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CLASS CONFLICT AND IDEOLOGY AMONG THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE IN THE  
'HOMELANDS': INKATHA - A STUDY

by Gerhard Maré,

INTRODUCTION

The Inkatha movement has received a great deal of publicity over the few years since its revival, and especially with the recent formation of an alliance between the ("Coloured") Labour Party, Inkatha, and the ("Indian") Reform Party. This paper was done to suggest a possible approach, for discussion, to the analysis of current political, ideological, and economic developments in the reserve/"homeland" regions of the South African social formation. More specifically, the paper hopes to provide information that could be relevant to an analysis of some developments in the kwaZulu region. An elaboration of these hints at an approach along with integration of factors relating to the stage of capitalism dominant in the social formation and class struggle would have made this a more satisfactory paper for discussion.

The approach adopted has to be extremely tentative at this stage, both because of the immediate and obvious problems associated with contemporary research and analysis (it is even less possible to approach the subject with "objectivity", to "distance oneself from it", than is the case with topics that can more properly be called "history"), but also because of the dearth of material available on the reserve/"homeland" regions and the difficulty of doing research in these areas.

In the first section I will introduce certain concepts relating to an analysis of the "homelands". I owe many of the ideas and concepts in this section to two articles by Wolpe (Wolpe, 1975 & 1976), and articles by Legassick and Wolpe (1976) and Innes and O'Meara (1976), and many of their ideas are borne out by the analysis in the second section. The second section deals specifically with the Inkatha movement. Information relating to this movement is provided and one issue is presented in greater detail, but no attempt is made to rigorously apply the mode of analysis of the first section to the issues around the position of Inkatha. Indicators exist but with so many dynamics operative at this stage they can be no more than indicators.

However, I do not believe it to be possible to understand political, economic and ideological developments in the "homelands" without keeping the questions raised in the first section in mind - and

definitely impossible to come to an adequate understanding if these areas are looked at in isolation, i.e. if apparently "internal" events and processes are not situated within a context broadly defined by the specific stage of the development of capitalism in South Africa (a stage of monopoly capital dominance - and more specifically, industrial monopoly capital), and without keeping in mind the history of class struggle within the social formation.

#### SECTION ONE - Aspects of Class Formation in the South African "Homeland" Areas.

Class formation has to be looked at in the complexity of an "historically determined system of social production" (see definition of class quoted in Shivji, 1976:19). The configuration of classes in the South African social formation and, more specifically, in the "homelands" can only be understood if the analysis takes into account South Africa's position on the periphery of the world capitalist system; the way in which proletarianisation took place, and is still taking place; the specific history of class struggle; etc.

It is not possible to do justice to even a summary of the background necessary to an analysis of class alliances and struggle as it involves the "homeland" regions. A few points need to be stressed though.

Initial penetration in South Africa was done through the operation of merchant capital. Biased demands were made on the pre-capitalist modes of production. In other words, because the exploitative mechanisms of merchant capital operate in the sphere of exchange, it was not necessary to alter the relations of production in these pre-capitalist modes of production (pre-CMPs) fundamentally. Forces of production, on the other hand, had to be revolutionised because of the increase in demand for commodities to become part of the capitalist process of circulation (exchange relations). I am not suggesting that it is possible to alter one set of relations without disruptive effects on the other - "A mode of production is an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the relations of production" (my emphasis) (Hindess & Hirst, 1975:9). But no attempt was, and probably could be, made to institute capitalist relations of appropriation of surplus value at this early stage.

During this period limited demands for wage, or tenant, labour were made. However, with the discovery of first diamonds and then gold this demand

for labour grew rapidly and the South African system of compound control and migratory labour slowly developed - some aspects consciously instituted while others developed "naturally". Motivated by the needs of expanded reproduction of capital, the control and reproduction of labour power function of the reserve areas became institutionalised - control over political developments in these areas and over labour flows. Proletarianisation of the rural population proceeded rapidly and labour was, and is, absorbed not only from the South African population but from the whole of southern Africa.

