

CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH RESULTS

2.1 : INTRODUCTION

This Chapter presents the data obtained from respondents in reply to the survey questions. The research questions identified in the Appendices are, and for easy reference listed again below:

- “In general, how would you characterise the first electoral process held in Angola in 1992, held in Mozambique in 1994, under the National list of Proportional Representation electoral system, after 17 years of armed conflict?”.
- “What difficulties were encountered or faced for the 1991 Bicesse Accords (for Angola) for the 1992 Roma Peace Accords (for Mozambique), to be effectively and efficiently applied, with regard to the assembly, demobilisation, disarmament of troops and their social reintegration?”
- “How did people assess the role of the National Electoral Commission, in terms of the organisation of the first ever general elections in Angola, in Mozambique, with regard to the voting registration, the programme of civic education of the citizens in voting the electoral campaign and the counting of the electoral results?”
- “What was to you the meaning of the first multiparty elections held in Angola in 1992, in Mozambique in 1994?”
- “In your understanding did the voting process reflect the free choice of the voter? To what extent did the process of voting contribute to the mechanism of conflict management in Angola/Mozambique?”

- “Furthermore, in your understanding, did the voter make an intentional choice, i.e. an independent choice, or did the voter cast his or her vote under pressure, being influenced by his or her ignorance, illiteracy or fear?”
- Could it be said that the voting process in Angola/ Mozambique was influenced by ethnic factors?”
- “What legal instruments and institutions were in place to prior and during the electoral campaign that may have facilitated the emergence of other minority political parties for their participation into the national electoral process?”
- “In a comparative study of the election outcomes in Angola/ Mozambique, some academic theorists specialised in elections, such as Lijphart and Reynolds, indicated that these Lusophone countries had two different outcomes. Angola faced a post-electoral crisis and Mozambique had a peaceful transition, in spite of the fact that both countries had opted for the same PR electoral system choice. In this context, what comparisons can be drawn from the experiences of Angola and Mozambique, within the ambit of their respective electoral processes vis-à-vis democracy and the building of a democratic and law-abiding state ?”

2.2: DISCUSSION

“In general, how would you characterize the first electoral process held in Angola in 1992 and in Mozambique in 1994, under the national list of Proportional Representation electoral system after 17 years of armed conflict?”

Respondents from Angola described *the first electoral process held in 1992 to have been without major incidents and commended the high turnout of 92%. Of an estimated voting population of 5.3 million, 4.862.748 voters were registered. The rate of absenteeism was really insignificant. In addition to that were eleven presidential candidates and eighteen political parties running the race, which also reflected a great lesson in patriotism and civic and political culture on the part of the Angolan people whose overwhelming majority voted for peace and reconciliation and nation-building instead of continuing civil war*⁹.

As acknowledged by Hodges (2001:172), the failure of the peace process can partly be explained by Jonas Savimbi's failure to convert from military to political leader and his psychological inability to accept short-term defeat and building a long-term base of support outside his traditional Ovimbundu constituency by exploiting the failures of the incumbent regime.

Other respondents asserted *that the 1992 Angolan elections were an opportunity for the development of the democratic project in Angola. It was unique. Now, we see that Unita's combatants, nationalists without a personal project, who have come from the bush, have taken up their tasks and working side by side with other fellow Angolans. Savimbi undermined merely all the wishes of the Angolan people in order to fulfil his personal project. Therefore, Savimbi has never been a democrat and there has never been democracy in his project*¹⁰ⁱ.

As for Mozambique, respondents felt that *the first electoral process held in 1994 was an unprecedented success. For it was equally the first multiparty electoral process in the country's history, following a devastating long devastating civil war*¹¹.

Respondents mentioned that *the success of the Mozambican elections had direct implications on the reassurance and implementation of the Rome Peace Accords, as well as on the role played by the international community in granting financial and material resources which was crucial in determining the electoral success. Most importantly though, the respondents asserted that it brought was the popular consciousness of longing for a definite peace*¹².

“What difficulties were encountered or faced for the 1991 Bicesse Accords for Angola and the 1992 Roma Peace Accords for Mozambique to be effectively and efficiently applied, with regard to the assembly, demobilisation, disarmament of troops and their social reintegration?”

