LIVING THE PAST IN THE PRESENT: A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE MEMORIES OF WAR AND VIOLENCE OF FORMER CONGOLESE SOLDIERS LIVING IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the Almighty God and to all children, women, men, civilians and soldiers who are victims of various forms of violence in the DRC and around the world.

In memory of my beloved parents: Georgine Sengi and Matthias Lakika.

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been previously submitted for any other degree or examination at any other university.

Signed in Johannesburg on ………………… day of …………………. 2019

(**Dostin Mulopo Lakika**)

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

A.C.M.S: African Centre for Migration & Society

A.F.D.L: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

A.P.R: Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (Rwandan Patriotic Army)

C.E.T.A: Centre d'Entraînement des Troupes Aéroportées (Airbone troops training centre)

C.N.D.P: National Congress for the Defence of the People

CONADER: National Commission of Demobilisation and Reinsertion

D.R.C: Democratic Republic of Congo

D.S.P : Division Spéciale Présidentielle

E.F.O : Ecole de formation des Officiers

F.A.C: Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces)

F.A.Z: Forces Armées Zairoises

F.A.R.D.C: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo

F.D.L.R: Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)

F.P.R: Rwandan Patriotic Front

G.S.S.P : Garde Spéciale pour la Sécurité Présidentielle

H.C.R: High Commissionner for Refugees

I.C.C: International Criminal Court

I.C.R.C: International Committee of the Red Cross

J.K.K: Joseph Kabila Kabange

L.D.K: Laurent-Désiré Kabila

M.S.S : Mobutu Sese Seko

M23: Mouvement du 23 mars (March 23 Movement)

M.L.C: Mouvement de Libération du Congo (Movement of the Liberation of Congo)

M.P.R: Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (Popular Movement of the Revolution)

P.I.R: Police d'Intervention Rapide

R.P.A: Rwandan Patriotic Army

R.P.F: Rwandan Patriotic Front

R.C.D: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy)

SADC: Southern African Development Community

S.M.I: Structure Militaire d'Intégration (Military Structure of Integration)

U.D.P.S: Union for Democracy and Social Progress

UNITA: National Union for Total Independence of Angola

U.P.C: Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Congolese Patriots)

Abstract

This study sought to explore and understand the memories and lived experiences of former soldiers from the time they joined the army until their exit and post-army life in South Africa. The study highlights the significance of the contexts in which former soldiers recount their military experiences as forced migrants in a different country. Drawing on empirical data generated from interviews with former Congolese soldiers in Johannesburg, this study examined the socio-environmental impact on former soldiers' remembering/forgetting war and violence as refugees in a different context - South Africa. Based on fieldwork in the city of Johannesburg, South Africa, the study uses traditional ethnographic methods. Narrative interviews and participant observation were appropriately used to examine the lived realities of twenty-one former soldiers living as refugees in South Africa. The study employed thematic analysis to understand the various discourses of militarisation in different fields.

The study conceptualised the socio-environmental as Bourdieu's concept of fields, exploring the lives of former soldiers in both the DRC field and South African field. The field is a social space defining the boundaries of actions and offering the conditions that shape those actions. I am using the term field to talk about military activities in the Congo bearing in mind that this military field has internal connections with the Congolese society which differ from the South Africa context.

One of the main objectives of this study was to understand the impact of the social space offered by South Africa on former soldiers' understanding and implementing of military ideology or principles and practices which are based on the violence. This study's goal was to explore if former soldiers' conception of war and violence remained un/changed after moving from one context to another, whether military behaviour, attitude or principles continued to influence their lives in South Africa and more importantly when and how they drew on the military discourse in their new country. Using Bourdieu's concepts, this study was also concerned about military principles/practices former soldiers did *habitualise* or *de-habitualise* in their post-military lived experiences in South Africa. Here, I argue that military identity, as constructed, is hugely spatialized. Therefore, this study is about exploring military habitus outside the military field.

Overall, this study found that the motivation to join the army for many participants was informed by the search for meaningful masculinity which incorporated dimensions of economic success, violence through revenge or defence and their role in an emerging nation.

This masculinity was constructed in relation to coloniality and ongoing colonial hierarchies. Military identity or military violence is inextricably linked to the specific field. The military identity in the DRC field, for instance, included the creation of 'rights' to which soldiers had access. These rights became, to use Bourdieu's term, '*doxalised*'. Conceptualised as a patriarchal institution, the army was also defined as a place of discipline and order which are viewed as products of violence. Soldiers learnt to obey without questioning the authority of their superiors. Following the superiors' commands is one of the tenets of military training that informs the transition from civilian to soldier. On the other hand, soldiers echo this patriarchal conception when they deal with civilians, expecting them to obey and surrender without resistance. However, in the South African context, this study found that military habitus of former soldiers was being constituted and constituting, constantly negotiated—that is *constructed/ing*, *reconstructed/ing* and *maintained/ing.* This study found that habitus can be acquired, claimed and even dismissed and more importantly, migration significantly impacts on the identities of former soldiers. I argue that while some of their military practices have become *habitualised*, this *habitualisation* is complex and altered by multiple realities of the host society.

The results of this study combined with the rich literature reviewed provide, therefore, a significant theoretical contribution to the understanding of the influence of the field in the definition of military identity, military violence in the context of mobility. The study also offers great contribution to the current concepts developed by Bourdieu which do not account for the capital that ex-soldiers deploy in the migratory context that acts as a new field. I therefore argue that Bourdieu's five concepts of field, capital, practice, habitus and symbolic violence should be reconceptualised to add military capital as a new concept of capital particularly when applying these concepts in the contexts of former military personnel mobility.

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Chapter One: Introduction

In this study, I examine how migration influences the identity of former soldiers. Adopting Bourdieu's theoretical tools of the field, capital, practice, habitus and symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986) as well as interviews and thematic analysis, I examine the complex, contradictory and competing representations of military principles, memories of war and violence. This is done in order to understand how dominant representations of military identity and practices are contested and renegotiated in the post military lives of former Congolese soldiers living as refugees in South Africa. I explore their understanding of war and violence as well as the influence of new environments and relationships in their representations of military involvement and violence. More importantly, I focus on the details of their everyday practices such as the authority in the way of speaking and the use of the language and gestures which, in the context of this study, could be "filled with social meaning" as noted by Winter, (1999: 10).

Various factors ranging from economic to political may explain people's motivations for joining the army. After receiving military training however, young soldiers imbibe its ethos, which sometimes glorifies killing and other forms of violence. Of note, the paradox of the modern armies is that the relationship to violence has been widely mediated by weaponry (aviation, artillery, etc.) and therefore the soldier is dragged to curb violence, but in some contexts such as, the DRC marked by political unrest, wars and various forms of violence soldiers make use of both, physical and symbolic violence.

It has been argued that military training aims not only to improve the capacities of soldiers in the fulfilment of their duties, but it also serves to refashion their behaviour by making them less sensitive, less worried, more aggressive and more interested in competition than cooperation. This ultimately results in the normalisation of violence (see Barak, 2006); Jackson, Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Lüdtke and Trautwein, (2012). During training, soldiers become "immersed in an extensive boot-camp program in which their civilian status is broken down and the new identity of military recruit is forged" (Jackson, Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Lüdtke and Trautwein, 2012:271). They imbibe a militarized view of masculinity that extols the disproportionate use of hostility, power and aggression (Grossman, 2001). Soldiers who exhibit weakness are attacked, detested and portrayed as effeminate.

The question of remembering and forgetting violence has attracted widespread debate among scholars. In his influential book, *On Collective Memory* (1991), Halbwachs is concerned about the way mental images of the present are used to reconstruct the past. He argues that the collective memory of a society depends on the 'cadre' or 'framework' within which a group is positioned in a society. Similarly, Argenti and Schramm (2010) argues that memory is not a simple, unmediated reproduction of the past, but a selective re-creation that is dependent for its meaning on the remembering individual or community's contemporary social context, beliefs and aspirations. These re-creations of the past are partial, unstable, often contested, and prone to becoming sites of struggle, meaning that individuals and societies can produce false memories. Although unable to distinguish between true and false memories, Argenti and Schramm admitted that even 'false' memories bear a relation to truths beyond their supposed original events; a form of meta-truth about the present that is projected back in time (Argenti and Schramm, 2010: 2). Although soldiers carry on memories that belong to what we can call military field.

Bourdieu's (1977) concepts of field, capital, and practice help to explain habitus as mental dispositions which are durable and transposable. The expression of habitus depends on the context, allowing the individual to adjust to the new environment. The central argument of this study is that the idea of false memory is problematic because it rests on a belief that memories are factual accounts. Winter (1999: 11) define social learning as "the assimilation by an individual of narratives or scripts about himself and his exchanges with other people". In order to understand how memory expresses a sense of the past, it is important "to return to the individual, whose sense of the past is both the beginning and the end of all processes of 'social learning' (Winter, 1999: 11). The way people remember or forget or the manner in which they talk about war and violence is deeply dependent on their encounters with different people in different settings and on what they aim to achieve because "our memories are constantly reconstructed in keeping with the needs of the present" (Cole, 2001: 23). As social actors, individuals have the capacity to work on, fight and transform traumatic memories to fit the realities of the present (Shaw, 2007). Referring to Long (2001), Mahati (2015: 1) states that social actors are "entities (individuals or groups) that can be regarded as having agency". Thus, this study aims to highlight the significance of the contexts in which former soldiers recount their military experiences as migrants in a different country. Studying Congolese soldiers living in South Africa helps us to investigate how capital can be invested through migration. It also helps to explore how these former soldiers question their military habitus. The interest of

Bourdieu's concepts is that we can understand how habitus acquired in a specific field can migrate and be reinverted in a different context. Congolese population under study are refugees who previously belonged to military field before migrating. They are an important symbolic capital in terms of using violence and masculinity.

Drawing on empirical data generated from interviews with former Congolese soldiers in Johannesburg, I examine the socio-environmental impact on former soldiers' remembering and forgetting of war and violence as migrants in South Africa. I conceptualise the socio-environmental in terms of Bourdieu's (1977) concept of fields. In this study, I examine the lives of former soldiers in both the DRC field and South African field. The field is a social space defining the boundaries of actions and offering the conditions that shape those actions. This social space is compared to a soccer field in which people compete with each other, "using differing strategies to maintain or improve their position" (Thomson, 2008: 69). One of the main objectives for this study is to understand the impact of the social space of South Africa on former Congolese's soldiers' understanding of military ideologies that are based on the use of violence. In this regard, I argue that military identity, as constructed, is considerably spatialised. Military identity in the DRC field, for instance, included the creation of 'rights' for soldiers. These rights became, to use Bourdieu's term, "*doxalised*". Conceptualised as a patriarchal institution, the army is also defined as a place of discipline and order which are products of both, physical and symbolic violence. Soldiers learn to obey without questioning the authority of their superior officers and hence expect the same in their interactions with civilians. In some instances, military commands may contradict individual's moral and ethical principles but such individuals are obliged to obey commands.

Violence in the army or in the society is associated with masculinity. This kind of violence is aimed at exercising some form of domination referred to as "phallic" in relation to slave trade and colonialism (Mbembe, 2001). For Mbembe, phallic domination "has direct, close connections with the general economy of sexuality [...] it has been the focus of ways of constructing masculinity and power" (2001:13). The army paraphernalia are symbols of power used by soldiers when interacting with civilians (Owino, 2008). In many parts of Africa, particularly in the DRC, studies have shown that civilians bear the brunt of soldiers' violence in different ways such rape and sexual violence, extortion and various forms of harassment by which they exhibit their masculinity (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005; Baaz and Stern, 2009; Meger, 2010; Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010).

Drawing on the literature which highlights the contested nature of memory (Halbwachs, 1992; Cole, 2001; Conway, 2007; Connerton, 2011; Young and Shepler, 2012), and considering the memory of violence as part of an "undifferentiated eternal present" (Pandey, 1999:24), this study seeks to answer the following questions: When former soldiers move from one context to another does the new social milieu influence their understanding of war and violence? What military behaviour, attitude or principles continue to influence their lives in South Africa? What do they leave out? When and how do they draw upon their previous military experiences in their new country? Which of their military experiences do they *habitualise* and which ones are *de-habitualised* in their post-military lived experiences in South Africa? Following Winter's (1999) observation that experiences in particular social spaces and moments of social action are stored in individual memories when people move to different contexts, this study seeks to examine the impact of migration on the military identities of former DRC soldiers living in exile in South Africa. Considering that military identity is spatially constructed, and that it draws and exercises its power from a spatial frame, I make case that former soldiers migrating from their country would become 'spaceless' and therefore have to renegotiate their identities within their new social milieus. This suggests that they are compelled to adapt their identities to the realities of everyday life in their host communities.

The former soldiers' narratives of war and violence are informed by the principles and tenets of the institution of the army. Halbwachs (1992) explains that an individual's understanding of the past is strongly connected to their group consciousness. Cole's (2001) ethnographic study has shown how Madagascar's bloody colonial history has influenced the memories of the people. A substantial number of former Congolese soldiers who talked about their lives saw themselves not only as perpetrators, but also as victims by virtue of their military engagement and difficult life in a foreign country. It was in that context that they chose to speak out about their experiences. But what they talked about was not profoundly private matters, since they existed in a social framework or a particular field; their personal experiences were drawn from the framework of collective action.

1.1. Contextual background

The DRC conflict started in the mid to late 1990s when the country was in the throes of multi-faceted armed conflicts involving the armies of various states as well as an assortment of rebel and militia groups. Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda backed Laurent-Désiré Kabila's

(hereafter L.D.K) Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) and accused Zaire, which had been by Mobutu Sese Seko (hereafter Mobutu Sese Seko) for 32 years, of seeking to destabilise its neighbours (Likoti, 2006). This situation was exacerbated by the Rwandan genocide of 1994 in which an estimated 800 000 people were killed. In early 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) shot down the plane that was carrying president Habyarimana and took over power in Rwanda. More than one million Rwandans, the majority being Hutu and former members of the defeated government, were displaced. Displaced Hutus have often been accused of being implicated in the genocide as Nzayabino (2011: 17) suggests when he states that "they crossed the border after looting the country and taking with them government assets and military equipment to Zaire". In the DRC (then Zaire), the defeated Rwandan government (with the majority of Hutu) received support from the Mobutu regime and was able to gather "over $8 million in weapons in Goma and Bukavu a month after the genocide in spite of the arms embargo" (Stearns, 2012:47). Mobutu was often accused of hosting rebel movements from Angola, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda in the DRC (then Zaire) (Stearns, 2012). In addition, Mobutu was reportedly supporting Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to fraudulently traffic diamonds through Zaire avoiding taxes and buying weapons with fake papers and escaping an internationally imposed arms embargo against them (Stearns, 2012: 53). The AFDL's military action which received the support of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola was in response to repression by the Mobutu regime of certain ethnic groups, as well as to the threat posed by rebel/militia movements, particularly Rwandan rebels (associated with the 1994 Rwandan genocide) who were operating in the area (Lamb, 2012:37).

Some scholars have contested the security argument put forth by countries like Rwanda and Uganda to justify the constant presence of their armies in the DRC, contending that the war against the DRC is caused by those whose clear intention was to loot the natural resources of the country (Meger, 2010; Nibishaka, 2011). According to Likoti, the DRC was the world's fifth copper producer with annual output of 500,000 tons of copper and was the top producer of cobalt and diamond. The gold potential of the DRC remains virtually unexplored, which, Likoti argues, is the reason for military interventions into the country, rather than the often-cited security threats that the DRC has been claimed to present to its neighbours, such as Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda (2006: 126). He goes on to argue that these governments have engaged in trafficking Congolese minerals using unlawful monopolies, forced labour, prisoners and even murder (Likoti, 2006: 126).

In 1996, Kabila launched a military attack against Mobutu's government from the Kivu region with a total of 40,000 AFDL troops including contingents of Congolese, Rwandans, Eritreans, Somalis, Ugandans, Tanzanians, Kenyans and Ethiopians who claimed that they were liberating Africa from dictatorships (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005: 75). On the 17th of May 1997, after an unhindered march to Kinshasa, he appointed himself as president, suspended the constitution and changed the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which was its former name from 1964 to 1971. Upon his arrival in Kinshasa, Kabila ordered soldiers of Zairean Armed Forces under Mobutu to disarm. Thousands of these soldiers either deserted or joined the AFDL. From June 1997 onwards, the new regime's military high command sent the ex-Mobutu soldiers to the Kitona military training base to be trained in what leaders of the AFDL referred to as ideology and re-education.

According to Mbembele (2013), 57,000 soldiers were herded like cattle to Kitona, whose accommodation facilities were grossly inadequate, and where they were subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment and suffered malnutrition, starvation, abuse, public killing, and poisoning in Kitona (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005: 76).[1] Mbembele (2013) further states that soldiers from the Congolese and Rwandan armies invaded military camps (such as CETA, Tshatshi and Kokolo) where many of Mobutu's soldiers lived with their families and raped large numbers of women. The relationship between Kabila and his allies took a negative turn on the 27th of July 1998 (Kamitanji, 2008). Kabila relied on Mobutu's army to organize an armed fight against those who helped him to oust Mobutu and take over power. On the 2nd of August 1998, the second Congo war erupted in eastern DRC and Kinshasa when contingents of the Rwandan army and the so-called Banyamulenge[2] soldiers who turned against L.D.K. They founded the The Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma (RCD-Goma), allied to Rwanda, ten days after on the 12th of August 1998. This was followed by other attacks by the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), a rebel group founded a month later by Jean-Pierre Bemba in the north-west of the country (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005). Experiencing a shortage of skilled soldiers to resist these attacks by troops trained and supported by Rwanda and Uganda, L.D.K turned to ex-FAZ soldiers who he sent to the frontlines.

[1]Kitona is a town in the Bas-Congo province located 500 Km south-west of Kinshasa, the capital city of the country.

[2] the Banyamulenge claim to be Rwandophone Congolese long settled in South Kivu

Assisted by Rwanda and Uganda, these rebellious groups nearly toppled Kabila having almost entered Kinshasa (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005). With the support of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, Kabila managed to overcome these threats (Likoti, 2006). Eight days after his death (he was reportedly shot by one of his bodyguards) in 2001, his son, Joseph Kabila, took over as head of state and continues to rule until the time of this study. The first multiparty votes after these conflicts were held in 2006 in which Joseph Kabila was elected for a first term. His contestant in the second round was Jean-Pierre Bemba. In 2011, following the parliamentary decision abolishing the second round of the presidential election, Kabila was elected on a facultative run-off with less than 50 percent. The 2011 polls, characterised by massive fraud, were seriously criticized by the local Catholic Church and international organisations and described as lacking transparency and credibility (Dizolele and Kambale, 2012).

Violence in the Congo has led to waves of migration of populations in African countries, especially in South Africa. Migration waves of Congolese populations in South Africa can be traced in three phases. First, Congolese were interested in South Africa after establishment in 1988 0of diplomatic relations between Congo (then Zaire) and South Africa. It is important to stress that the lootings of companies and business activities that took place in Congo (then Zaire) in 1990 and 1991as well as the downfall of the public administration led to the emigration of middle class from Congo to South Africa (Inaka, 2014). The second wave of displacements of Congolese to the rainbow nation was caused by the two wars that the country experienced from 1997 to 2001. Finally, since the signing of the peace agreements of Sun City in 2002 until today an influx of Congolese populations have been observed in South Africa, fleeing recurrent violence, which has devastating effects on the country's economy and the level of life of the population.

The DRC has become a theatre of armed conflicts especially in its eastern part in spite of the 2003 peace agreement signed in South Africa which officially marked the end of the war. According to the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) newspaper, forty armed groups have been reported as operating in the eastern part of the DRC.[3] Rwanda and Uganda have, several times, been accused of supporting militia and other armed groups destabilising the Congo (Dagne, 2011). Following the signing of many peace deals and in an effort to have a united national army in the country, FAC (the former army of the DRC), FAZ, the three RCD

[3] See IRIN newspaper at: http://www.irinnews.org/report/99037/briefing-armed-groups-in-eastern-drc

factions, MLC; Mai-Mai; and a number of other armed groups have been identified as armed groups (Baaz and Verweijen, 2013). The first step of the military structure of integration (SMI) which was established to assemble all combatants at FARDC-run[4] c*entres de regroupement* and then transfer them to *centres d'orientation* run by the National Commission of Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER) where combatants were required to select integration into the FARDC or demobilisation" (Lamb, 2012:38). Baaz and Verweijen (2013: 563) argue that the process of military integration has contributed to the "further unmaking of an already unmade army", a crucial factor in perpetuating violence in the country.

On 26 July 2006, an armed group, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) was founded in the Kivu by Laurent Nkunda, a former senior officer in the RCD Goma, which was then being investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC). According to Stearns (2012: 26), a fundamental concern underpinning the CNDP's existence and whose resolution was a precondition for any future army integration was the eradication of the FDLR rebels, ideally to be coupled with the return of the 55,000 Congolese Tutsi still living in refugee camps in Rwanda. In January 2009, Nkunda was removed from the leadership of the CNDP by Bosco Ntaganda, who announced that he was incorporating the CNDP into the Congolese army to fight the FDLR. Following his invitation by Rwandan officers, Nkunda was reportedly arrested by the Rwandan security forces and has not appeared in public since then. Nkunda's removal and arrest caused a split in the CNDP with many fighters joining the Congolese army following a peace deal the Congolese government signed on 23 March 2009 (Baaz and Verweijen, 2013).

The M23 was launched in 2012 by nearly 300 soldiers with the majority being former members of the CNDP, claiming that their mandate was the implementation of the 2009 deal. With the support of the UN peacekeeping forces, a peace deal between the government and rebels was signed in December 2013 in Nairobi which ended the conflict. As part of this deal, amnesty was granted to members of armed groups for acts of war, insurrection and political offenses. However, on 11 August 2014, the president of the former M23 declared that Kinshasa had deliberately kept a significant number of their members as refugees in Rwanda and South Africa in order to benefit from legal protection even though the deadline for amnesty applications had expired. The government denied these allegations, arguing that the

[4] FARDC (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* or Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)

implementation of the amnesty law would continue even beyond the deadline.[5] Although, efforts have been made at a political level to end the war, the DRC continues to experience violence, and a relapse into another civil war in the east of the country remains possible.

1.2. Former Congolese soldiers in South Africa

According to Morris (1998: 1120), the prolonged "political turmoil in the DRC, the election of a democratic government in South Africa [in 1994] and the possibility of staying for a lengthy period by applying for asylum led to a substantial increase in the number of Congolese moving to South Africa".[6] Significantly, those moving to South Africa include fighters from the many armed groups operating in the DRC. Many of these fighters have found safe havens in different African and European countries. It was estimated that 20,000 former Congolese soldiers left the country in 2005 (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005). This number has probably increased given the persistent violence and the deterioration of military conditions within the Congolese armed forces, and presumably ¼ of this military population may be in South Africa.

