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Uncertainty in Jerusalem:
A study on the effect of Israeli policies and state practices on the lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem.

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Research Report submitted for the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Migration

African School of Migration and Society (ACMS)

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Declaration

I, Rosa Manoim (Student number: 725975) am a student registered for Masters of Arts (Migration). I hereby declare that this research report:

- Is my own unaided work except where I have explicitly indicated otherwise. I have followed the required conventions in referencing the thoughts and ideas of others.
- Is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Migration at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination at any other university.

Signature: _____ Date: 21 November 2018

Abstract

This research report examines the everyday effects of Israeli policies and state practices (relating to rights to live in the city) on the lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem. It engages with state policy and practice across three main scales; the larger scale level of rights to the city itself, the closer-to-home scale of bureaucratic threats against the family home, as well as the micro-scale questions of the everyday. In this report I examine empirical evidence – a case study of a house demolition, and ethnographic material from a Palestinian neighbourhood targeted for settlement projects - alongside the policy data that relates to each of these instances- including policy on land-zoning, tenancy, residency and social security. I argue that the cumulative effect of these policies and practices create the unstable conditions, which I refer to as a 'coercive environment', which works to indirectly displace Palestinians from Jerusalem. This report shows that the daily uncertainties that Palestinians experience as a result of these policies intensify the precarious conditions of everyday life, and further finds uncertainty as one of the multiple forms of violence present in the coercive environment. Themes including everyday anxiety, security and fear, punishment and criminalization, procedural bare life and emotional violence, arise from the empirical data observed and collected, and are examined for how they create uncertainty and form part of this coercive environment.

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List of Abbreviations

PA-	Palestinian Authority
OPT-	Occupied Palestinian Territories
MFA-	Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MI-	Israeli Ministry of Interior
NGO-	Non-Governmental Organisation
UN-	United Nations
IDF-	Israeli Defence Force

Abbreviations from organisational reports referenced in this report:

CCPRJ-	Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem
ACRI-	Association for Civil Rights in Israel
UN-OCHAOPT-	United Nations: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territories

Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

The very presence of Palestinians in Jerusalem, as historical residents, challenges the narratives that legitimize the Israeli state. The response of the state to this, includes a variety of bureaucratic policies and practices. In this research report, I explore how the everyday lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem are shaped by these Israeli state practices and policies. Using empirical data from ethnographic research in Jerusalem, I look specifically at administrative house demolitions and tenant evictions both of which, at first glance, do not immediately appear as obvious occupation/displacement policies, as they are understood as bureaucratic necessities. By looking at these within the context of the multitude of other policies and practises that target Palestinians specifically, (including land zoning, citizenship/residency laws, as well as fines, checkpoints, and permits,) my research shows that the cumulative effect of these results in an environment of violence, which I call a "coercive environment". In this environment the Palestinian daily experience is one of uncertainty, anxiety, and anguish where mere existence is an act of resistance against the ongoing occupation and colonization of their homes and land.

Outline

The outline of my report is as follows: I begin with an introductory chapter which positions my research within the complex geopolitical space of the city of Jerusalem.

In this chapter, I introduce my research as well as define some of the language and terminology I use. After which I briefly explain and summarize some of the important laws and policies that affect or govern Palestinians' lives in Jerusalem.

In the second chapter, I provide a literature review which frames the theoretical basis of this research report. The literature locates the research site and question, within a framework of knowledge that asks us to reconceptualise how we understand (civil) constructs and boundaries, and engages with the concept of uncertainty. On this foundation, it then locates power and how we understand it – focusing, in particular, on settler colonialism and structural forms of power in 'the everyday'. Finally, it looks more specifically at Jerusalem and the surrounding region, through engaging with literature that explores bureaucratic means of control and the security-industrial complex.

Thereafter in chapter three, I explain the methodology used to carry out this research, as well as a brief discussion on the limitations of the research and my own positionality.

In chapters four and five, I present my research findings and provide an analysis of these findings as follows:

Chapter four is based on a case study of a home demolition and raises questions on the uncertainty embedded in Israeli policies and some of the emotional effects thereof.

Chapter five includes ethnographic material from empirical research I undertook in a Jerusalem neighbourhood, where a family was evicted. It raises questions about the everyday experience of life under conditions of the uncertainty I found and outlined in the previous chapter. This chapter asks how Palestinian families navigate their present and see their futures; and what these responses can tell us about the underlying structural conditions present in their everyday.

In my conclusion, chapter six, I sum up my arguments from the previous chapters; namely that in this paper I have found that Palestinians are subject to an environment of multiple, intersecting, and all-encompassing layers of structural violence - which I call a 'coercive environment' in Jerusalem, as a result of Israeli state policies and practices. The everyday experience of uncertainty is an important aspect of this structural violence which we should take into further consideration in research around this area.

This introductory chapter is structured as follows: I will be providing some context and background to my research report, by discussing the significance of occupied Jerusalem as a space for study, and arguing that the manner in which it is studied needs to be done in a way which responds to a contemporary context of global precarity, rather then re-prescribing fixed labels that are no longer useful in analysis. Thereafter I will explain my research focus, and briefly summarize my research aims and process. This chapter concludes with a list of definitions and explanations for some of the important terms and policies that are central to this research, and follows after an explanation on the complexity of defining terms in this context.

Context: Occupied Jerusalem



Figure 1 A Divided Jerusalem (Totten, 2011)

Jerusalem/ Al-Quds, is an important socio-historical and political space; regularly in the global media for the tensions and conflicts that take place, both on the ground and in international conversations. It is a city that is important to many, many people for religious and spiritual reasons, and one that forms part of the identities of people worldwide. But aside from that, Jerusalem is also home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, (323,700 according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ACRI, 2017)). Their rights to the city however, are constantly contested; and further challenged by the effects of settler colonialism, the privatization of public spaces under globalized neoliberal capitalism; and the Israeli state which is threatened by the mere existence of Palestinians. Palestinian existence in Jerusalem disrupts the idea of a 'Jewish and democratic state' that Israel narrates (Pappe, 2017). Palestinian presence subverts the narrative of exclusive Jewish indigeneity; and the threat of Palestinian citizens becoming a majority challenges the State's identity as *Jewish*, whilst preventing its citizens from voting challenges its identity as *democratic*.

Palestinians of occupied East Jerusalem, face disruptions to their daily routine on a regular basis. The ‘lucky ones’ have a Jerusalem residency permit or "Jerusalem ID" card; which entitles them as tax-payers, to benefits such as health-care services from their municipality. Unlike citizenship however, usually understood as sovereign and unalterable (Arendt, 1973), Jerusalem residency can be, and regularly is, stripped away from their Palestinian holders. This can be done in a number of ways; from how often one visits their family over in the West Bank, to how closely related one is to someone who is in linked to or convicted of a crime. In addition to the residency permit; other bureaucratic and procedural mechanisms are employed to get Palestinians out of Jerusalem; in particular, the disruption of their home lives through the political effects of zoning policy, such as home demolitions or evictions. Combined with checkpoints, regular arrests and heavy fines targeted at the population of East Jerusalem quite specifically; the lives, and plans for the future, of Palestinians in occupied Jerusalem are fraught with obstacles and uncertainty.



Figure 2 Qualendia: Checkpoints preventing access to Jerusalem.

Research focus

My research is guided by the following questions:

What are the structures and policies that affect Palestinian’s rights to live in Jerusalem?

How do Palestinians make sense of and respond to everyday life in occupied Jerusalem?

How can we theoretically understand the multiple layers of (un)certainty that govern Palestinian life in Jerusalem?

'Headline-worthy' events that take media attention such as wars, hunger strikes, and overt legal discrimination are important and need to be written and thought about. However, I argue, the subtler and more complex forms of violence; those that are tied up into the sphere of everyday uncertainties; are increasingly impactful on people's lives and yet increasingly difficult to engage with, ever-changing, and harder to observe from a distance. And yet, as Zigmund Bauman (2000) and others remind us, we are living in an age of increasing precarity and the state-centred, binary and bordered, legalistic way of understanding the world is less and less in touch with the every-day realities of those we write about (Bauman, 2000; Das and Poole, 2004; Armano et al, 2017; Favel, 2007).

It is important, as a starting point, to note that in examining the everyday lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem, I will be ensuring that I simultaneously maintain an awareness of the specific legal status of Palestinians in Jerusalem - as these statuses significantly affect their lives - and yet avoid the re-inscription of state-categories onto people. The research, therefore, engages with the different forms of legal status and legal identity from the participant's experience and perspective, and I have drawn on literature that covers a wide range of these statuses. I do not want to make assumptions or classify Palestinians according to the legal mechanisms the Israeli state uses, so I will not centralize these legal statuses as I do not want to do the work of the Israeli state - classifying and dividing Palestinians through a legal regime - but will engage with the multiple forms of citizenship, legal identity and status. Most significant of these in Jerusalem, is the 'Jerusalem Identity Document' or Jerusalem Residency Permit that most Palestinians of Jerusalem hold, allowing them legal residence and the social security benefits that come with that, restricted to only within Jerusalem. I will discuss this in more detail in my definitions section. Additionally, there are Palestinians who only have West Bank residence (citizenship with the Palestinian Authority) but who are able to come into Jerusalem to work or visit (subject to strict regulations). There are also Palestinian citizens of Israel (called 'Arab Israelis' by Israeli institutions), who can be anywhere in Israel, including Jerusalem; furthermore are Palestinians without legal identity/ status or who are illegal; as well as refugees.

Collecting and working with data

To collect empirical data, I spent a month in Jerusalem, in 2017, immersed in the tensions and ambiguities of the environment and the people's everyday engagement with it. Submerging myself in Jerusalem, I watched on with a young family, as the state forces demolished their home which was built without a permit. I spent weeks sitting with an elderly couple and their family who had just been evicted from their home, in a central neighbourhood of East Jerusalem - a neighbourhood infamous for these evictions - and I participated in their communal gatherings and community protests; as well as spending time with them as they tried to figure out

what to do next. To compliment my time spent observing life in Palestinian East Jerusalem, I also spent some days looking for the historical changes evident in the landscape of 'Israeli West Jerusalem', where massive new developments were being constructed alongside the homes that Palestinians used to live in before their expulsion in 1948: which are now being marketed as "quaint old Arab homes" for much higher prices. In addition, I spent time at check-points, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) offices, Palestinian shops/marketplaces, on Palestinian transport, in different Palestinian villages and neighbourhoods inside the Jerusalem municipal boundaries; as well as in the Old City area of Jerusalem. I also spoke to and observed Israeli activists and non-activists as well. During my field-research period, I managed to gain deep ethnographic data based on my observations of human emotion and interactions. After completing this empirical research, I did a year of desktop research; researching the particular Israeli policies and state practises that arose from my research, their background and context and how they are applied today. My study therefore uses empirical research as a starting point but compliments this with desktop research on policy and law. My research methodology will be explained in more detail in chapter three.



Figure 3 Arabic inscription visible on the archway of a West Jerusalem home in an upper class Jewish neighbourhood

In researching the experiences of Palestinians in Jerusalem, I found that the regime is multi-layered, and that understanding one layer out of context does not accurately represent the reality that people face. My research showed me that it is helpful to look at uncertainty as something that can be created or harnessed by the state for their aims. This raises questions about ongoing settler-colonialism and the liberal state; in particular how Palestinians' basic human rights are abused in an era where colonialism and human rights violations are no longer publicly acceptable. I also found that the emotional effects of occupation policies are, themselves, important yet subtle forms of violence which are harder to address using existing grievance processes. This research also shows how Palestinian forms of resistance can include simply the act of embodying hope and

survival and creating certainty in places of uncertainty. This report also raises questions on the difficulties of isolating specific and individual practices as most important – as what it found instead, was that it was the accumulation and intersections of the multitude of state practices, that create the conditions that Palestinians face in Jerusalem, and that practices cannot in fact be read as standalone from each other. An idea which might have implications for legal and political resistance or solidarity. These findings are explained in more detail throughout this report.

Background and the difficulties of providing definitions

Background

The contemporary state of Israel, sitting at the interchange between projecting itself as a multicultural liberal democracy (Pappe, 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Democracy, n.d) in a Westphalian state system, and the inherited logics of settler colonialism (Wolfe, 2006, 2012; Veracini, 2013; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015), is an important site for current study because of what it can tell us about constructed boundaries, citizenship and/or legal status, and precarity. Palestinians in Israel/Palestine, within the borders of Jerusalem particularly, face these questions on a daily basis. In seeking to further understand the structures that underpin an extremely complex and contested socio-political environment, I found that it is crucial to look specifically at the people whose daily lives, and rights to the city in which they live, are affected so severely by these systems. For this reason, amongst others, I look at the Palestinians' experiences of Jerusalem.

The task of providing definitions and explanations

It is necessary and important to locate my research topic within a clear and concise explanation of the history of the city of Jerusalem, and place that history against the backdrop of each important political moment in global history that shaped it. Yet I have been unable to simply summarize the history of Jerusalem because with Jerusalem particularly, it is the *dispute* over this history that makes it such an important city. Growing up Jewish, I learned a specific history, which over time I began to question, particularly when the on-the-ground reality that I began to see - both in the news, and for myself in my visits there - made the history I had learned, seem improbable. Israel pours millions of dollars each year into the project of projecting its present and history in a certain way; a project called 'hasbarah'. In activist circles, *hasbarah* means Israeli propaganda and in the circles I grew up in, it means defending Israel from the people threatening it, otherwise known as "Israel Advocacy". It tells a story of victimized Israelis' under threat from all sides, wishing to live in the Jewish homeland without fear (see Stephens, 2008). It portrays the binary of terrorism and violence versus democracy and safety (Ministry of Foreign Affairs - IDF, n.d.). Most importantly, it teaches that any critique of the State of Israel is an attack on the Jewish people (Butler, 2004). It echoes the past horrors of antisemitism in the world, and promises that without Israel's strong military power, and the united voice of Jews worldwide, Jewish people risk becoming victims to genocide once more (Pappe, 2017). In this context, security becomes an aspiration as well as the

moral justification for otherwise morally unjustifiable actions (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Butler, 2004). Reading over my field notes, I noticed a pattern emerge over the beginning of my conversations and interviews with Palestinians. The participants began our conversation with a concise, clear explanation of their family's history in Palestine and in the city of Jerusalem, specifically. This was then followed by an explanation of the history of Palestine, as a place where their families lived and farmed before being displaced by the Zionist project. One of the main difficulties I have encountered in this research report, is tackling the tension between the academic requirements of concepts, terms, and histories to be introduced, summarized and defined; and the ever-present fact that history and definitions are political, contested, and perhaps even subjective (Abu El-Haj, 1998; Peteet, 2005). In Israel/Palestine histories, concepts (such as citizenship and legality), and geographies are used by the Israeli State, as tools of state-building and maintenance of hegemonies (Abu El-Haj, 1998; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015). History, concepts and geography are simultaneously being evoked (albeit in very different ways) by Palestinian families and organisations as tools of resistance, survival or self-preservation (Peteet, 2005). How then am I supposed to provide a clear and concise, objective and useful academic explanation of the concepts I use? In this report therefore, I have tried to retain the clarity required for intellectual rigour while constantly questioning the political implications of the very act of definition.

> *"Naming a place functions as a public claim. Repeating a name, standardising it, and displacing former names normalises it. The names that endow place with meaning and resonance, particularly in settler–colonial settings are often ideological invocations, part and parcel of an imaginative, often violent geography, that are then standardised by the state and often the academy. In other words, naming is an assertion of power. In the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, naming can be a diagnostic of power; conflicts over naming reflect and are integral to contests over control and ownership" (Peteet 2005, 157).*

The name Jerusalem, is itself, inherently political (Azaryahu and Golan, 2001; Peteet, 2005). By activists and Palestinians, it often is referred to by its historical Arabic name, *Al Quds* (shortened from *al-Quds al-Sharif*), and yet 'Jerusalem' is also accepted by many left-wing circles, because it does not refer to Israel; thus legitimizing the State of Israel over Occupied Palestine. Naming places in Israel/Palestine is contested, political, complex and important in understanding the history and power contestations (Peteet, 2005). Current place names are not innocent but constructed and deliberate (Azarvahu and Golan, 2001). Nadia Abu El-Haj, argues that knowledge is produced, often in quite a material way. She shows that current practise in Israeli archaeology "inscribes the landscape with the concrete signs of particular histories" (1998, 168). "The (embodied) history and historicity created through the work of archaeology situate the Jewish nation's claim to the city in a historical trajectory separate from that of the rest of the city's inhabitants" (Abu El-Haj 1998, 180). Part of the Zionist project in Palestine, has been the 'Judaization' of the geography; re-naming places to represent Jewish aspirations and ties to the land (Azaryahu and Golan 2001; Peteet, 2005). "From a Zionist perspective, the 'Hebraicization' of the landscape may be praised as a restoration of the Jewish past on the land and as an aspect of Jewish national revival. From an anti-Zionist perspective, it may be condemned as symbolic erasure of the

Arab past" (Azaryahu and Golan 2001, 192). This is typical of settler colonial societies, who actively engage in the project of creating a history for the settler class, possible only through erasing the history of the indigenous population of the area (Wolfe, 2006, 2012; Veracini, 2013). The recent announcement by current United States president, Donald Trump, on Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, has shaken the region and the world; and the United Nation's decision to veto this move, is further proof of the contested nature and tense, shaky politics of defining and categorizing the geographies of Israel/Palestine.



Figure 4 (State of Israel, n.d): Map of Israel without reference to Palestine or Palestinian cities. The West Bank is called Judea and Samaria. This map is from a government publication detailing "Jewish Settlement in Israel".

These contestations and complexities play out through my research and in writing this report. For example: In writing my chapter about home demolitions, I wanted to write briefly about *how in East Jerusalem, Palestinians are particularly vulnerable to administrative home demolitions*. This sentence requires me to not only explain the demolitions, but I am also required to define what is meant by *East Jerusalem*, and *Palestinians*. Both Palestinians and Israelis have claimed the city of Jerusalem as their capital (Peteet, 2005). Some theorists (of diverse political backgrounds) believe one shouldn't define Jerusalem by East and West. Some activists and

historians say this is because the occupation begun in 1948, and so both East and West Jerusalem, are part of occupied Palestine. Differentiating East Jerusalem as if West Jerusalem is not occupied too, erases the history of the occupation of West Jerusalem in the 1948 *Nakba,* which furthers the settler colonial project of displacement and erasure. Some Israeli state institutions and Zionist writers refer to the whole as Jerusalem and its surrounding neighbourhoods as 'Greater Jerusalem', and want to see, and legislate, a 'unified Jerusalem' as the centre of the Jewish homeland (Ir-Amim, 2018). Some human rights groups argue that reference to a unified city of Jerusalem, fulfils the Zionist project of erasing Palestinian presence in the city and that referring to the East and West sides separately, is important to signify East Jerusalem's status in international law as an illegally occupied territory (Peteet, 2005; United Nations, 2014; CCPRJ 2014; B'tselem, 2017).

In writing this report, I have made reference to Jerusalem as a city specifically, as opposed to Israel or Palestine as a state. Referring to the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea as either Israel or Palestine or Israel/Palestine is contentious. The 1948 Armistice Line (or the 'green line') is treated by the international community as the official border of Israel (Clarno, 2008). As of 1967, East Jerusalem and other areas of the territories occupied by Israel can be seen as under Israel's de facto sovereignty, and East Jerusalem and some other areas have been officially annexed since them. Some states however do not acknowledge Israel's rule over any part of the area (Clarno, 2008).

In this research report one of my aims is to examine state policy, and in doing this I will speak about the Israeli State. Palestine would not be the appropriate term to use for the state in this research, as Palestinian State policies would presumably refer to the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank. For the purposes of this research report I refer to Palestinians, as the Palestinian people of historical Palestine- the land upon which the settler colonial State of Israel now exists. The actual existence of Israel as the State is assumed in this paper. This is not to make a 'public claim' about the legitimacy of the state, but rather to interrogate the entity of the state by putting its own definitions in conversations with those of its Palestinian residents.

Now that I have demonstrated some of the difficulty of simply defining East Jerusalem I would have to define 'Palestinians' and I would be faced with similar problems. Activists, and the Palestinians I spoke to during my time there, would consider all people of Palestinian descent as Palestinian. However, Zionist's including many Israeli State institutions define the Palestinians within Israel's borders as 'Arab Israelis' or simply 'Arabs' (Endeweld et al, 2016), thus different from Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza. Reference to all Palestinians as simply 'Arab' may be part of the political agenda of demanding other Arab and/or Muslim states to take responsibility for the displaced Palestinians, or as part of denying the existence of Palestine in and around the area that is currently under control of Israel. Referring to all Palestinians regardless of citizenship or status, as Palestinians, is then in itself a political move towards unity of Palestinian people, and/or acknowledging their connection to the land of Palestine. However, scholars (Greenstein, 2010; Azoulay and Ophir, 2013) have noted the importance of carefully distinguishing the different population groups, as something imperative for creating sustainable change. Greenstein (2010) points to the importance of distinguishing citizens from non-citizens in

the occupied territories where these distinctions affect the rights of those groups. The complications continue when trying to define Palestinians in a situation where most Palestinians in Jerusalem hold revocable permanent residency as opposed to citizenship. I have tried to define and unpack this further below.

As I've just expressed, this research report requires the reader to understand that history, geography, law and definitions themselves; are all inherently complex, political, and contested. They are also extremely important. Much of the contested background unfortunately is going to fall outside the scope of this report and I will not be able to do it justice in defining it.

Thus, the reader will be going into this research report with a fair amount of uncertainty themselves, but this is appropriate. Most important questions do not have easy answers.

With this in mind, I will do my best to define some of the most important and basic terms I will be using and outline some of the relevant policies that underpin this report:

Terms and policies

1. Israelis:

   When I refer to Israelis, I refer to the Jewish population of Israel, who have Israeli citizenship. There are various other minority groups in Israel, who also hold Israeli citizenship, including the Druze community and various immigrants of other religions who have become naturalized. Jewish immigrants to Israel can automatically receive citizenship under the Law of Return, 1950 (Jewish Agency for Israel, 2013). Legally, there is 'no such thing as Israeli ethnicity' (Kalman, 2013). Jewish Israelis are registered as 'Jewish' on their ID cards. There are Palestinian citizens of Israel (generally called 'Arab Israelis' by Israeli individuals and institutions (including the Central Bureau of Statistics) (Endeweld et al., 2016)) but I refer to them then as Palestinian citizens of Israel, unless they identified themselves as otherwise in my interactions with them. I interacted with many Israeli's during my fieldwork in Israel, from a broad spectrum of politics, spending much time with left-wing Israeli activists who interact with Palestinian Jerusalemites on a regular basis, to other Israelis who, like the majority of Israelis, hardly ever interact with Palestinians, except in some service transactions (i.e. grocery store/ gardener) or in passing. I do not specify Israeli Jerusalemites/ Israeli residents of Jerusalem, because unlike for Palestinian Jerusalemites, it makes no difference to Israelis' citizenship or residency status, whether they live in Jerusalem, elsewhere within Israeli's borders or even as settlers in the West Bank.

2. Israeli Forces:

The Israeli army, called the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), referred to by Palestinian civil society as Israeli Occupation Force "ranks among the most battle-tested armed forces in the world" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs- IDF, n.d.).

> *"The IDF's security objectives are to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Israel, deter all enemies, and curb all forms of terrorism that threaten daily life. Its main tasks include reinforcing the peace arrangements; ensuring overall security in the West Bank in coordination with the Palestinian Authority; spearheading the war against terrorism, both inside Israel and across its borders; and maintaining a deterrent capability to prevent the outbreak of hostilities"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs- IDF, n.d.).

