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THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON ZIMBABWE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS (1980 -- 1987)

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in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts

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DECLARATION:

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

.....Gregory..... 31st day of March, 1988.

Christopher Ivan Gregory

To my parents, Edite and

Ivan Gregory.

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ABSTRACT:

This dissertation investigates the impact of the ideology of the ruling party on Zimbabwe's foreign relations for the period 1980-1987. Zimbabwe's foreign policy, claim ruling party and Government officials alike, is based upon the ruling party's adopted *Marxist-Leninist ideology*.

In an attempt to assess the nature of this relationship, the research sought greater clarity on the question of the nature and function of ideology, and attempted to construct the official ideology of ZANU (PF), particular attention being paid in both instances to the foreign policy dimension.

The investigation focussed on two important issues in Zimbabwe's foreign policy: its national role conception of nonalignment, and its foreign policy in southern Africa. In this regional context the focus was on two states, South Africa and Mozambique.

The research concluded that ZANU (PF)'s official ideology was operationalised in the external arena, forming the conceptual base of the foreign policy adopted by the Government of Zimbabwe, and in this way impacting upon the choice of goals and policies.

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Chapter One: Research Objective and Theoretical Overview

1.1 The Principal Objective of the Study

This investigation seeks principally to explore the relationship between ideology and foreign policy with respect to Zimbabwe's foreign relations. That such a link exists can reasonably be inferred, both from the declaratory foreign policy record, and from repeated statements by Zimbabwean government officials proclaiming as much. One may be sure from the outset of this research that ideology is a factor in Zimbabwe's foreign policy -- at least insofar as Foreign Ministry officials and other Government and ruling party spokesmen have invoked it in the context of the country's foreign relations.

The major question to be investigated centres around the nature of the link between ideology and foreign policy. Is ideology an active constituent of the foreign policy process, in the sense of contributing to the formulation of foreign policy, or is it merely a cynical rationalisation of foreign policy conduct?

It should therefore be stated from the outset that the

focus of this investigation is essentially motivational. The emphasis is on the reasons behind adopted foreign policies, and not on the acts themselves.

1.2 Rationale

While Zimbabwe has been independent for seven years, there still exists a dearth of writing on the country in general, and its foreign relations in particular. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe has steadily acquired a significant role in international politics on the regional, continental, and global levels. This is reflected in the number of significant positions of office which have already been attained by senior members of the Zimbabwean Government.[1] The more notable of these include the election, in 1982, of Zimbabwe to serve a two-year period on the UN Security Council, and the recent election of President Mugabe to the position of Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement for the period 1986-1989.

This contribution is far from fortuitous. The Zimbabwean government has deliberately set about establishing an active foreign policy record. In the first five years of independence it sponsored a tenfold increase in the number of foreign service personnel, and approved a twelvefold increase in the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[2]

Given these and other developments, it is important that the bases of Zimbabwe's foreign policy orientation be identified and explored. For it would appear that the role of that country in international affairs will become increasingly important in years to come. Moreover, conclusions reached in the course of this investigation may shed light on the foreign policy conduct of states in the Third World of a similar self-professed orientation and internal political structure.

1.3 Hypothesis

It is suggested that the existence of a comprehensive and explicit ideology, as opposed to at most a set of unsystematised doctrines or preferences, will have some considerable impact upon the foreign policy system involved (Smith, 1981,59). Just such a comprehensive and explicit ideology is claimed by the government of Zimbabwe and the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front). It is suggested that ZANU (PF) -- by its own admission "guided by Marxist-Leninist principles" -- and the government activate these guidelines in the formulation and conduct of the country's foreign relations. Thus, it is hypothesized, ideology plays a significant part in the process of Zimbabwe's foreign policy.

1.4 Statement of the Problem

A key assumption of this research is rationality on the part of the Zimbabwean Government, at least in relation to its world view. The country's foreign policy is also presumed to be goal-orientated; there is a (hopefully) discernable reason for condemnation of US action in Grenada, for example. What is more, this stance can be tied in to those adopted by the government on a range of other foreign policy issues. Central to an understanding of Zimbabwe's foreign policy is, it has already been contended, the ideology professed by the ruling party. As previously stated, the major problem of this investigation centres around the nature of the nexus between ideology and Zimbabwe's foreign policy. For, while Brecher, Steinberg and Stein (1968, 81) may assert that "the link between image and decisions is indeed the master key to a valuable framework of foreign policy analysis", we have no reason to believe that one can systematically link linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour. Assuming, then, that the world view *qua* image of a foreign policy elite is influenced by, *inter alia*, considerations of an ideological nature, on what grounds can one establish that the ideology is active in any particular or selected issue of the country's foreign relations? The approach adopted by this investigation in an effort to manage the problem is discussed in the following section, along with other issues of method-

ological importance.

1.5 Investigative Approach

This study proceeds, by way of analysis of ZANU (PF) elite doctrine and an examination of several major aspects of the post-independence foreign policy record, to investigate the impact of ideology on Zimbabwe's foreign relations. Such an approach raises several issues of methodological importance, each of which will be dealt with in turn.

1.5.1 ZANU (PF) as the Ideological Focus of Attention

It may legitimately be asked why, in a study of the foreign policy of a state, the focus is upon ruling party ideology, rather than that of the government in power. The answer is to be found in the nature of the relationship between ruling party and government in Zimbabwe, and in the high degree of correlation between government and ruling party in that country.

With regard to the first point, Mugabe and his party colleagues have frequently outlined the pre-eminent role of the ruling party in matters of policy. ZANU (PF) is described as the governmental watch-dog in such matters; the ruling party decides on policy and ensures that this is implemented by government. To some considerable extent this must be facilitated by

the second point made above. For, with few exceptions, the ZANU (PF) elite is the governmental elite. With regard to those said to be primarily responsible for foreign policy -- the President and Foreign Minister -- the correlation is direct. Normally it is the elites which propagate ideology (Mittelman, 1975; Zolberg, 1966). While the common man may provide the target, or one of the targets, for the propagation of an ideology, the elites represent its source and present concentration (Mittelman, 1975, 24). This is certainly true of Zimbabwe, where the ZANU (PF) -centred ideology of Marxism-Leninism still lacks real grass- roots support (Reed,1987,56).

This thesis therefore concentrates upon the elites, as these are seen to constitute the centre of ideological thought in Zimbabwe. More specifically, the ZANU (PF) elite is focussed upon for, as the ruling party in Zimbabwe, it represents the source of the ideological principles which, Party and Government officials claim, constitute the basis of, and motive force behind, Government policy.

All this is fine as regards theory (ideology) and intention. However, Mugabe and his colleagues have, while asserting the dominance of party over government, and ZANU (PF)'s role in giving policy direction to Government, admitted that this relationship is far from settled. Thus when it comes

to examining the practice of Zimbabwe's foreign policy, the analysis will -- as far as is possible -- distinguish between, and examine separately, ruling party and Government policy and practice on the particular issue under examination. Cognisance of the fact of an as yet unsettled ruling party dominance over Government, may shed further valuable light on the ideology/ foreign policy nexus.

1.5.2 The 'Collective Actor' Assumption

One of the more important points of contention centres around the 'collective actor' approach. There is a growing body of literature critical of this approach as applied to foreign policy studies. Jervis (1976, 319) states that "A common misperception is to see the behaviour of others as more centralised, planned and coordinated than it is". This he attributes to the human drive "to squeeze complex and unrelated events into a coherent pattern" (Ibid.). Jervis lists several possible consequences of such an approach: present misperception may result in inaccurate prediction; present action having been assumed to be the product of centralised decision-making and integrated values, this behaviour will be assumed to set a pattern for the future; moreover, the importance of internal conflict having been minimised, insufficient resources will then be directed towards research into the factions and bureaucratic structures of the other side; finally, inconsistency in the

other side's policy is likely to be regarded as evidence of duplicity.

Notwithstanding these and other criticisms, this thesis treats and examines ZANU (PF) as a collective actor. However, it should be noted that, with regard to its input into the foreign policy process, the ruling party is, for the most part, equated with its fifteen-member Politburo. As noted in 1.5.1 above, the emphasis will be on the ruling party rather than the government.

The justifications for the adoption of the 'collecti' actor' approach are several. Jervis has noted the propensity of human beings to impose some sort of order upon data so as to gain an understanding of that information. This may be presented as but another manifestation of man's desire to increase his control over the environment. It may also be seen as an inborn and necessary human trait, insofar as order must be seen if any understanding is to follow.

Holsti (1976, 19-20) argues similarly that "in order to experience and cope with the complex, confusing reality of the environment, individuals have to form simplified, structured beliefs about the nature of their world" (cf. Brodin, 1972, 99). Political scientists are not immune to this -- else one would see naive empiricism taken to new extremes.

Assuming this is indeed the case, how is one to avoid selecting data which leads to an incorrect or misleading picture, one which leaves the analyst worse off than before? Political scientists should be cognisant of this human process, and aware of the epistemological ramifications. This process should be monitored, tested against both theory and experience in order to, in a recognisably -- and unavoidably -- imperfect fashion, make progress. It all boils down to a tension within -- but by no means confined to -- political science, namely that between generalisation and verification (Van Dyke, 1960, X).

Kelly and Fleron (1971, 56-57) argue that, since ideological beliefs are but a constituent part of the total 'belief-disbelief system'[3] of an individual or group, it is "grossly insufficient to study only the content and structure of the ideological system when one is looking for determinants of human behaviour. One must first and foremost look at the content and structure of the individual's entire belief system."

However, it would be difficult, if not impossible, at this low stage of research on Zimbabwe to, assuming one is able to identify the major contributors to the formulation of foreign policy, establish and examine the content and structure of the entire belief system

of each. Indeed, the purpose of this study is not to concentrate upon the interaction between various competitive individuals or factions within ZANU (PF). Rather, it is to ascertain the general ideological view of the policy-making elite and, from this starting-point, investigate the contribution of this ideology to the formulation and conduct of the foreign policy of the country.

Jervis (1976, 341) himself admits that "this belief [of unity and planning], although inaccurate, may be a useful assumption that leads to relatively accurate predictions." This may particularly be true, he argues, if the interests and power of the contending elements in the other's government are fairly stable. Further to the point:

> "Even if predictions made with the benefit of complete knowledge of these variables [the values, beliefs, and power positions of the other's factions] would be more accurate than those possible with the assumption of centralisation, it does not follow that those based on only incomplete and unreliable information will be more accurate than the alternative" (Ibid).

It is argued that ZANU (PF), as represented by its fifteen-member Politburo, is relatively stable as regards the interests and power of the contending elements involved in foreign policy formulation and conduct. Notwithstanding the factionalism within the

party as a whole that has been identified by recent studies (e.g. Clough, 1983; Gregory, 1980; Libby, 1984), it is argued that the Politburo is characterised by a high degree of homogeneity vis-a-vis adherence to the Party line. This informed assumption is based, for the most part, on these members' longstanding position in the party elite, and on the accumulation from various sources of data related to these members' use of ideological language, analysis and rationale. Such ideological homogeneity is also believed to exist, albeit at a lower level, within the upper echelons of the government.

There are, however, additional factors which support the case for a 'collective actor' approach to this investigation; namely, Zimbabwe's position as a newly independent Third World state, and the ruling party's professed and practiced organisational theory.

Seton Watson (1972, 213-214) has pointed out that foreign policy is perhaps the last preserve of action of political elites. As late as 1914 the conduct of foreign policy in Western states was almost exclusively undertaken by professional diplomats. Only with the outbreak of World War One did popular support and opinion come into its own. A similar pre-1914 situation still prevails in most if not all less-developed states, whereby foreign policy is typically the preserve of a relatively small coterie

of government officials. In this connection a noted African scholar of African foreign policies has argued:

> "Unlike their counterparts in Europe and the United States the governing elites, and indeed in many cases the Presidents or heads of state, in Africa have greater control over the foreign relations of their countries" (Aluko, 1977, 10).

Aluko provides three justifications for this contention. Firstly, as new states within the international environment, these African countries lack the traditional pattern of external behaviour found in the older established states. This is particularly true of Zimbabwe which, after UDI in 1965 was, by virtue of its increasingly pariah status within the international community, subject to severe constraints with regard to both the quality and quantity of its external relations.

Aluko's second point revolves around the relative lack of serious domestic institutional restraints on the behaviour of most African leaders. Notwithstanding the almost intact and highly developed state apparatus inherited by the newly elected ZANU (PF) government by virtue of the Lancaster House agreement, this point still has great relevance for the foreign policy process in Zimbabwe. The previous Rhodesian administration bequeathed an undeveloped and limited foreign policy bureaucracy, one which reflected its

isolated position within the international community. Since 1980, therefore, the new government has enjoyed unparalleled leeway in the area of foreign policy in the sense that it been able to construct, almost from scratch, its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Simbarashe Mumbengegwi is quoted as having said in October 1981:

> "We are trying to catch-up (sic) with 90 years of not having a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What we only had (sic) was Ministry of South African Affairs". (Good, 1984, 363)

It would seem to be likely that, within such a newly developed organisation, the beliefs and objectives of the ruling party could more easily be operationalised.[4] This trend would seem to be further encouraged by the centralising tendencies currently practiced by the ruling party in Zimbabwe.

Arising out of Aluko's second point is his third contention; that African heads of state exercise greater influence over the foreign policy process than do their counterparts in the more developed states. Brodin (1972, 109) has suggested, meanwhile, that it seems reasonable to infer that, within smaller states, bureaucratic influences may more easily be neutralised by the direct control that can be exerted by the top decision-makers, and that the individual personality thereby stands a better chance of asserting himself against the organisation. Aluko (1977, 10) takes this

point one step further, noting that the field of foreign affairs "is often regarded as the special preserve of the President". Observers and the foreign Minister himself have claimed as much with specific reference to the central role played by President Mugabe within the Zimbabwean foreign policy process.[5] Aluko's main point is that the ideological inclinations of the head of state become for this reason that much more important in understanding, and perhaps predicting, a state's behaviour.

Another important factor is the substance of ZANU (PF)'s organisational theory. As the chapter on domestic politics indicates, the ruling party is endeavouring, with some considerable success, to centralise power within its hands. The 1984 Party Congress confirmed Mugabe's unchallenged position as leader of both Party and Government. Along with his deputy -- again both of Party and Government -- Mugabe elected the remaining members of the 15-member Politburo. This institution, in turn, was given the task of supervising Government ministries.[6] It has been made abundantly (and publicly) clear that Government policies originate in the ruling party.[7] There is no good reason to believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is exempt from this arrangement.

Centralisation of power is, of course, a major objective of Marxist-Leninist organisational theory:

to concentrate and thus facilitate decision-making in the hands of those who, it is argued, are, by virtue of their adoption of the 'correct' proletarian ideology, best suited to the job (Roche, 1984). This centralising tendency on behalf of the ruling party renders ZANU (PF), it is argued, less subject to the fissiparous tendencies that plague parties run on more pluralistic lines, for example. Of course it would be naive to imagine that ZANU (PF) encounters little opposition to its attempts to consolidate power. Recent studies have discussed the role of the domestic bourgeoisie in thwarting moves towards centralisation by the ruling party.[8] However, it is argued that, notwithstanding internal and external opposition, ZANU (PF) is making considerable progress in this regard.[9] Progress is particularly far advanced in areas of 'high politics' which are characterised to a greater degree by input from senior members of the ZANU (PF) elite.

That is not to say that the ruling party has a free hand in foreign policy formulation. It still has a substantial domestic sector to contend with -- the industrial sector, the farming community, and the like -- not to mention substantial resource constraints. However, this domestic constituency is undoubtedly far smaller, as a percentage of the population, than is the case in even a small but developed state like Holland or Sweden. Zimbabwe's population is

predominantly rural and illiterate. It is unlikely that this sector has any real conception of foreign policy, let alone any desire to play a role in shaping it. The same is substantially true of the urban population.

Thus it is argued that, as a body of politicians hand-picked by the ZANU (PF) First Secretary and his deputy, and given increasing power over policy formulation and decision-making, the Party elite is characterised by a high degree of ideological homogeneity, defined as fealty to the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, with regard to matters of foreign policy. Moreover, as input into the foreign policy formulation process is believed to be restricted to a small coterie of Party/Government officials, the impact of the ideological convictions of these people must be accorded some considerable significance.

For the reasons enumerated above, ZANU (PF) will, for the purposes of this study, be treated as a collective unit. This assumption will be continually borne in mind, and considered whenever discrepancies appear between the assembled data and the hypothesis to be tested. Jervis (1976, 342) alerts us to the importance of sensitivity "to alternative explanations involving internal conflict and lack of coordination." This advice will be heeded. While

ZANU (PF) will be treated as a collective actor, the 'black box' approach will hopefully be circumvented to a considerable degree by means of cognisance and consideration of that factional disunity which is known to exist within the ruling party.

1.5.3 The Relationship Between 'Official' and 'Operational' Ideologies

Some foreign policy studies have been criticised for their failure to distinguish between official and operational ideology (Holsti, 1976, 33). In many cases the simplistic assumption has been made that what the elite says is what it believes. We do not need a cognitive psychologist to tell us that this is far from always being the case. It would be foolish to believe everything that is said, particularly in the realm of politics. However, one would be equally foolish to dismiss all that is said. What is called for is some sort of method of assessing linguistic behaviour. This writer has compiled a number of criteria by means of which such data might be evaluated (Table I). These criteria were used to construct *ZANU (PF)'s official and operational* ideologies, and in the investigation of the link between the ideology of the ruling party, and Zimbabwe's foreign relations. The assumption is made here that a movement's ideology may be determined with reasonable accuracy by caroful attention to its stated

TABLE 1

DECLARATORY	SUBSTANTIVE
(1) Source and *nature of* statement: - *official* policy? - "off the record"? - status of speaker? - written or *spoken*? (*prepared* beforehand, edited, written by someone other than the speaker?) - reported? - *reliability of* newspaper's reporting? - *corroboration* by more than one newspaper, other than syndicated copy?	(1) Consistency: *can actions* be understood in the light *of* statements made? If not, why not? - *factors beyond* govt. control? (e.g. drought) - overambitious goals? - internal dissension impeding *policy* implementation? - *lack of real* commitment on the part of govt; previous statements largely or wholly rhetoric?
(2) Direction of *statement:* - *context*? (electioneering, for example) - audience? - type of audience? - size of *audience*?	
(3) Consistency of argument: - over time? - internal? - *between* spokesmen? (corroboration)	
(4) Length and level of argument?	
(5) *Compatibility of* argument? (e.g. do a number of different statements share a common theme?)	

N.B. The *declarative* evidence cannot always be *easily* separated from the substantive. In many cases the declarative may take the form of the substantive, *e.g.* a UN General Assembly *speech* in which a particular *stance* is publicly proclaimed. Moreover, in some cases this may be the *only available* data.

doctrine and its actions, and to the relation between the two in the context of the external constraints under which the movement must operate.

The starting point is that of consistency (cf. Brodin, 1972). This is examined on a number of different planes: consistency between spokesmen, over time, internal consistency of argument, and so on. Context is another major consideration. It is suggested that the context in which a particular statement or declaration of policy is made may shed some light on the credibility of the utterance. Thus, a statement by Mugabe at an open party gathering, of ZANU (PF)'s objective of the eventual elimination of private enterprise in Zimbabwe, is not necessarily as significant as a similar statement to an international business magazine whose readership is known to be predominantly capitalist in orientation. However, more credence could be attached to the first statement if one was aware of the existence of the second.

Not all of the criteria could be applied to any one datum. Rather, they were viewed as rules of thumb, and their degree of trustworthiness was tested from case to case. It should be emphasised that these criteria are multiplex (cf. Young, 1982, 20-21). However, in most cases many if not most of these criteria were utilised in conjunction with one another. It was felt that, as most criteria were used

in the majority of cases, and as exclusive reliance on one source or one criterion was avoided, that the test attained a high degree of acceptability.

While Table I is an attempt to bring a scientific basis to the accumulation and processing of data, it is not claimed to be a foolproof method. Indeed, this writer questions the advisability -- and practicability -- of applying 'normal' scientific procedure to the study of international relations. (cf. Gunnell, 1975; Spegele, 1985; Taylor, 1985). Only so much can be quantified and co partmentalised before the data begins to suffer from methodologism. The exercise of judgement was an important factor in the evaluation of evidence for this investigation.

The data used in the construction of ZANU (PF)'s ideology was collected from the statements of prominent spokesmen for the ruling party -- most frequently those members of the Politburo -- and key Government officials, i.e. Ministers and their deputies. This data was then supplemented, wherever necessary, by incorporating details presented by other Party and Government officials which seemed to closely follow the basic themes delineated by the more authoritative spokesmen. However, attention was also paid to statements by these officials which appeared to be at variance with the general trend of thought.

The temporal starting-point for this data is 1972. For it was in that year, according to ZANU (PF) spokesmen, that the ruling party was ideologically 'reborn', henceforth to espouse Marxism-Leninism. This is not to say that the early years of the party, the period 1964-1972, have been ignored. For it is illustrative to note both the differences and the similarities between the pre- and post-1972 periods. The collected and sorted data is presented in Chapters 3 and 4.

A final caveat: Table I classifies data into 'declarative' and 'substantive' evidence. However, not all of the data can be so easily separated. Do public statements of intent or support, for example, constitute declarative or substantive evidence? Certainly, words can be deeds but, by their very nature, they cannot be accorded the same degree of significance that one would attach to more concrete evidence, such as cross-border action or membership of a military alliance. (Gregory, 1984, 74-75).

1.5.4 The Relationship Between Ideology and Foreign Policy

Most of what was discussed *in 1.5.3 above is* applicable here. For, in examining the extent to which the ideology is operationalised, *one must* investigate the link between ideology and action. It is action which, for the *most part, operationalises*

the ideology. Therefore, the criteria for assessment enumerated in Table I were utilised in an examination of the assembled declarative and substantive data.

These data were collected from several different sources, both primary and secondary. The data were then sorted into subjects or themes -- nonalignment, sanctions, apartheid, United Nations, Afghanistan, and so on. The preliminary task related to the establishment of ZANU (PF)'s ideology as it *specifically relates* to foreign relations. Table I was again used in the accomplishment of this task.

The main task, the investigation of the relationship between data and ideology, was more difficult. An attempt was made to answer the following question: Is there an acceptable correlation between what is professed, and actual conduct in the foreign policy arena? This of course begged the question of what constitutes an 'acceptable correlation'. Take the following scenario: The Zimbabwean Foreign Minister *publicly declares* Policy A to be his country's position vis-a-vis International Crisis Situation B. This he justifies publicly in terms of the ruling party's ideology by means of Argument X. On what grounds should an observer accept or dispute the validity of this illustration of the use of ideology in foreign policy, where validity refers to 'proof' that ideology was a constituent part of the policy

formulation process?

Some considerable research has already been done into the relationship between belief systems and foreign policy formulation and conduct. However the techniques and approaches which up to now have dominated this research -- cognitive mapping and other related psychological approaches -- focus upon the individual policymaker. There are, for example, several studies of the role of Henry Kissinger in US foreign policy formulation and practice. This thesis, as discussed above, concentrates on the ruling party (i.e. the Politburo) as a collective actor. For this reason particularly, it is felt that behavioural and cognitive psychological approaches are of little utility. A more traditional approach is used instead. The principles of consistency and context are again invoked as a basis for verification.

(i) Consistency in statement: It is assumed that party and government spokesmen, as political animals, appreciate that taking a public stand on an issue is an action not to be easily repudiated. Moreover, such stances may effectively limit a policy-maker's room for manoeuvre (Hadenius, 1983, 140; Brodin, 1977, 30-33). Bearing this in mind, consistent reiteration of a certain public stance may be judged as indicative of beliefs held by the foreign policy elite. Of course, this is no hard and fast rule. Much hinges on

the political cost of making a particular statement. For example, in the present international political climate, it costs little to adopt an attitude hostile to the South African government -- indeed, the costs of not adopting such a line may be considerable. Apartheid unites across the political or ideological spectrum to a far greater degree than many other issues of interest to the international community. However, many of those united in their opposition to apartheid are united for different reasons. It is not enough to know where one stands on a particular issue, it is also important to know why.

(ii) Consistency in action: An important methodological point relates to the difficulty of separating declarative from substantive evidence. As noted in an earlier section, words may, in certain contexts, be judged to be deeds; condemnation by President Mugabe, in front of the UN General Assembly, of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and of US policy towards Nicaragua, is a significant action, one which may incur political consequences for Zimbabwe. Ideally, such a declarative stance would then be followed by more concrete action: the supply of arms and finance to 'liberation movements', the signing of a mutual defense pact, or some similar move. But even such evidence is not without possible ambiguity. Two states may assist UNITA in Angola for different reasons, for example. One for security reasons

narrowly defined, another because it believes the MPLA government to be ideologically or politically illegitimate. To take another pertinent example, the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR is not always undertaken for the same, or even similar, reasons (Young, 1982; Fukuyama, 1985). Again it is important to consider the rationale behind the adoption of a particular stance, or the supply of materiel. The reasons may be as important as the action itself. Moreover, an action may be more clearly understood in terms of the reason for its adoption. The question remains, however, of how to go about establishing the 'real' motivation.

Context is again a key issue, and tied in with consistency. Should a stance be adopted with consistency, and in a number of different contexts, public and private, then more credence may be attached to that position.

To return to the scenario posited above. It is argued that two major criteria have to be fulfilled: (1) Argument X must be credible in terms of the criteria enumerated in Table I; (2) Policy A must be consistent (word and deed) with Argument X, as well as passing the test in terms of Table I. if this is the case, and both argument and policy enjoy consistency over time, then one should accept the illustration as valid -- or at least give the Foreign Minister the

benefit of the doubt.

1.6 Overview of the Literature

Kelly and Fleron (1971, 53) have noted that ever since Western scholars began trying to analyse the political behaviour of Communist leaders, they have felt compelled to present some answer to the question: In what ways does the official ideological system affect the actions and decisions of these leaders? In the area of external relations the debate has most commonly centred around the ideology versus national interest controversy, with views ranging from a complete denial of any motivational impact of ideology, to arguments ranging on ideological determinism.[10]

While eighty years of communist rule in the Soviet Union has produced no consistent answers on the role of ideology in the Soviet foreign policy process,[11] ideology has, not withstanding the widely differing definitions of the concept, become an accepted constituent part of the study of foreign policy.[12]

Ideology is presently regarded as a variable in the foreign policies of many states, those in Africa being no exception. In the post-decolonisation period there have been a number of studies which have noted the role of ideology on a particular state's foreign

relations.[13] Indeed, several scholars have gone so far as to suggest that, owing to their newly-independent status, these states were and are more prone than most to influences of an ideological nature (e.g. Mittelman, 1975; Zartman, 1966).

An underlying assumption of many, if not most, recent foreign policy studies would appear to be an "all-inclusive"[14] definition of ideology. For, as Combs (1966,27) has pointed out, "general theory and research about ideology and behaviour is directly related to the way in which ideology is defined". With the growing influence of the nascent discipline of the sociology of knowledge, it was often assumed -- a la Karl Mannheim -- that most, if not all, people are equally ideological. Following logically from this was the implicit or explicit assumption that foreign policy is ideological per se. Typical of this approach is the recent assertion by Mtshali (1973,95; my emphasis):

> "Ideology is an essential point of departure; without it, it is difficult to assess the foreign policy of any state or of (sic) its international role."

This approach would appear to have been strengthened with the exploration, beginning in the post-war years, of the nexus between ideology and politics.[15] Much research has been and is being devoted to the link between beliefs and behaviour.[16] A number of these studies have illustrated how vital is the relationship

between belief system, perceptions and decision making.[17] Research supports the conclusion reached by Holsti:[18]

> "A decision-maker acts upon his 'image' of the situation rather than upon 'objective reality', and it has been demonstrated that the belief system...plays an integral role in the cognitive process".

While the behavioural, and particularly the cognitive psychological approaches focussed on the belief/action nexus, for the most part they did so with the use of an all-inclusive concept of ideology.[19]

In the 1970s and 1980s, however, a number of writers have noted the emergence of a group of Third World states for which ideology appears to take on a distinct dimension.[20] Apparently underlying the line of argument of these scholars is a conception of ideology which distinguishes it from political thought in general.[21] A concomitant of this starting-point, that not all thought is ideological, is the premise that some foreign policies are more ideological than others. Thus Radu (1982, 992) can assert that: "Ideological considerations, as a result of their domestic power structure, are now dominating the foreign policy of a number of African states". Fukuyama (1985,30) makes a similar case, defining Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and North Korea as "ideological states", thus (presumably) distinguishing them from other,

non-ideological states.

The emergence, in the 1970s, of a number of self-styled Marxist-Leninist states in the Third World, has encouraged research into the role of ideology within these states.[22] While, generally speaking, little attention has been devoted to the area of external relations, the influence of ideology in this sphere is acknowledged.[23]

The emergence, in 1980, of Zimbabwe as a newly-independent African state has excited little such attention. Despite the frequent pronouncements, by both ruling party and government, of fealty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, few writers have examined -- or even acknowledged -- the impact of this ideology on the domestic development or foreign affairs of Zimbabwe.[24] Indeed, there is a dearth of literature on Zimbabwe in general, and her foreign relations in particular. That which does exist is marked by a great lack of consensus. Good (1984, 348) characterises the country's foreign policy as "largely a function of the national political economy and external interaction". The concept of ideology does not enter into his analysis. In marked contra-distinction to this is the article by Kunert and Vale (1984), in which the authors contend that Marxist-Leninist ideology is central to an understanding of both domestic and foreign policies in Zimbabwe. Patel

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(1985) and Reed (1987) appear to fall somewhere in between. Patel approaches the country's foreign relations from the perspective of dependency theory, but does highlight "an organic link between the manner in which Zimbabwe gained its independence..., its domestic policies..., and its foreign policy principles...." (Ibid., 230-231). Reed acknowledges the growing importance of ideology in the period 1964-1980, but suggests that Marxist-Leninist ideology is but one of a number of factors. The focus of his analysis is domestic. Gregory (1987a) focusses on the ideological factor. He attempts to illustrate an organic link between ruling party ideology and ZANU (PF)-inspired changes in Zimbabwe's domestic milieu. In a later article (1987b), he suggests the existence of a link between Mugabe's personal ideological convictions and Zimbabwe's increasing prominence in southern African and global affairs. To date, however, no substantial study of the contribution of the official ideology of the ruling party to Zimbabwe's foreign policy has emerged.