The ex-combatants living as refugees in South Africa were members of the FARDC who fled when Mobutu was overthrown in May 1997 or when they quit one of the several armed groups. At the time of this study, it is difficult to say exactly how many Congolese ex-soldiers live in South Africa as there is no data on military migrants in South Africa. Soon after the wars, large numbers of Congolese soldiers moved temporarily to countries like the Republic of the Congo (also called Congo-Brazzaville), Angola Zambia and Zimbabwe (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005). But due to security concerns relating to the geographical proximity of some of these countries to the DRC, especially the Republic of Congo (where many were gathered), many moved further away to places like South Africa. This was made possible by financial support from their relatives or income made in the countries of transit (see Losango, 2006). Apart from political and economic reasons, these refugees chose to go to South Africa because they were able to cross its land borders at some points (Mbikayi, 2008). Unlike many other countries whose migration policies keep asylum seekers in camps with restricted mobility and economic opportunities, refugees in South Africa are theoretically entitled to study and work as well as

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[5] (http://www.congosynthese.com/news_reader.aspx?Id=7034#GCWTi0JwqEbdmdHP.99).

6 This is because of delays in the application system which allows people to remain in the country on asylum seeker status.

to choose where they want to live (Morris, 1998). As such, many refugees in South Africa choose to live in urban areas.

The ex-soldiers discussed in this study have mainly settled in Johannesburg, living in neighbourhoods such as Yeoville, Berea, Hillbrow, Bezuidenhout Valley and Kensington. They live in cramped conditions sub-renting rooms within flats and sharing with roommates who are either fellow Congolese or from other countries. This is what Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Palomaresm (2009) call the "ethnicisation" of some areas in Johannesburg with Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville having high concentrations of migrants from African countries. According to Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Palomaresm (2009), some parts of Yeoville have almost become "Congolized" (hosting many Congolese residents, bars, restaurants, etc), while some areas in Berea and Hillbrow are said to be 'Nigerianized'. Like civilian refugees, former soldiers have difficulties accessing healthcare and employment in South Africa. It is important to highlight this point since the lack of basic needs is a key feature of the contexts within which the former soldiers remember their military experiences and navigate their new environment.

Like many civilians, former soldiers were also victims of violence and suffered extensive traumas for which they would require medical and psychological treatment, but many are denied treatment by public clinics and hospitals (Moyo, 2011). Beside the inability to communicate in English or one of the South African local languages, it has been found that 34% of the reasons given for refusal of emergency care and 54% for non-emergency care relates to nationality and documentation while the processing of asylum claims can take over two years (SAMP, 2004: 50). In addition, uncertainty, social exclusion and xenophobic sentiment as well as socio-economic hardships encountered in the host country continue to overwhelm many migrants and take a toll on their well-being (Bhugra and Becker 2005; Palmer and Ward 2007). The hostile attitudes of local people towards foreign nationals is linked to the slow pace of service delivery in South Africa and the country's struggle to satisfy the needs of its citizens. Despite its impressive infrastructures and housing delivery, the majority of South Africans, especially black people, remain poor. Morris argues that the persistence of unemployment, poverty, crime and poor material conditions has certainly increased the pressure on foreign black Africans and intensified the tendency of the local population to blame African immigrants for the lack of order and progress in post-apartheid society (Morris, 1998:1125).

Refugees and asylum seekers have limited access to employment in South Africa. Many are unemployed or underemployed in relation to their educational attainments (Peberdy et al., 2004). Black African migrants are sometimes discriminated against by employers in the labour market and denied jobs even when they hold valid papers (Morris, 1998). Morris states that this discrimination goes along with negative stereotyping of refugees and asylum seekers by local South Africans. In contrast to the commonly held assumptions of South Africans that foreign nationals are taking up local people's jobs, it has been revealed that most immigrants in South Africa have been forced into informal trading incommensurate with their qualifications (Morris, 1998). This is often because the refugees are unprepared to take on gardening, construction or other unskilled jobs (Morris, 1998: 1132). There is growing evidence that many immigrants have acquired different skills enabling them to take up any kind of employment in order to survive. Some of them have often been reported as being involved in illegal business (selling drugs for example) in order to eke out a living. Those who are street hawkers in Johannesburg have also been victims of robbery and police harassment. Many have had their goods confiscated by the police thereby losing their sources of income.

These kinds of antagonism and prejudice have strengthened the sense of national identity among migrants. Within the Congolese diaspora, this is expressed through a movement of people called 'combatants' who denounce the war, dictatorship and other political problems in the DRC. They are committed to improving living conditions in their homeland such that they will eventually be able to return home (Frydenlund, 2015; Demart and Bodeux, 2013; Inaka, 2016). While they conceal their military identity where they live, Congolese ex-soldiers make use of the military identity in various contexts that include securing jobs as security guards or car guards. Whether they used to be part of rebel movements or the Congolese army, they would introduce themselves as part of Mobutu's army which was reputed to have been well-resourced and trained by senior Israeli officers in Egypt and North Korea and received logistical and command support from French and Israeli military cooperation (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005:69). From my own observation, I noticed that even civilian Congolese refugees with the right physical appearance claimed to have been part of Mobutu's army as a means of securing jobs in the security sector. This is also an important indicator of reshaping identity which is dictated by the new environment.

1.3. Rationale of the study

Since the eruption of the war in the DRC, research has tended to focus on its civilian victims and only a few studies have been conducted on Congolese surviving soldiers in the Congo (Baaz and Stern, 2009; Baaz and Verweijen, 2013). This is perhaps due to a sense that that trying to understand perpetrators involves the risk of exonerating them (Magnani, 2011; Nevitt, 2013; Palmary, 2016). It is assumed that soldiering, particularly in Africa, is inevitably linked to violence and human rights abuses. I argue that this is an unproductive approach that discourages scientific interest in, and limits research into, the lives and actions of soldiers (see also Nevitt, 2013). In this regard, Magnani (2011:2) notes, there is a sense of certainty that suppresses [the] historical variability [of violence] and that only leaves a hypocritical sense of it as a merely deplorable outbreak on an otherwise peaceful scene. The present study is partly motivated by Nevitt's (2013) provocative question: If violence is a terrible thing, why do we watch it? I therefore contest the dominant view of violence by critically analysing former Congolese soldiers' narratives about militarisation, the logic of the military vocation, and conceptions of war and violence. I seek to interrogate the actions and motivations of soldiers, how they are affected by their living and work environments and what moral codes they use to legitimise their actions (Palmary, 2016:79). More importantly, the study explores how the change of status and new environments contributes to different discourses of war and violence.

My interest in soldiers as a subject of study is rooted in my personal family experiences. I had a paternal uncle who was a senior officer in the Zairean army. He seemed to be a hard and fearful person on the outside, but when he was with his family, he was gentle and friendly to children. In addition, my elder sister is married to a soldier who was a paratrooper. My parents had disapproved of the relationship initially as soldiers in the DRC are commonly perceived to be violent people. But throughout his relationship with my sister, the man was an exemplary husband and father to his children. However, when he was away from his family he acted in a different way towards people. I remember seeing him whipping a man with a belt on the street just to prove that he was a soldier. I also observed him several times involved in the illegal business of selling drugs without fear of being arrested while he could apprehend drug-dealing civilians. However, he was a good father to his children and a good husband to his wife until he was taken away to Kitona and never to return when the older Kabila came to power. Furthermore, my work as a researcher in South Africa brought me into contact with former

Congolese soldiers and I saw how they sometimes relied on their military experiences to deal with the difficulties of refugee life in South Africa[7].

My interest in researching former Congolese soldiers grew when I worked as a security guard at a Chinese company in Fordsburg, Johannesburg. Before being hired, we were asked if we had military backgrounds and I was struck by the emphasis placed on this particular requirement and wondered why the employers felt that former soldiers were the most suitable candidates for the job. I had not imagined that former Congolese soldiers would be willing to disclose their military identity in South Africa because of the political problems in the DRC and the fact that soldiers were perceived to be perpetrators of violent human rights abuses. But then I realised that in that particular context it was advantageous to have a military background because military skills are required in South Africa's security sector given the country's reputation for high rates of violent crime. Many of my colleagues in that company were former Congolese soldiers who taught me how to use firearms like the Ruger, AK47 and pistol. During the 'training' I received from them, they often spoke of their experiences in the Congolese army. These interactions solidified my desire to understand how militarisation, war and violence were conceived in the Congolese context and remembered in the context of migration by former Congolese soldiers widely assumed to be perpetrators of human rights violations.

Knowing how the armed forces operate in the DRC is very important for an understanding of the lived realities of former soldiers within the context of a new field – South Africa. For instance, studies on rape within the Congolese armed forces reveal the extensive role of masculine and socio-economic discourses in the perpetration of these crimes (see Baaz and Stern, 2008; 2009; 2010). However, rape is only one of the many atrocities committed by DRC soldiers during wars and complex and contradicting discourses often emerge in the course of studying such crimes.

There is dearth of studies exploring the memories of former soldiers who have crossed their national borders to seek haven in countries like South Africa. Recently, Maringira focused on the continuities of military identities among Zimbabwean army deserters in South Africa (see Maringira, 2014; Maringira, Gibson and Richters, 2014; Maringira and Núñez, 2015). The

[7] Lakika, and Adeagbo, 2016 (forthcoming); Lakika, Kankonde Richters, 2014; Lakika, 2011; Vearey, Nunez and Lakika, 2011.

focus of Maringira's research is the political factors that lead these deserters to abscond from the army and to flee to South Africa and the ways in which they make use of their military skills to survive in South Africa, rather than, for instance, revealing the ideas or motivations behind military violence and its different representations within the army. Exploring the life of exiled Zimbabwean soldiers in South Africa, Maringira et al (2014) argue that Zimbabwean exiled soldiers remain fully attached to their military identity as a result of forcible and premature termination of their careers. Drawing on Bourdieu's concept of habitus, Maringira et al (2014) argue that military dispositions are ingrained in the bodies of soldiers and that these dispositions are generative and transposable in different contexts. They argue furthermore that the habitus, acquired and forged during military training, helps our informants to substantiate and defend their military being in the present context, that of self-imposed exile (Maringira et al, 2014: 7).

It is noteworthy that South Africa does not offer much employment opportunities to forced migrants in general. As I have shown previously, the difficult living conditions of refugees in South Africa compel many former Congolese soldiers to make use of their military training and skills to eke out a living. Similarly, Maringira (2014: 12) argues that former South African soldiers use their guns and maintain their military identities because they continue to be marginalised by the government and live in townships which are characterised by violence. Without necessarily refuting this claim, it is important to note that former soldiers' use of violence can be explained in many complex ways. My point here is that the assertion of military identities and violent behaviour by former soldiers is conditioned by their social deprivations and their living environment. This is due to the fact that South African townships are highly militarised places, and not necessarily because of the training of the soldiers (Maringira et al, 2014).

Today, many young men have resorted to what Hamber (2015: 13) calls "masculine solutions" as an 'empowering' way to deal with their poverty. A good case in point is the radicalisation of young Europeans who are attracted by terrorist movements around the world. This is why, following the January 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Manuel Valls, former French prime minister, used the term apartheid[8] to describe the social inequalities, politics of marginalisation

[8] This article published in French in *by Le Monde Newspaper* can be found at this link http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/01/20/l-apartheid-en-france-pourquoi-les-mots-de-manuel-valls-marquent-une-rupture_4560022_823448.html

and segregation that deprive poor young people of housing, education and employment. Young people who are involved in terrorism have never been in the army, but are attracted to terrorism by social deprivation and uncertainties over their futures. If they were correctly looked after and given the guarantee of a promising future the likelihood of radicalisation would be minimized. As Hamber (2016:14) rightly notes, violence is considerably more endemic in the society than that which is simply linked narrowly to past political incidents, and now extends intergenerational and across the categories of race and class. This study aims to take the debate further by demonstrating how different discourses, views and contexts have influenced soldiers' memory of war and violence. One of Maringira's (2014) claims is that because soldiers are made and not born, it is difficult to unmake them. This is not always true because Maringira does not really explain the impact of exile and migration on the identities of soldiers. Returning to Bourdieu, it is true that soldiers develop a military habitus due to their exposure to the army, but as human beings they navigate various environments in which they needed to adjust their habitus to fit specific contexts. I argue that longevity of service is also a factor influencing the mental dispositions of ex-soldiers. For instance, as findings of this study will reveal, the duration of exposure to the military determines the extent to which a military ethos is imbibed by the individual.

The making or unmaking a soldier also depends on context. The army promotes teamwork among soldiers and the way soldiers act in a group can differ from the way they act as individuals. There are influences which limit the actions of soldiers at the individual, societal and institutional levels. For instance, the way sexual violence is perceived in wartime differs from the way it is perceived in peacetime. More so, the way sexual violence is perceived in the DRC differs from the way it is perceived in South Africa. This suggests for example that while Congolese society turns a blind eye to soldiers' violence, the same crime can attract serious sanctions in South Africa. The field presents an important web of organisational and ideological constraints regulating the conduct of individual soldiers. A study examining former soldiers in different fields aims to determine which factors are most determinative of their lives and how they interact with each other. Given Valenzuela's (1985: 136) observation that the most lasting contribution of the 'scientific' literature on the military in the Third World was its impact on policymaking, with its far-reaching normative implications, not its contribution to

the advancement of social science theory, one of the major contributions of this study is that it provides theoretical insight into the lived realities of soldiers in different contexts.

Varying notions of masculinity and femininity is one of the common threads running through much of the literature on the military (Barett, 1996; Stets and Burke, 2000; Woodward, 2000; Xaba, 2001; Sasson-Levy, 2002). Commonly held assumptions of masculinity consider men as protectors and providers and of women as fit for child rearing and household chores. In this context, Palmary (2016: 94) notes that through images of domesticity and commitment to support of the family, men are able to justify violence as moral and ethical. These ideas are rooted in social (one's gender) rather than the biological (one's sex) definitions with even less attention to the sub-cultural, cultural, and cross-cultural factors (Stets and Burke, 2000). As an institution, the army is conceived primarily as a space for men and soldiering has been viewed as a traditionally male role. This study interrogates the assumptions underpinning these concepts with the aim of identifying the variation in the meanings of being masculine and feminine (Stets and Burke, 2000:16).

1.4. Research argument and question

This study focuses on the significance of the multiple meanings that former Congolese soldiers ascribe to their remembering of war and of the violence that they might have perpetrated during their military experiences as well as their social interactions with civilians in the context of migration. As such, the study seeks to provide insight into the competing and contradicting narratives of war and violence as well as military identities by former Congolese soldiers living in South Africa. Despite some studies on violence being conducted in Africa that include the influence of violence in political change across the Southern region (Gutteridge, 2013), the liberation war in countries like Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau (Henriksen, 1976; Minter, 1994; Ciment, 1997) or the civil war of Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams, 1999; Shaw, 2007) to mention few, it follows that studies on memories of violence have been predominantly produced in America, Asia, and particularly in Europe. These studies have mainly been in connection with the memories of the world wars and the holocaust and African knowledge systems about war and violence still remain under-researched, particularly in the case of perpetrators. As such, the main research question of the study is as follows: How do Congolese former soldiers living in Johannesburg remember wars/violent acts in which they were involved in their military career and how do the contexts of mobility influence their discourses of war and violence as well as their military identity?

The argument of the study is organised into the following three parts from which the objectives of the study are drawn:

1. The army is a specific field which aims to train soldiers to express hegemonic masculinities in which violence or aggression and other forms of brutality is applauded while at the same time requesting the individuals to reframe from using violence in the ordinary life;
2. Military identity is spatially constructed and entitles soldiers to various *doxalised* rights in a very specific environment which I identify in Bourdieu's term as 'field'. This field structures social relations wherein soldiers make use of the power conferred by the military paraphernalia (especially the gun) to claim some privileges and to dominate and inflict violence on others;
3. Migration constitutes a turning point in the new field where the identity of former soldiers' is sometimes contested, annihilated or even renegotiated.

From the above-mentioned, the objectives of the study are:

- To establish the competing and contradicting memories of violence among Congolese ex-combatants living in Johannesburg, South Africa, and different contexts of remembering;
- to explore military systems of knowledge and the rationale behind the use of violence in their everyday interactions;
- to assess former Congolese soldiers' perceptions of masculinity and femininity as they relate to a militarised identity;
- to explore former Congolese soldiers' use of military capital in different contexts for different purposes;
- to examine the importance of visual images such as photos, medals, beret, certificates and military uniforms in the post-military life of former soldiers;
- to discuss the extent to which remembering war and violence can be instrumental and contributing factor to their healing in South Africa.

Bourdieu's (1977; 1984; 1986; 1990) concepts of field, capital, practice, habitus and symbolic domination, the notions of docile bodies (Foucault, 1975) and other concepts developed in disciplines like psychology are used to examine the ethos and principles of the army and the influence of the field in military identity and practices. These concepts are particularly useful in the finding chapters of this study.

Summary

In this introductory chapter, I have laid the foundations of the study, discussing its rationale and posing the research question and objectives. In the main, this study puts particular emphasis on the 'field' as a place where military identity can be forged, socially acknowledged or contested; a place where violence can be triggered or mitigated. The presence of former Congolese soldiers in South Africa offers an interesting opportunity to study the complexity of discourses of war and violence and to draw from these discourses how their military memory is used for different purposes in different contexts offered by the new 'field', South Africa. What is more interesting to know from their post-military lives is the way they reconstruct or

deconstruct their military experiences and the influence of the new social milieu in their remembering and/or forgetting the war and violence they either witnessed, condoned or committed during their military active lives. More important to learn is the influence of the new field in determining what military practices have been rejected or kept and how what is kept is used in their post-military experiences in South Africa.

Research methods

This study utilises qualitative methods to allow an exploration of the ways that people make sense of their social worlds and how they express these understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style and social rituals (Deacon et al., 2010: 5). These methods involve viewing events, actions, norms and values from the perspective of the people who are being studied (Bryman, 1988: 61). They enable me to examine different languages, behaviours and conducts of former Congolese soldiers in different contexts in South Africa. By former soldier, the study does not mean those who necessarily retired from the army, but it implies any military member of the Congolese armed forces who left the army against their will and found themselves as refugees or exiles in South Africa.

1.5. Outline of chapters

Chapter One has provided the background to the thesis, outlining its aim, research questions and objectives, rationale and a background to political unrest in the DRC.
Chapter Two provides a review of the critical literature review and the study's conceptual and theoretical framework in regard to concepts such as memory, gender and violence in postcolonial Africa marked by political unrest and where the military plays a key role of preserving political power. These are explored in relation to Bourdieu's concepts of field, capital, practice, habitus and symbolic domination. Chapter Three discusses the research methods including the population size and sampling technique, thematic analysis, observations, and data analysis tools as well as ethical issues. Chapter four presents different motivations behind young people's decisions to enrol in the army. Importantly, while nationalism/patriotic sentiments were the motivating factors, many youths found themselves in the army due to some ruptures marking the turning point of their lives. These ruptures result from the socio-economic and political crisis affecting the DRC.

Chapter five discusses the making of a soldier, showing how candidates who joined the army with different motivations were taken out of the city in isolated places to be trained to inculcate the principles of the army applauding violence and brutality as expression of hegemonic masculinity. The usage of the term hegemonic masculinity in this study must be cautioned from the beginning. It assumes a type of violent military masculinity – but hegemonic masculinity, as findings will indicate, is not universal but context specific (and in certain contexts does not always have to be violent or militarized). Even in that context, hegemonic masculinity is tactically used and expressed. In this sense, there is a "need to recognize social struggles in which subordinated masculinities influence dominant forms (Connell, 2005: 829). To this end, hegemonic masculinity here concerns a militarized violent and hierarchical hegemonic masculinity in particular enacted in a specific context, the army. It is based on assumptions that hegemonic masculinity is synonymous with soldiers' "attitudes and behavior, such as violence and abuse of women and children, substance abuse, and risky sexual behaviors" (Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger, 2012: 13). These conceptions of hegemonic masculinity are context-specific presenting military masculinity as a "cultural ideal strongly associated with a rigidly hierarchical social order, and glorified militarism" (Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger, 2012: 17). In this sense, "hegemonic masculinity is seen as beacon by which the socialization of [soldiers] takes place" (Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger, 2012: 23). The majority of soldiers seek to "to position themselves relationally, consciously, or unconsciously, in alignment with hegemonic standards as a central mechanism for establishing/maintaining an effective masculine identity" (Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger, 2012: 23).

Hegemonic masculinity refers to that which constitutes a ''real man'' (real soldiers) or forms of ''successful masculinity'' (Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger, 2012: 24). In the army (requiring much practice and training) the concept of hegemonic masculinity is used first to distinguish soldiers from one another (promoting emulation) and then to toe the line between soldiers and civilians, and "explain how they come to construct masculine subjectivities" (Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger, 2012: 24).

In the South African context, however, former soldiers were also regarded as victims of the gendered order of society on, for example, xenophobic attitudes, lack of socio-economic opportunities, loss of their military identity and the free society logic that South Africa promotes marked mainly by the freedom of expression and opinion. In this sense, some other forms of hegemony without oppression could be adopted (behaviors (Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger, 2012). The new environment compelled them, to some extent, "to change their

attitudes and behaviors, and even renegotiate their social position and identity" (Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger, 2012: 13).

Using Bourdieu's concept of field this chapter also demonstrates how the context of the DRC represents soldiers and how some military practices were *legitimised*, leading many soldiers not only to get involved in corruption, but also to use military paraphernalia as expressions of power and domination. This is similar to Palmary's (2016: 93) point that the law has changed to represent a set of practices that need to be negotiated with in order to legitimate violence. Chapter six discusses the military tradition in which the promotion of violence is viewed as an expression of masculinity. In this regard, my argument is that violence is rationalised in the sense that prior to battles, soldiers' minds are prepared to commit violence as a way of being obedient, but also as a way of protecting themselves (Calhoun, 2001). This chapter highlights the sacredness of the commandment in the army and its influence in the perpetration of violence. Another form of memory is drawn from the ritual practices consecrated to the soldiering, emphasising their influence in the soldiers' minds and outweighing the western techniques of conducting war. The chapter also discusses the military construction of the spoils of the war as well as gender construction within the military.