Israelis are conscripted into the IDF at age 18, and refusal lands them in prison (there are a limited number of strict grounds that allow Israeli teens to avoid conscription). When referring to Israeli Forces, I include the Israeli Army (IDF) and the Israeli police force, especially the 'Border Police', who are often deployed in the occupied territories to carry out the state's work in evictions, demolitions, etc. The border police, (known in Israel as Magav) are mostly deployed to police Palestinian areas, protests, etc. and sometimes 'serve alongside the IDF' (Garin Mahal, n.d.). In the words of the Ministry of Foreign affairs, "The police's principal mobile task force, the Border Police, deals mainly with internal security problems and includes a special anti-terrorist unit" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Law Enforcement, n.d.). They are recognizable by their dark green berets, and their noticeable presence in Palestinian neighbourhoods. As advertised in the Ministry of Defence's funded, pre-Military program for international volunteers for the Israeli Army, 'Garin Mahal', "Because of their combat training, border policemen are employed in unique areas, where there are greater risks for riots, violence and even terror. They serve mainly in the countryside, in Arab villages and towns (along with the regular police), near the borders and in Juda and Samaria" (Garin Mahal, n.d.). The Magav are made up of various 'special operations' units which include a "terror undercover unit…which specializes in covert operations…" and "answers directly to the Shabak (Secret Service)" rather than following "regular military or police command structure". In addition, there are plain-clothes units who are "often assimilated into the area during the observations and ambushes", as well as riot control, intelligence, and canine units (Garin Mahal, n.d.).

3. The Oslo Accords, Occupied Palestinian Territories, the West Bank and Area C:



Figure 5 Areas A, B, and C of the West Bank (ResearchGate, 2018)

Areas A, B and C of the West Bank, formed during the Oslo Accords and the 'peace process', from 1991 till 2000. Under this process the Palestinian Authority (PA) was created to give the Palestinian people of the West Bank and Gaza, a form of self-governance which was heavily limited. This was supposed to deal with the issues of Israeli settlements, the borders demarcating Israel from Palestine, Israel's military control over the Palestinian territories, as well as address the issue of the Palestinian right of return. Under the Oslo Accords (Oslo) the structure dividing Areas A, B and C were created, the idea being a "temporary arrangement towards the incremental transfer of power to the Palestinians" (ICAHD 2017, 2). Only Area A (which includes the major Palestinian cities of Nablus, Ramallah, and Bethlehem) is under Palestinian control. Area A is 18% of the West Bank. Area B, which takes up 20% of the West Bank gives Israel military or 'security' control and Palestinians 'civil' control. In Area C, Israel has full civil and security control, and it comprises of 62% of the West Bank. Palestinians have no control or say over any civil issues including land management (such as the demarcation of building permits) in Area C.

> *"Around 300,000 Palestinians live in Area C however Israel has moved in more than 400,000 of its Jewish population who live in 150 settlements and 97 outposts… The Oslo Accords have been a complete failure because Israel has not acted in good faith so that a viable Palestinian state on the 22% of historic Palestine could be established"* (ICAHD 2017, 2).

Israeli institutions often refer to the West Bank as "Judea and Samaria". East Jerusalem, (which is my focus in this paper, though I may make reference to parts of the West Bank), operates in the same way as Area C, in that Palestinians do not have any control over even civil matters.

Clarno (2008, 2017) explains Oslo as 'a neoliberal project' intertwined with ongoing colonialism. Oslo, he explains, was central to this capitalist agenda; which ensures Israel's increased participation in the global economy (which made 'peace' as defined at Oslo, necessary) and the creation of a 'regional free trade zone'. By removing the need for Israel to rely on Palestinian labour, through neoliberal restructuring, the forms of colonization have altered. Palestinians live in increasing poverty (Alyan et al, 2012) according to the National Insurance Institute (Endeweld, et al., 2016), and compete with other 'categories' of migrant workers for Israel's left over menial labour (Clarno, 2008). Free trade agreements, the Zionist projects and the complex waves of migration towards Israel; the shift in economy away from agricultural and towards 'high-tech'; and finally the formation of the Palestinian Authority, all together make the current *post-Oslo* form of ongoing colonization possible. "The formation of the Palestinian Authority allowed Israel to partially outsource the occupation" (Clarno 2017, 6). Clarno's (2017) tentative reference to the 'outsourcing' of occupation is important to understand in order to better conceptualize Israel's political landscape. The idea of 'outsourcing occupation' alludes to the privatization of what would otherwise be projects of the Israeli state. These include the military industry, the security industry, and the social service industry to name but a few. There is now work being done within Palestine on the idea that NGO's are "paying the cost of occupation", by fulfilling the occupying power's obligations under international law, and this "letting Israel off the hook" (Suhaib interview, 2017). For example the United Nations pays rent to the Israeli government for Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank. This type of relationship started at Oslo.

In this report the abbreviation OPT, or 'occupied territories' refers to the Occupied Palestinian Territories namely Areas A, B, C of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. 'PA' refers to the Palestinian Authority, or government of the West Bank currently led by Fatah.

4. Settlements:

Israeli settlements in Palestinians territories occupied after the 1967 war; East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza strip, are illegal under international law- in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention (Tahhan, 2017). Israeli institutions dispute this, saying the "prohibition under the Fourth Geneva Convention against the forcible transfer of civilians to territory of an occupied state was not intended to relate to the circumstances of voluntary Jewish settlement in their ancestral homelands…" as the land was "legitimately acquired" (State of Israel n.d., 2). Jewish Israelis, often supported through state and private organisations move to these Palestinian areas as part of a project of appropriating that land for Israel by cementing Jewish presence there. Though illegal, their infrastructure is well supported by the

state and new settlements are constantly being planned and expanded all the time both in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In 2005, Israel withdrew its settlements from Gaza.

5. Demographics, Population Transfer, Facts on the Ground:

   'Demographic threats': are an extremely important issue for Israel. Whilst maintaining a profile amongst the liberal world and the West, in general, as a vibrant democracy, or as 'the only democracy in the middle east' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Democracy, n.d; Pappe, 2017), Israel needs to ensure a Jewish majority; without this they would no longer be protected under this defence of democracy. The Palestinian population in Jerusalem are potentially a massive threat to this demographic position Israel is holding; as unlike their West Bank and Gaza communities; they are living in 'Israel' yet are not citizens. 'Demographic issues', as they play out in Israel/Palestine are linked to issues of racism (Grosfugel et al, 2015), or ethno-nationalism, and demographic warfare is about putting measures in place to have more Jews then Palestinians (or vice versa). This is done through redrawing borders, and as I argue later, creating an unfavourable environment, in an attempt to make people move away, often referred to as 'the silent transfer' or 'population transfer'. Forcible population transfer is a war crime under international law; it breaches the Fourth Geneva Convention, and is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Tabar, 2010; Tamimi, 2017).
   The idea of 'creating facts on the ground' refers to the infrastructural programs aimed at shifting the geography and demography to ensure that, should a final settlement be reached between the Israelis and Palestinians, that Israel is able to keep control and ownership over as much land and resources as possible due to having settlements spread over what would otherwise be Palestinian land.

6. The Nakba, 'Israeli War of Independence' and 1948:

   What Zionist discourse and the State of Israel refer to as the "War of Independence" which led to "the establishment of the State of Israel", Palestinian discourse refers to as the catastrophe, or *Nakba*, referring to the period where thousands of Palestinians lost their lives and hundreds of thousands were displaced and became refugees. Some discourse refers to the area known as Israel as *'48* to signify the borders established at that time. Zionist discourse says that the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who became refugees or internally displaced persons 'left voluntarily' (Pappe, 2017). However, a growing number of academics, historians and activists argue that this period should in fact be declared as the beginning of a process of ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people (Pappe, 2017; CCPRJ, 2014; Azoulay and Ophir, 2013).



Figure 6 Israel's acquisition of land after the 1948 Nakba (AFP, 2018)

7. East Jerusalem:

The 1948 war or Nakba resulted in the division of Jerusalem into two parts, the western section which came under Israeli control and the eastern section under Jordanian rule. From 1967, after the 6-day war (or the *Naksa*, for Palestinians, referring to the beginning of the current occupation) Israel took control over the Palestinian territories including the West Bank, and authorized the annexation of the eastern half of Jerusalem, though understood in international law as unlawful and invalid. In this area the Israeli State "applied Israeli law…in breach of international law" (Betselem, 2017a). As with most boundaries created under the current Israeli state system, the municipal boundary around Jerusalem which included this annexed land was drawn in "accordance with demographic concerns" (Betselem, 2017a) namely to keep out as many Palestinians as possible in order to ensure a Jewish majority, whilst securing as much land for Israel as possible (Clarno, 2008; Pape, 2017). In some cases "Israel included some lands belonging to villages near Jerusalem within the city's municipal jurisdiction, yet left the owners outside it" (Betselem, 2017a). At present, the annexed land I've been referring to includes "at least 370,000 Palestinians and some 280,000 Israeli settlers" (Betselem, 2017a). As many civil society groups have reported on, Israel is doing as much as it can to 'systematically' 'drive out' as many of these Palestinians as possible (Betselem, 2017a; Al-Haq, 2015; CCPRJ, 2014). Right now the separation barrier (often referred to by the Israeli regime as the 'security barrier' and known by its critics as the 'Apartheid

Wall') cuts off some of its neighbourhoods and cuts it off from the West Bank. The separation barrier, though declared illegal under international law at The Hague is legitimized in Israeli society as a security measure to prevent terrorism (Ir-Amim, n.d; Clarno 2008). It expands beyond the official municipal borders to include many of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and at the same time "artificially cuts up the Palestinian space and leaves large populations outside the city" (Ir-Amim, n.d) thus functioning to "increase the ratio of Jews in the Greater Jerusalem, [and] … reducing the portion of Palestinians". This both serves to 'divide and rule' (Ir-Amim, n.d) and to 'create facts on the ground', namely secure the maximum amount of land towards Israel in the event of a peace settlement (see point 5 above).

Greater Jerusalem is the term used to describe this expanding border around the lands Israel wants to include in its plans for an expanded Jerusalem, and can be associated with the project of settlement and population transfer (Peetet, 2005). The strategy of reducing the number of Palestinians and increasing the number of Jews in the city is part of a longer-term plan to "Judaize" Jerusalem (Tamimi 2017, 38) namely increase its Jewish character and have it more solidly cemented as a Jewish city.

8. Jerusalem Residency and Revocation:

In short, this refers to the legal status of most Palestinians in Jerusalem. Rather than citizenship, they are given status as 'permanent residents', which gives them rights in Jerusalem. In theory, Palestinians of East Jerusalem (like other 'permanent residents'), can apply for citizenship, but this process requires recognition of Israel and a pledge of loyalty to the State. In recent years, more Palestinians are applying for this due to the difficulties of living with permanent residency (Busbridge, 2014). Residency, can be and often is, revoked, on an assortment of grounds which leaves the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem in a very precarious position. Not only do the majority not hold citizenship elsewhere, but they are also constantly required to prove that they are residents of Jerusalem to maintain their status. I will explain in further detail below:

The legal status of "permanent resident" as opposed to citizenship was given to Palestinians in Jerusalem, following the census that was held after the 1967 war and annexation of East Jerusalem (Tamimi, 2017). Those present during the census were recorded as "Jerusalem Arabs" and given residency, allowing them to stay (CCPRJ, 2014). Those not present at the time of this demarcation, lost their rights to the city (See Point 12: Absentee Law) and had to apply for them through 'family unification', "a protracted and highly complicated process" (Tamimi 2017, 39) (See Point 10: ban on Family Unification).

Holding 'permanent' residency as opposed to citizenship makes Palestinian's rights to live and move around Jerusalem "a revocable privilege, instead of an inherent right" subject to the discretion of the Israeli Ministry of Interior (Al-Shabaka, 2017). Unlike citizenship, residency rights do not include the

unconditional rights to register children, unite with family, or even to stay (CCPRJ, 2014): "The number of Jerusalem residencies revoked between 1967 and 2015 reached at least 14,565, more than 11,000 of which took place after the introduction of the "centre of life" policy. This number excludes dependent children, which would bring the total number to over 86,000.32" (Tamimi 2017, 40).

Within Israel's borders, including Jerusalem, the Israeli government must respect the civil rights of everyone, not just its citizens. Social and economic rights including education and social security are based on residency, as opposed to citizenship. Permanent residency holders are also entitled to vote in municipal elections, and access public services (CCPRJ, 2014; Ronen, 2017). For Palestinians, whose residency status is revocable, and thus uncertain, the rights that they are entitled to are thus also insecure (Ronen, 2017).

Understanding residency acquisition and revocation is complex, as it is regularly changing and relies on a multitude of policies. The legal framework around it can be described as "multifaceted and intricate" (Tamimi 2017, 38). The main reasons under which residency can be revoked are: (1) a Palestinian resident cannot prove that their *centre of life* is in Jerusalem, (2) they lived abroad for 7 years or received residency in another country, and (3) through 'breach of allegiance' with Israel. NGO's refer to Israel's "forcible transfer" of Palestinians from Jerusalem when describing the increasing ways that Israel can revoke Palestinian rights to be in Jerusalem.

The Entry Into Israel Law of 1952 and its regulations of 1974, regulate residency. The law states that if one leaves Israel and settles in another country, they will lose their residency. It defines that 'settles in another country' includes having lived for more than 7 years in another country or receiving permanent residency or citizenship in a foreign country. Palestinian civil society describes their status, as making them "foreigners in their own land", as permanent residency under this law is usually given to foreigners for long stay in Israel (CCPRJ, 2014). Whilst the West Bank and Gaza Strip were not previously considered to be foreign countries outside of Israel, they now are (Tamimi 2017, 39).

Without notifying the population in any way, in 1995 Israel introduced a new criterion for determining residency, called "the centre of life" standard (See Point 9: Centre of Life Standard). Over 11500 residency statuses' have been revoked since the introduction of this policy. In addition, Palestinians who meet all the other requirements are now vulnerable to revocations under the new 'breach of loyalty' law (See Point 11: Punitive Revocation of Residency).

A 1989 case set a precedent that has been more recently affirmed, that the legal status of Palestinians in Jerusalem was that of permanent residents - which meant they needed to live in the country to maintain that status. The ordinary status of permanent residence throughout the world assumes that the resident has citizenship in another country that they can return to. For Palestinians of Jerusalem, this is not the case, they have nowhere else to go as indigenous inhabitants of the land of Palestine before the

colonization of the land/ establishment of Israel as a state. The idea that East Jerusalem Palestinians who've lost their Jerusalem residency should move to the Occupied Palestinian Territories is legally absurd; "Israel cannot simultaneously regard the West Bank as a destination for migration and object to it acquiring full independent statehood. Such a claim would also invite the possibility that Jewish residents of Europe whose rights were violated be told to "go to Israel" instead of being able to fight for their rights" (Ronen, 2017)

Thus, Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are constantly at risk of being legally stateless, losing their residency permit results in them being left with no legal status at all.

9. Centre of Life Standard:

Unlike residency policies worldwide, Palestinian Jerusalemites must constantly prove that they live in Jerusalem. Thus, even Palestinians who have *never left the city* have to prove that they still live there, that Jerusalem is their "Centre of life" (Ronen, 2017). A "high standard of proof" (Tamimi 2017, 20) is required as part of the ongoing process of Palestinians continually proving that they are in fact residents of East Jerusalem. These valid forms of proof include, "house ownership papers or rent contracts, electricity, water and telephone bills, payment of municipal taxes, salary slips, proof of receipt of medical care, and certificate of children's school registration" (Tamimi, 2017). The Palestinians I spoke to, all stressed the sheer quantity of paperwork required for this process, using phrases such as 'stacks and suitcases of papers' (Mustafa* interview, 2017) to indicate the extent of the process that needs to be undergone. If the Ministry believes that a Palestinian's centre of life is in the West Bank (for example, that they are secretly living or spending most of their time there because they are unable to find work or afford rent in Jerusalem, or because their spouse is there after being unable to access Jerusalem residency through family unification (See Point 10: Ban on Family Unification)), their residency can be easily revoked. Their claim to Jerusalem as their home – or 'centre of life' is under constant investigation. Most Palestinian residents have stories of state agents arriving at their homes without notice, demanding to see proof of their presence if they are not there. "They wake my mother-in-law up and she says we have left for work already. They demand to see if our toothbrushes are wet and if there is laundry in the laundry basket otherwise they say we are lying about living at this address" (Anonymous interview, 2017). Only recently have the courts ruled that it was unacceptable for the authorities to do this in the middle of the night and so now they may only inspect the address during daylight hours (Mustafa interview, 2017).

10. Ban on family unification:

As part of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, in June 2017 the Israeli (Knesset) parliament, renewed what was supposed to be a temporary Ban on Family Unification, a regulation which came into order during the Second Intifada in 2003. This prevents 'family unification' permits which allowed the spouse to join their partner inside the borders of Israel, when one spouse is an Israeli citizen or resident and the other is a resident of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Those who remain within Israel's declared borders risk deportation. Families continue to be forced to split apart or leave the country (Adalah, 2003).

Not only does the centre-of-life policy affect all Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, (and not a single Israeli) it becomes an even greater problem for 'mixed families (Tamimi, 2017), where one spouse has Jerusalem residency and the other holds West Bank/Gaza residency. After 1991, residents of the West Bank and Gaza started requiring special permits to live with their families, which weren't necessary before. The permit procedure for families to live together has changed a number of times and the procedure known as "gradual process", which allowed family members to eventually receive permanent residency, after years of temporary permit renewal and proving 'centre of life', was frozen in 2002. Since then the 'temporary' freeze has remained in place, and legislation has been enacted that continues to prolong this 'freeze' (Tamimi, 2017). The effect of this legislation is that no Palestinian from the West Bank or Gaza strip may be granted citizenship or residency status. Temporary residence permits are granted only under limited conditions; there are restrictions based on age and criminal record, not only of the applicant herself but also based on her family members, including in-laws. Therefore, under this policy then, if a wife of a Jerusalem resident wishes to live with her husband in Jerusalem, the security record of her in-laws, parents, etc. could prevent her from being able to live with her husband in Jerusalem. And even if this is all deemed acceptable by the Israeli authorities, she still may never receive permanent residency status due to the freezing of this law. Mixed families therefore have their options severely limited; they would need to either live separately hoping 'unrealistically' that their application would be accepted; live illegally in Jerusalem; leave Jerusalem and risk their residency being revoked due to moving their 'centre of life', or maintain two households - one in Jerusalem and one in the West Bank. However this is impossible for most families, due to the limited financial means (with poverty levels within of Palestinian society ranging at 80%) (Alyan et al, 2012; Tamimi, 2017).

11. Punitive Revocation of Residency:

At the time of my fieldwork there was much uncertainty about whether the state practice of revoking residency as a punitive measure, namely to punish Palestinians (as this never happens with Israelis) for committing acts that are seen as showing a 'breach of loyalty' to Israel. These are generally crimes such as attacking Israelis or having affiliations to political organizations that Israel defines as terrorist groups,

including Hamas - the ruling party of Gaza. In March 2018, Israel passed a law that declared this legal; thus allowing the Interior Minister to revoke the Jerusalem residency of any Palestinian they see as a threat on the grounds of "breach of allegiance to Israel" (Entry into Israel Law (Amendment No. 30), 5778-2018) (Hamoked, 2018). This law is unsettling to Palestinians because, as human rights lawyer, Mustafa* puts it, "most Palestinians don't declare loyalty to Israel, does this mean they will all be deported?"

12. Absentee Law and Land Expropriation:

The Absentee Property Law of 1950, declared any Palestinian refugee expelled after the 29th of November 1947, to be an "absentee". Through this law, any property belonging to this group was confiscated, and "absentees" were unable to access any rights:

The Absentee Property Law (1950) allows for the Israeli State (through the office of the Custodian of Absentee Property) to seize property of Palestinian refugees. It defines anyone (Palestinian) residing outside of Israel, as an absentee and allows for her property to be seized. Following the 6-day war, residents of the Occupied Palestinians Territories (OPT) who owned property in Jerusalem were recognized as 'absentees' despite the fact that they didn't necessarily even leave their homes. Settler groups have used this law as a tool for increasing Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem over the years (Prusher, 2013) as I will explain further in chapter five.

For many years this law wasn't applied to East Jerusalem, but over the last years it has been. In addition, the Israeli 'separation wall', has restricted many Palestinian families' access to their East Jerusalem properties, thus turning them into 'absentees' (Prusher, 2013).

According to Palestinian legal NGO Adalah (2015), the Supreme Court's 2015 decision on *Custodian of Absentees' Property et al. v. Daqaq Nuha et al.* confirmed that the Absentee Property Law can be applied to properties in East Jerusalem, whose owners are in the West Bank. This decision retrospectively approved previous expropriations and permitted future ones.

> *"The Court's decision has validated one of Israel's most racist and arbitrary laws, enacted in 1950 primarily to confiscate Palestinian refugee property after their displacement from their homes. There is no other place in the world, not in democratic systems nor in dictatorial regimes, where such a law applies. Despite these realities and the positions of former Attorney Generals, the Supreme Court gave the green light for the application of arbitrary codes on occupied land and its population, with no regard to their protections under international law…The imposition of the law on Palestinian properties in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and not on the properties of Israeli Jews living in settlements, illustrates the real discriminatory objectives behind the law" (Adalah, 2015).*

Israeli settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories who have properties in Jerusalem are not affected at all by this law, as it doesn't not apply to them.

As Israeli left-wing news site, Haaretz (Prusher, 2013) reports, although the law was initially targeting the Palestinian refugees of 1948, who Israel worried would return to claim their homes back,

> "*Today this is about Palestinians who live in the West Bank – and sometimes, meters from their property in Jerusalem – and had their homes confiscated because they're now "absentees," i.e. no longer Jerusalem residents. In other words, we're not talking about the homes of Palestinians who are already spending a second or even third generation in Jordan or Lebanon … – we're talking about people who still live in the vicinity, under Israeli rule, but now find themselves on the wrong side of the line for maintaining their property*". (Prusher 2013, Haaretz)

Chapter 2: Literature Review

In order to understand the effect of Israeli policies and practices on Palestinians everyday lives in Jerusalem, we need to position this question within a particular historical moment. To do this we need to engage with theories of various forms of intersecting power that shape the environment around this question, and in order to try to understand the working of power, we need to contextualize this further by questioning categories, boundaries, and certainties.

This chapter engages with the literature that forms a theoretical foundation for my research. It introduces and challenges the broader concepts - such as borders, categories of citizenship, law etc. - and unsettles these, providing instead that precarity and instability are important places to locate new research in. I then look at how the literature suggests we can examine power, within this complex context. Finally, I examine the more specific literature that hones in on these broader questions, within the context of Israeli policies.

My literature review is laid out as follows: first, I begin by positioning my research report within some of the current debates about *knowledge production in an age of liquidity;* fluidity, unfixed boundaries, unsolid categories and a porous state. I look at some of the literature on categories, borders, as well as on the phenomenon of uncertainty and its relevance today.

Thereafter, I look at some of the literature that *locates structures of power within this context*. I look at intersectionality, structural violence, and settler colonialism specifically, as well as beginning to look at the idea of everydayness as a way of studying power.

Finally, I bring the literature geographically closer to my research question and look at texts that engage *with policies in Israel/Palestine that affect people's everyday experiences*. I discuss broadly the ideas of power in Israel/Palestine and then look specifically at literature on the permit regime, population transfer, securitization and fear.

Locating knowledge within a time and space of liquidity

Categories, borders, constructions

The field within which my research might sit, is the growing literature that works to question and rethink structures that we had previously imagined as stable and true. In particular, the concept of the bordered sovereign nation state responsible for all her people, the legitimacy and unquestionability of law, the authenticity with

which state structures of power exist and the possibility of due process etc. Rather, we are living in an age of liquidity, fluidity, uncertainty (Bauman, 2000). Understanding a society merely through its official policies and own publications, omits chunks of important information about how real people's, real lives can exist in spaces of complex contestations.