Respondents answered that *in the case of Angola, one of the major difficulties was the high level of mistrust and suspicion between the two former belligerents. Another problem was the time factor. Elections were prepared in a limited period of eighteen months. And the country lacked proper infra-structures after nearly 30 years of destructive war*¹³.

Respondents also held the view that *under the Bicesse Accords, the military component was given priority before elections could be held. This meant that 200,000 soldiers had to be stationed in assembly points for demobilisation and thereafter the formation of a new national army of 50,000 combatants from both government and Unita . However, contrary to the Bicesse Accords, Unita did not allow the hand-over of the territories under its control.*

*This did not prevent the government from not implementing a population census, taking the first step by completing a voters'roll for the elections. As a consequence of Unita's behaviour, the government became more suspicious as to Unita's willingness to adhere to the peace process*¹⁴, leading both parties, **MPLA** and **UNITA**, in violation of the "Triple Zero Option clause"¹⁵ of the peace process, which made the demobilisation process to be far from completion . This clause required the cessation and prohibition of accepting lethal equipment, whatever its origin, by both Government and **UNITA**.

A further difficulty was that the resources made available to **UNAVEM II** were seriously inadequate. Anstee (1993:497-8), making an evaluation about the Angolan electoral process, pointed out that at the highest point, the total number of UN international personnel in Angola came to about one thousand. This might be compared to the successful operation in Namibia where there were something like eight thousand personnel for a population and electorate less than one-sixth of the size of Angola. The total budget for **UNAVEM II** from June 1991 to October 1992, the period in which the operation was initially supposed to be completed, was only \$ 118m, compared to Namibia's \$ 480m.

Respondents felt that *the difficulties encountered in Mozambique may be viewed as twofold: Political mistrust between **FRELIMO** and **RENAMO** and limited logistics. They also pointed out that 'There is always a long distance between the commitment of the international community in support of the democratic processes and the effective materialisation of such commitment. For instance, it became clear that at the end of the democratic transition, the social reintegration of former combatants did not constitute the main concern of ONUMOZ. In practice, ONUMOZ attempted to apply a certain programme for demobilisation and social reintegration that was not sustainable for lack of sufficient funds. It was like a sweet in the mouth of the demobilised people¹⁶.*

Respondents also asserted that *some of the difficulties were related to the many claims launched by **RENAMO** with regard to its combatants, who after being demobilised, did not benefit from the social reintegration 'packages'. However, what became also a 'hot*

issue' in this process of social reintegration was the disarmament due to mistrust and suspicion generated by the long civil war between **FRELIMO** and **RENAMO**. For instance, **RENAMO** until very late did not want to disarm, mainly in the central province of Sofala, its main stronghold¹⁷.

Respondents underlined that the other aspect to look at was that 'the major part of the combatants both from **RENAMO** and **FRELIMO** did not have any further academic or professional training, therefore, demobilisation for them simply meant unemployment. The rise of unemployment brought along a high criminality rate, arms trafficking and social insecurity for most citizens¹⁸.

"How did people assess the role of the National Electoral Commission in terms of the organisation of the first ever general elections in Angola/ Mozambique, with regard to the voting registration, the programme of civic education of the citizens in voting the electoral campaign and the counting of the electoral results?"

Given the great importance of the National Electoral Commissions as the electoral structures, a general overview is provided to enhance the understanding of their *modus operandi* in Angola as well as in Mozambique. In Mozambique, the National Elections Commission was formally established in January 1994, to implement the elections. It had a broad range of powers and responsibilities assigned by both the 1992 Rome peace accords and the electoral law. These powers and responsibilities included ensuring the

freedom and transparency of the elections, registering party coalitions, adjudicating complaints and validating and declaring the electoral results.

The National Electoral Commission whose President is independent, was a separate but parallel electoral institution like the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration. Both institutions were made up of political party representatives. The partisan make up of the National Electoral Commission of ten **FRELIMO** members, seven from **RENAMO**, three unarmed opposition members and one President, Dr. Mazula, selected unanimously by the Commission, and two Vice-Presidents, one each from **FRELIMO** and **RENAMO**, ensured the Commission's political balance, autonomy and independence.

