



**Constructing a Regional Common Foreign Policy: A Case Study of ECOWAS and  
SADC**

**Lehlohonolo Majoro**

**Supervisor: Prof Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk**

**A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and  
Management, University of Witwatersrand, in fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of Master of Management (specialising in the field of Security).**

---

**Johannesburg, May 2016**

---

## DECLARATION

I, Lehlohonolo Majoro, declare that this research report is my own work except as indicated in the references and acknowledgements. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in this or any other university.

-----  
Lehlohonolo Majoro

Signed at .....

On the ..... day of ..... 2016

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Special acknowledgement goes to the Wits School of Governance, lecturers and supporting staff for all the assistance provided. Special mention goes to my supervisor Professor Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk who has skilfully assisted me through this journey. To my family and friends your strength and belief in me has carried me through to this end, I am eternally grateful.

## Table of Contents

Constructing a Regional Common Foreign Policy: A Case Study of ECOWAS and SADC.....	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iii
LIST OF TABLES .....	vi
Acronyms and Abbreviations .....	vii
ABSTRACT.....	xi
1.1 Introduction and contextualisation .....	12
1.2 Background: History of SADC and ECOWAS.....	13
1.2.1 SADC.....	13
1.2.2 ECOWAS .....	14
1.3 A comparison of SADC and ECOWAS .....	15
1.3.1 Aims of objectives: .....	15
1.3.2 Structure .....	16
1.4 Purpose of the Study .....	18
1.5 Knowledge Gap .....	19
1.6 Research Aims and Objectives .....	20
1.7 Research Question .....	22
The sub-questions of the study are framed as follows:.....	22
2.1. Introduction .....	23
2.2 A Conceptual Framework: Institutionalising Foreign Policy Behaviour.....	23
2.3 Regional Organisations and International Relations Theory .....	25
2.3.1 How Regions Are Formed .....	27
2.4 African regionalism and the choice between differentiation and integration .....	31
2.5. Conclusion.....	33
Research Methodology .....	35
3.1 Research Paradigm: .....	35
3.2 Research design .....	35
3.3 Data collection methods and Sample .....	37
Table 1 Climate Change .....	38
Table 2 Maritime Security.....	39
Table 3 Terrorism .....	39
Table 4. SADC & ECOWAS Levels of Cooperation .....	40
3.4 Limitations of the study .....	41
Findings .....	42

4.1 Introduction .....	42
4.2 Background: Climate change and its impacts versus a global response.....	42
4.2.1 Climate Change and the Global Response .....	44
4.2.2 Climate Change and the African Response .....	46
4.2.3 SADC's response to climate change .....	49
4.2.4 SADCs adaptation strategy.....	49
4.2.5 SADCs Mitigation Strategy .....	50
4.2.6 ECOWAS's Response to Climate Change.....	51
4.3 Maritime (In)security: Background .....	52
4.3.1 Africa Integrated Maritime systems (AIMS) 2050 .....	53
4.3.2 SADC's Response to Maritime (In)Security .....	55
4.3.3 ECOWAS .....	58
4.4 Background: The threat of Terrorism to Africa and the World .....	61
4.4.1 The AU's response to Terrorism .....	63
4.4.2 A SADC Response to Terrorism .....	65
4.4.3 An ECOWAS Response to Terrorism .....	68
4.5 Conclusion.....	71
4.5.1 Applying the Model.....	71
Table 6. Cooperation Scale .....	73
Table 7 Revised findings.....	74
5.1 Introduction: Does institutionalising CFP help harmonise regional policy and/ interests. ....	75
5.2 African Regional States continue to evolve as intergovernmental institutions .....	76
5.2.1 What do our findings tell us about the evolution of African states?.....	77
5.2.2 An adherence to sovereignty compels the proliferation of intergovernmental institutions .....	80
5.3 The EU model of institutionalisation versus a flexible model .....	81
5.3.2 To what extent is SADC following the EU model versus a flexible model? .....	82
5.3.3 To what extent is ECOWAS following the EU model versus a flexible model? .....	84
5.3.4 African regionalism has its own intrinsic value.....	85
5.4 Institutionalisation and its implications for CFP .....	86
5.4.1 The African Security Regime Complex .....	88
Table 8 Brosig's typology of convergence.....	91
5.4.2. What do our findings tell us about IGO's and their implications for CFP? .....	92
5.4.3 A CFP that can thrive in any of the approaches.....	95

5.5 The importance of values, interest and identity for CFP .....	96
5.5.1 SADC's dilemma of shared values .....	98
5.5.2 ECOWAS and shared values .....	99
5.5.3 The extent to which shared values are important for CFP .....	100
5.6 Conclusion:.....	101
Conclusion.....	103
References.....	108
Websites:.....	117

## **LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1. SADC & ECOWAS Levels of Cooperation .....	40
Table 2. Cooperation Scale .....	73
Table 3 African Institutions that deal with climate change .....	48
Table 4 Levels of Cooperation - Revised findings .....	71
Table 5 Brosig's typology of convergence .....	91

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific States

ACSRT - Algiers Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism

AFDB - African Development Bank

AFISMA - African-led International Support Mission to Mali

AGN - African Group of Negotiators

AIMS - Africa Integrated Maritime systems

AMCEN - The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment

AMCOMET - African Ministerial Conference on Meteorology

AMD - Africa's Maritime Domain

AMESD - African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development

APMA - African Port Management Association,

APRM - African Peer Review Mechanism

AQIM - Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ARC - African Risk Capacity

AU – African Union

AWG LCA - Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action

BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CADSP - Common African Defence and Security Policy

CAHOSCC - The Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change

CCA - Climate Change Adaptation

CCDS - Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff

CCJ – Community Court of Justice

CFP – Common Foreign Policy

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy

CILSS - Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel

ClimDec Africa - Climate for Development in Africa Programme

COP - Conference of the Parties

CSBM - Confidence and Security-Building Measures

CTED - Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate

Dfid – Department for international development

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo.

EAC - East African Community

ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States

ECOMOG – ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West Africa

ECREEE – ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency

EIMS - ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy

EU – European Union

FLS – Frontline States

GCCA - Global Climate Change Alliance

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GGC - Gulf of Guinea Commission

GHG – Greenhouse Gas

GoG - Gulf of Guinea

GPC - Global Producing Centres

GSF - Global Shippers Forum

GWOT - Global War on Terror

IBSA - India Brazil, South Africa

ICC - International Chamber of Commerce

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGO – Intergovernmental Organisation

IHO - International Hydrography Organisation



ILO - International Labour Organisation

IMO - International Maritime Organisation

IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ISDSC - Interstate Defence and Security Committee

IUU - illegal unreported and unregulated

IWRM - Integrated Water Resource Management

JAMS – Ansaru - Jama’atul Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan

MCO - Ministerial Committee of the Organ

MDAC - Maritime Domain Awareness Centres

MDC - Maritime Domain Centres

MESA - Monitoring of Environment for Security in Africa

MMCC - Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre

MOWCA - Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa

MSS - Maritime Security Strategy

MUJAO - Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

NAM - Non-Aligned Movement

NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NEPAD - New Economic Partnership for Development

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OAU - Organisation of African Unity

PMC - Private Military Companies

PSC - Peace and Security Council

PSP - Peace and Security Protocol

REC - Regional Economic Communities

REDD - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

RISDP - Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan

SADC- Southern African Development Community

SADCC - Southern African Development Coordinating Conference

SADC OPDSC - SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation

SALM - Small Arms and Light Weapons

SANDF - South African National Defence Force

SARPPCO - Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation

SIPO- Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

SMC - Standing Mediation Committee

SOP – Standard Operating Procedure

SSA – Sub Saharan Africa

UASC - Union of African Shippers Council

UNCTAD - UN Conference on Trade and Development

UN ECA - United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGCTS - UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

US – United States

UK – United Kingdom

WCO - World Custom Organisation

WTO - World Trade Organisation

## ABSTRACT

This study seeks to interrogate how regional institutions in Africa construct their foreign policies. States are faced with a continuously evolving global structure and as a result face complex challenges that require the collaboration of collective efforts to resolve. In order to overcome such challenges states are tasked with the challenge that involves finding ways to amalgamate their policy frameworks. This is a serious challenge, but one that states must overcome if they are to find effective solutions to growing global challenges. What this research has endeavoured to achieve is show exactly how the task of forging collective or common foreign policy is achieved and what institutions are best suited to help African regions achieve their goals of a common foreign policy. To this end, the study uses qualitative design and employs document and content analysis, focusing on the structure and history of the two organisations (ECOWAS and SADC). It then looks at the three foreign policy approaches (climate change, terrorism, and maritime security), comparing the coordination of each and seeking out what works in terms of finding and/ or building of the necessary institutions in order to gauge the cohesion of the regional organisations given different contexts. The adherence to sovereignty by member states has proven once again to be an impediment where collaboration particularly of the supranational nature is concerned. What this study has endeavoured to do is to show that despite an adherence to sovereignty certain goals can be achieved. While the adherence to sovereignty is deemed a constraint towards cohesive regionalisation, this study finds that the issue is not necessarily an adherence to sovereignty, but the imposition of unrealistic or misplaced targets such as the vision of the two African sub-regions to acquire supranational institutions. For the most part, the findings were that African regionalism continues to evolve as intergovernmental organisations. Using Brosig's (2013) typology of convergence This study has not only shed light into what works as a framework for achieving set goals and targets, but it has also shed light into the different types of arrangements that can be achieved given different contexts. This study hopes to add value to the understanding of the African regional society and how it makes and implements its decisions, The hope is that this also sheds light into understanding reasons behind policy failures and their successes thereof.

# *Chapter 1*

## **1.1 Introduction and contextualisation**

The rationale for this study resides in the need to understand foreign policy behaviour in regional contexts. Foreign policy as an area of study seeks to unpack the state and how it functions, which on its own is already complicated. Winston Churchill, in describing the Soviet Union's foreign policy, captures the complex nature of the subject in this statement:

Soviet Union foreign policy is a puzzle inside a riddle wrapped in an enigma, and the key is Russian nationalism

(<http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2010/ebra0319.html>)

Foreign policy-making in regional contexts is a relatively novel area of study, and in light of the above statement, the reasons become clear. Traditionally, foreign policy analysis seeks to dissect the state and its decision makers. The idea is that by doing so we can understand various states' interests, and make sense of how they assert it to the world. Formulating foreign policy in a regional context is difficult, because it requires balancing the interests of single states against collective goals set for a region made up of various states. In the post-independence African context, sovereignty often overrides the collective goal, thus negatively affecting the objectives of regional cooperation.

To forge regional cooperation, institutions are required to formalise cooperation even if cooperation is not itself always a formal process. It thus needs to be decided what this formalised cooperation will look like (what form it will take), and in Africa it would seem the nature of cooperation is such that it makes it difficult to forge coordinated foreign policy in relation to regional dynamics. As such it is difficult to keep track of the multiple challenges, which, given globalisation's influences, are hard for states to tackle alone, and thus require collective effort through regional cooperation.

This study seeks to interrogate how regional institutions in Africa construct their foreign policies. A case study of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) should help identify the similarities in and differences between how regions in Africa forge their foreign policies. At the crux of this

exercise is identifying regional frameworks that either constrain or encourage common foreign policy behaviour.

The academic significance of this study lies in the fact that little has been researched about foreign policy in regional contexts, and even less in the African context, with the least research on how both ECOWAS and SADC forge their foreign policy. Below is a background of the study which offers some context regarding the research paper's two case studies.

## **1.2 Background: History of SADC and ECOWAS**

This study sets out to assess what kind of regional organisations encourage or constrain common foreign policy (CFP) coordination. The study traces the evolution of African organisations, particularly the historical development of SADC and ECOWAS, to see what we can learn from their trajectories, and thereby perhaps identify the issues that have helped and continue to help contribute to either the encouragement and/or constraining of CFP coordination.

### **1.2.1 SADC**

According to Van Nieuwkerk (2015: 3), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an expression by fifteen nations of the Southern African region to collaborate in the interests of peace, security, democracy and development. SADC is in effect a re-adaptation of its predecessor the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which was formed in 1980 deliberately excluding political and peace and security issues from its agenda, focusing rather on economic development (Cawthra, 2010: 10). Cawthra (2010: 10) contends that security issues were the preserve of the Front Line States (FLS), an informal alliance of countries willing and able to counter South Africa's military hegemony and support the insurgent armed liberation movements against the apartheid state.

The functional division of the SADCC initially continued with the foundation of SADC in 1993. A position was raised that SADC should concentrate on economic issues and that security issues should be dealt with by a separate structure. SADC's evolution as a security actor became institutionalised in 1996, when the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). In August 1999, heads of state and government decided to restructure all SADC

institutions, including the OPDSC itself, and adopted a review of the operations of SADC institutions at an extraordinary summit in 2001 (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012: 9).

Furthermore, Van Nieuwkerk (2012: 9) writes that in January 2002 the SADC Summit mandated the OPDSC to prepare a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which would provide guidelines for implementing the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation over the next five years. In 2010 following a revision of SIPO, SIPO II was approved by the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia. Cognisant of the weaknesses of SIPO I, SIPO II was then structured around five sectors: political, defence, state security, public security, and police (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012: 11).

According to Van Nieuwkerk (2015: 1), in the run up to its August 2015 summit meeting, SADC adopted a set of progress reports and policy documents that suggests a deepening of regional integration, particularly on development and security cooperation. Among these were the revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The future arrangement is that the RISDP and the SIPO will culminate in one strategy which will provide a holistic approach to issues of sustainable economic development and peace and security in the SADC region.

### **1.2.2 ECOWAS**

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 in Lagos, marking the culmination of the region's aspirations to attain political and economic freedoms. The ECOWAS is currently made up of 15 countries. According to Essuman (2009: 415), politically ECOWAS regionalism was assumed to serve as an instrument for foreign policy and a collective bargaining bloc as well as a motivation for south-south co-operation between states that had, under colonial rule, been divided in terms of the interests of the European colonising powers. Economic development, in the effort to bolster a collective regional peace and security in West Africa, was a key primary objective in the formation of ECOWAS.

Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 6) affirms this assertion as he points out that 'economic issues were given priority as a means of developing co-operative ties'. According to Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 6) unlike SADC, the ECOWAS treaty did not include any security-related provisions, as political and ideological issues were considered divisive. Instead, economic issues were

given priority as a means of developing co-operative ties between member states. In 1978, a first attempt was made to develop a security framework by adopting a Protocol on Non-Aggression. This declaratory statement was followed in 1981 with the adoption of the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (a mutual defence pact) that entered into force in 1986.

Furthermore Van Nieuwkerk (2001:) writes, in 1990 the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was created following intervention in a civil war in one of ECOWAS' member states. The SMC, in turn, established a Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG would become the security and peacekeeping wing of ECOWAS through its assumed leadership in the various civil conflicts that took place in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.

According to Rashid (2013: 6), the conflicts and repeated regional troop deployments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau led ECOWAS governments to a number of realisations. Firstly, conflicts of the 1990s were not simply the old-type localized national violence but complex conflagrations that spilled across national borders with far-reaching regional implications. Various ECOMOG missions in the 1990s had been reactive, ad-hoc, and plagued with all kinds of problems in their conception, deployment, operation, financing, and oversight. The realisations motivated Nigeria, the largest troop contributor and chief financier of ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, to push for the creation and adoption of the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, and security in 1997.

### **1.3 A comparison of SADC and ECOWAS**

#### **1.3.1 Aims of objectives:**

SADC and ECOWAS have similar aims and objectives, and these similarities help the choice of case study for this research paper. The revised SADC treaty of 1992 calls for the harmonisation of political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states. Similarly, ECOWAS's Cotonou treaty calls for:

harmonisation and coordination of national policies and the promotion of integration programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture and natural resources, industry, transport and communications, energy, trade, money and finance,

taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology services, health, tourism, legal matters.

Article 3 of the revised ECOWAS treaty maps out the vision for the sub-region. According to the treaty:

the region is motivated by the need to encourage, foster and accelerate economic and social development of member states in order to improve the living standards of the people of West Africa.

Furthermore, the revised ECOWAS treaty seeks:

to promote harmonious economic development of member states for effective economic co-operation and integration largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-reliance.

The SADC treaty similarly calls for the creation of appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of SADC and its institutions. According to Van Nieuwkerk (2015: 3), the current SADC vision is one of a:

common future, a future within a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa.

Van Nieuwkerk (ibid) asserts that this formulation has been re-phrased as follows:

[t]he SADC vision is to build a region in which there will be high degree of harmonisation and rationalisation, to enable the pooling of resources to achieve collective self-reliance in order to improve the living standards of the people of the region.

Both of the regions' mission statements emphasize the need to uphold democratic principles and prioritise the stability of their regions, a key demand towards facilitating economic growth and prosperity.

### **1.3.2 Structure**



The Summit of SADC is the supreme policy-making institution of SADC and it is made up of the Heads of State or Government of all member states. The Summit is responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC. Similarly, in ECOWAS, the Heads of States and/or Government of member states is the highest decision making body. It determines the general policy and major guidelines of the community. Decisions of the body are adopted depending on the subject matter under consideration by unanimity, consensus or by a two-thirds majority of the member states. Decisions taken by the Summit are by consensus after which are deemed binding.

The secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC and is responsible for strategic planning and management of the programmes of SADC and implementation of decisions of the summit and of the Council. The SADC secretariat also plays an important coordinating role, but does not involve itself in decision making. Similar to SADC, ECOWAS has an executive secretariat mandated under article 17 of the treaty to direct the activities of the executive secretariat, including the promotion of community development programmes and projects, as well as multinational enterprises in the region.

Parallel to the SADC troika is an independent institution called the SADC OPDSC. The OPDSC, like the Summit, has its own troika. The troika has an agreed period for the election of a chairman, and a vice chairman on the basis of rotation (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 9). The troika is supported by several committees, including the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO), the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC). The MCO comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security, and state security of each member state. Decisions taken by the OPDSC are referred to the Summit for discussion and approval (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 9).

ECOWAS's organisational structure can be separated into three compartments: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The executive is made up of head of state as described above and supported by the council of ministers. Both regions have made provisions for a council of ministers which serves as an advisory body to the summit and heads of states respectively.

The legislative arm of ECOWAS is coordinated by the Community Parliament. The Community Parliament is established as provided for in article 13 of the treaty. The method of election of the members of the Community of Parliament, its composition, functions, powers and organisation, are defined in protocols relating thereto. According to Van

Nieuwkerk (2001: 6), although the 1992 SADC treaty does not mention a regional parliament, a SADC Parliamentary Forum was established in 1996 and approved as an autonomous institution by the SADC Summit in 1997.

The judicial component is made up of the Community Court of Justice (CCJ). The CCJ composition, powers, and procedures are set out in a protocol relating to it. The CCJ carries out the functions assigned to it independently of member states and the institutions of the community. Judgements of the Court of Justice are binding on the member states, the institutions of the community, and on individuals and corporate bodies inside the community.

According to Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 6), from its constitution and structures it is clear that SADC has not evolved an elected parliament in the sense of a supranational body with authority to formulate or approve binding SADC policy. SADC, however, has four directorates that appear similar to ECOWAS's four specialised commissions (trade, industry, transport and social affairs) and a tribunal, which will be similar to ECOWAS's Community Court of Justice.

#### **1.4 Purpose of the Study**

There are on-going challenges faced by states on the African continent, including climate change, economic recession, unconstitutional changes of government, the growing vulnerability of national borders, illegal migration, and an increase in organised transnational crime, drug- and human trafficking, money laundering, illicit mining, and maritime piracy (See 13<sup>th</sup> CODESRIA General Assembly, 2011; also Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).

Khadiagala (2009: 78) and Van Nieuwkerk (2009: 97) have both argued that if states pool their resources they will be better able to tackle these common challenges. Little has however been researched about the kind of institutions required to make provision for addressing these challenges. In Africa the pooling of resources in regional efforts to combat common challenges has historically been riddled with organisational challenges (Khadiagala, 2009; Cawthra, 2009; Van Nieuwkerk, 2009).

These challenges are said to stem from unresolved questions of defining interests and specifying targets of foreign policy. Advancing collective foreign policies is said to be deprioritised in the interests of adherence to sovereignty. Notwithstanding collective

problem-solving needs, regional institutions in Africa are relatively stunted and weak (Khadiagala, 2009: 77).

To further explore these challenges the research paper intends to look at regional organisations in two of the continent's sub-regions: ECOWAS and SADC. According to Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 6) ECOWAS and SADC are both prominent African sub-regional organisations. Both appear to have similar formal structures and organs (council of ministers, an executive secretary, a secretariat and operations in multiple official languages). Both regions show evolved security frameworks in the form of the ECOMOG and the ISDSC for ECOWAS and SADC respectively.

The formation of these organisations in the two sub-regions embody sharp contrasts as they deem questionable what international relations theories may have to say about the formation of regions and in which contexts their frameworks are to be strengthened or weakened. The argument put forth by neo-functionalists like Haas (1958, 1961) contends that for states to cooperate on larger issues, cooperation on the smaller issues must first take place. In what is described by neo-functionalists as a 'functional spill-over' Haas asserts that economic or trade relations are the impetus for cooperation on subsequent issues such as security to happen. This may hold true for a region like ECOWAS, whose creation was driven by a need to develop an economic cooperation and integration scheme among its 16 West African members which then soon evolved into a security community (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001; 6).

Conversely, the FLS were founded on the premise that they would curb the apartheid regime's threat to regional stability and thus resembled what Buzan and Waeber (2013) regard as a regional security complex. The region has, since the formal abolition of apartheid in South Africa, evolved into an economic and developmental community after it transformed and became SADC, thus putting into question the argument put forth by Haas. The purpose of the study will thus be to compare the two sub-regions with the hope that this will offer insights into which kinds of regional frameworks help encourage or and which constrain foreign policy coordination in regional contexts.

### **1.5 Knowledge Gap**

Research on the sorts of institutional arrangements required to shape regional foreign policy coordination and the factors that constrain or encourage coordination on the part of member states is scant. The largest body of research on foreign policy was the *Formative Process Research on Integration in Southern Africa* (FOPRISA) of 2009, which focused on the

foreign policy and international cooperation dimensions of SADC's approach to security. The research found unresolved issues in what undergirds the values of the organisation (Cawthra, 2009: 87). Shaw and Omolon's (1994) *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS* offers insights into that region's foreign policy behaviour.

There has not been a case study of SADC and ECOWAS with specific attention to their CFP, on contemporary challenges which include but are not limited to climate change, maritime security, and terrorism. There have, however, been numerous studies that have explored comparisons on other grounds between the two sub-regions. These include a comparative analysis of SADC and ECOWAS which examines conflict resolution (Essuman, 2009), while another study looks at the regional trade frameworks of the two sub-regions (Afesorgbor & van Bergeijk, 2011). Cawthra (2007) also does a comparative study of regional security co-operation among developing countries, while Van Nieuwkerk (2001) compares SADC and ECOWAS and explores both the sub-regions' experiences in building collaborative efforts against challenges brought forth by a globalised world.