Chapter seven discusses the post-military lives of former soldiers in South Africa using Bourdieu's ideas in terms of how they view themselves, what has changed in their identity and conduct as well as what has remained engraved in their behaviour. As Magnani (2011:2) argues, violence must not only be explored in physical aspects, "linguistic, structural, and other various aspects of violence also have to be taken into account". More importantly, the chapter explores different ploys former soldiers rely on to contest, reject or renegotiate military power and identity within the community. Chapter eight is the conclusion of the study, summarising key findings, arguments, and highlighting original contributions of this thesis to knowledge as well as possibilities for future research. In the chapter to follow, I discuss different concepts relating to the military, which form the theoretical framework of this study.

Chapter Two: The socio-spatial context of military violence

2.0. Introduction

The discussion to follow draws on Bourdieu's ideas of the field, habitus, practice, symbolic violence and social space to explore the socio-spatial contexts of military violence. In this regard, I argue that while military identity (or military habitus) is durable and transposable, its durability and transferability are context-specific. This means, for example, that the reputation of violence that soldiers have in the DRC is informed by specific ethno-national discourses and the construction of an 'us' versus 'them' identification of the enemy (Coryn et al., 2004). The theoretical approach adopted here also incorporates ideas from disciplines such as anthropology and psychology in view of the fact that "concepts have no definition other than systemic ones, and are designed to be put to work empirically in systemic fashion" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96). This chapter consists of four sections: the first examines questions related to memory with a particular emphasis on context; the second addresses the question of gender within the army; the third explores postcolonial violence particularly in the African context and the last section presents the rationale for the use of Bourdieu's analytical tools in the study.

2.1. Military memory and context

Although, some scholars argue that remembering and trauma are individual rather than collective experiences (Bourke, 2006, Freeman, 2010), this study deals with the individual memories of former Congolese soldiers that are part of the collective memory of the Congolese national army. Individual memory is the recollection of personal experiences and the capacity of the mind to add, delete and edit memories in relation to their perceived usefulness and significance (Young and Shepler, 2012). This implies that individuals have the capacity to filter events, to remember vital skills and experiences and forget less important events (Young and Shepler, 2012). Although the events that produce memories may originate externally, their experiences are unique to individuals. According to Freeman (2010: 97), this is part of "narrative unconscious" associated with shared cultures showing that individual memories are part of the collective experience since culture is formed by people's beliefs and values. Collective memory is constituted by the aggregate of individual experiences while at the same time individuals can also draw from the collective to produce their personal memories. I

propose in the context of this study two areas that I consider as the sites of collective as well as individual memory. These two areas are religion and the body which are discussed in the paragraph to follow.

2.1.1. Religion, memory and the body

Durkheim (1995) explains that collective memory connects societies with the past for the preservation of social unity and cohesion. In his study of traditions of religion, he concludes that the transmission of rituals, traditional beliefs, values and norms and commonly performed customary ceremonies create a sense of 'collective dedication', the supremacy of the individual and the profanation of the unity of the group viewed as sacred. According to Durkheim, commonly shared beliefs compel individuals to unite to create a shared experience of the group. He further explains that collective memory creates a sense of community that helps to keep the group together when its unity is threatened. Durkheim's view is that totems are immensely powerful and provided people with the means to remember effervescent group experiences individually. Although, Durkheim claims that the collective effervescence allowed the past to be transmitted to the present, his submission on collective memory was based upon individual memory and the celebrations and totems that trigger those memories.

In the same vein, Halbwachs (1992) contends that human memory can only function within a collective context. Collective memory, Halbwachs asserts, is always selective; various groups of people have different collective memories, which in turn give rise to different modes of behaviour. By groups, Halbwachs refers to social classes, families, associations, corporations, armies, and trade unions. He further points that all groups have distinctive memories that their members have constructed, often over long periods of time (1992: 22). He illustrates this by showing how people who travelled to the Christian holy land over the centuries represented the life of Jesus in different ways and how the past memory of wealthy old families in France departs sharply from that of the *nouveaux riches*; and how the realities of the working class is different from those of their middle-class counterparts. For his part, Connerton (1989) argues that the collective memory of a society is built on two social activities: commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices. He argues that ritual performances are the carriers and sustainers of images of the past and recollected knowledge. Following Connerton, Sakaranaho (2011: 143) notes that since accounts become fixed in writing, transmitting the memory of a culture in writing rather than orally narrows down the possibilities for improvisation and

innovation. This is important in the context of this study that examines the role of memory in the current lived realities of former Congolese soldiers in Johannesburg, South Africa. It allows us to gain insight beyond the past of these former soldiers, into how their present lives are influenced by different contexts. They are able to refashion, falsify their experiences and memories of the past to fit in present. Connerton (1989) maintains that both activities (commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices) are inextricably linked as commemorative ceremonies are embodied forms of rites performed by the participants and without bodily practices there would be no particular type of acquired symbolic capital which will be demonstrated through ceremonies. Connerton further stresses:

> Commemorative ceremonies prove to be commemorative only insofar as they are performative. Performativity cannot be thought without a concept of habit and habit cannot be thought without a notion of bodily automatisms (1989: 5).

He observes, furthermore, that the body mainly contains habitual memory as the transmission of the past is done through bodily practices. Non-verbally articulated memory can be understood as practical representations enacting and giving significance to the collective memory discourse. It follows that in case there is such a thing as social memory, it then implies that we are likely to find it in commemorative ceremonies for commemorative rites constitute a way of social memory transmission as argued by Connerton (1989: 4). Bodies are the centres of emotions in the process of remembering. The role of emotions in any remembrance is critical since untagged memories are likely to vanish and emotions are always partly linked to the past. The importance of the body is reinforced by the fact that is the site of not only collective, but also individual memory. For instance, during my field work, a former soldier shared with me his experience of once eating human flesh which has made him give up eating meat altogether. In this case, refraining from eating meat has become for this ex-soldier a form of resistance to remembering the violence he perpetrated. Spillman and Conway (2007:87) argue that bodily habits, tastes, or practices sustain a subordinate collective memory such that the body becomes a particularly important resource for those who lack other means. Likewise, researchers into the rituals of contemporary spirit possession in African contexts (for example Niger, Mali, Mozambique and South Africa) reveal that the body has become the incontestable site of spirit possession resulting from numerous forms of cultural memories (Nunez et al., 2014; Trentini, 2012; Stoller 1994 in Spillman and Conway, 2007). Quoting Stoller, Spillman and Conway question the anthropological interpretations of spirit possession in terms of functionalism, psychoanalysis, textual interpretation, and so on, and build on Bourdieu's notion of embodied

taste, among other sources, to critique the heavy bias toward text and discourse in the social sciences (Spillman and Conway, 2007:82). Using Stoller's study on spirit possession among the Songhay people, Spillman and Conway argue that embodied memory, in contrast to textual memory, is the site of critical, subordinate collective memory. In essence spirit possession ceremonies are said to spark Songhay counter-memories, which are stored in the flesh (Spillman and Conway, 2007:82).

The body is also important as a symbol and object of social control in terms of the ways in which it is used to represent a nation, a centre of an ideology or power (Spillman and Conway, 2007; see also Foucault, 1975). For example, in my fieldwork, ex-soldiers stated that, although they sometimes felt discouraged in the battlefield, the military uniform, symbolising the nation and the motto of the army "*Tokowa po ya ekolo*" (meaning 'we will die for the nation') inspired them to keep fighting. This shows that the body is no longer considered as a possession of the individual but of the nation. To retreat from battle is therefore not betraying oneself, but the whole nation. Igarashi's (2000) study of Japan's remembrance of World War II highlights the importance of the discursively constructed body as a symbol of national identity, tracing representations of the body through various post-war genres. He demonstrates that the "discursively constructed body" was part of the wartime regime's attempts to create obedient, nationalist bodies by forging ties between nationalist ideology and bodily functions (Spillman and Conway, 2007:83).

The body is also the centre of religious values. As Sakaranaho (2011) points out, there is no religion bereft of social or cultural memory. Religion encompasses a series of rituals performed on individual bodies. These rituals or ceremonies confer specific powers on individuals and influence people's behaviours. Furthermore, religious beliefs and practices may have an impact on the remembering process. As Sakaranaho's notes,

> The process of remembering is not only a personal act but always takes place within a certain social context and is socially mediated. [Put differently], memory is intersubjectively constituted, and it is therefore important to take into account the social dimension of human memory (2011:139).

Many participants in this study stated that they underwent ceremonies aimed at changing their minds and behaviours (see chapter six) before donning their military uniforms for the first time. According to Spillman and Conway (2007:84), a ritual, for instance, is not just a symbolic representation of something else, not simply a text that needs decoding, but a matter of bodily repetition that is both performative and mnemonic. This kind of memory, as Connerton (1989)

rightly observes, remains solidly engraved on people's minds rather than any discursive memory which is easily challengeable and whose invocation is rooted in dominant cultures. As an example of the force of "ceremonies of the body" there are "those practices through which the French nobility of the seventeenth century displayed their privileged status" (Connerton, 1989:102). Memory is no longer seen as the common reflection of past events, a 'true' record of the things that had happened but is understood as produced, constructed, often in a conflict with the established and legitimising history. Hamber and Wilson (2002:38) note that remembering past violence is not just causing trauma to the one who remembers, [but] depends on how we remember, the context of the remembering, and what it is that we are remembering. Instead of focusing on the memory practices of state institutions, ethnography is interested in how people remember and in the alternative ways of dealing with the past which can contribute towards the democratization of everyday life (Zaviršek, 2006, N.P).

2.1.2. Remembering war and violence

The studies surrounding memories have of late become a thriving academic enterprise (Argenti and Schramm, 2009; Cole, 2001; Halbwachs, 1992). Memory is more than recalling past events, it is an expression of remembering, a dynamic engagement for social change (Zaviršek, 2006). The past recalled is not always the true representation of reality as experienced; it is often biased towards the needs of the present. In this regard, there are competing definitions of the recall of memory in the present. Acknowledging the multidimensional aspect of memory, Barliner recommends:

> A *phenomenological* approach which consists of capturing the way people perceive: they remember, forget and reinterpret their own pasts. This focus on history as it is lived, on the remembrance shared and transmitted by social groups has shown that people experience and interpret their pasts from a multiplicity of viewpoints (200: 200).

This is important for the present study's examination of how former soldiers remember their military experiences. This remembrance includes a competing, contrasting or resistant viewpoint depending on the context in which they find themselves. According to Sakaranaho:

> The past has become a heavily contested territory. What makes this contestation so important is that it concerns not only the past of individuals and groups but also their present life and identity. It is therefore important to pay attention to what memories are chosen for remembrance and how this selection takes place (2011: 137).

Anthropologists have developed a nuanced concept of remembering. Argenti and Schramm (2010:2) state that whether at individual or collective level, the recreations of the past are partial, unstable, often contested, and prone to becoming sites of struggle. This partiality and instability results in the reproduction of what they term false memories (Argenti and Schramm, 2009:2). Following Feuchtwang, Argenti and Schramm argue that even false memories bear a relation to truths beyond their supposed original events; a form of meta-truth about the present that is projected back in time (Argenti and Schramm, 2009: 2).

Similarly, Bodnar (1993) differentiates between vernacular and official representations. Vernacular memories originate from the people and are used to explain those events that most immediately impact the masses. Official memory is created for a purpose of sustaining the social fabric or the values of the society. Official memory has often been politically motivated, emphasising the agency of the society rather than its victimisation (Connerton, 1989). This is expressed in Assmann's observation that what an individual or society chooses to remember or forget is unavoidably a moral choice; the past can cast a long shadow upon a society and remembering or forgetting its history inevitably becomes a political matter (Sakaranaho, 2011: 152).

Halbwachs (1992) has a presentist approach to memory and states that social constructions of memory are influenced by the needs of the present issues and understandings. Groups select different memories to explain current issues and concerns. In order to explain the present, leaders of a group reconstruct a past, rationalising which events are to be remembered and forgotten as well as rearranging events to conform to a particular social narrative. This is particularly true of religious communities which Bellah, Sullivan, Madsen, Swidler, and Tipton. (1985) call "genuine communities of memory" which is constituted by the retelling of selected stories. According to Sakaranaho (2011: 144), these stories offer examples of men and women who have embodied and exemplified the meaning of the community and become an important part of the tradition that is central to a community of memory.

An example is how contemporary Betsimisaraka villagers in Madagascar understand the country's colonial history, particularly the bloody rebellion of 1947. Cole (2001) demonstrates that the country's presidential elections in 1992-93 generated a 'flood' of local memories of and conversations about 1947. The actions of candidates and their supporters strongly mirrored events that preceded the rebellion during which villagers were forced to take sides, subsequently enduring acts of retaliation from both rebels and the colonial state. Similarly,

Trentini (2012) found that healers in Mozambique used memories of the country's civil war to deal with people's complaints about witchcraft. In the case of Sierra Leone, Shaw (2007) finds that certain Christian churches invoke spiritual practices to deal with their memories of the country's 11-year civil war using prayer, video viewing, and plays, as ways of forgetting, and of turning demonic memories of war into acceptable forms of Pentecostal prayers.

Drawing on Cannerton (1989), Sakaranaho (2011: 144) notes that the main events of a religious tradition are not only told or inscribed, but they are also enacted in different rites and rituals. These rites and rituals involve various kinds of bodily practices, which by means of repetition forge ahead 'habit-memory'. Habit-memory, which is very close to habitus, can be illustrated in different forms, ranging from highly formalised ceremonies, such as the investiture of religious personnel, to small individual gestures like lighting a candle or blessing oneself or the way of dressing. Religious stories offer community members a rich source of identification which creates intra-subjectivity and extra-subjectivity. Members come to know what to do which is in line with their religious beliefs and whom to approach or to distance themselves from. This backs Sakaranaho's statement that collective memory justifies certain ways of believing and acting and hence operates as a matrix for living in the present. In addition, however, reference to the past as a justification for the present is often linked to the group's future, since its survival is seen as depending on the continuity of its traditions (2011: 145).

According to Shaw (2007), many Sierra Leoneans were reluctant to talk about their war experiences to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. By so doing they chose to forget. This did not mean that they lost their personal memories, but that they unwittingly chose not to encourage the return of the violence by giving it public attention. Those who were convinced to talk, after internalising the TRC's message that "clearing the chest" brought relief, decided to transform this message by integrating it with the local concept of healing as forgetting, stating that the TRC helped them to forget (Shaw, 2007: 68). Forgetting does not mean ignoring the past, but it enables, as Shaw demonstrates in the case of the Sierra Leonean church, "a different remembering of the violence". Drawing on Connerton's notion of the importance of forgetting in the construction of a new identity, Sakaranaho (2011: 153) points out that forgetting, as part of the religious conversion, allows the individual to turn "to new sources of belief and authority". Referring to Jackson, the author then adds by stressing that:

> Re-presenting violent events as a story enables people to manage memories of violence, subverting the power of those events to control their experience of self and world, such narration cannot necessarily be equated with an 'objective' rendition of events (Shaw, 2007: 69).

This does not mean that people cease to remember and suffer, nor does it mean that they become autonomous authors of their own thoughts and feelings. Instead, people learn to experience their memories in ways that enable them to be worked on, fought, and transformed in the very same way that Sierra Leone's war can itself be worked on, fought and transformed. It is important to review literature on memory and the different ways of remembering/forgetting as the discourses of former soldiers about war and violence tend to be guided and informed by a particular understanding of military culture. Such military culture aims at transforming their way of seeing things but also the particular social context which may lead the former soldiers to challenge their previous military knowledge and attitudes.

Although in most cases, the effort people make is to forget, particularly when memories are about a contested past, I align with Barliner's appropriation of Halbwachs argument that memory is also the persistence of something from the past into the present (Barliner, 2005: 200). Also drawing on Olick and Robbins (1998), Barliner adds that a particular past perseveres because it remains relevant for later cultural formations (Berliner, 2005:200). Berliner further explains that memory enables us to understand the past we are carrying and to see how this past has shaped us as well as the way we transmit it. Memory is not these series of recalled mental images, but a synonym for cultural storage of the past: it is the reproduction of the past in the present, this accumulated past which acts on us and makes us act (Berliner, 2005:201). One of my participants stated that soldiers are trained to be tough and to resist pressure. He said remembering this helped cope with the difficulties he faced as a refugee in South Africa. This illustrates the idea that tradition is not simply a repetition of the past in the present. Rather, the distinctive mark of tradition is that it actualizes the past in the present, thereby restoring to human lives its essential core (Sakaranaho, 2011: 146). In this context, the past provides a kind of relief, helping people to cope with the challenges of the present. Also, in contemporary South Africa, current socio-economic realities marked by racism, corruption and social injustice brought disappointment to many South Africans making them forget the evils of apartheid

when criticising the current ANC government with some even scathingly attacking the current government through claims that it is worse than apartheid.[9]

Returning to the past in these cases becomes a way of fostering a sense of security in a world of insecurities (Sakaranaho, 2011). In this context, quoting Middleton and Edward, Berliner points out that:

> [Through] practices of institutional remembering and forgetting it is possible to see how the continuity of social life, as preserved in certain forms of social practices, [...] depends on the preservation of those practices (Berliner, 2005: 205).

The evocation of notions of discipline, order, toughness and even violence that former soldiers sometimes display is a clear indication that some military experiences remain relevant to their post-military careers. The conditions of remembering vary between times and places due to differences in culture, social and economic situations across societies. This possibility of how former soldiers produce different representations of military in their post-military life culture has to be explored. This shows that the past is always presented but viewed from a particular angle and is difficult to be fully and correctly remembered.

The events or memories on which societies foster remembering may make little sense to individuals, and they can thus feel excluded from these collective memories. This is particularly so in the case of what Halbwachs calls "autobiographical memory" which is defined as the memory of events that we have personally experienced in the past (Halbwachs, 1992: 24). For instance, institutions like the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions or traditional courts have been established in some countries that were torn apart by conflict. These institutions aimed to pursue official truth-seeking, by publicly documenting and investigating events through testimony from victims and perpetrators as well as analysing primary and secondary data sources, and ideally providing a foundation for healing and reconciliation (Cunningham et al., 2010:1523). However, this view of healing and reconciliation in post-conflict contexts has been much criticised for inadequately tackling individual needs (Hitchcott, 2013; Hamber and Wilson, 2002; Rugema et al., 2013). As in the case of Northern Uganda, bodies that have become a new frontier in warfare, bearing gruesome, visible and physical legacies have not taken centre stage in peace processes, which means that the needs of some of the worst-affected survivors have been ignored (Hollander and Gill, 2014:5). In the same vein, Hamber and

[9] See Desmond Tutu's declaration at http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2016/02/02/desmond-tutu-goes-360-jacob-zuma-and-anc-worse-than-apartheid-govt/

Wilson argue that nations are not like individuals in that they do not have collective psyches. In addition, nation-building discourses on reconciliation are said to often subordinate individual needs, whilst truth commissions and individual processes of healing work on different time lines (Hamber & Wilson, 2002:35). The ways in which the past is eluded and the fact of closing down counter-narratives can become a source of discomfort and humiliation for individuals involved in the conception of this memory, leading to the resumption of its lived past (Campos, 2008; Parsons, 2011). This counter-narrative is, in some way, what Foucault (2011) terms *parrhesia.* According to Foucault (2011:25), the *parrhesiast* telling of the 'truth' "risks hostility, war, hatred, and death." Truth here is what challenges the collective remembering and hinders the society. However, as much as this could hold strengths in some circumstances, it is difficult to assume that a counter-narrative is the truth. Rather than seeking the truism of ex-soldiers' discourse of violence, the concern of this study is, as Foucault (2011: 3) states, to analyse:

> [t]he form in which, in his act of [remembering], the ex-soldier constitutes himself and is constituted by others as a subject of a discourse of truth, the form in which he presents himself to himself and to others as someone who tells the truth, the form of the subject telling the truth.

However, even in the case of autobiographical memory, the individual hardly reconstructs the past as experienced. The way society remembers the past can be rigid and monotonous because they become written accounts. For instance, *lieux de memoire* remain as they were erected, but different meanings can be drawn from them depending on the context of remembering. *Lieux de memoire* (literal translation of "place of memory"), or memory icons, objects [can have various forms] such as photographs, diaries or letters, [war memorial, monument, building or statue] which serve to enshrine a particular version of family or [society] history (Fuchs, 2006:185) and become sites of remembrance have gained popularity as important objects of tourism and heritage movements (Sakaranaho, 2011:137). But even these *lieux de memoire* become the site of individual memory in the sense that those who are concerned always remember their own experiences when they are in front of them and the present and future generations remember what societies experienced in the past. For Schwartz, collective memory refers to the distribution throughout society of beliefs, feelings, moral judgments, and knowledge about the past" (Schwartz, year and page unstated)[10]. Importantly, while *lieux de memoire* remain unmovable, their meaning can change over time to meet the current needs of

[10] http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/beos_collective

the society. Focusing on the link between memory and trauma, Foote (1993) has explored the impact of tragic and violent American events on physical space, identifying four possible ways that, he believes, societies adjust or change or embellish the environment or site marked by violence and/or tragedy: sanctification, designation, rectification and obliteration. Violent or tragic sites become consecrated when society confers a sacred status to a place previously known as blasphemous or polluted. A sanctified place or shrine is defined as a public space set aside for the memory of a specific person or group of people with a strong indicator officially consecrated through some kind of ceremonial devotion. Sites of designation are marked as special sites, but do not have a connotation of consecrated space. These sites are "unveiled, rather than dedicated" (Foote, 1993:18).

For instance, in South Africa we have a place called "Vilakazi Street" (a lively, culturally rich area on the periphery of Johannesburg), a product of the apartheid government's policy of segregation historically known as a site of struggle in the fight for freedom in South Africa and where both former president Nelson Mandela and Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu lived. Foote (1993) stresses that over time chosen areas turn to be consecrated. Essentially, these are 'memorials in progress.' Sites representing minority causes or 'once in a lifetime' freak events may also become designated sites. Sites may also be rectified; these repaired sites remove evidence of the violence/tragedy and are returned to their previous public use. Obliteration, usually reserved for violent tragedies that induce community shame, removes the sites from public use; the buildings and landmarks associated with the site are eliminated and there is no official mention or marker identifying the site. Foote's work is supported by examination of memorials dedicated to those who are lost to terrorism since 1988.