The Technical Secretariat for Election Administration's primary task was the technical administration of the electoral process. Its responsibilities included the conduct of a comprehensive voter education programme aimed at increasing knowledge and building of trust in elections among the voters. This electoral institution was also required to be politically balanced, therefore, its twenty-five members were divided among the parties, with a Director General appointed by the Mozambican President. It equally had two Deputy-Director Generals, one each from **FRELIMO** and **RENAMO**.

In Angola, the National Electoral Council was established under Law 5/92 and was composed of 34 members, chaired by a judge of the Supreme Court who had to be elected by the same Court in its plenary session. The National Electoral Council's membership also included one representative of each political party or coalition of parties, running for elections, in so far as they were formed under the Law on Political Parties.

The National Electoral Council had two main organs: The General Directorate of Elections, whose task was to organise and ensure transparency of the elections at central level; and the Provincial Electoral Councils whose task was the organisation and supervision of the electoral process at provincial level. The 32-member composition of the Provincial Electoral Council included a judge from the Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, a representative of the local government and a representative of each political party or coalition of parties, running for elections and recognised by the law.

In Mozambique, as in Angola, the establishment of the National Electoral Commissions excluded the participation of civil society. Both countries used the United Nations Development Programme experts as neutral buffers. Similarly in both countries, the National Electoral Commissions' decisions could not contradict provisions of the peace accords and all decisions had to be made by consensus.

Angola and Mozambique had similar electoral mechanism structures. It may well be that the difference between them lies in the fact that in Mozambique the electoral institutions were far more expensive, contrary to Angola whose entire electoral process was underfunded. Similar to Mozambique, Angola in a highly polarised political environment, the selection criteria of the members for the National Electoral Commission and the General Directorate of Elections needed perhaps a much more neutral presence to ensure transparency, eliminate fear and build confidence in the entire electoral process. As Roque (1994:51) put it: “The National Electoral Commission was under both President’s control and the General Director of Elections being the latter appointed by the government”¹⁹.

Respondents viewed that *the role played by the National Electoral Commission, as testified by the International observers and the UN Special Representative to Angola, was very pleasing and commendable. It acted with the greatest transparency and seriousness during the entire electoral process*²⁰.

The National Electoral Commission mandate was, among other things, to organise the voters’ roll, to provide civic education to the people and steering the elections. It also provided rules of eligibility, norms and regulations for the electioneering. It ensured the guiding principles for election fundraising and the establishment of polling stations and the announcement of the electoral results.

The National Electoral Commission’s mandate was equally extended to provide time on air both Radio and TV, on equal footing for the presidential candidates and the political

parties. Its mandate came to an end with the announcement of the final electoral results seeing that the second round for the presidential candidates couldn't take place because of **UNITA**'s recourse to war.

Respondents answered that *the main role of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) working in conjunction with its executive organ referred herein as the Technical Secretariat of the Electoral Administration (STAE) in the first multiparty elections held in Mozambique was to rescue the mistrust that existed in relation to Government institutions that have been regarded as siding with **FRELIMO** . The former had been able to conquer the confidence of all the people, despite the great potential of political mistrust between main political organisations. Therefore, the National Electoral Commission backed by the technical and the financial assistance from the international community, performed its duties with exemption.*

In general terms, the role of the National Electoral Commission in Mozambique was positive, not only in terms of overcoming political differences between the former belligerents but mainly in terms of voters' registration, civic education, electoral campaigning and counting of the electoral results which was greatly facilitated by the information technology²¹.

Respondents also noted that *the programme of civic education encountered some difficulties in rural areas because of a high level of illiteracy. The result thereof was that people could be misled seeing that some civic officers were not trustworthy in conveying the civic message attached to the voting. Instead, these officers took advantage of the*

situation by misleading the potential voters and directing them to vote for the party of their own preference²².

“What was the meaning of the first multiparty elections held in Angola in 1992, in Mozambique in 1994?”