In this work on Palestinian's rights to the city, I focus on *citizenship* not only as it is defined by law, but also, more broadly as a category that in itself is shrouded in uncertainty, power differentiation, and inconsistency (Favell, 2007; Fanon, 1967; Arendt, 1973; Anderson, 2006; Bauman, 2000). So whilst I'm focusing on the constructed state of Israel - looking at Palestinians in Jerusalem - I will also be drawing on the work that includes Palestinians whose documents do not grant them rights within Jerusalem.

Das and Poole (2004, 23) write that, "the complexity of lived experience inflects notions of justice and law with different kinds of imaginaries from those available in the official sites and representations of justice and law", which serves as a useful methodological and analytical reminder, that elements of daily life are not reducible to their legal definitions.

Borders create themselves and the categories of people in relation to them – who is legal or illegal, a citizen or an outsider. "The border itself only exists because it is the place where all these classifications are made…" (Favell 2007, 272). Favell (2007) speaks of the need to reconceptualise migration theory without the pre-existing assumptions we have about nation-states, borders, or legality. Boundaries as the zones dividing 'us' and 'them'/ the 'other' (Grove and Zwi, 2006) have been generally accepted as a de facto norm in much historical literature, and the normative framework surrounding them is the idea that humans - seen as generally bounded in a political, geographical space - sometime move over these boundaries (Favell, 2007). I heed the call of Favell (2007) and others (Trouillot, 2001; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Bauman 2000) that the formal understanding of human movement, borders, and states, need to be unpacked and rethought; historicized and examined. Citizenship is not just affected by *people* moving over borders, but by historical and structural changes; *borders* moving over people.

With this in mind the basis of my research is that **boundaries are constructed**; as opposed to natural (Favell, 2007) and there is an importance in revisiting this and not taking for granted the existence of the Westphalian border system or the Weberian bureaucratic system. The political borders of the 'state' are becoming blurred and ambiguous under the contemporary realities of globalization, capitalism, and human movement, and thus it is imperative now more than ever to understand this as a starting point as opposed to working towards a clearer definition of traditional boundaries (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Anderson, 1991; Trouillot, 2001; Bauman, 2000 and Favell, 2007).

Das and Poole (2004), in their edited collection that reframes a social understanding of 'the state', show how anthropological methods of inquiry are particularly useful in examining 'the state' from 'the margins'. They

explain how ethnography - a methodology that prioritizes experience as a way of knowing - allows us to gain insight into areas that may otherwise be overlooked by 'the more formal protocols' of other sciences (Das and Poole 2004, 4). In this research, I have taken guidance from their cautionary questions on how to study the state without re-inscribing conventional but simplistic understandings of it such as by looking purely at administrative order. The authors raise important questions about "illegibility, partial belonging, and disorder" as well as "the relationship between violence and ordering" at the margins of the state which have been guiding sub questions throughout my data analysis (Das and Poole 2004, 6).

As Bauman (2000, 203) advises, “We need to pierce the walls of the obvious and self-evident…”. If we can take, as a starting point, that we are living, moving, and producing knowledge in an age of liquidity (Bauman, 2000) we can determine two main conceptual shifts: First, that concepts that we can easily take as-is, as given, need to be questioned, historicized, and examined rather then re-inscribed. (In my research I do this particularly with ‘legality’, ‘the state’, the ‘citizen’ or ‘resident’ to name a few). The second shift is the focus of our analytical lens. If we are to learn things in an age of liquidity it is increasingly important to focus on issues which are messier, more marginal, covert and significantly harder to see, touch or legislate. Here I come by the idea of the lived experience of ‘uncertainty’ as a phenomenon important for study, and the reality and existence of state practices that are not necessarily codified as official legislature or policy.

Uncertainty as a phenomenon worth studying

Having explained the urgent need for research that looks at social structures through a critical and unassuming lens, I have recognised the need to allow space to explore social phenomena that are not the well-researched, somewhat tangible phenomena of legality, nationality, power, agency, and violence, but are the liminal intersections between these and other social forces.

By granting focus on what is historically seen as an exception or an outlier, i.e. that which is unpredictable, intangible, precarious as opposed to an analysis of fixed yet flawed systems, I will be joining the growing body of literature that takes seriously the massive implications and widespread nature of instability (or, as I call it ‘uncertainty’).

Drawing from literature on precarity, particularly precarious labour as a growing phenomenon of late modernity (Standing, 2011; Bauman, 2000; Lewis et al, 2014) shows the consequences and complexities of the increasing number of informal, non-contractual, and therefore unbounded in the traditional sense, *uncertain* workers. The work done by academic and civil society on labour precarity has transformed the way we understand contemporary work, allowing the conceptualization of work to move from seeing impermanency as an accidental and/or occasional outlier, to seeing it as a major global phenomenon, which despite having existed in pockets throughout history, is now something of an epidemic, a “condition inherent to global capitalism” (Armano et al 2017, 3). I understand uncertainty as a theoretical foundation of this report, through precarity, as

well as vulnerability (Butler 2004), 'liquidity' (Bauman 2000) or even 'ambivalence' (Trouilliot, 2001). Research on uncertainty in late modernity has also been furthered in other fields, such as through Psychology and the study of trauma, where it has been understood as a subjective experience of anxiety (Hirsch et al 2012).

Armano et al (2017) in *Mapping Precariousness, Labour Insecurity and Uncertain Livelihoods* have engaged with various understandings of precariousness and present an array of definitions from different schools of thought. Although the edited book focuses on the understanding of precarity in relation to labour practise, I have found it, and other labour-literature, to have close relevance to the understanding of 'uncertainty' as a constructed, social, practice. Armano et al (2017, 4) historicise and position precarity as a form of existential 'fragility', encompassing "insecurity, vulnerability, lack of protection…" resulting from "an aggressive and unforgiving neoliberal agenda… ".

Whilst the term 'precarious' is usually used to describe a particular type of impermanent work/labour situation; the definitions, implications and discussions around it form a highly useful foundation to begin to conceptualize 'uncertainty' in social ways. The labour precarity research, has made leaps in engaging with the idea of something instable, linked to modern society that affects one's ability to rely on a particular path or future.

I elucidate on the definition of uncertainty from a social perspective, looking at the range of (im)possibilities of people have to make decisions about their lives, to predict or plan or dream or aspire; to make day-to-day choices. The below definition, is taken taking from a more medically oriented Journal (Penrod 2001), I particularly find the ideas of discomfort which can be mitigated through confidence or control to be quite useful:

> *"Uncertainty is a dynamic state in which there is a perception of being unable to assign probabilities for outcomes that prompts a discomforting, uneasy sensation that may be affected (reduced or escalated) through cognitive, emotive, or behavioural reactions, or by the passage of time and changes in the perception of circumstances. The experience of uncertainty is pervasive in human existence and is mediated by feelings of confidence and control…" (Penrod 2001, 241)*

Penrod (2001) and others in the medical and psychological field, link 'uncertainty' with discomfort in particular, but theorize it in relation to experiences of 'suffering, enduring and hope'. She draws our attention to the "temporal distinction" in discomfort; namely that "uncertainty is always experienced in the present, but it is affected by past experiences and is related to forecasts of the future" (Penrod 2001, 241).

Uncertainty: the discomfort caused by the disruption of the (1) day to day and (2) ability to foresee a clear future, can be identified in the effects of Israeli policies. Much of the regional literature (Clarno, 2017; Berda, 2006; Kelly, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015) notes the "arbitrary" nature of particular Israeli policies, such as the seemingly randomness of whether a Palestinian would be given access from point A to B on any given day, be it through a checkpoint (Kelly, 2006), whether she will be granted or denied the necessary permit (Berda, 2006,

2012) to her destination or whether in a few years' time there will be another wall/barrier disrupting her usual route (Clarno, 2008). Berda (2006, 7) describes the Israeli permit-regime that effects Palestinians trying to move around as, "*effective inefficiency"* designed to slow down the movement of the population. I will expand on these texts in the final section of this literature review.

Locating power structures within this space

Intersectionality and structural violence

Various structures, political and historical, have worked to create the current dynamics affecting the day-to-day lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem. These include structures of occupation, racism, settler-colonialism, and capitalism. There are of course, various others, including patriarchy, nationalism, white-supremacy, to name but a few; and whilst research should be, and has been, focused on some of these forms of violence, an in-depth engagement with some of them, cannot be covered in this small research report. However, awareness of the intersecting nature of power and violence in all spaces is necessary (Crenshaw, 1991) - that even while my report finds specifically violence targeted at race, dispossession and colonialism, it is necessary to see these in the context of the structural forces of patriarchy, homophobia, classism and so many others, which remain ever-present in the lives of those affected by them, in both Israeli and Palestinian society. I will do my best to give a brief explanation of how some of the literature guides my research through its understandings of some of these power structures.

In 'The One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine', Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophi (2012) write that the need for a new language and a way to reconceptualise the occupation/regime in Israel/Palestine, exists. They show that occupation is discussed (and legislated) as if temporary, whereas it is a *structure*. They explain how the frameworks of 'occupation' 'colonization' 'apartheid' are all three "necessary but not sufficient" (Azoulay and Ophi 2012, 16). They propose instead, framing the situation in terms of power (Azoulay and Ophi, 2012).

Systems of power are now something we see as 'multiple' and acting on many 'levels' (Abu-Lughod, 1990), which is why an intersectional approach (Crenshaw, 1991) - one that does not diagnose one structure of power at the expense of ignoring the many others - is always necessary. For this reason, understanding the everyday life of Palestinians in Jerusalem, requires a holistic examination of the environment, and an assessment of not only the effects of individual policies but of the cumulative effects of the multitude of policies and state practices together. This cumulative effect is also experienced differently by different people, depending on where they are positioned in relation to the power structures.

I have found theories of power focused on fear, particularly productive for this project. Looking at power through engaging with and understanding why the dominating class act the way they do, is helpful for understanding how this power is enacted or reproduced. Some theorists (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Berda, 2006; Kelly, 2006) point to 'fear' and its related phenomena of self-preservation, inherited trauma, and aspiration for safety and security. Certainty, in security, safety, and the possibility to envision a future for oneself in one's home, is a major theme of this research, and in unpacking power structures we can identify in the tensions that arise from these human needs. Safety for whom, at whose expense? We need to ask why and how the structure that provides safety for one 'group' is at the expense of another. What purpose do these 'groups' serve, and what structures are in place to maintain this precarious, and ultimately oppressive, balance (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Anderson, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Fanon, 1963, 1967; Pappe, 2017; Wolfe, 2006; Butler, 2004)? Kelly (2006, 103) asks, "…who is made to bear the burden of fear produced by such practices…" a question which I echo but through my own research, add to, asking also "and how, and why, and what does this tell us"?

> *"Racism is a global hierarchy of human superiority and inferiority, politically, culturally and economically produced and reproduced for centuries by the institutions of the 'capitalist/patriarchal western-centric/Christian-centric modern/ colonial world-system'… The people classified as above the line dividing superior from inferior human beings are recognised socially as human beings and thus enjoy access to rights (human rights, civil rights, women's rights and/or labour rights) and social recognition of their subjectivities, identities, epistemologies and spiritualities. Those classified below this line are considered subhuman or non-human; that is, their humanity is questioned and, as such, negated (Fanon 1967). In the latter case, access to rights and recognition of their subjectivities, identities, spiritualities and epistemologies are denied…"(Grosfoguel et al. 2015, 636).*

Constructed social divisions are important to take cognizance of, in research on structural forces, to ensure a holistic analysis of society, in a way that doesn't paint all actors, networks and participants with the same brush. Grosfoguel et al's (2015) definition, is useful as a guide to conceptualizing research in a manner which historicizes and deconstructs systems of power, oppression, inequality and difference. This creates space for a better understanding of the lived experiences of Palestinians in Jerusalem, as they are differentially affected by policies, practices, and forms of citizenship. My work is looking at the structures affecting those that are deemed 'other' (Grove and Zwi, 2006) by the settler colonial boundary-regime (Wolfe, 2006; Shenhav and Berda, 2009; Veracini, 2011). Namely those that fall into the category of being below the abyssal line, (De Soussa Santos) who are in the zone of non-being (Fanon, 1967) as in the case of the Palestinian population of Jerusalem.

Those denied citizenship and categorized by the state as 'others', regularly need to interact with the constructed boundaries of the state (Das and Poole, 2014). Part of this research is aimed at investigating how in these interactions, uncertainty is produced or reproduced. Grosfoguel et al (2015) define racism as not simply a prejudice out of context but a historically and socially constructed one. Being able to look at contested space and determine the on-the-ground politics separating the 'other' (Grove and Zwi, 2006; Grosfoguel et al., 2015;

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015) from those in power, is essential in beginning to conceptualize a grounded understanding of daily experiences, in a situation fraught with tension, division, and emotional warfare.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) discusses displacement, erasure, and dispossession; forms of violence made possible through a racialized hierarchy of power in society. She explained these forms of violence as "relations of power between the colonizer and the colonized [which] are performed through social, cultural, economic and political spheres" Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 4).

Understanding structural violence, including racism, colonialism, dispossession, and the production of systematic inequality, is imperative for understanding the context I'm studying. The works of Franz Fanon (1963, 1967) Kimberle Crenshaw (1991), Patrick Wolfe, Johan Galtung (1969), Judith Butler (2004) and others, provide guiding insight for positioning power, intersecting structural violence, and resistance. I lean on them as a theoretical foundation through which to understand society.

Next, I look specifically at settler-colonialism as one such form of a power structure through which we can try to understand some of the current practices in Jerusalem.

Settler Colonialism

Significant ground has been made in identifying uncertainty as one of the social forces that come out of settler-colonial systems, affecting particularly those that are most marginalized by these systems (Mackey, 2014; Shenhav and Berda, 2009; Berda, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Kelly, 2006).

Trying to understand anything about the experience of Palestinians in Jerusalem, or even anything about the situation in Israel/Palestine without a concrete awareness of the history of the foundations upon which contemporary Israel now exists, would likely lead to an inaccurate and blurred understanding of the current reality. To view the empirical data out of context of the circumstances that led to the current relationships between people and state, forms of power, and formations of citizenship and borders, would leave them as mere descriptive pieces, unable to answer and ask new questions about the world. Engaging with a wide variety of literature that both presents a case for and argues against the usefulness of the settler-colonial framework, I argue that if used with consideration of its limitations it remains a useful framework of analysis and discussion. Many theorists whose work I have relied on (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015, Clarno, 2017; Wolfe, 2006; Pappe, 2017), have referred to Israel as a settler-colonial society, an analysis which I will further engage with, to see what it can teach us and how it can assist us in better understanding the empirical data.

The setting of the settler colony, is significant in its long-lasting effect. With the presence of the settler and the lingering residue from processes of violent racialization (Berda 2013, Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015), elimination (Wolfe, 2006), differentiation and displacement (Wolfe 2006, 2012; Lloyd et al 2013; Mackey, 2016; Shenhav and Berda, 2009) which respectively define settler colonialism, whilst each having their own specific implication; settler colonial logics and structures have visibly had a large effect on the lives of Palestinian

Jerusalemites. Israel/Palestine broadly and Jerusalem specifically, is a site of contestation, control, and bureaucratic regulation formed through a settler-colonial system (Shenhav and Berda, 2009; Wolfe, 2012; Rouhana and Khoury, 2012; Clarno, 2017; Kelly, 2006).

Veracini's (2013) important engagement with Israel as a settler colony lays out the various debates, intersections and points of difference in ideas around Israel as both of a site of occupation and of settler colonialism. He differentiates between the internal or 'Israel proper' (what he sees as 'successful') settler colonialism and the ("unsuccessful") settler colonialist attempts of the occupation and military control in the West Bank, as well as Gaza. Other contemporary theorists, such as Rouhana and Khoury (2012, 206) have conceptualized this differential relationship, as a 'special type of citizenship' namely "Settler colonial citizenship". They provide examples of the "continued settler-colonial process, particularly regarding land, space, culture, and demography…resources, services, and employment opportunities" (Rouhana and Khoury 2012, 219). One of their main arguments, is the hypocrisy that lies in the way that Palestinian 'Arab' citizens of Israel, were mistreated as if they were Palestinian non-citizens or rather as "subjects of a settler colonial project" (Rouhana and Khoury 2012, 219), a differentiation also made by Veracini (2013).

I turn to the definition of settler colonialism used by Andy Clarno (2017) and other's in the field, which I quote below and will continue to rely on further into this research paper:

> *"Settler colonialism is a form of colonization marked by ongoing efforts to displace local populations and expropriate their land in order to establish or expand a society dominated by settlers [which] operates through racial projects that devalue and dehumanize "native" populations, provide "ethical" or "legal" arguments for dispossession, and contribute to the formation of racialized structures of settler domination" (Clarno 2017, 2).*

However, it is also worth noting that many contemporary theorists have critiqued the use of settler-colonialism as a framework, both generally and also for the case of Israel/Palestine, specifically. I focused particularly at the works of Busbridge (2017), Bhandar and Ziadah (2016), Greenstein (2016) and Hijab and Gassner (2017) to engage with this critique. The main points in this regard are as follows:

Settler Colonialism is useful as a framework, as it combats the myth of Israeli exceptionalism, as well as mobilizes international solidarity while making the important links to indigenous/anti-colonial movements and scholarship. It is also useful in its comparative function; drawing links between different regions and allowing a lens for understanding power in the region. In addition, it does the important work of changing the implications of the Israel-Palestine discussion; namely, there is an implied call for decolonization as opposed to the hegemonic call for a 'state solution'.

However, its weaknesses come about in relation to these important functions, where in the comparative approach there is a tendency to inscribe a teleological framework onto the situation; (the idea that Palestine's present is another settler-colonies past); and the error of superimposing logic where it might not be best fit (because

although there are settler-colonial similarities, Israel-Palestine is simply *not* Australia). In addition, there are limited practicalities for decolonization discussed, and often a further fragmentation of Palestinian society is implied. Another serious critique is the imposition and production of an over-simplistic settler-native divide and other binaries that are not useful as an analytical tool in a complex environment. The omission of local and regional-specific issues and complexities, as well as the lack of a predictive value from the framework when one does acknowledge the diversity of settler colonial situations, also need not be overlooked. The issues of inclusion and omission extend to the problematic tendency of allowing certain scholarly voices to silence others, especially indigenous views; and also ignoring other important conceptual frameworks that may not fit neatly into a settler-colonial mould and yet are crucial to a proper analysis (Busbridge, 2017; Bhandar and Ziadah, 2016; Greenstein, 2016 and Hijab and Gassner, 2017).

Ultimately, if the use of the framework of settler colonialism replaces a thorough engagement with the complex local histories, politics, and realities at play in Israel-Palestine on the ground; then it is harmful to use this framework.

However, with a deeper understanding of these limitations and common errors of Settler Colonialism scholarship; and a commitment to apply the framework to the context rather than imposing it in a one-size-fits-all manner; then the settler colonial framework remains important and useful to engage with as a concept arising from both the literature and the data.

Following the substantial body of literature that defines Israel as a settler colonial society (and having argued that this is a useful framework, when applied carefully) and that the experience of uncertainty for the colonized group is one of the implications of this; my research on the structures affecting Palestinians' every-day experiences now considers the structure of settler colonialism as it manifests in Jerusalem.

Everydayness as an object of study

"Everyday life is profoundly related to all political constraints, social relations and activities," (2015, 2) - an idea which is also foundational in the works of Foucault and Abu-Lughod. I have found that much of the contemporary literature (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Braverman, 2007; Berda 2006; Das and Poole, 2004; Jean-Klein, 2001) looks at the 'politics of the everyday' as a place for understanding power systems and their implications. Rather than looking at one big, particular moment - a treaty, assassination, or war - to understand a structure, the method of looking at 'the everyday', a methodology that arose from feminist scholarship- can tell us far more of the nuance, complexities, and realities.

Everydayness as an object of study can tell us about knowledge/power/space practices (Das and Poole, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015) that provide room for understanding both the foundation upon which practices arise, and the implications and challenges which come about in the everyday. It provides space for a more

holistic, intersectional, and grounded understanding of people and the structures that affect them (and are affected by them).

On this basis, the final section of my literature review, looks at what makes up the 'everyday' in the region.

Policies in Israel/Palestine affecting the everyday

Re-contextualizing the story of modern day Israel/Palestine.

Israeli 'new' historians such as Ilan Pappe (2017), have been working on re-telling the story of the history of contemporary Israel/Palestine. These stories shift the narrative from the idea of an empty land to the story of forced expulsion, and even ethnic cleansing, during the Nakba of 1948. Palestinian author, Ramzy Baroud (2018) has written books on the history of Palestine/Israel from the position of a Palestinian refugee, in a political project to promote an authentic voice of and for Palestinians themselves; in a context where this narrative is silenced in place of the voices of white or western non-Palestinian scholars (Baroud, 2018). Perhaps because of the well-funded, political and ideological project of promoting a particular, Zionist narrative of historical and current systems in Israel/Palestine (Pappe, 2017) work is constantly being done to re-examine reality in this region.

The recent history of Israel in general, and Jerusalem, specifically tells a story about tensions, clashes, and institutionalized separation through city building, legislation, unrest and infrastructure put into place to maintain the narrative of Israel as a democracy with a Jewish ethnic majority (Rouhana and Sultany, 2003; Veracini, 2011; Wolfe, 2012). Scholars have examined these complexities in space, concluding that these infrastructures are part of a project of territorial claims that lead to displacement, segregation, and even uncertainty. They have looked at these through a focus on various institutions, including the 'separation wall' (Clarno, 2008), the legislation around 'permits' restricting free movement (Berda, 2006), identity documents and checkpoints (Kelly, 2006), and the disruption of private space and life-cycle events including births, and burials (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015).

Bureaucracy and social control in Israel/Palestine

Yael Berda (2006), explains in her paper on the 'permit regime', that the occupation is based on violence; physical, direct, violence from the Israeli forces (such as beatings, arrests, and even assassination), as the foundation; and spatial violence (barriers restricting free movement) as a 'second layer'. Together these amount to a **layered and severe form of social control** which she calls "the bureaucracy of the occupation". She argues

that it is this bureaucracy system that embodies colonialism in the region. Settler-colonial systems, which I defined earlier, I found to be enacted through various state policies and practices including the bureaucratic system and the permit regime which Berda describes.

Although her focus is on work permits, which are the documents required by the Israeli state to allow Palestinians from the West Bank, to enter Israel to work (for particular time periods), my research is focused more on people who are not directly affected by work permits but are affected by other aspects of the permit regime; it is still highly relevant as the concepts she uses are increasingly relevant for understanding the system affecting Palestinians of Jerusalem. She uses the concepts of "procedural bare life" and "security theology" in her paper, and proposes them as ways we can better understand and describe these daily life obstructions that Palestinians in the occupied territories, encounter.

I found Berda's (2006) micro-scale look at Palestinian's every-day experience in confronting daily obstructions such as the permit-regime, useful in the way it tackles the less-tangible question of uncertainty (as opposed to the more obvious task of looking at physical direct violence for example). She writes about the occupation-tactics of replacing direct physical violence with other forms of control, thus creating "effective[ness]" from bureaucratic 'inefficiency'; leaving Palestinians in a state of "procedural bare life", kept alive, yet unable to live a full and vibrant life under occupation.

