

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Background: Description of the area of study

This study analyzes the “socialization” of the countryside and the agricultural production in Manica district during the postcolonial period. Manica district is located in central west Manica Province of Mozambique, bordering the following districts: Barue to the north; Sussundenga to the south; Gondola to the east; and, to the west, Mutare district of Zimbabwe (see Appendix 1: Map 1).¹ The majority of its inhabitants are Shona-speaking people subdivided into Mateve and Manyika speakers. It has a humid-temperate climate with two distinct seasons: dry and cold from May to September (tropical winter), and hot, humid and rainy from October to April.² The principal river of the district is the Revué. The district is located on a plateau bordering Zimbabwe.³ Its soils and environmental conditions are favourable for agriculture, hunting, forestry, and mining. In general, the soils are good for the production of cash crops such as maize, cotton, wheat, sunflower, beans and potatoes (see Appendix 1: Map 2).⁴ During the colonial period (1960 until 1975), agricultural production was done by white and African settlers (*colonos brancos e negros*) in the broader context of the colonial settlement system (*sistema de colonatos*).⁵ In this system, the majority of ordinary rural Africans were used as farm workers in Mozambique and they also were recruited as laborers for the colonial plantations in Zimbabwe.⁶

1.2. The aim of the study

This report analyzes the “socialization” of the countryside and the agricultural production in Manica district from 1975 to 1987. Specifically the research answers the following questions:

¹Kindly provided by Arlindo Charles-National Statistical Institute (INE)-Mozambique, 2013.

² Neves, Joel das. ‘Economy, Society and Labour Migration in Central Mozambique, 1930-c.1965: A case study of Manica province’, PhD Thesis, University of London, 1998, 23-24; MAE. ‘Perfil do Distrito de Manica-Província de Manica, 2005, in www.govnet.gov.moz, accessed on 01-05-2013, 2.

³Neves, “Economy”, 23; MAE, “Perfil do Distrito de Manica”, 3.

⁴Ibid, p. 17.

⁵Hedges, D. and Rocha, A. “Moçambique Durante o Apogeu do Colonialismo Português, 1945-1961: a economia e a estrutura social” in *História de Moçambique: Moçambique no Auge do Colonialismo, 1930-1961*. D. Hedges, ed. (Maputo: Imprensa Universitaria, 1999) 165.

⁶Neves, “Economy”, 21.

- What was the impact of the Portuguese system of *colonatos* on agricultural production in Manica district from 1960 to 1975?
- What was the impact of the liberation struggle of Mozambique on the Portuguese system of *colonatos* in Manica district from 1972 to 1975?
- What did the “socialization of the countryside” do on agricultural production in Manica district between 1975 and 1987?

Changes occurred in the organization of traditional agricultural production in parts of Manica district after 1890 when as the colonial state replaced traditional leadership. The rural population lost not only their sovereignty and right to self-determination but also their resources, including their cattle and land, to the incoming white settlers.⁷ These changes were intensified from the 1940s to the 1960s by the establishment of the *colonato* system following World War II in Europe. During the war, Mozambique came to support the Portuguese economy through the further integration of Africans in the intensive production of export goods as workers earning low incomes.⁸ This system was supported by forced African labor during the 1960s. This was the principal factor causing the growth of the clandestine migration of Africans from Manica district to Southern Rhodesian plantations, in search of better livelihoods, a situation which continued until the independence of Mozambique in 1975.

After independence, Manica district (as elsewhere in the country) experienced the abandonment by white *colonos* of their socio-economic positions in agriculture and trade, which led the government to replace the *colonatos* with state farms for agriculture and cattle raising, a policy which lasted until 1987. In that year structural adjustment policies were adopted, marked by the withdrawal of support for state enterprises and the beginning of institutional support of a market economy and private property.⁹ “Socialization of the countryside” operated in the same way as the system of *colonatos* operated, in that rural Africans were integrated as a rural proletariat but organized in Communal Villages (*Aldeias Comunaís*- hereafter referred to as ACs)

⁷Mlambo, A. S. “The International Dimensions of the Zimbabwean Crisis up to 2005”, South African Historical Society Biennial Conference, *Southern Africa and the World: the Local, the Regional and the Global in Historical Perspective*, (2005, 25-29, June,) 2.

⁸Neves, “Economy”, 26-27; 100; Duri, P. T. ‘Antecedents and Adaptations in the Borderlands: A Social History of Informal Socio-Economic Activities across the Rhodesia-Mozambique Border with Particular Reference to the City of Umtali, 1900-1974’, PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2012, 128-133.

⁹Adam, Y. *Escapar aos Dentes do Crocodilo e Cair na Boca do Leopardo*. (Maputo: Promédia, 2006) 127-131.

and in production cooperatives.¹⁰ Therefore, the first objective of this report is to examine the impact of the colonial system of *colonatos* on agricultural production in Manica district from 1960 to 1975.¹¹ The second objective is to analyze the socio-economic postcolonial state policy of “socialization of the countryside” and the agricultural production in Manica district from 1975 to 1987.¹²

1.3. Literature review

Studies on the “socialization” of the Mozambican countryside, particularly those focusing on rural Africans living in ACs and working in collective farms in the state farms, are few and limited. Some of these studies about “villagisation” and “collectivization” were developed in southern Mozambique, particularly in Gaza province, and in the north, particularly in Cabo Delgado province. In the case of central Mozambique, studies of “socialization of the countryside” have been developed for Tete province, much less so in Manica province. Due to the heavy dependency on migratory labour in production and trade in the colonial economy of Manica province, research has mainly concentrated on these themes for the colonial period.

Historical studies about the rural economy of Manica district during the colonial and postcolonial periods do not address the dynamics of its transformation outside the context of the colonial economy. Their approaches are fundamentally about the rural Africans work on colonial farms, production of cash crops for tax payment, migrant labor to the neighboring countries, motivations, causes and importance of this economic structure for colonial government, and the significance of this economic system of exploitation for the rural population in Manica district.¹³ There are many studies broadly related to the postcolonial socio-economic “socialization of the countryside” and war. These studies concentrate on land conflict due to the process of nationalization and the process of integration of rural Africans in agricultural production and trade.

¹⁰Borges Coelho, J. P. “State Resettlement Policies in Post-Colonial Rural Mozambique: The Impact of the Communal Village Programme on Tete Province, 1977-1982”. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. (1998, 24:1) 64-85.

¹¹Hedges and Rocha, “Moçambique”, 165.

¹²Borges Coelho, “State Resettlement”, 61.

¹³Neves, “Economy”, 20-22;

1.3.1. Rural economy among African societies

The debate about the meaning of “rural economy” among Africans societies is a long and complex debate. Marxist theory is based on the mode of production and defines rural African economy based on the class of individuals resident in rural areas whose main activity is agricultural production at a rudimentary level, using, for example, hoes, draught animals, unpaid African labour and low capital inputs.¹⁴ The terms “rural areas” and “rudimentary techniques” were defined in relation to the industrialization and mechanization in Western Europe during the nineteenth century. The meaning of this concept is that Africans were not capable of self-sufficiency without their integration into an industrial and capitalist market as workers. Indeed, from Marxist to capitalist theories, Africans are defined as semi-autonomous in economic production.¹⁵

This research discusses rural Africans who, producing with rudimentary techniques, also maintained a strong relationship with the market system for their self-sufficiency in the colonial and postcolonial period. Economically, most rural Africans were self-sufficient before the penetration of capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century. From that time, African labour was integrated into the colonial economy as workers producing raw materials for industries and markets overseas.¹⁶

According to Jack Lewis, it is important to integrate the discussion about rural economy within the meaning of the African society. For him, African society is a productive and redistributive unit implying a strong relationship between people, people with their natural resources, and of course, production with rudimentary techniques. It is in this light that Theodor Shanin sees rural Africans as “small agricultural producers, who, with the help of simple equipment and the labour of their families, produce mostly for their own consumption, direct or indirect, and for the fulfillment of obligations to holders of political and economic power.”¹⁷ In keeping with Shanin’s perspective, this paper will argue that socio-economic and political power

¹⁴Lewis, J. “The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry: A Critique and Reassessment”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (1984, 11:1) 2; O. H. T. Juergensen. ‘Peasants on the Periphery: A Geohistory of Rural Change in Mozambique, c.1960-1992’. PhD Thesis, Queen’s University, Kingston, 1996, 18-19.

¹⁵Fallers, L. A. “Are African Cultivators to Be Called “Peasants”?” *Current Anthropology*. (1961, 2:2) 108; C. E. Welch, Jr. “Peasants as a Focus in African Studies. *African Studies Review*. (1977, 20:3) 1-2.

¹⁶Fallers, “Are African Cultivators”, 109.

¹⁷Shanin, T. “Introduction: Peasantry as a Concept” in *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Shanin, T. ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 3.

in Africa was controlled by a system of colonial exploitation from the end of nineteenth century to the mid twentieth century.

Many authors agree that this definition is a consequence of the development of the capitalist system due to the industrialization process, where rural Africans were integrated as workers earning low wages to pay mandatory taxes, and where they tried to continue agricultural production for self-sufficiency. The consequences of this integration were profound. Rural Africans lost control over their lands including their means of production and they became “rural workers”, transferring their surpluses to the dominant group, in the capitalist system. My research study discusses how the *colonatos* used the traditional rural agricultural production model as its basic structure of work. Therefore, the functioning of this system was based on a socio-economic, political system of domination of the rural population living in villages.¹⁸

This implies that a number of members of rural Africans societies were responsible for providing labour on the farm where they produced their sustenance. Each society had a particular division of labour and means to use their natural resources. They also had a specific formula for their exchanges at markets, which ranged from trade within their closed communities to the development of broader networks. It is this complex system of connection that integrates the concept of rural Africans societies, as a rural, socio-economic and political class connected by natural property, production, consumption, social reproduction, identity, prestige, sociability and welfare, as well as strong power relations.¹⁹

1.3.2. Colonial agricultural policy and its legacy in rural economy in Manica District

The discussion about the legacy of the colonial agricultural production in Manica district is related to the period before the 1960s, when the Mozambique Company established its administrative control over agricultural production and trade in Manica and Sofala in 1891.²⁰ Few studies of the rural economy in Manica have discussed the dynamics of the economic organization of the system of *colonatos* in agricultural production and trade and the links between these activities with rural population production for the colonial economy. The

¹⁸Fallers, “Are African Cultivators”, 109.

¹⁹Shanin, “Introduction”, 3-4; Bundy, *The Rise and Fall*, 3-5; Tung, F. H. “Peasantry as a Way of Living” in *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Shanin, T. ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) 57.

²⁰ Neves, Joel das, “Economy”, 68-69; 84-5.

focus of these studies has been fundamentally on the reasons, motivations and importance of African labour for colonial farms and its significance to the traditional rural agricultural production in Africa.²¹

Some authors have argued for the continuation of African economy from the pre-colonial period until the period of the colonial capitalist exploitation.²² Out of this argument, this research tries to discuss what impact of the Portuguese system of *colonatos* had in agricultural production in Manica district during the 1960s to 1970s.

To understand the legacy of the colonial agricultural production in Africa, it is important to discuss land access and methods of agricultural production during the colonial period. Two models have emerged to help understand colonial agricultural production. One is centered on the preservation of local practices, where the Africans were the basic force of agricultural production. The other is influenced by factors originating in the colonial system of exploitation, where rural families are simply manpower.²³ This research considers both models, because the development of the colonial economy meant the exploitation of natural resources and manpower of rural population. It asks the question: How was colonial agriculture organized?

It was because the Portuguese colonial agricultural economic and its administrative structure of governing was weak that the Portuguese opted for indirect control of the African economic production. As a result, Africans could play a key role in managing colonial production so as to minimize exploitation and to maintain the control of land and their production. This process was developed despite marked changes in African agriculture due to the impact of World War II. Thus, Portugal changed its position relating to African production. This included the integration of specific African producers into its planned system of production from 1940 until after 1960.

To achieve their goals for Mozambique's agricultural reform, the Portuguese intensified the system of *colonatos* along the Beira Corridor, expropriating more African land for the benefit of white *colonos*. According to Joel das Neves, they also allowed the integration of some black

²¹Cruz, M. "História da Formação da Classe Trabalhadora em Manica e Sofala do Púnguè 1892-1982", Tese de Licenciatura, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, 1982, p.161-175; Mavaneke, T. "O Programa de Gestão dos Recursos Indígenas nas áreas Comunitárias Zimbabwe", in *Actas do Workshop Sobre a Elaboração de uma Proposta para Projecto de Área de Conservação Transfronteiriças de Chimanimani*, (Jun.), 1995, 7-10.

²²Beach, D. "As Origens de Moçambique e Zimbabwe: Paiva de Andrade, a Companhia de Moçambique e a Diplomacia Africana 1881-1891". *Arquivo*. (1993, 13) 15.

²³Negrão, J. *Cem Anos da Economia Africana*. (Maputo: Promédia, 2001), 15, 24-5.

farmers into the system of the *colonatos* including them as part of a new assimilated class that was emerging in Manica, Mavita, Mavonde and Dombe. All of them had been migrants from Southern Rhodesia, members of the main chieftaincies, or Africans that who had otherwise distinguished themselves from the ordinary people.²⁴

In contrast to these few integrated black farmers, many ordinary Africans living on land suitable for agricultural production and pasturage for cattle lost their land in favour of *colonatos* along the Beira Corridor. This new stage in land redistribution occurred in areas of the Beira Corridor particularly from 1953 to 1958 as a first phase of the new colonial economic policy, called the National Development Plan (NDP).²⁵ In regions such as Sussundenga, Rotanda, Mossurize and others areas of Manica province, the colonial government integrated local authorities (*régulos*) and those Africans in the *colonatos*. This group of Africans was supported by the colonial administration in agricultural production and trade. It was a variation of the old colonial policy to divide Africans into group to suit its economy and administration.

In Manica district the ordinary rural African did not have direct support from the colonial administration. This situation raises the question: What impact did the system of *colonatos* have in agricultural production in Manica district until the end of the system of colonialism in Mozambique in 1975? This study will begin to answer this question.

1.3.3. “Socialization of the countryside” and the agricultural production in Manica District

A year before the independence of Mozambique in 1975, the *colonos* began to abandon agriculture and trade in Manica district as elsewhere in the country.²⁶ This led the new government to proclaim nationalization of the land and other socio-economic sectors on 24 July 1975 and to begin the process of creating state companies and the “socialization of the countryside”.²⁷ The goal of this policy was to ameliorate in the high levels of poverty left by the colonial economic system.²⁸ Despite its objectives, the government did not meet these

²⁴Neves, “Economy”, 148.

²⁵Ibid, 160-170.

²⁶Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*, 50; 58.

²⁷Adam, “Escapar aos Dentes do Crocodilo”, 127-131.

²⁸Negrão, “Cem Anos”, 269-70; Cardoso, F. J. *Gestão e Desenvolvimento Rural: Moçambique no contexto da África Sub-Sahariana*. (Lisboa: Fim do Século, 1993) 40; Abrahamsson, H and Nilsson, A. *Mozambique: The Trouble Transition-From Socialist Construction to Free Market Capitalism*. (London: Zed Books, 1995) 29.

expectations and the results, in terms of agricultural production, were insufficient to sustain improved conditions for most rural populations.²⁹

Agricultural production has always been a key element of the rural economy. Farm labour and the control of natural resources, trade and the management of their activities and experience in economic production were fundamental to the African form of production. Included here is local sociability, as a place of consumption (house-village).³⁰ The development of the local relationships of the lineage had a strong cultural relationship in the socio-economic and political activities, which “socialization” did not in practice recognize. It became a problem for this policy, because rural population continued to produce in their own way as a form to survival.³¹

The elements of the policy of “socialization of the countryside” were developed at different key moments. The first moment occurred with the formal declaration in February 1976 of the objectives of the ACs, state farms, and the collective farms.³² The second moment was after the Third Congress of Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* -hereafter referred to as FRELIMO) in February 1977, when it asserted itself as a Marxist-Leninist party. In pursuance of this policy, all agricultural land and others sectors were formally declared subject to nationalization in December, 1977.³³

The nationalization of abandoned agricultural lands meant the transformation of these areas into state farms and production cooperatives into which rural population were integrated. Such integration meant work in state farms as well as producing subsistence/food in cooperatives and trade while living in ACs.³⁴ The population living in ACs was seen as the base of modernization of agricultural production to supply raw material to the industrial sector.³⁵ In addition, the contribution of the rural population living in ACs was to work in state farms, but the responsibility of government was to provide them with schools, hospitals, security and other

²⁹O’Laughlin, B. “Proletarianization, Agency and Changing Rural Livelihoods: Forced Labour and Resistance in Colonial Mozambique”. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. (2002, 28:3) 511-513.

³⁰Negrão, “*Cem Anos*”, 269-70.

³¹Cardoso, “*Gestão e Desenvolvimento Rural*”, 40.

³²Hall and Young, “*Confronting Leviathan*”, 59

³³Egero, “*Moçambique*”, 89; Hanlon, J. *Mozambique: Who Call the Shots?*. (London: James Currey, 1991) 13; Hanlon, J. *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*. (London: Zed Books, 1984) 75-6.

³⁴Alexander, J. “The Local State in Post-War Mozambique: Political Practice and Ideas about Authority”. *Africa*. (1997, 67:1) 2.

³⁵Hall and Young, “*Confronting Leviathan*”, 91.

necessities. These two forms of the rural socio-economic organization became known as the central pillars of “socialization of the countryside” until 1987.³⁶

The functioning of this policy ran into many problems. First, investment that was too weak to support the policy. Secondly, rural population was integrated in a collective production without respect to their homeland and management traditions in agricultural production and trade.³⁷ The results of these two factors were drastic: poverty, hunger, and disease.³⁸ This research analyzes how these factors resulted of the implementation of the policy of “socialization of the countryside” in Manica district from 1975 until 1987. Although the policy’s objective was to improve the socio-economic condition of rural population the “agricultural pricing policy was established within the conception of a planned economy, with a planning system responsible for the distribution of consumer and investment goods”.³⁹

According to Juergensen, the way the post-colonial economy functioned in Mozambique made rural population dependent on profitable work and reduced their control over the land and their economy and culture.⁴⁰ It meant that the policy destroyed socio-economic self-sufficiency among the rural population and the development of the rural areas, while the governmental vision aimed at diminishing African cultural practices as well as the colonial legacy.⁴¹ FRELIMO intended to combat cultural practices, defend the nation and fight against tribalism. In so doing, the government marginalized local knowledge and leadership as material contributors to the development of the country.⁴²

Many factors explain the crisis which eventually emerged in the early 1980s and which led to the abandonment of centralised socialist economic policies. Apart from the marginalization of the rural population, potential contributors to economic and social development included: the inefficiency of specialized technical support in mechanised agriculture; the struggle against colonial Southern Rhodesia (1976-1979) in support of

³⁶Hall and Young, “*Confronting Leviathan*”, 94-96.

³⁷ Borges Coelho, “State Resettlement”, 65.

³⁸Hall and Young, “*Confronting Leviathan*”, 99.

³⁹Chingono, “*The State, Violence and Development*”, 37.

⁴⁰Juergensen, “*Peasants on the Periphery*”, 19-20.

⁴¹Englund, H. *From War to Peace on the Mozambique-Malawi Borderland*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002) 19-20.

⁴²O’Laughlin, B. “A base social da Guerra em Moçambique: análise de “A causa das armas em Moçambique”, *Antropologia de uma Guerra civil*, de C. Geffray, Paris: CREDU-Karthala, 1990”. *Estudos Moçambicanos*, 1992, 109; Englund. “*From War to Peace*”, 19-20; Adam. “*Escapar aos Dentes do Crocodilo*”, 133.

