

A REFLECTION ON THE *POLIS FOR PIGS* – SOCRATES' TRUE AND HEALTHY POLIS

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Abstract

Plato in his dialogue the *Republic* designs an ideal polis, the Kallipolis, seeking ‘justice, our good and the knowledge of the good required for understanding and bringing justice, happiness and good government into our lives and society’ (Santas 2010, p.7). The first step in the Kallipolis’ development is a polis without formal government whose citizens live a modest, stable, sustainable lifestyle. Disparaged by Glaucon as a *polis for pigs*, Socrates’ incongruous rejoinder is ‘the true polis... is the one we’ve described, the healthy one, as it were’ (*Rep.* 372e). Contemporary commentators are critical of this polis, questioning its role in the *Republic*. In trying to understand the *polis for pigs*, and Socrates’ praise thereof, I posit it is a village, and consider it has virtue, is good and its citizens are happy. However, despite being true and healthy, it is not the best or an ideal polis, but it is crucial to the development of the Kallipolis.

Declaration

I declare that this report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals, in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university.

Arnold Christianson
16th March 2015

Dedication

For Our Darling Daughter Dr Sarah Ann Christianson MBBCh (Wits) DA (SA)
1977-2008

She chose to dedicate her Life to her Family, Friends, Colleagues and last but never least her Patients.

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Preface

This project has its origin in a coincidence of ideas, the phenomenon of two or more people with no apparent connection and separated by space or time, or both, developing similar ideas. In 2008, in celebration of Charles Darwin's 200th birthday and the 150th anniversary of the publication of *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*, I delivered a lecture to the University of the Witwatersrand's Division of Human Genetics entitled *A Reflection on Modified Mud*.¹

Considering how life on earth began from "modified mud" and the untold number of species, including Man, that subsequently evolved, I describe the different forms of Life and their effect on the environment. This is described by Charles Darwin in closing *On the Origin of Species* as:

‘There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved’ (1859, p. 490).

That was until the last 12 000 years of Man's existence and influence on earth. In those 12 000 years, and particularly during the Anthropocene, the 250 years since the start of the Industrial Revolution, in a moment of time humankind ‘has thrown every fundamental, life-sustaining system on Earth off kilter’ (Sachs, 2008, pp. 67-68) and caused the sixth, great extinction of species, but the ‘only one in which one species has pushed the others over the cliff’ (Sachs, 2008, p. 72). Cogitating on this, I proposed in my lecture that the current destruction of the environment can be directly attributed to humankind's unreasoned and avaricious behaviour, which, if our environment is to survive to sustain the over nine billion people expected on Earth by 2050, we will need to control.

Early humankind, the San hunter-gathers, existed as small communities in a state of absolute scarcity on the edge of extinction. Living in nature as families they initially divided their

¹ On evolution, Benjamin Disraeli, the British Prime Minister, opines at the Oxford Diocesan Conference in 1864 ‘Is man an ape or an angel? My Lord, I'm on the side of the angels’ (Browne, 2003, pp. 251-252). In 1863 Sir Charles Lyell, renowned geologist whose ideas were central to Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, wrote to Thomas S Spedding ‘The question of the origin of species gave much to think of, and... cost me a great struggle to renounce my old creed. One of Darwin's reviewers put the alternative strongly by asking ‘whether we are to believe that Man is modified mud or modified monkey. The mud is a great come-down from the ‘archangel ruined.’ (Lyell, 1881, pp. 375-376).

labours on gender-based lines, with women gathering fruit, vegetables, small animals, insects and making the clothing, and men hunting large animals for meat and hides. Both men and women assisted with raising the children.

Co-operating and trading with each other individually and between communities, they moved continuously in search of the best resourced areas for food, water and clothing, and perhaps a little extra, if available, for occasional pleasure. The primary objective of these families and communities was survival and reproduction, thereby ensuring future continuity, and not the acquisition of possessions and wealth.^{2,3,4}

Arguably one of the most significant events in humankind's history occurs 10 000 to 12 000 years ago; the advent of settled village life or sedentism. The transition from a nomadic lifestyle to a settled existence was largely made possible by humankind's ability to reason and domesticate plants and animals. Now women and men did not have to dedicate their daily lives to the acquisition of food and other basic necessities. For the first time, the production of a sustainable supply of food provides the opportunity and time for reasoned thought and specialisation.⁵

Subsequent improvements in agriculture and later the industrial production of goods ensured that life over the millennia was progressively more sustainable, with enough for the growing number of people to live, and increasingly a significant and growing percentage of people to exercise their excessive wants.⁶

Over the last 65 years, in the face of ultimately finite and fragile resources, humankind has grossly overproduced both people and products. The overproduction of products is to satisfy the largely unreasoned expectations and demands for luxury, that is for 'things which go beyond what is necessary for a city' (*Rep.*, 373b), for the unconstrained upper and upper-middle classes— *avaricious Man*.⁷ In the process we ignore the poverty of billions, and do untold

²Leakey, 1979, pp. 148-149.

³Schapera, 1930, pp. 75, 91.

⁴Wilson, 1978, pp. 82-83, 139.

⁵Douglas S Massey, 2002, p.10.

⁶When I developed the lecture in 2008 I had not read the *Republic*. Having done so for the first time in 2013 I can now equate 'excessive wants' with Plato's 'unnecessary, including lawless, appetitive desires' following Reeve (1998, pp. 43-47).

⁷ From the 2008 World Bank Development Indicators, 20% of the World's people live on more than US \$10/day (*the reasonably well-off to wealthy*), 30% (*the poor*) on less than US\$10/day, with just under 50% (*the abject poor*) of the world's people surviving on less than US \$2 a day. (My italics).

Global Issues.[<http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/poverty-facts-and-stats>]

damage to the Earth and thus humankind's future. I conclude that modern Man is no angel, let alone an Archangel¹, and to achieve resurrection "will have to learn again to live to their needs and not their excessive wants".

Some 2400 years prior to my ruminations, Plato, a Greek of aristocratic descent in the prime of mid-life, well-educated and travelled, a writer, soldier, politician for a limited time, wise from life's experience, philosophised on needs and desires. He associated them with humankind's motivations and in his seminal philosophical text the *Republic* related them to justice and injustice in his quest to define his ideal state, the Kallipolis.

Approached from a different perspective from mine but with a similar concern in mind, the welfare of the polis, Plato's consideration offers a solution. Humankind must find a way to govern their excessive wants if justice is to prevail in the polis.

‘If you are designing an ideal society, as Plato does in the *Republic*, and contrasting it with the corruptions of existing societies, as he also does in the *Republic*, then you need to think about much more than political institutions in a narrow sense. You need to think about all the influences, all the ideas, images, and practices, that make up the culture of a society. I do not mean “high culture”, but culture in a more anthropological sense - the sense my dictionary defines as “the total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the shared bases of social action.” Even this definition is not broad enough, for it makes no mention of the material culture of a society - its characteristic artefacts, its buildings, even the kinds of landscape it creates. Plato did not forget the material culture.’

M F Burnyeat, 1997, pp. 217-218.

1. Introduction

In the *Republic*, in the context of a dramatic dialogue between Socrates, Plato's older brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, and several associates on 'the way we ought to live' (*Rep.* 352d),⁸ Plato has Socrates offer an account of 'justice, our good and the knowledge of the good required for understanding and bringing justice, happiness and good government into our lives and society' (Santas, 2010, p.7).

To achieve this end, Socrates and his interlocutors discuss different societal states, each a polis⁹ of a different nature, to seek and define justice and injustice in the polis. The first is Thrasymachus' state in which 'justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger' (*Rep.* 388c). Here the stronger are those ruling the state— 'democracy makes democratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical laws and so on for the others' (*Rep.* 338d-e).

The second polis discussed is Glaucon's social contractarian polis (*Rep.* 358c-359c), in which justice is not intrinsically, but merely instrumentally, good. His contractarian theory is a new consideration for the circumstances and nature of justice, at that time.¹⁰ Here the weak band together to confront the strong and formulate an agreement with them so that both groups can live harmoniously, thus achieving justice.

Socrates details his own account of the origin, development, nature and administration of justice in three poleis, culminating in the Kallipolis (*Rep.* Books II-V). He begins by describing how a polis theoretically comes into being, in order to see how justice and injustice originate therein (*Rep.* 369c-372d). What he develops is a settlement of craftsmen who are capable of providing for their needs and who live an apparently settled, modest and peaceful existence.

The way of life in this nascent polis is rejected by Socrates' interlocutors, particularly Glaucon, who, referring to the polis's simple, bucolic lifestyle, disparages it as a *polis for pigs*. Subsequently, most commentators have followed suit, criticising the *polis for pigs* as being unrealistic, in respect of its structure, functioning and the character of its citizens. As such the role of *polis for pigs* in the *Republic* is questioned.

⁸ For this dissertation I am using the GMA Grube translation, revised by CDC Reeve, 1998.

⁹ Here I am using the word polis following Grube (*Rep.* p. 44 [footnote]), for a community of people. This differentiates it from a 'city', which is a misnomer. I will return to this issue later.

¹⁰ Quote from Lycophron the alleged originator of contractarian theory (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1280b 7-11).

After Glaucon's criticism of the *polis for pigs*, Socrates, to accommodate Glaucon's expectations for, and perhaps given his social status his considered entitlement to a more civilised lifestyle, readily agrees to expand the polis into a *luxurious* polis, to 'see how justice and injustice grow up in cities' (*Rep.* 372e). However, before proceeding, Socrates makes the seemingly throwaway remark that '[Y]et the true city (polis), in my opinion, is the one we've described, the healthy one, as it were' (*Rep.* 372e). It is this statement that stimulated this study, and to which it is devoted to understanding.

Given the breadth of vision and the attention to detail encompassed in Plato's exposition of the Kallipolis, his relatively sparse reflection on the *polis for pigs* (*Rep.* 369c-372e), which he considers to be the true and healthy polis, seems incongruous. With Socrates' riposte to Glaucon that the *polis for pigs*' 'way of life won't satisfy some people' (*Rep.* 373a), one has to ask why so little has been written on the development, functioning and role of this polis in the *Republic*.

'The first polis (*Rep.* 369a-372d) is a notorious stumbling block to interpretation [of the *Republic*]' (Reeve, 1988, p.176). Donald Morrison supports this opinion, deeming the '*city for pigs* deeply puzzling', questioning if whether it is a false start and whether Socrates 'abandons this first city because it has some fatal flaw' (2007, p. 250). Others question the likelihood, even the possibility, of its existence, criticise its functioning, and disparage the character of its citizens thereby diminishing its role in Plato's project.

What then is this *polis for pigs*, and what in its functioning and the behaviour and character of its citizens, lead authorities in the field to question it so severely, whilst Socrates, who always seeks knowledge and truth, sings its praises?

In this dissertation I will try to answer the following questions. What is the *polis for pigs* and which features of it justify Socrates' description of it as true and healthy? Then, what is the *polis for pigs*' relationship to the *luxurious* polis and the Kallipolis and what is its role in the *Republic*? Finally, derived from Dickinson (1931, p. 13-14), I will reflect on the relevance of the *polis for pigs* in today's global, riven unhappy polis.