A specific aspect of this process of primitive accumulation in South Africa was the maintenance of pre-capitalist economic forms - even after the stage of merchant capital dominance. (I would argue that it is not possible to speak of pre-capitalist modes of production co-existing with a dominant CMP - other than in a period of transition - but rather of forms of production under a capitalist mode of production). Dominance of the CMP "mainly tends (the predominant tendency) to expanded reproduction of the capitalist mode of production, that is, to dissolution of the other modes of production and subsumption of their agents to capitalist production relations" (Bettelheim, 1972:297). This predominant tendency arises out of the nature of appropriation of surplus labour in the form of surplus value under the CMP. The CMP demands the "freedom" of the labourer from control over the means of production, "free" to sell his/her labour ("the period of time for which he is free to sell his labour-power is the period of time for which he is forced to sell it" - Marx, 1976:415). If relations of production under a pre-CMP allowed control over the means of production, e.g. appropriation of surplus labour on the ideological level as in the feudal mode of production while the peasant maintains control over production, that control has to be destroyed in order to create the paradoxical situation of "free forced" labour.

However, Bettelheim points out that the predominant tendency is combined with another, "secondary tendency, that of 'conservation-dissolution'" (1972:297). In other words, restructuring of the pre-CMPs (i.e. subordination-conservation) take place under the dominance of the CMP. This is especially true of the system of labour exploitation that developed in South Africa. Such a restructuring of the relations and forces of production of the pre-CMPs has taken place that the most important aspect to these becomes their subordinated articulation with the relations and forces of production of the CMP.

To recognise that "conservation" has taken place and that it has been functional within the specifics of the South African system of labour exploitation is not to argue that the function has remained the same over time. Articulation between pre-capitalist forms and the CMP has undergone changes as the needs of the stages of development of capitalism have changed, and as the nature and intensity of class struggle changed and fluctuated. Nor is it to argue that articulation occurs only on the economic level. Within a social formation the reproduction of the conditions for capital accumulation takes place on the economic as well as on the political and ideological levels. Articulation between modes of production has to be analysed at the same level of abstraction as that at which the concept "social formation" functions (see Moss, 1977:18-24). In other words, articulation between the CMP and other forms has to be looked at in the complex inter-relationship of economic, political and ideological factors.

For example, conservation of pre-capitalist forms, in various ways essential to exploitation in South Africa, "tend to be expressed not in terms of the relations of class exploitation they must sustain, but in racial, ethnic, national terms" (Wolpe, 1975:244). The political policy of apartheid, or rather the political elements of the policy of apartheid, and the way in which this policy finds ideological expression is designed to strengthen this tendency. It is then necessary to see what the implications are of conservation and this mode of expression of relations of exploitation both in terms of class formation within the "maintained" areas of the South African social formation (the reserves/"homelands"), and also in terms of perception and nature of class struggle. It could be expected that class struggle/opposition could be perceived and expressed in similar terms to those in which exploitation is expressed, i.e. racial, ethnic and national terms. Also that the competition for the meagre benefits to be derived from fulfilling roles in the "maintenance" of the reserve areas could occur. These are points to be examined and illustrated in Section Two below).

Two main arguments on the role and alliances of the petty bourgeoisie (black) in South Africa can be advanced. The one sees the deprivation and discrimination against the African petty bourgeoisie leading to alliances with black workers and peasants, rather than across the colour line with their white equivalents. The only groups who could possibly find enough benefit in supporting the policy of "separate development" would be administrators and a possible commercial bourgeoisie within the reserves.

On the other hand the alliances between classes and the interests of classes and fractions of classes may not be as "obvious" along racial lines as the first position would argue. If a "convergence of interests" does occur it has to be analysed in terms of the conditions that produce it. The positions in possible alliances entered into by the petty bourgeoisie can only be understood if the conjuncture is analysed.

I will take up this second position and expand on that. The first very necessary distinction to be drawn in an analysis of the role of the petty bourgeoisie is that between the new and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. (cf. Wolpe, 1976:12-13 and Innes & O'Meara, 1976:77) Poulantzas defines the traditional petty bourgeoisie as "small-scale producers and small traders (small property). They include forms of artisanal work and small family businesses in which one and the same agent is both owner of the means of production and of labour and is the direct worker " (1973:37); and the new petty bourgeoisie, "which tends to increase under monopoly capitalism", as "non-productive wage-earning workers...(and)... civil servants employed by the state and its various apparatuses. These workers do not produce surplus value. Like others, they sell their labour-power and their wage is determined by the price of reproducing their labour-power, but they are exploited by the direct extortion of surplus labour, not by the production of surplus value." (Poulantzas, 1973:37)

A second necessary distinction is that between the petty bourgeoisie in the reserves and those in the "white" areas. This distinction refers to the difference in the relations between these groups/components and the conditions of the social formation as a whole.