In addition, she discusses the ways we can differentiate between Weberian and Colonial bureaucracy. In this research report, I analyse the bureaucratic systems that affect the lives of the Palestinians of Jerusalem, and yet the term *bureaucracy* and the connotations thereof (usually understood to be ridged clear rules and standardized systems) don't really encapsulate the effect of the Israeli regime on Palestinians. I found it to be a complex system with numerous rules and regulations, that are highly enforced in a military manner, and yet still plagued with uncertainty, and even absurdity, making it hard for the affected population to understand, track, and comply with rules which are often either altered or applied, without notifying the population group who they effect. Berda's explanation of this system is fitting; that it is a residue of colonial bureaucracies which are designed as the opposite of Weberian bureaucracies: whereas Weberian bureaucracies which are based "on rules, stability, hierarchy, accountability, efficiency and speed, colonial bureaucracies tenets are secrecy, flexibility, ever-changing rules by military decrees, personalized governing and total discretion" (Berda 2012, 3).

Tobias Kelly also describes these phenomena in his ethnographic text on *Fear and the Uncertainties of Law during the Second Palestinian Intifada (2006)*. He explains the contradictory implications of Israeli bureaucratic policies on Palestinians lives; namely that the policies meant to create order have "led to disorder". He argues that these systems, such as the identity documents, are of utmost importance in Palestinian lives and yet have effects of creating uncertainty and anxiety because of the inconsistent manner in which these documents were interpreted. "*Rather than reduce uncertainty, documentary practices only increase it. Law and legal categorization provide only a false refuge from arbitrary power"* (Kelly 2006, 103).

Kelly's (2006, 90) understanding of state policies, in this case ID documents; as something that "penetrates" the daily lives of Palestinians "*as an unstable technique of governance, producing considerable anxiety for all those subject to their use"* gives an indication of the socio-political implications of Israeli bureaucracy on Palestinians daily lives. 'Anxiety', as indicated by Kelly (2006) is something worth exploring and understanding.

Reading Kelly, alongside Yael Berda and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, I was able to find more evidence for the links between the Israeli state systems they respectively describe, and the experience of uncertainty that Palestinians are made to feel as a result:

> *"As documents constantly shift between determinacy and indeterminacy, they produce particular types of subjects, not through coercion or discipline, but as a result of the uncertainties and fears that they create…" (Kelly 2006, 92)*

He argues that rather than seeing documents as "abstracted entities", it is most important for them to be looked at in the context in which they "are p*roduced, verified, and take effect"*. For him what this means in terms of concrete research, is both the examining of the documents themselves and how people use them; and simultaneously looking "*beyond documents to examine the conditions of their production and reception in very particular historical contexts*"(Kelly 2006, 92). Chapters four and five will attempt to do some of this work, historicizing land policy and construction by-laws.

Securitization and fear

> *"When a settler colonial state like Israel constructs itself as a state under attack that must constantly "defend" itself…its entire system of governance is centered on ensuring that people are always afraid. In settler colonial contexts, security rhetoric and the security regime rely on fear as a common and even privileged instrument to further otherize and separate "dangerous" Others…The fusion between security claims and fear has created a context filled with violent values and acts, advancing racist imperialism and generating a permanent state of emergency" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 9)*

Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015), writes how Israeli settler-colonialism perpetuates violence and oppression on the bodies of Palestinians through a systematic and advanced process that portrays the Israeli State as the victim and thus enables the state to continue to hold power and practice violence. She calls these systems "the politics of fear" and "security theology".

Shalhoub-Kevorkian's (2015, 4) book aims to better understand Israel's 'industry of fear' through asking "What kind of power is at work in settler colonialism? And what happens to people, families and communities surviving under the surveillance of such an economy of fear and securitization?" She looks at the production of knowledge and the effect it has on the Palestinian's everyday life. *Security theology* is what she calls this production of knowledge, explaining how it came about and is perpetuated and understood. This explains the foundational need for understanding Israeli discourse and propaganda, and the "political economy of truth" and the distortion of knowledge in an environment of occupation, and settler colonialism specifically (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 10), themes which are also highlighted in Ilan Pappe's (2017) work *Ten Myths About Israel* and which I also raised in the introduction in relation to Israel's narrative of itself.

Within the industry of fear, Palestinians are seen as 'potential terrorists' under this system, which creates the discourse and knowledge that legitimizes otherwise unjust policies (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015). Palestinian people have been 'branded', she explains, by the Israeli regime, as "security risks" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 3). How this plays out is that they are then treated as criminal and thus not given freedom of movement or access to services; which is all excused as necessary for security measures. An idea I explore further in this paper; Chapter four engages with issues around criminalization and public knowledge/ perceptions. The practice of criminalizing population groups and shifting liberal discourse from *humanitarianism* to *securitization*, which could be understood as a post 9/11 shift (Butler, 2004), brings us back to the questions raised earlier in the literature review; on the importance of understanding how power works, and who it works for.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Overview

This chapter provides an overview of the methodological approach I used to conduct this research. After giving an overview of the theoretical and methodological underpinnings to my research, I explain some of the considerations of embarking on research in a 'conflict environment'. Thereafter I explain in greater detail what my data collection process involved: I outline the method used to come to my research question, and thereafter I explain my fieldwork process, including my ethnographic participant observation and interviews. I then elaborate on how I complimented this empirical research with further desktop research. After outlining these research methods, I expound on my site and participant selection and thereafter conclude the chapter with a reflection on my positionality within the research.

My intention with this research report was to research the policies and practices that affect Palestinians lives in Jerusalem, in particular the 'everyday' effect of these state practices. What this means is that I embarked on research to investigate *state-practice,* not to investigate people. However, it is important to me that the voices and experiences of the people affected would be the starting point in this research into state-systems (Baroud, 2018). Whilst there is a vast range of literature about Palestinian people; some vilifying, some in solidarity; because I had wanted to learn about how people were affected it was necessary to the integrity of the research to find this out first hand from Palestinians in Jerusalem, themselves. My strategy with that starting point, was that once I had gained a deeper understanding of the Palestinian experience of Israeli policy/practice, I could then gain a better understand the institution/ system in place in Jerusalem. Although this research cannot answer many of the questions I would have loved to have been able to, (such as whether the emotional effects of state policy are deliberate as part of the project of settler colonialism, or what the implication of the 'coercive environment' is for activism or advocacy) it doesn't completely ignore these questions; perhaps it is a work in the direction of these questions. This research is not action-research and does not propose any solution or suggestion but has been important for myself in gaining complex and valuable information that can inform the direction of my own future actions.

Researching the effects of Israeli state practices and policies on individuals' everyday lives, especially in relation to the everyday uncertainties that play out in the lived experience of Palestinians in Jerusalem, required a research methodology that looked deeply at the subtler, more complex experiences of people. For this reason, a qualitative methodology was necessary, and in particular a methodology that allowed the data that might ordinarily be side-lined to play a central role. Therefore although books can be written (and have been) that focus on the Israeli legal system (i.e. the inconsistency of domestic law with international law, or the court systems), or its political system (such as the voting system) or even issues of conflict (relationship between Israelis and Palestinians, gendered conflicts etc.), my aim was to focus on something less documented, less tangible to the reader, and less obvious. Taking guidance from academic engagement with Migration Studies in

terms of finding methodology to operationalize a critical analysis of the social world with all its constructed borders, laws, cultures and systems; I drew on a variety of qualitative research methods to explore and try to gain an understanding of the everyday lives of people on the margins.

Rather than research that which takes, as a fact, the sovereignty of a state, or the rationality of its laws and practices; I chose to research that which questions aspects of society that often aren't questioned, such as the silent status quos that allow us to only notice deviations; or the constructed, political nature of 'common sense' (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015) guided me in my conceptualization of this research and led me towards flexible, deep and grounded methodology.

During the period of a month in 2017, (particular dates not specified for reasons of ensuring participant anonymity,) I immersed myself in Jerusalem, observing and documenting resident's (in the social, not legal sense of the word) everyday engagement with the complex environment, in particular the state practices that affected their daily coming and going. After collecting this empirical data, I continued my research through desktop research methods, engaging with legislation, academic writing, and even news sites and other spaces representing public opinion. In putting these various forms of data together, I focused on themes and phenomena in contrast and conversation with my empirical analysis. Whilst my initial research plan envisioned that I would find one or two particular policies that most intensively affected Palestinian daily lives, my findings instead were that it was the combination of the numerous, sometimes contradictory or absurd, sometimes obvious and restrictive, policies and practices, that created the particular environment Palestinians in Jerusalem face every day. Following the discourse of some civil society groups who refer to it as a 'coercive environment' (Reynolds, 2017), my analysis found that one could not separate one particular policy from its context; as it is how they accumulate and intersect that creates a predictable unpredictability for Palestinians in Jerusalem.

Following the work of Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015), I focused on 'the everyday' as a research strategy. "Attention to mundane and routine activities reiterates the feminist notion that the "personal is political" and alludes to the ways in which the everyday is a space for oppression and domination, but also subversion and creativity" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 2). Through observing the way Israeli policies impacted Palestinians 'everyday', and also observing the community's response, I used the methodological framework of everyday-ness to understand more intimately the systems in place in Jerusalem.

Qualitative research methodology acknowledges the inherently 'political nature' of social research. No research topic or method can claim to be "abstract and neutral academic tools" (Punch 2014, 217). It is acknowledging and engaging with questions of subjectivity, positionality and agendas - including, of course, our own as the researcher - that is of utmost importance in developing sound and useful research. Ignoring the realities or concealing them would not do justice to social research as Punch explains (2014, 217) "social science research is in part a political process, and always has been". Feminist research methodologies for example, centralise these issues, acknowledging that power, including between the researcher and the research, the participants, and

the space exists, and that this affects the outcome and can thus not be overlooked in the name of objectivity (Punch, 2014; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015).

Research in a complex, conflict environment

The environment in which I conducted my research, is understood as a conflict-environment; which meant questions of safety needed to be considered as part of my research strategy. In addition to issues of safety and protection, concerns around conflict and bias were also present in terms of research on Jerusalem. In addressing the safety concerns, I needed to examine my own safety as a researcher, as well as that of my participants. This included engaging with issues of positionality, privilege and power in the society. Within the borders of Israel, Jews (both citizens and visitors) are in a far more privileged position of power then Palestinians (including Palestinian citizens of Israel, and residents of Jerusalem and especially Palestinians who are stateless or without legal status). For this reason, I needed to approach my research with an awareness of the power imbalance between myself and my participants. This also meant that situations that may not have been dangerous for me, may have had severe repercussions for my participants. As a population regularly under surveillance, this also meant that conversations I imagined were private may not have been. This environment required me to try my best not to put my participants at risk through my presence or actions, and to really take the lead from them with regards to how far a conversation could go, or where we could talk etc.

In addition, for both the desktop research steps of my research process, as well as the on-the-ground empirical data collection, a critical analysis of sources was required due to the nature of the site and topic. Rather than looking for objectivity from the people I spoke to or read, Palestinian families, civil society activists, Israelis, reporters, scholars, etc- I listened to them with an awareness of their backgrounds and positionality, and the experiences that informed their realities.

Collecting data

Multi-step data collection process

The data collection process, was a multi-step process I will lay out in detail below. The process can be summarized as follows: An initial desktop research process, including engaging with existing literature on the themes that related to my research topic and familiarizing myself with the geographies and histories of Jerusalem. I, then, undertook empirical research, which included various forms of data collection, specifically, interviews with civil-society members, conversations with individual Palestinian Jerusalemites often at their workplaces in East Jerusalem, as well as conversations with Palestinian families at significant events and participant observation. I then went on to do further desktop research, to fill the gaps and engage with the

questions and issues that arose from the empirical work. In particular, looking more closely at Israeli policies and practices relating to Palestinian's rights to live in Jerusalem and plan their futures there.

Engagement with literature- pre-research

To begin with, I engaged with much of the existing literature on Jerusalem, including literature on settler colonial societies, borders and boundaries, and Israeli policy. Although my engagement with the research question and the site, started many years prior to this research - which I will address further on with regards to my positionality - this material gave me a better understanding of the complex, highly contested environment and how to navigate it in qualitative research as an outsider. It also gave me a clearer understanding of where the research gaps are and what kind of questions to focus on.

My research questions, below, were informed through engagement with this literature:

1. **What are the differential forms of citizenship among Palestinian families in Jerusalem? What structures and policies affect their rights to live and work in Jerusalem?**
2. **Does Jerusalem, a contested space within the settler colony of Israel, produce uncertainty for Palestinian residents? – How can we theoretically understand the multiple layers of (un)certainty that govern Palestinian's life in Jerusalem?**
3. **How do Palestinians make sense of and respond to everyday life in occupied Jerusalem?**

Collecting empirical data on the ground

This process included the following methods of empirical data collection, further described below as:

- interviews with civil society members/NGO's
- Conversations with individual Palestinian Jerusalemites
- participant observation at events (demolition, eviction, protests)

The next step in my research process, was to collect empirical data on the ground at the research site. This included conducting semi-formal, in-depth interviews with members of Non-Governmental Organisations/ Civil Society; as well as in-depth conversations with Palestinian individuals using a more dialogical method. Most of my time however, was spent doing participant observation at 'events', including weekly demonstrations, a demolition, and an eviction- and then continuing my participant observation before and after these events, spending time with the families involved, engaging in ethnographic research through 'deep hanging out' (Geertz, 1973), conversing and informally interviewing members.

The individual and civil society interviews and conversations informed the themes that I focused on in analysing the field data I had collected from the ethnographic (participant observation) work.

My research techniques were flexible, as I tried to both observe, and engage the participants. Although I came prepared with an interview schedule for semi-formal interviews, in doing the empirical research I found it was preferable to put this aside, and sit with my participants, spending time with them and talking with them. People

ended up telling me stories about their lives, often with visual aids that they themselves presented (one participant showed me the pictures on her phone in which her daily life (a family day out to spend time in nature) intersected with her experiences of occupation (her father being pushed by the Israeli police during their eviction), or pictures on the wall of their home, even things on their Facebook). In some situations, participants didn't talk to me so much, perhaps because there was a language barrier, and perhaps because they were caught up in daily life, and daily resistance, especially as I was in their space during a demolition, or at protests etc.

However, in these cases I explained myself as a researcher and they allowed me into their spaces, and sometimes pointed things out to me that they thought were important for me to see or understand. All in all, my research techniques were very informal, they harnessed methods of conversation, being there, participating when possible, and hearing stories. I therefore prefer to see this research method as engagement more than interview. Although it may not fully fit into the Dialogical Research category, ideas from dialogical research methodology have been helpful as guides. Particularly the ideas that writing about people should not concretize or finalize said people, but should leave the rest of their experiences open and changeable. "… Dialogical research requires hearing participants' stories not as surrogate observations of their lives outside the interview but as acts of engagement with researchers… [during which] the researcher does not passively record where the respondent is, in his or her life. Any research act is necessarily reactive in its effects…" (Frank 2005, 969). Indigenous Methods also give guidance to my research strategy; although this research cannot be said to fit fully into the Indigenous Methods paradigm, especially as I am not an Indigenous researcher and have also relied on various other methods; Indigenous Research Methods provide tools for relational, decolonial, and more inclusive ways of doing research. As Kovach (2010, 40) explains, oral knowledge is prioritized, through storytelling, listening, sharing; "Indigenous knowledges comprise a specific way of knowing based upon oral tradition of sharing knowledge…" Kovach (2010, 40) locates the 'conversational method' within the Indigenous Research paradigm, explaining it as "a method of gathering knowledge based on oral story telling tradition congruent with an Indigenous paradigm [which…] involves a dialogic participation that holds a deep purpose of sharing story as a means to assist others"

Desktop Research

Over a number of months, I then solidified this data through deep textual and desktop research, which correlated to the data I had already collected. Specifically, I read reports on changes in Israeli legislation, engaged with historical changes to the city, looked at land policy, citizenship/residency policy, legislation around movement (and borders within Israel/Palestine), read histories and reports on specific neighbourhoods and regions where my research is situated, and also read various news and opinion pieces from both right-wing and left-wing sources. This section of research required sifting through various positions, opinions, and biases. I approached

the textual data with an understanding that almost nothing written on this subject is neutral or unbiased, and therefore I needed to use the information I found with an awareness of the authors' objectives and positionality.

Other than pieces of legislation themselves, reports on them, news articles, and scholarly essays will usually come from an author with some kind of bias, be it a human-rights centred agenda or an investment in the continued existence of the status quo within the borders of Israel. Looking at the publishers, the funders, and the source or medium, all aided in looking critically at the texts I used to understand the on-the-ground reality and fact check the events I had witnessed.

Site and participant selection

My research is focused on Jerusalem for a number of reasons; in particular, because of the global importance of the city for many different groups of people, and also because of the various historical changes the city has undergone. I think it is incredibly important, and increasingly so in our world, to look at migration geography as borders moving over people, as opposed to only seeing it the other way around. In Jerusalem, borders and boundaries are constantly contested, in both the political sphere and the every-day. For myself, as a Jewish person, who visited Jerusalem on visits to *Israel* as a child, and later, on visits to *Palestine* as an activist, I was confronted with hidden realities that are so easy to miss. Over this time, I noticed that rather than Jerusalem changing, my understanding of it changed, and in particular, my awareness that there was so much I *hadn't seen* or *didn't know about*. Part of this research, is about finding out some of these hard-to-see realities that tourists to the Holy City of Jerusalem would hardly notice yet are a daily reality for Palestinians who live there. Jerusalem therefore was a fitting site for research into policy and possible uncertainties for the population marginalized in that society.

However, the more specific localities in which I collected empirical data, were chosen less deliberately. My intention was to familiarize myself with Jerusalem, more specifically with East Jerusalem's Palestinian neighbourhoods, yet the specific neighbourhoods or villages I immersed myself in, arose organically. This happened through the gradual process, wherein I attended major events, and met people there who agreed to become my participants. Often, this happened through introduction via other research participants and the contacts I had already. My participants were found using a combination of purposeful-sampling and snowball sampling methodology: I accompanied an Israeli activist to the demolition site and to the eviction site, and the people I met through her, introduced me to other people including their family members and neighbours, some of whom, ultimately became my research participants.

Positionality and reflexivity

As I've already mentioned, social research is never neutral; we write about the things we care about and are interested in. With topics like mine, that contain a large human-rights element and the research exposed human rights violations, it seems redundant to feign neutrality. What is necessary then, is to maintain awareness of one's own personal leanings, and to interrogate them throughout the research process to ensure solid research as opposed to an opinion piece. In this research, I have endeavoured to do that every step of the way. This involved attempting to understand things from various sides and positions - especially those that weren't naturally my own - and to hear, read, see and allow the data to form, instead of forcing it into some pre-existing mould. Often, when I became very emotional during the data collection process, I needed to step back for a while in order to continue trying to write this research report. It became essential to separate my emotional response to what I had witnessed and how I related to it, from the research project. There were times that I may have failed at this and felt unable to continue.

Being a white, Jewish person, put me in a place of enormous privilege and power in occupied Jerusalem. It allowed me access to spaces that my participants themselves could not access. It allowed me to get easily into and out of the country and easily around the country. This required that I maintain an awareness that my experiences with the Israeli state, were absolutely not representative of the experience of everyone else around me, particularly in the case of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Other aspects of my positionality, being a woman, being queer, in a religious society and state, were also necessary for me to be aware of throughout the research, but didn't really end up being as much of an issue as I had thought. I dressed modestly and other than one scary night, where I got lost in a very religious Jewish neighbourhood on my way back from Sheikh Jarra, my body didn't really restrict my research abilities. It did have an effect however, as I was often positioned in women-spaces. Sitting with the evicted family in Sheikh Jarra, I sat with the women and it might have been odd or uncomfortable for the family, if I had positioned myself with the men instead. It is also possible that my being gendered a woman, made it easier for the participants to be welcoming to me. It is possible that a white Jewish man, namely the embodiment of the power hegemony in that society- could have been perceived to be more dangerous, which may have made our interactions less open. This is of course, just a possibility. It is also possible that it would have made no difference whatsoever.

When interacting with participants I made my political position, of being anti-occupation and anti-colonialism, known, because I assumed that my positionality, a Jew in Israel, would define me as Zionist, unless I explained otherwise. In addition, as a foreigner, who cannot speak Hebrew, I was occasionally seen as a non-Jewish international observer. In these cases, I disclosed my Jewishness immediately, as I thought it would be inappropriate to pretend otherwise, and it was important for me that if participants feared talking to me because of my Jewish privilege within Israel, then it was up them to make that decision themselves with all the facts of my identity at their disposal. Not only did it impact the way participants saw me, my Jewishness also impacted the ways in which I saw the space and interacted with it. Growing up Jewish, being exposed to a right-wing

Zionist narrative about Jerusalem and Israel in general, has affected the way in which I conducted my research: Namely, that I was not going in to a space that was completely new, but rather I was going into a space that I already had a great deal of knowledge about but often from a completely different perspective from that which I was able to gain during this research collection process. After spending time in Israel as a young tourist with my family, and then as part of a Zionist youth movement in my adolescence, I learned more about the position of Palestinians and eventually returned to historical Palestine (both the Israeli 1948 borders and the West Bank) as a Palestinian-solidarity activist for programs on displacement, militarism and inequality. But this time my engagement with Jerusalem was from a social research perspective which often required me to refocus and re-learn the city once again from a new perspective.

Finally, my positionality plays out in the writing up of this report. I needed to be aware of that all-too-common phenomenon of the white researcher, hoping to 'do good', orientalizing 'the other' and telling *other people's stories* in an irresponsible way. I have had to deal with questions about my responsibility in my positionality, the issues of my benefiting (through the production of an MA thesis) from other people's struggles, and the limitations of my intervention. Is it possible to do research without doing harm? What are the responsibilities that come along with being given the space to witness? In an earlier draft of this report, I included some field notes that expressed my own thoughts, "why aren't they *doing anything* to stop the state violations against their homes"? I asked, without realizing that this *need to be 'doing something'*, is something I am imposing on my participants without their consent, without a full understanding of their situation and without awareness of my own positionality. There are likely numerous other instances like this, where I have been irresponsible in my understanding of, and interactions with, participants. Limitations to this research therefore include my own lack of experience and the need to continue learning ways of doing social research that is more *useful* then *harmful*.

Chapter 4: Demolition– Uncertainty in Israeli Policies

Introduction

In this chapter, I look ethnographically at an 'administrative house demolition', in a Palestinian Jerusalem neighbourhood, as a case study for examining the effects of Israeli state policy on the lives of Palestinians there. Through this case study of a home demolition I witnessed in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Ras al Amud, I engage with issues of control over land, collective punishment, everyday anxiety, and the emotional impact of the practise of demolition policy.

I will briefly explain the complex Israeli policies and practices around home demolitions, including the different categories of demolition orders and how they are carried out (or *not carried out*), and the extent to which they affect Palestinian families in Jerusalem. I will then contextualize demolition practise, by looking briefly into the historical and political state policies on land/control over space in Jerusalem, in particular at land-zoning policy. Thereafter, I demonstrate how some literature has understood demolitions in relation to population displacement. After which, I use ethnographic data to show how anxiety and everyday uncertainty becomes a reality for Palestinians in this system. I explain how, through the use of uncertainty as a political tool, administrative practices function as a form of 'punishment'. Finally, I will look at humiliation and emotional violence in this context. This chapter shows that uncertainty is used as a political tool in demolition policy.

Background and Context

What are demolitions and who do they affect

> *"Since 1967, Israeli authorities have demolished over 27,000 Palestinian homes in the occupied territory. Between 2000 and 2007, Israeli authorities rejected more than 94 percent of permit requests in Area C" (Tahhan, 2017)*

A home demolition is when, for either punitive or administrative reasons, a home or structure is bulldozed until uninhabitable, leaving only rubble. In certain situations, select sections of homes such as room additions are demolished. My research focuses on administrative demolition orders, as a bureaucratic state practice; namely, application of regional construction policy that provides that new buildings require state-issued building permits in order to be legally built. Under this policy, home demolitions are seen as simply a remedy to illegal construction. Demolition orders notify the family of their impending demolition but do not provide definitive information as to when the demolition could be carried out.