Zimbabwean liberation, involving the implementation of economic sanctions, specifically the closing of the Machipanda border crossing and Rhodesian access to the Beira Corridor and its Port in 1976; and the severe multi-year drought, famine and starvation of the early 1980s.⁴³ By 1982, the accumulation of negative consequences of these processes resulted in the postponement of FRELIMO's Fourth Congress.⁴⁴ As a result of the apparent incapacity of existing socio-economic policy to pursue stated development goals, FRELIMO's Fourth Congress in 1983 decided to withdraw from the policy of "socialization of the countryside" and the government adopted a full economic structural adjustment programme in 1987.⁴⁵

1.3.3. War, poverty, and economic crisis: the fall of the "socialization of the countryside"

The development of the war between FRELIMO government and Mozambique National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional de Moçambique* - hereafter referred to as RENAMO) (1976-1987) was one of the principal factors that lead the Government to abandon fully the policy of "socialization of the countryside" in 1987. In general terms, war does not contribute to human progress: it reduces a community's capacities to progress. More specifically, even the contradictory analyses from Marxist scholarship argue that war brings destruction of at least the physical means of production, creating social changes on society. In this study, the discussion is about the impact of war on the implementation of the policy of "socialization of countryside" on agricultural production in Manica district.⁴⁶

The continuity of war and the absence of investment in rural areas became problematic causing the level of poverty to increase. The rural poverty line in Mozambique has been defined as the minimum income/consumption level below which a person is considered to obtain adequate subsistence. The minimum is described in four categories: (i) the food energy intake approach; (ii) the basic needs approach; (iii) the American one-dollar-a-day international

⁴³Ratilal, P. "Mozambique: Using Aid to End Emergency". (Maputo: UNDP, 1989) 19; Human Rights Watch. "Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique". *An Africa Watch Report*. New York, 1992, 20.

⁴⁴Minter, W. *Os Contrás do Apartheid: As Raízes da Guerra em Moçambique e Angola*. (Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, 1998) 41; Alex Vines. *Renamo: Terrorism In Mozambique*. (London: Bloomington in Indianapolis, 1991) 61. Egero, *Moçambique*, 99.

⁴⁵Chingono, "The State, Violence and Development", 37.

⁴⁶Murshed, S. M. "Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction". *Journal of Peace Research*. (2002, 39: 4) 387-8; Chingono, F. "Mozambique: War, Economic Change, and Development in Manica Province, 1982-1992" in *War and Underdevelopment*. Vol. II. F. al. al. ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 89.

comparison criterion; and (iv) the social subjective poverty line.⁴⁷ The government used these categories to define specific policies and programs for population groups considered to be poor. This study uses these categories to understand the economic structure of the rural population in Manica District.

1.4. Research methods

The basic methods used in this study were developed in two main phases. The first phase was based on the literature review that provided the basic knowledge of colonial and postcolonial socio-economic policy regarding agricultural production and trade in Manica district. In the second phase, I compared this knowledge with the primary sources collected in the National Archive of Mozambique (AHM) during my field work in Maputo and in Manica province and district in February and March 2014.

In the archives, I collected information from colonial records in the Beira Collection (Fundo do Governo do Distrito da Beira-FGDB). In this collection, I focused on (i) general economic trade and labour mobilization in Manica district; (ii) reports of agricultural production and trade, principally those managed by the employers' guilds (*Grémios*). In addition, I examined the Central Government Collection (Fundo do Governo Geral-FGG), where I concentrated on reports of development and settlement plans (*planos de fomento e povoamento*) from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Using these collections I produced statistical data that helped me to describe the impact of *colonatos* system on agricultural production in Manica district. I also did research in the African Affairs Department Collection (Fundo de Negócios Indígenas-FNI). There I collected legislation and other data about forced labour recruited to work on the white farms, the living conditions in the plantations and the wages paid.

These sources presented some problems related to the format in which the reports were written, principally during the period of the struggle of liberation of Mozambique from 1960 to 1974. Many of the reports were written in a propagandistic form, imbued with Portugal's ideology that its colonies in Africa were governed in a multiracial developmental order, where there was no difference between the white European population and Africans, as was evident in

⁴⁷Cunguara, B. A. "Pathways out of Poverty in Rural Mozambique". MA Thesis. Michigan State University, 2008, 6-7.

racist South African and Southern Rhodesian records. For this reason, I concentrated my research not only on official administrative reports, but also on reports made by white farmers, traders and the socio-economic civil organizations, such as, employer's guilds (*Grémios*).

In addition, I did research in the post-colonial archival collection of the National Commission for Communal Villages (Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunaís-CNAC). I analyzed reports of state enterprises in terms of the agricultural production and trade, land occupation, labour and wages. I read reports about the socio-economic activities of rural populations living in ACs. In these reports, the issue was to collect data about land access, agricultural trade and other socio-economic conditions of rural population in Manica district. All of these sources are considered in comparison to published governmental sources such as the postcolonial socio-economic legislation also accessible in the AHM. I also researched the Oral Sources Collection of the AHM. This collection gave me information about the system of *colonatos* and its functioning, principally on Manica province. I compared information from this collection to the interview collection published by Joaquim Furtado available in www.rtp.pt about the influence of the struggle of liberation led by FRELIMO guerrilla movement over the Portuguese *colonos* and companies.

Beyond these textual sources, I collected more than ten-structured and semi-structured interviews (life stories). These interviews permitted me to do comparative analyses with the primary sources found in the archives and secondary sources. Mixed methods enabled me to reconstruct economy of Manica district. I also collected oral interviews, both individual and collective, among ex-managers of the state companies and farms, ex-workers of these companies and rural population more generally living in Manica district with experience of “socialization of the countryside”. Among the latter, I raised particularly questions on their memories and experiences of working on farms, land occupation and management, agriculture and formal and informal trade during the period of “socialization of the countryside” and war (1975-1987). A sample of the questions asked included: How did the state agricultural companies establish farms in rural areas? How did rural population react to the presence of these companies? To what extent did the establishment of these companies create land conflict with rural population?

Using oral testimonies in a comparative framework with archival documents and published literature helped me to write about the past of Manica district.⁴⁸ Moreover, questions about the 1960s and 1970s helped me create a safe environment in which my interviewees could answer without fear of the government, and all of them responded to this approach. However, a problem I sometimes faced, related to this method, was that of forgetfulness about the 1960s: a few of my interviewees were influenced by time and age in memory and remembering.⁴⁹ In this case, I used collective interviews to help them remember. In addition, I compared this oral information with colonial and postcolonial archival sources and information from newspapers such as “*Noticias da Beira*” (Beira News) that started publication in the 1950s and “*Revista Tempo*”- (Time Magazine) published since 1970. I compared information from these sources with previous interviews of the Oral Sources Collection that is available in the AHM.

A significant problem that I had during my fieldwork was getting answers to my questions about the post-colonial socio-economic development and war. These subjects are closely related with present day reality, including accumulation and poverty. Many of the possible interviewees are those who had influence on development or poverty due to the war or mistakes in administration after independence. In these interviews, discussion about the socio-economic development of Mozambique in the postcolonial period is seen from different points of view and, owing to the relative shortness of Mozambique’s democratic process, is considered only a political matter. As a result, few people in this category were available to be interviewed and those who spoke with me explained their ideals in political language. To resolve this issue, I structured my interviews around life stories, where the subject explained their experience of life and their view about what they knew. In addition, I used my own experience and knowledge of the local language and local culture to explain to my interviewees the objectives of my study, and I focused my questions on events and to estimate the impact of these events to understand the era.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Keightley, E. “Remembering research: memory and methodology in the social sciences”. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*. (2010, 13:1) 13.

⁴⁹Thomson, A. at all. “The Memory and History Debates: Some International Perspectives”. *Oral History*. (1994, 22:2) 33.

⁵⁰Mouton, M and Pohlandt-McCormick, H. “Boundary Crossings: Oral History of Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa- a Comparative Perspective”. *History Workshop Journal*. (1999, ?:48) 45.

Additionally, I used copies of the published statistical data from the national census of 1980 about the socio-economic conditions of the first five years of independence. This strategy gave my interviewees some trust and opening to discuss sensitive issues such as poverty, hunger, disease and war during the time they lived in the ACs. Interviewees could thus appreciate that my interest was only to confirm and to obtain further information and observation about the socio-economic conditions brought by “socialization of the countryside” in Manica district. My questions were selected for specific interviews. Before each interview, I searched for basic information about the subject, enabling me to prepare individually the type of question that I should do from one interview to another, avoiding those questions that might be sensitive. I concentrated on questions about the numbers of people living in the ACs and working in production cooperative or on collective farms in Manica district during “socialization of the countryside”. I also collected data about farming and cattle raising companies to discuss about the rural economy, the techniques used in agricultural production, the kinds of investment made on production, the kinds of goods produced and sold, and lastly, other local activities to increase the rural economy incomes of Manica district.

1.5. Structure of the report

This report is divided into four main chapters, including this introduction as the first chapter. The second chapter deals with colonial agricultural policy and its implications in Manica. It examines the agricultural production and trade of the Portuguese *colonato* system in Manica District from 1960 to 1975, and the impact of the liberation struggle of Mozambique on the Portuguese system of *colonatos* since 1972 until 1975. The third chapter focuses on “socialization of the countryside” and the agricultural production in Manica district from 1977 to 1987. In the first section, the chapter deals with the early experience of collective agricultural production and trade developed by FRELIMO in the liberated zones during the struggle of liberation and how this experience materialised as policy to be implemented after independence.

The second section relates the rupture of the colonial agricultural production to the state farms on the agricultural production implemented by the policy of “socialization of countryside” in 1977. In the third section, the chapter deals with the early consequence of the “socialization of the countryside” in Manica District. Section four characterizes the state companies on the

agricultural production in Manica District from 1977 to 1983. Section five discusses the fall of the “socialization of the countryside” on agricultural production in Manica District from 1983 to 1987. Chapter four is the conclusion of the report where I argue that FRELIMO’s Fourth Congress in 1983 marks the ending of the socialization project and the movement of the economic policy into a more neo-liberal economic strategy by 1987. This process provided more economic strategies of survival for the rural inhabitants during the volatile conditions of economic instability and war, which marked the 1976-1992 period of Mozambican history.

Chapter 2:

Agriculture in Manica District before Mozambique's Independence (1975)

2.1. Introduction

The present chapter discusses the impact of the Portuguese *colonatos* on the agricultural production in Manica district from 1950s to 1975. The chapter, on the one hand, describes in general, the socio-economic and political challenges that Portugal met and resolved, by implementing development plans and the installation of *colonatos*. On the other hand, it analyzes the impact of Mozambique's liberation struggle on this new economic structure, particularly on the *colonatos* of Manica district, from 1972 until 1975.

2.2. Agricultural production and trade through the system of *colonatos* before 1975

The Portuguese *colonatos* was established in Mozambique between 1945 and the end of the 1960s. Two background factors explain their introduction in Mozambique. The first was the colonial government's reforms introduced from 1928 to 1930. One of its objectives was to diminish the role of the non-Portuguese capital investment in Mozambique. Indeed, in the 1930s, as part of the new state's colonial policy, the Portuguese government began to impose a central and uniform administration controlled from Lisbon. The second was the economic impact of World War II which produced conditions highly favourable to increased colonial production and trade with the metropole.⁵¹

The objective of this reform was to increase the number of private companies in the rural areas that would be owned by large, medium, and small-scale white Portuguese farmers and some middle-African farmers (*assimilados*).⁵² This policy was based on utilization of cheap labour of the majority of the African population to produce raw materials to be sent to Portugal, and Mozambique in return would receive manufactured goods.⁵³

This objective prompted Portugal to attempt to convince the international community, led by the United Nations that all of their overseas colonies were provinces composed of a mixed

⁵¹Smith, A.K. "António Salazar and the Reversal of Portuguese Colonial Policy". *Journal of African History*. (1974, XV: 4) 667.

⁵²Neves, "Economy" 86.

⁵³Vail and White, "*Capitalism and Colonialism*", 288; Isaacman and Isaacman, "*Mozambique*", 40/1; Isaacman. "Transforming Mozambique's Rural Economy". *African Studies Association*. (1978, 8:1) 17.

population without exploitation between whites and blacks, and the major political administrative reform was made in 1951, when Portugal converted their colonies in Africa to Overseas Provinces.⁵⁴

This transition was made in response to the strong internal and external criticism against its system of exploitation in Africa. Due to this, the Salazar members of Government led by Marcelo Caetano and Adriano Moreira decided to sign both the International Labour Code in 1955 and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention in 1957. These changes enabled Portugal to be accepted as a member of the United Nations in 1955. In 1961, Portugal attempted to reinforce international acceptance of its colonial governance by abolishing the Native Statute.⁵⁵

From the early 1950s until the end of the 1960s, Portugal's agricultural policy had two significant challenges to manage Mozambique as its colony in Africa: to modernize its agrarian economy, from manual agricultural production to mechanized agricultural production.⁵⁶ To do so, it was necessary to have a considerable number of the semi-skilled population, to build dams to supply electricity, irrigate fields and to build roads and warehouses to facilitate internal and external trade. In addition, Portugal integrated the African population in villages and as rural workers into its new economic Rural Development Plan established in 1953.

The aim of this plan was to improve the economic development of Portugal, which had a huge number of unemployed and rural ordinary citizens to increase the agricultural production in Mozambique as its colony. At the same time, it was important to convince the international community that they had abolished the system of exploitation in their colonies in Africa.

To achieve that objective, the plan envisaged the construction of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, dams, warehouses, hydroelectric power and irrigation schemes in the metropole and in the colonies.⁵⁷ The second objective was to move the poor and unemployed part of the population from Portugal to Africa as *colonos* to work in agricultural production and commodity export.⁵⁸

⁵⁴Spence, C. F. *Moçambique: East African Province of Portugal*. (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1963) 29-33; Borges Coelho. "Protected Villages", 151/2; das Neves, "Economy", 154.

⁵⁵O'Laughlin, "Proletarianization", 517, 526; Juergensen, "Peasants on the Periphery", 116; Spence, "Moçambique", 31.

⁵⁶Ribeiro-Tôrres, J. L. "Rural Development Schemes in Southern Moçambique". *Journal of African Affairs*. (1972, 3:2) 62.

⁵⁷Neves, "Economy", 152/3.

⁵⁸*Ibid*, 172-195.

All of these objectives became part of subsequent plans: the second (1959-1964), and third (1968-1973), but with strong economic investment for both: white and some African population (*assimilados*) as colonos into the Portuguese propaganda that was defending the Salazar colonial fascist system against international critics. For that, Portugal developed the system of the *colonatos* since the mid-1950s until the end of the 1960s.⁵⁹

In December 1957 the Department of Land Settlement and Technical Brigade for the Settlement and Development of the Revue (Brigada Técnica de Fomento e Povoamento de Revuê-BTFPR) was established. In November 1960 this was incorporated into the newly-formed Mozambican Provincial Settlement Board (Junta Provincial de Povoamento de Moçambique-JPPM).⁶⁰ In its initial implementation of the *colonatos*, the BTFPR from 1957 to 1962 began surveys of land, ecology, African society and urbanization as a way of encouraging the establishment of the white *colonos* from Portugal to Mozambique and in other colonies.⁶¹

From its inception to the end of the 1960s, the BTFPR inspected more than 29,150ha of land for farming and irrigation. For example, the *Colonato* of Sussundenga had around 3,300ha, divided into 120ha plots that were fully irrigated farms for white *colonos*, and 4,750ha divided between 3,100ha for white *colonos* and 1,650ha for black *colonos*. All of these lands were irrigated plots. In the *Colonato* of Zónué had around 9,200ha divided into 88ha irrigated plots for white *colonos*, and the rest were not irrigated plots for African production.⁶²

In areas such as, Manica village, Machipanda, Mavonde, Vanduzi and Penhalonga many *colonos* and companies were established in free or spontaneous *colonatos*. They received indirectly support in agricultural production and trade from the BTFPR during the 1960s until 1975, but members of the *Grémios* received aid with land surveys, clearance, credits, trade, and technical support.⁶³ Three different types of *colonatos* were implemented in Mozambique. The 'oriented' and 'guided' *colonatos* supported the migration of the poor *colonos* from Portugal. Some *colonos* were already living in Mozambique and included some African leaders or

⁵⁹Borges Coelho, "Protected Villages", 150/2; das Neves, "Economy", 160/4.

⁶⁰Ribeiro-Tôrres. "Rural Development", 63; Spence, "Moçambique", 100/2; Diário do Governo, I Serie, N^o 56, 12 de Março, 1959, 256; Diário do Governo, I Serie, N^o 106, 13 de Maio, 1965, 659.

⁶¹Neves, "Economy", 154, 160/1.

⁶²Franklin, "RIOCM", 72; ⁶²Spence, "Moçambique", 109.

⁶³Neves, "Economy", 155/6.

assimilados. This type of *colonatos* financed the *colonos*' occupation of tracts of land, cash bonuses, livestock, low-interest credit, and substantial technical assistance.⁶⁴

This system was implemented in the highlands of Manica Province, where the Settlement of Sussundenga (*Colonato de Sussundenga*) including the Revue valley in the region of the Massambuzi and Zónue functioned. All of these areas were good for agricultural production⁶⁵. The rest of the colony, in general, and Manica district in particular, was reserved for the free or spontaneous *colonatos*, where the government mobilized white farmers who were already in the region or civil white servants and poor rural whites who wished to become farmers.⁶⁶

According to Joel das Neves, there were nine companies occupying 11,914 hectares from 1937 until 1955, and 34 farms that were occupying more than 28,399.5 hectares from 1910 until 1961. Many of the 40,313.5 hectares belonged to the white companies and *colonos* in Manica district until the end of 1961 (See Table 1, 2 and 3 below).⁶⁷

Table 1: Farming Units by Administrative *Conselho* in Mozambique Province, 1967

Name of Administrative <i>Conselho</i>	Number of Units		Area Occupied (1,000 hectares)		Average Size of Unit (in hectares)	
	Traditional	Developed	Traditional	Developed	Traditional	Developed
Lourenço Marques	53,628	567	77.4	329.5	1.4	581
Gaza	156,432	1,779	248.0	348.7	1.6	296
Inhambane	159,019	185	279.1	121.5	1.8	657
Manica e Sofala	135,446	451	224.3	676.8	1.7	1,507
Tete	99,865	61	152.3	46.2	1.5	757
Zambezia	277,961	308	219.0	376.5	0.8	1,222
Moçambique	419,745	553	688.9	302.9	1.6	548
Cabo Delgado	149,946	106	173.1	49.3	1.2	465
Nuassa	62,975	33	107.8	20.7	1.7	628

Source: Isaacman and Isaacman. Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982, 44.

⁶⁴Reis Figueira. "O Povoamento Dirigido", 105-107; Ribeiro-Tôrres. "Rural Development", 62.

⁶⁵Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*", 43; Isaacman. "Transforming Mozambique's", 18; Neves, "Economy", 154,160-166; Spence, "*Moçambique*", 88-89, 100-110; Hedges e Rocha. "*Moçambique*", 165-166.

⁶⁶Neves, "Economy", 154.

⁶⁷Ibid, 352.

Table 2: White Agricultural Companies in Manica Administrative *Conselho*, 1937-1955

Administrative Post	Name of Company	Place	Hectares	Year of Installation	Distance from Manica Headquarters
Manica	Chimonica-1	Revué	2,430	1937	18 km
	Missão de Jécua	Jécua	1,407	1942	6 km
	Mussa Chand & Filhos	Andrade	50	1949	11 km
	Sociedade Predial do Vumba	Manica	787	1951	10 km
Mavonde	Agro-Pecuária do Dororo	Dororo	1,900	1920	31 km
	Chimonica-2	Elvas	1,015	1937	20 km
	Agro-Pwcuária do Muza	Muza	3,400	1943	20 km
Mavita	Sociedade Agrícola de Mavita	Mavita	525	1942	38 km
Dombe	Missão do Dombe	Dombe	400	1955	235 km
Total	9	9	11,914		

Source: Adapted from Neves, Joel das, “Economy, Society and Labour Migration in Central Mozambique”, 352.

