, and as such arrived at a shared vision. Like ICRC's vision, the environment in inner city Johannesburg was a key concern. The One Voice vision was for "a clean, safe, healthy environment, working together with communities to bring about a better life to sustain livelihoods". Participants complained about the amount of rubbish in and around trading areas; however they did not have a specific programme of action to bring about change.

When asked about the programme of action, the participants spoke of their (sometimes successful) efforts to meet with councillors and getting them to put more energy into clean-up campaigns. In this light, their vision was grounded in the realities on the ground, and in terms of the communication machine, they were already actively engaging with local councillors, such that an assemblage existed between them and the councillors. Since the councillors also wanted a clean city, the desiring-production of the city-government matched One Voice's own desiring production to some extent and the channels of communication were therefore open.

However, One Voice also reflected that councillors often suggested the traders undertake cleaning themselves, or the councillors were all talk and no action. Therefore, while One Voice's communication assemblage was engaged in production – it took place in the real, the possibilities for a successful outcome were somewhat limited due to the different perceptions about how clean-up could be achieved. These different perceptions made it difficult for One Voice to negotiate agreement with their own members, as their

members refused to be part of the clean-up themselves, insisting this was the city government's responsibility. Nevertheless, One Voice steering committee members remained optimistic, and indicated that negotiation with councillors was ongoing. As such, they were maintaining the communication machine. Unlike the chaotic whirlpool uncovered in the first workshop, in this workshop, the organisation was able to reflect on existing and ongoing efforts to communicate.

One Voice members also spoke of their sympathies lying with the informal waste reclaimers of Johannesburg, and indicated that they sometimes attended workshops with waste reclaimers hosted by NGOs (especially Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO)), and had identified shared interests. One Voice members therefore reflected on the possibilities of connecting with the reclaimers around the city clean-up, and the possibility of connecting themselves, reclaimers, and city councillors in an assemblage to bring about the clean-up. However, they did not build on this possibility, and seemed instead to defer to WIEGO, and expected the NGO to undertake work in defence of waste reclaimers. In any case, had they wanted to establish a more stable relationship with the reclaimers, they would likely have faced difficulty: as Samson (2019) has documented, solidarity has proved difficult to establish between different groups of reclaimers. As such, while One Voice had the imagination to make further connections, they did not make rhizomatic links between themselves and others who may be in solidarity. They continued to focus their energy on the arboreal levels of the state.

It was therefore difficult for One Voice to generate a consistent flow of communication between itself and traders/members, between itself and solidarity organisations, and between itself and councillors. The connections in the assemblage remained loose. While the flow was inherently what made the organisation stand as a unit, One Voice did not make creative plans to make the relationship more solid. Even the members who were committee members do not maintain a consistent flow between them. For example, the other steering committee members expected Julekha to take the lead in communicating with the councillor about the clean-up, such that Julekha had to carry the weight of the organisation. But Julekha did not feel that she could build the organisation alone and was frustrated at how unreliable other members were. Nevertheless, these problems do not amount to a useless organisation, as I will reveal when I discuss my observations of events.

Communication flows in the organisation, from the organisation and its members towards others such as councillors, waste reclaimers, and WIEGO. The assemblage that is One Voice could be strengthened by the organisation's members working together, but because of their fractious relationships with each other, it was difficult to keep a team together, and difficult to generate harmony. This did not prevent communication, but limited how powerfully that communication could impact on decision makers and other solidarity organisations.

5.2.4 Analysis of desire identified in the workshops

The flows of desire in the two organisations, as identified in Workshop 1, bore some similarities, as the organisations together identified both the administrative particulars and affective qualities that make a CBO. The administrative particulars included organisational constitutions, other paperwork and offices. The affective qualities, for example, 'consideration', 'admiration', 'creativity', 'empathy', 'sincerity', 'faithfully', 'empower', 'advocacy', and 'sharing' were greatly valued. As such, both CBOs were both practically and emotionally invested in building their organisations and were assemblages of production. The organisations also pointed to these components, particularly the affective components, as essential to communication. They saw these components producing the flow of communication in the first instance, in that desiring-production propelled them to connect with others in an affective way.

However, marked differences between the organisations pointed to different intensities of desire, flowing in different directions. For example, ICRC had orderly administrative activities and powerful affective links between staff, the steering committee and members, as well as between other solidarity organisations working in the sector. Throughout the workshops it exhibited joyfulness and camaraderie, as well as full experience and knowledge of how to organise and run a campaign. It was strongly involved in producing action and sought to do so with creativity, using its assemblage of people, material things, and affects. Part of the strength of the organisation also flowed from the role played by women, since they took the forefront of leadership and women were given a special place in ICRC, with a separate women's caucus. The role of women in the organisation focussed on affirming the power of women, the affective relationships of care, as well as the practical skills of planning and following through for daily existence. All these components added up to a functioning

communication machine, generating practical and affective flows from themselves, through members, staff and the steering committee, outwards. The machine sustained impetus such that it formed a more solid structure, not easily broken down by break-flows. However, its solidity as an organisation did not lead to striations of power, but ongoing lateral connections, which sought to affirm and build others to also be empowered. Communication in ICRC was therefore empowering and powerful, able to build blocs of power from which communication activities flow.

By contrast, One Voice's desire moved in the direction of micro-fascisms, in terms of both expressed and unacknowledged efforts to create insiders and outsiders. The flows of desire were marred, for example, through its gendered and xenophobic lens. While Julekha did the main work of the organisation, her voice was excluded from decision-making; other women in the organisation were not in leadership roles, and One Voice's steering committee consisted mainly of men (except Julekha). Several members made xenophobic remarks, creating conflict in the organisation and in the workshops; and comments about illegal traders led to conflicts about inclusion and exclusion. Alongside the administrative gaps (e.g. a lack of paperwork, lost Constitution, and no office space), affective relationships in the organisation were fractious, limiting the ability of the organisation to hang together. Given the micro-fascisms and the widely divergent views, it is surprising that the organisation continued to exist, since its assemblage seemed to consist more of break-flows than flows.

However, as emerged in the third workshop, when they revealed their communication with the councillors about cleaning up the trading areas, the organisation did reveal a functioning communication machine. This machine did not address the overall position of traders in the inner city, but it did pick up on some of their concerns and carry these into a forward flow from themselves to the city. As I will show in my description of the organisations events, the conflict and micro-fascisms also did not overly affect the day-to-day functioning of the organisation, and its ability to tackle members' problems in an effective manner.

My observations, described in the next section, confirmed some of the points already identified in the workshops, but some stark differences also emerged.

5.3 OBSERVATION: CBO COMMUNICATION AS FLOWS OF DESIRE

In this section of the chapter, I attempt to track the CBOs' flow of desire by examining their particular activities and events in which they participate, and by examining the assemblages that generate productive and creative flows. In my discussion that follows this section, I compare my observations to the picture set out by the two organisations presented in the participatory workshops. In the first part of this section I describe and analyse the contentious politics of One Voice: despite fractious politics inside the organisation, its desiring-machines function to engage and disrupt the power structures of those outside the organisation, especially the street-level bureaucracy, and the modus operandi of NGOs and academics. In the second part of the section, I discuss the desiring-machine of ICRC, which flows in a smoother, more organised fashion than One Voice, creating a sturdy solidaristic organisation that nevertheless finds little leverage in relation to local government and its eviction procedures.

5.3.1 One Voice's engagement in micro-politics

As discussed above, emerging from the workshops, a clear micro-fascist politics was evident in One Voice members, in terms of the rejection of foreign nationals and 'illegal' traders, as well as possibly patriarchy in terms of how Julekha was excluded from group discussions, and women were excluded from leadership positions. The workshops also revealed a fractious and somewhat chaotic organisation. However, as the sections below show, the micro-fascist assertions and the ruptures in the organisational hierarchy did not influence the main practices of the organisation. The organisation operated at the level of micro-politics, organising traders at specific sites, and rejecting the politics of taking up global, or even national struggles. In this section, I describe three specific events that I observed, which highlight the ways that One Voice contested power, and show that these activities could be effective, albeit only at local levels. The observations took place through walking the streets of inner city Johannesburg to meet One Voice members, observing activities at the One Voice office, and attending a workshop of street traders hosted by Oxfam.

5.3.1.1 Walking among street traders

On 18 September 2018 I met with Frans and Julekha at Frans' trading stall in Hoek Street. Julekha was wearing the organisational t-shirt on illicit trade in illegal goods, while Frans was wearing his everyday clothes. His stall was in a formal trading area behind the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. Frans sold sweets, chips and loose cigarettes. His stand was a metal and brick capsule with a pull-down garage door for locking up. Nearby, other traders were trading in shoes, clothes, handbags and luggage. We huddled inside his stall, sitting on boxes of stock. We had a brief cigarette and conversation about organisational work, sometimes interrupted by customers. Here we see what Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 7) call the rhizome, that is, the connection between One Voice, committee members, stalls, stock, cigarettes, sweets, chips, clothes, streets, handbag, customers, languages (English, African languages, French): a "ramified surface extension in all directions". These components all form an assemblage and, in the case of One Voice, these connections tend to be lateral, not hierarchical, that is, rhizomatic, not arboreal.

Frans said One Voice's main members are illegal traders because "if someone gets a legal stall they do not keep up with membership; they have no use for us". He also said that illegal traders were frequently harassed: "But they are used to running. [Laughs] they are very fit!" With respect to foreign traders he said they had their own organisations, but sometimes came to One Voice meetings. However, he observed that the One Voice committee hardly met with the city government because "Mashaba is not interested in us".

When talking about the politics of One Voice, Frans highlighted an assemblage of connections, disconnections, flows and break flows. Each of these changes the assemblage, multiplying openings and opportunities, as well as closures. As this assemblage shifts and changes in response to the connections it makes, or leaves, we see the flow of desire and the possibilities for engaging power. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 8) describe, "An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands connections." Without these connections, the assemblage of the organisation remains finite and frozen. The connections allow the assemblage to move, for One Voice to find lines of flight for different moments and kinds of action.

After the chat, Julekha and I set off to walk around the inner city and chat to traders (Frans could not join us as the bottom of one leg was amputated and he has difficulty walking). Julekha explained that this was the main form of organising – going from stall-to-stall to stay in touch with people and see if things were running smoothly or if there were problems. She argued, in contradiction to Frans, that they focussed on the formal traders and liked to stay in touch with existing members. However, she complained:

I'm the only one that's really doing the work. Our members complain that the others only come to them when they want money. I go around to talk to members, but the others don't really do that.

She also mentioned that there was a gender dynamic to this:

Our men don't like to do the work. They are always Julekha! Julekha! Julekha! I must always tell them what is what and if people is coming to them, they send them to me. I must always help the people.

In this walk, it therefore became clear that the flows of the organisation were dependent on one woman. Although she would like a more flat structure where everyone was working together, she argued: "They don't respect me. They really don't respect me."

We set off down Plein Street, dodging puddles of uncertain origin on the pavement (it was unclear if the pipes were broken or if it had been raining and the drains were blocked). At the corner of Eloff Street and Plein Street we crossed over and headed up Eloff Street. Along the way most of the traders had fruit and vegetable stalls, or sweets and chips, as well as leather goods (luggage and belts), African clothing, and beadwork. The pavements have to be formally demarcated with space for stalls and space for pedestrian traffic, and most of the traders were trading legally.

Along the way, every now and again, Julekha stopped to talk to a particular trader. She greeted them, introduced me and asked them how things are going. None of the traders have any complaints besides the fact that business was not good and they were struggling to sell their goods. While chatting to one fruit seller, I bought fruit for later. At the next stall Julekha and I bought a cooldrink. Julekha explained that not all the traders were One Voice members; in different streets, traders might belong to different organisations, or multiple organisations, depending on how they thought they were best served. Nevertheless, warmth flowed between Julekha and the traders, and as such they were connected in an

affective assemblage, developed through a shared understanding of their concerns, that is, the difficulties of doing business on the street. This assemblage of One Voice was made up of affective communication, which served to make rhizomatic connections between One Voice members and their steering committee.

While Julekha is a member of the One Voice committee, on the street, there appeared to be no hierarchy. It was not an organisation that stratified everything or a formation that gave power to those in charge. Traders did not run all their life strategies through the organisation, but operated independently according to their own interests. Nevertheless, they remained part of the assemblage that is One Voice and, as I will show in the next subsection, utilised the organisation when necessary.

We crossed over Lillian Ngoyi Street and Rahima Moosa Street, continuing up Eloff Street. At Kerk Street we turned left, and stopped by a stall where two elderly women were making beadwork and selling beads. Julekha and the women discussed another person who was trying to set up a new traders' organisation. The two traders did not speak English well, and Julekha later told me: "I don't speak their language, so they don't like me." However, the women spoke in broken English, and sounded frustrated about the attempt to set up a new organisation. But she also laughed about this woman: "She is nonsense! We can't go with her." Julekha asked if they were going to the Johannesburg Informal Traders' Forum meeting the following Wednesday, but they say they could not leave their stall as they needed to make money. After leaving their stall, we turned back towards Eloff Street, and crossed over it, then down Joubert Street, past Ackermans. Julekha explained that it was difficult to organise traders:

Some of us do go to workshops and meetings, but most traders can't leave their stalls because they need money. We go to WIEGO and SAFTU [South African Federation of Trade Unions] meetings, Streetwise. We also meet the waste pickers [waste reclaimers] there. We are the same, same issues. We do support them.

Here again, Julekha identified the rhizomatic connections between themselves and solidarity organisations. However, she reflected on the difficulty of these relationships, because of traders' constraints. As such, the flow of the communication machine was limited by the day-to-day realities of traders trying to make a living. As identified in Workshop 3, the connections remained loose and did not much extend the communication flow of One Voice.

From Joubert Street we headed back down to Plein Street, then turned right and headed back to Frans' stall on Hoek Street. In this tour of some of the streets in inner city Johannesburg, I saw the flows of desire of One Voice, Frans, Julekha, and the street traders. Their desire was in how they actively created their lives and means of existence, through their trade connections and their organisational connections. The flow was not steady; interruptions included gender and language dynamics, and the difficulties of traders leaving their stall for organisational matters. As such, the organisational dynamic was fragile, and the organisation did not build a powerful presence.

Nevertheless, there was a flow, the street level efforts to connect with traders in walkabouts did help motivate action when action was needed. While the city only sees organisations such as One Voice as true organisations if they bear the bureaucratic markings of a formal institution, One Voice is not bound in such a way. Instead, it exists "owing to a particular problem, which is ultimately not eternal in nature, but transitory" (Guattari, 2015, p. 79). This looseness leaves the organisation open for new possibilities, without "recourse to alienating models" (p. 83). However, the transitory nature of traders' issues leads to an organisation that ebbs and flows, and whose communication efficacy waxes and wanes in relation to the immediacy of the issues. Guattari (2015, p. 213) argues that "real effectiveness hardly matters", if actions "break with habitual social processes". The next subsection will explore the extent to which One Voice breaks with these habitual social processes.

5.3.1.2 At the One Voice office

On 11 November 2018, I went to the new office of One Voice (due to inability to gain space in the inner city, the office was at the Lenasia taxi rank, where they had succeeded in negotiating with JPC to get space). Arriving at the taxi rank, we were surrounded by hooting and stalls selling various Chinese goods, clothes, shoes, cheap cellphone cables and covers, and innumerable offerings of plastic in various shapes and forms. It was unclear where the office might be, and none of the traders we asked seem to know, until we found someone who directed us to the JPC building. At the security gate leading to the building, the security guard guided us to the office.

The room had no furniture, so the six committee members were sitting on upturned buckets, crates, or on the floor. Most of them were wearing organisational t-shirts, or the t-shirts on illicit trade in illegal goods. I had just missed a committee meeting when I arrived, but traders kept coming into the room to get advice from committee members about their stalls and the fact that they had been trading there for a long time but were not registered on the JPC's system. Julekha highlighted how acquiring an office was a game-changer for One Voice, as she saw this as forming a hub of communication, and providing a level of stability. For example, she highlighted that if they received suitable furniture, they could store organisational documents in the office, and with a desk and computer could keep and generate communication. While the office was rudimentary when I visited, JPC had said it would provide office furniture, although it was unclear if they would follow through on the promise.

One Voice committee members reported that there had been a backlog on the system since 2013 and that the administrator was not doing her job properly. They accused her of collecting rent without entering it on the system or providing receipts, so they suspected she was pocketing the money. JPC had just appointed a new administrator who was trying to catch up on the backlog. In the meanwhile, people were facing eviction from their stalls since they had not paid rent due to not receiving invoices or statements, because they were not registered on the system. Then some One Voice members came into the office, clearly heated up and shouting (not in English so I could not understand what was being said). Committee members then explained to Julekha and myself that an ex-committee member was outside the security gate of the office, and had called traders together to claim she was the real committee and those in the office were not.

We went outside to investigate. A large group of traders had gathered to listen to the woman who was claiming to be the real committee. Some of them were trying to push into the premises of the office, but two security guards held them back and then locked the gates. We continued to observe from inside the gates. Many of the traders were clearly not satisfied with what the woman was saying and started to argue with her about her right to call a meeting. For example, one trader shouted:

Who do you think you are? Our committee has been here for a long time. We know them all. You are jealous. We got an office and now you jealous!

A scuffle ensued, with more people arguing that she did not have a mandate to call a meeting. Then they started to disperse saying that they were not going to listen to her as they knew who their committee was (some of this was in English and some translated to me).

In this situation, it was clear that communication was serving to support the committee that was in the office. Traders' communication was in support of those who had long taken on One Voice's work, and who had secured various practical support for traders. After the group dispersed, the security guards opened the gates and we went back to the office. More members came into the office to comment on the events that had taken place. The thrust of the comments was that the woman had seen that they now had an office, and assumed it went along with financial resources (it did not) that she wanted to get her hands on.

The effort by one woman to derail the committee strengthened the ties between traders and their committee; communication flowed because the members were in solidarity with each other on this issue, and therefore rhizomatic connections made for a functioning communication machine.

As we saw at the workshop, without formal structures, election processes, and a constitution, the nature of One Voice was always contingent and always open to contestation. The organisation then was nothing more than its flow of desire; it was little more than "intensities that are produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 164). Here we saw an overflow of feelings and heated interactions, binding members together in loose connections that produced the possibility of challenge from inside and from outside. While one woman tried to assert herself as "a delegated individual who can claim to speak on its behalf" (Guattari, 2015, p. 219), the primary intention of the organisation was to act in unison when necessary in a provisional manner.

Despite the disruption, One Voice is a recognised assemblage, owned by the traders, who defend the territory they occupy. The flow of desire is to maintain the existing committee and hold onto the newly acquired office space. While the assemblage of the communication machine is straightforward (as I will show below), it is mainly affective connections such as loyalty and solidarity which make the assemblage that is One Voice. As the day went on, it

also emerged that the loyalty to the existing committee was due to its knowing how to navigate the existing system imposed by JPC on the trading space.

After the disruption, since it was close to lunchtime, we all put money in a pot and someone went to buy food. The new JPC administrator then came into the JPC office and committee members briefed him on the system errors and registration problems and insisted that the JPC stop its eviction attempts due to these problems. For example, Julekha told the JPC administrator:

A lot of our people are not on the system. That lady before you was just taking money but she never put people on the system. They never got receipts. We looked on the system for traders who've been paying, but they're not there. But there are people we don't know on the system.

While I was there, she also emailed the head of JPC to ask for a meeting to discuss the way forward. We then ate lunch together, and the committee members further spoke about their work. For example, one committee member said:

We are working with most of the traders here. We got them proper structures [the formal stalls]. It's we who were pushing for those structures. Then we got them electricity. All these stalls have electricity now. But now JPC is saying we haven't paid; if you haven't paid they're going to evict us. But they can't even tell us who paid, who didn't pay. They don't know what they're doing. We're not going to let them evict people when they don't know who is who and what is what.

While it was undoubtedly clear that JPC administrative systems were in disarray (according to the JPC's own administrator), One Voice committee also made clear that it used the broken administrative system as leverage to stop evictions. They would be powerless to help traders who were not paying rent if it were not for the administrative disarray. It is clear that the assemblage of One Voice, based in the experience and history of the committee members is able to keep defending the traders; in turn, the traders are loyal to the committee that has served them well. Thus, despite the conflicts over who is in the organisation and who is out, members continue to see value in the organisation and invest their desire therein.

The limits of the administration are turned to the advantage of One Voice. In Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, p. 251) words "by displacing the limit ... that is by reconstituting it", One Voice rediscovers "an internal limit to be surpassed ... by means of a displacement".

Such reconstitution allows desire to escape the bounds and limits placed on it by JPC and government systems, and opens lines of flight.

Therefore, although in their communication to the JPC they demanded the administrative system be fixed, it was arguably not in their interest to have the system running smoothly, as they would be less able to protect their members. When I discussed the organisational cleavages identified through the workshops (e.g. arguments about illegal traders and xenophobia), such cleavages were in marked contrast with my observations at of the organisation in action. At the micro-local level, an agreed-upon agenda was clear: the organisation was able to manoeuvre to protect members, despite disagreement about who were legitimate traders.

This type of action also shows “a break with habitual social processes” (Guattari, 2015, p. 213) of government and governance, which I mentioned in the previous subsection. The actions of the organisation involve “successive modifications” in response to JPC’s actions but “any masterplan remain[s] entirely abstract” (Guattari, 2015, p. 214). As such, the activity of the third workshop to create an organisational vision was totally misguided on my part, because that is not how the desire of One Voice functions, albeit that their vision was directly related to the efforts the organisation was making to encourage a clean-up of their trading areas.

Bénit-Gbaffou (2018a), Daniel (2017), and Mmbulaheni (2015) found that street trader organisations are often more concerned with getting local government to create clear registration processes, such that traders may become legal, and such that their legal position is clear. However, in meeting organisation members at the office, I observed One Voice members made use of legal grey areas and administrative failures in order to protect traders. Their stated goal of having a smooth running administration of traders was at odds with their political practice of exploiting loopholes.

Trader meetings with the city government had collapsed due to poor trader attendance (in turn due to poor timing of meetings and no transport money being provided) and government control of the agenda (Matjomane, 2013). However, these meetings were not the terrain in which One Voice chose to pick its battles. Instead, its interactions were much more local – direct manipulation of the local circumstances at each trading area and with

each local office of the JPC. In light of this, total agreement on whether to organise foreign nationals and whether to organise illegal traders was a moot point.

Direct political communication with local traders and the local JPC office (in person and via emails) was more important than complex communication campaigns involving a high level of organisation. Furthermore, their engagement was a complex movement between what Miraftab (2004), in the title of her article, calls “invited space” and “invented space”. JPC had invited One Voice to use the space of the office, but One Voice then creatively invented the space as a place to challenge JPC and its administrative systems. As such, the spaces were not steady structures, but involved in processes of what Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 10) call deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, which are processes “always connected, caught up in one another”. One Voice takes over the territory of JPC (albeit with permission) but breaks up the territory to its own ends, then reconstitutes the space as its own territory to be protected from predatory others who contest who is really a committee member.

In terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of desire, then, we see the flow of desire not through an overarching political engagement with those at a high-level of hierarchical power (which Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 16) call “arborescent systems”), but at the level of ‘underground’ networks and rhizomes. While the JPC tries to claim that the trading spaces ‘belong’ to it through the government contract, and marks the territory by allocating trading bays, traders deterritorialise the space and claim it as their own, not through direct claims-making, but by subtly undermining what power the city and JPC have to choose which traders receive stalls and who gets evicted. Political contestation of power relations through desire, for One Voice, does not require mass communication campaigns, but instead a kind of ‘micro-politics’ sustains the organisation, and meets the needs of organisation members. As such, they are in opposition to government’s laws or, as Guattari (2015, p. 83) describes it, founding their own laws.

O’Sullivan and Zepke (2008, p. 10) argue that such local engagement “can be the only condition of resistance, the only condition by which resistance may create a new cosmos”. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004) explain, even when such organisations have sustained effect, they are not directly part of global resistance. Instead, they make their politics and engagement with power manifest “in a series of local operations of varying orientations” (p.

422). Regarding the politics of civil society organisations, Bosch et al. (2019, p. 120) found that in South Africa, the communication strategies of civil society “are connected to local circumstances and local cultures”. Despite the machining desire of this local organising, One Voice’s political goals were not achieved through “a high degree of creativity in the way they adopt and apply different communication tools” (Bosch et al., 2019, p. 126). Instead more humble oral means of communication were bolstered by a sophisticated understanding of how the administrative system in which they were embedded could be manipulated.

As I will discuss in the following chapters, the organisation lacked sophisticated framing on broad issues, only weakly registered an aesthetic, and hardly used the multiple communication technologies on offer, but it understood its local audience (JPC officials and local members) and communicated effectively at this level. Whereas the rhizomatic connections between organisation members were clear in our walkabout of the city, and even at the office of One Voice, in the next subsection I will explore the extent to which desire flows into breaking potential rhizomatic flows between Oxfam and themselves.

5.3.1.3 At Oxfam Inequality Workshop

On 19 February 2019, One Voice invited me to join it in attending the Oxfam Inequality Workshop. After confirming with the organisers that this would be acceptable, I arrived at the well-appointed Oxfam offices in a new building in a business park. The offices were carpeted and modern. The workshop took place in a large room with round tables and comfortable chairs, and PowerPoint facilities. Some of the workshop activities also took place in side rooms. Shereza from ICRC also attended the workshop. The space occupied by Oxfam, both in terms of the physical space, and in terms of its international reputation, marked it as a bureaucratic organisation that still sought to represent the those most affected by inequality. The order presented by Oxfam was in marked contrast to the messiness of One Voice, even when One Voice has office space.

After singing a struggle song, and Shereza calling out “Amandla!”, the workshop was opened by Basani Baloyi of Oxfam. Julekha and Presley from One Voice were wearing the t-shirts ‘Stop trading in illegal products’, with their logo on the back of the t-shirt. The singing of the struggle song and the call out and response to “Amandla” imply Oxfam and workshop attendees as united in a common struggle, through the repetition of what Guattari (2015, p.

235) calls “historic utterance”. However, as the workshop unfolded this identification with a common struggle unravelled, as I will show below. The wearing of similar t-shirts represented the connection between organisation members (but this will be tackled in more detail in the chapter on Aesthetics).

A researcher and academic at Wits University, Ben Scully, then presented a draft paper on “Inequality and the Informal economy”. The main thrust of his paper was that statistics on how many traders there are and where they are located made it impossible for government to develop effective policy governing traders. Therefore, he argued, government was not well-positioned to support traders and efforts to support traders were entirely ineffective. His conclusion was that government needed to put more effort into research to establish the extent of the informal sector and then use this information to support policy change. Notably, the workshop started with a presentation from an academic towards the traders; in this situation, the traders were not communicating themselves, but instead positioned as audiences in need of education.

After the paper presentation we went into the smaller room to discuss whether Ben Scully’s paper reflected the experience of the traders, whether these issues were relevant to traders, and to say whether or not they agreed with the findings and recommendations in the paper. However, in the separate room, One Voice members and Shereza hardly spoke at all to Ben Scully’s paper. Instead, Shereza spoke about the reclaimers in the city and how the city had hired Pikitup to replace the reclaimers. They had installed recycling bins all over the city, and only Pikitup was now authorised to pick up the recycling bins, taking earnings away from informal recyclers. Here Shereza revealed the challenging arboreal layers of power that dominate the city and made it difficult for informal sector workers to operate. It was not Ben Scully’s lack of statistics that present a key barrier to these workers, but the barriers (both physical and regulatory) imposed by the city. The city’s practices highlighted its efforts to maintain the existing social order, and suggested that traders must organise to disrupt the policing function of the city.

However, One Voice members did not take up Shereza’s suggestion. Instead, Julekha spoke about the competition for stalls and the lack of land allocated to traders – underscoring the need for urban land reform. She complained that the city has hired JPC to manage the stalls, and this meant they had to pay R80 rent every month. The link between

Shereza's words and Julekha's is that a key issue highlighted is the way the local government outsources city management to private companies such as Pikitup and JPC. As highlighted in the literature review, Bremmer (2000) argues that such outsourcing is a deliberate strategy to halt the informalisation of the inner city. In this context, the city's focus is on "creating a business-friendly environment conducive to economic growth" (M. Pieterse, 2019, p. 60), means that businesses receive payment from the city that prop up business's ability to operate, at the expense of informal traders and creating insourced jobs in the city council.

With privatisation of street trade management vested in the JPC, those operating 'illegal' stalls do not have to pay rent and are therefore in a better position. Julekha went on to say that those who had 'legal' stalls were losing out to those with 'illegal' stalls, because the 'illegal' stalls were on the perimeter and more easily accessible to customers. This impacted on the sales made by rent-payers, and led to them not doing so well in business. Slow business then led to traders borrowing money from loan sharks. She said One Voice could not support 'illegal' traders because they were out-competing legal traders due to not having to pay rent.

Like statements made in the workshops, we see here the micro-fascisms in One Voice, where some organisation members want to police the borders of the organisation and the management of trading spaces. In the activities at the office it is clear that it is impossible to establish who is legal and who is illegal, and this uncertainty is used to protect traders. However, notably the traders being protected are those who have space in the formal market stalls set up by the government: anyone on the periphery of the market, having created their own space, is regarded as illegal.

Thus, the policing of street trade (by government bureaucracy and its outsourced agents, and by the traders) creates tensions between different traders (Grant & Thompson, 2015a). As discussed in the literature review, the purpose of street trade management from the point of view of JPC then becomes the collection of revenue (profit for JPC), in the form of rent, from street traders, rather than being concerned with the viability of the income-generation efforts of street traders (Daniel, 2017). While at the Oxfam workshop, Ben Scully spoke as if the city would help traders more if it had the right kind of data. This idea is at odds with the ways the city privatises services, in its efforts to support formal business and

create a conducive business environment. As Webster (2019, p. 64) argues, in inner city Johannesburg, “[d]ecisions taken by the state, which have material impacts in the lives of street traders, are ... the result of fealty to investor and rate-paying classes”. Therefore, offering statistics to government in order to support traders and address inequality is unlikely to have effect.

Presley then spoke about the need to break up monopolies of big business to make room for more competition from small traders. Again, this suggestion is at odds with the privatisation plans of the city, which seek to enhance the prosperity of formal businesses, rather than the prosperity of street traders (M. Pieterse, 2019). He pointed out regulations that hampered trade, underscoring Bénit-Gbaffou’s (2018b, p. 12) point that any policies that seem to support traders are “necessary public relations instruments”. Presley also highlighted informal workers who were not paid, such as community health worker volunteers, and said those needed to be accounted for in the statistics. He challenged researchers to work more closely with people on the ground to establish the true size of the sector.

The disconnect between Ben Scully’s paper and the traders’ issues was marked, and reveals a different understanding of politics. Whereas Ben Scully focussed on the arboreal level of politics and the relevance of research to policy formulation, One Voice and other traders’ organisations present at the workshop focussed on realities on the ground, which reveal a government unconcerned with creating policy in favour of traders. As Guattari (1984, p. 221) argues,

... no genuine political analysis can emerge out of the utterances of an individual, especially those of a ... lecturer unfamiliar with both the language and problems of his audience. An individual discourse is relevant only to the extent that it can link up with already functioning collective utterances, voice already involved in the social struggle.

The Oxfam workshop and papers presented sought to link with trader organisations and make common cause with them. However, given the different levels of operation, alliances were uneasy. At the workshop, traders were dismissive of the concerns of the academics and Oxfam; they viewed the papers presented as too distant from day-to-day realities. For example, one trader contested the presentation: “You want to talk about us, but then you

need to work more closely with us. We will then show you our concerns." Therefore, any hoped for alliance between Oxfam and traders' organisations had limited value for traders.

Outside the realm of traders' organisations, other authors on South African political movements have pointed to the disconnect between the micro-politics of community organisations and the imagination/aspirations of explicitly left NGOs and academics about turning local struggles into social movements (Bohmke, 2012; M. Evans, 2019; Mdlalose, 2014; Pointer, 2004; Sinwell, 2012; I. Steyn, 2016; S. Walsh, 2015). What these authors have revealed, and what I found in this study of One Voice, is the highly contested and fractious micro-politics, trying to present a façade of 'oneness' to organisations such as Oxfam in order to secure legitimacy. While those outside the CBOs want to build a politics to address hierarchical, arboreal politics, the flow of desire in One Voice is about making rhizomatic connections at local level, in line with the immediate and pressing concerns of the CBO members.

Not only do organisations such as One Voice subtly undermine the power of government and its allies, making effective administration unattainable, they also subtly undermine the would-be allies wanting to take on the global capitalist system, in favour of their more immediate daily concerns. As such, One Voice is able to directly attend to its members, which breaks the desiring-machine of government, breaks the government's flow, and allows the organisation to flow into ongoing existence. One Voice is building power against the power of street-level bureaucracy, rather than taking on problems of neoliberalism and the broader systems that perpetuate their members' survivalist existence. It, and other organisations like it, make street trade impossible to police. However, their efforts do not prevent the ongoing privatisation of street-level service provision by the city.

At the Oxfam workshop, the traders' organisations insisted that if Oxfam wanted to build solidarity with them, it needed to amplify their voices, not the voices of academics who did not address their immediate concerns. While Ben Scully bemoaned the lack of statistics on the size of the informal sector, it is precisely this uncertainty which allows traders and their organisations to escape the capture of bureaucracies. Social-justice inclined NGOs and academics need their connections to CBOs in order to represent themselves as interlocutors between grassroots organisations and the powerful in society (Mueller-Hirth, 2009). However, in this particular case (and perhaps in other instances), the NGO and academics

attempted to achieve solidarity by asking the CBOs to listen. As such, One Voice was not positioned as a communicating organisation with its own communication machine. One Voice's communication, in this context, only served to deny a connection between itself and Oxfam. One Voice and other traders' organisations made it clear that they were not on the same page, and that Oxfam had a duty to be on the same page as the traders, rather than traders being on the same page as Oxfam.

They attempted "a power takeover by a dominant language" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 8). While the CBOs were given an opportunity to talk separately and bring their discussion back to the plenary, this talk was meant to only focus on the paper presented. However, in their refusal to talk to the paper, traders demanded that Oxfam listen to them, not the academic. As such, the NGOs and academics on one hand, and traders on the other hand, only spoke past each other and did not build the rhizomatic power of traders' organisations to address their own issues. A shared assemblage was not created, a shared flow of desire was not generated, and a shared line of flight was not agreed upon.

In terms of the flow of desire at this event, solidarity was not established because communication from both sides went in different directions, with neither side listening to the other. Instead of a flow of desire, repeated break-flows occurred. While Oxfam's purpose in holding the workshop was to build solidarity, its agenda-setting attempted to position itself as the lead organisation in a partnership, thus asserting hierarchical, arboreal power. Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 79) describe language as 'order-words', which are political structures to enforce something normative. In 'ordering' the CBOs to listen, Oxfam and the academic sought to enforce a political hierarchy in which the statements of NGOs and academics had authority. They present their aim as "the rational and reasonable organization of a community" (p. 414). The language presented at the workshop was "pass-words beneath order-words" (p.110) that allow passage into the corridors of power.

However, the CBOs, including One Voice, did not see solidarity with Oxfam and academics as useful, and continually asserted their power by breaking the flow of the workshop. Here we see arboreal and rhizomatic power fighting it out, and those operating at the rhizomatic level able to elude the control of the arborescent system. While Oxfam saw its role as politically conscientising, the traders' organisations were alive to this attempt at domination, and slipped away. The traders brought in their own enunciations, their own

communication, revealing the field of desire in which they disrupted the language of NGOs and academics, and used the space to their own ends.

In the workshop, no affective relationships existed between One Voice and Oxfam; they were not loyal and supportive of each other, but each had their own agenda. As such, there was a break-flow in communication, rather than connections in an assemblage building towards a powerful solidarity. However, One Voice made its own communication machine visible, and generated its own messages, albeit that these were not taken up by Oxfam.

5.3.1.4 The flow of desiring-communication in One Voice

The flow of desire in practice at the street level is in marked contrast to the fascist desires of One Voice as revealed through the participatory workshops (e.g. xenophobia, complaints about 'illegal' traders, sidelining a woman who does the main organisational work). We see in the same organisation a complexity of stratifying members in terms of who is in and who is out, while in practice rupturing arboreal power using broken administrative systems, and refusing the order-words of the NGOs and academics. Thus, there is not a single line of flight, but scrambling of the lines. Given that their reality is not orderly, One Voice also operates in a disorderly fashion. One Voice's communication machine is opportunistic, rather than building towards a consistent campaign.

The organisation contains "microfascisms just waiting to crystallize" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 10). Yet due to organisation instability, the micro-fascisms may never result in an organised organisational outburst of xenophobic violence or attacks on 'illegal' traders. Instead, the micro-fascisms likely function through micro-aggressions between South African and foreign, and between 'legal' and 'illegal' traders. In Deleuze and Guattari's (2004, p. 412) words, for One Voice "the coordinates permitting them to be erected as stable models [may] never become available". Its assemblages are unstable, rickety.

One Voice has also adopted a micro-politics, in which it does not build a powerful mass organisation, nor does it take on the powers of the global neoliberal order or the neoliberal state. Instead, its creativity is expressed through local challenges at the street level. Members who took part in this study pointed to several hindrances preventing them from becoming a mass organisation, particularly the lack of time and resources for members to participate in organisation building. While these hindrances mean that One Voice has not

developed into a power bloc that can directly take on local government and the JPC, it remains nimble enough to address issues (such as potential evictions) as and when they arise.

The organisation does not exist through grand narratives about an envisioned future, nor any master plans. Instead, “[e]ven in impossible dead-end situations”, One Voice is like other organisations Guattari (2015, p. 213) describes as those who try “to tinker with the institutional machinery, to produce an effect on some part of it”. They do not aim for a complete take-over of power, only to undermine power when it has the opportunity to do so. The fluid assemblage of One Voice connects its members together through a shared subjectivity of being traders, with common experiences in relation to trading in Johannesburg, and with shared experience of the One Voice committee helping them.

The communication machine is part of the flow of commonality between traders that allows them to cohere into a group, but group members also seek to separate out who is a legitimate member and who is not. The more the traders see themselves as operating in the capitalist terms of profit and loss, the more they feel the need to fight to defend their territory and the more they turn to the language of xenophobia and policing/security.

As such, the organisation does not take off to develop new lines of flight; they do not seek to become more than traders with shared problems, and therefore do not imaginatively explore other possibilities. Much as they try to deterritorialise by breaking through the city’s imposed by laws and regulations that generate profit for JPC and take rent money, they also reterritorialise by themselves imposing limits on who may be a member and who may not be a member. Desire in the organisation is a complex pattern of flows and break-flows, and as I will show in the forthcoming chapters, the specific qualities of One Voice’s communication do not enable it to build a mass communication-machine, but neither is this their goal.

Instead, rather than taking on power directly, One Voice generates power through refusal: refusal to accept the accuracy of administrative systems, a refusal to allow someone to undermine the committee members, and refusal to accept the discourse of Oxfam and its invited speakers. As such they “jettison seemingly immutable hierarchies” (Kanngieser, 2012, p. 277) of the local government structures, and those of international NGOs. But the processes observed above reveal One Voice as an organisation in which “[t]actics are refined through trial and error ... groupings fade and rupture ... [they are able to] gestate

'underground' and to sprout in unexpected places, rhizomic assemblages [that] evade control and capture" (Woods et al., 2013, p. 437).

5.3.2 Inner City Resource Centre organising for protest

Unlike One Voice, and as discussed in the section on workshops, ICRC is a more formal organisation, has planning structures in place, and has office-bearers, including staff. However, like One Voice, ICRC mainly organises at the rhizomatic level, albeit that they typically also work to engage with and challenge arboreal power.

A key reason for ICRC's existence is its ongoing effort to secure a place for inner city residents' voices in planning for affordable housing. However, from 2016, when Mashaba came to office, until 2018 the ICRC had failed to secure any meetings with the mayor. They had been shut out of the Johannesburg Inner City Partnership (JICP), with the mayor insisting that he would host a meeting at another time for community activists. He never set up such a meeting, and organisation staff and members were very frustrated by the lack of engagement. Therefore, ICRC's communication machine was not able to establish an assemblage and communication flow between itself and the city. The subsections below reflect on its other efforts to do so.

The previous mayor, Parks Tau had involved the ICRC and other NGOs and CBOs in the JICP meetings, but Mashaba was not adopting the same approach. After a particularly negative encounter in which ICRC members were chased out of the JICP meeting, in September 2018 the steering committee of ICRC came together to discuss the way forward.

The below subsections discuss the steering committee meeting and its decision to hold a protest, the planning process for the protest (both in inner city buildings and in their offices), and finally the protest march on 14 November 2018. Because of their orderly planning process, it was much easier to coordinate observation times with ICRC than One Voice and, therefore, I was able to undertake observation in more instances.

5.3.2.1 Deciding on protest: Steering committee meeting

On the day of the steering committee meeting, 17 September 2018, I had just arrived in Johannesburg and came to ICRC's office to greet everyone. The offices are on the third floor

of a high rise building, and at the time of the steering committee meeting, the organisation occupied four offices (one office for reception, one office shared by three employees, one office for the director, and one office for meetings/tea room). The building is aging and has not been renovated in many years, but it is clean and in reasonable condition. The type of office occupied by ICRC shows it as a more formal organisation, and by some definitions may be described as an NGO.

When I arrived at the offices, the director, Shereza Sibanda pressed me to attend the steering committee meeting, as she felt it was very important for me to see how decisions are made in the organisation. Six people attended the meeting; the steering committee is made up of building organisers in different parts of the city. The meeting room is a small office, with plastic chairs and a table to the side where coffee, tea and muffins were served. The room was also full of old protest placards, banners and organisational flipcharts.

The meeting attendees went over what had transpired at the JICP meeting organised by the city. However, it was clear they were not conducting business as they usually would as they spoke English to accommodate me, and they also explained things that they would not have needed to explain to each other. ICRC had always been invited to JICP meetings under previous mayors, but Mashaba made them feel unwelcome and eventually expelled them of the meeting. The ICRC steering committee discussed their strategy when they attended the previous JICP meeting. They had all worn organisational t-shirts and sat together in a bloc, in an attempt to show strength and numbers. However, steering committee members said this proved to be a disadvantage, as the mayor could easily identify the organisation members and evict them from the meeting. One steering committee member said:

Next time we are not going to sit together. We must sit far from each other and ask questions. They must not know we're together.

Another steering committee member also said:

We must dress smart. We must be like those business men. They mustn't know we're from ICRC. No red t-shirts!

Thus, they intended to disguise their unity and yet contest the thrust of the meeting, which was supporting investors in the inner city. In this part of the steering committee meeting, we see the flow of desire in the ICRC's activity of attending the JICP meetings. We see their

flow of participation broken by the city officials and investors whose own flows of desire are in a different direction. The rhizomatic flow of desire is broken by the arboreal flow of power. But the break in the flow is not halting ICRC's desire to engage, and they creatively plot new actions, new lines of flight, by proposing adaptations to their communication machine. These adaptations are expressed through a micro-politics of occupying space differently, and as I will discuss in the chapter on Aesthetics, a new aesthetic of dress. As Deleuze (1995b, p. 7) describes in *Chaosmosis*, this takes the organisation out of "repetitive impasses ... from a creation which itself indicates a kind of aesthetic paradigm". He goes on to argue the necessity of opening the discourse and structure of groups to overcome that which condemns groups to remain imprisoned by institutions.

ICRC's new approach suggests the adoption of a new aesthetic approach in that they intend to switch from their organisational branding towards the business aesthetics of the investors (this will be discussed in more detail in the forthcoming chapter on Aesthetics). This discussion on a change in objects (clothing) demonstrates how the organisation plans to reconfigure its communication tools to make an assemblage/desiring-machine in order to (hopefully) generate a different outcome.

Also, the reconfiguring of the space to their own ends in itself creates new flows, which overcome the 'rules' by which the meeting space and agenda are governed. Whereas CBOs often challenge power by forming a bloc, in this instance, the bloc is recognised as a tool that fails in the context of JICP events. So they decided to adopt a pattern of spreading out, as opposed to sitting together. The proposed change to the communication machine aims to make the people more invisible to power, in order to make the same message more palatable to the same audience, and thereby challenge power. As we saw in my description of Workshop 2, ICRC recognises the desires of the city government to only engage investors with their slick presentations and formal clothes, and therefore recognises that the organisation has to adapt its own presentation to match that of investors.

When reflecting on desire as an assemblage/desiring-machine, the ICRC did not intend to reconfigure the machine by changing the audience or changing the framing of their messages, but the change of aesthetic and reconfiguring space. By changing the components of the communication machine in this way, the organisation suggests that a new flow could be generated. Thus we see the flow of organisational desire joining

audience, aesthetics, tools, and framing to enhance communication. The aim of this adaptation is to accrue more power in the context of JICP meetings, in that they cannot be as easily sidelined if they are not as easily identifiable as a bloc, and if their appearance is indistinguishable from that of the investors at the meetings. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 229) explain, while the powerful will always try to stop the lines of flight, the relatively powerless will always generate “mutant flows” that overrun the codes of the state and capital. As such, the group can “begin to speak in a given institution and at a given moment of its history without reinforcing the serial and alienating mechanisms” of the state institution.

The steering committee also decided to undertake a protest on 14 November 2018, and discussed their different plans for organising in the different areas. Shereza pointed out that some organising would have to take place on the weekends, as this is when they would find community members and community leaders at home. They agreed they would visit a number of areas, including Booysens informal settlement, Marlboro where people live in cluster units, occupied factories on London Road, the shacks and hostels of Denver, Bekezela informal settlement in New Town and those sleeping under the bridge in the area, emergency shelter (tents) provided by the city in Wembley, factories in Doornfontein, as well as all the areas where they had members in buildings. Here we see the flow of the communication machine out of the confines of the meeting space and into the streets of inner city Johannesburg. This will be discussed further in the next subsection, where I went with the organisers on one organisation campaign in inner city buildings.

The steering committee agreed to create a pamphlet about the march to share with the members, building occupants and communities. However, while their own message was to inform people about the protest march, they also saw organising as an information gathering exercise, in that they wanted to include each area’s messages in an overall organisational memorandum to be presented to the city government. In this instance, the steering committee highlighted the importance of wearing organisational caps and t-shirts in order to make themselves more visible to the audience (people living in the areas). The discussion points to the pre-existing communication machine that the organisation has used time and again in order to organise members.

In this section of the meeting, we see the ICRC’s flow of desire through connecting inner city places (buildings, informal settlements, shacks, hostels, streets, shelters) and

audiences, through the tools (a pamphlet, clothing), an aesthetic (organisational brand), and through messaging that framed the issues pertaining to the march in a way that was relevant to each area. These components make up the desiring-communication assemblage, which generates the flow of desire to build power by bringing a mass of people together. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 215) explain: "Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions." In their organising to bring a large group of members together, ICRC escapes the bounds of the definition of an NGO and takes on a more social movement type structure. The tools and aesthetic (pamphlets, area visits, t-shirts and caps) they planned to use are typical of social movements in South Africa, as has been documented elsewhere (cf. Bosch et al., 2018, 2019).

As I will show in the next subsection, the desire did not remain as a steering committee meeting discussion, but the organisation took forward the flow in action. As we journeyed through the inner city together, I watched ICRC organisers and members making rich interactions.

5.3.2.2 Preparing for protest: Walking the inner city

On 16 October 2018, I joined a team of organisers from ICRC, as they walked around the inner city from building to building where they had members. The aim was to make members aware of the upcoming protest and encourage them to help organise. There were four of us: two staff, Philemon and Jabu, one steering committee member, Samuel, and myself. Despite the steering committee meeting having emphasised the importance of wearing the organisational brand in undertaking organisational activities, none of the organisers wore organisational t-shirts or caps (this will be discussed further in the chapter on Aesthetics). They were dressed in their everyday clothes. However, they had printed and were carrying a pile of pamphlets for distribution in the buildings. In terms of the distribution of pamphlets and the process described below of meeting with members, this walk through the city was a key part of the communication-desiring-production of the ICRC.

We took the lift down from the office and headed out into the street, walking to a nearby taxi rank. The first thing that struck me on the streets was the smell ... car fumes, urine, litter, stagnant water in gutters and random holes in the pavement. Dodging other pedestrians

and street traders, I was surrounded by the noise of people talking, cars and trucks. Hooting. Crossing the roads was frightening as what seemed to me reckless traffic came from every direction. The more I walked around the inner city, the clearer it became that the decay of the city does not stop the vibrancy. People are leading busy lives, on the go, active. The movement never stops. People are buying and selling in the informal street economy, many on the streets and many operating out of dilapidated shops painted with rudimentary signs announcing their wares.

In our walk to the taxi rank, the assemblage of the three ICRC staff and I connected with the assemblage of the city. The flow of desire spread out, dodging through pedestrian and automobile traffic. The flow, the movement, is an essential part of ICRC's organising; they make the streets their own territory, which they navigate with comfort and ease. Nevertheless, they are at war with the local government's control of the city, not in the violent sense, but their desire flows to undermine control. Thus characterised, ICRC, its staff and members, constitute what Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 4) call a "war-machine", which is not necessarily violent, but could be expressed through art or science or other forms of creativity; war is only a consequence of action, not the aim. The war machine is "in opposition to the State apparatus" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 24), freeing from arboreal power, and dispersing power by connecting rhizomes. Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 18) call those who have invented the war machine "nomads", and indeed we became like nomads trekking across the city.

While we travelled the streets, the lines marked on the territory by the city government, we moved along this territorialised space, but it was deterritorialised as we moved in our own pattern; having "absolute movement ... speed, vertical or swirling movement [which] is an essential feature of their war machine" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 381). The streets have been made by arboreal "tree logic" marking out the hierarchical functions of the state (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 12). This tree logic creates the tracings of power, ready-made to guide and control movement. However, the four of us travelled as an assemblage making our own map, travelling around the city according to our own imperatives, and making desire flow in accordance with the rhythms of the city.

Everything was in the shadows of tall buildings, yet the day was hot and even at the start of the journey, I was drinking my water. We entered what was once an underground

parking lot, and is now a taxi rank, and found the relevant taxi for taking us to the part of the city where we were organising. It was dark and dirty in the taxi rank, but it ran efficiently, with three men overseeing the movement of taxis. While we waited for the taxi to fill up with passengers before we could leave, I chatted to Samuel, a 63-year-old man. He told me he was starting to feel too old for walking the streets but “I must do this, the work is important ... ICRC has helped me a lot with my building, so I must say thank you by also doing the work”. Jabu laughed at me, asking: “Can you really walk with us? You are also old, and,” he pointed at my fat body, “we are going to walk very far today”. I laughed, nervous about how I would manage to keep up, but feeling determined. After all, I had put on good walking shoes that morning. This joking and teasing are an essential part of the affective labour holding ICRC together; such communication develops affectionate bonds between people in a communication assemblage.

We left the taxi rank and headed out of the office and trading spaces of the inner city to Jeppestown, a more residential area of flats. Here again, the streets were full of litter. As I walked, the city government's idea of turning around the poor state of the city to become an investor haven or dream seemed like pure fantasy: nothing to do with how people actually carry on their lives. I wondered aloud where the cleaning services were, and Jabu told me:

Pikitup don't do their jobs. It's all corrupt. They get paid but they don't clean the city. And the waste pickers [reclaimers] can't do everything with no gloves and overalls and place to clean themselves.

Philemon concurred:

They don't get paid. Pikitup have big contract, but the waste pickers don't get paid. At the end of the day they are stinking. They have nowhere to wash.

I asked if the problem is that waste reclaimers only clean up what they can recycle and leave the rest of the rubbish behind. Laughing, Samuel said: “Haai, it's not their job.” Despite their sympathies however, Jabu, Philemon and Samuel were not familiar with the ongoing politics of the relationship between Pikitup and informal traders. For example, Samson (2020) has documented how Pikitup attempts to “integrate” waste reclaimers, but in effect, takes over their territory (in what she describes as a colonising project) and marginalises many informal reclaimers. Sekhwela and Samson (2020, p. 22) also point out that the city and reclaimers have different ideas about what integration would mean, including disagreement about “(1) what reclaimers were being integrated into; (2) the objective of

integration; (3) the mode of integration; (4) the goal of recognition of reclaimers; and (5) control over integration". Therefore, although ICRC has an interest in the city being cleaned up, they have not made a solidarity connection with the waste reclaimers in a way that has led to a shared understanding.

Once we were off the main drag where the taxi dropped us, the streets were quiet, without traffic. Here, instead of the tree logic of the streets controlling movement, we moved in ways "entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 12); while the ICRC team members had their own map in mind, it is made of their own desires, flowing through the streets and buildings, and they discussed where they were going next as we were walking.

The first place we stopped was a compound: a cluster of hovels around a sandy courtyard overgrown with weeds and litter. The owners of the property had long fled and the city used this as an excuse not to provide water. The houses were illegally connected to water and electricity. We did not enter the dark hovel where two toddlers ran up to greet us then disappeared back into the gloom. A tired old lady in a yellow housecoat came to the door and Philemon explained about the march in a respectful tone and handed over some pamphlets for the lady to deliver to other compound occupants when they returned from work at the end of the day. Although she agreed to distribute the pamphlets, it is unclear how committed the woman was to attending the march, as she seemed tired and uncertain. Nevertheless, I had the impression that she would distribute the pamphlets.

The way that the Jabu, Philemon and Samuel talked to the old woman was full of respect. They spoke quietly and expressed sympathy for her difficulties. This tone of expression is an essential part of the affective labour of the communication machine; by expressing care for the women, Jabu, Philemon and Samuel brought her closer to the ICRC and suggested that her concerns were central to why the ICRC exists.

In both Samuel - who said he was getting old - and the demeanour of this old lady, we saw the break in the flow of the life force of desire, where the energy to organise is limited by aging bodies. The organisers faced incredible odds against apathy, and their determination was not matched by everyone we visited that day. Nevertheless desire continued to flow through the communicative actions of the organisers, and through the activities of ICRC. They continued to add components to their assemblages by connecting to new members in

buildings and informal settlements. As discussed in the description of Workshop 2 above, even though they have not succeeded in influencing the provision of affordable housing in the inner city, they are at least determined to say: "We are still here. We are not going anywhere." Desire flows in their determination for ongoing resilience.

The compound where the woman stayed had also overturned the power of the state to demand payment, in that they had illegally connected water and electricity. It is as if they sensed that "the law is the invention of the despot himself" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 213), that is, the law is not written to serve them, but serve the state. As such, while those such as the old lady may or may not have energy to join a protest, their desire moves through breaking the flow of the capitalist machine in a small way. Narsiah (2007) argues that this is a refusal of neoliberal subjectification. Such cleavages "animate a struggle not only economic and financial, but political as well" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 255). The refusal is also part of the communication assemblage, as it speaks directly against the messages the city puts out about the responsibilities of payment. The message is clearly spoken that desperately poor people cannot afford to pay, and therefore will not pay.

Next, we walked past several dilapidated buildings, and came to a block of flats that was clean and in fairly good condition. Philemon saw a young man on the balcony and waved to him, asking him to ask his mother to come down. A well-dressed middle aged woman came down and met us in the lobby. She did not seem happy to see us. Philemon told her about the protest and handed her a pamphlet about it. She seemed reluctant to take the pamphlet and uninterested in the protest. She said: "We've been protesting all these years, but nothing changes." The atmosphere was tense. Philemon explained the importance of the march, but she was not convinced. She took the pamphlets on offer and said she would distribute them, but it seemed to be just words. We said our goodbyes, and as we left the building Philemon commented: "Sometimes this is what we find. We help people and once they've got their place they don't bother with us anymore. They've now got water and electricity, and they're happy with what they've got."

Again, we see the activist flow of desire through determination, but the flow of desire remains rooted in what is real, which is the limit of possibility. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 27) explain:

Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of objective existence, it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, and does not outlive them. Revolutionaries ... are content to be objective, merely objective: they know that desire clasps life in its powerfully productive embrace.

The organisers in ICRC did not move away from the reality of the situation: that it was difficult to organise, and not everyone would connect with their particular desiring-change assemblage. In the way the ICRC organising team works in their communities of members, “they affirm and exercise the freedom to come together or break away” (Goh, 2006, p. 223). Nevertheless, they kept their desire flowing through the communication machine, choosing to engage with others no matter how receptive or not they were to the message. Again this touches on the refusal to leave, their refrain: “We are not going anywhere.”

We moved on to a small informal settlement of about ten shacks backed onto a building that had fallen into such decay that it was no longer liveable. We sat and drank water and shared cigarettes. I asked them about their access to services. They had an illegal electricity connection and got water from the tavern next door, what was formerly a house. They used the toilets in the various buildings around the informal settlement, such as the tavern, and informal hairdresser diagonally opposite them. They had been asking for services since 2006, but each time the city administration changed they had to start the application process all over again.

Philemon explained about the upcoming march and shared the pamphlets with them. They were very keen on attending the march and happy to hear about it:

We have come a long way with ICRC, they never stopped fighting for us. We also won't stop fighting. We must attend that march.

Here we see desire flowing as through a “nomadological war machine”, refusing “the normalized conditions of living. It does not want any part of it” (Goh, 2006, p. 228). The communication here is flowing, as the organisers and the informal settlement dwellers share small talk and have a clearly established rapport with each other. This speaks to the bonds of friendship that have developed between organisers and members of ICRC over the years, and which is part of the affective work of the organisation.

In spite of their living conditions, in this group of people defiance propelled the assemblage/desiring-machine forward. These residents have recognised that they “cannot

afford to sit back and wait for change: [they] need to effect it through the everyday style in which [they] live" (Hickey-Moody & Malins, 2007, p. 18). Here the desiring machine functions through a psychological connection and a shared code (between the residents and ICRC) about the world, making the transmission of messages smooth and the messages easy to understand (Høstaker, 2014). Desire here reveals its affective qualities of communication, expressing determination, loyalty and conviction. The pamphlets and the process of visiting these inner city residents allows for the flow which "the psyche deploys in producing connections and links between thoughts, feelings, ideas, sensations, memories, and so on" (Buchanan, 2014b, p. 12).

The affective qualities, the informal settlement residents, the organisers, the ICRC, form an assemblage for action, and this generates a powerful flow of solidarity. Through this solidarity, the residents increase what Williams (2007, p. 358) calls "the degree of power of acting", alongside ICRC. However, this war machine is not a solid construction; it is about the flow of desire, or as Goh (2006, p. 230) describes it, "a future-oriented project or projectile ... [it] thereby clears a path for the future thought of a future community". As I will discuss below, the affects and solidarity continue the flow of desire in other inner city residents too.

After leaving the informal settlement, we then undertook a long walk, past the Ellis Park football stadium, where suddenly everything was quiet and clean. It seemed that the city gave more attention to stadiums than living conditions. Indeed, Philemon commented: "See how nice it is here. It's quiet. Imagine if the whole city was clean like this!" This spark of imagination and recognition expressed by Philemon is part of what keeps ICRC going; desire flows from and through the real, connecting dilapidated parts of the city with the cleaner areas generating aspirations and the productivity of the organisation.

After quite a walk, we came out in Bertrams and went to another run-down block of flats, where the owner had abandoned the tenants. We sat down in the lounge of the building organiser to share a Coke and discuss the march. She was keen to help mobilise and took pamphlets not just for her building, but for other buildings in the surrounds that she promised to visit to mobilise. She said she's was loyal member of ICRC, proudly stating, "I've been with ICRC a long time; we must be together". Despite the expression of a sense of community in her words – the flow of desire into solidarity - this is not a community with a

“totalitarian micropolitics”, where everything is already solidly structured; instead it is “a space where tangential trajectories are possible, a space where heterogeneous elements are free to come together by desire, and are equally free to break away” (Goh, 2006, p. 222).