To achieve the above I will first describe the *polis for pigs*, which I deem a village, highlighting the issues that recommend this consideration. I will then describe the contemporary commentaries on the *polis for pigs*. What follows is my synthesis of what the *polis for pigs* represents, considering its relationship with the *luxurious* polis and the

Kallipolis, and responding to the considerations of contemporary critics. I will argue that Socrates is quite serious in positing that the *polis for pigs* is true and healthy, and why this polis exists and is a good polis, but not the best or ideal polis, and not Utopia. It is however, fundamental to the development of the Kallipolis, Plato's most beautiful polis.¹¹ Finally, in a postscript, through the Songs of the Daughters of Necessity (*Rep.* 617c) I will address the relevance of the *polis for pigs* to today's global polis and to our future.

¹¹In proceeding I will further link (in footnotes) Plato's theory on the origin of the *polis for pigs* with relevant current social anthropological theory on the early social development of humankind. This is not to suggest that the *polis for pigs* is an original or early polis, but rather to highlight the issues involved in the early development of human communities, cooperation and sharing, division of labour and specialisation, are the same as documented by Plato and similarly relevant.

2. The *Polis for Pigs*

The goal of this chapter is to describe the *polis for pigs* (*Rep.* 369c-370e). I will begin by laying the groundwork for a discussion of the *polis for pigs* by describing its relationship to the other poleis.

2.1. Developing the Kallipolis for justice

Socrates delineates his theory of justice, both social and individual, by first inquiring into ‘what sort of thing justice is in the polis, and afterward looking for it in the individual, observing the ways the smaller is similar to the larger’ (*Rep.* 368e-369a). This approach assumes an isomorphism between justice in the state and justice in the individual. It initiates the discussion between Socrates and his interlocutors on designing ‘in theory’¹² the larger entity, the Kallipolis (*Rep.* 369a). This occurs through the sequential description of a series of poleis, each of which has a significant role in the development of the Kallipolis. As such, this description is not historical or an idealised view of the development of the Kallipolis.

The conventional view is the Kallipolis is a Greek polis (*Rep.*, 470e) that Socrates develops in three stages. The *polis for pigs* is the first stage, beginning as a small settlement of craftsmen working together to provide for the needs they require to live— food, shelter and clothing. Their needs grow, and with this the polis grows. When the polis is fully grown its citizens have ‘the economic necessities of city life in the fifth century BC’ (Burnyeat, 1997, pp. 228- 229) giving them a simple, ordered, sustainable lifestyle, which, although modest ensures their happiness.

The second stage is the development of the *luxurious* polis, driven by *pleonexia*, ‘the desire to outdo others and get more and more’ (*Rep.* 359c), and ‘enjoying all the pleasant “extras” of ancient Greek civilisation’ (Burnyeat, 1997, p. 229). Created to meet Glaucon’s requirements for a civilised life, Socrates enlarges the *polis for pigs* into a ‘*luxurious* polis... a polis with a fever’ (*Rep.* 372e). Inflamed by ‘those same desires that are most of all responsible for the bad things that happen to cities (poleis) and the individuals in them’ (*Rep.* 373e), citizens of the

¹²Grube’s translation, revised by Reeve, uses the word theory. Plato understands the concept of a theory, an idea or set of ideas that is suggested or presented as possibly true but that is not known or proven to be true, but knowing it will be tested in the future (*Republic*, 472c-e, 592b).

luxurious polis strive for ‘the endless acquisition of money... [having] overstepped the limit of their necessities’ (*Rep.* 373d).

The third stage is the regeneration of the *luxurious* polis through the implementation of justice and governance. The acquisition, education and appointment of Guardians to defend and administrate the polis stills the *luxurious* polis’s fever (*Rep.* 399e). The Kallipolis then emerges when Rulers are selected from the Guardians.

In an approach slightly different to other commentators, Christopher Reeve (1988, pp. 170-172, 176) and Leo Strauss consider the *luxurious* polis when healed by the interventions of the Guardians as a separate entity. Reeve designates it the *Second Polis* and Strauss the ‘city of the armed camp’ (1964, p. 64). From this polis the Kallipolis comes into being.

Thus in the theoretical design of the Kallipolis, a polis with a constitution different to all others in its time, the *polis for pigs* is the first stage. It is later incorporated into the Kallipolis, where its producers will be essential for its provisioning and economic viability (*Rep.* 463b). The Guardians regulate, maintain civic order and defend the polis, with the Rulers, functioning as a kingship or aristocracy (*Rep.* 445d), governing and preserving justice (*Rep.* 463b), and thereby ensuring happiness for all its citizens.

2.2. Founding a new polis

In Socrates’ view it is our individual inability to fulfil the numerous needs we each have that is the underlying principle on which a polis is founded and develops. Some needs are basic to everyone and must be fulfilled in order to live. These are bodily and material needs including food, clothing, and shelter. Thereafter, for the producer-citizens of this founding polis comes ‘food, drink, sex and all things associated with them’ (*Rep.*, 581a) to ensure they fare well, lead a good life and are happy. For Guardians and Rulers, beyond the original material or bodily needs, are the needs of the soul, available to them in the Kallipolis.¹³ So,

‘[B]ecause none of us is self-sufficient but we all need many things... and because people need many things, and because one person calls on a second out of one need, and on a third out of a different need many people gather together in a single place to live together as partners and helpers’ (*Rep.* 369b-c).

¹³Following JRS Wilson, 1997, p. 315.

Need is therefore the wellspring of society. Because of each person's lack of self-sufficiency it is in their interests to rely on others to obtain what they need, whilst at the same time assisting their fellow citizens to fulfil their needs. To facilitate this mutual self-interest, they congregate and live in a particular place, associating as partners¹⁴ and helping each other, cooperating and so making it possible to 'share things with one another, giving and taking' because each believes this is in his best interest (*Rep.* 369c). This enacts the tenet of 'the common good for the sake of each man's good' (Strauss, 1964, p. 94) for fulfilling the needs of both society and its citizens. Socrates thus defines a polis as an association of mutually cooperative citizens, living in a designated place, to fulfil their needs.

The members of this association are partners; therefore their union is a partnership. '[I]t was for the sake of this (sharing) that we made their partnership and founded this city' (*Rep.* 371b). Cooperating and sharing the products of the endeavour for the common good achieves functional reciprocity (*Rep.* 369c).^{15,16} These are the unwritten articles of their association, the contract between them (*Rep.* 333a).

Having established that need is the progenitor of the development of poleis, Socrates initiates the development of the *polis for pigs*, with 'Come, then, let's create a city (polis) in theory from its beginnings. And it's our needs, it seems, that will create it' (*Rep.* 369c). The polis referred to here, following Wilson (1971, p. 314), can be considered the Kallipolis. 'Its beginnings' is the *polis for pigs*, which will in time metamorphose into the part of the Kallipolis for its producers who will fulfil its economic needs.

The initial needs of the citizens of the *polis for pigs* are food, clothing, shelter and health care (*Rep.* 369d). Different craftsmen, initially a farmer, builder, weaver, cobbler and doctor, become partners to provide the initial basic requirements for this settlement. The decision is made that each craftsman will work full time at his craft, not involving himself with the craft of others to fulfil his own different needs. Rather he will contribute all the efforts of his labour to the common weal (*Rep.* 369e-370a), to be shared amongst everyone, including himself. Thus the communal advantage of their association is advanced by the division of labour, this division being based on each person's natural ability (*Rep.* 370a).

¹⁴Following Bloom, in his translation of Plato's *Republic*, the use of the words partners or partnership have their root in the word *koinon*, meaning "common" or "public".

¹⁵'There is, of course, one very special activity that is a particularly potent stimulus for group cooperation, and that is the sharing of food' (Leakey, 1979, p. 76).

¹⁶'[H]umans could not have evolved in the remarkable way in which we undoubtedly have unless our ancestors were strongly co-operative creatures. The key to the transformation... into a cultural animal living in a highly structured and organised society is sharing' (Leakey, 1979, pp. 10-11.).

To maximise the advantage of the division of labour each craftsman specialises in the particular craft he is naturally suited for, working only in that craft and gaining expertise, rather than being involved concurrently in other crafts. This is to ensure a better job is done timeously as ‘the doer must of necessity pay close attention to his work rather than treating it as a secondary occupation... [so] more plentiful and better quality goods are more easily produced’ (*Rep.* 370b-c). Thus the principle of specialisation is established. The citizens of this emergent polis can now fulfil their basic needs and thereby satisfy their desire¹⁷ to live and sustain life.

Both division of labour and the principle of specialisation that follows are premised on each person’s natural ability and talents, it being recognised that ‘each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being suited to one task another to another’ (*Rep.* 370a). Santas, following Rawls, refers to this as the ‘natural lottery assumption’ (2010, p. 62). Because people are born with different capabilities and talents, in the *polis for pigs* the producers work in a trade best suited to their natural aptitude. This is inclusive of those less physically and intellectually endowed, who will later become partners as retailers, merchants and wage-earners (*Rep.* 371c-e).

Subsequently, in the Kallipolis, different capabilities and talents ultimately define not only people’s crafts, but also their professions and social role or position, as division of labour and the principle of specialisation also apply to those in government. It will apply to those with silver and gold in their souls, the Guardians and Rulers (*Rep.* 415a).

This emergent polis is thus a partnership of individuals with the requisite abilities to perform the crafts required to meet their basic needs, congregating in a small, agrarian settlement. They have no choice in this, other than autarky with all its implications (*Rep.* 370a). Initially, their circumstances are limited, so there can be no conflict of interest among them as this would jeopardise their project of ‘[living] together as partners and helpers’ (*Rep.* 369c) to overcome their individual lack of self-sufficiency and provide the things they need to live.

It is in this hamlet¹⁸ that Socratic justice originates with the principle of specialisation, following the natural division of labour. Socrates later finds this principle ‘rolling around at

¹⁷ Desires are for the things that individuals want. Gerasimos Santas clarifies that needs are more objective than desires and ‘are not the same as desires: we may desire things that we do not need, and we may have a need for things for which we have no desire’ (2010, p. 60).

¹⁸ McKeen characterises this hamlet (*Rep.*, 369c-d) as ‘the embryonic *micropolis*’ (2004, p. 73). She also describes the lifestyle as ‘hardscrabble’ (2004, p. 74)

our feet' (*Rep.* 432d.), when he institutes it as the principle of justice in the Kallipolis. There the principle of specialisation is interpreted as '[J]ustice... if you remember, [is] that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city (polis) for which he is naturally best suited... justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what isn't one's own' (*Rep.* 433a-b).

Also found in this hamlet, as a result of the need that brings these people together as partners, who help each other and cooperate and share, is unity. Unity is attainable in this hamlet and the completed *polis for pigs*, as conflicts of interest are minimised by the unwritten articles of their association, assisted by the principle of specialisation which dictates that people should not dabble in other peoples' trades (*Rep.* 433a-b), and thus their livelihoods.