## **1.6 Research Aims and Objectives**

The objective of this research is to try and understand what kind of regional institutional arrangements are required on the African continent in order to forge better CFP in relation to contemporary, post-millennial challenges faced not only by nation states, but by the way such states have been incorporated into regional relations with their neighbours. This assumption is made on the premise that a CFP will allow for better coordination of responses to common challenges (Khadiagala, 2009; Van Nieuwkerk, 2009).

African regionalism is faced with a situation where states are reluctant to give up their sovereignty, which is said to come against efforts of forging a CFP (Khadiagala, 2009: 77). Regional organisations must thus decide on organisational frameworks that will allow them the capability to respond to such challenges. This may involve addressing questions of identity and values. It could also mean addressing issues that hinge on the relinquishing of some aspects of sovereignty.

The European experience of supranational organisation is commonly regarded as a prototype or model for other regions to emulate, and as such the African Union (AU) is said to reflect much of the European Union (EU) model (Farrah, 2013: 1). It is worth noting, however, that crafting the EU's common foreign and defence policies remains essentially a work in progress, despite fifty years of building supranational institutions (Khadiagala, 2009:81).

Cawthra (2009) acknowledges the argument made by Nathan (2004), who contends that it is not really contested that the development of common values is key to the consolidation of a common regional approach to security and international relations. What is less clear, however, is how these values will evolve: what mechanisms, procedures, processes and institutions will be put in place to undergird such an evolution and precisely what these values are (Cawthra, 2009: 88)? What is central to the argument of this paper is that African institutions find what works for their intended goals and purposes.

This research paper also tries to understand the institutional framework necessary for the realisation of CFP objectives in Africa. According to Khadiagala (2001: 3), past themes in African foreign policy behaviour proceeded from recognition of the severe constraints on the freedom of actors. To overcome their inherent weaknesses, post-independence African states constructed their own continental and regional institutions.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was founded in order to enhance the member states' leverage in world affairs, amongst other things. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was one way of disaggregating interests of developing nations from those of the East and the West during the long Cold War of the twentieth century, and was achieved through institutionalising discourses around development and sovereignty as the demands of African states. Leadership battles and deliberate attempts to cling on to sovereignty by African elites as a means to protect their corrupt and illegitimate regimes stifled the project for African unity (ibid). Although some successes were realised such as the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, French economic and political influence in West Africa still remains a constraint to the realisation of full political sovereignty or many states in that region.

In the 1990s, with the dismantling of legislated apartheid in South Africa, and a rapidly globalising world at the end of the Cold War, individual states' foreign policy behaviour underwent a change. The values of human security became prominent, resulting in the transformation from OAU to African Union in 2001 (Akokpari, 2001: 34-5). With this transformation two fundamental principles would change (Article 4(e) and 4(f) of the Constitutive Act would chip away at sovereignty with regards to issues of conflict and non-interference. The institutionalisation of good governance tied to developmental packages and cooperation was underpinned by both the New Economic Partnership for Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (ibid).

With growing insecurities consequent to increasing transnational crimes, drug trade, as well as the challenges of climate change, terrorism, and so on, the former UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali's (1992) agenda for peace was supposed to help institutionalise the role of sub-regions in peacekeeping on the African continent. The increase in institutions has, however, had minimal effectiveness in reducing conflicts, transnational crimes, and it has also had little impact on facilitating more cooperation within regions or across the continent. But there is an argument that just by being there these institutions deter conflicts.

### **1.7 Research Question**

Can the institutionalisation of CFP assist SADC and ECOWAS in the achievement of their objective to harmonise regional policies and/or common interests?

**The sub-questions of the study are framed as follows:**

- a) How are African regional organisations evolving? Is it as intergovernmental or supranational institutions?
- b) To what extent are SADC and ECOWAS following the EU model of institutionalisation, or are they adopting a flexible model?
- c) What are the implications of these approaches to cooperation for CFP?
- d) To what extent does CFP require common shared values?

## *Chapter 2*

### **Literature Review**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

Why do states interact with each other and why do they feel the need to interact with each other? Different theories of international relations have their own accounts as to why states find it necessary to interact with one another and how they go about doing so.

This chapter will attempt to unpack how and why states interact with one another. At the core of this exercise is an attempt to identify the different sets of options available from which one can interpret how states are able to arrive at certain ends with regard to cooperation where regional integration is concerned. There are various ways that permit for states to achieve whatever ends they want to achieve, however with these there may be certain advantages and disadvantages which this study as a whole attempts to provide answers to. This chapter will provide the theoretical framework that will be utilised throughout this study. The theoretical framework is selected from an array of literature which discusses international relations and its theories. Furthermore various other thoughts regarding how regions are formed are integrated into these discussions with the purpose of enriching the topic and broadening the spectrum in order to place this study within suitable debates.

#### **2.2 A Conceptual Framework: Institutionalising Foreign Policy Behaviour**

The definition of foreign policy can differ depending on one's approach and preference for methodology; this is the caution of Cohen and Harris (1975: 318) regarding the multi-dimensional nature of foreign policy behaviour. Akokpari (2001: 37) argues that 'while some scholars conceive of foreign policy as the course of action adopted by a state, others see it as the interplay of domestic and external forces or simply, the projection abroad of domestic politics'.

Foreign policy behaviour is a summation of the different approaches available for understanding a state's disposition to other states. Foreign policy-making is a subset of this and encompasses the relative realities experienced by states and how they respond to them. Conventionally, foreign policy aims at achieving a specific objective or set of objectives consistent with the interest of the state undertaking the foreign policy mission. Conversely,

Marxist scholars observe structural elements such as positioning in the global arena as reflecting the orientation of the powerful economic class or elite. Foreign policy thus becomes a tool by which states must assert their agency in the system. (Akokpari, 2001: 37-38).

A further conceptual dimension in the foreign policy discourse relates to its formulation. This is the area where foreign policy takes on a decision-making approach. Allison's (1971) *'Essence of Decision'* reveals the wide range of players in foreign policy-making which breaks apart the state as a monolithic actor. This introduces us to a wider definition of what encapsulates the term 'state interest', and introduces us to a wider range of stakeholders, both within and outside the state. While foreign policy has a multiplicitous approach, it does however remain predominantly within the domains of high politics which are generally dominated by a small elite who controls power within a state (Khadiagala, 2009: 78).

Evidence of the state's dominance in foreign policy-making comes from the public policy arena. From this perspective, the state takes centre stage as an actor and replaces all other actors allowing us to focus on what is actually being done instead of what is only proposed or intended. It also differentiates a policy from a decision, which is essentially a specific choice among alternatives. Public policy-making can be understood here as the process where authoritative plans or courses of actions are devised on public issues (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006: 13-14).

A recurring argument in international relations points out that governments are confronted by a transforming world characterised by elements of globalisation, which highlights the vulnerabilities of national governments to the emerging regional concerns in the form of transnational policy issues (such as environmental challenges or the consequences of international and transnational crime) and so on (Webber, 2014: 1). States must therefore position themselves to address these challenges effectively, and to do so they have to pool their resources together, which is an action that delves into a novel area that encourages the ceding of sovereignty to a supranational body. It is trusted that a supranational body will harmonise individual foreign policies to formulate a collective approach to common challenges. The 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' (CFSP) of the EU is an example of this, as it illustrates the logic of a common foreign policy approach (Van Nieuwkerk, 2009: 99).



One study explores how constructivist scholars approach foreign policy. It is argued that state policy makers create the social world within which they conduct foreign policy in interaction with other states. Thus foreign policy becomes an instrument for building bridges amongst states. Subsequently states use foreign policy to assert and construct an identity through ideas and norms which discursively reaffirm and shape their interests (Wicaksana, 2009: 9).

To achieve these aims states must commit to institution building that will entrench the states' mutual long term interests. Khadiagala's (2009: 78) adoption of the liberalist internationalist approach of foreign policy for the articulation of interests and demands is thus a powerful tool and a conceptual framework that will be adopted throughout this study. Khadiagala (2009: 78), Evans *et al.* (1993), and Keohane *et al.* (1995), accept that theories of institutions speak of rules and structures that facilitate decision-making and embedded in institutions are individuals whose actions are enabled and disabled by the rules.

### **2.3 Regional Organisations and International Relations Theory**

The objective of this section of the paper is to probe international relations and its theories to better understand the nature of regional organisations. Whether institutions matter is an argument put forth by different scholars with different results. For constructivists, world politics is socially constructed. Wendt (1995: 173) argues that '[t]he fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material and shape the identities and interests of states as well as their behaviour. These social structures are defined by shared knowledge and understanding among groups of states, and vary between relationships of mistrust and conflict and relationships of trust and co-operation'.

Constructivists argue that the interests and identities of actors (in this case, states) are neither given *a priori*, nor are they preordained, but they are shaped in the interactions with other actors. According to Wendt (1995: 172) constructivism dispels the argument that material power is the only motivating factor for states and argues that international relations is also shaped by discursive power which is ideational and includes culture, ideas, and norms, also meaning that normative action can transform international relations.

According to Hopf (1998: 174) constructivism is similar to critical theory in that it is critical of the conventional international relations theories which uphold arguments that support material power. Conversely, constructivism offers alternative understandings of a number of the central themes in international relations theory (Wendt, 1995: 172). Constructivism

dispels anarchy in the international system and argues that anarchy must be interpreted to have different meanings for different actors based on their own communities of inter-subjective understandings and practices. Hopf (1998) does, however, distinguish between constructivism and critical theory, arguing that epistemologically the two are different as critical theory goes much deeper than offering an alternative in its rejection of conventional theories in international relations.

Neo-realists contend that institutions can do little if anything to enhance stability in an anarchical international system that generates fear, uncertainty and relentless competition for power and security among states. For neo-realists institutions are based on the self-interested calculation of the great powers; they have no independent effect on state behaviour and they are therefore not an important cause of peace (Mearsheimer, 1994: 8). Mearsheimer (1995: 85) also insists there is no solid evidence for the peace causing effects of institutions.

Liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, share the rationalist underpinnings of realism; they posit that states set up institutions in order to advance their specific interests and facilitate collectively beneficial cooperation. In relation to security, institutions can provide states with information, reducing the uncertainty and risks associated with anarchy (Keohane & Martin, 1995).

Van Nieuwkerk (2009: 97) accepts the liberal institutionalist argument that regional institutions stand to benefit from global economic opportunities (especially considering the presumed advantages of market size, and increased bargaining power in international negotiations). Regional institutions are said to be better able to establish stability, reduce poverty, advance developmental objectives, and anticipate and respond effectively to international challenges (ibid).

According to the neo-functionalist argument, as proposed by Haas (1958, 1961), economic integration and trade stimulate functional interdependence between states in regions and thus forge communities that will reduce the risk of hostilities between countries. The 'European Coal and Steel Community' can be said to be an example which illustrates this argument. For scholars like Cawthra (2007) a neo-functionalist underpinning ignores the fact that collective forms of security, which have nothing to do with trade, do also forge regional integration. Cawthra (2007:28) illustrates the different forms of security cooperation which are proven to forge regional institutions:

- military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), in which states seek to combine their defence capabilities against a designated common external enemy;
- mutual assistance or mutual defence treaties, where states pledge to come to the assistance of any other member state in the event of it being attacked (and sometimes in the event of internal threats as well);
- non-aggression pacts, which are quite often linked to mutual assistance agreements; and,
- common, collaborative, co-operative, or comprehensive security arrangements, where member states agree to a set of ground rules governing relations among them (and sometimes also to internal practices), institute confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), and develop cooperative approaches to security.

One particular and very influential strand of constructivism is associated with the work of Karl Deutsch (1957: 5), whose main proposition was that cultural interaction and communication can become so intense that a region can become a security community. A security community is defined by the shared sense of belonging to a community, a sense of togetherness including the development of diplomatic-political-military practices and behaviour that ensure for a long time the expectation of only peaceful relations among the populations.

According to Nathan (2010: 1) it is no longer empirically tenable to claim that international institutions serve the interests of great powers and are not a cause of peace. This has been illustrated in several instances. Since the mid-1990s a notable international development has been the growth in the number and assertiveness of regional institutions active in the realm of peace and security. These institutions have created security regimes of various kinds and have undertaken preventive diplomacy, mediation, peace operations, post-war peace-building, arms control and disarmament (ibid).

### **2.3.1 How Regions Are Formed**

According to Bach (2003) there are two dispensations on how regions are formed: the old notions are considered myopic and somewhat insignificant in this new age of regionalism. A combination of the old and new is regarded as new regionalism. New regionalism takes account of multi-layered patterns which are intergovernmental, supranational and

transnational. For Bach (2003: 22), new regionalism is therefore a shortcut for newly acknowledged and monitored patterns of regionalism and regionalisation.

According to Acharya (2012: 5) 'the major impetus for new regionalism seems to have been disillusionment with the narrow focus of existing approaches which stressed formal structures and intergovernmental interactions, to the exclusion of non-state actors and informal linkages and processes of interaction.' According to Hettne and Soderbaum (1998: 2) 'the old regionalism was generally specific with regard to objectives and content, and often had a simple and narrow focus on free trade arrangements and security alliances, whereas the number, scope, and diversity of the new regionalism has grown significantly over the last decade.'

Bach (2003) contends that prior to new regionalism the formation of regions was a culmination of two processes: regionalism and regionalisation. The former emerged in the 1960s, and refers to the ideas, ideology, policies and goals that sought to transform a geographical area into a clearly identified social space. Regionalism also related to the construction of an identity and carried as a result, a strong cognitive component (Bach, 2003: 22).

Regionalisation emerged in the 1980s, and from Bach's (2003) description, had neo-functional underpinnings in that regionalisation was not associated with regional organisations, but was more a generalisation of structural adjustment and deregulation policies that went along with the diversification of the globalised economy into three major core regions: North America, the EU, and the Asian-Pacific region. The EU here was an exception as it already had institutional developments (Bach, 2003: 21) built up since the end of the Second World War.

The resurgence of this regionalisation process is said to have followed later, encouraged by fears that a deadlock of the Uruguay rounds of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and possible transformation of the EU into 'fortress Europe' might prompt the re-emergence of protectionism and regional commercial blocs. He also acknowledges that the end of the Cold War, and the fall of the Iron Curtain, also created a range of opportunities for the establishment of regional schemes (Bach, 2003: 21).

So while regionalism refers to the general phenomenon as well as the ideology of regionalism in the sense of a geographical area or type of world order, there may thus be many

regionalisms. On the other hand, regionalisation generally denotes the empirical processes by which regions are formed, and furthermore, implies an activist element or a process of formation. There can be regionalism without regionalisation and vice versa. For Hettne & Soderbaum (1998: 5) it is important to conceive of regional organisations as second order phenomena compared to processes that underlie regionalisation in a particular geographical area, which should be seen as region making.

Hettne & Soderbaum (1998: 5) also introduce us to the concept of 'regionness' being the state in which a geographical region is transformed from a passive object to a subject with capacity to articulate the interests of the emerging region. Regionness is the level of convergence at which a region can be said to have increased or decreased in its level of coalescence. There are three stage or processes of regionness (Hettne & Soderbaum, 1998: 6):

- the first, described as the pre-regional stage, constitutes a geographical and social unit; this stage constitutes a low level of regionness, where a balance of power, or some kind of concert, tends to be the sole security guarantee; this stage is therefore regarded as the primitive region;
- the second stage is where actual regionalisation takes place; this process could start with either formal, intergovernmental regional cooperation/state-promoted regional integration or informal, spontaneous, market and society induced processes of regionalization, in any of the cultural, economic, political or military fields;
- the third level is the region as acting subject with a distinct identity, institutionalised actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of decision-making, in relation with a more or less responsive regional civil society, transcending the old state borders.

It is worth noting however that this is not a stage process and regionalisation or regionalism is not an evolutionary process. This is also to say that there can be one stage without the other and that there is nothing inherently good about regionalism or regionalisation from a normative point of view. As Hettne & Soderbaum (1998: 7) also acknowledge, it is therefore not a requisition for a region to move from one stage to the next in the assumption that better can be accomplished in the next.

There are of course different views on how regions are formed. It is out of these variations that different conceptions of regional formation are reproduced resulting in debates around

the distribution of power, and order and hegemonic presence as factors that speak to the nature of a particular region.

Katzenstein (2005: 237) claims that world politics is built around regions that have been deeply influenced by the United States' (US) post-war imperium. In Katzenstein's (2005) world only one power really matters in the diffusion of regionalism and that is the US which maintains a global presence and whose power and preferences are critical to the shape and functioning of all regions. Core states such as Japan (in ASEA) and Germany (in the EU) also play a crucial role. Regions are made porous by globalisation and internationalisation, which porousness leads to the growth of cross-border exchanges, global transformations, and inter-state relations which reinforce the influence of the US (ibid).

Buzan and Waever (2003: 8) conceptualize world politics as regional security complexes defined as: local sets of states existing together and whose major security perceptions and concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security perceptions cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. For Acharya (2007) this form of regionalism is motivated by some form of threat than interdependence of interests.

According to Acharya (2007: 635), Buzan and Waever's (2003) argument entails neo-realist-favoured notions of bounded territoriality and distribution of power. This is blended with securitisation theory, which focuses on political 'speech acts' with which a security issue is posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (a nation state, the liberal international economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed to have some right to survive. Conversely, Acharya (2007: 635) argues that Katzenstein's (2005) materialist argument adopts an analytical eclecticism which looks to a mix of geopolitical, behavioural and constructivist understandings of regions. It draws from multiple explanatory frameworks that are formulated on pragmatic assumptions.

For Acharya (2007: 634) the views of Buzan and Waever (2003), as well as those of Katzenstein (2005), profess a constructivist understanding of regions in as far as they acknowledge that regions are socially constructed and express changing human practices. The scholars, however, reject the view that regions can be simply a product of the shared imagination of peoples and states. Neither of the scholars considers social construction to be adequate; rather, it has to be combined with materialist determinants.

## 2.4 African regionalism and the choice between differentiation and integration

According to Khadiagala (2001: 2) foreign policy-making in regional contexts is an arena for dense patterns of common and conflicting interests with wider implications for multiple actors. This is evidenced in Africa, which has seen the tension between sovereignty and supranationalism play out in the relationships between nation states, and between such nation states and their regional affiliations. For Khadiagala (2001: 2):

African foreign policy has essentially been a matter of deliberate actions by elites. Limited by a dearth of resources and competing domestic concern of nation and state building, African elites, for the most part, have chosen to participate in external realms to overcome their inherent weaknesses.

While that holds true, the collective choice by its own virtue has also proven problematic as it is combination of divergent views. Elites see it as a threat to their regimes. This has often been the case when the collective consensus was in support of human rights and democratic norms which came against the interests of oppressive regimes or the elites they serve (Khadiagala, 2001: 2).

The OAU was established to give meaning to an African identity and to institutionalise the fight against colonialism (Khadiagala, 2001: 4). Despite decolonisation the OAU had, historically, little to agree on collectively. Instead the organisation was riddled with competing interests, from leadership battles to battles about what identity to adopt. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah's Casablanca minority group favoured a unified continent with common economic planning (including a common currency and monetary zone), an African military command and a common foreign policy. At the other end, the majority of African states, grouped under the Brazzaville and Monrovia blocs, favoured a more gradualist approach to continental unification and unity (Adebajo, 2013).

The gradualist approach became the founding principle of the OAU. It is a choice that created an institutional vacuum in the need for coalescence. As such states rather opted for decisions which guaranteed specific regime survival, protecting their own interests or the interests of internal elites against a unified approach which promised to bring normative values like human rights to the fore. As a result, the OAU failed when the need arose to speak with a common voice against repressive and undemocratic regimes, thus creating an institutional culture of tolerance and 'turning the other cheek' (or looking away) in the face of human

rights violations such as those witnessed in Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire and Idi Amin's Uganda (Adebajo, 2013).

Khadiagala (2001:2) argues that despite Africa's weak global position, internal differences in resources engendered variations in the degree of independent foreign policy action. He acknowledges Nigeria's role in the creation of the ECOWAS in 1975 as demonstrating the links between economic capabilities and leadership. 'ECOWAS under Nigeria succeeded in whittling down the veneer of sovereignty that had concealed conditions that wrought wars and internal decay in Liberia and Sierra Leone' (Khadiagala, 2001: 2).

As Khadiagala (2009: 79) would have it, the ECOWAS interventions, however, came too late to prevent West Africa from descending into regional conflagration, as demonstrated in the escalation of civil wars in the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau over decades. In East Africa, unresolved competition among three equally matched states in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania led to the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in the 1970s (Khadiagala, 2009: 79).

As an effort to adapt to the changing international order and environment, the Cairo Declaration of 1993 established the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The OAU, despite its relatively good organisational structure, was unable to keep up or deal with the continually changing global order and so the AU was formed in 2001, and with it came the attempt to realign African foreign policy interests and objectives in a more coordinated and unified direction (Adebajo, 2013).

The AU's peace and security architecture sets out two main policy instruments: the Peace and Security Protocol (PSP), and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The primary responsibility of these (to promote peace, security and stability in Africa) are to be vested in the seven 'regional economic communities' (RECs). Despite a rigorous organisational structure, the general consensus amongst scholars (see Nathan, 2012) is that collective problem-solving in the regional institutions of Africa remains relatively stunted and weak.

Furthermore, foreign policy behaviour in Africa has focused on security and trade, and the inability, largely, to find much else to agree on sets the tone for the regionalism with which we are dealing. For Franke (2008: 317) the fight for liberation set the tone for Pan Africanism and security cooperation which has largely been the impetus for regionalism in Africa.



Franke (2008: 317) argues that African security cooperation resembles the constructivist definitions of a security community.

In order to qualify as members of a security community, states need to share more than merely some core values. Most importantly, they need to display a shared commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict, and ideally have institutionalised a practical knowledge of such in some kind of rule or regulation structure that generates trust (Franke; Adler 1997: 249-77).

The AU seems to meet this stipulation, as articles 4(e) and 4(f) of the Constitutive Act calls for peaceful resolution of conflicts and an expression to get rid of conflict which is characteristic of a security community. Enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the members of the AU share common values, meanings and understandings as is evidenced by common institutions such as APRM and NEPAD (Franke, 2008).

According to Essuman-Johnson (2009: 409) ECOWAS and SADC resemble a regional security complex in their efforts to resolve conflicts in their regions. These are findings of a comparative analysis of both regions' conflict resolution mechanisms. Essuman-Johnson (2009) examines the efforts of the two regional bodies to resolve conflicts, and concludes that intervention in conflicts succeeded or failed depending on the level of regionness or the existence of structures for conflict resolution in the regional security complex.