(It may be necessary to introduce further distinctions in order to obtain a more complete picture of class formation as it relates to the petty bourgeoisie. For example, to what extent is the category of the "marginal pole of the economy" (Quijano, 1974) useful in analysing class positions - this is undoubtedly a growing economic sector. Some of the members of this group could sympathise with the proletariat from which they have been forced and/or to which they hope to return; and it is possible to start talking of a bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie (cf. Shivji, 1976:63-66), to refer to that section of the new petty bourgeoisie situated in the "homelands" who are attempting to secure an independent economic base - 'independent'

pressure that could be exerted on, for example, traders through the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC).

In other words, what is important in analysing the position of the petty bourgeoisie is "the place they occupy in the historically determined system of social production", and this includes political, ideological, as well as economic factors.

## SECTION TWO - Introduction.

As has been mentioned above, this section will deal specifically with the Inkatha movement. Under A some information on the structure and history of the organisation will be provided and also a look at the movement through the speeches of Chief Buthelezi, president of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National Cultural Liberation Movement: Inkatha) and the Chief Minister of kwaZulu. This does not mean that I take the many statements, speeches and letters, made and written by Buthelezi as reflecting the functioning and interests represented by Inkatha (or through Inkatha), but they do indicate (if only through repetition) the attitudes of a co-founder of the movement and the wishes for the organisation of a very prominent member. Certain recurring themes will be examined, e.g. the strategy employed by Inkatha - in relation to "homeland" politics, unity of the oppressed - and also the Chief's and, therefore, the National Council's attitude to "free enterprise".

Sub-section B is an examination of one of the few concrete issues around which individuals and organisations (representing economic interests) have taken positions. This is the tri-partite agreement controversy that has, at the time of writing, still not been completely resolved. Another such issue, on which I unfortunately do not have enough information is that of changes, or suggested changes, in the land tenure system in kwaZulu.

### A1 - Background.

The Inkatha organisation claims to represent more than 120 000 paid-up members (cf. SAIRR, 1977:2; DN, 25/4/77; NM, 27/5/77) and Buthelezi probably has the support of several times that number of Zulu-speakers, if not among other races and ethnic groups. How efficiently this vast number of people is being tied into the organisational and decision-making structure is difficult to say. The structure makes provision for many levels of participation, e.g.

and the Progressive Party. These unity moves have drawn the wrath of the Afrikaans Press (accusations of Zulu "imperialism") and guarded support from the English-language newspapers (see, e.g., editorial comment Rapport, 15/1/78; ST, 15/1/78; Star, 12/1/78).

What practical cooperation, beyond the obvious and important symbolic value, is going to come from the alliance remains to be seen. The issue of "black unity" will be returned to below.

**A2 - The Rhetoric of Mobilisation: "populism"; "nationalism"; "unity"; and "a tradition of opposition".**

"...(It) is important to note that whatever the weaknesses of the populist framework as a description of reality, ideas that may be called populist serve wide-ranging purposes as political rallying-cries, both for those in power and for those in pursuit of power. The major aspect of such 'populisms' ... is the stress upon solidarity and the unity of vast sections of the populace that it provides: a populism is thus a creed most attractive to leaders. In very many cases the stress upon solidarity will represent neither the real situation of the mass of the people, nor their views of that situation ... Rather it will represent an aspiration to make a particular view as to the characteristics that unite people prevail over any continuing elements that divide. Instead of assuming solidarity to be the actual norm therefore, it is wise to look to the tensions between the various elements and various perspectives as defining the dynamic of any so-called 'populist' movement" (my emphasis) (Saul, 1970:143-4).