As with justice produced by the principle of specialisation Socrates later moves to ensure unity in the Kallipolis. To him 'there [is no] greater evil ... for a city than that which tears it apart and makes it many instead of one... or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one' (*Rep.* 462a-b). Unity in the polis is necessary to assist in ensuring the polis's happiness (*Rep.* 412d-e, 420c, 421b-c). However, in the Kallipolis, unlike in the *polis for pigs*, this is conventional and is the responsibility of the Guardians (Annas, 1981, p. 103).

Unity, the principle of specialisation, and each craftsman contributing his labour, or the goods produced by his work, to the common purpose, enables the citizens of this hamlet to realise community interests and assure communal happiness. Through this process, because 'each believes that this is better for himself' (*Rep.* 369c), each producer-partner fulfils his needs, satisfies his necessary desires and achieves personal happiness. This is perhaps encapsulated by the motto "All for one, one for all".¹⁹

This hamlet is too small to provide what is necessary for each craftsman to successfully perform his allotted task. More producer-partners are required to perform tasks, including making tools and animal husbandry (*Rep.* 370c-d), to support the original citizens in providing for the polis's needs. The hamlet thus grows into a polis that 'won't be a huge settlement' (*Rep.* 370d) despite the increase in numbers.

¹⁹The motto of the Three Musketeers in the book of that name by Alexandre Dumas, (1844). Gutenberg Books Online. [<http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/>]. Accessed 9th September 2014.

2.3. Settling in

For this polis to further provide for the citizens' needs it requires that products are imported from other poleis, in exchange for those which it produces for export. Therefore the citizens 'must produce not only enough for themselves at home but also goods of the right quality and quantity to satisfy the requirements of others' (*Rep.* 371a). This exchange is undertaken by merchants with the assistance of sailors, if the trade is by sea (*Rep.* 371a).

The presence of sailors and sea trade indicates that this polis is at the coast. For this trade to be possible the *polis for pigs*' citizens must produce a surplus after satisfying their own and the polis's needs, which its merchants can trade with other poleis for merchandise this polis requires. This implies two things. Firstly, the polis will increase in size as sailors will be added to the population (*Rep.* 371a). Secondly, the *polis for pigs*, together with its citizens, is not impoverished.

However, before trading with other poleis, the citizens of the *polis for pigs* first need to share amongst themselves, 'giving and taking' (*Rep.* 369c) the extra goods they produce to fulfil their own needs. These extra wares are taken to market to exchange with other citizens. If the craftsman is not able to exchange his products because nobody is there at the same time who wants to exchange with him, he can use the services of retailers thus allowing him to get back to work. Retailers are in the business of buying and selling (*Rep.* 371d), and will exchange the craftsman's goods for money; they in turn exchange these goods for money from those who want them (*Rep.* 371b-d).

The market and currency is established 'to enable the citizens to share what they have made' and the merchants and retailers aim to 'facilitate the *sharing* of what people need; there is no indication in the text they are seeking money in this endeavour' (DeWeese-Boyd & DeWeese-Boyd, 2007, p. 119). The currency is used to facilitate exchange (*Rep.* 370b)²⁰ which accords with the polis's articles of association. Thus, in the first instance, the polis's economy is a mixed system of exchange using sharing, giving and taking, and currency as a token of exchange.²¹ Carter characterises this as the city-dweller (city-state citizen) living 'within a money economy and the countryman (rural villager) largely outside it' (1986,

²⁰ Allen Bloom in his interpretive essay of his translation of the *Republic* notes of the *polis for pigs* that money is not of value in itself and is not pursued as an end in itself. That development would be the result of inflamed desires. Here money simply facilitates exchange (1968, p. 344).

²¹ Allen Bloom's translation (*Rep.*, 371b) is 'Out of this we'll get a market and an established currency as a token for exchange'. Aristotle also considers 'money was introduced to facilitate exchange' (*Politics*, 1258b4).

p.81).What is described by Socrates appears to be an early description of a free market system of exchange and prioritising communal interests.

When the *polis for pigs* is complete its citizens have gainful employment at crafts they are naturally suited to, trained for and experienced to perform well. They enjoy a lifestyle with adequate food, housing and clothing. In addition they have time to relax with their children, feasting with wine and delicacies, hymning the Gods, before enjoying responsible sex, but being careful not to have too many children.²² All their material and bodily needs are adequately fulfilled in what Burnyeat describes as a ‘moderately austere’ lifestyle (1997, p. 231). It affords them good health, longevity and is sustainable (*Rep.* 372a-d), and is a lifestyle sufficient to satisfy the necessary desires²³ of its producer-citizens for ‘food, drink, sex and all things associated with them’ (*Rep.* 581a).

It is this polis with its modest but happy way of life that Glaucon disparages by asking Socrates if he were ‘founding a city (polis) for pigs... wouldn’t you fatten them on the same diet’ (*Rep.* 372d). When asked what he would feed these people with, Glaucon delineates his own expectations for a feast including couches and tables and delicacies and desserts. What follows is the development of the *luxurious* polis.

Socrates’ description of the *polis for pigs* offers no mention of government and its attendant institutions and instruments. Despite this its citizens ‘live in peace’ (*Rep.* 372d), recommending that there is little internal strife in this polis and it has good relations with its neighbours. Its citizens are no longer poor, but they do not enjoy wealth.²⁴ One of the future responsibilities of the Guardians is to ensure the producers in the Kallipolis do not accumulate wealth, ‘which makes a craftsman and his products worse... [and results in] luxury, idleness and revolution’ (*Rep.* 421d-422a). The implication is that the citizens of the *polis for pigs* are certainly not wealthy.

²²No mention of family is made in Socrates’ account of the origin and development of this polis. As this was in the 5th century BCE (Burnyeat, 1997, p. 229) the family would have been an accepted part of society. There is no reason to consider the family was not a part of the *polis for pigs*. Perhaps, however, this omission and the manner in which Socrates describes sex at the feast at *Rep.*, 372b are, as suggested by Burnyeat, indicative that Socrates ‘is sketching a primitive anticipation of the arrangements he will propose for the ideal city, where the family is abolished in favour of communality of women and children (1997, p. 230).

²³Necessary desires are those which we cannot resist or which are beneficial to the individual. The desires which we cannot resist are those whose satisfaction is required by nature for life. Unnecessary desires are those that go beyond necessary desires. Thus unnecessary desires are those that relate to excessive want. Lawless desires are those that ‘free of all control by shame or reason... omits no act of folly or shamelessness... [and are] a dangerous, wild and lawless form of desire’ (*Rep.*, 571c-572b). They are responsible for the worst crimes and injustice.

²⁴Wealth. A comparative abundance of things which are objects of human desire; esp., abundance of worldly estate; affluence; opulence; riches. Webster’s Online Dictionary. [<http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/wealth>].

Needs grow with the increasing size and complexity of this community, but necessary desires and mutual interests continue to coincide and are fulfilled by the citizens' communal efforts. If one accepts Rawls' definition of the circumstance of justice²⁵, then the exigencies of the situation and the citizens' needs dictate the circumstances of its justice. The application of the principle of specialisation, following natural division of labour, and cooperation and sharing following on their partnership, ensure justice and unity in this communal venture.

If a polis is broadly defined as a community of people¹¹ then this polis is the *first polis*, with the interpretation of its title continually open to equivocation in translating the word "polis". It can be anything from a hamlet or village to how Aristotle conceives a polis, which is a 'city-state' resulting from numerous villages combining.²⁶

Socrates conceives a polis as an association of mutually cooperative people, thus a community, living in a designated place, to fulfil their needs. Given his description of the *polis for pigs*, a polis of producer-citizens, without formal government and its residents living a simple, ordered, sustainable lifestyle which meets their needs, suggests that this is a village, comprising a community of men, women and children, of possibly several hundred to just over a thousand strong.^{27,28} As such it can, depending on your viewpoint, be the *polis for pigs*, that is the polis of the ignorant (Burnyeat, 1997, p.231), or more empathetically the *kōmē*²⁹ of producers.

Finally, in describing need as the wellspring of society right from 'its beginnings', Socrates has made '[sharing] things with one another, giving and taking, [as] each believes it is better for himself' (Rep. 369c), that is cooperation and sharing, the *primordial social relationship* of society. The consequence of this is '[I]f Socrates is right... when he says that man's needs can only be satisfied through *cooperation* with others then it follows that society is natural and indeed necessary to man' (Wilson, 1977, p. 318). This is in contrast with the contractarian polis in which Glaucon proposes the circumstances of justice are a presumably

²⁵'The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary' (Rawls, 1971, p. 126).

²⁶Aristotle in *Politics* (1252b9-1253a, 1261b13-14, 1289a14-17) delineates a 'city-state' as a larger, autonomous, self-sufficient polis, with government and thus city hall (a meeting place) and a constitution. It develops from the merging of several villages (also a polis in the broad sense of the word community of people). A village is the association of several households (male head, female, children and slaves and also a polis in the broad sense of the word).

²⁷Wagstaff, 1975, p. 163. Such villages were common in ancient Greece at that time. On the basis of a population of 1000 to 1200 people consisting of male citizens, each with a wife and three to four children (~5.5 per family), this village could have between 180 to 220 families. There may have been some slaves in this village, a farmer owning perhaps one or two (Carter, 1986, p. 77), but are not included in this calculation.

²⁸The population of the Kallipolis, for comparison, is calculated as 27 720 people, comprising adult male citizens and their families (~5.5 persons per family). Metics, foreigners and slaves are not included in the calculation (Annexure I).

²⁹*Kōmē*. Village.

anarchic *state of nature* in which men are predatory, with each harming the other to gain what they want. It is their desire to avoid this harm that leads to the mutual agreement resulting in government, law and justice. Hence justice in this instance is artificial and a compromise.^{30,31}

³⁰Wilson, 1977, p. 317.

³¹Santas, 2010, p. 60.

3. Contemporary Commentaries on the *Polis for Pigs*

Socrates designs the *kōmē of producers*, his true and healthy polis, to represent a polis that fulfils the needs of its producer-citizens. Contemporary commentators, when discussing the *polis for pigs*, align into two basic positions. Most commentators, naysayers, disagree with Socrates' appreciation of the *polis for pigs*, considering it either ironic or wrong, thereby diminishing its role in Plato's project. They question the possible existence of such a polis, its structural arrangements, and the nature and character of its inhabitants. By contrast aye-sayers accept Socrates' praise of the *polis for pigs* and seek to explain and justify its role in the *Republic*.

Nevertheless, all commentators agree that the *polis for pigs* originates because of its citizens' individual insufficiency and their self-interest in fulfilling their *needs* (*Rep.* 369b-c). It is also Plato's first step in the development of the Kallipolis.

3.1. Naysayers

These contemporary critics have difficulty in defining the *polis for pigs* and its role in the *Republic*. They deem the *polis for pigs* design is deficient for several reasons. The first is that the polis does not have formal government and its institutions. Secondly, the character of the polis is deficient as neither justice nor injustice exists therein or it lacks progress and the aspects of civilisation that this brings to society. Thirdly, the character of its producer-citizens is deficient in that they lack unnecessary appetitive desires. Alternatively, the citizens do in fact have the full range of appetitive desires, but since the polis has no formal government institutions, it is unable to prevent them exercising their unnecessary appetitive desires and lapsing into *pleonexia*.