In the case of the conflicts experienced in ECOWAS, the organisation's conflict resolution efforts were ad hoc, even though they were bold and innovative. The efforts were not set within an effective conflict resolution mechanism and therefore were not very successful. In the case of SADC, its conflict resolution efforts in Lesotho were botched and in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) it did not make any meaningful impact in helping to resolve the conflict despite some mediation efforts by South African leaders (ibid).

## **2.5. Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to debunk all types of analyses that look at reasons why and how states interact with each other. At one level this chapter looked at foreign policy as a lens through which states interact with each other. Within foreign policy as a field of study there are various other ways of interpreting a foreign policy. Consistent with what this study aims to achieve, a liberal institutionalist perspective of foreign policy is adopted throughout this

study focusing on how states bring together their interests to form long lasting and formidable coalitions.

Foreign policy is one aspect of how states interact with each other. Another variation includes the consolidation of states interests to form one foreign policy which is deemed effective in addressing contemporary challenges that require concerted efforts. This is a tough balancing act considering the fact that states interests are not uniform.

Coalition building among states can take different forms the most formidable of these is deemed supranational which demands that states have a certain level of convergence. The lesser level of convergence amounts to a lesser form of coalition. In conjunction with the levels of convergence are theories on how states are formed, these add a dynamic element to regional formations that takes into consideration the different contexts.

What this chapter has sought to achieve is place African regionalism within suitable theoretical debates. The aim has been to highlight how liberal institutionalism can help towards understanding and making sense of regional formations from an African perspective thus outlaying what this study will aim to achieve.

## Chapter 3

### Research Methodology

#### 3.1 Research Paradigm:

Qualitative research is a form of social inquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and make sense of their experiences and the world in which they live. Informed by an understanding of the social reality of individuals, groups and cultures, qualitative research is a strategy that usually emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2012: 380). As a research strategy it is broadly inductivist, meaning that theory is the outcome of research (Bryman, 2012: 26, 380). Qualitative design is thus a suitable strategy for this study which seeks to compare institutional similarities and differences between ECOWAS and SADC on the premise that certain frameworks either constrain or encourage foreign policy coordination.

The approach of this research is grounded in qualitative assumptions which contend that researchers must understand the socially constructed nature of the world and realise that values and interests become part of the research process. Complete objectivity and neutrality are impossible to achieve; the values of researchers and participants can become an integral part of the research (Merriam, 2002: 8).

What makes the nature of qualitative design a strength as well as a key feature in relation to this study is its social approach in terms of data collection methods. A qualitative study makes use of in-depth interviews, focus groups and desktop studies, which allow for close contact with participants and provides analysis that is open to emerging concepts and ideas (ibid).

#### 3.2 Research design

This study employs a qualitative case study of both ECOWAS and SADC. Qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources (Baxter, 2008: 543). This ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather examined through a variety of lenses, and this allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood (ibid). There are various approaches that guide case study methodology (Stake 1995, Yin, 2003, 2006). For the purposes of this study design, Yin's approach will be used.

According to Yin (2009: 18) case study can be used when a study seeks to cover contextual conditions because they are relevant to understanding the phenomenon and its context. Case study can also be used when the boundaries are not clear between phenomenon and context. In this particular research study it is not clear whether foreign policies of regions are either encouraged or constrained by their contextual conditions or the phenomenon being the policy at hand and the nature of conflicts that arise from its implementation.

In a case study one ought to develop preliminary concepts at the outset of the study. The purpose is to place the case study in the tradition of appropriate research literature, so that lessons from the case study will more likely advance knowledge and understanding of a given topic (Yin, 2003: 3). Developing preliminary concepts beforehand also helps define the study's unit of analysis, which in the case of this study are constituted by the regional frameworks and the contexts that help encourage or constrain regional foreign policy making.

According to Yin (2003: 5) at least six kinds of case studies can be identified, based on a two-multiplied-by-three matrix. Case study research can be based on single- or multiple-case studies. Second, whether single or multiple in format, the case study can be exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory (focused on the explication of causal relationships). Multiple case study, which this research paper employs, includes two or more cases within the same study. These multiple cases should be selected so that they replicate each other – predicting similar results (literal replication) or contrasting results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication) (ibid).

An exploratory case study (whether based on single or multiple cases) is aimed at defining the questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study (not necessarily a case study) or at determining the feasibility of the desired research procedures. An explanatory case study presents data bearing on cause-effect relationships – explaining how events happened (ibid). A descriptive case study presents a complete description of a phenomenon within its context (ibid). This study makes use of a descriptive case study method based on the discussion of two cases: ECOWAS and SADC.

The choice of issue areas is informed by the growing insecurity these present to nation states and their inhabitants across the African continent. Terrorism is on the rise, particularly in West Africa; the activities of terror groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al Dine in Mali and the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continue to plague the West African region. There have not been reported cases of terrorism in Southern Africa, but insurgencies

such as the M23 rebels in the DRC continue to clash with government forces, while countries like South Africa are seen as attractive destinations for the funding of terrorist networks (Benjamin, 2015). Both regions have made declarations on terrorism, but it remains to be seen if policy development and implementation will take place beyond multilateral joint forces as is prevalent in West Africa.

Maritime security presents an even larger insecurity as a lot of trade takes place at the coasts, and although piracy has been reduced in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), the laundering of contrabands and weapons is rife, rendering the littoral states vulnerable to transnational criminality. In Southern Africa, especially along the upper reaches of the Mozambique Channel, Tanzania and Seychelles are worst hit by Somali pirates working out of the Gulf of Aden. Similar to the scenario in the GoG, transnational and organised criminality affects Southern African states exposed to the Indian Ocean (Potgieter, 2012: 7). Like fighting terrorism, ensuring maritime security requires a concerted effort, which ECOWAS more than SADC seems to comprehend.

Climate change and global warming continue to be increasingly urgent concerns around the globe, and projections show that in sub-Saharan Africa this will affect the agriculture which most African economies depend upon (World Bank). While both SADC and ECOWAS respectively acknowledge the threat that climate change presents to their member nations, both regions are yet to establish frameworks to respond to this growing concern. The information contained in Table 4. SADC & ECOWAS Levels of Cooperation below depicts the levels of cooperation at face value and based on a survey of open source articles.

### **3.3 Data collection methods and Sample**

This study employs document and content analysis, focusing on the structure and history of the two organisations (ECOWAS and SADC). It then looks at foreign policy approaches to three issues (climate change, terrorism, and maritime security), comparing the coordination of each and seeking out similarities and differences. This highlights the strengths and weaknesses of institutional frameworks that impact on the coordination of foreign policy approaches.

The sources were selected on the basis of them being relevant to what has been achieved or described in both sub-regions respectively.

Under the theme of climate change, five sources were obtained. Given the fact that this is a fairly contested area there is little information in the open in terms of declarations and protocols. There was only one media article that had relevant insights on the developments with regard to climate change and this was in reference to ECOWAS.

**Table 1 Climate Change**

<b>Media</b>	
SADC	
ECOWAS	1
<b>Internet Sources</b>	
SADC	3
ECOWAS	1
<b>Published Declarations</b>	
SADC	
ECOWAS	
<b>Protocols</b>	
SADC	
<b>ECOWAS</b>	

With regards to the subject of maritime security, nine sources were obtained. These sources were selected on the basis of their relevance towards identifying what is being done in both sub-regions respectively. Mostly media sources in the form of academic articles as well as articles sourced from the internet were used to identify what trends are visible. Two declarations were found concerning ECOWAS, one of them is a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

**Table 2 Maritime Security**

<b>Media</b>	
SADC	4
ECOWAS	3
<b>Internet Sources</b>	
SADC	
ECOWAS	
<b>Published Declarations</b>	
SADC	
ECOWAS	2
<b>Protocols</b>	
SADC	
ECOWAS	

Terrorism yielded several sources, six media articles were used, five more sources were internet sources and two published declarations were found one for each region respectively.

**Table 3 Terrorism**

<b>Media</b>	
SADC	2
ECOWAS	4
<b>Internet Sources</b>	
SADC	4
ECOWAS	1
<b>Published Declarations</b>	
SADC	1
ECOWAS	1
<b>Protocols</b>	
SADC	
ECOWAS	

In total twenty seven sources were obtained. A model is built and explained under **section 4.5.1** and **Table 6** respectively. The data was analysed using this model and yielded only one change as presented in the findings **Table 7**.

**Table 4 and 7** are mutually reinforcing in a sense that they form the basis from which the study's hypothesis is tested.

The rationale behind using open source in **Table 4** is to then measure this against what else is out there in terms of actual data that speaks to the actual levels of cooperation. What is then found or the lack thereof either confirms or denies any changes with respect to there being evidence of collaboration which may or may not support the idea that a certain kind of institution is being discussed.

**Table 4. SADC & ECOWAS Levels of Cooperation**

<b>Issue areas of Common Foreign Policy (CFP)</b>	<b>Levels of cooperation</b>	
	<b>SADC</b>	<b>ECOWAS</b>
<b>Climate Change</b>	Low	Low
<b>Maritime Security</b>	Low	High
<b>Terrorism</b>	Medium	Medium

This research paper tries to ascertain how much cooperation there actually is on these issues. It interrogates the levels of cooperation that ought to be there, and investigates the constraints and incentives for the coordination of these policies.

Using content analysis, the aim is to identify levels of cooperation evidenced in the documentary record. The sample is limited to three thematic areas of investigation: climate change, terrorism, and maritime security. The documents range from internet articles, published declarations and protocols, as well as minutes, presentations and other relevant materials.

According to Marying (2000: 4), content analysis reveals not only the manifest content of the material, as its name may suggest. It also allows the researcher to unearth differentiated levels of content, to deduce the themes and main ideas of the text as primary content and to reveal



context information as latent content. The analysis of formal aspects of the material belong among its aims as well.

Using an inductive category development, which is a feature of content analysis, inferences are made to contents that communicate any form of cooperation between parties and the aims of their cooperation. The idea is to use those deductions and inferences that speak to cooperation and harmonisation of policies and its nature, and then measure that using the scale provided for analysis.

### **3.4 Limitations of the study**

While this study attempts to identify and understand the types of institutional frameworks that may or may not work for African regionalism, it must be noted that this is a small study and due to its lack of funding will rely on sources available to the public via online media and other relevant policy documents. As this is a short research paper, it should be noted that the paper will not cover the subject comprehensively, but in the future the study may be replicated to produce a more comprehensive analysis.

## Chapter Four

### Findings

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the findings that will contribute to the outcome of this research paper. It measures the levels of cooperation happening between the RECs in Africa (SADC & ECOWAS). In doing so a number of tools are used. One such tool is a content analysis of media reports, internet sources, published declarations and protocols to ascertain how much cooperation there actually is in the regions.

Furthermore, the aim is to weigh the aims and objectives of these two sub-regions and how these meet with the aims and objectives of their CFP themes (climate change, maritime security and terrorism). The idea is to evaluate if the stated goals and intentions of the RECs are being met and are relevant to the nature of cooperation deemed necessary.

In the end this chapter will combine and evaluate what is in place in terms of policies or documentation, and measure that in the terms set out in the study's cooperation scale. The assumption is that this will then help towards designating what the level of cooperation is, on a scale ranging from very high to very low, the analysis of which will then follow in the next chapter. This chapter also compares the preliminary findings with the revised findings.

#### 4.2 Background: Climate change and its impacts versus a global response

According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the standard definition of climate change refers to:

a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods ([http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press\\_factsh\\_science.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_science.pdf)).

According to Jaspal & Nerlich (2014: 122) climate change became an increasingly pressing concern for scientists, social and political commentators, and politicians alike in the 1980s. The first mention of danger and calamity in relation to climate change was from the 1963 proceedings of a conference in New York of the Conservation Foundation. Subsequent to that

more publications would be released speaking to the effect that the behaviour of humans was having on the climate regime upon which our civilisation depended.

Jaspal & Nerlich's (2014) argue that social representation of climate change in British media in the 1980s contributed to the current dialogue of climate as a danger requiring immediate attention, both socially and politically. Their argument is that the Earth's climate has been a scientific issue for over two hundred years, however it only became a socio-political issue about three decades ago and 1988 was the year that climate change became an obsession of the media and political outlets, directly as a consequence of James Hansen's work at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

In Africa climate change has been identified as a leading human and environmental crisis of the twenty-first century. The problem of understanding climate change is a major challenge confronting the African continent. Tadesse (2010: 1) says it has been argued that the consequences of climate change are key factors in the development of acute conflicts, and it therefore becomes imperative to achieve a proper understanding of the phenomenon and its potential consequences across Africa.

According to Tadesse (2010: 1) African nations are among the lightest polluters, however they suffer the same consequences as the rest of the world and even more so because they depend largely on their agricultural economies to sustain themselves. Many climate models also predict negative impacts of climate change on agricultural production and food security in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Typical consequences of climate change include higher temperatures, the drying up of soils, increased pest and disease pressure, shifts in suitable areas for growing crops and livestock as a result of isotherm migration and the environmental and ecological changes consequent to that, increased desertification in the areas bordering the Sahara region, higher risk and frequency of floods, deforestation and soil erosion, and the loss of soil fertility in coastal regions as a result of sea level rise (ibid).

The UN's IPCC has identified Southern Africa as an area very susceptible to climate change. The IPCC claims that temperatures in the region have risen by over 0.5 degrees Celsius over the last 100 years. It is widely accepted that the region's climate will become hotter and drier over the next century. Since 2001 consecutive dry spells beyond the cyclical droughts characteristic of the region has led to periodic and chronic food shortages. For example, in 2001 and 2002 six countries, namely Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and

Zimbabwe, faced a food deficit of about 1.2 million tonnes of cereals. These were estimated to cost USD 611 million, nevertheless the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the aforementioned countries have decreased (SADC Climate Change Adaptation for the water Sector booklet, 2011: 5-7).

According to a report by the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) of the Intra- African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP Regional Programme for West Africa, an EU initiative meant to support climate change dialogue within the ECOWAS region, the ECOWAS region is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world to the impacts of climate change. The region and more especially the Sahel zone, has seen significant climate disturbances since the beginning of the late 1970s, including periods of drought punctuated by heavy rains and severe flooding. Poverty levels in the region are high and made worse by unfavourable climate conditions; water and food insecurity, and the health costs consequent to the changed ecology which enhances the risks posed by disease vector species, are further complications. Key effects of climate change in the region include a decrease in surface water resources, a decrease in humid land area, a decrease in biodiversity and fishing species, decreasing production and productivity of plants and animals, and increased food insecurity. Adaptation has thus been deemed a priority (<http://www.gcca.eu/intra-acp/gcca-regional-programme-for-western-africa>).

#### **4.2.1 Climate Change and the Global Response**

According to ‘Climate Change Adaptation in SADC: A Strategy for the Water Sector (2011),’ the global priority in order to mitigate the effects of global warming and to prevent further climate changes is through the implementation of mutually agreed frameworks and policies. The two most common policies involve mitigation and adaptation as described below (SADC Climate Change Adaptation for the Water Sector, 2011: 3):

- mitigation in the context of climate change is defined as a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases; examples of mitigation measures include the adoption of more efficient uses of fossil fuels, the conversion to renewable energies such as solar and wind power, and the expansion of forest areas and other sinks to remove greater amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere;

- adaptation is the process of taking actions to help communities and ecosystems cope with changing climate conditions; adaptation measures include the construction of flood walls to protect property from stronger storms and heavier precipitation, or the planting of agricultural crops more suited to warmer temperatures and drier soil conditions.

Mitigation measures are associated with very high opportunity costs whereby developing states argue that high emissions are a result of the developed countries' industrialisation leading to their development. As a result everybody suffers while historically a few have benefitted and continue to benefit. The argument is thus that mitigation measures hinder the development of those now trying to industrialise and this is a result of stringent emission targets that are continually being changed. Developing countries therefore argue that developed countries have a historical debt to pay for their past and current emissions since all this activity now constitutes a hindrance to development in the global south. Below is an historic summary of frameworks that have been implemented to try and reduce the impacts of climate change.

The UNFCCC is one of three adopted at the Rio Earth summit in 1993. Its sister Rio Conventions are the UN Convention on Biological diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification. The three are intrinsically linked and are meant to prevent dangerous human interference with the climate regime. The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994 and 195 states have ratified it ([http://unfccc.int/essential\\_background/convention/items/6036.php](http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php)).

In at what is now coined the Conference of the Parties (COP) which first took place in Berlin, Germany, the parties to the convention have met every year since its inception. The purpose of the COP is to discuss pertinent issues relating to climate change. Since it first began it has set the tone where frameworks relating to climate change are concerned. The event takes place annually and is popular for developing key outcomes relating to climate change. The most relevant are summarised below ([http://unfccc.int/essential\\_background/items/6031.php](http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php)):

- 2013: at the COP19 in Warsaw, governments took further essential decisions advancing the Durban platform; the conference would pave the way for the 2015 conference towards securing a universal climate change agreement; key outcomes of the conference include; the rulebook for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and

Forest Degradation (REDD Plus), The Green Climate Fund and the Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage

([http://unfccc.int/key\\_steps/warsaw\\_outcomes/items/8006.php](http://unfccc.int/key_steps/warsaw_outcomes/items/8006.php));

- 2012: at the COP18 in Doha, amendments to the Kyoto protocol were adopted;
- 2011: at the COP17 in Durban, the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action was drafted and accepted; the outcome of the conference was a roadmap for climate change post 2020 ([http://unfccc.int/key\\_steps/durban\\_outcomes/items/6825.php](http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.php));
- 2010: at the COP16 in Cancun agreements were drafted and largely accepted; these agreements were key in setting out frameworks on adaptation and mitigation; additionally, the Green Climate Fund was established, notwithstanding the Financial, Technology and Capacity Building Support Protocols which were adopted to support mitigation and adaptation frameworks ([http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun\\_nov\\_2010/items/6005.php](http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/6005.php));
- 2007: at the COP13 in Bali, parties agreed to a Road Map, which charted the way towards a post 2012 outcome; as a result the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG LCA) was established as a subsidiary body under the Convention by the Bali action plan to conduct comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome to be presented to the COP for adoption (<http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6431.php>);
- 1999: at the COP3 the Kyoto protocol was adopted; the agreement came about following countries' realisation that emission reduction provisions in the convention were inadequate and thus parties launched negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate change; the first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012; the second commitment period began 2015 and will end in 2020.

#### **4.2.2 Climate Change and the African Response**

According to 'the Draft African Strategy on Climate Change (2014: 13),' an African strategy for climate change was adopted in Sirte, Libya in 2009 by the AU Summit. It was the AU Summit which mandated that the African Union Commission (AUC), among other things, facilitate the building of a common Africa position in preparations for the COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009. That year the Climate Change and Desertification

Unit (CCDU) was established in the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA) and an African Strategy on Climate Change would also be adopted.

The scope of the strategy is 20 years spanning the period 2015-2035 and will be reviewed every five years based on AU planning cycles. The strategy delineates a common position for African organisations primarily on the adaptation and mitigation frameworks they ought to adhere to. The objective of the strategy is to provide the RECs, member states and other stakeholders with a single source of strategic guidance that would enable them to effectively address climate change challenges (ibid).

The draft African Strategy on Climate Change (2014: 13) further declares that in recent years, in order to enable the continent to have a common position on climate change issues, related institutions and programmes have been created with the aim of forging a harmonised policy on climate change. A list of institutions are provided below:

**Table 5 African Institutions that deal with climate change**

<b>Climate Institution/Initiatives in Africa</b>	<b>Related in</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Objectives</b>
African Group of Negotiators to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol (AGN)		1992	Pools resources and power among African states, and seeks to advance common African issues on climate change
RECs		-	This research paper looks at two of the RECs; ECOWAS and SADC.
NEPAD		2001	Stimulate Africa's development by bridging existing gaps in priority sectors, which include among others environment and climate.
Nairobi Framework on Climate Change		2006	Address capacity building in developing CDM projects covering regions in Africa, Caribbean, Pacific, and Latin America.
Algiers Declaration on Climate Change		2008	Establish a Common African position and the need to speak with one voice in the UNFCCC negotiations towards a new legally binding global climate change regime
Tunis Declaration and Action Plan		2008	Determine the rationale and modalities for establishing an African panel on climate change
African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development (AMESD)		2007	Enhance monitoring for preparedness and adaptation to environmental change.
The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN)		2009	Permanent forum where African Ministers of the environment discuss mainly matters of relevance to the environment of the continent.
The Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)		2009	Give the highest political attention to climate change issues on the continent.
African Ministerial Conference on Meteorology (AMCOMET)		2010	Promote political cooperation and streamline policies at a pan-African level and advocate for sound decision-making based on robust science.
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA), AUC and African Development Bank (AFDB)		2011	The three institutions constitute the Climate for Development in Africa Programme (ClimDec Africa) and jointly strive to build partnerships between government institutions, private sector, civil society and vulnerable communities.
The African Climate Centres		-	Serve as WMO Regional Climate Centres (RCCs) for Africa for down scaling of products from WMO Global Producing Centres (GPCs) in the developing regional specific areas.
Monitoring of Environment for Security in Africa (MESA)		2013	Support IGAD countries improve the management of their natural resources.
The African Risk Capacity (ARC) – A Specialised Agency of the AUC.		2014	Complement existing national, regional, and continental disaster reduction activities and climate change adaptation initiatives.



The following section discusses the attempts of Africa's RECs (primarily SADC and ECOWAS) to tackle the issue of climate change.

#### **4.2.3 SADC's response to climate change**

According to Lesolle (2012: 10) all SADC Member States joined an international treaty, the UNFCCC, whose main objective is to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere. In 1995, realising that the emission reductions provisions in the Convention were inadequate, a process was launched to strengthen the global response to climate change, and, two years later the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.

Lesolle (2012: 10) also reflects on Article 3 of the UNFCCC, which delineates the principle of equity and of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities'. For SADC member states, the priority is on reducing the impacts of global warming and climate change on development and also on adapting and coping with the increased climate variability and climate change. According to the SADC website, SADC's roadmap for climate change can be divided into two frameworks: one for adaptation, and one for mitigation.

#### **4.2.4 SADCs adaptation strategy**

As adaptation to climate change involves many factors of progress in Southern Africa, SADC is committed to several international conventions and programmes on climate change. All SADC member states are party to the following conventions

(<http://www.sadc.int/themes/meteorology-climate/climate-change-adaptation/>):

- UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol (as mentioned above);
- the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, which specifically targets the preservation of internationally important wetlands, it also contains a resolution covering climate change impacts, adaptation, and mitigation; and.
- the Convention on Biological Diversity, which has resulted in numerous decisions and technical papers describing the links between biodiversity and mitigation of climate change effects.