Individuals' accounts of the past can significantly change depending on the reality of the present. Events may be viewed as traumatic or contested, but the way they are remembered is dynamic and dependant on the context. Argenti and Schramm talk about fake memories that the individual presents through oral narratives. My view is that these 'fake' memories need to be studied in order to explore their interests for individuals who present them in a new context. This concurs with the concept of transformative remembering offered by Haaken as an alternative framework for looking back (Haaken, 1998). Military memories of war and violence orchestrate multiple layers of the issue from economic and political forces that impel such discourses to imminent dodges and impasses that plague the subjective side of the equation (Haaken, 1998:183). Halbwachs (1992) has rightly focused on the presentist approach in researching memory by vividly arguing that the past is a social construction mainly, if not

wholly, shaped by the concerns of the present. He made use of the presentist approach in the Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land. He argues that the beliefs, interests, and aspirations of the present shape the various views of the past as they are manifested respectively in every historical epoch (Halbwachs, 1992:25). The way we tell stories of the past is related to who we are today, to the person we are telling the story and to what we would like to achieve. The fact that ex-soldiers, for example, regret their involvement in the Congolese Army can be seen as a method of looking to correct their identity in order to get acceptance within the present-day community. The past is felt in human bodies, known in landscapes and landmarks, and perceived as the moral fabric of social relations. Considering the individual's capacity as agent, the focus of this study is on the way former soldiers are able to recall or to represent themselves in different military events they participated. The focus on alternative ways of remembering also helps to shed light on the ways violently dislocating transregional processes that are rendered internal and are incorporated into people's lives and into their social and cultural practices and imagination (Comaroff 1985; Shaw 2007; Masquelier 2001; Cole 2001; Stoller 1995).

While scholars have largely discussed collective and individual memories, little attention, if any, has been paid to how the memory of the war and violence infuses and shapes the lived realities of former soldiers, and how it is constructed and contested in their everyday life particularly in the context of mobility. Since it is argued that individuals draw on the context to remember or recreate the past (Halbwachs, 1992:22), there is a need to explore how former soldiers located in the civilian migrant group use this specific context to reconstruct or remember their military past experiences. This study aims to expand present discussions on remembering and to fill a vacuum in the literature on memory in the region by interrogating the role that the act of remembering war and violence plays in the identity reconstruction and subjectivity of ex-soldiers in Africa. I will also analyse how the memory of the civil war provides symbols and signs that shape attitudes towards power.

2.1.3. Symbols and memories

Our search for understanding of the world in which we live has evolved from studies of the physical world through studies of the biological and social contexts in which we find ourselves. Another major environment is now apparent - the symbolic. This environment is composed of the symbolic modes, codes, media and structures through which we communicate, create

cultures and organize the world. The delineation of the various symbolic systems and the contexts in which they are employed, their relationship to each other and ultimately to the physical, biological and social environments is the most exciting exploration of the 20th century (Ruby, 1981:3).

The world in which we live is often marked by illustrations. With the emergence of social media and smart phones, the dominant tendency today is to capture and immortalise all the events of our lives through photographs. In most cases people's political, personal and even individual decisions are controlled by photographs. The manner in which we pose ourselves in photographs constitutes the vehicle of message which can determine our culpability or faultlessness, or increase our chances of winning or losing elections, or gain us respect or contempt, etc. Vilém Flusser claims that the emergence of photography – as the first historical form of technical image – produced a radical cultural shift that heralded significant changes in the conditions of possibility of human life (Becker, 2011:249). Images such as photographs whether in professional exhibition, public events, hobbies or history or family play a key role in the process of remembering (Strange, Garry, Bernstein, and Lindsay, 2011; Stiliou and Siotou, 2007). In the context of migration, Stiliou and Siotou (2007:8) argue that migrants renegotiate past and present experiences in relation to their migrant status. Personal photos have a significant part in the production of memories, offering us pasts which in one way or another reach into the present, into the moment of looking at a picture. They work as a mechanism through which the past can be re/constructed and situated within the present. The findings of Strange, Garry, Bernstein, and Lindsay's (2011) study on how people read true or false news headlines of world events accompanied with or without loosely related photographs. It further reveals that photographs are instrumental in allowing people to easily remember their past. However, the study suggests photographs also "led people to 'falsely' remember genuine world events" (Strange et al. 2011:92). This seemingly false remembrance may be justified by the fact that although people have experienced what happened in their environment they were not actors of the event. In his study of the cultural role and function of photography, Ruby notes that rather than focusing on a critical analysis of 'important photographs', the attention is more on the common use of photographs by ordinary people (Ruby, 1981:4). The motivation behind this common use of photographs is in line with Schwendener's appropriation of Ariella Azoulay's idea in which he states that the subject of a photograph, even when s/he might be identified as a 'victim', exists as a 'citizen' in the realm of photography, communicating and

potentially bestowing upon the future viewer a sense of agency and responsibility (Schwendener, 2013:15).

Photographs and other items people keep need to be examined in their social context (Clark-Ibáñez, 2004) because, as Flusser argues, photography is not only a reproductive imaging technology but it is also a dominant cultural technique through which reality is constituted and understood (Becker, 2011: 251). As such, displaying photographs of people's active life on the wall is not only part of a coping strategy, but also a way of communicating a message to the surrounding community. The meaning of these pictures and messages conveyed become interesting for unpacking. Quoting Worth's (1977) study on ethnographic semiotics, Ruby (1981: 85) urges researchers interested in meaning through sign systems to depart from their personal analysis of cultural texts to the ethnographic study of how people make meaning in their everyday lives, noting also that photography can teach us a good deal about how we see and how we remember (Ruby, 1981: 7).

In a transnational context, photographs can function as means of communication for transmitting information and images as well as beliefs and senses. Images or other military items such as berets, certificates or military uniforms former Congolese soldiers brought from the DRC mean a lot to them because, as Stiliou and Siotou (2007) observe, photographs reveal our past, but their importance in the way they are used depends on the present. It can be argued that we can therefore examine how personal photos of migrants can work as a medium for the articulation, negotiation, interpretation as well as contestation of past and present experiences. Therefore, the kind of photographs migrants choose to show (or not show), the narratives that accompany these photographs which are circulated within the transnational family are very significant to the present study (Stiliou and Siotou, 2007:2). Annette Kuhn (2002:14) argues in this regard that memories evoked by a photo do not simply spring out of the image itself, but are generated in a network, an intertext of discourses that shifts between the past and present, spectator and image, and between all these and cultural contexts, historical moments.

Drawing from my own observation as a member of the Congolese community in South Africa, Congolese families in Johannesburg hardly take photographs in their houses or places of work. This can be explained by the bad living or working conditions in which they find themselves. They are afraid to portray a negative picture of themselves back home which can bring shame not only to them but also to their families in Congo. Instead, many of their photographs, especially those they put on social media or send to families in Congo portray them in the park

and in leisure time, carrying thus a sense of entertainment and pleasure for people in the home country. In this way, a very particular idea and memory of the migration period is being constructed, which presents an idealised image of their daily lives in the host country. They produce a memory of migration that gives young people back home the impression that the host country is a land of milk and honey (Mbikayi, 2008; Inaka, 2014). However, during my field work I learnt something different. I learnt that some former Congolese soldiers interviewed at their houses displayed a lot of their military photographs (in which they pose with uniforms and heavy weapons) on the walls of their houses. There were almost no photographs of their lives as migrants in South Africa. The few of them who chose to display photographs taken in South Africa only chose those photos taken with highly placed South African personalities. This is an interesting phenomenon that this study seeks to understand and one that resonates with a study of Albanian migrants in Greece:

> Depict their former work experience and the discourse that the migrants set out while showing these photos, they supplement positively their self-image and they offer a counter-discourse to the stereotype of the migrant-worker that has no education or training qualifications. Photographs can be used to talk about employment occupied in [the DRC]. They refer to their working duties and recollect the respect paid to them by the local community because of their role and their job identity (Stiliou and Siotou, 2007:5).

Photographs are very powerful tools of memory conservation. The examination of photographs can help people remember their lives in the past and reflect on their situations in the present. Photographs can also be used as a way of claiming a particular identity that people might have lost. They can also be used as a means of resistance in the face of adversity in changing contexts.

One of the goals of this study is to examine how people remember and what symbolic forms their memory takes. During my interactions with former soldiers I could observe some military items such as medals, berets, certificates and military uniforms which, I strongly believe, hold particular meanings for their post-military lives.

Adopting an anthropological perspective, this study aims to understand different representations soldiers create through remembering and forgetting their past. These representations evolve within context and are sometimes competing, contesting or dismissing, taking heed of various cultural, economic, political and social realities these former soldiers are faced with. Berliner stresses that memory helps us to think through the continuity and

persistence of representations practices, emotions, and institutions, an idea fundamental to anthropologists since the founding of the discipline (Berliner, 2005:205).

2.2. Gender studies within the army

Gender can be defined as the socially learned behaviors and expectations that are associated with the two sexes (Andersen 1993:31). Many scholars have discussed the differences between sex, gender, masculinity and femininity (Laurel Richardson, 1981; Laura Kramer, 1991; Renzetti and Curran, 1989; Kimmel and Aronson, 2004; Ingraham, 1994). Sex has often been associated with the biological and gender with the socio-cultural, a distinction that has become the sociological standard (Ingraham, 1994).

What is lacking in these theories is any concept of heterosexuality as an institutional organizing structure or social totality (Ingraham, 1994:216). Our behaviours as expected are the products of our culture. Family, church, and educational system are the institutions that provide our cultural values. Gender is the result of the ideology and organisation of the regulations of relationships between men and women. Taking into account the historical and institutional gender link to heterosexuality helps to move gender studies from the restricted analysis of separate conducts and grouping actions to serious examinations of heterosexual relations as an organizing institution. In this way, the assumptive genetic body of heterosexuality is altered, uncovering its operations the way it makes meaning and the way it is related to history and practical conditions. Despite the important part played by feminist sociologists in analysing the junction of gender and social institutions, there is less focus on the links between gender and heterosexual institutions.

The social construction of gender views men as strong, tough, entrepreneurial, and providers who are permitted to engage in irreligious activities, while the paramount destiny and mission of ‘woman’ is to fulfil the noble and benign offices of ‘wife and mother’ (Schultz, 2014:58). This cultural perception has even been extended to the labour market where women usually perform support roles as clerical, administrative and medical staff and where a huge gender difference between men and women is often noticed. The structures of many societies were designed to favour men to the detriment of women and where some efforts were made to improve women’s conditions, the result is that they were subjected to other forms of violence and abuse from men who consider the improvement of women’s conditions as a danger to their masculinities (Hamber, 2016). This is what Hamber (2010:15) refers to as a security-insecurity cycle. It follows that some of the advances in the security of women, in social, political and egalitarian terms, even if not completely realised, have led to other physical insecurities for them.

Collett and Lizardo (2009) use the power control theory to explore gender differences in the inclination to get involved in risk-taking activities. This theory focuses on men's and women's level of power outside of the family relative to the power they have within the household (and it is in this sense equivalent to certain exchange formulations of power). While liberal feminists use social and cultural attitudes such as sexism and discrimination to explain gender inequality, the argument of radical feminists is based on patriarchy that is what gives men power to exploit women. Black feminists highlight the role of race, class and ethnicity towards understanding the oppression of women of colour in the west and elsewhere (Winslow, 2010:6). Families are categorised on the basis of the dominant positions traditionally ascribed to men. This leads to the production of structural effects that situate men differently in relation to women and to each other according to history (Ingraham, 1994:207). Collett and Lizardo (2009:208) note that patriarchal households are those in which the mother occupies an 'obey' position in the workplace (or does not work outside the house) and in which the husband does not. In these households, men use the power gained in the workplace to dominate and women are considered important agents of social control. The authority gained by the possession of power externally (mainly from the workplace) is reproduced within the family, contributing to the duplication of the same form of male-dominated households. Durkheim suggests that men are the principal beneficiaries of marital relationships, and that matrimonial relations with fewer regulations improve the wife's situation (DiCristina, 2005). Drawing on Durkheim's work ([1897] 1951), DiCristina (2005) notes that spouses' interests in marital bonds are often divergent, with wives requiring primarily liberty and the husband seeking discipline. In these patriarchal families, girls, more than boys, are usually subjected to social and physical restrictions while boys or sons are more likely to be persuaded to take initiatives, to develop a sense of risk-taking, and sometimes their misdeeds are condoned and unpunished. Girls or daughters in patriarchal families, on the contrary, will be discouraged to embark on dangerous activities.

These roles are replicated at the national level. According to McClintock, the very definition of nationhood rests on the male recognition of identity. Women are typically construed as the symbolic bearers of the nation but are denied any direct relation to national agency (McClintock, 1993:62). Gender discrimination in terms of status, prestige and power is more noticeable in professions such as the military. The literature shows that in times of conflict, gender notions become very rigid and social roles heavily controlled (McClintock, 1993; D'Amico and Weinstein, 1999; Febbraro, 2007; Carreiras and Kümmel, 2008; Winslow, 2010). D'Amico and Weinstein (1999:4) thus believe that the military is a fundamental site for the

construction of gender, that is, the defining of the boundaries of behaviour – indeed, of life possibilities – for people we call men and women. This is supported by the popular views that women are unfit for the military because of their perceived physical weakness and inability to handle weapons. Martin van Creveld, a famous Israeli military historian, declares that the feminization of the military is equivalent to its weakening and decline leaving the armed forces in the awkward position of being successively incapable of doing for what they have been invented (quoted in Carreiras and Kümmel, 2008:30). For his part, Winslow (2010:10) argues that women were (and are) kept out of the armed forces because of the myth of biology, which is not seen as the social construction that it is. In this argument women are supposed to be genetically programmed to nurture life and are physically and emotionally not strong enough for combat.

Another challenge facing women is the one related to leaderships within the army. Febbraro (2007) shows, for example, that in the Canadian Army, women in leadership roles were challenged by their male counterparts reflecting Winslow's (2010:13) observation that in the military, the attributes of a successful leader (decisiveness, confidence and assertiveness) are stereotypical of men. He further observes that:

> Women are portrayed as needing male courtesy and protection and as housewives who should receive flowers when entertaining officers in their homes. This only reinforces male attitudes towards women in combat as Kümmel remarks that these constructs of the female as someone to be courted and to be protected symbolically makes war a man's business" (16).

When they leave the barracks, Congolese soldiers transfer these patriarchal attitudes to political and social spheres and often expect civilians to submit to them without questioning. I therefore use Connell's (1987) concept of gender order, which characterises a society over time and seems to be broader and inclusive than patriarchy. The conservative orientation of gender order establishes a clear difference between men and women on the basis of two great functions: psychological and intellectual. This justifies the commonly held assumptions of men as soldiers who are strong and resilient, forceful and dispassionate (Barrett, 1996) and of women are as passive mothers and wives both in and as the nation requiring the protection of manly warriors (Banerjee, 2012: 17). The psychological functions include affective functions consisting of family duties and, increasingly, aesthetic pursuits (e.g. art and literature), whereas the intellectual functions appear to consist of economic, political and scientific activities (DiCristina, 2005:216). Men are therefore expected to be producers of power and wealth while

women are expected to focus on mothering. Courtenay argues that gender is negotiated in part through relationships of power allowing men's control and dominance over women (Courtenay, 2000: 1388). This traditional [or mechanical or static] classification of gender roles between men and women provides images of reality which conceal the operation of heterosexuality both historically and materially (Ingraham, 1994:212).

Violence is often used a way of expressing dominance and authority. Violence is an expression of masculinity because it symbolises the victory of the strong over the weak. Masculinity is a quality or set of practices that is stereotypically associated with men. The word 'stereotypically' is used here to show that men do not exclusively perform a quality or action. Each society has its 'cultural discourses of masculinity' including hegemonic masculinity which is a kind of masculinity that is most valorised, and that most men would strive to emulate (Kiesling, 2007:657). The qualities and practices that people laud, long for and struggle to reach are described by the cultural discourses that produce hegemonic masculinity (Kiesling, 2007). I argue here that the army is a societal institution with specific cultural discourses, and that members of this institution are expected to produce certain qualities and practices that respond to hegemonic masculinity. These qualities and practices are not exclusively expected from a specific sex, but from both sexes. Cultural discourse, the term I adopt here, is used by Kiesling to denote beliefs concerning the fixed way of thinking of men and masculinities. Consequently, the use of discourse rather than ideology is because cultural discourses are more concerned with institutional practices and the flexibility in the way of appending cultural discourse in which opposition and stimulation can be admitted (Kiesling, 2007).

It is interesting to note that men are not always as powerful and dominant as they are often perceived to be. For instance, a man can be physically strong but financially weak. Similarly, while women have always been portrayed as powerless and vulnerable, there are women who resist this description by taking up male roles. That is why, following Kimmel and Aronson (2004:205), I prefer to use masculinities and not masculinity given that the term as having different things to different groups of people at different times. Masculinities denote social roles, conduct, and expectations for men in a particular society at any time. Thus, the emphasis is not on biology but on gender and the variety of identities that different groups of men may have at different times.

Gender regimes within a society are often associated with the perpetuation of violence. When men suffer from the 'psycho-economic' violence which impairs their male role as defined by

the society, they often resort to violence to reassert their masculinity (Campbell, 1992). Barak's appropriation of Hale's statement explains that some of these explanations of violence may include those favouring internalized feelings of shame and humiliation leading to feelings of anger, hostility and rage (Barak, 2006). With regard to soldiers' violence, studies have shown that men in uniform often resort to violence to demonstrate power and control in their households (Greene et al., 2011). Baaz and Stern (2009:497) explain that soldiers turn to violence because of their inabilities (or 'failures') to inhabit certain idealised notions of heterosexual manhood. Fanon (2004:94) similarly describes violence as "a cleansing force" that frees soldiers from the frustrations and anger that follows from poverty and neglect (Baaz and Stern, 2009: 511).

The demand for gender equality has challenged the sex-based stereotypical roles assigned to men and women. Women's and feminist movements have significantly contributed to the awakening society to women's role not only in the family, but also in various areas of society. In some families when men are unable to perform their roles due to sickness or death, women play the roles of both father and mother, and have become involved in professions previously regarded as men's. This shows that gender is plural, relational and situational. I essence, people regularly fashion and refashion their own gendered identities within the context of [their] interactions with others and within the situations [they] inhabit (Kimmel and Aronson, 2004:503, 507).

Instead of associating hegemonic masculinity with men's power and violence, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) propose the reassessment of the concept and caution that hegemonic masculinity is not about force but ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions and persuasion. For instance, in a macroeconomic environment like that of the DRC marked by lack of job opportunities for men, women have become breadwinners with the change of gender roles being hailed by some men (Turshen, 1998).

Wage differences between men and women may be seen as a strategy for perpetuating hegemonic masculinity but as Connell (1993:603) notes, when the historical conditions for a strategy's success have altered, the hegemonic form of masculinity is vulnerable to displacement by other forms. Research has shown that in crises, DRC men can renegotiate their masculinities by accepting a lower status within the family and society (Hollander, 2014).

Migration has also contributed to the change of traditional gender roles for men and women. For instance, Ahan (2002:32) observes that 56% of immigrant Korean married women [in the

US] are in the labour force, primarily because the wife's work is necessary for economic survival, especially for self-employed families. This role shift is what leads Connell (1993:598) to argue that cultural turbulence around themes of masculinity has grown. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) also noted the role of cultural constructions, and the interplay of gender dynamics within race, class, and religion as significant in the enactment of gender inequalities. The conceptualisation of masculinity is neither fixed nor static, but dynamic. Although war in countries such as Rwanda, Mozambique and Sudan, has led to the increase of crimes, leaving many orphans and widows, it has also empowered many women by giving them a chance to take up responsibilities they had been prevented from taking previously and to demonstrate their capabilities as heads of households (Turshen, 1998; Twagiramariya and Turshen, 1998).

Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) have suggested reformulating the concept of masculinity in the following four ways: (i) a more complex model of gender hierarchy, emphasising the agency of women; (ii) explicit recognition of the geography of masculinities, emphasising the interplay among local, regional and global levels; (iii) a more specific treatment of embodiment in contexts of privilege and power; and (iv) a stronger emphasis on the dynamics of hegemonic masculinity, recognising internal contradictions and the possibilities of movement toward gender democracy. With changes in society today, gender roles have completely changed as women are able to get involved in domains that were previously preserved for male such as the military. In the section to follow, I examine different ways of applying the concept of hegemonic masculinity to men and women within the army. Arguably, war results in some of the extreme expressions of both masculinity and femininity. Connell was not writing about wartime and the way that war impacts on and draws strength from notions of masculinity and femininity is one of the themes this study seeks to explore.

Literature has shown that the army is one of the domains of salient expression of masculinity (Barrett, 1996; Connell, 1993; Connell, 1995; Connell, 2005; Dunivin, 1997; Maringira, 2014; Maringira, 2015). According to Barrett (1996: 129), the military is a prime candidate for the study of masculinity, not only because it is an institution populated with men but also because it plays a primary role in shaping images of masculinity in the larger society. This tendency to consider the army as male's institution unsuitable for women who are often viewed as the weaker sex and unable to perform certain tasks traditionally known as male's tasks has led many to undermine female capabilities. The acceptance of women in the military has been the subject of heated debate dominated by two opposing views – traditionalist and evolutionist. For traditionalists, women are weak and unfit for combat roles in the army. On the other hand,

evolutionists consider women as an equal sex, constructed a conception of military culture in which they expected women to be full partners of defense [sic] (Dunivin, 1997:6), and they believe that women can successfully fight alongside men in the army. Even though, women were admitted into the army, they were assigned specific secondary roles away from the frontlines such as tending to the wounded and serving as cooks, seamstresses, and launderers (Tran, 2007:2). Nursing corps were institutionalised as auxiliary arms of the military during the Spanish-American war in 1901. An estimated 34,000 women were reported as serving as nurses by the end of the World War I (WW1) (Tran, 2007:3). Many believed that assigning women to combat would adversely affect a successful military (Dunivin, 1997:9). The turning point for women involvement in the military was during WWII because of the desperate need of human resources. According to Tran, roughly 350,000 women served in the military during the course of the WWII war out of 12 million in the armed forces (Tran, 2007:3).

These days, women are no longer limited to such roles as catering and nursing in the armed forces, but are now also deployed to the frontline which contrasts the traditional image of women as fearful, weak and vulnerable. It is reported that women were involved throughout the civil war in Peru although their roles were not officially recognised (Theidon, 2003:71).

Soldiers are expected to embody perceived masculine features such as autonomy and risk taking; perseverance and endurance; and technical rationality (Barrett, 1996: 140). Soldiers are trained to take risks and to sacrifice themselves because the notion of ‘militarised masculinity’ is associated with braveness (Weierstall et al., 2013). This is expressed partly through the kinds of words (such as queer or fairy, girl, pussy, weeny and wimp) used to taunt soldiers during military training for what is perceived to be ‘un-masculine’ behaviour (Barrett, 1996).