Her pink lounge walls were streaked with damp and mould. The roof was leaking and had been leaking since 2011. They had no electricity and used paraffin for cooking. They collected water from a tap in a building next door where no-one lived anymore; it still had water but her building had been cut off. They carried five or six buckets of water a day for use in the home. Nine people lived in this two bedroom place – four in one bedroom and five in the other. Her room was shared with her adult son, who was a student, his wife and their toddler.

Like those living in the informal settlements and other buildings we had visited, these groups and individuals “are constituted in such a way that they [are] excluded from various other dominant positions of power” (Bell, 2008, p. 21). However, this does not preclude a thriving flow of desire. For example, the son of the household explained that he was very involved in the the political party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and that he was excited by Julius Malema. He said, “We must all be activists. I am an activist every day.” He then took me to the shared room and showed me his drawings. They were rudimentary, but he explained he had been teaching himself to draw so that maybe he could sell his pictures. He told me that he has a university degree in marketing, but had not been able to find work.

Despite, the grind of poverty, his life force was irrepressible, as he constantly hustled for survival. While being confined to the dilapidated territory of the city, the range of the young man “cannot be mapped more than the range of a bird can be mapped” (Janz, 2002, p. 396); instead we can notice the milieus of his life, his situation. Thus his desire does not flow within the confines of his limits but ruptures attempts to hold him back. His creativity does not belong “to a nation, a place, but ... comes to *escape* the geosocial formation’s habits and conservative tendencies” (Saldanha, 2017, p. 13).

I bought one of his drawings, and we were then ready to leave, but I was hot and tired, so we decided to head back to the ICRC office. Getting back to a main road, we nabbed a taxi, and it took us to the intersection of the road where the ICRC office building is. Travelling around observing the ICRC organisers attempting to mobilise people in buildings where they

already have a constituency, I saw upfront crumbling damp houses with mould growing on the walls. The informal settlements in the back yards of tumbled down houses that were beyond repair and no longer liveable. The flats were hollowed out versions of once beautiful interiors. The ghosts and dirt of hundreds of lives clung to the staircases, corridors and walls. These places felt tired, not able to carry the full weight of the burden of deliberate under-development. And yet the occupants repeated the organisational refrain: "We are not going anywhere."

What sustains ICRC and keeps it going, as well as keeping people connected to it, can be described as a kind of sediment that has built up over time. The sediment is like a sandbar in a river: the sandbar shapes the flow of the river, and the river shapes the sandbar. As such, the flow of desire of organisation members (like the river) interacts with the sedimented flow of ICRC (a sandbar). In that the organisation has become more stable, it has deterritorialised the city: refusing its limits, but then reterritorialising the city by making a territory, which is still subject to changes in the flow of members. Its territory is made by action and communication; these actions of organising by visiting buildings, talking to people, and distributing pamphlets are repetitious, but always with difference; "they are the ropes that tie sets of territories and milieus together (Janz, 2001, p. 397).

This is the territory of its own offices, but also the territory of the buildings and shacks in which its members live, the layers of accumulated destitution, the streets of the city, the routes they travel. As such, the organisation has become what Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 41) call "molar", that is, more rigid and organised. However, the sediment has not turned into sedimentary rock because it has not become absolutely solid: it is not totalising and strongly hierarchical, but does have a centre and a level of unification (solidarity). They are in an intermediate state between the molecular (like loose particles) and the molar; over time "there may be a greater or lesser number of exterior forces or organizing centers participating in the molar form" (p. 58). Therefore, the ICRC assemblage stays supple enough to creatively produce a flow of desire, while at the same time having resilience which draws members together. The communication machine of ICRC consists both of organisation practices built up over time, and the possibilities of new connections with new people as they travel around the inner city.

5.3.2.3 Preparing for protests: At the offices

On 12 November 2018, two days before the planned protest march, ICRC had invited other organisations to the meeting to discuss how they could be involved in the protest. One organisation,imba, was a Yeoville-based residents' group and the other was One Voice. The meeting took place in the same office where the steering committee meeting had taken place. Nine people attended the meeting including myself, and most people were drinking tea or coffee and eating muffins. The meeting room was one hub of the ICRC's communication machine, in that it often conducted organising meetings in this space, also relying on the flipchart paper set up in the room, on which it drew its plans and shared ideas.

Shereza introduced the ICRC and its work. She explained that the meeting intended to bring together organisations with a shared agenda, identify things in common, create a shared platform, and support the protest march. Her aim was to increase the power of organisations to act together in order to build a larger campaign. The other organisations' members then introduced themselves.imba said it had identified housing problems in Yeoville and mentioned they came across an ICRC pamphlet, and felt that they should align and work together.

Høstaker (2014, p. 199) explains, "To promote our ability to act is at the same time to promote joyous affects and to weaken the power of tyranny over ourselves." The meeting started with a strong show of support for joint action on shared issues. The key issues covered at the start of the meeting were that the city was too focused on engaging with investors and did not have enough focus on engaging with inner city residents and traders. Instead, inner city residents and inner city traders were harassed at home and on the streets. The communication machine at the start of the meeting seemed to involve making connections and a shared assemblage for action.

Frans from One Voice said:

*Our members face police every way they turn. In their homes, on the streets.
Traders, residents we all the same with the same problems.*

Several participants focussed on the grime in the inner city, which was attributed to the lack of services in inner city buildings, making them difficult to clean, as well as lack of toilet facilities for traders. Also, grime problems were created by the outsourcing of cleaning to the

Pikitup company that they said was not adequately doing its job. Members of One Voice also complained that despite traders trying to overcome joblessness by trading, the city was not supportive of traders.

However, the Chairperson, Zachariah, also complained that “95% of traders are illegal foreign nationals”, and should only be allowed to trade if their paperwork was in order. He insisted that it was important for migrants to get their papers before his organisation would defend them. Members of Zimba then complained that most of the buildings in Yeoville were occupied by illegal foreigners and that there were too many people living on the streets around them. One woman reported:

We don't want the homeless on our streets. If we find them, we take their stuff and burn it, and chase them away. We want them out of Yeoville.

Others at the meeting were stunned and shocked into silence, before Shereza jumped in and said this was unacceptable behaviour as many people had been driven onto the streets due to evictions: “Homeless people should not be attacked because they have nowhere to use the toilet or wash.”

Several meeting participants explained that foreign nationals had no papers because the Department of Home Affairs was not providing a good enough service. Philemon from ICRC explained that migrants were welcome to join their organisation and participate in the upcoming protest march. He acknowledged: “It's difficult to organise foreigners. You can't get papers unless you can bribe home affairs.” Shereza said it was true that “foreigners don't always come to meetings but they have their own organisations and we can meet with them”.

The meeting closed with much discomfort and, after the meeting, some One Voice members and all the ICRC members who had attended spoke of their shock at the xenophobia expressed in the meeting. Shereza said: “We are trying to build a shared platform but we can't work with people who're thinking like that! Imagine!”

Whereas the micro-fascisms of some members in One Voice did not affect their functioning at the local level in relation to the JPC, these micro-fascisms had a strong impact on the ability of ICRC to organise a united front. What seemed like a promising communication assemblage at the start of the meeting, broke down and disrupted the flow of

solidarity. The effort to create community failed. Whereas ICRC aimed for what Goh (2006, p. 222) calls the “comforting thought” of “automatic hospitality within the community”, it ultimately had to close ranks and their desire did not flow in the direction they had initially imagined. Xenophobia and the treatment of homeless people broke the flow of desire and sent ICRC in a different direction of going it alone. As such they maintained their molar identity rather than being pulled apart by other organisations with a micro-fascist identity.

As Bell (2008, p. 13) explains, “molar rigid segments maintain the identity of our desires ... they also prevent desire from exploding into chaos and disorder.” The danger of molar units is that they become too rigid and hierarchical. However, in the case of ICRC, desire was still able to flow into producing a protest, but its molar identity was strong enough that it could avoid being derailed by the micro-fascisms of the other organisations. While micro-fascisms can often lead to a thicker layer of fascism, in this instance, ICRC managed to prevent them from suffusing “every little cell” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 228) by remaining supple and modifying its plans. As such, ICRC is an adaptable assemblage, able to move in and with the milieu. It also shows its communication machine flowing over the fissures, and resisting the micro-fascist impulses of other organisations. Instead, the organisation continues to highlight solidarity – with the homeless, with foreign nationals, and with other organisations, as the key to the functioning of their communication machine.

5.3.2.4 The protest

On 14 November 2018, I met Shereza at the ICRC office at 8am. She was taking a lot of phone calls, organising logistics of transport to the protest. While she was still taking phone calls, we caught an Uber to Pieter Roos Park – the meet-up point for the protest march. About 200 people were there already, most of them wearing either ICRC t-shirts, or the t-shirts of the women’s group which formed part of ICRC. People were milling around, and some sat under trees for shade, waiting for the march to start. Meanwhile, minibus taxis brought more and more people to the meeting point. By 10am it was already getting hot, and people were sharing drinks; vendors arrived with ice lollies for sale, and they were quickly snapped up. Groups of people started standing in circles, singing struggle songs and dancing. The mood was joy-filled and defiant. In this activity, we see the flow of desire to build an organisation through affect, whereby joy increases the desire to act (Deleuze,

1978). This affect of joy, the singing, and the organisational branding flowed into the communication machine of protest, and resulted in further flows of activity.

Shereza eventually called everyone together with the loudhailer on the back of a truck. Members of different organisations were invited to speak about their agenda for the day, and the demands that would be presented to the Mayor Mashaba. Members of ICRC spoke about the housing rights and housing problems of the inner city (already described elsewhere in this chapter), while the women's group spoke about women's rights and the need for their issues to be addressed so that they could provide for their children. Members of EarthLife Africa, who were also attending the protest march, spoke about the need for clean electricity to be delivered to the inner city, and spoke about how green energy would be cost effective for inner city residents. Crispin Kashindi of GRWV then spoke about the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in the inner city, "We are here in Johannesburg because we couldn't live where we come from; it was too violent there. In terms of UN resolutions, refugees do have rights. We have a right to housing, education and health services." However, a small group of protest participants booed and muttered angrily.

Despite ICRC's best efforts, the micro-fascism of xenophobia kept emerging in the organisation, through members. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 215) explain:

Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective.

While membership of ICRC is theoretically based on shared values and goals, members do not always adhere to the codes put out by the organisational officials and in the constitution. Hence, while Shereza rounded off the speeches by explaining the need to be united, already elements within the organisation were breaking away. As such, the desire of ICRC cannot be seen as totalising. However, what is articulated by the 'deviant' members is not "open to something new, always form[ing] itself anew, which ... promises a radical future" (Goh, 2006, p. 226). As such, the war machine of the ICRC attempts to overturn the economics of inner city housing in favour of the most vulnerable, not just in the neoliberal state, but also in members. Whatever micro-fascisms the members bring up, the communication machine continues to flow over these fissures, and the organisation continues to build solidarity with foreigners, especially women.

Despite the limits of the machine, everyone then started gathering in rows behind the truck, preparing to begin the march. Women took to the head of the protest, and all protesters were singing and toy-toying, and carrying a huge array of placards (which I will discuss in the chapter on Framing) and the mood was jubilant. As such, “joyous affects” (Høstaker, 2014, p. 199) promote unity and shared resistance to the influence on investors on housing in the inner city. As much as ICRC was not tied together under a single vision, the organisation nevertheless connects itself to many other communities through its traditional political performance, through song, placards, banners and clothing, it speaks of a history of defiance, dating back to resistance to apartheid. This assemblage then highlights the molar aspects of political solidarity – the ongoing permanence of revolution, alongside the changing particulars of each protest and each protesting organisation.

The politics of the organisation are “overcodified by their linguistic idioms, customs, economic practices and political inclinations” (Goh, 2006, p. 221). Through its music, ICRC strikes up political refrains. According to Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004, p. 311) concept of the refrain, “song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos ... [and] necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile center”. However, it often “launches forth, hazards an improvisation” such that it opens new possibilities. While drawing on the traditions of apartheid and often using apartheid songs, the songs are adapted to the particular demands of the organisation, in particular that politicians must listen.

The march set off from Pieter Roos Park, up Empire Road before turning onto Queens Street, then turning round in Queen Street, heading in the opposite direction down Empire Road, and turning onto Joubert Street. We then walked past Constitution Hill and round onto Civic Boulevard, coming to the back of the civic centre and stopping on the corner of Civic Boulevard and Jorissen Street. The march was guided by the police, who steered the participants off the planned route, which was written in the police agreement. The route of the march thus does not allow for experimentation; it presents a blockage, such that it is difficult for desire to stir; it is “obstructed, arborified” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 14).

Nevertheless, marchers resisted control, reasserting themselves as a community by singing and toy-toying. But given how steep Joubert Street is, in the heat, most people stopped singing and toy-toying and focussed their energy on getting up the steep incline.

Vendors were going up and down selling ice lollies, and protestors were all buying them. Some of the older women on the walk climbed aboard the truck that was leading the way as the road was too steep for them. The movement does not stop, but it slows down, yet remains disruptive, disruptive of traffic and disruptive of the everyday life of the city.

When we came to the corner of Civic Boulevard and Jorissen Street, many protesters sat down in what shade they could find on a grassy embankment. Several ice lolly and food vendors then appeared, and many of the protesters (and myself) bought ice lollies and samosas. However, many of the protestors remained in a tight group that was toying and singing. It seemed as if no one from the mayor's office would be coming out to greet the protestors, and many were getting riled up. The police were eager for us to leave, stating that the time allocated to the protest was up. However, protestors shouted that they would not disperse until someone came to fetch the memorandum. The communication machine continued to generate flows through organisation members into expressions of determination and refusal to be ignored.

Eventually, Mr Philemon Mnisi came down from the mayor's office to collect the memorandum. One of the women leaders read the memorandum to him and asked that the mayor's office reply by Monday 19 November 2018. Mr Mnisi said that they would take some weeks to reply to the memorandum, at which Shereza threatened further action. However, the threat of further action sounded weak, given that they did not have the capacity to gather more people to act.

In manifesting the protest, ICRC's desire flowed, sustained by the energy of members and staff, and at the same time sustaining members and staff. However, a number of break-flows interrupted the ability of the organisation to organise and communicate. These included the micro-fascisms, the police changing the route, the impact of the heat while walking a steep road, and the repulsion machine of the city, which closed off engagement with the mayor and city council.

While the protest march articulated a shared community among ICRC members and other solidarity organisations, and with the apartheid history of struggle, it took on a certain monotony. Protests in South Africa are a regular occurrence and repetitious; South Africa experiences numerous protests in a year (Alexander et al., 2016, 2018; Oyedemi, 2020;

Paret & Runciman, 2016; Runciman et al., 2016), but because they are so pervasive, they are increasingly ineffective. As Zepke (2014, p. 37) points out,

... typically the 'left' communication proposes only two types of action: protest and petition. Capital has already embraced such processes, made them part of its own breaks ... We need to propose new actions ... but they must be flows ... automatically leading on to still other actions.

So the flow of desire as a creative impulse in ICRC is limited. Protests are already standardised, making it difficult for organisations to make claims against those in power (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009). However, the protest does not only serve to pressure those in power. Instead, the protest builds solidarity among ICRC members, through their passionate interactions, their joy, which motivate them to act and engage in collective action (Gould, 2004). As such, the flow of desire, generated by the communication activities in the organisation was not steady, but had to be diverted, and flow over and around obstacles. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 315) spell out, desiring machines contain

... myriad little connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions by which every machine produces a flow in relation to another that breaks it, and breaks a flow that another produces.

While ICRC has a limited ability to break the flow of the city and change the city's course from interacting solely with investors, its ability to keep going and sustaining itself, recreating itself as an assemblage allows for ongoing political communication and action. And while I did not witness it as part of this study, on the 11 February 2020, the ICRC, as stated on its Facebook account, succeed in "meaningful engagement" with the office of the Gauteng Premier David Makhura, having persuaded him to visit Booyssens informal settlement, and an agreement to work together to resolve problems there. The premier also agreed that he would in the near future be engaging with ICRC about the conditions in inner city buildings.

5.3.2.5 The flow of desire in ICRC

In continually finding and acting on common purpose, ICRC members, steering committee and staff's assemblage and the flow of desire through it is powerful, in that it acts to produce further action. None of the actions are complete in themselves, but the communication machine carries the organisation forward. There is a shared recognition that

... [a]s social beings we are always already collective; what we do, and do not do, affect socio-political realities. This means we cannot afford to sit back and wait for change: we need to effect it through the everyday style in which we live. (Hickey-Moody & Malins, 2007, p. 18)

But the organisation may be stuck in what Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 318) call the “placard stage”. Like the unions, which Guattari (2015, p. 225) talks about, there is a sense in which “the development of a modern, capitalist State needs such organizations”. Protests and demonstrations, insofar as they are allowed by the state and negotiated with the state, can allow the state to claim it is democratic because it allows dissent. As such, while we may regard ICRC members, steering committee and staff as having “passional subjectivities”, their machinic action and production “may easily slip out of their grasp and they may end up reproducing the existing system” (Høstaker, 2014, p. 188).

This repetition does not, however, mean that action is meaningless. As Deleuze (1994, p. 22) explains “even the simplest imitation involves a difference”, however subtle. As such, while the similarities are marked between the ICRC’s protest in 2018 and its other protests, as well as South African protests in general, they are “tracing a path amidst, with, and against impossibilities” (Thoburn, 2016, p. 370). Through its repetitions, the organisation succeeds in producing solidarity (in spite of some members exhibiting micro-fascist politics). It does not limit “the future to what has already been or to what is already known” but opens up “the potential for the unknown” (Hickey-Moody & Malins, 2007, p. 4).

In addition, the organisation is dynamic, moving between the arboreal levels of codes, such as its constitution, its formal office space, making organisational plans, and having a director, and rhizomatic levels by connecting members and solidarity organisations, and allowing space for a sense of community to develop. In a sense they are nomads, “continuously *en route*”, modifying and taking an opportunistic approach to the rules (Saldanha, 2017, pp. 57–58). In the workings of their desiring-communication machine, they “act against dominant systems of thought and social conditions” (Deuchars, 2011, para. 11). While having a semblance of order, through observation, I have “expose[d] the messiness and dynamism that is molecular politics” (Woods et al., 2013, p. 435). As such, although ICRC does not succeed in overturning power, they do not allow the state to be the sole holder of power, and soldier on despite the obstacles.

5.3.3 Analysis of desire revealed through observation

The flow of desire flowing through and generated by the CBOs' communication machines consists of material objects (such as paperwork and t-shirts), practical processes (such as planning, meetings and workshops), and affective qualities (such as loyalty, compassion, and solidarity). These different aspects are rhizomatic nodes through which desire flows and which generate desire. They form the assemblage of each organisation. As shown in the above sections, by following the flow of desire through the organisations, it is possible to trace the way the two CBOs produce and reproduce themselves through communication.

Thus far, the chapter has focussed on desire as creative and, as such, explores how the organisations creatively adapt their communication activities to the realities of their daily political lives. As Bell (2008, p. 22) explains, becoming politically transformative entails becoming creative: "It entails tapping into a line of flight, shamelessly asking the right questions, in order to transform the system or assemblage of power". The case studies have also revealed how the flow of desiring-communication shifts, or has the potential to shift, power relations in inner city Johannesburg. By examining the flows and identifying break-flows, the efficacy of the two CBOs in building and/or shifting power is opened up. The flow of desire reveals the organisations' lines of flight, that is, how they go about producing change in the political terrain.

This section brings together the flow of desire exposed through the workshops and during events I observed, building an understanding of how a communication-machine can generate political transformation, and why and how the communication-machines of the two organisations are strengthened or weakened by their political communication activities. Whereas in the previous sections of this chapter, I have pulled out the issues pertaining to the individual case studies, in this section I will compare and contrast the case studies, highlighting the two CBOs' successful efforts and their unsuccessful efforts.

In order to compare and contrast the organisations, I have used the framework shown in Table 2 below, which identifies the components of the organisational communication assemblages. These components will be further elaborated in the discussion in the next subsections.

Table 2

Components of communication machines identified in Participatory Action Research workshops and observation

		One Voice	ICRC
Paperwork/documents		Memorandums from protest marches, membership forms	Constitution, mission and vision statement, pamphlets, planning flipcharts, memorandums, press releases, funding proposals, funding reports
Other material objects	Office	Acquired during course of study	Several rooms, incl meeting rooms
	Other	T-shirts	T-shirts, caps, placards, banner
Practical activities	Meetings	One attended, did not include planning	Two attended, one included planning
	Public engagements	At one workshop	One protest
Expressions of affect		Anger, resentment, disagreement, solidarity, affection, camaraderie	Affection, solidarity, determination, camaraderie, hard work, passion

After elaborating about these components, I will discuss the overall creativity (or lack thereof) that affects the CBOs' ability to effect political engagement and political change.

5.3.3.1 The relationship between paperwork/documents and the flow of desire

In the first Participatory Action Workshop, participants identified paperwork such as organisational constitutions and action plans as an important component of desire. For ICRC, the documents were an essential part of their functioning. For example, throughout the course of my research, ICRC repeatedly used words that were in their constitution, their vision and mission statements to explain what they were doing and why. (The content of these documents will be elaborated further in the chapter on framing.)

All the staff and steering committee, and many of the members were familiar with these documents, and therefore how these documents were tied to the work they were doing. The organisational plans were on flipcharts in various offices, with tasks assigned to particular people. As such, the planning documents were clear to everyone in the organisation, so that everyone could work as a united whole. These planning documents were generated through

collaborative/participatory processes, such as meetings and workshops. Notably, the documents and paperwork described here were only useful insofar as they formed an assemblage with the ICRC steering committee, staff, members, donors, and other solidarity organisations. It was the circulation of documents in ICRC that allowed them to be part of the flow of desire, and thereby build political power. The documents, as objects, are not a flow, but the flow is the movement of those objects through time and space. As such, they are not fixed points in the system of communication but are a trajectory, through which the organisations generate a line of flight. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 25) point out, “a rhizome is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo ... coming and going rather than starting or finishing”.

In terms of their protest march, ICRC staff and steering committee strongly associated generating documents with the process of the march. For example, ICRC held meetings to create a collaborative memorandum for handing over to the mayor at the end of their protest march. They had an organised filing system where memorandums from all previous marches were kept. In addition, they had a file of press releases for every march, and had generated a press release for the march I had observed. It was therefore clear that documents and paperwork held significance for the organisation, and were part of its activities of existence. These documents had a more arboreal focus, in that they were directed to the local government and the media, who had relatively more power than the ICRC. However, by not responding, both government and the media asserted their power to “stop the lines of flight”. Therefore, the paperwork generated in this instance stalled at the level of arboreal power, limiting its reach.

One Voice had hardly any documents reflecting its existence. They had a few memorandums from previous marches, and membership forms to sign people up to the organisation. None of these was kept in an orderly filing system, and were simply kept at the houses of various steering committee members; all the documents that were shared with me were stored in plastic shopping bags. Despite having membership forms, steering committee members indicated that they did not use the forms because they knew their members personally, and even when they used to fill in the forms, they did not have any method of tracking membership. Part of the reason for the lack of records was that they had no office for storing files and documents. However, it was clear that even with an office, paperwork and record keeping were not an important part of the organisation. The lack of paperwork

and documents such as a constitution allowed members to operate however they saw fit (e.g. attend government meetings or not, accept illegal traders or not, accept foreigners or not). Such flexibility allowed the organisation to operate in an opportunistic way, attending to immediate matters, without steering committee members even checking in with each other.

The flow of desire for the organisations was thus quite different: it led to and stemmed from different types of organisations with different priorities. Insofar as documents create organisations and organisations create documents, ICRC was able to operate effectively to contest power by showing the longevity of the organisation, and therefore insisted it must be part of the city government's planning efforts. It also allowed the organisation to build a tough organisation, as it could secure funds to undertake the activities it wished to in order to contest the inner city of Johannesburg political terrain. Furthermore, the documents allowed the organisation to communicate with members, and as such most members used the words from those documents when talking about the organisation. This showed an alignment of the members with the vision and mission of the organisation and built solidarity. Therefore, political communication, as embodied in the documents, is an effective part of building political power in ICRC.

By contrast, the lack of paperwork did not hinder One Voice in terms of the work it did, which was addressing traders' needs and opportunities when they arose, rather than making a solid structure. As such, One Voice's desire stemmed from it being a contingency organisation, not a formal one. While One Voice could certainly build solidarity without paperwork, the lack of document 'evidence' allowed the city government to declare that it was not a real organisation and, therefore, the city government did not need to engage with One Voice. However, the lack of paperwork also meant that the city government and JPC was not able to surveil the organisation and use organisational information to its own advantage (e.g. it could not simply access the records of One Voice in order to check who was and was not paying for stalls).

In political terms then, the lack of documents had both advantages and disadvantages for the organisation, which impacted on the amount of power it was able to wield. At the micro-political level of particular trading areas, it could use a lack of documents to protect traders, but at a larger political level of the wider city, its lack of paperwork undermined its

ability to be heard. Insofar as the organisation only focussed its efforts on the micro-political level, then lack of paperwork did not hinder the flow of desire for the organisation.

Thus, while paperwork and documents were identified at the first workshop as important to desire, it proved not to be the case for all both organisations. Paperwork can be one node in the organisational assemblage, but not necessarily so. We therefore cannot say that paperwork is an essential component of building political power, but for some organisations it can be used effectively to maintain and build solidarity and access resources for continuing work.

5.3.3.2 The relationship between existence of office and desire

In the first workshop, having an office was not highlighted as part of the flow of desire, but was included in the tools list. Nevertheless, since I observed the use of office space as part of the flow of desire in the two CBOS, I have included it here. During the course of the study, Julekha from One Voice most often mentioned the necessity of an office to improve the functioning of the organisation. ICRC's offices were the hub of its activity, not just for staff and steering committee members, but also for other members, and drop-ins looking for help.

In terms of One Voice, even though during the course of this study the office remained rudimentary, with no furniture, it was a useful place where meetings could be held and where people could go for help if needed. Access to the office was jealously guarded and was part of a vociferous dispute between a former member and other members and steering committee. As such, the office was a component of the flow of desire through One Voice, as it allowed the steering committee to set up more stable relations with its members. While I was at the office, there was a flurry of activity, including the steering committee meeting I had just missed, and the walk-ins from many members over the course of the day.

Also, because their office was in the JPC building, they were better able to access the JPC administrator and build a relationship with them (albeit a complex relationship). Given the role that the office plays in One Voice organising (and the difficulties previously created by lack of an office), this space could be viewed as part of the communication assemblage for One Voice. It allowed for changing political relationships with its membership and with the JPC, even though the organisation still relied of verbal communication, and going on street walkabouts to talk to traders.

Importantly, ICRC operated without an office for many years, then was given a small office space at CALS, and only thereafter secured funding. The office has given them much more stability and ability to organise. ICRC's office space consisted of four offices when I started the study and had expanded to six offices by the time I completed the study, with a total of seven computers. Every week day (and often on Saturdays) the staff came to the office, the steering committee members visited often, and members and people off the street dropped in to talk over their problems and get help. Meetings with solidarity organisations, steering committee members, and women's groups also took place at least every fortnight at the offices. From the office, the organisation sent out information posters for specific buildings, organisational information pamphlets, made phone calls to members and steering committee, and sent emails to donors and solidarity organisations. When preparing for the protest, the staff painted placards in one of the meeting rooms. Given this hive of activity, the ICRC office was a key component in their communication machine, through which desire flowed and which also generated the flow of desire.

Offices allowed the organisations to claim space, but this did not lead the organisations to become static or arboreal. ICRC and One Voice continued to value their rhizomatic connections more highly than the formal ones created by office space. Given that offices are rather more formal than informal markers of an organisation, they potentially are part of arboreal politics. However, given that ICRC and One Voice used them as a hub to establish rhizomatic connections, they were one node in the rhizomatic machine through which desire flows, and from whence desire flows for these two organisations. While the office space allowed all the CBOs to strengthen their flow of political communication, the flow must leave the offices and move out into the world for it to be effective. Thus, despite reterritorialising office spaces for their own ends, the primary work focusses on deterritorialising the city to undermine the kind of order the city government attempts to impose on them.

For the two CBOS, the offices emphasise that the politics of CBOs "intrinsically contain both arborescent and rhizomatic tendencies that achieve articulation at different points within the cycle of political stability" (Woods et al., 2013, p. 434). By serving as the home of the organisations, the office was in hierarchical relationship to the membership, but in terms of how the office reached out into the world, it may also be a rhizome, a node in the organisational assemblage. As such, offices are of a dual nature and perform dual functions, allowing for flows and break-flows of desire through the organisations.

5.3.3.3 Other material objects and the flow of desire

In the course of my observation, I paid attention to other communicative objects the staff/steering committee/members of each CBO were using. The main object that all of the organisations used were t-shirts. The details about the aesthetics of the t-shirts will be discussed in the chapter on aesthetics; as well as my observations of when the t-shirts were worn. In the main, only One Voice members wore their t-shirts on a day-to-day basis, while ICRC only wore them to protest.

For One Voice members, therefore, their desire for connection was everyday and the t-shirts communicated those connections and loyalties. For ICRC the t-shirts were more about creating an unusual mass-spectacle, with emphasis place on how the t-shirts look *en masse*. Despite these differences, the study showed how the material objects are an important part of the assemblage, part of the flow of desire, and also generating the flow of desire. In terms of assemblages of communication, these objects are the material properties of communication, which must combined with the enunciative properties in order to achieve efficacy (Deuchars, 2011). These material items express the organisational “self-concept” and signify the organisational “connection to society” (Elliott, 1997, p. 287), identifying the organisations as political, and also identifying the political terrains on which the organisations operate. The t-shirts perform a rhizomatic function and create and maintain relationships, and are therefore part of the creative production of the CBOs. They are therefore useful objects for building political power.

5.3.3.4 Meetings and the flow of desire

As shown in the descriptions of my observations, both organisations used meetings as a way to connect steering committee members (unfortunately I just missed the One Voice steering committee meeting). ICRC also used meetings to connect with other organisations with which it sought solidarity. One Voice used informal meetings in its office to connect with members, and also informal meetings to connect with the JPC administrator. The primary analysis of these meetings will be undertaken in the chapter on framing. My purpose in this subsection is to focus on the flows and break-flows in the meetings, and how these meetings make rhizomatic or arboreal connections.

ICRC's steering committee meeting initially focussed on the arboreal levels of government in terms of their attendance and the JIPC meeting. However, having met with obstacles at this level, they devised new strategies for entering that space again. In the communication between steering committee members, the organisation did not dwell on simply climbing the tree, but on how it could disrupt the arboreal levels to its own advantage. As Woods et al. (2013) argue, this ability to disrupt arboreal relations is part of the dynamism in the politics of solidarity organisations. Such dynamism in the communication between steering committee members shows a strong flow of desire through the steering committee and through ICRC. Their desire is forever confronting obstacles and finding ways to overturn them and it does not stop its endeavours. This strategy is made of "mutant flows" that challenge the "whole chain and web of power" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 229).

In the second part of the ICRC steering committee meeting, the steering committee focussed on where the organisation's strengths lay, that is, its ability to connect with members and organise a mass campaign. They discussed how to connect with members, meet with community leaders, and all the material objects that were important to this campaign. As such, the meeting is a motor for the flow of desire in the organisation; it allows steering committee members to communicate effectively with each other, and drive forward to action, focussing on the process of creative production.

The second meeting I attended hosted by ICRC was, however, composed more of break-flows than flows. While it initially seemed to make rhizomatic connections in terms of shared issues linking the different organisations at the meeting, it soon collapsed into xenophobia. This collapse shows how disruptive politics not always enables the flow of desire, but can instead become micro-fascist. However, even though this micro-fascism is a break in the flow of ICRC's desire, ICRC is not halted by it. As I will show in the next subsection, desire flows over the break-flow, and the organisation shows its ongoing resilience in continuing with the protest, showing its strength through a mass campaign. The ICRC staff at the meeting managed to take over the communication in the meeting, and overflow the micro-fascisms. ICRC found desire-flows "which escape and which flee" both arboreal power and micro-fascism (Hickey-Moody & Malins, 2007, p. 16).

In both meetings, we see organisational communication that focusses on the rhizomatic level of power. While its activities aim to disrupt the arboreal power of the city government,

ICRC recognises that the rhizomatic links, building a mass organisation, are the source of its power. This focus reveals a “[t]ransversality in the group [which] is a dimension opposite and complementary to the structures that generate pyramidal hierarchization and sterile ways of transmitting messages” (Guattari, 2015, p. 118). Thereby, the group (ICRC) shows its intention to act and produce something new in developing its action; something which is not “embodied by a delegated individual that can claim to speak on its [the group’s] behalf” (Guattari, 2015, p. 219).

The flow of desire in the One Voice meeting I attended also focussed on these transversal links. Communication was primarily among the steering committee and members in a non-hierarchical fashion. Members flowed in and out of the office in a free-flowing manner. No one spoke on behalf of the other, but the whole group (One Voice) expressed a consensus. This transversality liquidates the structure of the organisation “in favour of a more fluid and distinctly non-hierarchical system of intra-organisational unconscious relation” (Alex, 2008, para. 6). The transversal flows do not follow any pre-set paths or channels, but cross any which way and so disrupt any attempt at arboreal power and jettison hierarchy (Kanngieser, 2012). As also revealed in the workshops, One Voice did not have ideological doctrines or activities, and its transversal activities undermined any possibility of forming an organisational ideology.

Even when the steering committee members connected with the JPC administrator, this slight rise up the arboreal tree of government does not represent climbing the tree, since the administrator is a relatively low level functionary in the JPC, and the steering committee engages him as equals who both have relatively little power. The flow of desire and communication through the One Voice office leaves the organisation open to experiments, using the failures of the administrative system to their own advantage. They “affirm and exercise the freedom to come together or break away” and are always open to something new (Goh, 2006, p. 223). While the city government complains of such loose structures, and uses the loose structure to declare One Voice ‘not a real organisation’ (Matjomane, 2013), it is precisely this fluidity that allows the organisation to act in a malleable way to the opportunities presented in the political terrain. For the organisation then, the flow of desire is not found in disagreements about micro-fascisms, but in the free flow of experimental, contingent communication.

The transversal links the CBOs adopted are empowering, offer recognition to all role-players in the organisations (e.g. steering committee members, other members, and staff), and offer more opportunities for the flow of desire to be experimental and contingent. While ICRC has a more orderly structure than One Voice, both allow for creative energy and productive flows and are therefore able to operate on the terrains of power, albeit in different ways and at different levels.

In the next subsection, I will explore the productivity of these flows in the context of public engagements.

5.3.3.5 Public engagements and the flow of desire

Public engagements were a key opportunity for the CBOs to get their messages across. The most spectacular public engagement was undertaken by ICRC in the form of its protest march. One Voice's public engagement was a small affair, that is, attending the Oxfam workshop.

The ICRC protest march was part of the assemblage of the organisation's communication machine, but in itself was also an assemblage in that it brought together various other components, and linked rhizomes. For example, the large group of people, the banners, t-shirts and placards worked alongside singing and toy-toying, and the presentation of a memorandum to a city government official. For the participants in the protest producing the spectacle this "*departs* from the normalized conditions of living" and represents a rupture from their daily lives (Goh, 2006, p. 227). As a communication machine, it is also a nomadic war machine, on the move and breaking with the ordinary and contesting the state machine. These bodies and objects connecting together form a community, out of rich, affect-loaded, interactions. This sense of community does not automatically generate a new world but it points forward to the possibilities of a new world (Nail, 2013, p. 49). As such, desire flows through the communication machine, producing change for the participants in terms of breaking the flow of their everyday lives and making possible "an ethical relation of opening out toward an empowering connection of others" (Braidotti, 2012, p. 3). While the protest has its limits in terms of transforming the state, it nevertheless embodies resistance to the state, and produces and reproduces ICRC as a shared, collective identity (Bignall & Patton, 2010; Gao, 2013).

At the Oxfam workshop, One Voice's public engagement also showed resistance to arboreal politics, but in this instance it was the arboreal politics of Oxfam. The desiring-communication machine of One Voice pointed out the relevance of micro-politics at the local level, that is, the daily experiences of inner city street traders. Oxfam may also be seen to be against the state machine, one of "those social formations that can potentially be antagonistic to the state form but eventually become part of it or 'take it over'", rather than breaking the machinery altogether (Deuchars, 2011). Oxfam's desiring machines are hierarchical and attempt to "*capture* the inventiveness and to lead it in certain directions", rather than opening up new possibilities (Høstaker, 2014, p. 148). Through their particular brand of 'story-telling' they "conventionalise thinking" and dull the potential for disruptive thought (p. 193).

While One Voice's own politics also do not confront or entirely disrupt the state, they do manipulate the state formation by not being co-opted by the JPC's definitions of which traders are in and which are out. They do not co-operate with the state's attempts to "draw lines" that striate space; they draw their own "supple" lines (Watson, 2008, p. 210). They also resist the striated politics of Oxfam, whereby the Oxfam places itself in the role of politically conscientising the One Voice members and other street trader organisations. In this workshop, One Voice breaks away from the Oxfam's "fall into the worst alienation" (Guattari, 2015, p. 78), produced by Oxfam's deference to the arboreal state machinery. Instead, One Voice makes it clear that the transversal links between its members, based in its members' subjectivity as traders, is of greater import by the hierarchical solidarity offered by Oxfam. This communication assemblage of One Voice breaks the assemblage of Oxfam, freeing itself from the possibility of domination. As such, it is in the process of creating its own micro-politics.

Public engagements offer an ideal opportunity for communication by CBOs to wider audiences. In terms of creativity, that is, what they create, public engagements can produce flows of transformation and resistance, or break flows. In ICRC, the flow manifested in the production of a rhizomatic protest, which was a vivid spectacle of joy and affirmation, generating solidarity. However, it did not succeed in breaking the flow of the city government's plans for inner city housing, so the public engagement offered limited scope for engaging those beyond its own solidarity circles.

By contrast, One Voice's flow was more confrontational in its public engagement at the Oxfam workshop, which resulted in its own flow breaking the flow of Oxfam, and maintaining its own interest in local struggles on the ground, rather than arboreal struggles with the city government. In terms of desire, the two organisations operated differently, with the desire of ICRC attempting production to connect with the inner city government, whereas the desire of One Voice was to focus on on-the-ground connections between traders. In its public engagement, GRWV attempted to connect with possible members, but its desire was not to make rhizomatic connections, but to place itself in a higher position compared to those it helps. At the same time, its desire could not flow into contesting the government space, because the avenue of human rights was blocked.

In its public engagements, neither organisation succeeded in producing a flow of desire into arboreal levels of government, but they did create a flow of desire that connected rhizomatically to their own members.

5.3.3.6 Affect and desire

As Deleuze (1978) explains, unlike ideas, affect does not have an objective reality, and does not represent anything. Instead, it is something that either increases or decreases the ability to act. Emotions are one type of affect and, for example, joy increases the ability to act, whereas sadness obstructs or inhibits the ability to act. Therefore, joy increases movement, the flow of desire, whereas sadness impedes the flow. In this subsection, I explore the affective qualities of the CBOs and the resultant flows of desire into and through the communication machines. Affect will also be further discussed in the chapter on aesthetics.

As I have highlighted at various points across this chapter, ICRC exhibited the strongest affective qualities of the two organisations. Its joy, comradeship, laughter, and affectionate relationships flowed into passionate work and activities, culminating in the outward display of solidarity. ICRC staff, steering committee, and members often expressed loyalty and emotional investment in the work of ICRC and the existence of an organisation embodying that work. As Deleuze (1978, p. 11) explains, joy pushes one to create positive, common ideas, and the purpose of movement and action, "the labor of life", is to increase positive experiences by connection with each other. Indeed, the labour of ICRC is to build collectivity

and through collectivity, to improve the lives of inner city residents, especially in terms of their access to affordable, good quality housing.

Desire and communication flow between people, paperwork, offices, t-shirts, placards, banners, buildings where residents live, the streets in which they protest, it does not stop. Actions flow into reflections which flow into new actions. In the case of ICRC, affect “sticks ... sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects” (Ahmed, 2010, p. 29). This preservation and sustenance in the form of organisation, gives ICRC some solidity, while maintaining flow. Therefore, we can see ICRC as a sandbar in a river: it flows and moves with the river, but also has some persistence.

Like ICRC, One Voice was passionate in its expressions of affect. However, the type of affects were more variable. While in the PAR workshops, One Voice expressed a lot of conflict (anger, resentment, disagreement), in my observation, solidarity was more prevalent. For example, at their office, members shared much excitement and passion in their resistance to the woman who was claiming that she was the official representative of the organisation. They laughed together, and shared outrage and dismissiveness towards the woman. These affects propelled them to break up the meeting the woman had called, and to act in solidarity. While the affective qualities of engagement were slightly more subdued at the Oxfam workshop, the members nevertheless expressed their passionate solidarity with their members, expressing shared concerns.

The affective life of One Voice was illustrative of Deleuze's (1978, p. 11) “continuous variation”, wherein the flow or movement of affect is not steady, but ebbs and flows. From the micro-fascist anger expressed at the workshops, which threatened to pull the organisation into a whirlpool, to the joy of connection, the desiring machine sometimes flowed quickly and sometimes almost stalled. Through the flow of affect, the organisation exercised power: “it is not by means of power, each one realises his power, it is by means of affects” (Deleuze, 1980, para. 2). Affect in One Voice flowed at a micro-political level, and this is where it found it power and voice. For both organisations, affect points to how the organisations contest power. By expressing joy and affection in their communication (including non-verbal communication), they are able to build their organisations to act effectively in their given situations.

In the next section I will present a composite of the findings from this chapter and discuss them in relation to the theory of desire and desiring machines proposed by Deleuze and Guattari.

5.4 DISCUSSION

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, desire is machinic in that it makes connections between things, practices, people, and affects in order to produce change. In this chapter I have explored the desire of CBOs in terms of their efforts to build a political communication machine in order to leverage political power, and in terms of the amount of creativity involved in the communication activities. In exploring the organisations, I attempted to find the “creative opening[s] to an outside in moments of rupture” (B. Anderson, 2010, p. 166), in order to assess the extent to which the organisations were disrupting the ordinary functioning of power, and thereby transforming power relations. Like Guattari (1984, p. 254), I argue that theorising about organisations in political struggle must be “primarily concerned with how to open that struggle out to the desire-production and creativity of the mass of people”.

Although neither organisation in this study undertook wholly new political acts, which shows the limits of their creativity, they did actively create their own spaces for political engagement and built rhizomatic connections between members, things, activities and affects. They did not see politics as being confined to government or political parties in created spaces, but asserted another identity related to their involvement with people with whom they shared space. For both organisations, power lay in their ability to organise large groups of people to take action, and their creativity lay in their ability to build these rhizomatic connections.

Both organisations made their communication machines through use of actual material objects including (for ICRC) paperwork and documents, offices, and t-shirts, banners, caps, and placards, and the office and t-shirts (for One Voice). While the material objects did form part of the communication machine, they did not improve the flow of desire in the organisation. One Voice's lack of paperwork did not inhibit the organisation as they relied on interpersonal connections. However, when they did not have an office they repeatedly saw this as a hindrance, and believed their acquisition of an office would help with organising and

improving communication with members. During the course of this study, it was too soon to tell whether the office would improve organisational functioning and lead to improved communication. However, the lack of material objects (besides t-shirts) limited the connections the organisation was making, and therefore limited the potential of the machine. For an organisation to work it needs to “connect up to an increasing number of other escaped or freed elements whose ultimate collective aim is the transformation of the dominant political order” (Nail, 2013, p. 44). In so far as it did not connect up to so many objects, it was not able to fully contest the dominant political order, but kept its actions on the terrain of micro-politics. It could not show, through its organisational objects, that it was a tangible organisation, which enabled the city government to declare it not a real organisation, thus limiting power. But at the local level of the JPC, it showed its existence by presenting a collective body of people who contested the rights of the JPC to evict them.

In comparison, ICRC put many of its material objects to good use, particularly as it allowed them to build shared identity, communicating with members through pamphlets, providing t-shirts for members, members carrying banners and placards. Its memorandum and press releases were less effective in that they did not influence or effect change in either local government or the media. Nevertheless, material objects were an important part of ICRC’s functioning communication machinery. In ICRC, we see the connections of rhizomes, where “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything else” (Woods et al., 2013, p. 436), and this allowed the organisation to connect with existing potential and be open to experimentation. In its work, ICRC identified numerous objects that could be connected to each other in order to develop its agency. ICRC’s activity illustrates how agency is “caught up in things ... Circuits, bodies, moves, connections” (K. Stewart, 2007, p. 86).

The CBOs also make use of practical activities, such as planning, writing (letters, emails, memorandums and press releases), meetings, and public engagements. In the case of One Voice local meetings did contribute to building power to respond to JPC’s efforts to identify which traders had paid rent and which had not. However, the organisation did not really use planning and rather responded in an opportunistic or impromptu way when the needs arose. This opportunism was, however, not necessarily problematic as Saldanha (2017, p. 58) explains, groups require “constant modification and an opportunistic approach to the rules. Such inventiveness requires deep attunement to the environment”. Indeed, in its practical activity One Voice was well aware of the rules and regulations governing street

trade, and the way the bureaucracies of local government and JPC applied the rules. However, in their activities, they used the rules to protect their members, and argue that the defunct administrative systems meant that JPC could not act on threats to evict people.

In terms of its public engagements, these did not take place on the organisation's own terms and did not successfully build rhizomatic connections with potential solidarity partners. However, the Oxfam workshop did allow an opportunity to reaffirm the organisation's power on the terrain of the local, and dismiss efforts to gain power at arboreal levels. In its engagement at Oxfam, it highlighted the 'enunciative properties' of their assemblage (Deuchars, 2011), in that they were able to communicate different priorities to those expressed by the academics at the workshop. Power could thus be deployed for the organisation's own ends.

Unlike One Voice, ICRC planned their action in far greater detail than the other two organisations, and therefore had more elaborate and deliberate public engagements. Its practical activities strengthened the communication machine, and allowed communication to build political power. Their activities involving members, staff, steering committee and solidarity organisations facilitated the organisation in "opening out toward an empowering connection to others" (Braidotti, 2012, p. 3). ICRC also made its communication machine especially powerful by making affective connections, as all layers of the ICRC structure expressed joy and camaraderie, as well as a passion for the work. Particular efforts were made to push women to the forefront of the organisation, such that women were affectively included and empowered. Affect is political. As Anderson (2010, p. 167) explains, affect limits "the efficacy of power as command, capture or limitation", in that affect builds morale which "is grasped and handled as a diffuse potentiality, instead of a fixed, locatable target" (p. 182). In ICRC, then, affect strengthened rhizomatic connections and built solidarity, allowing for free-flowing communication. Because of the strength of organisational affects, even though its efficacy with respect to government was limited through the course of the study, it could not be kept silent, and thus it was not suppressed and remained "a kind of destabilizing factor in social life" (Høstaker, 2014, p. 156).

One Voice also made affective connections, albeit more complex and erratic connections in that the members experienced conflicts and exhibited micro-fascisms, but also showed solidarity in their organisational activities. Affective relationships that exhibited

conflict and revealed micro-fascisms inhibited the organisation's ability to make rhizomatic connections, especially new connections with new groups of people. However, when the organisation members showed sympathy for each other, were excited by group activities, and laughed at their 'enemies', they revealed organisational strength that allowed them to challenge the JPC at the micro-political level. Both the expressions of micro-fascism and those of solidarity in One Voice were intense. When talking about the micro-fascisms, such as at the first and second workshop, organisation members were vociferous, angry, aggravated. When they were working in solidarity, as they were at the office, they were excited and sharing jokes and laughter. In both instances these were "intensities that produce something" (Mazzei, 2013, p. 108). They produced either a closing off of the organisation to the outside, or produced camaraderie within the organisation. Therefore, desire in One Voice ebbed and flowed; the organisation was erratic, sometimes seeming to hinge solely on Julekha; at other times, bringing members into the heart of action. Desire does not automatically bond people together and enable groups to endure; it "has to be trained or disciplined to produce lasting collectivities" (Buchanan, 2008, p. 19). In One Voice, desire did not create a steady organisation, always ready and able to invent new, creative practices and activities. However, it did have enough solidity to operate at a micro-political level of the street traders and challenge JPC's system for governing street trade.

In terms of solidifying the organisation, ICRC had the most stable communication machine, and exhibited arborescent tendencies in its organisation structure, in that it had a central hub from which activities flowed outwards, and a slightly hierarchical structure in terms of having a director, staff, steering committee and members. As Woods explains (2013, p. 439), although Deleuze and Guattari "counterpoise arborescence and the rhizome ... they repeatedly point to the entanglement of these system ... rhizomes can never be free of arborescent tendencies". The organisation also had arborescent tendencies in terms of its efforts to speak to the arboreal heights of government, but even then the organisational focus was on collective action, asserting that the organisation would not disappear and would continue to contest power. Therefore, the way desire flowed in and through ICRC also involved rhizomorphous activity, connecting the rhizomes to fight the arboreal relations of power. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 15) describe, they attempted to take on power by rhizomes spreading out like roots, but also attempting to penetrate the trunk of arborescent power. ICRC's refrain 'we are not going anywhere' embodied the power the organisation exhibited through its permanence and refusal to allow failings to hinder its ongoing actions.

ICRC therefore revealed itself as an organisation in which “[r]hizomic political action is not derailed by minor setbacks” (Woods et al., 2013, p. 437). The communication assemblage in ICRC, was like the assemblage described by Dewsbury (2011): expanding possibilities, and actively entertaining things, ideas and feelings to build political power.

Desire flowed much more coherently in ICRC, with its alignment of values, passions, work, and solidarity networks. In terms of the desiring-communication machine, the different connections allowed a flow of desire into constructive activities and ongoing, clear communication. For the ICRC, desire was productive because organisation members were strongly aligned, and the organisation was also aligned with solidarity networks. Its production involved both inward looking activities such as strengthening and empowering members, and outward looking activities such as engaging with the city, working with legal NGOs, and being involved in court cases. Therefore, “consistent revolutionary compositions” (Nail, 2013, para. 47) were built and sustained through the organisational practices and (human and non-human) actors.

However, given that the climax of their planning and communication was a protest that looked, sounded and felt like many other protests in South Africa, it could be extending its creativity further, into new communicative actions using the powerful network it had already established. A year after I completed my observation of ICRC, I spoke to Shereza on the phone and ICRC was again in the throes of planning another protest. When I asked her about it, she said: “We have a protest every year.” According to Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 15), revolutionary activity involves sustaining something old while doing something new: putting rhizomorphic flows “to strange new uses”. In ICRC, no clear action differentiated what the organisation did under my observation from what they had always done. Therefore, during the course of my study, it did not successfully destabilise the arboreal politics of the inner city, and the relations of power remained fundamentally the same.

By comparison, throughout my observation of One Voice, I experienced a lack of clarity about the possibilities for the future of the organisation. Although Julekha expressed the wish that the organisation achieve more for traders, she did not feel powerful enough to implement changes, and the traders in any case did not have the time or inclination to focus on building the organisation. One Voice’s micro-fascist tendencies expressed by various members created a break-flow in the life of the organisation, as it did not allow them to

expand beyond the limited membership they already had. Although various members also emphasised the need for solidarity, these expressions often went along with caveats. Because of these micro-fascisms, during the course of this study, One Voice seemed to be constantly at risk of “exploding into self-destructive chaos” (Bell, 2008, p. 7). The micro-fascisms hindered “wayward becomings, the lines of flight” (p. 24), and broke the flows of desire, such that they limited the possibility of transforming power relations in the inner city. These micro-fascisms impeded creativity, such that the organisation could not imagine anything other than what it already was, and could not imagine communication beyond the day-to-day functioning of the organisation.

However, despite the ongoing threat of collapse, One Voice sustained itself through an opportunistic micro-politics. Within the structure of power at local level, One Voice succeeded in experimenting with the opportunities available, finding “an advantageous place ... [causing] flows to pass and escape” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 161). In doing so, it invented a machine to stall the flow of evictions from trading stalls; this is like what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) call the ‘war machine’, which opens up the political terrain of action. Its communication contested the authority of the JPC in terms of its chaotic administrative system, allowed communication to open flows through which One Voice members stayed in place.

Here they were like nomads, directly undermining state power, albeit at a micro-political level. As Munro and Thanem (2018) explain, for Deleuze and Guattari, the nomads do not necessarily move, but instead occupy space in a way that pushes back against the arboreal efforts of the state to govern that space. Their challenge, expressed in the flow of the communication machine is “[d]ynamic and outward bound ... [undoing] static authority” (Braidotti, 2012, p. 2). As such, the flow affirmed the power of One Voice and empowered members to take control of their trading spaces, despite the state having ceded control of the spaces to JPC. These nomadic practices reveal “resistance against the hegemonic control over space” (Ganser, 2009, p. 169). These actions of One Voice creatively ruptured the relationship with the state (and those to whom the state had ceded power). Unlike ICRC with its detailed plans, planning did not go into the One Voice actions; they simply responded to the best of their ability according to circumstance. Such inventiveness, despite not being planned, “requires a deep attunement to the environment” (Saldanha, 2017, p. 58). As such,

despite the micro-fascisms, One Voice showed deft footing in handling challenges on a case-by-case basis.

In terms of creativity, One Voice produced “new ways of thinking” to challenge local state power (Roffe, 2007, p. 44); however, its creative thinking was hindered by micro-fascisms that limited the extent to which they could establish rhizomatic flows. By contrast, ICRC’s creativity was strongest in stimulating rhizomatic flows; however its creativity was limited by the repetition of similar actions across time. Both these organisations did, however, put the flow of desire to good use in terms of creating political communication that was effective in particular ways.

5.5 CONCLUSION

Flows of desire are made up of “myriad little connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 315). In this chapter I have highlighted the connections that the two CBOs made between things, activities, people, and affects such that I could trace the flow of desire through the two organisations, and the blockages which inhibited it. Depending on the nature of the flow of desire, the organisations had greater or lesser creativity, and therefore, greater or lesser ability to communicate politically and challenge arboreal power.

ICRC’s communication strategy revealed the importance and strength of making rhizomatic connections between objects, practices, people, and affects to achieve solidarity. This solidarity was the source of its political power and, with more creative strategies, it might be able to leverage power in new directions, rupturing the ordinary operations of the local government political system. One Voice showed how micro-fascisms blocked the flow of desire and broke the possibilities of building rhizomatic connections, but it also showed the importance of operating opportunistically and creatively at the micro-political level.

Following the flow of desire through and in the CBOs goes some way to revealing why and how political communication worked or failed for each of them. However, desire is not the only component on which political communication relies. Instead, as I will show in forthcoming chapters, other communicational aspects need to be part of organisational practices for desire to flow in the direction the organisation envisages. In the following

chapters, I will discuss the two CBOs' political audiences, their framing of the issues, the aesthetics and the tools they use, but also show how these components are fastened to desire.

Chapter 6 FRAMING

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Framing is central for activist organisations to get their message across and shape their relationship to power. In Johannesburg, city governments have repeatedly had a vision of making the city internationally known as a place of wealth in Africa. For example, under apartheid, the city attempted to attract young cosmopolitan white South Africans to the inner city. Currently, the DA government has a vision of Johannesburg as an African World Class City. With respect to the inner city, one of the most prevalent frames emerging is the 'crime and grime' frame, which focuses on cleaning the city of rubbish and those it calls criminals. The city also emphasises the need to attract investors.

Framing is linked to the desires discussed in the previous chapter, as frames emerge from the thoughts, actions, and affects, of members and steering committees who come together to agree on a shared agenda. The link is depicted in the conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1 (on page 4).

Here we see the desiring-machine driving the types of frames produced. As we saw in the chapter on desire, the CBOs are not all equally aligned among their members; for example, in ICRC a strong alignment existed between staff, steering committee and member, and therefore the frames were more stable. However, in One Voice a lot of disagreement was exhibited (especially in the workshops), and therefore the frames were contentious and members competed to establish frames. For each organisation, the frames emerge differently from practices and activities, that is, desires. The different frames emerge out of the political values of the organisations; so, for example, the frames used by One Voice often revolve around inclusion/exclusion, which is especially marked in some members arguing for excluding foreigners while some argue for inclusion (this will be further explored in the subsection on xenophobic and anti-xenophobic frames below). Sometimes the frames are used for expedience in the moment (for example, One Voice's frame on corruption when relating to the JPC administrator at their office), and others are well-planned, for example, in ICRC's memoranda, press releases, and protest placards.

In seeking to address their various issues, the CBOs in this study need to align with (and perhaps, subvert) existing frames or generate new frames commensurate with their goals. As discussed in the literature review, activist organisations' frames are all, in one way or another, collective action frames, identifying problems and their causes, and proposing solutions; the collective action frame is thus discussed below. Some of the other key frames I have already highlighted in the literature review as being important in relation to South African CBOs include the rights frame, the economic frame, the poverty frame, the corruption frame, the xenophobic frame, and the gender/feminism frame. The frame analysis was based on identifying frames in the literature, frames used by the city, and comparing those to frames used by the organisations in their documents, messages uncovered through observation, and the messages emerging from the three workshops. I explored the frames listed above, but was also alive to other frames that emerged in the course of the study.

As I will highlight below, while the different organisations deployed most of these frames, only ICRC developed an economic frame which challenged neoliberalism as a basis for tackling inner city problems. One Voice did not use the rights frame. The only additional frame that emerged during the course of the study was the crime and grime frame, which was particularly strongly spoken about in ICRC documents, and by all organisation members at the second PAR workshop. However, whereas the city government uses the crime and grime frame to blame the ills of the city on residents, traders, and foreign nationals, the two organisations pointed to the ways in which the city government was creating the crime and grime problems.

The previous chapter on desire was structured around the workshops and observation, and rooted in the desires of each organisation. However, in this chapter, the structure is based on the frames used. For each frame, I then show similarities and contrasts in how the organisations used the frames. Apart from the collective actions frames, I have clustered the frames in groups, that is, (i) frames on the qualities and rights of the CBOs' constituents (poverty frame and rights frame); (ii) frames on the nature the government's plans, lack of plans and failures (neoliberal critique, corruption, and crime and grime); and (iii) frames based on inclusion/exclusion (xenophobic and anti-xenophobic frames, and gender/feminist frames).

The chapter commences with an overview of the ways that the tCBOs framed their work, and an analysis of the implications of the frames for organisational power. The analysis in this chapter looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the different frames, exploring whether they help the organisations build power, and if so, what kind of power. The analysis also explores the connection between the frames and South Africa's political culture, as highlighted by the literature review. Due to One Voice having fewer documents than ICRC, it was easier to extract frames from ICRC's work; however, as explained in the methodology, I also drew on the frames used at the PAR workshops, and those used in my observations of events. Therefore, below, I have tried to balance the amount of material from each organisation, if possible, in order to give a robust picture of the two organisations.

6.2 HOW CBOs FRAME THEIR MESSAGES

Much of the material analysed for this study did not use any particular framing devices, but merely listed the needs, wishes and wants of the organisation members. For example, One Voice demanded more space be provided for legal stalls in order to staunch illegal trade, while ICRC demanded affordable housing, and water and electricity service provision. These lists do not allow for a strong connection with desire, as the expectation is that the other, to whom they address their lists, will act to provide. However, as I discussed in the previous chapter on desire, desire is based on each organisation's activities. Therefore, in exploring frames, I have dug more deeply into how the frames connect to the CBOs' desire.