According to SADC's website other initiatives include a memorandum of understanding between SADC and the World Food Program, which highlights adaptation as one of six main

areas of cooperation. Similarly, a framework of sub-regional climate change programmes has been developed under the auspices of the AMCEN and the regional climate change programme (ibid).

SADC's website informs us that although many sectors are dealing with the impacts of climate change, water resources are particularly acutely affected. Access to water in SADC is predicted to become increasingly challenging, and therefore the SADC secretariat adopted a Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) Strategy for the Water Sector. The main goal of the strategy is to lessen impacts of climate change through adaptive water resources development and management in southern Africa. The CCA Strategy recognises that water issues impact on a range of sectors, including energy, health and agriculture. Likewise, adaptation measures are required at different levels of governance and management oversight (ibid).

Further analysis of the SADC website reveals that there are more initiatives such as the COMESA, EAC and a SADC joint initiative called 'The African Solution to Address Climate Change'. This programme is called the Tripartite Programme on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation. The programme is being funded by Norway, Department for International Development (DFID) and the EU and is a five year initiative that started in 2010 (<http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-deputy-executive-secretary-regional-integration/food-agriculture-natural-resources/tripartite-programme-climate-change-adaptation-and-mitigation/>).

Other relevant initiatives include protocols that seek to address some specific aspects of climate change, which include:

- the 2001 Protocol on Fisheries;
- the 1999 Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law enforcement; and,
- the 1998 Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology.

#### **4.2.5 SADCs Mitigation Strategy**

Analysis of the SADC website yielded information on the SADC climate change framework for mitigation. The 'SADC Support Programme on REDD (2012-2015)' provides background information on climate change and REDD. It is also framework to improve the capacities of Member States to design national REDD programmes and to cooperate on

REDD issues that are strategic and of common regional interest <http://www.sadc.int/themes/meteorology-climate/climate-change-mitigation/>.

According to the 'SADC Support Programme for REDD 2012-2-15' (2011: 6), the REDD Support Programme fits very well into existing SADC regional policy frameworks, such as the SADC Protocol on Forestry or the new SADC forestry Strategy. The 2002 Protocol on Forestry stipulates amongst other things that state parties shall cooperate by (Protocol on forestry, 2002: 9):

- promoting trade and investment based on the sustainable management and utilisation of forests, including developing and agreeing on common standards for sustainable forest management and forest products; and
- by harmonising approaches to sustainable forest management, forest policy, legislation and enforcement, and issues of international concern.

#### **4.2.6 ECOWAS's Response to Climate Change**

An ECOWAS framework for climate change is a combination of different initiatives directed at addressing issues that somewhat relate to climate change. The most recognised of these initiatives and similar to SADC are the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol to which the majority of member states in the region are signatories.

According to a Strategic Plan 2007-2015 released by the ECOWAS Commission Water Resources Unit, there is the Ouagadougou Declaration, adopted at the ECOWAS Conference for Peace and Security on 12 November 2007 in Burkina Faso and which articulated the need to establish a regional centre to promote Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. The foundation for the Centre was laid with Regulation REG.23/11/08 of the 61st Session of ECOWAS Council of Ministers in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in November 2008. The Ecowas Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) is a specialised agency which acts as an independent body but within the legal, administrative and financial framework of ECOWAS rules and regulations (<http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/planstrat-2007-2015-eng.pdf>).

There is also the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). According to the GCCA which is an EU initiative designed to support the West African region with issues relating to climate change, CILSS is there to support ECREEE. CILSS is a

centre of expertise on issues related to desertification and land-use in the Sahel, it coordinates multiple regional initiatives on climate change, including the GCCA Intra-ACP Programme. The CILSS collaboration with the GCCA Intra-ACP was launched in March 2012 with €4-million funding from the GCC, and the programme will continue until early 2016 (<http://www.gcca.eu/intra-acp/gcca-regional-programme-for-western-africa>).

According to a Strategic Plan 2007-2015 released by the ECOWAS Commission: Water Resources Unit, there is yet another Ouagadougou declaration, which was adopted in 1998. This, together with the adoption of a regional Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) plan in 2000, added two key milestones leading the region to setting up a Permanent Framework for Coordination and Monitoring of IWRM in West Africa (<http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/planstrat-2007-2015-eng.pdf>).

### **4.3 Maritime (In)security: Background**

The sea is responsible for a substantial amount of the world's trade and as such presents opportunities and risks alike. Oceans cover seventy-two percent of the surface of our blue planet and constitute more than 95 percent of the biosphere, oceans make providence for transport which accounts for 80 percent of global trade (UNCTAD: 2012).

According to Dabugat (2014: 1) maritime (in)security has recently dominated the security development discourse on how maritime environment relates to land. This sentiment is tacitly reaffirmed by scholars namely (Ukeje & Ela, 2013 and Coelho, 2013) who submit that there is a need to rethink conventional wisdom as it relates to the geopolitics of the seas, and to understand how such feeds into existing policies and actions at regional, continental and global levels.

By Till's (2004: 315-16) account most threats at sea are grouped as 'piracy' a term which is rendered insufficient and a misconception as threats include a spectrum of local wars, terrorist attacks and piracy. Till (2004: 315-316) proposes that once the inaccurate use of the concept of piracy is deconstructed, a clearer picture of the maritime threat cluster emerges. For Till (ibid) the argument is that concepts like piracy limit responses whereas expanding the concepts that are sources of risk would allow for a better response.

A look into the traditional threats eminent in the GoG shows a broad spectrum of what the maritime threat encapsulates. These include environmental pollution, illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, sea robbery and trafficking in narcotics (Dabugat, 2014: 6). The rise of maritime insecurity in the GoG in its different manifestations, is nurtured by several challenges including an acute fixation on an economy based on revenues from natural resources, particularly oil; negligence of threats emanating from the seas by the post-colonial state; and the absence of adequate, coherent and effective operational strategies to galvanise national-, regional-, and international efforts (Coelho, 2013: 11).

Non-traditional threats include crude oil theft or oil bunkering, armed banditry, and the activities of private military companies (PMCs). According to a report by a private security company operating in the maritime industry namely GlobeSec Global Security Consultants; in the GoG maritime insecurity is also explicitly linked to militancy in the Niger Delta and spreads into neighbouring countries through organised criminal networks and tangential separatist movements. Several bank robberies over the years 2008 and 2009 in Benin, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea for example were conducted using speedboats and heavy weaponry. Engagements in the GoG are frequently more violent than around Somalia and kidnap ordeals are more dangerous (Globesec, 2010: 9).

Frequent maritime incidents off the African coast in 2008 and 2009 and slow responses from littoral African governments reflect strategies only conceptualised on paper but lacking strong operational capability that falters when good governance by the appropriate authorities is called for (Frey, 2009: 22). Frey (2009: 22) goes further and contends that weak regimes on land give rise to weak maritime regimes; maritime insecurity then extends from the harbour to the high seas.

According to Coelho (2013:6) similarly southern Africa is presented with both structural and circumstantial challenges that are relative to African coasts and are apparently worsening. If not properly addressed some could develop into inter-state conflict and hard maritime security threats, while others could jeopardise the economies, environment and public health of the societies and countries in the region. In 2013 piracy and armed robbery were regarded as the main maritime security threats to Southern Africa.

#### **4.3.1 Africa Integrated Maritime systems (AIMS) 2050**

An African regional response to maritime (in)security is one rooted in urgency and the need for an African discourse geared to protect and advance the continents maritime interests. According to Potgieter (2013) in July 1994 the OAU adopted the African Maritime Transport Charter, which recognises maritime transport as essential for economic development across the continent which would require of African nation states to collaborate in the pursuit of solutions. In June 2010 the AU subsequently updated and expanded the Charter, to include provisions for the security and protection of the marine environment.

In December 2012, AIMS 2050 was adopted by the African Ministers Responsible for Maritime-related Affairs, to identify and take claim of Africa's Maritime Domain (AMD). It sets in motion several processes which aim to enhance the geo-strategic importance of the African continent. According to AIMS (2013: 10), Africa has vast potential for wealth creation, in addition to the need to realise that AU member states have common maritime challenges and opportunities, and indeed significant responsibilities for generating the desirable political will for implementing the strategy.

The need for the 2050 AIM Strategy is also inherent in the objectives and principles of the Constitutive Act (Article 3 and 4). Article 3 of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU provides that the objectives for which the PSC was established shall include the development of a CADSP for the AU, in accordance with Article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act (AIM, 2013: 10).

The 2050 AIM Strategy provides a broad framework for the protection and what is framed as the sustainable exploitation of the AMD for wealth creation. The strategy is the product of crosscutting inputs from African experts that includes think tanks, NGOs, the academy, REC's, Regional Mechanisms (RMs), AU Member States, specialised institutions, and other important stakeholders such as the Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), the African Port Management Association (APMA), the Union of African Shippers Council (UASC), maritime training institutions, all memoranda of understanding on Port State Control, the UN, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), WTO, World Custom Organisation (WCO), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Global Shippers Forum (GSF), International Hydrography Organisation (IHO) and the private sector (AIM, 2013: 7). Two of the RECs, namely SADC and ECOWAS, are explored further.

#### **4.3.2 SADC's Response to Maritime (In)Security**

The Standing Maritime Committee of the ISDSC convenes on issues of common interest relating to the maritime agenda in SADC. The Standing Maritime Committee follows the mandated decision of the ISDSC seminar held in Gaborone in March 1995 and validated at the inaugural meeting of the Standing Maritime Committee in July 1995. The Standing Maritime Committee is thus a sub-committee of the operations sub-sub-committee (SADC SMC 1, 2002: 9).

According to the Standing Maritime Committee charter, the Standing Maritime Committee seeks to promote peace and prosperity in the region through maritime military co-operation. These committees' aims and objectives are to achieve optimum degree of maritime military co-operation in the Southern African region within the aims and objectives of the ISDSC (ibid).

According to the Standing Maritime Committee of SADC the following are the aims and objectives of collaborative efforts regarding maritime security in SADC (ibid):

- a) the provision of mutual maritime security in order to ensure the freedom of sea lines of communication;
- b) the development and maintenance of maritime capability in the region; and,
- c) the development of maritime capacity to meet the contingencies that require quick response.

The following section identifies other measures which are present in the SADC region that aim to address maritime (in)security.

According to Coelho (2013: 13) the adoption of the SADC maritime security strategy was set off following the hijacking of the Vega 5 by Somali pirates in the Mozambique Channel in 2010. The SADC Troika asked the State Security Sub-Committee of the ISDSC to draft guidelines towards a regional action plan for combating piracy. The Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia then mandated the creation by the ISDSC of an assessment team to establish the extent of the threat.

Coelho (2013: 13) asserts that the team comprising representatives of Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia assisted by the SADC Secretariat, produced a series of recommendations as well as a draft action plan. On the basis of that plan, the Joint Defence and Security Committee and State Security Sub-Committee met in Pretoria, South Africa, to develop a SADC Maritime Security Strategy (ibid).

The Strategy which is 'classified' and therefore not publicly accessible was formally adopted by the Summit Heads of State held in Luanda, Angola, in August 2011, and is currently in force. According to Coelho (2013:13) the strategy cites the eradication of Somali piracy from Southern Africa as its first priority and securing the west coast of Southern Africa as well as the vast rivers and lakes of the region, such as the Congo River and Lake Tanganyika, which are vital to trade and development as the second priority (ibid).

The Strategy consists of two main components: military deterrence and intelligence-gathering. Military deterrence consists of the deployment of South African naval means to patrol the coast along northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania after an agreement signed among the three countries in the beginning of 2012 (ibid).

According to Coelho (ibid),

under Operation Copper, a South African naval vessel has been permanently stationed off the coast of Pemba in northern Mozambique, with support from a maritime patrol aircraft and a maritime surveillance helicopter. A second component of the strategy involves the 'massive South African naval intelligence-driven operation' supported by Maritime Domain Centres (MDCs) to be run from specifically identified strategic locations at Silvermine in Cape Town, and the Bluff in Durban, coordinated by a multi-security agency centre in Snake Valley, Pretoria, and aimed at gathering and processing intelligence. The system includes 'maritime intelligence-gathering hubs' in South Africa's neighbouring countries up to Kenya along the Indian Ocean coast, and as far as the DRC along the Atlantic Ocean coast, involving the use of local populations as intelligence gatherers to directly feed Pretoria with information.

The SADC Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) is supplemented by various other processes as has been deduced from the minutes taken at the 20th meeting of the Standing Maritime Committee of the ISDSC in Lusaka, Zambia in April 2014. The minutes highlight the level of activity characterized by joint military exercises and operations. According to the minutes



taken at the 20th Standing Maritime Committee session several joint operations have taken place and more are scheduled to take place. The most notable have been the Interop East Exercise that was conducted in August 2013 in the Mozambique Channel in which South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, and France participated; and the Interop West Exercise conducted in the Atlantic Ocean in 2014. Preparations were underway for Exercise Interop West, however due to other commitments Angola requested that the exercise be rescheduled to 2015.

The meeting noted that in terms of the SADC MSS the following actions would be required (SADC SMC, 2014: 6):

- a) establishment of Maritime Domain Awareness Centres (MDACs);
- b) funding sources for SADC MSS;
- c) appointment of MSS representatives at SADC headquarters;
- d) marketing of SADC MSS; and,
- e) legislation in respect of reporting vessels entering SADC maritime zones.

The meeting also noted that, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania have signed trilateral memoranda of understanding to facilitate maritime cooperation and have established MDACs. However, personnel to operate MDACs in Durban and Cape Town are yet to be deployed. (SADC SMC, 2014: 7).

According to a keynote address that was made by the Chief of Naval Staff of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF), Rear-Admiral R.W Higgs (2013) on the occasion of ‘Conference on Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) grouping and Africa : A partnership for Sustainable Development’ added that several measures could enhance and contribute to SADC’s maritime strategy. One of the measures identified by Higgs includes the trilateral system of regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. Following the need to combat threats emanating from non-state actors such as those related to terrorism, armed robbery and piracy, the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) grouping incorporating India, Brazil, and South Africa decided to forge cooperation to provide a secure environment for trade in the area. IBSAMAR was founded in 2007 and is a series of naval exercises – the first of which was held from 5-16 May 2008 – designed to facilitate interoperability and compatibility of combat capabilities, enhance readiness for multi-lateral operations, and develop and improve doctrine, tactics, and operating procedures (Higgs, 2013: 6).

Furthermore, Higgs (2013) adds that all of the above are supplemented by other BRICS partnerships, such as the involvement of Russian navy in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and along the coast of the Horn of Africa. During the period 2008-2013, the Russian navy has conducted 19 campaigns that led 148 convoys of some 717 commercial ships through potential pirate threat areas (Higgs, 2013: 5).

### **4.3.3 ECOWAS**

ECOWAS has slowly started to grasp the realities and full implications of the maritime dimensions of its regional security architecture that had for long been dominated by an overwhelming fixation with security on land. The challenge has been to implement interventions that are integrated and holistic, rather than those in which actors at the different levels pursue disconnected and divergent measures capable of undermining effective solutions across the short-, medium-, and longer terms.

According to a report published by Chatham House (2012: 11), ensuring the security of the GoG is beyond the capacity of any existing regional body acting in isolation. There is indeed a significant number of stakeholders who see themselves as necessary counterparts to the establishment of a secure GoG. Apart from the ECOWAS and other international stakeholders the most relevant and local ones are:

- the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has a more advanced maritime security strategy to that of ECOWAS; together with ECOWAS, both regions lie on the GoG and have recently joined forces to tackle challenges in the GoG; the ECCAS fits into the broader continental view primarily because it promotes information sharing and management, joint patrol and surveillance of maritime space, the harmonisation of actions at sea, the introduction of a regional maritime tax regime, the acquisition of equipment for joint use and the institutionalisation of a periodic maritime conference (Ukeje, 2013: 24);
- the MOWCA; long before the June 2013 Summit of Heads of States whose highpoint was the recognition of the imperative for effective Gulf of Guinea-wide inter-regional effort on maritime security, there had been modest inter-regional coordination arrangements between West and Central African countries; the MOWCA was a culmination of a modest effort to institutionalise the cooperation of the two regions. (Ukeje, 2013: 34);

- the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC); similar to MOWCA, the GGC is yet another regional stakeholder, the GGC is a platform for intergovernmental cooperation composed of all countries exposed to the GoG; it is described by Ukeje (2013:39) as the only organisation in the West African region with a coherent mandate covering the whole of the GoG; according to the Chatham House report (2012: 11), the GGC has the largest mandate for dealing specifically with maritime issues and was established in 2001 as permanent framework for collective action with a view to ensuring peace, security and stability conducive to economic development in the region.

According to Ukeje (2013: 24) what forms the kernel of ECOWAS maritime strategy was first discussed by the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) at a meeting in Cotonou, Benin in April 2010. For the longest time the maritime security challenge was perceived as a Nigerian problem due to the activity of insurgents in the Niger Delta, as such maritime security issues were kept out of the regional agenda, and thus contributing to a lag in the implementation of measures to combat maritime insecurities. Since the Cotonou process ECOWAS has signified the urgency in the need for greater commitment towards information sharing, asset coordination and integration (ibid).

In 2012, ECOWAS created Zone E directly adjacent to the ECCAS Zone D as its first operational zone, involving Nigeria, Niger, Benin and Togo. Together the two zones constitute the choke point of piracy and other criminal activities along the GoG waters. Like the ECCAS model, ECOWAS envisages that member states in the designated zones will coordinate their maritime activities, share information and generally pool resources (Ukeje, 2013).

This next section aims to identify what other measures are there in the ECOWAS;

On 29 November 2012 the GGC signed the Luanda Declaration on Peace and Security in the GoG Region which states that in response to increasing maritime insecurity, GGC member states need to establish regional cooperation and inter-state dialogue (Chatham, 2012: 11). The Luanda Declaration also set the tone for the Yaounde Declaration by calling for the GGC, ECCAS and ECOWAS to ‘work together to develop and implement a comprehensive (long term) strategy for peace, security and development of the Gulf of Guinea region’ (<http://cggrps.org/wp-content/uploads/LuandaDeclaration-EN.pdf>).

On 24-25 June 2013 in Yaounde, the Heads of State and Government of Central and West African States met at the joint summit on the regional strategy to combat piracy, armed robbery, and other illicit activities committed in the GoG. The outcome of the summit now popularly known as the Yaounde process resulted in the adoption of three outcomes (Ukeje, 2013: 44):

- a) Declaration of the Heads of States and Governments of Central and West African States on Maritime Safety and Security in Their Common Maritime Domain;
- b) Memorandum of Understanding among the ECCAS, ECOWAS and the GGC on Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central Africa
- c) Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.

The Memorandum of Understanding (2013: 3) between the parties was established in order to achieve better cooperation among the regional ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC maritime centres. The cooperation would seek to promote synergy through the pooling and interoperability of community resources. To this end, it shall have the following specific objectives:

- a) coordination and implementation of joint activities;
- b) promotion of close partnership among the parties;
- c) regular exchange of information and experience sharing;
- d) harmonisation of control procedures for ships, port installations sea farers, ship owners and insurers in the area of maritime safety and security;
- e) harmonisation of laws on piracy and other illegal activities at sea;
- f) adoption and implementation of a methodology for Automatic Identification of Ships (AIS);
- g) strengthening of cooperation with International Criminal Police Organisation (ICPO-Interpol); and,
- h) promotion of the fight against crimes at sea.

In November 2013 West African maritime experts met in Banjul, Gambia where they urged the ECOWAS commission to facilitate the development of a detailed action plan for the implementation of the proposed ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) (CEDEAO press release). Subsequently on 29 March 2014 , ECOWAS adopted the EIMS, a draft

priority plan of action for implementing the EIMS was validated at a meeting that took place 27-28 July 2015 in Abuja, Nigeria (Blede, 2015).

According to Blede (2015) the 15 ECOWAS member states adopted 20 priority activities to be implemented between 2016 and 2020. These relate to maritime security and key objectives of the maritime strategy including governance, the environment, the economy, research and training. EIMS took its cue from two resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2018 and resolution 2039. These encouraged the development of appropriate strategies to address maritime security threats. The strategy also feeds in with the AIMS 2050 as well (ibid).

Additionally, Blede (2015) explains that on 13 March 2015 the ECOWAS Commission inaugurated the Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre (MMCC) for a maritime zone known as Pilot Zone E. This marked an important step in the implementation of the EIMS. It is declared as solid proof of member states' commitment to solving the critical issue of maritime piracy, along with other illicit activities at sea.

The centre in Cotonou will coordinate all joint activities between the four states (Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo), including patrols, information sharing, training, and drills. In accordance with the guidelines set out in EIMS, the centre will report to the Regional Maritime Security Coordination Centre of West Africa. It will also work with the multinational maritime coordination centres of Zones F and G, thereby completing the maritime security architecture at the sub-regional level. Zone F includes Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone, while Zone G is made up of Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Senegal (ibid).

#### **4.4 Background: The threat of Terrorism to Africa and the World**

Terrorism is widely deemed to be a threat to international peace and security. According to Crenshaw (1981: 379) the term was coined to describe the systematic inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population. The phenomenon of terrorism as a challenge to the authority of the state grew from the difficulties that the revolutionaries experienced in trying to recreate the mass uprisings of the French Revolution.

Crenshaw (1981: 379) further contends that causes of terrorism ought to be distinguished in order to differentiate common patterns of causation from historically unique causes. While

certain acts of terrorism are direct causes of some grievances such as resistance to the state, some are ideological such as Islamic extremism. To compound the subject further, the elaboration of globalisation characterised by transnational political movements and communication networks has made terrorism even more complex as a political phenomenon and a challenge to nation states, reflecting the very complex nature of the societies in and across which it is perpetrated. According to Botha & Solomon (2005: 1), on a global scale the biggest threat of terrorism is presented by Islamic extremism which does not necessarily rely on the temporary hold on political and economic power in a particular country, but rather in the formation of a transnational terror network that has disastrous consequences.

According to Salihu (2015: 2) West Africa in particular has seen an increase in terrorism especially in the Sahel region. Cases include deadly terrorist attacks in Mali and Nigeria. Groups such as AQIM, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, Ansar Sharia, and Jama'atul Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (JAMS – Ansaru) have become major sources of insecurity in the region.

Since 2009 attacks by Boko Haram alone have killed about 13,000 people, displaced about 1.5 million and devastated the already impoverished north-eastern Nigeria. On 15 April 2014, Boko Haram attacked a girls' school in Chibok, northern Nigeria and abducted over 250 young girls sparking global outrage (Salihu, 2015: 2). In Mali, terrorist and separatist groups continue to undermine ongoing peacekeeping operations. For instance on March 2015, a deadly terrorist attack took place in Bamako, claiming the lives of five civilians and injuring seven others including two United Nation staff (ibid).