Table 3: White Settlers Farms in Manica Administrative *Conselho*, 1910-1961

Administrative Post	Name of White Settler Farm	Place	Hectares	Year of Installation	Distance from Manica Headquarters
Manica	Maria Elizabeth Delport	Machipanda	20	1935	19 km
	Manuel Fernando	Vila Manica	4	1939	1 km
	António Tavares	Munene	1,200	1942	7 km
	Costa Apotsos	Revué	477	1945	22 km
	Manuel Rosa	Machipanda	750	1945	13 km
	Lourenço M. D. Canhão	Machipanda	1,500	1946	15 km
	António G. Mão Cheia	Zombe	1,000	1949	20 km
	Bernardino José Carvalho	Águas Frescas	770	1952	12 km
	Manuel da Costa Campos	Jécua	800	1952	8 km
	Manuel Agonia N. Gomes	Vila Manica	15	1952	1 km
	Laurinda Casais Lopes	Vila Manica	11	1953	2 km

	António Henriques de Matos	Vila Manica	6.5	1954	1 km
	José Duarte Lourenço	Revué	300	1959	10 km
	António Fernandes Aguiar	Chirara	2,050	1959	25 km
	Manuel da Costa Santos	Munene	180	1960	11 km
	Dr. Fernandes Lisboa e Abílio de Jesus Antunes	Inhamucarara	497	1961	22 km
Mavonde	Robert Garvin	Chimeze	2,000	1910	26 km
	Artur magno Pinheiro	Muza	400	1937	18 km
	Armindo Duarte	Zué	200	1940	28 km
	Helena de Jesus	Vengo	100	1940	7 km
	José da Cruz	Vengo	120	1942	7 km
	Manuel E. dos Santos	Muza	120	1948	23 km
	Silvino Simões	Vengo	200	1949	7 km
	Alfeu Cardoso	Vengo	130	1949	9 km
	António Toscano	Elvas	900	1949	7 km
	António Tavares	Vengo	4,500	1954	11 km
Mavita	Joaquim V. M. de Carvalho	Tsetserra	5,000	1949	50 km
	Joaquim V. M. de Carvalho	Tandara	3,000	1957	32 km
	Arlindo Viriato	Inharimba	346	1958	54 km
	António de Paiva Roda	Inharimba	375	1958	56 km
	Joaquim Dimas Fachadas	Inharimba	498	1958	56 km
	João M. Bernardo	Nhamezara	210	1959	75 km
	João Mendes	Nhamezara	210	1959	76 km
	Alvara Ribeiro	Nhamezera	210	1959	77 km
<u>Dombe</u>	Domingos T. Magalhães	Domb	200	1957	254
<u>Total</u>	34	21	28,399.5		

Source: Adapted from Neves, Joel das, “Economy, Society and Labour Migration in Central Mozambique”, 352.

AHM records have confirmed the names of these companies and white *colonos* and farms that were mentioned above, but data from the research also indicates that until the installation of the system of the *colonatos* in the 1960s, the white population working in agricultural production

and trade in Manica district was not more than 1,278 in 1962 (See Table 4 below). By 1968 this number had doubled to more than 2,595; 2,531, of the Portuguese, evidence of the changes brought about by colonial policy in agriculture in the 1960s (See Table 5 below).⁶⁸

In 1962 the African population was estimated at more than 54,540 inhabitants. This number increased to 77,345 inhabitants according the census of 1967, and by 1970 the population was estimated to be more than 93,168 African inhabitants in Manica district. Many of them were recruited as workers on the *colonos* farms (See Table 4, 5, and 6 below).⁶⁹

Table 4: Portuguese Population by Administrative Post in Manica Conselho, 1960-1962

Administrative Post	Nationality	Race	Man	Woman
Manica	Portuguese	White	428	256
	Portuguese	Coloured***	29	32
	Portuguese	Black***	29	12
	Indian	Indian	44	40
Bombe	Portuguese	White	16	11
	Portuguese	Coloured***	5	7
	Portuguese	Black***	5	1
	Indian	Indian	9	8
Mavita	Portuguese	White	166	125
	Portuguese	Coloured***	6	1
	South African	White	1	3
Mavonde	Portuguese	White	19	15
	Portuguese	Coloured***	5	1
	German	White	1	8
	Total		763	520 (M+W=1,278)

***- Black and Coloured people were considered as part of the Portuguese population if they were assimilated or non-indigenous.

Source: Franklin a, “Relatório da Inspeção Ordenaria ao Conselho de Manica”, 6.

⁶⁸Borges a, “RIOCM”, 4.

⁶⁹Franklin a, “RIOCM”, 6, 88; Borges a, “RIOCM”, 3, 8; INE, “IV Recenseamento Geral da População-1970: Distrito de Manica e Sofala”. Lourenço Marques: DPSE, 1970, xxiv.

Table 5: Portuguese Population in Manica *Conselho*, 1962-1968

Nationality	Year	
	1962	1968
Portuguese and Non-Portuguese	1,278	2,595
Portuguese	-----	2,531
Non-Portuguese	-----	64

Source: adapted from Franklin a, “Relatório da Inspeção Ordenaria ao Conselho de Manica”, 6 and Borges a, “Relatório de Inspeção Ordinária ao Conselho de Manica”, 4.

Table 6: African Population in Manica *Conselho*, 1960-1962

Administrative Post	Man	Woman	Total
Manica	5,973	6,329	12,302
Bombe	11,733	12,111	23,844
Mavita	6,821	6,882	13,703
Mavonde	2,311	2,882	4,691
Total	26,838	27,702	54,540

Source: Franklin a, “Relatório da Inspeção Ordenaria ao Conselho de Manica”, 88.

The data can be interpreted in multiple ways. The first interpretation is that the Portuguese administration at the end of the 1950s became stronger and well organized in terms of the functioning of its administrative system, land occupation and control of the African rural population in Manica district. In addition, the installation of the system of the *colonatos* and their institutions meant that Portugal was giving *colonos* better support in terms of investments, land surveys, construction of roads, bridges, dams, warehouses, drainage and irrigation works, and technical assistance on the agricultural production and trade.⁷⁰

This system also increased the displacement of rural African population and expropriation of their fertile lands since the end of 1950s.⁷¹ Due to this, the colonial government published the Decree 43894 of 6 September 1961 which attributed to the *Grémios* the responsibility for the land occupation process. This was the way that the colonial government found to guarantee lands to the African population to produce food and crops for exportation and

⁷⁰Neves, “Economy”, 155.

⁷¹Isaacman and Isaacman. “*Mozambique*”, 43.

for tax payment. This decree also classified these lands into three different categories, namely: first, second and third land types.⁷²

The classification of land in these categories adopted in the 'reforms' of 1961 - to promote the interests of white *colono* farms favoured white farming areas in the fertile lands in Manica itself, Machipanda, central region of Mavita, and north of Dombe (see Appendix 1: Map 2 and 3). All of these areas were fertile for the production of potatoes, maize, wheat, cotton, tobacco, and forestry, favourable for trade due to the existence of Beira Corridor that had roads and the railway linking Southern Rhodesia and Beira, basic infrastructures for the export of the agricultural commodities in this region.

Consequently, the rural African population was pushed away from the Beira corridor to areas such as Mavonde, west of Mavita, and south of the Dombe region. In these areas, they produced maize and beans for their own consumption and market, cotton to supply the textile industry (Textáfrica in Chimoio city), and a compulsory amount of tobacco for administrative tax obligations and for exportation to Portugal (see Appendix 1: Maps 2 and 3).

The growth of the white *colono* population and its occupation of prime land meant the intensified transformation of the greater part of the African population into rural workers on colonial farms, where they were producing cotton and tobacco on their own lands expropriated by the *colonato* system. By the same token, this process caused a shortage of fertile lands for the rural African population. This fact was caused by land laws conceived early by the Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira in 1961, who established Land Funds (*Fundo de Terras*), out of the African customary laws about land tenure.⁷³

This land tenure imposed the concept of “State” that had never been present among the African population. In doing so, all regions that were under the control of African leaders (*régulos*), according to Negrão were considered “Land Fund”.⁷⁴ Consequently, between the 1960s and the 1970s, complaints about land shortages were widespread among the African population.⁷⁵ These claims were presented by their paramount chiefs (*régulos*) during meetings

⁷²AHM-FGDB, Cx. Nº 763/A: Processo D/17, 1959-1964; Pereira da Silva. “*Terras, Pastagens e Água*”, 113; Negrão. “*Cem Anos*”, 150-151.

⁷³Neves, “Economy”, 148; Negrão, J. *One Hundred Years of African Rural Family Economy*. (Lund: University of Lund, 1995) 116-117.

⁷⁴*Ibid*, 117.

⁷⁵Franklin d, “Acta Nº 4 da Banja Realizada na Regedoria de Macequece do Posto da Sede, 08/03/1962 in “RIOCM” (do Distrito de Manica e Sofala)” in AHM-FGDB, Cx. Nº 1478: DSAC-“RICM”, 1962, 146.

(*Banjas*) organized by the colonial administrator in order to persuade the local chiefs and the rural population to commit themselves more fully to agricultural production, principally cotton and tobacco, and also to stop the migration to Southern Rhodesia and to promote labour contracts on white farms.⁷⁶

For the colonial government, these *Banjas* were organized because of the wider importance of African production for the colonial economy, but for African leaders and population they were seen as places where they could request solutions for problems such as land expropriation, bad treatment on the farms; low wages; and low price paid for crops on *colonatos* and *Grémios*.⁷⁷

For example, at the *Banja* in Mavita on 30 January 1962, where local leaders of Maribane, Mucímua, and Zixixe and more than 300 Africans, were present, Enasse Caracadzai and Zuarimo Jone complained about the shortage of lands for farming and pasture due to the plantation of eucalyptus by BTFPR in their lands.⁷⁸ In 1965, the same claim was presented by a local leader of Chazera region. In 1968, a similar issue was presented by the local leader of the region of Nhacuanicua who complained about the planting of more than 7000 eucalyptus trees in Penhalonga and Chimanimani promoted by the Agriculture and Forestry Service of Penhalonga.⁷⁹

Due to the shortage of lands more than 17 families migrated to other regions of the district or to Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The responses that came from the colonial administrative inspectors were the same in all reports. For example, they answered the local people as follows: “the African population must follow the norms brought by the BTFPR, because it was important to develop the local economy in which the local population has benefit from employment; I will discuss it with the local administrator”, according to the inspector Borges.⁸⁰ These responses did not offer solutions for the rural population in Manica district. The local administrator was following the plan that was made to develop the system of *colonatos*. The solution that the Africans had was to find new areas to settle or to migrate to Southern Rhodesia.

⁷⁶Neves, “Economy”, 180.

⁷⁷AHM-FGDB, Cx. N^o 756b: Processo D/17- Ao Sr. Governador do Distrito de Manica, 1951-1961.

⁷⁸Franklin b, “Acta N^o 2 da “Banja” Realizada na Regedoria de Mucímua do Posto de Mavita, 30/01/1962”, 142.

⁷⁹Borges, “RIOCM”, 75.

⁸⁰Ibid.

Moreover, as a result of this system, of more than 4,164 Africans men available for work in Dombe in 1962, only 1,500 were employed in local farms.⁸¹ It meant that the remainder migrated to the neighbouring countries (South Africa and Southern Rhodesia).⁸² In the case of Manica district, it was estimated that in 1959, 1,245 African workers were recruited to work in white farms. In 1960, this number rose to 1,655 workers recruited. In addition, more than 1,973 African workers were recruited in Manica, Barue, and other regions of Manica province.⁸³

Due to the increase in number of the rural population to migrate to neighbouring countries, the colonial administration changed its rules. The first measure was to increase control over the circulation of the African population by the already existing local administrative police (*Sipaios*) in all administrative posts. This measure contradicted the change of policy introduced by Adriano Moreira in 1961 pertaining to the free circulation of the African population in all Oversea Provinces of Portugal in Africa.

These changes did not modify the obligation of African labourers, but improved at least theoretically some basic conditions of work. For example, in 1961, legislation obliging all *colonos*, farmers, and agricultural companies to pay the cost of accommodation and food in money as a way of increasing the wages of African workers, was published.⁸⁴ These changes did not reduce the imposition of cheap contract labour, imposition of forced cotton and tobacco production which continued to lead high levels of debt, and contributed to serious demographic imbalances, a sharp decline in agricultural productivity, famines, disease, and soil erosion in Manica district.⁸⁵

The implementation of the three Development Plans was accompanied by the creation of institutions in order to support the system of *colonatos*. It was in this context that in 1957 the Department of Land Settlement that was integrated into the BTFPR was created. This institution was funded by the National Development Bank, created in 1959 for local investment in agriculture and industry.⁸⁶ The bank also funded the *colonos* settled in Massambuzi, Zónue, and Sussundenga (see Table 2 above and appendix 1: Maps 2 and 3).

⁸¹Franklin a, "RIOCM", 103.

⁸²Interview with Pita Meque, Manica city, 21 February 2014.

⁸³Franklin a, "RIOCM", 95.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵AHM-FGDB, Cx. Nº 627: Processo B/11, 1951-1961; Isaacman and Isaacman. "Mozambique", 53.

⁸⁶Neves, "Economy", 152-153.

During the 1960s, the BTFPR inspected more than 9 companies and 34 white *colonos* and farmers who occupied more than 40,313.3ha in agricultural and forestry production in Messica, Rotanda, Mavita and Penhalonga. Among the *colonos*, some had large farms and companies, for example: António Nerantzoulis in Revue and Costa Aptosos in Messica⁸⁷

Land surveys for the white *colonatos* along the Revue River and of Manica district were financed by the BTFPR under the budget approved in the second Development Plan (1959-1964). From this plan the BTFPR received an estimated \$2,017,391.30 (58,000,000\$00 esc.) and \$5,565,217.39 (160,000,000\$00 esc.).⁸⁸ These funds were used in two phases. The first was used only for the installation of white Portuguese *colonos* from 1959 to 1961, and the second phase was used for the installation of black *colonos* from 1961 to 1962. In addition, more than \$4,390,408.64 (130,000,000\$00 esc.) was used for studies and the process of installation of the irrigation system.⁸⁹

In coordination with the authorities of Manica district, the BTFPR program invested in the construction of roads and bridges linking the Beira Corridor with all administrative posts to sustain the development of trade with Beira Port and Machipanda Border with Southern Rhodesia. The relationship between *colonos* and Southern Rhodesia farmers was important as the latter transmitted their experience to *colono* farmers in Mozambique. For example, the construction of small fields to demonstrate how to produce selected hybrid seeds, and to use pesticides and fertilizers, while agricultural resources such as tractors with wagons, ploughs, grades and seeds were brought from Southern Rhodesia.⁹⁰

During the second (1959-1964) and third (1968-1973) Development Plans the BTFPR made considerable investments in roads and bridges construction, to support the white *colonos* that were members of the employers' guilds (*Grémios*). The credit was used for construction of warehouses, small stores/canteens (*cantinas*) and other infrastructure. For example, from 1962 until the end of 1968 the BTFPR invested around \$3,048,422.31 (87,672,625.7\$00 esc.)⁹¹ These

⁸⁷Neves, "Economy", 156, 352.

⁸⁸Banco de Moçambique. "Boletim Estatístico", 5.

⁸⁹CIPF. "Relatório da Execução do II Plano de Fomento". (Lisboa: IN, 1962) 241-243; Neves, "Economy", 161; Banco de Moçambique. "Boletim Estatístico", 5.

⁹⁰Neves, "Economy", 162-163.

investments resulted in the construction of six secondary roads and eight principal rural roads (Estradas Rurais-ER) in Manica district (see Appendix 2).⁹²

For the construction of the agricultural trade infrastructure, the *colonos* received from the BTFPR credits more than \$382,742.31 (11,333,000\$00 esc.) up to the end of 1962. Its resulted in more than 8 different stores and canteens constructed in Manica district, namely: one at the agricultural fair in Manica headquarters; three stores in Mavita; one store in Mavonde, and three stores and one Export Cereals Marketing Board (Junta de Exportação de Cereais-JEC) depot in Dombe. All of these stores were frequented by as many as 58 traders.⁹³ The number of private *colono* stores increased from 8 to 92 in Manica district to the end of 1968. This growth – which continued to the end of the third NDP in 1973 - meant that the system of *colonatos* came to dominate trade as well as production and “villagisation of Africans” in Manica district.⁹⁴

This “villagisation of Africans” had two objectives: the first was to control the African labourers and to transform them into rural proletarian workers on white *colono* farms and companies and receiving low wages. The second was to control the tax paid in work or agricultural crops that was collected by the *régulos* for the colonial administration, and to support the functioning of the system of the *colonatos* in the whole of Manica district.

These objectives resulted in investments made by the Department of Agriculture for Africans farmers at the end of the 1950s. They invested, for example, more than \$1,817.90 (340,592\$00 esc.), on seeds, ploughs, hoes, tractors and on construction of warehouses for crop storage. The result of this investment was that each year African farmers sold to the *Grémios* more than 657 (90kg) sacks of wheat and 69,417 (90kg) sacks of maize.⁹⁵

From 1960 to 1975, the rural population of Manica district consisted of workers servicing the colonial farmers, companies, stores, or in administrative sector and paying individual tax to the colonial authority. Even so, the majority continued to work in their fields, producing maize and others crops for their consumption and trade. For example, maize sold to *Grémios* was around 14,000 to 16,000 (90kg) sacks year in Manica district. The potatoes that were produced in

⁹²Borges a, “RIOCM”, 75; Banco de Moçambique. “Boletim Estatístico”, 5.

⁹³Franklin, “RIOCM”, 38, 49, 72, 144 and 118.

⁹⁴ Borges a, “RIOCM”, 64; Borges b, “RIOCM” in AHM-FGDB, Cx. N^o 1479: Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil (DSAC), 1970, 9.

⁹⁵Neves, “Economy”, 123/4; 139-146; Banco de Moçambique. “Boletim Estatístico”, 5.

Mavita and Mavonde posts averaged more than 900,000 to 120,000 kilograms per year. All of these crops were produced by the African population and sold to *Grémios* at a low price.⁹⁶

All this productive activity did not improve the economic and social development of the rural African population, but instead transformed them into rural proletarian workers of the farms of the *colonos* paying different taxes in agricultural crops, work or in money, such that the wage they were actually receiving as workers was not more than 150 to 180\$00 esc.⁹⁷

Data from research in AHM indicates that from 1962 to 1963, for example, 24,075 Africans paid a total individual (head) tax of \$7,224.83 (206,269\$00 esc.); to the end 1968, the domicile tax collected from the rural population working in agriculture, trade and livestock was more than \$134,690.96 (3,844,080\$00 esc.), and the amount collected from this tax from African workers was more than \$26,938.19 (768,816\$00 esc) in all Manica district.⁹⁸

The data shows that huge contribution of taxes was from the rural population considered non-assimilated (indigenous). It also meant that the rural population supported the colonial economy in Manica district. The economic environment of the white *colonos* transformed in the context of tensions and confrontation with the advance of FRELIMO guerrillas in Manica district in 1972.

2.3. The impact of the liberation struggle of Mozambique on the *colonatos* in Manica District (1972-1975)

Beyond its economic objectives, the establishment of the *colonatos* in the 1960s also came to embody political and ideological objectives against the development of a nationalist movement and Mozambique's liberation struggle. But, the appeal of the burgeoning sense of nationalism, strongly swayed the rural population to support the struggle. Inside the *colonatos* the concept of "*villagisation*" of rural areas became stronger as the military intelligence and psychological warfare strategy of the Portuguese counter-insurgency in Mozambique.⁹⁹

⁹⁶The price paid by Gremio for the crops from rural families was estimated in 1\$00 for 1kg of maize, 1\$30 for beans, 2\$20 for wheat, between 2\$30 to 3\$70 for cotton (Franklin a, "RIOCM", 115-116; 141).

⁹⁷AHM-FGDB, Cx. N^o 664- Processo B/15, 1957-1962: Relatório Anual Referente ao Ano de 1960.

⁹⁸AHM-FGDB, Cx. 720C. Processo C/8, 1962-1964: Taxa Pessoal Anual.

⁹⁹Borges Coelho. 'Protected Villages', 203.