Several respondents made the point that the first ever multiparty elections held in Angola in 1992 meant the birth of a new reconciled nation after many decades of war. But this sentiment was soon reversed through intense disappointment since the wish for peace and a democratic rule, expressed by the majority of the population, was hijacked by weapons of ambition by those who had been democratically defeated but were not abiding by the results of the elections. The Angolan people viewed the resumption of war as a contradiction and an aberration between the promises of peace and the belief in a democracy and the position of taking up arms'. Why have the electoral disputes not been resolved by the contesting parties, by any other peaceful mechanism other than violent means²³, they asked.

Respondents answered that the first ever multiparty elections held in Mozambique meant aiming at cementing peace and opened up a new page in that country's history after 19 years of monopolyism. With elections, new political parties were created and a new democratic government came out from the electoral legitimacy monitored by the

international community. Therefore, the first elections were the stepping stone of the democratic process in Mozambique by which the universal suffrage was adopted to vote the country's leadership. Respondents assured that in the Mozambican case, above all, the voters cast their ballots for peace, to avoid the Angola debacle²⁴.

In your understanding did the voting process reflect the free choice of the voter? To what extent did the process of voting contribute to the mechanism of conflict management in Angola and Mozambique?

*In Angola, respondents answered that the main threat and to some extent the stumbling block to the voting process and the free choice of the voter, contrary to the spirit and letter of Bicesse Accords, was the unwillingness on the part of **UNITA** during and after the elections to hand-over its held territories under government control as if there was a state-within-a-state and not allowing other contesting parties to campaign in such areas. Such attitude encouraged **UNITA** that had its military capacity almost intact to return to war by failing to demobilise its army.*

*Therefore, it became clear from the beginning that **UNITA** did not want to fully cooperate to the political and military processes to put an end to the Angolan conflict. Contrary to government controlled areas in **UNITA**'s held territories people did not have much freedom of choice. The only choice that people had most of whom were held in*

captivity was to choose UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. In such areas the voting process was far from creating an enabling environment contributing to the mechanism of conflict management in Angola²⁵. For Savimbi, as Bender (2001:94) put it: “Peace is not power, we are not interested in peace, only in power”²⁶.

Respondents in Mozambique underscored that the voter’s choice was intentional. This was so because the main intention of the voters was to cast the ballot for peace thanks to the civic education. However, respondents contended that in some regions the vote was conditioned to serve only peace. In other words, it became an issue of public concern attitudes taken by the traditional rulers (Regulos) and healers (Curandeiros) during the elections whose actions clearly manipulated the popular will in some districts and localities.

For instance, due to the common fear that always existed around the magical power of the traditional rulers and healers and partly because the democratic process was not yet embedded in the people’s culture. Those local authorities put pressure on the households for families to vote to the party not of latter’s choice but of the traditional rulers and healers’ choice²⁷.

Respondents, however, agreed that it was generally accepted that the electoral process in Mozambique reflected the free choice of the electorate for did not have a massive political manipulation as the main objective was to vote for peace which inherently contributed to the management of conflict resolution in that country²⁸.

Furthermore, in your understanding, did the voter make an intentional choice or the voter cast his or her vote under pressure being influenced by his or her ignorance, illiteracy or fear?

In Angola, several respondents concurred that the above question is related to the previous one. One respondent made the point that in *UNITA's held territories the vote cast was greatly influenced by fear with a degree of ignorance and illiteracy. However, in Government held territories there was a great deal of voting for peace and putting an end to the long conflict though there was also a sense of ignorance and illiteracy among voters which resulted to final counting of a relative number of blank ballot papers*²⁹.

In Mozambique, the majority of respondents also acknowledged that *the above question is related to the previous one. They asserted, however, that ' the voter made an intentional choice because civic education campaign played a significant role in electioneering though illiteracy and fear may have had some influence but not to the extent of changing anything substantive*³⁰.

One respondent remarked that *the voter made an intentional choice but under duress for up until the day of voting there was a looming fear that **RENAMO** would resort to war. This made some people to vote to avoiding war namely in the most war affected central and northern regions of Mozambique exactly where **RENAMO** obtained the majority of votes*³¹.

Another respondent underlined *that in rural areas where resides the majority of the Mozambican population people have been misled by the voting procedure. For instance, in such areas people have been told by some unscrupulous civic officers that if a voter doesn't like **RENAMO**, **FRELIMO** or any other party should place a mark "X" in the ballot paper and this had an opposing effect which was to vote in favor of that very specific party*³².