Home demolitions can be differentiated by type. Judicial or Administrative Orders are given to home owners for the reason of 'building illegally', such as building without a permit or for defying a court order against building. There are also punitive demolition orders, which are demolition as a form of punishment and/or prevention of crimes and terrorism', as well as other categories including land-clearing/military demolitions (ICAHD, 2017; Darcy, 2013).

According to the Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolition's 2017 report, (ICAHD, 2017) overall administrative demolitions count for only 20% of demolitions throughout the whole of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian territories. Land-clearing operations and military demolitions account for 61%. Military demolitions, such as the 18,000 homes demolished in Gaza in 2014, relate to "houses demolished by the IDF during military operations for the purposes of clearing off a piece of land, to achieve a military goal or to kill wanted persons as part of Israel's policy of extrajudicial executions" (ICAHD, 2017). Public understanding in Israeli society reflects a perception that home demolitions are 'necessary for security reasons', which is perhaps because administrative demolitions are a relatively small percentage of official demolitions as most demolitions are categorized as either Punitive or Military orders (mostly carried out in Gaza and the West Bank).

Administrative demolition is applied in situations where a building does not have a valid building permit. In East Jerusalem and Area C, where administrative demolitions take place, Palestinians have no control over land management, which often leaves them with limited options but to build without permits (ICAHD, 2017; CCPRJ, 2014). Due to Israeli planning and zoning policy, only a tiny portion of Palestinian owned land is zoned for residential use in the first place as much of it is zoned to not allow any building at all (such as for 'open space' or 'green spaces[1]') (Kaminker, 1997). In fact, only 13% of East Jerusalem is zoned for Palestinian building and hardly any of this zoned land has space left for further construction (United Nations, 2014; CCPRJ 2014). The result is that at present, it is almost impossible for Palestinians to build legally. Obtaining a building permit for a structure in East Jerusalem, even an extension to a house, is met with a multitude of bureaucratic obstacles, and has been described as 'impossible' and even 'Kafkaesque' (Margalit 2014, 12).

Since the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, at least 2000 houses have been demolished (United Nations, 2014). According to the United Nations Occupied Palestinian Territories branch (United Nations, 2014)., "At least a third of all Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem lack, Israeli-issued building permits, which are difficult to obtain, potentially placing over 90,000 residents at risk of displacement, which has a psychological impact."

142 structures in East Jerusalem were demolished in 2017 for the reason of being built without a building permit; affecting 631 people and displacing 233 people, (some of the structures demolished were livelihood structures, as opposed to homes) (United Nations, 2018). The effect of these demolitions is far more extensive than on the

[1] Green spaces, portrayed as environmental liberalism; namely ensuring open, natural spaces in an otherwise densifying city, are in fact a highly political issue. Work has been done by organisations such as B'tselem and Bimkom documenting and contesting the zoning of 'green' spaces as another form of limiting Palestinian access to Jerusalem and ensuring 'facts on the ground' for continued Israeli settlement expansion.

233-displaced people; because the thousands of residents holding demolition orders over their homes and waiting to see if their home will be demolished next, are also affected by the trauma and the uncertainty of their situation, as I explain in the following pages.

Unlike administrative demolitions, punitive demolitions - demolishing someone's family home because he is suspected of a crime - are illegal under international law (Darcy, 2003), and highly contested by international and local civil society. Yet, mass administrative demolitions have been carried out and are associated with collective punishment, (also illegal internationally (Darcy, 2003)) for punitive purposes (such as the 1997 bomb attack in Jerusalem, which resulted in 29 homes demolished that month under apparently administrative purposes) (Betselem b., 2017).

In a legal sense, bureaucratic demolition policy aims at restoring the land upon which homes are illegally built, by removing those unlawful structures. This is compatible with international humanitarian/liberal politics, but only if we take the policy out of context, and understand it *ahistorically*, ignoring the surrounding policies and structures in contemporary Jerusalem. Try understanding it in a context of limited legal rights for a population group to build, where people resort to illegal building in desperation, civil society groups and theorists see demolition policy as ultimately based on discrimination (Betselem b., 2017; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Margalit, 2014; Clarno, 2008), and as part of a regime of displacement, as I will elaborate on ahead. Building without permits is done in both Palestinian villages and Israeli settlements (Betselem b., 2017; ICAHD, 2017). However, the treatment of the illegal buildings in these two spaces is vastly different. Israeli homes are almost never demolished for being built without a permit, but instead are often retroactively approved (Btselem b., 2017). "Israeli settlers build thousands of housing units…without permits [often with the cooperation of] government ministries" (Btselem b., 2017). Yet, despite for many Palestinian Jerusalemites building illegally is often the last, or only option; due to the 'absence of planning schemes', and 'the refusal of authorities to grant them building permits, "when they have built, the authorities have responded aggressively, demolishing thousands of houses over the years of occupation, without offering a meaningful solution to the housing shortage" (B'tselem b., 2017).

I find it important to note that receiving a demolition order does not mean a house will definitely be demolished. "Today tens of thousands of Palestinians hold demolition orders in their hands and live in fear, wondering when the bulldozers will arrive to demolish their home" (ICAHD, 2017). Many families could be notified of a demolition, and before daybreak the very next morning the bulldozers arrive; or, they could wait many years in uncertainty.

> *"Once demolition orders are issued, inhabitants are usually given little notice that their home is about to be destroyed. Often, as little as fifteen minutes is allowed for residents to remove all their belongings from the house they are about to lose. On other occasions, soldiers have informed families that their home might be demolished in the future and no further information is supplied" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 96).*

Many administrative demolition orders are issued but then not carried out; and although they expire within 30 days, they can be re-issued at any time. Judicial demolition orders never expire, resulting in thousands of Palestinian Jerusalemites living in constant fear of waking up to finding the demolition teams outside their homes (Ir Amin, 2009). Creating this peculiar type of uncertainty that reflects both an inevitability, *a demolition will happen,* and simultaneously an unpredictability *as to when it will happen, and to whom,* is a powerful tool of population control. Creating an environment for Palestinian Jerusalemites that ensures the presence of fear, discomfort, and worry for the basic structure foundational to the family and community, has been described by many scholars as part of a project of population transfer, or part of creating a hostile environment, that coerces Palestinians to leave the city. In addition, it creates a type of emotional or psychological weapon, which is hard to describe with policies, statistics, or even photographs.

Land/ Control over space/ Planning



Figure 7 East Jerusalem Zoning Map depicting limitations on available building space (United Nations, 2009)

"According to the Town Planning and Building Law of Israel (1965), a building permit may be issued by the municipality to a landowner whose property is included in an approved town planning scheme that designates his land for residential use. If a property owner builds on his land without a license, he has committed a criminal offense and his home will be demolished. At the time [in the 1970s] there were no approved town planning schemes for Arab- owned land, and thus all Palestinians were denied the right to use their own property." (Kaminker 1997, 7).

Although a handful of neighbourhoods were eventually approved, very little has changed since then.

It is an obvious starting point in engaging with home demolitions, to ask, - when residents of East Jerusalem have to face the dire economic and emotional consequences of demolition orders on their 'illegal' homes – why then do they build illegally?

In short, because most Palestinian neighbourhoods are not zoned as permissible to build on. In these areas there is no way to obtain a building permit. The few that are zoned for residential building are already overcrowded with buildings as the natural growth rate of Palestinians is not even close to being met by the housing provisions of the State. Families still need to build onto their homes or build new homes, for the new generations. Applying for a permit then, in these few areas is extremely costly and often unsuccessful, with heavy bureaucratic hoops to jump through. In these cases I'm referring to, Palestinians who often own this land that they are trying to build on, but are not given the permits to build. For this reason many Palestinians take the risk of building illegally as they have no other option (ICAHD, 2017; Margalit, 2014).

One such case of this, is that which I have begun to describe of the demolition in the Ras al Amud neighbourhood in the Jerusalem area. The family owned the land upon which the home was built but were unable to get a building permit. These issues, as I've already indicated, extend beyond issues of demolition practise and into historic issues of land zoning and urban policy itself. "Government planning policy, denies Palestinians the right to use their land in East Jerusalem" (Kaminker 1997, 6).

Land ownership, and the right to use one's own land in Jerusalem is a highly contested, politicized issue. There are several different angles for understanding this issue: including (1) international humanitarian law, which Palestinian and Israeli NGOs refer to, to point out the ongoing violations by Israel in terms of occupation and war crimes, dispossession and contravening the Geneva Convention; and (2) Israeli domestic law[2], which Israel relies on to undertake demolitions, and through which is the only avenue available to Palestinian families and their lawyers to try protect their homes (Margalit, 2014; CCPRJ, 2017). Other ways of understanding it, include thorough social analyses, including the dynamics of settler colonialism, racism and oppression, or, on the other side of this, the dispute over biblical claims to a homeland (Braverman, 2007; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015). Kaminker (1997), who was involved in Israeli urban planning, tells her personal experience of working for the

[2] Under international law, is illegal to apply domestic law to an occupied population (CCPRJ, JLAC, al-Haq)

Jerusalem municipality in city planning after 1967, where she'd hoped to be part of making a 'united city', but was in fact "contributing to the first in a series of plans that prevent Palestinians from using their land" (Kaminker 1997, 6).

Of the land in Jerusalem, some has been taken for Israeli use after the Nakba, in West Jerusalem, and half was administered by Jordan until 1967, when it became occupied by Israel. At this stage, urban planning zoned and drew up the area which resulted in East Jerusalem becoming further divided into segments, isolating Palestinians between Israeli settlements. Of the small portion of land that Palestinians still own in East Jerusalem, they are legally only allowed to build legally on 10 percent of that, because more than half of the land they own is "outside the boundaries of approved neighbourhood plans" which means that "half their land is frozen and cannot be used" (Kaminker 1997, 9). Kaminker (1997) explained the results of this being "a shortage of 21,000 homes for Arab families" when she wrote in 1997. This rate has only increased as the city continues to refuse to authorize construction to keep up with natural growth rate.

The bigger picture has been described as the 'quiet transfer' (Reynolds, 2017; Ir-Amim, 2009) which is about encouraging through this coercive environment, as opposed to through direct violence in forced displacement as we generally understand it, Palestinians to leave the city of Jerusalem. Forcing people to build illegally, and thus putting them at risk of demolition, is one of the weapons used for this.

Uncertainty as a political tool

The following sections engage with the case study based on ethnographic data, in the form of my field-note extracts. The data extracts, tell the story of the home demolition I witnessed in the East Jerusalem Palestinian neighbourhood of Ras al Amud. They are analysing section by section but should be understood as one complete event. The analysis therefore is cumulative, referring to extracts in earlier sections as well. The following sections show how uncertainty is used as a political tool of displacement and settler colonialism. First, through showing how administrative demolition can be seen to be as part of a project of displacement, and thereafter through showing an analysis of 'everyday uncertainty' as it relates to demolition policy. Thereafter, I discuss the connections between these administrative policies and the idea of 'punishment' and criminalization of Palestinian society. Finally, I engage with the idea of emotional violence in this context.

> *At 5.30am, I accompanied Israeli activists, Sara and Avishai to a small Palestinian village. We followed the GPS up a hill, coming to a small, dense Palestinian neighbourhood. I later learned the village was called Ras al Amud. I later learned so much. When I arrived I didn't know a lot, just that there might be a demolition this week, somewhere in this neighbourhood. A handful of Israeli activists in Jerusalem were notified on their Whatsapp group about it and took turns to come through, there were two others who came yesterday but the demolition didn't happen yesterday. We struggled to find the house and Sara didn't want to call the family while it was so early, in case they were sleeping. She didn't want to*

say 'hi, we're Israeli activists, we're here for the demolition, to support you, if it happens'. So we wondered around the sloped streets, and I tried to imagine what a family that thought their home might be demolished today would do when they wake up. Turn off the alarm and brush their teeth? Pray? Although a seasoned activist, Sara wasn't sure what to do, as this morning was an anomaly, activists usually only find out about demolitions once the area is already closed off and the bulldozer has arrived. Eventually we found the house, the big one on the corner. It looked brand new, unfurnished and uninhabited. I had heard that the new, not-yet-inhabited houses were much more frequently demolished. But only much later when we were chatting with the family did I understand that the reason it looked like this was because the family and community had stripped it bare; of everything; furniture, lights, including taking out the windows and doors in order to save as much as possible in case the demolition took place. (Extract from my Field Journal, Ras al Amud, 2017)

Theoretical understandings of home demolitions as a form of displacement

Home demolitions can be understood as part of a battle for 'control over space' (Margalit, 2014) which can be analysed in various ways. This type of control, when understood through Foucault's ideas on discipline and punishment, points to the ways in which infrastructure can represent power - and through it populations, can be ordered or managed (Margalit, 2014). The demolishing of a family home is also understood by scholars as a mechanism of settler colonialism (Margalit, 2014; Salhoub-Kevorkian, 2015). Theodore Hertzl, the pioneer of modern Zionism once wrote, "If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct" (quoted in Wolfe 2006, 388). Nadera Salhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 5) explains this concept of population replacement (Wolfe, 2006) in terms of 'the demolition of indigenous presence', as a critical component of the settler colonial project.

Although the actual implementation of a demolition is unpredictable and sometimes arbitrary (Ir-Amim, 2009), Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 96) understands state acts, such as demolitions, to function "in an organized, systematic and highly regulated manner to discipline Palestinians and intimately affect their individual and family life" Alongside Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) and Margalit (2014), a growing body of work exists looking at urban policy, zoning, land appropriation etc., and the relationship these have with conflict, displacement, occupation and geopolitics in Israel. These include the works of Rassem Khamasi and Oren Yiftachel, (issues of ethnicity and urban planning) and Yehuda Shenhav (who's work on bureaucracies was important to the works I have particularly relied on) (Berda, 2006; Clarno, 2017) and many others. In addition, many NGOs (B'tselem, ACRI, CCPRJ, ICAHD, Bimkom) as well as the UN, publish reports and statistics on issues of land and urban policy in relation to displacement and occupation and on home demolitions in particular. The issue should be no longer in the shadows of public discourse. And yet it seems, it still is.

"House demolition does not happen in isolation, but is part of a wide, systematic and comprehensive policy designed to consolidate Israeli control over East Jerusalem Palestinians and create a Jewish majority wherever possible. Here, the concept of domination goes beyond territory, and operates on many levels, some overt, some

symbolic and hidden, in order to demoralize the Palestinian people, destroy their self-image, deprive them of their secret desires and their personal safety, so as to eradicate any thought they might have of independence. A wide range of governmental agencies work together to achieve this goal: the Municipality of Jerusalem, the Ministry of Interior, the police and the Israel Security Agency (the Shin Bet)…" (Margalit 2014, 11).

According to the extensive research done by a number of Human Rights organisations (B'tselem b., 2017, ICAHD 2017, Al-Haq (Tabar 2010; Darcy 2003)), whilst demolition of houses in East Jerusalem is based, according to Israel, on purely procedural and administrative reasons due to planning policies, this is not the case. Looking at the patterns in these demolitions, proves that in fact "the mass demolition policy serves objectives totally unrelated to planning" (Betselem b., 2017). B'tselem (b., 2017) concludes that administrative home demolitions are a 'political act'. The idea of creating or destroying 'facts on the ground', (an idea reiterated in scholarship on the region) is about cementing, quite literally, an Israeli presence in what would otherwise be declared Palestinian land in later land negotiations or peace agreements, and includes the removal or destruction of Palestinian presence. Moving Palestinians out, to move Israelis in, therefore is an ongoing state project; resonant of settler colonial practices over time (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015). Home demolitions happen most frequently on land that might be in the way of future planned roads that connect settlers and settlements; lands adjacent to Israeli settlement which may prevent expansion of the settlements; and land Israel wants to "keep for itself in the final-status agreement" (Betselem b., 2017) by ensuring that the Palestinian Authority cannot claim the land, on the grounds that is has Palestinian homes on it. But not only is it about the project of settlement and replacing Palestinians with Israelis (Tabar, 2010; Wolfe, 2006), but it is also about the project of disrupting and making Palestinian life uncomfortable in Jerusalem, saying quite clearly 'you are not wanted here' (Margalit, 2014).

Settler colonial scholarship tells us of erasure, both through overt acts of physical violence, and more subtle ways of removing the presence of the indigenous population and replacing them (Veracini 2010, 2013; Wolfe, 2006). Following the work of many theorists studying Palestine/Israel, we can look specifically at demolitions as systematic acts of erasure. In an almost Kafkaesque sequence of building, demolishing, building again, we gain small insights both into the project of quiet displacement, and of resistance (Rouhana and Khoury 2015, Salem 2017)). Israel's unofficial policy of making life so unpleasant that people leave, through leaving them in 'procedural bare life' form (Berda, 2012) can be understood as part of its demographic war. If settler-colonialism is when a settler minority dominates over an indigenous majority (Veracini, 2010), there is much incentive in the modern era to shift demographics and thus have what would be an official majority instead of an official colony (Veracini 2010). Mackey (2014) explains how a phenomena of settler colonialism is the establishment of settler *certainty*, often through creating indigenous *uncertainty*.

Anxiety and everyday uncertainty

Looking at the case study of this demolition in a Palestinian neighbourhood of Jerusalem, we see that Palestinians in Jerusalem face instances of everyday uncertainty and anxiety (Berda, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015) as a result of living in a site of conflict, settler-colonialism, and ongoing occupation.

The housing demolition policy, because there are thousands of Palestinian homes built without permits, is effective in its arbitrariness, because demolishing every single illegal Palestinian home would not be viable for Israel. This is not only because of the likelihood of the international outcry that would result (and it is very important for Israel to continue to be seen by the International community as ethical) or that it would likely ignite mass Palestinian resistance, but also because an explicit and consistent implementation of the policy would be financially and logistically burdensome on the state. The current policy therefore, has far more effective results for the state. Demolishing a potentially random selection of the many Palestinian homes built without permits, is sufficient for giving the message that any individual house could be demolished; leaving thousands of Palestinians in the Jerusalem area with the fear each day that their home could be the next one.

> *It's now 7.50am. We're sitting inside the home having coffee with one of the men who live in this house. He saw us outside and invited us in, thanked the two Israelis for coming. There were some old grey couches, and not much else. He explains that he and all of his friends had been sleeping upstairs on the top floor of the house. They were camping out there, to not leave the now bare home alone, in case the bulldozers come. A woman comes in to bring us all coffee and stays for a while to talk kindly to us. The activists I came with are going to leave and go back home soon, around 8ish 'cause it seems like it's not happening. Demolitions usually happen much earlier, before the sun is fully up.*
>
> *My stomach has somewhat unclenched from the fear and tenseness I had arrived with, and by now, three hours later the atmosphere was relaxing somewhat, the children had been kissed goodbye and sent off to school and we were having coffee with a nice family from Ras al Amud.*
>
> ***
>
> *8.45am. Someone shouts from the road. He had been keeping a lookout all this time. Everyone rushes to look out the window toward the bottom of the road that connected the village to Jerusalem. Suddenly, men are rushing around. Before, they weren't. It didn't seem like it was going to happen because now it's so late. But we have just heard that the bulldozer is down the road! People keep rushing to the window to look, and running up and down the stairs. I'm told by the activists to decide for myself if I'm going to participate in resisting if the family decides to not evacuate. Young men are removing everything they can from the house, wooden gates, sleeping mats from upstairs etc.*
>
> *I can't tell if the atmosphere is tense or not because I feel so tense and scared and nauseous. The people who came to have coffee with us seem quiet but not panicking. There is a woman outside who looks like how I feel. I keep stealing glances at her. There is terror on her face.*
>
> *Now that woman is crying. Another is rubbing her back, sounding positive telling her, "its ok, its ok". She's holding her. They're staring out into the street. Waiting for the bulldozer. Her cries start getting louder and less controlled. Three other women come to stroke her face, console her. Inside the younger men are running up and down the stairs. (Extract from my Field Journal, Ras al Amud, 2017)*

This everyday uncertainty has multiple attributes. Firstly, there is the everyday anxiety of living in an 'illegal home' - waking up each day to the possibility of finding the demolition crew outside one's house. Secondly, is the disruption to the possibility of 'ordinary life' through the absurdity that results from the arbitrariness, that is embedded in the policy itself, namely that it is practically impossible for State forces to carry out the policy properly - and demolish each and every illegal house in East Jerusalem, and therefore demolishing at random becomes the de facto practice.

The effects of these lived realities are intangible and therefore hard to comprehend but, I argue, it is very important to have some sense of the everyday individual and emotional effects in order to better understand the political effects of these policies. For example, the emotional complexity of waiting for one's house to be demolished in a situation in which *some* but not *all* homes will be demolished, may result in the fact that one family's good fortune may mean another's misfortune, as demolitions are undergone in a de facto random way. I.e. if all residents of a neighbourhood such as Ras al Amud have received demolition orders, family X's prayers and wishes that they will not be the ones to wake to the bulldozer may also be imbedded with guilt that if not them, it could be one of their neighbours or friends.

In examining these (a) anxieties and (b) absurdities I argue that 'everyday uncertainty' is a reality for Palestinian Jerusalemites, as a result of Israeli practices such as the demolition policy.

Whilst the majority of demolitions take place without the family getting proper warning, the Ras al Amud demolition I am describing, could be seen as the exception. This family had information that their home would be demolished, and whilst it was not definite, with no official notice stating the date of demolition. As with all the others, it was marked as illegal and under demolition order, but through the connections their lawyer had, they had managed to find out this crucial information which allowed them to make decisions to take precautions. I find this particular case an important one, as it proves that even in exceptional cases in which families are somewhat prepared, uncertainty is still quite clearly present.

Margalit (2014, 14) describes "bulldozer anxiety", the 'syndrome' suffered by East Jerusalem Palestinian families living in fear of losing their home, like this. Whilst around 100 homes are demolished each year, more than 11000 homes have pending demolition orders. This works out to be approximately a quarter of the population of East Jerusalem, who wake up each day not knowing if their home and family might be one of the unlucky ones. "No one knows in advance whose house will be spared, whose will be demolished and or when a demolition will take place. The State of Israel has been able to instil this fear deep in the psyche of the residents of East Jerusalem" (Margalit 2014, 19)

Was the fact that the windows and doors had been taken off; in order to save the materials, an indication that some certainty of the fate of the house was present? Or, was the fact that the house was built at all; that the family built a beautiful house, clearly with precision, finishing the outside with sandstone and connecting the home to the neighbourhoods electrical network; an indication that they really could not expect that their home would be knocked to the ground and they would be handed the bill for the cost of the bulldozer? How is everyday life constructed and lived in this zone between hope and precaution?

Salhoub-Kevorkian (2015) argues for the usefulness of looking at the 'politics of everydayness': To better understand a settler colonial society such as this, it is necessary to engage with the everydayness of control, as Salhoub-Kevorkian (2015) explains when engaging with Adriana Johnsons essay on "Everydayness and Subalternality" (Johnson 2007, cited in Shoulhoub-Kevorkian, 2015). "The everyday, we could say, is the level at which hegemony seeks to reproduce itself. It is the threshold at which hegemony seeks to become invisible as such, its violence buried deep, so that it is lived as consent rather than domination" (Johnson 2007, 23).

The daily perils of life under occupation are hard to see from a distance. Decision making, from small to large decisions are all affected, possibly in ways that become almost natural. Small decisions, like going out for the day, and big decisions like building a family home, albeit on one's own land, after failing to obtain a building permit, are affected. The decision to leave home each day, with the idea in the back of your mind, that you could come back to seeing your home demolished, is quite hard to comprehend. As is the decision to put time and effort and money into the building of one's family home, if there is a chance that your home, may be one of the unlucky ones, out of the many thousands that receive demolition orders but never get demolished. Should one hang up that picture of the grandfather? Or keep it as minimalist as possible, just in case? Should one try get a job closer to home, in East Jerusalem - though it may be more menial - in case one needs to rush back if the Israeli forces are around?