Insofar as the CBOs deployed frames, they articulated a general collective action frame, calling for people to unite or work together in solidarity. These collective action frames were typically addressed towards other members or members of other organisations in an effort to unite people under a shared agenda. Another aspect of the collective action frame was that the organisations sought to collaborate with government and, to this end, they repeatedly called for 'meaningful engagement'. As we saw in the previous chapter, both organisations made efforts to connect with government, and frames were both directed at government and an attempt at shared action.

Apart from the collective action frame, the organisations used a cluster of frames to justify their members' lists of demands. Typically, this cluster focussed on the poverty frame and on the rights frame. Using the poverty frame, they pointed to how poverty resulted in

spiralling social ills, and how their constituencies found services unaffordable (ICRC), or how the organisations were pro-actively tackling their poverty (One Voice). ICRC strongly adopted the rights frame, particularly in relation to socioeconomic rights (rights to housing and services (ICRC)), however, One Voice did not use the frame in any document I had access to, and I also did not hear them using that frame at workshops or in observing events.

Another cluster of frames centred on the failures of government action, in particular, (i) a frame against government's neoliberal policies; (ii) claims of corruption; and (iii) complaints about crime and grime in the inner city. The anti-neoliberal frame was only used by ICRC; One Voice did not talk about how the city's pro-business stance lead to limited trading space being offered. One Voice was more likely to use the corruption frame, particularly as it related to police and security guard action, but also corruption in allocating stalls and collecting rent from stall holders. Both organisations also used the crime and grime frame, but it only strongly came forward at the second PAR workshop, during the city walkabout with the ICRC organising team, and in the third PAR workshop where One Voice expressed an interest in pressing government to clean up the trading areas.

In terms of inclusion/exclusion, One Voice members strongly used both xenophobic frames and anti-xenophobic frames. Of the One Voice members I met, only Julekha used a gender/feminist frame, while ICRC members often used anti-xenophobic frames, and gender/feminism frames. These frames generate new possibilities for ICRC, while limiting the range of action for One Voice.

The next subsections have been organised around common themes emerging, as follows, (1) the collective action frame, (2) a cluster of frames justifying organisational claims-making, (3) a cluster of frames focussed on government failures, and (4) a cluster of frames about inclusion/exclusion.

6.3 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME

As mentioned above, and in line with the literature, both organisations used the collective action frame, calling for organisations to collaborate with each other, to create joint action, and stand united. As I will discuss in my chapter on audience, ICRC made the most effort to

put the frame into practice, and called on One Voice to work together. For example, at a 12 November 2018 meeting to plan its 14 November 2018 march described in the chapter on Desire, Shereza Sibanda of the ICRC, argued:

We need a people's dialogue ... We can't work alone in our silos; we are all facing the same issues. If it's traders or residents, we face evictions, the inner city is dirty and Pikitup is not cleaning properly. Among residents and traders, there are foreign nationals, so we need not to be xenophobic. The city is calling all of us illegal and criminals. We must come together and show we are united. (Field notes, 12 November 2018)

At the same meeting, Frans Seema of One Voice concurred, adding that police were harassing traders and those living on the streets who had been evicted. GRWV members did not attend this meeting, but at another planning meeting the next day, Crispin Kashindi, concurred that:

Our members are living in terrible houses. We must work with others to tackle this issue. Also many of our members are traders and they are harassed, therefore we need to support them in their place of business. (Field notes, 19 October 2018)

Here we see a strong parallel between the different collective action frames, in that the organisations recognise shared interests. The frame was initially deployed by Shereza, but this successful deployment of the frame "invites other groups to recognize its utility and potentially exploit it in mobilizing their own constituencies" (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 3). The frame deployed was diagnostic, motivational and prognostic, that is, according to Benford and Snow's (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988) definition, it diagnosed a shared problem (use of the inner city, whether it be as traders or residents), used the diagnosis to motivate why they should work together, and presented a prognosis that they should share action. They also used this frame to attribute blame (i.e. the government is at fault), as per Aslanidis's (2018) explanation of frames. The diagnostic frame deployed was based in a sense of injustice, that is, the conditions and treatment of people in the inner city were unjust. The injustice frame "serves as a basis for articulating grievances and for envisioning an alternative social order" (Carroll & Ratner, 1999, p. 608). Ketelaars (2016, p. 342) and Keck and Sikkink (1999, p. 95) call this commonality of frames "frame resonance", but they argue that frame resonance needs to extend beyond the confines of organisations and strike up motivation in a general audience because the frame resonates with their everyday lives.

Despite the affirmation from both organisations that they shared common interests, my observation of the event showed that, to some extent, these were just words. As described in the chapter on desire, xenophobia frequently prevented the organisation members from connecting. This shows that shared frames may be a precondition for coming together, but they do not necessarily hold organisations to working together, especially if different frames are deployed emphasising their differences. Such divergences of interest are not uncommon among different organisations, since many activist organisations “seek to articulate their own agenda in a way that resonates with a ‘sentiment pool’ consisting of individuals who hold congruent, but latent, views” (Gahan & Pekarek, 2013, p. 763). Although the organisations have some shared interests, in Gahan and Pekarek’s (2013) terms they do not succeed in *amplifying* their frames to the point of bring people together, such that different audiences are invigorated; the frame also does not *extend* into framing a shared plan of action, and only provides a notional shared action. Therefore, the CBOs are not maximising their mobilisation potential, and the frames do not open up a shared strategic trajectory (Westby, 2002).

Perhaps part of the reason that perhaps the framing of collective action fails is that it attempts to unify under too many different problems, that is, the problems of residents, the problems of traders, and the problems of foreign nationals. As such, the frame seems rather more a catalogue of issues, than a strong uniting, overarching frame. The ICRC argued in an undated document entitled *Meaningful engagement in sectional title*, that the separate issues all belong to the same body, and that each body part needs the others to function. However, in the chapter on desire I showed how One Voice frequently undermined any potential collectivity (micro-fascist xenophobic and sexist politics). As such, sometimes organisational “ideology may be so dominant that strategic considerations are rejected” (Westby, 2002, p. 299). In the case of ideology trumping strategy, true frames cannot be made, as framing also involves the *strategic* development of frames to bring about shared action. As such, we can see the links between framing and desire; where desire hinders joint political, creative action, it also hinders the creation of frames to advance action.

Collective action involving solidarity organisations is also not the only angle the organisations applied in their framing. They also sought collective action with government. For example, in a submission to the Johannesburg Inner City Summit, ICRC insisted:

Underpinning all other demands and essential to sustainable development and the deepening of our democracy is our call for all citizens of the inner city and their formations to be included in all policy formulation and implementation processes.
(Submission to the Joburg Inner City Summit 2007)

Numerous other ICRC documents cite the Constitutional Court on housing (*Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as Amicus Curiae)*, 2009), which orders government to engage meaningfully with inner city residents facing eviction. Even in its protest on 14 November 2018, protesters held up a placard reading:

Mr Mashaba / Engage with us / Stop raiding us!

These statements seek to make common cause with the government by suggesting that together, inner city residents and the City of Johannesburg can find a shared solution. However, they failed to deliver a message because it is excluded from JICP meetings. Since it does not move beyond the issues, ICRC's frames did not move "toward more comprehensive critique(s) of power and more comprehensive forms of action" (Carroll & Ratner, 1999, p. 602).

Despite the intentions of the CBOs to leverage power with their collective action frames, and despite various policies enshrining participatory governance (e.g. Section 152 of the Constitution of South Africa and the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) of 1996), full participation of communities and people who live in South Africa is not a strong part of the government's political cultural practice where there is a lack of political will, corruption, and lack of skills and capacities (Masuku & Molope, 2020; Munzhedzi, 2020). Therefore, in terms of the logic of influence, the CBOs were unable to "choose frames that allow them to exercise influence over decision-makers and policy-making outcomes" (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484).

Based on the literature review, it was expected that collective action frames would form a significant portion of the organisations' framing strategy. As shown above, collective action was viewed as essential, but was not always a reality for the organisations. However, as will be discussed below, both organisations further positioned their calls to action around a cluster of frames that supported their claims-making.

6.4 CLUSTER OF FRAMES SUPPORTING ORGANISATIONAL CLAIMS

As will be highlighted below, ICRC adopted a rights frame, while both organisations used the poverty frame. This cluster of frames served to present the organisations' constituents as worthy of attention given the intractable problems that faced them. These frames may also be regarded as injustice frames, in that they diagnose the problems that their membership is facing, that is, poverty and rights infringements. The overall effect of these frames was to put the constituents front and centre in the communication by the CBOs. As such, these frames spoke to the relationship between the organisations and their members, and served to inform audiences about their members. For example, the poverty frame focussed on the poverty of their constituents, while the rights frame focussed on the constituents' rights. These frames are elaborated in the next subsections.

6.4.1 Poverty frame

The political elite in South Africa frequently use the poverty frame, and the ANC's political and historical rhetoric reflects a concern for the poor (Berger, 2008). It would therefore seem that when CBOs use the poverty frame it is aligned with frames used by political elites. However, as discussed in the literature review, the ANC's policy and practice do not match its poverty rhetoric. Instead, it favours a market approach to service provision, and with respect to local government focusses on cost recovery (Hazelton, 2019; Huenteler et al., 2017; McDonald, 2002; McDonald & Ruiters, 2005a, 2005b; P. Naidoo, 2010; Ukwandu et al., 2019; Whittington & Nauges, 2020). Even its indigency policies create a "low-level war with poor citizens" (Ruiters, 2018, p. 174).

Furthermore, the poverty frame does not make much headway in the media in South Africa, which has frequently deferred to the frames of investors and those punting economic growth (Chiumbu et al., 2016b; Duncan, 2014; Ives, 2007; Kariithi & Kareithi, 2007; MacPherson & Wadsworth, 2011; Mayher & McDonald, 2007; Mudzamiri, 2009; Pointer, 2015; Rao & Wasserman, 2015; Rodny-Gumede, 2017; J. J. Williams, 2006b). With regard to media coverage of poverty, most coverage of the poor is neutral (43.6%; 10.3% negative; 30.8% positive); the media do not "critically engage with issues affecting struggles of the poor" (Chiumbu et al., 2016b, p. 8)

In the case of Tembelihle in South-West Johannesburg, Lau and Seedat (2017) found that poverty narratives implied a helplessness and victimhood in the community where all efforts to thwart poverty are seen as futile. However, Naidoo (2010) found that many poor people preferred to avoid the frame, because of stigma associated with it. The poverty frame goes along with much morality, either blaming the poor for their own plight or holding them up as heroes for enduring suffering (Hull & James, 2012; P. Naidoo, 2010).

Both CBOs in this study used the poverty frame in their work (as found in organisational documents), in their discussions at the PAR workshops and in my observation. However, they did not deploy the poverty frame in the same way, and it did not always imply victimhood or helplessness of members. As I will discuss below, ICRC's use of the poverty frame did emphasise the difficulty of actions and used it to attempt to draw sympathy, but it also used the frame to establish links between organisation members so as to build solidarity. For example, describing a growing crisis for the poor, in an undated pamphlet entitled *The Impact of Eviction on Migrants*, it argued:

Socially, the evictees are reduced to mere destitute with no shelter, nowhere to prepare food, no where (sic) to refresh their body and no proper base to start from a meaningful life. ... This also leads to poor mental, emotional and physical health due to stress caused by lack of access to services and sanitary condition, increased child illness and degrades her self esteem [sic].

ICRC's pamphlets and actions pointed to the difficulties created by poverty, and it had attracted members who similarly used this frame, and vice versa. The prevalence of the frame among members is part of the reason that ICRC have adopted the frame because ICRC often used workshops and meetings to establish shared frames. The poverty frame establishes a "criteria of social belonging" (Fraser, 2007, p. 21) and the "logic of membership" (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484).

For example, when we went on the walkabout with the ICRC organisers that was described in the chapter on desire, ICRC members often framed their problems as being due to poverty. These members often identified poverty as the key reason they could not pay for electricity and water. The shared experience of poverty brought members together. Therefore, in a letter to the President on 4 September 2009, ICRC located the problem at the door of local government's credit control policies, explaining:

We leave it to your imagination where you then get water and where you defecate when you live in a high rise building surrounded by many more – there are certainly not adequate secure public facilities. The same desperate pursuit of credit control occurs with Electricity, again with little understanding of poverty and inadequate income levels facing an increasing majority.

In this quote, we see the poverty frame being linked to the anti-neoliberal frame and the government failure frame, suggesting that the poor primarily present their difficulties as structural and related to failures in government practices, as previously argued by Davids and Gouws (2013). However, the frame does not give members much power; as Nkuna (2016, p. 117) previously found, the poor are “in a permanent state of despair and frustration, lacking political trust”. While the frame resonates with members, it is not necessarily empowering them. Instead the tone applied to this frame “relies on the compassion of individuals, NGOs, and the state” even though these power relations are highly inequitable (S. Walsh et al., 2008b, p. 263).

In his book *We are the poor*, Desai (2002) explains how some activists claim poverty status in order to claim they are deserving of low-cost services; but this means that they rely on government to provide the services, rather than taking their own action. By using this frame, activists “envision an oppressed agent that is sacrosanct in its wretchedness” (S. Walsh et al., 2008b, p. 263), but that goes unheard by the powerful. Therefore, it is not surprising that ICRC’s letter to the South African president went unanswered; despite organisations appealing against cost-recovery measures, the government was not moved to change policy. As discussed in the introduction to this subsection, the media also do not “critically engage with issues affecting struggles of the poor” (Chiumbu et al., 2016a, p. 8). Therefore, the frame has no impact on power players such as politicians and the media.

Aside from the strengths and weaknesses of the poverty frame for building membership, and its failure in influencing government and media, ICRC’s poverty frame did fall within the framing “logic of influence” (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484) insofar as it appealed to donor organisations. During the course of the study, ICRC director Shereza Sibanda explained that one way she secured funding was by showing donors around the buildings where the organisations members live, and showing them the conditions of poverty. In this instance, Shereza made the “sensual field” relevant to her audience; she tied together “elements of the scene so that one set of meanings rather than another is conveyed” (Kriesi, 2004, p. 384).

In the examples presented above, ICRC also used highly evocative and emotive language when it deployed the poverty frame. As per the literature, such emotive language involved generating sympathy (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993) for those affected by squalid conditions in buildings and informal settlements, and those affected by homelessness. The use of emotive language therefore contributed to frame alignment and amplified the poverty frame such that ICRC was able to attract like-minded thinkers and those with shared values whether it be the poor or donor organisations. Therefore it was able to leverage some power by using the poverty frame. In the instance of the donor organisations that fund ICRC, they have not succumbed to “compassion fatigue” (Chouliaraki, 2006; Höijer, 2004).

Unlike the ICRC, One Voice tried to challenge disabling poverty frames, in favour of highlighting the poverty-relieving efforts of its members. One Voice often highlighted that its members were actively working to get out of poverty by turning to street trade, for example, in a Memorandum to Mayor Parks Tau on 26 June 2013m they said:

We have chosen the informal sector as a means of survival rather than resorting to crime or any other illegal means of making a descent [sic] living under such harsh economic realities that are worsened by recession, job losses and general poverty.

This poverty frame challenged the city’s frame “of lawlessness and of the ‘hawker problem’ [that explain] the ‘miserable death’ of the Johannesburg CBD [Central Business District]” (Rogerson & Rogerson, 1997, p. 99). This frame positioned the traders as moral citizens deserving of help, especially because they had not resorted to crime. The specific help it asked of the city was not the provision of handouts but, as stated in its memorandum to Mayor Maseko on 24 July 2007, simply a place to trade:

The Mayor must be aware there are high rates of unemployment in the country and that rates of poverty are very high ... We demand that there must be more stores given for trading so that people can earn a living.

In using the poverty frame in this way, One Voice relied heavily on solutions (prognostic frame), suggesting that the problem was easy to solve. This frame articulation sought to contest the common image of poor people, who were unemployed due to personal failings (I. E. Marais, 2016), and rather showed them working to improve their lot. One Voice’s use of the poverty frame showed that the organisation had come under the sway of South Africa’s neoliberal culture, wherein their poverty was not structural so much as the poor people’s personal failing (I. E. Marais, 2016). One Voice’s framing aligned it with a neoliberal

subjectivity, that is, “individualised market-based empowerment” (Barchiesi, 2004, p. 12). It amplified a neoliberal political culture whereby the practices of the South African government and the values of prosperity churches were aligned. The neoliberal frame encouraged individual entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency (Cant & Ligthelm, 2002; Preisendörfer et al., 2012), rather than solutions rooted in solidarity. Therefore, when using a poverty frame which showed the poor as actively engaged in their own upliftment, One Voice achieved frame resonance (Benford & Snow, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Ketelaars, 2016; Snow & Benford, 1988; Steinberg, 1998), by appealing to the city’s wish to promote entrepreneurship.

As I showed in the chapter on desire, and as I will further show in the chapter on audience, this frame resonance was helpful in terms of the “logic of influence” (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484), because in using this language they were able to get access to their local councillor, convince JPC to provide an office space, and (after my fieldwork ended, and in collaboration with other traders’ organisations) the city agreed to upgrade trading stalls in the inner city and elsewhere in Johannesburg. And according to conversations I have had with Frans and Julekha, the upgrades have commenced.

However, it is important to be cautious of proclaiming the success of this frame, because the city has continued to adopt a “restrictive approach to street trading in the inner city” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015, p. 80). Part of the weakness of the frame stems from the fact that traders do not seek to overthrow municipal by-laws entirely, but instead seek to work within the logic of the city’s frames. As such they are dependent on the city’s benevolence and accommodations, but do not challenge the city to extend beyond merely provision and upgrading of stalls (Webster, 2017)

One Voice further framed their members as having huge barriers to addressing their poverty because they could not come together as traders’ organisations due to the fact that traders cannot leave their stalls. Indeed, despite recognising this problem, One Voice has not successfully developed frames that reach its members in order to bring them together. Therefore, it is not surprising that the city actively dismissed traders’ organisations as unrepresentative (Matjomane, 2013; Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014). In this respect, the poverty frame is not effectively working to bring members together, and

during my fieldwork, many traders even argued that they were not part of the working class, but rather business people.

In arguing that they were not part of the working class, the traders were dismissing the stigma associated with being poor and actively claiming a more respectable title of being business people. One Voice had been unable to use the poverty frame to grow its membership, and thereby leverage more power. In using the poverty frame among its membership, compared with using the poverty frame to address the city government, One Voice did not achieve frame resonance, and did not align its frames with the logic of membership (Klüver et al., 2015).

For both organisations, the poverty frame was primarily used as a diagnostic frame, in that it identified the problems of their respective organisation members. However, One Voice was also able to turn it into a prognostic frame, suggesting that the prognosis was two-fold, that is, (1) the traders must proactively develop their businesses to overcome poverty; and (2) the city must allocate more bays to traders in order to make street trade more viable. In terms of achieving their political goals only ICRC used poverty to powerful effect in terms of building collective action while, but both organisations also managed to use the poverty frame to attract audiences beyond their membership, in the form of donors for ICRC and the city government for One Voice.

One Voice has most effectively wielded the poverty frame to secure trading bays for its members. However, in terms of the logic of influence, the poverty frame did not serve to get the organisations media attention. As described in the literature review, the media exclude the poor from participating in media framing contests on poverty (Mudzamiri, 2009). This exclusion results from the fact that, despite being sympathetic to the poor, the media do not provide a structural analysis of where poverty comes from (Chiumbu et al., 2016a). So, for example, the media might sympathetically cover a particular eviction case, but they do not dig down into the structural reasons for eviction. Therefore, when the two organisations talk about the sources of poverty in terms of government's useless or destructive actions, the media were not paying attention. As such, none of the organisations were able to access media power when using the poverty frame and, indeed, none of the organisations received any media coverage during the course of my research.

The poverty frame used by both organisations pointed to the poor as victims of circumstance but, with respect to One Voice also suggested that poor people were empowered to act, and indeed do act to do what they can to alleviate their plight. In the case of ICRC, the poverty frame was strongly linked to the rights frame, which will be discussed in the next subsection.

6.4.2 Rights frame

As discussed in the literature review, a human rights culture has been inculcated in South African pro-poor subjectivity (Van Heusden & Pointer, 2006), and this culture has been reaffirmed by several court rulings on the provision of HIV/AIDS medicine, on inner city housing rights, and on the right to trade in inner city Johannesburg (*Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2)*, 2002; *South African Informal Traders Forum and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others*, 2014; *Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others*, 2008). Therefore, it not surprising that ICRC have adopted a rights frame.

In particular, based on the 2008 Constitutional Court ruling, ICRC argued that the city government was obliged to meaningfully engage with them as representatives of those facing eviction. For example, in my observation on 16 October 2018, Shereza argued:

The weapon to shake Mashaba is the 2008 Constitutional Court judgement ... the city must engage with civil society in the inner city and provide housing, must provide accommodation for the poor but none has been provided and the city went to court to get a stay on the Constitutional Court ruling.

As Dugard (2016) points out, in the 2008 court ruling, it did not specify with whom the city must engage before undertaking an eviction. Therefore, in applying the court's ruling, the City of Johannesburg does not need to engage with organisations like the ICRC, but only with the residents of a building who are actually facing eviction. Even though the court ruling also specified that the city must provide housing, it did not specify the type of housing, and therefore the city has been able to get away with providing temporary accommodation and even tents (Ah Goo, 2018b).

Nonetheless, ICRC also invoked other Constitutional rights. For example, in a 2007 submission to the Johannesburg Inner City summit, it argued that a stable society is not

possible without the people of the inner city being able to access land and shelter. They further argued that, through urban development, city government must overturn the ills of apartheid and not discriminate against the poor. However, it did not only rely on legalistic argument; its explanation of rights relied on evoking pity for inner city residents. For example, in an undated pamphlet entitled *The Impact of Eviction on Migrants*, it provided a detailed description of rights violations created by evictions:

The sheer noise, confusion, and scale of the process of eviction can be a terrifying experience for any child. The loss of possessions such as school materials: books and uniforms during evictions, and the disruption to parents' lives can have a serious effect on the ability of children to attend school. Adequate housing and secure living conditions are integral to children's welfare, and are guaranteed by the SA and international law.

Much of ICRC's organisation work also revolved around rights, in that it brought together women of all nationalities to teach them about their rights so that they could challenge human rights violations. The organisation also ran workshops in which it shared with its members procedural ways that they may challenge evictions. For example, on its now redesigned website, it argued that if ICRC equipped people with relevant knowledge, they would be able to challenge the government and fight for their rights.

However, in a personal conversation with Shereza on 4 November 2019, she observed that rights talk had become useless, because they had won numerous cases to stop evictions from one building or another, but this had not led to a change in policy. Indeed, the transformative possibilities are, in practice overstated, since the Constitutional Court faces a balancing act between the socio-economic rights of the public, and government's ability to only provide progressive realisation of rights (Cachalia, 2018). As such, Constitutional Court limitations have led to a political culture in which "faith in the constitutional project" sits uncomfortably with "a mood of disappointment and criticism drawing on critical race theory, postmodernism, poststructuralism, Africanist and Black Consciousness political traditions, and postcolonial theory" (Cachalia, 2018, p. 377). And for activist organisations there is a tension between pursuing litigation and pursuing mobilisation, whereby an excessive focus on pursuing legal cases dissipates energy for pursuing other forms of action (Davis, 2011; Johnson, 2006; Liebenberg, 2007). Further, the potential for leveraging the frame in inner city is limited, since Johannesburg Mayor Mashaba reportedly lashed out at rights-based CBOs and NGOs for thwarting efforts to address housing matters in the inner city (Mathope,

2017). As such, the rights frame adopted by ICRC had not gained traction in securing the government's ear.

The rights frame and the poverty frame work together to build a picture of the injustices organisation members' face. But these are quite inward-looking frames, in that they focus on what is going on for the members, and posit their members as victims of government failures. As Deleuze (1996, para. 1) explains, rights are "pure abstraction"; they are set up as wish fulfilment for achieving that which is not currently being achieved (a lack); they cannot come about through declarations, but only through connecting the desiring machine in such a way as to produce rights in practice, that is, production of a flow of power to become meaningful in material terms.

In the next section, I will discuss more outward-looking frames, where the CBOs identify government action and the environment in which they live.

6.5 CLUSTER OF FRAMES ON GOVERNMENT FAILURES

Not surprisingly, given that the local government was a key audience targeted by One Voice and ICRC, analysis of local government's role and action formed a key part of the messages that the two organisations communicated. Both ICRC and One Voice framed the government as failing them, however, they did not place equal weight on frames that identified the source of the problem. For example, ICRC used an economic frame and pinpointed the neoliberal intentions of the city, which it saw as government deliberately disregarding the voice of inner city dwellers and listening closely to capitalist investors looking to turn a profit. In contrast, One Voice frequently complained about corruption, which involved petty corruption at the level of taking bribes from traders, and failures in the administration of the JPC (contracted by local government to manage trading stalls). Both organisations also used the 'crime and grime' frame, and framed the police as a major source of (negative) engagement with the city.

These frames did not flow one into the other, so they are not presented in any particular order, however, I will first discuss the economic frame, followed by the corruption frame (which encompasses corruption by city officials, police corruption, and the allegedly corrupt JPC administrators), followed by the crime and grime frame. However, the frames do yield a

picture of the complexity of the city, and the alleged failure of local government to address the needs of inner city residents, traders and foreign nationals.

6.5.1 Economic frame: Pro- and anti-neoliberal talk

As discussed in the literature review, the main political parties in South Africa have adopted a neoliberal approach to government, and this is reflected in the governance of inner city Johannesburg, regardless of which party led city government prior to and during the course of this research (Bond, 2000; Madlingozi, 2007; Mosselson, 2020; M. Pieterse, 2019; Visser, 2004; Von Schnitzler, 2008, 2016). With respect to the housing requirements needed for inner city residents, the DA proposed to release 'bad buildings' to private investors, support the private sector in refurbishing the buildings, and set aside 20% of the residences so created for 'inclusionary housing' (City of Johannesburg, 2018). However, the terms of its inclusion assumed that most inner city residents, earning an average of R3500 a month, could afford R2100 rent (SERI, 2018). The economic frame used by the city government is therefore pro-investor, in that the private sector and its investments are assumed to be of benefit to all Johannesburg residents.

To challenge the city government, like the social movements that came before (cf. Ballard, 2005; Desai, 2002; McKinley, 2016; Runciman, 2012; von Holdt & Naidoo, 2019), ICRC used an anti-neoliberal economic frame to tackle the local government's pro-investor frame. It argued that the city was only looking after the interests of investors and the wealthy, while neglecting the interests of the poor. For example, on a placard at its protest march on 14 November 2018, it asked:

Why give property to private investors? We will never have affordable housing!

In an invitation to a mass meeting on 2 June 2017, ICRC argued that the type of housing being developed by investors was too expensive, and therefore exclusionary, not inclusionary. It further argued that most inner city residents were poor, yet the government was only setting aside 20% of investor renovated buildings for 'inclusionary housing'. The organisation further pointed out that housing could not hope to be inclusionary if it excluded the poor from participating in the planning process and decision-making (as it did with respect to the JICP meeting, described in the chapter on desire). But the ICRC did not only frame the plans as unrealistic and exclusionary: it described them as offensive. For example,

on a placard at its 14 November 2018 protest, it pointed to the reality of what had so far been provided, and the possible next steps for housing provision in the inner city:

Mashaba's housing plan
Shacks
Tents
Containers
Slums
Next kennels for 2019

Finally, positioning itself as opposed to the language of a “world class African city”, which was discussed in the literature review, at the second workshop the ICRC spelled out its vision as being for an inclusive city, which included the poor, street traders, and foreign nationals.

These frames contested the terrain on which Mayor Mashaba was making plans for the inner city, wherein he saw his collaborations with investors as the only way forward for housing provision in the inner city (City of Johannesburg, 2018). In particular, he saw the 20% requirement as adequate for addressing the needs of the poor. The tone of ICRCs communications about the government’s pro-investor stance, as uncovered during my fieldwork, was one of resignation.

In Workshop 2, ICRC members expressed that they felt “rejected and ignored”; they said they were “disappointed”, “flabbergasted”, and disgusted by the mayor because of the favour shown to investors. One workshop participant went so far as to say she wished “the earth must open up and take me”. The emotion behind the anti-neoliberal economic frame, seemed to suggest depression among members, but this affective quality was in marked contrast to the generally upbeat, fighting spirit ICRC members also exhibited. The emotions are part of what put “the heat into cognition” (Gamson, 2003, p. 92) into any frame; the ICRC frames were not just dry logical, rational construct, but deeply felt. And apart from the sway of critical messaging, it was the emotion that bound ICRC members together, as discussed in the chapter on desire. The emotional discontents and rallies to resist were in stark contrast to the penny-counting approach of the city government.

Traders also felt disappointed with the actions of the city government, and their failure to implement fair stall allocation, as highlighted below.

6.5.2 Corruption frame

One Voice used the corruption frame to talk about problems in the inner city, especially to discuss traders' problems with the police and with the companies contracted to provide trading stalls to traders. Complaints of corruption, included paying bribes to the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) in order to prevent the confiscation of stock because "[e]nforcement officers are given the power to impound traders' goods who contravene the bylaws" (Matjomane, 2013, p. 25). However, traders argued that the JMPD over-exerted their power, even impounding goods of those not contravening any bylaws. For example, in my walk-about with Julekha Latib in the inner City on 30 September 2018, one trader explained that JMPD harassed traders even if they had legal papers to show they were paying rent. She said, "They still want money, otherwise they take your stuff". Traders also pointed out that when their stock was confiscated, JMPD did not give them a receipt for confiscated stock and did not take it to a regulated storage area so that traders could retrieve stock on payment of a fine. Instead the stock went missing and traders believed the police were selling the stock themselves.

One Voice members also presented personal examples of unjust police action, for example, one committee member contacted me via WhatsApp on 17 October 2018 to share an encounter she had experienced earlier in the day:

I was going to a meeting on Sunday, and on the way, I saw some traders with the police. The police just came and took their goods. I tried to help them but the police weren't listening. They just took the goods without even giving a receipt. They supposed to give a receipt.

Because police harassment was so frequent, when I visited Frans Seema at his stall on 18 September 2018, he even made a joke about it: "Illegal traders face a lot of harassment. But they are used to running. *[laughs]* They are very fit!" The JMPD corruption has been pointed out in the literature by Bénit-Gbaffou (2018a, 2018b), Jonathan (2018), and Roever (2016); therefore the public policies that do exist are "necessary public relations instruments" (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018b, p. 12), rather than providing protection for traders. Despite complaining of corruption, One Voice did not call for new policy that allowed for anyone and everyone to trade. They reported problems in the registration system and complained when administrative procedures were not followed. However, as I pointed out in the chapter on Desire, One Voice also leveraged the administrative failures to prevent evictions of traders

from stalls on the grounds that the JPC did not know who was registered and who was not, and who had paid and who had not. At the One Voice office on 11 November 2018, a One Voice committee member told me:

People are facing evictions because they haven't paid rent because they did not receive statements, because they are not registered on the system.

They explained that there was a system backlog because the previous administrator had not done her job. They said they had found boxes full of six years of administrative records dumped in an empty room infested with cockroaches. A new administrator had been instated, and the One Voice committee members thought the new administrator might catch up and get the systems in order. But in 2019 Julekha told me in a private conversation that the new administrator was also taking money without issuing receipts and also had not put data onto the computer system.

Regardless of whether they had paid or not, One Voice's committee said they would protect their members because those who had not paid were aware that they would be given no proof of payment, so regardless of whether they paid or not, they could equally face eviction. This shows that although One Voice wielded the corruption frame to their advantage, arguing that traders had not paid due to corruption, they also argued that traders should nevertheless not be evicted for non-payment. This is opposite to the claim by Webster (2017, p. 119), who argued that traders do not want to overthrow municipal by-laws entirely, but only want formal strategies of professionalisation and litigation. In this case, One Voice members protected members whether or not they complied with the law.

One committee member told me that the JPC had asked One Voice to keep records on their behalf, but One Voice was not willing to do so (in any case, they did not have the administrative capacity). This reveals a hidden strategy on the part of One Voice in that they framed themselves as law-abiding, while eluding the implementation of an effective administration system. Traders also believed that an auditing company, Ernst and Young, had found evidence of wrongdoing by the JPC and the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) (another outsourced provider for traders) but that the JPC and MTC were sitting on the report. In a protest memorandum issued to Mayor Parks Tau on 26 June 2013, it demanded that the city government release the report, instead of "sitting on top of it because of their corruption". This revealed how reporting corruption was used to organise traders into

protesting, but that it also used the corruption of officials to claim their own right to act outside the law.

In using the corruption frame, they also emphasised the injuries to traders, and implied that the JPC should be sympathetic given their own failures. For example, in an email on 18 October 2018 to the JPC from the One Voice committee, they argued:

... these unfortunate Traders sitting in their stalls or cages since 2013 to date have no records of ever existing on the system, moneys were taken from them, and promises made by [name of administrator], its utterly very, very sad that these poor traders were abused, treated in a very undignified manner, and on behalf they want answers.

Similarly, even though at the first PAR workshop Julekha had argued that they did not want to support illegal traders, in practice, when she encountered harassment of (unknown and possibly illegal) traders by police, she tried to intervene and stop the confiscation of stock (as described in the WhatsApp message above). While various authors have argued that traders want consistent procedures for registering as legal traders (cf. Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018b; Daniel, 2017; Mmbulaheni, 2015), they were adept at using the corruption frame to call out police for illegal actions, but happy to move between legality and illegality to protect traders.

One Voice was able to wield power using the frame, because they used it to build solidarity among members, and they leveraged the corruption frame to reject the JPC's efforts to evict members. As such, the corruption frame built both inward and outward power for the organisation. Although this was not a coherent, thought out strategy in the organisation, the use of political opportunity by the organisation pointed to complex relationships with power and a political instinct for addressing power. While I have shown in the previous subsections that the CBOs wielded frames differently, as I will discuss below, they found common ground with the grime frame, while diverging even more on their approach to the crime frame.

6.5.3 Crime and grime frame

As discussed in the literature review and the conceptual framework, the City of Johannesburg has often blamed the poor for 'crime and grime' in the inner city and has been accused of criminalising the survival strategies of inner city residents and traders (including

foreign nationals) (cf. Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018; Daniel, 2017; McMichael, 2015; Mosselson, 2015; Murray, 2008; Todes, 2012; Wilhelm-Solomon, 2016; Zulu, 2020). However, the crime and grime frame was also prevalent among the members of the CBOs in this study.

The CBO members agreed that the city was dirty and that crime was high, but they rejected the idea that they were to blame for either the crime or the grime. They also argued that they should not be responsible for cleaning the city up as they had neither the facilities nor services to do so (for example, inner city residents often had water cut off so cleaning could not be done; traders did not have access to toilets near their trading bays, so public urination was necessary). In other words, the CBOs flipped the crime and grime frame on its head: while government blamed poor people, the CBOs blamed government.

For example, at the 12 November 2018 ICRC meeting to organise a protest march, One Voice Chairperson, Zachariah Ramutula, lamented:

Pikitung [cleaning company contracted by the city] they don't do their job, they must be scrutinised to do a proper job. ... If people are working on the streets they have nowhere to toilet, government needs to provide affordable toilets and dustbins ... not complaining about people making the city dirty.

ICRC agreed that people living and working in the city were being blamed for the dirt and treated as if they were part of the rubbish. Therefore, in a mock protest at Workshop 1, ICRC members demanded: "*Mashaba listen to our voices ... we are not rubbish ... We are not rubbish!*" Similarly, at Workshop 2, members of all two organisations said the city government was "*creating a pauper city, a dirty city, a drug city, a crazy city, a kak city, a makaka city*". According to One Voice and ICRC, the problem was that the government had outsourced cleaning of the inner city, and the outsourced company was not doing its job.

The two CBOs argued that informal waste reclaimers should be provided with safety and cleaning equipment and be paid by the city, rather than outsourcing to Pikitung. Sekhwela and Samson (2020) point out that the city and informal waste reclaimers have not been able to find a way to a common understanding of how to integrate the informal waste reclaimers in the Pikitung project. Without developing common ground between the city and informal waste reclaimers, the city's efforts to integrate informal waste reclaimers keep failing. The waste reclaimers see Pikitung's involvement as a kind of 'colonisation' of their territory (Samson, 2020). The waste reclaimers also do not have solidarity among themselves,

because they treat the areas where they collect refuse as 'territories' over which they have established ownership, and also waste reclaimers compete with each other to collect more refuse (Samson, 2019). Because these circumstances leave the matter of waste collection unresolved, inner city residents and traders argue that the city is responsible for creating agreements, and therefore they must find a way to incorporate waste reclaimers, instead of further giving ground to Pikitup.

ICRC also viewed the denial of service actions implemented by the city government as the cause of 'bad buildings', as well as the cause of dirty streets because the homeless were forced to sleep on the streets and use the streets as their toilet. Research by Ah Goo (2018b) confirms that evictions are leading to more homelessness, and she also points out that when people are evicted from one part of the city so that 'upgrades' can happen, evictees then move to another part of the city that then becomes more dilapidated. As such, the problem of 'bad buildings' keeps moving around the city, but is never dealt with.

During my walkabout of the inner city with ICRC members on 16 October 2018, a member in her dilapidated flat explained:

Look at the walls [covered in damp and mould]. The roof have been leaking since 2011. But there is no one to fix it. We don't have water. The building next door got water but its standing empty. We are living here but we've got no water. We go next door and get five or six buckets a day. But we can't keep the building clean with that.

As stated in an undated pamphlet entitled *The Impact of Eviction on Migrants*, ICRC said the solution to 'bad buildings' was not to evict people, but rehabilitate the buildings and provide residents with the means to keep them clean (e.g. water provision and regular refuse removal).

Residents and traders alike expressed a strong need for the city to be cleaned up. For example, a One Voice member at the third PAR workshop, expressed that:

One Voice vision is for a clean, safe healthy environment, working together with communities to bring about a better life to sustain livelihoods. Everything must be nice around the stalls. We don't want it dirty here. The city are not cleaning but people are trading food in environmentally unsafe space.

Previously, in Workshop 2, they had stated that Mayor Mashaba should address the dirtiness around trading bays by providing dustbins, stock storage areas, toilets where

traders could relieve themselves, employing informal waste reclaimers, providing them with suitable protective clothing and equipment, and providing them with showers where they could wash after spending the day dealing with refuse.

Apart from evictions and service disconnections leading to grime, ICRC also made a strong link between the city's failing and resulting crime. It emphasised that when electricity was switched off in buildings, the buildings were so dark at night as to make crime possible, because criminals were invisible and could "lurk there" (Press release, 14 November 2018). Wilhelm-Solomon (2017) also argues that the darkness of inner city buildings can lead to criminality, and also to residents being the target of crime.

At Workshop 2, ICRC members also explained that they had met nurses and teachers living on the streets because they had been evicted. Because they had no home they could not be presentable for work and had lost their jobs. ICRC members explained that this led to two types of criminal activity, that is, petty thefts/muggings, and substance abuse to deal with depression.

However, ICRC pointed out that it was not only street people and poor residents that were responsible for crime. For example, in a press release on 16 July 2009, it said numerous illegal evictions were taking place because of collaboration between unscrupulous landlords/building management agencies and city officials. ICRC also underscored that city policies meant that bylaws outlawed many ordinary activities the poor use to survive. For example, where landlords had abandoned buildings, 'building hijackers' took over, and residents were willing to pay them as they took on the role of managing the building, keeping residents safe and fixing shared facilities. Calling these buildings 'hijacked buildings', has criminalised building residents and has become "a legal tool to justify displacement, stripping any perceived rights of the occupants to have a voice in the redevelopment" (Albisa et al., 2013, p. 105). The residents of these buildings face continual harassment from police and security services (Ah Goo, 2018a; McMichael, 2015; Wilhelm-Solomon, 2016, 2017), albeit that the courts have declared many eviction attempts illegal in long running battles between residents, the City of Johannesburg and landlords (Wilhelm-Solomon, 2020a). The language of legality and illegality continue to play out, such that a "deferred emergency arises" (Wilhelm-Solomon, 2020a, p. 406), where neither residents or the city find a solution to the inner city housing crisis.

Furthermore, Shereza explained to me that whereas in townships people can access free basic water and electricity, the city had not made it possible for inner city residents to access such services. In many buildings, water and electricity services have been cut off (Tissington, 2013), and therefore, city residents often resorted to 'illegal connections' of water and electricity because they needed to access the services. Indeed, city officials' definition of residents as criminals seems to hinge on these illegal connections; Wilhelm-Solomon (2017, p. 183) highlights the comment of one official who says: "It is a common practice that bad buildings attract criminal elements; illegal connections of electricity; illegal connections of water". However, despite the city government's attempts to make life difficult for inner city residents by cutting off services in order to move them out of the inner city, a "ruinous vitalism" persists, with social relations and infrastructure constantly being broken down and regenerated (Wilhelm-Solomon, 2017, p. 183). While some criminal activity, such as drug dealing do occur in these buildings, these are "mostly practiced by a minority of occupants", so the city overstates crime in order to exert control over the buildings.

In terms of power then, ICRC's position on the legality of residents' stay in dilapidated buildings held some sway in the courts, and so sometimes the ICRC wielded enough power to keep people in buildings. However, the city also continues to evict from illegal buildings, by providing 'temporary emergency accommodation' (TEA) to evictees (as required by the law) but the types of TEA provided are unsuitable for long term housing (Tissington, 2013; Wilhelm-Solomon, 2020a; Wilson et al., 2015). The framing of crime therefore represents a power tussle between ICRC members and the City of Johannesburg, which will no doubt continue to play out in the courts, without a change in direction from the city in terms of housing provision.

The language of One Voice regarding crime in the inner city was more complex, and in fact, members did not agree on the correct way to deal with 'illegal' trade, as I have already discussed in the chapter on Desire. For example, when I met him at his stall on 18 September 2018, Frans told me that 'illegal traders' were One Voice's main members "because once someone is declared legal they don't keep up with us." In the eyes of Frans, then, the line between legality and illegality was small, and could be remedied by the city providing more trading spaces, rather than clamping down on illegal traders. Previous to this, in 2015, the organisation was well aligned with this idea, for example, in a 2 June 2015 *Submission to the City on the City Roadmap*, it said that illegal trading could be eliminated

by demarcating trading areas where no demarcations existed. They argued that instead of creating 'crime' by declaring some traders illegal, the city could eliminate a lot of crime by simply allowing people to trade instead. For example, in a protest march memorandum to Mayor Parks Tau on 26 June 2013, it said:

We live in a country that has a high rate of crime and many people have resorted to doing crime as a living. But many of us (hawkers) have tried to do what is called "vukuzenzele" [wake up and do it for yourself] by trading and selling our products on the streets or where ever [sic] possible, were [sic] we can access local markets.

However, as I discussed in the chapter on Desire, it is unclear if the organisation ever had unity around the issue of 'illegal trade', because at the first PAR workshop and during my walkabout of the inner city on 18 September 2018, some members expressed the belief that illegal traders were destroying the livelihoods of legal traders, because they had lower overheads (did not have to pay rent) and could therefore sell products cheaper. For example, during the walkabout, one trader commented: "The police must be clear who are legal and illegal traders. Illegal traders must register or else we won't defend them if police confiscate their goods."

Another source of contention between members was around the issue of illicitly traded goods and counterfeit goods. As I will explain in the chapter on aesthetics, in the course of observing the organisation in action, several One Voice members wore t-shirts condemning trade in illicit goods, and they sought to distance themselves from these traders, claiming such trade damages the economy. As explained in the literature review and the conceptual framework, the city government uses this language of counterfeit goods to clamp down on all traders (Arias, 2019; Moyo, 2017) and, during the course of my research, launched raids against foreign national whom it said were trading in such goods (Mabuza, 2019b, 2019a; Ngatane, 2019). The language of some members of One Voice echoed the city official's language, in that they argued people did not pay tax on illicit trade and therefore they were robbing the government of income. For example, it joined in a protest with the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) on 6 March 2018, in which the memorandum to the South African Revenue Service (SARS) stated:

We demand that SARS take an active and rigorous approach in declaring a "LEGAL WAR" on illicit trade in South Africa given that Illicit Trading is essentially a criminal

act and may be treated as such by Authorities, such as SARS and SAPS [South African Police Service].

(The t-shirts, and printed pamphlets and posters for this protest, and the buses to transport people to the protest were paid for by the registered tobacco companies fighting illicit trade in cigarettes.) However, a trader who I spoke to during my walkabout of the inner city on 18 September 2018 said, with respect to trading in illicit tobacco products:

You can't stop these illegal cigarettes. People are buying them because they can't afford legal ones. Traders are selling them because they've got a market. If people can afford the legal one, they are going to buy it.

As discussed in the chapter on desire, these disagreements between One Voice members meant that the organisation was not able to build a steady solidarity, and therefore the organisations did not build overarching solidarity campaigns across the city. The contradictory framing kept One Voice bound in micro-politics at the micro-level of each city councillor and each branch of the JPC. As discussed in the subsection on corruption framing above, this can lead to an effective micro-politics that allows One Voice to prevent evictions at the local level, and even to demand an upgrade of trading facilities, but it prevents traders from finding common ground.

Regarding the use of the crime and grime by ICRC and One Voice, we see a complex terrain of power and desire, whereby the organisations contest and accommodate the frame. ICRC, and in some instances One Voice, repurposed the language to lay responsibility for solving crime and grime at the door of the city. One Voice and ICRC were particularly aligned on the grime frame, in that they argued the city was not doing enough to keep the city clean, and the city's strategy for keeping the city clean was not appropriate to the circumstances of residents, inner city traders, and waste reclaimers. Despite this shared frame, which was touched on by both organisations at the workshops and in the 12 November 2018 meeting at the ICRC offices, they did not build solidarity with each other around the issue, and furthermore did not build solidarity with waste reclaimers. As such, the frame was not powerfully deployed by these CBOs.

By contrast, when the ICRC deployed the crime frame, it underscored why 'illegal' service connections were important for inner city residents. It emphasised that evictions created crime, in that people were destitute and lost their jobs, so it was able to challenge the city on its record of crime prevention. It also highlighted the illegal actions of city officials

with respect to illegal evictions, and aligned its frames with legal terms to demand justice for potential evictees. Using the crime frame was successful for ICRC in that it was able to leverage the language in court and therefore able to stop evictions (albeit not all evictions). Furthermore, inner city residents who were victims of crime, found solidarity in ICRC. The ICRC interpreted crime in defiance of the city's framing of crime.

One Voice's frame alignment with the city was much stronger in that it accepted that local government was responsible for allocating trading bays, and merely wanted government to extend those spaces. Some members also agreed that illegal traders were a problem and were in favour of government and police action against illegal traders. In this sense, One Voice's frames were not really challenging the city to change its policies, but rather just extending the space allocated to traders. When using this frame, members sought to secure agreement with the city and use that to leverage concessions. The tone when using this frame was conciliatory and appeasing. Similarly, in the way the organisation addressed the issue of counterfeit goods and illicit trade, many One Voice members made common cause with the government, and sought to distance themselves from illicit traders. The power of this aspect of the crime frame was that One Voice members could position themselves as deserving help from the city, rather than being outright against city policies.

The use of the crime and grime frame revealed a complex pattern of the interplays of power in the inner city. As I will show in the next section, the crime and grime frames are threaded through the xenophobic and anti-xenophobic frames, in that inner city xenophobia is linked to the arguments that (i) foreign nationals do not look after the inner city buildings properly and create overcrowding, (ii) while they are also held responsible for drug dealing and sex work.

6.6 CLUSTER OF FRAMES ON INCLUSION/EXCLUSION

6.6.1 Xenophobic and anti-xenophobic frames

Both ICRC and One Voice members used both xenophobic frames and anti-xenophobic frames. In the chapter on desire, I covered in a fair amount of detail the xenophobic discussion within One Voice, but the focus there was on what type of organisation One Voice members were creating. In this section, I will discuss how xenophobia and anti-

xenophobia are used to build power. Many participants of Workshop 2, during a brainstorming activity on the kind of city they were living in, argued that:

The government is creating a slum ... The government is also escalating xenophobia and creating a xenophobic city.

However, immediately after that statement, one ICRC member stated:

Yes, we do have a problem with xenophobia, but the foreigners are also making problems. They don't want to work with us. When we call them to a meeting they're telling us: "No! Your government is not our problem. You must sort that problem yourself."

In ICRC then, we see an unmet desire for solidarity. As such, debates around xenophobia were prevalent throughout the workshops. Historically, both ICRC and One Voice have been actively anti-xenophobic, and have actively expressed this in protest marches and organisational documents. For example in a memorandum to Mayor Parks Tau on 26 June 2013, One Voice stated:

We demand that metro police must stop insulting the hawkers by calling them foreigners amakwekwere and they must stop influencing xenophobia attacks.

This suggests that, in the past, One Voice had worked in solidarity with foreign street traders. They saw xenophobia as part and parcel of the harassment traders faced from JMPD. Therefore, initially One Voice was building solidarity and alliances with foreign traders. However, in the very same memorandum, One Voice argued that the city must stop allocating specific trading areas to specific nationalities. They pointed to a number of streets and markets where traders were exclusively Congolese, Nigerian and Zimbabwean. This points to the ambivalence of One Voice members to foreign traders, because they view them as competing for space. The strategy for growing solidarity, therefore, appears to be to play both the xenophobic and anti-xenophobic frames at the same time, so as not to lose out on foreign members or xenophobic members.

This double-speak was further apparent when One Voice attended an ICRC protest planning meeting on 12 November 2018. Zachariah stated:

95% of traders are illegal foreign nationals. But we work together as Africans and people of God must work together if they have documents. ... I like everyone as long as you've got relevant documentation. But those foreigners without documents

... Government must evict those foreigners. I'm not xenophobic but it is a problem if South Africans can't get a space. It's unacceptable.

The statistics quoted in this statement are false, but echo various statements from government officials about the prevalence of foreigners in the inner city (Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018; Danso & McDonald, 2001; Ekambaram, 2019). Furthermore, Zachariah Ramutula is part of a prevailing argument that allows all African foreigners to be treated as if they are undocumented 'illegal aliens', despite the Department of Home Affairs having a considerable backlog in issuing documentation (Ekambaram, 2019; Landau, 2006; Pineteh, 2017). However, he also interweaves a key anti-xenophobic frame that has, at times been successfully deployed in South Africa, that is, that Africans are one people, and South Africa should welcome relatives from elsewhere in the continent (Landau & Monson, 2008).

Despite such statements coming from the One Voice chairperson, in the first workshop, many participants were disgruntled with their chairperson and saw him as damaging the reputation of One Voice. It is therefore apparent that xenophobic frames are not part of a planned strategy that One Voice has made but more of a justification and rationalisation of their xenophobia. As Matjomane (2013, p. 45) explains, apartheid-style planning limits the number of trading spaces that are made available, which "triggers competition, tensions and xenophobia conflicts among the street traders". However, the xenophobia is not rooted in deep hatred for foreigners or moral failings of thugs, but form part of a "highly interested debate in which matters of serious material consequence [are] at stake" (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013, p. 588). Because street trade is primarily about economic activity, economic difficulties offer a rich ground for One Voice members to align in common cause around xenophobia dressed up as economic concern and/or economic concern dressed up in xenophobia.

The prevalent micro-fascism was continually being challenged by other One Voice members. As asserted at the above meeting by Frans,

We should not be excluding illegal or legal. We need to come together. People don't have papers because Home Affairs are not doing their job. We can't complain them if they don't have papers. We must understand they got a problem.

In February 2019, another One Voice explained that One Voice leadership had joined other traders' organisations in going to the mayor to insist that all foreign traders in the city be removed. He said that it was "disappointing" and that he was concerned that there would be violence in the inner city as a result. Because of this double-speak, and the disagreement

among members, it was not possible for One Voice to build solidarity with foreign traders, thus limiting their own scope of action and their own power to act. Even within the organisation, conflict limited the power the organisation had to act in unison. The frame therefore stunted the possibilities for One Voice to build power.

The frame generated a break in the machine such that One Voice was not able to insist on a better plan for allocating trading bays in the inner city, and therefore its politics remained at the micro level. As a framing activity, xenophobia may create some synergy with xenophobic traders, but in terms of building relationships with other social justice organisations, frame resonance was not achieved. While the frame fitted into the broader political culture of South Africa, as discussed in the literature review, it could not be used to generate political sympathy in some of the left-wing organisations with which One Voice had sought alliance (e.g. its inability to develop alliances with Oxfam, which I will discuss in the chapter on Audience).

Although ICRC had a strong track record of rejecting xenophobia and involving migrant women in its work, some members still expressed xenophobic sentiments. For example, at the second workshop, in a heated discussion on xenophobia, one woman member stated:

I am not xenophobic. I've got no problem with these foreigners. But the Nigerians are drug dealers ... selling drugs to our children. The police must arrest all of them.

This echoes a common frame around the criminality of foreigners as discussed in the conceptual framework (cf. Banda & Mawadza, 2015; Chiumbu & Moyo, 2018; Crush, 1999; Kerr & Durrheim, 2013; Steenkamp, 2009). However, after the woman's statement, other the ICRC members negated what she had said, explaining they had foreign members and many South Africans sell drugs so Nigerians should not be singled out. They blamed "fat cats", politicians and white people for the problems of the inner city, and insisted that South Africans and foreigners faced similar problems in the inner city so should unite. ICRC, therefore, showed political savvy in building solidarity. The most successful anti-xenophobic frames deployed have been ones where locals and foreigners identify a shared struggle and stand together (Kerr et al., 2019).

Nevertheless, in an aside after the first workshop, Shereza expressed frustration that many foreigners kept themselves apart from local struggles. Therefore, in spite of its efforts, ICRC struggled to build solidarity with foreigners, which confirms Ramaprasad et al's (2015)

assertion that South Africans complain that foreigners hold themselves apart and have retreated into enclaves, leading to further misunderstanding and prejudice. Albeit that ICRC has made some headway by including foreigners in its activities and has even employed a number of foreigners at its office members had to continually reassert anti-xenophobic frames to keep any xenophobic members in check.

Even though members of One Voice expressed a number of xenophobic frames, they could, within the same statement also deploy anti-xenophobic frames, for example, that all African are one. Most members of One Voice and ICRC who made xenophobic remarks during the course of this research also asserted they are not xenophobic but have particular problems with having foreigners in the country. For One Voice, these were economic issues, while the one xenophobic member of ICRC focussed on crime (drug dealing).

Both One Voice and ICRC members were aware of how anti-xenophobia could be used to build solidarity, but only ICRC deployed this as an active part of their political programmes and succeeded in bringing on board foreigners in its membership and staff structures.

6.6.2 Gender/Feminist frames

As discussed in the literature review and the conceptual framework, gender violence and gender exclusion are a key part of South Africa's political culture – on both an interpersonal and organisational level. Therefore, it is not surprising that these frames were deployed by organisations. In terms of One Voice, only Julekha used a gender/feminist frame, and this was deployed to point out how other steering committee members did not listen to her but depended on her to do all the organisational work. This frame can be regarded as a personal one, rather than an organisational one, and apart from Julekha's comments I did not witness any overt gender incidents in One Voice during my fieldwork.

By contrast, the gender/feminist frame was strongly embedded in ICRC's work. For example, on their website, before it went defunct, there was a clear emphasis on gender:

There is a need to challenge this human rights violation this can be done by educating women about their rights...

This frame was matched by organisational action (as discussed in the chapter on desire). They used the frame to attract women to the organisation, and held specifically women-

focussed events, for example, in an invitation to a celebration of its women's forum on 16 September 2017, it said the women's forum is a

platform created by women members of the Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC) for women living in the inner-city of Johannesburg. These women meet, share stories and experience of life, encourage, support and inspire one another in different matters.

This event was a conscious effort to build collective action among women, and the frame built solidarity in the organisation, between women. Notably, the frame pointed to the affective qualities of engagement, that is, story and experience sharing, encouragement, support and inspiration. As I have previously mentioned in this chapter, the women's forum was specifically designed to bring foreign nationals and South Africans together so that they could build camaraderie and overcome xenophobia. In Workshop 3, in the activity for selecting organisational frames, ICRC members split into two groups. One of the groups specifically chose the frame "Observe women's rights", highlighting the extent to which women's rights are embedded in the organisation, and also their intention to use the frame in organising and political action.

Both the framing of women in this way and the organisational activities in this regard are in marked contrast to many other civil society organisations in South Africa. Indeed, in South Africa gender/feminism in political organisations is seen as 'divisive' and women's discussions of politics are labelled 'gossip' (Eriksson, 2007; Jolaosho, 2017; Miller, 2016; Pointer, 2004). Gender violence is also common in South African civil society organisations (Maluleke & Moyer, 2020; Miller, 2017; Pointer, 2004). As such, ICRC strongly pushed back against South African political culture and showed the possibility for civil society organisations tackling socio-economic issues to ensure that gender is considered a key part of solidarity, and far from being 'divisive' was in fact inclusive.

6.7 HOW THE CBOs GENERATE POWER (OR NOT) THROUGH FRAMES

As discussed in the conceptual framework, the main purpose of framing exercises for organisations such as CBOs is to build collective action and to influence other powerful role-players in society (Aslanidis, 2018; Ayres, 2004; Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 2000; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Gamson, 1995, 2003; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; S. D. Reese,

2007; Snow, 2008; Snow & Benford, 1988). Framing activities by people and organisations help them to establish power and influence (Hertog & McLeod, 2001). However, frames are always being contested, and so the CBOs in this study must compete with other power brokers to spread their chosen frames to supporters, allies, and even perhaps changing people's views to bring new allies on board (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Entman, 1993; Gamson et al., 1992; Pan & Kosicki, 2001).

In the findings above, I showed how ICRC and One Voice consciously emphasised the importance of building for collective action in order to build power. Both organisations also used the poverty frame, albeit that they deployed it in markedly different ways. The only other frames deployed across the board were anti-xenophobic frames; however, the frame did not strongly build the power of both organisations, since only ICRC used it to establish solidarity with foreigners.

The rights frame was a key part of the framing activity for ICRC, but it was slowly moving away from this frame because of the limited power and efficacy of winning single cases in courts while systemic changes were needed. One Voice and ICRC also used the crime and grime frame, and strongly rejected the city government's discourse blaming inner city residents, traders and foreigners for the crime and grime. Instead they blamed government's strategies for perpetuating problems. One Voice also deployed a corruption frame, which was particularly associated with petty corruption by JMPD, the police, and low ranking administrators at JPC. The gender/feminist frame was a key part of ICRC's organising.

However, it is not enough to just identify which frames are being deployed. The key reason for analysing frames in this thesis is to assess how they build power for the CBOs. The struggle over meaning can generate "relationships, problems, coalitions, and configurations of connectedness or power or both" (Mander, 1999, p. 3). In terms of power, it is necessary for the deployed frames to strongly connect with audiences in order to build solidarity or identify shared interests. The frames must also form part of organisational practice and creativity (i.e. desire). Ideally, the frames would also be disseminated through effective aesthetic communication, and using suitable communication tools.