Could it be said that the voting process in Angola and Mozambique was influenced by ethnic factors?

While ethnicity was crucial to the origins of the Angolan and Mozambican nationalisms, the liberation wars and post-independence wars supported by the Cold War rivalry reinforced the concept of the Angolan and Mozambican nations and weakened the concept of ethnicity which in its negative form was tied up with colonial political legacy of 'divide and rule'. Ethnicity in this ambit is understood in its proactive form by which voters were identified themselves who they were within the context of a national community based on shared history, social geography, language and culture by volunteering themselves and without being manipulated from the political parties' leadership.

Both **MPLA** and **FRELIMO** having headed a successful anti-colonial struggle against Portuguese rule made these two armed political organisations capable in bringing

together the diverse elements of Angolan and Mozambican societies for the attainment of the shared objective of independence.

This explains for instance the national and not ethnic distribution of the vote in Mozambique. For legislative vote, in the north, **FRELIMO** obtained 20 seats in Nampula, **RENAMO** 32, while **RENAMO** obtained 6 in Cabo Delgado and 4 in Niassa and **FRELIMO** 22. In the Centre, **FRELIMO** obtained 3 in Sofala, 4 in Manica and 5 in Tete; **RENAMO** obtained 57. In the South, **RENAMO** obtained 1 seat in Maputo Province and Maputo City and 3 in Inhambane. **FRELIMO** obtained 57.

These results clearly demonstrate that although **RENAMO**'s initial base was among the Ndau, Senas, Nyanjas, Tongas and Shonas, the whole centre of Mozambique; and **FRELIMO** backed mainly by Makondes in the north and Shanganes in the south. The reality is that each party scored particularly well across the country. **FRELIMO** won with relative comfort in two of the three northern provinces (Cabo Delgado and Niassa) and scored astonishing victories in all the southern provinces of Gaza, Maputo, Maputo City and Inhambane. Whereas **RENAMO** won comfortably in northern province of Nampula and in all four central provinces of Tete, Zambezia, Manica and Sofala. As Haines and Hoods (1995) put it: "Interestingly, ethnic considerations not feature prominently in the elections... Again, there seems little relationship between ethnic particularism and political allegiance"³³.

Brito (1994) making an analytical assessment of the founding elections in Mozambique and the geographic repartition of voting argues that there was a polarisation of the electorate around the two main political formations, **FRELIMO** and **RENAMO** and their presidential candidates.

Furthermore, Brito (1994) contends that such polarisation brought about the territorial concentration of voting of each of these two political formations which translates a degree of local voting hegemony given the war historical past and roots of these political parties.

Brito(1994) also makes the point that the voters'electoral behavior is determined by factors linked to the conjuncture of the specific time in which elections are held and it also lies on the idea that voters react and decide on the manifestoes that are offered by parties and/ or by candidates.

By the same token, Pereira (1994) making an evaluation of the 1992 Angolan elections suggests that the electorate did not fragment along ethnic lines as some predictions indicated it would, because of Angola's ethno-cultural diversity and long years of internationalised civil war.

First, Pereira (1994) based on credible data dismisses the argument that the incumbent regime was controlling larger population as the electorate in each of the two main

contending parties was about the same size. In addition, he argues that blank and spoiled ballots was similar in each party's core area.

In terms of election results, **UNITA** performed well by scoring an average of 76 percent for the National Assembly and 80 per cent for the Presidency in its 'core' region of support in the South-central provinces of Benguela, Bie, Huambo and Kuando-Kubango. Similarly, the **MPLA** won comfortably in the northern home provinces of Luanda, Bengo, Kwanza-Norte and Malange by scoring an average of 85 per cent for the National Assembly and 81 per cent for the Presidency.

However, what determined the elections, Pereira (1994) argues was the outcome of the impressive support received in ten peripheral provinces, where about 40 per cent of the country's electorate voted. In such areas **MPLA** averaged 77 per cent for the National Assembly and for the Presidency compared to **UNITA**'s 23 per cent.