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[1]For a list of the most important of these see: 5 Years of Achievement. Ministry of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Causeway, Harare, April 1985. p. 35

[2]Ibid., p. 34

[3]The authors borrow this concept from Rokeach (1960, 35) who defines a "belief-disbelief system" as follows:

> "It includes all of a person's beliefs and therefore is meant

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> to be more inclusive than what is normally meant by ideology. Ideology also refers to a more or less institutionalised set of beliefs -- 'the views someone picks up'. Belief-disbelief systems contain these too but, in addition, they contain highly personalised pre-ideological beliefs".

[4]Reed (1987, 50) has recently suggested as much, arguing that foreign policy was probably the area in which the Rhodesian state apparatus was at its weakest

[5]In this regard see Patel (1985), who quotes several statements by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs which support Aluko's contention

[6]For a particularly revealing exposition on how this is done, see "Nkaka addresses Promotion Council" (PS 144/85/EM/SC. 12 April 1985) in which the then Minister of National Supplies elaborated on the role of the Economic Affairs Committee of the ZANU (PF) Politburo

[7]See Chapters 3 and 5 for the theory and practice respectively of this arrangement

[8]See, for example, 'Yates', 1980

[9]See Chapter 5 for an illustration of this point

[10]I have attempted a synthesis and critique of much of the literature in my "Soviet foreign policy: ideology or power politics?" International Affairs Bulletin 11, 2, 1987. pp. 44-61. A useful recent study of ideology in the context of Soviet foreign policy is R. Judson Mitchell's Ideology of a Superpower. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1982

[11]An excellent overview of this manifest lack of agreement is to be found in Chapter 1 of the doctoral thesis by R.E. Combs, The Role of Ideology in Post-War Soviet Policy Determination. University of California, Berkeley, 1967

[12]Thus most readers and textbooks on foreign policy include a discussion of the ideological variable. See, for example: Aluko, 1977; Barber and Smith, 1984; Clapham, n.d.; DeLancey, 1980; Holsti, 1974; Jensen, 1982; Ojo, et. al., 1985; and Rosenau,

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1968

[13]For example: Anglin and Shaw, 1979; Mittelman, 1975; Mtshali, 1973; Nolutshungu, 1975; Nye, 1966; Thiam, 1965; Zartman, 1966

[14]The term is used, in the sense given it by Mittelman (1975, 38), to cover almost all aspects of political thought

[15]See, for example: Farrell and Smith, 1967; de Rivera, 1968; Rokeach, 1960

[16]For example: Bonham and Shapiro, 1977; Choucri, 1967; Falkowski, 1979; Farrell and Smith, 1967; Gray, 1975; Hopple, 1980; de Rivera, 1968; Rokeach, 1960; Wilkenfeld, et al., 1980

[17]For example: de Rivera, 1968; Rokeach, 1960; Smith, et. al., 1956; Snyder, et. al, 1954

[18]Holsti, 1969, 543-544. In support of his argument, Holsti cites the following works: Boulding, 1956; Festinger, 1957; Ray, 1962

[19]For example: Gray, 1975; Larson, 1983; de Rivera, 1968; Rokeach, 1960

[20]See, for example, the individual contributions to Wiles (1982) and Ra'anan et. al. (1935). Also: Albright, 1983; Ogunbadejo, 1981; Ottaway and Ottaway, 1981; Radu, 1982; Soremekun, 1984. Soviet Africanists have also noted and commented upon this phenomenon. While they might not agree with the conception of ideology employed throughout this dissertation, they do nonetheless recognise the emergence in the past two decades of a number of Third World states which utilise ideology in a manner which sets them apart from other Third World states. See, for example: Brutents, 1983; Gavrilov, 1983; Ulyanovsky, 1980

[21]For an elaboration on this conception of ideology, see Chapter 2

[22]See, for example: Ottaway and Ottaway (1981) and Radu (1982). Also the recently established 'Marxist Regimes' series published by Frances Pinter, England

[23]The article published by Radu (1982) is a notable exception

[24]The articles by Kunert (1981), Kunert and Vale (1984) and Gregory (1987a) are rare exceptions to the rule

Chapter Two: The Concept of Ideology

This chapter reviews some of the extensive literature on the concept of ideology. It is hoped that this will assist one in understanding the influence of ideology on developments in Zimbabwe since independence, particularly with regard to foreign policy. With the terminological and conceptual confusion that currently surrounds this term ideology must be clearly defined from the start. Thus, after a brief examination of the origins and early usages of the term, some of the more contemporary conceptions of ideology are reviewed. Any attempt to conceive of and define ideology must include a consideration of its perceived role and functions. These are extensively treated in this section in an effort to gain maximum insight into the role of ideology in policy making; that of foreign policy in particular. The chapter concludes with an overview of the existing literature pertaining to the relationship between ideology and foreign policy.

2.1 Ideology: A Brief Intellectual History of the Concept

The term 'ideology' dates from the end of the

eighteenth century, when it was introduced by French philosopher Destutt de Tracy to denote the study of the origin and laws of operation of ideas. "Ideologue" was the term used to describe a person who studied the 'science of ideas', i.e. psychic facts of all kinds, and their relation to language. Napoleon I applied the term pejoratively to those whom he felt were unduly obsessed with ideas rather than action.

In its later, and (for the purposes of this study) much more important sense, ideology is used to refer to a collection of closely related beliefs and ideas, characteristic of a particular group or community. It was used in this sense by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and has come into more general usage as the influence of their ideas has spread.

For Marx and Engels, ideology is the sum total of ideas relating primarily to social life which appear to exist in their own right in the minds of those who hold them, but are in fact governed by material laws of their own. In short, ideology is the articulation of a class experience. These ideas, if they are to be termed ideological in nature, are characterised by the subjects' unawareness both of their origin in social conditions, and of the part they play in the maintenance or otherwise of these conditions. Ideology is thus <u>false</u> consciousness. Under Stalin's rule, however, Marxists came to use 'ideology' to

denote <u>all</u> forms of social consciousness, including those freed from mystification and distortion by virtue of their 'scientific' nature.[1]

The original Marxist concept was the basis of the twentieth century theory of ideology and, more generally, the sociology of knowledge. The foremost exponent of the latter school of thought, Karl Mannheim, focussed on the historical-social situation out of which individual thought emerges. He argued that all thought is ideological insofar as thought may best be understood in terms of its social context. Man is a social being, thus what he thinks is the product of a social situation, and has a social point of view.[2]

2.2 <u>Towards a Definition of Ideology</u>

Before considering the views of various writers as to the role and functions of ideology, this writer seeks to pin down the concept of ideology. From the outset it should be stated that the concern of this writer is not with the truth-value of ideology, but its functional value, so to speak. What is the input of ideology, or ideological thinking, in politics?

Dissatisfaction is felt with the "all-inclusive"[3] definitions commonly given to ideology. <u>The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary</u> (Third Edition, revised)

defines ideology as "A system of ideas concerning phenomena, especially those of social life; the manner of thinking characteristic of a class or an individual". Anthony Flew's (1979, 150) Dictionary of Philosophy defines ideology as "Generally, *any system* of ideas and norms directing political and social action".

It is evident that the term ideology has been accorded an increasingly wide range of meanings.[4] It has been argued that all thought is *ideological insofar* as thought may be understood in terms of its social content. Where the term ideology is accepted as referring to the *political sphere* of human interaction, it is understood as constituting the political values exposed by a person or a group. Thus while The African Political Dictionary defines ideology as "a set of beliefs, values, attitudes and preferences about how society ought to be organised and *for what purposes...*",[5] it goes on to assert that "All people have ideologies".[5]

Such definitions are too loose. This writer concurs with Minogue's (1980, 27) proposal of a theory of ideology which will "prevent the whole idea of ideology from going fuzzy at the edges and absorbing all forms of thought". It must be given what Mullins (1972, 498) has referred to as "*discriminating* power". The utility of the concept of ideology must

surely rest on the ability to distinguish between ideological and non-ideological thought. With this approach in mind it is asserted that, firstly, ideological thought is distinctly political in nature, secondly, that ideological thought can be distinguished from other forms of political thought. Each of these contentions will be briefly defended.

Carlsnaes (1981) argues that the conceptual and analytical value of the term "ideology" lies in its political, not cognitive nature. He suggests that ideology should be seen, not as a cognitive factor affecting the perceptions of a policy-maker, but as a "doctrinal and thus...consciously rational element defined in terms of explicit, action-orientated goals" (ibid., p. 184).

This writer, however, argues for a combination of the two conceptions. Ideology is a cognitive factor affecting human perception. However, where ideology differs from other forms of cognitive influence is in the area of choice; the adoption of ideology is to a far higher degree voluntaristic, while subjective perception in the form of cultural, sexual or other biases is to a far greater degree, inborn, unavoidable and natural. Ideology is cognitive, but differs insofar as it is consciously adopted for essentially political purposes at a (usually) post-pubescent age. Only then does it begin to colour perception.[7]

Political scientists do not need to use the concept of ideology to describe and analyse the peculiar cognitive or other characteristics of the relationship between thought and apperception. Other terms will suffice. "But", Carlsnaes (1981, 86) suggests, "we do need a term to characterise a political phenomenon which does not have ancient roots but which, on the contrary, has become prominent only during this century".

The conscious adoption of an ideology means, of course, that not all political thought is equally ideological. This is the second conceptual distinction asserted by this writer. Following Minogue (1980), it is argued that a distinction must be drawn between ideology and political doctrine. For, as Grace (1980, 149) has recognised, "The explanatory value of ideology is lost entirely if it cannot be contrasted with elements of politics that are non-ideological".[8] Most definitions of 'ideology' or 'ideological' imply that these terms refer to constants rather than variables. Like Putnam (1972), this writer rejects conceptions of ideology that assume that everyone (or at least everyone in modern society) is equally ideological.

At this point we are still left with the question of what exactly is ideology. For this writer the answer

must be that one cannot provide exact parameters for ideology. The distinction between ideology and other forms of political thought is neither absolute nor the same in all cases. However, to avoid the charge of aporia, a schema of characteristics each of which has appeared with some frequency as one element in a definition of ideology or ideological is provided. This is followed by an enumeration and discussion of various functions of ideology. The [illegible] concludes with an examination of ZANU (PF)'s conception of ideology, as presented both in doctrinal writings and in statements by prominent party members. It is hoped that, by this approach, the concept of ideology will be made sufficently coherent for analysis for the purposes of this thesis.

Table 2: Possible Elements in the Definition of Ideology or Ideological

"Political actors may be said to be ideological when they are..."(Choose one or more)

1. Guided by a comprehensive, consistent, deductively organised belief system

2. Guided by an explicit, consciously held belief system

3 Guided by a belief system that is closed, rigid, resistant to new information.

4. Guided by a belief system that is effectively or

emotionally charged

5 Guided by a belief system that distorts or oversimplifies reality, that is 'biased' or 'irrational'

6. Guided by a philosophy of history and/or a social theory that is applied to everyday questions and issues.

7. Concerned with abstract principles, not concrete interests.

8. Future orientated, utopian

9. Hostile and intolerant toward political opponents; prone to dichotomous "black-white" thinking; 'paranoid'

10. Opposed to compromise, bargaining, incrementalism, and other aspects of pluralist politics

11. Alienated from established social and political institutions

12. Extremist

13. Orientated to conflict and opposed to consensus

14. Authoritarian; a moral absolutist; prone to value ends, not means.

2.3 The Role and Functions of Ideology

One path to an understanding of ideology is to examine its role and functions. For, as Carew Hunt (1958,14) has noted, ideology is significant only if it makes its adherents act in a way they would not otherwise

do. From an examination of the literature the following six principal functions emerge: description, explanation, prescription, legitimation, unity, and action. The legitimation, unity and action functions are derived from the three cognitive functions of description, explanation and prescription.[10]

Of course these functions cannot be as easily separated in practice. It proves extremely difficult to separate, for example, unity from action. While the former may initially precede the latter, action taken will then come to have the effect of consolidating the social group involved. In a similar way, the cognitive functions contribute to the creation of unity which, once sufficiently established, then may act to cement cognitive unity amongst adherents to the ideology. For the purposes of analysis, an attempt will be made in the following discussion to separate the functions of ideology. However, the inter-relatedness of these means that a certain repetition in the discussion is unavoidable.

Before embarking upon an examination of these functions a general introductory note on the role of ideology is called for.

2.3.1 The Role of Ideology

The debate on the contribution of ideology to the making of both domestic and foreign policy, has ranged

from a complete denial of any motivational impact to views verging on ideological determinism. This study *explicitly rejects both extremes* on this policy continuum. Ideology is neither pure deception nor the sole determinant of political behaviour. It is neither mere camouflage for economic-class interests, nor an unambigious guide to political behaviour. As this writer has elsewhere observed, in analysing ideology, one is dealing with propensities.[11] Would one then be correct in asserting that ideologists sometimes employ non-ideological thinking? This writer would argue that seldom if ever is this so when dealing with politics. Ideology is in such circumstances always present -- albeit sometimes less evidently so than at other times -- in the form of fundamental philosophic assumptions or premises. In understanding this point A. Ross Johnson's schema is useful.[12] Johnson differentiates three levels of political ideas found in communist ideology:

(1) general philosophical assumptions -- for example, dialectical materialism;

(2) doctrinal elements, indicating the general direction of political action in a given historical period -- for example, the dictatorship of the proletariat;

(3) 'action programs': programs of political action, specifically tied to particular historical and socio-economic conditions -- for example, Stalin's "social-

ism in one country" and Mao Tse-Tung's "modern revisionism." Programs of political action are always subject to revision by the political leaders, and such revision is considered to be both positive and necessary. "Action programs" are often indistinguishable from "policies" in a Communist political system; they differ from "policies" in a pragmatic political system in terms of their continuous and conscious derivation from and justification in terms of especially the doctrinal but also the philosophical elements of the ideology. "Doctrine is thus the politically crucial link between dogmatic assumptions and pragmatic action".[13]

In the case of Soviet ideology, it is the obvious revision of doctrinal elements and action programmes which throw many Western scholars off the scent, leading them to assert that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) does not believe in its official ideology, or even that the Soviet view of the world is not much different from that conception held by Western statesmen. However it is the central philosophical assumptions which <u>fundamentally</u> colour the ideologue's view of the world, even on these occasions when he is being more obviously 'pragmatic' than usual.[14] Richard Lowenthal (1958, 21) has pointed out that:

> "...empirical 'Realpolitik' without ideological conceptions

> can exist as little as can 'empirical science' without categories and hypotheses based *on theoretical speculation*".

In sum, then, ideology plays an ever-present role in policy-making. However its impact is variable, ranging from unspoken, even subconscious assumptions on the nature of the international system, to postures of a more clearly ideologically-inspired nature. *Assessment of the nature and level of the contribution of* ideological thought to political judgement and action is further complicated by the fact that ideological and non-ideological behaviour may have the same, or similar expression. Thus it is often important to ascertain not only the nature of a particular policy or posture, but also the underlying motivation or rationale.

2.3.2 Functions of Ideology

Most scholars agree on the significance of the cognitive functions of ideology.[15] Ideology assists in the 'construction of reality'[16] by means of description, explanation and prescription, providing what Mittelman (1975, 34) describes as a "cognitive scheme". First of all, ideology furnishes a descriptive and explanatory assessment of the prevailing situation; in Mullins' (1972), 504) words, it "conceptualises the historical process". In the light of this assessment, ideology then prescribes in the form of strategy and goals, what should be done to overcome the status quo, and the methods by which this

might be accomplished. Mullins (Ibid., 504) highlights the connection between description, explanation and prescription:

> "How the future is conceived will be greatly influenced, of course, by how the present and the past are understood".

Triska and Finley (1968, 115) have elaborated on this link, with reference to Marxist-Leninist ideology:

> "Aside from goal formation, it appears necessary that Marxist-Leninist doctrine as a cognitive science, if operative in the elite's belief system, must strongly influence expectations of historical development and the consequences of its own actions. The cognitive proposition of Marxist-Leninist doctrine must be drawn upon to define the forthcoming situation in which action is contemplated. They should also affect judgements of the relative viability of perceived alternatives".

Ideology thus contains both factual and normative elements.

Brzezinski (1967) reminds us that no ideology, however elaborate, can provide answers to all aspects of historical development. Unforeseen events are continually thrown up to confound the policymaker.[17] What is important is adherence to the basic assumptions or premises which, internalised to a greater or lesser extent by the adherents, influence their interpretation of and reaction to events. As Johnson (1972, 2) has pointed out, there are different levels of thought within ideology, each differing in its

discreteness and generality of application.

With reference to Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, Brzezinski (1967, 132) asserts that "The persisting and important role of ideological assumptions in the thinking and actions of Soviet leaders...is essential to an understanding of their conduct...". He (Ibid, 133-134) lists some of these assumptions: a commitment to economic and dialectical determinism in history; a conviction that the vehicle of history is class struggle; an apocalyptic vision of the future and, allied to this, a belief in the inevitable triumph of the communist form of social organisation, which is rooted in the conviction that most social evils arise out of private ownership; the conviction that socialist construction is predicated upon the complete control of power by the Communist Party; the Leninist concept of the necessity for the violent seizure of power, reflecting the dominance of 'consciousness' over 'khvostism' in historical processes; and the Leninist concept of imperialism as affecting the relationship between the capitalist and the underdeveloped countries.[18] Brzezinski (Ibid, 135) suggests that "the combination of Marxist doctrine, Russian revolutionary experience, social-economic backwardness, and the vested interest of the ruling Bolshevik Party" resulted in the notion of an immutable hostility between capitalism and socialism, upon which global social developments depend.

Brzezinski (ibid.) concludes that the abovementioned "conceptual and analytical factors combined serve to organise the Soviet vision of international affairs, to define goals, and to evaluate reality". The ideology, as derived from the meshing together of doctrinal principles and the specific reality of those who subscribe to the ideology "then becomes part of the reality and an autonomously existing factor, conditioning behaviour through the selection of the various policy alternatives that may exist at any particular moment" (ibid., pp. 135-136).

By providing a common cognitive map, ideology positively impacts upon the unity of its adherents. This effect is particularly important in a Third World setting given the imperative for national unity -- and the usual marked absence of it -- within most developing states (Mittelman, 1975; Zartman,1966). Ideology can create common gound by furnishing a shared interpretation of the existing order, and a vision of the future.

Zartman (1966, 37) argues specifically within the context of a newly independent state that ideology provides consolidation, identification and assurance. Consolidation is bound up with legitimation; in consolidating the elite's position, ideology legitimises that position and provides a new basis for

unity. Old myths and values are succeeded by replacements furnished by the ideology. (For Johnson [1968, 81] the legitimation of a program of social action is the basic function of ideology.) The element of faith is important for, as Zartman (ibid., 37) notes, the pressures of the revolutionary situation do not permit experimentation and demonstration (cf. Mittelman, 1975, 37). Authority is thus conferred upon the propagators as they have the accepted version of events; their power is legitimised by their ability to explain.

This consolidation function extends down the political hierarchy: by creating a "community of faith" (Zartman, p. 37), ideology imparts a sense of unity and solidarity to the true believers, the cadres (Phillips, 1984; Plano and Olton,1982). Moreover, the newly-created solidarity now in itself becomes a value to be defended; not only is authority thus legitimated, but also its ultimate attribute, the use of violence.

Understanding the unity or consolidation function is crucial for an appreciation of the nature of ideology. One thus avoids the interpretation of doctrine as merely a cover for and rationalisation of interpersonal or interstate power struggles. Of many, perhaps most political leaders, it is true to say that "Ideology is believed, before it is used" (Zartman,

op. cit., 39).

Both legitimation and unity are tied up with the identity that ideology can provide. This is a key issue in most African states, which lack national solidarity. Zartman (Ibid., 38) argues that ideological solidarity offers an alternative to nationalist sentiments. Ideology identifies the resentment of its adherents and plausibly explains the causes of and solutions to these resentments. Ideology enables one to identify friends and enemies -- both domestic and external -- of society. Moreover, the existence of a common identifiable enemy both necessitates and facilitates solidarity and identity.

Zartman argues for the centrality of enemies within ideological thought. No mere scape-goat, the enemy has a "satanic role" (p. 40), and as such is crucial to the ideology. As the ideologues encounter problems and setbacks, they must blame these on the enemy in order to sustain the ideology. Indeed, for the ideologue, setbacks are prima facie evidence of the enemy's presence.

Prescription and unity combine to promote the durability of the ideology. As noted earlier, ideology not only describes and explains the existing situation, it also points the way to future goals. The believer accepts more readily the present

inequitable situation safe in the knowledge that the ideology assures a better future. More importantly, the ideology deflects present failure away from the adherent and onto the identifiable enemy. When treated in this way, failure, even successive failure, can promote not scepticism but fanaticism, convincing believers of the need for a more concerted effort to deflect the enemy.[19] On the other hand, a few successes -- not necessarily at home, but within the international ideological community -- can boost domestic confidence in the ideology, and in this way promote its durability.

Central to ideology is its action component. Ideology is used to promote action. By explaining the historical process, ideology motivates human participation in this process (Mullins, 1972; Mittelman, 1975). It justifies participation by providing a moral basis for action (Johnson, 1968; Blais, 1968); the existing order is condemned and the superiority of the future order is explained. Goals, objectives, and the tactics and strategies to be employed are furnished (Mullins, 1972); Zartman, 1966). But more than this, ideology communicates these cognitions, evaluations, ideals and purposes among members of groups. For Mullins (1972, 509) this is the importance of ideology for politics.

Moreover, ideology encourages and legitimises action.

Description and prescription intertwine to provide political and psychological support. In Mullins (ibid.) words:

> "The significance of ideology in mobilisation is not that it 'causes one to do' but that it 'gives one cause for doing'".

In short, ideology provides grounds for the political activity engaged in.

2.4 The Link Between Ideology and Foreign Policy

Much of the previous discussion on the role and functions of ideology is, of course, applicable to foreign policy; this particular area of political activity cannot be totally divorced from other, domestic political activity. Moreover, the previous section was not specifically orientated towards the domestic milieu, but was more general in nature. In the following section, however, the views of several scholars, specifically on the ideology/foreign policy nexus, will be examined as we attempt to increase our understanding of ideology with reference to its impact on the formulation and practice of foreign policy.

Brzezinski (1967) has made a considerable contribution to the understanding of the impact of Marxism-Leninism upon Soviet foreign policy. His views will be considered at some length, as this writer argues that, given ZANU (PF)'s self-professed and self-defined Marxist-Leninist stand-point, these views may shed

some valuable light upon ZANU (PF)'s foreign policy orientation and conduct.

Brzezinski (Ibid. , 136) argues that it is important to draw a distinction between short- and long-range prospects. The former are, he suggests, naturally much more susceptible to the imperatives of the moment. That is not to say, however, that short-term policy is immune to ideology. For short-term policy is only partially a function of the situation as created by external forces. As Brzezinski (1967, 136-137) points out:

> "They are also the consequence of certain long-range commitments made by the Soviet Union itself, and in that sense they are the product of the factors that shape the nature of that long-range commitment. From that standpoint, they do feel the impact of ideology on Soviet external behaviour and policy".

Brzezinski (ibid., 137) argues that the general Soviet approach to international affairs is significantly affected by "the fundamental Soviet assumption that all material reality changes continuously through the clash of antagonistic contradictions". For this reason, he argues, the Soviets have an intense preoccupation with change.

Brzezinski's view of the impact of ideology on foreign policy is in substantial agreement with the discussion in the previous section of this chapter. He regards

ideology as impacting upon each stage of policy formation -- understanding, evaluation and action. Ideology *defines, first of all,* the ultimate purposes to which policy must aspire. It also provides the conceptual tools with which to understand and evaluate the various historical phases -- revolutionary quiescent, imperialist, or one characterised by national liberation movements -- that serve as stages on the way to the ultimate goal. Finally, the nature of a particular phase having been *established,* the main enemy must be correctly identified, and appropriate measures taken.

Brzezinski argues that Marxist-Leninist ideology is responsible for infusing Soviet foreign policy with a keen appreciation of the close relationship between international affairs and domestic developments. The Soviet elite regards inter-state relations as but one *aspect of international* relations. The classic realist perspective (international relations as principally the interplay between states of various sizes, each pursuing its own national interests) is rejected in favour of a view of the world as "a continuing struggle among a variety of interests -- domestic, social, economic, political, as well as national" (Brzezinski, 1967, 139). It is ideology which predisposes the CPSU to evaluate the international situation in terms of a complex correlation of forces, rather than a states-orientated

balance of power.[20]

Ideology also *infuses Soviet foreign policy* with "a sense of continuity in purpose".[21] Notwithstanding both its desire and its ability to adapt to prevailing circumstances, the Soviet leadership derives a sense of continuity from its militant conception of relations in which reality is viewed as continuous conflict. Accordingly, there can be few Soviet long-range commitments to the status quo, given *this* teleological conception of history.

For Brzezinski (Ibid., 140), ideology imparts an absolute attitude of self-righteousness to Soviet foreign policy, arising out of the Soviet conviction that, in the final analysis, Soviet foreign policy is always objectively correct since it is geared to history. A corollary of this is the belief that the *USSR is always promoting the cause* of peace, even when waging war.

Related to its long-term perspective is a "sense of compulsive obligation" (Ibid., 146), on the part of the Soviet Union, to assist the global spread of communism. In this respect Soviet foreign policy differs from Czarist foreign policy. *To be sure*, certain traditional concerns -- national security, frontiers, national power, etc -- are common to both. Brzezinski argues that the CPSU regards these

essentially short-term concerns in terms of certain long-range perspectives, and not as ends in themselves. Thus, he argues, "the Soviet conception of their own security is inherently offensive; as long as alternative political systems exist, there is continued (sic) need to be preoccupied with security issues" (ibid., 142). Moreover:

> "Because they see themselves as part of a historical process toward a defined end, the Soviet leaders are compelled to view any effort to 'stabilize' or to 'normalize' the international situation as a hostile design". (Ibid.)

National interest, Brzezinski argues, must be viewed in terms of the ultimate ideological objective. For, he suggests, Soviet leaders regard any policy which increases the power and capability of the USSR to promote communism, to be in their national interest. Brzezinski (ibid., 147) concludes that Soviet insistence on ultimate peace as depending on the total victory of a particular social system led by a particular political party "injects into international affairs an element of a fundamental struggle for survival not conducive to conflict resolution".

Zartman (1966) considers the impact of ideology on the foreign policies of underdeveloped (specifically African) states. He identifies six distinct functions of ideology with reference to external relations. Each will be considered in turn.

1. Zartman (1966, 41) discusses the "general use of ideology to *perceive events* and explain their meanings". For Zartman (ibid.) this is the most important *function of ideology*. Like Brzezinski (1967), Zartman argues that ideology provides a *perceptual base for the making of foreign policy*; guerrillas are regarded as terrorists, bandits, or *freedom fighters*, while a secessionist movement is regarded by some observers as legitimate, by others as *rebellious or even traitorous*. Such perceptions will, of course, have ramifications for policies to be adapted, and actions to be taken. For example, friends and enemies can thus be identified as a basis for policy.

2. Ideology can be used for justification, Zartman observes. It serves to legitimate policy choices, to make them more acceptable, both to other states and to the domestic audience. Zartman (ibid., 43) suggests that each use of ideological myth strengthens the doctrinal base as much as it does the policy. However, he claims, if a state felt an action to be necessary, but unjustifiable in ideological terms, it would proceed regardless. Zartman suggests that states can become prisoners of their justifications as the more a state justifies a policy on certain grounds, the harder it becomes to break ranks. Only the ambiguity of the involved political myths and the emergence of new -- or differently perceived --

solutions makes escape possible.

3. Ideology is power. Besides its domestic legitimation and other functions, ideology can also create a basis for interstate or interparty solidarity, conferring international influence on the followers of the ideology. Zartman (ibid., 43) contends that in this way, ideology "helps the new African states to overcome their powerlessness by using symbols and values as a more readily available and more rapidly constructed power base than material elements of national power".

4. Ideology also indicates possible courses of action, not by prescribing specific policy, but rather by limiting options.[22]

5. More importantly, ideology may limit the policy options of others. According to Zartman (ibid., 45):

> "An essential role of ideology is to decree the unthinkable, and thus tie the hands of the enemy with his own inhibitions".

6. Ideology is prescriptive, outlining the new order or political culture which foreign policies are to strive to attain. This new state of affairs is both an objective, and a promise. As the goal is frequently in conflict with the existing status quo, the state cannot merely defend its interests, altering or maintaining its position in the state system, but

must alter the system itself. Zartman (ibid., 46-47) elaborates on this point:

> "To the ideologue, the external environment must be revised in order to secure domestic goals and support the internal system. This visionary and revisionist aspect also makes plain the total nature of ideology. The new order is not only internal, it is above all external, indivisible, universal. The minute it starts to lose these characteristics, it begins to compromise, loses its purity, and weakens its solidarity function".

As it can find no ultimate security within the extant state system, the ideological policy must work for the construction of a new environment.

Notwithstanding the six functions of ideology identified by Zartman, he is at pains to suggest that few states promote a purely ideological policy. Where these do exist, he argues, it is usually when no direct state interest in involved; for instance when the target states are geographically distant from the instigator states. An example cited by Zartman (ibid., 48) is support by "revolutionary-idealist regimes" for subversion against other African states. In such cases "ideology is used to identify the friend and the enemy, give support to the friend on the basis of an accepted view of the forces of history, and justify the action" (Ibid.).

Far more common, Zartman argues, is a mixture of

ideology and national interest, the two representing extremes on a foreign policy continuum. Zartman (Ibid.) identifies three more common situations mixing ideology with national interest: "those states that speak ideologically and act according to interest, those states that mix their motives for the same end, and those states that contribute to a sort of situational dialectic in which their ideological policies, confronted by the pressures of reality, produce a new environment that is different from the status quo ante but that falls short of the ideal". Zartman cautions against slotting a state's foreign policy into any one of these categories; a particular state's policy may fit one category at one time and another on a different occasion.

2.5 The "Ideology vs National Interest" Controversy.

Any exploration of the international dimension of ideology almost inevitably encounters the perennial argument of ideology versus national interest. Zartman (1966) is a case in point. The debate has ranged from a complete denial of any motivational impact of ideology, to views verging on ideological determinism.[23] Much of this does not bear repeating. In a previous section this writer hopefully made clear his attitude to these extreme positions. Instead this writer will proffer his own conclusions on the matter.