These views are clearly held by both Rachel Barney, who considers the *polis for pigs* an 'impossible city' (2001, pp. 217-218[n.10]), and Julia Annas, whose insightful analysis concludes 'that Plato has not given the first city a clear place in the Republic's moral argument... [it] adds nothing, except a context in which the Principle of Specialization is introduced' (1981, pp. 78-79). Annas' claim in severely limiting the *polis for pigs*' role in the Republic obviously also denies that the polis can be true and healthy.

3.1.1. Alleged flaws in the polis for pigs

a. Lack of formal government

This structural defect of the *polis for pigs* relates to its apparent lack of formal government.³² Barney summarises this by stating that ‘what daily life does not here include is most striking, namely no military, no constitution, rulers, or political activity’ (2001, p. 213). As such they consider the *polis for pigs* is defective ‘because it includes nothing to counteract the destabilizing effects of unnecessary appetites and the *pleonexia* to which they give rise’ (Reeve, 1988, p. 171). That is the *polis for pigs* has no government or its institutions, including an army, to counteract *pleonexia* and the external threat of attack during war, or the internal threat of civil strife. In the Kallipolis Guardians are present to control and oppose these threats.

b. The absence of justice or injustice in the polis for pigs

Ian Crombie considers the description of the *polis for pigs* in Book II to be a ‘false start’ because neither justice nor injustice are to be found in it (1962, pp. 89-90). He believes that the description was perhaps not removed from an earlier version of the *Republic*.

c. The polis for pigs’ lack of progress and civilisation

Richard Nettleship denies the *polis for pigs*’ likely existence because its inhabitants, living only to their needs, and having a lifestyle of ‘idyllic innocence [and] animal simplicity... [is] devoid of progress... [and it] excludes the greater part of the elements that make up human life as we know it; it excludes civilisation’ (1920, p. 72). In noting the lack of elements of civilisation he is perhaps, different to Glaucon, referring to art, literature and philosophy, including natural philosophy or sciences, which are obviously not present in the *polis for pigs*.

3.1.2. The personae of the citizens of the Polis for Pigs

Jonas *et al* clearly and simply classify the personae and problems related to the appetitive human nature of the *polis for pigs*’ citizens. They also present arguments to counter these issues (Jonas et al., 2012, pp. 342- 352).

a. On being less than human

³²Most naysayers, including Rachel Barney, Daniel Devereux, Christopher Reeve and Christopher Rowe refer to the *polis for pigs*’ lack of a formal system of government.

The minority position is that the *kōmē*'s producer-citizens' characters do not have the full range of human appetitive desires, thus they cannot represent 'a plausible human community' (Jonas et al., 2012, p. 343). In essence, this talks to the lack of unnecessary appetitive desires that result in *pleonexia* but which motivates the civilised lifestyle called for by Glaucon. John Cooper³³ details this position cogently, contrasting justice in Glaucon's contractarian polis with that in the *polis for pigs*. He clearly explains how the apparent lack of unnecessary appetitive desires in the citizens of the *polis for pigs* recommends that by only being motivated by their necessary desire to achieve their good, individually and mutually, they cannot be truly just. There is nothing to tempt them into pleasurable gratification, cheating, freeloading and other unjust actions. This arises in the *luxurious* polis, where injustice is palpable, and true justice only exists in those who seek to do what is right in the face of temptation.³⁴

b. On being normal producer-citizens

The second and majority position on the character of the *kōmē of producers'* citizens is that they do have the normal appetitive desires, both necessary and unnecessary. However, this means that it is inevitable that the *polis for pigs* will fail as the structural deficiency of the polis— no formal system of government and its institutions— will not prevent its citizens exercising their unnecessary appetitive desires, resulting in *pleonexia* driven degeneration into injustice and chaos; in essence into the *luxurious* polis or worse a *state of nature* as presupposed for Glaucon's contractarian polis.

If Socrates considers the *polis for pigs* true and healthy, the question is why he allows a situation where this polis will inevitably fail due to the inability of its citizens to control their appetitive desires? To some commentators this is confirmation that Socrates' praise of the *polis for pigs* is ironic.

Obviously, in considering Socrates' praise to be ironic implies that these naysayers do not consider the *polis for pigs* true and healthy. That being the case, given that they consider the *polis for pigs* is the first step in the development of the Kallipolis, what does this step represent? Seemingly, as part of the whole that is to materialise, the *polis for pigs* would then be like a vestigial limb, which as Annas posits, is only useful to introduce the principle of specialisation.

³³ Cooper, 2000, pp. 5-27

³⁴ Jonas et al., whilst accepting the validity of Cooper's argument, consider it unsound as the first premise is false, justifying this by quoting Socrates' (*Rep.* 572b) and Glaucon's (*Rep.* 359c) opinions that everyone has both necessary and unnecessary appetites.

Barney broaches the topic directly stating that ‘it would be overstraining human nature to expect this acorn-eating³⁵ simplicity to last: humans will rebel and demand more.... The *polis for pigs* depending on a suspension of the realities of human nature is thus an *impossible city*’ (2001, pp. 215, 217-218 [n.10]). Reeve follows suit noting that the *polis for pigs* citizens are ruled by their necessary appetitive desires. There is no philosophising, therefore no philosophers, and no fighting, therefore no honour-lovers. Its populace therefore does not have the means to defend itself against *pleonexia* driven internal strife or outside aggression, and with no philosophers to rule it has no means of access to the good and thus cannot assure happiness. He concludes that the *polis for pigs* ‘is stable only in a fantasy world in which people never pursue *pleonectic* satisfaction, never lose control of themselves or succumb to *akrasia*’ (Reeve, 1988, p. 178).

3.1.3. A concluding naysayer commentary

The final word goes to the measured opinion of Christopher Rowe from *The Place of the Republic in Plato’s Political Thought*.³⁶ He suggests that the *Republic* can be viewed as ‘a political work’ wherein politics ‘is a matter of reconciling interests in the community, [that is] of finding ways in which different groups can scratch along besides each other’ (2007, p. 28).

Recognising that the *polis for pigs* ‘differs from any ordinary city in that the causes of conflict, and the things that cause the overdevelopment of our irrational desires, have not yet been introduced (2007, p. 44 [n22])... and has no political institutions [to counteract these]... he [however] defers from considering it a truly “Socratic” community, as there is no mention of the inhabitants doing philosophy’ (2007, p. 44). He concedes that as this polis has Socrates’ approval, ‘it perhaps goes without saying that they will [come]’ (2007, p. 44).

3.1.4. The true nature of humankind

Daniel Devereux (1979, pp. 36-40) has the sentiments of a naysayer. In his paper *Socrates’ first city in the Republic* he seeks to address the true nature of humankind. Is human nature the *pleonexia* driven nature of the unjust man portrayed in the pre-political state of Glaucon’s contractarian polis in which ‘injustice is natural to man while justice is unnatural and contrary

³⁵ Barney quoting Socrates’ description of ‘roasting acorns’ as part of the description of the lifestyle of the *polis for pigs*’ citizens considers this, following Lovejoy and Boas (1935), to be a symbol of primitive scarcity (Barney, 2001, p. 214). This is different to the conventional view that acorns allude to sex.

³⁶ Rowe, 2007, pp. 27-54.

to nature' (1979, p. 38)? Alternatively, is it as Socrates considers like the citizens of the *polis for pigs* who are naturally endowed with characteristics which make possible a mutually beneficial system of cooperation and are thus fitted by nature for communal living? In this Devereux questions Socrates' opinion of the *polis for pigs*' citizen's character and if they are capable of cooperation and sharing.

Glaucon's contractarian theory of justice (*Republic*, 358e-359a-c) describes, as previously discussed, a *state of nature* in which moderate scarcity of goods, humankind's self-seeking nature, rough equality of capabilities, and minimal rationality pertain. To overcome this *state of nature*, the collective weak contract with the strong to ensure neither group will harm the other.³⁷

By contrast the *polis for pigs* with no initial *state of nature* and no obvious formal government has natural justice and a modest, peaceful, sustainable lifestyle based on mutual cooperation and sharing between its citizens. Devereux asks the question:

'What sort of life is most natural for men— that is, most in accordance with their nature— in the absence of law and government?' (1979, p. 38).

Devereux immediately states that life in accordance with man's nature, in the absence of laws or government, is a condition which has never existed, and most naysayers would agree with him.³⁸ However, he considers that Socrates, in highlighting natural cooperation in the harmonious *polis for pigs*, is repudiating Glaucon's 'stress on the naturalness of strife and selfishness... [and obviously he] does not regard *pleonexia* as an essential and ineradicable component of human nature' (1978, p. 38).

Rather, 'Socrates regards man as fitted by nature for communal living and cooperative endeavour... for their mutual benefit' (1978, p. 40). In the absence of government and law, this does not seem possible in a polis. Such a community would be feasible only if peoples' desires are limited to necessary desires and thus the 'rationale for Socrates limitation on desires in the first city' (1978, p. 40). Thus for Devereux *pleonexia* has primacy over cooperation and sharing in humankind's nature, setting him alongside most naysayers albeit he approaches the issue from a different perspective.

³⁷Santas, 2010, pp. 38-40.

³⁸Based on the consideration that man is by nature a political animal (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a) and has always had government this may seem correct. Current knowledge of humankind's early social existence suggests it is not. Aristotle did not have this knowledge available to him.

3.2. Aye-sayers

Having delineated why Socrates' praise of the *polis for pigs* should not be taken at face value we can turn to those who support his contention that the *polis for pigs* is true and healthy and the role they define for it in the *Republic*.

3.2.1 The lucky polis

Catherine McKeen³⁹ labels the *polis for pigs* Swillsburg,⁴⁰ and considers it is true and healthy. In her detailed and discerning analysis of the *polis for pigs*, she, like others, compares it to the Kallipolis. By comparison she considers it limited and inferior, but better than the other poleis in the *Republic*, and wishes to discern 'if some serious moral is to be read in Plato's characterisation of the city of pigs' (2007, p. 74).

Central to her thesis is that Swillsburg is a healthy, true and good community based on its unity, albeit that she does not consider this 'the right kind of unity' (2004, p. 71). Unity is necessary for any polis, community or group to function (*Rep.* 351c-d), and 'groups divided by disparity and divergent interests will be unable to undertake any common projects' (*Rep.* 351d-352d) (2004, p.82). Poverty and wealth within a polis divides it (*Rep.* 421c-423b), and division in the polis is anathema to Socrates (*Rep.* 462a-b) as it causes disunity resulting in the demise of a polis.

Unity for McKeen is premised on three principles, the first two of which the *polis for pigs* has, but is deficient in the third. Despite this she considers there are 'deep morals to be read concerning civic unity in the *city of pigs*' (2004, p. 74).

McKeen's first principle is that of size. Here I am in accord with her, although we differ as to what we consider the actual size of the *polis for pigs*. Pointing out that a polis should only 'be allowed to grow such that it is a unity' (2004, p. 86), she considers the *polis for pigs* fits between her *micropolis* (my hamlet) and the *luxurious* city with respect to its way of life. The *luxurious* polis is too large, having in addition to those of the *polis for pigs*, numerous frivolous crafts leading to over population.