Saul points out that there are weaknesses in the concept of 'populism'. It is, however, an accurate description of the rhetoric employed. An analysis that starts off with the descriptive term (describing an ideological position) needs to move beyond this framework to analyse the "tensions between various elements and various perspectives". This could possibly throw more light on the interests being served by those appealing to a populist unity. Indicators as to where these tensions might lie, have been mentioned in Section One.

Buthlezi has repeatedly, over the years, come out with an appeal that specifically denies divisions or, positively, called for groups to unite in the interests of "the struggle of the black man in Southern Africa" (BS, 22/6/75:2). "It (Inkatha) is not meant to be a political faction since its constitution rejects all partisanship in our struggle for self-realisation. We do not want to have divisive factions at this crucial time ..." (BS, 22/6/75:2). Possibly the clearest statement on this issue - repeated in the same words more than a year later - is that on "black nationalism": "The bricks of black nationalism are many and varied. There are ethnic groups, there are tribes, there are



trade unions, drama societies, black church groups, student organisations, cultural groups and many others" (BS, 14/3/76:17; also BS, 16/2/77:3). This unity also bridges generation gaps (cf. BS, 13/11/77:8).

Two months later, in 1976, the call for unity was repeated, motivated in terms of all blacks being "fellow victims of apartheid" with a need for "co-ordinating all our joint efforts to fight our common enemy, who is the oppressor responsible for our common plight" (BS, 8/5/76: 18-19). The cause for division does not lie in the different interests of various black groups but is caused by oppression itself - African nationalism feeds on itself because of oppression, aided by the policy of "divide and rule".

Addressing migrant workers in the SJ Smith Hostel in Durban, Buthelezi had this to say:

"It is true that I believe in trade unions. I believe that workers can only have machinery for negotiation between themselves and management through trade unions. Having said this, let me emphasise that we are however not oppressed only as workers in South Africa. We are not oppressed only as peasants. Nor are we oppressed as an educated elite... We are oppressed in South Africa on the basis of our black skins. We have therefore to unite as blacks if we intend dealing with our problem decisively" (BS, 28/8/76; also 28/8/77:10).

This theme is repeated regularly in speeches. In his opening address to the Women's Brigade Annual General Conference, Buthelezi spoke about "an organisation which embraces all sections of our black community without any distinction of class ... or any other distinction". And, "(t)here should be no room for fights between slaves. The priority for slaves is to break the chains of their bondage" (BS, 29/10/77:8-9; also 27/5/77:3).

While it is undoubtedly true that blacks suffer a common discrimination in South Africa, making the populist appeal close to an experienced reality, the differences in relations of exploitation as it affects different classes do ultimately lead to conflicting interests. The reality of continuing exploitation in a post-independence situation has led to class conflict within black society despite the rhetoric of a unifying racial oppression.

But how is this unity seen within a strategy of liberation, and how is "cultural liberation" defined? At the second ordinary session of the Inkatha National Council, Buthelezi quoted Amilcar Cabral on

"cultural liberation" as "an attempt ... to assert the cultural personality of the oppressed people in an act of rejection of that of the oppressor ... whatever may be the state of subjection of a nation to foreign rule and the influence of economic, political and social factors in the furtherance of this domination, it is generally in culture that the need to protest, leading to the emergence and development of the liberation movement, is found" (BS, 8/7/76:15-16).

Professor SME Bengu, secretary-general of Inkatha, in a series of lectures published in 1977, said that:

"Cultural liberation as a philosophy can only be adopted by people who, after analysing their situation, have realised that their domination is not only a political one - but that it covers the various aspects of culture such as the educational, economic, political and spiritual areas. It is at such a point that the oppressed people decide to bring about a cultural liberation of their country on various fronts" (Bengu, 1977:5).

It is a strategy of "various fronts" or a "multi-strategy" that is the topic in many of Buthelezi's more recent speeches. This goes along with the stated policy of using "homeland" structure as a base from which to operate. The first two public references to Inkatha (referred to above) stress the need for united mass action. There is, however, some conflict over the extent of black unity. At times Buthelezi stresses an ethnic, or Zulu national, approach as a qualification to a national approach. He does, for example, repeatedly point out his traditional position of authority to counter accusations that he owes his position to "homeland structures" (e.g. BS, 8/5/76:37; 12/5/76:3; 20/9/74:6; 30/4/76:57-8; 13/11/77:5).