From our earlier general examination of the functions of ideology, it is clear that the major function of ideology is cognitive. Ideology enables one to impose some sort of coherent order on the environment. What are the ramifications of this for the national interest argument?

National interest must, of necessity, be a key variable in the thinking of any foreign policy-maker who hopes to pursue a foreign policy option with any reasonable degree of success. However, the fallacious assumption underlying most arguments which downplay ideology in favour of national interest is the idea that national interest is some objective thing waiting only to be discovered -- and thus that the ideological element, if present at all, can be factored out at will. However there is little -- if anything -- in the way of criteria which objectively constitute national interest.[24] States do not find their interests, they choose them.

Perhaps the best historical example of this is the nascent post-1917 Bolshevik state. Faced with the choice of either continuing to promote international proletarian revolution, or the protection of the new Soviet state, Lenin compromised. He chose to consolidate the new state as a base from which to promote revolution. This has led to an ineluctable

tension within Soviet foreign policy formulation between classical raison d'etat and what this writer terms 'raison de la revolution'. In other words, how to promote international systemic change while at the same time coping with the reality of being a state amongst 160-odd states.

In sum, then, it surely goes without saying that, as with any other state goals, national interest arises out of the perception and values of the polity concerned. Ideology plays its part in the choice of values and the shaping of perceptions, and in this way contributes to the construction and pursuit of the national interest pursued by an ideologically committed ruling elite.[25]

For this writer, debate centres not around the issue of whether or not ideology can have a motivational role in foreign policy formulation, but around the precise nature of that role. In what ways does ideology impact upon the formulation and practice of foreign policy? It is hoped that some answers to this and other related questions will emerge in the course of this research.

2.6 The Role of Ideology Within ZANU (PF) Thought

This chapter would not be complete without a look at ZANU (PF)'s conception of ideology, as seen through

the writings and public statements of the party elite. This section will examine the general place of ideology within ZANU (PF) doctrine; an explication of ZANU (PF)'s understanding of the relationship between ideology and foreign policy will be left for the following chapter.

ZANU (PF) historiography, such as it is, distinguishes a significant break-through in the party's opposition to white minority rule. The adoption of Marxist-Leninist ideology in about 1973 is claimed to have transformed the nature of the party.[26] In 1978, Mugabe (1983, 58) reminded his followers that:

> "We are not a social club, nor are we just any Party. We are a socialist Party committed to a scientific socialist ideology whose basic principles are clearly enunciated".

Ideology, it is claimed, is ZANU (PF)'s distinguishing characteristic.

Indeed, since the mid-1970's a considerable number of the party elite have spoken of ideology as constituting a significant factor in party thought and action. As early as 1974 Herbert Chitepo, the then ZANU Chairman, declared the party to be "guided by the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution".[27] At the historic Central Committee meeting held at Chimoio in 1977, at which Mugabe's leadership of the party was confirmed, the new ZANU President asserted that

"Ideology guides the Party. The leadership which leads the Party must, therefore, be ideologically orientated" (Mugabe, 1983, 38). In the same year Mugabe alluded to the lack of "ideological direction" (ibid., p. 41) in Zimbabwean black nationalist politics, prior to the formation of ZANU. The party avoided this pitfall with the adoption, in 1973, of Marxism-Leninism as "its guiding philosophy"(ibid., p. 38). Thus in 1978 Mugabe referred to scientific socialism as "the basis, on which we would like to operate politically and socio-economically" (ibid., p. 180). In the same year he argued that "The ideology of our party...must provide both the direction and motivation..." (ibid., p. 56) for all members of the party hierarchy.

Put simply, ZANU (PF) asserts that "Ideology guides the Party "(ibid., 38). This it appears to do in three ways: ideology describes and analyses reality, then prescribes solutions and/or courses of action accordingly. Ideology plays a significant role in shaping ZANU (PF) perceptions both of what is, and of what ought to be.

ZANU (PF) uses ideology as a prism by means of which to order reality. According to Mugabe (ibid., 67), the significance of the period of "ideological transformation" (1972-74) was that it "enabled the Party to identify the struggle not merely in terms of

its nationalist nature...but also in terms of its class character".[28] Beginning in the early 1970's, the military training of ZANLA recruits included a rudimentary political education, utilising Marxist-Leninist categories of analysis.[29] Maurice Nyagumbo has, since independence, spoken of the role of ideology in enabling workers to understand the "scientific basis of their society".[30] It is important that workers appreciate not only the fact of their oppression, but the reasons for this sorry state of affairs.[31] Ideology assists in this understanding, furnishing not only a description, but an explanation of the situation.

Ideology functions as a cognitive prism for the party elite as well. According to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witness Mangwende, ideology is of paramount importance in the elaboration of foreign policy insofar as it provides a "filter"[32] through which reality is perceived.

Within ZANU (PF) thinking ideology clearly has an important prescriptive function. It not only describes and analyses what exists, but also in what ways the prevailing situation should be changed. Ideology thus actively sets goals for the movement. In 1977, Mugabe (1983, 47; my emphasis) declared that the adoption by the party of scientific socialist ideology "<u>demands</u> of us that the enemy's political

structure be dismantled to create room for a new political socio-economic order...". In the following year, Mugabe (ibid., 69) spoke of the consistency of ZANU's ideological approach in "charting the goal of the revolution pre-independence and the revolution post-independence." In a list of pre-requisites for revolution, Mugabe (ibid., 177) included"...a clear ideology charting out a clear ideological line".

The adoption of Marxist-Leninist ideology predicates the use of armed struggle and the aim of revolution rather than reform. Indeed the predilection for violent revolution is quite logical in the light of a prior acceptance of an ideological analysis of the existing status quo.

Nyagumbo has elaborated on the continuing role of ideology in the post-independence era:[33]

> "It is on the basis of these [Marxist-Leninist] principles that we shall restructure and reconstruct our national economy so as to ensure the victory of socialism over capitalism. It is also on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles that we shall create social justice, national unity, a national culture and upon which we shall base our foreign policy."

In September 1980 the Zimbabwean Premier was explicit on the prescriptive role of ideology with regard to post-independence socio-economic goals:[34]

> "...socialism gives us the intellectual and theoretical framework for the direction or *orientation of our policies* and programme".

ZANU (PF) socialism, Mugabe reminded his audience, is based on Marxist-Leninist principles.[35] Mugabe's statement highlights the cognitive role of ideology within party doctrine. Herbert Ushewokunze (1984, 5) has gone so far as to assert that, "Without the criterion of socialist ideology, our institutions cannot carry out socialist transformation".

For Nathan Shamuyarira (1976, 571) the prescriptive role of ideology is two-fold. It not only "acts as a general guide in the formulation of policy and in response to the many issues and situations that arise", but is also important insofar as it provides "a vision of the kind of society the movement wants to create" (Ibid.).

Prescription should, of course, result in action. Mugabe in 1985 made explicit the link between ideology and ZANU (PF)'s policies:[36]

> "The business of socio-economic management is first and foremost the business of national planning involving definite policy orientations, but such policy orientation must, in the view of my Party, emanate from our exposed *socialist philosophy...*".

On a previous occasion the Zimbabwean Premier was more to the point:[37]

> "The policies that my government pursues emanate from the ruling party. ZANU (PF) has adopted socialism as its ideology".

Hence the socialist thrust of the three-year Transitional National Development Plan, as exemplified by the following policies: the increased acquisition of land by the State, the creation of agricultural and industrial cooperatives, increased State participation in all sectors of the economy, central planning, the pre-eminence of ruling party over Government, increased social services, an increased role o the worker in production, and the regulation of private enterprise to comply with State objectives.[38]

In his 1984/85 New Year message to the nation, the Zimbabwean Premier described scientific socialism as "the ideological modality through which transformation in the various fields just mentioned will be carried out".[39] These areas ranged from social services, through industry, commerce and agriculture, to international relations.[40]

Nyagumbo has argued that ZANU (PF)'s struggle for independence has both a national and an ideological element. Prior to independence the emphasis was nationalist. This accomplished by means of the attainment of national independence, "the second objective, namely the ideological one of seeking to

establish a just society on scientific socialism (sic), assumed a new primacy...".[41]

Nyagumbo made the point that this was not true of all the allies of the phase of armed struggle, but only for the workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals. While the nationalists' objectives were achieved in April 1980:[42]

> "the revolution of the workers and peasants is a continuous one, transcending even the temporary peace and stability promised by every bourgeois regime. Historically, this is so because the workers and peasants, being the most exploited by capitalism, will not stop fighting until capitalism has been dismantled".

Members of the party elite have alluded to the motivation function of ideology. Nyagumbo, for instance, discussed the importance of ideology in motivating the proletariat so as to accomplish ruling party objectives. He argued that it is not enough that workers hate oppression, they must also understand its source. Here ideology is invaluable insofar as it furnishes an understanding of the "scientific basis of...society".[43] The ideology is necessary if the working class is to be given the class consciousness needed for them to follow the Party's lead. As one ZANU (PF) writer put it:[44]

> "The co-relation (sic) and alignment of class forces and the level of class consciousness or political consciousness

> determines the pace at which we forge ahead with our revolutionary process. In other words the extent to which various sections of our society have developed revolutionary political consciousness determines the degree to which we can effect qualitative socio-economic transformation".

The ideological rationale is clearly present: class struggle as the motive force of historical development. The party elite is no exception. As Mugabe (1983,56) declared in 1978, ideology "must provide both the direction and motivation" for all members of the party hierarchy.

ZANU (PF)'s ideology not only motivates but legitimises action. For some of the ruling party elite, Marxism-Leninism justifies participation by providing a moral basis for action. According to Mugabe, the capitalist/socialist confrontation is "one of conflict between morality and immorality".[45] Mugabe has elaborated, in some detail, on this theme.[46]

Unity is tied in with perception, motivation and action. Mugabe and his colleagues have frequently argued that national unity is the prerequisite for socialist development. In one of his more recent statements, the President asserted that:[47]

> "Only when there is a one Zimbabwe People with One Leader will a scientific re-organisation of Society along socialist lines be possible".

Marxist-Leninist ideology thus provides the rationale for the adoption of a single-party state system.

In his capacity as First Secretary of *ZANU (PF)*, Mugabe argued that, by endorsing the Party's Marxist-Leninist line, the Second Party Congress laid "the basis for uniting all those who believe in scientific socialism".[48]

Maurice Nyagumbo has clearly outlined the importance of ideology in creating proletarian class unity. He asserted that "the capacity of the working people and the peasants to construct a socialist state depends on the degree of their consciousness of their long-term interests as a class".[49] Nyagumbo went on to discuss, inter alia, the task of the party in providing the workers with "political ideological education whose (sic) main thrust is to make them conscious of themselves as a class distinguished from the...bourgeoisie...".[50] As only ideology, it is claimed, can inculcate this awareness, Marxism-Leninism is indispensable to ZANU (PF).

In an earlier discussion, Zartman (1966,40) argued for the centrality of enemies within ideological thought. Certainly, within ZANU (PF) literature the term 'enemy' is frequently employed. Mugabe (1983, 177) has asserted that a prerequisite for revolutionary

struggle is a "clear analysis of the conflict situation resulting in a clear definition and identification of the principal enemy and the reactionary forces supporting him". On a separate occasion Mugabe (ibid., 47) argued that the correct identification of the enemy by ZANU (PF) constituted an important stage in the prosecution of the armed struggle.[51] The identification of an enemy contributes to both the unity and motivation of party members.

From this examination of the place of ideology in ZANU (PF) thought, the centrality of ideology clearly emerges. Ideology is viewed as necessary to impart clarity, commitment and unity to the driving force of the revolution, the workers and peasants. Its fundamental importance rests on the belief that, without ideology, the scientific basis of society can be neither understood nor changed. Proletarian unity is dependent upon proletarian class consciousness. This, in turn, is dependent upon ideological education. The central organisational role in all of this must, the ideology dictates, be played by ZANU (PF), the party in the vanguard of the revolution.

It is for this latter reason -- the role of the ruling party in the promulgation of socialist revolution -- that the period following the 1984 Party Congress has witnessed renewed calls for a vanguard of committed

cadres. The Congress itself resolved to establish the Herbert Chitepo Ideological College for the education of cadres with the 'correct' outlook. It is widely argued that, for the country to progress from the present national democratic stage, ZANU (PF) must transform itself into an elitist vanguard party. Ushewokunze (1984, 33) has called for the replacement, by ideology, of race, tribe, region and family differences, as a basis for discrimination. It would appear that, in the years to come, members of the ruling party elite will attempt to make ideology an increasingly prominent constituent part of all aspects of Zimbabwean life. The Prime Minister himself has intimated no less.[52]

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[1] Kolakowski, 1981, I, p. 154

[2] The dominant meaning of ideology within Mannheim's work is "the whole outlook of a social group". (quoted in Mullins, 1972, 500)

[3] The term is Mittelman's (1975, 38)

[4] Perhaps the best review of the many meanings of ideology is Naess, A. Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1956. Especially pp. 141-176

[5] Phillips, 1984, p. 173

[6] Ibid.

[7] Both Rokeach (1960, 35) and Glazer (1954, 293) appear to support this point. Rokeach approvingly cites Glazer's conceptualisation of ideology as "the views someone picks up", in order to differentiate it from his own concept of a 'belief-disbelief system'. My point is surely particularly true of most, if not all Third World states in which there is still a very low level of awareness of, and adherence to, Marxist-

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Leninist ideology. The contention of the voluntary and conscious adoption of ideology is more problematic when one applies it to the older, more established Marxist-Leninist regimes. In the Soviet Union, for instance, Marxist-Leninist assumptions have become so much part and parcel of much of the Soviet consciousness; they must infuse the thought of many Soviet citizens without their necessarily being always aware of the intrusion. However, perhaps even the constant referral to doctrine in that country supports the point made above regarding the conscious element in ideology

[8]Mittelman (1975, 39) argues along similar lines that:

> "Employed in this manner, ideology is too comprehensive and has little utility for distinguishing among aspects of political behaviour. Since it fails to further empirical investigation, this broad type of definition has little analytic value".

This difficulty is also recognised by Sartori, *1969*, pp. 398-400

[9]This schema is drawn from Putnam, 1973, 32

[10]See Zartman (1966, 35-41) for an excellent example of this

[11]Gregory, C. "Soviet foreign policy: ideology or power politics?" International Affairs Bulletin 11, 2, 1987. pp. 44-61

[12]Johnson, *1972, p. 2. Johnson's classification is* drawn from Brzezinski, Z. The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Action. Revised edition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967. pp. 489-490

[13]Ibid., own emphases

[14]I have discussed this point at greater length in my "Soviet foreign policy..." op. cit.

[15]For example: Jensen, 1982; Mittelman, 1975; Holsti, 1983; Mullins, 1972; Plamenatz, 1971; *Brzezinski, 1967; Zartman, 1966.* Compare Carlsnaes, 1981

[16]The phrase is borrowed from de Rivera, 1968

[17]*Even Lenin (1968, 80), who argued for the* omnipotence of Marxism, conceded that:

> "History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced parties".

[18]*Jensen (1982), Radu (1982) and Carew Hunt (1958a)* are in substantial agreement

[19]Holt and van de Welde, 1960, 777

[20]For a brief but illuminating comparison of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist concept of the 'correlation of forces' with the more traditional Western concept of balance of power, see: Deane, M.J. "The Soviet conception of the 'correlation of world forces': implications for American foreign policy" Orbis Fall 1976. pp. 625-636

[21]Brzezinski, 1967, 139. Besancon (1980, 13) is in agreement

[22]Jensen (1982, 73) is in agreement

[23]For this writer's views on this issue, see: Gregory, C. "Soviet foreign policy: ideology or power politics?" International Affairs Bulletin 11, 2, 1987. pp. 41-61

[24]For the vast majority of states in the 160-or-so strong international state system, the ultimate goal is the survival of the state. For the self-professed Marxist-Leninist regimes, however, this goal is qualified as these states experience a tension between nationalist and internationalist impulses. For as the state is, according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, a class-based phenomenon, a long-term objective of the governments of such regimes must be the eventual demise of the states system. This has implications for the national interest controversy. Most classical realists would argue that physical security is a national interest 'given'. This begs the question of what constitutes security: is it territorial *inviolability, or is it a conception of 'ultimate* security' born out of a zero-sum vision of a world locked in manichaen conflict? For a thought-provoking discussion of the problems posed for Marxism by the continuing existence of international relations, see:

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[20]For a brief but illuminating comparison of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist concept of the 'correlation of forces' with the more traditional Western concept of balance of power, see: Deane, M.J. "The Soviet conception of the 'correlation of world forces': implications for American foreign policy" Orbis Fall 1976. pp. 625-636

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Berki, R.N. "On Marxian thought and the problem of international relations" World Politics XXIV, 1, 1971. pp. 80-105

[25]The Zimbabwean Foreign Minister is in substantial agreement with this point. See chapter 4 of this thesis

[26]See, for example, the following articles which first appeared in Zimbabwe News in the late 1970s, and were later included in a collection of Mugabe's political writings: "The perspective of our revolution" (Mugabe, 1983, 40-47); "ZANU carries the burden of history" (Ibid., 48-58); "The role of ZANU in the struggle" (Ibid., 63-69)

[27]Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979, p. 289

[28]Party literature contains numerous examples of class analytical writings. See, for example: Makamure, K. "An analysis of social classes in Zimbabwe" Zimbabwe News 17, 2, 1986. pp. 14-17; "The second phase of our revolution" Zimbabwe News 14, 2, 1983. pp. 6-8; "Political education in ZANU: abridged commissariat lectures" Zimbabwe News 10, 1, 1978. pp. 53-59. A number of other Marxist-Leninist categories of analysis prevalent in ZANU (PF) writings may be found in Chapter 5 of this thesis

[29]See, for example: "Political education in ZANU: abridged commissariat lectures" Zimbabwe News 10, 1, 1978. pp. 53-59

[30]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" PS 509/84/MA/SD. 25 July 1984. p. 6

[31]Ibid.

[32]"Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy -- Mangwende" PS 330/83/AM. 12 May 1983. p. 3. This point will be followed up in a section to follow on ZANU (PF)'s ideology of foreign policy

[33]"Civil servants should defend party policies -- Nyagumbo" PS 594/84/SC/SN 29 August 1984. p. 2

[34]"Prime Minister addresses Zimbabwe Economic Society, September 8 1980". Government Printer, Salisbury, September 1980. p. 5

[35]Ibid.

[36]"PM addresses nation on independence eve" PS 176/85/MA/ME 2 May 1985. p. 6

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[37]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" Policy Statement no. 6, December 1981. p. 8

[38]Ibid.

[39]Mugabe, R. "1985 -- year of national consolidation" Zimbabwe News 16, 2, 1985. p. 6

[40]Ibid.

[41]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" op. cit. p. 4

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid., p. 6

[44]"The second phase of our revolution" Zimbabwe News 14, 2, 1983. p. 6. Own emphasis

[45]"Prime Minister addresses Justice and Peace Commission, February 6 1982" Policy Statement no. 7, February 1982. p. 6

[46]"The construction of socialism in Zimbabwe -- Prime Minister" Policy Statement no. 14, July 1984

[47]ZANU (PF) Election Manifesto 1985. p. 5

[48]Ibid., p. 7

[49]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party..." op. cit. p. 6

[50]Ibid.

[51]Numerous references to the importance of the correct definition and identification of 'the enemy' are to be found throughout Mugabe (1983). See, also: "ZANU in a nutshell" Zimbabwe News 9, 5-6, 1977. p. 46; and "Political education in ZANU: abridged commissariat lectures" op. cit.

[52]Chisaka, C. and Wetherell, I. "Mugabe on socialist transformation" Social Change and Development 1, 6, 1984. pp. 2-4, 25

Chapter Three: Ideology and ZANU (PF)'s Political Thought

The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), or ZANU (PF), led by Robert Mugabe, claims to be Marxist-Leninist in outlook and orientation. ZANU (PF) has publicly and consistently professed such an allegiance since about 1972. In 1978 Robert Mugabe (1983, 44) explained how, six years previously, ZANU had embarked upon a new stage of the struggle for national independence.

> "A new stage had now been reached in the development of our methods of guerilla warfare. Our ideological conception had transformed and scientific socialism based on Marxism-Leninism became our ideology".

This claim has since been frequently reiterated.

Such doctrinal developments are reflected in the revised party programme, Mwenje 2, which was issued in 1972. In 1977, on the occasion of a Central Committee meeting, Mugabe (ibid., 38) was emphatic on the issue of ZANU's ideological commitment:

> "The Party has accepted scientific socialism as its guiding philosophy...Ideology guides the Party. The leadership which leads the Party (sic) must, therefore, be ideologically orientated".

Since the attainment of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, ZANU (PF) has consistently reaffirmed its commitment to Marxism-Leninism. In 1984 Mugabe again declared that "...the Party I lead has adopted the philosophy of socialism based on Marxist-Leninist principles...".[1]

The President's colleagues echo such pronouncements. In 1983 Witness Mangwende, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, outlined the principles and key elements of Zimbabwe's foreign policy, according particular importance to the ideological component:[2]

> "Of overriding importance...is Government's continuing commitment to the socialist ideology adopted by ZANU-PF so very long ago..."

In 1984 the then Minister of State for Political Affairs, Maurice Nyagumbo, declared that the new Zimbabwean constitution "...spells out in no uncertain terms that ZANU (sic) is a socialist Party following Marxist-Leninist principles...".[3] He went on:[4]

> "It is on the basis of these principles that we shall restructure and reconstruct our national economy so as to ensure the victory of socialism over capitalism. It is also on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles that we shall create social justice, national unity, a national culture and upon which we shall base our foreign policy".

In the same year, Nyagumbo succinctly defined ZANU (PF) as a "vanguard, Marxist-Leninist party".[5]

3.1 The Controversy Surrounding ZANU (PF)'s Ideological Claims

Notwithstanding such protestations, many observers of widely divergent political persuasions argue that ZANU (PF) is not socialist in the Marxist sense of the word. John Day (1977, 391) offers the pre-independence observation that "the nationalists are *not fundamentally interested in* communism as an overriding doctrine or a political system." He claims that none of the nationalist leaders, Mugabe included, regards himself as a Marxist.

From a post-independence perspective Astrow (1983) postulates that, by the very nature of its leadership, ZANU (PF) is *essentially a petit-bourgeois* organisation, committed to the extension of the privileges of its elitist leadership. Spicer (1984,1) asserts that, amongst ZANU (PF) cabinet colleagues Prime Minister Mugabe is "the only convinced Marxist-Leninist". Michael Hartnack (1984), a Harare-based journalist and a frequent commentator on the Zimbabwean scene, adopts a contrary position, arguing that, far from being a committed Marxist-*Leninist*, Mugabe "feels he must resort to the fashionable ideology and rhetoric of the Eastern bloc" in order to "alleviate the resentment of the poor and bridle the blatant self-indulgence of the rich...".

While Dayal (1980, 485) says of Mugabe: "Not being irrevocably committed to a particular ideology, his approach...is essentially pragmatic".

"Bobo" (1983) is more circumspect than is Astrow in his brief assessment of the initial years of Zimbabwe's independence. However, he does suggest that the government political line is "essentially liberal and, further, that the direction of development in Zimbabwe since 1980 "primarily serves the interests of the national bourgeoisie and their transnational allies" (Ibid., 40). Bobo concludes that it will be up to the people of Zimbabwe to accomplish "what the present government cannot" (Ibid., 39); namely a transition to socialism which eradicates the inequalities of the UDI era.

This study is primarily concerned with the impact of ruling party ideology on Zimbabwe's foreign policy. Of primary importance, therefore, is that which the ruling party professes to believe.[6] Controversy over the nature and ideological claims of the new regime is not peculiar to Zimbabwe. Similar disaccord has arisen in the wake of most if not all so-called "socialist revolutions".[7] Such debates beg the question -- seldom answered -- of what precisely is meant by such concepts as Marxism, Marxism-Leninism and socialism. Astrow (1983), is not alone in criticising Mugabe and his party for being not Marxist

in orientation, but petit bourgeois. However, as this writer has discovered, attempts to define Marxism stand, almost without exception, on conceptually thorny ground. This issue is dealt with in some detail in the Appendix.

Having established an operational definition of what this writer regards as the essence of the Marxist and Leninist traditions, this discussion proceeds to an examination of the ideological pretensions of ZANU (PF) itself. For ideology is used by the ruling party in Zimbabwe -- whether it be, as the large majority of observers argue, as a mere legitimising device designed to appeal to a domestic constituency, or whether it informs the Weltanschauung of ZANU (PF). Two key elements will be focussed upon: ZANU (PF)'s conception of Marxism-Leninism, and ZANU (PF)'s conception of the vanguard party.

3.2 ZANU (PF)'s Conception of Marxism-Leninism

Examination of the doctrinal writings of and public statements by the ZANU elite reveals a number of themes within ZANU's ideological thought. Each of these themes will be elaborated upon in turn.

3.2.1 Class as the primary unit of analysis

Since about 1972 references to class have pervaded the writings of the ZANU leadership. Nathan

Shamuyarira, for instance, has asserted that FROLIZI's political bureau was designed to "intensify the class struggle in Zimbabwe" by means of the rapid creation within the country of a "revolutionary situation" (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979, 176). Shamuyarira (ibid., 178) also interpreted the ongoing conflict in the early 1970s within ZAPU for political power as "a titanic class struggle between the bourgeois nationalists and the young socialists."

In 1974 Herbert Chitepo, then ZANU National Chairman, indicated a link between national class struggle and international class conflict. He spoke of "the historical world-wide struggle between the forces of progress and those of reaction, between the exploiting classes and the exploited classes, between the bourgeoisie and the working class..." (ibid, 286). The conflict in Zimbabwe was, he argued, yet another manifestation of the global class struggle.

In the same year Shamuyarira (1974, 166) asserted that "The guerrilla was one part of the ongoing class (and racial) struggle". He argued that in southern Africa, "The lines of class and race coincide all along the line" (ibid, 166-167). Class was essential to any correct analysis of the prevailing situation (ibid, 161). Moreover, internal dissension within the nationalist movements themselves could only be resolved by "a correct class analysis of the

situation"; only class analysis could provide a "correct identification" of the "people" and the "enemy" (ibid., 161-2).

In 1978 Mugabe (1983, 67) claimed that the period 1972-1974 was "one of ideological transformation which enabled the Party to identify the struggle...in terms of its class character."

Since independence in 1980 a number of ZANU spokesmen have emphasized the continuation of the class struggle.[8] In an address to the ZANU (PF) Youth League, Prime Minister Mugabe alluded to the post-independence intensification of the class struggle. He warned that:[9]

> "Our youth should....have a constant awareness of the need to defend our revolution, for the enemy we defeated yesterday continues to weave his strategy for our down fall (sic)".

In 1982 Herbert Ushewokunze reportedly told a group of political science students that "Our struggle was, and is, a class struggle". Ushewokunze (1982, 263) has also spoken of the post-independence intensification of class conflict. He gave notice that the bourgeoisie would attempt "to pre-empt radicalisation of Zimbabwean nationalism in the direction of socialism", This, he argued:

> "...will be part of the class struggle which will be fought not in the bush but on such prosaic 'battlefields' as the

> sundowner circuit the ministerial office and the business meeting over lunch at some posh Salisbury hotel or club" (Ibid).

On a separate occasion, Ushewokunze linked the development of technology with the emergence as distinct classes of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and the parallel "growth of class societies".[10]

The use of class analysis is not, it seems, confined to mere rhetoric. For a number of members of the ruling party and Government elite appear to interpret relations within Zimbabwe in zero-sum terms; one is either supportive of the new regime or in opposition. Ushewokunze has reportedly declared that the judiciary, the police and the armed forces all serve the ideology of those who create them. Conflict, he reportedly argues, would necessarily result in those institutions when a new class with a new ideology came to power.[11] Edgar Tekere is quoted as saying: "I think a non-partisan, a civil servant who is not party-orientated...is a myth".[12] Ushewokunze has provided what is arguably a distinctly Marxian view of the relationship between society and its institutions. He has argued that:[13]

> "Laws are formulated and enforced in the service of one group; a group seeking to maintain its privileges. Law can only, therefore, be a tool used by one class to oppress another class...the law is

> there to make sure that the oppressed class does not institute new politics, new economics, new standing armies *and new privileges*".

Moving on to the police force Ushewokunze argues in a similar fashion that:[14]

> "Contrary to the idea of an apolitical police force, every police force in the world ensures that laws enacted by a given political and economic set up (sic) are obeyed. Every police force acts in a manner so as to *consolidate the rule* of one class and its oppression of another class".

For Ushewokunze the political and socio-economic situation is clearly a zero-sum one. The police force, army and the civil service "are either for socialism or for capitalism".[15]

Mutumbuka has analysed the role of education in a similar fashion. He claims that "In capitalist *countries*, education serves the function of entrenching and perpetuating the class structure and its attendent social inequalities".[16] He goes on to assert that "the curriculum cannot be neutral. It is always ideologically loaded".[17] In newly-independent Zimbabwe, he declares "Curricula must be imbued in socialism and "float on a film of socialism".[18]

3.2.2 Materialism

Few references are to be found to document the contribution of materialist philosophy to the

political thought of the ruling party. Ushewokunze has asserted that "...Marx deepened and developed our understanding of human society, showing that the economic organisation in society is the basis upon which the whole political and ideological ideas (sic) as well as practice depend".[19]

Dzingai Mutumbuka, former Minister of Education and Culture, has described one of the "concrete tasks of education at the school level" to be "to form a scientific materialist world outlook in the younger generation"[20]. Mugabe himself has proclaimed that "we shall always be aware that our economic needs determine what else we do or learn".[21] While Mutumbuka asserts that "In any socialist society the centrality of production must be recognised...".[22]

As demonstrated in the earlier section on class analysis, Ushewokunze has argued in an historical materialist fashion that the state and its institutions (the superstructure) are but an expression of the economic base of that society. Hence his rejection of the "myth" of an apolitical judiciary, police force or civil service. He argues, for instance, that:[23]

> "laws are formulated and enforced in the service of one group....Law can only, therefore, be a tool used by one class to oppress another class...".

Thus, also:[24]

> "Every police force acts in a manner so as to consolidate the *rule* of one class and its oppression of another class".