Her second principle, for which I also have regard, is specialisation, which is present in the *polis for pigs*. Recognising the diversity in human communities, with inhabitants working at

³⁹McKeen, 2004, pp. 70-92.

⁴⁰Intuitively, this brings to mind a rural American town.

different occupations, she advances that ‘some degree of unity is achieved... through the principle of specialization... insofar as individuals specialize in their *technai*, and insofar as these *technai* provide for some efficient meeting of human needs’ (2004, p. 83). Thus the *polis for pigs*’ correct size and the practice of specialization contribute to its unity and moderate way of life, which McKeen considers less-regulated and preferable in many ways to that of the Kallipolis as ‘one enjoys the simple pleasures of life, manages one’s own affairs and relaxes with one’s family’ (2004, p. 73).

The third principle, which McKeen considers unifies the *polis for pigs*, is that of enlightened self-interest. On this principle we disagree. In her view, this makes it a mutual benefit society, wherein citizens trade and exchange the products of their labour because they will personally benefit and ‘not out of altruistic concern for the good of the whole community’ (2004, p. 85). The citizens consciously restrain their appetitive desires to avoid the adverse consequences of unnecessary desires. This, in her terms, is ‘enlightened, self-regarding interest’ (2004, p.90). In essence, private interests predominate in McKeen’s *polis for pigs*, and its citizens only instrumentally value its justice, civic unity and the polis itself.

In the *polis for pigs*, unlike the Kallipolis, there is no formal government to ‘[minimize] or radically re-interpret’ (2004, p. 91) private interests and guard against other risks, the eventuality of which would lead to disarray and disunity in the community. So the *polis for pigs* is ‘unified, healthy, true and happy... to an extent... [but] is better than any of the other non-Kallipolis alternatives’ (2004, p.92). However, its continuing existence is largely dependent upon ‘lucky circumstances which allow individual self-interests to coincide’ (2004, p. 71). This makes it inferior to the Kallipolis, as a polis whose unity is so dependent on circumstances cannot be truly just or happy.

3.2.2. A polis more ideal than the Kallipolis?

Three co-authors, Jonas *et al*,⁴¹ wholeheartedly support the *first polis*, considering that ‘Socrates genuinely believes the city is healthy and desirable... and is superior to the Kallipolis’ (2012, p. 332). Their claim, therefore, recommends that the *polis for pigs* is the best polis in the *Republic* and that Socrates means for a polis to be true and healthy is the ideal.

⁴¹Jonas et al, 2012, pp. 333-334.

Socrates' has high praise for the *polis for pigs*, which he does not explain or justify after Glaucon's challenge, and which he never explicitly returns to or rescinds. This raises doubts as to whether his praise of the *polis for pigs* is genuine. Most commentators believe that whilst he 'never *explicitly* rescinds his praise of the First City, he *indirectly* does so in later passages in the *Republic*...and they offer theoretical and exegetical evidence that purportedly demonstrates the inferiority of the First City' (Jonas, 2012, pp. 342-334).

Their counter view is that the *polis for pigs* is deserving of Socrates' commendation and that he prefers it to the Kallipolis. The apparent ease with which Socrates moves from the *polis for pigs* to describing the *luxurious* polis, at Glaucon's bidding, causes critics to readily dismiss his praise of the former or to consider it ironic. To counter this, Jonas *et al* begin their argument following Rowe (2007, pp. 43-45).

Rowe believes that Socrates is satisfied with his exposition of justice in Book I, but acknowledges that Glaucon, Adeimantus and others are not convinced. To further defend justice, thereby satisfying the needs of others and not necessarily himself, Socrates embarks on his further explanation of justice in Book II-V. He constructs the Kallipolis 'as an analogy for the good, and therefore just, individual or soul' (2007, p. 43), beginning the construction with the *polis for pigs*, which he considers true, thus also good and just. By comparison the *luxurious* polis is fevered, with Socrates readily undertaking its construction to help extend the search '[to] see how justice and injustice grow up in cities' (*Rep.* 372a).

Glaucon is unaware of the justice in the *polis for pigs*, and that his demand for a polis suitable to his expectations indicates that he does not recognize his appetitive desires are unnecessary and a feature of injustice. Therefore Socrates develops the Kallipolis to demonstrate to Glaucon and Adeimantus the meaning of injustice and justice, through their propagation in the *luxurious* polis and the Kallipolis. Socrates spends considerable effort constructing the fevered polis, and then curing its fever in the Kallipolis, to still Glaucon's fever, and to get him to understand justice and desire it for himself. Socrates does this despite having previously constructed the just polis - his true and healthy polis. This is, in summary, why Socrates expends the effort developing the Kallipolis, and why he considers the *polis for pigs* superior to the Kallipolis.

4. Revisiting the *Kōmē of Producers*

‘Yet the true polis, in my opinion, is the one we’ve described, the healthy one, as it were’
(Plato, *Republic*, 372e).

It is this statement, so obviously incongruous in the greater scheme of the *Republic*, which initiated this project. To many scholars of the *Republic*, this “throw-away” comment seems inappropriate. The majority opinion is that it represents Socratic irony and that even Socrates did not believe this to be the case. Following Morrison (2007, p. 241), I have a ‘tin ear’ for the irony in this instance, believing that Socrates meant what he said, and as previously stated, perhaps the dramatic incongruity of the statement is inviting you to consider it more deeply.

4.1. A new synthesis

To validate Socrates’ consideration that the *polis for pigs* is a true and healthy polis, given the scepticism about its possibility and the reservations about its inhabitants and its role in the *Republic*, a new synthesis is necessary to supplement the understanding of this polis, still the doubts of naysayers and replace them with a cogent aye-sayer’s view. In this I talk to the political endeavour of ‘designing an ideal society’ (Burnyeat, 1997, p. 217), starting at its beginnings, the *kōmē of producers*.

To solve this conundrum first requires an interpretation of what Socrates actually means when lauding the *polis for pigs* as true and healthy. This is obviously a clear endorsement of the *polis for pigs* but does this indicate that Socrates considers it to be the best or the ideal polis in the *Republic*? There is no consensus in the literature on this issue.

Jonas *et al* accept at face value Socrates’ praise of the *polis for pigs* and consider it to be the best polis in the *Republic*. This means they consider that a polis that is true and healthy is the ideal polis. Given the role of the *polis for pigs* in the overall scheme of the *Republic* and that it is a polis of a limited population size comprising only producers this view seems hard to sustain. However, this interpretation of Socrates’ meaning is shared by some naysayers who seem to think that Socrates means to say that the *polis for pigs* is an ideal. However, the relationship between this ideal and the Kallipolis remains unclear, and because of the problems they identify in the polis’s structure, functioning and the behaviour of its citizens, they infer that Socrates must be speaking ironically.

McKeen's position falls between these two views. Accepting Socrates' accolade of the *polis for pigs* at face value she considers this polis better than other poleis in the *Republic*, but limited and inferior to the Kallipolis. It is therefore a good polis, but not the best or ideal polis. My position accords with that of McKeen, albeit that I derive my position in a manner different to hers.

In proceeding I will delineate what I consider Socrates means by the *polis for pigs* being true and healthy, consolidate my position that the *kōmē of producers* is a village and clarify its relationship with the Kallipolis. In the process, to convince critics that the *kōmē of producers* is worthy of Socrates' accolade, I will respond to contemporary commentators' positions on the *kōmē's* structural flaws and the problems relating to its producer-citizens' personae.

4.1.1. On the *kōmē of producers* being true and healthy

What is it in this village that makes it 'the true polis... the healthy one, as it were' (*Rep.* 372e), inducing Socrates to later incorporating its principles and way of life into the Kallipolis? This tribute, on my reading, does not make the *kōmē* either the best polis or an ideal polis. What makes it true and healthy, without an obvious reason given in its description, is a point of conjecture. Although irony may be taken to mean saying something different from what is actually meant, I do not believe that Socrates is ironic in this instance. I will argue, following McKeen, that Socrates uses the word "true" to indicate a unified society, and in my opinion, "healthy" to highlight that the *polis for pigs* has the essential virtue – justice.

On my reading, civic unity is the main but not the only reason which makes the *kōmē of producers* true and healthy. The decision to 'live together as partners and helpers' (*Rep.* 369c) in this village, cooperating and sharing, and augmented by the principle of specialisation, binds the citizens of the *kōmē of producers* together into a cohesive community. These principles also maintain the unity of the *kōmē's* citizens in the face of their challenges, and ensure the equitable sharing of the products of their labours.⁴² There is another issue that contributes to their unity. The citizens gather not only as partners, but also as helpers (*Rep.* 369c), and this collegiality assists in maintaining their unity.

⁴²As there is neither poverty nor wealth in the community it must be assumed that the distribution of the *kōmē's* gross product is shared evenly amongst the partners.

Unity in a polis is that which Socrates considers allows a polis to be a polis. All other poleis, because of the divisions within them, are themselves two or more poleis. Two such poleis within a polis are the wealthy and the poor, who are always at war with each other (*Rep.* 422e-423a). Thus the *kōmē of producers*, because of the unwritten articles of association of a collegial partnership, assisted by the principle of specialisation, and since it has neither wealth nor poverty, is a unified polis. On the basis of this unity it is a naturally true polis.

The *kōmē of producers* also has health which contributes to it being true. Besides the fact that this *kōmē's* way of life is peaceful, stable and sustainable, which ensures the rude health of its inhabitants, the *kōmē of producers* has health in another form. It has justice, which is a virtue, 'a kind of health' (*Rep.* 444e). Justice, natural justice in this instance, is consequent upon the principle of specialisation, following from division of labour and,

'[makes] the city (polis) good by its presence... and has the power that makes it possible for them (the other virtues wisdom, courage, moderation) to grow and, preserves them ... as long as it (justice) remains there itself... [it] rivals wisdom, moderation and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city' (*Republic*, 433a-e).

However, justice is only one of the virtues required to make a polis completely good (*Rep.* 427e) and thus an ideal polis. There is still much to be done before the *kōmē's* unity and justice are successfully applied in the larger setting of the Kallipolis to ensure that polis's complete virtue, goodness and the happiness of all its city-state citizens. Although unity and justice make the *kōmē of producers* true and healthy, thus, to some extent, a virtuous and good polis, it is not the best or the ideal polis. That is still to come in the Kallipolis.

a. A further consideration on unity in the *kōmē of producers*

Catherine McKeen, in her well-considered paper on Swillsburg posits that there are three principles which underpin the *kōmē of producers'* civic unity. On the first two principles, the polis's size and the principle of specialisation, we concur, although I believe the *polis for pigs* is a village, smaller than the town she conceives. On the third principle we disagree.

Based on its citizens' 'enlightened, self-regarding interest' (2004, p.90), which McKeen considers induces them to consciously restrain their *pleonexic* desires, Swillsburg is a mutual benefit society. This contrived coincidence of enlightened self-interest ensures that private interest, and thus personal good, comes before public interest and thus collective good, in Swillsburg. It is this which she believes makes the *polis for pigs* deficient compared to the

Kallipolis, and which requires re-ordering, through state control, for the Kallipolis to come into being. It is also what separates her view on the reasons for the *kōmē of producers*' unity, from my approach.