Portuguese counter-insurgency was aimed at preventing the rural population in villages from supporting the FRELIMO guerrillas and limiting their influence in developing nationalist consciousness against the colonial system of exploitation and the supply of new recruits as combatants.¹⁰⁰ This program was implemented first by the construction of a defensive line, as part of a counterinsurgency program against FRELIMO guerrillas on the Tanzanian and Malawian borders, through forced rural population resettlement villages, surrounded by barbed wire, where the liberation struggle led by FRELIMO guerrilla had developed from 1964, principally in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and later, in Tete province since 1968.¹⁰¹

In the case of Manica District, colonial villages were established from 1972 when FRELIMO guerrillas started to operate in this region. Even so, few *aldeamentos* were constructed in comparison with Mungari and Cantandica administrative posts of Bárué district in the north of Manica province.¹⁰² The first action of FRELIMO guerrillas when they arrived in Manica district in 1972 was the mobilization of the rural population to accept their presence so that they could easily install their military bases. FRELIMO had small bases of not more than 15 members in each of the following regions: Nhamira, Dororo, Mavonde, Andrade, Vanduzi, Muchinga, and Chimanimani.¹⁰³

FRELIMO guerrillas impinged on white *colonos* and farms in two different moments in Manica district. At first 1972, when they came to understand that the guerrillas were in the region and many Africans were giving them food and information, testimony suggests that the support in provisions did not have any negative impact on *colono* production and trade. Even so, settlers became apprehensive for their future, and some began to transfer their relatives to Manica and Chimoio cities, and understood that around Manica district the Portuguese army was not able to give them security on their farms: the majority of the Portuguese army had been stationed in Tete province to protect the Cahora Bassa dam.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰Borges Coelho. 'Protected Villages', 203.

¹⁰¹Juergensen. "Peasants on the Periphery", 159-162.

¹⁰²Eduardo da Silva Nihia. 'Primeira Reunião Nacional dos Combatentes da Luta de Libertação Nacional: A Frente de Manica e Sofala'. *Report*, March, 10-13 of the 2001, in AHM, Cx. 8/14- Oral Sources Collection, 2001, 10.

¹⁰³Interview with Pita Meque, Manica city, 21 February 2014; interview with Alberto João Baciquete, Manica city, 6 March, 2014.

¹⁰⁴Eduardo da Silva Nihia interview in Joaquim Furtado. 'GLCU'. Episode 39, *RTP Report*, 2012; Sérgio Vieira interview in Joaquim Furtado. 'GLCU'. Episode 39, *RTP Report*, 2012.

Indeed at this stage, some farmers and traders located in the hinterland areas of Manica district, started to collaborate clandestinely with the guerillas, giving them food supplies and information about the Portuguese army.¹⁰⁵ António da Silva João, who was a Portuguese businessman in Mozambique from 1956 until in 1977, confirmed these reports:

We circulated in rural areas, I can't say peacefully, but we circulated safely. Myself for example, I had construction works in many districts and with many different cars. The FRELIMO guerrillas never attacked me, my companies and cars. I mean that, I was living in Buzi in that time, and the administrator of Buzi, who was working under the Portuguese flag, was working at the same time for FRELIMO guerrillas. He was supporting them in various ways. It was due to his support of the guerrillas that many settlers in Buzi did not become the target of FRELIMO attacks.¹⁰⁶

Then, in 1973 until the end of war in 1974, FRELIMO guerrillas changed the socio-economic environment of colonial economy of Manica district.¹⁰⁷ During this period, FRELIMO attacked trains along the Beira-Southern Rhodesia railway. In regions such as Vanduzi, Garuso, along the area between Chimoio and Manica cities, along railway line, mines were laid and trains were derailed.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, the guerrillas intensified military actions on the roads of Manica district as well as on private farms. In the attack on farm '*Quinta das Águas Frescas*' on 14 January 1973, that belonged to the white Portuguese settler, Joaquim de Matos Dias, his wife, Maria José was killed. This incident changed political and economic relations between white *colonos* and guerrillas and the African population in the district. Many areas, such as Chimandza, Dororo, Timba, and Mavonde were abandoned by the farmers and came to be known as liberated zones, where agriculture was taken over by the local African population.¹⁰⁹

By the end of 1974, FRELIMO guerrilla actions in Manica district resulted in many white *colonos* abandoning their farms and small shops and retiring to Manica, Chimoio and Beira

¹⁰⁵Interview with Pita Meque, Manica city, 21 February, 2014.

¹⁰⁶António da Silva João interview in Joaquim Furtado. 'A Guerra de Libertação Colonial do Ultramar'. Episode 40, *RTP Report*, 2012.

¹⁰⁷António da Silva João interview in Joaquim Furtado. 'GLCU'. Episode 40, *RTP Report*, 2012.

¹⁰⁸Interviews with: Mário Oliveira Muzondo, Manica city, 6 February, 2014; Silvestre Tambai Mudzenguere, Manica city, 26 February, 2014; Oriva Massoni Mabethana, Manica city, 27 February, 2014; Henrique António (Chirubuatha), Manica city, 6 February, 2014.

¹⁰⁹Joaquim Matos Dias, interview in Joaquim Furtado. 'A Guerra de Libertação Colonial do Ultramar', Episode 39, *RTP Report*, 2012; Alexandre Teixeira interview in Joaquim Furtado. 'A Guerra de Libertação Colonial do Ultramar'. Episode 39, *RTP Report*, 2012.

cities. Some of them were to find places in Southern Rhodesia as farmers or to work in other sectors. Nevertheless, for the African population the displacement of the white *colonos* and farmers in Manica district meant the end of the colonial system of exploitation. This process was confirmed by the coup d'état in Lisbon on 25 April 1974 and the beginning of a new kind of relations between Portugal and Mozambique with the signature of the Lusaka agreement on 7 September 1974, and Mozambique's independence in 1975.

2.4. Conclusion

The installation of the Portuguese system of *colonatos* in Manica district had two dimensional results: one socio-economic, and another, political and ideological. The socio-economic dimension emerged as the consequence of the socio-economic structure of the 1940s and 1950s, where the commercial agricultural economy had strong dependence on non-Portuguese investment due to the weak level of the investment of the Portuguese economy. As the form to change this economic structure, Portugal implemented its development plans between 1953 and 1974, including systematic colonial settlement in rural areas (*colonatos*).

This meant the installation of the white *colonos*, construction of the socio-economic infrastructures to support increased agricultural production and trade, using a low paid African work force, transforming the African population increasingly into rural proletarians. Politically, the *colonatos* were part of a new, centralized structure which increased the dominion of Portuguese *colonos* over the semi-industrialized agricultural production and trade.

The ideological dimension was to show to the international community that the system of the *colonatos*, was based on the integration of the Portuguese population where some whites and some blacks lived together in a harmonious multiracial system without exploitation, thus apparently justifying the argument that Portugal did not need to 'decolonise' its colonies in the 1960s and early 1970s.

In the case of the Manica region, earlier investments made in the construction of hydroelectric power plant at the Chicamba Real dam, Revue River and the construction of the first textile factory (Textáfrica) in Chimoio from 1951 to 1955, were followed by investments made in land survey, construction of the roads, bridges, dams, warehouses, small shops-canteens, drainage and irrigation works. The system of *colonatos* much developed in the 1960s intensified the transformation of the rural African population as rural workers, who were obliged to pay

taxes in work, money or crops. The development of the liberation struggle 1972-74 in Manica district began the dismantling of colonial agricultural production and trade, as the fertile lands, recently expanded for settler agriculture, other socio-economic activities of the white and black *colonos* came to be abandoned in the liberation-independence process.

Chapter 3:

State-Centred Rural “Socialization” and Its Impact on Manica, 1975-1987

3. 1. Introduction

The vision of socio-economic development introduced during the liberation war challenged fundamental elements of the system of colonial economic exploitation including its agricultural mode of production, which were replaced by practices tending towards “socialization” of production in the liberated areas. After independence, with FRELIMO controlling state power, this process came to signify the replacement of settler control of most of the fertile agricultural land by state agricultural companies; and the installation of the new administrative power through FRELIMO cadres and *GDs* in countryside. However, the vision of new forms of economic development resulted in frustration among much of the rural population as the material consequences of state control of land and the creation of the state companies, communal villages (*ACs*) and production cooperatives (*CP*) came to be realized.

In its second section, this chapter discusses the early experiences of agricultural production and trade developed by FRELIMO in its liberated zones during the struggle for Mozambican independence. These analyses are made in comparison to the Tanzanian experience of *Ujamaa* villages and collective labour after its independence in 1961. The third section of this chapter examines the crisis of colonial agriculture and the development of the policy of “socialization in the countryside”, from the initial interventions by government to organise production on abandoned colonial farms, and their dependence on the rural population as their main work force, as well the expansion of Communal Villages. The fourth section details the intensification of centralised agricultural policy under the impulse of political vanguardism from FRELIMO’s Third Congress in 1977, and the systematic attempt to integrate the rural population fully in the policy of socialization of the countryside. The fifth section analyses the alarming results of this policy in a period of increasing regional warfare as well as drought along with the radical changes in policy from the early 1980s to 1987 (when full economic adjustment measures were adopted). The sixth section discusses the “top-down” approach to the implementation of the policy of “socialization of the countryside” in Manica, where possible in Manica District. This discussion is made with the characterization of the different Communal Villages that FRELIMO

constituted, which in Manica district were known as pilot Communal Villages that had their origins in forced mobilization motivated by FRELIMO cadres. The section ends with important data on the decline of socialization in Manica Province and District, and the reemergence of the private and family sectors of production.

3.2. Collective production during the Mozambican liberation struggle, 1964-1974

The result of the first years of war between 1964 and 1966 was the dismantling of the Portuguese administration in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces and many Portuguese settlers and traders fled from the rural areas to the towns.¹¹⁰ This process meant that extensive rural areas of Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, where the majority of the rural population lived in dispersed form, were freed from colonial administrative control. In addition, rural commerce hitherto supported by white *colonos* who owned the small shops (canteens) that sold basic domestic goods such as salt, sugar, oil, cloth, and soap in exchange for the local produce of these areas essentially declined, resulting in the absence of markets and the shortage of goods for the rural people to buy.¹¹¹

Due to the absence of colonial administrative control on these areas, FRELIMO designated these areas as “liberated zones”. Nevertheless economic reality obliged the rural population to cross the border to Tanzania to sell their agricultural products in order to buy the basic domestic needs. Indeed, the war of liberation in Cabo Delgado and Niassa in the 1960s developed on the basis of an interconnected strategy of creating social and political structures in these areas and at the same time reshaping the rural network of production and trade.¹¹² In pursuit of this strategy, FRELIMO started to identify among the rural population leaders and influential men who had experience in trans-border trade with Tanzania, to be the chiefs of villages and organizers of production and trade. Such leaders came to be known as *Chairmen*.

It was in this context that Lázaro Nkavandame, who had experience of agricultural production and trade with Tanzania, was appointed FRELIMO Provincial Secretary in Cabo Delgado and as Director of the Department of Commerce, controlling the rural population's

¹¹⁰Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*, 79-80; Vail and White, *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique*, 394.

¹¹¹Negrão, J. G. *A Produção e o Comércio nas Zonas Libertadas*. (Maputo: AHM, 1984) 8.

¹¹²Vail and White. *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique*, 394; Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*, 83.

production and trade in the province's liberated zones.¹¹³ The results were significant: in 1966, for example, they exported to Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara) more than 500 tons of cashew nuts; 100 tons of sesame; groundnuts and several tons of castor oil were also exported.¹¹⁴

The development of agricultural production and trade in liberated zones meant that some members of FRELIMO who had accumulated modest amounts of capital during the colonial period as farmers and traders, began to organize their own plantation and marketing schemes, replacing the departed European settlers and merchants from 1966. Many of the rural population in the liberated zones in Cabo Delgado, after a month working in such plantations collecting the harvest, began to complain that they were paid only a shirt or *capulana* (a cloth) or salt and tin of condensed milk for a bag of cashew.¹¹⁵ Thus, the socio-economic development of the liberated zones brought changes in relationships between FRELIMO political and military leaders and the Chairmen who were managing the population, production and trade. The contradiction was about how economic activities should be organised and managed in the liberated zones.

The central FRELIMO political and military leaders, afterwards known in popular historical parlance as the 'revolutionary group', advocated that production should be done collectively and that there was a strongly reciprocal dependency between guerrillas and the rural population. Collective work came to be seen as the precondition for both soldiers and rural population to survive in the joint struggle against the Portuguese army, administration and system of exploitation. On the other hand, the Chairmen and some African traders, known as the 'reactionary group' "...felt that there should be a private trading system in the liberated areas, which could purchase the farmers' surplus in exchange for consumer goods".¹¹⁶

Indeed, some FRELIMO members were former trans-border traders and workers on farms and in others sectors in Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Kenya.¹¹⁷ This history strongly influenced their option in favour of private production and trade as opposed to the collective approach to liberation defended by the revolutionary leadership – a position no doubt also partially inspired by Nyerere's Rufiji Ujamaa project from 1967 to 1969.¹¹⁸ This meant that the

¹¹³Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*, 96.

¹¹⁴Vail and White. *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique*, 395.

¹¹⁵Negrão. *A Produção e o Comércio nas Zonas Libertadas*, 8.

¹¹⁶Abrahamsson and Nilsson. *Mozambique*, 24.

¹¹⁷Tembe. "Uhuru na Kazi", 258.

¹¹⁸Freyhold. "Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania", 36.

struggle of liberation of Mozambique from 1967 to 1970 was developed on the basis of two systems of production. In order to eliminate private production, FRELIMO started, in 1967, to construct villages (*aldeamentos*) and national shops (*lojas da nação*) in different villages, where committees were elected to replace the local chiefs with leaders now called Chairmen. These leaders, both men and women, were responsible for organizing the population living in villages and for producing in collective a form.¹¹⁹

In addition, the revolutionary FRELIMO leaders recognized the importance of women in agriculture and in transport of war materials. In 1966, the Women's League was created; in 1967 the League was transformed into the Women's Detachment (*Destacamento Feminino-DF*). This indicates the shift from the previously accepted women's functions during the war, from having the roles of 'producer, re-producer and source of sexual satisfaction', to that of trained, arms-bearing guerillas.¹²⁰

These changes in the political and military structure of FRELIMO developed at the same time as Nyerere's political ideology, African Socialism. For him, African Socialism was like a democratic system, related to an attitude of the mind. His comparison between African Socialism and capitalism led him to see the difference not so much in their methods of producing wealth, but in the way wealth was distributed. Capitalism developed such that the employee's interests came to be opposed to those of the employer.¹²¹

African Socialism was at the time seen as a new order of economic structure of African society. According to Nyerere,

Ujamaa, then, or "familyhood" describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man, and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man by man.¹²²

¹¹⁹Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*, 93; Negrão. *A Produção e o Comércio*, 17; Casal, A. Y. "Discurso Socialista e Camponeses Africanos: Legitimação Política-Ideológica da Socialização Rural em Moçambique (FRELIMO, 1965-1984)". *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos*. (1991:14-15) 39.

¹²⁰Israel, P. "Lingundumbwe: Feminist Masquerades and Women's Liberation, Nangade, Mueda, Muidumbe, 1950s-2005". *Kronos: Southern Africa Histories*. (2013, 39, Nov.) 204/5; L. J. K. Bonate. "Muslim Memories of the Liberation War in Cabo Delgado". *Kronos: Southern Africa Histories*. (2013, 39, Nov.) 248.

¹²¹Nyerere, J. K. "Ujamaa-The Basis of African Socialism" in *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952-1965*. J. K. Nyerere. (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966-1970) 162-164.

¹²²Nyerere. "Ujamaa-The Basis of African Socialism", 170.

This argument helps us understand the influence of Nyerere's African Socialism on FRELIMO leaders such as, Eduardo Mondlane who, in 1967, identified the Tanzanian model of socialism as one which could be assumed as part of FRELIMO's weaponry against Portuguese colonialism.¹²³

In the same year, some west European countries and the USA ended their support to FRELIMO in weapons and funding to support the war effort, while at the same time, Portugal, as a member of NATO, continued to receive support in war materials from the West for use against the liberation movements in its colonies. In this political and military situation, FRELIMO became more dependent on military support from socialist countries, thus apparently reinforcing Nyerere's theoretical differentiation between African Socialism and western capitalism.¹²⁴

It was within this political and ideological environment that FRELIMO held its Second Congress in the rural Matchedje Administrative post of Niassa province from 20 to 25 July 1968. At the Congress, Eduardo Mondlane as president of FRELIMO affirmed that:

The FRELIMO guerrilla movement is actually much more socialist, revolutionary, and progressive than ever. And the line is now *par excellence*, more toward socialism than to Marxism and Leninism.¹²⁵

During the Second Congress it was clear that the political ideology of the revolutionary group in the leadership was supported by the majority of FRELIMO members over that of the 'reactionary' group. In addition, two main theses were adopted at the Congress: one advocated "Prolonged People's War" and the second "People Power", indicating that the leadership envisaged a lengthy war of liberation which could not be made without the support of the rural population in all matters.¹²⁶

These arguments were developed as a consequence of the development of the struggle of liberation. The integration of the rural population was the fundamental social basis for FRELIMO's war effort while making use of the experience of Tanzanian economic policy. Thus FRELIMO began the process of "villagisation" and "collectivization" of production and trade in liberated zones as its own ideology, experience and difficulties developed during the war,

¹²³Kruks. "From Nationalism to Marxism", 240.

¹²⁴Nyerere. "Ujamaa-The Basis of African Socialism", 164.

¹²⁵Eduardo Mondlane, speech during the II Congress of FRELIMO in 1968 in Joaquim Furtado. 'GLCU'. Episode 13, *RTP Report*, 2012; Egero, "Moçambique", 23.

¹²⁶Kruks. "From Nationalism to Marxism", 244.

including tensions emerging as the result of class conflict inside the movement.¹²⁷ “Collectivization” meant collective labour to facilitate planning in agriculture and trade. Collectivization could help obviate the problems of farming's dependence on individual worker strength, health or performance as well problems of seasonal variation. To achieve this objective it was necessary that the entire rural population should live in Communal Villages (*ujamaa* villages) to allow the sharing of knowledge between people as a means of making better decisions for all.¹²⁸

With these plans FRELIMO developed its control of liberated areas. The population had specific days in a month for communal fieldwork, growing crops for the army, whose members worked side by side with the civilian population. This contributed to reinforcing the sense of common objectives as well as identity and class solidarity among the rural population and between the rural population and the army. People's shops (*lojas de povo*) were created in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete. These shops offered short-term credit and barter arrangements, served as collection points for commodities to be exported to Tanzania, and facilitated interregional trade between the rural populations.¹²⁹ All of these organisational structures were created in order to concentrate the population to support the guerrillas with food, youth in training and transportation of war materials.¹³⁰ By 1968-69, in the rural areas under FRELIMO control, agricultural production and trade was done on collective farms (*machambas colectivas*). The harvest such as maize, cassava, beans, potatoes and rice were for self-consumption of the population and the guerrillas whilst crops such as cashew, tobacco, rubber and rye were for export.¹³¹

These changes meant the coexistence of three types of agricultural production in the liberated zones. The first was known as FRELIMO farms or National Farms. In this type, the production was done by guerrillas, committees of the villages, the Female Detachment, schools and hospitals to supply the guerrillas who were in the front line of the war.

¹²⁷Egero, *Moçambique*, 32-35; Casal. “Discurso Socialista e Camponeses Africanos”, 41; Kruks. “From Nationalism to Marxism”, 238; Egero, *Moçambique*, 23.

¹²⁸Freyhold. *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Social Experiment*, 23-25; Nyerere, J. K. “Agricultural is the Basis of Development” in *Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967*. J. K. Nyerere. (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968) 104.

¹²⁹Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*, 96.

¹³⁰Negrão. *A Produção e o Comércio*, 1, 3, 13.

¹³¹*Ibid*, p.31, 39-40.

The second was the collective people's farm or cooperative farm. In this type, agricultural production was done in *aldeamentos*, but managed by a political commissar. In many cases, the crops produced were for trade but the aim was to end the exploitation of man by man. The last type was individual or family production. This form of production had the main objective of sustaining the food security of each family or village.¹³²

FRELIMO encouraged continuous growth of its production and trade annually.¹³³ The result of this socio-economic environment was notable from 1969. According to Central Committee information reported by Negrão, for example, from 1966 until the end of the 1973, the liberated zones of the Cabo Delgado exported to Tanzania more than 6,574,528 Kg of different crops (see Table 7 below).¹³⁴

Table 7: Crops Exported to Tanzania from Cabo Delgado Liberated Zones, 1966-73

Product	1966	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	Total
Cashew	500,000	530,159	608,734	648,009	701,568	-----	
Sesame	100,000	414,782	188,230	526,163	412,616	-----	
Peanut	100,000	53,041	77,589	55,082	58,082	-----	
Total (Kg)	700,000	997,982	974,553	1,229,344	1,172,649	1,500,000	6,574,528

Source: Negrão. "A Produção e o Comércio", 80.