The more common position is, however, that of a national approach - "There is no Zulu freedom that is distinct from the black man's freedom in South Africa" (BS, 14/3/76:27; also 8/5/76; 23/8/76:4; /10/73) - and argues that "homeland" politics provide the base from which to act ("We regard kwaZulu as a base for regional administration and local development" - BS, 8/7/76:3; 18/5/73:4).

The multi-strategy approach was spelt out in greatest detail in a speech at Portland University and is worth quoting at some length:

"Realism demands that we do not think simplistically in military terms and that we recognise that a strategy which can be shared by all is necessary if we want to bring about liberation in the foreseeable future. If no single movement will bring about the collapse of apartheid, no single strategy will do so either ... If progressive forces have to be mustered,

## B - Tripartite-Companies (Tripcos)

The manner in which Inkatha, or the threat of mobilisation of the movement, can be used is fairly clearly illustrated by the issue of tripartite companies. This section will look at the conflict around the issue in some detail. Some introductory remarks are necessary.

The conflict was basically between Buthelezi, supporting and acting on behalf of capital involved mainly in the circulation of commodities on the one hand, and on the other the urban-based section of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. They were, and are, directly threatened by the benefits of the enormous scale of operation of the chain stores (in many cases linked to productive monopoly capital). Even if, in some cases, the traders involved are operating on a large scale it is not comparable with say Greatermans and OK Bazaars.

There occurred a split in the class of small-scale owners, in keeping with their "in-between" position, between that section (apparently mainly involved in operations in rural areas - an African can only obtain a site in a residential area if he/she has no trading interests outside the residential area) supporting Buthelezi and Inkatha (and, therefore, tripcos), and those, mainly urban members of Inyanda (Natal and Zululand African Chamber of Commerce) opposing tripcos and later also Buthelezi and Inkatha.

The conflict, a struggle against proletarianisation, was also marked by an initial attempt to maintain it on the level of the economic. At least this was the case with Inyanda members (or rather, while opposition was organised through Inyanda). Buthelezi, on the other hand, immediately "escalated" the conflict to include issues of "benefit to the masses" and support for the KLA and Inkatha - in other words, a political struggle through political organisations. By the time the "opposition" attempted political organisation they had lost the fight and had to rally round previously defeated and discredited political figures (e.g. Barney Dladla, former Councillor for Community Affairs, and the King).

"I am not exaggerating when I state that this is one of those occasions, when I feel that the problems we encountered in bringing about this project was really worth our while. Before birth there is pain and suffering. It can be truthfully said that some pain and suffering also heralded the birth of this project" - Chief Buthelezi at the Madadeni opening of Checkers-KwaZulu (BS, 24/11/77:1).

During October, 1974, the Prime Minister announced that "the time had arrived" for "homeland" governments to decide for themselves on the specifics of outside investment - in other words, on the terms under which "white" capital would be allowed into the areas under their control. This statement was welcomed by Assocom, the Afrikaanse Handels-Instituut and the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC). (NM, 4/10/74)

Initially it appeared that blacks had taken the initiative after this invitation and decided on the most satisfactory way in which ("white") capital was to be admitted to the "homeland" areas. It was reported (NM, 20/5/75) that the Greatermans group would be operating in kwaZulu as Checkers, if the support of the KLA and organised African trade could be obtained. At this early stage of the "tripco affair" it appeared that the chain group (Greatermans) would have 51% of the shareholding (to be reduced to 25% after 10 years) while 49% would be held by kwaZulu citizens and the kwaZulu Developemnt Corporation (in fact the BIC as the regional developmant corporation did not exist).

Two further aspects of this initial news release need to be mentioned. Firstly, the plans were revealed by Mr Zazi Kuzwayo, who quoted from a BIC letter. This letter stated that the expansion of chainstores into the "homelands" through tripco agreements had the support of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Developemnt. (Kuzwayo had by late 1973 received loans to the value of R187 000 from the BIC (NM, 25/8/73), and made the news at this time for attacking opponents of the BIC, especially those in Inyanda. Amongst other properties Kuzwayo owned at that time 6 shops in Clermont outside Pinetown, a shop at KwaMashu, and a bottlestore at Mapumulo).