Socrates' discussion on the *kōmē of producers* is largely centred on functional reciprocity and specialisation producing economic and distributive justice for the community. McKeen's consideration of alleged enlightened self-interest in this polis evokes thoughts of Adam Smith's theory of the invisible hand.

‘Every individual necessarily labours to rend the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor know how much he is promoting it... he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his intention.... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society... I have never known much good done by those who affect to trade for the public good’ (1776, p. 572).

Surely this is one of the most well-known expositions of enlightened self-interest, and a cornerstone of the modern market.

Conversely, the citizens of the *polis for pigs* gather in the hamlet as a partnership to achieve their collective purpose to provide for their needs, and continue in like vain in order to improve their circumstances. In this partnership, paraphrasing Smith, they ‘[labour] to render the annual [product] of the society as great as [they] can’ (1776, p. 572), and they share that product. There are no invisible hands in the partnership— all hands are above board and visible from the beginning. The end, which is part of each individual's intention, and which he applies himself to through cooperation, sharing and the principle of specialisation, is to promote the public interest, not his own gain. His own security is reliant on that public interest and his own gain, over and above that of his fellow citizens, would be in conflict with the articles of association of the partnership.

Enlightened self-interest places self at the forefront, before others; the mutual interest of the *polis for pigs*' citizens places the polis first and the attainment of the group's interests ensures that individual interests are achieved. Therefore, the marketplaces envisioned by Socrates and

Smith are in two different poleis, separated by time and underlying political and economic philosophy.

Luck and the contrived coincidence of individual enlightened self-interest has little to do with the success or failure of the *kōmē of producers* as is suggested by McKeen. Rather, the *kōmē's* success is consequent upon the rational choice of its citizens to work together to achieve their mutual interests thus ensuring their individual interests align. Failure, should it occur, is down to fate— but every polis and every person is subject to its vicissitudes.

In considering that the citizens of Swillsburg only instrumentally value its justice, civic unity and the polis itself, McKeen is, on my reading, incorrect. It is in villages, like the *kōmē of producers*, that the citizens truly understand and respect the virtue of communal unity and the good that it achieves. This good may be the simple life they live, which means they are deemed ignorant, but they are intelligent enough to realise that the unity of their partnership is fundamental to their wellbeing and happiness.

4.1.2. On being a *kōmē*

Different poleis are described or alluded to in the *Republic*. Each is a polis of a different nature but each is a polis in the sense that they are communities of people.⁹ Throughout the *Republic* and in the works of contemporary commentators these poleis are considered as a “city”, a word which in the modern and Aristotelian sense of a city-state describes as a large, autonomous, self-sufficient polis, with formal government, its institutions and a constitution. However, a polis, in the broad sense can be anything from a household to a city-state.²⁶

As the *polis for pigs*, according to all commentators, is the first step in the development of the Kallipolis, it is, on my reading, most likely a village.²² No other explanation can justify its unity despite lack of formal government and the behaviour of its citizens in achieving their ends. The alternative, of not accepting the *kōmē of producers* is a village but rather a city-state, is to rely on Socratic irony, and to hypothesise endlessly on why this village is anything from a fantasy to impossible. It is also to denigrate its citizens, ordinary *dēmos*, common rural people, as being ignorant, less than human, and incapable of making choices that would maintain the unity and justice of their community.

To my knowledge, no other commentator has defined the *polis for pigs* as a village. Catherine McKeen, aware that size is an issue, says it fits between her *micropolis* (my hamlet) and the

luxurious city with respect to its way of life. However, her *polis for pigs* is still big enough to require city hall and its ancillary functions, which I consider villages do not have. I believe that Christopher Rowe, in recognising that the *polis for pigs* ‘differs from any ordinary city in that the causes of conflict, and the things that cause the overdevelopment of our irrational desires, have not yet been introduced (2007, p. 44 [n22])... and has no political institutions [to counteract these]’ (2007, p. 44), implies that the *polis for pigs* is small in size. He does not however delineate its size.

If one accepts that the *polis for pigs* is indeed a *kōmē*, as previously described, and not a polis in the modern or Aristotelian sense of a city-state, then this must alter your consideration of this community. Being less populated, a society of small scale, the structure, functioning and behaviour of the citizens of the *kōmē of producers* will be different from those of a large polis or a city-state.

4.1.3.Organisation in the *kōmē of producers*

The *kōmē of producers* obviously does not have formal government and its institutions. This, according to its critics, is a major design fault of the *kōmē* and why such a polis is unlikely to exist. Their concern is how the *kōmē of producers*, as Socrates describes, can be stable and sustainable, if there are no political mechanisms to control its citizen’s *pleonexic* tendencies. Without these mechanisms there is nothing preventing the *polis for pigs* from lapsing into a divided polis like the *luxurious* polis, or worse still, the social chaos of a *state of nature*.

Villages in 5th century BCE Greece tended to be self-contained and largely autonomous due to distance, geography and slow communication. Carter confirms that at this time, ‘country-dwellers lived in towns and villages which were thought once to be autonomous, and although Athens had usurped control, the communities continued in many respects to function as before’ (1986, p. 79). Dylan Futter, when referring to the *perioikoi* of Sparta, notes that ‘they were ‘free provincials’ of semi-autonomous towns and hamlets across Laconia and Messinia’ (2012, p. 40). This autonomy allows for the less regulated, contented village lifestyle McKen proposes (2004, p. 73), but the citizens of the *kōmē* have to rely on their own resources to cope with day-to-day matters.

The *kōmē of producers*, standing alone, is always at risk. This relates to fate, or as the citizens would have it, the wrath of the Gods. The external threats the *kōmē* faces include war and inclement weather conditions causing either drought or floods. Internally, the threats include

human and animal diseases, crop failure and disasters such as fire. Its citizens are ordinary people, so some conflicts of interests will occur between individuals. There is a market, so disagreements over bartering and what constitutes fair wages will arise. Men and women live in close proximity to one another, giving rise to issues of fidelity. These are the type of conflicts between its citizens that would satisfy Adeimantus's response to Socrates, when the latter enquires where justice or injustice is in this polis. Justice, and conversely injustice, is in 'some need these people have of one another' (Republic, 372a).

This *kōmē*, whose citizens are neither impoverished nor wealthy, is not unique, then in 5th century BCE Greece as now in the 21st century AD. Carter confirms this assessment of ancient Greek villages when describing the quiet citizens of such rural communities as '[he] can amass no capital; his work leaves him no time to attend to affairs of the city; he is no meddling busybody' (1986, p. 77-78). If its citizens have no wealth then the polis similarly has no wealth, so the *kōmē of producers* does not have the financial resources necessary to fund city hall and its institutions.

Besides not having the money to fund city hall, the *kōmē of producers*, being a community of producers, does not have the type of citizens that are necessary to populate the institutions of city hall; those with gold and silver in their souls. The *kōmē's* citizens have bronze and iron in their souls and thus do not have the natural aptitude to do the work of city hall. Furthermore, as Carter points out, the citizens do not have the time to undertake such functions. A producer's time is devoted to his craft in order to secure the needs of the community.

So villages do not have formal government and its institutions. That is for larger poleis, those with wealth and thus the finances to afford them. Following Rowe, that is still to come in the *luxurious* polis and the Kallipolis, and why Socrates, when describing this *kōmē* as a polis at 'its beginnings', does not include government in his discussion.

However, not having formal government does not preclude this *kōmē* and its citizens from having characteristics that ensure it functions well, despite the risks it always faces. In this it is no different to any village. To function well on a day-to-day basis and to face fate when it arises, the *kōmē of producers* has that which makes it true and healthy. In the first instance, the articles of its association incorporating the principles of its founding, includes cooperating, sharing and helping each other to achieve their mutual benefit. Add to this the

principle of specialisation and the result is a polis with unity and economic and distributive justice, whose producer-citizens are happy because their needs are met.

These collegial citizens are assisted in their quest by their fine character. Of a small polis, a village Plato describes in *Laws*, he notes its characteristics and those of its citizens as being ‘not intolerably poor nor driven by poverty to quarrel with each other; but presumably they did not grow rich either... Now the community in which neither wealth nor poverty exists will generally produce the finest characters because tendencies to violence and crime, and feelings of jealousy and envy, simply do not arise’ (*Laws*, 679b). All of these features suggest a society, albeit of small scale, in which the citizens are a cohesive community, in which conflicts of interest are minimal and therefore they can exist without formal government and its institutions.

What the *kōmē of producers* has to ensure its existence and stability may seem inadequate by comparison with the Kallipolis, but it is a small polis and not complete as in the case of the Kallipolis. Its unity, and therefore its stability and capacity to meet adverse circumstances, is not ‘highly contingent... on lucky circumstances which allow individual self-interests to coincide’ (McKeen, 2004, p. 71). That is all very well when things are going smoothly, but as McKeen points out, this is not sufficient ‘against changing fortunes, accidents and circumstances’ (McKeen, 2004, p. 71). Enlightened self-regarding interest would then translate into every man for himself, whereas the mutual self-interest of the *kōmē of producers* would result in a collective effort to face and overcome the problem.

4.1.4. Further considerations on justice and injustice in the *kōmē of producers*

It is Crombie’s contention that a polis without justice and injustice, which is how he views the *kōmē of producers*, cannot be, and therefore Socrates’ attempt at its description is a mistake. Consequently, Socrates’ praise that it is true and healthy is by extension false. This is supported by other naysayers asserting that Socrates, in the *Republic*, does not return to justify or defend the *polis for pigs* because it is indefensible. Responding to Crombie and the other naysayers, Socrates does in fact return to a consideration of the *polis for pigs* (*Rep.* 432d-433a, 443b-c). This is not to defend, augment or rescind his opinion of the *polis for pigs*, but to recognize that the *polis for pigs* has justice.

On injustice, it is the contention of Jonas *et al* that Glaucon is unaware of the justice in the *kōmē of producers* and that his demand for a so-called civilised polis indicates that he does not

recognize his unnecessary appetitive desires are a feature of injustice. Turning to Nettleship, one's first impression of his view that the *polis for pigs* is 'devoid of progress... [it] excludes the greater part of the elements that make up human life as we know it; it excludes civilisation' (1920, p. 72), is that it is simply "Glauconic". He may however be calling for an elevated concept of civilised society, one that includes culture in the form of art, literature and philosophy, including natural philosophy, which he considers advances civilisation. In his text, as with Glaucon's call for a civilised society, there is little further to support this contention.

Accepting this to be the case, Nettleship is obviously considering the *kōmē of producers* as a larger polis or a city-state. A city-state of producers does not exist, and producers have other things on their minds (*Rep.* 581a). Progress, culture and civilisation in the form required by Nettleship are not to be found in a village. They are yet to come in the *luxurious* polis and Kallipolis.

However, Nettleship's assertion on the absence of progress in the *polis for pigs* is not true. The polis grows from a hamlet, in which very limited circumstances prevail, to the peaceful, flourishing, sustainable village with a market, currency and trade with other poleis. That is undoubtedly progress. It is however progress based on need, not *pleonexia* as in the *luxurious* polis, where 'the desire to outdo others and get more and more' (*Rep.* 359c) wanton luxuries, leads to expansion, wealth, poverty and war, amongst other things.