Militarised notions of masculinity and femininity have often put greater emphasis on hierarchy rather than the ways in which the genders complement each other (Theidon, 2003). The militarised image of masculinity is that of a strong, tough, aggressive, obedient, dedicated, nationalist, risk-taking, and machine-killing soldier. Any soldier perceived as not having any of these qualities is therefore likely to be called a fag, woman, malinger, unfit, or such other derogatory term.

Soldiers also define themselves as warriors by distancing themselves from, and demeaning the life of civilians which they consider to be feminine. This highlights the gendered institutional logic that conditions notions of what the army is and what it is not, and who a soldier is and is not which perpetuates gender inequalities (Kimmel and Aronson, 2004: 505). Being part of the

national defence forces for women means social prestige and the exercise of power and privilege that is socially uncontested and which civilians are not entitled to.

Hegemonic masculinity, according to Barrett (1996: 130), refers to a particular idealized image of masculinity in relation to which images of femininity and other masculinities are marginalized and subordinated. This means that men who are viewed as the embodiment of masculinity may also express signs of femininity. The argument I proffer here is that manhood or womanhood in the army is not about biological differences, but it is determined by different ways of demonstrating masculinities. Masculinities are not determined by genetic material; rather it is the capacity to demonstrate warrior's behaviour (Barrett, 1996). Military masculinity is also measured in the soldiers' capacity to resist the enemy, to use a gun and to kill. Depending on the context and motivations, women are also able to embody masculine traits like their male counterparts. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 841) state that masculinity represents not a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men [and women] position themselves through discursive practices. They therefore propose a re-examination of the concept of hegemonic masculinity. It follows that through a more humane and less oppressive means of being, a man might become hegemonic, as part of a process leading toward an abolition of gender hierarchies (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 833).

Kimmel and Aronson (2004:504) argue that definitions of masculinity are not simply constructed in relation to the hegemonic ideals of that gender, but also in constant reference to each other [because] gender is not only plural as it is also relational. The interest in masculinity in this study does not concern only the way the army expects its members to display masculine characters, but also what influences the way they exhibit what they perceive to be masculine behaviours, particularly how women who form the minority of the troop members are perceived and influenced by their male counterparts. The idea is to depart from common perceptions of masculinity and 'soldier constructs' in order to explore the subjective construction of masculinity and femininity beyond the physical traits and differences between men and women. A good example of female involvement in the army is in the 1990 Gulf War in which 40,000 women were part of the US armed forces. Their role was hailed by the former US secretary of defence, Richard Cheney who declared that the role of these women was crucial to the success of the war (Dunivin, 1997). This can be understood as a form of a 'heroisation' of violence involving both males and females and which is a feature of certain notions of masculinity.

Debates about masculinity concern specific qualities traditionally associated with men such as the way men talk and show toughness, virility or vigour, as well as their perceived capacity to protect the community from external threats. That is why those who resist women's involvement in the army consider that they are too tender and motherly and that the idea of a woman inflicting violence is strange (Winslow, 2010:16). Kiesling (2007:662) argues that the most prominent feature claimed for men's language and masculine language is power and hierarchy. Dominance is performed very differently, for example, when men are talking to women rather than to other men. But, as I will show, in the category of what soldiers call 'women' are included civilian men and women.

But even if women are allowed to take up traditional masculine roles, the underlying logic of the army as man's world remains unchallenged. Men in the army are not expected to exhibit feminine traits, such as showing emotion or being nonaggressive or subservient (Locke, 2013:82). In the eyes of soldiers, civilians (men and women) who avoid war are regarded as women just like defeated enemies who are seen as weak and fearful soldiers are regarded as 'women'. This highlights how notions of "militarized patriarchy", which is central in dominant constructs of masculinity, are used to describe relationships between soldiers and their chief commanders, and between soldiers and civilian people. However, it is not only men who subscribe to these ideas as women also do so. Putting oneself in the position of a man reflects the extent to which taking public space and the assumption of power is associated with this militarized patriarchy. Expressing masculinity is not only about demonstrating physical force, but also relates to the capacity to leave loved ones and accepting to be deprived of their affection for the sake of the country.

Military training is reported to be a hard experience to which only few people are called. The selection process is so strict (this can be questioned today particularly in the case of the DRC) that in the process of voluntary involvement, those whose profiles are less promising may be disqualified from the outset. During the process, soldiers avoid being labelled 'failed man', preferring to pay the price of a warrior mentality [to escape] humiliation and shame that faces the sissy as a failed man (Goldstein, 2001:269). Woodward (2000:647) argues that military training is the acquisition and development of a collection of physical and mental attributes required in order to undertake the tasks necessary for waging war. He argues furthermore:

> First gender identities are not innate or biological, but they are socially constructed, second, the fluidity or the changeability of gender identities offering 'the capacity to

> endorse, reproduce, change, and subvert norms of behavior prescribed by social convention'; third, gender identities are played out in a specific context; fourth, the context allows the production and reproduction of infinite gender identities; fifth, gender identities are built on the relation of domination or subordination; the space referring to the place, and through the relation of the body to space is significant to the construction of gender identities; lastly, "gender identities are both culturally and temporally specific" (2000:642-3).

This study uses this framework to understand the way gender is constructed within the army. I also apply Connell's (2000) arguments to explore masculinity within the structures of gender relations. More importantly, the study seeks to explore how soldiers construct masculinity after leaving the army. As they themselves acknowledge, soldiers are not born but made soldiers, and it is their military training that produces the culture of violence that they end up imbibing. This also applies to female soldiers.

This study also draws on Connell's (2000) proposal to explore the conceptualisation of masculinities among former Congolese soldiers in South Africa with regard to the following notions: (1) Multiple masculinities: the idea that in different periods and cultures, gender is constructed differently, meaning that violent and aggressive forms of masculinity are not necessarily the only forms of masculinity; (2) Hierarchy and hegemony: There is generally a dominant or 'hegemonic' form of masculinity, the centre of the system of gendered power; (3) Collective masculinities: Multiple masculinities may be produced and sustained by the same institution; (4) Bodies as arenas: Men's bodies do not fix patterns of masculinity, but they are still very important in the expression of masculinity, which constantly involves bodily experience, bodily pleasures, and the vulnerabilities of bodies; (5) Active construction: Masculinities are actively produced, using the resources available in a given milieu; (6) Division: Masculinities are not homogeneous but are likely to be internally divided. Men's lives often embody tensions between contradictory desires or practices; (7) Dynamics: Masculinities are created in specific historical circumstances. They are liable to be contested, reconstructed, or displaced.

Woodward's (2005:652) observation that masculinities are often defined in opposition or relation to feminine or other masculine gender identities echoes Connell's (1993: 599) opposition of the psychological conception of masculinity by stressing that its meaning is found in the social structure and the historical dynamic of gender relations. Since masculinity is the result of social structures regulating gender relations, this study explores the ways in which

former Congolese soldiers express masculinities in their new social contexts as refugees and migrants. If the model of military masculinity is indeed hegemonic, then living up to that model in some way must bring privilege and status in the eyes of others (Woodward, 2000). Another concept that is directly linked to this study is postcolonial violence which I discuss in the section to follow.

2.3. Violence in postcolonial Africa

Since the military legitimises the use of violence in some contexts, it is important to explore the perspective of former soldiers on violence and violent behaviour. In this regard, I examine the scholarly debate on sociological perspectives of violence focusing mainly on the intimacy violence, child abuse, infanticide, family dysfunction, poverty, social isolation and other forms of domestic violence (Alexander 1974; Daly and Wilson 1981; Barak, 2006; King 2013; Kaufman and Zigler, 1987). These different discourses sometimes contradict each other, depending on the social context. For instance, while many commentators condemn domestic violence, some scholars have also found that the conception of violence is culturally constructed and that there are women who consider being beaten by their male partners as a demonstration of love (Rasool et al., 2002; Pan et al., 2006). This does not exclude other various forms of domestic violence women face in their relations with men but it is used as an example because physical violence is the most visible form of violence and because the cultural construction of violence also justifies the minimisation of emotional, psychological, sexual, and economic violence to perpetuate fear, intimidation, power, and control (Amoakohene, 2004; Ahn, 2002). There are also other forms of violence such as fighting for independence or freedom. When any of these forms of violence is condoned, it is always justified in one way or the other (Palmary, 2016). For example, Palmary (2016) has shown how the outbreak of violence against foreigners in South Africa was legitimised by the notion of law.

Without seeking to justify violence, I move away from the popular view of the military as violent, to provide an anthropological understanding of how violence is endorsed and even celebrated within the military. In my encounter with many former DRC soldiers, some claimed that they still believed military ideologies and practised the military lifestyle because they believe it makes them stand out from others. According to Steger and James (2013:23), ideologies help people navigate the complexity of their political universe and carry claims to social truth. They identify the following three key determinants of the maturity of an ideology:

Its degree of uniqueness and complexity; second, its context-bound responsiveness to a broad range of political issues; and, its ability produces effective claims in the form of conceptual chains of decontestation (Steger and James, 2013: 25-6). They further argue that decontestation is the process by which ideas are taken out of the contest over meaning and thus are seen as truths by many people (Steger and James, 2013: 26).

The aim of the military ideology is to enable soldiers, as Hinton (2004: 95) stresses in the case of the Cambodian genocide perpetrated by the notorious Khmer Rouge, to cut off [their] hearts. Hinton suggests two theoretical perspectives based on cultural models and practice theories for an anthropological understanding of large-scale violence. The cultural models are largely tacit knowledge structures that are both widely shared by and mediate the understanding of the members of a social group. The cultural model of violence can be the result of the folk beliefs or models, which are tacit forms of knowledge that are more conservative than scientific theories and are more resistant (though not completely resistant) to empirical disconfirmation, shared among individuals (Collins and Dressler, 2008:66).

The assumption I make here is that military understandings or perceptions of violence may not correspond to the everyday understanding of violence given that they have different status and act at different cultural levels. Collins and Dressler (2008: 55) focus on the concept of "person-in-environment", highlighting that individual's model is not only formed of individual biographical and idiosyncratic information, but also that which is culturally transmitted, or learned, and therefore shared with other members of the cultural group. The military culture is characterized by a patriarchal structure dominated by values such as formality, rank, leadership, loyalty, camaraderie, and emotional control. Importance is placed on masculine ideals, encouraging notions of dominance, aggression, self-sufficiency, and risk-taking (Castro et al., 2015: 2). Abbate's (2016) argument is that the hyper-masculine military culture sustains attitudes and practices that normalise a culture of sexual (and other forms of) assault and suggests the re-evaluation and challenge of the culture of hyper-masculinity at the root of uncontrolled violence and aggression. The military promotes an especially toxic, extreme, and exaggerated form of masculinity – hyper-masculinity or 'military masculinity'. Military masculinities emphasize polarized gender roles, acceptance of stereotypical gender roles, and an obsession with tolerating pain, control of one's emotions, violence, and power. The military furthermore encourages soldiers to perceive the domination and destruction of the enemy as exciting and enjoyable while instilling in them a desire to manifest this desire to dominate

through aggression and violence. This point is in line with the utilitarianism, the ethical theory positing that one ought to act so as to maximize the utility (usually construed as happiness) of the greatest number. If, through killing some people in war, one will thereby secure the well-being and/or happiness of the whole group, then killing seems not merely permissible but, further, obligatory (Calhoun, 2001). The enemy is in the category of what Giorgio regards as "life unworthy of being lived" or I would say, 'life unworthy of being spared'. In a study on the Cambodian genocide, participants who are former Khmer rouge members explained that in the Khmer rouge ideology the "word, 'enemy,' had great power [which] could make a child stop recognizing his or her mother, father, and siblings (Hinton, 2004:113). In this context, life and death are not properly scientific concepts but rather political concepts, which as such acquire a political meaning precisely only through a decision (Giorgio, 1995:164).

Military training propels soldiers to walk in a military manner with a regular measured tread or to race, lauding the use of physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill and sexual violence (Hunter 2007). Soldiers are trained to internalise the dominant culture of the army which regulates their conduct, distinguishing them from others in the society. The need to fit into the army's principles is what leads soldiers to normalise the abnormal by adopting prejudicial attitudes as those who deviate from military norms are considered misfit by the military hierarchy. In most cases, those stereotypes and labelling are related to civilian life. The derogatory attitude against those failing to embody military mores is used to perpetuate hegemonic masculinities (Barrett, 1996) which will be discussed in next section of this chapter. The fact that soldiers are encouraged to remove any civilian behaviour leads them to hate, reject, judge and otherwise harm other people who do not share their belief system (Dreyer, 2007:14). Sometimes socialising with civilians is avoided for fear of ill-defined shame. Civilians in Congo are in this case considered as inferior and even in the way soldiers interact with them.

Military violence is sometimes unconscious and soldiers might justify their violent deeds as a way to defend their honour or demonstrate their loyalty to their superiors by executing their orders (Hinton, 2004). In fact, Hinton interrogated one of the Khmer soldiers about the motivation to kill, and the answer was that he did kill to avoid being considered unable to cut off [his] heart (Hinton, 2004: 95). This case highlights the role of cultural model and practice theory in the normalisation of harmful conducts (Hinton, 2004). Cultural models are the beliefs that are widely shared, regulating the conduct or behaviour of the members of a social group (Hinton, 2004). Hinton (2004) notes that although some variation can be noticed among

individuals, some cultural models are deeply engraved within a society and may inspire or stimulate the action of large numbers of individuals. Hinton continues by explaining that cultural models and practice theory are frequently used to serve the interests of dominant political groups by legitimating their power, goals, and desired forms of social inequality (Hinton, 2004: 95). Through violence, soldiers may see themselves as fulfilling their duty and gaining honour (Hinton, 2004).

The level of violence in a society can also be traced to the way people are organised in the society. Bourgois (2001: 28) notes that:

> Political, economic and institutional forces shape micro-interpersonal and emotional interactions in all kinds of ways by supporting or suppressing modes of feeling and manifestations of love or aggression, definitions of respect and achievement, and patterns of insecurity and competition.

The discussion to follow explicates the implications of political, economic and institutional forces in the production of symbolic and structural violence in the postcolonial Africa with particular emphasis on the case of the DRC.

2.3.1. Symbolic, structural and everyday violence

In his analysis of the role of class, race, national culture and violence, Fanon (2004) points out the inherent antagonism between the settler and the native in the struggle for national liberation. Fanon describes the work of colonisation as violence and supports that compromising to end the struggle between the coloniser and the colonised is impossible. The identity of both, the coloniser and colonised is defined in opposition to each other, labelling the 'others' as foreign civilized/barbaric, hardworking/lazy, rational/emotional, masculine/feminine, progressive/primitive, cultivated/savage, developed/underdeveloped etc. (Dann and Hanschmann, 2012:124). According to Mbembe, colonisation aimed to implement the coloniser's sovereignty and rested on three sorts of violence. The first was the founding violence helping to create the space to exercise violence and regarding itself as the only power to judge its laws. The second type of violence concerns the legitimation with the aim to help produce an imaginary capacity converting the founding violence into authorising authority. The third form of violence was designed to ensure this authority's maintenance, spread, and permanence" (Mbembe, 2001:25). In this context, Fanon (2004:4) asserts that there is no conciliation possible as one of them is superfluous. Describing the difference between settlers and the colonised, Fanon shows that the latter find themselves in well-kept surroundings and a

belly permanently full of good things while the surroundings of the colonised remains unsanitary and impoverished.

In *King Leopold's ghost: A story of greed, terror, and heroism in colonial Africa,* Adam Hochschild (1999) reports that at least 10 million people lost their lives during the reign of King Leopold in Congo. Many were trodden or flagellated to death for failing to meet the rigid production quotas for ivory and rubber harvests imposed by Leopold's agents. Others were worked to death, forced to labour in servile conditions as porters, rubber gatherers or miners for little or no pay. With regard to rubber production, it was reported that to fill their quota, rubber gatherers had to spend twenty-four days a month in the forest, where they built crude cages to sleep in to protect themselves (which was not always successful) against leopards (Hochschild, 1999: 163).

Mbembe (2001:28) stresses that the colonial relation, in its relation to subjection, was thus inseparable from the specific forms of punishment and a simultaneous quest for productivity. The colonisers' presence into the colonised sector was only through police (or, conceivably, on a charity mission), leaving less opportunity to the colonised. The coloniser's fear of losing hegemony over the natives coupled with the natives' ambition to overthrow the coloniser resulted in violence which became the only possible means of communication. As Fanon points out, it is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence (Fanon, 2004: 23). Government's workers use a language of pure violence in dealing with the colonised peoples (Fanon, 2004: 4). Violence thus becomes not only a sensible option, but also the only thinkable option in different circumstances. Consequently, the colonised people use "antagonistic violence" to eradicate the "capitalistic violence and state terrorism" (Rodriguez, 2011: 3). In the case of Congo, this political awakening was more remarkable in the outbreak of popular uprising that took place almost nationwide, starting from Leopoldville in 1959 (Lemarchand, 1964).

While Africa has overcome colonialism, the structures of oppression and inequality still persist. Farmer (2010: 337) argues that social factors including gender, ethnicity ('race'), and socioeconomic status may each play a role in rendering individuals and groups vulnerable to extreme human suffering. Contemporary Africa is built upon extremely unequal social structures rooted in colonisation since social class determines access to social benefits. According to Mbembe (2001: 46),

> There was an economy of predation based on three features: indebtedness, expenditure, and deficit. Second, a general regime of privileges and impunity made possible this economy's relatively extended reproduction.

Graham argues that "colonisation was built on a political, economic and social system of exploitation and domination and today the result is that the post-colonial world of nation states [has] structurally and practically [imitated] Western nations" (Graham, 1986: 31). Those in positions of power have granted themselves compensations and rights far beyond their wages. Public funds are misappropriated in forms of double payment of rent, false administrative leases, secret commissions, 'backhanders' and under-invoicing in the granting of public contracts, allocation of property rights or bank loans, misappropriation under cover of performing customs and tax procedures. The creation of parallel administrations caused the deviation of state funds with official documents. Mbembe (2001: 49) further explains that:

> By the beginning of the 1970s, most of these countries had entered a stage where, from a legal and fiscal viewpoint, the bulk of national wealth was, for all practical purposes, part of the "eminent domain" of a tyrant acting as a mercenary with state funds and the national treasury.

The growing inequalities illustrate how violence operates within social structures in systematic ways to harm or otherwise disadvantage certain individuals (Farmer, 2010; Burtle, 2011). There is violence in social relations between the big and the small, the powerful and the weak, leaders and people, soldiers and civilians and between men and women. In most cases social violence is linked to income inequality and poverty, two salient forms of structural violence (Burtle, 2011). Societies are often peaceful when people are satisfied about their needs; conflicts are more likely to arise when certain groups feel frustrated and marginalised for lack of proper response to their socio-political needs. In this regard, Christie (1997: 318) notes that structural violence occurs when certain groups of people are deprived of need satisfiers; [particularly], when needs for economic well-being or for self-determination are systematically denied to certain segments of society. In the DRC for example, the phenomenon of street children is widespread since many parents are either unemployed, underpaid or owed their salaries and are therefore incapable to look after their children. As a way of getting rid of these children, many families accuse them of witchcraft and abandon them to live in the streets.

These children commonly known as *Kulunas*[11] are often involved in criminal activities such as mugging and sometimes used as political thugs during election periods. However, when they became a threat to the government, a so-called anti-crime campaign was launched that has resulted in the killing and disappearance of the *Kulanas* (Human Rights watch, 2014).

The causes of structural violence against civilians by agents of the state are often far more complex than the common explanations offered (Burtle, 2011). On one hand those who are wealthy rely on the violence against the poor to protect their status while on the other, those living in extreme poverty often use violence as means of changing their living conditions which mirrors the situation between colonisers and the colonised. While nationalist discourses were deployed against colonial domination, the same tyrannical methods of the past have been used by indigenous politicians against their own people in the postcolonial system (Graham, 1986). In most cases, the vast majority of victims in this violence are the poor and weak members of society.

Factionalism within the armed forces often leads to the illegal use of violence among their rank and file in the form of racketeering and extra-judicial killings. According to Mbembe (2001: 50),

> Today, these countries, when not torn by bloody civil wars, find themselves in a situation where resorting to brute force has become the rule, whether in transactions between what remains of the state and individuals, or in ordinary social relations.

Violence in these states is also regarded as an integral part of the power accumulation process rather than a sign of political decay (Cohen, Brown and Organski, 1981). This highlights the importance of the military in postcolonial Africa as a means of power, wealth and status, a situation that partly explains the vicious cycle of violence between those in government and their political opponents. There are unending battles over the extractive prerogatives and resources that will make the costs of anti-state action prohibitive. Instead of abandoning their claims to sovereignty, states often tend to confront their opponents violently to ensure their control over the resources necessary for effective territorial domination (Cohen, Brown and Organski, 1981: 904). It is in this context that soldiers operate.

[11] Young delinquents engaged in criminal actions by extorting people's properties often through the use of small and light weapons.

The important point for this study here is how post-independence contestations contribute to the creation of new military identities and forms of violence. It is important to note also the role of ethnicity as an enduring feature of postcolonial societies. Sometimes, the presidential guard (as it is the case in the DRC) is viewed as an army within the army whose members enjoy special enhanced incomes and privileges. Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010: 2) rightly argue that the unwillingness of many leaders to leave power and allow democratic transition leads to the creation of these specialised units for repressing demands for democratization. Other members of the regular army are often owed for many months and become disgruntled, a situation that accounts for political instability of many postcolonial societies marked by incessant mutinies and political coups.

It ought to be noted that in Africa of the 90s, as Richards (1998) argues, the new political violence was paradoxical, that is, it erupts in a weak state framework. According to Richards (1998), violence is more related to the collapse of the state. The crisis of confidence undermining the legitimacy of state institutions turns the violence against society (Richards, 1998:86). In the article, "Violence, peace, and peace research", Galtung (1969) distinguishes between direct and indirect structural violence, the latter being characterised by monopolization of resources by a group/class while the former refers to the destruction basic means of realisation.

Drawing on a 20-year retrospective analysis of field notes on political terror, repression and everyday violence in El Salvador, Bourgeois (2001) suggests four forms and expressions of violence that include direct political, structural, symbolic and everyday violence. The first refers to physical violence and terror administered by official authorities and those opposing it, such as military repression, police torture and armed resistance. The second concerns chronic, historically-entrenched political and economic oppression and social inequality, ranging from exploitative international terms of trade to abusive local working conditions and high infant mortality rates. The third form, symbolic violence, includes the internalized humiliations and legitimations of inequality and hierarchy ranging from sexism and racism to intimate expressions of class power. Bourdieu's theorisation of symbolic violence calls to notice those unnoticed manners of gendered domination that not only underlie daily rituals of sleeping and being 'sheltered' but also larger orders of power that are scarcely recognized as such (Roy, 2008:329). Symbolic violence is exercised through cognition and misrecognition,

knowledge and sentiment, with the unwitting consent of the dominated (Roy, 2008:329). The fourth for, everyday violence concerns daily practices and expressions of violence on a micro-interactional level – interpersonal, domestic and delinquent. It focuses on the individual lived experience that normalises petty brutalities and terror at the community level and creates a common-sense or ethos of violence. The aim of this framework is to help the study to explore the everyday violence that soldiers inflict on the people surrounding them as a result of the institutional violence they (soldiers) endure in the army.