Importantly, not all frames gain traction, as powerful elites tend to be better able to disseminate their frames, and therefore their frames have more influence (Carragee &

Roefs, 2004; Entman, 1993, 2007; Gitlin, 2003; Matthes, 2012). For organisations such as CBOs, it is difficult to be heard when elite voices dominate (Bullock et al., 2001). Throughout this chapter, I have identified the possibilities for each frame to build organisational power and for it to get a hearing in the public domain, or in the corridors of power.

To bring this data together, below I discuss the power potential of each organisation, as it generates or breaks political flow for each of them. Firstly, I will discuss if/how frames deployed by One Voice allowed it to generate the most power (in relation to membership and government officials). I will then examine the dense frames used by ICRC to build strong solidarity networks.

6.7.1 One Voice's framing a terrain of ongoing contestation

One Voice's frames fitted in with a number of aspects of South Africa's political, albeit in sometimes contradictory ways. For example, when using collective action frames, members emphasised the need for solidarity, fitting into the South African solidarity culture. However, it also used frames that undermined solidarity, such as the xenophobic frame, but this also fitted into an aspect of South Africa's political culture.

Given the poverty of its members, one might expect the organisation to fit within the political culture of demanding redistribution in favour of traders, but instead it fitted within the political culture of "individualised market-based empowerment" (Barchiesi, 2004, p. 12), by pointing to traders' entrepreneurial efforts to rise out of poverty. Nevertheless, it framed government's adoption of neoliberal policies as the cause of corruption (corruption frame), matching the literature on outsourcing (cf. E. Brown & Cloke, 2004; Harrington & Manji, 2013; E. Harrison, 2006; Pierce, 2006; Szeftel, 1998). For example, with regard to the JPC, it recognised that the outsourcing of services (trading bay rental) to private companies was allowing corruption to thrive because private companies could collect rentals without providing basic administrative documents such as contracts and receipts. It further blamed the city government's outsourcing strategy for grime (crime and grime frame) in the inner city, since it stated that the outsourcing company, Pikitup, were not implementing adequate city clean-up programmes.

However, since frames "are part of the collective struggle over meaning" (Vliegenthart & Zoonen, 2011, p. 112), within One Voice, I did not find a single frame that pulled the weight

of its political efforts. Rather it was quite opportunistic in the way it deployed frames: it used whatever frame was likely to be effective during the process of a framing contest. For example, it used the government's neoliberal frame strategically in order to make claims on the City of Johannesburg to allocate trading space to its members. In terms of establishing political power, its use of the neoliberal frame worked within the logic of influence (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484) by suggesting that the street traders and the city government had a shared economic agenda for the inner city, that is, a thriving business environment. The frame allowed "them to exercise influence over decision-makers and policy-making outcomes" (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484).

The contradictory nature of the frames also revealed what Snow (2008) conceptualises as a dynamic process of realignment, such that power is asserted through frames as necessity dictates, and as works in their favour. One Voice's frames sometimes fitted into and sometimes pushed against the broader political culture (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; S. D. Reese, 2007; Westby, 2002). One Voice did not just align its frames with those of political elites; they also engaged in frame transformation (Benford & Snow, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Snow & Benford, 1988) to shape different understandings about long-standing inner city problems. For example, it transformed the crime and grime frame such that it diagnosed the same problem as the city government, but identified a different culprit, and identified a prognostic frame that was the polar opposite of the government's prognosis.

Within One Voice the most contested frames were those that were xenophobic and those that were anti-xenophobic. Both of these frames operated within the logic of membership (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 484). On the one hand, by using xenophobic frames, One Voice could make political connections with the rising number of xenophobic South Africans. On the other hand, if it used anti-xenophobic frames it could make alliances with foreign nationals, and other civil society organisations that were actively trying to challenge xenophobia in South Africa. However, here the choice of frames was not about a strategic position; it was rather related to divergent world views among One Voice members. Despite the divergent views on foreigners, which expressed a micro-fascist politics, the organisation held together by deploying other frames (discussed above) that were better aligned.

As I showed in my chapter on desire, One Voice operated on a micro-political level. At this level, calling for more trading bays to be created through the language of individual endeavour gave the organisation some leverage in creating space for ever more street traders. Similarly, through the crime and grime frame it could insist on the city government cleaning up its trading areas, albeit that it had not had significant success in this regard. I have also shown how One Voice cleverly deployed the corruption frame to protect members from eviction by pointing out that the JPC did not have adequate records. However, because harassment of street traders is ongoing, it does not always succeed in protecting street traders and only succeeds in doing so through localised mass organisation, such as at taxi ranks.

One Voice's use of frames, alongside the organisational activities revealed in the chapter on Desire, generated some power for the organisation. While the power was continually contested, with repeated actions of the city government against street traders (often in the form of the JMPD), One Voice maintained a foothold in the politics of the inner city, and continued to bind some street traders together around a shared agenda.

6.7.2 Inner City Resource Centre's focus on building solidarity

ICRC displayed the most synchronicity of framing and action, in that it continually met with other organisations and members to establish a shared agenda, including shared frames. Their activities and frames continually propelled the desiring machine in efforts to build power by identifying arenas of solidarity (collective action frames).

For example, at its meeting on 12 November 2018, it tried to bring together a number of organisations to join in the protest against the city mayor. As described in the chapter on Desire, this meeting fell apart due to the xenophobic frames used by some attendees. However, the failure to produce shared frames points to the difficult and contested process of negotiating frames. Sometimes participants agree on the diagnostic frame, for example, poverty in the inner city, but do not agree on the solution (prognostic frame), or do not agree on what kind of action should be taken (motivational frame) (Benford & Snow, 2000). At the meeting, at first it seemed that the organisations in attendance were articulating a shared frame, that is, members connected and aligned their language around shared "experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion" (Benford & Snow,

2000, p. 623). However, frame alignment was not achieved because in the process of frame articulation, xenophobic frames were articulated.

ICRC's other framing activities are rather more successful. For example, at its office when preparing for the protest, members and staff were creating placards for the protest. In this activity, they articulated numerous frames (as described above), which they thought were impactful in carrying a message to protest bystanders and the mayor. This process of frame articulation was extremely active, with members and staff throwing ideas around and improving on each other's ideas. In this situation, I observed frames being generated, maintained and contested through dynamic, discursive processes (Benford, 1997; Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Gamson et al., 1992; S. D. Reese, 2007; Snow, 2008). Some of the frames emerging from the placard-making session included the poverty frame, the rights frame, economic frames (around the affordability of housing), and the crime and grime frame.

However, this activity of developing frames was not purely about the salience of the frame (Benford & Snow, 2000), that is, it was not only about clarifying ideas, message logics and cognitive arguments. The frames were also selected based on emotional resonance; some of the frames used expressed anger or elicited laughter. Generating frame resonance and frame alignment in ICRC was not an entirely rational process; instead frames may be chosen based on how they attract members, and in turn how they might impact on other audiences (Benford, 1997). For example, in the room where the placards were being created, "anger and outrage" held the ICRC "political community together" (Macamo, 2012, p. 46). Through the framing activity, ICRC sought to generate sympathy for those affected by housing issues in the inner city, as per Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993). Similar to Fiss and Hirsch's (2005) argument, ICRC members were motivated by intense conflict with the city's housing provision trajectory. The member and staff's emotions resulted in moral outrage and moral conviction, which brought them together in collective action, confirmed authors such as van Zomeren et al. (2011).

For ICRC then, frame selection was not merely about making statements, but about what it could do with those statements. And what it particularly did was generate much solidarity. As described in the subsections above, ICRC used the poverty frame, because that was how its members spoke of themselves, so the frame resonated with them. While the frame failed to generate sympathy from the government, it was also effective in attracting

fundraising. As such, the frame extended its purview of power, giving the organisation a life-blood injection to continue the work. In this instance, because ICRC connected the frame to the correct audience, it achieved its fund-raising goal.

Similarly, the human rights frame was strongly connected to ICRC's work, in that it ran many workshops to inform members of their rights, and especially workshops and events focussed on women's rights. Alongside deployment of the frame, it worked to equip members to undertake their own cases with full knowledge of their rights. So even though ICRC staff recognised the weaknesses of the court-route to challenge the city, they deployed the rights frame rather to empower members by sharing knowledge.

While the rights knowledge was not enough to equip members with the power to take matters to the Constitutional Court, rights discussions could be useful in engaging with landlords to negotiate lease agreements and service provision in the inner city buildings. Rights talk could also sometimes force the city into talks with respective building residents, since they knew they had a right to be consulted. However, in the case of housing rights, rights language used by residents prompted Mayor Mashaba to lash out at human rights organisations, arguing that they were thwarting efforts to address housing matters in the inner city (Mathope, 2017). But some of Mayor Mashaba's frustration and resultant outburst could also be read as human rights organisations succeeding in preventing mass evictions from the inner city, and therefore the rights language was having some political effect.

As explained in the literature review, the conceptual framework, and above, South Africa has a neoliberal economic trajectory (Barchiesi, 2004; Bond, 2000; Madlingozi, 2007; Visser, 2004). While ICRC used an anti-neoliberal frame to contest the investment-oriented path chosen by the City of Johannesburg, it was blocked from accessing the kinds of forums where this could be put on the agenda (as described in the chapter on desire). Nevertheless, ICRC's use of the frame was not powerful, because it did not have figures and statistics to back up its arguments. For example, it remains unknown how much the average inner city resident pays for rent, and how much people would be willing to pay to access decent housing. Such studies are difficult because, as Mosselson (2015) points out, many inner city residents are just passing through, or frequently change accommodation depending on their circumstances: sometimes in an effort to secure cheaper accommodation, or sometimes in an effort to secure better quality accommodation. It is therefore difficult to survey inner city

residents and draw strong conclusions about their needs and wishes in terms of inner city accommodation.

Therefore, ICRC's demand for decent affordable housing, whatever the cost to the city, was anathema to "the powerful private sector who want predictable, manageable spaces which allow them to gain returns on their investments and a local government which is firmly committed to enhancing the image of the inner-city and making it attractive to corporate investors" (Mosselson, 2015, p. 16). Without an alternative, costed plan, it was difficult for ICRC to find purchase with the economic frame, because successful economic frames rely on budget per population size. While ICRC likely had many allies who were opposed to profiteering around inner city housing – and this issue had emotional resonance for many, since they did not specify an alternative plan – it was difficult to win the political battle using anti-neoliberal frames. Adequate frames must usually contain cognitive and non-cognitive elements to be successful.

By comparison, the frames ICRC used were more substantial when it came to cleaning up the inner city: their contention was that Pikitup was not doing an adequate job, and informal waste reclaimers in the city were doing much of the work. ICRC was clear that the cleaning budget should not be outsourced to one company but rather that existing reclaimers should be employed or contracted by the city. ICRC was also clear that much of the dirtiness of the inner city was due to the city government's failure to provide free basic water and free basic electricity to inner city dwellers (these services were available to them in Johannesburg's townships). Given that many people already accessed free basic services, it was unclear why these services had not been extended to inner city residents. However, as touched on in the chapter on Desire, during the 16 October 2018 walkabout of the inner city, the City of Johannesburg often refused to provide services in buildings without the landlord signing off, and often people were living in buildings with absentee landlords.

However, while ICRC used the anti-crime and grime frame, this was not a key focus of its framing activities, and therefore it did not use the frame to increase power in the inner city, or to force the government to act. The bulk of its campaigning revolved around the poverty of its members, their need for affordable housing, and their rights to housing; this crime and grime frame was merely an adjunct and therefore not being used to full effect to leverage power in the inner city.

ICRC also used anti-xenophobic frames as a key part of its organising to pull members and staff who were foreigners and involved them in organisational activities. Apart from being involved in the ICRC housing access programme, these women also worked together on income generation through a sewing project. This sub-group of ICRC focussed on uniting poor South Africans and foreigners living in the inner city, and ensured that foreign nationals became involved in all of ICRC's work. By recruiting women by attracting them to the income-generating project, ICRC built alliances with foreigners and increased solidarities between South African and foreign residents in the inner city. As Kerr and Durrheim (2013) have pointed out, anti-xenophobic frames are most successful when locals and foreigners identify a shared struggle and stand together. Unlike GRWV, who did not make common cause with South Africans, and unlike One Voice which did not consistently make common cause with foreigners, ICRC was strengthened by its anti-xenophobic activities.

Overall, ICRC's frames were multi-layered and multidimensional. However, they have not succeeded in shifting the city government's stance on housing. As I will show in the chapter on Audience, the frames were not enabling ICRC to be heard by local government. Instead, the strength of its frames were in allowing the organisation to connect with poor inner city residents, whether they be South Africans or foreigners, and build solidarity with them. Its frames further allowed it to leverage funding from international donors and to secure assistance from legal organisations such as SERI and CALS, and even secure some gains in the South African court system. Therefore, its frames gave ICRC power and longevity in the inner city, albeit that they have yet to find a way to make the city government listen.

6.8 CONCLUSION

As discussed in the conceptual framework, frames are aligned with the political culture of a given society; in South Africa, as highlighted in the literature review, political culture is highly contested, with common threads, deviations, and even open contradiction. For example, the human rights culture sits uncomfortably next to a culture of violence. In this chapter, through a study of frames, I have shown how the two CBOs fitted in with the South African political culture, often in contradictory ways. Depending on their 'fit' with the political culture, the organisations were able to access particular forms of power, or if they were 'cut off' from the

political culture, they were not able to generate power. As such, the two CBOs have aligned to some extent to aspects of South African political culture, in that they have used the rights frame, the poverty frame, and frames regarding the problems with neoliberalism. They have also aligned themselves with exposing government as corrupt, and adopted the language of crime. Their strong use of both xenophobic and anti-xenophobic frames reflected a large part of South Africa's political culture, where xenophobic attacks by citizens, and increasingly government, ravage communities of African foreign nationals, while another part of civil society tries to strike down xenophobia.

Through frames, therefore, the two organisations aligned themselves with certain sectors of society, and attempted to build a shared understanding of the problems. For example, poverty is a major concern in South Africa, given that there is a high unemployment rate and large numbers of people living in informal settlements without access to water, electricity and sewage reticulation. In using the poverty frame, both organisations attempted to establish the poor as worthy of compassion and care. However, the different organisations tried to frame issues and events differently to win framing contests and win over audiences to their viewpoint (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Entman, 1993; Gamson et al., 1992; Pan & Kosicki, 2001).

Comparing ICRC with One Voice, I saw both pro-poor and neoliberal frames being used, with ICRC emphasising the poverty of members, and One Voice highlighting the entrepreneurial endeavours of their members. As will be discussed in the chapter on audience, while ICRC's frame won it political allies in terms of members, solidarity organisations, and donor organisations, the entrepreneurial frame of One Voice allowed it to gain power at the micro-local level to ensure that local councillors acknowledged them as an important part of the local economy. As such, both frames could extend the power of a CBO, depending on which audience the frames were aimed at (this will be discussed further in the chapter on audience). Therefore, it is clear that it is not *only* the frame that gives an organisation political power but rather how it fits into their overall programme and activities (desire) and how it is targeted at particular audiences. These strategic determinations are part of the framing activity of CBOs, and as discussed above and in the chapter on Desire, ICRC most consciously and collaboratively worked to develop shared frames. This shared activity allowed it to build solidarity with like-minded others.

The rights frame, most strongly deployed by ICRC, similarly fits into the South African human rights culture. As discussed in the literature review, the conceptual framework, and above, the human rights framework has led to political wins for some pro-poor organisations challenging the executive and legislative arms of government (cf. De Vos & Webster, 2015; Dugard, 2016; Johnson, 2006). With respect to ICRC, in collaboration with rights-based NGOs, they have won some gains, both at Constitutional Court level, and in single cases of preventing eviction from some buildings (Wilson, 2011). Even though it continued with direct action and mobilisation of inner city residents, previously ICRC “disavowed the APF’s formerly exclusive reliance on direct action and began, alongside traditional protest politics, to assist inner-city communities to access legal representation, negotiate leases with their landlords and lobby the City of Johannesburg for better access to social services” (Wilson, 2011, p. 139).

However, as previously pointed out, given how much transformation is a key intention of the South African Constitution, the human rights culture has been surprisingly untransformative of the South African political milieu (Cachalia, 2018; Dugard, 2016). Indeed, in recent years, ICRC has found the existing rights in the Constitution as almost useless, except in terms of winning individual cases, because winning numerous cases does not lead to the local government changing direction in its pro-investor housing plans. Therefore, even though the rights frame is a significant part of South Africa’s political culture, it has not proved successful in bringing about the systemic change needed in South Africa, and is therefore not necessarily a powerful frame for South African CBOs.

The anti-neoliberal frame was a big part South Africa’s political culture of resistance from CBOs and social movements in the early- to mid-2000s (Ballard, 2005; H. Marais, 2011; McDonald, 2002; McDonald & Ruiters, 2005a; von Holdt & Naidoo, 2019). However, the frame has not had staying power: social movements did succeed in stopping wholesale privatisation, but government successfully clawed back power by shifting to other cost recovery strategies (McKinley, 2016). Therefore, ICRC has not been able to make powerful political gains by using the anti-neoliberal struggle, because the power of the earlier struggles has been dispersed. The anti-neoliberal frame did not work particularly well as part of the logic of membership or the logic of influence, and ICRC would need to do a lot more work to understand the economics of its membership in order to challenge neoliberal politics.

In terms of the logic of influence, only One Voice was successfully able to deploy the entrepreneurial and anti-corruption frames to political effect. For example, it was able to stop the JPC and the local government from evicting traders, by using a frame to highlight the corruption taking place at its local offices. Given South Africa's political culture of pervasive corruption and the fact that it is treated with impunity (Lekalake & Nkomo, 2016), it is interesting that One Voice succeeded in deploying the frame to its own advantage. On the surface the frame sounded simply like a complaint against local elites, but it was an effective roadblock to stop the eviction of traders from their stalls. Without adequate data, the city government and the JPC were not able to act against street traders, and this has been backed up by a Constitutional Court ruling. Since the JPC and city government could not prove administrative fairness, their hands were tied by One Voice's evidence of corruption.

As I have shown above, many frames deployed by the CBOs fall within the logic of membership or the logic of influence. However, the way the crime and grime frame was deployed by One Voice and ICRC was an attempt for the two organisations to make common cause with each other, and therefore formed part of a logic of solidarity, rather than a logic of membership per se. In the way that it was deployed, the two organisations also did not extend the frame to make alliances with waste reclaimers, although they signalled shared interests with the waste reclaimers. In practice, this frame was not successful in building a strong alliance. While the organisations were in agreement that it was a shared problem, it was not the main focus for either organisation, and therefore did not strongly generate a flow of desire or power. Furthermore, through the deployment of a xenophobic frame by some One Voice members, any tentative alliance fell apart. This shows that shared frames may be a precondition for coming together, but they do not necessarily hold organisations to working together, especially if different frames are deployed emphasising their differences.

Regarding the xenophobic frame, some One Voice members may have deployed it in order to attract other members by mimicking their xenophobic comments; however, it is more likely that it represented the increasingly xenophobic South African political culture. Certainly, some members were concerned that the xenophobic frames were alienating possible foreign members and other types of allyship. ICRC used the anti-xenophobic frame within the logic of membership.

Most of ICRC's frames fit well within the logic of membership, seeking to attract members and allies, and this sustains its ongoing work. However, unlike One Voice, it was not successfully deploying frames within the logic of influence, in that none of its frames succeeded in capturing the attention of those in power in the city (as I will discuss in the chapter on Audience). By contrast, One Voice did not strongly deploy frames that would likely increase its membership, albeit that they deployed frames that mirrored the frames of their members. However, the CBOs used frame alignment in the context of South Africa's political culture, in that they addressed poverty, human rights, neoliberalism and corruption. As such they would find some frame resonance in broader society. Significantly, the organisations rarely moved from diagnostic frames to prognostic frames (and where they used prognostic frames, they were mainly an appeal to government to act). This failure implies that the organisations were well aware of the problems of their members and constituents, but they were unable to provide solutions, beyond insisting that government must meaningfully engage, listen, and align their actions with the needs of the poor.

Based on this critique, the organisations have gone some way to developing frames relevant to South Africa's political culture. However, the frames did not change over time in response to changes in the environment, government policy, or even change of the political party in charge of the city. While it is important for organisations to sustain frames as part of their organisational identity, the organisations are not well-positioned to take part in framing contests if they are not adapting frames to be part of the conversation in broader society. As I discuss in the chapter on communication tools, they are often not disseminating messages beyond the reach of interpersonal communication. As such, the reach of these frames is limited and none of the organisations are leveraging the frames to build a mass audience.

Chapter 7 AESTHETICS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, drawing mainly on critical visual analysis, I reveal key elements of the CBOs' aesthetic, their visual personality and visual language. The main focus in this chapter is visual because images play a significant role in capturing the attention of the public, media and political elites (Veneti, 2017). They can set off chain-reactions of emotions that mobilise audiences (Stoehrel & Lindgren, 2014). Given that the chapter focusses on the aesthetics of the organisations' visual outputs, much of the discussion explores the affective qualities of the images but also how aesthetics are shaped by "cultural, historical and representational conventions" (Schroeder, 2006b, p. 9). I also ground the discussion in more tangible visual elements such as colour, proportion and symmetry, image quality, accompanying text, typefaces, and symbols. The chapter also makes connections between the concepts depicted in Figure 1 (on page 4).

According to Guattari (1995b), aesthetics deconstruct structures and codes, allowing for recomposition and new creations. These new creations allow people to see new worlds, which open up opportunities for new types of political action. In this way, aesthetics are linked to desire, in that desire is about creative production for political change. As such, aesthetics were politically significant because they have the capacity to bring new thinking and new concepts into being (Porter, 2009). According to Rancière (2010, p. 116), aesthetic practice connects us to the "hope of 'changing life'", provides an opportunity for "free play" that suspends the ordinary workings of power (p. 118), and allows us to delve into the dark unconscious of our society. Therefore, in this chapter I explore how/if the aesthetics of the CBOs allows for new ways of seeing, creativity, and therefore new political action.

In a different vein, aesthetics also contain the political possibility of creating collectivities. Guattari (1995b, p. 98) describes how archaic societies used dance and music to "crystallise complementary segments of subjectivity"; that is, individuals were wrapped up in "collective identities". Given the networks of assemblages that make up the world, as described by Latour (2005a) and Deleuze and Guattari (2004), aesthetic production can bring subjects and objects together, making a collective machinery for collective action. In

South Africa from the 1960s and through apartheid, aesthetics were implicated in social and political scrutiny (Mashige, 1996), which included spectacles of violence and brutality (Ndebele, 1986) and political communication that aimed to create unity and solidarity (Cronin, 1988). Therefore, this chapter explores if/how the two CBOs used aesthetics to generate solidarity.

The chapter also places strong emphasis on the affects produced by aesthetics, and how affect impacts on power, both individually and collectively. The power of aesthetics lies in creating affective responses, for example, feelings of unity and discipline, anger and fear (Cronin, 1988; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). So, images convey messages through affects – the perceptions, feelings, sensations, atmospheres, moods, movements, transitions, intensities, potentials, values, encounters – cut through rational deliberation (Bruno, 2014; Deleuze, 1978; Jay, 1992; Massumi, 2002; Seigworth & Gregg, 2010). Affect is not a solid structure or thing; instead, like desire, it flows between people and things, developing relationships, which can be either positive or negative relationships (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010). Therefore, affects are always immanent to relationships. Therefore, in this chapter I explore the affects produced by organisational aesthetics in the realm of developing relationships between people.

The first section draws on data gathered at the PAR workshops, examining the CBOs' concept of aesthetics (especially beauty) and how this relates to the affects that the CBOs identified as relevant in achieving communication goals. The identified affects include a strong emphasis on happiness, joy, and empowerment of organisation members and their audiences.

In the next section of the chapter, I delve into the critical visual analysis, focusing on organisational branding (logos, clothing and banners). The chapter points to the importance of a brand identity in establishing an organisation in the social and political terrain. The section focusses on if and how the CBOs' aesthetics are reaching audiences and securing audience loyalty by establishing an organisational identity or brand personality. The section also looks at the aesthetics and affective qualities of branding in order to understand each CBO's brand personality and visual language, drawing on literature from an advertising/marketing perspective.

The chapter concludes with a discussion on the aesthetic elements of CBO communication, reflecting on areas of strength and weakness for each organisation.

7.2 EXPLORING AESTHETICS AND AFFECT IN THE PAR WORKSHOPS

Based on the PAR workshops, in this subsection, I explore how the different organisations defined beauty and what affective qualities they sought to generate through their political communication. The first workshop focussed on the concept of beauty in exploring aesthetics, because this was the most accessible term through which the organisations could explore aesthetics. The concept of beauty was explored in two activities in the first workshop – the first activity on day one was collective, with everyone building on the definition of beauty. In the second activity, the CBOs separately addressed how they implemented beauty in their political practice. In highlighting beauty, some participants felt that beauty was a driver of their political work (and political communication), because their quest for political change was a quest to create beauty in their world.

In the second workshop, the participants explored the aesthetics of the elites in the inner city of Johannesburg, as well as the aesthetics of branding. In the first activity, they made collages by cutting out from magazines pictures that depicted the aesthetics of elites. In the second activity, they focussed on branding, and found images of logos. We then discussed logos and what makes a logo memorable.

In the third workshop, the two organisations focussed on their plans moving forward for aesthetic activities. However, even though through the aesthetic exercises the organisations had identified flaws in their aesthetics, they were reluctant to bring about aesthetic changes due to the attachments they had to their visual aesthetic identity, in terms of logos, t-shirts, and banners.

I explore each of these workshop activities in the subsections below.

7.2.1 Collective definitions of beauty

In the first activity of the first PAR workshop, participants explored the concept of beauty (see Figure 7) and identified activities they found beautiful, items they thought beautiful, the qualities of a beautiful person, and activities they thought were beautiful. In some cases, the

Figure 7

Definitions of beauty



person referred to was someone involved in organisational activities. In other instances, the “person” covered people in general. In the collective exploration of beauty, in contrast to much of the theory of aesthetics, participants did not focus on art, but on people. As for Kant (1987), the CBOs’ assessment of beauty was inherent in the values of the observer, not entirely in the observed object. However, the observer was not regarded as having superior taste, but instead having a vision for how beauty is embodied in people.

Regarding the qualities of a beautiful person, participants began by saying: “Everyone is beautiful!!!” The values that the workshop participants as observers saw as embodying beauty included that a person was “fair”, “humble”, “happy”, “respectable”, and “caring”, had a “smile”, “strength”, “fitness”, “confidence”, and sought to “protect” others.

Regarding the additional beautiful qualities of organisation members, key attributes were “good role model”, “availability”, “active”, “organiser”, “good listener”, “listening well”, “good presentation”, “teaching and facilitation”, “good memory”, “problem solving”, “equality”, and “good communicator”. All of these reflected the values of the observer/workshop participants, which suggested that to be beautiful was to embody being an activist that worked with others.

Activities regarded as beautiful included “dancing”, “singing”, “soccer and sport”, “riding a motorbike”, “driving a car”, and “a good laughter”. Items participants found beautiful included “juice”, having a “license”, “gospel music”, and “umbhaqanga music”. In the activities and items regarded as beautiful, some definitions leant more towards an artistic

sensibility, especially music. However, it is important to note that such artistic sensibility played second fiddle to the human qualities that were seen as beautiful.

The qualities of a beautiful person offered a reflection on the qualities of a 'good' activist from the point of view of the participants. For example, humility, fairness, confidence, and strength indicated affective qualities that made for 'good' human connection. These affective qualities are about "values, practice, and styles, as well as aspirations" (Ahmed, 2010, p. 41). These qualities point to participants' perceptions that beautiful communication is relational. By having these qualities, individuals gain the ability to pass communication from one body to another, as described by Seigworth and Gregg (2010). Because the qualities move in a flow from one person to another, they are affective and relational. It is not possible to measure these affective qualities on their own; they can only be identified in the qualities of interaction. As Bruno (2014, p. 14) describes, affect is "exposed as a pliant, porous medium ... an extensive form of transmission".

Similarly, smiling, "a good laughter" and happiness are beautiful because of their ability to bring others together. They reflect the affects of joy, which Deleuze (1978) and Ahmed (2010) point out increase the ability to act and the ability to connect. Whereas a smile is a concrete object, representing a state of mind, being affected by a smile results from the ebb and flow of feelings. This concept of a smile connects with Deleuze's (1978) idea of images being representational ideas, but the affect of images being in the rise and fall of feelings, sensations, moods, and atmospheres.

As much as other qualities increase connection, Ahmed (2010, p. 33) points to the intimacy of happiness; what makes us happy is deeply personal, and yet it is possible to spread happiness: "[t]he feeling can also lift or elevate a proximate object". Through optimistic feelings of happiness, people form attachments and feel solidarity, causing "the subject [to lean] toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter with their object" (Berlant, 2010, p. 93). At the same time, happiness – a smile, laughter, "discloses life as expressive and differential" and, as an affect, it opens the social, creating creative openings "to an outside in moments of rupture" (B. Anderson, 2010, p. 166). After all, amidst the difficulties of life in the inner city, happiness – a smile, laughter, can offer a moment of respite, increasing the morale in a world that takes away housing, limits the possibilities of trade, and attacks foreign nationals. These affects are unstable, they are not

deterministic, but temporarily alter bodily experience and influence what bodies can do (Clough, 2010). They have potential (Massumi, 2002). They bring the “immanence of a joy ... down to the surface of the world”, and reassure and affirm those affected that there is more to life than their material circumstances (Brinkema, 2014, p. 243).

Much as happiness is a flow, moving from body to body, it also attaches to specific objects and bodies (Ahmed, 2010). As such, in the listing of beautiful objects, participants reflected on particular styles of music, “juice”, and having a driver’s license. As such, objects have affective qualities; affects are embodied. The beautiful objects mentioned by participants were specifically connected to pleasure and happiness, which “puts us into intimate contact with things” (Ahmed, 2010, p. 31). The embodiment of affect also takes place through activities, such as dancing, driving a car, singing, and playing sport. Later in the chapter, I will explore how the CBOs put objects (their branding materials) into use affectively, to create connection and solidarity, and also how they embodied affect through their political actions.

When the workshop participants reflected on the potential for beauty in organisation members, the focus was on affects that led to action, such as good memory and communication, being active, and being a good listener. In this understanding of beauty, affect is embodied in skills, what Deleuze (1978, p. 8) defines as “the increase or diminution of the power of acting”. In the participants’ concept of beauty, they are not just focussing on objects of beauty, but asking themselves: What are we capable of, “what’s in our power” (Deleuze, 1978, p. 9)? In this understanding, organisation members were made beautiful by their ability to exert power, not as something abstract but as something exercised: these “affects are the exercises of power” (Deleuze, 1978, p. 13).

At the same time, when the participants reflected on the beauty of “teaching and facilitation”, “problem solving”, and “good communicator”, we see affect “closely knit to the activity of thinking” (Bruno, 2014, p. 20). In thought and affect, action is always “underway and on the way to the next” (Massumi, 2002, p. 91). These skills connect affect and ideas, with ideas having a focus on particular objects (in this case, tasks to be completed), whereas the skills circulate, they are not fixed, but take place in motion. The skills have a concrete reality in that they are practiced in the real, and yet they are immanent to particular situations and places – for example, places and situations in which teaching and facilitation take place.

The dual qualities of these skills – concrete and real, and flowing and immanent – point to Latour's (2005b) discussion of aesthetics as being part of a greater flow. The physical actions and situations, and affect are not moving separately, but are tied together, moving in a one direction. As such, the actions and situations in which the actions take place, and the affective aspect of these skills are beautiful and political in bringing a sharing knowledge among political actors.

At the end of the first activity of the first workshop, the participants discussed which concept was most relevant for driving political communication. Some participants referred to the concept of desire, while Shereza argued, "Beauty is the source of everything, isn't it? We want beauty. That is why we do what we do."

In the next subsection, I discuss how the two CBOs conceptualised beauty as part of their political communication practices. The subsection covers the way the organisations talked about their aesthetic practice at the first workshop. These aesthetic practices included the feelings (affects) they aimed to inculcate in members and audiences, and the activities they undertook which they felt were beautiful and likely to induce the members and audiences to feel according to their aims.

7.2.2 Beauty and affect in practice

On the second day of the first workshop, the CBOs broadened their understanding of aesthetics by talking about the affective qualities of aesthetics, which might include, for example, fear, anger, frustration and so on. Participants reflected on how they wanted members to feel in their political communication, and how they wanted their audiences to feel. They then went on to discuss how they generated those feelings using the beauty of their political communication.

7.2.2.1 Affective positivity in Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC) communication activities

In terms of what affects the ICRC wanted to generate among members and in their audiences, they sought to make everyone feel welcomed (see Table 3), that is, it was not their intention to exclude anyone from the communication activity. In terms of how they wanted members to feel, ICRC focussed on building the strength of its members, in particular, to become leaders and mentors to whom people could look up.

Table 3

Affects ICRC seeks to generate in members and audience

Members' feelings	Audience's feelings
Strong; powerful; confident; free; welcomed; superheroes, winners; important; leaders; successors; perfectionist; achievers; challengers; mentors	Protected; represented; happy; empowered; welcomed; supported; overwhelmed; loved; respected; special; organised; equal

The terms, shown in the left column of Table 3, reflect the qualities of organisation members shown in the collective definitions of beauty (in Figure 7 above). The agreement between definitions of beauty and how the organisation members wanted themselves and other members to feel, showed a desire for generating positive qualities in members. Words such as “perfectionist”, “successors”, “winners”, and “achievers” alluded to members striving to be better, and arriving at a pinnacle of achievement. Words such as “strong”, “superheroes”, and “confident” conveyed inner qualities members should have or acquire, while the words “challengers”, “leaders”, and “mentors” showed outwardly directed activities members needed to engage in. In particular, the word “challengers” pointed to how the members must be prepared to contest ideas and push forward despite resistance. Again, these qualities were based on the organisational values, which see activism as beautiful. These qualities moved from one member to another as they encouraged and supported each other to become strong activists who achieved political gains.

Similarly, the affects the organisation sought to generate in audiences (government officials, councillors, security) aimed towards inclusivity and encouraging action. In the activity, ICRC did not distinguish between different audiences and the affects they sought to generate. They wanted all audiences to feel “loved” and “empowered” to take forward organisational aims, while also having their own viewpoints acknowledged, by feeling “respected” and “represented”. I found these words surprising as, based on the literature, I would have expected the organisation to want audiences to feel either challenged or frightened into action. Instead, the aim was to encourage action by generating positive feelings. If I reflect on their interaction with Mayor Mashaba described in the chapter on Desire, although he refused to engage with them, ICRC’s goal remained to collaborate and participate to generate the best possible housing plan for the city. This goal embodied Deleuze’s (1978) concept of affect in which affects such as joy increase the power of the body to act. Through collaboration and relationship building, ICRC saw how power could be generated in the best interests of its members *and* in the best interests of the city.

In Rancière's (2001) definition, these affects would not constitute a politics, because he sees politics as only taking place by generating conflict. However, these words point to the possibilities of aesthetics creating a sense of commonality or collectivity, as highlighted by Guattari (1995b) and in the African literature on aesthetics (cf. Ahura, 1985; Cronin, 1988; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). In its selection of affects ICRC wanted to instil in its audience, creating positive feelings was linked to hopefully generating a positive response and positive actions as a result of receiving communication. The organisation hoped that by generating beauty – empowering its members to develop powerful personal capacities – the resulting affects would make their audiences receptive to their messages. This could be achieved through mutual respect for the values they each brought to the table.

In thinking through how they generated beauty, ICRC participants at the workshop said they made their campaigns beautiful and happy by organising their members and holding protests. They provided t-shirts and caps for their members, and at protests they made placards and used whistles and vuvuzelas to attract attention to the protest. They also used music such as struggle songs to enliven participants, and a loudspeaker to share messages. To keep everyone safe, they ensured it had visible marshals at the protest. Later in the chapter I discuss how this aesthetic was put into action during the organisation's activities.

According to the workshop activity and organisational practice, a big part of generating shared feelings among members involved using organisational branding. Branding will be discussed further on in the chapter. It is unclear how the organisational communication, especially at the protest, was meant to generate the affects the audience sought to generate, as protests are typically seen as a challenge to the powers that be (Ndebele, 1986; Rancière et al., 2001), and are unlikely to generate feelings of love, feeling protected, and feeling respected in authorities. However, this was explored further in the second workshop.

7.2.2.2 Different affects for different audiences in One Voice communication

In the workshop activities, One Voice's aspirations were less focussed on building members' as powerful activists (see Table 4); they were mainly concerned with how members would feel due to services 'dispensed' to them, rather than empowering members. Therefore, they wanted to make members happy, and wanted to be well-received by members, overwhelm members with achievement, and keeping members safe and sound.

Table 4

Affects One Voice seeks to generate in members and audience

Members' feelings	Audience feelings
Happy; well-received because concerns fulfilled; achievement; overwhelmed; safe and sound; praised; exalted	Government officials: impartial
	Security: responsive
	Communities: secure
	Media: amazed and surprised at the success of the communication

Unlike ICRC, where members are meant to become active roleplayers in the organisation, One Voice workshop participants rather saw themselves as servants of the members. Perhaps because, in comparison to ICRC, members (traders) were not able to attend all the meetings needed to better their lot. As Frans and Julekha repeatedly told me, traders found it difficult to leave their stalls since it limited their ability to eke out their meagre existence. Therefore, in the case of One Voice, members entrusted office bearers to tackle their issues, but did come out in support of activities if driven to do so by attacks from the authorities.

In addition to the affects workshop participants hoped to generate in members, it imagined that members would be praised and exalted for undertaking successful trading activities and becoming successful entrepreneurs. The overall effect was seeing good feelings flowing from outside rather than being held among capacitated members who were active in the organisation. These feelings described by One Voice workshop participants did not build strong action among members, but they did build a 'happy' camaraderie and exalted feelings among members, such that they were connected through joy and pride in their achievements. As Deleuze (1978, p. 10) explains: "The affects of joy are like a springboard, they make us pass through something that we would never have been able to pass if there had only been sadnesses". Through these feelings and joint activities, One Voice members have passed through several successful campaigns in winning space for their members' trading stalls and, for example, access to (prepaid) electricity in some stalls.

Unlike ICRC, One Voice workshop participants identified different feelings they wanted to generate for the different audiences (as shown in Table 4 above). In identifying impartiality as an affect for government officials, One Voice was reflecting on the bias government officials have in favour of formal businesses. Government sees formal business investment as essential to rebuilding the inner city (Koster & Nuijten, 2016). Previous city governments

attempted to 'clean up' the inner city by removing informal traders (e.g., Operation Clean Sweep in October 2013 (Albisa et al., 2013; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; McMichael, 2015)), but during the course of my research, Mayor Mashaba never made any new policy on informal trade. Meetings were held with traders' organisations and the city government, but no way forward was clearly defined. Hence, it behoves One Voice to keep pushing for impartiality that does not favour formal businesses over street trade. While this focus in One Voice may be regarded as arboreal, during the course of this research it did have some entry point at the micro-local level; therefore, there was room to push for the city government to provide more services for the traders.

In terms of security, One Voice had a problem that security personnel harassed traders and confiscated their goods but when traders called them to deal with crime, security personnel were not responsive. Therefore, the primary goal of One Voice was to motivate them to act in a responsive way. Despite aiming for this behaviour from the security personnel, One Voice did not have a clear sense of how they would go about this. They felt it was pointless to approach individual security personnel, since they were 'just following orders'; at the same time they did not have access to the security companies who had acquired the contracts to provide security services in trading areas. The problem here is that the security companies were answerable to the city, not to those on the streets that needed support. Therefore, while the arboreal heights of government provided an entry point through meetings with city officials, there was no entry point for One Voice to gain access to the managers of security companies. And indeed, during the course of my research, One Voice did not make any attempts to contact the managers of security companies.

With respect to communities, One Voice hoped that communities did not feel threatened by street traders, but instead wanted communities to feel secure that traders, by keeping the streets busy, made crime more difficult, and therefore protected community members. Again this is a one-way flow from One Voice to the community members. The workshop participants did not conceptualise an rhizomatic flow based in shared interests in tackling poverty. Unlike Deleuze's (1978) concept of joy, the positive flow generated by One Voice in terms of making communities feel secure, did not lead to strong connections with other bodies, and did not create common notions, which could move communities and One Voice to act together in support of street trade.

Although at the workshop One Voice said it aimed to draw positive attention from the media, in practice during the course of my research, One Voice made no effort to contact the media. They had no clear sense of how their aesthetic would help them to do so. While the media are attracted to spectacles, the spectacles required are usually not joy-inducing. Instead, “fire on the ground photographs better. Burning buildings and burning tires make better television than peaceful vigils and orderly marches” (Gamson & Meyer, 2004, p. 288).

For One Voice workshop participants, both the relationship with their members and the relationship with other audiences had strong arboreal elements. While, as shown in the chapter on desire, they made great efforts to connect to members by visiting them at their stalls, this was mainly a one-way flow of activity, since members rarely came together in solidarity. Similarly, the efforts to connect with local government, security companies, and the media were all actions “of root-tree structuring” which blunt rhizomatic potential (Lawley, 2013, p. 39). Tree-like communication does not lead to dialogue that develops strong and enduring relationships (Kent & Lane, 2017, p. 573).

7.2.3 Exploring the aesthetics of elites

In the second workshop, the focus was on how the CBOs understood the messaging coming from the city. In the activity on aesthetics, the workshop participants broke into four groups (they were not organised per organisation). The participants then reflected on what the city government wanted the city to look like and what kind of people it wanted to attract. The groups used pictures cut out from magazine to make their collages. The groups then reported back on their collages, using adjectives to describe their collages. Each of these is shown below.

7.2.3.1 Group 1: Report-back on collages

Group 1 reported that the city preferred to speak to people who could afford vacations and an expensive lifestyle. Such people were used to luxury and wealth – a world class, first grade lifestyle (see Figure 8). It shows fancy houses, people in suits, fancy shoes and accessories, fancy food, and people taking a trip on an aeroplane.

Figure 8

Group 1 collage



The participants identified the city government's goals to make the inner city glamorous and for "politics [to be] performed celebrity-style" (Miller, 2017). In Group 1's collage, we see the importance of what Miller (2017) calls ritualised dress in high end fashion, travel opportunities, as well as elaborate food and designer homes. In the chapter on desire, I noted that ICRC believed it was overlooked in the JICP meeting because they were not dressed the way investors

dressed. Thus, the elite's accoutrements keep the members of the CBOs locked out.

7.2.3.2 Group 2: Report-back on collages

Adjectives Group 2 associated with people the city wanted to speak to included "beautiful people who have cellphones and money". They also had "power and energy", and "strong desires". The collage (see Figure 9) links to the expensive cars, iPhones, drinking Moët & Chandon, and overseas travel, described by Miller (2017). We also see people heavily scented with expensive perfumes, designer homes, and again restaurant food.

Figure 9

Group 2 collage



Also, most strikingly, the picture that dominates is of a semi-naked couple in the throes of passion. To the group members, this suggested a kind of sexiness not connected with their own lives. It pointed to the "sexual shenanigans of political leaders" (Miller, 2017, p. 94). As Miller (2017) goes on to explain, this type of lifestyle is only accessible to the masses through

media images (such as the ones used in the collages). Yet, even though these lives are only peeked at by the CBO members, they recognised that these are the new expectations for “political citizenship” (p. 95) in post-apartheid South Africa. To be a citizen now means to be a consumer (Veriava, 2014) and in this terrain the poor who cannot afford to consume luxury goods are invaders (Veriava, 2019). In this new understanding of citizenship, life is about the ability to afford commodities and all social relations are transformed into economic relations (McDonald & Ruiters, 2005a, p. 3)

7.2.3.3 Group 3: Report-back on collages

Group 3 reported back on their collage with the slogan “not all that glitters is gold” (see Figure 10). They said the city wanted to speak to people who had expensive luxuries, leisure time, and status. These were thin, beautiful people who played golf and had sundowners in places to unwind.

Across all three collages so far shown and in Figure 11 below, architecture and designer homes feature quite predominantly. To the top right of Figure 10 there is a collage made up of many different images of architecture. This speaks to one of the central issues in inner city Johannesburg: what type of housing should be provided? Instead of accepting the reality that

Johannesburg’s wealthy have fled to the northern suburbs of Johannesburg (Tomlinson et al., 2003b), where modern new architecture has taken over, the city government keeps pressing for a return of elites to the inner city. Workshop participants were very clear that the kind of accommodation they need does not form part of the city’s imaginary.

Figure 10
Group 3 collage



7.2.3.4 Group 4: Report-back on collages

According to Group 4, those to whom the city government was likely to listen were the chic, exclusive and lavish elite. They had access to luxury, expensive and classical style, and richness. They were also beautiful and exquisite and had access to hospitality and tourism, travelling through *Egoli*⁵. The images associated with these adjectives are depicted in the collage in Figure 11.

Figure 11

Group 4 collage



Like the other groups, Group 4 also paid strong attention to designer homes, but also chose pictures of beautiful gardens and scenery, as if having access to nature is also a luxury for inner city residents and traders. Apart from the consumer goods depicted in the collages (such as cars,

phones and fashion), they all also had a strong sense of place – the type of places elites could access. This sense of space also speaks to the infrastructure available to the elites in their blissful abodes. Social space organises and contains the relationships between people, and their relationship with production, in effect creating hierarchical social functions (Lefebvre, 1992). Social formations are made through spatial practices and these have some longevity, creating social cohesions between different groups. In recognising the spaces that elites occupy, and the spaces the city government wants to create, the participants recognised the social pact between the social groups of investors and government. Here the delineation of social spaces consisted of “intersecting flows of violence, desire, and money” (Saldanha, 2017, p. 45).

In these spaces, and with their various luxury goods, elites create networks of people and things; this network flows generating power for them (Latour, 2005a). The power is made up through the aesthetics of the spaces and objects in connections with each other,

⁵ Johannesburg, City of Gold

forming “aesthetic machines” (Guattari, 1995b, p. 90). The aesthetic machines generate affects and material objects, which create social relations. The affected set off in the workshop participants were two-fold: first, disgust and outrage that the city government was only making alliances with elites and, secondly, disgust and frustration for the conditions in which they live.

Through this activity the workshop participants explored the aesthetic power differentials in Johannesburg. As described in the chapter on framing, the CBO members wanted to rid the city of “crime and grime”. However, they argued that the only way to accomplish this was for the city government to work hand-in-hand with inner city residents, street traders, waste reclaimers and foreign nationals. Like the elites, their push was for a ‘clean’ architecture. While they were enthralled by the high life, their focus was not on achieving a lavish lifestyle. Rather, working with government, they wanted to innovate the way of life in the inner city to create a viable option for housing the poor, providing access to goods through informal trade, and embracing cosmopolitanism through the multinationalism of the inner city.

7.2.4 Exploring the aesthetics of consumerism

As discussed in the conceptual framework, aesthetics as a form of political communication has been most powerfully used by advertisers. Advertising is political in that it has transformed ordinary people into consumers, and tied a large part of people’s self-concept to the type of goods they consume (Elliott, 1997; Meijer, 1998; Savat & Harper, 2016). Attaching oneself to a brand has become increasingly common, and is happening at a younger age (Radder & Huang, 2008). Different status is applied to different brands, and people are familiar with the logos of brands associated with affluence (Bevan-Dye, 2012).

Brand recall, often in the form of logos, is an important marker of brand awareness (Radder & Huang, 2008), and in the activity below the workshop participants reflected on the logos of affluent and recognisable brands. The purpose of the activity was for participants to reflect on the meanings of a brand, as an avenue to explore the meaning of their own organisational brand. Staying in groups from the above activity, the participants went through the magazine and cut out different logos. We then stuck up the logos on the wall and discussed them. The logos chosen by each group are depicted below (**Error! Reference**

source not found., Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found., Figure 15).

Figure 15

Group 2 selection of logos



Figure 15

Group 1 selection of logos



Figure 15

Group 3 Selection of logos



Figure 15

Group 4 selection of logos



Workshop participants were asked which of the logos in their collages were most familiar and most unfamiliar to them. The participants agreed that most of the logos that they had selected were unfamiliar to them. The only ones they knew really well were the Mercedes (Error! Reference source not found.) and BMW (Error! Reference source not found.) logos, and the Woolworths (Error! Reference source not found.), Vaseline, and

Nivea logos (**Error! Reference source not found.**). They then discussed that the Vaseline and Nivea logos were familiar because they used those products. They associated Woolworths, BMW and Mercedes as luxury goods, which were aspirational to them. We then moved on to discuss what made a logo memorable, and I asked the participants to think of logos that were easy for them to remember without seeing them first. Participants mentioned the McDonalds logo, the MTN logo, the Toyota logo and the Nike logo. They said these logos were memorable because they could draw the logos themselves and they had a simple design, and only used one or two colours. They again looked over the logos they had put in their collages and said that they would not remember many of these logos because they were too complex.

Based on this examination of logos, the workshop participants then considered their own organisational logos. None of the participants could draw their own logos, and they struggled to remember exactly what was on them. Based on this exercise they understood that their own logos were not creating brand recognition for them, and that brand recognition was a key part of them getting their message out and attracting attention to their organisation. Despite their own insights into the problems with their organisational logo, in the third workshop, when it came to strategising the aesthetics of communication in the future, none of the organisations wanted to change anything about their branding, as they felt attached to the brand in various ways. This will be explored in greater detail in the next subsection, in which I discuss organisational branding.

7.3 BRANDING IN COMMUNITY BASED ORGANISATIONS

This section of the chapter is based on critical visual analysis of the CBOs' brand personality, specifically based on analysing their logos, clothing, and protest banners. The two organisations' brand personality differs quite markedly. For the ICRC, much of the brand personality and visual language rely on the colour red, connecting the organisation to broader South African struggles against poverty and oppression. The One Voice brand personality presents a mixed bag since they do not use single colours in their visual materials, and they do not use the logo in a consistent way. However, they do connect themselves to pan-Africanist and South African trade union movements through their logo. The aesthetic components of the visual material are discussed in more detail below, starting

with a discussion of organisational logos, followed by a discussion of organisational clothing, and ending with a discussion on organisational banners.

7.3.1 Logos with hands

Remarkably, all three of the organisations used hands in their logos (see **Error! Reference source not found.** and **Error! Reference source not found.**). The hands constitute naturalistic symbols in the logos, to which audiences are highly receptive (Machado et al., 2015). While the focus of One Voice's logo is more on the single pointing finger, ICRC use the hand as a support to the inner city. Both organisations use circular elements in their logos, with the One Voice logo being the most circular. Both logos also speak to geography, and thus place, with the One Voice logo have map of Africa, while the ICRC logo represents the local geography of inner-city buildings. The ICRC logo is the most colourful logo, while One Voice has deployed a variety of colours inconsistently across time, however the One Voice logos is relatively simple, while the ICRC logo is highly detailed, including shading.

7.3.1.1 Pointing up and forward in One Voice logo

On a symbolic level, One Voice's logo locates the organisation in Africa (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). While the symbol of a fist is common in South African union struggles (see for example, **Error! Reference source not found.** on the next page), the pointing finger breaks with the tradition in a way that implies voting for change, rather than

fighting for it. The single finger is a clear reference to the number one, which is relevant to the organisation's name. The direction of the pointing also suggests that the organisation is rising up and has a clear sense of direction. The symbolism of rising also appears in the ANC logo spear pointing upwards (see Figure 17 on the next page) and

Figure 16

Older One Voice logo (left) and recent logo (right)



the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) logo rising fist (see **Error! Reference source not**

Figure 18

Pan African Congress logo (left) and African National Congress logo (right)



Figure 18

South African Municipal Workers Union logo (left) and National Union of Mineworkers logo (right).



found.). The One Voice symbol of Africa on its logo is strongly reminiscent of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) logo (Figure 17), clearly linking the organisation to other Pan African struggles.

In both One Voice logos, the circular border holds the symbols and text together. While the literature suggests that round shapes are associated with “approachableness, friendliness, and harmony” (Zhang et al., 2006, p. 796), the shape here seems more like a military badge that would be worn on a uniform. Zhang et al. (2006) argue that round shapes are preferred in collectivist societies, and indeed in the case of One Voice, they aim to create a collective of street traders.

The way the border and the circular text is laid out mirror the logos of trade union movements (see **Error! Reference source not found.**), so the organisation is clearly linking with similar organisations and identifying with their symbolism. The strong border on the logo makes it feel somewhat hemmed in. While the organisation seems hemmed in on many sides, they aspire to free spaces for street traders, and removing the border would loosen up the brand personality. As Airey (2009, p. 30) points out, the ideal logo is one that is recognizable just from the shape; given that the One Voice logo is just round, it is not so memorable and recognisable.

Over time, One Voice has changed the colours of its logo, with the logo on the left using the colours of pan-Africanism and the ANC (black, green and gold) (as for Figure 17). The logo on the right uses the colours typically associated with South African trade unions (red,

black and yellow) (as for **Error! Reference source not found.**). The original logo is the green and gold one, linking the organisation to Pan African movements and the red and yellow one was made by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), linking the traders into the trade union movement. However, in discussion with Julekha, the change in the selection of logo colours was not deliberated on within the organisation. Rather, when they were working with COSATU, a COSATU designer changed the logo to point to their alliance. (One Voice has since moved away from its alliance with COSATU and now allies with the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU)).

Both sets of colour place One Voice in specific political traditions, that is, the pan-Africanist tradition, that see all Africans united in one continent, and the Marxist union tradition that unites the working class. During the apartheid struggle, “colour was, for a time, a less policed mode than words or images” (Archer & Stent, 2011, p. 119). Therefore, the green, yellow and black, and the red, yellow and black colours were a way to circumvent the policing of political symbols and became iconic bearers of multifaceted messages. This led to these groups of colours coming to symbolise the South African solidarity culture, and it is therefore not surprising that One Voice chose these colours to symbolise their own solidarity.

However, the trade union movement is in decline (Bhorat et al., 2014; Buhlungu & Bezuidenhout, 2008; Mbandlwa & Dorasamy, 2021; von Holdt, 2002; von Holdt & Naidoo, 2019) and street trade organisations have expressed pessimism towards trade unions (Matjomane, 2013). The South African union movement has “failed miserably to forge any serious and longer-term strategy to relate to, organize, and support informal [workers]” (McKinley, 2015, p. 462). When I started my research, some One Voice members were working closely with SAFTU and hoping to gain support for organisational activities through SAFTU. However, by the time I had completed fieldwork they had drifted away, and Julekha explained that SAFTU did nothing to help them. Therefore, the link between One Voice and the trade union movement is tenuous.

Because of its similarity to other trade union logos, the One Voice logo is quite generic, and does not lead to the brand standing out from other similar organisations. The aesthetic ties One Voice’s logo to what Adorno (1998) calls a product of history; he argues that aesthetics tie one into following an existing social order. While the brand personality and political tradition are clear, it may not attract new audiences who might be alienated from or

feel no connection with South African left political traditions (for example, many traders regard themselves as entrepreneurs, not 'working class'). By relating to specifically the social order of anti-apartheid and anti-capitalist, the logo represents a limit of the organisation in attracting new members and making alliances with new audiences. The logo does not escape the "strictness of conformity" (Hegel, 1998, p. 5).

Regarding technical aspects of the logo, while the round shape gives the logo some symmetry, the text and the stars in the text are off-centre (unlike the images in **Error! Reference source not found.**). This is visually distracting, and suggests a lack of sophistication in logo design. A simple adjustment of placing the stars horizontally at 180° would make the logo more approachable and professional. The pointing finger is also a little distracting because it is not quite at 90°. It would have been preferable if the letters were adjusted to place ONE VOICE at the top, with the finger pointing to the name, instead of after the name. As it stands, the overall logo is off-balance, and does not represent well an organisation that is trying to achieve balance and impartiality from government. Symmetry has long been considered an element of aesthetics (Pittard et al., 2007) and the lack of symmetry reflects a poor understanding of aesthetics in One Voice. Symmetrical images are more likely to be judged highly (Tinio & Leder, 2009), so the asymmetry does not convey an organisation that should be held in high regard.

The typeface on the logo does not convey any particular brand personality because it is a multi-purpose font, that indicates no particular meaning. However, the typeface does resemble the typefaces on the SAMWU and NUM logos (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). Given the badge-like nature of the logo, the typeface is a good choice, because it is simple and easy to read. In a study on street trader organisations in Johannesburg, One Voice members were found to have the lowest literacy level (Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014), so a simple font is the most accessible for members.

The aesthetic is connected with a desire for collectivity and unity, through symbolism and colour that defines many organisations for the poor and working class in South Africa. Overall, the logo is likely appealing to members because of its resonance with other popular organisations, and because the colours and symbols are familiar to most poor South Africans. However, the aesthetic of the logo would not be appealing to other audiences because it does not break with trade union tradition and, therefore, does not offer new

possibilities for collectivity. The One Voice brand aims to establish “assumptions, attitudes, beliefs and values” (De Chernatony, 1999, p. 158) with which its members can identify, and with which potential political allies can identify (such as the trade union movement).

The logo ties One Voice to an organisational concept, which has been delineated by the early members. In Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) theory, the organisational concept becomes a machine generating blocs of sensation – affects. Indeed, despite recognising the failings of their organisational logo, as discussed at the second workshop, at the third workshop the organisation members strongly insisted that they were emotionally attached to their logo. They like the fighting spirit embodied in the logo, through the pointing finger, and through the symbolism connecting them to past struggles.

While the affective qualities of the logo lack originality, and tie the organisation to a style of politics associated with pan-Africanism and union organising, it also ties the organisation to fighting the struggle. This passion for the fight unites members who have to face-off against the JPC and city council that try to evict them, and the police who harass them. While the self-concept does not allow for creativity, and therefore does not allow for new possibilities (as shown in the chapter on desire), their existing strategy does yield results for the organisation and therefore they are not inclined to change strategy.

As discussed above when describing workshop activities, although CBO members recognised the failing in their logos, none of them wanted to change their logo. In spite of the failings, organisation members felt brand loyalty. Unity had been built around the logo, and the longevity of the logo spoke to organisation members’ sense of history. Therefore, although the logo might not attract new members, or bring about a change in the way others perceived the organisation, the logo was a powerful tool for loyally holding people within the organisation.

7.3.1.2 Building the inner city in Inner City Resource Centre logo

The ICRC logo is much more pictorial than the One Voice and ICRC logos, with shading and a variety of colours (see **Error! Reference source not found.** on next page). This painterly effect makes the logo feel like a substantial vision, especially with the yellow sunlight surrounding the picture, and the blue skies above. However, due to the amount of detail, the logo does not transfer well in other organisational applications, for example, on the red t-shirt

on the right of **Error! Reference source not found.**, the picture is rather gloomier, with black clouds hanging over the buildings. As Airey (2009) points out, a logo needs to be transferable across a range of mediums, and when the language of a logo relies too much on colour, meaning is easily lost when the logo is translated for a different medium. The details of the colour logo, with its shading, are lost as they are too complex.

Figure 19

Two formats for ICRC logo



Because of this painterly feel, the logo is not as iconographic as the One Voice logo, and also the logo does not evoke other logos from which it might draw symbolism, nor does it refer to other political traditions, which suggests that the organisation is independent of other traditions. However, the logo is strongly reminiscent of clip art and, therefore, seems a bit gimmicky.

The translation from colour logo to t-shirt logo is also disrupted by the use of different typefaces in each logo. While the logo on the t-shirt is multi-functional, it is also bold and clear. The bold typeface on the colour logo does not gel well with the image, and looks heavy in contrast to the rest of the logo. The words also run wider than the rest of the logo and make it seem as if the text is not part of the logo. Because of the contrast between the logo on the t-shirt and the colour logo, the organisational brand does not come across clearly, and does not create a strong identity for the organisation.