Secondly, it was reported at this stage that the tripco idea had originated from the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC), "and this resolution was believed to have flowed out of the favourable impression made on African traders when Checkers helped Mr Winnington Sabelo, an Umlazi businessman, set up his own supermarket" (NM, 20/5/75). (Sabelo was given a loan of R187 000 by the BIC early in 1974 to build a shopping centre, and commented: "I want to bring West Street (Durban's main shopping street) to Umlazi township").

By the end of June, 1975, the battlelines had been fairly clearly drawn. On the 24th June Chief Gatsha Buthelezi came out strongly in support of tripcos, and at the same time issued a warning to Inyanda "not to attempt to create a split between his Government and African

in Natal and Zululand ... to develop progressively on their own." Checkers would destroy "all the small African traders. We must build our own retail organisations and while this is being done - it could take 20 years to have fully developed African trading - the African consumer must suffer." In other words the African traditional petty bourgeoisie (and under the racially discriminatory effects of apartheid also a possible commercial bourgeoisie) are attempting to stem the effects of the "tendency for the petty bourgeoisie to be undermined and eliminated in a capitalist formation: Lenin described it as a 'transitional class'" (Poulantzas, 1974:238).

Buthlezi denied that the Checkers agreement would "destroy all the small African traders" - quite correctly, as the agreements were at that stage for outlets at Umlazi, KwaMashu and Madadeni. Wholesale facilities to be offered by Checkers would aid traders operating in areas outside those covered by the store's retail operations. This split in the interests of the traders was to aid Buthelezi later. He also defended the tripcos in terms of his Cabinet's "development policy".

Two new developments, to increase in importance, were now mentioned (August, 1975): it was reported that "the tri-company scheme has become part of KwaZulu development policy and also found instant acceptance with the Zulu liberation movement, Inkatha, at its conference in Nongoma recently" and; Zazi Khuzwayo suggested that Zulus would like him to lead in "all spheres, not just business" (NM, 6/8/75).

On the 10th August Inyanda rejected tripcos, and eleven days later the kwaZulu government decided to accept the Greatermans proposal. A few days later NAFCOC, meeting in Umtata, rejected the kwaZulu cabinet decision. This goes against the reported earlier support by NAFCOC, and even that the partnership agreement had been suggested by NAFCOC. It could have been that NAFCOC had expressed support for aid directly to traders, as in the example cited of Winnington Sabelo. In May, 1976, Patrick Gumede (then vice-president of NAFCOC) denied that the tripco proposals had originated from this body - he claimed that the "tri-company concept was infused into the minds of the homeland governments by the Bantu Investment Corporation" (NM, 24/5/76). This seems to be the most likely explanation as the BIC has such extensive control over economic activity in the "homelands".

Further developments during 1975 were the reported acceptance of the tripco proposals by Inyanda, and a vote of confidence in the kwaZulu government at the same meeting. A statement was also made that Inyanda had not "solicited the help of opponents of the KwaZulu Government". Later Khuzwayo reiterated his opposition to the tripco deals but reaffirmed his support for the kwaZulu government. In November it was reported (NM, 18/11/75) that Inyanda "angrily rejected the tripartite concept two weeks earlier" and that "Zulu consumers (had) bought R186 000 worth of shares in the scheme" (this aspect was not followed up and who the "consumers" were is not clear).

In December Buthelezi moved the conflict into the party political arena once more. He claimed that he was "testing public opinion" through Inkatha meetings. The opposition to tripcos was being organised into a political party (at this stage unnamed, but later to be revealed as the Inala Party), Buthelezi said. Several traders, including Mr Gogo, a Hammarsdale trader and member of Inyanda, and King Goodwill were said to be involved.

Barney Dladla, former kwaZulu Councillor for Community Affairs, and strong opponent to the scale and manner in which the BIC was involved in kwaZulu economic activity, supported the Inyanda - "If we allow these big boys in, the Black man will be wiped off the business map" (NM, 20/12/75). During May, 1976, Dladla came under attack in the KLA for having introduced an Inyanda motion that month opposing tripcos. It was claimed by the Councillor for Roads and Works that Gumede had attacked Inkatha at the meeting and had hinted that he would have to enter opposition politics.