People are required to live between hope and fear. Both taking precautions and trying to build a future.



Figure 8 Israeli forces stand between the community and the bulldozer as it completes the demolition. All residents can do now is watch

> *"I keep thinking of these random objects. There was this car on the road, when they moved everyone from the house, and made us get in line with the car. Random rules, Israeli forces enforcing "don't move beyond that car!"... The Palestinian man who had parked there obviously hadn't parked there for his car to be a yardstick of how close families can get, to their home as it gets demolished. The soldier's main job for a while was keeping us in line with the car, as people tried to step forward towards their home. Before they had prepared the bulldozer.*
>
> *Then there was the fan. It's very hot today. Just before the police /military came into the house, a teenager grabbed the fan from the top floor of the house, taking it down with him. When I saw the house crumbling, for a second I thought, "it's good that they got the fan out". It's weird, the things that come to mind when absurd acts of state violence are happening. I also kept thinking how the cup I drank coffee from that morning, is under that pile of rubble. I can only imagine what the thoughts and feelings are of the people whose actual memories and life is connected to that home. Not just a cup of coffee and a small fan" (Extract from my Field Journal, Ras al Amud, 2017).*

Despite demolition practise being procedurally random, I did find some elements of *certainty* present in the field. This family knew, unlike many others, that most likely the state would go through with the demolition. And, being one of the lucky families that got notified in advance, they knew with enough certainty to take all

the furniture and even the windows out of the house in preparation, to minimize their losses. They may have even warned their children that this might happen. Whilst the exact date wasn't certain (the day before they had spent the day waiting for the demolition crew who did not come); there was still a vague sense of certainty. Although it was also plain to see that despite this certainty there will always be some disbelief, as evidenced by the woman who had managed to hold herself together, until we knew for sure that the bulldozer was heading up the road, at which point her grief and pain truly took hold of her. This was the moment at which the teenager decided to grab the fan, fully resigning himself to the knowledge that his home would be taken down, and that resistance was futile. Consciously yet spontaneously making the last minute decision to save a useful artefact rather than to stay and resist, as he and the other men had been discussing for quite some time, shows the complexity of the effect of these policies on decision making for the people affected.

Yael Berda (2006) describes the bureaucratic uncertainties that affect the core of one's existence as creating 'procedural bare life' which "does not create the fear of death, but rather denies the conditions for life". The banality of the violence of the demolition, embodied this. Despite that this event will leave the community shaken, it is still part of their normal lives. What was most remarkable for me as an outsider, was how other than me, everyone knew what was happening and everyone had seen this before. Aside from certain moments (the arrival of the demolition forces, the beginning of the demolition, and one or two instances in which someone broke down and cried) it seemed almost practised. Everyone knew the system, everyone had seen it before, and the overall mood was that this is simply what just happens. The fact that such a high percentage of homes have demolition orders on them, results in the absurd becoming normal, and legitimate anxiety becoming an everyday reality.

> *After the demolition started I kept thinking back to how just before; that house that was turning into rubble, I had sat in it. It was well built, solid, beautiful, sandstone outer.*
>
> *The demolition took a little over an hour. It felt like many hours. It was extremely procedural. The police 'cleared the area' spreading out and pushing the residents of the village back up and down the streets and out of the way, there were many police; stationed all over, and enough to form a heavy line in front of the group of people I was with. Some 40 residents of the village including the residents of the house. Most of the women went a little further back on the front porch of another house behind where we stood. So when the bulldozer started, first moving close enough to the house and then finally pushing its arm into the building's wall; the scream and cry I heard from one of the women behind me resonated loudly in my ear, despite the deafening sound of metal on concrete. The bulldozer continued its work, the woman stopped sobbing.*
>
> *For at least twenty minutes my body was shaking. I had never seen or heard anything like this, and for me as a Jewish person, very much implicated in all of this - it was just too much. Yet everywhere around me, people were generally still. I was the only one shocked, everyone here had seen these before. It was*

part of life here; a fact I still struggle to get my head around even as a researcher. I watched people having to watch a machine pull down the home that previously 15 people had lived in; and not be able to do anything about it (Extract from field Journal, Ras al Amud, 2017)

This brings our attention back to the "false refuge from arbitrary power" that Kelly (2006, 103) shows these legal systems create. Cementing uncertainty, anxiety, and fear into a legal policy is a very useful tactic, if the state's aim was to maintain an image of an ethical democracy with a functional legal system; and at the same time move Palestinian people out of Jerusalem. It is debatable whether the conditions, perfect to produce this outcome, were deliberate, tactical decisions or simply chance. But the on-the-ground reality at the moment, is that Palestinians have to resort to building illegally, as chances of building legally are slim; and that the results of building illegally include everyday anxiety about whether *your house is the one*, whether *today is the day*, or whether *you'll be lucky this time around*.

Punishment

This section deals with issues of punishment, in particular collective punishment and criminalization of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Criminalization - and the resulting 'punishment' of a criminalized population - needs to be understood not in isolation, but as part of the system that maintains the occupation in Jerusalem and sustains (through preventing resistance), the environment in which uncertainty can be used as a political tool by Israeli forces.

In a system in which Palestinian life is categorized as a 'security threat' to the state of Israel, a 'theology' which is woven deep into the fabric of the society (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Berda, 2006), acts of 'punishment' become part of daily life. The uncertainty of never knowing if your home will be demolished (as previously discussed) is one part of that punishment, but so are the many other layers of punishment that build the foundation upon which Palestinian's precarious lives in Jerusalem are built. Most notably is the tool of collective punishment to prevent resistance.

There was so much self-policing. I couldn't understand it so well at the time when I watched the restraint that the community showed, shaking with anger hurt and frustration at watching the Israeli forces tear down their home. When we left the site a couple hours later we drove past the Palestinian neighbourhood of At-Tur, the one with the main road which connects 2 major Palestinian hospitals, which they block off as punishment (or a deterrent for criminal activity) when someone throws stones. There were lots of stones left in the rubble that used to be this family's house. The whole house is now just stones. When the Israeli forces left the site they got into a tight formation, with a line of border police at the back, walking backward, facing the community, as if protecting the front from it; It looked to me that they knew how many stones they'd just created. As if they felt they needed to protect the massively armed forces from the community they'd destroyed. (Extract from field Journal, Ras al Amud)

The Israeli forces' body language upon leaving the demolition sight was notable in that it portrayed the Palestinian community as the perpetrators of violence as opposed to themselves, despite the fact that they had guns while the Palestinians did not, and that they had just forcibly torn down a family home. This type of phenomenon however, is normal in settler colonial conditions.

I will explain firstly about the criminalization of Palestinian life; in particular how, embedded in 'security' discourse, the practise and understanding of home demolition becomes a means of punishment and prevention against some imagined potential crime, and the effect of this.

Thereafter, I will elaborate on the practise of collective punishment (which is normalized in an environment in which Palestinians are criminalized as explained above); in particular how this prevents resistance to practises like home demolitions and creates further uncertainty. I will look specifically at the normalization of collective punishment and home demolitions as a form of collective punishment.



Figure 9-Armed Israeli forces preventing the community from accessing the home

A) Criminalization of Palestinian daily life

Embedded in 'security' discourse (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015), policies such as home demolitions are understood in public discourse, as means of punishment and/or prevention against some potential treasonous act or crime.

"Israeli fear of the Palestinians" results in 'interventions' or prevention of access for Palestinians including demolition of homes, denial of access to healthcare, family reunification, proper burials, and limitations on

Palestinian movement, including in Jerusalem; all of which are “legitimated by a security rhetoric that cases Palestinians as potential terrorists" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 3).

Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 3) explains that the system which categorizes Palestinians perpetually “as potential terrorists”, allowing them to retain a permanent social status of *guilty,* regardless of whether they had committed a single crime, is the everyday reality produced by institutionalized fear. Palestinian people have been 'branded', she explains, as "security risks" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 3). How this plays out is that they are then treated as criminal, and oppressive policy is understood as ‘necessary for security measures’.

In addition to this social criminalization, there is also the criminalization of Palestinian individuals through state policies such as the land/zoning policy I described before, in which “the state forces [the Palestinian people] into becoming criminals by not providing them with a legal way to build a house” (Margalit 2014, 15). The narrow space for choice between providing shelter for one’s family and becoming the owner of something ‘illegal’ – in this case, a home, results in this idea that most Palestinians are criminal (Margalit 2014). It also describes imprisonment of East Jerusalem Palestinians residents, “who have not complied with the court’s ruling by failing to obtain a building permit or demolish the structure” in particular when they have been unable to pay the requisite fines due to their economic situation, which as I’ve mentioned, is overall below the poverty line (Endeweld et al., 2016; Alyan et al, 2012). Serving their prison sentence however, does not exempt them from the legal requirement of having to show a permit or demolish their home and so “after being released from prison the resident may find himself in the same situation time and again” (Margalit 2014, 48).

Due to the everyday criminalization of Palestinian society, combined with criminalization through providing limited possibility of building homes legally and the patterns of re-criminalization in a context of dire economic circumstances, and finally because of the association between demolitions and ideas of threats against state security in a context of settler colonial fear-production (Shalhoub-Kevorkian. 2015), the effect is that, upon hearing of a home demolition, “most people think that Palestinians houses are demolished because their inhabitants performed some terrorist acts. This is not true[3]” (ICAHD, 2017)

Although there is much published about demolitions, by civil society and academics, as well as various alternative news sources, there is not the type of public outcry one would expect. There may be many reasons for this but two possible ones are (a) that they may not be seen as an epidemic, as many more people receive demolition orders then experience actual demolitions, as explained earlier; and (b) that they are understood as of a punitive nature; and public opinion may not be affronted by this in this era of securitization. Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) calls for an examination into both the “political economy of fear” and “the political economy of truth”, namely how we understand these stories.

[3] Full quote: “In 99% of the cases the residents had absolutely nothing to do with security offenses: they neither committed illegal acts nor were even accused of doing so. (It should be noted, however, that demolishing homes belonging to families of terrorists is a form of collective punishment against innocent people that itself constitutes a war crime).” (ICAHD, 2017)

"[We need to interrogate] the process of knowledge production about Palestine and the Palestinians, and of the way in which the media and the dominant discourse manipulate, nullify, deny and distort knowledge, silencing the voices of people under siege and creating a context filled with terrified, cynical communities (Palestinian and Jewish alike). Such communities are bound to their context and to global political powers by the manufacture of fear of Others" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 10).

My own empirical research, found that public opinion perpetuates an idea that demolitions of Palestinian homes are necessary punitive measures to counter 'terrorism'; i.e. the belief that this family must have 'deserved it' because they committed crimes. This is a phenomenon common of settler colonial contexts - that the colonizing class must constantly be in fear of the 'other' as a means to justify their ongoing colonial project. Fear, therefore is produced and reproduced under these systems (Fanon, 1967; Clarno, 2008; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Kelly, 2006, Azoulay and Ophir, 2012; Busbridge, 2014; Wolfe, 2006).

Although I do not have scope in this research report to engage with the international illegality of punitive demolitions, a form of collective punishment, which have been extensively written about (Darcy 2003 and various others), it seems that this has a clear relationship to public opinion on demolitions in general. Administrative demolitions, which are legally seen as non-punitive, namely because they are officially understood to be returning the house/ piece of land to the way it is supposed to be as opposed to confronting a crime. This makes administrative demolition orders, relatively quick and easy for Israeli Municipal offices to issue, as opposed to the punitive demolition orders which require higher procedural standards to issue, sometimes including court intervention. Administrative demolitions therefore are able to take place in an environment of limited public knowledge or understanding about the circumstances leading to the epidemic of building without permits (such as land zoning and bureaucratic obstacles). Together all of this results in the criminalization of Palestinian life, including down to the most basic structures: housing. Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) explains this as being part of a *factory of fear* necessary to legitimize a settler-colonial state which is sustained through a constant fear of the 'Other'.

Within this context, it makes sense that documenting state violence is one of the few routes available to Palestinians as some form of resistance, as it can be seen as part of the struggle of gaining international solidarity, as described by Mira*, a Palestinian civil-society organiser:

"the struggle is long and it has been proven throughout the history that to get to reach justice, you need the support of the whole international community … I think justice can reach all if we have people all over the world just unite … and just lets break things down and not treat a person - doesn't really matter where they are from - as a criminal or a person who wants to make trouble" (Mira, interview 2017)

Perhaps it was out of this context, in attempts to get their side of the story across, or perhaps because, as I will now explain, any other form of reaction or resistance to the demolition is often out of the question, that many residents took their phones out and filmed or took pictures during the demolition. Documenting, and 'telling the world'; sharing on social media has become a popular form of resistance against the criminalization/ demonization of a marginalized group, particularly in heavily constrained environments.

> *Usually it's only once the police already close off the area that activists know to come though, and that everyone knows that it's really going to happen. When we were still sitting in the home awaiting the demolition crew, I asked Sara what she and the other Israeli activist are going to do. She explained that usually all they do is document the demolition, or if the family wants them to, then they get involved and get arrested. I presume this means resistance like refusing to leave the house or trying to block the bulldozer. "Documenting is more effective" Sara explains. The demolitions happen anyway, whether there is resistance or not. (Extract from Fieldnotes Journal, Ras al Amud 2017)*

B) Collective punishment prevents resistance

Part and parcel of the criminalization of Palestinian society, is the ongoing collective punishment. Although completely illegal under international law (Geneva Convention), collective punishment, and any form of punishing one person for a crime she personally did not commit, is a tactic widely used in the Israeli regime in both overt and subtle ways (Mira interview 2017). Although as I've mentioned, administrative demolitions are condoned by public opinion because they are mistaken for 'punitive demolitions', this itself is highly politicized. Punitive demolitions, in short are based on the goal of "deterrence" against crimes, 'against the State of Israel[4]" "They say this is in order to make better new Palestinians, who would not do that type of action in the future. To deter them from doing that, if they know that this will happen to their family, they will not do it" (Mustafa* interview, 2017). There has been sufficient work published on the incompatibility of punitive home demolition law (referred to as Regulation 119 (1)) with International Humanitarian Law (Darcy 2003, 13). Darcy (2003, 13) poses that "To describe Regulation 119(1) as a piece of draconian legislation would not do justice to its severity[5]".

[4] The domestic law relied upon by Israel for 'punitive' home demolitions is heavily critiqued both legally in domestic and international arenas, and ethically in the humanitarian liberal framework. Regulation 119(1) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 provides for the demolition of homes of people who "have, or are suspected to have, been involved in acts prejudicial to the security of the State of Israel" (Darcy 2003, 11)

[5] "Theoretically, a Military Commander may order the demolition of a house, or houses, on the suspicion that some inhabitants of a town have committed, or abetted the commission of, or been accessories to the commission of offences; the provision demands no link between the perpetrators and those to be punished other than mere geographical proximity." (Darcy 2003, 13). Which is a direct contradiction of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention which Israel is bound to (as a signatory and an Occupying Power) which forbids unnecessary destruction of property; and in this case the destruction as a punitive measure, often referred to as a 'deterrence' measure cannot be seen as 'militarily necessary' (Darcy 2003)

And yet, in a settler colonial environment, embedded with logics of security theology (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Berda, 2006), punitive demolitions, as well as more subtle and covert practises of collective punishment, continue to take place and be incorporated into the daily lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem. These include:

> *"Punitive home demolition and punitive residency revocation, closure of Palestinian neighbourhoods, preventing prayers for both Christians and Muslims in their holy sites. Punitive or random collection of taxations, these are all punitive measures that have been used by the Israeli occupation since the occupation of '67. For example if a Palestinian commits what's considered to a state a crime like alleged attack or stab, they go and demolish his family's house, which is one of the rules of the criminal law, that you can't punish a person for another person's act" (Mira interview 2017)*

Filming the demolition, and uploading the videos were one of the very few options available for immediate resistance. One could either watch the demolition and cry or feel anger but do nothing, try to resist physically and risk being jailed, fined, and possibly losing one's residence permit- alongside knowing that even if one does resist most likely the state will still demolish your house… Or, one could film the event on their phones, which in this contemporary era is an act of resistance.

The following extract refers back to the morning before the demolition begun:

> *7am: sitting inside the family home on the grey couches, sipping coffee, a man with a toddler walks in, and everyone gives the little boy lots of kisses. The activists try to greet the toddler and ask his name in broken Arabic, and his dad coaxes him to tell us his name, but he doesn't want to, and goes to sit on his dad's lap instead. He's pulling around a little bag on wheels and doesn't seem amused by my attempts to make him smile. Another man calls him over and gives him more kisses. I ask Sara the Israeli activist; why are we sitting here, and not creating ungovernability, like if people blocked the narrow streets with cars, so that bulldozers can't get through? She tells me simply that Jerusalemites have a lot more to lose… (Field Journal Extract, Ras al Amud).*

The small child, Shafik*, who was being kissed and looked after by the men we sat with, who couldn't be coaxed to smile at us, has a medical condition requiring frequent hospitalization. Shafik had a little wheelie-bag backpack, that has a pipe that leads under his clothes because he has a digestion issue; and the bag acts like an external stomach. In broken Hebrew, his dad explained all of this to the activists I was with, "I spend a quarter of my life in hospitals".

What the implications of this are, are far deeper than him being a worried and exhausted father. Losing his 'National Insurance' is not worth the risk of fighting for his home. Shafik's dad works in West Jerusalem. If he resists this bulldozing, he may have his house at the end of the day today, but it is possible that he will lose his Jerusalem residency permit; as he would get a criminal record which may jeopardize it. Then he will no longer be able to access the health care his son needs in Jerusalem. And, as Sara explained to me, "if we resist today, they will just bulldoze tomorrow".

Choosing whether to resist the demolition or not, is therefore a far more complex decision for the family than it might seem from a distance. And, as the activists explain to me, the implications of resistance for Jerusalemites are more severe than in many other societies. 'Having a lot to lose' then can be understood in various ways. The rights given to Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, making their lives more bearable then Palestinians who are trapped in the West Bank or Gaza , might be seen as tools to supress resistance, understood by some theorists as a form of population disciple (Margalit, 2014; Foucault, 1979). Although far too simplistic an analogy, (as rights such as National Insurance and relatively free movement in Jerusalem are necessary for survival more than advantages per se,) civil rights as Jerusalem residents might be seen as the carrot; and collective punishment as the stick (Azoulay and Ophir, 2013).

The main road of the neighbouring village of At-Tur which has the two major hospitals I referred to earlier, has been closed off by checkpoints or blockades as a form of collective punishment; inconveniencing and harming entire neighbourhoods, for actions taken by individuals. A few years ago, when it was last closed off, hundreds suffered and one woman even died because she was unable to reach the hospital in time due to the blockade. In 2015, in a similar type of blockade, at Hizma checkpoint had a sign reading:

> "TO THE RESIDENTS OF THE AREA: A FEW OF YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR DISRUPTING PUBLIC ORDER BY THEIR ACTS OF RIOTS, AND BECAUSE OF THEM THIS BARRIER WAS SET UP. YOU OUGHT NOT TO COOPERATE WITH THEM. TO GUARANTEE YOUR SAFETY AND RESTORE PUBLIC ORDER TO YOUR AREA, SEND US ANY INFORMATION RELATED TO THOSE VIOLATING THE SYSTEM AND THEIR ACTS IN YOUR AREA".

Contact details were also included on this sign (Al Haq, 2015).

I find this example pertinent because its message is so clear. An individual's act of resistance has the potential of negatively impacting not just herself but her entire community. What the consequences of throwing a stone then are, are unpredictable, but potentially fatal for the family and friends of the stone-thrower.

Most interestingly, rather than being read as incompatible with the liberal democratic framework that Israel places itself in; collective punishment of this nature - extreme, fatal, unpredictable, disproportional and totally illegal - it is still read by public opinion as "a necessary security measure", which seems to cancel out all its problematic nature. This is the power of the industry of fear. "Israel's militarist policy justifies actions taken to "protect" Israeli citizens at the expense of violating the rights of Palestinians" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 10).

Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2012) explains how the effects of this are an exponentially increasing violent separation between the colonized and the colonizer:

> *"The political economy of fear, exclusion, death and collective punishment, characterized by a fundamentally unequal power relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, leads to violence, counter-violence and erasure. This creates an escalating vicious cycle in which the imbalance of power forges an ever-widening gap between the powerful and the powerless"* (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 10).

Home demolitions can also be seen as collective punishment in themselves. Punishment for living in Jerusalem and being Palestinian.



Figure 10 Israeli forces at Ras al Amud, in the background the bulldozer continues to tear down the home

Emotional tactics - adding insult to injury

> *As it went on and on, the concrete falling around us, the house became a one story from a two, and then became half; while most people were still, there were moments when they couldn't repress their responses anymore. Each time someone attempted to move forward towards the house the police lunged forward, using their bodies to keep the neighbourhood residents back, shouting aggressively. A couple of men were softly crying; and one man, one of the men whose homes it was and who had helped build it; punched and broke his own car's windscreen, the car that was being used by the police as a landmark barrier for us to stand in line with and not come closer. Perhaps he'd wanted to punch the police.*

People were drinking water; and offered water to the man who punched his car. It seemed like one of the few ways to keep busy, and to offer comfort.

Watching everyone with no concrete way to express their frustrations, and the risks against resisting too high, many people videoing the destruction on their phones as if letting the world know their story would bring hope for the termination of their subjugation

It was so systematic, and everyone knew the system. And so random. Stay behind this line. Don't come forward. I noticed quite how big the police's guns were from up close. As soon as the police marched off in formation the young men of the village sprung to action, sweeping; piling; they were clearing the street and area of the rubble that was once a home. I think I saw the grey couches sticking out from under some large chunks of cement. The community members were clearing the rubble because not only is it dangerous for children; but also because they will be fined if they don't clear it in a certain amount of time.

Shafik, the little boy with the wheelie bag will find this pile of rubble where his home used to be when he comes home from school.

The family will be billed for the cost of the demolition. (Field Journal Extract, Ras al Amud 2017)



Figure 11 Cleaning the rubble after the demolition

In addition to the emotional cost of families living in constant anxiety and the emotional cost of being punished as a population for trying to live in Jerusalem, are elements of demolition policy that seem to strategically add extra humiliation and suffering. Breaking the spirits of a population may be a technique useful for the

demographic battle of population transfer. My empirical research shows some of the emotional effects of demolition policy in a coercive environment; which, I argue can be seen as emotional warfare - a colonial tool used by state forces for the purpose of furthering the settler colonial project.

We see this manifest on the body of the man who punched his own car windscreen, shattering the glass, after long moments of watching the demolition crew bulldoze his home. He had helped build the home and, in that moment, had no other outlet of his pain. The procedure which involved the police, heavily armed, and in accordance with random rules ('stay behind the car') ensuring that the Palestinian residents of the village could do nothing other than watch the demolition. If they tried to fight the border police, they would simply be arrested, that was made clear. The precedent has so securely been set, that everyone knows that their whole family would be made to suffer either through loss of residency and thus insurance benefits such as access to hospitals, or through the broader effects of resistance and arrest: loss of jobs, fines, prison sentences and thus loss of income. With nothing else to do but watch his home be demolished, with no outlet available for his emotions he punches through his own vehicle. Issues of gender and community may be relevant here too and are discussed widely in literature, but are outside of my scope. The only other ways of coping with the emotional effect of the demolition, seemed to be in offering comfort to one another through sharing bottles of water; otherwise there was nothing to do but watch. This all creates a vicious power dynamic and ensures the effect of humiliation and through this, the reinforcement of power structures (Fanon, 1967).