2.3.2. Reinforcement of disciplined behaviour in the army

Discipline is a type of power that coerces the body by regulating and dividing its movement and the space and time in which it moves. Tracing its origins back to monasteries and armies, Foucault (1975) explores its workings through timetables and the ranks into which soldiers are arranged. Discipline implies a series of methods aimed at meticulously controlling the body's operations by assuring the constant subjection of its forces and imposing upon them a relation of docility-utility (Foucault, 1975: 137). It functions like a powerful machinery in which the human body enters to be acted upon by manipulating its elements, gestures and behaviours. This is what Foucault calls a "political anatomy" where the human is explored, broken down and rearranged (Foucault, 1975: 138). The army is generally understood as a place of sacrifices and risk-taking, training troop members to adopt particular behaviours which allow the use of deadly force and weapons to defend their country's interests and to protect their people. Those called to serve in the military are forced to observe an 'iron discipline' or a 'blind discipline'. This iron or blind discipline means that soldiers are constantly and consciously called to obedience of their seniors and to be ready or willing to perform their duties. Baaz and Verweijen (2013) show, for instance in the case of the DRC army, that an offence perpetrated by a soldier is not only viewed as a violation of rules, but also as a violation of trust or mutual obligations. Such mutual obligations are at the heart of the relationships between soldier and commander – and their violation resembles the breach of the client-boss relationships. In their view, an important number of members of the Congolese Army are accused and condemned not because of their abuses against civilians, but mainly because of their disobedience to the commandment (see Baaz and Verweijen, 2013 - my translation from French into English).

Discipline, according to Mbembe (2001: 24) in relation to state power enhancement in Africa before and after colonisation, refers to "specific relations of subjection" between soldiers and

their superiors. This subjection results in the “supreme denial right” of soldiers to question or say no to the authority (Mbembe, 2001: 25). Soldiers are constantly reminded about discipline through different words, gestures or slogans such as ‘shoot first and ask questions later’ or ‘execute first and complain after’. These ideas become part of their lives as they always refer to them in performing their actions and what Austin (195:40) calls speech act[s] resulting from the performative utterances, and contribute to the transformation of the individual’s behaviour. These utterances represent “a performance of some kind of action” (Austin, 1975: 5). For instance, when a soldier says, “I will die for the country” or “my blood will be poured out for the country”, he is far from being theoretical. As part of military discipline, these utterances carry power in their constant reiteration.

Pavlov’s classic conditioning experiment paved the way for new theories on human behaviour and provides a way of understanding how the military conditions soldiers through blind discipline. Thorndike shows, in his “law of effect” phenomenon, a link between humans and animals with regard to specific situations (or stimuli) and behaviours (or responses) that are rewarded (Van Wyk, 2000). Put differently, the specific behaviour produced depends on the specific context that can discourage or encourage it. At the core of military culture is training, which can be understood as the process through which precisely defined behaviour changes are made to occur in [soldiers through the appropriate plan] of activities and contingencies of reinforcement (Newton, 1980: 184). The environment remains determinant in shaping behaviour.

The process of behaviour development is important for this study of former soldiers living in new social contexts. The Skinnerian model suggests that behaviour is acquired through useful learning and reinforcements leading to crafting students’ behaviour in an appropriate way. In this process, the expected behaviour is praised and rewarded while deviant behaviour is punished, discouraged and unrewarded (Phillips, 1998). This process also requires that instructors take heed of their own behaviour which is important in reinforcing the modification of students’ behaviour in a specific environment. In other words, the leaders who are influencing the learners’ behaviour modification need to preach by good example. Skinner uses the terms “controller” and “controlee” to label people who control others and those who are controlled by other people (O’Donohue and Ferguson 2001: 208-209). In the context of the army, the controller is the leader who is in charge of enforcing the principles of the army and the controlee are the soldiers who have to be reinforced to behave according to the army’s

philosophy. According to Baaz and Verweijen (2013, my translation from French), discipline includes questions of order in the army, punishment of those who break the rules and that of behaviour adaptation to the prevailing professional norms and values governing military world in general. As such, the freedom of soldiers is curtailed as they are confined in a situation where they are compelled to behave not as they wish, but to respond to the need of the institution that employs them. Foucault (1975) suggests that discipline contributes to the development of a new economy and politics for bodies given that modern institutions require bodies to be individuated according to their tasks, as well as for training, observation and control.

Since the conduct of soldiers is constantly monitored, it is Skinner's view that peoples' behaviours are influenced by external elements whether they like it or not. Planned controls aim to reinforce the behaviour of soldiers to respond effectively to the demands of the institution. As result, the controller may rely on callous methods in the form of punishment. Baaz and Verweijen (2013) report that DRC soldiers are sometimes compelled to perform humiliating tasks such as carrying water or cutting grass without wearing shoes. One of the most common punishments is flogging in front of troops commonly known as *fimbo* (a Lingala word meaning whip). This, as well as other forms of punishment, is usually done at the whims and caprices of the chief-commander (see Baaz and Verweijen, 2013 – my translation from French into English).

Such aversive methods force soldiers to comply with orders and make them change their behaviour (O'Donohue and Ferguson 2001). Although behaviourist theorists (e.g. Tuckman, 1992) believe that punishment is unnecessary in the reinforcement of characters, punishment in the army is aimed at making soldiers develop the kind of aggressive behaviours which the institution values. Therefore, while people may freely decide to join the army, they have no independence of choice when it comes to observing its rules. Those who fail to conform are punished while those who do are rewarded not only in terms of material or financial compensation but also with honour, praise and promotion (Baaz and Verweijen, 2013).

Skinner's theory of reinforcement helps us to explore how soldiers are made to inculcate certain behaviours. Foucault argues that discipline gives rise to a whole new form of individuality for bodies, which enables them to perform their duties within the new economic, political, and military organisations evolving in the contemporary age. He maintains that the aim of discipline is the creation of "docile bodies" required by the new economics, politics and warfare

of the current generation (Foucault, 1975: 138). Arguably, Foucault's approach is the opposite of Skinner's. He talks about how people come to be self-regulating as opposed to learning through punishment and reward from a higher authority. Docile bodies in the army are understood as bodies forcibly shaped to respond to the demands of the institution. Military discipline aims to develop soldiers' characters and efficiency in the performance of duty as well as the subordination of the individual will to the group's interest. Through initiatives and functions, military discipline implies obedience of the commander even in his absence.

The reinforcement theory uses a positive influence of the instructor called reinforcer to control the student's behaviour. In this regard, Tuckman (1992:46) describes basic education as "operant conditioning" towards certain outcome, which for soldiers is to become 'un-civilians with new ways of thinking, talking and walking. Another useful concept for this study is the concept of a discriminative stimulus which is stimulus that can signal operant conditioning. Instead of waiting for the operant response to be given randomly, "the coach can condition students' reinforcement by compelling them to display a particular behaviour" (Tuckman 1992: 47). For instance, in order to show respect toward a senior officer or flag, junior officers are required to make a salute and wait until requested to drop their hands. It is important to note that what controls behaviour is the consequence and not the gesture. However, the sign is helpful in guiding the soldiers to adopt the right response on which the reinforcement depends. Various steps can be used to explain behaviour modification. These include, for instance, the identification of a desired or target behaviour or following instructions pertaining to the performance or non-performance of the behaviour that forms the object of attention or the refrain of the disruptive or unwelcoming behaviour and/ or the reinforcement of the target behaviour during its occurrence (Tuckman 1992).

In discussing the question of discipline, it is important to find a possible link between the army's perceptions of discipline and then to relate it to a specific paradigm that may inform the behaviours of soldiers. Although the role of a conditioning environment in the acquisition of disciplined behaviour is important, this study is more concerned about life out of the conditioning environment. Particular attention is given on how the previous behaviour acquired from a certain environment influences the new environment whilst also exploring the influence of the new environment in the continual occurrence or denial of this behaviour. In case of any changes to behaviour resulting from the new environment, the study examines reasons behind such behaviour changes within the new setting.

2.4. Bourdieu's concepts

Bourdieu's (1977; 1990) notions of field, habitus, capital, doxa and social domination are useful for this study's exploration of military discourses of war and violence in varying contexts. Bourdieu's (1990: 35) has offered the following influential definition of habitus:

> The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.

The habitus informs behaviour and how individuals navigate the field. It is a system of durable and transposable dispositions which can be used to adapt in new situations. As a durable system, the habitus is a product of history. Bourdieu further argues that:

> In each one of us, in differing degrees, is contained the person we were yesterday, and indeed, in the nature of things it is even true that our past personae predominate in us, since the present is necessarily insignificant when compared with the long period of the past because of which we have emerged in the form we have today (Bourdieu, 1990: 56).

For his part, Dumais (2002: 46) argues that habitus is one's disposition, which influences the actions that one takes; it can even be manifested in one's physical demeanour, such as the way one carries oneself or walks. One's socialisation and different identities contribute to one's habitus which develops over time. The habitus can thus be understood as a grammar or set of norms for specific environments which Bourdieu refers to as fields. The habitus links structure and action such that the latter is a result of the former which recreates itself. Highlighting the adjustment of the habitus to the particular environmental or field conditions of its constitution, Bourdieu (1977: 95) argues that the habitus engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions and no others. Explaining the concept of field, Reed-Danahay argues that:

> A field of forces, whose necessity is imposed on agents who are engaged in it, and a field of struggles within which agents confront each other, with differentiated means and ends according to their position in the structure of the field of forces, thus contributing to conserving or transforming its structure (Reed-Danahay, 2004: 32).

The concept of the field is fluid and "has to be rethought anew every time" when applied empirically (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 109).

A field, according to Bourdieu, is a system of social positions in which individuals or institutional agents struggle for access to resources such as the different kinds of capital. The word capital often implies:

> Economic theory has allowed to be foisted upon it a definition of the economy of practices which is the historical invention of capitalism; and by reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, i.e., (economically) self-interested, it has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange as noneconomic, and therefore disinterested (Bourdieu, 1986: 46).

Bourdieu's idea of capital goes beyond the Marxist understanding of the term as the finances that enable livelihood. Capital, in Bourdieu's understanding, is what is valuable within a particular context, including social, political, economic, cultural and symbolic capital (prestige and honour).

In this study, the army is conceived as a field with numerous sought-after capitals, for which various actors strategically position themselves. In the context of this study, examining the lived realities of former Congolese soldiers in South Africa, it is important to identify the cultural capital they possess and how they deploy it for different purposes within the context of migration. Bourdieu argues that the field and capital cannot be disentangled. Herein, I argue that former soldiers brought something from the field which they use for various purposes in the context of migration. The next discussion concerns the review of each form of capital in Bourdieu's theorisation.

2.4.1. Cultural capital

According to Dumais (2002: 46), cultural capital serves as a power resource or a way for groups to remain dominant or gain status. There are three types of cultural capital according to Bourdieu:

> [O]bjectified cultural capital, which refers to objects that require special cultural abilities to appreciate, such as works of art; institutionalized cultural capital, which refers to educational credentials and the credentialing system; and embodied cultural capital, which is the disposition to appreciate and understand cultural goods. (Dumais, 2002: 46)

Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (such as pictures, books, dictionaries and instruments) which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee. It is not surprising that when the benefits of investing in education are assessed, only the profits are reckoned. Defining education in terms of its functions fails to take into account how it contributes to reproduce the social structure beyond transmitting cultural capital through heredity (Bourdieu, 1986). The structure of the field, that is the unequal distribution of capital, is the source of the specific effects of capital such as the appropriation of profits and the power to impose the laws of functioning of the field most favourable to capital and its reproduction (Bourdieu, 1986). In the context of this study, cultural capital includes the social assets of former soldiers including their training, dress sense and the philosophies that may continue to influence their post-military lives in a different social context.

2.4.2. Social capital

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources that are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition which provides each of its members with the backing of the community. It also includes owned capital, a ‘credential’ that entitles them to credit in the various senses of the word. These relationships may exist only in the practical state, in material and/or symbolic

exchanges which help to maintain them. They may also be socially instituted and guaranteed by the application of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and by "a whole set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them; in this case, they are more or less really enacted and so maintained and reinforced, in exchanges" (Bourdieu, 1986: 51). Social capital is a source of power because, as Bourdieu has pointed out,

> the social capital accruing from a relationship is that much greater to the extent that the person who is the object of it is richly endowed with capital (mainly social, but also cultural and even economic capital), the possessors of an inherited social capital, symbolized by a great name, are able to transform all circumstantial relationships into lasting connections (52).

A good illustration of social capital can be found in the DRC army's network of 'Big Men'. According to Baaz and Stern (2013), Congolese soldiers maintain loyalties to several of these networks which they look up for protection and social capital. An individual's amount of social capital is often dependent "on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected" (Bourdieu, 1986: 51). Social capital creates the unbridgeable boundaries of the group beyond which constitutive exchanges – trade, commensality, or marriage – cannot take place.

The relationships between soldiers and civilians are defined by the ethos of the army. Usually civilians are called names and soldiers are discouraged to socialise with them. In the context of migration, soldiers seek to establish new social networks and therefore compelled to modify their behaviours to be able to enter into new social groups different from those of the army. It is important to mention that social capitals are convertible, meaning they can be used for different purposes in different contexts. The exchange of the various sorts of capital becomes the foundation "of the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital (and the position occupied in social space) by means of the conversions least costly in terms of conversion work and of the losses inherent in the conversion itself (in a given state of the social power relations)" (Bourdieu, 1986: 54). However, this does not account for military capital which is acquired through socialisation in the army. This study enriches Bourdieu's ideas in regard to military capital, a resource applied by former soldiers in migration setting, as illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 1: Different kinds of capitals



***Source**: Author*

Military capital is an important asset that can be used to access other forms of capitals, particularly in the context of migration. Given that capital is durable and transposable, this study will examine how former soldiers use their accumulated military resources to access other forms of capitals in the South African context marked by various socio-economic challenges. In this study, I argue that even though soldiers spend most of their time in one field (the army), they are also involved in other fields which they can access using their military capital. While their military identity can be durable, their migration from the DRC to South Africa has led to the transposition of their habitus into their new contexts. In other words, their military identity has been altered to fit the conditions or realities of the new context. As such, their practices are informed by the interaction between habitus and field.

The different forms of capital in the army field include social, cultural, economic, and symbolic capitals which are mutually convertible and cannot be treated in isolation and are all characterised by contestations among stakeholders (Bourdieu 1986; Casey 2005; Lars 2008). The habitus, according to Bourdieu, describes the mental dispositions of people and is a kind of a cognitive map:

> The habitus, the durably installed generative principle or regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus (Bourdieu 1977: 28).

One of the goals of this study is to explore how habitus of former soldiers is "being constituted and constituting, is central to understanding habitus as being constantly negotiated—that is *constructed/ing*, *reconstructed/ing* and *maintained/ing*" (Hunter, 2004: 177 – original emphasis). Bourdieu argues that there is a dialectical relationship between habitus and field, and it is the interface of the field and habitus that produces practice (Bourdieu 1990). Bourdieu defines habitus as both, "a structuring structure" and as a "structured structure" (Bourdieu, 1984: 170). As a structuring structure, habitus organises the practices and the perception of the practices. For instance, the DRC army promotes hegemonic masculinity through risk-taking activities and perceives those soldiers who positively respond to this requirement as "people with refined taste (the perception of these practices)". On the other hand, "a structured structure is the product of the incorporation of the division in social class. The habitus does not only tend to promote attendance to military ideas of hegemonic masculinity but is also a product of that attendance. Therefore, soldiers who are trained in those ways become "more likely to be socialized to value" and enjoy the violent activities associated with hegemonic masculinity (Flecha, Gómez and Puigvert, 2003: 37-38).

Habitus is the cognitive/mental system of structures, which are embedded within an individual (and/or a collective consciousness) which are the internal representations of external structures. Habitus involves our thoughts, tastes, beliefs, interests and our perceptions of the world around us and is forged via enculturation, education, breeding, family and culture. In Bourdieu's view, habitus is potentially influential in people's actions and the construction of their social spheres and can be externally influenced. In terms of the field, habitus is flexible and can easily be exchangeable (Bourdieu 1990). The usefulness of this concept for my study is in the exploration of the social practices of former DRC soldiers in a new environment in contrast to their lived realities in the DRC. By practices, I mean the 'habitualised' actions and conduct (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Bourdieu 1990) of the former soldiers that are associated with their military identity.

One significant practice in the DRC is symbolic expression of power through violence. Bourdieu defines symbolic violence as the process whereby in all societies, order and social restraint are produced by indirect, cultural mechanisms rather than by direct, coercive social control (Jenkins 1992:104). Although, conventionally defined, the concept of symbolic violence is important for this study and is used to interrogate how it shapes the identity of soldiers in the DRC through organisational, institutional and social contexts. The occurrence of symbolic violence can be unnoticed in the sense that the individual is unaware that they are inflicting violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Thompson (1991: 23) argues that:

> Like many of Bourdieu's ideas, the notions of symbolic power and symbolic violence are rather flexible notions which were worked out in specific research contexts, and hence they are best explained by reference to his more concrete anthropological and sociological studies.

In the South African ground, practices are sometimes used as a response to the uncertainty caused by dire conditions in the host environment. They can also be used to affirm the previous identity of the soldiers or to even contest or relinquish that identity in their effort to rebuild their lives in South Africa. According to Hunter (2004), habitus and body subjectively and mutually constitute each other. In this regard, Green (2003:103) argues that the need for 'ideal bodies' leads people to be disconnected from their sensory and sensual selves [to meet] the standards of what the body 'should be' and how it should act, the dominant culture maintains control as people in oppressed groups distrust their own sensory impulses and give up their bodily authority. The soldiering world has become an environment where "trainers ceased to be responsible for directly shaping candidates' bodies, but rather set a 'training standard' requiring skills and attitudes' development through self-analysis, self-judgment and self-evaluation according to the attainment of a specific ideal" (Green, 2003: 119). In this sense, the use of Foucault's (1988: 18) concept of technologies of the self is relevant to this study. Foucault defines four types of technologies of the self: 1) technologies of production; 2) technologies of sign systems; 3) technologies of power, "which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivising of the subject (Foucault, 1988: 18); and, 4) technologies of the self,

> which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.

Another important element of Bourdieu's ideas which applies to this study is the concept of doxa. Doxa is the 'natural attitude' of the dominated groups which is misrecognized as socially arbitrary. Doxa is also a "*sens pratique"* which in particular a habitus and field determines "perceptions and opinions (essentially, orthodoxy or heterodoxy). Lastly, doxa is contrasted to discourse, which suggests a disembodied representational view of language and symbolic practices more generally (Myles, 2004: 94). Berlinerblau (1999: 202) emphasises that doxic beliefs, although shared by all, are themselves produced and reproduced by the dominant class. Herein, I argue that competitions and contestations among soldiers as well as soldiers' attitudes and violence against civilians within the Congolese society are influenced by unwritten (and sometimes written) rules, constituting what could be described as doxa. It is doxa which enables habitualisation (and is also a product of it) and makes social reproduction possible (Throop and Murphy 2002). For instance, the habilitualisation of corruption during the period of the then Zairean republic resulted from a proverbial doxa from Mobutu, '*voler mais voler intelligemment*' (in French meaning steal, but steal shrewdly). In a similar vein, the popular doxic pointing civilians are the cornfields of soldiers seeks to legitimise the illegitimate ways in which soldiers extort civilians in order to enhance their own poor incomes.

The fundamental theoretical components of a *doxic* approach to the military are: (1) the existence of dominant group or class in a specific time and space; (2) sharing certain unrecognised, tacit assumptions about the group and those out of the military world; (3) un/knowingly inscribe these assumptions in the behaviour or conduct of the members of the group and (4) un/intentionally solidify their own dominant position. If these theoretical gears can easily apply to the the DRC where these former soldiers originate from, there is a need to explore what of these *doxic* beliefs has remained after they have left their country of origin.

2.4.3. Motivation for using Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, capital and field

The use of Bourdieu's concept of field as the analytical framework for this study is based on the fact that while Bourdieu's concepts have origins in Africa – Algeria to be precise – (Goodman, 2003; Grenfell 2006), its application is yet to gain traction among African scholars researching militarisation on the African continent. Given that the socio-political realities of Africa are different from those of the West, I argue that exploring how former DRC soldiers residing in South Africa negotiate their identities as migrants in a foreign country would contribute to an African perspective on Bourdieu's field theory. In this sense, Bourdieu's concept of field is relevant in examining the lived experiences of former soldiers in two different contexts: the DRC and South Africa. The violence in Johannesburg has often been attributed to former soldiers from different African countries with a South African police minister once blaming Zimbabwean ex-military personnel living in South African for bank robberies and for promoting criminality. These allegations cannot be taken for granted because urban studies done in South Africa (Katsaura, 2013) using Bourdieu's tools of analysis have not singled out the identity of those involved in criminal activities. This is particularly the case in Johannesburg, the city of gold, where locals have frequently accused foreign nationals of being responsible for insecurity and crime in South Africa.

This study therefore examines how habitus can be acquired, claimed and even dismissed and more importantly, the impact of migration on the identities of former soldiers. Some questions such as does the new environment allow former soldiers to use violence? How do former soldiers consider themselves in this new milieu? Do they still view themselves as soldiers or civilians? What makes them believe that they have lost or regained their military identity? When and how they exercise their military identity in South Africa? What has changed and how do they justify this shift? This study, therefore, attempts to answer these questions using Bourdieu's concept of habitus, capital, field and practice as its analytical framework. More importantly, this study focuses on the different kinds of capital that former soldiers acquired in the army. Additionally, the study makes a significant contribution concerning the employment of military capital, a concept which remains undeveloped in Bourdieu's analytical tools. Considering that capital is deposited into individual and that is durable and transposable (Bourdieu, 1990), this study investigates the aspects of military capital that has remained dominant in the lives of former DRC soldiers and how they use it in the South African context. Put differently, the study examines how the South African context impacts the military capital

acquired by former DRC soldiers. Considering that these former soldiers have been removed from their previous field, this seems to paint the image of fish out of water. This study further examines the ability of former DRC soldiers to mobilise or to be mobilised in the new milieu, the opportunities they were able to grasp and which ones they missed in the foreign country. This is related to Bourdieu's term, "hysteresis" (Bourdieu, 1990: 59), that means the possibility that former soldiers' habitus may become misfit in the different environment.