More information on the Inala Party was released in 1976. Tension immediately existed around the name of the party (Inala being the name of the King's first regiment), but it is not my intention to examine the strain between Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill. Nor, with the information available to me, is it possible to examine accusations and denials of Bureau for State Security/Department of Information involvement in kwaZulu politics, and especially in the formation of the Inala Party. In the KLA the party and tripco opposition was directly linked when Gogo spoke on the issue. His comments are most revealing of the ambivalent position that the petty bourgeoisie in "homelands" find themselves in. On the one hand they are aware of the relative disadvantage with regard to the position of other races, as

"nobody with hair like mine or yours could establish a business in a white or Indian area"; on the other hand, "Black traders had been 'incited to jealousy' because the Black areas were the only crumbs they possessed, having been ejected from White areas. It was not easy, he said, to have only those few areas and then to have them taken away." (NM, 15/5/76)

In June Buthelezi played the card he had been threatening to use. The influence that Inkatha had with traders in KwaZulu was tested at a meeting called at Ulundi. As was mentioned above, Inyanda, in 1974, had a membership of 413 out of the 1600 African businessmen in KwaZulu (DN, 25/9/74). These members would probably be situated in the townships around the main urban areas in Natal. The meeting was called in Ulundi, situated far from the urban areas. The Inyanda "was called upon by KwaZulu traders to cooperate with the national liberation movement, Inkatha, failing which the KwaZulu Government would have no dealings with it" (NM, 14/6/76). It is significant that discipline was imposed not directly, but through the Inkatha movement. Inyanda was advised "to avoid politics and concentrate on the economy".

On 26th July, 1976, the first tripartite agreements were signed in Pretoria between the KLA, BIC and Greentermans (Checkers), Sasko Milling (to be known as Umlazi Bakery), and Aidec (African Insurance Development Company). The signatories said that under the scheme "an agreement is usually entered into between the White party, the Black interests if available, and the development body of a particular homeland ... (T)he shares acquired by the BIC in the three concerns would eventually be transferred to the KwaZulu Development Corporation" (DN, 26/7/76).

The Sunday Tribune (22/8/76), under the headline "KwaZulu and Inyanda Bury Hatchet" reported that the 18-month dispute had been settled in that Inyanda had "given its blessing" to the building of an international hotel at Ulundi, and had also joined Inkatha. But an international hotel is peripheral to the real issues involved in the dispute, namely the survival of traders in the larger urban areas. An hotel at Ulundi would fill a gap that no trader was going to move into. So it comes as no surprise that just before the opening of the first Checkers retail and wholesale outlet at Madadeni Patrick Gumede should once more express the Inyanda opposition to the scheme, "because it meant a radical threat to Madadeni traders whose business

would without doubt face drastic losses" (DN, 21/11/77). This statement was made after the security police had been to warn Gumede that he and other traders would be held responsible if anything happened to the supermarket. Threats of arson had reportedly been received.

Chief Buthelezi performed the opening of the Checkers supermarket on 24th November, 1977. He said that that was stage one - phase two would include Edgars, Saleshouse, Jet, Pep, KwaZulu Furniture Store, Beares, Standard Bank and Bata. Despite Buthelezi's claim that the tripco development would keep money in kwaZulu, the firms on his list seem to be well geared to recapture wages remitted from "white" areas. Dr M Olivier, Natal manager of the Corporation for Economic Development commented on opposition to tripcos. After dismissing the fears of traders as unfounded he said that dividends on shares sold to traders after the 10 year period could "according to CED viability studies ... give traders the same or an even higher return on investment as most of them were realising on their existing investments. 'I am not implying that traders should now abandon their undertakings, but I suggest strongly that they start taking part, by way of shareholding, in the tri-company schemes'" (NM, 30/11/77).

The petty bourgeoisie, as a transitional class, has a tendency under capitalism to either join the proletariat or the commercial bourgeoisie. I have tried to show that the political position of this class cannot be deduced from a single factor, but only through the close analysis of a range of factors. It is not even possible to group the whole of the "homeland" petty bourgeoisie together. This has implications for an evaluation of an organisation such as Inkatha.



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