Mustafa, a Palestinian activist and lawyer who I interviewed, explained why families can't really try to physically resist the demolition:

> *"I think people believe that if you resist it today and prevent it, of course there will be a lot of violence, the more resistance you do, the more there is violence right. And probably at the end of the day it will be demolished, you know if not today, tomorrow, if not tomorrow, next week. So, it doesn't really, you know, they have all the time in the world to do what they decided to do. And they have the resources and the force. You know you cannot, if you don't have force, at the end of the day" (Mustafa interview, 2017).*

The option of "Self-demolition" is encouraged by the state, and a choice that many Palestinian families may have to make. Self-demolished homes do not show in the statistics and reports and are not sufficiently documented. Self-demolition comes with its own trauma, different to that of watching the demolition crew and the Israeli police pull your home down, but likely equally, or perhaps more - scarring. Families who receive a demolition order may make this decision to save themselves having to witness a scene like this one I have described, or may make it for financial reasons if they cannot afford the fines and the bill for the bulldozer. For many it may seem like giving up and giving in to the system.

Das and Poole (2004) write about the idea of "maps of anticipation" namely, how people "come to anticipate and internalize the unpredictability of violence precisely through the predictability of physical sites where the state exerts its own seemingly arbitrary claims to sovereignty…" (Das and Poole 2004, 18). Although this concept easily applies to borders, or checkpoints, in occupied Jerusalem we can extend this idea to the site of

the family home. The implications of this are horrific to comprehend. “House demolition entails much more than the destruction of a physical structure. Years of savings go down the drain, personal property is damaged, and dignity trampled. The family may become dependent on charity, and the traumatic experience will follow the children for the rest of their lives” (Margalit 2014, 9).

As soon as the soldiers left, the community sprung to action cleaning the area of the rubble. I found out that they would be charged a fine if it was left as a hazardous mess, they had a week to remove the refuse, at their own expense. In addition they would have to pay the fee for the demolition itself.

Paying the bill for the demolition is a form of ‘adding insult to injury that can be understood through Margalit’s (2014, 12) reference to the “suffocating atmosphere that well may be regarded as psychological terrorism”. This has an effect of not only making a population suffer emotional wounds, but also creates a form of unequal dependence of the colonized on the colonizer (Margalit, 2014; Fanon, 1967). As I’ve already discussed, theory shows how Israeli settler colonialism functions through fear, both Israeli fear of Palestinians, and Palestinians fear of the everyday unpredictable violence. Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 10) explains how under settler colonialism, “the industry of fear …attacks the social fabric and daily life of the colonized, their land, their property and their politics of truth. Under such conditions the colonized are forever questioning what is happening around them, for the entirety of their social relations and history is fractured by the relationship with those in power, a relationship that denies them the right to be and become”.

The effects of fear, humiliation and emotional degradation are unquantifiable. That being said, it is imperative that we are aware of them and that in understanding the violence of ‘administrative’ or bureaucratic policies we do not limit this understanding to the material damage but also the ‘psychological terrorism’ of putting parents in a situation where they need to explain to their small children upon their return from school, that their home has become rubble, and that there may not be a way to prevent that from happening again, if they build another.

Chapter Conclusion:

Understanding home demolitions involves understanding the historical land issues in Jerusalem that lay the foundation upon which these demolitions can take place, in which a large percentage of Palestinian land has been taken away, and on the remaining part which is Palestinian-owned, building is still not permitted because of land zoning policy. In the small areas which are zoned for building, it is still difficult to get a legal building permit. The result; Palestinians in East Jerusalem end up having to build illegally and are then issued with demolition orders notifying them that their illegal structure will be demolished. Palestinians can then try to fight this legally but there is limited chance at success; and many of them wait, for the orders to expire, or for Israeli forces to appear with the bulldozer to knock their houses down at which point there is nothing they can

do but watch. Sometimes the bulldozer comes before they have a chance to pack their things up, and sometimes the bulldozer does not come. This uncertainty is effective in creating fear about the future for the Palestinians subject to it.

The uncertainty experienced by Palestinians as a result of administrative demolition policy, cannot be understood accurately without a broader understanding of the structural base upon which it takes place; as well as the environment in which collective punishment is a norm. Tactics of ensuring humiliation and suffering seem to be embedded in administrative policies, as I've demonstrated with home demolitions. The everyday lived experiences for Palestinians in Jerusalem of anxiety, are part and parcel of demolition policy; and although state legislation does not overtly prescribe this, this research shows that uncertainty of this nature is a political tool of occupation. As the Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions (ICAHD 2017, 1) explains, "The policy of house demolitions uses administration, planning, zoning and the law for overt political purposes: to quietly transfer Palestinians out of the country or, alternatively, to confine them to small enclaves, thereby leaving… land free for Israeli settlement and annexation". The Israeli administrative practise of home demolitions within the context of the other effects of Israeli policy; criminalization of Palestinian society, conditions of structural poverty, and precarity under the permit-regime, home demolitions can be understood as part of the broader project of coerced displacement. The home demolition policy and the somewhat arbitrary practise of it, affects a far wider group then those it physically displaces because it has a lasting effect of daily uncertainty for all Palestinians, even 'the lucky ones'.

Chapter 5: Life After Eviction in Sheikh Jarra

Introduction

This chapter shows the everyday complexities of the Israeli state's policies of subtle violence, that subject Palestinian Jerusalemites to life in a coercive environment. Here, I look specifically at the effects of state policy and practise, as they are embedded in everyday life. I look specifically at exclusion and resistance. With the eviction of a family from their home in East Jerusalem, as a case study, I look at what that family's response to the eviction can tell us about the Israeli state's policies. Through examining the responses of the community, we can identify some of the underlying structures of Israeli settler colonialism that bring about these responses, and better understand these structures. Abu-Lughod, (1990) writes that resistance should be seen as a 'diagnostic of power'.

In the previous chapter, I used the case study of a home demolition to better understand the effects of how state policy is carried out, and unpacked themes of control, uncertainty, and criminalization.

Using in-depth ethnographic data from spending a month with a family who had just been forcibly evicted from their home, this chapter expands on the themes that arose from my findings in the previous chapter, taking them one step further, by looking at them in the context of multiple, interacting state policies and the day-to-day's of everyday life.

> *"The present pattern of eviction and demolitions, accompanied by plans to establish settlements in the heart of Palestinian neighbourhoods, contribute to the creation of facts on the ground that fragment Palestinian neighbourhoods and weaken their physical, social and economic fabric, while forging a contiguous link between Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the remainder of the West Bank" (United Nations, 2010)*

Understanding home evictions alongside house demolitions, as the *major causes of forced displacement* of Palestinians in East Jerusalem (United Nations, 2010), scholars have written both about the structural/ political cause and effects (in particular the settler-colonial policies of displacement) as well as about sociological/ physiological cause and effects (i.e. the violation of the home, dignity, and sense of self of the effected families) (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Margalit, 2014 etc.). Here, scholars ask us to focus on and understand the centrality and significance of the home space; and the deeper meanings it has both globally and for Palestinians specifically (and in particular, Palestinian women.

In discussing my data on the eviction of the Samud*[6] family of Sheikh Jarra, rather than echoing this scholarship and showing another form of violation against a Palestinian family's connection to their home, I will be focusing

[6] Note: The pseudonym Samud, used to protect the family's confidentiality, means 'steadfastness' in Arabic and is linked to ideas of Palestinian 'staying' as resistance

on identifying the large scale systematic realties that we can find by looking at the micro-scale reality of a family dealing with an eviction.

My research shows that these underlying structures are highly composite and include both direct and subtle forms of everyday state violence. I pay special attention to the complexities of uncertainty, as it plays out through people trying to plan their futures with impending displacement hovering above them. Alongside this, are the complexities of the everyday contradictions the community faces; including contradictions between hospitality and eviction; coercion and daily resistance. This chapter shows the subtleties of the daily experience of Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

The chapter is structured as follows:

First, I lay out the context within which the eviction in Sheikh Jarra arises; explaining how politically important and widely discussed, the small neighbourhood is amidst the legal disputes about the evictions. Within that context, I then briefly summarize the specific case study I'm using, including the relevant policies and events, before engaging with the empirical data:

Through the ethnographic data, I will be looking at three major themes that deal with the complexities in the everyday. I will discuss the daily contradictions, in particular between eviction and hospitality. Then I focus on reading into the everyday experience of 'normal' life under occupation, highlighted here by ethnic-based eviction and engage with the question: 'how does one plan for the future in an environment plagued by uncertainty and displacement?'. Finally, I will look particularly at prayer and protest as acts of resistance against hopelessness and explore the structural foundations that bring about the need for these mechanisms.

Summary of case:

The first time I came into the neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarra in 2017, was just two days after the Israeli forces had come to physically evict the old woman Faheema* Samud and her family; a few people were sitting on white stackable plastic chairs on the street outside, opposite the Samud home. A month later and the plastic chairs were still against the wall opposite the home of the evicted family, and their neighbours and friends still going out in the evenings, to sit on those chairs outside the home. During the first couple of days there was an obvious presence of Israeli soldiers and border police, a little further off, standing around an army issued vehicle, milling around. Their presence felt confrontational and also made the Palestinian presence, on their white plastic chairs; feel like direct resistance. However, weeks later when there was no longer military presence and the families still sat on their chairs in resistance; it might have easily been mistaken to foreigners like me, for some elderly people wanting to spend time together outside their homes. They would be cramped together in the small

patches of shade until the sun went down at which point the crowd would get bigger, and the chairs spread out more. Over this time period various important changes took place in the lives of the Samud family.

> *On the first day that I sat with Faheema Samud, an elderly Palestinian woman, (a great grandmother!) and her family, we saw the settlers who now occupy Faheema's house - coming and going. Three men, one of whom was a young American white Jew, my age, and two older men who looked religious, as they were wearing yarmulkas (Jewish skullcaps for men) and who were probably Israeli. The American kept walking outside eating a packet of chips, in front of where we sat. He was either comfortable or was trying to look like he was, despite the presence of all these Palestinian residents of the neighbourhood sitting outside the home he now lived in, from which he'd displaced this old couple and their family. I was sitting next to a local activist who filled me in; there had been arrests the previous days; three Israelis and two Palestinians. I jotted down in my journal 'There are 10 Palestinians sitting here now who can do nothing but watch while these settlers mess up their home. The settlers are climbing onto the roof unpacking construction tools, making the people I'm sitting next to visibly uncomfortable'. Over the weeks I was there, the tensions I first noticed here became more ingrained, and more complex to witness. First of which, is this idea that they 'can do nothing but watch'. Over the weeks I learned that, by them sitting on their plastic chairs each night, was them doing something and secondly that this un-comfortability that I sensed was part of the overall environment that Palestinians encounter daily in complex and various ways. (Notes on Sheikh Jarra, 2017).*

The eviction in Sheikh Jarra is a story of a family, displaced first in 1948, being once again displaced. But more than that, it's a story about the complexities of survival and resistance under occupation. It is about the practices of combatting precarity with hope, and the possibilities of continued existence in a space where rights to exist are so contested. It is about the strategies of managing and contesting the every-day experience of uncertainty under occupation in a settler colonial society.

The legal battle is about the tenancy rights of the Palestinian residents in the neighbourhood who have been living there and paying rent since the 1960's to the Israeli General Custodian after they were given the homes, as resettled refugees, and promised ownership. Their legal battle was to prove their right to protected tenancy and the settler organisations that they faced in court aimed to disprove this and evict them, and re-claim the house as historical Jewish property on behalf of the Jewish ex-residents who had lived there before the 1967 war. These disputes sit on a legal foundation that is fundamentally unequal - providing for Israeli claims whilst categorically preventing Palestinian claims of this nature, as I will explain further.

In short, after years of legal battles about who had the right to live in that particular home, the Palestinian family lost and the right-wing Israeli organization won. They have sublet the property to individual Jewish settlers, who now live there, while Faheema Samud's family are looking for a place to rent elsewhere. They say they will try to move to Beit Hanina; on the far outskirts of Jerusalem; a neighbourhood that is already cut in half by the Wall; and surrounded by a growing number of settlements.

The eviction in Sheikh Jarra needs to be understood in the broader context of settlement, population transfer, and demographic warfare in Jerusalem. Ownership of land and property in Sheikh Jarra is disputed over in the courts as part of a debate about who the law deems to be a valid owner, and/or tenant, and which waves of

movement/displacement over the history of Israel it legitimates and which it overlooks. Simply put, the courts consistently rule in favour of Jewish ownership of the land; and there is no legal framework that allows for historical Palestinian claims to the land, whilst Jewish historical claims to land/property are supported by the state. Sheikh Jarra is interesting because it's one of the areas that Jews did actually live before the Nakba of 1948, (though some through renting from Palestinians). From 1948 that area was controlled by Jordan, and then from 1967 after the annexation of Jerusalem, the homes were given by the United Nations to a small number of Palestinian refugees. Funded by settler-organizations, Israeli Jews are now demanding them (back). Israeli law provides for this through the Legal and Administrative Matters Law of 1970, and no similar provision exist for Palestinian claims; and in fact the 1950 Absentee Property Law provides that Palestinians cannot recover any assets or land lost during the Nakba of 1948 (Azoulay and Ophir, 2013; CCPRJ, n.d, 2014; ACRI, 2017; Peace Now, 2017).



Figure 12 Sheik Jarra: Map of Israeli Settlement in and around Jerusalem (United Nations, 2010)

These disputes in Sheikh Jarra encompass a complex situation, raising questions about indigeneity, displacement, settler-colonialism and racism. However now the on the ground, reality is about the use of law and policy by Israeli forces in perpetuating the project of Israeli settlement, and appropriating large portions of Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem in order to further expand Israeli control throughout the entirety of Jerusalem, and to 'fight the demographic war' by moving Palestinians out of Jerusalem and thereby reducing their numbers, replacing them with Israeli numbers. The phenomenon of Israeli settlers needs also to be

unpacked and contextualized within a framework of a racialized, neo-liberal society, in relation to both right-wing ideology and the cost of living and a number of other socio-political factors. However, to fully interrogate all these phenomena is beyond the scope of this research report.

Finally, is the status of the Palestinians themselves in these neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. Having been promised title deeds of the homes and never receiving them, and then being told that they suddenly have landlords and owe rent. Then paying this rent for decades and learning that they were going to be met with a further wave of displacement, after having survived the first waves of displacement. Staying becomes an act of resistance and a symbol of hope for the society at large as Palestinian civil society activist Mira explains to me "We are originally from here. We were born here. It's our land, it's our house, friends, and our community. It's not easy just to leave the community and to leave the land you were living in. And for a lot of Palestinians, it's a matter of struggle to stay in your house." (Mira interview, 2017).



Figure 13 Residents of Sheik Jarra and Israeli activists march around the neighbourhood chanting to end the occupation

Background, context, and Israeli laws and policies

Sheikh Jarra, a small Palestinian neighbourhood in Jerusalem, became relatively well known during the wave of evictions which eventually ceased in 2009 after gaining much international and local attention. But again, in 2017, the residents have once again been targeted by right-wing settler groups, and forcibly evicted from their homes. Because, I cannot offer to contribute more to the many existing reports documenting the case in terms of its disputes, the history of activism, or the portrayals in the media; I will instead summarize these as succinctly

as possible before offering a focus on the subtleties of the everyday experience, which I think are very important yet least documented. Through these we can better understand the state structures that affect this experience.

New buildings haven't been permitted in the neighbourhood, since 1967 (Hammami, 2012) and Hammami describes the contested neighbourhood, as if stuck in the olden days. She writes a detailed ethnographic piece on Sheikh Jarra, her experience there starting as a safe-haven where herself and other Palestinians, from Gaza and the West Bank would spend a few days to get away from the terror of daily life during the intifadas, from the 1980s until the evictions in the 2000s, which she mentions briefly in her epilogue:

> *"In 2008, Muhammad and Fawzia "Um Kamil" al-Kurd were evicted from their home down in the wadi by settlers. Muhammad died of a heart attack eleven days later. Um Kamil continued to put up a brave fight and, for six months, held a sit-in at an empty lot near her home. In 2009, the Ghawi and Hanoun families lost their homes in the wadi to settlers. They too have continued to fight in the courts, as well as by keeping permanent vigil in a protest tent across from their homes. These three extended families who lost their homes are part of a larger group of twenty-three refugee families resettled in Sheikh Jarra by UNRWA before 1967. The remaining twenty are all under threat of losing their homes to settlers upon decision by the Israeli courts. In all, the settler master-plan for the neighborhood envisages evicting more than five hundred Palestinians from Sheikh Jarra and building three hundred settler homes in their place. The two pits that were supposed to be Palestinian hotels, are still pits." (Hammami 2012, 63).*

Now, 8 years later the Samud* family can be included on this list. A number of other families had been evicted around the time of the 2009 evictions, resulting in the neighbourhood becoming a landmark for Israeli and Palestinian protest against settlement. During the last wave of evictions Palestinians and left-wing Israelis held regular protests in Sheikh Jarra on Friday afternoons. Although some years have passed since the last eviction here, many of the same activists re-mobilized in response to this eviction, as the Friday demonstrations became quite a ritual. Before I had gotten to know the Samud family, I participated in some of the first few demonstrations and I would join the ones that took place later, after spending the morning with the evicted family in the couple's daughter, Ruweida's* home. I would leave the home space and go onto the street to join the small protesting group with Ruweida's mother, Faheema.

Understood out of context, the case of the Samud and other families in their position is about a legal battle over property. However, as I've explained in the previous chapters; these issues need to be understood within in their context; and in this case the context is one of an Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem. To fully contextualize it requires an understanding of forced displacement, rights to land, and occupation.

Understanding the legal conversations around the court decisions to evict the Samud family from their home requires an understanding of the waves of settlement to historic Palestine, in particular the increase in Jewish settlement after the brutalities of the Holocaust. Initially, Jewish settlement to Palestine could be understood to be an immigration wave; often Jewish migrants settled there to escape anti-Semitic persecution in other countries, particularly those under Christian rule. During and after the devastating period of the Holocaust however, the Zionist project – to create a Jewish state in historical Palestine - became a far more systematic settler project and the Jewish population there increased exponentially. This population increase, combined with various other social and political factors, including the post-World War II global humanitarian discourse that included the United Nations, as well as the idea of international human rights, the role of the British and their forms of colonization etc. all worked together to form the foundation upon which current Israeli settler colonialism takes place.

In order to maintain the façade of the democratic state, necessary under a post WW2 liberalized regime, the Zionist project undertook ways of moving Palestinians *out* to move Israelis *in*. (As explained in my definition section, in chapter one) Forced displacement is when a population group is forcibly moved out of a specific geographic area. Population transfer is the system in which one population group replaces another, in this case, Jewish Israelis replace Palestinians. The system by which this population transfer happens has changed over time, and can be identified at selected chronological points. Major points include the 1948 Nakba/ Israeli 'war of Independence' where sections of historical Palestine were declared to be Israeli territory, and with it the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; some of whom became refugees in other countries, some of whom became part of the 'internally displaced population'. The settlement project from 1967 onwards, though declared illegal by the United Nations under international law, is ongoing and often subsidized by state funds. Israeli settlements are growing rapidly. The phenomenon by which Israeli settlers evicted a Palestinian family from their home in Sheikh Jarra forms part of the project of population transfer as it replaces Palestinians with Israelis and aids the demographic growth of Israeli Jews in the area. Through state legal mechanisms the historical presence of Jewish inhabitants in the area are recognized exclusively while these mechanisms work to displace Palestinians.

Forced displacement is a quiet, yet effective, state-supported phenomenon that Jewish Israelis do not face whilst Palestinians do, in Jerusalem and elsewhere (Reynolds, 2017). The hundreds of Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons have no legal remedy to get access to their homes that they were forcibly removed from. By evicting them - although not an official policy of forced displacement - the result is another group of displaced Palestinian people. The idea that they should *simply rent another place elsewhere,* is not that simple in reality as there is hardly anywhere inside Jerusalem that Palestinians can rent (many Palestinian neighbourhoods are subject to similar policies of eviction and demolition, and as I've already explained, there is hardly any land zoned to allow Palestinians to build on it, and most existing buildings are already well over

full capacity) and thus most likely they will have to leave Jerusalem and perhaps become part of the population of the West Bank, no longer able to access the rights of Jerusalem residents. In addition, due to legislation such as the 'centre of life' policy, if the family find accommodation outside of the borders of the municipality of Jerusalem, it will be extremely difficult for them to be able to hold on to their rights as Jerusalem residents.

In looking at the question of rights to land, we must include questions on the difference between international and domestic law. What we need to understand in the situation of the evicted Samud family, are the laws around protected tenancy and how the Israeli law deals with tenants and with owners of property. Additionally, one needs a holistic understanding of the differentiation in Israeli policies between Israelis and Palestinians, in this case in relation to historical claims to their homes and land before their displacement in 1948. Absentee Law (explained in definitions section) confiscates the property of Palestinian's who fled in the 1948 war. Alongside this, is a law that provides for property owned by Jews to be returned to them through the Legal and Administrative Matters Law of 1970 despite that they were historically compensated for these properties.



Figure 14 Map of Sheikh Jarra (Grassroots Al Quds, 2017)

Everyday complexities in a coercive environment: Daily life after the Sheikh Jarra eviction

Contradictions of Eviction: Hospitality and Displacement

As a young researcher trying to be taken seriously in my research and writing, it is embarrassing for me to admit this, but important: *The grandmother of the family, Faheema often made sure I was warm enough, and that I was wearing enough jerseys when I sat out in the cold with them.* And it didn't stop there. Not only did the family go out of their way to try to communicate with me in English, despite the fact that the onus is on me to speak Arabic in their home, but the grandmother's daughter and son-in-law made sure I was eating the food that they had prepared for their family dinner; and they all made sure that I was safe on my way home to the room I was renting, in West Jerusalem. They always made sure I felt welcome in their space. Of course it was not just me they showed hospitality to, but all their neighbours and friends, including those who were Israeli's who came by to support them as they sat as a family; planning protests, and also planning their next steps – such as trying to find a home where they could afford rent, elsewhere in Jerusalem.

This is important because of the stark contrast I witnessed between the logics of hospitality and the logics of eviction and what these contradictions can tell us about state policy and its effect. The logics of eviction were spatially present; Faheema's son had been arrested on the day of the eviction for refusing to leave, and was under a restraining order for this, unable to enter his neighbourhood for the next few weeks. During my time with the family we all were aware, that I, as a Jew could get a house in Israel, with the support and encouragement of the state as soon as I felt like it (Jewish Agency for Israel, 2013); and that because of the settler colonial project of modern Zionism, the migration of Jews goes hand in hand with the displacement of Palestinians as an intentional demographic project. The family could do nothing but watch, as the settlers, Jews like myself, settled into the Samud family home, claiming it as their own; all the while as the elderly Palestinian couple sat outside and yet never forgot to offer their guests a cup of coffee.

Derrida's (2000) discussion on hospitality has been widely used to discuss issues of migration and other examples of a powerful actor (be it State or individual) opening their doors to those more desperate and less powerful. I use the concept of hospitality as a logic in place in Sheikh Jarra, to mean kindness, generosity and the act of welcoming and making others feel at home. Food and beverages, warmth, and a place to sit, encompass this hospitality. Derida (2000) argues that the 'host' through showing hospitability is also holding power, and showing sovereignty over their home. He explores conditional and unconditional hospitality. The idea of conditional hospitality - as an act that expects certain behaviour in return and further reinforces the sovereignty of the host - could be used to describe Israel's immigration law for Jews (Law of Return (see Jewish Agency for Israel, 2013)). However, as I use the term to explain the acts of hospitality and kindness by the Samud family, I use it as it is understood in society; as a value and not a performance of sovereignty. The hospitality

of Faheema and her family does not come out of a place of structural power, but rather comes about under the conditions of structural violence. In this case I argue, it points to the phenomenon of eviction as the antithesis of hospitality; welcoming guests in is noteworthy against the backdrop of forcible removal of residents. Understanding hospitality as part of everyday acts of resistance can tell us about the structures of power that are present in the everyday (Abu-Lughod, 1990).