3.2.3 Dialectics

Dialectical analysis is infrequently encountered in the writings and public utterances of the ZANU (PF) leadership. It would appear that dialectics are understood and/or regarded as valid by only the ideologically more erudite and committed members of the party. Mugabe, for instance, has employed such analysis on a number of occasions. In 1977 the ZANU leader spoke thus -- and in a somewhat didactic fashion -- of those who in 1974 and in 1975-1976 attempted to rebel against the Party line:

> "These constitute negative or counter-revolutionary forces because their actions are a negation of the struggle. We must negate them in turn. This is what is referred to as the negation of the *negation*". (Mugabe, 1983, 37)

In his 1980/81 New Year address to the nation, Mugabe referred to the independence struggle as "an historical and dialectical process".[25] The Zimbabwean Premier argued that:[26]

> "...since our peace is not a *static but an ever-evolving* and ever-unfolding reality, it also marks a new stage in the new struggle for the consolidation *and furtherance* of our national independence through the attainment of economic independence".

Mugabe argued in a dialectical fashion that the former

objective of political independence, pursued by means of revolutionary armed struggle, was now upon its attainment transformed into the new political means whereby the new -- and ultimate -- objective, ZANU (PF)'s socialist socio-economic goals, could be reached.[27]

In one of the few references to the dialectic to be made by a spokesman other than the ZANU (PF) leader, Senator Joseph Culverwell, then Deputy Minister of Education, has stated:[28]

> "We strongly believe that the implicit theoretical basis underlying the process of education as transformation is the Marxist dialectic between the social and the cultural levels".

The concepts of class struggle, the dialectic and materialism are brought together in ruling party analyses of both domestic and international issues. Indeed they are employed to link the domestic to the international. Thus conflict is most often, if not always, presented as being between two protagonists: the oppressed class and the oppressor class; the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; or socialism and capitalism.

Frequently emphasized is the paramouncy of the global bipolar conflict between capitalism and socialism. ZANU (PF)'s revised political program, issued in 1972, ascribed the internal situation within Rhodesia to

this manichean struggle. ZANU (PF), its representatives have frequently declared, sides with the forces of socialism. As the 1972 party program put it:

> "Progressive forces are engaged in a titanic global conflict with imperialism and capitalism. ZANU has thrown its weight on the side of progress-ive forces and has to confront the opposing forces everywhere". (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979, 263)

The inevitability of socialism's victory over capitalism is often reiterated. Socialism will ultimately win the day, first in Zimbabwe, but eventually throughout the world. Historical materialism presumably ordains this triumph.

3.2.4 Ideology

The indispensability for ZANU (PF) of socialist doctrine has been frequently and consistently emphasised by spokesmen for the party. The 1972 political program proclaimed the party's adherence to the principles of scientific socialism (Ibid., 252). In 1974 Herbert Chitepo declared the party to be "guided by the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution" (Ibid., 289). In 1977 Mugabe (1983, 44) asserted that in 1972:

> "A new stage had been reached in the development of our methods of guerrilla warfare. Our ideological conception had transformed and scientific socialism based on Marxism-Leninism became our ideology.

At a Central Committee meeting in 1977, Mugabe (1983, 38) stated that "Ideology guides the Party. The leadership which leads the Party must, therefore, be ideologically orientated".

Nathan Shamuyarira (1976, 571) has elaborated on the significance of ideology for the Zimbabwean national liberation movement. Ideology plays a dual role: it acts "as a general guide in the formulation of policy and in response to the many issues and situations that arise" (Ibid.). It is also important "in order to have a vision of the kind of society the movement wants to create" (Ibid). However, ideology is important not only in order to achieve the revolution, and to shape the future society, but also to maintain the new status quo. Mugabe promised the ZANU (PF) Youth League in 1983 that, in order to defend the revolution, they would be provided "with military, political and ideological training".[29]

Mutumbuka, meanwhile, is emphatic on the issue of ZANU's doctrinal purity.[30]

> "There is a great deal of confusion over the definition of "socialism", with many people confusing socialism with indigenisation. Others mistakenly equate socialism with the traditional communalism which was the common system of social organisation in Africa before colonisation. This has given rise to the so-called African socialism one hears about so frequently. There is

> no *such thing as* African socialism, or African capitalism for that matter".

3.2.5 Revolution Not Reform

Running throughout the doctrinal writings of ZANU (PF) *is the idea of* revolution rather than reform. ZANU has frequently argued for the complete reorganisation of the political and socio-economic order in Zimbabwe. Nathan Shamuyarira (1974, 159) has defined a socialist system as "one in which at least the major means of production are owned by the State; the economy is centrally planned; and political institutions are controlled *by the masses of* the people - the workers and peasants". For Shamuyarira, national liberation means "a fundamental systemic change" (Ibid.). In 1978 Mugabe (1983, 59) called for "the complete overthrow of the oppressive colonial system and the substitution for it of a new political and socio-economic order...."

A corollary of revolution rather than reform is the adoption of armed struggle for the attainment of independence. Shamuyarira (1974, 172) linked the two aspects in the early years of the guerrilla war:

> "Liberation movements use violence to achieve their political objectives and they are committed to the complete overthrow of the existing political system".

In 1978 Mugabe (1983, 146) emphasized that the guerilla struggle was "not just a revolutionary

struggle, but an armed revolutionary struggle". In a 1977 speech to the ZANU Central Committee he argued that for success to be achieved, ZANU must "continue to uphold the armed struggle as the only form of revolutionary action capable of achieving true victory...(ibid, 39). In 1985 he is quoted as saying that "The armed struggle is the principal form of the liberation movement."[31]

Both the choice of revolution rather than reform, and the resort to violent methods to achieve revolution, are apparently dictated by the acceptance of the principles of scientific socialism. According to Mugabe (1983, 47), the adoption of Marxism-Leninism:

> "...brought a socialist revolutionary dimension to the struggle and demands of us that the enemy's political structure be dismantled to create room for a new political socio-economic order..."

However, the emphasis on revolution does not mean that the socialist transformation should be implemented will-nilly, regardless of the consequences. To be sure, it is vital that national independence be attained as quickly as possible. But once in power, ZANU (PF) spokesmen argue, the socialist transformation should be implemented only as rapidly as is judged to be practical. In accordance with Lenin's own teachings, and perhaps also as a consequence of the more recent downfall of Salvador Allende in Chile, ZANU (PF) writings attach paramount importance to the

immediate establishment and consolidation of state power. This accomplished, only then can the transition to socialism safely proceed. This gradualist theme will be explored in greater detail in the section to follow on ZANU (PF)'s economic theory.

3.2.6 Theory of National-Democratic Revolution

Since the mid-1970s ZANU (PF) has proclaimed the necessity for a two-stage revolution in Zimbabwe: an initial national-democratic phase, to be followed by the socialist transformation. In 1974 Herbert Chitepo argued that the transition from settlerism to socialism would be a lengthy one. Halfway, he asserted "we will have to pass through the transitional stage of national democratic revolution" (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979, 289). This would entail a temporary united front against imperialism of "not only the workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, but also the national bourgeoisie and other patriotic and anti-imperialist democratic forces" (Ibid.).

In 1977 Zimbabwe News, the official party organ, stated that:

> "Our society is essentially a colonial society and, as such, we have to wage a national democratic struggle to overthrow national oppression. The national democratic revolution will serve to solve the principal contradiction in Zimbabwe which is the domination and oppression of the vast majority

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In 1977 Zimbabwe News, the official party organ, stated that:

> "Our society is essentially a colonial society and, as such, we have to wage a national democratic struggle to overthrow national oppression. The national democratic revolution will serve to solve the principal contradiction in Zimbabwe which is the domination and oppression of the vast majority

> of the Zimbabwean people by a small minority - a racist, reactionary clique of whites" (Astrow, 1983, 142).

The following year, Zimbabwe News elaborated on ZANU's theory of national democratic revolution:

> "ZANU is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It aims at achieving a socialist revolution. However, before the achievement of such a socialist revolution a transitional stage of National Democratic Revolution is necessary. The national democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution and the socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel to the national democratic revolution" (Ibid.).

Thus Leninist united front tactics would be employed during the transient national democratic stage in order to work for the overthrow of the indigenous bourgeoisie. Political independence -- the defeat of colonialism -- must be followed by economic independence -- the eradication of imperialism. This accomplished, the proletarian revolution could be fully realised. Hence Mugabe's summary of the phases of "our immediate national struggle" as follows:

(1) National armed struggle
(2) National independence
(3) National economic independence
(4) National socialism[32]

Ushewokunze (1982, 278) has defined national democracy

as a period "whereby society and its institutions have to be democratised. It is a transitional stage to socialism and the guiding principles are socialist".

In ZANU (PF)'s victory message following the 1985 general elections, Ushewokunze asserted that the dominance of foreign capital over the Zimbabwean economy would render impotent any immediate post-independence efforts to follow an independent capitalist path. All that would develop would be a form of neo-colonialism.[33] Ushewokunze went on:[34]

> "The next five years therefore challenge the party to guide the State in wrenching both political and economic power from the hands of the bourgeoisie and place it (*sic*) in the hands of the working people".

Maurice Nyagumbo argues that the vanguard party must retain the support of other classes including the national bourgeoisie. He quotes approvingly from the writings of political scientist Yashpal Tandon:[35]

> "...even during the stage of the struggle of the neo-colonies against imperialism, the task of the working classes *is not to organise* the people against all classes, including the national bourgeoisie. To struggle against imperialism and its local retainers is still a struggle for national independence".

Nyagumbo reminds his audience of the temporary nature of the national democratic united front:[36]

> "Of course, this should not

> imply a permanent coincidence of interests between working people and the bourgeoisie, but rather a tactic forced on us by the concrete historical reality of the existence of a stronger force which neither the working people alone nor the national bourgeoisie on its own can defeat".

3.2.7 The Role and Importance of the Worker

While acknowledging the role of the peasantry in attaining political independence, and the contribution of the national bourgeoisie and all other "democratic forces" in the consolidation of political independence, ZANU (PF) continues to stress the primary importance of the proletariat. For Mugabe, the worker has a dual signficance. The Zimbabwean premier has proclaimed: "To my party and government, the worker occupies a special place in our society because without him our economy cannot last a day".[37] On a separate occasion Mugabe argued in a similar vein that "the worker is the key to the entire production process as without him no production could take place....".[38] But Mugabe also regards the worker "as a revolutionary with a historical role to play in ensuring the unfolding of our socialist revolution.[39]

On the occasion of the first anniversary of Zimbabwe's independence Mugabe proclaimed:[40]

> "We are committed to the development of the working class with a high degree of worker-consciousness and enjoying an appropriate

status".

3.2.8 The Creation of a 'New Man'

Ruling party spokesmen argue that, if the gains of the revolution are to be consolidated and extended, then a 'new man' must be developed. As early as 1972 the revised party program called for, inter alia, education along socialist lines and the creation of a new man. In 1979 Dzingai Mutumbuka, then Head of the ZANU Department of Education and Culture, argued for "an education system...designed to produce a 'New Man'".[41]

Since 1980 Party and Government spokesmen have frequently discussed the role of education in creating a new socialist orientation within all Zimbabweans. It has also often been asserted that "mental decolonisation" must follow territorial decolonisation if socialism is to be successfully implemented.[42] In 1984 Mugabe called for "curricula and methodology...geared to the production of a new personality which would find a place in and contribute towards the construction of a socialist society".[43] Mutumbuka has suggested that the Zimbabwe education system should assist in the production of "cadres of a high level of political consciousness",[44] as such were essential for the establishment of socialism in Zimbabwe. Joseph Culverwell, then Deputy Minister of Education, is on record as saying: "Our aspiration is

to produce a new kind of man, one who is "better" and more effective than the average present-day citizen".[45]

3.2.9 Economic Policy

In many ways ZANU (PF)'s approach to the new economic order to be established in Zimbabwe is typically Marxist-Leninist. Certainly, ZANU (PF) itself has consistently professed to be aiming for the implementation of a socialist economy. The revised party program of 1972 declared that a "truly socialist self-supporting economy will be established and organised on broad principles enunciated by Marxism - Leninism" (Nyangani and Nyandoro, 1979, 257).

i) Cooperatives

Since the party's inception in 1963 the establishment of cooperatives has been a central feature of ZANU's vision of a future socialist Zimbabwe. The 1972 party program enunciated this theme. A Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development policy paper on cooperatives, issued in 1983, said that Zimbabwe's cooperative policy aimed at the ultimate establishment of cooperative production in all spheres of economic activity.[46] The policy paper stated that all means of production, distribution and social services should be organised collectively in socialist cooperatives. The rationale behind this, the paper argued, was that cooperative members serve not only their interests,

but also promote and safeguard the interests and aspirations of the working people *in general*.[47] Cooperative development, it seems, is as much essential to political development as it is to the transformation of the economy.

In the same year Moven Mahachi, then Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, declared:[48]

> "We see cooperatives as part of the overall strategy of achieving socialism in Zimbabwe. In other words, our stand on cooperatives is very serious, it forms one of the cornerstones in our plans for a socialist Zimbabwe...".

Mahachi continued in the same vein in 1985, declaring cooperatives to be "in the forefront of the struggle to transform the economy from capitalism to socialism".[49] The cooperative movement was, he asserted, "the vehicle to socialism".[50] On another occasion the Minister described cooperatives as being in "the vanguard of Zimbabwe's socialist thrust".[51]

Agricultural cooperatives were accorded particular significance "because agriculture is the basis of our economy".[52] Mahachi emphasized that membership of cooperatives should be voluntary as "the Government is not out to force anybody to join or form cooperative *(sic)*".[53]

ii) The state sector

Notwithstanding the importance of cooperatives in the road to socialism, the state sector is regarded by the party as the more vital. Mahachi has stated:[54]

> "The main economic factor in the establishment of socialism is the state sector. This is the sector that must take over the pillars of the economy - otherwise any talk of socialism is nothing but an exercise to mislead the working people".

In 1981 the Prime Minister stated that "government has committed itself to a system of the overall planning of the economy".[55] In 1985 he declared that an increased state sector was part and parcel of efforts "to lay a firm foundation for the transformation of our socio-economic base...".[56] Maurice Nyagumbo also regards a substantial state sector as one of the "necessary conditions" for a successful transition to socialism.[57]

iii) Worker ownership of the means of production

In the long term, ZANU (PF) asserts, ownership of the means of production must come to rest in the hands of the workers. The 1972 party program included, as an ultimate economic objective, "popular ownership of the means of production" (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979, 257). In 1985 Robert Mugabe declared that "our socialist philosophy will gain more and more momentum as we move into the future with more participation ...by the workers and peasants...across the entire socio-economic system".[58] For Mugabe, workers

are entitled to more than just the fruits of their labour, "greater justice or equity can ... only prevail if the workers also become the owners -- equal owners -- of the means of production".[59] He continued:[60]

> "Where correct production relations exist, then the worker is both owner of the means of production and owner of the surplus value earned from his labour".

Moven Mahachi summarized ZANU (PF)'s oft-used concept of "national transformation" thus:[61]

> "Essentially, the objective is to organise the economy so that workers, who are the real produces of wealth, directly benefit from the wealth produced. In essence, the workers become the owners of the means of production and actually participate in the distribution of wealth. This applies to workers in both industry and agriculture".

Mahachi continued:[62]

> "We would have attained a full state of socialism if our entire economy is controlled by those who produce wealth".

iv) <u>The land issue</u>

The distribution of land is a common theme in the manifesto of most Third World nationalist movements; ZANU (PF) is no exception. The land issue features throughout party writings. Since the party's inception in 1963, the stance has been one of the abolition of private ownership of land. In 1972 the revised political programme called for common ownership of land and natural resources.[63] In 1978

the party newspaper, Zimbabwe News, detailed the movement's stand on land:

> "On the land question, ZANU has stated repeatedly that all natural resources -- land, mineral, water, flora and fauna -- belong to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole in perpetuity. No person has right of private ownership of land and minerals. Land hunger was one of the main objectives for the freedom struggle, and certainly is the inspiration of peasants who have rallied behind the movement. The needs of the peasants should be assessed accurately and the land of Zimbabweans made available for them to use on cooperatives....In the light of statements made by the ANC boot-lickers ... we are compelled to state categorically that ZANU would dismantle the white farms and base its effort for increased production on an entirely new socialist arrangement". (Astrow, 1983, 140).

A manifesto issued in the run-up to the elections of April 1980 stated:

> "A ZANU Government will handle the question of land with the utmost urgency .... it will acquire as much land from the private sector as is necessary for the resettlement of the peasant population currently without land or with poor land. Such land will come from unused or abandoned land, underutilised land or land owned by absentee owners. A ZANU Government will 'promote on newly acquired land collective villages and collective agriculture' though such collectivisation will be 'by persuasion rather than compulsion.' Private

> agriculture will be retained but restricted only to efficient farmers". (Ibid., 141).

Moven Mahachi puts it more simply:[64]

> "...socialism cannot be built without a land reform programme that is against the private ownership of land".

v) 'Economic gradualism'

Qualifying ZANU(PF)'s approach to the establishment of cooperatives, of greater state control over the economy, of worker ownership of the means of production, and the abolition of land ownership is a policy of what this has termed 'economic gradualism'. Both before and since independence a number of prominent party members have cautioned against a precipitate approach to the socialist transition. In 1978 Mugabe (1983, 180) told his interviewers that "...you can't start off by nationalising everything. You have got to take into account the realities of the situation."

In 1984 Dzingai Mutumbuka declared bluntly:[65]

> "There is little doubt that if the total capitalist-owned economy were to be handed over to the Government or to workers today, a crisis would ensue".

The then Minister of National Supplies, Enos Nkala, argued in a similarly pragmatic fashion that:[66]

> "...it would be futile to do away with businessmen, who

> create many employment opportunities for people, without making sure that the *government can fill the gap*".

At the 1984 Second Party Congress, Mugabe emphasized that "transformation is not a mechanical process" and could not "take place over-night".[67] In the same year he remarked that:[68]

> "...a socialist revolution is *not a one-day wonder...Every* socialist revolution differs from another, not so much in its goals and qualitative content, as in the manner, mode, pace and time of its implementation, depending always on the concrete circumstances of the environment of its operation".

Kumbirai Kangai, the then Minister of State for Industry and Technology, has reportedly warned that the process of socialist transformation can be a lengthy one:[69]

> "The private sector will be with us for a long time. The process of change is one for which no person can give a deadline".

Ushewokunze has cited Lenin's "enforced reversion" to the New Economic Policy and Mao's post-1948 "dalliance" with China's national capitalists in support of his contention that:

> "in the transition to socialism, the shortest distance between two poin.s is not necessarily a straight line,..hurried and unprogrammed change can sometimes be as dangerous as going too slow."

Ushewokunze quotes with approval from the 1980 ZANU (PF) election manifesto: "One of the existing practical realities is the capitalist system which cannot be transformed overnight" (Ibid., 280). He argues for a carefully thought-out assault on the existing capitalist economy, one which rules out "precipitate or unconsidered measures" (ibid, 281). As Ushewokunze points out:

> "The deftest (and most successful) of revolutionaries have been those who have pushed carefully but creatively at the margin of risk, expanding that margin and increasingly controlling it". (Ibid)

vi) Private enterprise

Party spokesmen argue that, during the transition phase, a role clearly exists for private enterprise. As it cannot be quickly eliminated, private enterprise must be utilised for the good of the new political and socio-economic order. However, this is not to say that private enterprise would be given free rein, or that it could exist indefinitely. As Mugabe (*1983*, 182) saw it in 1978:

> "At the first stage you will have to cope with the system that has private enterprise anyway. And you are not going to start by seizing everybody's property. That would be impractical. You must proceed however towards a system where there is far more collective control than private control".

In 1980 the new Prime Minister argued in true Leninist fashion that:

> "You do not destroy an *infrastructure* that is in being in order to realize your socialist aims. In fact you can do so by building on the structure that is there" (Astrow, 1983, 144).

Private enterprise could be used in the interim to 'fill the gap'. Mugabe (Novicki, 1982, 6-7) again:

> "There are areas where we believe we cannot apply socialism in the immediate future or in the medium term. So it is in those areas that we believe we can entertain capitalism, *as it were*".

In the main, ZANU (PF) argues for a temporary coexistence between capitalism and those forces working for a socialist economy. Thus the three year Transitional National Development Plan, Mugabe argued, "*will naturally chart a socialist direction*, while recognising areas of private enterprise not immediately amenable to socialism".[70]

However party policy on the long-term status of private enterprise is not entirely clear. Prior to the 1980 general elections Mugabe introduced a discordant note with the assertion that:

> "...our Socialism must be *realistic*. It must never assume that in the end there won't be any private enterprise. I don't think you'll ever get to a situation where everything belongs to the State - it would be absolutely ridiculous, there *must be some* forms of property which continue to belong to individuals" (Astrow, 1983, 144).

The then Mayor of Mutare -- and presumably a member of the ruling party -- tackled the question quite differently. Councillor Davison Jahwi reportedly argued in 1983 that individual ownership of business should be eradicated in order to implement socialism in Zimbabwe.[71]

3.3 ZANU (PF)'s Conception of the Party

3.3.1 Role of the Party

Fundamentally, the role of the Party is that of the vanguard of the revolution. This role has been elaborated on at some length by Maurice Nyagumbo, a long-standing member of the ruling party executive. He divided his assessment into two sections.[72]

(1) the role of ZANU (PF) in the war of liberation
(2) the role of ZANU (PF) in socialist construction

The Party's initial task is one of political mobilisation. All "patriotic forces" have to be persuaded to join in a "national democratic revolution" against "settler-colonialism". The Party must work to construct a united front of all those who oppose colonialism, for the eradication of colonialism is the "primary objective".[73] As Mugabe (1983, 56) put it, the vanguard party must work for the establishment of "a national basis" for the revolution.[74]

> "Accordingly the struggle originally pioneered by a few would have been transformed into a revolutionary national struggle for national liberation and national independence".

The Party accomplishes this, according to Nyagumbo, by articulating the grievances of the masses, particularly the peasants, workers and revolutionary intellectuals" and, at the same time, providing the acquired leadership in the struggle for national emancipation.[75] This, of course, necessitates the adoption and utilisation of the correct ideology, namely Marxism-Leninism.

The Party's vanguard role does not end with the defeat of colonialism and the attainment of national independence. Nyagumbo points out that "...the revolution of the workers and peasants is a continuous one...the workers and peasants...will not stop fighting until capitalism has been dismantled".[76] The Party fights not for reform, but for revolution, for a complete transformation of the existing political and socio-economic order.

Accordingly, the Party's vanguard role assumes great significance, particularly now that with the attainment of a national democratic state, those bourgeois forces which joined in with the workers and peasants for the defeat of colonialism are no longer as loyal as they once were, their own selfish

objectives of national independence having been achieved.[77] Moreover, the Party's pre-independence task of mobilising the workers and peasants is far from completed. Nyagumbo argues that the settler colonialist policy of "divide and rule" accentuated divisions amongst the working people:[78]

> "The result was that the working people did not see themselves as a class with a common source of misery and a common destiny and objective. This feature has persisted into the post-independence era".

Of the peasantry Nyagumbo comments:[79]

> "Our peasant[ry], as a force of production, [is] under-developed in the ser[vice] ...that they lack ideological consciousness and social homogeneity".

Soon after the achievement of national independence, the Party must take the lead in the dissemination, on a national scale, of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Nyagumbo explains the significance of this:[80]

> "First and foremost, the capacity of the working people and the peasants to construct a socialist state depends on the degree of their consciousness of their long-term interests as a class. The working people must not merely hate oppression and exploitation; they must also master and understand the social basis of that oppression and exploitation. That is, they must grasp the scientific basis of their society.

In recognition of this, the Party must provide the working people "with political ideological education whose main thrust is to make them conscious of themselves as a class distinguished from the petit,

national and international bourgeoisie...".[81] Thus the role of the Party is an interpretive one. It alone possesses knowledge of the true ideology (Marxism-Leninism) which enables one to correctly analyse the prevailing political and socio-economic situation, and to construct the new, future order. The Party must provide correct analysis for those who as yet lack the correct analytical tools, while simultaneously disseminating the ideology which will eventually enable the workers and peasants to analyse for themselves.

At the same time, within its own ranks the Party must work for the creation of "ideologically clear and committed party cadres" who will strengthen the movement accordingly.[82] In 1984, Mugabe argued that if socialist transformation were to be launched with full force, "The Party had first to be well organised structurally and qualitatively so that high level of ideological consciousness would prevail within it".[83] The reason for this is clear, as Mugabe went on to explain: "The Party has to remain in the vanguard of our revolution and give policy direction to Government".[84]

Such efforts on the doctrinal front should not, however, be carried out in isolation. The Party, must have a dual-track policy: while providing political education for the proletariat and peasantry, it must,

at the same time, consolidate its hold on the new political and socio-economic order by means of organisational measures. Consolidation and extension of state power is of cardinal and immediate importance.

The Party must assume control over the government while, at the same time, remaining distinct from it. To this end, all government policy must emanate from the Party. As Mugabe put it, if the socialist transformation is to be "launched with full force", then "The Party has to remain in the vanguard of our revolution and give policy direction to Government".[85] The Party must supervise Government actions and, should the Government deviate from party principles, "it is the role of the ruling party to bring the Government back into the correct line".[86] For, as Nyagumbo phrased it:[87]

> "In our view, the Government and it apparatus are the vehicle of the ruling Party for realising its policies and programmes".

Moreover the Party, according to Mugabe, "has been and should remain our principal political instrument for the transformation of our society".[88] The Zimbabwean Premier envisages the Party eventually attaining the position such that "all economic and social organisations and institutions of the state....come under its political control and act in a single manner for building the socialist system".[89]

This, he claims, is the Party's "proper historical role", and is only possible with the attainment of a "one-party State democracy".[90] ZANU (PF)'s 1985 election manifesto asserts in a similar fashion that "Only when there is one Zimbabwe people, with one leader - the party - will a scientific re-organisation of society along socialist lines be possible...".[91]

Nyagumbo summarizes the role of the vanguard party thus:[92]

> "The role of the party in the Transition to Socialism in Zimbabwe is....to identify the characteristics of our historical reality and, while maintaining its revolutionary ideology at the fore, work out tactics by which to speed up the working class revolution. Having done this, the party is then better able to lead and organise the working people as well as to guide its Government in the realisation of the revolution of the working people. And, as we have seen, one of the primary tasks of the transition to socialism phase is the defeat of imperialism. Having identified the concrete historical realities, the next task of the party is to work out the steps, one by one, of undermining and eliminating, first imperialism and next the national bourgeoisie".

Given the crucial leadership function of the vanguard party, what should be the nature or makeup of this organisation?

3.3.2 Nature of the Party

As the Party assumes its leading role by virtue of its adoption of Marxism-Leninism, ideology is central to the organisation. As Mugabe succinctly put it in 1983: "The ideas must come from the party, the ideology comes from the party".[93] ZANU (PF) pronouncements frequently emphasize the radical change in Party thinking that allegedly took place in 1972. With the adoption of Marxism-Leninism ZANU was "transformed from a nationalist political party to a revolutionary movement...".[94] Mugabe (1983, 56) declared that ZANU "is not a social club, nor are we just any Party. We are a socialist Party committed to a scientific socialist ideology whose basic principles are clearly enunciated". In short, "Ideology guides the Party" (ibid., 38).

Accordingly, the leadership should be ideologically committed. The revised party program of 1972 stated:

> "Every official in all organs of the party and indeed every member must be acquainted with party policy, ideology and programme" (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979, 254).

Ideological unity must eventually pervade the entire party. Simon Muzenda, then acting Prime Minister, stated at a ZANU (PF) political seminar:[95]

> "There should be oneness of ideological belief and a consistent pattern in managing party affairs among party members".

Mugabe has, since independence, reportedly emphasized that while it might take a long time before the Party

was purged of non-Marxist-Leninist elements, it was "absolutely important" that "everyone who is in the leadership espouses Marxist-Leninist principles" (Viljoen, 1984).

As early as 1974 Nathan Shamuyarira (1974, 175) highlighted the importance of an ideologically committed leadership. He asserted that:

> "...the critical input in ensuring the continuation of the revolutionary nationalism after independence has been won, is the leadership. A leadership committed by conviction to a radical solution is important and decisive, especially in Africa, in safeguarding the interest of the masses".

The Zimbabwean Premier is quoted as having argued that "It is not a question of having everybody on the street supporting socialism" (Viljoen, 1984). With only a corps of ideologically committed cadres, socialism can be achieved.

ZANU (PF) defines itself as a party in the vanguard of the revolution, an alliance of the workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals. However, Nyagumbo was argued, "at our present stage of development of our productive forces, we cannot have an exclusively proletariat membership of our organisation".[96] In keeping with the tactics of national democratic revolution, ZANU (PF) is "at present epoch of our development essentially a mass party",[97] rather than

the preferred vanguard party. It is implied that, with the passing of the present stage of the socialist revolution, ZANU would expel all non-proletarian and non-peasant elements. For the "essential character" of ZANU (PF), Nyagumbo argues, is that "it is a Marxist-Leninist party which...makes it a party of workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals".[98] Again, it is Mugabe himself who captures the essence of the party standpoint:[99]

> "We must go through a transition from that stage which encompasses all progressive views, whether they are socialist or non-socialist, to a stage where we can say with a degree of certainty that the party is now purged of non-arxist-Leninist principles".

The foregoing discussion has set out and elaborated upon the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the ruling party. It has been established that, contrary to the assumption expressed in much of the existing literature on Zimbabwe, the ruling party does embrace an ideology of a high level of sophistication and coherence. In chapters to follow, the more specific questions of the ruling party's ideology as it relates to foreign policy, and the extent to which the official ideology is operationalised, will be addressed.

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[1] "Marxist-Leninist socialism only way -- PM" PS 10 July 1984, pp. 10-11

[2] "Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy --

Mangwende" PS 330/83/AM 12 May 1983. p. 4

[3]"Civil servants should defend party policies -- Nyagumbo" PS 594/84/SC/SN. 29 August 1984. p. 3

[4]Ibid.

[5]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" PS 509/84/MA/SD. 25 July 1984. p. 2

[6]At this point, the question of what constitutes a political party should be addressed, albeit briefly. ZANU (PF), like any other party, has both elite elements and grass-roots support. To what extent, it might legitimately be asked, would conclusions reached as to the political or ideological orientation of ZANU (PF), based on data gleaned from members of the ruling party elite, be applicable to all sections or levels of the party?