Terrorism thrives in West Africa as a result of the region's porous borders due to the contested legitimacy of governments by opposition political formations. The removal of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 by a Western coalition made up of Britain, Canada, France, Italy and the US not only succeeded in dismantling the dictatorship, but in retrospect also dismantled what was the balance of power in that region. As a result terrorism in the region has increased in numbers not only spreading in the Sahel but increasingly making its way towards Europe while also increasing the number of illegal migrants making their way into Europe (<http://m.ft.com/cms/s/0/35dcc2c4-5232-11e0-8a31-00144feab49a.html>).

The Southern African region is not very prone to terrorism, but it is not immune either. Cases can be made about the region being a breeding ground for terrorist networks. This was

highlighted by the fact that one of the perpetrators of the Mall attack in Kenya in 2013 carried a South African passport and had allegedly organised the attack while living in South Africa.

According to Rifer (2005:107) the two massive explosion that destroyed the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salaam, Tanzania in 1998 are considered the worst terrorist attacks to have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. One of the perpetrators, Khalfan Khamis Mohammed had lived in South Africa and managed to travel via Mozambique to his point of destination traversing past three SADC borders undetected.

Other cases include Zambia which was targeted by a series of bomb attacks – one of which killed a police officer in 1996. In Malawi five foreigners were accused of raising funds for Al Qaeda, while in the DRC it was alleged that Lebanese terror group Hezbollah was managing a financial syndicate in the country. Mauritius, another Southern African country, is known for its offshore banking sector, and it too has been seen to be vulnerable to terrorist financiers attracted by its offshore banking sector (ibid).

There are attempts by the state and non-state actors across the globe to respond to the challenges presented by post-millennial terrorism collectively; however that comes with its own challenges. The UN represents the highest authority when it comes to collective problem solving of global problems and on 8 September 2006 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS), which calls for a holistic, inclusive approach to counterterrorism. Although the primary responsibility for its implementation rests with the UN member states, effective and sustainable implementation requires the contributions of a variety of stakeholders, including regional and sub-regional bodies (RSRs). Both the UNGCTS and resolution adopted by the General assembly in September 2008 following its first formal review recognize the need to enhance the role of RSRs (as well as other stakeholders). However, they offer scant detail on the different ways in which RSRs can contribute and how their role can be enhanced (Rosand et al, 2008: 4).

#### **4.4.1 The AU's response to Terrorism**

According to Rosand (2008: 10) RSRs have much to offer in theory; however, the practical realities, which often include limited access to necessary resources, mandates that can too often be too narrowly interpreted such as to restrict certain activities, and higher priorities than dealing with terrorism, have resulted in uneven contributions from the different RSRs. Many are underfunded, providing few if any dedicated resources for counterterrorism. Each

intergovernmental body engaged in counterterrorism in Africa has had to confront this opportunity-cost at a practical level.

Ewi & Aning (2006) discuss the endeavours undertaken by the AU and its predecessor the OAU, in tackling and dealing with terrorism when the issue was neither fashionable nor at the top of the political agenda of powerful states and many international organisations. The OAU, was active in combating mercenarism and other problems of subversion on the continent, but it was not until the beginning of the 1990s that terrorism was actually put on the agenda of the OAU. Below is a timeline as given by Ewi & Aning (2006) of the counterterrorism frameworks set up by OAU and AU and the impacts they have had (ibid):

- in 2004 the AU also established the Algiers Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT); the AU deemed it necessary to make a practical contribution to promote implementation of both its continental counterterrorism framework and the UN strategy; the ACSRT is charged with enhancing counterterrorism capacities and cooperation among its members, and it envisions a highly integrated network of state and RECs focal points coordinated centrally through Algiers (Rosand, 2008: 10);
- in July 2004, at that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Addis Ababa, it was in recognition of the shortcomings of the 1999 OAU Convention that it became unanimously decided that the Protocol to supplement the 1999 OAU Convention be adopted; the 2004 protocol to the OAU counterterrorism convention explicitly endorses the complementary role that African sub regional bodies, including those officially recognized by the AU as RECs, can play in furthering implementation of the AU framework;
- from 11 to 14 September 2002 in Algiers, one of the Initial activities of the AU commission in response to 9/11 was to recruit an anti-terrorism officer in December 2002 to serve as a focal point within the AU Commission on counterterrorism matters.

Ewi & Aning (2006) acknowledge that the tragic terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001 (9/11) would be vicious illustrations of the magnitude of the threat that the continent and the world at large must face in the twenty-first century. The transformation of the OAU into the AU in the wake of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) declared by the US President George W. Bush was timely in the sense that it coincided with the transformation of OAU to AU and thus a new framework for combating terrorism. The first major activity undertaken by the AU post-9/11 was convening the first High-level Intergovernmental



Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, given the following context:

- in July 1999 at the 35<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government held in Algiers, Algeria, the OAU adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention); this was following the bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 whereby terrorism demonstrated a new dimension in relation to the growing trends in globalization and innovations in science, technology and communication. It became clear that terrorism in Africa was not only dependent on the internal factors, but also on the international environment; according to EWI & Aning (2006) the convention spells out a number of acts that clarify terrorism in an African context, and in order to reconcile the historical ambiguities implicit in the use of the term ‘terrorism’ in Africa, the convention differentiated between acts of terrorism and acts committed by people in their struggle for self-determination; and,
- in June 1994, at the 30<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Tunis, Tunisia, the OAU adopted a Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations; the adoption of the declaration should be seen as the first step in the development of an African counter-terrorism regime.

The following section discusses the attempts of Africa’s REC’s (primarily SADC and ECOWAS) on tackling the issue of terrorism.

#### **4.4.2 A SADC Response to Terrorism**

SADC has yet to devise an elaborated sub-regional response or mechanism to address terrorism. However, its secretariat is working with both the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to enhance collaboration on counterterrorism in the SADC region. On 14 January 2002 in Blantyre, Malawi, SADC issued its declaration on terrorism which seeks to (SADC Declaration on Terrorism, 2002):

Condemn all acts of terrorism wherever they occur and, therefore, undertake to:

1. accede or ratify international instruments on combating terrorism, adopted by the OAU and the United Nations and incorporate them into domestic laws;
2. fight with all means at our disposal all forms of terrorism that endanger the lives of innocent civilians, disrupt regional security, stability and the constitutional order of states;
3. cooperate at all levels in the exchange of information and identification of persons, institutions and networks associated with terrorism;
4. urge Member States to create, strengthen and harmonise legal instruments for the prosecution of groups or individuals involved in terrorism;
5. prevent SADC Member States from being used as bases or support centres for groups or individuals involved in terrorist activities;
6. appeal to cooperating partners for financial, technical and human resource development assistance to SADC Member States to enable them effectively combat terrorism.

According to Rosand (2008: 12) several joint UNODC-SADC activities have been initiated, including a sub-regional workshop for senior criminal justice officials focusing on the legal aspects of counterterrorism and related international cooperation in criminal matters, a ministerial conference on the ratification and implementation of the universal legal instruments against terrorism, and a series of bilateral technical assistance and training activities involving individual SADC members.

SADC already has a significant capacity for law enforcement cooperation, which Rifer (2005: 112) deems a critical step in the creation of any meaningful anti-terrorism partnership. According to Rifer (2008: 108), SADC is no stranger to responding to regional security challenges as demonstrated by the OPDSC's efforts to forge regional frameworks to curb transnational crimes including terrorism. The OPDSC has the following protocols to show:

- the Protocol on Transnational Threats such as Small Arms and Drug Trafficking;
- the 2002 Protocol for Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters; and,
- the Protocol Ensuring Cooperation in Wildlife Law Enforcement.

Until recently there has not been any specific operational and coordination mechanism dealing with terrorism, focus has rather been on transnational organised crime (Botha, 5).

Founded in the 1996 in Harare, Zimbabwe, the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO), is the primary operational mechanism in Southern Africa for the prevention and fighting of cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons. With the Interpol sub-regional bureau in Harare as its secretariat, SARPCCO is also a part of the international crime-fighting organisation. This gives Southern African police chiefs direct access to Interpol's resources and expertise, and therefore a unique capacity for combating crime across borders and throughout the region ([www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/police-sarpcco/](http://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/police-sarpcco/)).

The SARPCCO Multilateral Cooperation Agreement on Combating Crime within the region was signed on 1 October 1997 by Member States and came into effect on 29 July 1999. The agreement outlines commitments and objectives, and also sets out the conditions that would allow cooperation between police services. The types of crime that are a priority in the SADC region and SARPCCO are ([http: www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/police-sarpcco/](http://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/police-sarpcco/)):

- terrorism;
- motor vehicle thefts;
- drugs and counterfeit pharmaceuticals;
- economic and commercial crimes;
- firearms and explosives;
- trafficking in gold, diamonds and other precious stones and metals;
- crimes against women and children;
- illegal immigrants and stolen and lost travel documents;
- wildlife crime and endangered species; and,
- trafficking in human beings.

Rosand (2008: 11) contends SARPCCO has been able to develop and implement a series of practical programs, a number of which reinforce elements of the UN Strategy. These include the creation of a counterterrorism desk to assess relevant legislation in member countries, determine gaps and strengths, and make recommendations to the SARPCCO legal Sub-Committee.

Finally, SADC member defence and security experts met for the first time in December 2006 under the auspices of UNODC, marking the first time SADC member state officials met

specifically, to discuss how the sub-region could improve its response to terrorism (Rosand 2008: 12). Subsequent to that on the 10-12 June 2015 in Gaborone, Botswana SADC would adopt its first Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy. While not much has been published about the strategy what is known is that it covers issues such as (<https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-experts-meet-draft-regional-counter-terrorism-strategy/>);

- the threat of terrorism and violent extremism to SADC Region;
- measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard and
- measures to ensure respect for Human Rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

#### **4.4.3 An ECOWAS Response to Terrorism**

ECOWAS has been involved in a range of activities that are deemed as established frameworks which seek to address terrorism, but these only address the secondary issues around terrorism. ECOWAS has continued to work with different partners, including both UNODC and CTED, to further legal cooperation on terrorism matters in the sub-region (Rosand, 2008: 12). It is only recently that ECOWAS has made attempts to harmonise all its counterterrorism frameworks into one strategy; prior to that it relied on a number of frameworks borrowed from the UN, the AU, and state level initiatives. Ewi (2002: 22) lists several of these frameworks regarded as relevant instruments towards a counterterrorism strategy in the region:

- 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework;
- 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), their ammunition and other related materials;
- 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption;
- 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, resolution, Peacekeeping and Security;
- 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security;
- 1994 Convention on Extradition;

- 1992 ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters;
- 1982 Convention for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters;
- 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence;
- 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression; and the
- 1977 Framework Agreement of the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence.

According to presentation made by Barakamfitye (2013: 11-13) several of these instruments have been ratified by some of the ECOWAS' member states:

- Protocol on Democracy: 10 states Parties – Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierre Leone and Togo;
- Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matter: 11 ratifications: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierre Leone and Togo;
- Convention on Extradition: 11 ratifications: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierre Leone and Togo;
- Protocol on Conflict Prevention: 7 ratifications: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Sierre Leone, and Togo;
- Convention on Small Arms: 10 ratifications: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierre Leone and Togo;
- Protocol on Corruption: 8 ratifications: Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Sierre Leone and Togo;
- 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and combating of Terrorism: 12 ratifications: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Togo; and,
- Protocol to the 1999 OAU Convention: 2 ratifications: Mali and Niger.

Salihu (2015: 3) argues that these initiatives have not adequately curbed terrorism in the region. As a result ECOWAS has therefore took a further step at the 42<sup>nd</sup> Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government in February 2013 to adopt a Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism. This resulted in the ECOWAS Counterterrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. Chapter VI, Article 47 of the 42<sup>nd</sup> Ordinary session reaffirms this (<http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/42nd-ECOWAS-Summit-Yamoussoukro-27-28-Feb-20131.pdf>):

Authority reaffirms its commitment to the fight against terrorism in the Region. In this regard, it endorses the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan as well as the Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism.

According to Adigbuo (2014: 49) the Strategy is the result of an inclusive process that began in 2009 and has involved national, regional and international experts, civil society and media organisations. The principal purpose of the Declaration and Strategy is to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related criminal acts in West Africa, with a view to creating conditions conducive to sound economic development and ensuring the wellbeing of all ECOWAS citizens. The plans also seek to give effect to regional, continental and international counter-terrorism instruments and to provide a common operational framework for action.

Adigbuo (2014: 52) further argues that the strategy is anchored in regional and international cooperation; cooperation is particularly crucial in the area of intelligence gathering, investigation, prosecution and counter-terrorism operation. To this end, mutual legal assistance is an absolute necessity if the shortfall in and disparity between the West African states' capabilities must be met. Some of the major features of the strategy call for the establishment of an ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit, an ECOWAS Arrest Warrant, and an ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks.

The strategy also calls for the adoption of an ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Training Manual. An integral part of the strategy is its implementation plan that details the practical modalities for action. If implemented, the ECOWAS Arrest Warrant, for example, will strengthen cross-border cooperation among law enforcement agencies and eliminate safe havens for terrorists and other criminals. In particular, it will enable ECOWAS states to pursue terrorists across borders and so help prevent a Mali-like crisis within the region (ibid).

Other initiatives to combat terrorism in the region include an organised military mission sent to Mali by ECOWAS, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). According to the 42<sup>nd</sup> Summit Document, AFISMA would be transformed into a UN peacekeeping operation following a request by Mali. Furthermore a coalition exists in an effort to combat terrorism, a regional force made up of 8,700 troops, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria was assembled by the concerned states to fend off Boko Haram in the region (<http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/boko-haram-winning-n376786> ).

## 4.5 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, a model by which our data will be analysed is explained and presented below. The research findings are then presented and explained under revised findings.

### 4.5.1 Applying the Model

The levels of cooperation in regional arrangements tend to vary, making it difficult to evaluate how much actual cooperation there actually is. This study attempts to measure levels of cooperation using a 5-level model that ranges from very high to very low. The highest measure of cooperation in the global system is set out by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which designates the following as levels of cooperation (<http://ask.un.org/faq/14594>):

- a) Signature ad Referendum: a representative may sign a treaty "ad referendum", i.e., under the condition that the signature is confirmed by his state; in this case, the signature becomes definitive once it is confirmed by the responsible organ [Art.12 (2) (b), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969];
- b) Signature Subject to Ratification, Acceptance or Approval: where the signature is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, the signature does not establish the consent to be bound; however, it is a means of authentication and expresses the willingness of the signatory state to continue the treaty-making process [Arts.10 and 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969];
- c) Ratification: defines the international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act [Arts.2 (1) (b), 14 (1) and 16, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969];
- d) "Accession": the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states; it has the same legal effect as ratification; accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force [Arts.2 (1) (b) and 15, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969].

Any assessment of regional cooperation must also take into account several aspects that will deem that cooperation effective or not, and this includes commitment to implementation and evaluation as key factors. It must also be taken into account whether cooperation is reflective

of policy, or whether it is more of an orientation, and not leaving out the involvement of non-government stakeholders as well as the role of external actors particularly when it comes to funding.

According to Hettne & Soderbaum (2006: 180) it is worth distinguishing between the effectiveness of organisations carrying out a mandated task, and the actor-ness of organisations, developing a larger scope of action and room for manoeuvre, which in some cases extends as far as legal personality. Any assessment of effectiveness must be contextually specific, and as a consequence, the issue of effectiveness will ultimately need to be addressed through empirical analysis.

Furthermore, Hettne & Soderbaum (2006: 182) contend that it has become somewhat ambiguous as to what is a specifically regional problem, and why and when regional cooperation emerges in addressing global problems. This is the consequence of regional cooperation in a context of global transformation, in which the processes of regionalisation and globalisation are intimately intertwined. Any assessment of regional cooperation therefore will also depend on the perspective on global transformation.

Below is the scale that this study uses to measure the level of cooperation within regions. Further below is a description on how the scale will be used to measure the levels of cooperation within SADC and ECOWAS.



**Table 6. Cooperation Scale**

<b>Level</b>	<b>Activity</b>
<b>Very High</b>	Protocol/ treaty in place signed and fully ratified by all members. Expressed declaration/communiqué. High activity in regional Joint military exercises and drills. Strategy in place, characterized by Common operations centre and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Involvement of external stakeholders.
<b>High Cooperation</b>	Protocol/treaty in place signed and ratified by some but not all members. Expressed declaration/communiqué. Medium to high activity in regional Joint military exercises and drills. Strategy in place, characterized by Common operations centre and SOPs . Involvement of external stakeholders.
<b>Medium Cooperation</b>	Expressed declaration/communiqué. Memorandum of understanding between parties to cooperate. Medium to low activity in Joint military exercises and drills. Strategy in place, characterized by Common operations centre and SOPs. Involvement of external stakeholders.
<b>Low Cooperation</b>	Vague expression of cooperation. Memorandum of Understanding between some but not all members to cooperate. Intermittent activity in joint military exercises and drills. Common strategy in place. Involvement of external stakeholders
<b>Very low</b>	No statements of intent, no treaty no declaration. Little to none joint military exercises and drills. Vague Strategy.

**Table 7 Revised findings**

Thematic areas of investigation	Levels of cooperation	
	SADC	ECOWAS
a) Climate Change	Low	Very Low
b) Maritime Security	Medium	High
c) Terrorism	Medium	Medium

- a) The revised table shows that there is low cooperation in SADC when it comes to climate change issues and very low cooperation in ECOWAS. There is not much change between the revised and preliminary findings. Climate change as a policy issue is very amorphous and as a result there is little understanding on how to approach the subject. This could be a possible reason as to why cooperation on this thematic area is so low. There is however a difference in how both regions approach the issue leading to their success or lack thereof.
- b) There is medium-level cooperation in SADC when it comes to issue concerning maritime security, which is a deviation from the preliminary scale which determined the level to be low. There is a high level of cooperation in ECOWAS which is the same as the preliminary findings. ECOWAS is better suited to deal with maritime insecurities, which SADC could learn from.
- c) There is medium-level cooperation in both regions when it comes to issues concerning Terrorism, which is the same with the preliminary findings. The threat of terrorism in ECOWAS is much higher than it is in SADC. Given the threat level in ECOWAS, the regional body ought to do more as opposed to SADC whose face less of a threat from terrorism and could use their resources for more immediate concerns.

## *Chapter Five*

### **5.1 Introduction: Does institutionalising CFP help harmonise regional policy and/ interests.**

The institutionalisation of CFP should assist SADC and ECOWAS achieve their objective to harmonise regional policies and/ or common interest, the question is, what is meant by institutionalisation and how much institutionalisation already exists in both the sub-regions? These are questions this chapter will address. There are different forms of institutionalisation, the most common in Africa and across the world is intergovernmental. As many regional institutions find many constraints with this form of institutionalisation they opt for what is deemed the most effective, being supranational. There is however a high rate of failure in trying to set up self-reliant institutions and this chapter will also look at why this is the case.

While supranational institutions are highly esteemed as the most effective forms of institutionalisation, they demand a relinquishing of sovereignty which many states find difficult to adhere to. As such many regional organisations are intergovernmental, but this does not reduce the effectiveness of these institutions when it comes to adopting and asserting a CFP; as a matter of fact this is all contingent on several other factors which this chapter will also look at.

Regional organisations are faced with a constantly evolving world which is furthermore compounded by the evolution of globalisation. As such regional organisations must deal with making decisions that are not only cognisant of the present but must take into account the past and the future. This makes it difficult for regional organisations to make decisions or goals because those goals are vulnerable to the changes that take place in this constantly evolving world. An example of this is ECOWAS which was determined to advance economic integration, but was soon faced with security concerns that outweighed their initial agenda and thus had to reorganise themselves to become an economic and securitised regional body. This chapter will therefore also look at the changing context of world politics, how it affects the regions and in turn how regional bodies must adapt to these changes while holding on to their visions and values.

## 5.2 African Regional States continue to evolve as intergovernmental institutions

There is ground to argue that African regional organisations continue to evolve as intergovernmental institutions. According to Hettne & Soderbaum (1998: 6), an intergovernmental organisation (IGO) describes the level of convergence that may or may not be found in a region. Intergovernmental is said to be the process and/or level where either formal, intergovernmental regional cooperation or state-promoted regional integration or informal, spontaneous, market and society induced processes of regionalisation occur.

Conversely supranational organisation delineates a process and/or level whereby a region becomes a subject with a distinct identity, with institutionalised actor capability, legitimacy, and equipped with structures for decision making. Hettne and Soderbaum (1998: 6) also point out that regionalism is not an evolutionary process and therefore neither of the two stages are better than the other, a position this research supports.

The two most prominent of RECs on the African continent (ECOWAS & SADC) continue to forge common policies, as is evidently demonstrated by our findings which show that in each thematic area of investigation there is at least some implicit articulation of the desire to harmonise and achieve some form of common policy and interests.

The aims and objectives of the two regions as articulated in their treaties is among others to harmonise common policy areas. There are variations in what both the sub-regions intend to prioritise regarding the aims and objectives of their quests for integration. For ECOWAS the vision has always been to achieve integration through a concerted effort of self-reliance (see the ECOWAS treaty), the regional body therefore considers the attainment of its vision for integration only achievable through its ability to act concertedly to address regional issues.

The concept of self-reliance is, according to Hettne & Soderbaum (1998), tantamount to a self-determination and independence associated with supranational status. ECOWAS which is attuned to a neo-functionalist interpretation has therefore committed itself to cooperation in the smaller issues in the hope that this will functionally spill-over into cooperation on the larger issues which for the sub-region includes integration at large. It can be deemed that ECOWAS is determined to use its economic integration as a means to reinforce and achieve a supranational institution.

For SADC the goal was always to achieve a common and integrated political future, but how this was to be achieved and what the end goal would look like was never articulated. It is only recently that the sub-region has articulated its new vision to pool resources to achieve a collective self-reliance. It can be argued that SADC's end-goal is one geared towards a gradual process to attain supranational status.

### **5.2.1 What does the study's findings tell us about the evolution of African states?**

#### ***5.2.1.1 Climate Change***

The findings on climate change revealed the following levels of cooperation:

- low cooperation in the SADC region; and
- very low cooperation in the ECOWAS region.

What has perhaps proved to be important with regards to measuring the levels of cooperation within specific thematic areas of investigation has been to understand the nature of the issue within context. Firstly, climate change as a policy area is rather ambiguous and therefore difficult to address if addressing the concern means to evaluate what the problem is exactly and what must be done to fix the problem. What is evident is that climate change affects different policy areas ranging from energy, water resources, food security, natural disasters and trade. Climate change therefore constitutes a large policy area because it traverses a range of policy areas. This offers opportunity for member states to actually forge cooperation and/or integration and speak with a common voice on an issue area that is by definition and as the historical record attests a common challenge.