In exchange for their produce, in Tanzania Mozambicans acquired cloth, clothing, pots, axes, hoes, picks, knives, salt, sugar, matches, candles, soap, needles, thread, scissors, lamps, batteries, fishing nets, razor blades and notepads.¹³⁵

The political results of the socio-economic changes were also evident. In many rural areas controlled by FRELIMO, production and trade was under the management of cooperative associations and the Commerce Department which in turn was under the control of the Political Commissioner of the Defence Department.¹³⁶ This department accused Lázaro Nkavandame of responsibility for speculative practices in trade management, and being the cause of complaints of exploitation of labour for private gain in collective fields. As a result of these activities, he

¹³²Negrão. *A Produção e o Comércio*, 79; Borges Coelho. 'Protected Villages', 161; Casal, "Discurso Socialista", 43.

¹³³Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*, 95/6.

¹³⁴Negrão. *A Produção e o Comércio*, 80.

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Casal. "Discurso Socialista", 42.

was expelled from FRELIMO in 1970.¹³⁷ Indeed, the forms of production and exchange developed in the liberated zones and authorised in the Second Congress came to constitute the economic and social basis supporting, and receiving direction from, the political structure led by FRELIMO revolutionaries, who justified their approach with the ideology of collective popular power against colonialism.¹³⁸

The intensification and extension of the guerrilla war in the early 1970s was accompanied by further analysis of the nature of the anti-colonial conflict war and its socio-political objectives, a process which led to a clearer socialist orientation. In July 1972, a meeting of FRELIMO's dominant Defence Department decided on a more systematic statement of its economic approach, to the effect that production should serve the interests of the whole of society. Land was declared to belong to the people, and its control and administration were to be effected by FRELIMO.

The control that FRELIMO had over land and agricultural production and trade reduced the autonomy of the cooperative movement. The chiefs of these cooperatives were elected but confirmed by FRELIMO's leadership. In addition, each cooperative was to be registered by FRELIMO and its economic plan elaborated in line with FRELIMO orientation.¹³⁹ From 1972, the villagisation and collectivization of production and trade in liberated zones under military control became the socio-economic and political orientation for war in the successful struggle for independence.¹⁴⁰

3.3. The crisis of colonial agriculture and the beginnings of countrywide socialization: 1974-1977

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the advance of the liberation war had begun to threaten the system of colonial production in the countryside particularly in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete Provinces, but also south of the Zambezi in Manica and Sofala Provinces, causing the beginning of the withdrawal of settler farmers in the Beira Corridor from 1973. The coup d'état in Lisbon in April 1974 set in motion a process of transition in which the new

¹³⁷Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*, 96; Kruks. "From Nationalism to Marxism", 242; Egero, "Moçambique", 28-30.

¹³⁸Kruks. "From Nationalism to Marxism", 245; Negrão. *A Produção e o Comércio*, 81.

¹³⁹Negrão. "A Produção e o Comércio", 82-83; Casal, "Discurso Socialista", 45-46.

¹⁴⁰Ibid, 47.

Portuguese authorities came to an agreement with FRELIMO on 7 September 1974 for an official cessation of hostilities beginning the next day, and the installation of a shared transitional administration, created on 20 September 1974, which would govern until full independence (achieved 25 June 1975).

The socialist economic orientation of the new political regime was confirmed in the independence Constitution, which reiterated principles already partially delineated in 1972 to the effect that the land and the natural resources of soil, subsoil, territorial waters and continental shelf of the country were the property of the state, which determined their use and benefit.¹⁴¹ Although there was no specific legislation explicitly affecting the ownership of land at the time, this precept would necessarily affect the ownership, financing and management of much rural capitalist enterprise.

This political context intensified the exodus of the settler population. More than 50,000 skilled Portuguese personnel such as engineers, mechanics, accountants and agronomists left the country.¹⁴² According to Borges Coelho, it is estimated that by 1975 more than 80,000 of the 120,000 total white Portuguese population had left, and that by mid-July of that year only 10,000 remained. In addition, many departing *colonos* damaged or destroyed whatever they could not take with them, including farm equipment, trucks, machinery, cattle, crops and even factories.¹⁴³

From early as February 1975, the transitional government began to remedy the immediate crisis brought about by the exodus of settlers, the loss of management capacity and immediate viability of existing plantations and colonial farms, through state intervention in such enterprises so that FRELIMO directed cadres could mobilise continued production.¹⁴⁴

The fundamental problems of the rural economy were discussed at the First National Seminar of Agriculture in Marrupa District of Niassa Province on 29 May 1975 by more than 400 GDS representing 110 District Committees of the whole country.¹⁴⁵ This meeting recommended that the state have power and responsibility to rebuild the rural trade network, purchasing surpluses from the collectively organised producers, and supplying crops to local industry which should, in

¹⁴¹BR. "The Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique", 3-5; BR, I Série, Nº 76, Artigo 8, Constituição da República Popular de Moçambique, de 3 de Julho de 1979, 223.

¹⁴²Isaacman and Isaacman. *Mozambique*, 145.

¹⁴³Ibid, 145; Borges Coelho. "Protected Villages", 326/7.

¹⁴⁴Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*, 50, citing Decree-Law 16/75, 13 February 1975

¹⁴⁵Casal, "Discurso Socialista", 50.

turn, supply the trade networks including the people's shops (*lojas de povo*), some of which had been already created in late 1974 in place of colonial *cantinas*. Institutional arrangements to further this process were made with the creation in 1976 of the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture (PDA) and the National Directorate for the Organization of Collective Production (DINOPROC). In addition, Decree N^o 24/76, of 17 June 1976, legally instituted the people's shops, which now expanded to provincial capitals and district towns.¹⁴⁶ The management of these new enterprises was undertaken by FRELIMO cadres and *GDs*, and through Popular Villages. The cadres were given the responsibility of mobilizing the people to live in Collective Villages, to produce in collective farms, and to work in state farms, as the basis of the construction of a "New Man" and New Society".¹⁴⁷ In addition, they were responsible for creating administrative institutions for defense, production, commerce, education, culture and health.¹⁴⁸

The determinedly socialist and centralist economic orientation of the new political regime was confirmed in the independence Constitution, which reiterated principles already partially delineated in 1972 to the effect that land and the natural resources of the soil, subsoil, territorial waters and continental shelf of the country were the property of the state, which was to determine their use and form of exploitation.¹⁴⁹ Although there was no legislation explicitly detailing the nationalisation of land at the time, these precepts would necessarily affect the ownership, financing and management of much rural capitalist enterprise. Thus, the independence of Mozambique meant the disruption of the colonial system of production and trade, creating a generalised economic crisis considered to have lasted until 1977.¹⁵⁰ At the same

¹⁴⁶Borges Coelho. "Protected Villages", 329-330.

¹⁴⁷FRELIMO. "Aldeias Comunaís-Resoluções da 8^a Sessão do Comité Central da FRELIMO" in Doc. Inf. CDI. B. Moçamb. (20) 1976, 56-57; S. Chichava. "'They can Kill us but we won't go to the communal villages!': Peasants and the Policy of 'Socialisation of the Countryside' in Zambezia". *Kronos: Southern Africa Histories*. (2013, 39, Nov.) 113-114.

¹⁴⁸Machel, S. "Discurso do Presidente da FRELIMO e Presidente da Republica Popular de Moçambique, Samora Moisés Machel, por Ocasião da Abertura da Escola do Partido, em 25/10/1975" in FRELIMO. "Aldeias Comunaís-Resoluções da 8^a Sessão do Comité Central da FRELIMO" in Doc. Inf. CDI. B. Moçamb. (20) 1976, 59; Y. Adam. *Escapar aos Dentes do Crocodilo e Cair na Boca do Leopardo*, 118-119; S. Chichava. "They can Kill us but we won't go to the communal villages!", 114.

¹⁴⁹BR. "The Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique", 3-5; BR, I Série, N^o 76, Artigo 8, Constituição da República Popular de Moçambique, de 3 de Julho de 1979, 223.

¹⁵⁰Rogerson. "The Communal Villages", 233; Castel-Branco, C. N. "Problemas Estruturais do Desenvolvimento Agrário" in *Perspectivas Económicas*. C.N. Castel-Branco ed. (Maputo: UEM, 1994) 31; Isaacman. "Transforming Mozambique's", 20; Friedmann, J. "The Territorial Approach to Rural Development in the People's Republic of Mozambique: six discussion papers". *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. (1980, 4:1) 100.

time, FRELIMO introduced its experience of collective production and trade from zones liberated during the struggle against colonialism. This experience was inserted into the state programme of governing as part of the solution for rural economic problems.

The long-term objective was firstly to extend the principles of collective living and production in the rural areas, and secondly to facilitate more effective government assistance with the provision of irrigation projects, education and health schemes in the countryside, where more than 95% of population lived. Only 5% lived in concentrated zones along the valleys of the Limpopo, Zambeze, and Incomati river, or in fertile lands of the district of Angónia in Tete Province and Chimoio in Manica Province, or in cities or towns along the country.¹⁵¹

The government intended to create a new collective way of life, a new mentality, a new lifestyle for all Mozambicans who were living in the countryside.¹⁵² It was in this context that the policy of socialization of the countryside was assumed – with greater emphasis from 1977 – as a project of state farms, Communal Villages and production cooperatives as the basis for economic development. This would be based on a mix of high technology and economy of scale that would permit Mozambique to increase agricultural production, using the excess over local needs for its secondary industries and export.¹⁵³

In general, five kinds of Communal Villages came to exist in the country. The first was formed by the experience of collective production and trade in the liberated zones of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Tete Provinces. The second group consisted of those created round returnee populations hitherto living in Tanzania and Zambia. Thirdly there were the old colonial villages seen as concentration camps with different objectives: (i) to defend the colonial political order; (ii) to reduce support for FRELIMO during the liberation struggle and the influence of FRELIMO in developing nationalist consciousness against the colonial system, and (iii) as place for recruitment of farms workers. Many of these Communal Villages were established in Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Tete and Manica provinces.

¹⁵¹Andrade, X. and Garcia, P. T. “Novas Formas de Organização Territorial da Produção no Campo: Aldeias Comunas na República Popular de Moçambique” in *Conferência Regional Latino Americana*. UGI, Brazil, Agosto, 1982, 6-7.

¹⁵²Rogerson, C. M. “ The Communal Villages of Mozambique: an experiment in rural socialist transformation”. *Geography*. (1981, 66: 3). 233.

¹⁵³Isaacman and Isaacman. “Mozambique”, 148.

A fourth group of Communal Villages was formed by the resettlement of the rural population in later years due to the floods along the valleys of the Limpopo, Incomati, Buzi, Púngué and Zambeze rivers. The fifth group of Communal Villages was formed as a product of the mobilization made by FRELIMO cadres. Many of these Communal Villages were created in Cabo Delgado, Manica, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo provinces.¹⁵⁴

Although the immediate objective was to redevelop agricultural production and trade, the diffusion of FRELIMO political ideology and of technical and scientific support to the rural population against poverty, superstition and other traditional and colonial practices were seen as essential to the mobilization and shaping of this process.¹⁵⁵ The colonial army (including its post-colonial indigenous remnants), economy, education, religion and other forms of exploitation, summarized ideologically as ‘colonialism’ and ‘tradition’ and identified as the main target in the liberation struggle, continued thus as a target well into the independence period.¹⁵⁶

In order to promote agricultural production and trade as a state project, the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) had to coordinate this activity, while the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MOPH), according to Decree 1/75, assumed control and direction of Communal Villages as part of its structure. These institutions were responsible for two forms of production: the first was the modern sector developed by state agricultural companies (initially called units of production), with heavy dependence on the rural population as its workforce, and the second, collective production in cooperatives, developed by the rural population living in Communal Villages.¹⁵⁷

The FRELIMO leadership and the majority African population of the country enjoyed, enthusiastically and euphorically, the new environment of independence. Indeed, for the government, the economic crisis was related to the number of the agrarian companies and farms abandoned until the end of February 1976, and thus partially resolved by the measures it had set in motion.¹⁵⁸ As the process of intervention to resuscitate the abandoned colonial farms and companies in rural areas was made without any specific land law or regulation for its

¹⁵⁴AHM-CNAC, Cx. AC/95. Primeira Reunião Nacional das Aldeias Comunais: “Organizaçãodos órgãos de Direcção das Aldeias Comunais”, 1975, 1-4; Andrade and P. Garcia. “Novas Formas de organização Territorial”, 7-9.

¹⁵⁵Machel. “Discurso do Presidente da FRELIMO”, 59.

¹⁵⁶Casal, “Discurso Socialista”, 36.

¹⁵⁷Borges Coelho. ‘Protected Villages’, 333; Casal, “Discurso Socialista”, 56; Andrade and Garcia, “Novas Formas de organização”, 3-5.

¹⁵⁸Rogerson. “The Communal Villages”, 232; Egero. “Moçambique”, 86.

management, over the years, state intervention occurred through a piecemeal but nevertheless large scale process in which abandoned farms were bundled into new management units. Data for the rural areas in the early 1970s shows that more than 4,600 ‘modern’ - that is colonial and relatively well capitalized - units of production, occupying more than two and a half million hectares and employing more than 70,000 permanent workers and 250,000 seasonal workers, were abandoned by settlers and enterprises.¹⁵⁹ Faced with this crisis of existing production, in 1976 FRELIMO began to turn the central lands and infrastructures of the abandoned farms and companies into state farms, and by the end of 1977 many of these, located principally in the most fertile areas of Manica, Maputo, Gaza, Sofala and Zambezia provinces had been transformed into state Units of Production (UP).¹⁶⁰ However, owing to their constant need for machinery and imported inputs, state farms producing cotton, sugar, rice, citrus fruits, copra, sisal and tea would come to receive higher priority in investment than other sectors of agricultural production. Indeed, the creation of the state farms came to be based on the available labour of the rural population living in Communal Villages and working in the state farms as agrarian workers.¹⁶¹ In practice, the new policy gave no priority to the 90% of the 11.5 million of rural Mozambicans who at the end of the colonial period produced more than 70% of the country's total crops and a third of its marketed agrarian output.

With the decline in production of settler-abandoned farms, and of the rural marketing structure previously dominated by settler and Asian commerce, the total value of crops commercialized decreased in this period by 43% and the portion contributed by family agriculture decreased by 60%. The result of this was the shortage of agrarian supplies to the markets in rural areas, which had a strongly negative impact in provisioning of towns and cities.¹⁶² The first response by the new government to the marketing crisis was to create, in 1976, the National Directorate for Agricultural Marketing and Economics (DINECA) under the management of the Ministry of Agriculture (MA). Its first mission was to absorb all the remaining colonial cotton and cereal institutions (Instituto de Cereais de Moçambique-ICM and

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Mosca, J. *A Experiência Socialista em Moçambique (1975-1986)*. (Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, 1999), 146; Rogerson, “Communal Villages”, 232; Egero. “Moçambique”, 86

¹⁶¹ Yañez Casal. “Antropologia e Desenvolvimento”, 158; Isaacman and Isaacman. “Mozambique”, 149.

¹⁶² Wuyts, M. *Camponeses e Economic Rural em Moçambique* (Maputo, UEM, 1981) 48.

Instituto de Algodão de Moçambique-IAM), although now without their qualified administrative staff, who had left the country.¹⁶³

In addition, in June 1976, the National Marketing Company (Empresa Nacional de Comercialização-ENACOMO) was created to collaborate with DINECA under the management of the MA. Its responsibilities were: (i) to market consumer goods for the public sector and agricultural equipment for the state companies; (ii) to import consumer goods, equipment and raw materials necessary for economic activity and the population as a whole; (iii) to import, store and sell different products in retail commerce; and (iv) to export all products that the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) considered necessary and advisable.¹⁶⁴

3.4. State centralisation and top-down “socialisation”, 1977-1981

In February 1977 FRELIMO held its Third Congress, the first to be held in independent Mozambique. It was a moment of extensive political analysis, which had to take into account the radical changes in Mozambique’s economy and institutions as well as in the regional power structure. The decline of agricultural production and particularly of the rural trading networks meant that the country was not only losing foreign income from lost production of export crops such as cotton and sugar, but was also beginning to suffer shortages of food crops in towns and cities. Political and economic relations with Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were markedly worse from 1976 owing to Mozambique’s adherence to UN sanctions and its support for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. As a consequence, the country lost further significant income from transit traffic through the Beira corridor, and began to experience Rhodesia’s inspired rural destabilization.

In response to perceived economic and regional challenges, FRELIMO now declared itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and began to look for political and economic support from the socialist countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA-

¹⁶³Cravinho, J. “FRELIMO and the Politics of Agricultural Marketing in Mozambique”. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. (1998, 24:1) 100.

¹⁶⁴Ngovene. “A Política Agrícola”, 14; BR, I Série, Nº 64, Artigo 2 a 3, Decreto-Lei Nº 23/76, de 3 de Julho de 1976.

COMECON).¹⁶⁵ The initial task of the party was to establish the conditions for “popular democracy” as a precursor to the development of socialism in the long-term.¹⁶⁶

In matters of agricultural policy, the Third Congress decided to consolidate and enunciate with greater clarity the trends of centralised political intervention in the economy already adopted in a reactive way since 1974-1975. Agriculture was defined as the base, and industry as the dynamising factor, in Mozambican development. State farms were seen as a means of substituting the old colonial ‘modern’ sector in agriculture as well as explicitly essential to the process of socialization of the countryside, in which the state sector was considered to be ‘dominant and determinant’. The concentration of technical resources in state farms would lead to rapid development of productive forces and the training of agricultural workers and cooperative producers.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, popular democracy in the mind of FRELIMO, in their emerging socialist ideology, meant the centralization of all socio-economic institutions in the hands of the central government. Economic production and the prices of products and labour were to be planned and controlled by the state/party, which was considered nevertheless identical with the people.¹⁶⁸

Other crucial events in 1977 confirm the intensification of centralised decision-making in agricultural policy. Almost at the same time as the Third Congress, the Limpopo River flooded large areas of the valley, and the Government availed itself of the natural calamity to complete the process of dismantling the colonial *colonato* by compulsorily resettling much the population of higher lands in Communal Villages, and re-organising access to and agriculture in the fertile lowlands so as to favour state farms and cooperatives. In this process, the Limpopo Agro-industrial Complex (CAIL-Complexo Agro-Industrial do Limpopo) was formed. This complex, which came to control some 30,000ha, had as its main objective the rapid increase of rice

¹⁶⁵Hall and Young. “*Confronting Leviathan*”, 112; Castel-Branco, C. N. “Opções Económicas de Moçambique, 1975-95: Problemas, Lições e Ideais Alternativas” in *Moçambique: Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*. B. Mazula ed. (Maputo: Friedrich Ebert, 1995) 598-600; Abrahamsson, H e Nilsson, A. *Moçambique em Transição: um estudo da história de desenvolvimento durante o período 1974-1992*. (Maputo: CEA, 1994) 37; CEA. “Socialização do Campo e Planificação”. *Estudos Moçambicanos*. (1981, 3) 2-3.

¹⁶⁶Kruks. “From Nationalism to Marxism”, 249.

¹⁶⁷FRELIMO. *Documentos do III Congresso. Directivas Económicas e Sociais*. (Maputo, 1977) 32-34; B.Munslow. “State Intervention in Agriculture: The Mozambique Experience”. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. (1984, 22:2), 207-8; Henriksen. “Marxism and Mozambique”, 459

¹⁶⁸Egero. “Moçambique”, 19, 97.

production to consistently higher levels.¹⁶⁹ In December of the same year, the government formed the People's Development Bank (BPD-Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento) to support the financing of state companies, particularly through the acquisition of capital equipment such as tractors, combine harvesters and irrigation pumps.¹⁷⁰

Further measures to ensure effective implementation of state policy followed in 1978. To stimulate rural development, from 1978, the National Marketing Company (Empresa Nacional de Comercialização-ENACOMO) was to function alongside two other state companies created for the purpose: the Office of Agricultural Production Support (Gabinete de Apoio à Produção Agrícola-GAPPO) and the National Company of Agricultural Machinery (Empresa de Mecanização Agrícola-MECANAGRO).¹⁷¹ GAPPO was to be managed by the central government. At a provincial level, its responsibility was planning, programming and marketing agricultural production, as well as the provision of resources such as investment credits, human resources and all units of agricultural production. This institution worked with MECANAGRO to provide technical assistance to the state enterprises.¹⁷²

The results of the early post-independence measures in agricultural policy can be seen in government statistics reproduced and analysed by various authors. With regard to trends in total agricultural production, official figures (collated in 1985) show that the total value of agricultural production declined from 37 billion meticaïs in 1973 to 25 billion in 1975 and recovered at least partially to 31 billion by 1977.¹⁷³ Detailed analysis of the statistics suggests, however, that volumes and value of *marketed* agricultural production did not recover much from the low point of 1975.¹⁷⁴

Data from the Ministry of Agriculture reported by Borges Coelho offers a clearer sense of the results of the changes wrought in the sectoral pattern of the relatively low level of agricultural production and trade between 1975 and 1978. (See Table 8 below) In general, the decline in the proportion produced in the private sector (mostly settlers) is paralleled by the

¹⁶⁹Hermele, K. *Land struggles and social differentiation in southern Mozambique. A case study of Ckoke, Limpopo 1950-1987*. (Uppsala: SIAS 1988) 45-47.