This writer argues that with regard to the political orientation of the party, it is in the short- to medium-term of more significance what the leadership believes and does. This fact is particularly pertinent to ZANU (PF) given, as will be demonstrated subsequently, its highly centralised structure. Thus, if Mugabe and his hand-picked Politburo are avowedly Marxist-Leninist, then the Party organisation may be said to follow the same line. The grass-roots elements, though certainly lacking the ideological and theoretical sophistication of their acclaimed leadership, will nevertheless, 'objectively' speaking, proceed down the same political path.

[7]See, for example: Funk (1985) on Ethiopia, da Silva (1984) on Mozambique, and Chaliand (1978) on Angola

[8]Drew, R. "What kind of socialism for Zimbabwe?" The Star 4 November 1982

[9]"The Prime Minister outlines tasks for Zimbabwe's Youth". Policy Statement no. 12. July 1983

[10]"Transport network to expand -- Ushewokunze" PS 345/84/ST/SN. 23 May 1984. p. 4

[11]"Politicise the police, says Ushewokunze" The Star 10 November 1982

[12]"Revolution hijacked by civil servants" The Herald 20 October 1983

[13]"Cde Ushewokunze calls on police to institute change" PS 927/83/DC/AMR. 25 November 1983 p. 3

[14]Ibid., p. 5

[15]Ibid., p. 7

[16]"Mutumbuka warns unco-operative teachers' PS 521/83/ SM. 25 July 1985. p. 2

[17]Ibid., p. 4

[18]Ibid.

[19]"Ushewokunze launches Marxism-Leninism translations" PS 218/85/SM/SK. 24 May 1985. p. 1

[20]"Mutumbuka warns unco-operative teachers" op. cit. p. 3

[21]"PM calls for radical changes in education" PS 251/85/ ME/SM. 11 June 1985. p. 5

[22]"Education with production helps society, says Mutumbuka" PS 141/85/ME/MA. 11 April 1985. p. 2

[23]"Cde Ushewokunze calls on police to institute change" op. cit. p. 3

[24]Ibid., p. 5

[25]"Prime Minister's New Year speech to the nation" Policy Statement no. 2, January 1981. p. 2

[26]Ibid., pp. 2-3

[27]Ibid., p. 3

[28]"Education with production to effect socialism -- Culverwell" PS 306/84/AM/EM. 8 June 1984. p. 2

[29]"The Prime Minister outlines tasks for Zimbabwe youth" op. cit. p. 12; own emphasis

[30]"Socialism to benefit of majority -- Mutumbuka" PS 473/84/SD. 11 July 1984. p. 1

[31]"Mugabe calls for more arms and aid for anti-SA forces" The Star 22 October 1985

[32]"Prime Minister's New Year speech to the nation" op. cit. p. 3

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[33]"Party will guide the State on socialist path" The Herald 30 July 1985

[34]Ibid.

[35]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" PS 509/84/MA/SD 25 July 1984. p. 8

[36]Ibid., p. 7

[37]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" Policy Statement no. 6, December 1981. p. 5

[38]"PM on pay increase" PS 179/85/SM/SD. 2 May 1985. p. 1

[39]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" op. cit. p. 5

[40]"Prime Minister's independence anniversary speech to the nation" Policy Statement no. 4, April 1981. p. 6

[41]"Zimbabwe's educational challenge" [illegible]ica Currents no. 19/20, 1980. pp. 6-9

[42]See, for example: "Education wit[illegible]uction helps society says Mutumbuka" op. cit.; "Mental decolonisation necessary for transformation" PS 175/85/SD/SK. ??? May 1985

[43]"Schools must produce socialists says Premier" PS 721/84/GR/ME. 22 October 1984. p. 4

[44]"Education with production helps society says Mutumbuka" op. cit. p. 2

[45]"Education with prod[illegible]on to effect socialism -- Culverwell" op. cit. p. 3

[46]"Aiming at socialism" The Herald 19 September 1983

[47]Ibid.

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[33]"Party will guide the State on socialist path" The Herald 30 July 1985

[34]Ibid.

[35]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" PS 509/84/MA/SD 25 July 1984. p. 8

[36]Ibid., p. 7

[37]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" Policy Statement no. 6, December 1981. p. 5

[38]"PM on pay increase" PS 179/85/SM/SD. 2 May 1985. p. 1

[39]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" op. cit. p. 5

[40]"Prime Minister's independence anniversary speech to the nation" Policy Statement no. 4, April 1981. p. 6

[41]"Zimbabwe's educational challenge" Africa Currents no. 19/20, 1980. pp. 8-9

[42]See, for example: "Education with production helps society says Mutumbuka" op. cit.; "Mental decolonisation necessary for transformation" PS 175/85/SD/SK. ??? May 1985

[43]"Schools must produce socialists says Premier" PS 721/84/GR/ME. 22 October 1984. p. 4

[44]"Education with production helps society says Mutumbuka" op. cit. p. 2

[45]"Education with production to effect socialism -- Culverwell" op. cit. p. 3

[46]"Aiming at socialism" The Herald 19 September 1983

[47]Ibid.

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[48]"Cooperatives solid base for socialism -- Mahachi" PS 632/83/RC/DB. 29 August 1983. p. 1

[49]"Struggle for transformation continues -- Mahachi" PS 162/85/SM/EM April 1985. p. 4

[50]Ibid.

[51]"Production of wealth should preceed its distribution -- Mahachi" PS 513/84/BC/EM. 23 July 1984. p. 4

[52]"Cooperatives solid base for socialism -- Mahachi" op. cit. p. 1

[53]Ibid. p. 4

[54]Ibid., p. 2

[55]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" op. cit., p. 7

[56]"PM on pay increase" op. cit. p. 4

[57]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" op. cit. p. 9

[58]"PM addresses nation on independence eve" PS 176/85/MA/ME. 2 May 1985 p. 6

[59]"The construction of socialism in Zimbabwe -- Prime Minister" Policy Statement no. 14, July 1984. p. 3

[60]Ibid., p. 6

[61]"Production of wealth should precede its distribution -- Mahachi" op. cit. p. 1

[62]Ibid., p. 2

[63]Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979, 259

[64]"Cooperatives solid base for socialism -- Mahachi" op. cit. p. 1

[65]"Socialism to benefit of majority -- Mutumbuka" op. cit. p. 2

[66]"Nkala calls for gradual realistic change to socialism" PS 485/84/SC/SD. 13 July 1984. p. 4

[67]"Mugabe gets nod for one-party state" Sunday

Times (Johannesburg) 12 August 1984

[68]"The construction of socialism in Zimbabwe -- Prime Minister" op. cit. p. 9

[69]"Zimbabwe's slow road to socialism" The Star 14 July 1984

[70]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" op. cit. p. 8

[71]"Let's learn from North Korea says Jahwi" Zimbabwe Information Service November 1983. p. 1

[72]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" op.cit. p. 1

[73]Ibid., p. 3

[74]Ibid.

[75]Ibid., p. 4

[76]Ibid.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Ibid., p. 5

[79]Ibid., p. 6

[80]Ibid.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Ibid., p. 7

[83]"The construction of socialism in Zimbabwe -- Prime Minister" op. cit. p. 9

[84]Ibid., p. 9

[85]Ibid.

[86]"ZANU (PF) must keep government on right track -- Muzenda" PS 681/83/RC/DB/GR. 16 September 1983. p. 4

[87]"Civil servants should defend party policies -- Nyagumbo" op. cit. p. 2

[88]"The Prime Minister outlines tasks for Zimbabwe's youth' op. cit. p. 10

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[89]"The construction of socialism in Zimbabwe -- Prime Minister" op. cit. p. 11

[90]Ibid.

[91]"Ruling party spells out its aims and achievements" The Herald 10 June 1985

[92]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" op. cit. p. 8

[93]"Party to map out new strategy" The Herald August 1983

[94]Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979, 251

[95]"ZANU (PF) must keep government on right track -- Muzenda" op. cit. p. 2

[96]"Nyagumbo outlines role of party in socialist transformation" op. cit. p. 2

[97]Ibid. See also, Chikerema, C. "Take Marxism to the masses -- Ushewokunze" The Herald 27 October 1984

[98]Ibid.

[99]Legum, C. "Prime Minister Mugabe's 100 days to a time of decision in Zimbabwe" Third World Reports No. DH. 2. 25 May 1984. p. 4

Chapter Four: Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy: the Ideological Input

Since Independence, Party and Government officials have frequently asserted that ideology plays a significant role in the formulation and conduct of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. This chapter documents and evaluates that assertion. The role of ideology cannot be understood in isolation from the foreign policy itself. For this reason, theory of foreign policy -- as elaborated upon by the Minister of Foreign Affairs -- will be discussed. In addition, the context in which Zimbabwe's foreign policy operates, the principles and principal elements of that policy, and the machinery by means of which policy is formulated and executed, will be documented and discussed -- all through the eyes of the Government Ministers involved.

The focus is on the Government dimension for two reasons. Firstly, there is a high degree of congruence between Party and Government elites with regard to the foreign policy bureaucracy. This state of affairs will be discussed at greater length below. Secondly, it is in the Government context that the more substantive statements on foreign policy are made. However, the Government spokesmen involved are,

almost without exception, of equivalent or greater standing in ZANU (PF).

4.1 The Foreign Policy Process: the Relationship Between Government and Ruling Party

As discussed in an earlier chapter, ZANU (PF) is working towards a situation such that the ruling party dominates the Government. While the Government attends to the 'nuts and bolts' of day to day activities, the ruling party furnishes general guidelines in the form of policy directives. [1] To what extent is this true of the Foreign Ministry?

Within the Government itself, the general division of responsibility has been outlined on a number of occasions. According to Witness Mangwende, President Mugabe is the central figure in foreign policy formulation and conduct. As he put in an address to a group of trainee diplomats:[2]

> "...the Prime Minister defines foreign policy; the Minister of Foreign Affairs articulates that policy; and under the Minister's direction, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implements the policy or the dispensation from the top."

Where does this leave the ruling party? As noted in previous chapters, there is a high level of congruence between the ZANU (PF) Central Committee and Politburo on the one had, and Government MPs on the other. This is particularly true of the Foreign Ministry. At the

time Mangwende made the above statement, Mugabe was both Prime Minister and First President and Secretary of the ruling party, while Mangwende was both Foreign Minister and Politburo Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs. At time of writing Mugabe, now Executive President, continues to load both Party and Government, while Nathan Shamuyarira has replaced Mangwende as Foreign Minister. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Didymus Mutasa, does not form part of the Government's foreign policy establishment, continuing to hold as he does the post of Speaker of the House of Assembly.

In a 1985 Herald article Mutasa gave some insight into the party's relationship with Government. He stated that, as the Party is supreme over Government, his functions as Party Secretary for Foreign Affairs would "include supervising the Ministry of Foreign Affairs".[3] He foresaw a Foreign Ministry shakeup, working towards a situation where Zimbabwe's diplomats stationed abroad would "also assume the role of party representatives".[4]

While first-hand information on the workings of the foreign policy process with regard to the Party/ Government relationship is hard to come by, certain conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the above discussion. Mutasa's insight is consistent with official Party policy, and with ministerial statements

on the issue of the dominance of Party over Government. It is frequently claimed that ZANU (PF) gives direction to Government. There is no good reason to believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is exempt from this arrangement.

4.2 Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy

In his capacity as the Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witness Mangwende has on two separate occasions[5] (in 1983 and 1986)[6] elaborated at some length upon Zimbabwe's foreign policy. In so doing, he has discussed the concept of foreign policy itself, and the context in which such policy is conducted, the principles and principal elements of that policy, and the machinery used by the Government to project abroad its image and to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

4.2.1 The national interest: origins and principles

For Mangwende, foreign policy is essentially the pursuit of the national interest. Recognising the elusiveness of this concept, he broadly defines it as referring to "the objectives a state seeks to achieve in its conduct of relations with other states".[7] The identification and choice of these objectives and goals, Mangwende argues, is influenced by a number of considerations. These he identified as follows:

(1) the state's perception of its objective role and place in the international community

(2) the ideology adopted by the state, which serves a two-fold function: providing a filter through which the behaviour of other states is perceived, evaluated and judged, and providing a guide to action

(3) the state's level of aspirations and the psychological value it attaches to certain values

(4) the determination with which a state aims to pursue those articulated objectives, as well as the quantity of human and material resources it is willing to commit to the pursuit of its proclaimed national interests.[8]

Mangwende is at pains to point out the importance of the "extant environmental setting"[9] which often establishes "not only the perimeter or limits for action, but also, and even more importantly, the parameters and constraints to such action".[10]

However, Mangwende argues, even given the constraints imposed -- be it on a superpower or a micro-state -- each state still retains a certain capacity to achieve some of its objectives, either collectively with other states, or single-handedly.

4.2.2 The principles and key elements of Zimbabwean foreign policy

Mangwende argues for a close link between domestic and foreign policy:[11]

> "...a nation's foreign policy emanates, in large part, from its own domestic environmental conditions, and represents the strategy by which a nation seeks to express abroad, the substance of its internal, domestic policy, and by which it seeks to reconcile internal policy objectives with conditions prevailing in the international arena."

As he put it on another occasion, foreign policy is not an abstraction, but "a reflection of the domestic goals which a state has established for itself....What Zimbabwe wishes for itself is also what it would wish to be the reality of international relations".[12]

Mangwende points out that in conceptualising the various dimension of his country's foreign policy, those involved have been, and are, heavily influenced by the manner in which Zimbabwe gained independence and achieved national sovereignty. He argues that "Government's foreign policy direction is moulded around the very basic principles and beliefs upon which our liberation struggle was founded and won".[13] Mangwende identified four such principles:

(1) Described as of "prime importance" is the "continuing belief in ourselves as a people in charge of our own destiny...".[14] Zimbabwe is a sovereign,

independent country "aligned to and controlled by no other power".[15]

(2) Allied to this, is "a respect for other nations and peoples and for their right to chart their own respective destinies free from any interference from external forces, or internal forces working against the wishes of their broad masses".[16]

(3) A continuing cooperation with other states which share Zimbabwe's goals of the preservation of an independent identity, and the attainment of economic freedom from superpower, colonial control, as a followup to the attainment of political independence.[17]

Hence, as Mangwende points out, the Government's continued cooperation "with all the world's progressive forces".[18] However, there is a fourth principle which, for Mangwende, is of "overriding importance"[19] in the definition of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. That is the Government's longstanding and continuing commitment to socialist ideology.[20]

> "In defining our foreign policy, we continue to be strongly guided by that ideology -- by our belief in the establishment of a society of equals, rather than one in which some are more equal than others: by our belief that the means of production and distribution of national wealth should, ultimately, be controlled by the workers and peasants of Zimbabwe: by our view that the capitalist mode of economic

> development, be exorcised from an independent Zimbabwe."

Mangwende is not alone amongst his cabinet colleagues in claiming the impact, if not the primacy, of ideology on foreign policy. Mugabe himself has stated, in regard to Zimbabwe's foreign policy direction, that "Marxist-Leninist principles are the principles we would want to guide us in our socialist track".[21] In a 1984 address to trainee diplomats Maurice Nyagumbo, then Minister of State (Political Affairs and Provincial Development Coordination), informed his audience that it was on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles that the country would base its foreign policy.[22] Moreover, as the following brief discussion of Zimbabwe's brand of nonalignment illustrates, when referring to or discussing the nature of Zimbabwe's non-aligned stance, the input of Marxist-Leninist ideology is frequently mentioned. The discussion is brief, for Zimbabwe's nonaligned policy will be closely examined in chapter 5.

4.2.3 Zimbabwe's foreign policy orientation and the impact of ideology

The foreign policy of a state is a complex phenomenon. K.J. Holsti (1983, 98) alerts us to the vast difference in scope, for example, between sending a diplomatic note, and defining what a state will seek throughout the world in the long run. This section

concentrates upon Zimbabwe's foreign policy orientation. By 'orientation' is meant "a state's general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and for coping with persisting threats" (Ibid.). Holsti (Ibid.) identifies three basic orientations: (1) isolation; (2) nonalignment and; (3) coalition-making and alliance construction. From recent speeches and pronouncements by Party and Government officials, Zimbabwe's orientation would seem to be one of nonalignment.

The adherence by Zimbabwe to a policy of non-alignment is claimed in most if not all major policy statements. A recent supplement to the Public Service Bulletin, outlining the structure role and functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated:[23]

> "If one had to categorise Zimbabwe's foreign policy as a whole, one would have to define it as a policy of positive nonalignment."

Zimbabwean Government officials have, in the short time since independence, already played a prominent role in the movement. Mostly notably, Harare hosted the 8th Nonaligned Summit in 1986, Mugabe thus assuming the Chairmanship of the movement for the period 1986-1990.

The term 'nonalignment' is itself problematic, being

more often used than defined. While criteria for nonalignment (albeit vague and controversial in themselves) have existed since the first nonaligned gathering, the Cairo Preparatory Meeting of June 1961,[24] a 'verbal definition'[25] is more difficult. Indeed, the Non-aligned Movement itself -- in the form of the Legal Committee of the Group of Experts on the Establishment of the Solidarity Fund for Economic and Social Development in Nonaligned Countries -- was, in 1975, forced to adopt an ad hoc solution. "An understanding was reached", the legal experts affirmed, "that a country which is invited to attend a Conference of the Heads of State or Governments of the nonaligned countries pursuant to a decision of the latter should be regarded as a nonaligned country for the purposes of this convention".[26]

To understand nonalignment in the Zimbabwean context a number of definitions of the concept by Government officials are presented. Officials have, on a number of occasions, been at pains to clarify Zimbabwe's stance on this issue; the Government has been attacked in Parliament, for example, where it has been suggested by a ZAPU MP that ZANU (PF) was anti-Soviet, and thus not truly nonaligned.

One of the earliest post-independence references was made by the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simon

Muzenda, before Parliament in June 1980. The Minister described "our policy of positive nonalignment" as one of those "basic principles which inspire Zimbabwe's foreign policy and which will not change".[27] Muzenda declared:[28]

> "Zimbabwe's primary concern must be to prevent herself from falling under any form of domination, whether by the western or eastern blocs.....We shall not take sides in any armed conflict between West and East, and we shall exert our influence at all time in favour of detente. We are firmly opposed to the concept of 'spheres of influence'".

Muzenda's successor, Witness Mangwende, elaborated on this:[29]

> "The critical point is that the state must not automatically take sides on the critical issues of world politics; rather a country's position should be dictated by its own national interests first and foremost."

It is worth recalling at this point that Mangwende has emphasized the role of ideology in the determination of Zimbabwe's national interest. Thus it would appear that the country cannot be neutral on many international issues. Certainly, Mangwende has said as much:[30]

> "We are not a neutral country, but nonaligned (sic) country. A nonaligned country is one that refused to be aligned to any one of the armed power blocs in the world today. Zimbabwe is not a member of any such bloc. We are

> opposed to bloc politics and we take our position on international issues without fear or favour. Nobody dictates to us what position to follow. We are not neutral on the burning issues confronting mankind today. We stand firm against imperialism, colonialism, racism and exploitation of man by men in all its manifestations, so that cannot be neutralism."

Kumbirai Kangai has argued for a decisive element of ideology in Zimbabwe's nonalignment policy:[31]

> "Our concept of nonalignment is that it is not preclusive of a firm ideological grounding, but that it in fact presupposes possession of a definitive ideology...
>
> ...nonalignment does not rule out the possession of ideological holy cows; rather, it guarantees that should there be any holy cows to which a country pays homage, they are that country's own holy cows rather than those of friend's (sic) or enemy's country."

It would seem that for the Zimbabwean Government nonalignment precludes a political, diplomatic or military alignment, but presupposes an ideological one. This is not surprising if one accepts as genuine the zero-sum point of view expressed in a good number of Government and Party statements.[32] Robert Mugabe recently elaborated on what nonalignment meant to him and, in so doing, outlined how he saw the relationship between Marxist-Leninist ideology and a policy of nonalignment:[33]

> "Although Yugoslavia was aligned ideologically the same as the

> Soviet Union, following a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, it did not want to see itself belonging to the Warsaw pact, nor did it want its sovereignty compromised to the extent that it would not have the freedom to associate in certain areas of socio-economic endeavour, in trade and other forms of cooperation with the Western countries."
>
> To me, therefore, the term non-aligned, or Non-Aligned Movement, or non-alignment conjures up immediately the role of Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia, the struggle he waged to maintain some degree of freedom in his relations with the Soviet Union, so he could be associated also with Western countries."

To conclude: Government officials claim that Zimbabwe's foreign policy is based on Marxist-Leninist principles. Ideology, it is stated, is a basic component of foreign policy. It is of "overriding importance" in both the formulation of the national interest and the conduct of foreign policy. Ideology has a two-fold function: providing a filter through which the state perceives, evaluates and judges the behaviour of other states, and furnishing a guide to action. Not surprisingly then, it is widely claimed that nonalignment -- Zimbabwe's foreign policy orientation -- is based on that ideology.

With regard to the formulation process, the central role of the Prime Minister is proclaimed. As regards the role of the ruling party, it seems that, consistent with declared party policy, ZANU (PF)

attempts to lead and give direction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Certainly, the intention is there; it is however a question of how successfully this arrangement has been implemented.

It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the potential for the impact of ideology on foreign policy -- in both the Government and ruling Party domains -- is high. In chapters to follow the nature and extent of that impact will receive further attention.

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[1]A number of observers argue that this is already the case. See, for example: Hartnack, M. "Mugabe discusses Renamo" Business Day 16 July 1985

[2]"Diplomats should be honest and truthful -- Mangwende" op. cit. p. 3; my emphasis

[3]"Trade with West holds up socialist dialogue" The Herald 2 October 1985

[4]Ibid.

[5]Significantly, both speeches were addressed to civil servants to be posted abroad. On the first occasion the audience was composed of army officers destined for both domestic and foreign service ("Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy -- Mangwende" PS 330/83/AM 12 May 1983). On the second, the audience consisted of trainee diplomats (The foreign policy of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Lecture delivered by the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cde. Witness P.M. Mangwende, to diplomatic trainees at Ranche House College, Harare, 6th June 1986. Mimeo obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This discussion is mostly drawn from the first

[6]At the 1984 Second Party Congress, Mangwende was elected to the position of Politburo Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It seems reasonable to assume that this move further strengthened ZANU (PF)'s

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influence on government foreign policy. In the January 1988 cabinet reshuffle, Mangwende was replaced by Nathan Shamuyarira who, as a party stalwart, full member of the Politburo and a longstanding member of the editorial council of Zimbabwe News, would appear to be in an even better position to stamp the party's imprint on Zimbabwe's foreign policy.

[7]"Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy -- Mangwende". PS 330/83/AM 12 May, 1983. p. 2.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]"Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy -- Mangwende" op. cit. p. 3. Mangwende is not the only one amongst his Cabinet and Party colleagues to argue along these lines. See, for example: "Civil servants should defend party policies -- Nyagumbo" PS 594/84/SC/SN 29 August, 1984. p. 1; and "The foreign policy of Zimbabwe" in the supplement to the Public Service Bulletin 2, 2, 1985. Government Printer, Harare. p. 4.

[12]"Diplomats should be honest and truthful -- Mangwende" PS 931/81/RM 4 November, 1981. p. 2. It is for this very reason, amongst others, that chapter 5 of this study is devoted to events within Zimbabwe in the first five years of independence.

[13]"Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy -- Mangwende" op. cit., p.4.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ngangura, M. "Zimbabwe: under ZANU's umbrella" Africa Now December 1984 p. 26

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[22]"Civil servants should defend party policies -- Nyagumbo" op. cit. p. 1

[23]Supplement to the Public Service Bulletin 2, 2, 1985. p. 4

[24]See Willetts, P. The Non-Aligned Movement: the Origins of a Third World Alliance (Frances Pinter, London, 1978) for an elaboration on these

[25]By a verbal definition is meant an elucidation of the meaning by expression in alternative words (Flew, A. A Dictionary of Philosophy. St Martin's Press, New York, 1979. p. 80)

[26]Jankowitz and Sauvant, 1978, Vol. III, p. 1727

[27]Government of Zimbabwe, House of Assembly, Hansard 13 June 1980, col. 835

[28]Ibid.

[29]"Diplomats should be honest and truthful -- Mangwende" op. cit. p. 3

[30]ZIMBABWE. House of Assembly. Hansard 23 July 1981. cols. 799-800

[31]Kangai, K. M. "Zimbabwe and nonalignment" Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) XXXIII, 762, 1982. p. 15

[32]See ZANU (PF)'s ideological views, as presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis

[33]Malley, S. "An interview with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe" AfricAsia 32, August 1986. p. 8

Chapter Five: Ideology and Zimbabwe's Domestic Development

This chapter focuses on the domestic implementation of ZANU (PF) ideolo since 1980. The main thrust of this thesis being the influence of ideology on Zimbabwe's foreign policy, this exposition will of necessity be brief.[1] This chapter is included to provide readers with knowledge of the domestic situation which will enable them to better understand the ruling party's foreign policy values and goals. The assumption is one put forward by ZANU (PF): that the domestic informs the international. That is, Zimbabwe's foreign relations are in large part designed to further the country's domestic goals, and there will be a considerable degree of congruence between domestic and foreign policies, accordingly.[2]

As stated above, this chapter does not attempt a comprehensive survey and assessment of events in Zimbabwe since independence. Rather, it attempts to examine new trends that have emerged over the first five years, chiefly those developments which, engineered and encouraged by ZANU (PF), constitute an attempt by the ruling party to bring domestic political and socio-economic institutions into line

with its official ideology.

As discussed in the appendix to this thesis, ZANU (PF) adheres to a two-stage theory of revolution. It is argued that independence heralded the beginning of the first, national-democratic stage, the forerunner of the second, and final, stage of socialist revolution. Since 1980 ZANU (PF) spokesmen have consistently promoted this line of argument. Mugabe and his colleagues have been careful to emphasize the lengthy and often arduous process that is socialist transformation.

5.1 Policy of Reconciliation

On attaining power in 1980 Prime Minister Mugabe immediately took considerable pains to publicize his Government's policy of national reconciliation. Both former members of the Rhodesian and Zimbabwe-Rhodesian governments and members of ZAPU were included in his first cabinet. While such an attitude might be construed as indicating magnanimity on the part of the new Premier, it is also consistent with ZANU (PF)'s theory of national democratic revolution.[3] This posits that during the initial period of the revolution, the proletariat (in the form of the ideological vanguard) lacks sufficient strength to rule alone. What is called for is a united front of all democratic forces, to be discarded once the Party

has consolidated its hold upon the state.

Lancaster House presented Mugabe with an intact -- but extremely hostile -- state apparatus. If Mugabe were to avoid serious challenges to his authority in the months immediately following independence, he had to adopt an approach towards the bourgeoisie of 'divide and rule'. As one apologist has noted:[4]

> "This has lulled the bourgeoisie, both inside and outside the country, into a sense of ideological and economic security...the bourgeoisie is being neutralised by ZANU (PF) to prevent any possible counter measures they might have taken during the first few months of independence to destabilize the new government economically and politically".

While ZANU (PF) formally came to power in April 1980, the rest of that year and all the next were spent in an effort to consolidate state power and to impose order upon the new Republic. Thus 1980 was the "Year of the People's Power", and 1981 was the "Year of Consolidating the People's Power".[5] As Mugabe put it in 1985:[6]

> "Having found a Government of National Unity, the first major task the party had was to gain control of the state machinery".

5.2 Creation of the Zimbabwe National Army

The most immediate task to be accomplished was the

integration of the three standing armies, ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the former Rhodesian security forces. As Mugabe put it in his 1981/82 New Year speech to the nation:[7]

> "We reckoned that as a matter of priority, the securing of maximum peace would not only strengthen the new democratic political order we have created but that it would also provide an atmosphere conducive to *increased performance in* all our socio-economic sectors....
>
> But crucial to the attainment of optimum peace was always the task of integrating our forces...."

By November 1981 the process of integration was largely complete. The new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) constituted forty battalions totalling 50 000 men.[8] The Entumbane riots of February 1981 showed the vital importance of the prompt completion of this task. ZIPRA elements within three of the then nine newly integrated army units rebelled and clashed with ZANLA ex-combatants. However, the outbreak was contained, and this achievement further consolidated the Government's power. The process of integration was subsequently accelerated.

The importance of the integration process cannot be overemphasized. At independence the new Government was left with three fully armed and mutually hostile forces. ZANLA and ZIPRA together totalled some 50 000 ex-combatants, while the Rhodesian forces numbered 15 0000 men. Before the ruling party could hope to

extend its political base, these three forces had to be integrated so as to 'dilute' the anti-government elements. Events at Entumbane provided an inkling of what could have followed had this process not been given immediate priority. A ZANLA/ZIPRA standoff along the lines of the MPLA/UNITA situation in Angola, with ZIPRA basing itself in the Matabeleland bush, was a not unlikely alternative. Or, at the very least, large-scale armed banditry by trained men similar to that which has plagued Uganda for the past two decades.

5.3 Africanisation of the Civil Service

The Government also moved to establish and broaden its power base by means of the Africanisation of the civil service, beginning in 1980. A Presidential Directive was issued to allow appointment to senior positions in the army, police, judiciary and civil service of those loyal to the Government. "Without this control," ZANU (PF) later argued, "there was no way the Party could guide Government in implementing its policies".[9]

Senior officials of both Party and Government openly promote the idea of a politically partisan civil service. In 1984 the Minister of State for Political Affairs and Provincial Development Coordination, Maurice Nyagumbo, told a group of trainee diplomats that "it is absolutely necessary for [civil servants]

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not just to understand and sympathise (sic) but also to promote and defend Party policies and our external relations".[10] He went on to say that "the ideal situation would prevail if all key positions in the civil service, including the diplomatic career, were filled by zealous members of the ruling Party".[11] Knight (1984, 109) has pointed out the massive predominance of former bush fighters over technocrats in both the cabinet and the administrative apparatus.

In the same year, Mugabe informed Parliament that:[12]

> "Those we elect to top Government positions must be members who are conscious of the political policies of the Party, those who expouse the views and direction and ideology of the Party".