To varying degrees both regions have actually taken advantage of the policy area and exercised joint decisions on climate change. For ECOWAS the COP21 was the perfect setting for ECREEE to lead the regional organisation's participation at the conference. According to ECREEE's website, ECREEE's delegation to Paris would showcase its activities to the rest of the world as well as get first-hand information on the aspirations and agreements on climate change by the developing, emergent or industrialised countries that would be present (<http://www.ecreee.org/news/ecreee-organizes-strategy-meeting-supporting-ecowas-countries-address-climate-change>).

According to SARDC, for SADC COP21 would be an opportunity to speak with a common voice on the matter of climate change, this would include the emphasis on adaptation while

focusing on mitigation and the measures for achieving these, such as finance, technology transfer and adoption, and capacity building (<http://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/sadc-to-speak-with-one-voice-at-cop21/#>).

The fact that little seems to have been achieved when looking at cooperation levels of climate change, it does not discount the fact that there is cooperation. It may be worth noting that the primary measure for high cooperation rests on formal agreements or acquiescence of states who traditionally will sign some protocol and/or have a declaration in place. This is the standard as accorded by the Vienna Conventions Act which sets out guidelines for international relations, however it must also be noted that cooperation can take place even if there is not any formal requirements adhered to, at least in the traditional sense. For this reason it can confidently be said that the two regions reflect intergovernmental organisational frameworks. This is because there is not much success in forging independent institutions to carry out mandates outside the permission of states.

#### *5.2.1.2 Maritime Security*

The findings on Maritime Security revealed the following levels of cooperation:

- medium-level cooperation in the SADC region; and
- high-level cooperation in the ECOWAS region.

Both regions demonstrate an alertness to the threat posed by insecurity in the maritime sphere, although there is higher cooperation and alertness in the ECOWAS than there is in SADC. For ECOWAS the level of alertness is heightened by the fact that all but three of the states are littoral states, thus creating a high level of insecurity in that region. For years the Gulf of Guinea has been plagued by criminal activity, notwithstanding the high level of piracy. As a result of this ECOWAS has increased its capability to respond, which has coincidentally increased the level of cooperation as well. ECOWAS has developed a rigorous maritime security framework which includes cooperation with the ECCAS region, together the two form the choke point for any criminal activity in that region.

SADC on the other hand has 8 of its 15 member states that are littoral states thus creating a perception of a relatively minimal threat to member states on the whole. Given the fact that there are various criminal activity that affect the region, landlocked states are therefore not immune to insecurities related to maritime threats and therefore it is essential that the community at large cooperate to minimise insecurities.

SADC has taken a number of initiatives although there are issues as highlighted by Coelho (2013: 14), one such is South Africa's perceived hegemonic status which tends to overshadow its leadership role. The geostrategic alliance South Africa has with the IBSA grouping and BRIC countries also adds to the misperception of South Africa putting ahead its interests ahead of those of the region. As a result there has been reluctance by member states to adhere to certain frameworks or even share their sovereignty.

For ECOWAS there seems to be a determination by the sub-region to identify itself as supranational given its extensive frameworks in the maritime sector, there is however an inability or unwillingness of individual states to domesticate treaties relating to international maritime security to which they freely signed (Ukeje & Ela, 2013: 19). Ukeje & Ela (ibid) argue that the poor implementation of legal provisions at the national level is in turn at the heart of the absence of an integrated regional framework to tackle maritime security challenges in the ECOWAS.

#### **5.2.1.3 Terrorism**

The findings on Terrorism revealed the following levels of cooperation:

- medium level cooperation in SADC; and
- medium-level cooperation in ECOWAS.

Terrorism looms larger in the ECOWAS region than it does in the SADC region, and as such there is a much more urgent need for alertness in the ECOWAS than there is in the SADC region. Still, both sub-regions display a medium level of cooperativeness when it comes to this sphere. Considering that both sub-regions have supranational ambitions, the level of cooperation seems far lower in the ECOWAS given the level of threat notwithstanding the sub-regions emphasis towards attaining supranational status as its means of forging cooperation and/or integration. If this is the case it would mean that the ECOWAS is far more behind than SADC although based on the model this study uses, there is an optimum level of cooperation for both sub-regions.

For SADC, reaching supranational status has only recently become an end goal whereas the sub-region was always committed to integration and cooperation without the desire to necessarily attain supranational status. There is a low level of threat regarding terrorism in the SADC region, however there is documented evidence to suggest that there are growing terrorist networks that may be using the sub-region as a ground for running illegal activity.

This somewhat increases the threat even if that threat is not imminent, there are secondary threats such as proliferation in the trafficking of arms and smuggling of contrabands which may add to instability and criminal activity in the region. With the low level of risk the SADC sub-region does seem alert enough to detect, deter and even respond to terrorism through SARPCCO and the sub-regions latest development in terms of a draft strategy for terrorism.

Although both regions are somehow affected by terrorism, the optimum level of cooperation can be accorded to the fact that there are more imminent challenges that need to be prioritised in both regions, whereas terrorism has only escalated in the past few years and more especially in the ECOWAS than it has in SADC. For the ECOWAS region several states have agreed to join forces to combat the insecurity consequent to the activities of Boko Haram in the region. This may demonstrate the lack of concerted effort for the region as a whole in that those who aren't affected by the same challenges tend not to have an interest in adding much needed resources to contribute to the alleviation of a concern that is relatively shared. This in turn reduces whatever chances the region may have for reaching its supranational status. Conversely, the situation could also demonstrate the fact that there are alternatives and cooperation does not necessarily have to resemble supranational levels to be successful nor effective.

### **5.2.2 An adherence to sovereignty compels the proliferation of intergovernmental institutions**

The inability to share sovereignty by member states is the common thread that spans across the three thematic areas of investigation. The two sub-regions both demonstrate interests of reaching supranational status, however both are constrained by an adherence to sovereignty which often overrides regional interest particularly where regional interest could destabilise the power of national elites. As a result cooperation is limited to intergovernmental relations which themselves have proven a good conduit for regional cooperation on common challenges.

Whether cooperation can manifest into a supranational end-goal for the case of SADC or even increase in convergence where smaller issues are concerned for the case of ECOWAS, it is a matter of political will and to be straightforward will demand the sharing of sovereignty. This would certainly have implications, which could impact negatively for national elites. As



has been witnessed with the EU, it takes a level of political maturity to reach a level where nations understand the need to compromise their sovereignty, but even with these so called matured democracies there is some level of adherence to their sovereignty. From this analysis it becomes clear that this is a difficult task to achieve and as such requires some level of improvisation which for the two African sub-regions is to forge cooperation through other means, for the most part this cooperation is intergovernmental.

### **5.3 The EU model of institutionalisation versus a flexible model**

According to Archik (2015: 1) the EU is the latest stage in a process of European integration which began after World War II and seeks to promote peace and economic development. Initially there were six Western European countries, currently the EU is composed of 28 member states and is viewed as a cornerstone of European security, stability and prosperity. The EU has been built through a series of binding treaties, and has characteristics of both a supranational entity (in specified areas, sovereignty is shared and EU institutions hold executive authority) and an IGO (in other areas, cooperation is pursued by consensus) (Ibid).

In the course of deconstructing the EU's underpinnings, Archik (2015: 1) contends that in the aftermath of World War II, the United States viewed European integration as a way to entrench democratic systems and free markets, while the creation of NATO was meant to provide collective defence and security. European integration is thus linked to the success of the EU's various projects and the relative advantages that member states feel can be derived, this is so much that even the slightest challenge poses the risk of disintegration to the region. In 2015 the economic region emerged from serious challenges which cast doubt on the viability and sustainability of the entire regional project, these included the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the impending UK referendum on EU membership, to migratory pressures and dealing with a resurgent Russia.

Archik (2015: 4) argues that tensions have always existed within the EU between those member states that seek an ever closer union through greater integration and those that prefer to keep the EU on a more intergovernmental footing in order to better guard their national sovereignty. As a result, some EU countries have opted out of certain aspects of integration, including the Eurozone and the Schengen area.

It is apparent that the African institutions seek to emulate the EU model of supranational despite the fact that the EU itself is precarious about how to achieve that. According to Hetnne and Soderbaum (2008: 106) the idea that the EU model is one to emulate can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II. Here the study of regionalism, especially the old regionalism, was dominated by an empirical focus on Europe. During the era of such old regionalism, European integration theories were developed for and from the European experience and then more or less re-applied or exported around the world. All too often the EU was then seen and advocated as the good model, and other looser and informal modes of regionalism were, wherever they appeared, characterised as different or weaker.

To speak of a flexible model to that of the EU is not to discard that the EU is itself flexible and not as rigid as we assume it to be. Archik (2015: 4) points out the EU is both supranational and intergovernmental. For instance EU member states have largely pooled their national sovereignty, and EU decision-making is largely supranational. Decisions in other areas, such as foreign policy, require the unanimous approval of all 28 member states.

There is growing scepticism over the desirability of supranational institutions and whether these are really feasible given the issue of sovereignty, even the EU which has been synonymous with supranational status casts doubt. To speak of a flexible model is therefore the search for an alternative to a predominant Eurocentric notion of what regionalism is and should entail. According to Christiansen (2001: 517) the dangers of this privileging of Europe-centric understandings of regionalism has been misleading by representing regional models in the rest of the world as only focused on economic issues and are adamant about the limited degree of institutionalisation, while the EU is supposedly multidimensional and highly institutionalised.

### **5.3.2 To what extent is SADC following the EU model versus a flexible model?**

This research report assumes that cooperation levels in the chosen thematic areas of investigation have a bearing on what the end result of institutionalisation will look like, but this is not the case, rather the assumption lies on the premise that foreign policy behaviour in regional contexts should reveal the various constraints and impetus for cooperation. It is these various outcomes that will highlight the nature of the organisations in question, by pointing out to us the exogenous and endogenous processes that permit for certain behaviours.

SADC as has been established continues to evolve as an IGO and this assumption is supported by the findings. The sub-region has articulated its vision to be self-reliant, this indicates an ambition that for the sub-region to become like the EU will allow it the ability to exercise decision-making that is binding regardless of the resistance of national governments.

Taking from the findings, it is evident that SADC has an optimum degree of cooperation when looking at the three thematic areas of investigation all together. There is a low cooperation level when it comes to climate change, however this can be attributed to the ambiguous nature of climate change as a policy area. There is medium-level cooperation in maritime security and terrorism, nevertheless both policy areas have their own nuances too.

The findings of this research report speaks to how effective and cohesive the region is and this is based primarily on these three thematic areas as the representation of the regions' foreign policy behaviour. There is some variance in the levels of cooperation, indicating that these are not a constant and change depending on the context. It also indicates that in certain other aspects the region may be cohesive and effective, and in others not so much.

To be like the EU represents a desire to be consistent as is a prerequisite in order to achieve a concerted foreign policy behaviour in the region, but even in the most institutionalised region like the EU this is not so simple. There is an underlying connotation when regional organisations desire to have consistency in decision-making, this carries the assumption that to have a consistent approach in all policy areas will amount to its effectiveness. This, however, does not take into account the fact that national elites of countries in the SADC region are inclined to cling on to power and influence, and in doing so further reaffirms their sovereignty. In this regard it can be said that the desire to be like the EU is simply rhetorical if it is not supported by what is happening on the ground nor is it feasible if it does not take into account differing contexts.

While SADC has articulated its ambition to follow an EU model of institutionalisation, it does however seem to lean towards a more flexible model in the sense that it fails to conform to the Eurocentric demands of shared sovereignty. It does conform to certain features that are equally shared by the EU for instance the SADC Summit which is deemed the highest decision-making body in the sub-region makes its decisions based on consensus after which become binding. For the EU decision-making pertaining particularly to foreign policy is also consensus based, revealing of the fact that the EU itself is not entirely supranational.

### **5.3.3 To what extent is ECOWAS following the EU model versus a flexible model?**

ECOWAS a bit different from SADC borrows a lot of its philosophy from neo-functionalist theories in which economic integration and trade are meant to stimulate functional interdependence between regions and thus forge communities that will reduce risk of hostilities between countries. ECOWAS is the culmination of such reasoning and this is supported by its treaty wherein it envisions that cooperation will be the outcome of a self-reliant organisation that will stimulate further integration and cooperation in the region. The sub-region's vision is articulated as one that seeks to forge cooperation particularly on economic issues using a standardised framework of institutionalisation. It is hoped that this standard framework of institutionalisation will not only forge cooperation but facilitate the process of integration in the sub-region, eventually carrying over into other policy areas.

There is a very low cooperation level when it comes to climate change and what can be ascertained from this is that low levels of cooperation on climate change may be a trend in Africa due to the policy area's highly contested and ambiguous nature. For ECOWAS however this area presents a missed opportunity to achieve what they set out to achieve in that for them; to address common challenges within a supranational format is the kind of yardstick the sub-region requires to measure just how much is and actually should be achieved. Based on their vision, the assumption is that the sub-region ought to yield high cooperation levels that transfer onto other policy areas.

There is a high cooperation level in maritime security which is a positive highlight and the impetus that the region needs to achieve its goal of setting-off a self-reliant institution to tackle common challenges. There is a medium level of cooperation when it comes to terrorism, although this can be seen as progressive for what the regions intends to achieve in terms of displaying a satisfactory level of cooperation it is still insufficient considering the level of threat that is there in the ECOWAS region.

What was ascertained in the beginning is that policy areas ought to be contextualised in order to understand the salient issues that underpin the nature of the challenge in that way it can also be ascertained, what hinders or promotes cooperation where foreign policy behaviour and its coordination thereof is concerned. While it can be said that the ECOWAS is not doing enough for terrorism in the region, it can also be said that, in the context of what can be done, enough is actually being done. This brings to attention the discrepancy that exists between

intentions and reality; so while ECOWAS may envision a supranational institution that can enhance cooperation it remains stunted by an adherence to sovereignty which hinders the level of cooperation needed to advance the sub-regions goal to harmonise policy and thus forge greater integration.

Terrorism in particular exposes the lack of concerted effort deemed necessary for the sub-region to be where it wants to be, however ECOWAS has managed to forge alternative frameworks of cooperation which have arguably been successful. Merging the resources of different actors through a joint military force made up of Nigeria's neighbouring countries, certain inroads have been made towards pushing back terror groups like Boko Haram, although the terror group continues to reign terror in the region (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33097776>). What this demonstrates is the complexity of the challenge that terrorism presents not only to the ECOWAS region but the world at large.

Taking from the findings it can be noted that similar to SADC there is an optimum level of cooperation when looking at the three thematic areas of investigation all together. It is acknowledged that there is a sharp variance and that accounts for the lack of concerted action on behalf of the sub-region which renders the sub-region unable to reach the level that the EU is perceived to have. In that sense the ECOWAS doesn't measure up to what the EU is and doesn't measure up to the supranational institution it wants to be. It can be argued that the sub-region continues to evolve as an intergovernmental despite its efforts to be like the EU or rather what the EU represents.

#### **5.3.4 African regionalism has its own intrinsic value**

According to Hetnne and Soderbaum (2006: 183) new regionalism is in fact a heterogeneous process facilitated by globalisation, informal networks and multi-actor coalitions operating at different levels of the world system. While focus is put on the states as primary actors, what is being witnessed is that in fact what is declared as regional challenges are key contributing factors to what the regionalisation process looks like.

States as actors are merely the governance components of a process that is essentially already unfolding. Beyers (2000: 2) calls this an 'attitude' towards regional integration whereby the concern is the level of governance (international, European, national, regional or local) considered to be most appropriate for managing contemporary policy-problems. He further

distinguishes the two attitudes as supranational and intergovernmental, which has been already explored.

If the EU is taken as an example, regionalism there was already a process unfolding whereby trade networks of the steel and coal community were already underway, what the European community back then managed to do was formalise this process in order make the arrangement more effective and to integrate the region as to deter war between member states. The method of formalisation and/or attitude has indeed worked well for the EU, to the extent that regions across the globe have sought to emulate this. What this means is not that the EU model is in any form superior, but that it has for the most part been successful in notable aspects.

According to Hettne & Soderbaum (2008: 108) to equate African regionalism to that of the EU ignores the fact that regional organisations have their own intrinsic value, to argue otherwise derives from a misguided belief that meaningful and efficient regionalism is happening only, or primarily, in the core regions of Europe and North America. Essentially what is being witnessed is a common thread of challenges for example climate change affects everyone and under the advent of globalisation affects the already established processes and practises.

The EU's ability to effectively respond in most cases is what everybody else admires and seeks to emulate, however in some cases even the EU does fail to respond or even prevent certain challenges such as those that terror groups present. There has been several terror attacks in some of the EU's major cities including Brussels, Paris, London, Madrid and Berlin which goes to show that certain challenges are not only prone to the so called 'third-world,' but invariably affect most regions (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35870957>) . It should not be taken lightly that African organisations continue to evolve and discovering what works and what doesn't work for them. The fact of the matter is that certain challenges are difficult to avert.

#### **5.4 Institutionalisation and its implications for CFP**

For the most part what has been identified in this study is IGOs as the method for regional cooperation on the continent. The assumption is supported by two of the most prominent sub-regions on the continent being the ECOWAS and SADC. In this section it is explored what

the implications of this method is for CFP. Also, it is explored what the implications are for CFP if any of the sub-regions achieve their visions of supranational status.

Any implication of either of these approaches is open to interpretation, theoretically each school of thought in the discipline of international relations has something to offer on the subject of IGOs and their effect. One study that can perhaps lend insight into the effectiveness of IGOs is by Boehmer, et al (2004), this study interrogates the question 'whether IGOs promote peace'. Although the question itself is only tangentially relevant to this study, the logic behind the question does lend itself to the implications that necessitate why pursuing IGOs is beneficial or at the very least effective.

According to Boehmer, et al (2004: 3) Realists, liberals and others have long debated the utility of IGOs. Most agree that IGOs matter in some form or in certain contexts, but there is no consensus as to the extent of IGO influence and how best to treat IGOs analytically as an aspect of world politics. By holding that IGOs matter, participants in the debate usually mean that they should be capable of altering state behaviour. On one side of the debate, constructivists, functionalists, and liberal institutionalists contend that IGOs are (or can be) a central component of world order. On the other side, many realists argue that IGOs are only marginally influential in world politics and that IGOs typically reflect status quo power relations (ibid).

Boehmer, et al (2004) contend that even though international relations theories offer a lot of insight into the subject of IGOs, they also confine the subject to their limited paradigms. Their study therefore offers an alternative interpretation as a result of a bargaining approach it uses to analyse situational aspects which constitute the variable behaviour and influence of IGOs. The study finds that the effect of IGOs on disputes depends on the genesis and structure of IGOs, the origins of interstate contests, and interaction of the two (Boehmer, et al, 2004: 7).

Boehmer, et al (2004: 2) contends that IGOs are not broadly effective in the way they should be if IGOs alter preferences or form a web of constraining commitments, neither are IGOs ineffective. IGOs can promote peace, but success depends on attributes present in only the most cohesive and institutionalised organisations. It is also argued that IGOs will have the greatest impact on dispute behaviour in a limited number of ways related to mandate, member cohesion, and institutional structure.

Boehmer (2004) asserts that mandate, member cohesion and institutional structure are the impact modifiers, what Hetnne & Soderbaum (1998:5) distinguish as regionness. This is a process whereby a geographical region is transformed from passive object to a subject with capacity to articulate the interests of the emerging region. How well a region is able to articulate its interests depends on the variables that constitute the makeup of the region. Boehmer et al (2004; 19) describe these variables as follows:

- minimal organisations – contain plenary meetings, committees, and possibly a secretariat without an extensive bureaucracy beyond research, planning, and information gathering;
- structured organisations – contain structures of assembly, executive (nonceremonial), and bureaucracy to implement policy, as well as formal procedures and rules; and,
- interventionist organisations – contain mechanisms for mediation, arbitration and adjudication, and/or other means to coerce state decisions (such as withholding loans or aid), as well as means to enforce organisational decisions and norms.

Similarly, for Hetnne and Soderbaum (1998) IGOs resemble the behaviour of structured organisations, while interventionist resembles the behaviour of supranational organisations. From this format we can deduce that supranational organisations are simply a different formation of IGO, which reaffirms Hetnne and Soderbaums (1998) argument that the processes are not evolutionary. Be that as it may, experiences teach that the supranational-interventionist organisation tends to be most effective.

As Boehmer et al (2004: 29) posit, IGOs can variously reduce or exacerbate conflict or have no effect, depending on the level of institutionalisation, member cohesiveness, and organisational mandate. According to Boehmer (2004: 3) in terms of organisational mandate, IGO's with a security mandate are more effective at promoting peace than are economic organisations, it is only logical then that IGOs tasked with mandate of promoting trade the economic organisation will be more effective than an IGO with a security mandate.

#### **5.4.1 The African Security Regime Complex**

According to Brosig (2013) states and/ actors tend to converge and thereby create what he calls a regime complex. He describes regime complex as characterised by a 'collective of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes operating under conditions of dense institutional spaces (Brosig, 2013: 172).' In regime complexes the influence of individual or



component actors is to a significant degree a function of the regime complex and not exclusively depending on single regime capabilities. In other words the regime complex affects the performance of its component units due to either overlap in membership or policy intersection or both (Ibid). Furthermore regime complex can be distinguished from organisations in that the former are seen as institutionalised norms regulating behaviour, but having limited actorness, while the latter is very often nothing less than regimes but with operational capabilities and are thus more easily identifiable by what they do and usually enjoy at least a minimum of autonomy (Brosig, 2013: 318).

At the very basic level regime complexes emerge out of the existence of a pertinent issue that needs to be addressed. This might very well be unintended and not necessarily a consequence of deliberate design. It is co-evolving with the issue in place, leading to densely institutionalised spaces with membership and policy overlap (Brosig, 2013: 175). Brosig (2013 : 179) furthermore contends that the regime complex saturated by different actors and international organisations make for favourable convergence often in the form of a memorandum of understanding which is deemed practical in promising synergy and more effective cooperation.

Brosig (2013: 175) also argues that in the African context the security regime complex is shaped by pivotal or lead states such as South Africa, Nigeria, the UK, or France. Focusing on these states is warranted because of their ability to shape the regime complex. They are part of the regime complex through their membership in international organisations but also have the capability to steer the regime unilaterally and outside the framework of organisations but within the policy ambit of the regime complex.

According to Brosig (2013) the theory of convergence is an important tool to use in order to analyse and understand the regime complex. Brosig (2013: 181) offers us his 'typolgy of convergence' which describes the process in which security actors are linked together forming a regime complex. There are five types of convergence that Brosig and four degrees of intensity that describes the level of depth that can be achieved (2013: 181-182);

#### Five types of convergence

- Conceptual convergence - refers to congruence in policy programs, security doctrines, norms, rhetoric, and culture. Here contributions are exploring to which extent actors converge conceptually, verbally, and on paper.