¹⁷⁰Gaspar, N. *A Evolução do Sistema Bancário de Moçambique*. Dissertação de Licenciatura (Graduation dissertation). Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2000, p.17 and 29.

¹⁷¹Mosca, J. *A Experiência Socialista em Moçambique (1975-1986)*. (Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, 1999) 118.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, 119.

¹⁷³(1980 prices). brahamsson and Nilsson. *Mozambique* 54; see also Cravinho, "FRELIMO and the Politics", 99.

¹⁷⁴Wuyts, M. *Money and Planning for Socialist Transition: the Mozambican experience*. (Aldershot: Gower, 1989) 72-8

substantial increase of the proportion of the state sector; the family sector maintained a high proportion, while collective/cooperative production hardly advanced.¹⁷⁵

Table 8: Sectoral Production in Agriculture 1975-1976 to 1977-1978 (%)

	1975-1976				1976-1977				1977-1978			
	S	C	F	P	S	C	F	P	S	C	F	P
Rice	0.8	0.2	6.0	93.0	36.1	1.5	6.1	56.3	82.0	6.0	7.4	4.6
Maize	4.7	0.5	59.2	35.6	29.8	1.8	53.6	14.8	35.1	3.2	59.1	2.6
Beans	0.9	-	99.1	-	8.7	2.9	92.3	-	22.5	7.0	70.5	-
Groundnuts	-	-	100	-	-	0.3	98.7	-	-	0.2	98.8	-
Sunflower	1.4	-	12.3	86.3	25.9	1.7	20.7	51.7	38.6	14.6	35.1	11.7
Potatoes	35	2.5	2.5	60	76.0	6.0	2.0	16.0	90.9	5.4	1.4	2.3
Cotton	0.6	0.3	61.1	38.0	18.8	0.9	56.3	31.9	21.6	3.0	58.6	16.8

Sectors: S - State; C - Collective; F - Family; P - Private

Source: Borges Coelho. "Protected Villages", 337.

Detailed comparison shows that while the state sector advanced mostly with crops previously associated with capitalised settler farmers, including *colonatos*, such as rice, potatoes and sunflowers, it also increasingly became involved in the production of cotton, maize and beans, crops previously associated with the family sector.¹⁷⁶ Simultaneously, a critique of agricultural policy within both the party and the state developed from 1978. Clearly, the state sector was becoming dominant, and this was particularly true of its absorption of a large part of the agricultural investment budget. In 1977, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture allotted US\$40 million and in 1978 a further US\$25 million of its US\$38.5 million development budget was allocated to the purchase of heavy agricultural equipment for state farms. Further parts of the budget were spent on training, literacy and contracting technical advisors from socialist countries.¹⁷⁷ However, the volumes of marketed production were mostly modest and failed to meet the targets established. Indeed, the burden of the state sector in the management of agricultural production and political importance attached to the party/state to manage and mobilize the process of socialization of the countryside stimulated the emergence of different

¹⁷⁵Borges Coelho. "Protected Villages", 336/7

¹⁷⁶Ibid, p. 329, 336/7.

¹⁷⁷Isaacman and Isaacman. "Mozambique", 149.

readings among the FRELIMO leadership and government. These differences emerged in March 1978 during the first National Planning Conference (NCP).¹⁷⁸

At this meeting, the Ministry of Agriculture proposed changing the focus of agricultural investment from the state to cooperative farms owing to poor state farm performance. FRELIMO's Permanent Political Committee refused to accede to this proposition. The majority of FRELIMO's cadres led by President Samora Machel concluded that the development of the Mozambique economy was necessarily a radical transformation of society, following the revolutionary ideology developed during the struggle of liberation of Mozambique. At that time, they considered that production levels of the state companies could be much further improved in relation to that of family and private sectors (See table 8 above).¹⁷⁹

They were confident that the process of central planning directing ordinary people living in Communal Villages and working in cooperatives and the state farms would be sufficient to achieve these goals.¹⁸⁰ However, more effective central direction was considered necessary to promote state command over agricultural production and marketing. In 1978, the government established the National Communal Village Commission (CNAC-Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunaís) with the objective of developing more intensively hitherto poorly financed villagisation and collective/cooperative production. A series of re-organisations of rural marketing between 1978 and 1981 absorbed the pre-existing DINECA and the specialised colonial Cashew and Cotton Institutes (ICM and IAM) into a single state company, the Agricultural Marketing Company of Mozambique (Empresa de Comercialização Agrícola de Moçambique-AGRICOM).¹⁸¹

In a similar vein, in 1979, the National Wages and Prices Commission (CNSP) was formed, institutionalising the practice of price and wage controls sustained since independence as *ad hoc* measures to protect the urban population from rising food prices caused mainly by declining production and marketing. Its responsibility was to manage the prices of consumer products and production inputs.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸Casal. "Discurso Socialista e Camponeses Africanos", 62.

¹⁷⁹Yañez Casal. *Antropologia e Desenvolvimento*, 159; Barker. "Gaps in the Debates", 69.

¹⁸⁰Ibid.

¹⁸¹Chingono. "Mozambique", 73; Cravinho. "FRELIMO and the Politics", 100-103.

¹⁸²Cravinho, "FRELIMO and the Politics", 96-98; Raikes, P. "Food policy and production in Mozambique since Independence". *Review of African Political Economy*. (1984, 29): 97-98.

In the period 1979-80, centralised planning was further developed with the initiation of the systematic attribution of resources to particular sectors according to centrally established targets; annual economic plans were now to be compulsory for all sectors, and were to be elaborated in terms of a ten-year development perspective. Indeed, at this time the Prospective Indicative Plan (PPI-Plano Prospectivo Indicativo) – the overarching economic program synthesising all such planning for the 1980-1990 decade of development–began to be elaborated. This plan was finally approved by the People’s Assembly in October 1981.¹⁸³ Some of the plans envisaged by the state in the late 1970s contained very large mechanised agricultural projects. In Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, 400,000 ha. were set aside to be developed and financed by the Romanian state. In Manica and Niassa provinces, a project to develop more than 120, 000 ha. was to be financed by East Germany. More than 300,000 ha. of the Limpopo valley, and parts of Zambezia and Tete were to be developed by MECANAGRO with finance sourced from Belgium and the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁴

However, is not yet clear what proportion of these areas were lands considered as part of abandoned colonial farms. Official statistics show that the total area of the state farms amounted to c100,000ha. in 1978, increasing to 140,000 ha. in 1982, managed through 70 individual state farm management structures.¹⁸⁵ Subsequent research suggests that the total area of agro-economic enterprises taken over by the state was at least 600,000 ha. and possibly more than 1 million ha.¹⁸⁶

3.5. The decline of socialized agriculture and the reform of agricultural policy, 1982-1987

The projects shaped in the planning process outlined above represented a political determination to promote rapid development through the setting of targets, the recruitment of large volumes of foreign investment and expertise and state accumulation. In the period 1977-1983, 90% of investment in agriculture went to the state sector, two per cent to the Cooperative

¹⁸³Wuyts. *Money and planning*, 61; Hanlon, J. *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*. (London: Zed Books, 1984), 84-85.

¹⁸⁴Mosca. *A experiência*, 146.

¹⁸⁵FRELIMO, *Relatório da Comité Central ao IV Congresso*, (Maputo 1983) 31

¹⁸⁶West, H. G and Myers, G. W. “A piece of land in a land of peace? State farm divestiture in Mozambique”. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. (1996; 34,1) 31-31; see also Mosca. *A experiência*, 146.

of Production sector and virtually none to small-scale farming.¹⁸⁷ However, by the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the questionable rationale and viability of the state farm dominated model of modernisation and socialization came clearly to the fore.

The state agricultural sector was required to produce surplus income – for example, through exports – to offset the foreign borrowing and imports necessary to the planned modernisation in agriculture and more generally in the 10-year development process envisaged in the PPI. Yet, in the early 1980s, the country became an importer of large volumes of food products.¹⁸⁸ Indeed, during this period agricultural production in general declined (see Table 9 below).¹⁸⁹ Many factors explain this decline. One of them was the shortage of skilled managers, technical staff and workers to lead agricultural production and trade. Consequently, the output per hectare was often lower than 50% of that planned and compared unfavourably with levels in other countries with similar or lower levels of technical input and with lower import costs associated to production.¹⁹⁰

Table 9: Agricultural and Industrialised Food Production, 1975-1985

	1975	1977	1979	1981	1983	1984	1985
Marketed Agricultural Production ('000 tons)							
Cotton	52.0	52.0	36.8	73.7	24.7	19.7	5.7
Rice	94.0	60.0	56.3	28.9	17.3	19.1	17.9
Maze	95.0	34.0	66.0	78.3	55.8	82.6	58.8
Copra	50.4	48.0	51.0	54.4	30.7	24.8	24.0
Citrus	34.0	25.0	39.0	36.7	33.5	24.6	31.5
Total	325.4	219	249.1	272	162	170.8	137.9
Industrial Food Production ('000 tons)							
Sugar	228.0	158.0	211.6	177.2	73.7	39.3	23.6
Fish	6.8	6.8	N/S	9.6	12.8	11.7	14.7
Cooking Oil	17.1	17.0	23.0	21.9	13.8	7.6	3.8
Salt	31.3	51.5	57.9	86.4	35.0	18.6	23.1

¹⁸⁷Mackintosh, M and Wuyts, M. “Accumulation, social services and socialist transition in the Third World: reflections on decentralised planning based on the Mozambican experience”. *Journal of Development Studies*. (1988; 24, 4) 145.

¹⁸⁸Wuyts. *Money and planning*, 63; Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique*, 150; Marleyn, O. et al. “Notes on the Political and Organizational Offensive in Mozambique and Its Relationship to Agricultural Policy”. *Review of African Political Economy*.(1982, 24) 118;

¹⁸⁹Egero. “Moçambique”, 108; Munslow. “State Intervention”, 199.

¹⁹⁰Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique*, 150; Interview with António Rodrigues; João Siquice Macicana; and Santos Savaio, Chimoio city, 18 March 2003; Santos Sampaio, Sussundenga District, 20 March, 2003 in AHM-Oral Sources Collection.

Cashew Nuts	17.2	20.2	14.7	16.9	4.0	3.8	2.6
Tea	13.0	17.0	19.0	22.2	10.0	12.8	5.6
Total	313.4	270.5	114.6	334.2	149.3	93.8	73.4

Source: Adapted from Egero. *Moçambique*, 108.

As the implementation of state farm production advanced, the implications for the meaning of rural socialization became more apparent. Although there were initially health and educational advantages in the creation of Communal Villages, the state farms came to depend on them as seasonal labour reserves, and the absence of funding for advances in collective production and rural marketing created a context in which in the general rural socio-economic condition could not improve. Moreover, in many cases, employment in state farms came to be managed by FRELIMO cadres while low benefits were paid to farm workers.¹⁹¹

While the functioning of the policy of socialization of the countryside had a strongly modernising and transformative justification, it came to depend on using an unstable and untrained rural labour force. In addition, agricultural production was based on monocropping, an issue which posed further problems in the management of material and human resources.¹⁹² The management of the human resources was one of the biggest problems that the state companies and farms had during the entire period of their existence. Workers – contracted or seasonal – were often recruited without regard to their qualifications and knowhow. In practice, particularly as warfare increased, what was important for government was the integration of the majority of rural population to work collectively in state farms and cooperatives while living in defensible Communal Villages.¹⁹³

Research conducted at the time explains more deeply the growing tension between the economic idealism of the ruling party and the socio-economic position and aspirations of the rural population, as well as the negative effects such tension had on the quality of collaboration in the prosecution of state policy. O’Laughlin, Harris and Wuyts point to the essentially dualist basis of analysis lying behind the modernising socialism of state planning, as it seemed to ignore the class differentiation of rural society and its previously high level of integration in the colonial

¹⁹¹Mosca. *A experiência*, 146.

¹⁹²Isaacman and Isaacman. “Mozambique”, 151/2.

¹⁹³Lima, R. “Mercado de Trabalho: O Capital Humano e a Teoria de Segmentação”. *Pesquisa e Planejamento Económico: III Encontro Anual da Associação Nacional dos centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia-ANPEC*. (1980, 10: 1) 217; Yañez Casal. “Antropologia e Desenvolvimento”, 160.

market economy, not to speak of lengthy and variable traditions of technical capacity and dependence on inputs from wage labour inside and outside the country.¹⁹⁴

Hermele argues forcefully that much of the local population of the middle-Limpopo valley, after its compulsory displacement by flooding and the installation of CAIL in 1977, had little motivation in working for the success of centrally directed agro-economic initiatives.¹⁹⁵ Analysis of the performance of the Angonia Agro-Industrial Complex (CAIA-Complexo Agro-Industrial de Angonia) in north east Tete province points to the poor relations existing between state farms and local farmers, instead of the expected dynamic collaboration in pursuit of modernised and socialised rural production.¹⁹⁶ Writing of the densely populated Gaza and Maputo provinces, Roesch and Bowen clearly outline the cleavage on matters of agro-economic policy between rural producers, including occupants of Communal Villages and cooperatives, and the state which, while not helping them to produce, disqualified their skills and experience as part of the process of socio-economic advance.¹⁹⁷

After 1980, the poor performance of state farms was exacerbated by the declining market production from the household sector. Although there was improvement in some state farm yields in 1982, both sectors came to be affected by regional drought that year, contributing to severe food shortages in the main cities as well as in parts of the countryside. Increasing confrontation with South Africa and RENAMO directly affected many Communal Villages, family agriculture and already weakened rural commercial networks. The burgeoning foreign exchange shortage contributed to a context of economic and social crisis.¹⁹⁸ The ruling party postponed its Fourth Congress that was due to take place in 1982 to the following year and used the intervening period to begin a reorientation of political and economic priorities. In that year a

¹⁹⁴Harris, L. "Agricultural Cooperatives and Development Policy in Mozambique". *Journal of Peasant Studies*. 1980; 7(3):338-352; O'Laughlin, B. "A questão agrária em Moçambique". *Estudos Moçambicanos*. 1981(3):9-32; Wuyts. *Money and planning*, 63.

¹⁹⁵Hermele, *Land struggles*, 10-12

¹⁹⁶CEA/UEM. *Famílias Camponesas da Angónia no Processo de Socialização do Campo*. Maputo: CEA/UEM; 1983; CEA/UEM. *Organizar os Trabalhadores das Machambas Estatais. O caso do C.A.I.A.* Maputo: CEA/UEM; 1983

¹⁹⁷Roesch, O. "Rural Mozambique since the Frelimo party Fourth Congress: the situation in the Baixo Limpopo". *Review of African Political Economy*. (1988, 41):73-91; M. L. Bowen. "Peasant Agriculture in Mozambique: the case of Chokwe, Gaza province". *Canadian Journal of African Studies*. (1989; 23,3): 358; M.L. Bowen, *The state against the peasantry: Rural struggles in colonial and post-colonial Mozambique*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press; 2000

¹⁹⁸Wuyts. *Money and planning*, 89-93; Bowen, *State against the peasantry*, 58.

successful diplomatic offensive was launched to western countries such as Britain, West Germany, Portugal and USA, to attract new development and emergency aid.¹⁹⁹

From 1982, with the country importing large volumes of basic foodstuffs and inefficiencies in agriculture highlighted in the People's Assembly, and a central discussion among the FRELIMO cadres concerned the correction of errors in agricultural policy.²⁰⁰ Toward the end of that year, widespread discussion in advance of the forthcoming FRELIMO Congress enabled critical voices to be heard. As Bowen concludes, given the overall context, Frelimo "... found it politically expedient to respond to farmers' grievances and those of other rural dwellers".²⁰¹

The report of the party's Central Committee to the Fourth Congress in April 1983 was still couched in the then conventional expressions of vanguard socialist ideology. However, it confirmed that despite producing about 36% of all marketed agricultural production, particularly in high value products such of cashew, cotton and vegetable oils, the family sector had been marginalised, with state support for the sector in factors of production practically non-existent since independence. The report also reminded party members of the fundamental political reality that the family sector's importance went much beyond the volume of its production: it was the sector which contained millions of people, and thus the largest basis of the party's power.²⁰² A major concession in FRELIMO's vision for agricultural policy signaled by the Fourth Congress was to see in the family and private sectors a solution and priority to pressing problems of agricultural resources and food production.²⁰³ At the same time, decentralisation of the planning and pricing process so as to give priority and flexibility to district level needs was proposed.²⁰⁴

Indeed, although much of the planning apparatus continued as before, a series of actions in the following years exemplify fundamental changes in economic and agricultural policy. Determined to promote rapid change in order to stimulate higher levels of food production in the post-drought context in 1983 the government began the dismemberment of state farms, starting with the CAIL complex of state farms in the Limpopo. In the new dispensation, the state

¹⁹⁹Hall and Young. *Confronting Leviathan*, 142-145.

²⁰⁰Marleyn, O et al. "Notes on the Political and Organizational Offensive in Mozambique and Its Relationship to Agricultural Policy". *Review of African Political Economy*.(1982, 24) 118;

²⁰¹Bowen, *State against the peasantry*, 57.

²⁰²FRELIMO, *Relatório ao IV Congresso*, 33

²⁰³Munslow. "State Intervention", 213; 216.

²⁰⁴Egero, *Mozambique*, 105-106.

maintained a sizeable though much reduced foothold with 7 farms with lands amounting to about 25% of the area it had formerly managed. The remainder was distributed according to Table 10:

Table 10: Chokwe after dismemberment of CAIL 1986/87

Sector	No	Area (ha.)
State farms	7	7,500
Lonrho	1	2,500
Private sector	440	8,700
Family sector	14,600	10,100
Cooperatives	13	2,200
Total		31,000

Source: adapted from Hermele, *Land struggles*, 54

As Hermele indicates, in terms of production levels and productivity, the reorganisation proved successful. In 1986 the rice harvest was about 50, 000 tons, the highest since independence, with yields of 3.5 tons per hectare in the now more manageable state farms as opposed to 2,5 tons/hectare previously. Similarly, in 1985 the massive 26,000 state farm complex of the lower Limpopo (UPBL) was dismembered into 6 small state farm units amounting to about 2,500 ha, with underutilised and abandoned land redistributed to private farmers and family producers. The private sector then benefitted by substantial support through USAID farm and marketing inputs. As analysts noted at the time, the rapidity of the dismemberment process, brought about by the urgency of improving food security, left fundamental questions of land access rights, ownership and social differentiation unclear.²⁰⁵

The larger questions of rural-urban commerce and particularly the financing of foreign aid, the stabilisation of the currency and the diminution of parallel markets, issues clearly affecting agricultural production in 1982, came to be addressed in negotiations with the IMF and World Bank from 1983 to early 1987, when an agreed economic adjustment programme was introduced.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵Hermele. *Land struggles*, 54; O.Roesch. "Rural Mozambique", 79-80f; see also West and Myers, "State farm divestiture", 35-36, passim.