Earlier in the year, Mugabe had conceded that the civil service contained all kinds of people. He asserted that "in the future, those that are ideologically conscious will get preference",[13] and went on to suggest that a similar conscientization process would, at a later stage, be carried out in the army and judiciary.[14]

The Government and ruling party expect all state institutions not merely to acquiesce to the new order, but to actively support and promote it. For, as one prominent Party and Government official has argued, apolitical state institutions are a myth.[15] The argument goes that as the organs of state are

supportive of either capitalism or socialism (there being no middle ground), in Zimbabwe they must prove their support for socialism. Hence ZANU (PF)'s attempts since independence to politicise not only the state bureaucracy, but also the police, armed forces, and the judiciary.[16] The Minister of Home Affairs has underscored the priority of getting "all the machinery of the state acting in concert for the same and only objectives".[17]

In 1981 the Government proceeded to establish its influence in other areas of Zimbabwean life. The first workers' committees and workers' councils were established in 1981, as was the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). In the same year the Government proceeded with the creation of district, urban and rural councils.[18] In the rural areas these councils replaced the district commissioners of the colonial and UDI eras. In most cases these councils were the first salvo in the ruling party's drive to extend its influence at grass roots level. Thus in a number of constituencies the use of the secret ballot was disallowed, voters being instructed instead to stand behind the candidate of their choice.[19]

5.4 The Assertion of Party Over Government

In December 1981 President Mugabe formally announced the dominance of Party [i.e. ZANU(PF)] over

Government:[20]

> "The last meeting of our central committee has taken fundamental decisions in respect of the relationship between the party and the government. Government in the sense of the cabinet will in future only adopt and influence those policies which the central committee of the party has approved".

In 1985 Mugabe reiterated this point:[21]

> "The starting point of any national policies is henceforth to be the Party Forum, the policies in question being passed on to Government with well-defined parameters for implementation".

In 1982 President Banana announced that Government was considering legislation which would, inter alia, effectively further blur the distinction between Party and Government. The proposed bill would provide for state funding of parliamentary parties which enjoyed a significant following in the country, while prohibiting parties from receiving funding from outside the country.[22]

A cabinet reshuffle in June 1984 increased Mugabe's power vis-a-vis central government. The Ministry of Industry and Energy Development was abolished and replaced with two new portfolios, one of Industry and Technology, within the Prime Minister's Office, and one of Energy and Water Resources within the office of the Deputy Prime Minister. In addition, Maurice Nyagumbo, former Minister of Mines, was promoted to

head a new Department of Political Affairs and Provincial Development Coordination, also within the Prime Minister's Office.[23] In an interview with the Harare daily newspaper, The Herald, Mugabe explained the reasons behind these developments:[24]

> "...I am not happy with the limited degree of socialism that exists in our manufacturing sector... I am also not satisfied with the level of State participation in industry. I want to ensure that from this year onwards, major steps are taken to create socialism by establishing State enterprises, and by State participation in existing industries".

The appointment in the following month of eight provincial governors further illustrated the significance of the cabinet reshuffle. As political appointees, these provincial administrators became directly accountable to the Prime Minister's Office, via the Ministry of State (Political Affairs and Provincial Development Coordination).[25] Each Governor heads his respective provincial council, the function of which is to "formulate, coordinate, and supervise provincial policy within the framework of Government policy and secure the fulfillment of the national objective...".[26]

5.5 ZANU (PF) Second Party Congress and the Restructuring of the Party

The most significant political development since

independence was the convening of the Second Party Congress in August 1984. Prior to and in preparation for this occasion, ZANU (PF) officials proceeded with an extensive reorganisation of the party structure. This process began in 1982 and, by the end of 1983, provincial committees were in operation in all nine provinces.[27] Moreover, each province now possessed properly structured Districts, Branches, Villages and Cells.[28]

Following the establishment of hierarchical organs, attention was devoted to the emergence of the Women's and Youth Leagues. Consequently, a Women's League national conference was held in March 1984, while a Youth League national conference was convened in May of the same year.[29] Robert Mugabe has emphasized the important role played by the Youth and Women's Leagues of ZANU (PF). In 1984 he described these organisations as the party's "action wings responsible for the mobilisation and dynamising of the masses".[30] Referring specifically to the Youth League, he declared:[31]

> "You are the vital instrument which will ensure that ZANU (sic) becomes the only accepted political forum for a one-party state".

Party reorganisation was deemed to be necessary for ZANU (PF) to successfully contest the 1985 general election. While the ruling party emerged from the election a clear winner, there is consensus amongst

senior party officials that the restructuring of ZANU (PF) is far from complete.[32] At the present national democratic stage of the socialist revolution, ZANU (PF) is of necessity still a mass party, though admittedly with a vanguard element. What is called for is the creation of ideologically committed cadres to spearhead the socialist transformation. Eventually, it is argued, the ruling party will have streamlined itself into a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party. With the establishment of a one-party state, ZANU (PF) will finally assume its historic vanguard role.[33]

While the restructuring process was in August 1984, far from complete, it was deemed to have advanced sufficiently for the Second Party Congress to be held. More than 6000 delegates attended the Congress, and adopted a new constitution for the party. In terms of this new constitution, the Central Committees was tripled in size to ninety members, and its function was restricted to that of an advisory body.

The Central Committee is therefore no longer a power base independent of the Cabinet. The National Executive -- which had met infrequently -- was abolished and replaced with a 15-member Politburo (Hull, 1985, 38). As eleven of the appointees also held positions within the Cabinet, the gap between party and Government was further narrowed. Indeed,

Resolution 1.4 of the Second Congress instructs the Politburo to "superintend, supervise, and administer all Government ministries in accordance with the policies and programmes of the Party".[34]

The Congress also created five standing committees to "handle broad questions of public policy and seek to turn the resolutions of the party congress into comprehensible programmes" (Hull, 1985, 38). These five operate under the aegis of the Central Committee. The Legal and Constitutional Committee, charged with designing the plan for bringing about a one-party state, was headed by Maurice Nyagumbo, and included Edison Zvobgo. The Political and Policy Committee was led by Simon Muzenda, and included five other Government ministers -- Ushewokunze, Ndlovu amongst them. The remaining three committees deal with economics, social issues, welfare and national security.[35]

Mugabe himself emerged from the Congress with more effective executive authority within the Party. Not only was he unanimously elected First Secretary and President of ZANU (PF), but the new constitution assigns him the task, assisted by his deputy, of nominating the remaining Politburo members.[36] In a move clearly aimed at increasing Mugabe's legislative powers within Government, Congress Resolution 5.1 called for the creation, by Government, of an

executive presidency "without undue delay".[37]

The Second Party Congress was a milestone in a number of other respects. For the first time the application within the Party of the principle of democratic centralism was achieved to a significant extent.[38] A number of important resolutions were also passed. These included: a reaffirmation of the dominance of Party over Government; the adoption of democratic centralism as the fundamental tenet in the internal functioning and administration of the Party; and the desire to bring about a one-party state "in the fullness of time and in accordance with the law and the constitution."[39]

5.6 The One-Party State Issue

Underlying political relations in Zimbabwe is the constant refrain of the creating of a one-party state. The ruling party itself makes no secret of its intention ultimately to implement a one-party state system in Zimbabwe. The August 1984 Party Congress resolved "to bring about a one-party state in the fullness of time and in accordance with the law and the constitution".[40]

Since 1982 ZANU (PF) doctrine has increasingly become national doctrine. ZANU (PF) itself has come to be identified with the Government of Zimbabwe. The ethos

of Zimbabwe is gradually becoming that of the ruling party. Of course ZANU (PF) itself has been instrumental in initiating and fostering these processes. The ruling party desires synonymity with the government and the people of Zimbabwe.

While the Lancaster House constitution prevents the establishment of a de jure one-party state before 1990, save by unanimous consent of the House of Assembly, the ruling party has worked to establish a de facto one-party system. Opposition parties have been harassed in an effort to accelerate the attrition of their remaining support. Members of both Abel Muzorewa's United African National Congress (UANC) and the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ) have been detained for alleged links with South Africa. Both Muzorewa and Ian Smith had their passports confiscated, while Muzorewa also suffered a period of detention. The Government has, however, reserved most of its energies for ZAPU, the opposition party with by far the greatest measure of popular support, and thus the party most capable of challenging the ruling party's position.[41]

Since Nkomo's expulsion from Parliament in 1982, following the discovery of arms caches on several farms owned by Nitram, a ZAPU company, his party has come under increasing power from both Government and ruling party. ZAPU has harassed on three fronts: in

central government, in local government, and at grass-roots level. In the aftermath of Nkomo's dismissal, eleven ZAPU businesses and farms were confiscated, and the two top military commanders of the ZIPRA forces, Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa, were detained. These government actions resulted in a considerable number of ZIPRA ex-combatants deserting the ZNA and returning to the bush. These dissidents, as the Government calls them, have proceeded to roam Matabeleland at the expense of the local inhabitants. ZAPU has frequently and publicly been accused of support for the rebels, despite ZAPU's denials to the contrary. Evidence of ZAPU support for the dissidents has yet to be furnished by the Government.

Since 1983 ZAPU's organisational core has come under increasing attack. ZAPU MPs have been detained and branch officials harassed. Public meetings have been prohibited, and party property confiscated. In June 1984 the murder by dissidents of several ZANU (PF) officials in Matabeleland sparked off violence by ZANU(PF) supporters against ZAPU. The destruction of ZAPU property included the burning down of ZAPU headquarters in the Midlands town of Gweru. These attacks followed a government ban on ZAPU meetings in that province. The then Minister of State for Defence, Ernest Kadungure, reportedly thanked the mob, during riots in Kwe Kwe, for thus showing support for ZANU (PF). He is said to have stated that such

violence was a justifiable reaction to ZAPU support for dissidents.[42]

In the 1985 election run-up black opposition parties were subjected to considerable harassment in their efforts to campaign. In January 1985, during the opening stages of the general election campaign, ZANU (PF) supporters forced Joshua Nkomo to cancel a number of political appearances in Banket, Chinoyi and Masvingo, and to call off a planned three-day tour of northern Mashonaland.[43] In Masvingo, the Governor of Victorian province was reportedly at hand to meet and encourage the demonstrators, as was a Government Minister whose home is in Masvingo, and who is the party provincial chairman of the area.[44] On February 17 a ZAPU election rally in Kwe Kwe was cancelled as close on 4000 supporters of the two main parties fought until dispersed by police teargas.[45] At month end five UANC officials were dragged from a Hwange train and shot on the station platform.[46] In March government troops sealed off Bulawayo in a search for arms and dissidents Nkomo claimed that the security sweep was an attempt to intimidate and demoralize supporters of his party.[47] In the urban areas countrywide ZANU (PF)'s townships network of youth members saw to it that the opposition parties held no house meetings, while there were reports from the rural areas of ZANU (PF) Youth League members, backed by uniformed and armed men, beating locals and

exhorting them to vote for the ruling party.[48] In Glenview, a suburb of Harare, Youth Brigade members staked out, twenty-four hours in advance, the venue at which the opposition ZAPU party was to have held a meeting. ZAPU was forced to call off the rally. Similar tactics had been used the previous week to cancel a ZAPU rally in Mufakose, another suburb of Harare.[49]

While recognising excesses committed by its supporters, ZANU (PF) officials maintained that the violence was not part of an orchestrated campaign against the opposition parties. Mugabe himself on at least one occasion called upon his supporters to end their violence.[50] However, Mugabe, Enos Nkala and other party leaders have campaigned aggressively for the downfall of Nkomo, frequently explicitly linking him and his party with the dissident problem.[51] In the years preceeding the election more than one Government minister publicly legitimised violence against ZAPU supporters on the grounds that Nkomo and ZAPU were "enemies of the people". The lead has come from the top that ZANU (PF) is the people's party, that ZANU (PF) is the Government, and that opposition is illegitimate, if not treasonous. Moreover there are indications that the ruling party leadership actively organised anti-ZAPU measures. ZANU (PF) sources told The Times (London) that local party leaders had been instructed, prior to the election, to

collect names and addresses of opposition supporters. Once victory had been announced, the report said, supporters were to be beaten.[52] These lists were reportedly used in the post-electoral violence that followed ZANU (PF)'s victory.

Following ZANU (PF)'s electoral victory, party supporters went on the rampage against members of the opposition parties. Members of the women's and youth wings of the ruling party evicted opposition supporters from their homes in the Harare high density suburbs of Mufakose and Chitungwiza.[53] Police were well aware of the evictions but took no action. Similar tactics were practiced in Bindura and Glendale, north of Harare, and in the Midlands town of Kwe Kwe.[54] Days later, the violence had spread to Dzivaresekwa and Zengeza townships, near Harare, resulting in the axing to death of the ZAPU candidate for Dzivaresekwa. The Government, meanwhile, appeared unable or unwilling to stem the violence by its supporters.[55] Police kept away, making no attempt to intervene until the third day of violence.[56]

Post-election pressure on ZAPU was not restricted to grass-roots level. In the month following the election five of the fifteen ZAPU members of parliament were taken into custody for investigation into alleged anti-state activities, as were a white former mayor of Bulawayo, the incumbent black mayor,

and fourteen black city councillors. In total some forty ZAPU officials were detained.[57] This crackdown followed that month's appointment, to the Ministry of Home Affairs, of Enos Nkala, a long standing enemy of Nkomo. Nkala told the Zimbabwe Senate in September 1985 of his intention to "wipe out" ZAPU within the following few months. He declared:[58]

> "We should also hit the dissidents at their very roots, and that root is ZAPU and ZAPU leadership".

The 1985 elections effectively imposed one-party rule over much of the country with ZANU (PF) capturing 77% of the votes cast.[59] One observer summed up the prevailing situation thus:[60]

> "What exists in Zimbabwe at present is a 'de facto' one-party state, where the ruling party has an overwhelming legislative majority and utilises its legal, security and political powers to restrict the competitive potential of the opposition".

Thus far constitutional provisions have frustrated ZANU(PF)'s desire for a one-party state. These legal restrictions will, however, fall away in 1990. It is almost certain that ZANU (PF) will then proceed with all speed towards the establishment of a one-party state system, regardless of parliamentary opposition. Mugabe openly declared as much at a news conference following his party's general election victory:[61]

> "When the time does come for us

> to effect a one-party state we will do so whether these parties still exist or not. In other words if it's a one party (sic) state then that's it. The other parties will stand invalidated and only one party will remain".

5.7 People's Militia

Since independence the government has proceeded with the creation of two mass organisations designed to increase its influence in the rural areas: a people's militia and youth brigades.

In 1983 William Ndangana, the then Deputy Minister of Defence (Paramilitary), reported that 1500 instructors had been deployed country-wide to train the core of a people's militia. While at that stage four thousand members had been trained, it was hoped eventually to have a force of twenty thousand men and women.[62] The point was made that the selection of candidates for training was being done "with the help of local leadership to ensure that only those loyal to the Prime Minister and Government were allowed to join".[63] In 1984 Ndangana declared the main task of the militia to be "Government's eyes and ears".[64] As such they were to serve "as an early morning to our regular forces, army, police and airforce..."[65]

In September 1984 Sidney Sekeremayi, then acting Minister of State (Defence) assigned the militia a

more politically partisan role. Speaking at a passing out parade, he explicitly linked ZAPU with the dissident problem wracking Matabeleland, and declared that the militia would assist the regular forces in the elimination of dissidents:[66]

> "Through the dedication of Korean instructors and our own officers and non-commissioned officers of the People's Militia, we will build a force capable of helping our regular forces to sweep the dissidents away like dust in the wind and making others think twice before they make any attempt to interfere with our growing socialist state".

The Zimbabwean government has also created a number of youth brigades. In 1983 the then President, Canaan Banana, reported that 350 000 young Zimbabweans had been thus mobilised.[67] In July 1985 the then Minister of Youth, Sport and Culture, David Karimanzira, announced the goverment's intention to expand the Youth Brigades to over one million members, and to establish two other youth organisations. The new groups would be the Pioneers, aged between six and fourteen years, and a kindergarten section consisting of children aged five years and below.[68]

5.8 Political Proselytisation

ZANU (PF) spokesmen have, since 1980, emphasized the 'psychological variable' of socialist transformation Muzenda, for instance, has phrased it thus:[69]

> " The acceptance and application of socialist ideas largely depends on their proper *theoretical and conceptual* comprehension. People need to understand what scientific socialism is all about".

Mugabe declared in 1983: "The transformation we seek is both structural and psychological in the broadest sense".[70] He argued that "the transformation of *institutions, practices* and ways of life presupposses (sic) the transformation mentalities (sic), attitudes and values".[71]

In 1982, Mugabe included in a brief list of constraints on the socio-economic transformation of Zimbabwe:[72]

> "....the need for a political and educational campaign based on our envisaged socialist programmes in order to conscientize and transform the peasants and the working class, the students professionals and intellectuals, and the formation of cadres who are fully ideologized to constitute the organisational vanguard of the co-operative system in all sectors and lead worker participation in industries towards self-management".

In an earlier chapter we briefly discussed the concept within ZANU (PF) doctrinal thinking of a socialist new man. This theme has been pursued since independence. State institutions have repeatedly been called upon to instill in all Zimbabweans, in particular the youth, the values of socialism a la ZANU (PF). In this regard the mass media and the schools have been singled out for attention.

In keeping with its policy of increasing national control of the economy, the government has localised ownership of the mass media. In the newspaper field the government created the Mass Media Trust which in turn purchased the shareholding in Zimbabwe Newspapers of the South African Argus Group.[73] The Mass Media Trust also purchased all the shares of the Inter-African News Agency (whose main contract for international news was with the South African Press Association) and reconstituted it into the Zimbabwean Inter-African News Agency (ZIANA).[74] ZIANA is now the sole agency for the dissemination of news from Zimbabwe to the international community.[75]

In this way, the government has increased its control over the dissemination of news both inside and outside Zimbabwe. Radio and television services faithfully support Government policy, as does the major daily newspaper, The Herald. The weekly Financial Gazette -- a newspaper with a limited readership, mainly middle-class white businessmen -- remains the only independent newspaper. The paper with the largest national distribution, the Sunday Mail, retained, until the Government's ousting of its editor, Willie Musarurwa, in July 1985, a considerable measure of editorial independence. Musarurwa had achieved a certain notoriety for his willingness to criticize Government policy.[76]

The government has made it abundantly clear that these reconstituted media services are expected to assist in the "mental decolonisation" of the Zimbabwean people. In other words, the media are expected to support Government efforts to implement socio-economic change. A new ethos is in this way being promoted. Journalists are not expected to be neutral in the sense of reporting mainly facts and events. It is said that there is a war in Zimbabwe between capitalism and socialism -- and the press are expected to take the latter's side. Nathan Shamuyarira, then Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, has argued that:[77]

> "It is incumbent that all mass media personnel should be properly trained and oriented. They must have the necessary socialist political education and a knowledge of our history and culture".

As Mugabe put it in his 1981/82 New Year address, journalists:[78]

> "...must always be conscious of the new political, social and economic order and its demands and suppress their apathetic or resistant attitudes".

Socialism must be accepted by the mass media, and actively promoted. The media is expected to play a significant part in inculcating new values into Zimbabwean society. Shamuyarira again:[79]

> "Ideally the mass media should effect the transition from a capitalist system to a

> socialist one.....To do this the Mass Media (sic) ought to have bold and effective programmes designed to educate the masses and imbue them with the correct attitudes and values so that they are conscientized and they can identify themselves with and implement the Government's socialist policies".

Canaan Banana has put it somewhat more aggressively. At the Zimbabwean Newspapers annual journalist awards presentation ceremony in January 1986, he declared that in the current battle in Zimbabwe between old and new ideas, journalists should be "in the forefront of the battle to propagate new ideas, and to discredit the old ones".[80] He went on:[81]

> "In Zimbabwe today, we need journalists who combine highest professionalism with the correct ideological orientation ....Before they pick up their pens they must be committed to the ideology of liberation in the true and full sense of the word. The dedicated Zimbabwean journalist must serve his or her nation and must regard the pen as a new AK weapon in the continuing struggle for liberation".

The 'new journalism' in Zimbabwe is even accorded a foreign policy role. Just as the capitalist/socialist confrontation within Zimbabwe is part of a greater, international face-off, so the mass media's support for the new order within Zimbabwe must be reflected in its foreign policy stance. Shamuyarira has not been alone in asserting that:[82]

> "...the mass media must regard it as their international (sic) duty to give active support and

> maximum coverage to all the liberation struggles of the peoples of the countries under colonialist and imperialist shackles. They must resolutely fight against imperialism in support of liberation movements of SWAPO, ANC and PAC in Southern Africa, POLISARIO in North Africa, PLO in the Middle East and other movements in East Asia and Central America".

Since independence there have been a number of documented cases of the media supporting the government to the detriment of opposition political parties. In 1983 the Government accused Nkomo of attempting to leave the country under a false identity. Much media coverage of this allegation was given. Nkomo attempted to counter the allegation by producing a photostat copy of his air ticket and a telegram inviting him to a meeting in Prague to discuss the agenda for a World Peace Council meeting. The media, however, made no mention of this evidence.[83] In the runup to the 1985 general election, Emmerson Mnangagwa accused Ndabaningi Sithole of plotting with the government of the United States to topple the Zimbabwean government. When Washington denied all knowledge of the plot, it was left to the independent weekly, the Financial Gazette, to carry the report.[84] On another occasion The Herald refused to publish a reply by Ian Smith to a hard attack against him. The newspaper even refused to accept his reply in the form of a paid advertisement. The state-owned television station gave him equally short thrift.[85]

In sum, the mass media maintain a position strongly supportive of the Government. Radio and television services are notable in this regard, with scarcely a report critical of the Government. The state-owned television, in particular, severely limits reporting to Government and ZANU (PF) events. Until very shortly before the 1985 general elections, opposition parties enjoyed very limited access to the media.[86] To be sure, the pro-Government Herald does carry reports critical of the government,[87] but such criticism is almost always within a socialist framework. With the sacking of Willie Musarurwa from the Sunday Mail, it is left to the Financial Gazette to question the adviseability of socialism itself.[88]

While the Government is aware of the role played by the mass media in re-educating the populace, particular emphasis has been reserved for the system of formal primary, secondary and tertiary education. It is believed that Zimbabwe's best chances of achieving a socialist society lie in imparting socialist values to the country's youth.

Thus, since 1980 Government has brought formal education into the forefront of its struggle to effect socio-economic change.[89] The teaching profession has been urged to take part in politics, and to promote the new socialist order.[90] Dzingai Mutumbuka, then

Minister of Education and Culture, has declared that teachers must "display an impeccable commitment to the socialist ideology our country has chosen..."[91] There have been frequent calls for changes in curricula so as to imbue the country's youth with socialist values. For, as Mutumbuka said of education: "Its prime concern is the development of socialist consciousness".[92] To this end the Ministry of Education and Culture established a Curriculum Development Unit to revise primary and secondary school syllabi.[93] Another development has been the selection of eight schools for an experiment in education under the guidance of the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production (ZIMFEP).[94] Education with Production (EWP) has become the catchphrase in Zimbabwean educational circles. The basic principle of socialist education, EWP "focusses on the marriage of theory and practice, i.e. praxis, to develop the individual cognitively, physically, technically, thus effectively leading to a....person with a proletarian or worker consciousness".[95]

Mutumbuka has called for an "ideologically loaded" curriculum:[96]

> "This involves drenching and dressing curricular content, methods, organisation and assessment in socialism. Curricula must be imbued in socialism and float on a film of socialism".

Thus far, however, actual progress on curriculum development has been limited. Indeed, the new recommended history tests for primary schools emphasize the nationalist aspect of the independence struggle, or 'chimurenga' as it is popularly known in Zimbabwe. The concepts of ideology and class struggle are absent from what is essentially a liberal analysis.[97] Mutumbuka argues that the process of curriculum development is necessarily slow and that, for the present, the emphasis must be on educating the educators, i.e. the teachers.[98] Moreover, he argues, the first step in revising the curricula is to emphasize Zimbabwean nationalism -- that all Zimbabweans should regard themselves as such.[99] This the new history texts certainly do attempt to accomplish.

Notwithstanding practical constraints, it is intended that in future education in Zimbabwe will become more laden with ideological content. ZANU (PF) is committed to a philosophy of education which will spearhead the thrust towards socialism. Among the 1984 Congress resolutions was one calling for political education to be compulsory for all students from nursery school to tertiary level "to ensure the proper grasp of scientific socialism by future generations".[100] Mugabe told an end-of-year (1985) meeting of his party's Central Committee that:[101]

> "Since society will in future be comprised, almost to the man, of persons who will have had some schooling of some sort, it is important that a beginning is made in providing school children and students with well-planned political and ideological educational courses. In addition, the subjects taught at school must, where possible, be given a proper ideological perspective, so that the bearing they have on the socio-economic realities of Zimbabwe is not at variance with the Party's political philosophy".

5.9 Economic Policies

Robert Mugabe is proceeding with relative caution along the path to socialism. He has the benefit of hindsight, of a decade of independence and socialist experimentation in both Angola and Mozambique. Accordingly, the Zimbabwean government has so far been rather circumspect on the economic front, giving preference instead, as we have seen, to the consolidation of political power. Moreover Mugabe has to tread a tightrope between the technocratic and the populist elements within his own party, attempt to attract foreign investment to finance his economic policies, assuage the fears of the private sector so as to strengthen its support for the Government and, at the same time, try to remain true to his own personal vision of the direction in which his country should be developing.[102]

In keeping with its avowed policy of economic gradualism, the government has approached the private sector with caution. There has not been the wholesale nationalisation of industry that followed independence in Angola and Mozambique. On the contrary, Party and Government officials have frequently stressed the productive over the distributive aspects of socialism. Typical of this approach is the statement by the then Minister of National Supplies, Enos Nkala, in July 1984:[103]

> "It would be quite possible to distribute everything we found, but after that, what? The answer to this is too ghastly to contemplate".

If socialism is to fulfill its potential, so the ZANU (PF) line of argument goes, then the productive forces -- greatly neglected by colonial capitalism -- must be expanded. In this process private enterprise is said to have an important role to play.

Despite such reticence, however, many changes have been implemented, and it is evident that the process of socialist transformation has begun.[104] Party and Government officials stress that the political independence won in 1980 must be transformed into national economic independence.[105] In a New Year (1981) address to the nation the Zimbabwean Premier thus summarized the phases of the struggle:

1. National armed struggle
2. National independence
3. National economic independence
4. National socialism[106]

With the attainment of the second phase in April 1980, Zimbabwe has now embarked upon a drive for the economic independence which is regarded as a prerequisite for the attainment of socialism.

In 1982 the country formally embarked upon phase three with the proclamation of the "First Year of National Transformation". The year brought with it the Government's first attempt at central planning: a three year Transitional National Development Plan for the period 1982/83 to 1984/85. Mugabe described the plan as Government's "first endeavour at socialist transformation".[107] He added that:[108]

> "...the implementation of this Plan is intended to initiate processes designed to set the stage for the transformation of the inherited socio-economic system....This Plan in essence puts our nation at the threshold of our second revolution -- the socio-economic revolution designed to give greater meaning to our independence".

On an earlier occasion the Prime Minister thus summarised the nature and goals of the plan:[109]

> "The plan will be an embodiment, on the one hand, of set socio-economic objectives and, on the other, of the means of

> resources at our disposal aimed at achieving the set objectives. Because of our commitment to socialism, the plan will naturally chart a socialist direction, while recognising areas of private enterprise not immediately amenable to socialism".

Concrete guidelines included: the acquisition of more land for the peasantry; increased State participation in agriculture, mining, manufacturing and commerce, either alone or in partnership with private enterprise; the regulation by the State of private enterprise to comply "with state objectives and social demands"; and the establishment of people's cooperatives.[110] Some headway has already been made towards the achievement of these economic objectives.

5.9.1 The state sector

The Zimbabwean government is steadily increasing its stake in the economy. In addition to those state enterprises it inherited at independence, the Government now controls, or has a considerable stake in: fuel procurement, banking, insurance, the pharmaceuticals industry, the steel industry, the communications media, publishing and retail bookselling, and the hotel and tourist industries.[111] The Government has also created a number of new state enterprises. The Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation was set up in 1982 to facilitate government investment in mining and exploration.[112]

The Minerals Marketing Corporation (MMC) was established later in the same year, and now acts as the sole agent for the sale and export of all minorals (excluding gold) produced in Zimbabwe.[113] When the State's handling of major agricultural exports -- handled by another parastatal, the Agricultural Marketing Authority -- is taken into account, this gives the Government direct control over more than sixty percent of exports.[114] In 1984 the Government entered the insurance market with its own Zimbabwe Reinsurance Corporation (ZIMRE). This institution is, according to the Prime Minister, "the sole vehicle for external insurance".[115] The Industrial Development Corporation was established as "Government's implementation arm on participation in the manufacturing sector".[116] In 1985 the Zimbabwe Milling Corporation was formed with the intention -- according to a document lodged with the Registrar of Companies -- of taking over completely the functions of the existing milling companies.[117] On the promotions side, Government in 1984 took over management of the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair. The state now chairs both the management and executive committees of the fair. According to Canaan Banana, this move "is in line with our declared policy of bringing all major institutions in Zimbabwe under the direct management and control of Zimbabweans"[118]

At his Party's Second Congress in 1984, Mugabe

announced ZANU (PF)'s strategy for the period 1985-1990. This aims at increasing the degree of local ownership and control of the means of production (state, cooperative and individual), greater State involvement in strategic industries and the establishment of new industries, both by the State and by cooperatives.[119] In 1985 Mugabe told reporters at his post-election victory news conference that "the mandate also means that the Party must implement its policies....And hence, there is going to be an intensification of socialist programmes".[120] The following month Bernard Chidzero announced the Government's intention to increase its participation in the private sector.[121]

While the Government has increased its involvement in the economy, it continues to stress the role to be played by private enterprise in the economic development of the country. However, government officials stress, private enterprise must function within a socialist-orientated framework. That is, the private sector must cooperate in the attainment of national objectives. Mugabe argues that, as an unavoidable historical reality, capitalism "has to be purposefully harnessed, regulated and transformed as a partner in the overall national endeavour to achieve set national Plan Goals".[122]

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acknowledged. In 1981 Mugabe announced his government's commitment to a system of "the overall planning of the economy",[123] The first attempt as such was the aforementioned Transitional National Development Plan for the period 1982/83 to 1984/85. In the foreword to this the Zimbabwean Premier placed on record his government's commitment to a centrally planned Zimbabwean economy:[124]

> "Our firm belief is that it is only within the framework of a planned economy that Government is better able to influence and purposefully direct development....in harmony with socialist objectives. This role of Government in the development of our national economy is indispensable if we are to move speedily towards the establishment of the socialist state we envision".