Bourdieu's (1991) concept of field is concerned with how social order and domination are reproduced and renegotiated (Bourdieu 1991). Bourdieu's analytical tools of habitus, field and capital will be useful to understand why soldiers in the DRC relied on violence, what meaning they attached to violent acts, what privileges or advantages the DRC field allowed them to access and now that they find themselves in a South Africa; how they renegotiate their identities.

Chapter Three: Research Methods

3.0. Introduction

This chapter discusses the research and data collection techniques used in the study and reflects on some of the dilemmas – methodological and ethical – that emerged during the research process. Information about the participants, that is, the criteria for inclusion in the study, their profiles and sampling technique used is also provided. All the participants were former Congolese soldiers living as refugees in South Africa. The term refugee was used to refer to those ex-soldiers who were formally granted the four-year refugee status (South African Refugees Act 130 of 1998) as asylum seekers whose applications for refugee status were still pending for more than ten years in many cases. The chapter describes and justifies the research design as well as data collection and analysis methods for the purpose of this study and the logic that informed this choice. I also describe the instrument used to collect data as well as the procedures followed to carry out this study. Part of the chapter is also discussing the usefulness of data analysis methods. Lastly, since this study deals with people who are commonly viewed as perpetrators of violence, I discuss questions relating to positionality and trust as well as the ethical challenges that arose in the process of collecting data and the different ways of dealing with them.

The study is qualitative in nature with a particular focus on narrative interviews and participant observation. The choice of any method of inquiry raises the question of what kind of data the researcher intends to collect and how the methods will appropriately match the "empirical questions and issues" (Patton, 1999: 1189). The strengths of qualitative methods have been outlined in several studies (Guest et al., 2013; Griffin, 2004). Qualitative methods are suitable to "answer the *whys* and *hows* of human behaviour, opinion, and experience— information that is difficult to obtain through more quantitatively-oriented methods of data collection" (Guest et al., 2013: 1). The advantage of qualitative method is the capacity "to probe into responses or observations as needed and obtain more detailed descriptions and explanations of experiences, behaviours, and beliefs—this is how we answer the *why* and *how* questions" (Guest et al., 2013: 21). Qualitative inquiry, as Griffin (2004: 13) argues, is the only method that can allow in-depth analysis since it can deal with apparently contradictory data and provide insights into respondents' perspectives, which may be rendered invisible by quantitative methods.

Qualitative methods were chosen for this study for their relevance in enabling the former soldiers to give their opinions, views and feelings about the topic under investigation (Creswell 2003:188). They told stories about their military involvement expressing what and how they remembered their past military careers and how they felt in a different social environment. As such, the study did not follow any grounded theory and interpretative phenomenological analysis or any rules about suitable materials or mode of investigation, or the best level at which to study the stories (Squire, Andrews & Tamboukou, 2009: 1). The exploratory nature of the study accounts for the choice of qualitative methods. Creswell (2003:30) argues that exploratory studies are appropriately designed when much has not been written about the social phenomenon and researchers aim to gain an in-depth understanding based on participants' perspectives and insights. Since the study's focus is on the military experiences of ex-soldiers from the DRC, I made use of narratives as one of techniques of data collection and analysis.

The choice of a narrative, as highlighted by Squire et al. (2009: 1), enables insights from different and sometimes contradictory layers of meaning by bringing them into a useful dialogue with each other in order to understand more about [ex-soldiers] and social change. The stories collected, aimed to explore the ways in which the experiences of migration had affected memories that Congolese ex-soldiers had of war and particularly of the violence that they might have perpetrated, witnessed or been subjected to while they were still serving as soldiers. These stories have four parts: participants' involvement in the Congolese army, their military experiences, their departure from the army and their new lives as civilians and refugees in South Africa. Importantly, my personal observation of the ex-soldiers in their social circumstances such as their workplaces helped me to understand the extent to which stories of the Congolese wars and stereotypes of those who may have participated in it as inhumanly violent could lead to their stigmatisation in South Africa which has prompted some to engage in dissimulation or identity reconstruction.

While hegemonic masculinity was salient in the Congolese army, this study examined through observation what aspects of the hegemonic masculinity were perpetuated and/or challenged in the way former soldiers lived in the host setting. Through observation, I was able to investigate not only the stories told, but also the ways in which Congolese ex-soldiers "silenced, contested or accepted" (Squired et al., 2009) the violence they perpetrated, witnessed or suffered. The study was particularly interested in the social and political factors that influence the lives of former Congolese soldiers. Lived experiences require appropriate methods of documentation and analysis since the narrative process consists of focusing on studying one or two individuals,

gathering data through the collection of their stories, reporting individual experiences, and chronologically ordering (or using *life course stages*) the meaning of those experiences (Creswell, 2007:54). Narratives are the result of the way our experience are socially constructed as they are the only way through which we can express this experience and make it intelligible […] everything, and especially everything that is felt, imagined and communicated (thus, narratives), is a social and cultural construct (Cihodariu, 2012: 31). Creswell (2007) presents different types of narratives, but a thematic biographical approach was appropriate for this study because I was interested in writing and recording former Congolese soldiers' military experiences (Creswell, 2007; Squire, 2013). Through narrative, people reflect on their identity in the present when engaging the past (Cihodariu, 2012). The social constructionist perspective is that all 'narratives sit at the intersection of history, biography, and society' (Liamputtong and Ezzy 2005: 132); they are dependent on the context of the teller and the listener; and are not intended to represent 'truth' (Hunter, 2010: 44). Narratives become "one of the primary sources of meaning for human thought" (Cihodariu, 2012: 42). The challenge of narrative research, as Creswell (2007: 57) notes, is "its requirement to collect detailed information about the participant, a clear understanding of the context of the individual's life, and takes a keen eye to identify in the source material gathered the particular stories that capture the individual's experiences".

I interviewed twenty-one former male Congolese soldiers (see Appendix 1) about their military experiences and the impact on their lives. I explored these less frequently told narratives and examined "socially constructed 'realities' and the powerful discourses that influenced them" (Hunter, 2010: 45). This approach focused on how participants construct their own narratives about their experiences in relation to others involved at the time, and in relation to available social and cultural narratives. Inevitably, former soldiers had absorbed the socially constructed meanings placed on their experiences by others, which influenced the narratives that they chose to tell me (Hunter, 2010). As in the case of Hunter, a narrative inquiry methodology seemed relevant for this study because it helped me to "examine the data that I collected in relation to the social construction of the issue of early [military] experiences and to explore how [former Congolese soldiers]' narratives had changed and evolved over time" (Hunter, 2010: 46). The social environment has great influence in the construction process of an individual's self (Hunter, 2010). This approach was helpful as it allowed participants to construct a narrative of their life stories as a way of developing a coherent account of their lives and positioning

themselves in relationship to others (Hunter, 2010:47). This is an attempt to construct a stronger sense of self, using narrative as an integrative metaphor (Hunter, 2010).

In this narrative approach, the story becomes an object of study, focusing on how individuals or groups make sense of events and actions in their lives. Narrative is thus well suited to study subjectivity and the influence of culture and identity on the human condition" (Mitchell and Egudo, 2003, page unstated). This review of storytelling positions narrative research largely within the postmodernist paradigm. Mitchell and Egudo (2003) argue that postmodernism emphasises that knowledge is value-laden, and reality is based on multiple perspectives, with truth grounded in everyday life involving social interactions amongst individuals. The social construction of reality and knowledge is critically contextual. Since the focus of my study was about how ex-soldiers remembered war and violence during their military career, what mattered was not only their discourse about war and violence memory, but the context, the feeling and the body language as well as the argument used in the construction of this discourse was critical. More importantly, the study is concerned about what patterns of military identity remained and how former soldiers claimed this identity in the host setting. Listening to ex-soldiers' stories of violence enabled me to analyse how culturally and historically contingent the terms, beliefs and issues narrators address are (Mitchell and Egudo, 2003). Stories told within their cultural contexts to promote certain values and beliefs can contribute to the construction of individual identity or the concept of community (Mitchell and Egudo, 2003). Narrative offers the potential to address ambiguity, uncertainty, complexity and dynamism of individual, group, and organisational phenomena (Mitchell and Egudo, 2003). Narrative analysis can be used to "record different viewpoints and interpret collected data to identify similarities and differences in experiences and actions (Mitchell and Egudo, 2003:5). I decided to use the narrative approach to grasp various ideas of common understanding or beyond common understanding but with particular meaning such as feelings, images, and time. Narrative thus provided an appropriate way to explore the diverse experiences of the ex-soldiers under investigation and to examine the social dynamics, implicit knowledge and professional identities of military life. Through stories told this method reveals an in-depth account of the military role, the processes and organisational culture embodied within the stories told as put forward in by the work of Mitchell and Egudo (2003).

3.1. Congolese ex-soldiers' access and recruitment

The participants of this study are closely linked to the population I used for my master's research in forced migration studies which explored alternative strategies of dealing with trauma and the effects of political violence among Congolese refugees in South Africa (Lakika, 2011). I was therefore able to recruit participants from my own social networks who were victims of political violence and who sought psychological services for some of their health problems. One of the participants in that previous research was a senior officer (a colonel) in the Congolese Army who used his past military experiences as a coping strategy in South Africa where he had lived as refugee for many years. Also, having worked at a security company myself, I met some fellow Congolese who served in the Congolese armed forces before coming to South Africa. To select participants, I used snowball sampling techniques by which the researcher identifies other relevant research participants through those who have already been interviewed (Mashike, 2005). According to Faugier & Sargeant (1997: 793), snowball sampling "relies on the behaviour or 'trait' under study being social and participants sharing with others the characteristic under examination". Participants were selected from my personal networks given the sensitivity of the study and confidentiality issues for several reasons. First, these former soldiers were involved in the perpetration of violence against civilians who might still retain grudges against them. Secondly, some former soldiers remain traumatised from the violence they witnessed, perpetrated, condoned or even underwent which might explain possible expressions of deviant post-military conduct.

I also planned to access participants through the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) located in Johannesburg, which provides psycho-social support to perpetrators and victims of violence through its Trauma and Transition Programme (TTP). I chose the CSVR because I had previously worked with them on several research projects and was familiar with their staff members. Unfortunately, this did not work out as the Centre did not respond to the official letter of request that I sent to them. I finally relied on community and church leaders who agreed to connect me to former soldiers who were members of their communities or churches. The criteria for participants included former Congolese Army military personnel who were living as refugees, asylum seekers or as undocumented migrants in Johannesburg. Participants were from the FAZ and from the current army (FARDC). Those from FAZ also worked in the current Congolese armed forces before moving to South Africa. The choice of soldiers who had served in the regular Congolese Army was because it was hard

to identify those who were part of the rebel groups since many of them were not willing to declare their identities anyway. Although, many of them were reported to have fled to South Africa, it was difficult for them to declare their identity as members of armed groups for security reasons. On the other hand, soldiers from the regular army (as it will be discussed in the finding chapters) were known even by other members of the Congolese community who, in some cases, often sought their advice to deal with the current political crisis facing the DRC.

3.2. Data collection techniques

I relied on ethnographic methods of in-depth face-to-face interviews and participant observation for seven months from July 2015 to January 2016. Notes on each of these instruments and their relevance for this study are presented below.

3.2.1. Interviews

Seidman argues that in-depth interview is used where there is an interest in understanding the lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience (Seidman, 2006: 9). According to Gorman et al. (2005: 41), in-depth interviews also have the potential to offer balance and corroboration where observed phenomena are complex or involve a number of factors. In-depth interviews have much strength including the fact that it combines structure and flexibility. Open-ended questions offer participants the possibility of determining and shaping the conversation which is not possible with closed questions as used in a structured questionnaire. The order of topics is flexible and responses were probed and explored allowing me (the researcher) to be responsive to relevant issues raised spontaneously by the interviewees. Secondly, it allowed interaction, the most valuable tool of data collection offering space for participants to interact with the researcher without any restriction (Mashike, 2005).

Narrative interviews were most appropriate for this study not only because they allowed the researcher to get details on ex-soldiers' personal life stories, they also enable insight into how their military experiences are (re)reconstructed. This is only possible within appropriate spaces where they could freely share their own accounts of militarisation, war, violence and migration. Although the events, experiences and periods that constitute memory may be externally affected, the individual experience results in a "narrative unconscious" rooted in a shared life of culture (Freeman, 2010: 97).

The nature of my study and the type of data needed required an unstructured interview offering participants to freely express themselves about different topics that were raised and allowing the researcher to probe some of their answers. In-depth and unstructured interviews provided useful data about participant's experiences in the Congolese Army and the reasons leading to them absconding from the Congolese army and from their country of origin. Given the diverse experiences of ex-soldiers interviewed, many other probing questions arose in the discussions, making interviews last for more than one hour. Open-ended questions gave participants space to freely talk about their military experiences without having their responses constrained by a structured set of questions.

The interview guide focused on topics such as participants' involvement in the army, military experiences, and departure from the army as well as migration to South Africa. However, during the field work these topics were not rigid, as it is often the case in qualitative research. While I kept this framework, I realised that "the personal memory" of participants took the interview in different and unexpected directions (Zaviršek, 2006). Interviews were, as Watt (2007:91) points out, informal and conversational; exploratory, flexible, with open-ended questions. Importantly, data collected for this study did not only result from the responses provided by participants, but also from the observation of every particular details such as their body language, gesture, feelings, experiences and social milieu since interviewing and observing go together (Fontana and Frey, 2003). No particular rule was observed because each interview took place as a normal conversation rather than a formal interview and as I gave the participants the chance to tell their stories and highlight the salient aspects of their military career in the way that best suited them. Depending on participants' preference, interviews were mainly conducted in French and Lingala.

Interviewing allowed me to collect in-depth experiential information related to participants' background: their demographics, their motivation to join and leave the army, as well as their migration history. Then followed discussion related to military ideology, memories of war and violence and the transfer of military habitus to South Africa. However, to get a sense of their post military lives in South Africa, former soldiers were first asked to talk about their military identity in the DRC, how they perceived themselves and how they were perceived by others and what privileges they enjoyed. They were then asked to talk about the reasons that compelled them move to South Africa and their current experiences in the host country. This included discussion on relationships between soldiers and civilians, living conditions, access to public services such as documentation and medical care. More importantly, discussions

covered how their military experiences were used to deal with various challenges in the host country or to distinguish themselves from other people in different social contexts. After each interview I did an appraisal of how it was conducted, highlighting some emerging themes and adjusting some questions for the next interview. In order to better explore the transfer of military habitus in former soldiers' conduct in South Africa I decided to do participant observation in some of their social gatherings.

3.2.2. Participant observation

Participant observation enabled me to study social actors in their natural social settings (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Most of the participants were interviewed either in their homes or work places or in quiet public spaces. In all these places, I carefully observed the power dynamics and different attitudes the participants adopted. Those who worked as security guards were very sensitive to the in and out movements of people by often asking security questions to visitors, such as introducing themselves or the name of the department or person they wanted to visit. Security questions relating to place of birth or knowledge of the Congo as a country were also posed to me before the interviews. This showed that these former soldiers navigated a security field which made them more cautious when interacting with unfamiliar people for the first time. In addition, I also had the opportunity to do participant observation in some social gatherings of Congolese communities to which former soldiers were invited. These gatherings offered me a lot of valuable insight as well as comprehensive data that I could not get through interviews.

Participant observation was useful to this study because it enabled me to notice that most of the former soldiers were seeking to come out of isolation and rebuild their lives through new social networks in a foreign country. In this regard, I was more interested in learning the power dynamics of their language and actions as well as their influence in group decision-taking. Lubkemann (2000: 70) argues that:

> An understanding of the use of power in negotiations and of local conceptions of external political forces and internal political struggles also required an in-depth-participant-observation approach that could probe deeper than formal interviewing or survey methods alone due to its indirect approach and gradual, oblique realisation of the complexities and delicacies of context.

According to Bryman (2004: 339), participant observation is a good opportunity for the researcher "to confront members of a social setting in their natural environments". Through

participation observation, the researcher has the ability to observe behaviour and implicit features rather than just relying on what is data requiring much longer transcription (Bryman, 2004). Participant observation was useful as it allowed me to explore useful insights into unconscious behaviour which may not be established through interviews (Gorman et al. 2005). For instance, it is through participant observation that I came to realise that military identity was a complex asset which was differently claimed and recognised depending on the context in which former soldiers were placed. I was able to pay attention to the way my participants spoke and their body language in my interactions with them. I had few opportunities to observe some of them in social gatherings where I learnt how ex-soldiers interacted with others. For example, one of the participants was a trustee of the building where he stayed. Tenants sought advice relating to their lease from him before meeting the landlord; he was always busy willing to advise his fellow tenants who sought help from him. When he walked me out after the interview, I had with him, an occupant tenant we met in the stairs thanked him for the role he played in restoring peace in his family. I could hear that tenant saying that he ordered his daughter to come to kneel down before the former soldier and apologise for her misbehaviour towards him. Since I did not know what the problem was, I was not directly involved in the discussion. But from my observation, I could see that the former soldier was considered a resource person in the building. Many tenants, particularly Congolese citizens, relied on his advice either for matters relating to their lease or for their family problems. Lubkmann (2000) argues that interaction in the mundane affairs of everyday subsistence is useful to examine how social relations and their meanings are negotiated in actual practice. I also had the opportunity to attend a migrant meeting, organised by the Jesuit Refugee Service in partnership with the South African Department of Home Affairs, where I observed different behaviours from some former Congolese soldiers who were invited to that ceremony.

While participant observation requires developing close relationships with subjects, it was not difficult for me, as a member of the Congolese community in Johannesburg, South Africa. Many meetings or gatherings I attended concerning the Congolese community and discussions were mainly based on the socio-political situation in the DRC. During these gatherings I met some of the people (including former soldiers) with whom I already established friendships. However, my focus was mainly on former soldiers and I was very much interested in identifying cultural norms that exist in the military and how former soldiers applied these norms in their interactions with other members of the community. Some of the things that attracted my attention included their mode of dressing (many came wearing military uniforms

or red berets), and the way they spoke with authority as well as the effects of these military traits on other members in the community (Merriam, 1998). There was no particular site I chose to go to; I just went to any meetings that concerned the Congolese community with the hope that I would meet some former Congolese soldiers who were part of my study there and this approach was successful. These observations took place during the day. Some were in public gatherings; others were done during face-to-face interactions with participants either in their houses (for those who invited me to their homes) or in the meeting place of the interview. I was able to identify some patterns: for instance, the way a participant spoke about my polite way of knocking at his door or their intonations and volume of speaking. I could see in the facial expression of a participant who recounted that he ate human flesh how talking about eating animal meat was disgusting or how eating vegies which he presented to me was a form of forgetting his traumatic experience of eating human flesh. The same facial expression was also observed in the way of describing civilians as useless people compared to soldiers.

Following DeWalt, DeWalt, and Wayland's warning that "observations are not data unless they are recorded into field notes" (1998: 63), I had a notebook where I wrote down observations during my fieldwork. DeWalt, DeWalt, and Wayland (1998) recommend the researcher to take some of the field notes publicly to reinforce that what the researcher is doing is collecting data for research purposes. I made sure to write down field notes when the environment allowed me to do so. But sometimes it was difficult to write field notes particularly during face-to-face interviews. In order not to miss any part of the participants' accounts I wait until the end of the interviews. Once at home, I reviewed my notes to make sure that I linked the analysis with observations throughout the process to keep me on track. The aim was to explore recurring patterns or underlying themes in the behaviour, actions or inactions observed among former soldiers in the social gatherings. The writing up of the field work report was easy because being myself the observer, I unfailingly remembered things I witnessed in historical order and could map the physical space where events took place to recall details. The results of these series of observations are discussed in the section that follows.

3.3. Coping with traumatic stories: My own memories

During the field work, I heard many stories from former Congolese soldiers, some of which were very traumatic. These stories of war crimes and military violence affected me as not only as a Congolese, but also as one of the victims of soldiers' brutality. Modern anthropologists have highlighted different ways of constructing ethnographic knowledge "as much a product of the ethnographer's interactions with a particular people at a particular time as the theoretical position taken" (Cole, 2001:30). It is important therefore to reflect on the ways in which my position and identity may have influenced the data collection process (Lambert et al., 2010; Saw, 2010). Positionality "...reflects the position that the researcher has chosen to adopt within a given research study" (Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013: 71) and its identification requires to place the researcher in relation to three areas: "the subject, the participants and the research context and process" (Ibid: 71). Reflexivity informs positionality, requiring from the researcher a clear personal observation and examination about the influence of their worldview and subjectivity in the design, execution and interpretation of the findings of the research (Greenbank 2003). Reflexivity informs "sensitivity to the researcher's cultural, political, and social context" (Bryman, 2012: 393) since a researcher's epistemic integrity and social values could influence the research process (Greenbank 2003).

In social science research, reflexivity aims to explore and make sense of the relationship between the researcher and the object of research (Lambert et al., 2010). The focus of qualitative studies is the subjective realm, and as Shaw argues, what happens in the interactions between us and our world, the context in which we come into contact with objects (reality), and the way in which our descriptions (representations) of them are bound by time and place (Shaw, 2010:234).

Neutrality and objectivity are the often-required criteria in collecting and analysing data. However, neutrality and objectivity in ethnographic study are not only hard, but also not desirable because the researcher finds him/herself in the stories that participants share; his influence in the knowledge production effort needs to be outlined. In this regard, Adjei (2013: 6) stresses that the researcher is part of the social world in which the research is being conducted and that the researcher may bring some of his or her personal accounts to bear on the topic under investigation. This author underscores that flexibility and reflexivity where historical and socio-cultural experiences of both researchers and participants shape and direct data interpretation and analysis" (Adjei, 2013: 7).