The juxtaposition of hospitality and eviction is central to the structures that frame daily life in East Jerusalem. It raises issues of addressing an environment that works to dehumanize and crush spirits – through the experiential practise of re-humanizing and opening space for kindness.

Faheema's invitation and protectiveness over me and all her guests bought into stark contrast the absurdity of the fear under 'security theology' in constant production on the other side of Jerusalem:

> *So many Jews are scared to come here. I hear each day in West Jerusalem how it's dangerous to go into East Jerusalem, especially a tense neighbourhood filled with angry Palestinians- like this one they say. One especially shouldn't admit that they're a Jew here they say. (Notes on Sheikh Jarra, 2017)*

As I've already set out, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) points to the production of fear as something that creates further dispossession. She explains that these ideas,

> *"…aim at keeping Jewish-Israelis in an insecure psychosocial state, accompanied by a belief that their space and life are constantly threatened by the otherized Palestinian. Failing to debunk, historicize and politicize such logic that oppresses and demonizes Palestinians results in furthering an eliminatory, violent, military spirit inscribed over the bodies and lives of civilians. Accumulating and reproducing such an economy of fear turns security into a theology and biblical religious claims into effective, non-negotiable means to regulate the … lives and the very intimate social relations of the colonized, and further surveils and dispossess them as feared Others) (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, 180)*

Ethnographic observation and participation in Sheikh Jarra allowed me windows like these, to see what is going on in people's everyday experiences, as they resist and react to the eviction. This has allowed me to be able to uncover and examine some of the underlying structures, policies, and practises that bring about these reactions and it is these structures that I am interested in. Drawing from the works of Abu-Lughod (1990) who explains that through looking at everyday forms of resistance one can begin to understand power structures that give rise to the need for this resistance, I continue my focus on the everyday. And, as previously mentioned, guided by the works of Berda (2006) and Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) who explain that everyday existence is telling of 'broader politics' I argue that the evident actions of humanity and hospitality not only expose the racialized and politicized politics of fear that permeate Israeli society in order to justify ongoing settler colonialism (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015), but also expose the quiet violence of making a population feel unwanted and out of place; which has both an emotional effect, and a psychological effect of creating the experience of precarity. As described by Armano et al (2017, 4). *precarity*, not only is "characterised by uncertainty…. insecurity,

vulnerability, lack of protection…" but also is a structure that is both "aggressive and unforgiving". I argue therefore, that the environment that Palestinian Jerusalemites are subjected to is violent, and thus even in spaces in which direct violence isn't constant exists subtle, coercive state violence (Das and Poole 2004).

Everyday life and imagining a future, in an environment of uncertainty and absurdity

The next complexity I will unpack, is the juxtaposition of attempts at everyday life; or normalcy, and the absurdities of normalcy under occupation. Part of this is the process of planning for the future in an environment of such uncertainty and coercion.

> *Temporarily, the evicted couple were staying with their daughter, whose property is next door. This is where the family gathers together when they are not occupying the street outside. The small two room home has many pictures on the wall. Pictures of each generation, many beautiful photos of the children. There are already six people in that house, but they host whoever they need to. Faheema's son-in-law explained to me how he's been trying for years to expand the home, to build an upstairs, but he hasn't been allowed to. He tells me that the authorities come and measure the house, they won't even allow him to fix it up. Despite its size remaining tiny, rent has increased dramatically as Sheikh Jarra has become a politically contested neighbourhood. Yet residents of Sheikh Jarra, like other parts of Jerusalem need to hold on to their homes despite them being both too small, and still unaffordable. (Notes on Sheikh Jarra, 2017)*

It is nearly impossible to find an affordable home to rent in Jerusalem for Palestinians, and whilst it is much easier to live outside of Jerusalem, being caught doing so results in the loss of one's residency status and with that is confinement to the West Bank; entering Jerusalem or any part of Israel requires a difficult-to-obtain permit, as well as the daily trauma of checkpoints (Berda, 2006; Kelly, 2006).

In an interview concluded with Palestinian lawyer, Mira, she explained to me how overwhelming what she called "the coercive environment" is. Namely, how it is not just the major events such as the eviction that cause harm but the daily life in between these 'major events' that are also filled with coercive practise.

> "*Of course. I mean you are always running in order to fulfil these financial obligations and you don't have the time nor resources in order to improve yourself otherwise. So you just work the whole days and then after two weeks of receiving your pay check you will be having no money left because you have all these expenses that you have to pay and its really expensive here. In addition to the high fines of living in a house without a permit, paying lawyers and also making sure that you don't lose your residency by renting a really expensive house and paying the 'arnona'; the living taxation. So you ended up not having maybe time to do anything than just try to stay at your house and that's a struggle by itself" (Mira Interview, 2017)*

Yet this is not a unique system, it is an integral part of colonial regimes (Berda, 2006). Berda explains how it is the combination of actual, direct violence *alongside* the violence of control of space that together create the fully-fledged system of colonial social control. The Samud family, together with all the other families here, have been subject to structures of control even before their eviction materialized. It is necessary to look at this

case study not only as an eviction but also as an environment in which the future of the family has been worrying and unpredictable for many years.

> *"The system is secret; its rules are unknown to those who are not administering it directly… Its decision-makers are unknown and it is infested with conflicting decisions and what may seem like acute managerial inefficiency. However, all these features epitomize the effectiveness of the regime... These features and the bureaucratic mayhem they create... become powerful tools for population control…. In this system, space and time, uncertainty and fear of the discretionary power of the secret service become power tools of procedural violence against the Palestinian population, turning their lives into "procedural bare life", which does not pose a direct threat to physical existence but denies the basic conditions needed for daily life." (Berda 2006, 4).*

This is how Berda aptly explains the production of constant uncertainty as a tool of social control under a system of colonial bureaucracy in Israel/Palestine.

> *'They want us to evacuate here at the end of next month. The family home that we're sitting in; Ruweida's (daughter of the elderly Grandmother Faheema and her husband), I am told quite calmly, is also under eviction notice; the order is scheduled for just a couple months' time. "They" are the Israeli settlement groups. Sitting in the main room of the two bedroom home, talking about the week's events, this is how I find out that Ruweida and her husband and their other family members who live there have been informed that they will also be evicted.*
>
> *I ask "but what will happen" and they say "we don't know". It's tense for a while. People circulate with food. There is conversation about family, work, future, hope, cars. The son-in-law works with cars, which we bond over as I'm interested in car mechanics. He tells me how he took time off his work to be with the family and to find his mother-in-law, Granny Faheema, a new place to rent. Not only is he talented at fixing cars. 'I fixed this up myself' he shows me proudly the work he's done in refurbishing the small-well used kitchen and the flooring of the old, tiny house. He explains how he's designed plans for an extension to add an upstairs section as the two rooms that currently make up the house aren't big enough for the whole family, especially when his mother comes to visit. But the authorities measure each year, fining them heftily if there is any sign of external expansion (Notes on Sheikh Jarra, 2017).*

Talking about what I understand to be massive, life changing-events, in the same breath and in the same manner, as one talks about a car engine was absurd for me, but normal for the Samud family. This raises some questions; what is *normal*, what is *everyday* under these conditions? The normalization of impending displacement creates a scenario in which in a non-settler-colonial context, what could be considered massive uncertainties (arbitrary fines, impending eviction, arbitrary arrest, change of borders) become part of the everyday.

> *We are once again sitting on the plastic chairs on the street in the evening. Each time a newcomer arrives someone pulls up a plastic chair for them. Faheema's granddaughter, Raweida's daughter is called over, and told to bring chips for me and practice her English with me. She's 18. She's going to be a nurse she tells me. She's studying Hebrew at the Hebrew University, it's a 4 month course that she needs to do first in order to learn enough Hebrew, because the nursing course in Jerusalem is in*

> *Hebrew. She is then instructed to tell me about her twin brother and her sister. And her brother who got married. I only found out many days later that her twin is in jail for 2 months, he had been caught driving without a license. Her older brother married someone from another village outside of Jerusalem and so they don't get to see him very much anymore.*
>
> *A few nights later Ruweida shows me pictures of her family on her phone. There is one of the twins when they were younger, and many of the wedding. In between, there are pictures of her brother, being beaten up by Israeli forces. She explains that was when he was arrested protesting the eviction. She shows me some pics from when she visited family, beautiful nature pictures, and then some pictures of the settlers moving into her mother's house. (Notes on Sheikh Jarra, 2017)*

Like a mother's cell phone pictures of her family dressed up for a wedding, interspersed with terrifying images of her family being displaced with no recourse; it seemed that the environment of displacement and hopelessness becomes normalized into everyday life. Within this however, dreaming and planning does actively take place: We see this in the granddaughter's engagement in detailed planning for her future career which rests on the premise that she'll get to stay in Jerusalem and ultimately practice nursing there; despite the fact that her grandparents, and soon possibly her parents will be forced to leave their homes and will really battle to find an alternative place to stay within Jerusalem. In this context, the creation of future plans (like studying Hebrew in order to study nursing), of pockets of certainty- I understand as both potentially necessary for human survival and a reaction to an environment which aims to create despair and uncertainty. Policies reducing the living conditions of colonial and othered subjects to the bare minimum, survival without hope, life without something to live for, life that isn't fully human (Fanon 1967, Berda 2006, Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015), work as part of a project of displacing the Palestinian population without overt grotesque violence. Creating spaces of hope, future plans, and family; are thus acts of resistance against the regime's attempts at imposing 'procedural bare life' (Berda, 2006).

Prayer and protest in an environment of hopelessness

Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 181) writes about "the power of the colonized to nourish their continuity and history". She explains that "Palestinians' survival modes… reveal power in times of total powerlessness and challenge the eliminatory political logic of the theologized surveillance and control.

The empirical data shows, that through the production of order, rituals, regular and regulated processes- as seen through the smallest acts such as repetitive counting beads, to the larger actions such as weekly demonstrations, or sitting every night on plastic chairs as a form of protest- people create stability, predictability and hope in order to resist the structural violence of occupation which creates unpredictability, hopelessness, and chaos.



Figure 15 A car with some visitors to the Israeli settler in Sheik Jarra. Israeli flag in background

We sit. Same thing each night. Tonight a small black BMW drives up to the house. Hoots. 4 men get out. They wait for the settler to let them in. One guy stays in the car with the engine running. No one moves or even acknowledges them. But everyone is watching them. 'They're like monsters' Ruweida expresses, as she comes to sit with us. I ask her about these settlers coming with the car. She points out the cameras recently installed about her mother Faheema's old house, facing us on the street, and explains how anything they do here on the street is being watched.

Each night the community sit in a circle on the plastic chairs outside the house; I sit with the women across the road, the men, in increasing numbers sit right outside the house. There is a low murmur of chatting sometimes, but it's otherwise quiet. I watch Faheema's aged hands count the beads of her Tesbih (Islamic prayer beads/rosary) that she carries around and fiddles with, pushing each bead aside one by one, like an abacus. There is immense sadness in the air and on her face. Sadness and pain. Yet children still run up and down the street, taking turns on a skateboard, their laughter in stark contrast to the adult's faces. The Israeli flag flaps in the wind, the surveillance cameras installed around the house watch on, and their infrared lights quite noticeable in the otherwise dark night. The family are going to sit out here every night till they find a house. The men take turns to lead the prayers. The youngsters take turns to serve the coffee. Another car drives past, its headlights lighting up the Israeli flag on the home Faheema used to live in She reaches for a tissue to blow her nose. The winter makes her quite sick and she has asthma.

I comment on how strong and together everyone seems. The woman around me reply saying that there is nothing else to do. All they can do is leave it to Allah they explain, pointing up. That's all there is. I think about faith as a type of uncertainty but an uncertainty that provides hope instead of its opposite.

Night is falling, not far off the muezzin starts his call to prayer. It sounds amplified by the breeze. The women around me are standing, quietly. I can still smell the coffee from the last round served in tiny paper cups. The massive Israeli flag waves in the breeze, out of place, offensive.

The old lady's fingers are constantly busy, counting beads on her Tesbih.

****

> *"It gives me hope" explains Faheema's son-in-law, telling me how excited he was for the big protest planned for later that day. It's Friday morning, and the weekly Friday afternoon march is going to be bigger than usual today, some activists are bussing in from Tel Aviv to join. His wife had explained to me how no one other than her father really expected them to get their home back; and that they were sitting until they found somewhere else to move, not necessarily until the settlers left and gave their family home back in a fairytalesque manner. It is complicated then, what hope is being felt or sought after. (Notes on Sheikh Jarra, 2017)*

Prayer and protest are rituals which show the presence of hope and faith. And both of these were very present in Sheikh Jarra, in quiet, subtle ways which were inherently personal and in louder more public ways which were both personal and political. Looking at how these play out tells us about the structural violence that creates the need for intentional practices and displays of hope and faith. Structural violence in this case includes an environment of surveillance, threats of further displacement, police presence, legal battles, humiliating restrictions on self-development, ensuring that Palestinians never feel 'at home' in their homes. In response, prayer, protest and continuity show resilience and expose these coercive practices.

As explained in Azoulay and Ophir (2013) occupation is a highly developed structure, and yet it is understood as a temporary phase. Similarly, understanding the context through the framework of settler colonialism, we can see the structural nature of what Clarno (2017, 2) explains as "ongoing efforts" to displace, expropriate, and dominate.

Though completely still and silent, the security cameras installed on high poles around the home soon after the settlers moved in, this infrastructure acts as a tool of control and coercion. The little infrared light of the camera glowed on late into the night, reminding the residents of the neighbourhood that everything they do was being watched. Reminding them that everything that is watched can be used against them; (resulting in fines or arrest or even revocation of residency).

"What can we do…They are watching everything" according to Mustafa, a Palestinian native Jerusalemite who runs an organization assisting Palestinian individuals with the everyday legal battles they face; such as receiving a notification in Hebrew legal jargon that they can't understand informing them of a fine or court order. Mustafa explained to me about the layers of surveillance penetrating the Palestinian parts of the city, such as about the surveillance 'balloons' that were raised every Friday during times of unrest and protest in East Jerusalem which are able to monitor people no matter where they hid, and the increasing centralization of information stored in Palestinians residency or work permits, which are examined at random at flying checkpoints.



Figure 16 Israeli border police protecting the house and the settlers inside of it from the protestors

> *During the Friday protests, protestors take care to participate in non-violent protests. A crowd of Israeli activists and Palestinians marching up and down the neighbourhood, shouting anti-occupation slogans calling for freedom. Staying longer than the hour or two of allocated times resulted in the Israeli police forces, who were there in great numbers - absurd ratios of police to civilians- pushing protestors back, and threatening arrest. One week there was someone thrown to the ground, pulled between the police and their fellow protestors, and someone else dragged into a police van. Yet I noticed it was only the children who stepped a toe out of line, a group of three tiny children threw one stone, and then another, at the closed door of the evicted home. (Notes from Sheik Jarra, 2017)*

As Azoulay and Ophir (2013) describe, Israeli rule- which has historically tried to utilize the carrot/stick method for the population within Israeli borders - treats anything that could be seen as a "security risk" with the stick, and the framework wherein this categorization is made is extremely broad, and includes any form of protest, as well as any form of celebration for someone who is categorized as a risk. As Ruweida explained to me, they are not allowed to celebrate the return of someone who has been let out of jail. The cameras will see them. There will be more arrests. Azoulay and Ophir (2013, 12) explain that in fact "any permission to conduct normal everyday activities could be considered as the carrot".

> *The settlers had guns. A settlement group interrupted one of the Friday protests, young men carrying a flag with their right-wing organizational logo. They had small handheld pistols which they waved around- but didn't shoot. The police didn't arrest them. It became clear that the state police forces were*

there to protect them; the settlers, not the Palestinian displaced residents who had no guns. (Notes from Sheikh Jarra, 2017)



Figure 17 Israeli flag mounted onto the home, Sheik Jarra

These kind of standoffs were the only interactions between the settlers and their new neighbours, and that Ruweida imagined the settlers as 'monsters' came as no surprise. The Israeli flag that they mounted, symbolically, a classic display of colonialism through the ages, although currently viewed as a display of nationalism; embedded a display of power. It is also a symbol of erasure of indigenous presence (Shalhoub Kervorkian, 2015; Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2010) As a symbol it did nothing overtly violent, and yet it brought into one more neighbourhood a message reminding the residents of the radicalized hierarchy of citizenship, a reminder that their displacement was not over. Erasure, like this flag and security-politics, like the cameras, are part of the "ever-widening gap" between the colonizer and the colonized (Shalhoub-Kervorkian 2015, 9).

Yet every night we heard the call to prayer from the muezzin, and every night the granny Faheema, along with her family and neighbours, sat on those chairs opposite what once was her home. And every evening the community prayed and hoped and stayed. The sound of the muezzin came from somewhere behind the home, and as I heard the call and I naturally looked in its direction and all I could see was the Israeli flag and the security camera. But though distinct, out of place, visible; they were not the only symbols present.

Men lay out their prayer carpets. Faheema touched her beads and joined the prayer quietly. The counting of beads, the daily setting out of the chairs; these actions create order, ritual, familiarity, resistance. They combat uncertainty- creating predictability. If the settler-colonial project is to create alienation between the indigenous people and their place there, their homes, their lives; these rituals of resistance work to reject that.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) highlights and problematizes the system from which the right to control, watch, and dispose colonial subjects, permeates. Part of this system is about *not questioning* rights-violations, *normalizing* occupation through fear-mongering, and the security complex. She explains how home demolitions and evictions, surveillance and restrictions on movement among other forms of state violence "are, astonishingly, largely invisible to the Western and Israeli eye…[these violations] have been – and remain – uncountable, unseen and unrecognizable, and all are left with impunity" Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 117).

Chapter Conclusions:

This chapter concludes that the cumulative effects of the various Israeli state policies and practises create a very complex environment for Palestinians in Jerusalem. In responding to the impact of one state policy of displacement, the numerous other state practices and their effects are ever present. The idea of a 'coercive environment' is critical to be aware of in understanding what 'everyday life' looks like. This is embodied in the intersections of violence and displacement with family decisions on the future.

The eviction of Faheema Samud and her family occurred within in a context of historical displacement, in which Israeli law quietly allows for Jewish settlers to evict Palestinian families, and leave them with hard decisions to make, as there is insufficient housing for Palestinians in Jerusalem.

Through locating and examining the family's everyday resistance in the forms of hospitality, normalcy, and acts of hope such as prayer and protest - I have been able to engage with some of the ways that state practices affect the lives of its Palestinian residents. I have found that they create an environment of coercion; create a multitude of difficulties and challenges to a normal life.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This research report has shown how various Israeli policies and state practices cause uncertainty for Palestinians in Jerusalem as part of the structure of displacing the Palestinian population. The accumulation of a multitude of state practices that together result in making the daily lived experience so difficult and uncertain, for Palestinians in Jerusalem that they are forced to move out, serves the settler colonial agenda.

For Palestinians in Jerusalem, the right to live and move freely through the city, is neither permanent nor certain. Many Palestinians, civil society groups and scholars see the current system in place as assisting the goal of moving Palestinians out of Jerusalem, or 'forcible population transfer' albeit quietly and indirectly. This system contains legislation and policy that work to get Palestinians out of Jerusalem in various ways. One such way is through directly revoking their right to permanent residency permits (I have discussed residency revocations on the grounds of centre of life, punitive revocation, and the freezing of family unification permits). In addition, there are bureaucratic systems in place that get Palestinians out of Jerusalem through targeting their homes, ensuring there isn't anywhere for them to live, even if they do have residency. (I have discussed the land zoning policy, the home demolition policies, the eviction policy in relation to tenancy rights and property ownership (absentee property) and the court systems). Finally, I see the everyday uncertainties as a further step to quietly coerce Palestinians out of Jerusalem, through penetrating to even the most banal aspects of daily life (I have briefly discussed checkpoints, poverty and fines, collective punishment, surveillance, and the domestic legal regime).

These three aspects: the right to live in the city, the ability to find or build a house to live in, and the daily uncertainties together, create a form of structural violence through a multitude of systems of policies, each one making daily life in Jerusalem just a little bit more difficult. Together these create what organisations have termed a 'coercive environment'.

I have shown through a case study of a home demolition in a Palestinian Jerusalem neighbourhood, how the demolition of a Palestinian home embodies the uncertainty embedded in Israeli policy.

Homes are demolished when built without permits, but building permits are nearly impossible to obtain both because of the bureaucratic process and because of the city planning policies in place in East Jerusalem as of 1967. Palestinians are circumstantially thus forced into building illegally, which results in their homes being in the precarious position of being liable for fines and demolition. Very little option is available to these families, there is nowhere to move and it is illegal to build-on. Families witnessing demolition, as well as those waiting for the much-feared demolition order to be handed to them, suffer severe emotional and psychological trauma. The settler colonial state project ensures that moving out of Jerusalem is the most viable option for a sustainable life. The basic rights and services that living and paying taxes in in Jerusalem provides include health care and pensions, and rights to move around the city, and having these taken away by losing Jerusalem residency could

have dire costs on these families' lives. Moving outside of the delegated borders of Jerusalem, legally means that under the current Israeli system, Palestinian's Jerusalem residency permit could be revoked as this permit is revocable on a number of grounds, including evidence that a Palestinian person's 'centre of life' is outside of Jerusalem. Losing access to Jerusalem in this way means confinement to the West Bank, its multitude of checkpoints, Israeli settlements, and limited opportunities for employment and basic service delivery as one can expect from a territory under Military occupation. The uncertainty of if or when a demolition order will come, if or whether it is possible to find somewhere within Jerusalem to build, or if the family will be forced due to lack of options out of Jerusalem; and how they will rebuild their lives in that case; are all effective tools of coercion under the Israeli settler colonial regime. Because the implementation of administrative home-demolitions is unpredictable or arbitrary, the number of those affected by them far exceeds the number of those who personally experience the demolition of their own home; this unpredictability has the effect of ensuring that the majority of Palestinians have to deal with the uncertainties and fears I have outlined above.

My case study on a family's eviction from their family home in Sheikh Jarra looks at eviction, within the context of Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem, combined with the particular Israeli laws which target Palestinians and confiscates property from Palestinians who fled in the Nakba. Within this context are the inherent uncertainties of Jerusalem residency. My ethnographic observations of a family's everyday life and response to the daily uncertainties of Israeli policy shows some of the complex underlying structures present in Jerusalem. Through looking at the everyday life that follows the event of the eviction I was able to show how various settler-colonial structures (identified in the chapter on the demolition) arise and play out over an extended period of time through the experience of one family and their response to their eviction. These structures include everyday anxiety, the theology of security and its relation to fear, bureaucratic violence and procedural bare life, criminalization and punishment, and emotional violence.

I have argued that using the scale of *everydayness* and opening our research to the potential of finding multiple, intersecting, daily violations within context is necessary in understanding the on-the-ground realities of Palestinian's experience in occupied Jerusalem. Through a coercive environment- the ongoing settler-colonial project in place in Jerusalem continues to oppress the Palestinian population, despite international human rights law and liberal discourse and principles.

In addition, rather than continuing to focus research about large scale acts of direct violence, or through the binary viewpoint of whether a state's actions are legal or not, it is critical now more than ever to look seriously at the murkier, messier, greyer instances of structural violence. Uncertainty is one of these such phenomena- it leads to anxiety, loss of control, and estrangement from one's potential future.

Appendices

Notes

* all names of research participants included in this report are pseudonyms.

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