The full colour logo is inspiring; it suggests humans coming together to make a new city. The full colour logo aligns well with the organisation's aims to empower members, as the hand creates an image of strength, and the overall affect is one of possibility. However, despite the strength of the hand, the logo on the t-shirt suggests that the city is a dark and gloomy place, and lacks optimism. On the one hand, the logo on the t-shirt suggests the problems that the city faces, while the full colour logo is aspirational.

Figure 20

Logos depicting Johannesburg



While the other logos discussed above point to the two organisations' position in Africa, ICRC's logo makes clear that its terrain is a city. Many logos of Johannesburg depict the city, but usually they contain the Auckland Tower (see Figure 20). In leaving out the tower, ICRC's logo is more suggestive of blocks of flats for

accommodation, which is indeed the focus of ICRC's work. Nevertheless, the logo does not give a strong sense of place – it could be any city, anywhere in the world.

As for the One Voice logo, the hand is naturalistic and suggestive of the human involvement in the organisation, and the human involvement in the making of the city. Here the hand denotes both that human endeavour is the foundation on which the city is built, and that ICRC endeavour to lift up the city. In this sense, the city cannot exist without people, and therefore, the people should form the foundation of any plans for the city. Given that the hand is also holding up the entire city, the logo speaks to the strength of people. Since the city is being lifted up to the sky, it suggests moving towards a brighter future, which can only be achieved through human endeavour.

While the logo has many positive attributes, particularly the representation of human strength as a key to inner development, these attributes are lost in too much detail. Instead of the logo being iconographic, and representing the strengths of the organisation, it is not clear enough to draw members in. After the PAR workshops, participants did discuss slightly changing the logo, but this was not a priority for them, because they saw their work on the ground as more powerful than a logo change.

7.3.2 Wearing the brand: Organisational clothing for communicating issues

Clothes are a key way for people to embody a particular brand. As Bourdieu (2009, p. 199) points out, clothing provides opportunities for aesthetic stances in that they allow one to "experience or assert one's position in social space, as a real to be upheld or a distance to be maintained". Opting for particular styles or items of clothing makes "the body culturally

and socially visible ... the material that enables the immediate embodiment of identity” (Jenß, 2009, p. 331). Indeed, in the South African context, organisational clothing often asserts a political position and stance. For politically active South Africans, “the T-shirt has remained a constant and powerful medium for expression and activism in South Africa” (Moletsane & Lolwana, 2012, p. 277). For example, UDF and union t-shirts during the struggle against apartheid (Cronin, 1988; Frederikse, 1987; Louw, 1989; Thörn, 2007) the purple HIV+ t-shirt of the Treatment Action Campaign (Moletsane & Lolwana, 2012) and the red Anti-Privatisation Forum t-shirts (Bosch et al., 2018) of the early- to mid-2000s were iconic in drawing attention to the struggle. During election campaigns political parties frequently hand out free t-shirts to anyone willing to wear them (van der Westhuizen, 2009).

Joining a political group that has a particular colour outfit is akin to wearing specific colours in supporting a sports team: it marks the body out as belonging to a specific group, and unifies people using colour (Archer & Stent, 2011). While the t-shirt remains highly relevant in the South African political terrain, the EFF have also pushed the clothing boundaries further, no longer wearing a t-shirt but the red overalls of workers (Sorensen, 2020). In doing so, the EFF has swept aside the previous associations of the red clothing with the union movement, socialists and the APF, and taken it on for themselves; I discuss the impact of this in the next subsection.

Depending on visual aspects of organisational clothing, the clothes may convey a connection to other struggles such as, in the South African case, struggles to address poverty and oppression. In opting to wear similar, branded t-shirts, organisation members express a collective identity, which Guattari (1995a) argues is an important function of aesthetics. In the next subsections I discuss the impact of t-shirts on mobilising members.

The organisations have taken quite different approaches to organisational clothing, with the ICRC linking to typical South African struggle styles through its red clothing, One Voice has used a wide variety of colour in its t-shirts, reflecting no particular tradition.

7.3.2.1 Inner City Resource Centre rocking red

While apartheid era t-shirts often used the colours of the African National Congress (yellow, black and green), not all aspects of the struggle against apartheid were linked to the African National Congress. Red t-shirts and banners are also an iconic aspect of the language of

struggle in South Africa, having been used in the 1980s and current trade union movements. More recently, red t-shirts also became iconic to the struggles in the Anti-Privatisation Forum in the early 2000s. The use of red in banners and t-shirts “has its roots in Soviet revolutionary imagery of the 1920s ... [such that it] repeatedly highlights the revolutionary sentiments of the events depicted” (Maingard, 2003, p. 122). Given the history of red t-shirts in South Africa, the struggle and demands depicted in the ICRC t-shirts connect its struggles to other struggles, especially apartheid and post-apartheid struggles of South Africans to secure decent lives. In the early- to mid-2000s, the ICRC was an affiliate of the APF, which used iconic red t-shirts, so the ICRC t-shirt connected it to the broader APF struggle.

Depicted in Figure 21, the ICRC t-shirt carries organisational branding and demands. The front of the t-shirt carries the organisational name and logo, which marks the t-shirt as an attempt to raise the profile and visibility of the organisation. The text on the front of the shirt is a plain sans serif, possibly Arial font. The font choice makes for an easy reading message and clarity. By contrast, the messaging on the back of the t-shirt is not as clear.

Figure 21

ICRC Organisational t-shirt; t-shirt front (left) and t-shirt back (right)



Using several different fonts, along with multiple messages, and different layout for the messages (some centred and some left aligned) creates a busy t-shirt that requires a lot of work from the viewer. In addition, the words “WE DEMAND” in the largest font and in capital letters implies that demanding is the most important part of the message. While the choice of

font and size of these words suggest they are the most significant, it is likely that the key message is in one of the other items on the t-shirt. After the words "WE DEMAND", the stop sign and the words "EVICTIONS NOW!!" seem to be the secondary message. In terms of layout, this requires much shifting of the eyes, because the eye jumps to the stop sign and large lettering but to do so the eye must skip over the messages in the smaller font. The stop sign is effective in conveying its message, but overwhelms the words "EVICTIONS NOW!" and loses impact because it is placed in a thin border, which is a banner being held up by hands. The different images compete with each other and the banner imagery creates visual distraction.

Furthermore, because the eye skips over wording in a smaller font, further visual distraction is created because one has to go back to read it. The visual message is further disorienting because of the visual distraction created by the housing icon used as bullet points. Because the house icon looks like a rural mud hut the message conveyed is that the demands do not refer to inner city buildings but, instead, to freestanding housing. Therefore, the images on the front and back of the t-shirt convey very different information. Does the organisation demand freestanding housing, or does it want a place in the sea of high-rises depicted on the front of the t-shirt?

Despite the clear messaging on the front of the t-shirt, the t-shirt as a whole makes it difficult to zoom in on a clear message. In terms of wording, there are too many messages, which are almost illegible due to the different fonts and different font sizes. Multiple images, such as the high-rises on the front of the t-shirt, and the stop sign, banners and hands, and housing bullet points on the back of the t-shirt create further visual and message confusion. The visual and message confusion creates the impression that the organisation does not know what it wants, or that it wants too many things. In a march, bystanders would not easily be able to read and process the information on the back of the t-shirt because the marchers would likely be moving. As a result, bystanders are unlikely to be aware what the march is about and therefore may not support it.

As I have already pointed out, the ICRC does not use a traditional 'left' organisational logo; however, in using red for the organisational clothing, ICRC connects with South African political traditions. In effect, this hides the organisational identity because the organisation becomes indistinguishable from the very many other South African political organisations,

such as unions, that wear red t-shirts. In hiding the organisational identity, the main message that comes across is that the ICRC is an organisation that challenges government and corporate South Africa. The specifics of its own message are subsumed under a 'left' banner. This aesthetic does not speak well to the organisation's aim of creating beauty so that all audiences may be happy, as the red suggests a more confrontational approach. However, confrontation can be politically useful, depending on which particular strategies the organisation chooses to adopt. The caution is that some audiences might generalise and feel alienated from and unsympathetic to the organisation, simply due to what the organisational clothing tradition evokes.

However, at the third workshop, ICRC participants felt strongly that they wanted to keep their red t-shirt as it spoke of solidarity and defiance. They argued that it was a highly visible colour with strong visual impact, and also felt like a political 'home' to them. They did discuss changing the back of the t-shirt to make a clearer message. During Covid-19 they have indeed changed the back of the t-shirt, but now aligning with the Covid-19 health messaging, indicating that they are playing a role in helping people in the inner city deal with Covid-19 challenges.

An important factor in having organisational clothing is how the organisation uses available opportunities to promote the brand; this includes the places where clothing is worn and the frequency with which it is worn. In my observation, protest organisers did not wear the t-shirt when going house-to-house asking members to join the protest. Members only wore the t-shirt at the protest. The limited occasions where the t-shirt is used is a missed opportunity, as outside of a protest situation, members of the public may find the t-shirt easy to read (because people are not moving as quickly) and they may be prompted to find out more about the cause and the organisation. While wearing t-shirts at a march connects the organisation to the traditions of struggle in South Africa and builds collectivity, other opportunities for collectivity are missed by not wearing the t-shirts on many more occasions at many more events.

In considering the power of the t-shirt, however, it is important to consider how wearing the t-shirt makes the wearer feel: "What does clothing and, in particular, the T-shirt communicate about the wearer, about her or his life, identity, worries and concerns?" (Moletsane & Lolwana, 2012). Although the message is blurry to outsiders who might read

the t-shirt, the members feel the message is strongly aligned to their cause and their concerns. The red t-shirt also speaks to their identity as activists and their desire to make their politics visible through protest marches. Wearing the t-shirt at protest marches expresses the solidarity members feel, and the power that comes from that solidarity. The power flows not only from the wearing of the t-shirt, but also the actions that they perform when wearing the t-shirt.

However, the usefulness of the t-shirt in building power is also context-specific (Moletsane & Lolwana, 2012). As pointed out in the chapter on desire, when ICRC members wore the t-shirt to a JICP meeting, it became the tool of disempowerment. It was easy to evict the ICRC members from the meeting because they were 'in uniform'. The meeting chair could also refuse to give different members voice because they had already heard from ICRC members.

7.3.2.2 One Voice t-shirts – Inconsistent branding

Unlike the consistent colour of the ICRC t-shirts, the One Voice t-shirts do not have the quality of a uniform, since they have been printed in a wide range of colours over the years (see Figure 22). Apart from the yellow, blue and red t-shirts depicted in Figure 22, in my observation some committee members also wore a black t-shirt, and many also wore the white t-shirt depicted in Figure 23 (on the next page). Only a partial organisational logo appears on some of the t-shirts, that is, the pointing figure, but the image of the finger is not consistent and not always pointing in the same direction. In some of the logos on the t-shirts, such as the navy blue one third from the left, and the red one third from the right, the pointing figure is not even pointing up as it does on the logo.

Figure 22

An array of colours for One Voice t-shirts



While the first t-shirt on the left uses the original yellow colour of the logo, the front of the t-shirt only contains the logo, whereas the other t-shirts have the name of the organisation running below the pointing hand, and above the pointing hand there is a slogan: "ONE VOICE HAWKERS VOICE FIGHTING HARRASSMENT". The multiple word groups on the front of most of the t-shirts in Figure 22 are difficult to assimilate in a quick reading, although the words ONE VOICE appears three times, so the name of the organisation is very clear.

Figure 23

T-shirt for solidarity campaign on illicit trade



In my observation, only a few One Voice members wore the organisational t-shirts in Figure 22 but frequently wore the white t-shirt in Figure 23. This may have been because this was the most recent campaign some organisation members had taken part in (some

members were, however, opposed to this campaign). The One Voice logo on the back of the white t-shirt is smaller than some of the other logos on the t-shirt, and since it is near the bottom of the t-shirt, is quite lost. The t-shirt was not only frequently worn, but Julekha handed out the t-shirt at several events I attended, including the PAR workshops. The t-shirts therefore expressed a desire by some organisation members for solidarity with others.

Regardless of whether the t-shirt was one of the ones in Figure 22 or Figure 23, One Voice members wore t-shirts far more frequently than ICRC. For example, whereas ICRC members, staff and the steering committee only wore their t-shirts to their protest, at all the events I attended with One Voice members, including the PAR workshops, members always wore their organisational t-shirts. Therefore, the members felt a strong affinity with the organisation, and felt it important to make their identity clear. Even at their offices, several One Voice committee members were wearing the t-shirt, and they indicated that they frequently wore their t-shirts so that traders at the taxi rank could easily identify and find them. The t-shirts were thus used to express the committee's official capacity within One Voice.

Figure 24

One Voice t-shirt back



While I did not have an opportunity to see all the t-shirts (I was merely provided with the photo in Figure 22, I was shown a different white t-shirt with organisational goals on the back (see Figure 24). In terms of the text on the back of the t-shirt, the list of actions is quite long and not conducive to communicating one message to an audience. Nevertheless, the font is easily readable, and the star shaped bullets make it easy to distinguish one point from the next. The writing also indicates that

the organisation is tackling multiple issues that are relevant to organisation members, most of which are economic, poverty alleviation.

Given that the organisational logo frequently does not appear on the front of their t-shirts, the Africa logo on the back of the t-shirt (see Figure 24) reasserts that they see themselves as an African organisation. However, as I showed in the chapters on desire and framing, frequent xenophobic statements by members sit at odds with this pan-African identity. Nevertheless, One Voice members were reluctant to consider a different logo, and many members also felt that solidarity with foreign traders was extremely important to the organisation.

Because of the often-changing t-shirt colour and branding, One Voice clothing does not create a united voice. However, the t-shirt does consistently unite One Voice members, and highlight those who are involved, especially committee members. Therefore, the t-shirt effectively builds solidarity. For One Voice, it is not so much the t-shirt itself which creates unity, but the logo and organisational name on the t-shirt. By wearing the t-shirts, the organisation members wear their politics, expressing a shared vision and understanding of what the organisation stands for.

The t-shirt ties the members to the frames discussed in the chapter on framing, which focus on poverty alleviation and traders' efforts to address their own unemployment, as well as the problems they have with police and security force harassment. But whereas the t-shirt in Figure 23 expresses solidarity with other organisations, it also reflects divisions within the

organisation and divisions with other traders. The t-shirt is about making the distinction between legal and illegal traders, which is one area of conflict in the organisation.

7.3.3 Banners and their role in conveying CBO messages

With the exception of Philipps (2012), Schmahman (2017), and Corbett and Housley (2011), there is a dearth of literature on protest banners, and all of the above refer to protest banners in northern struggles. Other literature does mention the use of banners in passing, but does not study them. Even articles on South African protest communication, such as Bosch et al. (2018), Chiumbu (2015), and Dawson (2012) do not mention banners as an essential component. Nevertheless, most protests in South Africa organised by established organisations do involve carrying banners. Established organisations also use banners at meetings, workshops, conferences and other events organised either by the organisation or by others. Veneti (2017) does briefly discuss protest banners, but only insofar as they are frequently photographed by those documenting protests, including journalists. Because of the frequency with which banners have been photographed, there is a rich archive of South African protest banners, but these have not been the object of much study.

Philipps (2012, p. 4) establishes that banners are relevant visual material for study in activist organisations. He argues that banners are relevant for reconstructing “differences concerning orientation and disposition among the protesters”. However, the organisations in this study have not only used banners at protests, but also at events organised either by themselves or by others. Banners can be used at several events over the course of time or discarded after one event, and are usually dominated by text (Philipps, 2012). Protest banners are sometimes “very powerful and, with the right composition, can constitute a visually stunning image” (Veneti, 2017, p. 287).

Schmahmann (2017) and Corbett and Housley (2011) reflect on banners in terms of craft production, specifically a recent northern political turn towards tapestry, quilting, embroidery and knitting in banner creation. They emphasise the collective creation of banners as part of political practice, or “collectivist activism” (Schmahmann, 2017, p. 341), including public sewing events. Sarah Corbett originated the idea of cross-stitch banners for mini-protests, but these were not used in protests at such, but rather tied up in public areas in order to plant seeds in people’s minds in a non-threatening manner (Corbett & Housley,

2011). While Schmahmann and Corbett and Housley's example are not really relevant to the two organisations in this study, they do point to the importance of collectivity in the creation of banners.

Two types of protest banners are common: organisational banners and placards. I have already discussed placards in the chapter on Framing, with a focus on the words selected for placards. Below I discuss the organisational banners used by the ICRC and One Voice. Some of these banners were hand painted by organisation members, and some of them were professionally printed. Corbett and Housley (2011, p. 348) argue that handmade banners have a "profound effect", but I argue below that the impact depends on the aesthetic qualities of the banner.

7.3.3.1 Inner City Resource Centre changing banners over the course of time

Over time, ICRC has hand painted its own banners, with different designs and messages (see Figure 25, Figure 26, and **Error! Reference source not found.**). However, all the banners are red with black and, in some instances, yellow writing. Most recently, for its protest march on 14 November 2018, the organisation had a banner professionally printed (Figure 28). Despite the variations, the colours have remained the same – red, black and yellow, with the professionally printed banner having the organisation's full colour logo.

Figure 25

Early ICRC banner



In Figure 25, the lettering is easily legible, although there is a lot of text. The way the text is positioned is difficult to read, as the left hand side says "STOP

EVICTIONS WATER" and on the right hand side it reads "STOP ELECTRICITY CUT OFFS". Presumably, the word WATER is meant to be read as "WATER CUT OFFS", but because they are separated by the central image, one does not read the words in that manner. Since the word "Centre" did not fit in, and the banner could only fit "CTR", it is clear that the spacing was not well-planned.

The main image on the photo is very unclear; it does not look like the organisational logo and although it is recognisable as a hand, it is not clear what the hand is doing, or what it is meant to represent. It could be the fist of many left-wing banners, but it appears to be holding something unrecognisable. Despite the problems with the banner, it is not too bad an effort for a handmade banner, but points to the organisation in its infancy.

The next three images depict banners that the organisation still uses at various events. While the other ICRC banners would need to be carried by several people, the banner shown in Figure 26 is smaller and can be carried by two people. The overall design is much

Figure 26

Smaller ICRC banner



more legible than the one shown in Figure 25, with the lettering arced in a symmetrical way. The text is well-balanced and the message is clear. Compared to the rest of the text, however, the logo is a bit small and the colour of the logo is more grey than black, making it slightly less legible than the text. As in Figure 25, the name of the organisation did not quite fit in, which is not ideal for conveying the brand.

While the banner depicted in **Error! Reference source not found.** has bold and legible text, it does not have any organisational branding, so it is not effective as a branding exercise. Even on the basis of just the message, the run-on sentence is hard to read. It is easy to overlook the comma on the third line after "WATER IN" (even though it is in white),

Figure 27

Text heavy banner



quotation mark at the end of the text.

so the sentence becomes confusing. Having a full sentence to read also makes the message less effective than the one in Figure 25. It is unclear why there is a closed

The most recent banner (see Figure 28), was printed in November 2018 and the organisation paid a lot of attention to rectifying the design. Nevertheless, there are many messages, requiring audiences to digest a large amount of information. The typeset is highly legible and conducive to easy reading, and there is enough space around the lettering such that the banner does not feel too cluttered. Putting the organisational logo on a white background creates a spotlight effect and makes the organisation more visible.

Figure 28

Most recent ICRC banner



As with the ICRC t-shirts, the use of red locates the banners within the left political tradition and speaks of identifying with other struggles by poor people's movements. The evolution of banners over time shows an organisation becoming more concerned about its messages and branding, and seeking to make an impact.

Since the organisation has always carried a banner at protests it has attended, it reveals an organisation that seeks to unite people under one banner. As shown in the chapter on desire and the chapter on framing, ICRC is highly motivated by solidarity culture. The ICRC banners all focus on stopping eviction and service cut-offs in inner city buildings. The message has carried across the organisational banners, and strongly underscores the organisation's key message. On the final banner, the refrain "We won't move!!!" was frequently repeated by organisation members in the workshops and in my observation. It points to the resilience of solidarity in the ongoing efforts of the organisation in the inner city.

7.3.3.2 Protest banners and conference banners for One Voice

Like the ICRC banner, One Voice's banner is busy, carrying many messages. Since it is handmade, the lettering is varied and not typeset (see Figure 29). Even though some of the words such as "JMPD" and "EXPLOITATION" are in bold letters, this does not seem to convey information that is more important. Because of trying to convey many messages, the text does not fit on the banner very well, and the last line is much smaller than the other lines. This smaller writing does not specifically convey a message of lesser importance.

Figure 29

Busy One Voice banner



Like the ICRC banners, One Voice draws on the South African left tradition by having a red banner, which speaks to collective identity. Similar to the ICRC's banner in **Error! Reference source not found.**, the One Voice banner uses punctuation marks in a different colour to the main text, presumably in an effort to make the text easier to read. However, the use of punctuation in green does not make the message any clearer. And like the ICRC's banner in **Error! Reference source not found.**, the One Voice banner also does not have the organisational logo, such that the banner does not clearly brand the organisation. However, unlike the banner in **Error! Reference source not found.**, One Voice's banner does contain the full organisation name, so some identity is conveyed.

More recently, One Voice created a conference banner (see Figure 31). It was produced by COSATU for a conference One Voice members attended. However, the banner has since gone missing, and the only record of the banner is obscured by the two people standing in front of it. I have therefore left this banner out of the analysis.

Figure 30

One Voice conference banner



Because banners are an essential part of South African protest culture, One Voice members came together to make a banner. This communal, creative endeavour reveals the solidarity culture of the organisation. The banner also refers to the message I discussed in the chapter on framing. Despite the messaging, however, One Voice has not had much success in stopping the harassment of street traders, even though it has managed to prevent evictions in some instances. Julekha explained that it has been a long time since they protested as an organisation, and they had instead mostly protested in solidarity with others in recent years. Therefore, they had lost track of where their banner was and at solidarity events, they carried the banners of their partners.

As discussed in the chapter on desire, One Voice is able to operate on a micro-local level. However, this involves meetings with the councillor and low ranking staff of the JPC. When it does protest, it is now subsumed into larger solidarity structures, and the banners are no longer a key point in their protest activity.

7.3.4 Brand personality in the assemblage of political communication

According to the literature on branding, brands should work across cultures and in many languages in order to attract a wide audience (Airey, 2009; Bulmer & Buchanan-Oliver, 2006; Pittard et al., 2007; Whan Park et al., 2013). The key components of a brand, such as the brand logo, should help the audience identify with the product or mission of the organisation. Therefore, the brand logo needs to be easily recognisable and transferable across a range of media. In the sections above, I have examined the three logos of the ICRC and One Voice, and also looked at brand application in organisational t-shirts and banners.

Although ICRC and One Voice have developed an audience of like-minded individuals through their branding, they have not succeeded in attracting a wider audience (as will be discussed in the chapter on audience). The language of their branding mostly stays within the constraints of existing left-wing branding in South Africa, and therefore does not help them see beyond the existing culture to a place where new worlds are possible. While the

ICRC logo does step outside the typical branding, and does offer up a hopeful image (see **Error! Reference source not found.** on page **Error! Bookmark not defined.**) with blue skies and sunshine, the full colour logo is hardly used on their other branding; instead, the logo translates into a gloomy image on t-shirts.

Aesthetics can be politically useful in building collectivity and helping to create new worlds through new ways of seeing (cf. Cronin, 1988; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994; Guattari, 1995b; Latour & Stark, 1999; Rancière, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2010; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). In this regard, ICRC and One Voice are fairly successful in that they have a baseline of members in solidarity with each other. One Voice, through the use of its logo has also been able to establish, at times, links with the trade union movement (though these have not been sustained).

In the twenty-first century CBOs need to compete for the “mindshare” of audiences amid an information deluge (Elkington & Beloe, 2010, p. 17). To achieve this, CBOs would need to occupy mainstream by building and strengthening their brand in order to distinguish themselves from others (Hasaj & Krymbi, 2013). However, neither of the organisations have sought to strongly distinguished themselves from others. For example, One Voice has never made stable links with any trade union organisation, it wants to maintain its union-style identity embodied in its logo, to the extent that it does not stand out.

We therefore need to consider whether these branding ideals, based in capitalist culture, are appropriate for CBOs. Reducing the organisational efforts to what can be summed up in a brand can be a disservice to these organisations. While the organisational brands do assert an identity and characteristics of the CBOs, key social issues can be trivialised by reducing them to a matter of branding (Hasaj & Krymbi, 2013). Certainly the aesthetics of branding are intimately intertwined with capitalist society, the profit motive, and buying and selling (Adorno, 1998).

But as Guattari (1995a) has explained, aesthetics are liberatory if they can rupture the ways of seeing. In an era of mass communication, where branding is abundant, brands have become part of how people construct their identity (Couldry & Hepp, 2017). The CBOs in this study and their members have constructed their identity around their brand. For example, for ICRC the practices of being activists are very much tied to the red t-shirts and banners they use: they regard the colour as essential in carrying the message of the organisation forward

in a public way. They have stored the colour as part of their memory-based political experience with that colour (Kauppinen-Räsänen & Luomala, 2010). These visual elements are a key part of contesting the political terrain in the current milieu since “modern democratic politics is a battle of competing images” (Scammell, 2015, p. 8). In the case of these two CBOs, their logos and their brands are not appropriating visual territory or establishing themselves as single entities that stand out in the political terrain.

It is important that logos and the rest of the brand do not stand alone, in order to create a coherent message for the organisation. The CBOs have established their brand identity through logos, clothing, and banners. For ICRC, much of the brand hinges on colour, since the logo shape is not sharp or distinctive; too many different typefaces are used, and the logo is not easily reproducible on all mediums. For One Voice, the brand hinges on the pointing finger in its logo, which is printed on t-shirts without the rest of the logo. While the circular image is attractive, it does not really stand out, and the colours chosen are not unique to the organisation.

Therefore, regarding brand personality, the CBOs are quite weak in communicating through their logos and other brand elements. Where the ICRC and One Voice connect with the South African political traditions, thus having the potential to build collectivity, their brand personality runs the risk of being subsumed by other larger organisations. While the ICRC logo hint at the possibility of a new world, ICRC does not effectively follow through due to the execution of the logo in black. On an aesthetic level, the organisational brands of the CBOs reveal a missed communication opportunity that could be rectified with some thought and consideration.

7.4 DISCUSSION: CBOs’ MACHINERY OF THE AFFECT-BRANDING CONNECTION

Both organisations had a strong sense of the affects they wanted to achieve, both among their members and in their audiences. However, the affects ICRC identified with respect to members were more action-oriented than those of One Voice. One Voice saw the organisational leaders facilitating processes to generate affects among members, whereas the ICRC saw members facilitating organisational aims.

In respect of other audiences, ICRC and One Voice sought to generate positive affects among, for example, government officials, and they saw protest as a primary engine to generate the desired affects. In particular, the two organisations saw protest as happy and harmonious, and hopefully generating positive feelings in their audience.

In the next subsections, I delve more deeply into the affect-branding machinery of ICRC and Voice.

7.4.1 ICRC's affect-branding machinery

For ICRC, the affective qualities were put into words at the first workshop; I also observed them in practice. The atmosphere in the organisation revolved around a 'can-do' attitude. For example, at the workshop and at various meetings with the ICRC members, the steering committee and staff, the focus was on encouraging action to achieve organisational goals. Emphasis was repeatedly placed on the fact that the staff of ICRC could not achieve the members' goals without the active participation of members. Shereza repeatedly adopted an encouraging and persuasive tone towards others, and sought to underscore the need for members to play a lead role in all organisational activities.

Both the aesthetics of ICRC's branding and the affects it identified in the first workshop looked towards creating a sense of commonality or collectivity, as highlighted by Guattari (1995b) and in the African literature on aesthetics (cf. Ahura, 1985; Cronin, 1988; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). The members, steering committee, and staff effected some of their actions through branding, for example, mass wearing of t-shirts at the ICRC protest on 14 November 2018. However, they did not implement the aesthetics at every available opportunity. For example, on 16 October 2018 when they went on the inner city walkabout to announce the march, none of the staff or steering committee wore their t-shirts, despite the fact that in the steering committee meeting on 17 September 2018 they had highlighted the necessity of doing so.

Therefore, although ICRC showed an awareness of the importance of affect and aesthetics for building the organisation, they did not always follow through in practice, which limited the power of the communication machine. If they wore their t-shirts at every opportunity where solidarity might be possible, they could extend awareness about ICRC, towards building the kind of joyful collectivity they subscribe to. When applied with

consistency, aesthetics and branding create the possibility of making the non-sensible sensible (Conway, 2014). Through branding, affect is carried from one body to another. As I witnessed at the march on 14 November 2018, the aesthetics of branding, combined with the aesthetics of songs and toyi-toyi, generated feelings of solidarity, excitement and power among the members. Thus affect, moving through aesthetics, became a kind of glue holding together objects (bodies, things, ideas, practices, styles and values) (Ahmed, 2010). The t-shirts and banners are “happy objects”, which are “passed around, accumulating positive affective value as social goods” (p. 35).

However, in terms of trying to reach local government through its aesthetic branding, for example, the mayor rejected the bodies, in part, because of the branding they deployed. Government officials and investors “do not experience pleasure from proximity to [ICRC’s] objects” (p. 37). Therefore we witness a “political struggle” (p. 39) around affects (including how they are embodied in branding).

At the same time, ICRC members felt an alienation from the local government, and had a strong sense of injustice (as shown in the chapter on framing). Injustice is a type of unhappiness, but affectively, ICRC members do not stay with the unhappiness. Instead, as shown in their logo, they look forward to the “affective promise of happy objects” (Ahmed, 2010, p. 50) such as beautiful inner city buildings, blue skies and sunshine. Therefore, despite the problematic elements of the brand and the brand-aesthetics-in-practice, the organisation’s aesthetics fits into the flow of desire through the organisation, strengthening it to keep moving powerfully forward – never giving up. As they said many times through the course of my research “we won’t move”, in other words, they have no intention of leaving the inner city despite the rejection they experience from city officials and investors.

In terms of an aesthetic that challenges audiences by creating new ways of seeing, ICRC has some potential in presenting, in its logo, a vision of the city with blue skies and sunshine. At least as far back as Hegel (1998, p. 5) an argument is put forward that through aesthetics we can “escape every fetter of rule and regularity ... [the] strictness of conformity”. This can create a sense of optimism and promise of freedom. ICRC had deployed aesthetics to enter a realm beyond language and logic, connecting members to the “hope of ‘changing life’”, and providing an opportunity for “free play” that suspends the ordinary workings of power (Rancière, 2010, p. 118). However, since they are competing for

attention in a world overflowing with branding (Elkington & Beloe, 2010), they are not bringing new thinking and new concepts into being (Porter, 2009) because they rely on many of the old aesthetic tropes of social justice culture in South Africa. This repetition does not lead to government and media seeing them in a new way, so their aesthetic fails to challenge power in the inner city.

7.4.2 One Voice's affect-branding machinery

The affect-branding machine, like One Voice's organisational desire, is contradictory. Through branding the organisation pulls together and pulls apart, connects with other organisations and walks away. Whereas ICRC's affect and branding strengthens the flow of desire, One Voice's affect-branding machine works in fits and starts, much like the flow of desire I described in the chapter on Desire.

For example, organisational t-shirts are worn regularly by members, at their offices, when walking about the city visiting members, and when attending other meetings, but the branding of these t-shirts is not consistent. They use different fonts, different pointing fingers on the t-shirts, and different colour t-shirts. Furthermore, their logo was changed from the green and gold colours to the red and yellow colours, not through consultation with members, but at the behest of the union they were working with at the time. This points to the fact that while being attached to the organisation, different members tussle over the meaning of the organisation: are they xenophobic or anti-xenophobic? Are they willing to work with illegal traders or not? Are they against 'trade in illicit goods' or not? Are they aligned with the trade unions or not? None of these questions are ever resolved in the organisation. Similarly, a consistent brand is never resolved in the organisation.

In the circumstance of conflict, it is difficult to produce "on a large scale, a desire to create a collective generosity" (Guattari, 1995a, p. 24). When the members are not aligned in terms of the organisation they want to produce, on the frames they deploy, and on the aesthetic they use there is no "reciprocal determination of affect" (B. Anderson, 2010, p. 164). Nevertheless, the unruliness of the organisational practices provides an opportunity for "moments of rupture, instances of discontinuity, or flashes of passage" (p. 166) by which new potentials can open up. And indeed, as shown in the chapter on desire, although its politics only operated at the micro-political level, there was enough camaraderie between

them to influence the JPC and local councillor to engage with them. Within its diversity, the members did find enough commonality to take political action. Not all members agreed with all political actions and, therefore, they did not necessarily align with branding (e.g., joining with the unions (and the altered union-like logo), or fighting against the trade in illicit goods (and wearing solidarity t-shirts on this topic)), but, as shown in the chapter on framing, their shared agenda of stopping police harassment and calling for the clean-up of the city brought them together.

Similarly, although the brand was a bit muddled, members still all wore their organisational t-shirts in a way that connected the body to a shared affect of camaraderie. Thus affect gave efficacy to their power at a micro-political level (B. Anderson, 2010). Whereas the local government, the JPC and JMPD invent ways of “of targeting and destroying morale” (p. 169), One Voice had ways of protecting morale and harnessing it. This securing of morale “enables bodies to coalesce despite the persistent presence of affections that may diminish or destroy bodies” (p. 174). Morale becomes a life-force, a political force, through which power can be expressed.

Despite the different members’ political predispositions, through the relational flow of affect (Watkins, 2010), they have learnt the politics of solidarity to accumulate power. One Voice have many philosophies, but government, formal organisations, sociologies “think they should stick to only a few” (Latour, 2005b, p. 52). This contradicts much of social movement theory that implies movement members come together through a shared ideology (cf. [Steinberg, 1998](#); [Westby, 2002](#)). Much writing on South African social movements makes the same argument, for example, Abahlali baseMjondolo was described as having created a new “homegrown ideology” (Gill, 2014, p. 212), and the APF was described as “an ideologically socialist mass movement” (Cooper, 2010, p. 8). In One Voice, it was not an ideology that brought members together, but, rather, so that their solidarity could help protect them from the arbitrary actions of the state, JPC and the police. It is an entirely practical organisation, rather than an ideological one.

Nevertheless, for One Voice members, the act of wearing the t-shirts shows that they have a history of shared practical action that gives their images an intensity, which operates on a different level to their political disagreements and their different political logics. The intensity is “incipient action and expression”, with the propensity/potential to manifest in

“pathways of action and expression” (Massumi, 2002, p. 30). One Voice as a body, is not a steady structure, but always in flux and flowing, in the process of becoming: becoming collective, becoming political, becoming powerful. Without an exact political ideology, they are without a fixed home, and therefore are nomads, “continuously *en route*”⁶ (Saldanha, 2017, p. 57). In this sense, the organisation is not about who it is (a fixed identity), but more about what it can do.

In this process of becoming, they are in constant resistance with those who want the organisation to be regularly structured, with regular routines, regular membership meetings, regular constitutions, and regular elections. For example, the City of Johannesburg refuses to recognise traders’ organisations because none of the traders’ organisations function in the way that the government considers necessary in order to be viewed as an organisation (Matjomane, 2013). While local government (and other organisations) insist that they become hierarchical, arboreal and state-like, in practice, One Voice, in its desire, its affect, its aesthetic, refuses this final structure, and remains forever nomadic and forever molecular. Without full consciousness of doing so, One Voice’s action is “a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies” (Latour, 2005b, p. 44). In Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) terms, they practice different ways of organising and acting. Despite the assumption that power comes from orderly, military like discipline, in One Voice, power is established by the hidden ways they move and operate politically (ways also somewhat hidden from members).

7.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have discussed the organisations’ understanding of aesthetics, and one arena of aesthetic expression, that is, organisational branding. While at Workshop 1, the organisations grasped that aesthetics (“beauty”) was key to political communication, this did not always come across strongly in their actual communication activities. In the activities in the second workshop, they also understood that different ideas of “beauty” shaped a neoliberal aesthetic quite different from their own aesthetic. However, in practice the different organisations had a different sense of how aesthetics were politically useful.

⁶ Emphasis in original.

ICRC had a strong sense of the political relevance of their own aesthetic, and were tied to red as highlighting their own political position against the inner city being turned into a playground for the wealthy. They also expressed their own idea of beauty in their logo, wanting blue skies and sunshine over the inner city buildings: and this is the goal they are working towards. Thus their aesthetic ideals and their aesthetic practice embodied in branding (e.g., deploying branding at a protest march), come together in power political affect of solidarity. However, the aesthetic aligns them with, and makes them indistinguishable from other social justice movements. Therefore, the aesthetic does not lead to government or the media looking at them with fresh eyes. As such, they cannot use the aesthetic to shift power relations in the inner city.

For One Voice members, the organisational logo resonated strongly with them, as they wanted to identify with the politics that, for example, had given them access to legal stalls, and in some cases (prepaid) electricity and water. However, their understanding of aesthetics is not as strong as ICRC's because they do not maintain a consistent brand, using many different coloured t-shirts with a wide variation of interpretations of their logo. This means to the outside world that One Voice does not appear in the traditional political sense. Thus, they do not leverage their power at the political heights, but only at a micro-local level. Nevertheless, as I showed in the chapter on desire, despite remaining entrenched only in micro-politics, they were able to exert power to leverage better services for their members, as well as to 'negotiate' against evictions. The brand is consistent enough that wearing the t-shirt gives members a sense of belonging and solidarity, without making the aesthetic visible to the outside world.

In this chapter, I have therefore exposed how aesthetics are a key part of political communication, and how aesthetics can be deployed for political ends. Nevertheless, aesthetics cannot be a loose object on their own – they must connect to political practice (desire) and to framing, to form a powerful political communication machine. Where the organisations successfully deploy their political aesthetic, it builds solidarity among members. Neither CBOs has successfully deployed their aesthetic to reach up the tree of the state, but if they apply their aesthetic more consistently to build community, they can generate more rhizomatic power to take on the state in particular circumstances.

Chapter 8 COMMUNICATION TOOLS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

In order for communication to take place, there must be a medium or tool of communication. At the simplest level, this could be, for example, a human baby's cries for a parent to attend to their needs. In this instance, the communication tools are the sound-creating organs of the baby's body. At the other extreme of complexity, the ubiquitous cellphone allows communication through electrical impulses travelling across the globe through complex infrastructure. In this chapter on Communication Tools, I explore the tools used by the CBOs in this study, including bodies and things that work together to make communication flow. As depicted in Figure 1 (on page 4), communication tools are a key part of the political communication machine being explored in this thesis. As stated throughout the thesis, none of the aspects of communication work alone – they form a machine, an assemblage, in which all parts need to function in order for communication to generate power. While each chapter has isolated the different concepts for scrutiny, the tools being studied in this chapter are only useful insofar as they allow for the flow of desire, message, aesthetic and connection with audience.

Therefore, in this chapter, I will not simply describe the tools being used, but explore how they work as part of the communication assemblage to generate power, to “empower collectives and individuals to represent themselves, and to do so on their own terms” (Vatikiotis, 2008, p. 115). Understanding tools as only useful in an assemblage with other actors, avoids understanding the use of tools as deterministic or instrumental. The notion of an assemblage points to the way that humans extend their range of action in conjunction with tools. Indeed, what distinguishes human species from other animals is the complexity of our tools (Peeters et al., 2009).

Regarding communication tools, the tools themselves are centrally implicated in the action; for example, a pamphlet might *explain* a political position or the need for an upcoming action. While human endeavour is involved in producing the pamphlet, once it is made it can stand alone in carrying the concepts to other literate humans who might find the pamphlet. In this sense, we can see communication tools as acting in their own right. This

concept of things being actants has been elaborated in Latour's (2005a) Actor-Network Theory. He argues that the social is not only about connections and relations between humans, but also "a type of connection between things that are not themselves social" (p. 5). Groups of humans in the social are equipped with things, and as Bennet (2010, p. 4) explains, objects have "an efficacy ... in excess of the human meanings". Bodies enhance their power by making assemblages with things, therefore, communication tools can be used by CBOs to enhance their power.

As Latour (2005a, p. 70) suggests, "it's the power exerted through entities that don't sleep and associations that don't breakdown that allow power to last longer and expand further". While the state is one powerful assemblage, it is possible to create other assemblages to capture power and use it against the state (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). Organisations such as CBOs depend on mobilisation of both bodies and things (resources) "to sustain collective action and garner support" (Matjomane, 2013, p. 154). This chapter discusses the things the CBOs are able to use in order to extend their range of action.

As discussed in the conceptual framework, in recent years much emphasis has been placed on social movements use of digital media as a means to shift power, the Arab Spring in 2010 was described as a Twitter revolution (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011; Howard & Hussain, 2013). However, many studies have shown that the social media revolutions would not have been possible without on-the-ground organising, so it is not satisfactory to give all the credit to new technologies (Altan-Olcay & Icduygu, 2012; M. Hassan et al., 2015a).

Under apartheid, and as discussed in the literature review, a wide variety of media tools were used to challenge the apartheid regime, including protest songs and toyi-toyi, photography, pamphleteering, posters, art, alternative newspapers, t-shirts, and graffiti (Cronin, 1988; Thörn, 2007; Tomaselli, 1986; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Vershbow, 2010). Recent research on South African civil society organisations (including NGOs, social movements and CBOs) has found that many of the anti-apartheid communication traditions continue into the present (Bosch et al., 2018, 2019; Chiumbu, 2015; Dawson, 2012; Twala & Koetaan, 2006; Wasserman, 2018). While South African NGOs and social movements have often moved their communication into the digital arena, Bosch et al. (2019) found that social media and other digital technologies were rarely used by CBOs, who mainly relied on nanomedia. Similarly, as I will discuss in this chapter, my study shows that digital technology

is not at the core of communication tools used by the CBOs in this study: word-of-mouth organising remains the predominant form of communication for these organisations, even the better-resourced ICRC that has an Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)-equipped office.

In this study, I explored the CBOs' use of communication tools through their self-reported use as discussed in the PAR workshops, and by observation through the course of the study. In this chapter, I first discuss the findings of the PAR workshops in which the CBOs discussed their use of tools, before looking at each organisation to describe their tools use in practice. However, the chapter will not simply be a listing of tools they used, but will discuss how their use of tools impacted on the two CBOs' ability to extend their power to build networks of power, and thereby bring about the change they want.

8.2 EXPLORING TOOLS IN THE PAR WORKSHOPS

In the PAR workshops, the participants reflected on their knowledge of available tools and the tools they used in practice.

8.2.1 Workshop 1: Establishing existing communication activities and strategies

As explained in the previous chapters and in the methodology, the first key activity of the first workshop involved the two CBOs in actively exploring the concepts in this study by placing keywords on cards in the star shape. As shown in **Error! Reference source not found.** (on the next page), the participants identified a wide variety of communication tools, involving electronic media, activities, mainstream media, organisational media, and musical instruments.


Electronic media included computers and cellphones, telephone calls and SMSes, emails, social media including WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, chat boards, and "please call me". Older electronic media included loudspeakers and telegrams. Mainstream media identified included television and radio, as well as billboards. Organisational media included logos, t-shirts, letters, flyers, and placards. Activities were also considered a key tool, including pickets, marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, petitions, engagement in meetings, and verbal communication. Musical instruments identified included

guitars, pianos, and trumpets. Other tools for communication included pens, road signs, and offices.

From the variety of items identified, it is clear that the activists had a grasp of the full range of communication tools available to them, but this did not reveal much beyond a listing of objects. Further exploration was revealed in other activities, as discussed below.

Figure 31

Identification of tools



8.2.2 Spontaneous call for a mock protest

In the first part of the workshop we did not focus a lot of attention on exploring tools, but when we were discussing framing of messages, I suggested they write their messages as newspaper headlines, and they counter-suggested that instead they design placards, and when it came time to present their placards to the plenary, instead of presentations, they decided to present their work in a mock-protest. This shows the centrality of protest in political communication in the minds of the workshop participants.

The participants grew very excited about the mock-protest, and it was clear that this type of activity gave them energy and joy. Even though this was simply a role-play, the participants behaved as though they were indeed organising a real protest, in that they had fun coming up with slogans for their placards, and when the time came to present their placards through the role-play, they were extremely joyous, loudly singing protest songs, smiling, toyi-toying, and acting as if a government official was really there to collect a memorandum, shouting out their demands, and shouting “Phantsi!”, “Viva!” and “Amandla!” at various points.

Since a mock protest does not have the possibility of influencing government to change the conditions of their lives, the mock protest served an entirely different function in the workshop. From the role-play, it was clear that protest was not just a practical activity to get government attention, but that participating in protest-like activities was key to building spirit and solidarity. They were keen to enact a protest to generate the kind of energy and collective relationships that they were used to generating in an actual protest. In the context of the workshop, the protest was not about creating a political event or spectacle to attract the attention of outside observers. Instead, the mock protest had affective qualities that were fundamental to the type of community organising with which the CBOs were familiar.

Protest was not merely an external political tool, but something they embraced mentally, bodily, emotionally and even spiritually. Protest was part of their understanding of themselves as political. By enacting the protest, the workshop participants showed themselves as having a shared political culture, history and traditions, and they used the songs and verbal expressions associated with this culture and history. Protest forms part of their subjective understanding of themselves as activists. In that they could perform the

protest in the context of play, the mock protest became a 'collective rite', a "symbolic embodiment' ... of the beliefs and feelings of the group" (Jasper, 1998, p. 418).

The ritual elements that were enacted in the mock protest included the use of tools additional to the protest, that is, the placards they created, the songs they chose to sing, toyi-toying, and the ritual use of words that were commonly used during South African protests (Phantsi!, Viva!, and Amandla!). Making the placards was part of the "framing" activity of the workshop; in the process of making placards (a communication tool), the participants came together to collectively construct the messages and frames of the organisation. This shows us the functioning of the communication machine, in that the workshop participants understood that the frames must be channelled outward through tools.

Once these messages were placed on the placards, they further became a tool for the dissemination of messages to the outside world. The placards then served two functions: framing – developing collective agreement about shared meanings (and thus building collectivity) (Keck & Sikkink, 1999), and messaging for others outside the organisation. Once carried at a protest, the placards helped convey the message of the protest to onlookers, in a situation in which there would be limited opportunity for verbal engagement and discussion.

Regarding the songs and toyi-toyi, as Jasper (1998, p. 418) explains, "[s]inging and dancing are two activities often found in rituals, providing the requisite emotional charge through music, [and] coordinated physical activity". For participants/protestors to realise the potential for emancipation, the tools of communication must "involve interactivity and collective production" (Dawson, 2012, p. 327), and creativity was crucial in this endeavour. Songs mobilise support (Bosch et al., 2018, p. 2164), and there is an expectation at South African protests that songs will be sung, and the songs are strongly aligned with anti-apartheid songs "in terms of their musical structure, lyrical content, reception and political impact" (Jolaosho, 2013, p. 146). Singing anti-apartheid songs confirms the history of the participants in struggle, or for younger members, the continuity with the past since songs were an integral part of showing opposition to apartheid (Alexander, 2012; Schumann, 2008; Slovo, 2003). As such, the songs are a way of carrying history forward among younger members, such that tools are able to cross a vast distance in time. Emotions are embedded in song "as a cultural and social soundtrack of memories and minds" (Rosenberg, 2013, p.

176). The songs are “intrapsychic”, in that they include “processes interior to the individual, including embodied sensation, emotional responses, and rationalizations of experience”, which carry across the group and overcome any disagreements between participants (Jolaosho, 2013, p. 146).

These group feelings should not be confused with early theorists’ ideas, in which contentious politics was reduced to “instinct driven, unconscious, irrational, and destructive behavior of unruly mobs” (Gould, 2010, p. 18). The organisations were conscious about what they were doing, and the focus was not on destructive behaviour. They were rationally choosing activities which were playful and joyful and somewhat ritualistic, in order to build a sense of collectivity and solidarity at the workshop. The individuals’ identity as protestors came together with the affects of shared action such that “dynamics circulate as flows of energy between and among bodies and groups” (W. Liu & Opatow, 2020, p. 134). The flow generated a feeling of power among the participants.

This tool of protest points to desire not as a specific political goal, demand, or achievement, but as a process, activity, flow, extending beyond meeting basic needs. In this sense then, the protest is not so much a tool of getting government to cooperate as it is a tool of bringing the collective into reality, through a protest, even a mock protest – they are becoming activist, becoming collective, becoming crowd. Affect is mobilised in a rational way, based on the participants previous experience of the way that protests build solidarity and unite people in action. The act of protest or mock protest gives protestors the “sensation of a moment of existing relationally, interactively” (Gould, 2010, p. 26).

While affect is non-rational in that we have no clear explanation for how the emotional intensity that arises between people works, it is not irrational, because the acts done to invoke it make sense in terms of the individuals’ needs to connect to the collective, and for the collective to share action. As Gould (2010) explains, since oppressed people may often feel subordinate, dominated, marginalised, to the extent that they are exhausted, anesthetised, frustrated, irritated, agitated, unsettled, bewildered, infuriated, overwhelmed, alarmed, and even terrified, it is important to find ways to overcome the immobilisation that can result from these emotions. Therefore, in protesting, protestors may not be able to shift actions of government officials, but they are able to overcome their own immobilisation and

process their own feelings. They affirm that they have agency, they are active, they refuse to be invisible, they are not defeated and they are determined.

Protest, then, does not necessarily function as the accumulation of power to overturn and challenge the state, but as the accumulation of power to exist, the accumulation of power in the refusal to remain invisible, the refusal to remain downtrodden, and instead find within themselves and with the collective the energy to fight. In this sense then, the emotions generated through protest or mock protest can be viewed “as a motivational force” and a crucial means by which the workshop participants understand themselves, their context, their interests and commitments, their needs, and their options for securing those needs (Gould, 2010, p. 23). The protest enables participants to “gain dignity” (Jasper, 1998, p. 417), even if they did not necessarily expect to achieve the political change they desire.

After the mock protest, and on the second day of the workshop, participants were asked to evaluate the tools that they had identified on Day 1 and identify whether and how they found them politically useful.

8.2.2.1 Evaluating tool use

In evaluating tool use, the CBOs broke into separate groups to discuss tool use among themselves. These discussions are reflected below.

One Voice

One Voice suggested that protests were the most useful form of communication. However, they said in leading up to a march they needed to submit letters to government officials, attempt to secure meetings with them, and develop a petition. During a march, the most useful tools were loudspeakers, flyers, t-shirts, banners, placards, singing, and a paralegal to interdict the relevant department to address grievances. SMS and WhatsApp were also considered important for organising and informing members. They said emails and telephones were not useful because few members had access to email, and telephone calls were too expensive.

Although in the workshop One Voice were keen to highlight protest as the most important type of communication for their organisation, during the course of this study, I did

not observe One Voice planning or participating in any protests. While members who participated at the workshop have clearly organised in the past, since they were familiar with the types of communication tools involved, it was not high on their agenda of communication activities through the course of this study.

However, the fact that they highlighted protest as the most important form of political communication reveals a lot about the members' perceptions of what political communication means. Presenting protest as a type of theatric performance, previous authors have argued that "activism is not fully thinkable or operational apart from performance" (Hamera, 2014); activists often regard protest as the most sure-fire way of gaining attention, especially media attention (S.-D. Liu, 2013). But as Robins (2014, p. 101) points out, protests tend "to obscure the everyday realities of chronic poverty", since they focus on dramaturgy, rather than the banal reality of daily life. Furthermore, "media spectacles are very difficult to sustain over time and seldom produce the kinds of state responses desired and required" (p. 98). Nevertheless, protests remain an important political communication tool in that they "may be staged mainly as reminders of the human scale, seriousness, and disruptive capacity" of an organisation (W. Bennett, 2003, p. 163).

Apart from the actual emphasis on protest, One Voice members pointed to numerous other tools that form a protest-machine – these included, a petition, loudspeakers, flyers, t-shirts, banners, placards, singing, and a paralegal to interdict the relevant department to address grievances. This points to One Voice's understanding of protest not as a single thing, but as a series of materials and bodies that must be connected together to realise an action. Here Latour (2005a) and Deleuze and Guattari's (2004) notion of an assemblage comes into focus; the communication machine is made of many components/objects that work in concert to generate the flow of political action. Most of these components are material objects but, for example, singing is more embodied and ephemeral – it does not last as an artefact outside of the protest situation (except for those protest songs that have been recorded and distributed).

Regarding t-shirts, Willems (2011) argues that t-shirts, especially red t-shirts, are a symbol of resistance to oppression. However, I have already discussed the aesthetic of the the two organisations' t-shirts in the chapter on aesthetics. Not all community protesters wear t-shirts, but once they are formed into an organisation the t-shirt becomes de rigueur.

Similarly, once CBOs have turned into an official organisation, they regard banners as important for making their identity clear at a protest. Loudspeakers and pamphlets are also commonly used encouraging participation in protests, as identified by Bosch et al (2019). Whereas social media are frequently identified as a modern way to invite people to attend a protest, in-person communication remained the main tool for CBOs, even if it was not conversational but through a loudspeaker. Most South African protests also ended with a petition or memorandum being handed over to an official to make the organisational demands clear to the officials. Like the protest placards, the documents carried the message to officials, when the organisation members' bodies were blocked from doing so.

Regarding organising protest, apart from flyers and loudspeakers, the organisation indicated that they do use WhatsApp to communicate with members. However, they also indicated the limitations of this tool in that many members did not have smartphones, and when they did, they often could not afford to buy data. For example, through the course of my fieldwork the One Voice chairperson and another leading member, Frans, did not have smartphones and relied on SMS and phone calls to keep in touch (after I completed fieldwork, Frans acquired a smartphone and now uses it to stay in touch with other One Voice members). Notably, the organisation did not have a WhatsApp group for One Voice members so that they could communicate en masse, but rather sent messages to individuals. The organisation also did not report using any other social media to stay in touch or organise solidarity networks.

What emerged from One Voice's discussion during the workshop was that tools were not viewed as standalone objects – they clearly work in concert with each other. For example, prior to protests taking place, One Voice activists viewed it as important to try to secure meetings with government officials so that they could get their message across more directly. During the course of this study, One Voice members spent more time meeting or trying to meet with government officials than they spent organising protest. As discussed in the chapter on desire, they often reported meetings with local councillors, and also showed me emails in which they tried to get the head of the JPC to look into corruption by the local administrator at the taxi rank.

While in the workshop, they spoke of protest as the most important political communication activity. In practice, as I will discuss below, meetings were far more common

places of communication for One Voice. In the context of South Africa's ideals of participatory democracy enshrined in Section 152 of the Constitution of South Africa (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996), this type of close engagement with government officials is envisaged. Although research has shown that such close engagement has not always been achieved (Atkinson, 2007; Lemanski, 2017; Miraftab, 2009; Tapela, 2015; Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Nleya, 2010; Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2014; A. Wafer & Oldfield, 2015), One Voice's underscoring of the necessity for meetings points to the "the realization that some form of conversation as human activity remains irreplaceable" (Pajnik & Downing, 2008, p. 10).

Previous research on South African protest has pointed out that, indeed, protest does not just arise spontaneously, but that a lot happens before the protest (Nkuna, 2016; Piper & Nadvi, 2010). These studies have indicated that protest arises when community organisations do not feel heard by government officials. Insofar as One Voice was securing the attention of the local councillor, during the course of this study, organisation members did not feel frustrated enough that they organised a protest. I will discuss meetings as a tool of communication later in the chapter when I present my observations.

Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC)

ICRC members also felt the most useful communication tools were demonstrations and marches, and media (especially television). To ensure a successful march and attract media attention, they argued that they needed their office to work from. They also said they needed computers to send emails to possible participants, communicate with donors about protest funding, and announce the event on Facebook. They also argued that to organise members, they needed to hold engagement meetings with relevant stakeholders to encourage participation in their protest. On the protest they said they needed t-shirts, flyers, banners and placards, and a memorandum to hand over to relevant officials.

ICRC was markedly different from One Voice in that it emphasised the use of ICTs in its communication strategies. This is probably because it was a more structured organisation, traversing between an NGO and a CBO, and because they had access to ICTs at their office. As Bosch et al. (2018) have identified, in South Africa more formal organisations use the internet (especially email and mailing lists) and social media, whereas the more community based organisations do not. However, as I will discuss in my observation, ICRC

did not have a very sophisticated understanding of how to use social media to build solidarity and instead focussed on making announcements, such as announcing an upcoming protest, or announcing (with photographs) that a protest had taken place.

The office was indeed an important organising tool for the organisation as throughout the course of the study, staff could be found working at their computers and holding meetings at the offices. The literature on CBOs in South Africa does not have much to say on the use of offices for organising, but in a previous work (Pointer, 2004), I identified the Anti-Eviction Campaign office as an important site for organising. Similarly, Jolaosho (2013) mentions the Anti Privatisation Forum office as an important site for the organisation to gather. Therefore, it is not unusual for organisations to have access to spaces where they can organise their activities. However, ICRC was unusually well-equipped for a CBO, therefore tending towards being an NGO.

As for One Voice, ICRC had a strong sense of the ecosystem of tools needed to do their work, especially organising a protest. The organisation spent a lot of time organising a protest and I observed them using these many tools.

8.2.2.2 Strong emphasis on protest

Workshop 1 strongly underscored the emphasis the organisations placed on protest in their imagination of political communication. Although only one organisation undertook a protest during the course of my study (as I will discuss in the descriptions of my observations below), the emphasis on protest in the workshop suggests that the participants viewed it as an important political tool. Even though Liu (2013) argues that they may be ineffective in drawing attention to the issues, because the spectacle of protest obscures the issues being protested about. As I will show in my chapter on audience, ICRC was the only organisation that attempted to communicate with government and the media through protest, and they were unsuccessful in getting their voices heard by those in power. This lack of response was enacted in the workshop, when some of the participants undertook role-plays, which I will discuss in the next subsection.

8.2.3 Workshop 2: Exploring the communication strategies of political elites/opponents

At the second workshop, in which the workshop participants explored their relationship to elites and political opponents, role-play was used to unpack the tools used by elites. One of the groups explored the use of tools by wealthy people, another explored the use of tools in their everyday life, and the other two groups explored the use of tools in their political life. Each of the group's role-plays are described and discussed below. The CBOs were not in separate groups, but participants divided according to a numbering system.

8.2.3.1 Group 1 role-play

The group presented a role-play about an elite man buying a Mercedes Benz using a cellphone. The sales person typed and printed up the documentation on a computer and the man then arrived, signed the paperwork and drove off in his Mercedes. Back at his house two women celebrated the purchase of the car, using champagne to communicate their delight.

After the role-play, the participants discussed their perceptions about the tools used in the role-play. They identified cellphones and computers as key communication tools. However, they also highlighted that a Mercedes Benz and champagne were also communication tools, communicating status. They discussed how the elite have access to a range of communication tools that are beyond the reach of CBO members. They argued that because they did not have access to all these tools which indicated status, they were not taken seriously by government, as government listened more to investors than it did to them. The participants argued that the only communication tool they shared with the elite was their cellphones and, even then, they did not have regular access to data and airtime.