Furthermore, in the rural provinces, far from the **MPLA**'s Luanda base, this party secured a significant support from Lunda- Norte, Lunda-Sul and even in both Kwanza-Sul and Huila provinces claimed to have belonged to **UNITA**'s popularity.

In view of the above, Pereira (1994) concludes that it is evident that rather than fragmenting along ethnic or regional lines, the Angolan electorate appears to have solidified around the two truly national parties, each of which had a very different view of, and project for, the nation.

Cilliers and Dietrich (2001:103-106) arguing on ethnicity in Angola, they highlight the fact that **UNITA**'s ethno-nationalism has been tolerated but not fully accepted by all Ovimbundu sub-groups. Constant purges within **UNITA** suggest that Savimbi's hegemony was based on coercion rather than consent. Cilliers and Dietrich further argue that the political project of **FNLA** and **UNITA** has never been national but sub-national. In other words, beyond the rethoric, these two Angolan political organisations were primarily concerned with the aspirations of a particular ethnic groups-Bacongo-Mbundu or Ovimbundu, not the creation of a multi-ethnic and multi-racial Angolan state. Contrary to **MPLA**'s strong ethnic appeal has integrated and homogenised the nation by creating a minimal sense of national identity.

In Angola, respondents answered first that *the voting process was not influenced by ethnic factors because the electorate did not fragment along ethnic lines. It is true though that each main contending political party lied on its ethno-cultural ground either Bakongo, Kimbundu, Ovimbundu or other but ethnic appeals of solidarity rang hollow in country that faced many years of long civil war in which for instance, Ovimbundus were killed by their fellow Ovimbundus, as the cases of Tito Chingungi, Wilson Fernandes and former Secretary-General of the MPLA and Prime Minister, Marcolino Moco, whose entire family was reportedly to have been killed by UNITA in Huambo in February 1993.*

Secondly, **MPLA** and **UNITA** as the main contenders had different approaches in relation to elections which was determined by their manifestoes . **MPLA** embraced an ethnic diversity and made a strong cross- ethnic appeal for national building and

*reconciliation by recruiting voters across the entire nation*³⁴. As Pereira (1994:22) put it: “ The **MPLA** secured an average of 24 percent of the two-party vote in the four ‘home’ provinces of **UNITA**, whereas the corresponding figure for the latter in their reversed equation was just 15 per cent”³⁵. In contrast, *UNITA’s campaign rhetoric was based on ethnic Ovimbundu redemption that is fighting for a better place for the Ovimbundu that constitutes approximately a third of the entire population under the Angolan sun against Kimbundos and Mesticos (mixed race) and whites*³⁶.

However, what was also mistaken on the part of **UNITA** , among other things, was the fact that more than half of the Angolan army among high-ranking officers were and still are Ovimbundus as well as a number of appointed ministerial and deputy ministerial positions were being held by Ovimbundu in a **MPLA**-led government. Hodges (2001:27) responding to the claim of the ethnic factor in the Angolan conflict argued that large numbers of Ovimbundus uprooted by the fighting in the Planalto central have sought refuge in the government-controlled towns. Furthermore, many Ovimbundus were fighting in the government forces. Therefore, ethnic identity in the Angolan conflict has rarely been characterised by outbursts of inter-communal violence, acts of ethnic cleansing or communally based massacres of civilians. In this respect, it is quite different from the conflicts in more ethnically polarised African societies, such as Burundi and Rwanda.

In Mozambique, respondents generally answered *that although the trend of voting in Mozambique could be regionalised. The truth of the matter is that voting can not be*

*ethnicised*³⁷. As Haines and Wood (1995) put it: “Interestingly ethnic considerations did not feature prominently in the elections. While it is probable the case of mixed ethnic origin have been disproportionately influential in **FRELIMO**, that organization is generally cosmopolitan, reflecting the highly diverse nature of Mozambican society”³⁸.

What legal instruments and institutions were in place prior and during the electoral campaign that may have facilitated the emergency of the other minority political parties for their participation into the national electoral process?