²⁰⁶For this process, see Hanlon J. *Mozambique. Who calls the shots?*(London, James Currey, 1991) 113

3.6. “Socialization of the Countryside” in Manica Province and District

In Manica Province the first state interventions were made in highland regions of colonial companies and farms of at least 500 hectares that had been abandoned by 1976. In that year the State Agricultural Enterprise of Manica (Empresa Estatal Agrícola de Manica-EEAM) was established. This company managed the different Units of Production – created through intervention – located in Chimoio, Gondola, Sussundenga as well as Manica districts.²⁰⁷ After FRELIMO’s III Congress, this situation changed as a result of the decision to transform all state Units of Production in the country into agro-livestock enterprises. Thus from 1978, the EEAM was transformed into: five state agro-livestock enterprises located in Sussundenga, Chimoio, Gondola, and Manica districts, namely: the state Poultry Company of Manica (Empresa Estatal Avícola de Manica-EEAM); the state Citrus Fruit Company of Manica (Citrinos de Manica-CM); the state Agricultural Cotton Enterprise of Manica District (Empresa Agrícola de Tabaco do Distrito de Manica-EATDM); the state Livestock Company of Manica District (Empresa Estatal de Gado e Corte do Distrito de Manica-EEGCDM); and in 1981 the State Agricultural Enterprise of Vanduzi in Manica district (Empresa Estatal Agrícola de Vanduzi-EEAV) was created.²⁰⁸

As their names suggest, these companies had specific kinds of products that they produced. For example, the *EEAV* was to produce food products, principally maize, beans, potatoes, onions and wheat. The *EATDM* was to produce tobacco and cotton for export, and the *EEGCDM* to raise livestock to supply the market with meat and milk. All of these plans were managed by central government through *GAPPO* and with technical assistance from by *MECANAGRO*.²⁰⁹ As a result, the state company of Poultry of Manica (Avícola de Manica-AM) had more than 889ha of fertile land, which was located in regions of Manica City, Machipanda, Mavonde, Jécua, Chibata, and Bagamoio in Manica district, employing not more than 410 workers in the different sectors of activities at its bankruptcy in 1987.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷DPAM-CNAC-MAP. “Memorando de Venda-Empresa Estatal de Leite e lacticínios de Manica”. Maputo, 1997, p. 4.

²⁰⁸DPAM-CNAC- MAP. “CNA: Memorando de Venda-Avícola, EE-Delagação de Manica”. Maputo, 1997, p. 28-42.

²⁰⁹GTZ/MAP. *Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola e Proposta para o Fomemnto de Factores, 1987-1900*. Masvingo, Janeiro, 1987:20.

²¹⁰DPAM-CNAC-MAP. “CNA”, 8-9.

With regards to *EEAV*, functioning from 1976 to 1980 as a Unit of Production, this unit had more than 2,910 ha of fertile lands under its control, but only cultivated 1,580ha and employed 186 workers.²¹¹ This situation changed from 1981 when the newly-formed *EEAV* received investment allocated by the government of more than \$4,746,657.3 (169,693,000.00MT) to cultivate an estimated 8,000ha of fertile land. However, the company cultivated only 4,798 ha or 59.97% in 1981; 3,188 ha or 39.85% in 1982; 1,304 ha or 16.3% in 1983; 709 ha or 8.86%; 824 ha or 10.3% in 1985; 1,165 ha with a slight increase in 1986 in 14.56%.²¹² The company stopped contracting seasonal workers from the Communal Villages and employed only permanent workers in decreasing numbers, from 302 in 1985 to 237 in 1986 and until its closure in 1987 when it employed only 270.²¹³ The *AM* and *EEAV* together did not employ more than 833 workers at their closure in 1987. In terms of the number of the working age population recorded in the census of 1980, it is likely that only a small minority gained full time employment in state companies developed through the broad policy of socialization of the countryside.²¹⁴

Shortly after the transition to independence, the first Communal Villages and Production Cooperatives began to be created in Manica Province. In 1975-1976, three districts were selected for the installation of pilot Communal Villages with two Cooperatives of Production each, namely: Chimoio, Sussundenga and Manica. In Manica district, the Pilot Communal Village of *Muzongo* was installed with two cooperatives of production: *25 de Junho* and *Chinhamacungo*, both with no more than 290 members working in no more than 494 ha of land of the collective farms (Table 11 below).²¹⁵

²¹¹MAP. “Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola e Proposta para o Fomento de Factores”, 17; DPAM-CNAC-MAP. “CNA”, 28-42.

²¹² Myers, 1993: 46-47.

²¹³DPAM. “Balanço de Força de Trabalho Permanente: Empresa Estatal Agrícola de Vanduzi-Campanha 1988-1989. Vanduzi, 1989, 1.

²¹⁴INE, “*IV Recenseamento Geral da População-1970*”, xxiv-xxvi; CCR. “Os Districtos em Números”, 6.

²¹⁵AHM-CNAC. Cx. 150. CPAC: Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC durante o Ano de 1981. Chimoio, 1981, 13-14; AHM-CNAC. Cx. 150. CPAC: Resumo da Campanha 80/81 no Sector Cooperativo. Chimoio, 1981, 3.

Table 11: Pilot Communal Villages and their Cooperative of Production in Manica Province, 1975-1977

Name of District	Name of Pilot AC	Name of CP		Members of the CP		Number of Ha	
Chimoio	1 ^o de Maio	1 ^o de Maio	2	73	93	286	488
		Josina Machel		20		202	
Sussundenga	Buapua	3 de Fevereiro	2	70	95	176	253
		Nhamarenza		25		77	
Manica	Muzongo	Chinhamacungo	2	70	290	362.5	494.7
		25 de Junho		220		132,2	
Total	3	6		478		1,235.7	

Source: AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. CPAC: Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC Durante o Ano de 1981. Chimoio, 1981, 13-14; AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. CPAC: Resultado da Companhia 80/81 no Sector Cooperativo. Chimoio, 1981: 3.

This meant that in these three villages, there were only six production cooperatives, with a total of 478 members working in no more than 1,235 ha formerly belonging to the *colono* farms. This number may well not include all the family members, as the reports so far encountered do not indicate how many people were living in each Pilot Communal Village and working in each Pilot Cooperative in the period from 1975 to 1976.²¹⁶

These three Pilot Communal Villages were formed as a result of the popular mobilization of cadres and *GDs* of the FRELIMO party. Popular mobilization meant explanation of the kind of houses to be constructed, their location, and the advantages of access to social services such as schools and hospitals. However, the rural population of Manica had little experience of associating political independence with collective forms of living and working: the struggle for liberation in Manica from 1972 to 1974 had not integrated the majority of the rural population collectively as a means of supporting the anti-colonial guerilla struggle as it had in the liberated zones of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete provinces.

In all the reports and documents consulted, there was no reference to the opinion of the rural population about the process of the creation of the Communal Villages and Cooperatives of Production. This absence reinforces the argument that the policy of socialization of the countryside was a state project, decided by the FRELIMO leadership during their meetings, where they categorically stated that: "...it is the party's responsibility to mobilize the population

²¹⁶AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. CPAC: Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC Durante o Ano de 1981, 13-14.

in the formulation of the collective farms, Cooperatives of Production, and the Communal Villages.²¹⁷

Mobilization in many cases meant forced mobilization to live in Communal Villages and to work collectively due to the socio-economic and political environment of the time.²¹⁸ Modernization and socialization of the countryside meant more a distant political discourse than locally relevant social and economic development. The state cadres, the neighbourhood secretaries and the *GDs* did not respect the histories, traditions of the rural population in the process of installation of Communal Villages and Cooperatives of Production. This issue provoked tension between the rural population and the party/state. Those who resisted living in Communal Villages were seen as against political independence. In many cases, such resistance was met with corporal punishment by the party/state.²¹⁹

FRELIMO as a party/state integrated the rural population in Communal Villages in Manica using compulsory mobilization similar to that employed during the villagisation process in some areas of Tanzania. For example, in 1967 the regional commissioner of Tanga declared in a speech to the district council that, the government punishes those who are not willing to do the jobs that they have been instructed to do.²²⁰ In the case of Manica, the installation and the development of the Communal Villages were sometimes pacific and without fuller evidence it is difficult to generalise. In Manica district, some oral testimony indicates that the secretaries of the party, the cadres of the *GDs*, and the chiefs of party cells imposed authoritarian measures on the rural population resisting Communal Villages and Cooperatives of Production.²²¹

This testimony was confirmed by Mr. Rogério Alfredo Chinogara:

We had many problems when the FRELIMO installed the Communal Villages in our area. All of us were living in our lands but when FRELIMO came, we were forced to go to live in Communal Villages and to produce in collective form. The collective production was a novelty for us. Before independence, people were working individually. Each family had a small field to produce its food. Thus, when independence came, we saw the secretary of the party and *GDs* mobilize the people to go to live in villages, but

²¹⁷Casal, “Discurso Socialista”, 60.

²¹⁸Interview with João Minigo Jimo, Manica city, 26 February 2014; Interview with Rogério Alfredo Chinogara, Manica city, 28 February 2014.

²¹⁹Chichava. “They can kill us”, 116 and 118; Egero, “Moçambique”, 34-35; Dinerman. “O Surgimento dos Antigos Régulos como “Chefes de Produção” na Província de Nampula (1975-1987)” in *Estudos Moçambicanos*. (1999, 17) 100.

²²⁰Freyhold. “*Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania*”, 36.

²²¹Interview with Rogério Alfredo Chinogara, Manica city, 28 February 2014.

the people did not accept this mobilization at first. They did not know what life would be like in Communal Villages, but later, with the development of RENAMO attacks and presence of the government armed forces, we had to go to the Communal Villages and work collectively.²²²

It seems that the experience of the forced mobilization of the rural population to live in Communal Villages and to work in Cooperatives of Production that was a reality in Tanzania in a different context and place became a powerful school for the installation of Communal Villages in Mozambique in general and in Manica in particular. In Tanzania, the development of Communal Villages and cooperatives of production was implemented and orientated by law promulgated in 1967 which authorised corporal punishment of those who refused to participate in these projects of development.²²³

In Mozambique, however, the Communal Village and Cooperatives of Production project was implemented without specific orienting law before 1978. Secondly, in Manica province as well as in Manica District, the project was implemented in specific areas, most of them *ex-colonato* farms, or in old colonial villages. In some cases, the creation of Communal Villages was forced due to the development of war in rural zones or due to the influence of the natural calamities (floods). In many cases, FRELIMO cadres and GDs unilaterally made the decision to mete out punishment. It was hardly made through government orientation, according to Mafusse Mwenessane.²²⁴

Compulsory mobilization undertaken by FRELIMO cadres became the basic factor in the implementation of the policy of socialization of the countryside with much resistance of the rural population from 1975 to 1977, particularly as each member was obliged to work in cooperatives of production for three to five days a week for five hours.²²⁵ The income from this production in many cases benefitted FRELIMO cadres, intensifying rural resistance to Communal Villages and cooperatives of production. Mafusse Mwenessane reported on his thinking in this period thus:

We were working for FRELIMO party and its cadres: GDs, secretaries of residential neighbourhoods, and chiefs of party cells, not for our own development. We left our

²²²Interview with João Minigo Jimo, Manica city, 26 February 2014.

²²³Freyhold. “*Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania*”, 36.

²²⁴Interview with Mafusse Mwenessane, Manica city, 28 February 2014.

²²⁵AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. CPAC: Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC Durante o Ano de 1980, 7.

lands, our animals, fruit plants, our traditional culture, and everything that we had before. We became dependent on the orders of FRELIMO cadres. This kind of life became very difficult for us. Many of us resisted living in Communal Villages and working in cooperatives of production. But the RENAMO war that started here in Manica district between 1976 and 1978 had already created many victims. From that time, we understood why FRELIMO forced us to live in Communal Villages and produce in cooperatives of production. They were concerned about our security.²²⁶

Moreover, the kind of crops to be produced was decided by FRELIMO cadres and sold to the state by the cooperatives responsible for production. The management of this production was made by FRELIMO cadres in each Communal Village. The income from agricultural production in many cases did not improve the socio-economic conditions of the majority of population in countryside.²²⁷ Indeed, according to informants such as Mafusse Mwenessane, a common conclusion of the rural population about the cooperatives of production was that they were working for the FRELIMO party and its cadres: *GDs*, neighbourhood secretaries and army. This was the case because all activities of the cooperatives of production were planned by FRELIMO as party/state leaders and not by their members.²²⁸

It is clear that the installation of the Communal Villages and cooperatives of production in Manica district was to create the labour organization to support the establishment and functioning of the state agricultural companies. Nevertheless, in order to establish a fuller picture of the nature and context of recruitment to the Communal Villages and cooperatives of production, the potential attractions of work in the state farms to which they were a necessary adjunct –their control of fertile lands and access to state finance, machinery and other resources – need to be considered.

On the other hand, more information needs to be found concerning areas outside the state farms and their immediate labour areas and the socio-economic alternatives, such as finding work on the remaining private farms and enterprises as well as family agriculture, which continued to exist in parallel to the state and socialized sectors, as the data below indicate. The relevance of territorial control and developing regional warfare was also important and also requires more information. Particularly in the early 1980s, as RENAMO insurgency intensified, it was important to concentrate and provide refuge for the rural population in Communal

²²⁶Interview with Mafusse Mwenessane, Manica city, 28 February 2014.

²²⁷Andrade and Garcia. “Novas Formas de organização Territorial”, 15-17.

²²⁸Interview with Mafusse Mwenessane, Manica city, 28 February 2014.

Villages and in cooperatives of production as form to control and defence important to guarantee security in the countryside. Indeed, the Communal Villages were then transformed into collective residential units, with many problems such as lack of food security and basic public services owing to unsustainably large populations.²²⁹

Although subject to correction with further research, the available census statistics concerning population distribution and occupation give a clear idea of the coexistence and interdependence of the different sectors of population and forms of settlement in Manica Province and District. According to the census of 1980, the working age population (age 15-64) in Manica province was more than 259,385, of which 237,385 (91.5%) were employed in state companies (See table 12 and 13 below).

Table 12: Population by Age and Sex in Manica Province, 1980

Year	Census of the 1980		
Region	Manica Province		
Age	Man	Woman	Male +Female
0-14	140,681	142,297	282,978
15-64	113,976	145,409	259,385
65-75+	9,178	9,243	18,421
Total	263,835	296,949	560,784

Source: INE, “IV Recenseamento Geral da População-1970”, p. xxix; CCR. *Os Districtos em Números: Manica*. (Maputo, Direcção Nacional de Estatística, 1983) 2.

Table 13: Workers in Diverse Agricultural Sectors in Manica Province, 1980 Census

Workers in State Companies				Rural Farmers or Private Sector		
Occupation	Workers (contracted and seasonal)					
	Male	Female	M+ F	Male	Female	Male + Female
Farming/Cattle raising	89,862	146,628	236,490			
Operators of Agricultural Machinery	891	4	895			
Hand or Animal Traction Farmers				85,080	146,438	231,526
Pastors of Animals				633	22	655
Total	90,753	146,632	237,385	85,713	146,460	232,173

Source: Adapted from CCR. “Os Distritos em Números”, 46.

These tables also show 232,173 workers classified in the family and private sector, constituting 89.5% of the total working age population of the Province in 1980. Similarly, in the

²²⁹ Dinerman, “O Surgimento dos Antigos Régulos”, 131.

case of Manica district, the 1980 census indicates that of the 23,620 working age population, 20,136 or 85.24% were employed in state companies, and that 19,450 or 82.35% of the working age population were classified as working in the Family and Private sector. (Table 14 and 15 below)

Table 14: Population by Age and Sex in Manica District, 1980 Census

Age	Male	Female	Male + Female
0-14	12,885	13,218	26,103
15-64	10,671	12,949	23,620
65+	940	988	1,928
Total	24,496	27,155	51,651

Source: Adapted from INE, “IV Recenseamento Geral da População-1970”, xxiv, xxvi; CCR. “Os Districtos em Números”, 46.

Table 15: Workers in Diverse Agricultural Sectors in Manica District, 1980 Census

Workers in State Companies				Family and Private sector		
Occupation	Workers (contracted and seasonal)					
	Male	Female	M+W	Male	Female	Male + Female
Farming/Cattle Raising	7,535	12,504	20,039			
Operators of Agricultural Machinery	96	1	97			
Hand or Animal Traction Farmers				6,952	12,482	19,434
Pastors of Animals				63	3	66
Total	7,631	12,505	20,136	7,015	12,435	19,450

Source: Adapted from CCR, “Os Districtos em Números”, 46.

In terms of the agricultural production of the state companies, their results did not meet the expectations stressed in government economic ideology when compared with the production of private sector and the rural population, living or not in Communal Villages without any investment from the government. The PPI program had as one of its goals, raising marketed production of the whole rural population, but results showed relatively low levels of marketed production in comparison with the state companies (Table 16 and 17 below).²³⁰

²³⁰GTZ/MAP. “Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola e Proposta Para o Fornecimento de Factores”, 20-22.

Table 16: Production of the State Companies in Manica Province, 1977-1985 (Tons)

Year	Maize	Beans	sunflower	Potatoes	Onion	Vegetable	Wheat	Tobacco	Cotton
1977	1,430	39	234	746	-	360	-	40	-
1978	5,088	7	1,200	2,050	240	538	-	300	-
1979	4,960	176	287	2,125	295	1083	-	392	-
1980	4300	48	551	1,667	135	966	93	390	-
1981	6,876	81	673	3,646	42	962	151	151	-
1982	6,150	17	367	1,910	46	627	98	237	-
1983	2,220	67	63	759	30	1,784	45	126	-
1984	4,246	52	159	-	129	1,398	128	98	10.4
1985	3,173	44	49	180	48	1700	42	44	-
Total	38,443	601	3,583	13,083	965	9,418	557	1,856	10.4

Source: Adapted from GTZ/MAP. “*Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola*”, 20.

Table 17: Marketed Production of Family and Private Sector in Manica Province, 1977-1985 (Tons)

Year	Maize	Beans	Sunflowers	Potatoes	Onions	Vegetables	Wheat	Tobacco	Cotton
1977	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1978	128.8	107	1,223	3,190	-	3,280	-	-	1050
1979	832	21.2	454	330	-	1,473	-	2	250
1980	1,558	47	386	300	-	690	-	3.6	80
1981	660	60	107	578	-	1,643	-	4.4	80
1982	772	10.9	88	83	-	493	10	1.3	20
1983	733	50	84	49	69.2	613	71.3	1.3	-
1984	3,270	36	121	-	70	1,987	3	9.45	30
1985	1,739	23.2	10	1,966	313.5	11,760	5	0.50	4
Total	8,860.8	355.3	2,473	6,806	452.7	21,939	89.3	28.25	1,574

Source: Adapted from GTZ/MAP. “*Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola*”, 21-22

With the impulse given by policy directives of FRELIMO’s III Congress, the number of Communal Villages grew substantially, although relatively slowly. Statistical data of the number of Communal Villages in Manica Province in the studies made by Borges Coelho, Egero, Andrade and Garcia, and Araújo indicate a growth of 6.1% in 1980 to 25.4% in 1982 of a total population in the province of 560,784 (according to the census of 1980).²³¹ More recently

²³¹AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. “CPAC”: Lista Actualizada das Aldeias Comunaes Existentes a Nível da Província, 1980, 1-5; AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. “CPAC”: Proposta do Programa Para Manica. Maputo, 1981, 1; AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. “CPAC”: Aldeias Comunaes Novas. Chimoio, 1981, 1.

collected data suggests however that in 1982 almost 40% of the population of the Province lived in 168 such villages.²³²

In the case of Manica district, there was a different pattern and higher level of villagisation. The population living in Communal Villages grew from 8,370 residents, or 16% of the district's total of 51,651 in 1980, to 37,798 in 1982 (See Table 18 below and Table 14 above).²³³ The figures suggest that in 1982 the majority of the rural population of Manica district now lived in Communal Villages, a substantial increase almost certainly related to the intensification of warfare, and the protection enabled through military control of the Beira Corridor.

Table 18: Growth of Communal Villages in Manica Province and District, 1977-1982

	1977-1978			1979-1980			1981-1982		
	ACs	People	%	ACs	People	%	ACs	People	%
Manica Province	9	4,500	1,0*	20* 107**	32,594*	6.1*	111* 168**	143,541* 223,972**	25.4* 39.9%**
Manica District				15**	8,370**	16%**	48**	37,798**	73.17%**

Source: Adapted from Borges Coelho. 'Protected', 345; Egero. "Moçambique", 115; Araújo. "As Aldeias Comunaís" 2; AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. "CPAC": Lista Actualizada das Aldeias Comunaís Existentes a Nível da Província, 1980, 1-5; AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. "CPAC": Proposta do Programa Para Manica. Maputo, 1981, 1; AHM-CNAC. Cx.AC/150. "CPAC". Aldeias Comunaís Novas. Chimoio, 1981, p. 1; Andrade and Garcia. "Novas Formas de Organização Territorial", 25-27.