From this role-play, it emerged that while CBO members were aware of the many communication tools, they felt that the tools were exclusionary. The role-play underscored that ICTs were not an enabler of democracy for the CBO members, but instead a barrier limiting their access to democracy. Unlike Western democracies (as discussed by, for example, Castells (2015)) and more affluent South African activists who have been able to leverage ICTs to participate in political life (as discussed by, for example, Wasserman (2007b)), CBOs do not all have the "ability to transcend the materialities of space and time"

(Barnett, 2004, p. 2). Previous studies on South African organisations involved in social change have also found that ICT access was mainly limited to the elite (cf. Bosch et al., 2019; Chiumbu, 2015; Mdlalose, 2014; Pointer et al., 2016). For example, Chiumbu (2015) highlighted the role of middle class activists in the Anti-Eviction Campaign in enabling internet access and building a website for the organisation. Similarly, Pointer et al. (2016) and Mdlalose (2014) highlighted how in Abahlali baseMjondolo, middle-class activists were responsible for content on the website and putting out press releases in the name of the organisation. Far from being an enabler of political engagement, for One Voice, ICTs were simply not available.

Apart from ICTs, as highlighted in my chapter on aesthetics, elite tools of communication included things such as the way they dressed, the addresses where they lived, the type of housing, and other commodity-related signallers of status. For the CBOs, since they did not have access to the 'right kind' of clothing, when they entered political meetings with local government, they were easily identifiable as activists and not investors, and therefore could be sidelined in the meetings, as happened to ICRC in the run-up to this study (discussed in the chapter on desire). In 2015, Chiumbu (2015) pointed out that in South Africa, ICTs remain "an elite form of communication ... and as such has limitations in providing an alternative space for counter-hegemonic activism". The workshop highlighted that, despite a rapid increase in access to smartphones by ordinary South Africans (Sooryamoorthy, 2017), the limited access to data and airtime still resulted in ICT activism being a relatively elite practice (i.e., more resourced activists could engage more easily compared to community activists). Only about one third of South Africans have smartphone access (O'Dea, 2020).

8.2.3.2 Group 2 role-play

Group 2 presented a role-play in which one participant was driving a car from place to place and picking up friends along the way, as well as visiting a bottle store, a butchery, and a shebeen. Different friends kept calling on his cellphone and he would either agree to fetch them or tell them that he was busy. Eventually, they all stopped at one place, started braaing the meat they had picked up at the butcher, and partied together.

In the discussion after the role-play, the participants emphasised the centrality of a car to their enjoyment of life. They discussed how they were dependent on others for transport, and that those with transport often played a leading role in deciding who could join in the fun and who was excluded. While in this role-play, access to transport was central to organising entertainment, activists also experienced limitations on their ability to participate in struggle due to their lack of access to transport. In this sense transport was an essential communication tool in that it allowed people to meet up and talk in the absence of access to social media such as WhatsApp. The car was literally a vehicle for communication that allowed messages to move from one area to another, and to bring people together so that they could meet. Thus, it may be regarded as a communication tool.

For example, Jolaosho (2013) highlighted the important role of providing transport money to those who attended APF meetings. Without access to funding to provide transport money, it would not have been possible to organise meetings at the scale the APF achieved. In my own experience as an activist in the AEC and Indymedia, having a car resulted in me being the main driver for the organisation. During the course of the study, access to transport money also influenced the extent to which participants could attend workshops, and the provision of transport was central to ICRC being able to organise a protest, as I will discuss in my discussion of observations below. Chiumbu (2012) and Pointer et al. (2016) also briefly mention the role of vehicles to activists in terms of driving around townships with a loudspeaker to inform community members of upcoming meetings. However, I only observed the use of loudspeakers by ICRC at its protest. Apart from these sparse mentions, other literature I found on communication for social change did not discuss the centrality of transport access as essential to organising communication at mass meetings. This may be because Western countries typically have good public transport networks, whereas South African townships were designed in such a way that black South Africans had to travel vast distances to get to city centres where political decisions were being made. The difficulties experienced by participants in their day-to-day lives and their activism are further underscored in the Group 3 role-play as discussed below.

8.2.3.3 Group 3 role-play

In the third role-play, participants enacted some of their experiences with reaching out to the mayor's office. The second workshop took place after ICRC had conducted its protest, and

they were experiencing difficulty in getting the mayor's office to provide a response to the protest memorandum. This was enacted during the workshop.

An ICRC member role-played phoning the mayor to check on the status of the response to their memorandum. A person at the mayor's office checked for records of the memorandum on his computer, but said that the memorandum still needed to be discussed by the Housing Committee, and they could not give a date as to when such a Committee meeting would take place. They advised the ICRC member on the phone to check again in two months' time. Thereafter, in the role-play, participants enacted a picket, during which they were carrying placards and singing the well-known apartheid era song *Senzeni na?* (What have we done?). In response to the picket, the mayor sent the police to chase the protestors away, but the participants kept singing, until the police fired on the protesters, who then ran away.

This role-play again underscores Piper and Nadvi's (2010) and Thompson and Nlelya's (2010) point that efforts to communicate with officials long precede protest. While the participant playing the ICRC member in the role-play was able to phone the office and get through to an official, they were not able to get any response to their memorandum. While the local government had the memorandum on record, they had not met in six months in order to discuss the memorandum, and it was clearly not a priority for the city council. This speaks to how closed meetings take place in government which exclude CBO members, and limit the extent to which participatory democracy takes place, as already discussed in the literature (cf. Lemanski, 2017; Miraftab, 2004, 2009; Miraftab & Wills, 2005; A. Wafer & Oldfield, 2015). But the role-play also showed that the ICRC were well aware that protest had not been a successful communication strategy for them. But they continued with protest because it was an important part of their repertoire in building solidarity, rather than in securing change from government. The role-play also underscored that while participatory democracy was enshrined in South African law, for activists it had no practical meaning, because they were excluded from the halls of power.

In their role-play, the action resulted in the government shooting at protesters, but never in their practice of protest have the ICRC being shot at. If they had been shot at, they might have been more successful in securing media attention and the attention of the public more broadly. Previous research has shown that violent protests are more likely to receive

publicity, both in South African and elsewhere in the world (cf. Bosch et al., 2018; Boyle et al., 2012; Robins, 2014). Instead of receiving attention in the form of a violent response from the state, ICRC continued to experience invisibility and exclusion, even in protest.

In the fourth role-play, workshop participants also indicated the role of violence as a tool getting media attention and contesting the type of intervention the mayor was making in their community, as discussed in the next subsection.

8.2.3.4 Group 4 role-play

In this role-play, the participants underscored how the mayor only got in touch when he wanted to use them to draw attention to himself in the city, but did not otherwise address the needs of poor communities. The role-play related to the well-publicised clean-up campaign run by Mayor Mashaba during the course of this study, during which he asked people to volunteer to clean up communities instead of paying waste reclaimers money to help clean up the city (Johannesburg City Council, 2018; Moeti, 2019).

In the role-play, the mayor was on the phone trying to get hold of a Mrs Dube to tell her about the Clean Up campaign that would be taking place in her neighbourhood. Mrs Dube was too busy selling *amagwinya* (vetkoek) to talk to the mayor, and told him that he was only speaking to her now because it was election time and he wanted votes. Mrs Dube then went to her neighbour to complain about the mayor. This word-of-mouth activity is central to political organising at a micro-political level, as I will discuss below.

The mayor arrived in the neighbourhood with the JMPD and bodyguards. He began his clean-up campaign by making a show of picking up rubbish himself. He complained about the mess and litter around the traders' stalls and accused them of not cleaning up. They protested that he had not provided bins and had not hired staff to help with the clean-up. However, the mayor told the JMPD to confiscate the traders' goods. The traders started gathering around the mayor singing apartheid era protest songs, and then started throwing vegetables at him, the JMPD and his bodyguards. Some of the protesters were arrested.

In the role-play, the media were filming all of this, and the mayor said he has on film that the traders beat him up. He told them that he inherited the mess from the ANC government, and that the DA loves people. However, the traders told the media that they were just

fighting to keep their goods. Despite the traders talking to the media in the role-play, the only reason the media attended the clean-up was because the mayor had chosen to make a spectacle of it. For those participating in the role-play, it is important to note that they experienced communication from the city government to often be play-acting, saying one thing and doing another, or making a spectacle of any projects they completed, while ignoring the millions more people they were not serving. In this context, the role-play participants could not imagine any meaningful conversation with government, so the communication tools dissolved into the throwing of vegetables.

Miraftab (2004) underscores the levels of control that are involved in participatory democracy in South Africa, with officials declaring the space in which participation is viable. In this instance, the mayor acted as though he was creating a communication opportunity, but in practice he had no intention of listening. For him, it was not about political communication with the traders, but about showing himself as doing something to clean up the city. The role-play also showed the elite closed to contestation, and the extent to which political elites could act with impunity. The only tools that the community had against the mayor's campaign were disruption-by-vegetable. Even though this uncivility was the only way to communicate with the mayor in this instance, it led to negative attention for the organisation in the role-play.

The activity also underscores the role of violence in getting media attention; without violence it is extremely difficult for communities to show their deep displeasure at the city government and have their voices amplified by media. In this instance, the media are potential tools, through which the traders' message can be amplified, but the media as a tool are extremely unpredictable (Gamson & Meyer, 2004) as they usually highlight the way the message is conveyed, rather than explaining what the community message is.

8.2.3.5 Discussing the role-plays

In the discussion after the role-plays, the participants mentioned that they knew that if they were able to share their experiences on social media, they might receive wider attention. They acknowledged that protest was having little impact on their efforts to communicate with government, and that government actively ignored them or excluded them. While they felt that cellphones enabled them to have communication with each other, they did not know

how to extend their usefulness, and argued that they did not have the know-how to use social media as a political tool. This indicates that although training from development organisations might not always be useful (Servaes & Hoyng, 2017), given that most CBO members had cellphones, training on how to use them for political ends might be effective.

Walsh (2014) warned that tool-based training to improve CBO communication skills can be problematically naïve and wilfully blind if it does not fit in with the daily rhythms of life for those who have been trained. However, because cellphones are increasingly becoming part of the rituals of day-to-day life, it might be possible to leverage these tools in a more political way, if the CBOs had the relevant know-how. In particular the workshop participants felt that they could benefit from training on the political use of ICTs, since they knew Mayor Mashaba was on Twitter, and, therefore, they might be able to access and challenge him that way. They indicated that much of the training they received regarding technology use focussed on technical aspects of the tool, for example, which button to press, which app to use and how the app works. However, they had never received training on how to make the tool political. For example, they had not been taught how to grow an audience, how to frame their messages, and how to use aesthetics to grab attention. They were not using social media to start up conversations with like-minded individuals, or with elite political role-players. I will discuss this further below, when I explicate my observations.

While this workshop focussed on the 'fantasy' element of tool use, it strongly showed the difficulties of using ICTs for communication, and especially the power-relations embedded in those tools, as per discussions by Bosch et al. (2019) and Trillò (2018). For example, the CBOs identified how some tools were only available to the elite, especially things that sent out signals that were not ordinarily considered communication devices, for example, cars, clothing, and particular clothing brands that communicated wealth and status. As discussed in the chapter on aesthetics, they knew these aesthetic items (tools) were powerful and that they were excluded from using them. They recognised that they were blocked from entering some political spaces because they did not have access to the tools. For example, ICRC knew that they had been blocked from participating in the JIPC meeting because they did not look the way investors looked.

Even in terms of the relative accessibility of social media to build an audience, they knew that some elites knew better than they how to use these tools for engagement

(especially entertainment stars). They also knew that companies employed social media specialists to undertake advertising. Therefore, the CBOs were clear that powerful barriers prevented them from gaining attention in the social media political space and they understood that they did not have the skills to navigate it successfully. They had some sense that, correctly skilled, they could use social media to reimagine “hope for a constructive collective politics” by being better able to navigate “in this complex, confusing and contradictory tangle of mediation, politics, culture and community” (Pajnik & Downing, 2008, p. 12). As such, CBO members wanted help to overcome the barriers and make sense of these new political worlds.

Given that protest also featured in some of the role-plays, it was clear that the CBOs were much more comfortable in the spaces of protest than they were in cyberspace. Even though they also expressed disillusionment with the possibilities for protest to change the government’s agenda, they continued to consider it an important tool in their political lives. The mock protests revealed that protest is a powerful tool for conducting what Jasper (1998) calls the rituals of solidarity, rather than necessarily a powerful action to force government to change.

In the next workshop, the participants reflected on the communication tools they preferred to use in their daily lives and in their political activities.

8.2.4 Workshop 3: Developing an organisational communication campaign

In the third workshop, in which the organisations designed a communication strategy, individuals brainstormed the main communication tools they used on a daily basis, and then went into groups and addressed which of these tools should be the top three tools for the CBOs to use in communicating. The chosen tools are listed in the Table 5 below:

Table 5

Preferred tool use among the CBOs in the study

Group 1: ICRC	Group 2: ICRC (Rivoningo)	Group 3: One Voice
WhatsApp	Word of mouth	WhatsApp
Word of mouth	Radio	Word of mouth
Email	TV	Mainstream media

In contrast to the first and second workshop in which the participants emphasised the importance of protest, the third workshop underscored the use of word of mouth in political

organising. Indeed, in my observations, which will be discussed in the next section, word of mouth was the main means of communication for all two organisations. This maps well to Hardt's (2008) point about the importance and relevance of conversation in our daily lives and in political organising. In the case of all two organisations, the interpersonal connections were key to their political activity, and to the ongoing participation of members in the organisations.

Three of the groups at the workshop also emphasised WhatsApp as a key communication tool in their daily and political lives. Even though not everyone has access, cost efficiency, simplicity, and user-friendly features have promoted the use of the WhatsApp in South Africa (Shambare, 2014). Whereas data is relatively expensive in South Africa (Howdle, 2020), several data providers offer special cheaper deals for WhatsApp data use (Labuschagne, 2020). As such, this ICT is relatively affordable compared to other data and internet services in South Africa. The technology also offers the opportunity to communicate with large groups at the same time. However, neither CBOs in this study was using the technology this way: they mainly used the technology for interpersonal communication, once again underscoring the importance of one-to-one conversation in the daily and political lives of the CBO members, as described by Hardt (2008).

Two groups also highlighted the importance of the mainstream media in their daily lives and indicated that they would like to get the media much more involved in organisational activities. However, none of them could identify how they might attract more media attention, since previous efforts to contact the media had failed. They nevertheless felt that if they got the framing of their messages right, the media might be more interested in their work. A large body of research is devoted to underscoring the difficulty of activist organisations in attracting media attention (Bosch et al., 2019; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; H. Johnston & Noakes, 2005; Snow & Benford, 1988), but unlike many Western social movements, the CBOs in this study did not have a specific strategy for overcoming media resistance to sharing their messages.

One of the ICRC groups emphasised the importance of email to their work, and indeed in my observation, ICRC staff spent a lot of time sending emails. These were primarily to donor organisations, the media, local government officials, and some members, as well as to receive emails from some of the mailing lists they belonged to. Particularly in terms of

regular reports to donors, email was important in keep ICRC running and, in general, their email use was rather for more formal communication. However, One Voice did not feel it was that important because members did not have regular access to a computer and did not know how to set up email on their phones. However, they did send two emails to the head of JPC in the course of this study, and felt that this was the only way they could reach him; nevertheless he did not respond to their emails.

Given that ICRC tends towards an NGO organisation, rather than a CBO, its use of social media for more formal communication is not surprising. Indeed, Bosch et al. (2019) found that more formal organisations such as NGOs relied a lot on email for communication with staff, donors, and the media, as well as circulating news items via mailing lists. Dawson (2012) and Wasserman (2007b) also previously mentioned email and mailing lists in the work of the Treatment Action Campaign.

8.2.5 What the workshops revealed about tool use in the two CBOs

The workshops revealed that while the organisations used a number of different tools in their communication, none of them were really successful in reaching government. Protests (and the related tools of petitions and memorandums, loudspeakers, flyers, t-shirts, banners, placards, singing), phone calls, emails – none yielded two way communication with government for the CBOs. In the second workshop, the participants highlighted how the use of status-signallers, such as stylish clothing and fancy ICT equipment like high-end cellphones, were central to how seriously the government took investors compared to themselves. The role-plays and discussions around protest show the waning utility of this form of communication, but the organisations did not really have strong alternatives. This will be further revealed in the observations below.

8.3 OBSERVATION OF TOOL USE BY BOTH CBOs

In my observation, tool use was less important to all the organisations than interpersonal interactions, especially connecting to members in city walkabouts, ICRC's protest, and meetings with office bearers in both organisations. Although protest was strongly emphasised in the workshop, in my observation, only ICRC undertook protest action. I will discuss each organisation's tool use in my observations below.

8.3.1 Inner City Resource Centre's tool use for political communication

As was made clear in the chapter on desire, in my observation, ICRC used the most tools, and also used ICTs the most. My description of ICRC in the chapter on desire starts with meeting the staff and steering committee at the ICRC offices. The offices were a central communication tool for the ICRC, in that it formed a hub through which all other activities flowed and where organisational administration and record keeping (including finances) took place. Staff used computers to (i) send out emails such as letters to donors or the mayor and press releases; (ii) and write materials such as pamphlets and posters, which were printed to be shared at meetings in buildings; (iii) keep organisational records, including workshop and meeting minutes, and financial records. Women also gathered at the office to make Wonder Bags as part of the organisation's entrepreneurial activities. Organisational t-shirts were kept there, as well as the organisation's camera and office stationery.

On an average day, two or three people would arrive at the office seeking help or advice from the staff, whether it be related to housing issues (such as rent, water and electricity), or for example, foreign nationals unable to get their children into school. They would have usually picked up an ICRC brochure somewhere, seen a poster in a building, or been advised word-of-mouth by other members about the organisation. The offices would be a hive of activity. At the same time, this activity would be amplified by the various tools available at the office. In this hive of activity, things and bodies, in assemblage, would generate flows of communication, knowledge, information, thoughts, solidarity, plans, and instructions. The office did not work as a standalone tool, but as a place where other tools were either kept or generated. The office is both part of an assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004; Latour, 2005a), and also the things that hold the other assemblages of tools and people, working together to generate a flow of organisational activity. The assemblage is not so much a thing, as a process, movement, flow. The tools enable desire to flow from the hub of the organisation to the many audiences, which I will discuss in the chapter on audience. As explained in the chapter on desire, the office and all the other material objects were identified as key to the organisational desire, i.e. building action through documentation.

While the literature does not have much to say about the importance of offices as a tool of organising, Pointer (2004) and Jolaosho (2013) specifically mention the use of the office by the Anti-Eviction Campaign and the Anti-Privatisation Forum respectively. During the

early days of my study, Julekha from One Voice repeatedly explained why their organisation needed an office (as I will discuss in the next subsection). The ICRC was unusually well-equipped for a CBO, so it was able to mobilise many resources towards building its networks of solidarity. The object of the office and the other objects in the office were part of the things that made the social events flowing from ICRC (Michael, 2012b, p. 168), as I will describe below in relation to the steering committee meeting.

On the first day of my observation, as described in the chapter on desire, I was pressed into a steering committee meeting; the office where the meeting took place was full of past communications paraphernalia: banners and placards from previous protests, flipchart paper stuck on the walls outlining organisational plans, and some press clippings pinned to the wall. During the course of the meeting, the steering committee used the flipchart to outline their plans, and particularly explained the plans to me in terms of the different areas where they organise and the different needs of people at those sites. In my study, ICRC was the only organisation to hold such planning meetings where a specific action plan was put together with activities, responsible persons and timelines. The tools were used to create order; this is far from the disorderly conduct associated with social justice organisations who have been portrayed as “instinct driven, unconscious, irrational, and destructive” (Gould, 2010, p. 18). At this meeting the steering committee discussed undertaking a protest, and discussed their plans for this protest in meticulous detail.

They also discussed the use of communication tools, such as the t-shirts they wore to attend the meeting with the JICP, and how these were not effective in that it meant they could be identified and easily removed from the meeting. They further discussed how to remedy this issue in future, by not sitting together as a bloc to attend such meetings, and dressing in smart clothes to ‘deceive’ the mayor into thinking they were middle-class citizens or even investors. One steering committee member said:

We must dress smart. We must be like those business men. They mustn't know we're from ICRC. No red t-shirts!

In this discussion, they exhibited a clear sense of the tools they were choosing and how they were helpful or harmful. While the t-shirts gave them a feeling of solidarity, Willems (2011) highlights how, in South Africa, red t-shirts are a marker of those resisting oppression, and therefore the t-shirts made the organisation members stand out at the

meeting. However, the steering committee also recognised that the use of t-shirts was context-driven, and emphasised that they would be visiting different communities to involve them in the upcoming protest, and that they would wear t-shirts to make them recognisable in those communities. As one steering committee member commented:

We must wear t-shirts and caps when we are organising. We must show who we are; then people will recognise us and get involved.

However, in practice, when I walked about the inner city, going from building to building to organise members, the ICRC steering committee members and staff did not wear their t-shirts; they simply dressed in ordinary clothes. Thus, although they had the t-shirts to carry the brand, as discussed in the chapter on aesthetics, the organisation did not make use of every aesthetic opportunity. Nevertheless, by the time of the protest on 14 November 2018, they had printed t-shirts for everyone who was attending the protest, such that they made a powerful display at the protest. As Archer and Stent (2011, p. 119) point out, more than posters and placards, clothes “can be used more or less overtly to convey a message ... clothes embody one’s political standpoint ... The body becomes text and the carrier of the message in a different way.” In this instance, the t-shirts portrayed the bodies of the members as part of the body of ICRC.

This connection of things and bodies points to Latour’s (2005a) Actor-Network Theory in which objects and people together perform a function that would otherwise not be possible. The t-shirts and the bodies are networked to make an assemblage, and this assemblage enables action. In this case the action was shared across the t-shirt wearers, who expanded the networked assemblage even further, leading to the affect of solidarity and to shared action. It is important to note, however, that this assemblage does not always have the same affect: instead we must trace the network of connections, which involve “often wild innovations”, to understand “what the collective existence has become in their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best define the new associations that they have been forced to establish” (Latour, 2005a, p. 12).

As stated above, when the steering committee members and staff traversed the city to meet building and informal settlement dwellers, they did not wear the organisational t-shirt. Instead, they printed out a pamphlet announcing the upcoming protest. Together, the pamphlet and the organisers explained to different communities about the necessity for a

march. While the visits to these members allowed the organisers to establish an emotional connection and relationship, the pamphlets were left behind, to be shared with others who did not meet with the organisers, and also to serve as the trace left behind by the organisers. The pamphlet extended the reach of the organisers to others who may attend the march, but who they did not visit.

Similarly, ICRC had an organisational pamphlet explaining the services the organisation offered; these were often left at particular buildings to inform the dwellers about the organisation. In my observation, they also printed posters and pasted them on the walls of the passages in many inner city buildings to inform people of upcoming meetings and workshops. While much of the literature of social justice organisations' communication nowadays focuses on ICTs, especially social media, ICRC relied on the methodologies used to organise communities under apartheid. For example, the anti-apartheid movement relied on "newsletters, bulletins, pamphlets, leaflets and flyers" (Louw, 1989; Sparks, 2009; Tomaselli, 1986).

The use of these old mediums highlighted how familiar they were for many of ICRC's members, many of whom were older women and some were likely members of the anti-apartheid struggle. Aside from not having data, they were not familiar with how to organise via ICTs and social media. Indeed, compared to its members, ICRC was fairly well-resourced, but the staff were also unfamiliar with how to develop a meaningful online presence. For example, when I started my research, on wanting to check some information about ICRC on its website, I found that the website had vanished. I reported the problem to Shereza and she tried to investigate, but the staff had no technical understanding of where it went and how to get it back. Later in the year, I again raised the lack of a website with staff but as Shereza explained:

We hired a guy to fix the website. But we've called them and called them, and they keep promising they will fix the site by the end of the week. But they do nothing. We already paid them. But they haven't done anything.

This problem points to the fact that some level of technical ability is needed to maintain an online presence, and without technical support, it is not possible for an organisation to develop or maintain a website. Prior to commencing with my research and while I was developing my research proposal, I had looked through the website to glean enough about the organisation to write the proposal. The bulk of the website was dedicated to blog entries,

which were merely announcements of events that they also distributed via pamphlets, purely photographic diaries of events, and press releases. The blog did not contain any discussions about the changing politics of the inner city or articles about evictions that were taking place.

They also used social media in a similar way to their blog: they simply posted announcements of events, photographs of events that took place, and press releases prior to events. They did not try to participate in any social media conversations. For example, they did not use Twitter to connect to the then-mayor Herman Mashaba and attempt to establish dialogue with him, even though he made daily posts on the platform. If they had engaged with his tweets, particularly around the inner city's problems he posted about, they might have been able to create dialogue with him and contested his narrative. Even if they had not created dialogue with him, others might have picked up on the contestation and may then have created a dialogue with ICRC. On social media, dialogue is essential, because it "moves the focus away from actions which benefit only a single organization by introducing the principle of equality among communication partners, which should be seen as a product of ongoing and long-term communication and relationship-building" (Benecke & Oksiutycz, 2015, p. 3).

The focus of ICRC on using social media as a broadcast medium reveals a fundamental misunderstanding about what social media are for. As such, "the overarching belief that everyone with internet access is potentially an activist is fundamentally flawed" (Mutsvairo, 2016, p. 6). In the case of ICRC, on-the-ground activists were not easily able to become digital activists. Even though some ICRC staff members were young, and digital natives with respect to their social lives, they did not have a sense of how to transition their social-media-for-social-relations into digital activism. They were therefore missing a key political communication opportunity.

These problems with the website and social media tally well with previous literature, which highlights the poor skill set in terms of the internet and social media in most CBOs (cf. Bosch et al., 2018, 2019; Chiumbu, 2015; Dawson, 2012). As Trillò (2018, p. 120) points out, "social media might facilitate collective action, but can hardly be said to drive it because of stark inequality in access to communication technology and inequality in access to visibility". The lack of visibility was a particular issue for ICRC, in that they only had 15 followers on Twitter and 369 follows on Facebook. They had no clear sense of how to boost their

following and, during the course of this study, several staff said: “We need training on social media for us and the steering committee”.

Furthermore, while it might have been possible to challenge the mayor on Twitter, Mukhudwana (2020) and Sorensen et al. (2019) point out that South African politicians on Twitter frequently only respond to other politicians, journalists, and other elites. An organisation with only 15 followers on Twitter is unlikely to have got the attention of the mayor on Twitter. Similarly, Gwaze et al. (2018) found in relation to the city of Cape Town, that officials did not respond to housing rights activists on Twitter and Instagram. Likely, the organisation would have had to expend more resources to actively engage on social media. Above all social media require that one be social, that is, engage in conversation (Benecke & Oksiutycz, 2015); however, ICRC had not attempted to undertake political conversations in the social media space, so it is unclear whether they could have been successful or not in the social media terrain.

Unlike on social media, the organisation members, steering committee and staff were adept at using conversation/dialogue to communicate, and made deliberate efforts to go door-to-door to share information by word of mouth. Hardt (2008, p. 17) highlights the importance of the art of conversation, arguing that it offers the “social benefits of being in the company of others”. While movements such as #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall used social media to good effect during their campaigns (Bosch, 2017; Trillò, 2018), notably university students are relatively better resourced than poor communities, more literate, and from a younger generation that is more adept at using technology.

Apart from social media, the organisation did use some ICTs more adeptly, especially email. They sent emails to the mayor’s office, the South African Police Service (SAPS), and the media announcing their upcoming protest. While the mayor did not reply, the email to SAPS led to a meeting with them to plan the route of the protest, and provide further details about the march. However, this meeting showed the power of SAPS to limit the activity of CBOs in that they could determine how and when a protest takes place. As Oyedemi (2020, p. 621) explains, the Regulation of Gatherings Act in South Africa is a regulatory framework, which “undeniably locates power to the state to manage protest actions. This generates genuine opposition that the state may use its power not only to avoid violent protest but also to determine the shape of and how people protest.” Given that the control of protests fell

within the ambit of the state, there was a limit to the extent to which CBOs could use protest to press for change. As such, there is “a tension between just insurgency discourse and the overall intentions of a protest, and the official script of a city government that regulates how and where public protests are to be enacted” (Day et al., 2018, p. 9). In this case, while the tool (email) connected the ICRC to the chosen audience (SAPS), the outcome was simply to receive authorisation, thus tying the communication to an arboreal communication machine.

Just as the emails to the mayor were ignored, the emails of press releases to the media were also largely ignored – only one media outlet sent a reporter to the protest on the 14 November 2018, and they did not report on the protest. This shows that despite having relevant tools, on the whole the ICRC was not able to extend its scope for action beyond its own solidarity network, as discussed in the chapter on audience. While, as discussed, the tools were able to generate flows, the flow broke down between ICRC and the elites, such as the City of Johannesburg and the media. The lack of media coverage could likely be ascribed to the fact that the protest was not violent and did not involve destruction of property, as this is often a precondition of protest coverage in South Africa (Bosch et al., 2019; Lubinga, 2020; Pointer et al., 2016).

A key role of the news media is to draw attention to what is new. While “protest is a type of theatric performance”, without which activism is not fully thinkable (Hamera, 2014), the media would likely only be interested if there were something new in the performance. If they do not present a novel performance, protests “do not leave lasting impression, rather they are fleeting and ritualistic” (Oyedemi, 2020, p. 620). Another way that a protest might attract media attention would be to ensure an unusually large group of people participate in the protest to serve as a reminder of “the human scale, seriousness, and disruptive capacity of this movement” (W. Bennett, 2003, p. 163). While the ICRC protest was reasonably large (about 500 people) it did not achieve participation at a level to attract attention.

In the days leading up to the protest, the ICRC offices were even busier than usual. ICRC hosted a meeting with other organisations to invite them to the protest. ICRC participants, and Frans and Julekha from One Voice, were keen to identify shared interests, such as the grime of the inner city and poor access to services. As such, they saw the meeting as an opportunity for “frame articulation and frame amplification” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623). They also held out the hope that the meeting could “through engagement”

lead to a growing solidarity towards making “a better society, a better state and even a better world” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 363). However, the meeting did not lead to the formation of new solidarities; rather it alienated the different organisations from each other due to xenophobic comments made by some attendees. Meetings, as a communication tool, can provide an opportunity for conversation and the “circulation of ideas” (H. Hardt, 2008, p. 23), but it is only possible to achieve such ends if there is “mutual interest in knowing and learning from the other” (p. 24). In the meeting, the different participants confirmed “their own subjectivity and their own relation to the world” (p. 10), but the meeting/conversation tool did not enable the meeting of minds. This reveals that despite having the relevant tools for communication, the passage to solidarity is not an easy one, and can easily be derailed by a mismatch in values or ideology.

Nevertheless, in the offices, activity continued. Regular members came in and out, painting placards for the march. In the making of placards, the members “engage concretely with essential political concepts such as democracy, power and agency as well as the particular political contests of the day” (Gillan, 2008, p. 260). The activity of making placards was one of developing frame consensus, as the members worked together to come up with suitable phrasing on the placards, and this united them on a shared agenda. The mood around making placards was a lot of fun, as members cracked jokes with each other, and made fun of the mayor and investors in a defiant way. The activity highlighted the way that the task producing tools together could build affective relationships as members felt united in their goal. Thus, the making of a placard was not just expressive of a political position, but also about the members’ attitudes, such as rebellion against the powers of the state. As such, the placards represented both “interior impulses”, such as mood, feelings and thoughts, and “exterior circumstances”, that is, the living conditions in the inner city (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 318). Placards were the connection point between the individual members, other members, and later at the protest, the outside world.

On the day of the protest, many tools were visibly in use: cellphones were used to coordinate transport to get participants to the starting point, t-shirts and caps were handed out, a flatbed truck with a loud speaker was used for various people to speak to the crowd, the ICRC and the women’s banners were being carried by protest participants, numerous placards were held up, participants were singing and toyi-toying, and one ICRC staff member was taking photographs (which were later shared on their Facebook page and sent

to donor organisations to prove the activity had taken place). The event revealed how members participated in the action of communication. The aim of this participation was not merely to find agreement and participate in democratic processes, but to contest the power inequalities that exist (Waisbord, 2014). As Oyedemi (2020, p. 623) explains:

Protest is participation⁷. It is a form of participation that reflects the actions of individuals in speaking out about or against ideals and processes that have influence in shaping their well-being. It is a form of social involvement in decision-making about principles that shape their lives as citizens.

The protest was the culmination of their collective action through the use of many tools, and taking many actions.

However, this participation among the ICRC members, steering committee and staff did not culminate in the kind of participatory governance imagined in the South African Constitution. As discussed in the introduction, CBOs are supposed to play a key role in delivering the kind of participation envisioned by the Constitution because CBOs aim to tackle exclusion and discrimination in government by challenging government to meet community needs (Buccus et al., 2008; Hicks & Buccus, 2008; McEwan, 2003; J. J. Williams, 2006a). As stated in the literature review, despite the Constitutional Court rulings that the City of Johannesburg was obliged to dialogue with inner city residents (*Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as Amicus Curiae)*, 2009; *Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others*, 2008), part of the reason ICRC was protesting was because their members were not being consulted. The fact that the city government ignored the protest and never provided any response to the memorandum reveals how little influence constitutional rulings have on ensuring participatory governance happens.

Even though peaceful protest is also inscribed in the Constitution (Bill of Rights, Chapter 2, no. 17), city and town governments frequently use unlawful procedures to limit the right to protest and this limits the right to participatory governance (Royeppen, 2016). So for example, prior to the protest march, ICRC had met with SAPs to set the route for the march. On the day, the police present insisted on redirecting the protest, such that the

⁷ Emphasis in original.

protestors did not arrive at the front of the City Council's office, but instead round the back, and as such were less visible. As Day et al. (2018, p. 9) argue, the limitations of the power of the protest were not just in the closing off of talks between the city and the protestors, but were also "manifest in spatialised processes". As such, ICRC was not even able to leverage the occupation of space as a tool for communication. This failure points to a way in which, unless violent, protests are too routinised to be an effective tool of communication. While protests do establish "a protocol for the enactment of collective dissent" (Jolaosho, 2013, p. 140), their power was blunted by the protestors having to cooperate with police if they were to comply with the Regulation of Gatherings Act. Therefore, the outcome of the protest was hardly determined by the protestors' intent, but rather by "police planning" (p. 140).

Because of arriving at the back of the building, officials for the City Council offices did not initially know where to find the protestors in order to receive ICRC's memorandum. Such memoranda are frequently used as tools of communication with officials in the South African context. As explained by Jolaosho (2013, p. 140), "memorandum might set a limited time frame for grievances to be addressed with the expectation that further protests would ensue should there be no redress within the time period specified". Indeed, the ICRC read out their memorandum and set a time frame for response. But in the situation, the official immediately responded that they would not answer within that time frame as the housing committee first had to meet. The ICRC then responded that if they did not receive a reply, they would riot and "you will see things burning in the streets", but it sounded rather feeble and weak, since the ICRC does not use such tactics, and the government official was not intimidated by this.

This tussle of words left a rather damp feeling among the protestors, and they did not express victory. The energy went out of them, and despite some members trying to revive the spirit by singing, only a handful of protestors joined in. At that point the police told the protestors to disperse, and minibuses arrived to collect the protestors. While the ICRC had invested much of its desire, used collective framing to create messages, created a spectacle using aesthetics tools such as t-shirts and banners, and used numerous different tools to lead to the overarching tool of protest, the protest did not end in the mayor's office being a receptive audience to the communication of ICRC. Many of the components of the communication were in harmony – desire, framing, aesthetics, and tools, as discussed in this

and preceding chapters, but regardless of all their efforts, the City of Johannesburg had locked the organisation out of its communication circuits.

While protest is often sparked by “very poor communication between representatives of metros and communities” (Lubinga, 2020, p. 1391), protest is not an automatic remedy to this poor communication and social exclusion of the poor. Although they attempted to create their own space, by claiming the streets as theirs to occupy, they did not create the kind of space in which the elite “are open to hearing what the poor have to say” (Campbell et al., 2010, p. 3). In the months following the protest, ICRC staff made numerous attempts to follow up with the City of Johannesburg officials, but instead of receiving any kind of response, were told that the matter had not been discussed ‘yet’. However, this block on access does not necessarily reveal a weakness on ICRC’s part, but rather a government that is unwilling to listen and make participatory governance a reality in South Africa. Perhaps it also suggests that the city government might blacklist those who protest and refuse to engage with them.

As explained in the methodology, I had intended to analyse the CBOs’ photographs, but only ICRC had a body of photographs, many of which were taken at protests (like the protest on 14 November 2018). While ICRC had an archive of hundreds of photographs, they were not particularly useful for analysis as the shots were often out of focus, had poor brightness and contrast settings, and were often taken at such a distance that they did not tell a story. The photographs used on its (defunct) website and social media were of protest marches, pickets, and workshops. However, its archives also contained photographs taken at evictions and photographs of the living conditions of those in inner city buildings, which were not put on their website or social media accounts.

Emerling (2012) argues that photographs can usually be described as coming from an ideological position. Given the content of ICRC’s photographs, it had a clear ideological position of being a protest organisation, and also being involved in preventing evictions. But the photographs did not capture unique moments, nor did they break with or disrupt the ordinary. While the aim of the protest was to bring about change in inner-city Johannesburg, these documentary photographs did not operate in the tradition of apartheid-era photography, through which the photographs themselves (not just the protests) “attempted to bring about social and political change” (Wienand, 2007, p. 338). The photographs did not

contribute to “creating a better city in the immediate future” (Siegenthaler, 2018, p. 8). Instead, they captured the ordinary reality of protests in South Africa today. Nothing about the photographs was outstanding, surprising, or novel. Indeed, due to their similarity to many other protest images, the photographs did not “strengthen one’s conscience and generate compassion”, but instead “anaesthetize[d] us to their reality” (Horta, 2011, p. 22).

Referring to photographs such as holiday snaps, Bourdieu (1998) argues that not all photographs offer an opportunity for an aesthetic experience, but instead perform a merely evidentiary function. So, for ICRC, while the photographs served as historical evidence that a protest took place, and had what O’Sullivan (2012) calls political immediacy, they were not communicative acts that changed the audience’s way of seeing. Pink (2011, p. 100) argues that amateur photographs which go beyond family portraits and tourist photography serve four functions: (1) archiving and record keeping; (2) “making memories that intertwine personal with public narratives and personal experience with collective identity”; (3) imagining “collective futures” in which organisations can apply for funding and participate in international platforms where they present their work through photography; and (4) “re-constituting the past”. Thus, the amateur photography of ICRC did not have the same aims as ‘art’ photography, or even documentary photography by activist photographers.

For ICRC, the camera-tool allowed them to send photographs to funders to show that events really took place. The tool did not serve a role in making the organisation’s political communication available in public or government space, and they were therefore, not leveraging the camera for overt political communication. As Shereza pointed out, none of the ICRC staff had photography skills, so they could not develop the camera into a powerful political communication tool. As for the website, further technical training was needed to make the tool politically useful, and as for social media, training was needed to learn how to trigger conversations using photography.

Even though donor agencies often set up training for CBOs to develop technical skills (Hemer & Tufte, 2012; Servaes & Malikhao, 2016; Tacchi et al., 2009; G. B. Walker, 2007), ICRC had hardly received any technical training for its staff. Even though technical training is insufficient to develop a political communication presence (Servaes & Hoyng, 2017), in the case of ICRC, with its diffuse power structure, the tools would not have been captured by elites within the organisation. With regard to training, Shereza repeatedly emphasised the

need to democratise technological training for all members. Therefore, while technical training would certainly not have been a sufficient condition to use technologies politically, they would certainly have helped improve ICRC's communication capacities. Walsh (2014) is right that purely technical training can be blind, especially if the technologies are not already embedded in daily practice. ICRC was already using the technologies as part of organisational activities; the problem was that the outputs were not adequate.

Nevertheless, it is just as important to note that technical skills alone are insufficient. In the case of both social media and photography, training also needs to focus on using tools *politically*. This means producing outputs that generate political conversations, attract political audiences, build solidarity, and contest political elites. In the case of photography, this would mean that the ICRC members, steering committee and staff with camera access needed to learn how to document the politics of inner city residents' circumstances and share the photographs beyond just sharing them as part of donor reports. In the case of social media, staff needed to take time to build political conversation using their accounts. They therefore needed training on the multitude of ways to generate political dialogue on social media platforms.

The communication activities of ICRC showed them speaking but not being heard. As Lubinga (2020, p. 1395) argues, this may suggest that CBOs need to craft "different, yet effective communication strategies". For ICRC this may mean building up its ability to engage on social media, adopting a petition cycle using the amandla.mobi platform, and also building an even larger mass membership in order to make a bigger spectacle when it does engage in protest. The organisation is somewhat shaped by its imagination for political communication being almost completely confined to protest, but it nevertheless has a range of tools at its disposal that, if used differently, might be able to shape a different politics, such that it can leverage more power.

The main tools ICRC used were helpful in sustaining relationships between staff, the steering committee and members, as well as with donors. However, unless they build a larger mass, and also engage solidarity networks, perhaps on social media, they will not build enough power to force the city government's hand. Over the course of the last few weeks, at the time of writing during the Covid-19 pandemic, the organisation has indeed upped its social media presence. It is heavily involved in informal settlements in the inner

city, organising food drives and ensuring food security in these areas. Whether these activities will further build solidarity and increase ICRC's ambit remains to be seen. But as they repeated throughout my time engaging with them, regardless of any failings, "We are not going anywhere! We won't move!" As such, the organisation continues to occupy space and attempts to contest the politics of the inner city. Further technical and political skills training would likely increase their ambit of activity. ICRC has within its reach the possibility of using more technological tools to build solidarity and contest the political space.

In the next subsection, I reflect on communication tools used by One Voice and the possibilities for increasing its political power through tool use.

8.3.2 One Voice tool use for political communication

As discussed with respect to Workshop 1 above, One Voice members emphasised protest as a primary tool of communication. However, during the course of my observation, they did not undertake any protests. Just prior to the onset of my study, One Voice had participated in a protest organised by the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) on 12 April 2018 (Dyantyi, 2018), however, after my study began they did not continue to participate in SAFTU activities. Some One Voice members also participated in a FAWU protest against illicit trade on 14 August 2018 (New24, 2018). But once my fieldwork started they did not participate in any protests, not even ICRC's organised protest, for which ICRC had requested solidarity. The lack of protests during the course of my observation was somewhat surprising given that several studies found that of the large traders' organisations in Johannesburg, One Voice was most likely to protest (cf. Matjomane, 2013; Pernegger, 2016; Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014).

However, Frans indicated that there was an organisational lull since many of their members now had access to stalls, and therefore were less inclined to be involved in activism. As he explained, "if someone gets a legal stall they do not keep up with membership". Therefore, unless the city council or JPC made some sort of attack on the legal traders, they were unlikely to protest. For example, Julekha indicated that the JPC was planning to evict traders from the Lenasia taxi rank, and she said: "If they try to evict us, there will be chaos. We will protest". However, JPC's plans for eviction did not go forward; One Voice asserted that the administrative systems were in disarray and therefore the JPC

had no idea who the stalls were legally registered to, and who had and had not paid rent. One Voice thereby questioned the authority and legal rationality of evicting traders, and the discussion successfully shut down potential evictions before it escalated to police/security company involvement.

This example shows that One Voice often successfully used interpersonal dialogue to represent traders and address their issues. One-on-one meetings appeared to be the most useful tools for One Voice. As discussed in the chapter on desire, rather than mass campaigns, One Voice is now engaged in a micro-politics at the local street-level. It protects members from eviction, but does not protest to increase traders' rights. It communicates with members mainly by walking around the city and chatting to traders at their stalls. In this way, for One Voice steering committee and members, their bodies are the tools of communication, not sophisticated technologies.

During the first workshops and my first meetings with One Voice members, Julekha repeatedly underscored the organisation's need for an office, and during the course of my study, they acquired an office, albeit that it was not in the inner city. In my observation of being at the office on 11 November 2018, members of the organisation considered the acquisition a success. They felt the office gave them a home in which they could hold meetings and also a central hub where members could seek help. However, as I explained in my chapter on desire, the office was not without contention, as it became a site of struggle over who controlled the organisational resources. Nevertheless, the members were able to reassert their faith in the committee and send challengers away. Given that the office was also next to the JPC administrators' office, they were also easily able to access him and brief him about problems with trader registration and rent payments. Thus, the office was a clear tool in the communication assemblage for One Voice, in terms of its connection to members and to officials at the JPC.

However, unlike the ICRC office which was full of communication equipment, the One Voice office was bare: it did not even have any furniture. Office bearers and members sat on crates, or sat on the floor. While the organisation was promised furniture by the JPC, during the course of the study, no furniture was supplied. Although the long term plans were for One Voice to have equipment and furniture in the office to facilitate organisational record-keeping, this had still not happened a year after I completed fieldwork. This reveals the

limited tools that One Voice has at its disposal, and partially explains why they rely mainly on person-to-person communication rather than technology.

They did not even have the technology and funds to print pamphlets, flyers and posters. In the past, they did successfully access these technologies when needed, by paying at an internet café. Some of these documents had been kept by individual office bearers in the organisation. For example, for my frame analysis, Frans and Julekha each provided me with a plastic shopping bag containing various documents (many of them were not One Voice documents, but materials they had acquired when attending workshops by other organisations). Their meagre collections, kept in their homes, were the only archive documenting One Voice's existence. They also did not produce any new documents during the course of my observation. Even with an office, the bodies-as-tools remain the primary method of communication.

Regarding ICTs and social media, many members and office bearers did not have access to a smartphone and, therefore, could not use WhatsApp to keep in regular contact with each other. Furthermore, even those who had smartphones indicated that they could not always afford data. They also could not afford airtime to phone each other. As such, One Voice relied heavily on interpersonal connection, as seen in the walkabout of the inner city, and in their reported work of going to the local councillor's office to push for improvements in trading areas.

While One Voice had a Facebook account (and I used Facebook Messenger to make my initial contact with the organisation), they had not posted anything on the page since 1 January 2017, and prior to that 9 March 2016. Only eight people followed the page. Julekha managed the page, but she argued: "Maybe we can build solidarity there. But our members are not really interested in that, and they don't have data." This tallies well with the literature; many South African activists "rarely use their social media accounts because Internet access is expensive and poor citizens often do not have money to purchase Internet data even when they have access to smartphones or tablets" (Bosch et al., 2018, p. 2164). As early as 2008, Naidoo (2008) highlighted that activists often needed basic writing skills to interact on the internet, while literacy levels in South Africa are low (Howie et al., 2017).

The office bearers also had patchy access to email. When I was establishing contact with the organisation, Julekha used her daughter's email address to receive emails. Her

daughter would then print them out and give them to her. However, during the course of this study, Julekha had set up email on her phone and used it to contact the head of the JPC to inform him of administrative problems around trade registration and rent collection (as revealed in the chapter on desire). As discussed in the chapter on framing, the email exhibited a low literacy level, and was not constructed in formal writing as one might expect from such a complaint. However, this is not surprising, given that Bénit-Gbaffou (2016) argues that One Voice had the lowest literacy level of the top three traders' organisations in Johannesburg.

Besides the one-to-one communication the organisation used to speak to the JPC administrator, the local councillor, and Oxfam workshop delegates, One Voice made good use of t-shirts. I discussed the nature of the t-shirts in the chapter on aesthetics, where I connected the branding style to that of the trade union movement. Members wore t-shirts on all occasions when I observed their activities; they also wore their t-shirts to the PAR workshops. The t-shirts communicated a pride in the organisation, and were a symbol of shared activity. However, as I pointed out in the chapter on aesthetics, all the t-shirts did not look the same, and Julekha frequently wore one printed British America Tobacco against the sale of counterfeit goods. As mentioned in my chapters on desire and aesthetics, Frans was critical of this t-shirt and he did not see himself as aligned with that One Voice campaign.

This shows the way in which the broad organisation accommodated disagreements, as discussed in the chapter on desire regarding xenophobic comments by some members. Frans and Julekha remained connected and in solidarity with each other, despite their differences. When communities do not demand a unified national response, they are "paradoxically, both weaker and more resilient" (Paret, 2020b, p. 16). As such, while in the absence of external threat, One Voice could not build broad-based agreement that could coalesce into a broad mass movement, it could leverage micro-political gains with the local councillor. The t-shirts signalled to the local councillor that they were a real, legitimate organisation, with whom he must negotiate.

In this subsection, I have highlighted how One Voice communicated primarily using bodies-as-tools. During the course of this study, it did not participate in protest, nor did it have any protest banners or placards (as explained in my chapter on aesthetics, banners had been lost due to a lack of storage space). The organisation also did not print any

alternative media during the course of the study, hardly used social media, and marginally used WhatsApp. Bar one occasion, One Voice also did not use email. As described in the section on desire, rather than communication tools, the organisation was sustained by affective relationships between the members, and between the members and steering committee.

8.4 DISCUSSION

Arthur Miller, the famous playwright, once said: “Man must shape his tools lest they shape him.” When considering the tools used by the two CBOs, it appears as though the tools are shaping the organisations, rather than the organisation shaping tools to either build a broader movement, or challenge the issues important to members. For example, the fact that particularly ICRC and One Voice argued that they were protest organisations shaped how members saw the organisation and how the organisation saw itself. They did not choose the tool of protest to fit the needs of the organisation, but rather because that was what community organisations were ‘meant to do’. As I discussed above, part of the members’ identity as political beings was tied up with what Cornell et al. (2019) call, in the title of their article, South Africa’s “protest culture”.

8.4.1 How the Inner City Resources Centre used tools to gain power

For activist organisations, the aim of a political communication strategy is to reach as wide an audience as possible to persuade them to take up your cause (Earl, 2019). As shown throughout this chapter, ICRC used a wide range of tools to reach various audiences. However, the main audience it successfully reached using the tools it deployed was its existing members and donors. In this sense, it used tools primarily for solidarity building; this included protests, having the office as a central hub of communication, holding meetings and workshops, walking around the city to make interpersonal connections with building residents, wearing clothing, making placards together, carrying banners at protests, and distributing pamphlets and posters.

As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, ICRC resorted to protest because it was excluded from other political processes. But after my observation, in conversation with me Shereza remarked that they have a protest every year at about the same time, and that

protests were not a direct response to any particular issue. The results that ICRC got in terms of engaging with government were negligible. But the ongoing use of the tools of protest (and other related tools such as t-shirts, banners and placards) pointed to an organisation that was held together by regular protests, in order to show that they were doing something, they were trying to get through and, even in the face of failure, they would persist. As Bennet et al. (2003, p. 163) argue, protests remain an important tool of political communication in that they “may be staged mainly as reminders of the human scale, seriousness, and disruptive capacity” of an organisation. Activists often regard protest as the most sure-fire way of gaining attention, especially media attention (S.-D. Liu, 2013). However, as various protest literature has argued, peaceful protest, such as that undertaken by ICRC is not politically effective in attracting either government or media attention (cf. Malherbe et al., 2020; Paret, 2020a). Therefore, for ICRC, the primary utility of protest was to sustain solidarity among members through shared activities such as framing exercises to make placards, wearing organisational t-shirts to show their affiliation, and affective events to boost morale. In this sense, the tools ICRC deployed were primarily used for enhancing ‘good feelings’ between members, steering committee members, and staff, so that joyousness would propel them to act together.

However, the missing pieces in ICRCs communication activities were that it had not yet developed a creative strategy (desire), framing, aesthetic or tool use that was effective at reaching local government and the media. The organisation did exhibit some strategic thinking and effort to shape the tools to their own uses when they discussed the idea to only wear t-shirts for solidarity activities and not to attend local government events. Such strategic thinking, planning and implementation was a key component of “[s]uccessful (and failed) efforts to promote social change” (Waisbord, 2014, p. 154). Even so, they were not particularly adept at shaping these tools to the political circumstances, and were rather using them to build up to a protest to hold onto solidarity. Therefore, it is important to consider what tools ICRC was *not* using or not using *effectively*, that might boost its chances of reaching local government.

The difficulty in leveraging tools for political advantage was particularly stark in terms of how ICRC used social media. To be effective on social media, it is necessary for activist organisations to make frequent use of relevant topical/trending hashtags to engage in the politics of the day; these hashtags point to the political “tensors” (Benecke & Oksitycz,

2015, p. 2) that CBOs can use to highlight their own politics and thereby draw in political allies. This is because like-minded political organisations and individuals “will reward organizations for conforming to the[ir] values, norms, rules, and beliefs” (Holtzhausen, 2005, p. 408). While social media activism has often been studied in terms of historic moments such as the Arab Spring, attention must also be given to the long-term, persistent actions that build an organisation’s presence over time (Leong et al., 2019).

Typical, strategic practices that help activist organisations build politically involve creating and maintaining group beliefs (Leong et al., 2019) by: (i) engaging in their own provocative statements in an attempt to generate conversation with an audience – piggy-backing on common and/or trending hashtags and current events; (ii) connecting with similar organisations and provocatively entering into conversations with those organisations – using tagging; (iii) sharing posts of those with similar politics, also latching on to hashtags they commonly use; (iv) frequently tagging the media in their provocative posts; and (v) tagging and targeting elites in order to critique whatever they are saying. Through these types of processes, CBOs such as ICRC can, over time, build a critical mass of people, some of whom might feel motivated to participate in on-the-ground activities, such as protests (Ghobadi & Clegg, 2015).

Even those who do not consider themselves political may be moved to “post and repost politicised images, phrases, narratives, and survival stories within their digital networks of belonging” (Duarte, 2017, p. 2). However, to develop a successful social media presence, organisations need to track current social and political issues, and recognise social and political opportunities as they arise (Ghobadi & Clegg, 2015). This means CBOs need to become not just broadcasters of information, but listeners who respond to the messages of others (Murthy, 2018). The question remains whether, with training in the above techniques and strategies, ICRC can leverage more attention from local government and the media. It is certainly not encouraging to note that a Cape Town housing rights organisation, Reclaim the City, had no success on Twitter when they tweeted the Cape Town mayor (Gwaze et al., 2018); however, since I have not investigated Reclaim the City’s tweets, I am unclear if this was due to weaknesses in their social media strategy. Furthermore, social media in South Africa does not tend to be a dialogical space, since political parties tend to broadcast messages, without replying to comments (Bosch, 2018).

While leveraging resources (such as communication tools) is important to community political organising, in the instance of ICRC, the tools it was using did not prove enough to increase the flow of communication between the local government and themselves, and the media and themselves. None of its communication tools proved useful in communicating with government or other powerful role-players. As such, rather than shaping itself as an organisation that government must take seriously, its communication tools shaped them as an organisation that “encourage[s] citizens to take an active part in communities through the discussion of issues, problems, and challenges” (Waisbord, 2014, p. 153). It remains solidarity organisation, connected affectively and ideologically.

ICRC’s political communication machine then, could not connect its flow of desire, through the use of tools to all of their key chosen audiences. The flow of communication activity (and desire) therefore broke down, creating what Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 315) call a “break-flow”. If attended to creatively, this break-flow could open up new opportunities for the organisation, should it choose to connect the tools in a different assemblage to generate new flows. In this study, ICRC was the only CBO that showed significant potential for harnessing the power of social media. It expressed a strong interest in social media training; this could be effective, but only if the training looked at the technical and political skills required in cyberspace.

8.4.2 How One Voice used tools to gain power

With regard to shaping/being shaped by tools, One Voice was more adept at adapting tools to local circumstances, in that in all instances members wore their t-shirts and used many opportunities for interpersonal communication with various officials, including the JPC administrator and the local councillor. One Voice was able to leverage bodies-as-tools both to sustain solidarity and to engage their local councillors. Downing (2014) highlights the relevance of bodies in communication strategies, arguing that bodies can be “speaking, shouting, percussive, singing, and dancing communication instruments” (p. 331). Willems (2019) similarly highlights the importance of bodies in political communication; however, his emphasis is on a mass of bodies by which an organisation can make a spectacle. The bodily communication of One Voice was on a smaller scale; undertaken day-by-day one-on-one or in small groups. This type of interpersonal communication worked in a similar way to the affect that Seigworth and Gregg (2010, p. 1) explain passes “body to body”, resulting in a

“barely registering accretion of force-relations”. Depending of the relational affects shared, interpersonal communication gives bodies the possibility “for things to turn out differently” (Bertelsen & Murphie, 2010, p. 153).

Despite being adept at shaping tools to local circumstances, One Voice was not able to build on this to form a strong over-arching organisation, due to it being riven with conflicts, such as those about xenophobia and illegal traders (discussed in the chapter on Desire). Therefore, whereas ICRC was adept at having conversations within the organisation and with other solidarity organisations, One Voice’s conversation skills to build solidarity only covered a limited range of subjects, such as preventing evictions and preventing JMPD harassment. Whereas conversation may be useful as “a social event and a method of arriving at some kind of truth through responding to the other” (H. Hardt, 2008, p. 20), in One Voice members did not arrive at a shared ‘truth’; they disagreed on a range of issues but did not attempt to develop any kind of platform to resolve the areas of disagreement or take an organisational position. Therefore, regarding bodies – the only tool they really used – the tool had severe limitations in establishing shared values among One Voice members. Their alignment under the umbrella of the organisation was contingent on necessity: the main necessity being to stop government officials from acting against the members.

Whereas ICRC used tools to establish itself as a solidarity organisation, the tools to which One Voice had access limited the extent to which they could expand beyond micro-politics. In this sense, they were very much an organisation shaped by their tools, because they had no way of communicating with their members on a large scale. Because traders often could not leave their stalls to attend meetings, as Julekha and Frans repeatedly explained, having tools to communicate with large groups, such as a One Voice WhatsApp group could be a significant advantage were it not for the problems of access associated with not having a smartphone or data, and low literacy levels.

Because it did not have access to relevant tools, nor the skills to use them, it is hard to imagine that One Voice could extend its power beyond the immediate hyper-local spaces where their members have legal stalls. They had leverage at a micro-political level, but there were no particular opportunities to use tools to increase their purview of action.

8.5 CONCLUSION

Spivak (2010) asks in her book title “Can the subaltern speak?” but in this chapter, I have explored whether speaking can extend the realms of action for CBOs and their members. To attain power, the act of speaking is insufficient: the message must be amplified, and tools are the primary way of amplifying speech. The realms of political possibility for each organisation were shaped by the tools they chose to use. Numerous tools could be used for amplifying speech in order to improve the overall power of each CBO, with ICRC deploying numerous different tools in an attempt to leverage power. The tools gave them a modicum of power, especially for building solidarity; and in the case of One Voice operating at a micro-local level.

This chapter has revealed how appropriate tool use can enhance the power of a CBO. Certainly there were power differentials in terms of what tools each organisation could access; for example, ICRC accessed more tools because it had more resources. However, even when organisations have access, they are not necessarily skilled enough to use the tools effectively. Furthermore, given the weaknesses the organisations’ use of tools, it is unclear whether they could improve their access to political elites if they used different tools. This is an area for a further longitudinal study, to examine the reach of the organisation with current tool use, and whether this would be enhanced by using different tools.

Chapter 9 AUDIENCE

9.1 INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the conceptual framework and depicted in Figure 1 (on page 4), audiences are a key component of the communication machine. Indeed, communication cannot be assumed to take place unless persons send a message and persons receives a message. In the context of this study, the message senders are the two CBOs being studied, and the recipients are various government bodies, members, solidarity networks, and the media. The chapter is largely based in social movement theory, in that in terms of audiences, CBOs operate much like social movements: as for social movements, the CBO's purpose of targeting a particular audience is to bring about social and/or political change (Blee & McDowell, 2012).