In Angola, respondents observed *that prior and during the electoral campaign there was a great deal of legislation package that was in place deemed necessary by all political parties in order to safeguard and implement the on-going democratic reforms. This legislation package included the constitutional revision law n-.12/91 that proclaimed a democratic state based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, and introduced a multiparty political system away from a Socialist and one-party state. This law was followed by other laws such as laws n-.14/91 and 21/91 aimed at creating associations and political parties, and the right to strike law n-.23/91.*

Furthermore, other laws were passed as the right to broadcast and the right to political response and objection of political parties n-. 8/92. Other pertinent laws were law n-.1/92 and n-.6/92 on the Electoral process and International Electoral Observation related to the international observation of the various stages of the electoral process.

At institutional level, it was significant the creation of the National Media Council under law n-.7/92 which included in its membership representatives of the incumbent government, the main political parties, the judiciary and the press itself. This Council had a mandate to ensure press freedom and a code of conduct for all the political parties.

The other important institution was the National Electoral Council whose two main organs were the General Directorate of Elections and the Provincial Councils. The National Electoral Council had the mandate to coordinate and execute the electoral registration and all electoral related activities³⁹.

*In Mozambique, respondents held the view that the multiparty process was introduced through the 1990 constitution. Hence, it was before the signing of the 1992 Rome Peace General Agreement. The opening up for the participation of the political parties into the national political arena had already been provided for in the 1990 constitution which became effective after 1992. With regard to the emergence of political parties, respondents felt that the 5% threshold imposed by the PR electoral system choice penalised the smaller parties. In other words, a party could only have a parliamentary seat if it had achieved a minimum 5% of voting, and this led to coalition building such as **RENAMO-Electoral Union** as a means for smaller parties to achieve some kind of representativity as it were⁴⁰.*

One respondent alluded the fact of *the existence of the Trust Fund for the political parties legally formed as well as the **ONUMOZ**'s role as having been an enabling environment for the emergency of the new political parties in Mozambique*⁴¹.

In a comparative study of the elections outcomes in Angola and Mozambique, some academic theorists specialised on the elections such as Lijphart and Reynolds indicated that those two Lusophone countries had two different outcomes. Angola faced a post-electoral crisis and Mozambique had a peaceful transition, in spite of the fact that those two countries had chosen the same **PR** electoral system choice. In this context, what comparisons can be drawn from the experiences of Angola and Mozambique within the ambit of their respective electoral processes, vis-à-vis, democracy and the building of the democratic and law-abiding state?

In Angola, respondents answered *that electoral experiences of Angola and Mozambique shouldn't be viewed in linear terms or based on any particular electoral system such as list **PR**. They asserted that different outcomes were not due to the adoption of list **PR** but by other complex factors such as internal, regional and international contexts in which the two processes occurred. In the case of Angola, the vast natural resources of this country added another dimension to the post-electoral crisis, seeing that such economic conditions propitiate an environment that can also fuel conflicts instead of resolving them*⁴².

Angolan respondents while recognising the merit of the **PR** list *they categorically rejected the link with such electoral system choice as being the cause of the post-electoral crisis. Instead they argued that was the military posture of the **UNITA** leader who did not accept the final electoral results and did not appreciate many concessions made by the government including the offer of Vice-Presidency for Savimbi himself that precipitated the return to war. Savimbi was the main cause of the post-electoral crisis. He has never been prepared to accept multiparty democracy if Unita had not won the elections. Contrary to Mozambique where the leader of the main opposition, **RENAMO**, accepted the defeat as the popular verdict of democracy⁴³.*

In Mozambique, respondents alluded to the fact the **FRELIMO** and **RENAMO** had a genuine longing for peace contrary to Angola. They also contended that **UNITA**'s objectives was to grab power at any cost whereas **RENAMO**'s objectives were more focused on the real meaning of democracy. Therefore, list-**PR** and its merit should not be questioned⁴⁴.

2.3 : CONCLUSION

This study aims to probe the actual role of list **PR** in order to determine the degree to which such electoral system can have a determining effect on electoral outcomes in emerging democracies.

The subject of holding elections in Angola and Mozambique must be viewed both at international, regional and local level, because of the **UN** engagement and other international actors in ensuring a peaceful transition. Most importantly both elections happened in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War which prompted the realignment of global politics in these two countries.