In 1985 President Banana announced that in 1986 a Five-Year Plan would be released.[125]

5.9.2 <u>The worker and the economy</u>

In 1985 Parliament approved a new Labour Relations Bill. The Bill confers upon the Minister of Labour wide powers which include the making of regulations governing minimum wages, conditions of employment, the circumstances governing the dismissal of employees, and strike procedure. The increased powers vested in the Minister have been criticized by both the political left and right in Zimbabwe.[126] For, while workers have been given more power than ever before (the role, power and functions of workers' committees

have now been codified), the powers of the Ministry of Labour have increased dramatically. It is clear that, while Government is committed to improving the status of the worker, it intends that such developments should be under the strict supervision of the workers' Party and Government. Such an approach is, of course, classically Leninist.[127]

The new Labour Relations Bill boosts the power of the worker in Zimbabwe. For, while workers' committees have existed in Zimbabwe since 1981, the new bill codifies their role, power and functions. They have grown considerably in number since 1981, and indeed have gained a considerable degree of acceptance by management. According to Mugabe, ZANU (PF) envisages these committees assisting the ruling party in the eventual establishment of worker management of industry.[128] The ruling party hopes that by this time, it will have gained full control of these committees.[129]

5.9.3 Trade unions

Trade unions have come under increasing pressure to join the ZANU (PF)-manipulated Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), established in September 1980. As with all other mass organisations, the trade unions are regarded by Government as potential instruments through which to further its political goals. In a 1985 Labour Day speech Mugabe made this clear:[130]

> "Let me again stress the crucial role which the labour *movement* will have to play as we lay foundations for a socialist Zimbabwe. It will be its major task to impart to workers the right ideological orientation necessary for the attainment of our socialist goals".

The ZCTU appears to be living up to this role. At its second inaugural conference, held in July 1985, delegates proposed and adopted "scientific socialism based on Marxist Leninist (sic) teachings as the guiding principles of the labour movement in Zimbabwe".[131] The ZCTU recognised and affirmed its close affinity with the ruling party on the basis of common ideology, shared objectives, and shared principles. While both are structured according to the principle of democratic centralism, th

> "...recognises the party's supreme authority because they (sic) give guidance in all round development, political, social, cultural and economic policies."

Hence the ZCTU's rejection of what it calls "traditional economism".[133] In line with its task of worker education, the ZCTU set up an Education Committee with the objective of "establishing a new syllabus in which for the first time Marxist Leninist (sic) teaching is the dominant content".[134]

5.9.4 Cooperative development

The Transitional National Development Plan released in 1982 declared its "general strategy" to be the provision of "a solid framework and basis for

participation by popular mass organisations and to create new socio-economic institutions capable of harnessing and utilising the resources of the people".[135] While the former goal is being attained *by means of the trade unions and workers' committees*, the latter is being attained by means of the encouragement of cooperative production.

Some progress has been achieved in this field. In 1983 Bernard Chidzero noted that the number of cooperatives had grown more than two-fold since independence, from 400 to 1000.[136] By the end of February 1985, 1423 primary cooperative societies in *various sectors of the economy* had been registered by the then Department of Cooperative Development -- with a total membership exceeding 105 000.[137] The collective cooperative movement (worker-owned organisations whose assets are shared equally by all) totalled 300, representing between 20 000 and 25 000 people.[138]

Government strongly pushes the philosophy of cooperation and collectivism. The emphasis is on producer cooperatives in agriculture and industry. Notwithstanding the rhetoric, officials recognise the numerous and considerable problems they face in this sphere. These include a lack of capital, framing skills and supportive infrastructure, and poor organisational and management capacity, as well as a

"lack of ideological understanding of the role played by cooperatives in transforming the society into socialism".[139] While many excombatants have eagerly embraced the idea of cooperative production, the majority peasant population has firm traditional attitudes favouring individual land ownership.

Government is in the process of expanding its central and local government infrastructure so as to be able to provide more effective assistance to the existing cooperative movement. In 1983 the Department of Cooperative Development was created under the then Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development. This Department was aimed primarily at the promotion of agricultural cooperatives, those in non-agricultural fields receiving assistance from the relevant Government ministries.[140] In 1985 the title of the Ministry of State (Political Affairs and Provincial Development Coordination was changed to Ministry of State (Political Affairs and Coordination of Cooperatives). This move reflects the priority Government attaches to the development of cooperative relations of production, given the fact that the Minister of State concerned reports directly to the Prime Minister.[141] In 1984 Mugabe announced to his Central Committee that, as part of "a programme of mass education on the principles, management and establishment of cooperatives", Government would establish a cooperative college for the training of

cadres to manage cooperatives and state farms.[142] On the financial front Government has also expanded its services to the cooperative movement. Through the Agriculture Finance Corporation (AFC) and the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) loans are granted to cooperatives and members thereof.[143] In February 1986 Maurice Nyagumbo announced Government plans for a central cooperative fund that would form the nucleus for a cooperative bank.[144]

The state farm sector is also receiving assistance from Government. A state farm parastatal, the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) coordinates government efforts in this sphere.[145] This organisation is reported to have established itself as a leading producer of a wide variety of agricultural products.[146] Several new major state farm schemes were announced by President Banana in July 1985.[147]

Government has also set about expanding the rural infrastructure for, as Chidzero pointed out, resettlement, whether on a cooperative or an individual basis:[148]

> "...is designed not simply as a process of transfer of assets, but as one of integrated development involving productive use of land and the provision of economic and social services, as well as transport and communications. It is,

> therefore, necessarily a long-term task if it is to be a fully effective and successful exercise"

The main thrust of the Transitional National Development Plan was thus directed to rural development. According to Chidzero, Government was in 1983 channelling as much as one third of public sector investment into rural development.[149] Marketing and storage depots, *fertilisers and seed*, *credit* opportunities and agricultural extension services have all been made more accessible to the communal sector, with impressive results in terms of greatly increased peasant production.[150]

5.9.5 The land question

Land was one of the major issues of the seven-year bush war, yet the Government's post-independence record in this sphere has been unremarkable; unremarkable, that is, in terms of the goals the government publicly set itself. Reed (1987, 49), however, points out that in point of fact Zimbabwe's has one of the *world's largest resettlement* programmes. After independence Government committed itself to the resettlement of 18 000 families per year. The 1982 Transitional National Development Plan upped this quota to a figure of 162 000 families, to be settled over a three-year period, 1982/83 - 1984/85.[151] By 1985, however, only 35000 families had been resettled, according to official

figures.[152] A number of factors have contributed to this policy/action gap.

The Lancaster House constitution committed the Government to paying compensation, at prevailing market prices and in foreign currency, for underutilised land owned by white commercial farmers if it is compulsorily acquired. It has been reported that land acquisitions had by 1985 cost the Government approximately Z$ 76 million.[153] To date, the land acquired has been on a willing buyer-willing seller basis, and has thus been paid for in Zimbabwean dollars. If the Government were to appropriate from unwilling sellers the land it needs to accomplish its declared resettlement goals, the compensation would, in terms of the Lancaster House agreement, have to be in foreign currency. A foreign currency and balance of payments crisis could ensue.

This reasoning, however, does not explain the failure to acquire more land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis. In 1983, for instance, the budget for land acquisition was slashed from Z$ 25 million to Z$ 6 million.[154] Chidzero argued that the reason for this cut was the continuing severe drought which "places an automatic limit on resettlement."[155] Why then, in 1985, with the drought over, was the resettlement budget slashed still further to only Z$ 2 million?[156] It would appear that the burgeoning

defence allocation was imposing fiscal restraints on other sectors of the economy.

The Government also appears to have set itself unrealistic goals. 162 000 families in three years translates into approximately 270 000 people per year.[157] And as Chidzero himself recognises, effective resettlement means more than the mere allocation of arable land.[158] The resettled families have to be integrated into their new surroundings if the Government's oft-stated goal of self-reliance is to be attained.

There are signs of increasing Government pressure on the white farming community. In 1984 notice was served of a new Land Acquisitions Bill to be presented to Parliament. Moven Mahachi, then Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, stated that if Government were to acquire the required suitable land, it could not be expected to depend on the willingness to sell of the landowners.[159] Mahachi said that having been given notice of Government's intention to buy certain areas of land, it was hoped that owners would sell voluntarily. However, he warned:[160]

> ...it will equally be open to Government to repossess land from those landowners who may decide not to offer their land on willing seller/willing buyer basis".

In an address to the 46th special congress of the Zimbabwe National Farmers Union in 1986, Mahachi

delivered a similar warning.[161]

Previous statements by Moven Mahachi (in 1983) suggest that, while the Government may be faced with certain unavoidable problems in the acquisition and redistribution of previously allocated land, it is taking active measures to prevent the exacerbation of the existing situation. The Land Tenure Bill presented in 1983 contained two provisions relating to the acquisition of land: a prohibition against foreign ownership of rural land in the future, and a prohibition against further concentration of land ownership. The first would apply to a foreign national, corporation or company with a more than 25 percent foreign shareholding. The second would prevent a person who already owned a farm larger than 500 acres from acquiring more land.[162] The Minister told the Annual Congress of the Commercial Farmers Union: "This is our step-by-step approach towards socialism".[163]

5.10 Conclusion

In the first five years of independence, the Mugabe government laid considerable groundwork for the proposed socialist transformation. Primacy was given to the consolidation by ZANU (PF) of state power. In this the ruling party has been largely successful. The formal establishment of one-party rule (probably

in or soon after 1990) will merely put a legal veneer on an already existing situation.[164]

The economy, however, is still predominantly capitalist, yet the trend is clearly towards a socialist economy: a centrally-planned economy, a dominant state sector, and cooperative relations of production. While there has been much rhetoric, some of it obviously designed for popular consumption, this should not blind one to the very real changes of a socialist orientation that have been made.

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[1]The ideology/domestic policy nexus is discussed in greater detail in my "*The impact of ruling party* ideology on Zimbabwe's post-independence domestic development" The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 12, 2, 1987a. pp. 115-156

[2]Witness Mangwende, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, has claimed as much. In a speech largely aimed at illustrating the "...very close inter-relationship between our emergency (sic) as a nation, our internal *domestic policy* and our broader international foreign policy..." (p. 4). Mangwende argued that:

> "...a nation's foreign policy emanates, in large part, from its own domestic environmental conditions, and represents the strategy by which a nation seeks to express abroad, the *substance* of its internal, domestic policy, and by which it seeks to reconcile internal policy objectives with conditions prevailing in the international arena".

"Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy -- Mangwende" PS 330/83/AM 12 May 1983. p. 4

[3]This is not to detract from the part played by

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this policy in preventing the collapse of political, social and economic order in the newly-independent state. Rather, it is an attempt to suggest that there might be an underlying ideological motivation for the promotion of this policy

[4]Yates, P. "The prospects for socialist transition in Zimbabwe" Review of African Political Economy 18, 1980. p. 73

[5]"Prime Minister's New Year speech to the nation" Policy Statement no. 2, January 1981. p. 12

[6]ZANU (PF) Election Manifesto 1985. p. 9

[7]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" Policy Statement no. 6, December 1981. p. 1

[8]EIU QER Zimbabwe, Malawi 4, 1981. p. 9

[9]ZANU (PF) Election Manifesto 1985 p. 10. See also: "Ruling party spells out its aims and achievements The Herald 10 June 1985

[10]"Civil servants should defend party policies--Nyagumbo PS 594/84/SC/SN 29 August 1984. p. 1

[11]Ibid., p. 2

[12]"One-party state means ZANU public service" The Herald 13 September 1984

[13]Chisaka, C. and Wetherell, I. "Mugabe on socialist transformation" op. cit. p. 4

[14]Ibid.

[15]"Cde Ushewokunze calls on police to institute change" PS 927/83/DC/AMR 25 November 1983.

[16]See, for example: "No police force is apolitical" In: Ushewokunze (1984, 76-85). For a detailed treatment of Government attempts to emasculate the judiciary, see Weitzer, R. "In search of regime security: Zimbabwe since independence" The Journal of Modern African Studies 22, 4, 1984. pp. 529-557

[17]ZIMBABWE. House of Assembly Debates 13 July 1982. col. 633. Quoted in Weitzer, op. cit., p. 540

[18]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" Policy Statement no. 6. December 1981. p. 4

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[19]Gregory, 1987a, p. 125

[20]Ibid., p. 8. For an elaboration of the relationship between party and government in Zimbabwe see: "The party and the government" Zimbabwe News 13, 1, 1982. pp. 8-9

[21]"PM addresses nation on independence eve" PS 176/85/MA/ME 2 May 1985. p. 6

[22]"The President opens third session of Parliament" Policy Statement no. 8 June 1982. p. 3

[23]"Moderates advance" Financial Mail (Johannesburg) 6 January 1984. p. 32

[24]"Prime Minister speaks to The Herald" The Herald 13 January 1984.

[25]"PM unveils plan to give povo more say in development" The Herald 28 February 1984

[26]Ibid.

[27]Nyagumbo, M. "ZANU (PF) 1980-1983: party organisation" Zimbabwe News 15, 1, 1984. p. 6. For an account of the restructuring processes in several of the five provinces, see: "Midlands provincial report" Zimbabwe News 14, 4, 1983. pp. 9-11; "Mashonaland central" Ibid. p. 11; "Matabeleland provincial party congress Zimbabwe News 15, 1, 1984. pp. 7-8

[28]For a brief description of ZANU (PF) party structure, see: "Party structure" Zimbabwe News 13, 1, 1982. pp. 24-25; and "ZANU (PF) reorganisation hindering meetings" Zimbabwe Information Service 1588/ZIS/82/L5/TG/DC. 8 December 1982

[29]Mugabe, R. "1985 -- year of national consolidation" Zimbabwe News 16, 2, 1985. p. 6

[30]"The Prime Minister outlines tasks for Zimbabwe's youth" Policy Statement no. 13, July 1983. p. 10

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[31] Ibid.

[32] What was completed by August 1984 was the creation of the physical structures -- cells, districts, etc. What was still needed was to proselytise those who make up the structure. (Mugabe, R. Wide-ranging review of the activities of the Party in 1985" Zimbabwe News 17, 2, 1986. p. 21)

[33] As Mugabe put it in his preface to the 1985 election manifesto:

> "Only when there is one Zimbabwe People with One Leader will a scientific reorganisation of Society along socialist lines be possible. That is why ZANU (PF) seeks to bring all Zimbabwean under its umbrella so that there is only One Leader -- the Party -- for One Zimbabwe".

(ZANU [PF] Election Manifesto 1985. p. 5) A more detailed treatment of this theme is to be found in Chapter 3 of this thesis

[34] "Zimbabwe African National Union Resolutions: Second Congress". Zimbabwe News 16, 1, 1984. p. 32

[35] Meldrum, A. "Zimbabwe to move towards one-party state" Africa News XXIII, 7-8, 27 August 1984. pp. 1-2. A brief account of the composition and functioning of the Economic Affairs Committee of the ZANU (PF) Politburo has been given by its chairman, Enos Nkala. See: "Party must have say in economy says Nkala" The Herald 14 September 1985

[36] Legum, C. "Mugabe: turning the soil" Sunday Tribune 12 August 1984

[37] "Zimbabwe African National Union Resolutions: Second Congress" Zimbabwe News op. cit. p. 33

[38] "Editorial" Zimbabwe News 16, 1, 1985. p.3

[39] "Zimbabwe African National Union Resolutions: Second Congress op. cit. p. 32

[40] Ibid.

[41] Muzenda reportedly told a 1983 party provincial meeting in Matabeleland that "Most provinces in Zimbabwe can boast of being a one-party state --

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except Matabeleland". Muzenda urged ZANU (PF) officials in that province to bring it into line with the rest of the country ("Mugabe promises to work towards one-party state" Sunday Express [Johannesburg] 18 December 1983

[42]EIU QER Zimbabwe, Malawi 3, 1984. p. 7

[43]"Violent protesters force Nkomo to cancel campaign stop" International Herald Tribune 21 January 1985

[44]"Zim press gagged, Nkomo" Botswana Guardian 8 March 1985

[45]"Nkomo stoned, teargas fired in election battle" The Citizen 18 February 1985; "Early bruising for Nkomo in election battle" The Star 23 January 1985

[46]"Fear of poll terror grows in Harare" The Star 28 February 1985

[47]Meldrum, A. "Bulawayo is sealed off and searched" The Guardian 10 March 1985

[48]Ibid.; "Hiccups for Mugabe on road to poll victory". Financial Times 11 June 1985

[49]Hartnack, M. "Mugabe zealots prevent rally" Cape Times 17 June 1985

[50]"Fear of poll terror grows in Harare" The Citizen 28 February 1985

[51]Drew, R. "Early bruising for Nkomo in election fight" The Star 23 January 1985

[52]Raath, 1985a

[53]One resident claimed that mobs were operating from a prepared list of names. ("Homeless stream out of Harare townships" Rand Daily Mail 11 July 1985)

[54]Raath, op. cit.

[55]Hartnack, M. "Police lying low as ZANU mobs beat and burn". Business Day 10 July 1985

[56]"Rampaging mobs kill and burn in Harare" The Citizen 10 July 1985

[57]Cargill, J. "Political violence flares in Zimbabwe". The Weekly Mail 30 August 1985; "Crackdown on ZAPU after alleged plot" Sunday Times 15 August

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1985; "Five MPs in jail in Zimbabwe crackdown" The Star 21 September 1985

[58]Raath, J. "Threat to wipe out ZAPU" The Times 20 September 1985

[59]Raath, J. "Zimbabwe black voters impose one-party rule on half country" The Times 13 July 1985

[60]"Zimbabwe: the one party state issue" Background Briefing no. 27. South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein. January 1986. p. 4

[61]"First Secretary holds victory press conference" Zimbabwe News 16, 6, 1985. p. 7

[62]"Training of people's militia stepped up" The Herald 27 September 1983

[63]Ibid.

[64]"Militia are early warning systems -- Ndangana" PS 698/84/MA 15 October 1984. p. 2

[65]Ibid.

[66]"Militia will protect socialism -- Sekeremayi" PS 659/84/MA/SC 24 September 1984. p. 1

[67]"The President's speech on the third anniversary of independence" Policy Statement no. 10 April 1983. p. 6

[68]"Ministry plans to beef up youth brigades to 1 million" The Herald 3 July 1985

[69]"Success of socialism depends on people's understanding -- Muzenda" PS 684/83/DB/GR 16 September 1983. p. 2. See, also Chisaka, C. and Wetherell, I. "Mugabe on socialist transformation" Social Change and Development 1, 6, 1984. pp. 2-5; and "Schools in socialist vanguard" Sunday Mail (Harare) 18 September 1983

[70]"The Prime Minister's speech to ecclesiastical leaders" Policy Statement no. 11. April 1983. p. 1

[71]Ibid.

[72]"Prime Minister addresses Justice and Peace Commission" Policy Statement no. 7. February 1982. p. 6

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[73]"The mass media system in Zimbabwe serves national interests" Afrika XXV, 8-9, 1984. p. 35

[74]Ibid.

[75]"Reliable telecommunication stimulates rural development" PS 135/85/AM/ME. 9 April 1985 p. 4

[76]See, for example, Mark Senjelesi's "Fallacies of the one-party state" (Sunday Mail [Harare] 3 February 1985), an all-too-rare article supportive of multi-party democracy

[77]Shamuyarira, N. "The mass media and the new order in Zimbabwe" Zimbabwe News 15, 2, 1984. p. 23

[78]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" Policy Statement no. 6. December 1981. p. 4

[79]Shamuyarira, N. op. cit. p. 22

[80]"President calls on journalists to serve the nation" PS 66/86/RN/SG/BCC 31 January 1986. p. 2

[81]Ibid.

[82]Shamuyarira, N. op. cit. p. 23

[83]"Zimbabwe's media shun Nkomo case" The Star 23 February 1983; "Mugabe is muzzling us opposition parties say" The Citizen 10 November 1983

[84]"Zim press gagged, Nkomo" Botwana Guardian 8 March 1985

[85]Africa Contemporary Record 1982-1983 p. B897

[86]"Hiccups for Mugabe on road to poll victory" Financial Times (London) 11 June 1985

[87]One correspondent reports that, while there is no direct government involvement in editorial decision-making, there is some kind of self-censorship amongst the journalists themselves. Often when a report is too critical of the ruling party, the editor concerned either vetoes it, or cuts out the controversial or unpalatable aspects of the story. ("Zim press gagged, Nkomo" Botswana Guardian 8 March 1985)

[88]On the one-party state issue, for example, Musaruwa frequently published articles both in favour and against such a system.

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[89]"Schools must produce socialists says Premier" PS 721/84/GR/ME 22 October 1984

[90]"Teachers should take part in politics" PS 686/83/RC/DB/GR 16 September 1983

[91]"Mutumbuka warns uncooperative teachers" PS 521/83/SN 25 July 1983. p. 6

[92]Ibid. p. 2

[93]Culverwell, J. "Phenomenal developments in education: 1980-83 and beyond" Zimbabwe News 15, 1, 1984. p. 21

[94]"Education: achievements and the future" Moto 33, 1985. p. 4

[95]Gwarinda, T.C. Socialism amd Education: an introduction. The College Press, Harare, 1985. See, also: Culverwell, J. "The relevance of Education With Production in Zimbabwe" Zimbabwe News 15, 2, 1984. pp. 17-20

[96]"Mutumbuka warns uncooperative teachers" op. cit. p. 4. He called for these "to be matched by equally socialist programmes of adult education outside the formal system" (Ibid.).

[97]See, for example: Beach, D. Zimbabwe: A New History for Primary Schools The College Press, Harare, 1982; and Chirenge, J.M. A History of Zimbabwe for Primary Schools. Longman, Harare, 1982. Ian Phimister, a noted Zimbabwean Marxist historian, is scathing in his assessment of the 'new' Zimbabwean historiography. See: "Pasi ne (down with) class struggle? The new history for schools in Zimbabwe" History in Africa 11, 1984. pp. 367-374

[98]"The quest for a meaningful education" Zimbabwe News 14, 2, 1983. p. 13. Certainly the new texts for teacher education emphasize scientific socialist pedagogy. See, for example: Gwarinda, T.C. op. cit.; and Chung, F. and Ngara, E. Socialism, Education and Development -- A Challenge to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1985. Both texts have the approval of the Ministry of Education. Indeed, the latter book was publicly launched by the then Minister of Education himself. ("Mutumbuka launches book on socialism" PS 46/86/SG/MA 24 January 1986)

[99]Ibid.

[100]"Zimbabwe African National Union Resolutions:

Second Congress" Zimbabwe News 16, 1, 1985. p. 33

[101]Mugabe, R.G. "Wide-ranging review of the activities of the Party in 1985" Zimbabwe News 17, 2, 1986. p. 22

[102]An interesting illustration of this may be found in the area of direct foreign investment in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding the dearth of new such investment in the country since independence, Harare refuses a more accommodating stance towards potential foreign investors

[103]"Nkala calls for gradual realistic change to socialism" PS 485/84/SC/SD 13 July 1984. p. 1

[104]ZANU (PF) holds that the present period is one of laying the groundwork for a transition to socialism. It is asserted that the transition to socialism is some considerable way off.

[105]For an extended treatment of this theme, see: "The second phase of our revolution" Zimbabwe News 14, 2, 1983. pp. 6-8; "Prime Minister addresses Zimbabwe Economic Society: September 8, 1980" Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Information and Tourism, Causeway, September 1980. Also: "Shamuyarira: economic independence is now the battle..." Moto 32, 1985. p. 3

[106]"Prime Minister's New Year speech to the nation" Policy Statement no. 2, December 1980. p. 8

[107]Transitional National Development Plan vol. I, November 1982. p. i

[108]Ibid.

[109]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" Policy Statement no. 6, December 1981. p. 8

[110]Transitional National Development Plan, op. cit. Especially chapter 3, "New social order", pp. 17-21

[111]One local economist estimates the state's share in the economy to be in the region of 40% -- up from 30% at independence (Hawkins, 1985, 39). This willingness to undertake direct investment in private enterprise has been an important feature of public policy. As a significant feature of these investments has been disinvestment by foreigners, particularly South Africans, the net effect has been to localise control in line with Government policy.

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[112] In 1982 it acquired a 40% controlling equity participation in the Hwange Colliery Company, and in 1984 took over all of the local mining assets of the South African-based Messina Group. Again, this is consistent with Government's declared policy of decreasing foreign control over all sectors of the economy. In 1981 the authorities retracted permission given for a merger between Turnall Holdings and Mashonaland Holdings upon learning that the move would mean that the latter would become non-resident controlled. (EIU QER Zimbabwe, Malawi, 2, 1981. p. 12)

[113] "The President's speech on the third anniversary of independence" Policy Statement no. 10, April 1983. p. 7

[114] Hawkins, 1985, 39. Hawkins (ibid., 44) notes the significance of this trend at a time when many other African countries appear to be committed to a reduction in state intervention, enhanced reliance on market forces, the privatisation of at least some parastatals, et cetera. For a brief update on the influence of ideology on Zimbabwe's economic sphere, see my "Zimbabwe wants capital -- but not the capitalists" Business Day 2 September 1987d.

[115] "We are against super-profits says PM" PS 92/85/SC/MA 14 March 1985. p. 4

[116] "The President's speech at the opening of the first session of the second parliament of Zimbabwe" Policy Statement no. 15, 23 July 1985. p. 4

[117] Drew, R. "More grist to Mugabe's socialist mill". The Star 27 February 1985

[118] President addresses nation on independence anniversary" PS 151/85/SC 16 April 1985. p. 11

[119] Mugabe, R. "Zimbabwe African National Union: Central Committee report" Zimbabwe News 16, 1, January 1985. p. ???

[120] "First Secretary holds victory news conference" Zimbabwe News 16, 6, 1985. p. 5

[121] "State planning bigger role in private sector" The Herald 3 August 1985. In 1983 Chidzero stated that it was only the impact of the drought on Government spending that was preventing increased State expenditure in the private sector. ("Dr Chidzero discusses his budget" The Financial Gazette 9 September 1983)

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[122]Transitional National Development Plan op. cit. p. i. This plan in fact provides for an input from the private sector of 41% towards the attainment of the plan's goals

[123]"Prime Minister's New Year message to the nation" Policy Statement no. 6, December 1981. p. 7

[124]Transitional National Development Plan op. cit. p. i

[125]"The President's speech at the opening of the first session of the second parliament of Zimbabwe" op. cit. p. 3

[126]Drew, R. "Strife over Zimbabwe labour law" The Star 1 February 1985. Mbeki, M. "Where is workers' right to strike?" Sunday Mail (Harare) 10 February 1986

[127]See, for example, Lenin (1950, 36) on the inevitability of "a certain reactionism" in the trade union movement that has to be controlled by the Party.

[128]Mugabe, R. "Wide-ranging review of the activities of the Party in 1985" Zimbabwe News 17, 2, 1985. p. 21. See, also: Chisaka, C. and Wetherell, I. "Mugabe on socialist transformation" op. cit.

[129]Ibid.

[130]"PM on pay increase" PS 179/85/SM/SD 2 May 1985. p. 5

[131]"ZCTU article to Zimbabwe News" Zimbabwe News January 1986. p. 12

[132]Ibid., p. 13

[133]Ibid.

[134]Ibid.

[135]Transitional National Development Plan vol. I op. cit. p. 18

[136]"Chidzero praises big growth in cooperatives" The Herald 8 November 1983

[137]Mathema, N.C.G. "Zimbabwean cooperatives 5 years after" Social Change and Development 10, 1985. p. 18

[138]Ibid.

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[139]"Unemployment on the increase -- Mudzingwa" PS 636/85/SM/BC 13 December 1985. p. 4. See, also: "Production of wealth should precede its distribution -- Mahachi" PS 513/84/BC/EM 23 July 1984

[140]"Unemployment on the increase -- Mudzingwa" op. cit. p. 3

[141]"Few big changes in PM's new front line" The Herald 30 July 1985

[142]Mugabe, R. "Zimbabwe African National Union central committee report" Zimbabwe News 16, 1, 1985. p. 29

[143]Mathema, N.C.G. "Zimbabwean cooperatives, 5 years after" op. cit. p. 18

[144]"Plans underway for co-operative bank" PS 112/86/BC 27 February 1986. p. 3

[145]"President addresses nation on independence anniversary" PS 151/85/SC 16 April 1985. p. 6

[146]Ibid.

[147]"The President's speech at the opening of the first session of the second parliament of Zimbabwe" Policy Statement no. 15, 23 July 1985. p. 6

[148]"Unemployment to continue -- Chidzero" PS 648/83/RC/AM 6 September 1983. p. 3

[149]Ibid., p. 6

[150]Sparks, A. "Zimbabwe solving its land problem" The Star 21 December 1983; Frankel, G. "An African success story" The Guardian 16 December 1984; Barrell, H. "Footsie-footsie approach to nationalisation" The Weekly Mail October 18-24 1985

[151]Transitional National Development Plan vol. II. p. 3

[152]"Over 35 000 families resettled" The Herald 12 June 1985

[153]"President addresses nation on independence anniversary" op. cit. p. 5

[154]Frankel, G. "An African success story" The Guardian 16 December 1984

[155]"Dr Chidzero discusses his budget" The Financial

Gazette 9 September 1983

[156]Frankel, op. cit.

[157]A family is assumed to consist of five members.

[158]"Unemployment to continue -- Chidzero" op. cit. p. 3

[159]"No arbitrary land acquisition says Mahachi" PS 540/84/GS/BC/SN 2 August 1984. p. 2

[160]Ibid.

[161]"Minister warns farmers on unutilised land" PS 6/86/SM/BCC/SG 9 January 1986. p. 6

[162]"State policy on land is spelled out" The Herald 28 July 1983

[163]Ibid.

[164]Mugabe himself has intimated as much. (Mugabe, R. "The Parliament of Zimbabwe and some aspects of the Constitution" The Parliamentarian LXV, 1, 1984. p. 6)

Chapter Six: Nonalignment: Zimbabwe's National Role Conception

It is undoubtedly a truism to say that, with regard to foreign policy, the external environment imposes restraints on all states.[1] Such constraints are no doubt all the more formidable when confronted by a newly-independent, less-developed Third World state. However, as Utete (1985,47) points out, "the undoubted drawbacks imposed by a limited resource base need not incapacitate the exercise of initiative by developing states in regard to matters of importance to them in their international relations". States are free to endeavour to increase their influence in the global arena. Rothchild and Currey (1978) examine efforts by newly-independent African states to reduce resource scarcity and expand alternatives. The authors point out (ibid., pp. 112-113) that, given the limited resources available to most African governments, all the more significance becomes attached to which option is adopted. This will, to a considerable extent, reflect that government's values, Weltanschauung, and objectives. Hence the adoption by almost all Third World states of a nonaligned stance in international politics.