Below, I give a brief overview of the theoretical aspects of audience, and then present the findings, discussing the findings in terms of theory, and then concluding the chapter. In discussing the findings, data was gathered at the workshops and during observation, supplemented by what audience could be inferred from document analysis, for example, protest memoranda directed at particular people. The chapter is structured by first presenting an overview of audience, as identified during the PAR workshops, and then looking at the different audiences addressed in my observation of events and/or as discernible from documents analysed. I will explore why the different organisations chose those audiences (deliberations about the choice of audience), and what their perceptions of the audience were. Throughout the chapter, I will compare and contrast the organisations, identifying the CBOs' strengths and weaknesses in their particular audience strategies.

9.2 WHY AUDIENCE?

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the audiences to which the two CBOs chose to reach out, the reasons for those choices and whether these changed over time in response to audience actions, and how they perceived the audiences, for example, their strengths and weaknesses and capabilities for action. Audiences are important for CBOs because these

are the main power nodes that the CBO wants to influence (Amine, 2013; Kanngieser, 2012; MacKenzie & Porter, 2011; Tarrow & Tilly, 2009; Tilly, 2008).

CBOs want the audience to change behaviour and attitudes (2012), but may perceive different audiences in different ways. For example, audiences may be perceived as active or passive, engaged or disenchanted, self-interested or communitarian, receptive or demanding. Depending on these perceptions, an organisation may choose to target the audience in different ways. Some of these ways include adopting different frames and using different tools; however, these were discussed in previous chapters. In this chapter I focus on each CBO's audience strategy: who do they choose as an audience, why do they choose the audience, and how does the audience change over time in response to the perceived responses of those audiences?

In order to engage audiences, the CBOs stepped into both the public and private terrains. For example, they took part in or created different public events, and/or engaged one-on-one, for example, visiting people in their homes or at their trading stalls. However, it is necessary to engage a wider audience than one-on-one if the organisations aim to achieve broader change. This requires them to build networks or assemblages by communicating broadly.

9.2.1 Audiences as assemblage

Deleuze and Guattari's (2004) and Latour's (2005a) notion of assemblages highlights the network of connections between things, and in this chapter, I specifically focus on the networks between the CBOs and their audiences. In the network each type of audience "becomes strategic through the number of connections it commands ... [which lose] importance when losing its connections" (Latour, 1996, p. 372). As such, we can judge the strength of the relationship between each CBO and their specific audiences in terms of the timeframe or longevity of that engagement.

In terms of the theory of power based on Deleuze and Guattari's (2004) notion of an assemblage/desiring-machine, audiences are rhizomes in the network of power; however, government (and its outsourced companies) are rather more arboreal than rhizomatic. Rhizomatic nodes allow connection of one thing to any other thing, creating a multiplicity of potentials within the network (Woods et al., 2013); so, for example, an audience to a tool, or

one audience to another audience. Rhizomatic organisations have the “capacity to switch forms, tactics, and names, to gestate 'underground' and to sprout in unexpected places” (p. 437). Arboreal structures are rather more rigid and inflexible, allowing only for particular kinds of connection, with a central organisation with branches. Therefore, in discussing audience and analysing power relations, I focus on Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) theories of rhizomatic and arboreal assemblages of audiences as they relate to the communication machine depicted in Figure 1 (on page 4). A rhizomatic approach to CBO communication allows us to see CBOs and their audiences as “fluid civil society networks” or as arboreal and antagonistic (Carpentier, 2016). For example, connections with members and allies can be more numerous and flexible and thereby create increased potential for organisation. By contrast, government structures are hierarchical, with different departments reporting to those higher up the tree. While interdepartmental communication in government is meant to take place in an orderly fashion, in organisations such as CBOs, communication can be rather more messy, and therefore more dynamic (Woods et al., 2013).

The assemblage notion shows that the terrain of political engagement involves “random patterns as a result of complex interactions,” which are “expansive and powerful” (Kent & Lane, 2017, p. 573). For example, in this study, as I will show below, for One Voice the most meaningful and powerful interactions were not a result of strategic thinking and planning but were opportunistic, in that they engaged particular audiences as the occasion arose. Despite the CBOs agreeing that the government was the most important communication target, during the course of my study, One Voice was the only organisation that succeeded in communicating with (quasi-)government structures in a meaningful way, in the form of the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC) and their local councillor. Both ICRC and One Voice put a lot of energy into connecting with their membership. Only ICRC made a concerted effort to develop solidarity networks and to make contact with the media. Each of these audience types will be discussed in the next subsections.

9.3 DELIBERATIONS ON AUDIENCES

While the social movement literature has often assumed that the main target of communication is the state (Blee & McDowell, 2012; McAdam, 2000; Tarrow & Tilly, 2009; Tilly, 2008; E. T. Walker et al., 2008), a variety of other audiences have been identified,

the literature identified above. Mirroring the literature, I sorted the two CBOs' analysis of audience into the commonly identified categories of audience types, shown in Table 6.

Table 6

Clustering of audience types identified at PAR workshop

Audience type	Examples of audience
Government and quasi-government structures	parliament, tribunals, courts, city officials, JMPD and SAPS, government officials, mayor, councillors, premier, president, madam speaker, 'Red Ants' security company
Members/potential members	citizens, non-citizens, refugees, hawkers, tenants, homeless people, activists, witch doctors, prisoners, commuters, consumers, boys, girls, youth, elders, women, men, widowers, divorcees, single people, people with disabilities, patients, singers, dancers, cleaners, communities, squatter camps
Solidarity networks	church, universities, schools, crèche, women's organisations, forums and platforms, concerned civil society organisations, taxi drivers' organisations, teachers, doctors, nurses, social workers, school principals, lawyers, leaders of traditional organisations
Media	The media
Capitalists	labour brokers, business people, property owners

Based on this activity, it was clear that the two CBOs had a strong sense of who they should target in terms of their communication efforts. However, at this stage they were not deliberative about who their audience really was, but rather brainstorming all the possibilities. On the whole, organisation members had encountered all these types of audience, either on an individual (and sometimes personal) basis or in groups through organisational activities. The workshop participants exhibited rich social lives, filled with different types of people with different capacities. While the literature points to engaging with audiences in order to influence them (Amine, 2013; Kanngieser, 2012; MacKenzie & Porter, 2011; Tarrow & Tilly, 2009; Tilly, 2008), at this stage in the workshop programme, the workshop participants did not consider who they could influence, but only who they communicated with.

This activity provided a map of the network in which individual members and each CBO was embedded. As Latour (2011) explains, for each CBO in a network with their audience, "a given element becomes strategic through the number of connections it commands, and how it loses its importance when losing its connections" (Latour, 1996, p. 372). As such, for

the CBOs some of these connections were more salient than others, as will be revealed through the other workshop activities discussed below. As Davies (2012, p. 277) explains, these assemblages of audiences are dynamic, allowing “different actors to become part of the assemblage ... [and] others to leave”. In the list above, it is clear that the different actors play different roles in the network, and some may be a steady part of each CBO’s network, while others may move in and out.

Once this activity was complete, the two CBOs were asked to identify the top three audiences with whom they saw it as most important to communicate. The ICRC identified local government officials (like the mayor and Members of Mayoral Committees (MMCs) as their key audience, but also security companies (secondarily), and ward councillors (thirdly). One Voice also considered local government officials the primary audience and were also concerned with security personnel; they identified communities as the third important audience. With respect to the security personnel, the Red Ants are a “notorious private security” company (Wilhelm-Solomon, 2020, p. 414) that undertakes violent evictions in the inner city and elsewhere in South Africa. This security group has repeatedly be accused of human rights offences (J. Burke, 2018); in 2019 its license was suspended (Mabuza, 2019c), but the license was reinstated after four months (J. Evans, 2019). Thus they were again being used to quell the poor, and the ICRC considered the white business owners unapproachable and unassailable.

In order to identify these audiences, at the workshop the groups were deliberative, with One Voice having the most contentious deliberation. The organisation members differed in terms of who to prioritise, with some feeling that it was most important to build membership by working with communities, while others felt that it was more important to work with local government to access more trading bays. Some members felt that the security companies were not a primary audience, arguing that they only became important when they were harassing traders. Others felt that the organisation should more proactively engage with security to make trading areas safer for customers and traders (e.g., catching petty criminals stealing from stalls or mugging customers). When they presented their chosen audiences to the plenary, I asked how they thought they could address the audience, that is, the specifics of who they would speak to and where. One Voice members felt that it was important to have small meetings with local councillors, to go out into communities surrounding the trading areas and get them to support traders.

Regarding security companies, who had “increasingly adopted a model of proactive public-space policing” (Clarno & Murray, 2013, p. 212), One Voice members felt they were directing their attention towards harassing street traders rather than protecting traders and customers from petty theft in the vicinity of their stalls. As mentioned in the literature review, the City of Johannesburg had increasingly outsourced security services (Ah Goo, 2018a), but the traders indicated that they only came into contact with individual security guards and not their employers. According to One Voice members, the security guards saw themselves as only doing what their employers instructed them to do, and they were not receptive to taking on tasks suggested by the street traders. However, One Voice had not approached the security guards’ employers or managers, and did not consider them easily accessible. It argued that since the government has employed the security companies, it did not think the security companies were receptive to anyone except those with whom they held a contract. McMichael (2015, p. 1275) argues that rather than specifically tackling crime, the City of Johannesburg was using “security and policing tactics and technologies” to pacify those living and working in the city by addressing complexity through the assertion of power. This created an environment in which, due to intimidation, dialogue between security companies and traders seemed impossible.

In the ICRC, the main contention revolved around whether to include ward councillors and the mayor and MMCs under one audience, or to treat them separately. They concluded that they should be treated separately as they would use different strategies to communicate with the mayor and MMCs (protest) than they would with ward councillors (small meetings). Like One Voice, they also did not have a sense of who specifically they would speak to in security companies or where they would be engaged. For example, they did not know if security guards were in trade unions and if they could connect with those trade unions to push for change, and they had not attempted to contact the companies employing the security guards. Like One Voice, although they would like to engage with the security companies, they considered them unapproachable. In their view, the City of Johannesburg was hiring security guards to shut down the possibilities of engagement, so they did not see any feasible opportunity to engage this audience.

In this activity, the organisations were able “construct audiences within a cultural or evaluative framework” (Blee & McDowell, 2012, p. 4), specifically based on the relative power of the organisations. However, in the activity, the CBOs did not analyse the qualities

of each audience type and whether or not they would be receptive to the message. As such, the organisations chose audiences they perceived as having an influence on their lives, but did not “alter what they regard as possible and desirable to do” (p. 15). For example, they did not have a clear sense of what was possible in terms of engaging with security companies, and did not think up strategies for addressing those audiences.

9.3.2 Workshop 2: Exploring the communication strategies of political elites/opponents

At the second PAR workshop, the participants considered different types of audiences they had encountered in their daily lives, particularly focussing on someone who had more power than they did. In pairs, they discussed who they had the encounter with, the topic of the encounter, the outcome in terms of actions, and their feelings resulting from the encounter. Many of the participants described face-to-face encounters with police officers or police captains around individual cases such as burglaries, muggings, and domestic violence. They described these encounters as difficult and mainly fruitless, in that they did not achieve what they sought to achieve and often had to pay bribes for the police to even open a case. Even when a case was opened, it was not investigated.

Some participants also described encounters with government officials such as ward councillors, Johannesburg Mayor Mashaba, the Member of the Mayoral Committee (MMC) for housing, the Head of the Health Department, the Director and an Administrator of Johannesburg Property Company (JPC), an official at City Power, and an official at the Department of Home Affairs. These encounters were sometimes one-on-one (e.g. ward councillors, the Director and Administrator of JPC, and officials at the Department of Home Affairs). Many were also undertaken as a large group, in terms of protests in which memoranda were handed over to the officials.

As for the police, workshop participants expressed frustration or anger at the poor responses from these government officials, arguing that they often did not respond at all to the messages, or if they responded seemed to suggest action would follow but it never did. In terms of ward councillors and JPC officials, they said that the ward councillors and JPC officials expressed interest but did not always act on the agreed points of action. The Department of Home Affairs officials were obfuscatory, deliberately blocking assistance to

refugees and asylum seekers. At protests, while memoranda were handed over to demand action, the respondents did not respond or provide any follow up.

From this activity, it was clear that the power differentials between the workshop participants and their audience were marked. Despite entering the police terrain with the assumption that they would be helped, they could not engage in deliberative activities that resulted in “the shaping of governmental conduct” (Haas, 2004, p. 179). It was not possible for workshop participants to “bracket status differentials and to deliberate ‘as if’ they were social equals” (Fraser, 1990, p. 62). Instead, their communication became trapped in arboreal assemblages; such that they were “stifled by root-tree structures” (Lawley, 2013, p. 39). Thus, communication did create space to shift power relations.

Overall, after these encounters, workshop participants reported feeling aggrieved and disappointed; concerned for themselves; frustrated and bad; disappointed; mad and angry; bad and powerless; confused; sad; anxious; nervous; and lost. Because much the CBOs’ activities revolved around transforming feelings into action (Cerulo, 2010), the actual feelings were debilitating, but as ICRC said, “We are not going anywhere”, indicating their insistence on keeping going despite a non-receptive audience. They also indicated a need to reflect further on the activity in order to decide on their strategy going forward.

9.3.3 Workshop 3: Developing an organisational communication campaign

For social movements and similar organisations, “each specific target ... exhibits a unique set of strengths, weaknesses, and institutional capacities for response that may shape distinct patterns of action” (E. T. Walker et al., 2008, p. 36). Therefore, the third PAR workshop provided an opportunity to deliberate about the audiences available to them.

The groups, divided by organisation, each undertook a SWOT analysis, analysing which audience they had strength with, which audience they were weak on, which audience they had an opportunity to reach, and which audience was threatening to the organisation. Based on the SWOT analysis, each group decided on a target audience for their campaign. Given that there were many more ICRC participants, they decided to break into two groups, each tackling a different issue. The SWOT analysis for each group is presented in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9, over the next few pages:

Table 7*ICRC group 1 SWOT analysis*

Strengths	Weaknesses
Partner organisations Communities Constitutional court	Johannesburg Water and City Power Department of Education Private investors Churches Schools Migrant community City of Johannesburg councillors, officials, and mayor Department of Home Affairs
Opportunities	Threats
Constitutional Court Rental Housing Tribunal Youth Women Equality Court Public Protector	Johannesburg Property Company Red Ants Building hijackers Police and JMPD Landlords
Chosen target audience = City of Johannesburg	

In this SWOT analysis, although ICRC identified itself as strong with partner organisations (solidarity networks), communities (members), and the Constitutional Court (government), it did not choose to strengthen these further as part of their target audience, even though they had ongoing opportunity to do so. It also did not choose to engage with any of the audience with whom it had opportunities to engage. Instead, it chose to focus on the City of Johannesburg, even though it knew it was weak in speaking to this audience. As for Workshop 1, the determination to use this audience was based on the fact that it was the audience that had the most power to influence the lives of ICRC's members and residents of inner city buildings. Indeed, in my observation, the main audience for ICRC was the City of Johannesburg and the mayor in that they organised a large protest and took a memorandum to the mayor's office.

The choice of audience showed that no matter their reflections on their strengths and weaknesses, the organisation was determined to keep doing what it had always done. It was determined to crack the shell of the city government and gain entry there, but they did not have a clear sense of how this might be done by doing things differently. Unlike the organisations in Blee and McDowell's (2012) study, ICRC did not change their audience over time, or build to their strengths. Another part of the reason why ICRC continued to target this

audience was that it needed to show ongoing engagement with the city in order to justify itself to members. Regarding the audiences with whom it had the opportunity to engage, ICRC members specifically rejected those related to courts and courts structures, as they indicated that they had won many cases, but evictions continued. They had also won Constitutional Court cases (*Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as Amicus Curiae)*, 2009; *Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others*, 2008), which ordered that the city should engage meaningfully, but this still was not happening. Therefore, it was not appropriate for the organisation to continue to take on individual cases, but needed a more broad approach, which was to change city policy.

As I will show below, however, targeting the City of Johannesburg was not the organisation's only strategy (as shown in Table 8).

Table 8

ICRC group 2 SWOT analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
Partner organisations Communities Human rights lawyers	City of Johannesburg Government
Opportunities	Threats
Women Youth City of Johannesburg Social media Parliament	Building hijackers JMPD Police
Chosen target audience = Women	

In identifying where ICRC had a strong audience, the two groups were mostly in agreement, although Group 1 identified the Constitutional Court and Group 2 identified human rights lawyers. They similarly identified that they had a weakness with the City of Johannesburg and also identified the same threats. However, they identified some different opportunities, in terms of social media, City of Johannesburg and parliament, whereas they did not see their opportunities as being in legal structures.

They chose women as their target audience because they saw women as priority members since they were usually the heads of household in inner city buildings, and often

women were the most politically engaged. Furthermore, ICRC had a separate organising structure for women within the organisation. This shows that the organisation does identify where it has the most influence, as per the literature (cf. Amine, 2013; Kanngieser, 2012; MacKenzie & Porter, 2011; Tarrow & Tilly, 2009; Tilly, 2008). It also saw the organisation's opportunity to build on an "inherently relational" (Blee & McDowell, 2012) aspect of the organisation.

Unlike the ICRC, One Voice chose to invest its energy in pursuing an audience where it perceived it had both strength and opportunity (see Table 9). However, based on the findings of the second workshop, it seems that their analysis of their strength with regard to councillors was out of sync with their actual experiences of the councillors, which left them feeling 'aggrieved and disappointed'. Nevertheless, some of the One Voice participants at the workshop indicated that their councillor was open to meetings with them and open to some of their suggestions, albeit that the councillor was only interested insofar as these suggestions were in line with Johannesburg City Council's activities.

Table 9

One Voice SWOT analysis

Strengths		Weaknesses
Cleaners	Taxi Associations	Manager and Administrator of JPC
Researchers	Commuters	Metro police
Facilitators	Community	Security
Universities	Mayor	
Public	Traders	
Councillors		
Opportunities		Threats
Women	Public	Metro police
Youth	Taxi Associations	Health practitioners
Developers	Business owners	Illegal traders
Councillor	Reporters	Homeless
Community		Mobile hawkers
		Business owners
Chosen target audience: Councillor		

For example, in one of the meetings with a councillor, One Voice had wanted the taxi ranks cleaned up as they were full of litter and grime. While the councillor agreed with One Voice that the clean-up needed to happen, he wanted the street traders themselves to clean up, instead of engaging the services of waste reclaimers, who need the work, as described

by Samson (2020) and Sekhwela and Samson (2020). Despite this example of the councillor throwing it back on One Voice members to act for themselves, One Voice members felt that ongoing engagement might still yield a more successful outcome. As such, they continued to engage with him on-and-off, although most of their attention, in my observation, was focussed on the JPC and members, as I will discuss below.

9.3.4 Summary of deliberative capacity and networks of the CBOs

Under the strengths analysed in their SWOT analyses (in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9), we see the organisations as having strong social networks, with One Voice particularly strongly connecting to a range of audiences. The diversity of connections was born out in my observation, as I will discuss in the next section. ICRC also had a strong solidarity network as well as access to the courts when necessary. However, only through observation was I able to observe the strength and depth of these connections, which will be discussed in the next section.

This rhizomatic approach to CBO communication reveals the kind of fluid organisations, which actively construct community through their communication (Carpentier, 2016; Carpentier et al., 2003). These networks are decentralized and non-linear and are not only about strategic communication, but about communication as the ethos of each organisation and their members, who show concern for others on an ongoing basis (Kent & Lane, 2017). Furthermore, the connections to these audiences, despite being unstable and loose, show the “potential for connection at any one ephemeral moment, a point arrived at from past material actions” (Lawley, 2013, p. 38). In their communication strategy, ICRC had a strong plan to recruit new members in terms of approaching women in inner city buildings.

However, both organisations also had strong arboreal communication motivations. While Lawley (2013) points to the stifling nature of arboreal connections, ICRC and One Voice are particularly concerned with connecting to local government structures, identifying these as key targets. Directing energy towards the arborescent structures is not necessarily a dead end. As Woods et al. (2013, p. 435) insist,

... arborescent and rhizomic political formations do not represent two discrete modalities of politics, but that political systems intrinsically contain both arborescent

and rhizomic tendencies that achieve articulation at different points within a cycle of political stability.

Therefore, while arborescent politics can have a deadening effect, it can also be fundamental and necessary to transformation, and the engagement with government and members and solidarity networks exposes the “messiness and dynamism” (p. 435) of CBOs. While the state can deploy power for its own ends, the CBOs in this study will continually attempt to unravel those power relations.

Despite the workshop providing space for deliberation, neither organisation changes from arboreal ideas to more rhizomatic ones. However, this was also because they both had well-established rhizomatic networks, as will be born out in the next section. Furthermore, I did observe ICRC deliberating on its main audience (City of Johannesburg), its ideology and its motivations. However, unlike the US organisations studied by Blee and McDowell (2012), the two CBOs in my study were not as deliberative, and mainly stuck to the same audience strategy they had always adopted, despite its weaknesses.

9.4 AUDIENCE IN ACTION

In the preceding chapters, I have already given descriptions of the events I observed with each organisation, so below I do not go into a detailed description, but instead reflect more deeply on the audiences each organisation communicated with, comparing and contrasting each audience type for the two organisations, that is, government (and quasi-government structures), members/potential members, solidarity networks, and the media.

9.4.1 Government and quasi-government structures

As discussed in the conceptual framework, there are many arms to government, some of which may be more receptive to messaging from CBOs and others more antagonistic. As discussed above, in the PAR workshops, the CBOs identified various arms of government (see Table 6), but felt that the police and government-appointed security companies were not accessible. Therefore, as stated above, the organisations did not have practical steps to make the police/security companies into an audience, and this is born out in the descriptions of observed events below. In Workshop 1, they also identified the highest levels of government as being a possible audience, such as parliament, the Speaker of Parliament,

provincial premier, and the president. However, none of these were seen as a primary target for communication and was borne out in my observation of events below. In the above activities, one of the ICRC groups identified communication with the courts, especially the Constitutional Court, as a strength and as providing opportunities (see Table 7), but they did not participate in any court cases during the course of my observation. In terms of government bodies then, the organisations only acted on communication with the city government and mayor's office (ICRC), and local councillors and the JPC (One Voice).

Only ICRC attempted to undertake engagement in public, while One Voice focussed on interpersonal relationships (which were not conducted in public). In terms of forming assemblages between each CBO and government, only One Voice succeeded. Part of the success of One Voice resulted from it forming rhizomatic connections with government officials, whereas ICRC attempted to create an arboreal assemblage. I will discuss each of the CBO's efforts to engage with government below.

9.4.1.1 Inner City Resource Centre's efforts to engage government

As described in my chapter on desire, immediately prior to me commencing research, the ICRC had attempted to meet with the mayor, other local government officials, and potential housing investors at the JICP forum, and had been told to leave. While under the ANC government ICRC had been allowed to attend JICP meetings, this avenue was closed off by the DA-led local government during the course of my study. However, the ICRC continued to see local government and local government officials as a priority for its communication attempts. The members saw that it would be difficult to be heard, but nevertheless continued to make overtures.

The overtures proceeded through organising a protest and preparing a memorandum to hand over to the mayor at the end of the protest. Based on my examination of ICRC's historical documents, it was clear that it had held many protests, directed at various mayors, dating back to 2007, and also towards the Jeppe Police Station, the Housing MEC (Member of the Executive Council), and City Power. However, during the course of this study, ICRC only took its protest to the mayor's office. After that protest engagement, the mayor and other local government officials did not reply to the memorandum or communicate with the ICRC in any way. (Shortly after the study ended, the mayor resigned and the local

government again fell into the hands of the ANC.) The government remained a priority for ICRC because it was seen as the only power broker that could develop the inner city in a way that provided affordable housing for inner city residents. However, the power relationship between the city government and ICRC were such that ICRC did not manage to find a place in which it could engage with local government. Arguably, and as discussed in the chapter on Tools, the organisation might have had more success speaking directly to the mayor by social media since the mayor often posted tweets on Twitter. However, ICRC did not have the technical or political skills to do so, and based on Gwaze et al.'s (2018) study of a housing organisation and the Cape Town mayor on Twitter, DA mayors may not be receptive to housing rights organisations on Twitter.

Deleuze and Guattari (2004) point to this kind of problem in talking about arboreal relationships, revealing how they often lead to a block to action. No matter what action ICRC took during the course of this study, they were not able to shift the power balance, and they remained on the outside, trying to get in. Their particular approach to the problem – always choosing protest as a last resort – did not secure them a real audience in the local government. While Blee and McDowell (2012) argue that CBOs want their audience to change their behaviour and attitudes, ICRC achieved neither a behaviour nor attitude change from local government during the course of this study. If as Tilly (2008) describes, the purpose of social movements (and similar organisations) is to create contentious performances to attract an audience, the contentious performance of a protest by ICRC failed to attract the desired audience. Indeed, protests have become so common and repetitive in South Africa, that local governments are frequently ignoring them unless they are “disruptive and violent” (Bohler-Muller et al., 2017, p. 86).

Whereas Miraftab (2004) argues that civil society organisations are only able to participate in governance in the government's ‘invited spaces’, for ICRC, during the course of my fieldwork, no ‘invited spaces’ were even available to it. Indeed, participation has been totally sidelined in Johannesburg: “institutional channels (be it representative democracy, or various institutions and instruments set up by local government to enhance participation) are currently not working in the city” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008, p. 3). Instead of decisions being taken at the micro-political ward level, power has been centralised in the mayor's office, so insofar as ICRC could not gain the ear of the mayor, there were no places in which to articulate its own political ideas. In many cases the ward councillors were not even chosen by locals living

in the ward; they were chosen by the political party, which rewarded loyal party members with political positions.

In this set-up, ward councillors were unlikely to deviate from the party line; even if they personally agreed with their local constituency and not with the mayor's office, their political allegiance led to them voting against the will of the local constituency (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008). Where CBOs did manage to leverage public goods through politicians, this was often a result of clientelism, that is, "as the granting (by politicians to voters) of public goods based on personal networks and influences rather than on a well-established and clear set of principles and rights" (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2011, p. 455).

Therefore, over the years, the only successful government engagements ICRC has had was through the judicial arm of government, in the form of many court cases to stop or hinder eviction (many of these have been undertaken on behalf of ICRC members by NGOs such as the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI) and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS)). But as Shereza argued at various points through my fieldwork, even Constitutional Court rulings that the City of Johannesburg must engage with residents before evictions, had not changed the participatory practices of local government. And even though ICRC, backed by SERI and/or CALS, had successfully stopped many evictions, it did not change the repeated efforts of the City of Johannesburg to engage in evictions.

While Graber (2005) argues that political communication must have significant political effect on thinking, beliefs and behaviour of audiences, in the case of local government, I argue that political communication is not taking place because government provides no space in which ICRC can be heard. Furthermore, ICRC has no significant impact on the thinking, beliefs and behaviour of local government. ICRC finds a "lack of genuine opportunities ... to engage in public deliberation" (Haas, 2004, p. 179). This is in line with previous South Africa studies which found that communities resort to protest only when they are not being heard in other spaces and by other means (cf. Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008; S. Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Koelble & Siddle, 2013b; Lau et al., 2010; Mathekga & Buccus, 2006; Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Nleya, 2010; Tsheola, 2012). As Thompson (2011, p. 2) explains, protests occur "because of the ongoing failure of formal channels of participation and representation to yield the outcomes these communities so urgently need".

However, in the case of ICRC, even protest – an informal channel – could not yield the results desired. A message can only be regarded as public if it continues to circulate through time and space (Warner, 2002). So when ICRC failed to reach the city government it experienced an “expansive estrangement of public speech” (p. 87), with the City of Johannesburg showing “contempt for participation” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008, p. 27).

9.4.1.2 One Voice’s communication with local government and quasi-government structures

Looking at One Voice’s historical documents, it was clear that, like ICRC, One Voice had a history of protesting and presenting memoranda to various mayors, councillors, and the Economic Development MEC. However, the most recent of these was in 2014, suggesting that perhaps they no longer engaged in such protests. This conclusion might be wrong because the organisation did not have good record keeping so protests could have happened and memoranda could have been lost; nevertheless, they did not propose or plan any of their own protests during the course of my study. The only protests they participated in just prior to the commencement of my fieldwork, according to information Julekha provided to me, were the SAFTU march on 12 April 2018 (Dyantyi, 2018), and the FAWU anti-illicit trade march on 14 August 2018 (New24, 2018).

In contrast to ICRC, One Voice engaged with local government through the local government’s outsourced company, the JPC. This communicative engagement took place at the JPC offices at the taxi rank in Lenasia, as well as through emails sent to the head of the JPC. At the office at the taxi rank, they had communicated effectively with the JPC to the effect that JPC had given them office space in which they could conduct organisational business. While I was at the office, I observed the organisation engaging with the new JPC administrator at the taxi rank. One Voice explained that the previous administrator had not done her job properly, had taken rent from traders, but had not recorded their payment either on the system or by giving traders a receipt. The new JPC administrator agreed that the systems were in a mess, and told One Voice office bearers that it would take time to sort it out. In light of the administrator’s agreement that a problem existed, Julekha also wrote an email to the head of JPC explaining the problem and asking for his intervention.

During the course of the study, One Voice did not receive a reply from the head of JPC, however, a few months after the email, JPC notified One Voice that it was going to evict

traders who had not paid. Although I was not there, One Voice explained to me that it had again pointed out to the JPC administrator (in person) that JPC did not have proper records of who had paid and also had no idea which traders were legally registered to operate at the taxi rank. By communicating with the JPC administrator in person about the administrative problems, One Voice was able to stop the evictions and protect its members. While communication with the JPC administrator did not lead to getting the system updated, it did halt evictions.

Notably, this successful communication with a quasi-government structure only happened at a local level, and it is unclear in how many trading areas in the city One Voice deployed these tactics. I only observed the engagement at the Lenasia Taxi Rank. While the communication was contentious, it did not involve a contentious performance. The communication also did not take place in the public sphere, but instead was a one-on-one engagement in a personal capacity. JPC changed its behaviour in response to the communication, which can be regarded as a success. However, it was not a long-term engagement that directly took on the whole system created by the local government and the JPC (albeit that, as I describe below, they do undermine the arboreal workings of the city). The micro-local level of engagement taking place at one taxi ranks also does not result in gains for traders across the city. However, if similar practices are occurring among members of traders' organisation across the city, they can undermine the administrative system.

Analysing the engagement in terms of power, at a micro-local level, One Voice had the power to shift the evicting behaviour of the JPC administrator. The connections made for this communication to happen, and for this communication to be successful did not travel up to the arboreal structures of the JPC or local government. Instead, the connections made were rhizomatic, that is, the connections created a flow of power and communication that was non-hierarchical and entirely fluid, responding to the moment, not pre-planned. The power relations were in a constant state of flux between One Voice and the JPC administrator. As Davies (2012, p. 277) argues, these types of rhizomatic assemblages are "always in a dynamic state where different actors appear powerful at different times". Due to a complex set of interactions in this rhizomatic relationship, communication flourishes "in random patterns" (Kent & Lane, 2017, p. 573).

Whereas ICRC found that politics around inner-city housing had been highly centralised in the mayor's office (i.e. arboreal), for traders the power was decentred (i.e. rhizomatic). The local offices of the JPC operated semi-autonomously (in practice, if not by design). The JPC administrator was able to collect rents without providing receipts, and without entering the monies received onto the JPC's computer system (as reported to One Voice by a new JPC administrator in my presence). Because of this knowledge of maladministration, One Voice was able to "create a line of flight" to act against the dominant system (Deuchars, 2011, p. 5) for managing the local trading stalls.

In a sense then, the 'war machine' One Voice created, was able in some ways, to "take over" the state apparatus" (Deuchars, 2011, p. 5), because, since it had no proper records, the JPC lost its ability to decide which traders stay and which to evict. Thereby, One Voice de facto took on the role of the state in deciding who should be evicted. In this role, it chose to ensure that all the traders they knew (whether members or not), would be protected and would not be evicted. This in-flux power relationship at local level, shows rhizomatic connections and flows in action. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004) argue, at a rhizomatic level, connections can lead to altering the flow of power, even if it led the arboreal structures largely untouched.

In this instance, JPC still had the power to evict people if it wanted to be heavy-handed; however, due to their own administrative failings, they might not have successfully argued that an eviction was legal. Subsequent to stopping the eviction, One Voice members reported to me that the new administrator had adopted the same set of practices as the previous administrator, that is, taking funds without recording them on the system, and providing no receipts for traders who paid. One Voice was unable to stop the flow of illegality, and was unable to get the JPC to deliver better services (such as toilets and washing facilities for traders, waste reclaimers, and taxi drivers and owners) but it was able to halt evictions.

According to Frans, One Voice operated at this micro-local level across the city, taking on the (often corrupt) local JPC administrators to leverage power. While this was not a full-frontal attack on the city government, the combination of many micro-local battles by One Voice members (and possibly other traders' organisations in the city) culminated in a situation where it was almost impossible for the city government to create an effective city-

wide administrative system for managing street traders. The city and JPC had multiple systems of registering traders but had also recognised the failure of these administrative systems and therefore, allowed for a “informal rent system” (Mbele, 2017, p. 36).

In this informal rent-collecting milieu, the kind of power One Voice had was limited to stopping evictions, but the power was leveraged through multiple local administrators across the city by tolerating their corrupt practices. Indeed the main focus of One Voice was “fighting abusive police practices, resisting eviction and attempting to guarantee security of tenure for trading spaces” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016, p. 1116). While some traders’ organisations in the city attempted to tackle policy and legislation, One Voice had not successfully engaged at this level, due to government not acknowledging organisations that could not get their members to mass meetings. One Voice was also not able to access higher levels of government because the informal trading forum set up by the Department of Economic Development in 2009 to improve participation had become defunct (Matjomane, 2013). Even when it was running, the city controlled the agenda, did not allow street traders to add to the agenda, and blocked traders from speaking if they protested about the agenda. As it stands, the JPC seem to have “abandoned consultative endeavours with traders to focus on rent collection and site inspections” (Webster, 2015, p. 61).

Notably, the way One Voice ‘wages war’ at local level, is not through violent protest, or through planned tactics. Rather, like underground rhizomes, they burrow beneath the surface of the bureaucracy to undermine it opportunistically. This lack of strategic thinking was often viewed “disapprovingly by some of those on the left, who prefer the politics of the manifesto or plan (point by point)” (Deuchars, 2011, p. 22). Nevertheless, it was the fluidity of their actions that led One Voice to political successes (Woods et al., 2013, p. 434). As McCarthy et al. (2004, p. 307) argue, “the large number of policy bureaucrats who work in far-flung offices of the modern democratic states offer many points of very low-cost access”, and One Voice was indeed able to make use of the low-cost access to JPC’s lower level bureaucrats in order to leverage an ongoing arrangement regarding trading bays, wherever it organised members. Nyar and Wray (2012, p. 24) have argued that community organisations seem to have “little recognition ... that local government only has certain powers and functions ... and that some dissatisfaction should be directed towards other spheres of government”. In practice though, One Voice recognised that those higher up the hierarchy had more power, but it focussed attention on where it was best able to find

leverage. In any case, the city government's operations with respect to street traders did not "follow an open and coherent strategy, despite the prolific production of policy documents" (Pezzano, 2016, p. 498).

Despite the failings at the higher levels of city government, One Voice indicated that they were able to approach the local councillor to request changes. During the course of this study, Julekha reported that she had met with the local councillor at the taxi rank where she had her stall. In her approach, she emphasised the need to clean up the taxi rank, as well as another vacant plot of land, that could be used to give traders more space. The local councillor was receptive to the clean-up message in that he saw it as aligned with then Mayor Mashaba's widely publicised clean-up campaign (cf. African News Agency, 2019; Cox, 2019b; Mashaba, 2018, 2019a; Midrand Reporter, 2019; Randburg Sun, 2017; Vivier, 2017). However, as for the mayor's clean-up campaign, he placed emphasis on traders and taxi owners cleaning up the area themselves on a volunteer basis.

Neither Mayor Mashaba nor local councillors proposed hiring more council clean-up staff, or even extending a contract to waste reclaimers to facilitate clean up. Samson (2020) has documented the difficulties with implementing integration of reclaimers with the city's clean up systems, including that the city 'colonises' the reclaimers' territory. Sekhwela and Samson (2020, p. 22) further point out that the city and reclaimers have different ideas about what integration means, including "(1) what reclaimers were being integrated into; (2) the objective of integration; (3) the mode of integration; (4) the goal of recognition of reclaimers; and (5) control over integration".

Therefore, while Julekha had access to talk directly to the councillor, finding agreement on clean-up was not possible, as the traders and taxi drivers did not have time or expertise to volunteer, and the councillor did not express an interest in empowering reclaimers. Julekha reported that they had previous positive interactions with the councillor, for example, after protests and engagement with the councillor they had secured a (prepaid) electricity supply and (prepaid) water for traders. However, in this instance, because the mayor conceptualised city clean-up as a volunteer project, the councillor was only open to a project in which taxi drivers and stall holders volunteered their time to clean up.

While One Voice was able to leverage low-cost action from the local JPC administrator, it could not shift the city's policy about cleaning up the city, and therefore, it was not able to

shift the behaviour and attitude of the local councillor. The councillor was aligning himself with then-Mayor Mashaba, who tried to put forward a campaign for people to clean up the city on a voluntary basis (Office of the Executive Mayor, 2017b). Another part of the reason for the difficulties of taking on the city with respect to clean up, was that since 2001 the city government had outsourced all cleaning services to Pikitup (Samson, 2003, 2010), and efforts to integrate informal waste reclaimers into the clean-up system had failed (Samson, 2020).

Despite the failed effort to sway the councillor initially, One Voice members indicated that ongoing engagement with the councillor would be fruitful because in some instances they were able to leverage access to services they required. And indeed, while I was writing up my research, the City Council announced a major upgrading and clean-up of stalls in the inner city (as reported by Frans) and the Lenasia taxi rank (Staff Reporter, 2020). While the pressure for this did not only come from members of One Voice, in identifying a common concern, they had identified an issue with the possibility of political success. This ongoing engagement revealed that communication is

... not the one-off message of the tree, but the longevity of the rhizomatous relationships developed, their strength and endurance, their connection to other parts of the network through hidden bonds. (Kent & Lane, 2017, p. 573)

As such, unlike the ICRC, One Voice was able to access government and build some power at a micro-political level. These shifting and changing connections between One Voice, JPC and local councillors allowed for a flow of communication between the different nodes. This flow generated power for One Voice, such that it achieved some political success. As I will discuss in the subsection below on membership, this political success sustained One Voice membership.

While Tilly (2008) argues that engagements between social movements and the state involve contentious performances, One Voice did not adopt an approach of contentious performance. Instead its members established affective inter-personal bonds with the local level political and bureaucratic structures in the form of persuasive collaboration. Through “affective arousal” (Abiocca, 1988, p. 53) then, their political communication was not about rational arguments or debates, but instead the more readily communicated shared bonds, established through close relationship. These affects allowed for the flow of communication

more effectively than the flow of ideas (Gibbs, 2011). The way One Voice proceeded to engage its audience confirms Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, 2004), and Deleuze's (1978) notion that affective qualities are part of the 'things' that connect assemblages. Identifying affective bonds reveals the social, political and power relations of the invisible, intangible things that are involved in communication. While the actual outcomes of these political engagements are not always successful, "these connections happen to change continually the field of virtual potential means" (Lawley, 2013, p. 38).

This potential and the actual are in constant relation with each other, and it is through the continuous flow between them that action is generated. Even the outcomes are not stable. In Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, 2004) terms, the relationships between One Voice and JPC, and One Voice and the local councillor are always in a state of becoming, leaving the possibility open for ever new actions, with ever new potential outcomes. These rhizomatic connections create a "tension between the 'official' organization and that movement that takes place along its supple lines" (Lawley, 2013, p. 42). Although, as described in the chapter on Desire, relationships within One Voice are fractious, the relations between the different nodes in the rhizome are supple enough to allow for a micro-politics. Political communication takes place between these audiences as they do act and respond to each other, and the audience is receptive to at least some part of the engagement.

9.4.1.3 Effects of prioritising government for the CBOs

As discussed, both organisations saw government as a priority because the government could leverage the most power in terms of transforming their lives, seeing to their rights and providing services. However, only lower levels of government were reached, as in the case of One Voice. The higher up the hierarchy the organisations attempted to communicate. While ICRC had the possibility, like One Voice, of communicating with ward councillors, it had not taken this route because housing provision had been entirely centralised in the mayor's office and local councillors deferred housing issues to the housing committee within the city government.

Although the Section 152 of the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) guarantees communities the rights of participation, this research confirms Wafer and Oldfield's (2015) study, which showed a disconnect between the expectations of

government and the expectations of communities with respect to participation. This blockage speaks to the difficulties with arboreal government structures, which function through bureaucratic procedures, and in inaccessible spaces, such that political communication was difficult for the CBOs. This blockage was especially striking in the way the ICRC was forced out of JICP meetings. While One Voice did succeed in manipulating the bureaucracy, this was only to prevent government embodied in the JPC from its most egregious actions, such as eviction. However, in terms of One Voice's uncoordinated micro-local actions across the city, their work had the ability to limit eviction actions against legal street traders in other parts of the city, depending on where they were successful in challenging the local JPC administrators.

Previous research has shown that government is often inaccessible to the poor (cf. Atkinson, 2007; Lemanski, 2017; Mirafab, 2009; Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Nleya, 2010; Turok & Borel-Saladin, 2014), and my research bears that out, in that beyond the micro-political level, organisations do not succeed in communicating with local government or national government. With respect to the government audience then, the CBOs had little power to change the structure of government and its provision of services:

social inequality taints deliberation within publics ... inequality affects relations among publics ... publics are differentially empowered and segmented ... some are involuntarily enclaved and subordinated to others. (Fraser, 1990, p. 7)

Although, as I will show in the next subsection, One Voice and ICRC actively prioritised and built power through their membership, it was not possible for them to use this power to shift the stance of government.

9.4.2 Members members

As discussed in the conceptual framework, sustaining an organisation such as a CBO requires regular contact between members and creating a sense of belonging (Carpentier et al., 2003). This involves ongoing, active construction of the organisation and the identities of members (Carpentier et al., 2003) through decentralised communication and relationship building (Kent & Lane, 2017). As shown in the chapters on framing and aesthetics, the shared sense of belonging arises when members organise around a shared agenda (framed in a way that resonates with them), when there are affective relationships between the members, and when organisations closely identify with organisational branding (e.g., by

wearing branded t-shirts). Drawing on these previous chapters, below I discuss the relationship between each CBO and their members/potential members.

9.4.2.1 Inner City Resource Centre's engagement with members

ICRC placed much more emphasis on growing transversal ties between its staff, steering committee, and members. It planned engagement in its steering committee meeting, discussing who they needed to speak to in specific areas and buildings. As such, ICRC showed deliberative action in constructing its audience. Mueller-Hirth (2009) argues that organisations such as ICRC, in being subordinate, have no public space in which to articulate and deliberate (as is borne out in the forgoing subsection, where ICRC fails to engage government). Nevertheless, his argument that in South Africa "subordinated groups have no spaces for deliberation among themselves" (p. 429) does not hold water, as CBOs such as ICRC frequently created their own spaces of deliberation.

Based on their deliberation about strategy, ICRC staff went out from building to building, informal settlement to informal settlement, meeting up with members and involving them in organisational activities. Although not everyone in all buildings and shacks was open to ICRC's advances, most of them were and strongly identified with ICRC, for example, one man living in a shack, said:

ICRC are for us. Even if we do not win, we are together. They keep us up to say we are not going to give up, so we will always support them.

In this case, the man's identity was strongly tied to ICRC, and he viewed it as part of his journey to access his rights. They had been trying to secure water and electricity for years, but each time they came close to success, the local government changed hands to a different mayor, putting them back to square one. Despite this failure, ICRC's relationship with members was a "pro-active milieu, encompassing dynamics that advance the institutionalization of more routinized linkages, shared actions and campaigns" (Funke, 2014, p. 34). These site-to-site activities of ICRC staff, also reveal "sustained exchanges of resources in pursuit of common goals" (Della Porta & Diani, 2014, p. 21). The connectedness was not taken for granted but through ongoing efforts, was constantly created and recreated to bring about a shared commitment to addressing inner city housing problems. The historical documents collected in this research process also confirmed long-

running and ongoing efforts to connect in various ways, including mass meetings, meetings at buildings and informal settlements, meetings with women, and workshops.

In seeking an active audience at inner city buildings and informal settlements, ICRC staff sustain “dense social networks and connective structures” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29). While some of the conversation was structured when the ICRC staff informed the members about the upcoming protest, there was time for socialising, smoking together and drinking Coke. Such commonplace activities build morale which “exists as an object and medium of power ... What it is and what it does multiplies and varies as hope is invested in knowing, harnessing, and repairing” (B. Anderson, 2010, p. 182). Morale, as affect is not only about the individual emotional state of the members, but about that energy which flows between them (Clough, 2010; Watkins, 2010). Through the flow of affect, a new body is made, which is neither one individual or another, but in the case of these visits to people’s homes, the creation and recreation of the body of ICRC. This stirring of affect results in people becoming active (Massumi, 2002); members become eager to help prepare for protest and take part in the protest.

Thus, interpersonal relationships formed the basis of the connection, but the connection culminated in a protest attended by about 500 people – members and those from solidarity networks. The organisation was built on “solidarity incentives” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 124), such that individual members were motivated to engage in collective action. As such ICRC built the most power in the private sphere of interpersonal connection. Their members were invited to take action, and most do indeed take up the call. This was especially so with respect to women who had their own forum within ICRC in which they undertook affective activities such as story and experience sharing, encouragement, support and inspiration.

However, it was not just in these interpersonal interactions that ICRC sustained itself: the action taken at the protest, that is, wearing the same t-shirts, carrying placards with similar messages, singing and toyi-toying also built and sustained collective action. While ICRC members argued that the target was local government, the protest also served as a platform for members to be audiences of each other. The performance of solidarity in public, the taking of shared action, bound members to each other in solidarity. Through the protest, ICRC’s political communication “has a lot to do with the ability to credibly embody and perform certain sorts of persona” (Barnett & Low, 2004, p. 198). The persona adopted at the

protest was one of activists actively taking part in shared action. ICRC members were not supplicants to whom ICRC dispensed services – they were the engine of ICRC, sustaining the organisation, while the organisation gave them a focus for shared action.

If the protest is a performance of a public speech act, it succeeds in the recognition between the members and the resultant “circulatory activity” (Warner, 2002, p. 82). As such, the performance of a protest is “strategic as well as evocative” (Blee & McDowell, 2012, p. 3). It is not so much strategic in providing or gaining access to government, but it is strategic in sustaining ongoing shared activity between the members. As such, the organisation and its members tie them together “cognitively and emotionally” (p. 2). Like the anti-globalisation protests that took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as described by Juris (2008, p. 66), the ICRC protest provided “arenas not only for eliciting images and identities but also for living moments of freedom, liberation and joy”. In the case of ICRC, it was deliberate in its pursuit of this energy; it regularly organised protests that it knew would be ineffective in reaching government, but which would nevertheless bind them in solidarity.

Furthermore, during the course of research, Shereza repeatedly underscored the need for empowerment of everyone who came to ICRC as supplicants. She pointed out that she, and other ICRC staff and steering committee, would quickly burn out if they took on cases themselves. So, for example, ICRC staff would instruct newcomers on the steps they needed to take to address their problems, but did not take over the case themselves. Their goals were to empower people by teaching them how to address difficulties themselves. Women who came to their offices were encouraged to join the women’s forum in ICRC to build women’s solidarity, and also to build solidarity between South African women and migrant women. The women worked together on income-generating projects, found out about women’s rights in South Africa, and tackled language and literacy barriers.

Unlike many South African CBOs and social movements, where women form the backbone of organisations while men occupy leadership positions (Eriksson, 2007; Jolaosho, 2017; Pointer, 2004), Shereza has made a conscious effort to put women in leadership positions in the organisation. In doing so, ICRC built solidarity not just with women, but between men and women who became involved in organisational activities. Although the leadership of ICRC remained with Shereza, the forum operated semi-autonomously, choosing their own leaders. Women’s movements and CBOs/social

movements in South Africa have often been theorised separately; Eriksson (2007, p. 51) argues that: "Contemporary women's organisations are often approaching the lack of service delivery from another angle than SMs and CBOs of men and women whose tactics are often more confrontational and theorized as more 'radical'". By contrast, she argues, women's organisations are often focussed on care activities for the sick, for children, and for victims of gender violence.

ICRC worked in both terrains simultaneously, since ICRC members were both radical (e.g. protest, empowerment workshops) and caring (e.g. income generation, overcoming xenophobia). Both women and men in the organisation took on multiple roles, such that women, far from presenting a "disenchanted image of the overworked, overwrought woman-nurturer" (Miller & Pointer, 2019, p. 30), were joyous, encouraging and supportive of each other. When reflecting on inner city housing, several ICRC members argued that housing had gendered components in that it frequently fell on women to find accommodation for their families. Similarly, in inner city buildings without access to water and electricity, it was often women's work to find the fuel and water needed for cooking and washing. A gendered understanding of politics in ICRC therefore builds a foundation for women who not only form the backbone of the organisation, but who also occupy leadership positions.

9.4.2.2 One Voice's interaction with members

While One Voice was not as deliberative as ICRC in pursuing its membership as an audience, it nevertheless treated its membership as an audience, and, like the ICRC, did this through interpersonal relationships. When I walked with Julekha through the streets of the inner city, meeting with One Voice members, the conversation did not have a clear structure and agenda (unlike that of ICRC with its members during its inner city walkabout); instead the interactions were based on commonplace conversation, such as:

Julekha: *Hi Comrade, how are you?*

Stall holder: *Eish! Business is not so good! But ... [shrugs] it was better on Saturday. But next week is month end, so I will make it.*

Julekha: *How are things with the police?*

Stall holder: *It's fine, they are not troubling us.*

The walkabout did not take place with any specific action in mind, it was simply to maintain relationships between the One Voice committee and One Voice members. Arguably these

"[p]ersonal contacts support people who are ready to participate on attitudinal grounds" (Ohlemacher, 1996, p. 197). However, the traders that Julekha spoke to were not being asked to participate in any specific action, but simply to reassert that the committee was there for members should the need arise. Indeed, these are more nurturing engagements, seeking to maintain the membership in friendly relationship with the committee; this was the socialising aspect of movement building as described by Tarrow (2011, p. 29), which "undergird their networks of trust and solidarity" and create "informal connective tissue" (p. 138) between members and the committee.

In the absence of the possibility for mass meetings (traders did not have time to leave their stalls to attend meetings), these one-on-one activities that traverse the city maintained the semblance of an organisation and kept the committee connected to people on the ground. Because of these types of walkabouts, One Voice members remained engaged with the committee, and knew that if they were facing challenges such as attempts at eviction, or harassment from JMPD or security guards, they could call committee members to help resolve the matter. The JMPD and security guards sometimes acted with impunity, for example, even if traders had papers showing they were trading legally, the JMPD would ignore the paperwork and go ahead with their policing action. Typically, when facing these negative actions from the state (in the form of JMPD or security guards) the traders would call a committee member who would come to their local area and negotiate to stop policing action. The committee members had long experience of these types of negotiations, and were adept at shutting down evictions from 'legal' stalls. In a sense, One Voice existed primarily for the moments when traders lives were "disrupted by waves of repression: the rare moments where street traders might feel the need for (ephemeral, 'popping up') collective mobilisation" (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016, p. 1107). They were not able to exist more substantially because the traders were at the stalls all day and did not have the time and energy for meetings. Furthermore, the micro-fascism of some members prevented the development of a fully shared agenda.

These relationships came much more into focus when I went to the One Voice office. Here, activity was taking place – a power struggle, between a former committee member and the rest of the committee. The former committee member was declaring the committee invalid, claiming they had not been elected. However, the challenge merely resulted in the membership reasserting their loyalty to the committee and solidarity with each other.

Together they mocked the former committee member, joked about her useless efforts to sow discord, and expressed camaraderie with the committee members. This disruption was "identity-building [which] means that a sense of collective belonging can be maintained' (Della Porta & Diani, 2014, p. 24) through persistent positive feelings among the members and committee. The committee and members held the organisation together through affective arousal, which moved from one person to another. In their passionate engagement with the former committee member, the organisation members reaffirmed their choice of committee members; thus passion is "inseparable from politics ... [and] positively contributes to democratic communication" (Dahlberg, 2005, p. 115).

These affective relationships create "repetitious practices of power ... [which suggest] potentials for realizing a world that subsists within and exceeds the horizons and boundaries of the norm" (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 7). In these interpersonal, affective engagements, emergent power suggests potentials for action, beyond just the actual event of facing up to the challenge. Instead, the affective bonds sustained the organisation through challenges, both internal to themselves, and external in the form of the JPC whose evicting action was brought to a halt. Affect, in effect, allows for "the creative opening to an outside in moments of rupture, instances of discontinuity, or flashes of passage" (B. Anderson, 2010, p. 166). While, One Voice encompassed many micro-fascisms in terms of, for example, xenophobia towards migrant traders, affect unified members, sustained the organisation, and held it together. Notably, unlike trade union organisations, with their tightly bound, hierarchical structures, affect only loosely bound One Voice members.

The rhizomatic connections did not amount to a stable organisation, because of many views that divided them, such as the micro-fascist tendencies of excluding foreigners and 'illegal' traders. However, micro-fascisms do not necessarily destroy organisations or preclude solidarity from existing in those organisations. For example, many of South Africa's trade unions have a long history of unity, despite the micro-fascism of patriarchy (Munakamwe, 2014), including sexual harassment by trade union leaders (Miller, 2017); this has not led to the collapse of trade unions in South Africa. The rhizomatic connections were also not stable because traders rarely came together for mass meetings in which they could develop a shared agenda: the time-consuming nature of survivalist street trade did not provide opportunities for participating in mass meetings. However, the rhizomatic, loose connections allowed One Voice to act nimbly when faced with state repression. They could

and did use the faulty JPC administrative systems across the city to proclaim that JPC, JPMD and security guards did not have the evidence required to decide which traders were 'legal' and which were 'illegal'. Their success came through throwing the state bureaucracy into disarray and thereby preventing evictions.

9.4.2.3 Models of building membership

While the CBOs operate markedly differently with respect to communicating with members, they both relied on interpersonal strategies for organising and membership was the lifeblood of the organisations.. ICRC used interpersonal activities to build positive affect among members, which led to members feeling empowered and, when they were together, happy and motivated; these strong interpersonal relationships took place in visits to members' homes, attending building committee meetings, holding workshops, undertaking regular protests, and through income-generating activities for women. Because of these affective (and practical) activities ICRC membership was a stable mass of people who regularly interacted.

One Voice also built positive affective bonds with members, but these were rather more tenuous; some of the fragility was circumstantial in that there were no opportunities for regular mass meetings. However some of the fragility also arose due to micro-fascisms from some members, such that members disagreed as to whether the organisation was for foreign traders and for 'illegal' traders. As such, One Voice was not a radical space of insurgent citizenship. It was a "collective of atomised individuals" (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016, p. 1107), who nevertheless retained affective bonds across time and place and acted together in the face of repressive policing. In binding together their organisations in affective bonds, One Voice and ICRC built power in their membership in the form of increasing the ability to act through joy.

9.4.3 Solidarity networks

Solidarity networks allow organisations to cohere to produce a shared agenda for political action (Davies, 2012). Solidarity allows a group of organisations to come together for "sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 9). To work in solidarity, organisations need to unite to identify shared targets for their action (Della Porta

& Diani, 2014). They often form a network structure, rather than developing an overarching, united movement. Whereas many organisations can compete for attention in the shared space (e.g. government attention and media attention), solidarity can “recruit blocs of people” to build credibility (McCarthy et al., 2004). Because of this possibility for like-minded organisations to extend their range of action through solidarity, below I have investigated the CBOs’ efforts to establish solidarity with other CBOs and NGOs.

9.4.3.1 ICRC’s solidarity networks – success and failures

During the course of this study, ICRC put in the most effort to build solidarity networks. They already had a long-standing relationship with EarthLife Africa whereby they agreed to participate in each other’s protests. The solidarity was based, in part, on a personal relationship between ICRC director Shereza Sibanda, and the person in a similar role in EarthLife. As such, this was almost entirely an affective relationship. During the course of this study, I was invited to dinner with the two, and witnessed that the occasion was almost entirely social, but they did use the opportunity to catch each other up on organisational business, and EarthLife agreed to participate in the protest being organised by ICRC.

Such interpersonal connections are important because they “form collaborations and solidarities that allow movements to cohere and produce a particular politics of place” (Davies, 2012, p. 275). These person-to-person encounters create assemblages that “can temporarily cohere at certain times, before dispersing again” (p. 276). EarthLife and ICRC do not operate as one organisation. They come together and move apart, as and when needed. However, the connection was not only needs-driven; the dinner with Shereza and the woman from EarthLife was almost entirely affect-driven: they were renewing their bond, but it was not all about organisational work. The coming together was part of social life and was dynamic and fluid. This personal network was an “intervening variable ... [which] clarifies the step from willingness to participate to actual participation” (Ohlemacher, 1996, p. 198). Friendship explained the agreement between the two organisations that they would join each other’s protests.

However, when ICRC tried to build solidarity with other organisations during the course of my observation it was not so successful. For example, on 12 November 2018, two days before its protest, ICRC tried to build a connection with Zimba (another housing rights

organisation) and One Voice. In this instance, none of the participants had a shared friendship to rely on, so ICRC attempted to generate a shared framing that inner city residents and traders shared many of the same problems. However, the members of the other organisations at the meeting gave vent to xenophobic sentiments, to the extent that ICRC could not foresee its way to working with the two organisations. Whereas ICRC works to bring foreign nationals into the fold of its work, the other organisations were at odds with this value and these activities. In this context, it was not possible to develop affective relationships, nor to find common ground.

To build a movement and for organisations to mobilise in shared action, it was necessary for organisers to “be open to people of different values, experiences, and socio-cultural backgrounds” (Ohlemacher, 1996, p. 202). However, for ICRC it was not possible to bridge such a vast values-gap. As Ohlemacher (1996, p. 202) argues:

Heterogeneity⁸ is the key to linking many networks, and homogeneity is the key to developing the ‘critical mass’ at the starting point of collective action.

Since ICRC actively involved foreign nationals in its work, and since it could not establish homogeneity around this value, it could not create a solidarity network, since values were antithetical to each other. In solidarity networks, it is crucial to establish shared “values, frames and identities” (Caiani, 2014, p. 369). To come together in protest, ICRC needed to convince the other organisations that they had collective challenges and common purpose (Tarrow, 2011), but also that they had an affective bond of social solidarity.

To develop a shared platform for collective action, it was not necessary that all players in the network agreed on all aspects of the engagement, but collective identity formation required that beliefs and actions were at least compatible (Della Porta & Diani, 2014). Instead, ICRC (understandably) recoiled in horror at the xenophobic comments made by members of the other organisations. While participants agreed on some same collective problems, those frames could not “justify, dignify, and animate collective action” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 31).

⁸ Emphasis in original.

Meanwhile, in this same engagement, not all One Voice members behaved the same: some were as shocked by their chairperson's xenophobic comments as the ICRC members were. However, the contentious micro-fascist comments of one member limited the ability of the organisation to cohere into a steady whole. The diametrically opposed values meant that members did not agree at a values level, even though, as I have explained in the chapter on Desire and in this chapter, shared action was possible and effective. The main reason that One Voice was effective is that it operated at a micro-political level of the immediate stall surroundings; this type of operation did not lend itself well to the politics of mass mobilisation and engagement on a broader political level.