It is in the nature of things, that some villages will grow and coalesce with others and eventually form a *luxurious* polis. Once again Plato's Socrates has a template for the *luxurious* polis, his own polis Athens under the democratic and oligarchic constitutions of his youth and middle-age, and the tyranny of Syracuse under Dionysius I.^{43,44}

The *luxurious* polis is a large, populous polis. In it, the *kōmē of producers* is preserved, perverted and expanded by the addition of numerous frivolous craftsmen (*Rep.* 373b). It is overblown as 'the way of life [of the *kōmē of producers*]... won't satisfy some people... and is no longer adequate... to fill it with a multitude of things beyond what is necessary for a city' (*Rep.* 373a-b).

Aptly described by McKeen, the *luxurious* polis is one in which:

⁴³*Republic*, Lee translation, Translator's Introduction, 1968, pp. 9-18.

⁴⁴Chapter 1: the Life of Plato: Early years (Field, 1930, pp. 1-13)

‘appetites run wild...inhabitants develop tastes for meat, fish, cosmetics, perfumes, fashion, confections and prostitutes... all kinds of luxury goods are readily available, professions multiply, and the population explodes... rapid population growth fuels the need for more territory... [driving] the *luxurious* city to make war on its neighbours’ (2004, p. 73).

Injustice grows in this polis as the principle of specialisation is not strictly applied. Effective government is required to cure the *luxurious* polis’s *pleonexia* induced fever. ‘Socrates and his interlocutors will purify [it] step by step. By removing objectionable features... they gradually fashion the ideal city, where life will be moderately austere— as in the city of pigs— but civilised. Couches and tables are not removed; they remain at the top of the list of equipment for a civilised, cultured life’ (Burnyeat, 1997, p. 23).

The removal of injustice concurrently with excessive wanton luxury transforms the *luxurious* polis into the Kallipolis with the justice and unity found in the *kōmē of producers*. As Burnyeat notes this does not preclude civilisation and the progress which Nettleship considers the moderately austere life of the *polis for pigs* impedes. Over and above unity and justice, things that can improve society are maintained in the Kallipolis, and Burnyeat uses couches as an exemplar. ‘The social gathering with couches and tables is as good a place as any to localise the overall choice which is the main theme of the *Republic*, the choice between living well and living badly’ (1997, p. 233).

4.2 The primordial social relationship

As unity in the polis, largely dependent on the decision of its citizens to congregate, cooperate and share to fulfil their needs, is so important to Socrates, one must accept that he understands its foundation. Does he therefore develop the *kōmē of producers* based on a positive *primordial social relationship* to buttress his argument? Or, as proposed by Devereux, is he just offering an alternate to Glaucon’s *pleonexia* driven, pessimistic view on human nature in the *state of nature*? Does Socrates truly believe that citizens in the *kōmē of producers* are naturally capable of functioning in a mutually beneficial system of cooperation and communal living with no formal government?

In Socrates’ origin of the *polis for pigs* there is no prior *state of nature* with people continually at odds with each other until justice, and government, is imposed through law as proposed by Glaucon in his contractarian polis. So Devereux is correct in suggesting that Socrates is offering a more optimistic view on human nature in the origin of the *kōmē of producers*, a view

of cooperative humankind. He is, however, incorrect in considering this scenario, of humankind working cooperatively in the absence of government and law, is a condition that has never existed. Over 12 000 years ago, a true *state of human nature*, with cooperation and sharing, was the norm for the *First People*, the San. Circumstances change and with the introduction of sedentism, this *state of human nature* is conserved in settled agrarian society.⁵³ Justice is then achieved in this society through the principle of specialisation, following division of labour.

It is no coincidence that the principles underlying unity, cooperation, sharing and justice, premised on division of labour and specialisation, in the *kōmē of producers*, are the same three principles presently considered central to the evolution and development of early settled agrarian society.⁴⁵ It is a testament to Plato's powers of observation and analysis, that he recognised these principles and their significance, and records them in his description of the polis at 'its beginnings', in the *polis for pigs*. If Aristotle, in Western political thought, is adjudged as the forefather of political science (*Politics*, 1252a15), then Plato, having documented settled agrarian society's underlying initial principles, is possibly the first social anthropologist.

It is now accepted that humankind in the *state of human nature*, is naturally endowed with characteristics that equip it to cooperate and share, and is thus suited by nature for communal living to fulfil its needs. Socrates is correct in recording humankind's *primordial social relationship* as cooperation and sharing, and not predation and avarice. *Pleonexia* and its associated evils, including the circumstances of justice in a nominal *state of nature*, come later.

It is in societies of small scale, as in the *kōmē of producers*, where natural unity and justice can exist in the absence of formal government. In summary, Socrates, in recording humankind's *primordial social relationship*, establishes that 'society is natural and indeed necessary to man' (Wilson, 1977, p. 318), that needs have primacy over *pleonexia* in the origin and development of society, and that humans are naturally imbued with the ability to live harmoniously to achieve the common end of a good and happy life for all in the

⁴⁵ In footnotes (2-5,11,15,16,38) I have briefly documented how early man made the transition from nomadic hunter-gatherer life to settled village life about 10000- 12000 years ago. They detail that cooperation and sharing, division of labour and specialisation are central to this process and would have been observable in ancient Greek villages as they are in rural villages today. The difference from Plato's theory is the issue of what is natural; remembering what the ancient Greeks consider natural is different from today. Currently, cooperation and sharing and division of labour are considered innate, thus conserved from our animal heritage, and specialisation, following Massey⁵ is consequent on having the appropriate environment, that is having the time to develop it.

community. The necessary and sufficient mechanisms to attain the needs are cooperation and sharing— humankind's *primordial social relationship*.

5. Conclusion

In the greater political scheme of the times the *kōmē of producers* is a small, semi-autonomous, largely extra-political entity. Its citizens live moderately, according to their needs, necessary desires and the exigencies of their situation. The *kōmē*'s structure is, as in all small communities both then and now, without formal government for the reasons explained. There are however mechanisms in place, as discussed, to ensure that the polis functions well in the absence of formal government. These mechanisms include cooperation, sharing and natural Socratic justice.

I believe that the *kōmē of producers* is based on reality, and exists. It is certainly not an *impossible* polis or one which only exists in a fantasy world, as this will diminish Socrates' search for justice. Its producer-citizens are no different from any other similar producers throughout the ages. This concurs with the naysayers who believe the citizens have the normal psychological features of producers, but are concerned that there is no government to curb their unnecessary appetitive desires.

The *polis for pigs* has yet to experience wealth, with all its attendant *pleonexic* temptations, poverty and political problems. These are to be found in the *luxurious* polis, which is yet to come. It is in the *luxurious* polis that Socrates first introduces an institution of government, an army. Initially this provides for the *luxurious* polis's excessive wants by seizing other poleis' lands and serves to defend the *luxurious* polis's substantial wealth from invaders (*Rep.* 373d-374a). The *luxurious* polis can clearly afford city hall and its institutions.

The *kōmē of producers* does not have all the virtues of an ideal polis. There is no courage in the form of purple, dyed-in-the-wool Guardians (*Rep.* 429d-430b). It can at best muster a community response to threats, dressed in un-dyed cloth. It has no philosophy, but as Socrates describes in *Theaetetus* (Plato, 172d), and which is later wonderfully encapsulated by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*, 'Leisure is the mother of philosophy' (1651). The *kōmē of producers* does not yet have the luxury of such leisure time. Like other things the *kōmē of producers* does not have, following Rowe, this is yet to come in either the *luxurious* polis or the Kallipolis.

But what this polis has, *in toto*, is the strong foundation Socrates needs for the Kallipolis. Without a solid footing, any government of a city-state will collapse, sooner rather than later. Socrates does not attempt to redefine or defend the *kōmē of producers*, because, its way of life

and underpinning principles, as a foundation for the Kallipolis, is fit for purpose. As Strauss points out there is no need for lies or myths to justify the *polis for pigs*. ‘This is one reason Socrates calls it “the true city”, i.e. the truthful city’ (1964, p. 98).

This community is partially virtuous, good to the extent that virtue allows, and its producer-citizens ‘are made as happy as it is possible for them to be’ (Reeve, 1998, p. 176), consequent on the satisfaction of communal before personal interest (*Rep.* 412d-e, 420c, 421b-c). This is possible because of the unwritten articles of its association, its natural justice and because ‘[each citizen] loves something most of all when he believes that the same things are advantageous to it as to himself and supposes that if it does well, he’ll do well, and that if it does badly, then he will do badly too’ (*Rep.* 412d).

This then opposes Annas’ opinion that the *polis for pigs* ‘has not given the first city a clear place in the *Republic*’s moral argument’ (1981, p. 78). The presence in its precincts of the division of labour and specialisation, underpinning economic justice, with functional reciprocity enhancing the supplying of the needs for the ‘greater good of the whole [of the community]’ (Annas, 1981, p. 75), giving rise to distributive justice and concomitant unity, are surely reasons enough to justify the *polis for pigs*’ role in the *Republic* and a place in Socrates’ moral argument.

The *kōmē of producers* is not the best polis, but it is the best polis it can be given the prevailing circumstances. It has the essential virtue— justice; it also has moderation, of a kind, in that its citizens ‘rule the pleasures of drink, sex and food for themselves’ (*Rep.* 389d-e) and thus they exhibit ‘a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desire’ (*Rep.* 430e). It is eutopia, a good place, both in and of itself and a good place in which its citizen can live.

However, it is yet to become a cornerstone of the Kallipolis, the most beautiful polis, or Utopia. More correctly the Kallipolis is outopia- ideal but nowhere, except perhaps in heaven, for anyone to avail themselves of its citizenship (*Rep.* 592b). Until then, the *kōmē of producers* is the true and healthy polis, because as Socrates correctly predicts, and human history records, ‘until philosophers rule as kings...[or] kings and leading men philosophise...until political power and philosophy entirely coincide... cities will have no rest from evil... nor will the human race’ (*Rep.* 473c-d).

6. Postscript

‘Hunting and gathering life... left its mark on our minds just as it did on our bodies. On top of the technical skills of planning, coordination and technology, there was, equally important, the social skill of cooperation. A sense of common goals and values, a desire to further the common good, cooperation was more than simply individuals working together. It became a set of rules of conduct, of morals, and understanding of right and wrong in a complex social system... The great British biologist Conrad Waddington put it best: Through evolution humans became the ethical animal’ (Leakey & Lewin, 1992, pp.304-305).

I began this dissertation with a preface, describing a coincidence of ideas centred on a concern for the welfare of the polis. Plato, in the *Republic*, offers a solution— humankind must live according to its needs and find a way to govern their desire for excessive wants, if unity and justice are to prevail in the polis. I end with a postscript, returning to Plato’s solution and its underlying principles.