- Technical convergence - relates to convergence of functional properties such as specific individual actor capabilities within the African security complex. Are resources pooled effectively? Can actors complement one another?
- Formal convergence - describes the degree to which actors have actually formalized their relationships. Are relations evolving sporadically, or have actors agreed on an institutional (permanent) framework for interaction with regular meetings or even coordinated decision making?
- Practice convergence - refers to convergence in behavior. Beyond the rhetorical commitment, how are actors practicing it?
- Finally, political convergence - relates to actors interests and their power to assert those interests. It is achieved when actors share the same political stakes and have acquired comparable political interest.

#### Four degree of intensity

- Cosmetic convergence - refers to convergence that is superficial, characterised by its sporadic, unsystematic, and declaratory nature, leaving ample room for individual action in contrast to action under a regime complex with very limited potential for complementarity on mostly peripheral issues. It is also characterised by rather informal and less stable interaction and a lack of substantial common interests and goals.
- Partial convergence – is a more frequent but still mostly unsystematic interaction that allows for some complementary coordination. It is characterised by partially compatible interests and more formal and frequent interaction.
- Extensive convergence - describes situations in which actors are engaging in frequent and systematic coordination on the basis of mostly compatible capabilities often in the form of formalised coordination agreements and shared common interests on substantive issues.
- Last, full convergence - refers to an ideal type that is unlikely to appear in practice as it requires actors to divest significant parts of their autonomy within the regime complex. Here actors are assumed to fully converge on issues of high salience on a frequent, substantive, and highly formalised basis. In the end, actors become inseparable and nearly identical with the regime complex.

**Table 8 Brosig's typology of convergence**

	Cosmetic	Partial	Extensive	Full
Concept	Sporadic convergence of peripheral security concepts without much substance	Frequent but unsystematic convergence of security concepts	Frequent and systematic convergence of key security concepts	Very frequent substantive and systematic convergence of key security concepts
Technical	Technical capacities sometimes complement one another, actors consciously and systematically value individual capacities more than regime efficacy	Individual capacities partly complement one another, actors mostly value individual capacity more than regime efficacy	Individual capacities largely complement one another, actors value regime efficacy but not more than individual capacity	individual capacities fully complement one another, actors consciously value regime efficacy more than individual capacity
Formalisation	Mostly declaratory and informal commitment without much substance, only sporadic meetings	Declaratory commitment, some joint projects, sporadic but more frequent meetings	Systematic partnership built on contractual obligations, frequent and systematic meetings, many joint projects	Contractual partnership imposing clear obligations, frequent and systematic meetings with joint decision-making powers, extensive cooperation projects
Process	Actors converge by action spontaneously and unsystematically on peripheral issues	Actors converge more frequently but not systematically on issues of salience	Actors converge frequently and systematically on issues of higher salience	Actors converge by action deliberately and systematically to achieve substantive targets

Political	individual interests do not contradict one another but also do not complement one another	Individual interests do not contradict one another sometimes complement another	Individual interests mostly complement one another, regime and individual interests are partly identical	Individual interests fully complement one another, regime and individual interests become inseparable

## 5.4.2. What do the findings tell us about IGO's and their implications for CFP?

### 5.4.2.1 Climate Change

For SADC results showed low-level cooperation level for climate change, what can be deduced from this is that at face value, there seems to be a lack of concerted effort by the sub-region in order for the organisation to be more effective. While this may hold true to some level it discounts the context within which policies around climate change are made – climate change affects every other policy areas which may be the reason that institutions are slow to make the necessary resolution around the subject matter.

ECOWAS showed very low-level cooperation on climate change which validates the fact that the region continues to evolve as an IGO. Consequently there is not much achieved in terms of rallying for a common or rather effective response to climate change. The sub-region has in place structures to try and address the issue of climate change, but there doesn't seem to be enough will to address this issue. Again this can be attributed to the fact that climate change is contextually a contested and ambiguous policy area for which African states have only just begun to comprehend its impacts.

Using Nathan's (2010: 3) research paper on the peace-making effectiveness of regional organisations, he argues that effectiveness depends largely on whether a region's members want the organisation to be effective and on whether they have political trust and cohesion. This is true to a large extent looking at both SADC and ECOWAS wherein the variation in effectiveness demonstrates that there is will to act on certain issues and not enough on other matters. This fact becomes very clear when looking at maritime security in the two sub-regions.

Using Brosig's (2013) convergence typology this report finds that where climate change is concerned in both the sub-regions ranges between 'conceptual and formal'. It can be argued that there is a certain level of congruence of norms, rhetoric and culture. The UNFCCC as an

institution is indeed one such formal structure that sets out the agenda for interaction on climate change issues. The degree to which there is convergence is mostly ‘cosmetic’ which really sums up the sporadic, unsystematic and declaratory nature of the emerging African regime complex where climate change is concerned.

#### *5.4.2.2 Maritime security*

SADC has medium-level cooperation in the area of maritime security which demonstrates some level of alertness compared to climate change. The sub-region may feel it is more exposed to the threats posed by maritime security than that of climate change, however there does remain challenges even within the maritime sector. Such challenges include the lack of concerted effort wherein the inland member states may feel less at risk than the other littoral states, be that as it may the sub-region has put in place substantial measures to ensure that there is sufficient response to the challenge.

ECOWAS has a high level of cooperation and boasts a rigorous framework that has been put in place to combat maritime insecurity in the sub-region. The ECOWAS has signed a number of protocols that permit the independence of institutions including ECCAS, GGC and MOWCA to act and protect against maritime insecurities in the sub-region. This has created room for the organisation to counter terrorism and its root causes through initiatives such as maritime finance which look at broader issues and aim at providing financing for local stakeholders to engage in legitimate shipping activities (Ukeje & Ela, 2013: 34 - 35). The ECOWAS has managed to act cohesively to create this arrangement in the sub-region, which validates the argument that cohesiveness contributes to the effectiveness of a region. A failure to replicate the same cohesiveness when it comes to climate change can be attributed to organisational mandate for which ECOWAS is yet to be accustomed to regarding climate change.

It certainly becomes clear that regional organisations are inclined to act effectively where there is political will and this will be determined by the severity and impact of the challenge spread across all the member states. If member states feel they are less at risk given whatever the threat, they are inclined to be a bit more reluctant to collaborate with others to address the challenge. Consequently the desire to create supranational organisations is in order to circumvent this very problem whereby member states choose which issue affects them ahead of contributing resources to a problem. Terrorism is yet another policy area which depicts how regional organisations in Africa must grapple with political will.

The convergence typology in reflection to this report supports the argument that there is indeed an emerging African security regime complex particularly where maritime security is concerned. This regime complex ranges in depths as the study explores the differences in both SADC and ECOWAS. In SADC the type of convergence seen is ‘practiced/ process’ in the sense that there is practice and action that goes beyond rhetoric. The depth of this practice is ‘partial’ as there is interaction that is more frequent but still mostly unsystematic. In the case of ECOWAS, ‘convergence’ type is political with a depth that is ‘extensive,’ it means that ‘individual interests mostly complement one another, regime and individual interests are partly identical.’

#### **5.4.2.3 Terrorism**

Both SADC and ECOWAS showed medium levels of cooperation when it comes to the issue of terrorism which demonstrates a moderate will to address the challenge. It can be argued that enough is being done in both regions as both regions demonstrate some level of alertness to the issue of terrorism. It remains unclear whether enough political will is being generated from within both the sub-regions in order for them to act concertedly in a manner that reduces uncertainty over whether member states will contribute towards addressing common challenges or whether this is indeed enough to be effective in the context of what needs to be addressed.

Terrorism poses a very low-level threat for the SADC region which prompts the argument that if effectiveness is the standard of quality a regional institution requires to address a challenge, then in that sense SADC has enough capacity to be effective enough to address terrorism even though it is not supranational. Through SARPCCO which is a regional crime watchdog SADC seems alert to the threats of organised crime in the region, however according to Shaw (2003) crime levels suggest SADC SARPCCO is a failure.

Terrorism in the ECOWAS region poses a much higher threat and a much larger challenge. In this regard an argument can be made that not enough is being done in the sub-region. Be that as it may the sub-region has had some success in terms of pushing back Boko Haram which has laid the foundation for an argument to be made on the effectiveness of IGOs particularly when different actors converge. The leadership of Nigeria has been essential particularly in the fight against Boko Haram, while the election of President Buhari to office in 2015 has revitalised Nigeria’s role as a leader (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33097776>).

Brosig's (2013) convergence typology is particularly important in helping to understand the emerging African security regime complex particularly where terrorism is concerned in SADC and ECOWAS respectively. For SADC there are numerous institutions in place to tackle the issue despite the issue being less of a concern. For SADC the type of convergence is 'practice/ process' and depth is 'partial'. According to Brosig's (2013) typology table it means that 'actors converge more frequently but not systematically on issues of salience.' For ECOWAS the type of convergence is 'technical' in a sense that it relies on specific actor capability, and for the most part Nigeria plays that role. The depth fits more with 'partial' convergence, which according to the typology table means 'individual capacities partly complement one another, actors mostly value individual capacity more than regime efficacy.'

#### **5.4.3 A CFP that can thrive in any of the approaches**

What can be learnt from this study and African regionalism in general is that the regionalisation process is quite pluralistic and doesn't conform to one standard or framework. Furthermore it can be learnt that for any form of regionalisation that regional organisations pursue there are implications that both hinder and encourage CFP.

For the most part African regionalism continues to evolve as intergovernmental arrangements despite its desire to reach supranational status in the belief that supranational forms of institutionalisation allow better effectiveness. What the study found however is that intergovernmental relationship doesn't necessarily restrict any effectiveness and that the effectiveness of institutions is contingent upon several factors such as context and political will. Conversely supranational arrangements too can be deemed ineffective in certain contexts for example the EU who is renowned as a well suited supranational institution has for years pushed for a common currency, but there remains the UK who has its own currency, notwithstanding several other countries that have opted out of certain aspects of integration.

Indeed several factors can either hinder or encourage CFP – an approach to the form of institution is one important aspect. The next section of this chapter is important in that it unpacks the different contexts under which CFP may be hindered or encouraged.

Brosig (2013: 179) argues that there is increasing evidence that actors are converging in an evolving African security regime complex and even the best resourced actors are opting to work within these structures in contrast to unilateral action. What Brosig's typology (2013) adds to the argument of this report is firstly verification of the usefulness and suitability of

IGO's as conduits of meaningful cooperation. Secondly it helps explore the different circumstances that allow IGO's to be effective in carrying out certain policy decisions and practises and perhaps how to go about it. It offers viable options where funding is concerned as well as setting a conducive environment for several actors to take part in the process which sets the scene for an African security regime complex to unfold.

### **5.5 The importance of values, interest and identity for CFP**

Whether regional organisations require shared values in order to converge on CFP is a matter that is open for interpretation. The dominance of realism in international relations as a discipline was as a result of the bipolarity that existed during the cold war era. The falling down of the Berlin wall in 1989 signified the end of the bipolarity in the world and witnessed the emergence of the US as a global power. With the gradual decline of the US as a superpower we began to witness the emergence of new powers such as China, the Asean tigers, the resurgence of Russia and Europe in what was essentially becoming a multipolar world or as Spies (2010) describes, a polypolar world emerged. Spies (2010: 74) defines a polypolar world as global system characterised by post-modern features where identities of the 'poles' are more fluid and transient – there is thus a new systemic (dis)order characterised by polarity – subject to the overlapping participation by states in regional integration schemes, and compounded by the clashing loyalties incurred by extra-continental partnerships.

In the polarised world the nation state is made porous by globalisation thus rendering realism in the traditional sense innocuous given the proliferation of non-state actors. As a matter of fact alternative schools of thought would emerge that were critical of realism, these would introduce other key aspects of state behaviour that couldn't only be reduced to self-interest defined in terms of power. As a result ideas about values and identity politics began to emerge and it came to bear that knowledge about the normative behaviour of institutions was to be learnt.

For constructivists interest and identity are contingent and socially constructed, while states may remain the primary actors, the influence of their actions stems from norms that are systemic as a result of the behaviour of institutions in the global system. For constructivists values are the cornerstone of international relations in the contemporary world where interest is not pursued from an anarchist point of view, but through a process that reaffirms the norms



that are prevalent in society. Similarly liberal-institutionalists stress the importance of institutions as instruments for overcoming common challenges.

Functionalist scholars perhaps come close to discussing the kind of values one should aspire and these are born out of the market and economic forces. Their argument is that disintegrative forces that underpin sovereignty become less salient as integrative market and economic forces take precedence. Thus for the functionalist the importance of shared values underpins the movement towards supranationalism which creates a dynamic toward the advancement of CFP interests (Khadiagala, 2009: 83).

A lot of the time values tend to be overshadowed by identity which is the discrepancy between how one perceives himself against how they are perceived by the world as a result of their behaviour. While one may construct or adopt values they identify with, at times the identity which is the behaviour one exudes, may differ. Once one behaves in a certain way, that behaviour distorts perceptions which may further distort how others relate to them and thus affects the advancement of CFP.

Where values supersede interests the relationship tends to be more of a supranational kind, whereas the pursuit of self-interest tends to advance intergovernmental relationships, unless values and interest coincide. For realists states join institutions to ensure their relative gains which is their advantageous position vis-à-vis other states in the proposed institution (Souare, 2011: 84). It can be argued that there is a trade-off between values and interest of which the favour lies with interests and hence the proliferation of intergovernmental arrangements as opposed to supranational.

Values are essential if one seeks a long term arrangement and commitment to a common cause. Values such as democracy, human rights and liberal markets have overtime become good for rallying support against a common cause. To assume that values never change is misleading, a lot of the values we see espoused by different nations or regional organisations are those that are entrenched in the world system as a result of the West's domination in world politics since World War Two.

It can be said that a lot of the values encountered tend to be Eurocentric, hence the argument that Africa needs to re-affirm its own values. Indeed African states continue to struggle measuring up to the Eurocentric values that are imposed, a case in point is the OAU, which later transformed into the AU in order to keep up with the demands of globalisation. It is

apparent that in order to be integrated into the global market and to receive developmental aid which much of the African states are in need of, nation states have had to acquiesce to Eurocentric demands and values.

Where common values are present there seems to be a convergence of foreign policy and that has led the notion that for common foreign policy to thrive there must be shared values. But what happens where there are no shared values? For Risse (2010 : 38) the EU, which is highly regarded for achieving a coherent CFP is a good case study for analysing whether shared values are essential or not. While the EU has been successful on many occasions it has also failed to speak with one voice in different instances. The 2003 Iraq invasion showed an intra-European split as much as transatlantic one, while Germany abstained to vote in the UN Security Council over Libya.

Risse (2010: 41) argues that EU identity can be seen as an attempt to externalise its core values, as part and parcel of the more general effort at identity creation rather than as a genuine prescription for foreign policy and security. He argues that a foreign policy identity prioritising liberal and cosmopolitan values over everything else is necessarily likely to fail in the real world. By Risse's (2010) account, the EU approach is invested in liberal and constructivist doctrines which are, however, overshadowed by a realist approach.

As a result the EU has had to balance security, economic, and other 'material' needs with the promotion of core values. Using the Middle East as his example Risse (2010) contends that rhetoric about the promotion of democracy and human rights was overshadowed by foreign policy behaviour that prioritised stability over other values, which meant stabilising autocratic rulers and applying double standards. This is an argument that shows that values can be both malleable and encouraging; where they are encouraging the result shows a convergence of CFP and where they are malleable they highlight the inconsistencies of what they hope to achieve.

### **5.5.1 SADC's dilemma of shared values**

The birth of SADC was precipitated by a movement to decolonise Southern Africa which remained the only region that had colonial elements in the form of an Apartheid government that sought to destabilise the region, and thus suppress the rise of the ANC and other freedom fighting organisations in South Africa. As result some of the member states Tanzania and

Zambia, later including Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe would form an alliance known as the FLS to help destroy the apartheid regime and enforce democracy in the region.

It took shared values galvanised in aim to destroy colonialism and the apartheid regime that SADC was formed. Overtime SADC has established democratic principles such as human rights, development and common security to name a few. Whether the region has managed to uphold these values and whether these can translate into cooperation that is sustainable are question this chapter hopes to address.

Climate change in SADC presents both opportunity and obstacle. It's an obstacle in the sense that it has negative impacts which we have already unpacked. It can be deemed an opportunity if one considers the benefit for the region to exercise its ability speak with one voice on common issues which can overtime forge some kind of common identity. The fact that there is low cooperation on climate change speaks to the lack of convergence between values and interests regarding the policy area. The reasons for this as we have already discussed include but are not limited to the way in which climate change manifests as a very contentious policy area.

On the other hand however maritime security and terrorism show medium cooperation levels. This is testament of the assertion that common interest will forge cooperation, which is most identifiable and symptomatic with intergovernmental relations. The medium level cooperation which illustrates alertness on behalf of the regions ability to comprehend its challenges and indicates that the region has some capacity to respond. Where there are shared values the assumption is that decisions made by the regional organisation tends to overshadow self-interest and hence the desire for supranational organisation.

Often self-interests tend to overshadow shared values, reaffirming cooperation that's of an intergovernmental nature. There is criticism levelled against the maritime strategy of Southern Africa, according to Coelho (2013: 129) South Africa has modelled the strategy to fit its demands and those of its multilateral partners in IBSA and BRICS. Coelho (2013: 129) does however concede that South Africa does cover most of the financing while certain states (Mozambique and Tanzania in particular) benefit from a strategy that has largely been designed, implemented and paid for by South Africa.

### **5.5.2 ECOWAS and shared values**

For ECOWAS the intentions were that integration in the form of a supranational institution would be stimulated by a creation of shared values in economics and trade and that would hopefully translate into other policy areas. ECOWAS was founded to achieve collective self-reliance for the member states by means of economic and monetary union creating a single large trading bloc. Slow progress towards economic and monetary integration meant that the treaty of Lagos was revised in Cotonou in 1993 towards a looser collaboration. Politically ECOWAS regionalism was assumed to serve as an instrument for foreign policy and a collective bargaining bloc as well as a motivation for south-south co-operation. While ECOWAS has not necessarily succeeded in achieving its vision it has certainly made some ground in certain areas including maritime security.

ECOWAS showed very low levels of cooperation on climate change, high levels on maritime security and medium cooperation on terrorism. It showcases a very dynamic approach in that on certain issues ECOWAS can galvanise enough support to tackle common challenges and on others it lacks the political will to do so. ECOWAS needs the most support to combat terrorism which is widespread and a source of insecurity in the region given its role in proliferating other criminal activity in the region. The lack of convergence in that arena boils down to a disproportional interest; while terrorism is widespread in the region the perception is perhaps that it does not affect everyone in the same way. For example Boko Haram affects Nigeria and its surrounding states, some of which don't even form part of ECOWAS like Cameroon and Chad.

Terrorism in the Sahel is a source of much criminal activity in the region, but like Boko Haram because certain states are more at risk than others the problem becomes perceived as that of countries mostly affected as opposed to it being a regional problem. As a result there is a lack of concerted effort, which is very troubling for a region that places the success of its integration project on how it converges on CFP. What we learn is that even though values may be in sync, without a shared interest it is difficult to mobilise intergovernmental states about a regional concern. Brosig's (2013) typology of convergence is important for laying out different options for actors to be involved.

### **5.5.3 The extent to which shared values are important for CFP**

What has been discussed in this section is the extent to which shared values are important for CFP, and again it is found that the subject is open to interpretation. Mostly however it is also

a matter of expected outcomes; for supranational organisations to flourish or even exist there must be shared values that underpin the collaboration. The EU at least where it has succeeded in its attainment of supranational status is exemplary of the fact that shared values are essential towards the building of supranational organisations. The fact that the EU would not admit Turkey into the EU over issues of identity goes to explain how much shared values are important to the making and sustaining of supranational institutions.

What has also been established is that CFP is not reliant on shared values or the creation of supranational institutions, as a matter of fact CFP can be attained without either. What is most common in Africa is that a CFP is contingent upon several factors including interest and political will. What may be affected is perhaps the consistency and therefore effectiveness of CFP given this arrangement. Where interests are high, intergovernmental organisations are able to converge very effectively to assert CFP, but the convergence may not be the same across all policy areas.

## **5.6 Conclusion:**

The institutionalising of CFP is important for both SADC and ECOWAS if the sub-regions are to attain their visions of harmonising policies and/or interests. What this institutionalising will look like is a question that's at the heart of this research paper. There are different methods or forms to the institutionalising of CFP and each comes with its own implications. Whether one is suitable than the other has been the subject of this chapter, which finds that there is not one form of institutionalisation of CFP which stands out from the other, in fact each is contingent on several factors that include mandate, member cohesion and several other contextual factors.

For the most part it is argued that nation states in Africa continue to evolve as intergovernmental states and this claim is validated by the study's findings which show that cooperation levels vary and are contingent on political will and/or common interest. Over and above this there is a strong adherence to sovereignty which often overrides the collective mandates. It is in the desire to circumvent these challenges which often constrain cooperation in CFP that regional organisations opt for the attainment of supranational organisations in the belief that these are more effective.

A lot can be learnt from the EU who has managed to merge supranational and intergovernmental characteristics, what this study finds however is that there is a tendency to equate the EU with supranational status which distorts theory from practise. By equating the EU with supranational status, it has created the desire for regional organisations to emulate the EU, discarding the fact the EU itself is not entirely supranational, but manages to demonstrate the best aspects of supranational status. The EU however is not immune to the intergovernmental woe that affects African regionalism and that is managing the choice between sovereignty and integration.

Both SADC and ECOWAS demonstrate that shared values are not essential for CFP, both demonstrate patterns of CFP in several policy areas which are sometimes effective and sometimes not so much. This demonstrates that the insistence on the pursuit of supranational institutions is quite premature considering the fact that African nation states have a persistent adherence to their sovereignty. While many consider the EU as the form of institutionalisation to emulate it must however be clarified which aspects about the EU they choose to emulate. What has been ascertained is that the equating of EU with supranationalism is misleading in that it distorts theory from practise and so if one emulates the EU in the belief that the EU is entirely supranational then that institutionalisation will not work. The goal should be to identify which aspects the EU has made to work in their favour and for African regionalism to borrow what can work in its own context.

## *Chapter 6*

### **Conclusion**

This research report has taken the position that it is better for nation states to join together in cooperation and bring their resources together to form regional institutions. The belief is that such cooperation is beneficial to states given the complex world of today and its demands. Furthermore the pooling of resources is beneficial in that it allows for better reaction to common challenges which are global in nature and traverse state borders. While encouraging the formation of regional institutions is one thing, making them work is another challenge which this research report has explored.