While ICRC and One Voice operated as each other's audiences, they started off seeing each other as receptive to a joint frame, but it turned out that they were impervious to each other. While the literature discussed above does point to the importance of establishing solidarity networks, none of it documented the difficulties of doing so. In the case of ICRC and One Voice, while they have shared material interests such as stopping evictions, cleaning up streets and buildings, and ameliorating police action, it was on an affective level of values that the connection failed.

As Seigworth and Gregg (2010, p. 10) point out, instead of affect "somehow magically providing for a better tomorrow", the promise of connection "can just as readily come to deliver something worse". In this case, after the meeting, ICRC staff expressed disdain for One Voice, and even the One Voice members who were appalled by xenophobia did not attend the ICRC protest. ICRC's feeling are rooted in the "unhappy effects" of injustice, "the experience of being alienated", and they do not "put bad feelings aside in the hope that we can 'just get along'" (Ahmed, 2010, p. 50). Nevertheless, the bad feelings propelled ICRC forward in determination to challenge injustice, while the micro-fascism of One Voice limited its capacity for action.

9.4.3.2 One Voice's participation in solidarity networks

During the course of my research, various NGOs invited One Voice to attend their events in order to attempt to create solidarity networks. For One Voice, the expectation of solidarity would be met if their message was heard and their politics was supported. As stated above, One Voice members hardly attended these events because of the difficulty of leaving their

stalls, but One Voice committee members attended them to see if they could leverage any advantages (e.g. funding opportunities or access to policy makers).

At the Oxfam Inequality Workshop on 19 February 2019, attended by One voice and various other traders' organisations, a researcher presented his paper on the necessity to survey and count the number of street traders operating in Johannesburg. However, none of the traders' organisations that attended the workshop saw this as a priority. They emphasised that their priorities were the city's bylaws and the policing of street traders and the lack of basic services for traders, such as toilets, and places to store their goods. When it concerns the 'invited space' of the workshop created by Oxfam for One Voice and other traders organisations, this was only slightly different to the 'invited space' created by local government, in that those who entered the 'invited space' had to do so "within parameters of those doing the inviting" (Sinwell, 2012, p. 191).

Because of this disconnect between the NGO and CBO agendas, it was not possible for One Voice to secure solidarity with Oxfam on their terms, and therefore the relationship could not be fruitful for them. While Oxfam had more power than the traders' organisations, in terms of international networks, a large funding pot, and media access, One Voice did not see an alliance as advantageous because it would not help them with the day-to-day micro-politics at the local level. Oxfam and One Voice did not see the same issues as "socially relevant and worthy of collective efforts" (Della Porta & Diani, 2014, p. 119).

Oxfam saw its connection to CBOs as vital as it gave them an opportunity to position themselves as "an organisation that mediates between communities and the state" (Mueller-Hirth, 2009, p. 431). However, insofar as its connection to the micro-local level of the state (and the state embodied in the JPC) was the most essential part of its operations, One Voice did not need Oxfam to mediate. Apart from this, in the Oxfam workshop, the academics invited created the impression that they wanted an orderly politics of enumerated traders, which was antithetical to the messiness of One Voice action. Indeed, many NGOs and government "discredit street traders organisations, as lacking continuity, legitimacy, representativeness, and strategic vision" (Wits 3rd Year Planning and Politics Students, 2014, p. 6). Because of Oxfam's discomfort with the messy politics of traders' organisations, it hoped to co-opt the traders into its more orderly, civil politics.

Whereas, through the media, Oxfam could access a space in the public sphere and engage in public debates, the interpersonal relationships between One Voice and the counsellor and the JPC administrator were more significant than the hierarchical relationship between One Voice and NGOs. Throughout the course of my study, members of One Voice complained that they attended NGO meetings (of various NGOs) and these NGOs had the funds, but did nothing for One Voice. In One Voice opinion, the NGOs should merely be a channel for funds to flow from donors to the community level, and the NGOs should support the community level activities. As Mueller-Hirth (2009, p. 432) argues, NGOs are more concerned with making CBOs function with “organisational practices and procedures” that are akin to their own practices and procedures. Indeed, in the way donors fund NGOs and not CBOs, they imagine a civil society in which NGOs shape CBOs into more ‘civil’ organisations and marginalise those who do not cooperate with their reshaping.

So, for example, instead of holding workshops, NGOs could provide resources to CBOs such as office space and access to the internet. One Voice argued that the NGOs only wanted show themselves off as being connected to civil society to impress funders, without any productive result. When it comes to securing the needs of traders by protecting them from eviction and accessing services such as electricity in stalls, One Voice was by far a more effective structure for traders, and therefore, they frequently argued: “We’re the ones doing the work!” and “They’re not here on the ground, they don’t know what we need.”

Accordingly, One Voice would only see a tight solidarity with Oxfam as important if Oxfam could support its micro-politics in some way. Apart from the difficulty of traders leaving their stalls because they missed out on business, engagements with NGOs were not seen as fruitful. Because of the professionalisation and access to finance, Oxfam was better positioned in the social hierarchy in terms of access to policy makers and then media. But despite the messiness of One Voice (and its micro-fascisms), it was better positioned to secure the needs of traders at a micro-political level. This hierarchy does not allow for the “discovery of a common good ... the common good is chimerical” (Fraser, 1990, p. 72).

As an audience for One Voice’s message, Oxfam only made a show of listening, when it was actually hoping to make One Voice receptive to its own message. Therefore, One Voice did not find Oxfam (or other NGOs for that matter) to be receptive to their messages, and they could not build a successful, empowering, relationship. One Voice hoped to

impress on Oxfam (and other NGOs) the necessity of supporting them at the street level, but this fell on deaf ears. As such, rather than building solidarity, One Voice's power was undermined. Whereas the relationship was beneficial to Oxfam in that it could declare to funders that it had held workshops with civil society, the workshops did not enhance the capacity of CBOs such as One Voice. These workshops did not result in a redistribution of power, but instead allowed the NGOs to consolidate power by securing further funding for similar workshops, which again had no relevance to the micro-local politics of One Voice.

9.4.3.3 The relevance of solidarity in political communication

Whereas solidarity had the potential to expand the scope of the power CBOs exercise, in this study, the efforts towards solidarity did not yield the kind of powerful results they had hoped for. Both CBOs, in their different ways showed the difficulties of forging solidarities. For ICRC, the difficulty was some divergent values that were impossible to bridge (i.e. xenophobia). For One Voice, the inequality in its relationship with Oxfam did not yield any fruit because they had different conceptions of how civil society should be structured and how it should take action.

Therefore, despite international literature (cf. Caiani, 2014; Della Porta & Diani, 2014; Funke, 2014; McCarthy et al., 2004; Tarrow, 2011) underscoring the critical role of solidarity networks, in South Africa, they are not necessarily important to achieving the micro-political wins that CBOs need. Various South African literature has also decried the "atomization and silo-based activism [which continues] to prevent a broader advance for socio-economic progress" (Mottiar & Bond, 2012, p. 328). However, as Ballard (2005, p. 80) points out, while the community struggles may be small and marginalised, "they are pragmatic and quite logical responses to everyday hardships". Putting effort into building solidarity networks is time consuming, costly (transport to meetings, meal provision, meeting materials and equipment), and can be fractious, as well as being underpinned by unacknowledged inequalities. This lack of solidarity means that CBOs are not "able to intervene and determine criteria of a broader political debate" (P. Naidoo, 2015, p. 441), however, they build local power among their members and contest the local issues without the support of solidarity networks. The observations made during the course of the study were also at odds with the international literature on the media as a political audience/political target in that, as

I will describe in the next subsection, none of the organisations overly prioritise their connections with the media.

9.4.4 The media

According to international literature, “most movements spend considerable time and energy in seeking to attract and shape media coverage of their activities” (McAdam, 2004, p. 346). Benford and Snow (2000) have argued that they achieve this media attention through framing issues in a particular way that would engage the media. In this study I found that none of the organisations were overly concerned with reaching out to the media. Members of all two organisations indicated that they had tried engaging with the media in the past but the media were not interested in them. However, only ICRC had a documentary track record of trying to engage with the media, with at least six press releases over the years (the content was discussed in the chapter on Framing). While McCarthy et al. (2004) have argued that media coverage can be used to leverage influence over government, none of the organisations had any particular media strategy in mind for achieving this end.

In the lead up to their protest march, ICRC did disseminate a press release but only one journalist came to the protest, and no media coverage resulted. In my observation, writing the press release was a peripheral activity in organising the protest; more energy was given going door-to-door, making t-shirts and placards, and organising transport to the march. For example, despite faxing and emailing the press release to numerous media organisations, ICRC staff did not follow up with a phone call to any of the media houses. Shereza explained:

We used to know journalists there and there that would cover us. But those journalists left and now we don't know any journalists. Then who must we call?

This comment underscores that, as for most of the audiences explored in this study, affective relationships were more important for building power. When ICRC had affective relationships with sympathetic journalists, it achieved coverage, but due to newsroom staff turnover, they no longer had such access. Instead, they were confronted by the media as a hierarchical institution with no clear entry points for CBOs.

In their survey of civil society organisations, Bosch et al. (2019) similarly found that South African CBOs did not bother with a media strategy as they were unable to secure

coverage from any media. Some reported that the media would only come if something was burning, and none of the organisations in this study were inclined to that kind of contention. Indeed, researchers have found that for contentious struggles to receive coverage, they need to be “extraordinary in some way”, for example, “large, long, conflictual” (McCarthy et al., 2004, p. 297). As Rao and Wasserman (2015, p. 654) emphasise, the media sphere in South Africa “is still marked by significant exclusions”, with the media largely focussed on the activities of elites. Although the tabloids have been better at reflecting community issues (Wasserman, 2008), none of the organisations in this study gained any traction in the tabloids either. Instead, like Wasserman (2013, p. 75), they argue that the South African media does not “empower marginal communities or amplify lesser-heard voices”.

Therefore, although in some instances the media may help “to distribute political power to particular groups, causes, or individuals” (Entman, 2007, p. 166), in South Africa this was not the case for community organisations. Political communication with the media did not lead to a shift in power relations for any of the CBOs in this study and, contrary to the literature, the media was not a primary audience for many South African struggle organisations, especially at the local level.

9.5 DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I focussed on the theory of audiences as assemblage (based in Latour (2005a) and Deleuze and Guattari (2004)), especially Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) notion of arboreal (hierarchical) and rhizomatic (transversal) assemblages. In terms of assemblage theory, I have explored how each audience “becomes strategic through the number of connections it commands” (Latour, 1996, p. 372), and the extent to which the organisations are strategically connecting with relevant audiences. Furthermore, I have explored how the two CBOs attempted to make arboreal or rhizomatic connections. The rhizomatic analysis allowed us to see CBOs and their audiences as “fluid civil society networks” or as arboreal and antagonistic (Carpentier, 2016).

As shown in this chapter, at the workshops and in my observation, both CBOs emphasised the government as an important audience, and all of them devoted energy to trying to attract government attention. This is similar to social justice organisations around the world for whom government is “a claimant, an object of claims, or party to the claims”,

even though the involvement of government “greatly increases the likelihood of intervention by coercive agents such as police” (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009, p. 438). Although the CBOs emphasised the government as an important audience, only ICRC made an effort to engage in the public terrain through its protest and, despite the protest, ICRC did not achieve a deliberative engagement with the local government, and in fact received no engagement with the city government. In contrast, One Voice engaged with the JPC administrator and the local councillor with rather more success. These engagements took place in the private sphere, not the public one, but deliberation resulted in stopping evictions, and in ongoing engagement about cleaning up the taxi ranks and trading areas.

The inability of ICRC to reach government through protest, suggests that the frequency of protest in South Africa has created a situation in which government is now immune to protest. As Zepke (2014, p. 37) argues, under capitalism, the state has already made peace with protest, and incorporated it as “part of its own breaks”. So while protests may temporarily disrupt traffic, and in a minor way inconvenience an official who has to go down to the protesters to collect the memorandum, the government has already prepared for such actions, without allowing them to disrupt business-as-usual.

ICRC could not form a successful assemblage with the state in that the government blocked them from establishing a relationship with it; this block makes sense in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004, p. 10) idea of an arboreal assemblage: much as they seek to “make a rupture, draw a line of flight”, they reencounter the state that restratifies everything. By climbing the hierarchical tree to reach government, ICRC find “internal repercussions” that trip up their activities (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 14). The arborescent activities yield nothing for ICRC: instead it is difficult to dislodge power through the type of activities they undertake. Despite the considerable time, energy and effort that went into ICRC’s organisation of a protest, the activity yielded little reward.

By contrast, One Voice focussed on more local, rhizomatic connections, such that a flow of power took place between them and the JPC administrator and the local councillor. The access One Voice achieved did not take place in the public sphere, but instead in interpersonal relationships between One Voice committee members and micro-local political actors. Their politics does not attempt to climb a tree, but instead stays at the roots, connecting transversally. These connections at a local level allow One Voice members to

influence micro-political processes; these do not result in a changed system – indeed the overall structure of government remains unchanged. But the micro-politics do result in changed action at the local level, for example, traders who have not paid rent or who are not registered are not evicted from their stalls.

ICRC were rather more politically successful when they do make rhizomatic connections: its efforts to communicate with its members through interpersonal relations, sustained the organisation, and bound members to the organisation in fluid ways. One Voice also put effort into rhizomatic connections with its members. For both organisations, these assemblages energised and drew power into the organisation. The forms of communication for ICRC were both practical (communicating a plan of action) and affective (expressing concern and shared interests) and, for One Voice, they were mainly affective connections. As Abiocca (1988) asserts, audiences that are affectively aroused are more likely to become involved in a message and therefore be receptive. These relationships flourish through non-linear “hidden bonds” (Kent & Lane, 2017, p. 573). Many of these bonds are a result of years of inter-relating and undertaking shared activities. The positive affective bonds increase joy and thus increase the possibility for action (Deleuze, 1978).

However, this is not to say that affect is automatically transformative. As we saw in ICRC’s effort to build solidarity with One Voice, the affective response to xenophobia was a withdrawal of solidarity. Affects can break flows, as much as they can make them. In trying to build solidarity networks, the difficulty of establishing shared affects such as values, sympathy and support led to failures of all two organisations to extend beyond themselves. While ICRC had a positive affective relationship with EarthLife, it had difficulty going further than this to connect to other organisations who might join it at its protest. Similarly, One Voice could not establish a constructive relationship with ICRC (despite shared interests) and Oxfam. Because One Voice functioned through its micro-politics at local level, it did not put great value in potential solidarity networks, and even though some of the members attended other organisations’ meetings, they did not receive reciprocal support from those organisations, because their communication efforts fell on deaf ears. The NGOs they attempted to work with had their own agenda, and the communication was merely a pro forma proof to donors that they had engaged the broader civil society.

Similarly with the media, ICRC emphasised how the loss of affective bonds with particular journalists has resulted in it not receiving media attention. Without the interpersonal connections who had knowledge of ICRC as an organisation, journalists and editors were not motivated to cover the organisational activities. Since the two CBOs were not able to establish such relationships, they did not consider the media an important audience, even though studies of western social movements suggest that the media are a priority audience.

As much as one usually thinks of audience in terms of a mass audience, this chapter has shown that CBOs are more politically effective with in-person, one-on-one relationships, rather than trying to make a public splash. In addition, these in-person one-on-one relationships become meaningful insofar as the people are bound together affectively. As Anderson (2010, p. 164) argues, affects are an “inescapable element” of politics in that people come together in political groups because of shared affects. Affect builds morale, which “multiplies and varies as a hope” (p. 182). When the CBOs failed to establish affective relationships, they were politically ineffective. The communication machine of both organisations depended on communicating at a rhizomatic level, making close bonds, and not attempting to climb the tree of higher levels of government.

For Deleuze and Guattari (2004), bodies are ‘assemblages’ whose ‘function or potential or “meaning”’ becomes entirely dependent on which other bodies or machines it forms an assemblage with (Jeffery, 2016, p. 206). In making assemblages, the ICRC’s assemblage was mainly with its members and solidarity organisations, whereas One Voice’s assemblage focussed on members and local officials. In making these connections, both organisations achieved some minimal level of power.

9.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has underscored the importance of affective bonds in accessing an audience, doing politics, and building power. The organisations were only effective at connecting with their audience when they established affective bonds. When it came to bonding with members, by visiting homes and stalls respectively made social check-ins with their members, had personal relationships with them, and made efforts to renew those connections on an ongoing basis. Regarding solidarity organisations, ICRC had a long-

standing alliance with EarthLife, but during the course of the study, did not manage to establish any new alliances. The affectivity of this relationship was marked, as they only occasionally participated together in formal meetings, but met at a local restaurant to maintain friendship, while also talking politics. While it attempted to establish an alliance with One Voice, different values meant that such a bond broke down before it was even established. Similarly, One Voice did not successfully establish affective bonds with any other potential solidarity networks: the networks had their own political agenda, which did not align well with One Voice's micro-politics.

As is clear from ICRC's efforts to engage the media, they were only successful when they had affective relationships with specific journalists. Now that those have collapsed they were unable to secure media coverage. The paperwork of press releases was insufficient in achieving media coverage, and since their protests were not overly spectacular, they also did not secure media attention.

Only One Voice succeeded in influencing government officials (at a micro-local level), but the influence did not come from deploying a multi-component political communication machine: the affect was developed entirely through local proximity leading to familiarity over time. However, for those seeking to reach higher levels of government – not the micro-local level – the political communication machine needs to deploy components that affectively resonate with those in government. This means that their desire needs to focus more on production of creativity, the frames need to reach government (not just on a rational level, but on an affective level too), the organisations need to deploy an aesthetic that resonates, and they need to use tools that can amplify the messages.

Throughout this thesis I have pointed to the ways in which desire generates creativity, through which messages are crafted (framing), aesthetics are chosen (branding), and familiar tools are utilised. These all build up to an effort to reach their audiences. For some of the CBOs their creativity, framing, aesthetics and tool use lead to some successful engagements with some audiences (especially membership), but overall problems in the way they communicate lead to communication with some audiences breaking down. However, as I will now go on to discuss in the conclusion, some of the communication breakdown is not due to poor communication on the part of the CBOs, but due to spaces of engagement being closed off. For example, government failing to properly engage in

participatory governance activities, and NGOs acting as political elites by comparison with CBOs. While the two CBOs have room to improve their communication strategies, the context suggests that even these improvements might not yield political success in terms of influencing government to make policy and implementation changes. It is nevertheless possible to strengthen solidarity networks in this way, and thereby become more visible, in order to actively take up more space in the political terrain.

Chapter 10 CONCLUSION

10.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of political communication is to assert or generate power by influencing others in the social or political environment. In the South African context, many CBOs want to generate enough power to influence government (at whatever level) to bring about necessary changes in policy or implementation. While the South African government ostensibly considers participation by civil society as a key component of governance, many studies have found that the spaces for participation and the type of participation envisaged by the South African government do not work effectively (cf. Atkinson, 2007; Koelble & Siddle, 2013a; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Mirafteb, 2004, 2009; Sinwell, 2011a). Many have criticised the South African government for the way they control communication in government organised spaces of participation and for government's failure to listen outside the government controlled spaces. However, Wafer and Oldfield (2015) argue that "misrecognition" occurs both on the side of government *and* on the side of citizens and communities. Therefore, instead of simply critiquing government's communication style and approach, this study has looked at whether (or how) CBOs' political communication strategies contribute to such "misrecognition" by government.

Within the practice of political communication by CBOs, it is commonly assumed that such organisations need to build collective action and mobilise a large audience to challenge government to listen to their grievances. Therefore, CBO communication is not only targeted at government, but also at other people whom CBOs want to mobilise, such as members and solidarity networks. To do so they must build an assemblage of people and things, so that people are brought together in a shared campaign to challenge government. Furthermore, since the media have become key role players in "distributing power" (Entman, 2007, p. 164), if CBOs can access the media, they may be able to gain the attention of possible solidarity partners and of government. Throughout this study, I have therefore explored how the CBOs communicate strategically in order to reach and influence these audiences, especially focussed on, in Deleuze and Guattari's (2004) terms, whether they attempt to build rhizomatic or arboreal connections.

In the research for this thesis, I therefore explored the communication practices and strategies of CBOs to establish if they were adequate for gaining and influencing audiences (government, members/solidarity networks, and the media), and thus accumulating power, including collective power and power to push policy and implement changes through government. The research unpacked the CBOs' communication by exploring five concepts: desire, framing, aesthetics, tools, and audience. In exploring these five concepts, I have drawn on the assemblage theories of Deleuze and Guattari (2004) and Latour (2005a). These theories share similarity in that they see human and non-human, material and abstract actors working in concert to produce flows of activity. For example, in this study, the human actors included members, steering committees, staff and their audiences. Non-human actors included communication tools, as well as abstract actors such as aesthetics (which influence affective relationships) and frames (which influence logical and affective relationships).

In Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, 2004) terms the assemblage, also known as a "desiring-machine", is produced through the flow of desire. But their concept of desire is not about wishing for something that is lacking, but rather both a machine and a flow. The machine is assembled creatively and generates powerful flows that shape existence in various ways. CBOs' flows of desire are generated through the processes of production/creation which allow them to generate influence. Therefore, throughout this thesis, I have conceptualised communication as a 'political communication machine', assembled through desire, and generating creative communication to shape the political terrain. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms (1983, 2004), in order to shift the balance of power, things (human, non-human, material and abstract) need to be assembled in new ways so as to generate new outcomes, or new lines of flight. The central focus of this thesis then was to unpack whether the organisations conceptualise and strategise communication in novel ways, and, if they do so, is it possible for communication to shift the balance of power in the terrains in which they operate?

The CBOs studied for this thesis worked in different political terrains: for the Inner City Resource Centre (ICRC), the main focus was on access to affordable, quality housing; and One Voice aimed to support street traders in improving the geographic arrangements to improve traders' access to trading areas and thereby increase access to a decent livelihood. As such, apart from the five concepts shown in Figure 1, the communication machine is

affected by other actors (human, non-human, material and abstract) in the environment, which also connect to the machine. For example, for ICRC, their political communication machine was connected to the inner city residents and places where they live (be it buildings or informal settlements). One Voice's political communication machine connected to street traders and the streets and taxi ranks where stalls were located, as well as the stalls themselves.

In the preceding chapters, I have explored each component of the political communication machine depicted in Figure 1, and the ways in which each component helped or hindered the two CBOs from generating and influencing power. In the next subsections, I will look at the overall communication machine for each organisation and how that machine works to generate power, what type of power they are generating, and whether the power they are generating is shifting the balance of power in South African society. I will look at how the different components in the communication assemblage work (or do not work) together to generate a flow.

10.2 INNER CITY RESOURCE CENTRE'S POLITICAL COMMUNICATION MACHINE

Of the two CBOs in this study, ICRC was the most formal organisation, with membership structures, a steering committee, staff and funding. In some ways it could be described as a non-governmental organisation (NGO), but since it is membership driven, it could also be described as a CBO. Because of its formal structures, it had office space and meeting space, with relevant equipment useful for organising its political activities, including computers, furniture, printers and photocopiers. Its activities were generated in an orderly fashion, with planning meetings with agendas, preparation for activities, production of political activities and material objects, and evaluations after activities had taken place. Their activities were also reported back to the funders who sustained the organisation.

In this sense, ICRC was not a highly creative organisation (in terms of originality), in that its work was fairly procedural and drew heavily on the political culture of apartheid era politics. Nevertheless, it created a strong flow of desire in the organisation because it was highly focussed on undertaking political work. Members, the steering committee and staff were highly committed to their work, and they were affectively bound in friendship and joy,

such that they had a powerful rhizomatic network, that is, members, the steering committee, and staff were connected in a relatively flat structure, and they also connected to solidarity organisations in a non-hierarchical way. As a result, they had developed shared framing for their messages, had built camaraderie with their aesthetic productions, deployed a large range of tools in their communication activities, and attempted to reach diverse audiences with their political communication practices. Some of the power of the organisation came from the consistency with which it went about its activities.

For example, with respect to affective relationships, they have tackled power differentials in the organisation by addressing patriarchy and putting women at the forefront of their activities, instead of allowing men to be divisive through the practices of patriarchy. They have also worked to build solidarity between South Africans and immigrants in order to address xenophobia and strengthen their membership and form an inclusive organisation. The affective qualities of solidarity were formally assessed in the Participatory Action Research (PAR) workshops through various activities, and were also observed in the friendly, caring and joyous actions towards each other in the workshops and throughout my observation of events.

They were also consistent in the framing of messages, in that there was a clear correspondence between the frames used in their documents, the frames generated at the PAR workshops, and in my observation of events. This consistency does not mean that their frames have not changed over time. Indeed, they have subtly responded to the politics of the inner city in that in their earlier documents they mainly used poverty and rights frames, whereas they were focussing on an economic frame with respect to the demand for decent affordable housing. The frames have changed through ongoing discussions and collaboration processes, and because they have realised that court cases/rights challenges were not leading to political change in terms of how housing is provided in the inner city.

ICRC deployed a collective action frame, a poverty frame, a human rights frame, an economic frame, a crime and grime frame, an anti-xenophobic frame, and a gender/feminist frame. These frames have been consciously elaborated and agreed upon in mass meetings and workshops, as well as through discussions with members in the buildings and informal settlements where they live. Because the frames have been collectively established, they were highly effective in retaining members and also relating to new members who contacted

the ICRC when, for example, their housing was threatened by eviction, or when they were demanding that services be provided in their informal settlements. As such, the frames operated in the logic of membership. Because many members were poor residents of inner city buildings, they relate to the poverty frame based on their direct experience. However, the poverty frame diagnosed the problem (diagnostic frame) but the only prognosis (prognostic frame) was that government should care.

Because of South Africa's human rights culture, ICRC also deployed a rights frame, which is quite common among CBOs in South Africa. Even though socio-economic rights can easily be suspended if governments see a need to tighten the budget, rights language was still prevalent among ICRC members because they had won some cases in court, and the courts were able to help stop specific individual eviction cases. Therefore, arguably, the rights frame operated within the logic of membership and the logic of influence (influencing the courts). However, the rights frame has been useful in connecting with the judicial arm of government (via legal NGOs such as the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI) and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), in that many court cases have prevented evictions in the inner city. Constitutional Court cases have also reaffirmed their right to consultation around evictions. However, as Shereza pointed out to me, winning cases to prevent evictions taking place, did not lead to an overall change of eviction policy or practice by the city government. The government continued to attempt evictions, whether they were successful or not. Therefore, while the frame has diagnostic and prognostic elements in terms of seeking recourse from the courts, because turning to the courts is not that effective, it has no other prognosis.

The various frames deployed also helped them connect to some solidarity networks, but shared framing with some organisations does not lead to stable solidarity with organisations collaborating in joint action. For example, efforts to involve other organisations in its protest failed despite some shared frames, for example, the crime and grime frame. Again, this frame was diagnostic, but the different organisations did not agree on how to tackle the problem, and therefore no prognosis was developed.

While the organisations at the protest planning meeting agreed that the city government's lack of appropriate action led to crime and grime in the inner city, division arose between the organisations because of the use of xenophobic frames by some

organisations (or their members) and ICRC's anti-xenophobic frames. In Deleuze and Guattari's (2004, p. 215) terms, micro-fascism caused a break in the flow of desire between ICRC and other organisations. While the anti-xenophobic frames operated within the logic of membership in that immigrant members joined ICRC, it was not so effective at building solidarity due to growing xenophobia in South Africa. Whereas the xenophobic frame was (falsely) diagnostic, in using the anti-xenophobic frame, ICRC went beyond diagnosis and identified a prognosis in terms of its own actions to include immigrants, especially women immigrants, in the organisation.

The logic of membership also operated well within ICRC in terms of its work to empower women and challenge patriarchy. The gender/feminist frame created a situation in which men were less able to be divisive in adopting patriarchal attitudes towards women, and women were encouraged to be members and take leadership. Again, this frame strongly relied on the organisation coming up with its own solution (prognostic frame), by taking action within the organisation to tackle patriarchy.

With respect to government, none of the frames proved politically useful in (i) persuading local or provincial government to provide their members with decent, affordable housing, (ii) preventing police raids on inner city buildings, or (iii) preventing attempted evictions. In particular, when deploying the economic frame, ICRC highlighted the ways in which housing problems could not be addressed by investors renovating buildings, since such housing units were too expensive for inner city residents. However, the city continued with its neoliberal agenda of attracting investment, while also making participatory governance in the inner city extremely difficult. ICRC's call for decent, affordable housing was met with a plan by Mayor Mashaba which assumed that most inner city residents earning an average of R3500 a month, could afford R2100 rent. Therefore, when the organisation attempted to work arboreally, by attempting to connect with the heights of different branches of the government bureaucratic structure, the flow of desire was stopped. The flow was not broken by any of ICRC's actions or the failure of their desire, but by government's closing off of space to the organisation.

As such, with their strong desire propelling the organisation forward, the chosen frames have helped establish ICRC as a powerful rhizomatic role player in the political terrain of inner city accommodation, through building solidarity with members across the inner city.

While the poverty frame is only diagnostic, the other frames have at least some prognostic frames – even though they did not get government to take up solutions, where possible they implemented their own solutions. In this sense, frames and desire work together, because the organisation tries to produce the kind of relationships they frame as positive (e.g. anti-xenophobic and gender/feminist frames). The frames give the organisation power to act.

However, the frames were not all-empowering, which limited the extent to which ICRC was able to operate as a powerful political force in the inner city. Their power was also limited because, although they had a solid membership base and often acquired new members, their framing did not attract a membership at a large enough scale that they could disrupt or halt the flow of day-to-day life in the inner city. As such, they could not make themselves visible enough through protest for the government to pay attention.

With respect to aesthetics, ICRC had an established brand with members, the steering committee, and staff identify. This is a solidarity building aesthetic, which resonates with how members, the steering committee, and staff see themselves as activists, and as fighting to improve the livelihoods of inner city residents. Their visual aesthetic relied on the colour red which, in South Africa, is strongly associated with social justice organisations who promote the equitable distribution of resources and social goods in the interests of all who live in South Africa. Adopting this aesthetic has allowed the organisation to affectively connect to one another and to social justice ideas in South Africa in general. As such, objects such as the t-shirts and banners are “happy objects”, which are “passed around, accumulating positive affective value as social goods” (Ahmed, 2010, p. 35). These “happy objects” are part of the rhizomatic networks generated by ICRC’s desire. Apart from the visual aesthetic discussed in the chapter on aesthetics, they also deployed the aesthetics of anti-apartheid protests in their protest activities. This aesthetic marks them out as having a particular social justice political agenda. Guattari (1995a) points to the importance of aesthetic for developing a collective identity, and the aesthetic embedded in organisational objects certainly achieves that end.

The spectacle created by the red t-shirts united members, the steering committee, and staff in solidarity but due to them not having a large enough membership, the aesthetic did not attract the media by creating a heightened visual spectacle. In this sense, the media, through its decision-making power to include or exclude voices from media spaces, acts as

an arboreal organisation that the CBOs cannot access. The media makes the decision that CBOs are only worthy of coverage if they do something spectacular, rather than if they are challenging the government's framing of the issues. Furthermore, during the course of this study, the aesthetic was out of keeping with the neoliberal, investor-focussed politics of the DA-led local government, which hinged on luxury clothes, cars, and phones. Indeed, in part, wearing the t-shirt to a JICP meeting led to them being excluded from the meeting. Therefore, while the aesthetic binds members together through stirring affective bonds, their desire does not flow arboreally: even if the force of their desire is enough to make desire flow up the trunk of power and into the branches, the government has closed the access points for this desire.

The potential for creating an affective experience for members gives power to ICRC's aesthetic. Furthermore, in its logo, ICRC invites the audience to view the inner city in optimistic terms, with sunshine and blue skies. The aesthetic creates, "*a bloc of sensations, that is to say a compound of precepts and affects*"⁹ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 164) that exceed the limits of ordinary lived experience and moves into a realm beyond language and logic. However, in a world where brands are competing for attention, the logo was not effective because the logo was too detailed and not memorable enough to capture the minds of audiences. Similarly, it relied on the old aesthetic tropes of South African social justice organisations (such as red t-shirts). These old tropes did not push the government or the media to see them in a new way, and therefore, seems not to have offered any fresh thinking about how to resolve inner city housing problems. Whereas an aesthetic brand has the power to shift the way people see the world and thereby find 'brand allies', ICRC does not offer anything aesthetically new. It cannot shift existing power relations by only using the aesthetics of the anti-apartheid movement. It needs to develop a new aesthetic in order to present itself as an organisation that has fresh ideas about how to deliver decent, affordable housing in the inner city.

Together, its political desire, framing and aesthetic work to maintain solidarity through both analytical/logical and emotional affinity; the rhizomes of its organisation are spread across the inner city, while remaining connected. But these components of the political

⁹ Emphasis in the original.

communication machine do not allow them to participate in the governance structures of the inner city. They further do not allow the organisation to attract media attention and participate in the discursive space that the media creates for some political role-players. In order to attract attention, ICRC needs new political practices, surprising new frames, and a more challenging aesthetic that brings about new ways of seeing.

Despite having many communication tools at its disposal, ICRC was also not able to use these to open up the discursive terrain to make their message more widely heard. Whereas social media is frequently heralded as democratising mass communication, ICRC staff did not know how to use the tools it had for the best political impact. If they were able to use the tools effectively, they might be able to open up a discursive terrain in which their powerful desire, their framing of the problem of inner city accommodation, and their social justice aesthetic might attract a wider audience, and thus build solidarity with others outside the immediate geographic areas of the inner city. For example, if they had sufficient members, steering committee and staff who could write politically relevant articles on a regular basis, they could regularly produce a blog that presents important political arguments, and these could be disseminated via social media. Potentially, they could also be used as opinion pieces on media and left wing platforms in South Africa, such that they become powerful political commentators.

If its photography and video making skills were stronger, they might be able to generate powerful images that tell the story of inner city residents, and these could further be distributed via social media. With appropriate skills they could furthermore learn how to use social media to engage in conversations, rather than just to broadcast their activities and engagements. As it stands, the social media tools are not as yet connecting them to broader rhizomatic networks, and could certainly be deployed to do so. Such conversations could generate new terrains of solidarity to increase their functioning as a mass organisation and over time might attract media attention. It is unclear whether they could win the ear of local or provincial government through these mechanisms, but they could certainly increase the power of the organisation. However, it is important to underscore that the skills they need to develop are not only *technical* skills; their skills for using the tools *politically* also need to be enhanced.

In terms of its audiences, ICRC's strongest connection is with its own members. The organisation is highly rhizomatic, with the rhizomes spread across the inner city. It maintains this connection through multiple activities, such as meetings and workshops at its offices, walkabouts to visit members in their buildings and informal settlements, as well as specific meetings taking place at specific buildings/informal settlements to talk to the issues in those places of accommodation.

The organisation is also particularly strong in building a cohort of strong women political leaders who are empowered through workshops, income-generating projects, and taking the leading position in many building committees. This gendered component of their work is in stark contrast to other South African CBOs, where a strong women cohort sustains organisations, but leadership falls into the hands of men. Part of the strong affective dynamic in the organisation is attributable to the care members, the steering committee and staff show towards each other. Although Shereza remains at the helm, patriarchal attitudes are not tolerated in the organisation, and a strong emphasis is placed on women's power in the organisation.

Another factor strengthening the membership of ICRC is the important effort to include foreign nationals, particularly women, in the organisation. This is seen as a prime tool for tackling xenophobia and ensuring that all residents of inner city accommodation in inner city Johannesburg are treated on the same footing by ICRC. As I have pointed out, if the organisation was able to extend into other discursive terrains, it might be further able to extend its power and become a larger mass organisation.

During the course of this study, in my observation, ICRC was not able to establish a meaningful audience with the city government. While it handed over a memorandum to the city at the end of its protest march, the city government never responded to the memorandum despite repeated follow-up efforts. The opportunity for civil society to participate in city-making in Johannesburg are simply shut down and ward councillors in inner city Johannesburg simply refer inner city residents to the housing department in the centralised city government. Therefore, in exploring Wafer and Oldfield's (2015) idea that "misrecognition" happens both on the government and on civil society's part, it was not possible to explore whether ICRC was 'misrecognising' government, because it simply could

not gain access in any meaningful way (apart from handing over a memorandum after a protest march).

Despite the longevity of the organisation, it also has not maintained strong ties with the media and during the course of this study was not able to secure media coverage. This lack of connection can be ascribed to the fact that ICRC does not generate mass violent spectacles, which would attract the media. Even if they did manage to secure coverage through violent spectacle, such coverage would likely be negative. The media does not pay attention to the framing of political issues by CBOs because it favours the frames of political elites. Therefore, the media also closes off avenues for CBOs to win framing battles.

This research has established that ICRC has all the components to build more rhizomatic power (across South Africa, and perhaps globally) and create new discursive spaces for contesting the inner city political terrain. However, it has yet to bring these components together creatively to make a more powerful political communication machine. Furthermore, the research has shown that whatever activities ICRC undertakes, it is mightily difficult for CBOs to open up a space with government (whether they are government invited spaces, or their own invented spaces) through which inner city residents can participate in rehabilitating the inner city in order to make it more habitable for those who live there. The neoliberal agenda of the city government is so strong as to exclude civil society organisations and inner city residents entirely from decision-making politics.

The media also do not give attention to the day-to-day struggles of inner city residents, albeit that they cover inner city problems when, for example, foreign nationals and police engage in running battles on the streets, or when police raid inner city buildings ostensibly in an effort to stamp out crime. In these raids the media often recounts the number of people arrested but those arrested “are never charged but are rather released after a day or two” (SERI, 2019, pp. 22–23). Given the minimal coverage, or anti-poor coverage by the media, the only possibility ICRC has for extending its political power is to occupy discursive spaces, such as social media, in a much more strategic political way. This would require skills transfer from those experienced in social media campaigns to ICRC members, the steering committee, and staff. Importantly, a number of ICRC members, steering committee, and staff have the technical skills to use social media, but do not understand how to use it in a political way. While the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall members effectively used social media

in their campaigns against racism and financial exclusion in South African universities, this cohort is younger and part of the digital generation, whereas many ICRC members are older and more familiar with anti-apartheid political campaigns.

To extend the power of its political communication machine, ICRC would have to establish a new culture of political engagement that is quite different from the existing cultural political practices of the organisation, albeit that it must retain and build its affective bonds. In terms of the political communication machine, ICRC needs to make new connections in order to generate new political flows. By shifting its energies and focus, a new flow of desire could lead to a new political becoming. Desire must make new connections, and these new connections can be made by taking its frames to a wider audience, connecting with other social justice organisations and individuals who will identify with the aesthetic, and embracing new tools for engagement.

ICRC has power in terms of extending the scope for solidarity through rhizomatic connections, but some of it remains untapped and it would need to extend outside its comfort zone to take on a fuller political life.

10.3 ONE VOICE'S POLITICAL COMMUNICATION MACHINE

One Voice achieved any of its goals with respect to local government, in that it managed to protect traders from being evicted from their stalls, whether they had paid rent or not. However, it is important to note that in terms of political communication, this only takes place at a micro-local level, in respect of communicating with the local administrators at the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC) local offices. With respect to One Voice's political communication machine, the different components of the machine do not work in harmony, and it is only through interpersonal, micro-local levels of communication that it achieves its goal of preventing eviction. In One Voice, power is established by the rhizomatic connections between itself, the administrators of local JPC offices, and local ties with the ward councillor, which allow desire to flow into the gaps left by government's mismanagement of the trading areas.

Importantly, it does not achieve this goals through developing sophisticated frames, using a strong aesthetic, or complex tools. Its success is entirely rooted in the micro-local

circumstances at each JPC office: particularly the failed JPC administrative system and petty corruption. Because the organisation members do not agree on how to strategise beyond the micro-local level, they are not able to extend the scope of their successes up to the higher levels of government. For example, as revealed from the outset of Workshop 1, members did not agree, and therefore did not work together on whether to include 'illegal' traders, whether to collaborate with immigrants, and whether to take action to elect new leaders. As such, One Voice members worked in "reluctant solidarity" (Bähre, 2007, p. 38). Their desire often operates between flows and break-flows.

These break-flows are the result of the members' different ways of perceiving their interests. For example, those that wanted to include 'illegal' traders in the organisation argued that the organisation was built by bringing 'illegal' traders together to demand space. Those who did not want to include 'illegal' traders saw those traders as stealing their business and having the advantage of not having to pay rent. Because being a successful trader depends on an "entrepreneurialisation of the self" (Steck et al., 2013, p. 147), individual interests jockey with cooperative efforts. Most of their time and energy, and therefore creativity, go into developing their own businesses, and, as such, they do not have time, energy and creativity to develop solidarity to come up with a long term strategy for the organisation that can reach the higher levels of government.

As shown in Workshop 1, the conflict that leads to continuous breakdowns in the organisation also arises from each individual's own inner conflicts. For example, members expressed both sympathy for 'illegal' traders and the 'necessity' for excluding them. Such inner conflicts do not arise because of what Freire (1970) calls "false consciousness". Both points of view are embedded in the real circumstances in which traders find themselves: a need to sustain solidarity for the protection One Voice can provide when needed, but also a need to remain separate in order to compete with other traders. No clear truth emerges from such muddled waters, and so it is hard to find a flow that will most strategically carry the members out of the predicament.

These interruptions and breakdowns in the flow of desire are matched by a contest over organisational frames. For example, despite putting forward a poverty frame, the main emphasis is on aligning with the city's neoliberal policies, which focus on entrepreneurship. This frame then becomes, not a cause for solidarity, but the reason why traders need to

operate alone and compete for space and customers. While they gain some influence through the use of this entrepreneurial frame, it forces them into a mould of working within government rather than overturning its limiting language and policies (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; Webster, 2017). In positioning themselves as part of the entrepreneurial class, the communication machine again breaks down because it emphasises individual activity rather than solidarity, such that traders do not leave their stalls to attend meetings, so there are no opportunities for strategic thinking.

In contrast, One Voice is better able to deploy the corruption frame to its advantage. The frame works well because most traders have experienced corruption, for example, paying for stalls without receiving receipts, harassment and demands for bribes for Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD), problems in the registration system, and administrative procedures not followed. This frame therefore brings the organisation together to tackle the problems on the street and the taxi ranks where they have their stalls. They deploy this frame in instances where evictions are attempted, and thereby frequently manage to prevent evictions. However, when there is no immediate threat, the organisation is in abeyance.

They also do not use this frame to build solidarity to the extent that they can or will demand higher levels of city government for administrative change, that is, they make no effort to establish arboreal connections. Indeed, in part, they are only successfully able to deploy the frame at micro-local level because the illegality of the local administrator, and the sometimes 'illegality' of One Voice's members creates a kind of unspoken pact. They are able to argue that they are law abiding, while subtly undermining the possibility of implementing an orderly administrative system. While previous studies (cf. Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018b; Daniel, 2017; Mmbulaheni, 2015) found that traders were demanding consistent registration procedures to become legal traders, One Voice were adept at using the corruption frame to call out police for illegal actions, but happy to move between legality and illegality to protect traders. Such silent practices are change-making for One Voice, because they are able to ensure that the administrative system has tenuous grounds for acting against them.

This frame operates through an underground subterfuge in which rhizomatic connections between traders who have known each other for a long time and protect each

other, even if some of the traders have not paid their rent. The rhizome is not a stable structure, but that which is moving “in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo ... coming and going rather than starting or finishing” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 25). It does not proceed in an orderly fashion but modifies according to available opportunities. One Voice occupies the space in a way that pushes back against the arboreal, bureaucratic efforts of the state to govern that space. But this push-back does not come through an overt display of power. It is powerful because its line of flight is below the radar that the government uses to manage street trade.

Whereas framing has often been seen as an organisation taking an ideological position or building ideological coherence, the corruption frame deployed by One Voice is free from ideology. Instead, the frame is made up of the direct experience of traders: they recode the administrative system in their favour, but never quite make the frame public. The frame allows desire to flow in a way that produces material circumstances in One Voice’s favour. But it does not accumulate power by announcing its agenda in public or taking part in any public framing contest. Their ‘hidden code’ subverts the city government’s flow of desire by a ruse that does not overtly position the organisation in an overall schema but is merely cunning born of necessity. As such, although standing as a shared frame, it operates by silently infringing the rules set up by the city government. The city is largely unable to manage the trading areas because micro-local administrators also do not have an interest in doing so. One Voice is therefore able to successfully operate in a zone of obscurity.

Another frame that One Voice frequently articulated during the course of this study is the ‘crime and grime frame’. However, like ICRC, the frame was deployed to deliberately undermine the government’s position, which was to blame inner city residents and traders for the problem. For One Voice (and ICRC), the city is dirty and crime takes place there because the government is not doing its job. One Voice tried to deploy the frame with its local councillor at the Lenasia taxi rank, but the councillor countered by insisting that traders and taxi drivers needed to keep the trading area clean themselves. As such, the frame does not lead to immediate change in the way the city services keep areas clean. However, after I had completed my fieldwork, the city did start major upgrades on the trading areas; it remains to be seen whether this keeps the areas clean. The cleanliness of the city largely hinges on how Pikitup deploys their workers, and on how well the city is able to incorporate informal

waste reclaimers in its operations. So far, the city has not succeeded in this terrain (Samson, 2019, 2020; Sekhwela & Samson, 2020).

Whereas One Voice (and ICRC) might have been able to build rhizomatic solidarity with informal waste reclaimers to insist on an alternative city cleaning plan, no such solidarity has emerged. As Samson (2019) points out, the informal waste reclaimers themselves do not always exhibit solidarity with, for example, South African waste reclaimers pitted against Zimbabwean reclaimers. Furthermore, as described at various points in this study, the 'crime and grime frame' did not lead to solidarity between One Voice and ICRC. One Voice and ICRC showed more willingness to align with informal waste reclaimers and totally rejected Pikitup as a viable cleaning service. However, this has not led to easy solidarity because the informal traders are divided among themselves on a range of issues.

As such, informal traders in Johannesburg do not find easy solidarity with each other. The key frame used by traders to mark these differences revolves around the use of the crime frame: defining what is legal and what is illegal, and what types of illegality should be accepted. In One Voice, no overarching decision is made about whether or not to defend 'illegal' traders or defend those involved in the trade of 'illicit goods'. Instead, these matters are taken up at micro-local level, depending on the specifics in the geographic areas where the traders are operating. So, for example, Frans expressed tolerance for those selling 'illegal' cigarettes in the vicinity of his stall, while various One Voice members wore t-shirts against such trade, funded by legal tobacco companies. As for the framing of corruption, One Voice does not take an ideological position, but merely acts in a rather arbitrary fashion to defend members, regardless of where or what they are selling. The 'crime' frame is therefore haphazardly deployed depending on the relationships between the micro-local traders' groups. The frame is therefore not useful in building solidarity but reveals ongoing tensions among organisation members. Despite having weaker ties of solidarity, the rhizomatic network is highly flexible and mutable, so does give the organisation micro-local power.

Similarly, disagreement over whether foreign nationals can be members of One Voice and whether they are in solidarity with foreign traders creates an uneasy organisation. Different One Voice members expressed different attitudes towards foreigners, but were at pains to say that the xenophobia did not arise because of dislike of foreigners as individuals,

but only because of the space they occupied in the city. Thus the city government forces traders to compete for a relatively small number of trading spaces (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018a; Matjomane, 2013). The xenophobia is not rooted in deep hatred for foreigners or moral failings of thugs, but forms part of a “highly interested debate in which matters of serious material consequence [are] at stake” (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013, p. 588). However, because double-speak resulted, it was not possible for One Voice to build solidarity with foreign traders, thus limiting their own scope of action and their own power to act. The frame therefore stunts the possibilities for One Voice to build rhizomatic power.

Because of the areas of disagreement, the members were continually moving between individuality and solidarity as they confronted different circumstances: if the immediate threat was not making a sale, then they had to compete with other traders; if the immediate threat was preventing evictions, then they needed to make community with other traders. Thus, the movements of members in and out of solidarity depend on what is most logical for them in that moment in order to overcome hardship and secure a meaningful livelihood. As such, the desiring-machine of One Voice is “a *system of interruptions* or breaks” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 36), which flow according to whatever aspect of reality is currently under consideration. When they need solidarity, members come together around a shared corruption or grime frame; when they operate individually, they resort to a poverty/ entrepreneurship frame, or to the micro-fascism of xenophobic frames, or those arguing against ‘illegal’ traders. When solidarity is needed, the political communication machine starts up, connecting desire with frames, then gaining momentum through aesthetic.

Regarding the One Voice aesthetic, the way it deployed its brand could be described as a metaphor for the organisation. The brand totally lacks consistency: the logo has changed colour over the years (at the behest of those outside of One Voice); and their t-shirts have been printed in a wide array of colours with inconsistent images (albeit that they are recognisably of One Voice). Despite the vast irregularities in the way the brand was deployed, One Voice members were more consistent at wearing the brand at every opportunity than the other two CBOs in this study. This points to an aesthetic of chaotic solidarity: the members remain loyal to the organisation and to each other despite wildly divergent views. In one of the latest iterations of a t-shirt worn by many One Voice members, their logo is tiny on the back of the t-shirt clustered with many other logos. The t-shirt is intended to be used in the fight against illicit goods, and yet, all members do not agree that

that fight is meaningful or necessary. Thus, while wearing a t-shirt with One Voice branding puts the affective relationships between members on display, the diverse t-shirts also expose the multiplicity of views within the organisation.

Nevertheless, the act of wearing the t-shirts reflects an organisation made up of members who have a history of shared practical action, securing trading bays (and in some instances water and electricity in those bays) and preventing evictions. This experience of shared action creates affective bonds, which operate on a different level to their political disagreements and their different political logics. Just as their politics is fluid, so their aesthetic identity is fluid. One Voice, as a body, is not a steady structure, but always in flux and flowing, in the process of becoming: becoming collective, becoming political, becoming powerful. In this sense, the organisation is not about who they are (a fixed identity), but more about what it can do. The aesthetic allows them to assert solidarity, while at the same time allowing members to hold differing political positions based on which organisational t-shirts they choose to wear and which not to wear. Rather than connecting their desire, frames and aesthetic in a political communication machine to generate flows of power, One Voice exists in the crevices, presenting merely a whisper of communication through regular wearing of organisational clothing, but only coming together with one voice to challenge specific circumstances.

Because of the way the organisation operates at the micro-local level, One Voice has not deployed a wide range of communication tools in undertaking political action. The main organising 'tool' was interpersonal communication, whereby members share commonplace small talk in order to maintain affective bonds. While they occasionally used email to communicate with JPC officials, these emails went unanswered, suggesting the emails did not reach the intended audience. Due to financial constraints many members did not have smart phones and even those who could not always afford data, so they barely used tools like WhatsApp to keep in touch. Therefore, they are not able to extend the range of communication beyond their immediate locale, except in emergency situations when members and steering committee across the city might be called to engage in mass political action. On the one hand, complex communication tools are not needed for the type of politics they engage in; on the other hand, they cannot change the kind of politics they undertake without an increased capacity for varied tool-use.

For example, since they only engaged at a micro-local level, they could reach relevant audiences simply by walking to their offices and having conversations with those audiences. However, since they could not simply walk into the offices of higher level government officials, they would only have a chance of extending their power into those realms with a deployment of other communication tools. But, as I showed with respect to ICRC, even when deploying a wide range of tools, the higher realms of local government were inaccessible to CBOs. Therefore, I can only speculate whether having an improved access to tools and the (technical and political) skills to use would win One Voice any political gains.

Certainly, whereas Latour (2005a) and Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 2004) see the flow of desire being enhanced through creating assemblages of people and things, One Voice's power comes from the secretive way it refuses to cooperate with the desiring-machines/assemblages of others (e.g. higher levels of local government, or 'solidarity' NGOs). The intention is not to build power by increasing or amplifying the flow of desire, frames and aesthetic using tools. Rather its desire operates through breaking the assemblages imposed on it by undermining government's administrative system. In Deleuze and Guattari's (1983, p. 37) terms, for One Voice's desiring machine, "breaking down constitutes an integral part of the functioning". Its power comes from breaking the machine that attempts to control it, and therefore sometimes breaks the totalising power of the city government that attempts to control it.

In terms of the audiences they reach, only the local JPC administrator and the local councillor created space to hear what One Voice members were saying. And this is the terrain in which they succeeded in making political gains. The gains were not made by presenting complex arguments or proposing new ways to address inner city trading issues. Instead, silently, the JPC administrator and One Voice struck a deal of non-eviction because both knew that the administrative system was not operating as it should. The deal's power lay in subterfuge: both parties silently agreeing that they had an interest in breaking the administrative assemblage.

By comparison, even ostensible solidarity organisations such as Oxfam did not offer One Voice members any hope of increasing their power. Oxfam created space so that their work could be heard, and invites the traders' organisations. But those who entered Oxfam's invited space were not heard; they had to stay within the parameters of the agenda set by

Oxfam, in which they were mainly made to listen to academics talk. Even when they gave input it was unclear if/how this would be incorporated into Oxfam's campaign around informal trade. The messy politics of One Voice does not fit into the kinds of orderly, civil campaigns Oxfam attempts. While Oxfam attempts to position itself as an organisation "that mediates between communities and the state" (Mueller-Hirth, 2009, p. 431), One Voice does not need a mediator in the micro-local terrain in which it operates. With respect to NGOs then, the promise of solidarity is meaningless in that One Voice members argue: "We're the ones doing the work!" and "They're not here on the ground, they don't know what we need". This lack of concern or interest in solidarity with NGOs like Oxfam arises out of the fact that such organisations do not achieve meaningful change for traders on the ground.

Because One Voice rejects the solidarity offered by NGOs such as Oxfam, and because of the organisation's inner microfascism it "never succeeds in bringing its various parts together so as to form a whole" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 42). It does not have a fixed plan or strategy to produce flows of power, its desire merely responds to immediate necessity – working either as individuals working to generate a meagre profit, or as a collective finding solidarity to defend against evictions. Their desiring-machine does not produce a massive, explosive rush, like a river bursting through a dam wall. Instead, their power flows into fissures, shifting the micro-local terrain through cautious erosion.

On the surface, One Voice claims it wants the system to work better, but instead, they use the broken system to their own advantage. As long as the JPC administrator lets the traders go about their business, One Voice stands only in name (or in t-shirt). But under threat of eviction, the traders develop a shared corruption frame, and take on interpersonal communication with the JPC administrator with the threat of exposing the administrator. One Voice does not push the city government to design yet another master plan for inner city trading; it has found that their members are more or less left free to trade, and if they are not, then solidarity action will arise. The political communication machine of One Voice switches on when necessary, but much of the time it is barely used and barely necessary. They have no clear leadership or structure, no clear ideology, and only mobilise episodically. Even without these components that are usually thought of as necessary to civil society structures, and perhaps even because they do not have these components, the organisation sustains itself on an ongoing basis by eroding the subterranean power structures of inner city government.

In the higher echelons of the city government, traders have “limited voice or control over the management decisions” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015, p. 75). But in the absence of a meaningful policy on street trade, and in the absence of a functioning city administrative system for street trade, One Voice’s micro-local political practices operate to its best advantage.

10.4 CONCLUSION

A naïve analysis of the political communication of ICRC and One Voice would emphasise their failures. This study has shown that political communication by CBOs in South Africa is not reaching into the arboreal heights of government. Whatever strategies the organisations deploy, participatory spaces of government are entirely closed to them. This closure means that contra Wafer and Oldfield (2015) ‘misrecognition’ is the not the key barrier to communication between CBOs and government. Regardless of what communication strategies the organisations deployed, spaces of participatory governance are not open to them. However, where the CBOs focus their attention on rhizomatic connections, they are able to build meaningful solidarity.

Previous studies of communication in social justice organisations have typically focused on the structures of the organisations or the frames or tools they use. A few studies have looked at organisational, and at the relationship between audiences and the organisations, especially government and organisation. If we look to Latour (2005a) and Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 2004), it is easy to see how these different components form an communication assemblage. Assemblages are underpinned by the desire to make connections and therefore Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of desire is helpful in revealing the connections between these different elements of political communication (1983, 2004). Based on these aspects of communication, I established a conceptual framework for studying political communication in the CBOs that showed the *interplay* between the different elements and the machinic nature of the organisations’ political communication. The machine encompasses the five concepts of Figure 1, oiled by affect and rationality, which are used to varying degrees by the two organisations. When undertaking discrete studies of frames, aesthetics and tools, communication can appear static. By contrast my study maps the never-complete, dynamic flows, catching the organisations on the move. As such, this new conceptual model is useful for capturing the complexity of CBO communication.

The study methodology was also quite unique in that it triangulated three methods; the PAR workshops allowed the organisations to be co-explorers of their own communication in relation to the political terrain. This allowed them to apply an analytical lens to their own work, and for us to share insights. While Tacchi and Lennie (2014) have previously undertaken PAR to assess organisational communication, this was usually in order to evaluate particular projects. Uniquely, my PAR methods also gave the organisations insight into my conceptual framework and theory, such that they could grasp how desire moves them forward. This bringing together of theory and typical workshop activities allowed for rich engagement with the case study organisations. Further, triangulating this data with the analysis of material objects (to unpack frames and aesthetics), along with observation, generate a mass of data, which provided fruitful comparisons.

Given that this study focussed on organisations in inner city Johannesburg, it might not be applicable in every part of the country. For example, CBOs in other parts of the country may find government more receptive, or solidarity more difficult to achieve. However, the strength of this study is that it has developed a unique model for exploring communication systemically and machinically, which others can use to assess CBOs in other parts of the country, or even the world.

Previous South African studies of CBO-state interaction and protest have mentioned that CBOs make tremendous effort to communicate before they protest, but none of them looked in depth at what those communication efforts consist of. So this study brings to light new insights into how communication is undertaken, and the extent to which that communication shifts power. While the CBOs are addressing different issues, and they operate quite differently, they are nevertheless operating in the same political system and same political culture. Their scope for generating power is related to how they fit or break with the existing political system and culture. Even though the organisations do not make contact with the arboreal power of the city, their power lies in persistence and determination to stay a thorn in the government's side, such that the government is also hindered in implementing its neoliberal plans. For example, it cannot just evict residents or traders en masse, even if it can largely ignore the organisations.

Furthermore, where the CBOs focussed their attention on rhizomatic connections, they are able to build meaningful solidarity, and thus meaningful political power. ICRC has the

potential to extend its rhizomatic connections using social media, and thereby occupy more space in the political terrain. By contrast, due to the ambiguous solidarity of One Voice, and members' lack of access to communication technologies/data, it is unlikely to be able to extend solidarity and build new rhizomatic connections with those who could help it leverage power. Nevertheless, its own communication-for-solidarity and the rhizomatic connections with the JPC administrator and ward councillor enable it to be politically effective in preventing evictions from trading stalls.

Building rhizomatic connections is not the same as building a mass organisation, and some might argue this is a weakness. As One Voice has shown, it is possible for an organisation to furtively challenge existing power structures, even if the organisation is structureless and riddled through with contradictions. The rhizomes may be tightly or loosely connected, but through covert action, the underground connections may sometimes be better suited to undermining the state form, rather than overt political communication.

For both organisations, the interpersonal relationships are more important than participating in the formal structures of governance. And indeed, if we follow the example of One Voice, political communication might even be obsolescent if it focusses on gaining government attention and pushing for policy change in the current political milieu. Perhaps the subterranean subterfuge One Voice uses is more effective at seizing control simply by undermining the city's administrative system.

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