6.1 The Songs of the Daughters of Necessity (*Rep.* 617c)

6.1.1. Lachesis, the *kōmē* of producers

‘Or aren’t virtue and wealth so opposed that if they were set on a scales, they’d always incline in opposite directions? That’s right. So, when wealth and the wealthy are valued or honoured in a city, virtue and good people are valued less. Clearly. And what is valued is always practiced, and what isn’t valued is neglected’ (*Rep.* 550e-551a).

Almost two thousand five hundred years ago, Socrates initiated the Western tradition of philosophy, seeking truth by asking interminable questions of his contemporaries. Through the answers and counter questions appraising the premises of the argument, the debate progressed. Socrates’ method, the elenchus, is used to probe issues such as justice, injustice, courage, wisdom, beauty, friendship, love and many more.

Plato is never heard in these dialogues, but it is assumed that his own views are also included, particularly in his middle and later writings including the *Republic*. One of his objectives in the *Republic* is to ‘design the ideal society’ (Burnyeat, 1997, pp. 217). He begins in Book II, having relinquished the elenchus, by describing the *polis for pigs* (*Rep.* 369a-372d) in his search for the origin of justice. This is the polis vilified by Glaucon as the *polis for pigs*, but lauded by Socrates as true and healthy.

I suggest that the *polis for pigs* is a village, its citizens are ordinary farmers and tradesmen with normal needs and desires, who choose to establish this village as a public partnership. Its

circumstances of justice are simply their reasoned recognition of their inability to provide for their needs as individuals, and thus their decision to work together as partners and helpers, cooperating and sharing. This is the natural basis of unity in their community. It is augmented by justice, the natural basis of which is the principle of specialisation which follows from division of labour. Each of these elements—unity and justice—make the *polis for pigs* naturally true and healthy.

The *polis for pigs*' natural justice, and unity based on humankind's *primordial social relationship*, cooperation and sharing, is the start of Plato's answer to 'what is right both in public and private affairs' (7th Letter, 325b-c). It is the bedrock, or solid foundation, on which Socrates builds the Kallipolis. The Kallipolis is arguably an early account of communitarianism, placing the good before the right, in which its justice and unity are now conventional. Like all strong foundations, however, the *polis for pigs* is largely buried, unseen and ignored, and yet still virtuous.

6.1.2. Clotho, the *Luxurious Polis*

'What makes ancient Greece important for us is that it was faced by essentially the same political, philosophic and religious problems as ourselves... our age, like theirs, is one in which all the *foundations* are breaking down (Dickinson, 1931, pp. 13-14).

Things change. Perhaps beginning with Aristotle,⁴⁶ it is a long and momentous journey to Rawls' "justice as fairness" where:

'[E]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice... [wherein] the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests' (1971, pp. 3-4).

According to Michael Sandel⁴⁷ this:

'is a liberal vision that gives pride of place to justice, fairness and individual rights... [and] seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables its citizens to pursue their own ends consistent with a similar liberty for all; it therefore must be governed by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good' (1984, p.82).

⁴⁶ Miller, 1996, pp. 873-907.

⁴⁷ Sandel, 1984, pp. 81-96.

Rawls' contractarian liberal philosophy, giving precedence to individual rights, places the right before the good. And so the debate over Plato's concern about 'what is right both in public and private affairs' (7th Letter, 325b-c) continues to this day, but in what is perceived to be a vastly different world.

Is it a different world? 'All the cities of the present age are badly governed' (7th Letter, 325b-c) by the same political systems present in Plato's day— tyranny, oligarchy, timocracy, democracy. However, a new, insidious form of rule has emerged— 'corporatocracy' (Sachs, 2011, p. 105). In a Thrasymachean twist, strong corporate lobbies have usurped power from weak, ineffectual governments.⁴⁸ Our towns, cities, nations and the global polis are riven and fractious, possibly more so than Plato's city-states, by amongst other things politics, religion, colour, gender and sexual orientation schisms, and especially wealth and poverty.

The global wealth GINI coefficient⁴⁹, a measure of the inequality of wealth, has never been greater. One percent of the world's population (70 million out of 7 billion people) own almost half of the global wealth.⁵⁰ All of the evils induced by *pleonexia*, and more, abound in our poleis. *Pleonexia* has become an artform, to be viewed as images of puppets prance on I-Screens (television, ι-Pads, ι-Phones and other assorted devices), intermittently interrupted by messages from advertisers, latter-day poets, as to how we can acquire anything we want. We live in the global *luxurious* polis and injustice abounds.

The more things change, the more they stay the same. But there are current issues, recognised by Socrates, which have grown to excessive proportions that make it imperative that a true philosophy is found to provide solutions to humankind's present predicament.

6.1.3. Atropos, the Kallipolis?

'They'll enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their resources allow least they fall into either poverty or war'(Plato, *Republic*, 372b-c).

'As long as it is willing to remain one city, it may continue to grow, but it cannot grow beyond that point' (Plato, *Republic*, 423b).

Socrates understands the relationship between population size and available resources, and the consequences of not aligning them— wealth and poverty existing side by side fomenting

⁴⁸From "The Rigged Game" in Jeffrey Sachs' *The Price of Civilization* (2011, pp. 105-131).

⁴⁹ [http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Gini_coefficient.html]

⁵⁰Oxfam, "Working for the Few" [<http://www.oxfam.org/en/research/working-few>]

revolution (*Rep.* 422a). Two millennia later, Thomas Malthus gives greater expression to this debate in *An Essay on the Principle of Population*.⁵¹ His refined argument is much criticised because his doomsday prediction has not materialised. However, that is due to both time and circumstance. Humankind's ingenuity, as opposed to their minimal rationality, initially finds new ways of exploiting existing resources to satisfy the needs of the exploding population.

However, Malthus's time is coming. Neither Socrates nor Malthus could have anticipated the world's current imbroglio, in which the excessive population growth and unwarranted consumption of finite resources to achieve wealth, has damaged our environment to the point where future food and water security is imperilled.

Edward O Wilson, in the Forward to Jeffrey Sachs' book *Common Wealth*⁵², notes that humankind has now produced a global population:

‘dangerously close to the limit of Earth's available resources ... [and] we have arrived at a narrow window of opportunity ... [as] almost all the crises that afflict the world economy are ultimately environmental in origin...[but] the evidence is compelling: we need to redesign our social and economic policies before we wreck the planet. At stake is humankind's one shot at a permanently bright future’.

In my opinion, the crisis that afflicts our world economy is the outward symptom of a malign malaise. The global polis's circumstances of justice, or more correctly injustice, are absolutely apparent. Poverty is at unprecedented levels, with the world's poorest one billion people in a poverty trap in which they are barely able to survive. They are subject to undernourishment and disease and are denied access to health care and the basic amenities of potable water and sanitation.⁵³ Fulfilling their fundamental needs is barely, if at all possible. To make matters worse there are billions of others who live perilously close to this desperate existence. Global injustice is of such epic proportions that war, revolution and strife between nations, neighbourhoods and neighbours is a daily occurrence. It is available for viewing on your I-Screen 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

The imperatives are obvious. Never before has there been a greater urgency for a ‘true philosophy, that... from it we can come to recognise what is right both in public and private affairs’ (7th *Letter*, 325b-c). In our present global polis, national interests have been added to

⁵¹Thomas Malthus, 1798, pp. 1-125.

⁵²Sachs, 2008, Forward.

⁵³Sachs, 2008, pp. 30-31.

personal and public interests. Furthermore, apart from having to regulate individual *pleonexia*, governments now have the additional responsibility of disentangling themselves from big business and regulating corporate greed.

If we are to succeed at the one shot we have at a permanently bright future for humankind, a global accommodation is required to meet these competing demands, and to strive for the unity in the polis Socrates so obviously considers virtuous. This accommodation is necessary not only for the overall good and happiness of people, but to ensure the protection of their home, which is the source of their present and future needs and thus wellbeing— Mother Earth. Once before, in a rare moment of enlightenment, such an accord was achieved. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’ was signed in 1948.⁵⁴ Establishing a framework within which people pursue their own conception of the good, the common good, presumably its expected outcome, has yet to be achieved.

If we do not achieve an accommodation, a true philosophy, the alternative is ‘a clash of civilisations [which] could well result from the rising tensions, and it could truly be our last and utterly devastating clash’ (Sachs, 2008, p.4). These are the words of a man who has escaped the Cave and sought knowledge and Truth in the sunlight, not only from the highways but more importantly from the byways and the back roads. Yet Jeffrey Sachs, and the few like-reasoned, kindred spirits, seems not to be heard, back in the Cave, above the *pleonexic* cacophony of an avaricious minority— the “some who won’t be satisfied”. The latter do not accept a way of life which requires living to their needs (*Rep.* 373a), and thus necessary desires, preferring instead the accumulation of obscene wealth.

Such a true philosophy, premised in the first instance on humankind’s *primordial social relationship*, the natural ability to cooperate and share, is required for the development of a modern day iteration of the global Kallipolis. It further requires the incorporation of agreed concepts of justice, to accomplish the fulfilment of the needs and satisfaction of the necessary desires of the vast majority, if not all, whilst simultaneously avoiding the evils of *pleonexia*. It must be consistent with current and future realities.

Thereafter comes the real difficulty, with apologies to Michael Sandel but following Socrates (*Rep.* 473d) — to ensure that ‘political philosophy [does not] reside at a distance from the

⁵⁴Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>]

world... [so that] principles are [not] one thing, politics another... [in order that] our best efforts “live up” to our ideals...and do not founder on the gap between theory and practice’ (Sandel, 1984, p. 81). This will require the courage and wisdom of Socrates in taking the philosophy to the *agora*.

Achieving the modern Kallipolis, that most beautiful place, may seem a bridge too far; we are human and just as in Socrates’ time, it may be Outopia. We must however endeavour as the consequences of not trying are too daunting to contemplate.

The time is now. Tomorrow and the next are working days. The day after is too late.

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Annexure I— Demography of the Kallipolis

It is difficult to determine what the population of the Kallipolis is to be able to compare it with the *polis for pigs*. Socrates considers the Kallipolis should be of a suitable size to ensure that it does not grow beyond a point which will destroy its unity (*Rep.* 423b-c). He says of the Kallipolis ‘even if it has only 1000 men to fight for it...’ (*Rep.* 423a). To fully support 1000 male Guardians (there could also be female Guardians in addition) with housing, food, clothing, armour and weapons, would require considerable effort from the rest of the population.

Assuming four additional citizens (adult males) to support each Guardian, this would suggest 4000 more citizens, giving a total of 5000 citizens. This figure corresponds with the citizen population of Plato’s practical, good city in *Laws*, the suggested maximum citizen population being 5040 (Plato, *Laws*, 737e). Add to this women (5040), children (assuming 3-4 per family, that is an average 3.5 children per family), and a conservative estimate for the population of the Kallipolis is 27 720 people. Metics, foreigners and slaves are not considered in this calculation, but if present could arguably double the population. Thus the Kallipolis is small by comparison to Athens with a male, adult citizen population alone of some 60 000 people in 431 BCE, which is reduced by war, plague and famine to 25 000 in 400 BCE. (Hansen, 1998, p. 28).

Recognising the comparative demographic (polis population) size and the developmental relationship, of the *first kōmē* to the *luxurious polis* and the Kallipolis, is important to the development of my thesis.