This research report has sought to test the hypothesis that regional organisations are indeed beneficial and if so how? At which point do regional organisations become disadvantageous? It was in answering these questions that we interrogated what is it that hinders or encourages regional cooperation which is a question that is integral to understanding the institutionalisation of CFP with all its nuances.

Looking at SADC and ECOWAS this research report has borrowed from what the two African sub-regions have achieved in terms of setting up regional institutions. While both have been successful in setting up IGO's, both seem weary as to how to forge supranational organisations that are capable of decision-making that is outside the nation states ability to contradict binding agreements.

Using a framework that attempts to measure cooperation this study found that cooperation levels vary which thus rules out arguments that would render African regionalism to be supranational. As a matter of fact the study finds that African states continue to evolve as intergovernmental groupings which is reaffirmed by their incessant adherence to sovereignty which often undermines the call for cooperation.

The building of regional institutions is a very problematic area primarily because the setting up of such institutions doesn't guarantee success with whatever one's intended goals are. This research has thus been instrumental in highlighting the fact that different models of institutionalisation come with pros and cons, furthermore there is not one model of institutionalisation that is better equipped to deal with Africa's regional demands. For African regions it can be argued that for the most part cooperation even though it isn't supranational can and does work where intentions are stated clearly and where there is a convergence of several factors that include among many others political will, shared interests and context.

Political will is almost like a glue that binds everybody together around a certain cause, without political will it is almost impossible for regions to achieve whatever their visions may be. Often regional organisations will rely on a regional hegemon to galvanise political support using the promise of economic gains or whatever the case may be as incentives. Despite the liberalist and constructivist arguments on cooperation being about the setting up of rules and norms in order to regulate states' behaviour, it remains difficult to discount realism as a dominant school of thought. It is even more difficult to discount in this case where even the rules and norms or reasons that are given as to why states would form or join institution are indeed informed by some measure of self-interest.

Shared interests create an impetus towards cooperation and the lack thereof may hinder cooperation. SADC and ECOWAS as case studies for this research report showcase the implications that are attached where there is a presence or lack of shared interests. Where there are shared interests there is likely to be a high level of cooperation that can even resemble supranational institutions as noted with ECOWAS and its maritime strategy. Where there is a lack of shared interest cooperation may be hindered as is evident with climate change where shared interest is limited by other urgent demands such as food resources and primary healthcare and therefore there is not much benefit that states feel can be derived from cooperation in this particular area. Be that as it may nation states have made some effort to



actually put in some frameworks to combat climate change which shows an alertness to the danger, however without much incentives that alertness will remain hindered.

Context is yet another important factor in that the context sets out the parameters under which a certain action can be deemed feasible or not. Constructing a CFP requires an understanding of the context for it to be effective or even attainable. With an inadequate understanding of the context regional organisation, regions and their constituent states are only setting themselves up for failure in the long run. Globalisation is one such contextual factor and regional organisations ought to properly assess its exigencies if they ought to make effective decisions. Understanding the dynamics of the region where one is located, is yet another contextual factor that regional organisation must take into account for instance many nation states will have arbitrary national policies to those of the region and such these would have to be understood.

SADC continues to evolve as intergovernmental institutions as has been supported by the study's findings. There is a varying degree of cooperation between the three thematic areas that this study has used to explore questions about CFP. Decisions concerning CFP in the sub-region are made by consensus which reaffirms our claim. Climate change in the sub-region showed the lowest results in terms of cooperation while maritime security and terrorism showed an optimum level of cooperation. The varying level does discount arguments about supranationalism, but doesn't discount effectiveness of cooperation. This research paper has distinguished the kind of institutionalisation that SADC must carry out if it is to realise its vision of a coordinated CFP, for the most part the intergovernmental arrangement seems to work in SADC's favour.

SADC's challenge is to find ways of harmonising CFP in an intergovernmental environment, which is a difficult position given how adherence to sovereignty almost always undermines everything. Furthermore SADC must find ways to organise several of the factors already discussed if they are to succeed at cooperation.

The varying levels of cooperation in the findings of this study are an indication that political will is a dependent variable and therefore is subject to several changes that as already pointed out are contingent. In terms of shared interests what the study argues is that where there is shared interest cooperation increases, but this is also contingent on many other issues including understanding of the context. For instance SADC was formed as a result of a common threat which resulted in the formulation of the FLS to counter that common threat.

With that common threat gone SADC must find other common causes to help rally support and collaboration. It is a task that is not always easy as our findings show that finding a convergence of the stated factors is a difficult task.

ECOWAS similar to SADC has asserted its vision to become a self-reliant institution, but it too is constrained by an adherence to sovereignty. For ECOWAS the aim was that economic cooperation would precipitate larger integration of the region. How much of that has transpired makes apparent the fact that integration lags behind despite the sub-regions goals. Be that as it may there is still a fair amount of cooperation and harmonisation of CFP, but this varies based on the factors that have already been discussed. Maritime security showed the highest levels of cooperation, while terrorism showed an optimum amount of cooperation and climate change showed very little cooperation. The difference in the levels of cooperation are indicative of the type of institution ECOWAS continues to evolve.

Political will is one of the determining factors for the level of cooperation that can be achieved, similar to SADC, ECOWAS shows that enough political will can indeed encourage cooperation in as much as it does hinder it where there is a lack of political will. The same can be said of shared interests which are equally vital to the strength and sustainability of regional cooperation. In terms of context ECOWAS is a very volatile region in a sense that it has a history of numerous civil conflicts, famine, terror attacks and governance issues. It certainly comes as no surprise that cooperation was largely economic and has since evolved towards incorporating a security agenda. It is these nuances that can affect the how and what cooperation will look like.

The institutionalisation of CFP can and often does assist SADC and ECOWAS in the achievement of their objective to harmonise regional policies, although the process often is really what determines the outcome. What the study has done is to show several processes that come with institutionalisation and their outcomes. The study's thematic areas of investigation help enrich this study by showing exactly what the study espouses to demonstrate about institutionalisation and its implications, typically it shows that institutionalisation comes in different forms and attached are different outcomes. While the study hopes that institutionalisation will help harmonise CFP, it is not always the case that institutionalisation can have the desired outcome.

The making of CFP in regional organisations is indeed a tough task and is made even more complex by globalisation. While nation states may agree on certain issues it is difficult to

cooperate on those very same issues because of what it takes to achieve certain outcomes, notwithstanding what must be done or sacrificed to achieve such results. While the adherence to their sovereignty continues to override collective efforts it means states will continue to act according to the interests of their national elites which trumps above regional goals. It is because of this that African regional institutions envision supranational institutions as their belief is that supranational institutions will allow for better harmonisation of CFP. This however is not feasible since nation states won't cede their sovereignty which leaves intergovernmental institutions as the best alternative option. While African states continue to evolve as intergovernmental institutions they also show that even this arrangement can and often does make for the desired outcomes, but only if certain factors converge.

In conclusion, supranationalism although deemed important by the two sub-regions is however not essential. As a matter of fact, this research report finds that IGO's are more suitable to the demands required for a CFP to materialise in an African context. Not only do IGO's foster cooperation that is dynamic, but also allows for different avenues towards fulfilment of CFP goals. This is particularly the case if we take into account Brosig's (2013) typology of convergence. This research report concludes that IGO's are indeed conducive of regional aspirations towards achieving a CFP, IGO's also widen the spectrum for different actors to be involved on issues of interest. Brosig's typology is particular about an emerging African regime complex that brings a lot of factors together to make cooperation feasible and its goals attainable by putting all the options on the table thus making for a practical assessment and clarity of issues. Going further it will be essential that even more research is done on how certain relationship either encourage or discourage cooperation.

## References

Acharya, A. (2007). The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics. Cambridge University Press. *World politics*, Vol.59 (4), pp 629-652.

Adebajo, A. (2013). Prophets of Pan-Africanism: From OAU to the AU. *Independent Online (IOL)*. Retrieved from <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/prophets-of-pan-africanism-from-the-oau-to-the-au-1521876>.

Adigbuoa, E. R. (2014). The New ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy and Arms Trade Treaty. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, Vol. 25.

Afesorgbor, S. K. & van Bergeijk, P. A.G. (2011). Multi Membership and Effectiveness of Regional Trade Agreements in Western and Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of ECOWAS and SADC. *Institute of Social Sciences Working Paper* (520).

Akokpari, J. K. (2001). Post-Cold War International Relations and Foreign Policies in Africa: New Issues and New Challenges, *African Journal of International Affairs*, 4 (1&2), pp. 34-55.

Archik, K. (2015). The European Union (EU): Current Challenges and Future Prospects in Brief, *Congressional Research Service*.

Bach, D. C. (2003) New Regionalism as an Alias: Regionalisation through Trans-State Networks. Published in J. Grant, A. F. Soderbaum (Eds.), *The New Regionalism in Africa, Ashgate: The International Political Economy of the New Regionalisms Series*.

Barakamfitye, D. (2013). *ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan Draft*. Retrieved from [http://www.cafrad.org/Workshops/Ouagadougou25-27\\_03\\_13/ECOWAS.pdf](http://www.cafrad.org/Workshops/Ouagadougou25-27_03_13/ECOWAS.pdf).

Baxter, P & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers. *The Qualitative Report* Volume 13 (4), pp 544-559. Retrieved from <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf>.

Benjamin, C. (2015) SA an Attractive Destination for Terrorism Funding Networks. *Mail & Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-04-sa-an-attractive-destination-for-terrorism-funding-networks>.

Beyers, J. (2000). How Supranational Is Supranationalism? National and European Socialisation of Negotiators in The Council of Ministers. *Acta Politica* 33(4): 378-408.

Boehmer, C. Gartzke, E. & Nordstrom, T. (2004). Do Intergovernmental Organisations Promote Peace? *World Politics*, Vol. 57 (1).

Botha, A. & Solomon, H. (2005). Terrorism in Africa. *Centre for International Political Studies*.

Botha, A. *SADC and the Fight against Terrorism*. Retrieved from [www.cips.up.ac.za/old/.../SADC%20%26%20Counter-Terrorism.pp](http://www.cips.up.ac.za/old/.../SADC%20%26%20Counter-Terrorism.pp).

Boutros, B.G. (1992). An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping. *Report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council*, June. Retrieved from <http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm>.

Brosig, M. (2013). Introduction: The African Security Regime Complex: Exploring Converging Actors and Policies. *African Security*, Vol 6 (3-4). DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2013.854088

Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Buzan, B. & Waever, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cawthra, G. (2007). Comparative Perspectives on Regional Security Co-operation among Developing Countries. In G, Cawthra *et al* (Eds.), *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa: Wits University Press*.

Cawthra, G. (2009). Security Dimensions of Regional Relations and Integration. In C. Harvey (Eds.), *Proceedings of the FOPRISA Annual Conference, Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis*, Report 8.

Christiansen, T. (2001). European and Regional Integration, in J. Baylis & S. Smith, (Eds.) *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*Codesria General Assembly (5 – 9 December 2011) Africa and the Challenges of the Twenty First Century*. Retrieved from <http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article1321>.

Coelho, J. P. B. (2013). *African Approaches to Maritime Security: Southern Africa*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).

Cohen, B & Harris, S. A. (1975). Foreign Policy, in F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (Eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 6.

Crenshaw, M. (1981). *Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13 (4), pp. 379-399. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421717>.

Dabugat, K. (2014). *African Approaches to Maritime Security: The West and Central African Perspectives*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in collaboration with the National Defence College (Nigeria).

Ebrahim, I. E. (2010). *Reconciling National Interest and Values: a dilemma for South Africa's foreign policy?* Opening address by Deputy Minister at Dirco. Retrieved from <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2010/ebra0319.html>.

Essuman-Johnson, A. (2009). Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis of Two African Security Complexes. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 3 (10), pp. 409-422.

Ewi, M. & Aning, K. (2006). Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa. *African Security Review* Vol. 15 (3).

Ewi, A. M. (2012). *Vulnerabilities, Trends and Notorious Terrorist Networks*. Retrieved from [www.oecd.org/swac/events/Terrorism%20in%20West%20Africa.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/swac/events/Terrorism%20in%20West%20Africa.pdf).

Evans, P. Jacobson, H. & Putnam, R. (1993). *Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Farah, I. & Lam, J. (2013). *Crafting Foreign Policy in a Supranational Organisation: European Union Lessons for the African Union*. Retrieved from [http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2013-06-iscd-aucdc/Dr.\\_Farah\\_Ibrahim\\_and\\_Jasmine\\_Lam.pdf](http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2013-06-iscd-aucdc/Dr._Farah_Ibrahim_and_Jasmine_Lam.pdf).

Haas, E. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hass, E. (1961). International Integration: The European and Universal Process. *International Organisation* 15(3): 366-392.

Hettne, B & Soderbaum, F. (1998). The New Regionalism Approach. *Politeia*, Vol 17 (3).

Hettne, B. & Soderbaum, F. (2006). Regional Cooperation: A Tool for Addressing Regional and Global Challenges. In the book: *Meeting Global Challenges: International Cooperation in the National Interest. Cross-Cutting Issues. International Task Force on Global Public Goods*.

Hettne, B. and Soderbaum F. (2008). The Future of Regionalism: Old Divides, New Frontiers, in A. Cooper, C. Hughes and P. de Lombaerde (Eds.) *Regionalisation and the Taming of Globalisation*, London: Routledge.

Higgs, R. W. (2013). *Conference on BRICS and Africa: A Partnership for Sustainable Development. Keynote Address Hosted by SAIIA*. Retrieved from [http://www.saiia.org.za/doc\\_download/426-bricsafricaconf2013-s4-keynote-admiral](http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_download/426-bricsafricaconf2013-s4-keynote-admiral).

Hudson, V. and Vore, C. (1995). Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 39, pp 209-30.

Jaspal, R. & Nerlich, B. (2014). *When Climate Science Became Climate Politics: British Media Representations of Climate Change in 1988*. Sage: Public Understanding of Science (PUS) Vol. 23(2) 122-141.



Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 297.

Keohane, R. & Martin, L. (1995). The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security* 20(1), Summer 1995, pp. 39-51.

Khadiagala, G. L. (2001). Foreign Policy Decision-making in Southern Africa's Fading Frontline. Published in G. Khadiagala and T. Lyons (Eds.). *African Foreign Policies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers: pp131 -158.

Khadiagala, G. (2009). Forging Regional Foreign Policies in SADC: a framework for analysis. In C. Harvey (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 2009 FOPRISA Annual Conference*, Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis, Report 8.

Lesolle, D. (2012). SADC Policy Paper on Climate Change: Assessing the Policy Options for SADC Member States. *SADC Research and Policy Paper Series*. Retrieved from [http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/6724/7724/SADC\\_Policy\\_Paper\\_Climate\\_Change\\_EN\\_1.pdf](http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/6724/7724/SADC_Policy_Paper_Climate_Change_EN_1.pdf).

Makinda, S. (2008). *The African Union: Challenges of Globalisation, Security, and Governance*. London: Routledge.

Maritime Security Africa (March, 2010). *An Assessment of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy*. Retrieved from <http://www.globesec.co.za/Portals/0/MARITIME%20SECURITY%20IN%20AFRICA.pdf>.

*Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea (6 December 2012)*. Report of the conference held at Chatham House, London. Retrieved from [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0312confreport\\_maritimesecurity.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0312confreport_maritimesecurity.pdf).

Mayring, P (2000). Qualitative Content Analysis. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 1(2), Article 20. Retrieved from <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0002204>.

Mearsheimer, J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security* 19(3): 5 – 49.

Mearsheimer, J. (1995). A Realist Reply. *International Security* 20(1): 82-93.

Merriam, S. B et al. (2002). *Introduction to Qualitative Research. Qualitative research in practice: examples for discussion and analysis*. San Francisco: CA Jossey-Bass, pp 3-17. Retrieved from [http://media.wiley.com/product\\_data/excerpt/56/07879589/0787958956.pdf](http://media.wiley.com/product_data/excerpt/56/07879589/0787958956.pdf).

Nathan, L. (2012). *Community of Insecurity: SADC's Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Pennings, P. Keman, H. Kleinnijenhuis, J. (2006). *Doing Research in Political Science. An Introduction to comparative methods and statistics*. Sage Publications, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition.

Potgieter, T. (2012). Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Strategic Setting and Features. *Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper* (236). Retrieved from <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf>.

Potgieter, J. (2013). *Revisiting AIMS 2050: A 2013 Perspective*. Retrieved from [http://www0.sun.ac.za/milscience/images/stories/lecturers/sciencetech/Draft\\_papers/captain%20san%20johan%20potgieter.pdf](http://www0.sun.ac.za/milscience/images/stories/lecturers/sciencetech/Draft_papers/captain%20san%20johan%20potgieter.pdf).

Rashid, I. (2013). The Sierra Leone Civil War and the Remaking of ECOWAS. *Research in Sierra Leone Studies (RISLS): Weave* Vol 1 (1).

Review of Maritime transport (2012). Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat. Retrieved from [http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2012\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2012_en.pdf).

Rifer, M. (2005). SADC and Terrorism: Where is the Regional Strategy? *African Security Review* 14(1).

Risse, T. (2010). Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign Policy, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(3), 455-474.

Rosand, E. Millar, A. Ipe, J. Healey, M. (2008). *The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Regional and Sub-regional Bodies: Strengthening a Critical Partnership*. Washington DC: Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.

Salihu, N. (2015). *The Center Can Hold: Towards a Regional Approach to Combating West Africa's Terrorists*. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Policy Brief 1.

Shaw, M. T. and Okolo, J. E. (1994). *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS*. New York: St. Martins Press.

Shaw, M. (2003). Organised Crime and State Responses in Southern Africa. *Crime and Justice International*, Vol 19 (73). Retrieved from <http://www.cjimagazine.com/archives/cji9431.html?id=653>

Souare, I. K. (2011). Africa in UN Security Council, 1945-2010, *African Security Review*, 20 (1), pp 83-94.

Spies, Y. K. (2010). South Africa's Multilateral Challenges in a Polypolar World, *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 45: 4, pp 73-91.

Tadesse, D. (2010) The Impact of Climate Change in Africa. *ISS Paper 220*. Retrieved from <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper220.pdf>.

Till, G. (2004) *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century*, London: Frank Cass, pp 315-16.

Ukeje, C. & Mvomo, E. W. (2013). *African Approaches to Maritime Security: The Gulf Of Guinea*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).

Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2001). Regionalism in Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS Compared. *African Security Review* Vol 10 (2).

Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2009). SADC's Common Foreign Policy. In C. Harvey (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 2009 FOPRISA Annual Conference, Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis*, Report 8.

Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2012). *Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa. A Critical Analysis of the Revised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).

Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2015). *The Southern African Development Community – A Return to Collective Self-Reliance*. Conference on Strategic Theory: Revisiting the Regional Building Blocks of The African Standby Force.

Vrey, F. (2009). Bad order at Sea: From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea. *African Security Review* 18.3.

Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing International Politics. *International Security*, Vol. 20 (1). (Summer).

Webber, M & Smith, M. (2014). *Foreign Policy in a Transformed World*. London: Routledge.

Wicaksana, I. G. W. (2009). *Constructivist Approach towards Foreign Policy Analysis*. Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Airlangga University.

Yin, R. K. (2003). Applications of Case Study Research. *Applied Social Research Methods Series*, Volume 34. Sage Publications, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition.

Yin, R. K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. *Applied Social Research Methods Series*, Volume 5. Sage Publications, 4<sup>th</sup> edition.

#### Websites:

BBC revisited (n.d). retrieved from BBC website, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35870957>

BBC revisited (n.d). retrieved from BBC website, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33097776>

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). Retrieved from UNFCCC website,  
[http://unfccc.int/essential\\_background/convention/items/6036.php](http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php).

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). Retrieved from UNFCCC website,  
[http://unfccc.int/essential\\_background/items/6031.php](http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php).

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). Retrieved from UNFCCC website,  
[http://unfccc.int/key\\_steps/warsaw\\_outcomes/items/8006.php](http://unfccc.int/key_steps/warsaw_outcomes/items/8006.php).

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). Retrieved from UNFCCC website,  
[http://unfccc.int/key\\_steps/durban\\_outcomes/items/6825.php](http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.php).

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). Retrieved from UNFCCC website,  
[http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun\\_nov\\_2010/items/6005.php](http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/6005.php).

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). Retrieved from UNFCCC website,  
<http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6431.php>.

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). Retrieved from UNFCCC website,  
[http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press\\_factsh\\_science.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_science.pdf)

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). *Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change* (2014), retrieved from UN website,  
[http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap\\_draft\\_auclimatestrategy\\_2015.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap_draft_auclimatestrategy_2015.pdf)

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). *Cop 21 Paris (2015)* retrieved from COP website, <http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21>.

Climate Change data revisited (n.d). *ECOWAS Water Resources Strategy (2007)*, retrieved from <http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/planstrat-2007-2015-eng.pdf>.

ECOWAS' climate change data revisited (n.d.). *ECREEE meeting to address climate change (2015)*, retrieved from ECREEE website, <http://www.ecreee.org/news/ecreee-organizes-strategy-meeting-supporting-ecowas-countries-address-climate-change>.

ECOWAS' climate change data revisited (n.d.). *The GCCA Intra-ACP Regional Programme for West Africa*, retrieved from GCCA website, <http://www.gcca.eu/intra-accp/gcca-regional-programme-for-western-africa>

ECOWAS data revisited (n.d.). *ECOWAS' Forty Second Session of Heads of Sates (Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, 27 - 28 February 2013)*, retrieved from ECOWAS website, <http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/42nd-ECOWAS-Summit-Yamoussoukro-27-28-Feb-20131.pdf>.

SADC's Climate Change data revisited (n.d). *Adaptation for the Water Sector booklet (2011)*, retrieved from SADC website, [http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/SADC\\_Climate\\_Change\\_Adaptation\\_for\\_the\\_Water\\_Sector\\_booklet.pdf](http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/SADC_Climate_Change_Adaptation_for_the_Water_Sector_booklet.pdf).

SADC data revisited (n.d.). Retrieved from SADC website, [www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/police-sarpcco/](http://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/police-sarpcco/).

SADC data revisited (n.d.). *SADC Experts meet to draft a Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (10 Jun, 2015), Retrieved from SADC website, <http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-experts-meet-draft-regional-counter-terrorism-strategy/>

SADC data revisited (n.d.). retrieved from SADC website, (<http://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/sadc-to-speak-with-one-voice-at-cop21/#>).

Vienna Convention Law of treaties revisited (n.d.). Retrieved from UN website; <http://ask.un.org/faq/14594>.

2050 AIM strategy revisited (n.d.). Retrieved from AU website, [www.au.int/maritime](http://www.au.int/maritime).