*- Data collected from the studies made by Borges Coelho, Egero, and Araújo.

** - Data collected in National Archive of Mozambique during field work in Maputo-Mozambique.

Of the 48 villages established in Manica district up to 1982, ten were established in the countryside around Manica city and another ten in Mavonde administrative post, and a further six in Machipanda administrative post. More than 22 Communal Villages were constructed in Vanduzi administrative post. With regard to cooperatives of production, the number had grown

²³² AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. "CPAC": Lista Actualizada das Aldeias Comunaís Existentes a Nível da Província, 1980, 1-5; AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. "CPAC": Proposta do Programa Para Manica. Maputo, 1981, 1; AHM-CNAC. Cx.AC/150. "CPAC". Aldeias Comunaís Novas. Chimoio, 1981, p. 1.

²³³ INE, "IV Recenseamento Geral da População-1970", p. xxiv, xxvi and xxix; Conselho Coordenador do Recenseamento. *Os Districtos em Números: Manica*. (Maputo, DNE, 1983) 2; AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. "CPAC": Lista Actualizada das Aldeias Comunaís Existentes a Nível da Província, 1980, 1-5; AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. "CPAC": Proposta do Programa Para Manica. Maputo, 1981, 1; AHM-CNAC. Cx.150. "CPAC": Aldeias Comunaís Novas. Chimoio, 1981, 1,

to 32 in 1981 were 32 cooperative of production, eight of them (25%) in Manica district.²³⁴ This number grew to 12 cooperatives of production in 1982, but they had only 69.792 ha of the cultivated land. (Table 19 and 20 below)

Table 19: Location of Communal Villages in Manica District, 1977-1982

Administrative Post	Name of Village	Number of Families	Number of Residents
Manica City	Revué	148	1,674
	Muzongo	420	5,008
	Nhaunkaka	255	1,895
	Chinhambuzi	578	3,343
	Deteza	180	2,709
	Guindingui	420	2,333
	Chaiça	80	1,250
	Socera	39	----
	Maridza	300	----
	Forte Macequece	----	320
	10 Villages	2,420 families	20,430 residents
Machipanda	Herois de Moçambique	105	500
	Muvumira	17	312
	Chimidzo	----	----
	Munene	----	----
	Manhene	----	750
	Chinhamacungo	----	----
	6 Villages	122 families	1,562 residents
Mavonde	Chimedza	150	1,562
	Messica	247	2,257
	Chitunga	150	2,639
	Mainga	105	1,138
	Mudza	300	1,228
	Mapakue	300	1,743
	Penga	180	----
	Manga	180	977
	Nhamechinde	----	----
	Mavudzi	----	950
	10 Villages	1,612 families	12,482 residents
	Bandula	470	2,236
	Lore	94	598

²³⁴ AHM-CNAC. Cx. 150. “CPAC”: Lista Actualizada das Aldeias Comunais Existentes e Nível da Província, 1980, p. 1-5; AHM-CNAC. Cx. 150. “CPAC”: Aldeias Comunais Novas. Chimoio, 1981, p. 1.

Vanduzi	Pungue Sul	-	482
	Mahunde	****	****
	Mucombezi	****	****
	Nhamudimo	****	****
	Chitundo	****	****
	Macadera	****	****
	25 de Setembro	****	****
	Chinhamacungo	****	****
	Almada	****	****
	Marongorongo	****	****
	Chimuanandimai	****	****
	Belas-1	****	****
	Belas-2	****	****
	Garuzo	****	****
	Chirewa	****	****
	Eduardo Mondlane	****	****
	Selva	****	****
	Nhamatiquite	****	****
	Centro Chigodore	****	****
	Gacamira	****	****
	22 Villages	564 families	3,316 residents
Total	48 Communal Villages	4,718 families	35,798 residents

Source: Adapted from AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. "CPAC": Lista Actualizada das Aldeias Comunaes Existentes a Nível da Província, 1980, p. 1-5; 1981, p. 1; AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. "CPAC": Aldeias Comunaes Novas. Chimoio, 1981, 1.

****No data

Table 20: Number of Cooperatives of Production in Manica District, 1977-1982

Name of Cooperative	Number of Ha	Crops
Chinhamacungo	10	Maize
Marota	3.4	Maize
Sanda	8.94	Maize
Maconha	3.5	Sunflowers
Magura	4.462	Sunflowers
Muorenge	6	Vegetables
Mumango Dois	5	Vegetables
Mununge Dois	1.8	Vegetables
Mutome	2.6	Vegetables
Mandevu	4.29	Maize
Simbaikurima	0.6	Vegetables
Chicaca	3	Sunflowers
Total-12	69.792	

Source: Adapted from AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/145. "CPAC": Relatório, 1; Chimoio, 1978; AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. "CPAC": Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC Durante o Ano de 1981, 15-16.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, 90% of state investment in the agricultural sector went to state farms, two percent to cooperatives, and virtually none to the small-scale rural population farming.²³⁵ In the case of Manica Province, we had difficulty in finding complete data of the investment made in cooperatives of production during the period of functioning of the policy of socialization of the countryside. We identified the investment made in 1981 in only four districts of the total of nine, those considered safe during the war developed by RENAMO: Guro, Bárue, Sussudenga, and Manica. In these districts, of a total of 700,000.00MT allotted, 457,512.00MT was spent and 242,488.00MT remained unused.²³⁶ These numbers illustrate the difference in investment between the state companies and cooperatives of production. Further research is necessary to understand why even the relatively low investment allocated to districts was not spent in total.

In a context in which almost all new investment went to state farms up to 1983, only 8 cooperatives of production in Manica received funds from the government of not more 483,317.00 MT (See Table 21 below).²³⁷

Table 21: State Investment in Cooperatives (Manica district) - (Thousands of Meticaís)

Year	1978-1979	1980	1981	1982	Total
Agriculture	804-Estimated	-----	276,300-Estimated	----	
	764-Invested	332,417- invested	150,136-Invested	----	483,317-Invested

Source: RPM-Província de Manica. Relatório Ao III Congresso: Conselho Agrário Nacional. Chimoio, 1978, 33; AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. CPAC: “Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC Durante o Ano de 1981”, 16; AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. CPAC: “Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC Durante o Ano de 1980”, 7.

From 1983 until the formal end of the policy of socialization of the countryside in 1987 reports and documents of the MA do not report the creation of new Communal Villages in Manica Province and District. The only data about Communal Villages from reports of the CNP is related to plans for 1983 to 1985: for the construction in Manica Province of 125 Communal Villages with 212,919 residents in 1983, 139 Communal Villages and 282,289 residents in 1984;

²³⁵M. Mackintosh and M. Wuyts. “Accumulation, Social Services and Socialist Transition”, 145.

²³⁶AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. CPAC: “Relatório Síntese das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC Durante o Ano de 1981”, 16; AHM-CNAC. Cx. AC/150. CPAC: “Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas pela CPAC Durante o Ano de 1981”, 13

²³⁷Hall and Young. “Confronting Leviathan”, 99-100.

and 153 Communal Villages with 351,663 residents in 1985.²³⁸ These plans were not carried out owing to the countrywide economic crisis and consequent shift of policy from 1983.²³⁹

In the new context of agricultural policy formed after FRELIMO's IV Congress in 1983, western aid agencies were encouraged not only to help support internal refugees from war, but also to begin effective agronomic development support. In Manica Province, the government created the Manica Rural Development Program (Programa de Desenvolvimento Rural de Manica-PDRM) financed by German Technical Corporation-GTZ (Gesellschaft Technische Zusammenarbeit).²⁴⁰

This program functioned in two different phases. The first phase covered the period of civil war from 1984 until the introduction of the PRE in 1987. During the first phase from 1984 to 1987 the program was known as Mozambique Agricultural input Supply Programme (MAP). The second phase covered the period of the introduction of the PRE in 1987 to the end of the war in 1992. During this period the program was known as Mozambique Agricultural Rural Reconstruction Programme (MARRP).²⁴¹ MAP was to provide assistance to the rural population, principally those who had been displaced due to the war, living or not in Communal Villages, but located along the Beira Corridor, considered as a safe area of Manica district (See Appendix 1: Map 5).²⁴² MAP also provided the rural inhabitants along the Beira Corridor with food assistance, emergency agricultural supplies, as well as funds for the creation of micro-projects, for training and for agricultural extension schemes.²⁴³ The programme in this phase was implemented in two districts: Manica and Sussundenga. In Manica district, two areas were chosen namely: the countryside of Manica town and Vanduzi administrative post (See Appendix 1: Map 6).²⁴⁴

From the end of 1983, the programme concentrated its activities on food supply and agricultural crops for export such as cotton and tobacco. In October 1985, the programme had its first report meeting with the Manica government. The conclusion of the meeting was that,

²³⁸ Borges Coelho. 'Protected Villages', 361.

²³⁹ Raposo, I. "Do habitat disperso às <<aldeias comunais>>. A transformação do habitat rural em Moçambique/Os camponeses e o estado/Vilaculos". *Sociedade e Territórios*. (1988, 3:7) 106.

²⁴⁰ GTZ/MAP. "Estudos Sobre Produção Agrária", 1; GTZ/MARRP. "Discussion Paper on Possible", 3.

²⁴¹ GTZ/MARRP. "Discussion Paper on Possible", 3.

²⁴² GTZ/MAP. "Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola", 9.

²⁴³ GTZ/MARRP. "Discussion Paper on Possible", 3.

²⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 6.

despite the importance of food supply to the rural population and some support crop production for export, it was also important to promote food crops and to supply the rural population with implements for agricultural production.²⁴⁵

As a result, four pilot agrarian regions were created in Manica province. Two of them were in Manica district: in the countryside of Manica town and in Vanduzi administrative post. The other two pilot agrarian regions were created in Chimoio and Sussundenga districts. The program trained more than 153 agrarian assistants to give technical assistance to 9,223 members of the rural population living in these pilot agrarian regions, where each member farmed between 0.5 to 2.5 ha. In the case of Manica district, more than 59 agrarian assistants were trained to support to 5,636 members of the rural population that had been integrated in the program (See Table 22 and 23 below).²⁴⁶

Table 22: Training of personnel of the GTZ/MAP Program in Manica Province, 1984-1986

Agrarian Zone	Manica	Chimoio	Sussundenga	Total
Chief of Agrarian Zone	9	6	5	20
Assistances	90	49	14	153
Nº of Cultivators	5,636	117	3,470	9,223
Hectares	9,415	*****	*****	9,415

***** No data

Source: Adapted from GTZ/MAP. “Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola”, 52.

Table 23: Training of personnel of the GTZ/MAP Program in Manica District, 1984-1986

Agrarian Zone	Messica	Penhalong	Zonué	Mutambarico	Machipanda	Total
Chief of Agrarian Zone	1	1	1	1	1	5
Assistances	8	11	14	14	12	59
Nº of Cultivators	1,164	688	1,857	1,014	1,014	5,636
Hectares	****	****	****	****	****	****

***** No data

Source: Adapted from GTZ/MAP. “Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola”, 52.

MAP also supplied the rural population with seeds for maize, beans and vegetables, as well as hoes, machetes, ploughs and fertilizers. In total, it was estimated that more than 1,585

²⁴⁵ Ibid. 1-2.

²⁴⁶ GTZ/MAP. “Estudo Sobre Produção Agrícola”, 53.

tons of seeds, 795 tons of fertilizers, 140,700 different kinds of agrarian instruments, and 647 ploughs were distributed from 1984 to 1986.²⁴⁷

The result of the project in family agriculture was satisfactory in comparison with the cooperatives of production during the same period. For example, in 1986, the family sector produced 65.7% of marketed output of maize compared with only 34.3% from the cooperatives.²⁴⁸ In addition, according to MAP reports, the project took its program to areas where land conflicts had occurred between the local populations and those who had been displaced from their own areas by war. Many such conflicts were registered in lands along the rivers Revué, Msambuzi, Chicheia, Munene, and other areas of Manica district (see Appendix 1: Map 6).²⁴⁹ In this way, the transition away from the centrally controlled agricultural economy towards a decentralized rural economy based on more effective provision of basic inputs in the family and private sector began to appear in Manica from 1984.²⁵⁰

3.7. Conclusion

Collective production was developed by FRELIMO during its heydays as a guerrilla movement as a means of substituting the colonial economy, harnessing the political loyalty and the economic power of the population in zones in the areas it liberated. As the struggle progressed in the 1960s, trade networks in Cabo Delgado and Niassa were partially redirected to linkages with Tanzania, which at the same time began a serious programme of villagisation to drive modernisation and access to social benefits. The intensification of the struggle in Mozambique in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to FRELIMO's clear statement that production should serve the interests of the whole society and not individual accumulation, which was identified with colonialism. Villagisation and collectivisation of production and trade came to be seen as integral to the successful struggle for liberation.

After independence in 1975, this ideology became basic in the responses of the transitional and post-independence government to the crisis in colonial agriculture brought about by the rapid departure of most settler farmers and managers. Nationalisation of land and

²⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 5.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. 41.

²⁴⁹ GTZ/MARRP. "Study of Small Scale Irrigations in the Manica District and Chimoio District-Manica Province-Mozambique, 1991, 7, 11-12, and 14.

²⁵⁰ Chingono. "Mozambique", 84.

intervention in abandoned farms and agro-industrial enterprises resulted in the creation of large state farms, while collective production was established in communal villages and producer cooperatives. Existing levels and patterns of production would thus be maintained along with collective rural development, with little attention or support for family or private production and trade.

The FRELIMO government introduced collective production and villagisation not only to support production but also to give basic social services such as schools and hospitals, and to guarantee security, benefits not accessible to the dispersed majority of the rural population. The policy of “socialization of the countryside” thus embodied clear economic and social objectives in the creation of state companies, communal villages and cooperatives of production. .

From 1977, this policy was implemented with greater political intensity coupled with a high level of centralised economic planning which was to lead to a 10-year development programme based on collective agriculture and its industrialization, from 1980. The plans placed heavy reliance on state farms and on mobilization of the rural population by the FRELIMO cadres, in the creation of the communal villages and cooperatives of production. The plans depended on high levels of foreign investment in state agriculture which could not be repaid with the low levels of productivity and exports achieved, partly the result of the lack of trained workers and poor management, but also the huge negative impact of rural warfare led by RENAMO since 1976.

The negative economic and politico-military context of the early 1980s was exacerbated by extensive drought and the need to import large quantities of basic food products. Profound political and economic changes, giving much greater emphasis to the hitherto marginalised family and private sectors in production and trade, were initiated in the governing party’s IV Congress in 1983, and the dismantling of the large state farms began in the same year. Further changes in economic policy orientation affecting agriculture came about as part of economic re-adjustment negotiations with the IMF and World Bank between 1983 and 1987.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

The policy of “socialization of the countryside” was formally instituted in 1977 after the Third Congress of FRELIMO, which established the liberation movement as a Marxist-Leninist party. The goal of this policy was to conduct radical socio-economic, political and cultural transformation of Mozambican society, based in the countryside. In practice, however, following the experience of collective production developed in the liberated zones during the struggle of liberation (1964-1974), implementation of this policy began when the transitional government was instituted in late 1974. Its execution was more developed in response to political events than economic principles. The discourse developed by the new government about the radical transformation of society during the first years of independence (1975-1977) was received in different forms and with differing interpretations among the majority of Mozambicans, particularly those who were living in the countryside.

In many cases, the majority of the rural population having agricultural production and trade as their economic base hoped to replace colonial social and economic structure with a system that would reorient, for their own benefit, the infra-structure left by *colonos*. However, the desire, enthusiasm and euphoria following Mozambican independence quickly transformed into despair and disappointment owing to the replacement of the colonial economic structure by government plan to implement “socialization of the countryside.” This policy gained momentum and intensification after its ratification in 1977, with the creation of the state companies and cooperatives of production.

The implementation of this policy was made following Marxist-Leninist socio-economic, political and cultural ideology. Within this ideology, after independence FRELIMO put great emphasis on using the experience brought from the liberated zone during the struggle of liberation, which in turn was inspired by African socialism developed by President Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. Yet, the majority of Mozambicans did not have any experience of functioning in an agricultural and trade collective, either as labourers or as management.

The result of this policy after its first years of implementation was a disconnection between the family and private sectors in agriculture and rural trade left by the colonial system. African socialism, as articulated by President Machel and FRELIMO, based itself only partially on the economic structure left by the colonial economy. Up until the end of the 1960s,

Mozambican economic structure had been based on semi-mechanized agricultural production depending strongly on African forced labour, as a rural proletariat, using rudimentary means of production. With this legacy, it was difficult for the policy of “socialization of the countryside” to radically transform a mainly rural society, with little industrial base, into a Soviet-style socialism as had happened in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, as a party and as a government after Mozambique’s independence on 25 June 1975, on 24 July of the same year, FRELIMO proclaimed a policy to nationalize land and intervene in other socio-economic sectors. This meant that the rural population would not regain their rights to the fertile land that had recently been under the control of white farmers. Many were obliged to leave lands reoccupied at independence and live in communal villages and work in collective agricultural production.

This kind of socio-economic structure was new in comparison to the dispersed form of habitation and production left by the colonial government, except in the concentrated and fortified villages established by the colonial regime in some provinces (such as Tete) already threatened by liberation guerrillas. Older social relationships based on birth, consanguinity and other traditional affinities need much further study to understand how and to what extent the rural population maintained such relations in the colonial system and their degree of resilience in the rapidly changing post-colonial system.

The dependent economic structure brought about by the “socialization of the countryside” pushed the rural population to depend heavily upon FRELIMO *cadres* (GDs), beginning with gaining access to land. The rural population depended on the *cadres* for space for habitation in communal villages, means of agricultural production (agricultural instruments, seeds, fertilizers, etc.), as well as access to markets to sell their agricultural crops and to buy manufactured domestic goods. Security in communal villages and cooperatives was also dependent on FRELIMO *cadres* and its army.

Intensified dependence of the rural population living in communal villages on the FRELIMO army was the consequence of the development of the RENAMO war against the government; the collective villages were the principal target of RENAMO in undermining the FRELIMO socialist system in the 1980s. The extent to which the communal villages were seen as safe areas when these villages were the first target of RENAMO attacks needs much further examination. How did the rural population manage these different political orientations, with

FRELIMO cadres obliging the population to live in communal villages and work in production cooperatives that were the first target of RENAMO attacks?

The development of the RENAMO war also had a strong negative influence on the implementation of the policy of socialization of countryside. The war interrupted communication and the rural market networks between the production zones and commercial centres. In the case of Manica district, this interruption happened between Manica city and its administrative villages. Consequently, agricultural production and trade in Manica district developed only in the immediate vicinity of Manica city itself and the area traversed by the Beira Corridor to the Machipanda border with Zimbabwe and Mutare, which were considered safe zones protected by the presence of the Zimbabwean and Mozambican armies.

Even so, in these areas the basic food security was not guaranteed by production from the state agricultural companies and farm and the production cooperatives. Food security was guaranteed by family and private production. Socialization of countryside did not mean the elimination of family and private initiative in agriculture or indeed in others sectors of production. This means that the economic structure developed in Mozambique after independence, from 1975 to 1987, contained coexisting systems of production: the government administered sector based on state companies supported by the rural population living in communal villages and working in production cooperatives, and the family and private sectors operated by the majority of rural dwellers. Much further deep research is needed to understand how these two economic systems functioned together during the policy of “socialization of countryside” from 1975 to 1983.

FRELIMO’s Fourth Congress in 1983 resulted in the beginning of the end of the policy of rural socialization, the radical restructuring of state farms and introduction economic adjustment policies in 1984. This new direction came to be institutionalized with neo-liberal economic adjustment in 1987. This process gave the majority of the rural population the possibility to engage in the informal market as a strategy of survival under the volatile conditions of economic instability and war, which only came to an end in 1992, giving more opportunities to the family and private sectors to develop rural production.

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