The long run view developed by Reynolds and Lijphart about the list **PR** in determining a country's peaceful electoral outcomes seems to be static and the findings results attempt to overcome such weakness in a more realistic way by showing that particular important variables and issues than list **PR** such as the country's political, social and economic context and attitudes of the leaders of the major opposition political parties enable us to explore in dept the causes of crisis and peace in Angola and Mozambique for these two countries' different democratic electoral outcomes.

As Hodges (2001:167) put it : “ No one factor fully explains this difference in outcome. In Angola, personal factors, particularly in the case of Savimbi, have played a role. However, there does seem to be an overwhelming body of evidence to suggest that a large part of the answer lies in Angola's endowment of mineral resources...By contrast,

Mozambique is a much poorer country and its political factions do not have access to mineral rents”⁴⁵

2.4 :THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

This comparative study has attempted to identify several factors with regard to the electoral process and their eventual link to the list **PR** in the outcome of the 1992 and 1994 elections in Angola and Mozambique, respectively.

The importance of this study lies on the identification of the idiosyncratic factors as well as the discovery of their interplay in the outcome of the elections. The Angolan case study demonstrates, among other things, lack of full compliance with demilitarisation and the electoral process was never concluded and it should only be concluded with the second round of the presidential elections. It also highlights the absence of international and regional pressure on **UNITA**’s rebel movement and the fact that the **UN** mission in Angola which was under funded and under staffed and engaged in the accomplishments in short-time of the complexity of the tasks of restoring peace in a such vast country became unable to be an effective third party of dissuasion, therefore, the option was a “quick-fix solution”⁴⁶. Equally, the withdrawal of **UNITA** personnel from the National army not waiting for the outcome of the first round of elections or the **UN** efforts to investigate allegations of electoral fraude led to the return of civil war.

Contrary to Mozambique, the entire electoral process was completed and both the government's forces and those of **RENAMO** have been considerably depleted. Furthermore, most **RENAMO**'s traditional backers South Africa and Malawi dropped their assistance to that Mozambican armed rebel movement, and therefore at the close of the election campaign **RENAMO** simply did not have the military capacity to resume hostilities.

2.5: THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The study found the need to withdraw the burden placed on the list **PR** system by assessing and examining other factors that have impact on the electoral outcomes. Furthermore, the study acknowledges that elections are not a simple solution neither the PR system

The study also found that the electoral process with the electoral system based on the principles of list **PR** requires that the letter and the spirit of free and fair elections are adhered to by all parties to ensure the legitimacy of the elections outcomes and peaceful transition as was the case of Mozambique where the **RENAMO**'s leader, despite initial claims of rigged elections, accepted the electoral outcomes and asserted his role as the leader of the major opposition party.

In Angola, the study found that in theory **UNITA** embraced the Bicesse Peace Accords, but in practice even before the elections were held, that military organisation was implementing the use of force through delaying tactics by occupying more municipalities and adamantly rejecting to hand over the territories under its control. As Dietrich (2001) put it: "At the end of 1992, Savimbi rejected the results of the national elections and returned to war, taking the most lucrative diamond producing areas, including the newly developed Odebrecht facilities at Luzamba"⁴⁷.

The 1992 elections in Angola represent an unhealthy precedent in the experiences of democratic transitions and should not be replicated neither in that country nor elsewhere on the African continent. The loser should have no right whatsoever to side-stepped the democratic process simply because the electoral outcomes do not favour them by resorting to war. As Fatton (1995) citing Bayart (1991) put it: “When military power is invoked to settle electoral outcomes, democracy has lost its meaning and becomes a tragic farce breeding popular alienation and cynicism”⁴⁸.

2.6: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

It is hoped that the findings which arise from this research will be of some value, contributing to more certain and accurate predictions of the study of electoral systems and list **PR** in particular, in countries of emerging democracies like Angola and Mozambique that faced long years of armed civil conflict.

The findings also suggest more comparative research is necessary to examine and identify the need for incumbent regimes and opposition parties to create new strategies and attitudes that enhance electoral political transition in Africa through peaceful means by establishing enforcing constitutional and institutional mechanisms that prevent and control the divisive effects of electoral processes.

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