Nonalignment[2] is generally regarded as a policy designed to increase the importance and role of smaller states in international relations. For Choucri (1967,341-344), a policy of nonalignment enhances a state's freedom of action in world politics, serves to regulate interaction with the major powers, assists it in coping with perceived threats from the international environment, and accords some status to its holder. These states do not intend to surrender what is in most cases a recently achieved status of independence. Instead they attempt to widen their latitude of movement by means of collective action (Group of 77; nonaligned Movement) and multilateralism. Hence the original and fundamental nonbloc nature of the Nonaligned Movement. All this is not to overlook the domestic constituency: such a stance often enables a government to reinforce its own domestic position, illustrating to local political groups the independent stand of the leadership, and in this way contributing to the reinforcement of national identity.[3]

However, notwithstanding a high level of congruence amongst nonaligned states with regard to the underlying rationale for such a stance, the interpretation and content of this policy can vary considerably from state to state. There are arguably as many variants on the nonaligned theme as there are states professing to be nonaligned.[4] Some states go

so far as to repudiate the original nonbloc foundations of the movement. The 1979 Havana Summit, for example, witnessed a confrontation between states promoting the so-called 'natural ally' thesis, and states calling for the maintenance of the 'authentic principles' of the movement.[5] A similar conflict prevailed at the *1985 Luanda Conference.*[6]

Given the lack of unanimity within the *movement* -- some of it on the question of the basic principles of nonalignment -- it is not enough merely to know that a particular state professes to be nonaligned. It is necessary to examine the specific variant of the country under study. This may shed light on that state's perception of the nature of the international system and its role in that system, and its foreign policy goals and objectives. Given the above, the *particular form of nonalignment* adopted by Zimbabwe becomes significant. Why, for example, is that state's voting record in the *UN General Assembly on the issues* of Afghanistan and Kampuchea in diametric opposition to those of Angola and Mozambique? All three states are avowedly nonaligned, profess to be Marxist-Leninist in orientation, and are recently independent, southern African states. Indeed, one might at first sight question a simultaneous commitment to both nonalignment and Marxism-Leninism. How does Zimbabwe reconcile the two postures? To *answer* these and other questions, a detailed

examination of Zimbabwe's nonaligned posture is called for.

6.1 Zimbabwean Nonalignment: the Government Dimension

Zimbabwean government spokesmen frequently refer to their foreign policy stance as "positive nonalignment". A recent government publication, outlining the role, functions and structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claimed:[7]

> "If one had to categorise Zimbabwe's foreign policy as a whole, one would have to define it as a policy of positive nonalignment".

One of the government's earliest definitions of this policy was provided by Witness Mangwende, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs:[8]

> "By a policy of nonalignment, I mean that Zimbabwe shall not be under the wings of any big power, Russia, the United States or any other.
>
> I mean that we shall recognise that there is West and East, that there is a capitalist and a socialist ideology, and we shall stop at that recognition".
>
> What we are geared to achieve is the best of both worlds without putting ourselves under the wings of anyone".

The "essence of nonalignment", according to Mangwende, "is a deliberate and calculated refusal to enter into any military or political commitment with any of the

major powers or to permit the establishment of foreign military bases on a state's territory".[9]

Not only should Zimbabwe not fall under the domination of another state, but it *should not* automatically take sides in a situation of international conflict. However, this is not to imply Zimbabwe's neutrality on such issues. For Mangwende:[10]

> "The critical point is that the state *must not* automatically take sides on the critical issues of world politics; *rather*, a country's position should be dictated by its own national interests first and *foremost*".

On a subsequent occasion, Mangwende similarly declared that the adoption of a policy of nonalignment entailed that "we *reserve* for ourselves the right to examine issue-areas of foreign policy on the basis of merit, and within the context, on each occasion, of either *promoting* or protecting our own national interests".[11] Moreover, while the government may be opposed to bloc politics:[12]

> "We are not neutral on the burning issues confronting mankind today. We stand firm against imperialism, colonialism, racism, and exploitation of man by man in all its manifestations so that cannot be neutralism".

The government cannot be neutral in world politics by virtue of the Marxist-Leninist principles which, it claims, are of overriding importance in the elaboration of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. To recall

Kangai's conception of nonalignment, one which "presupposes possession of a definitive ideology":[13]

> "...nonalignment does not rule out the possession of ideological holy cows; rather, it guarantees that should there be *any* holy cows to which a country pays homage, they are that country's holy cows...."

In this connection, it should further be mentioned that Mangwende himself has claimed that the formulation of Zimbabwe's national interest is itself *subject to a major determining influence* in the form of the government's adopted Marxist-Leninist *principles*.[14] A *national interest informed* by such principles cannot, by virtue of the philosophy incorporated in that doctrine, be *nonaligned* *qua* neutralist.

The basic rationale behind Zimbabwe's conception of nonalignment contains a definite nationalist element. Government spokesmen argue that a policy of nonalignment is a logical extension of national sovereignty. Zimbabwe should exercise sovereignty over its external relations, as it does over its domestic *policies*. *As Mugabe* put it during in his 1983 New Year message to the nation:[15]

> "For, *the will of the people* must, at all times, remain supreme and paramount over their affairs. This is what our revolution was and is all about and that also is the essence of our right of self-determination".

Kangai's conception of nonalignment, one which "presupposes possession of *a definitive ideology*":[13]

> "...nonalignment does not rule out the possession of ideological *holy cows; rather,* it guarantees that should there be any holy cows to which a country pays homage, they are *that country's holy cows...*."

In this connection, it should further be mentioned that Mangwende himself has claimed that the formulation of Zimbabwe's national interest is itself subject to a major determining influence in the form of the government's adopted Marxist-Leninist principles.[14] A national interest informed by such principles cannot, by virtue of the philosophy incorporated in that doctrine, be nonaligned gua neutralist.

The basic rationale behind Zimbabwe's conception of nonalignment contains a definite nationalist element. Government spokesmen argue that a policy of nonalignment is a logical extension of national sovereignty. Zimbabwe should exercise sovereignty over its external relations, as it does over its domestic policies. As Mugabe put it during in his 1983 New Year message to the nation:[15]

> "For, the will of the people must, at all times, remain supreme and paramount *over* their affairs. This is what our revolution was and is all about and that also is the essence of our right of *self-determination*".

Mangwende has spoken in a similar vein of Zimbabwe's wish to remain "our own masters".[16] He declared that, in the realm of foreign policy, "we shall not permit ourselves to be dictated to from outside".[17]

The Nonaligned Movement was originally established as an alternative to the intense cold war bloc rivalry, and the concomitant tight bipolarity of the 1950s. The government's conception of nonalignment stresses its opposition to such bloc rivalry. In an address to the House of Assembly in October 1980, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simon Muzenda, spoke against "the superpower rivalry which is a cause of such concern to the Third World".[18] He went on to stress the government's strong opposition "to any foreign interference in the affairs of other countries".[19] Muzenda has also expressed opposition to the concept of 'sphere of influence'.[20]

The Zimbabwean government argues that opposition to bloc politics in in the country's best interest, and that of the Third World as a whole.[21] Moreover, it is claimed that positive nonalignment is "an extremely progressive method of overcoming the negative and intensely dangerous results of...interbloc rivalry".[22]

To recapitulate: nonalignment is claimed to be the essence of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. This stance is

intended to enhance Zimbabwe's freedom of action with respect to her foreign relations, and to preserve her independent stance with regard to the identification and pursuit of her foreign policy goals. For these reasons, positive nonalignment is opposed to bloc politics, and domination of the smaller states by the big powers. It precludes political, diplomatic, economic, or military alignment, but seems to presuppose an ideological one. For the government argues that it cannot be neutral on the major international issues of the day. Its Marxist-Leninist stance precludes such a position.

However, the Government's standpoint bears further examination. It is significant that the Government proclaims Marxism-Leninism to be a major determinant in the formulation of its foreign policy, and thus of its nonaligned stance. However, given the ever increasing plurality of Marxist-Leninist regimes globally,[23] a more precise assessment of the Marxist-Leninist element in Zimbabwe's nonaligned policy is needed.

To further complicate matters, there is, as noted earlier, a marked lack of unanimity with regard to the basic principles of nonalignment. Ironically, the two states around which the debate tends to focus, Cuba and Yugoslavia, are both avowedly Marxist-Leninist. The 1979 controversy over the natural ally thesis

promoted by the then Chairman of the Movement, Fidel Castro of Cuba, has highlighted this debate. Simply put, Yugoslavia continues to push for the maintenance by the Nonaligned Movement of a fundamentally anti-bloc position. As Tito, one of the original founders of the Movement put it in in 1978:[24]

> Fondamentalement, la politique de non-alignement est dirigee contre l'imperialisme, le neo-colonialisme, le racisme et toutes les autres formes de domination et d'exploitation etrangeres. Elle s'attaque a la loi du plus fort, a l'hegemonie politique et economique at a toutes les formes d'ingerence et d'emprise exterieures.
>
> Notre mouvement est donc hostile aussi a la division du monde en blocs. L'avenir de notre planete ne doit pas dependre de l'equilibre des forces ou de la suprematie d'un bloc sur l'autre. La realisation des objectifs qui sont les notres suppose que nous deployions tous des efforts constants pour supprimer cette division et renforcer les aspects des relations internationales propres a favoriser la paix, la securite et le progres social en general(23)

These so-called "authentic principles"[25] are opposed to Castro's so-called "natural ally" thesis. Castro continues to endeavour to orientate the Nonaligned states towards the USSR.[26]

In the light of the above, it is not sufficient to know that Zimbabwe regards itself as part of the Marxist-Leninist (as opposed to the socialist) camp.

This camp is growing in numbers, and is by no means homogenous.[27] However, few if any of these states claim to be anything but nonaligned.

It is this writer's assessment that, within the Marxist-Leninist camp, Zimbabwe most closely approximates the Yugoslavia variant, Mugabe following most closely Tito's nonaligned stance (see Figure 1). Certainly, the Zimbabwean Prime Minister claims as much, declaring in 1981:[28]

> "Whenever we think of the Non-Aligned Movement and the principles of sovereignty, the source of our inspiration is always Yugoslavia..."


In August 1986, immediately prior to the opening of the 8th Summit and Mugabe's assumption of the chairmanship, he declared his affinity for the Yugoslavia variant of nonalignment:[29]

> "...although Yugoslavia was aligned ideologically the same as the Soviet Union, following a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, it did not want to see itself belonging to the Warsaw pact, nor did it want its sovereignty compromised to the extent that it would not have the freedom to associate in certain areas of socio-economic endeavour in trade and other forms of cooperation with the Western countries.
>
> To me, therefore, the term non-aligned, or Non-Aligned Movement, or non-alignment conjures up immediately the role of Marshall Tito, President Tito of Yugoslavia..."

Opposition to bloc politics has traditionally been a

FIGURE 1

A conceptualisation of the Zimbabwean Government's position on nonalignment compared with that of selected Marxist-Leninist states with which ZANU (PF) enjoys close relations, utilising the UNGA voting record on the issue of the removal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and Kampuchea as the criteria for comparison.



corner stone of Yugoslav non-alignment. And on a rhetorical level Zimbabwe's anti-bloc stance is also clear. On a number of occasions Mugabe and his cabinet colleagues have publicly stated their opposition to bloc politics. In May 1986, on the occasion of a state banquet for the visiting Indian Head of State, Rajiv Gandhi, Mugabe criticised the superpowers' influence on Third World conflicts:[30]

> "More often than not, the root causes of the conflicts are traceable to the bloc rivalries or the geopolitical *interests* of the big powers. This dangerous states of affairs, I would suggest, makes the Non-Aligned *Movement even more* relevant to the defence and protection of the rights of the weak".

In his keynote address to the Harare Summit, Mugabe drew attention to the increasing incidence of conflict in non-aligned states, and the role therein of bloc politics:[31]

> "This sad state of affairs is primarily due to the intensification of bloc power politics *and* general interference in the internal affairs of small States (sic)".

With respect to the issue of nonbloc politics, Zimbabwe's declarative stance is clearly fundamentally different to those positions adopted by states such as Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Vietnam.[32] It is this writer's assessment that Zimbabwe's position most closely approximates the Yugoslav stance.[33]

In this connection, it is instructive to examine

Zimbabwe's UNGA voting record on the key issues of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, events of both North-South and East-West concern. Table 3 indicates a clear difference between the more hard-line, pro-Soviet African Marxist-Leninist states, Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Again, selon Rothchild and Curry, it is the element of choice which is significant. Each year since 1980, the Zimbabwean government had a number of options open to it. It could have voted either in favour or against the resolutions; it could have abstained, following the Nicaraguan example; or it could have conveniently and consistently absented itself, as did Romania. At this junction it is perhaps important to note that all the states whose voting records are examined here are states with which the Government and ruling party of Zimbabwe enjoy good relations. It is thus all the more significant that the Government chose to, by consistently opposing Soviet actions, along with China and Yugoslavia, make a definite statement. It is an important statement with regard to Zimbabwe's concept of nonalignment.

Before continuing the examination of the content and substance of Zimbabwe's policy of nonalignment, the input of the ruling party should be considered. For it cannot be denied that ZANU (PF)'s historical experience and its concept of nonalignment impact upon

TABLE 3

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 1980 - 1987

	AFGHANISTAN								KAMPUCHEA							
ANGOLA	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
CHINA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ETHIOPIA	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
MOZAMBIQUE	N	N	N	N	N	N	X	X	X	N	N	N	N	A	X	X	X
NICARAGUA	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
ROMANIA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
YUGOSLAVIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ZIMBABWE	X*	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A
	Res.ES 6/2 1980	Res.35/37 1980	Res.36/34 1981	Res.37/37 1982	Res.38/29 1983	Res.39/13 1984	Res.40/12 1985	Res.41/33 1986	Res.42/15 1987	Res.35/6 1980	Res.35/5 1981	Res.37/6 1982	Res.38/3 1983	Res.39/5 1984	Res.40/7 1985	Res.41/6 1986	Res.42/3 1987

Key:
Y = Yes
N = No
A = Abstain
X = Absent

* Zimbabwe was not yet a member of the United Nations.

Data for the period 1980-1986 from Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly. United Nations, N.Y.

Data for 1987 from "Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during the first part of its Second Session from 15 September to 21 December 1987". Press Release. Dept. of Public Information, United Nations, N.Y.

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UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 1980 - 1987

	AFGHANISTAN									KAMPUCHEA							
ANGOLA	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
CHINA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ETHIOPIA	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
MOZAMBIQUE	N	N	N	N	N	N	X	X	X	N	N	N	N	A	X	X	X
NICARAGUA	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A
ROMANIA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
YUGOSLAVIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ZIMBABWE	X*	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A
	Res.ES 6/2 1980	Res.35/37 1980	Res.36/34 1981	Res.37/37 1982	Res.38/29 1983	Res.39/13 1984	Res.40/12 1985	Res.41/33 1986	Res.42/15 1987	Res.35/6 1980	Res.36/5 1981	Res.37/6 1982	Res.38/3 1983	Res.39/5 1984	Res.40/7 1985	Res.41/6 1986	Res.42/3 1987

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both the Government's current foreign policy attitudes, and its conception of nonalignment.

6.2 Nonalignment: the Party standpoint

Thus far the discussion has focussed on the Government conception of nonalignment. Of course it is increasingly difficult to separate Government from Party points of view given declared ruling party policy of establishing the dominance of party over Government, particularly with regard to policy guidelines. However, the above discussion is based exclusively on statements made in an official Government capacity. In the section which follows, statements made in the party context will be examined, with a view to establishing ZANU (PF)'s viewpoint on nonalignment and ascertaining the degree of correlation between Government and ruling party on this major foreign policy issue. The discussion draws, in the main, from a special edition of Zimbabwe News devoted to nonalignment and the 8th Summit.

In an address to the ZANU (PF) party political commissars in preparation for the Harare Summit, Maurice Nyagumbo, in his capacity as Chief Party Political Commissar, "outlined the Party's thinking on the Non-Aligned Movement".[34] He defined nonalignment thus:[35]

> "...an active struggle for the attainment of national *independence or active support* for the struggles for national independence. We of the former c ies -- or we in Zimbabwe ne suffered colonial domination from socialist countries. Instead, socialist countries gave us guns, they gave us AK's, Bazookas, mortars *(sic)*, anti-aircraft guns, and bullets with which we shot our way freedom.... Non-Alignment therefore, basically anti-imperialist as it actively supports the *struggles for* national liberation".

Party ideological preferences and historical experience appear to mutually reinforce one another and to combine together to strengthen ZANU (PF)'s political *preferences*.

Party and Government thinking coincides in the issue of involvement. Nyagumb states that nonalignment "is not passive neutrality but positive neutrality which means engaging your enemy and fighting for your basic principles".[36]

In the same issue Yashpal Tandon argues that the main concern of the Nonaligned Movement is "opposition to the military alliances that would lead to world hegemony be (sic) either the NATO or Warsaw Pact bloc of countries".[37] He defines the Nonaligned as "essentially an anti-imperialist movement".[38] His definition of nonalignment is implicit in his contention that:[39]

> "It [the Nonaligned Movement] seeks to oppose and neutralise any hegemonic drives from the superpowers that lead blocs, namely the USA and the USSR".

In apparent contradiction to his statement quoted earlier, Nyagumbo appears to echo this point of view, contending that the Movement has 'taken the principled (sic) position of condemning any action by the two superpowers which disregarded the ultimate interests of the weak and small nations".[40]

A previous article in Zimbabwe News argued along similar, non-bloc, lines, suggesting that "the choice of Zimbabwe as the host country and future coordinator has gone to confirm the authentic, independent and extrabloc orientation of non-aligned policy".[41] A Zimbabwe News article of July 1986 concluded that:[42]

> "Mugabe's chairmanship will be delicately balanced between East and West -- against both right and left-wing political and ideological currents in the world but rather will endorse the *authentic principles of* Non-Aligned Movement and the interests of world peace and security".

The ruling party's nonbloc stance on nonalignment seems to have an historical basis. What is perhaps the best encapsulation of the basic tenets of Party and Government nonaligned policy was articulated by Mugabe in a 1978 speech to the Romanian Communist Party on the occasion of an official visit to

Bucharest:[43]

> "We emulate your position of independence and sovereignty, *free from* greater power domination, and yet aligned with the Soviet Union and all the socialist and progressive countries of the world... We want to be <u>socialist and sovereign</u> in an absolute sense".

Party policy, as reflected in the information disseminated to its political cadres, and political statements made in a party context, correlates to a high degree with Government policy outlined earlier. The extra-bloc nature of nonalignment dominates most mentions of nonalignment. In that sense a nationalist element infuses Party thinking in much the same way as it impacts on Government thinking on the issue.

However, differences do emerge with regard to the ideological currents in Party writings. Not only is the Party more obviously anti-Western in its rhetoric, but the language is more explicitly Marxist-Leninist. The rhetoric goes beyond mere statements, such as that of Nyagumbo quoted earlier that, while the former colonies suffered from Western colonial domination, they received political and military assistance from the socialist countries. For the <u>content</u> of Party analyses of international issues, both historical and contemporary, is infused with Marxist-Leninist terminology, and utilizes Marxist-Leninist terms of analysis. Dealing with "The Non-Alignment (sic) and the struggle against

counter-revolutions", two law lecturers from the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) define imperialism as "a moribund stage in the development of capitalism".[44] They proceed to argue that:[45]

> "imperialism has become synonymous with counter-revolution. The imperialist powers, notably the United States, have constituted themselves into a world peace force against progressive revolutions".

By definition, it seems, the USSR and similarly orientated states are exempted from such involvement. Thus it is that only Western states are condemned for their involvement in Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Chile, Grenada, Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and other hotspots. The authors conclude that the nonaligned Movement "must be prepared to take concrete measures against the imperialist countries who unashamedly seek to reverse the progressive political process in other countries".[46]

In a discussion of "The contribution of the Non-Aligned Movement to international law", another UZ law lecturer argues from a dialectically materialist point of view that international law expresses the interests of the dominant class in the world arena. Law arises as one of the superstructural elements determined by the economic base of society, be it national or international.[47] The writer claims that the socialist states are working for the development

of a new international law in order to facilitate "the creation of the necessary external conditions for the building of a new and just society, free from exploitation of man by man".[48] Perhaps the most significant point made by the author is that contemporary international law is neither "socialist, imperialist or capitalist" but is "of a general democratic nature".[49] That this is so is entirely due to the efforts of socialist and progressive states, for such developments must be asserted "against the will of imperialist and capitalist states".[50] The reader is reminded that "The will of the socialist states was and is ... diametrically opposed to that of the capitalist and imperialist states".[51] The global legal conflict is manichean, zero-sum and ultimately irreconcilable.

With regard to the struggle for economic independence, Zimbabwe's current objective, the 'natural alliance' of the socialist bloc and the Third World is strongly asserted. Contrasted with the "arrogance and obstruction" of the capitalist states is the "USSR's solidarity with the efforts of the emergent states to achieve economic independence".[52] The article concludes:[53]

> "The Soviet Union's policy aimed at supporting the just struggle of the newly-free countries for economic independence is a line of principle, and the USSR will continue to firmly adhere to it in the future, too".

Such lines of argument, tools of analysis, and theoretical constructs, acquire added significance in the light of a statement in a Zimbabwe News article that "Non-alignment enables the party to internationalise its national population".[54] The article asserts that the Party has a responsibility to defend the revolution both externally and internally:[55]

> "The population has to fully understand how world capitalism works, especially its capacity to destroy national sovereignty. It means understanding the true meaning of international solidarity, especially the assistance to liberation movements throughout the world".

In this way, "The internationalization of the population is also a defense of Zimbabwe's Revolution".[56]

In this context, what clearly emerges from a survey of the content of the special issue of Zimbabwe News on the 8th Summit is a strong bias against Western imperialism in general, and the USA in particular. While it has been argued that to a certain extent such attitudes are understandable in the light of the degree of US involvement in southern Africa, such an argument is inadequate as a complete explanation of ZANU (PF) attitudes. For these attitudes permeate regional and global Party analyses and accounts of international relations, both of an historical and a contemporary nature. The USA emerges as the global

villain of the piece almost since 1945. Representative of this is the treatment meted out to the USA and its allies in the above-mentioned article, "The Non-Alignment (sic) and the struggle against counter-revolutions". Conspicuous by its absence is any mention of the activities since 1945 of the USSR and its allies.

The ideological preferences of the ruling party are perhaps most clearly indicated by the priority it accords to relations with socialist states, and in particular the ruling (communist) parties of these states. On the one level ZANU (PF) is indeed nonaligned in the sense that it seeks to foster relations with many states of widely differing internal economic and political systems. Significantly, however, while most such relationships are established on a state-to-state level, certain states also enjoy preferential, party-to-party relations between the ruling party in each state concerned and ZANU (PF). The ZANU (PF) 1985 election manifesto explained the significance of these pledging that the ruling party would "establish strongest links with Communist and Working Class (sic) parties to deepen its socialist understanding and solidarity".[57] Since 1980, reportage in the Zimbabwean media on state visits to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, China, and other self-styled Marxist-Leninist states has emphasized the

establishment or cementing of ties on a separate, party-to-party basis.[58] This, not withstanding the fact that, in the great majority of cases, the occasion was a state visit, and thus ostensibly on a governmental basis. Moreover, addressing the 27th CPSU Congress, the head of the ZANU (PF) delegation, Maurice Nyagumbo, reportedly stated that the cementing of party ties between ZANU (PF) and the CPSU had established a "new and higher basis"[59] for cooperation between the two parties.

The degree of correlation on non-alignme[illegible]e Government and the ruling party of Zimbabwe, [illegible]gh. For both, nonalignment is in essence nationalist, nonbloc, and of a Marxist-Leninist orientation. Its own political master since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has adopted a policy of nonalignment in order to enhance its international position and further its international objectives. These objectives are determined by a Weltanschauung influenced, amongst other things, by Marxism-Leninism.

Where Government and Party policies appear to part company is on the question of the significance and input into thinking on nonalignment, of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. As has been seen, the Party is not only more obviously anti-Western in its rhetoric, but that rhetoric is more explicitly Marxist-Leninist. This may be said not only of party rhetoric, but also

of ZANU (PF) analyses of international relations, past and present.

From this, what can be said about Zimbabwe's policy of nonalignment? Problems arise with regard to the relationship between Party and Government. For, while the Party is certainly increasing its dominance over the Government, indications are that the arrangement is far from settled. Certainly Party and Government officials have asserted as much. With this in mind, can it be concluded that the Party is more radical than the Government or is it just more overtly so; a difference in style rather than substance? A corollary: are Government statements reflective of 'true' Government thinking, given the high (and increasing) degree of congruence between Party and Government? These and other questions will be tackled in the course of the following assessment of the operationalisation since 1980 of Zimbabwe's declared policy of nonalignment.

6.3 The operationalisation of Zimbabwean nonalignment

The essence of Zimbabwe's nonalignment policy may, it is argued, be illustrated with reference to two aspects of the Government's post-independence foreign policy record: its relationship with the socialist states, in particular the USSR; and its record of

foreign military assistance.

6.3.1 Ruling party and Government relations with the socialist states, pre- and post-independence

The roots of Zimbabwean nonalignment, and more particularly its post-independence attitude towards certain states in the socialist bloc, may be found in these states' impact upon the independence struggle of the 1950's and 1960's. This is perhaps the clearest example of how ZANU(PF)'s historical experience has impacted upon its conception of Marxism-Leninism.

One of the hallmarks of the pre-independence struggle is the sustained opposition between the major black nationalist movements,[60] two of which, ZANU and ZAPU chiefly concern us here. ZANU was originally born of a split from Nkomo's ZAPU in August 1963. Its origins in nationalist rivalry, ZANU continued to oppose ZAPU throughout the 1960's and 1970's.

This rivalry lent itself to exploitation by external powers, as well as by the Rhodesian government. For their own historical and ideological reasons, the Soviet Union came to support ZAPU, and China ZANU. The Sino-Soviet split of 1963 served to exacerbate tensions within the black nationalist movements, as explained by Nathan Shamuyarira, at that time ZANU's Secretary for external Affairs.

Shamuyarira has pointed out that Sino-Soviet rivalry increased the difficulties involved in the promotion of nationalist solidarity at international conferences where such unity was essential.[61] Moreover, it polarised support for the rival movements from the socialist states,[62] a situation which then spilled over into the rival solidarity organisations.[63] In 1966, for example, ZANU was not permitted to participate in the Havana Tricontinental Congress as, in the eyes of the USSR, ZAPU was the sole authentic movement. Similarly, ZAPU was excluded from all conferences where Chinese influence was pervasive. In 1969 the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), by that time firmly associated with the Soviet Union, refused to recognise ZANU as an authentic Zimbabwean liberation movement, confining its support exclusively to ZAPU (Reed, 1987, 51). A situation arose such that the rival nationalist movements would "recite the Sino-Soviet verbal recriminations that have little or nothing to do with the Zimbabwe freedom struggle" (Shamuyarira, 1976,550). On international issues such as Namibia, the war in Vietnam, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, "the movements were drawn into making statements of little relevance to their own situation" (Ibid.,552).

Sino-Soviet rivalry has had a particularly strong

impact upon ZANU (PF)'s pre- and post-independence attitude to the USSR and its closest allies within the socialist bloc.

6.3.2 ZANU-Moscow relations: nationalism and ideology

From the outset in the early 1960s the Soviet Union chose to shun dealings with newly-established ZANU. Having adopted ZAPU as the only "authentic" Zimbabwean black nationalist movement, Moscow proceeded to ignore ZANU throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966 and 1969, for example, ZANU was excluded from international solidarity conferences sponsored by the Kremlin.[64] Moreover, Soviet media commentary on the Rhodesian war during the 1960s and 1970s studiously omitted reference to ZANU's role in the struggle.[65]

ZANU, for its part, accepted material and diplomatic support from a number of other socialist states, China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and North Korea, and in this way was able to continue to bear the brunt of the fighting. However, by the late 1970's it was clear that the nature and quantity of materiel supplied thus supplied was inadequate. In 1978 Mugabe stated his intention of acquiring heavier and more sophisticated military equipment from the USSR.[66] A mission to Moscow on his behalf by Mozambique's Marcelino dos Santos, a staunch pro-Soviet, was however rebuffed.[67] Again Sino-Soviet rivalry intruded as Moscow made its position clear: support for Mugabe

would be given on condition that ZANU ceased siding with Communist China, and that Mugabe refrained from describing himself as a Marxist-Leninist of Maoist Thought.[68] Meanwhile, Soviet materiel support to Nkomo -- whose ZIPRA forces did not involve themselves in the fighting to the same extent as did ZANLA -- continued in abundance.[69] Much, if not most of ZAPU's formidable conventional arsenal was to remain in Zambia for a considerable period of time after the April 1980 election, and was to become a major source of friction between the newly-elected ZANU (PF) government, and ZAPU.[70]

Given the almost adversarial relationship that existed between the USSR and ZANU prior to independence, it is not surprising how lukewarm was the new government's attitude towards Moscow. Having finally attained its political objectives -- the independence and sovereignty of Zimbabwe -- the ZANU (PF) government was chary of the sudden wave of Soviet overtures with which it was greeted.[71]

A number of overtures were made by the Soviets in the period between the electoral victory and the installation of the new government, but all were rebuffed by Mugabe.[72] While a Soviet delegation was invited to the independence celebrations of April 1980, it received no great welcome by ZANU (PF), in marked contrast to that accorded the Chinese

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delegation.[73]

Following independence, Communist China established diplomatic relations with the new state almost immediately. The USA, for its part, was the first state so to do. Moscow, however, continued to be rebuffed. In the course of 1980, no less than three Soviet diplomatic missions were sent to Harare. On each occasion, the then Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, Simon Muzenda, refused to receive them.[74] This not to say that Harare was not willing to deal with Moscow. In a 1980 interview with the Soviet weekly, New Times, Mugabe said:[75]

> "As for the Soviet Union, we want to be friends with it, and we have repeatedly declared our readiness to establish diplomatic relations. This would help us gain a better understanding of each other and more fairly assess our stands on various issues".

However, as Muzenda put it in December 1980, what Zimbabwean nonalignment means "is that people who come to asked for diplomatic relations with us have to agree with the Government on a number of aspects of our relationship with them".[76]

However, it was only in February 1981, ten months after independence, that final agreement on the establishment of relations was reached. The Zimbabwean Government issued an official statement, the details of which are instructive. Relations

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