In the process of data collection, my interactions were characterised by the ‘insider-outsider’ duality. According to Merton (1972: 21), “insiders are the members of specified groups and collectivities or occupants of specified social statuses: Outsiders are non-members”. My status as an insider was related to my ethnic and linguistic origins, gender and immigration status in South Africa, which to some extent gave me easy access to former Congolese soldiers. Apart from requesting financial compensation, participants became eager to participate and also involved their friends. One day while I was busy interviewing someone, an ex-soldier I previously interviewed brought one of his colleagues who wanted to participate in the study. Being engaged with another participant, it was impossible to attend to him at the same time. I decided to take his contact details and schedule the interview at another moment. However, I was also viewed as an outsider as a civilian who was a victim of military violence in the Congo. During the interviews, I was able to confront my own perceptions and struggled with ex-soldiers’ accounts of situations in which I was subjected to abuse and mistreatment. On the other hand, I knew that ex-soldiers’ accounts about war and violence, and the context in which they found themselves could also change my perceptions of what I thought of them. This recalls Watt’s (2007: 87) observation that “conducting research, which looks so intensely at the personal lives of others, is not for the faint of heart, and at times I wondered whether I was up to the challenge”. Like her, I worried about what I would do with stories that depicted the participants in a negative light. I wondered whether I would be honest enough to report the revelations made by participants accurately especially if things did not go the way I had expected. Would I be discouraged from carrying on with the interviews? In this regard, a friend strongly advised me to seek help from a psychologist.

Reflexivity helps the researcher to honestly and openly interpret the data and to refrain from manipulating the data to meet his or her expectations (Lambert et al., 2010). Although Congolese ex-soldiers were friendly and many of them were nonviolent, some of their attitudes and the way they addressed me put me in an awkward position. First, my status as a researcher made them believe that I could understand specialised military terminologies which I did not understand. This not only made communication difficult at times but it also resulted in them doubting me. When they spoke to me using a codified language, they expected me to understand what they meant. However, having noticed that I was unable to get the meaning of their message the tone went up as one participant once said to me, “I am speaking to you in parables and I can see you don’t understand. You cannot be an intelligence officer” (interview with John, July 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English). There were times when they

addressed me rudely and when I was made to remember being mistreated by soldiers back in the DRC. It took a lot of diplomacy on my part to control the discussions and relationships to press on and elicit clear responses from them. In order to assume the status of an insider, I resorted to using some of their familiar language especially in relation to the way I greeted and addressed them where I used their military ranks and military salutations.

I felt traumatised when the interviews turned to the bloody invasion of Kinshasa in 1998 in which many civilians, including me and my family, were attacked. Soldiers of ex-FAZ who were kept in Kitona by L.D.K were equipped and forced to be part of the rebellion that stood against Kabila in 1998. During his first appearance following the rebels' attacks in 1998 LDK held a conference in which he emphasised the economic and political motives of what he called Rwandan and Ugandan aggression and appealed to the population of Kinshasa to resist the occupation. In his declaration, Kabila stressed that the Congo had identified its enemy in a tribe, Tutsi because, he further explained, the Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan armies were ethnically dominated by Tutsi. Stressing that the sovereignty and independence of the DRC were under threat, he called Congolese citizens to arm with machetes, catapults, spears to resist the occupation, the only manner of avoiding becoming slaves of Rwandans, Burundians and Ugandans. The ruling regime heightened people's awareness through a resentment campaign inviting them to enrol in popular self-defence movement to thwart rebel's actions. The power of Kabila's discourse of 'othering others' drove the populations into an unimaginable hunting with horrible scenes of 'pre-emptive violence' against not only the rebels formed by Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan troop members and Congolese members of ex-FAZ, but also to foreign nationals originally from these countries, and worse still, to even some Congolese people whose 'physical looking' was similar to Tutsi. Horrible scenes of violence against the 'rebels' were committed by the population of Kinshasa who responded to L.D. Kabila's appeal to defend themselves in popular self-defence movement. Alleged rebels, christened *nyanganakata*[12] or those who were suspected to be part of the rebellion were ruthlessly killed; their skulls were split open with machetes and their bodies dragged on the roads as a game. The killing of those rebels took various forms, setting alight being a remarkable form of death. Fire became the expression of wrath of the crowd who desired the death of the rebels either from Congo or from Rwanda and Uganda. People have lost the sacred aura of human life and

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[12] This word in Lingala takes various meanings such as enemy aliens, evildoers, savages, barbarians, cruel and inhuman or people who came from the bush to make our lives a misery.

dignity by frequently and ubiquitously accepting, routinising, normalising and even expecting acts of violence and killing of others (Scheper-Hughes, 1995). As Scheper-Hughes observes:

> The images meant to evoke shock and panic evoke only blank stares, a shrug of the shoulders, a nod-acceptance as routine and *normal* of the extraordinary state of siege under which so many live. Humans have any uncanny ability to hold terror and misery at arm's length, especially when they occur in their own community and are right before their eyes (1995: 416-7).

Human life was desecrated. The population of Kinshasa bitterly killed those labelled rebels (even innocent people who were perceived to physically look Rwandan or Ugandan were then hounded, mocked, insulted and their bodies were set ablaze. As Palmary (2016: 82) explains in the context of xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in South Africa, it was a "spectacular, public and brutal violence where people [viewed as enemies] were necklaced[13] in the street". De Villiers and Omasombo report that the abandoned corpses on the road expressed gruesome scenes. Ceaselessly singing or dancing, young people of Kinshasa accomplished a kind of collective catharsis of cremating the dead bodies several times as to reaffirm their victory on foreigner (Rwandan and Ugandan) (De Villiers and Omasombo, 2001-translation is mine). The situation was so tense that people were compelled to run away from their living area. We too decided to move to another suburb trekking for a long distance with our frail (now late) mother. Although we had money there was food scarcity and we had nowhere to get food because businesses were all closed in the city.

Recalling the horrors of this period was particularly traumatic for both me and the participants as we all had personal experiences of the events. When soldiers spoke about the way they were moved to Kitona which they viewed as Rwandan strategy mounted to purge ex-FAZ soldiers, and about how many of their colleagues were killed with some disappearing and never returned. I was deeply affected because they reminded me about my own brother-in-law who joined the new army of Kabila and went to Kitona, leaving behind his wife (my sister) with five children. In the beginning when he left his family was in contact with him. But since they were moved from Kitona to an unknown place when the second war erupted, his family had lost contact with him. Until then they were not sure whether he was still alive or dead. His wife and children have often relied on our family's support for their survival.

[13] Palmary explains that necklacing is a practice whereby a tyre doused in petrol is put around a person's neck and set alight. In Lingala they refer to it *as politique ya kolatisa pneu* mostly applied to criminals.

Another sensitive topic was the overall military brutality and violence against civilians in the DRC. The ex-soldiers felt that the DRC was a good place to be a soldier because they felt less threatened and more powerful there. Their stories made me recall occasions where I had myself been brutalised and extorted by soldiers in the DRC which made me resentful.

The account about soldiers' violence against civilians in the DRC is recurrent and reminded me about my own story as victim when I was one day terrified with a cousin in town after meeting a close relative who gave us some money. Passing next to a military camp on our way back home, on a noiseless Saturday afternoon because businesses already closed two soldiers who were on duty kindly whistled as a sign to call us. Without any suspicion we decided to respond to the official's call. When we approached them, we were brutally arrested and locked in a cell for a while. Later on, they came in the cell where they kept us and undressed us. After a thorough search, and under intimidation, they took all the money we had. They later asked us to share it with them, a demand we complied with. In that frightening situation, we gave them half of the amount, but our generosity was treated as attempted bribery of military officers and became another transgression of the law for which we had to pay. This was just a trick for them to confiscate all the money we had. After taking the money and snatching my cousin's short (they said the short was good for them to use it for sport) they ordered us to run without looking back. The reminder of these traumatic moments was unbearable for me and created in me resentment against former soldiers. As I interviewed them, I felt, through these experiences, that engaging with ex-soldiers about their memories of war and violence was extremely critical, placing me in dilemma. I found myself as a victim of military brutality through ex-soldiers' military experiences. In this context, the question of positionality became pertinent and painfully evident. It showed how it was hard to detach my personal experiences from the study (Bourdieu 1996). Here I placed myself in relation to former soldier's violence by acknowledging my personal positions (viewed in soldiers' accounts as victim of military violence) could potentially influence the research (Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013).

Although I was looking to understand ex-soldiers' memories of war and violence, I found myself caught in the same memories. Through my interaction with Congolese ex-soldiers in South Africa I realised that I had become victim in my own study. But here I had to overcome these sentiments and carry on with the study. Yet another noteworthy experience was my interaction with Johnson, one of the participants that I met in Yeoville when I was accompanied by a visiting researcher at ACMS. Interested in questions of violence in different contexts, the visiting researcher was curious to see how my interviews with former Congolese soldiers were

being conducted. Since she was not from the DRC and did not know any of them, I was not worried about compromising the confidentiality of participants by going with her to the field. Upon our arrival, we were welcomed by Johnson who quickly remembered me. The interview took place in an open space in a courtyard where we were repeatedly interrupted by people moving in and out. The feeling I had was that the place was not confidential enough and that Johnson did not sufficiently respond to my questions especially on sensitive matters. He told me that he did not live there, but only came to spend time with his friend. The interview was conducted in Lingala and French and the visiting researcher who was Spanish and spoke English did not understand anything we discussed. But when we were about to start the interview, I introduced ourselves and the aim of the research to Johnson and reminded him about the ethical commitments of safety and confidentiality. He said he did not care about confidentiality and was ready to answer any questions, adding that his name could even be mentioned because he was not afraid. He claimed to be known by the Congolese security services by virtue of being the founder of a Congolese combatant movement in Johannesburg. I found his boldness interesting and wondered how this could be linked to his security exposure and experiences in the new setting. This recalls the experiences of Baaz and Stern in their study of rape among FARDC troops. According to Baaz and Stern (2009: 504), their participants saw the interviews as an opportunity to state their case to an apparently neutral audience with connections to influential people (i.e., the international community and international donors). Nevertheless, in my case, the visiting researcher did not appear to understand the conversation and I explained to the participant that the visitor was only a friend of mine.

Johnson reported that he got involved in the *mouvement des combattants*[14] (or combatant movement) in South Africa to 'fight the current ruling government because of massive killing and social injustices. However, when asked about his livelihood activities, he replied that before he used to make fake papers to help people travel, but now he stopped doing that illegal activity since he embraced God. This aligns with Mashike's study which found that the lack of social, political and economic integration has coerced former combatants into criminal activities in South Africa (Mashike, 2007).

[14] A resistance movement of the Congolese diaspora which started in 2004 following the various political and economic turmoil affecting the DRC at the moment, and which is fiercely opposed to the Joseph Kabila's regime members of this Congolese diasporic movement regard as illegitimate and of occupation.

Although she could not understand the language of the interview, my visiting researcher companion argued that Johnson's body language suggested that he lacked confidence probably because of her presence. By contrast, I felt that her presence motivated Johnson and that he probably kept back some information for possible security issues.

Another issue worth mentioning from the interviews is when an ex-soldier told me that he once ate human flesh in the battlefield. I felt particularly revulsed as he said this in a public place without appearing to care that he could be overheard. After shouting, 'Oh no', I expected him to put an end to that traumatic story but he was not ready to stop supporting that there was no difference between the meat we buy in shops and human flesh. This reminded me of rumours we had heard in the DRC of MLC soldiers being accused of cannibalism and made me wonder if there could be any truth in such rumours. These feelings made me stop the interview even though that meant I could not get more information on the key mission of the study.

3.4. Data analysis and interpretation

The data collected was first broken into themes to highlight important patterns. that helped me to grasp the links between concepts, constructs or variables, and to see whether there are any patterns or trends that can be identified or isolated, or establish themes in the data (Mouton, 2003). Thematic analysis is a method aimed at identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 79). Thematic analysis is a process used to formalise the identification and development of themes (Thomas and Harden, 2008: 5). Themes capture what is essential about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82). *Theme-ing* is a process facilitating the empirical materials to be embedded and interpreted within their context in relation to a particular context of communication (Mayring, 2014: 39). Thematic analysis offers a theoretical freedom, allowing a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 78).

Given the qualitative nature of the study, I started the data analysis while conducting the interviews.

The research questions guided the fieldwork and were a constant reminder about how data would be analysed. During fieldwork, I paid attention to the behaviour of participants in

addition to what they said while also taking note of the important themes that were emerging. The first challenge was to transcribe all the recorded interviews which I did on my own for various reasons. The first is to be in personal contact with each participant and familiarise myself with the types of data collected and second, to avoid any information distortions which could result from entirely relying on the next person for transcription (Fontana and Frey, 2003: 77). A hired research assistant transcribed half of the interviews, but since I often listened to the recordings and summarised each participant's responses, highlighting crucial elements of their stories, mistakes from the transcriptions had minimal impact on the results. This was then followed by the task of coding each paragraph into themes and sub-themes, using the participant's own language wherever possible. Coding aims at identifying "prominent attributes of the data (semantic content or latent), and allude to the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon" (Boyatzis, 1998: 63). During this process, I listened to the tapes several times and recorded my impressions of what was going on for the participant, for me, and between us as the narrative unfolded. I recorded my thoughts and insights about the data into a memo file attached to the participant's narrative file and coded these insights. I conducted this process, recognising that some voices (knowledge) are silenced and other voices and knowledge dominate the airwaves (Hunter, 2010). Although transcribing is a challenging process, I allocated much of my time to it because, as Braun and Clarke note, "transcription informs the early stages of analysis, and [helps] develop a far more thorough understanding of data" (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 88)

After transcribing the first batch of the interviews, the primary task was to go through them one by one. The processes that I found particularly useful at the analysis stage were:

> Summarising each participant's story in a few pages; coding the data into themes and sub-themes using participants' own language to describe each theme; highlighting 'quotable quotes' early in the process; pulling out one phrase to represent each participant; using one phrase to summarise the main theme of the thesis; using many different analysis techniques; continuously interrogating the data to explore the extent to which they support or contradict the theoretical framework used by this study; and understanding that analysis and writing up are interwoven processes" (Hunter, 2010: 49-50).

The careful examination of the transcribed interviews allowed me to start assigning codes to the interviews. A code in qualitative inquiry, as Saldana says, "is most often a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data [resulting from] interview transcripts,

participant observation, field notes, journals, documents, literature, artefacts, photographs, video, websites, e-mail correspondence, and so on" (Saldana, 2009: 3). I adopted a constructionist approach to codify data from interviews, participant observations, field notes and other documents. Since I used phrases for my codes, I decided to follow Saldana's (2009: 188) advice that "if you have coded your data with only words or short phrases and feel resultant codes are elusive, transform the final set of codes into longer-phrased themes". This theming process may allow drawing out a code's truncated essence by elaborating on its meanings. It is therefore this process that allowed me to produce initial descriptive themes. From these initial themes I carefully looked at creating new themes able to describe and/or explain all of our initial descriptive themes. Patterns or categories were identified. For example, with regard to the understanding of war and violence there were behaviour of soldiers, logic of the army or non-conventional war. These patterns reflected the way ex-soldiers explained the memory of their military involvement. I then selected developed chapters of the study and chose relevant literature to support the findings of each chapter because there is no good thematic analysis without ensuring that the interpretations of the data are consistent with the theoretical framework as argued by Braun and Clarke (2006).

It is important to highlight the translation process and some of the challenges that emerged during the analysis. Palmary argues that "translation is an inevitable part of academic and research work through both a reliance on translated texts within the academy, as well as a reliance on translation in interviewing and other primary research activities" (Palmary, 2011: 99). The researcher's effort in this process is to preserve the epistemological meanings that reflect "the values, beliefs and social representations of the target language" (Palmary, 2011: 101). In this translation process, the following points were considered: first, being originally from Congo and speaking the same languages as participants, I was at the same time interviewer and interpreter. As such, I translated "more than just words and was concerned about the production of knowledge in social research" (Palmary, 2011: 102). Second, even if in the DRC people speak French and four local languages (Lingala, Swahili, Tshiluba and Kikongo), I noticed that participants' tendency was to mix either Lingala or French with some English words (for instance: *Mboka oyo ezali* 'boring' meaning this country is boring or *Nazali* 'busy' meaning I'm busy). The same tendency could also be noticed when they mixed Lingala and French. In this context, translation became much easier because some words were already used in their context. Third, knowing that the thesis was written in English I was also concerned about the originality of some words in the local context of the DRC in order "to be as close to

the reality as possible" (Palmary, 2011: 103). In some cases, words were tested with some friends from the DRC to make sure that their meanings were not distorted. Similarly, since English is not my first language, I also sought support from some friends who are English speakers about the right meaning of some words (for instance the translation of *tireur d'élite* into marksman or markswoman). Words like *mwasi*, *makusa, loyi-loyi, nyanganakata* and *Musenzi* were left as such because I could not find their real meanings since their meanings are located in a particular geography and gender (Palmary, 2011). In these instances, I provided some explanations next to the words or in the footnotes.

3.5. Dealing with ethics

It is important to stress that this research fully complied with the general University of the Witwatersrand's ethical standards of social research involving human subjects set by the Ethics Committee and Social Research Association (http://the-sra.org.uk/research-ethics/ethics-guidelines/) and was approved by this committee on the 22nd May 2015 (protocol number: H15/05/17). I complied with the ethical principles such as stating the aim of the study, guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality, seeking consent, and emphasising participants' rights to withdraw or escape any uncomfortable questions. This also included allowing the participants' room for withdrawing consent for participation or avoiding interviews. Verbal consent seemed sufficient for this kind of study because considering the way many of the former soldiers behaved, requesting them to sign consent form would have been a source of distrust and suspicion. Their wariness is justified because many of them fled the DRC for fear of persecution and lived in South Africa as exiles. Therefore, anyone doing research on this kind of population in South Africa runs the risk of being suspected to be a spy of the DRC government. Having a letter from the university and my student card was not enough. I was also interrogated about my identity, my place of origin, where I grew up and studied in the DRC as well as the reason of coming to South Africa - more importantly why I was doing this research. However, the mistrustful and suspicious attitudes were minimised during the discussion because ex-soldiers freely spoke and were happy to share their military experiences with me.

The case of anthropophagy is an illustration of the participants' openness; although some blamed others, but they acknowledged that it was happening and that they witnessed various kinds of atrocities. However, I took care to keep their identities confidential although some were happy for their real names to be used. Therefore, in this thesis I can remember ex-soldiers who participated through their age, rank, military experience and the unit in which they worked throughout their military career. Although I had time to discuss some of the data with my supervisor, her access to the personal information of the participants was strictly limited.

I was ethically challenged when interviews with some ex-soldiers were conducted in open spaces. As I stated earlier on, this was for safety concerns for them, as well as for me. Many rejected the idea of moving to quite corners of public facilities to be interviewed. Given that we were strangers to each other, they refused to go away and chose to be interviewed in familiar places where they felt secured. Generally, many of them arranged a space where I sat with them

to interact. I therefore interviewed them at the places of their choice to enable them feel comfortable and share their military experiences with me. But I was in an awkward position with a case of the participant who invited me at his work place, an open space, where many people run business with too much noise. The interview was often disturbed and I used to constantly remind him to speak louder to register what he had to share with me. Nevertheless, the most striking point was that he drew people's attention when he loudly claimed that he ate human flesh in the battlefield during his military career. As a researcher, I was put in a tricky position and hardly managed to switch to another topic until I decided to stop the interview and leave the place with him at the same time. Beside this critical moment, I did my best to avoid jeopardising ex-soldiers' lives.

Although the stories of my participants were traumatising, I realised, as Mahati (2015: 117) did in his study of independent child migrants in Musina (in the Limpopo province of South Africa), that the interviews had a "cathartic effect" on the ex-soldiers. Some explained their wrongdoings and excused themselves either by saying that they acted under duress and in line with the logic of the army, which I will talk about in chapter five of this study. Others distanced themselves from the violent acts stating that although they experienced or witnessed or condoned massive violence which caused the killing of innocent people, they were not personally involved in those acts.

Listening to these stories often put me, as in the case of Gobodo-Madikizela (2003: 17), in "the dilemma of both seeking and resisting explanation". However, I made an effort to control my personal emotions and to assure participants many of whom accepted being recorded. Following the transcribing process each audio file was stored on an external hard drive located in a locked file cabinet where I alone can access.

In order to guarantee the confidentiality of participants, the referring participants who were firstly interviewed contacted for me potential participants from their social networks. They either gave them my number to call me or gave me, with their consent, their numbers to call them. To my surprise when they gave my number to their former colleagues whom I had not previously met, I quickly received their calls, expressing their availability to partake in the study, and I was happy with the snowball results. I later learnt that some participants were motivated by the transport money and airtime the first people I interviewed received because they travelled from far to the meeting place. The airtime token was to enable them to contact their former colleagues who lived in Johannesburg and facilitate their participation in the study.

When I met with potential participants, they were straightforward, inquiring if I would give them something whilst others waited patiently until the end of the interview before asking for financial compensation. Whilst this put me in dilemma, I politely explained that there were no financial rewards for participation. I would have explained this before the interview process but in many instances, I found myself having to repeat myself as a way of dealing with the issue.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented the research design, emphasising on the qualitative nature of the study. I have also indicated different methods of data collection and analysis and the rationale behind their use. Furthermore, the way participants were selected and interviewed was discussed. Given the sensitivity of the topic, I have also indicated how former soldiers' accounts of war and violence were so traumatising to me and how I chose to deal with this trauma. One of the challenges faced was related to the security of participants and my own security, and in this chapter, I have indicated different measures taken in order to safely and successfully achieve the field work's goals. In the same vein, I have discussed ethical issues encountered during my interactions with participants and the different ways I used in dealing with them. The next chapter discusses key findings of this study.

Chapter four: Who am I today? Life stories of former soldiers

4.0. Introduction

The previous chapters discussed different methods of accessing participants and collecting data as well as the researcher's positionality and ethical challenges faced. In this chapter, I present the findings of this study. As indicated in the theoretical framework, all the chapters relating to the study's findings will rely on Bourdieu's concepts as an analytical framework for this study. While Bourdieu is used as the starting point for analysing data, the study also relies on other literature to interpret its findings. While the overriding motivation for joining the army is nationalism, findings from this study reveal that there are also other factors that justify people's decision to join the military. Using Bourdieu's tools of analysis, I argue that what motivates people to join the army is the quest to acquire various capitals. The acquisition of capital is important for men in the pursuit of various forms of masculinities that they need to express. Capital here is not only about the production of goods that can be directly converted into money; it is more about other material and immaterial things whose values exceed economic utility.

While in many parts of the world the conscription of youths is seen as a positive process of 'becoming a man', in Congo, in particular, recruitment of young people into the military has always been perceived as unwelcoming and gives the impression that those who embrace the army are delinquents or people without good education. This may be justified in part by the perceived violent behaviour of men in uniform. However, analysis of respondents' quotes in this study indicates that in recent decades the Congolese Army has become an attractive institution for young graduates from diverse socio-economic contexts. Many people with university degrees and specialisation in fields like administration and engineering have enlisted in the Congolese military. While the army is generally perceived as an institution for society's never-do-wells, a question that has never been posed to intending candidates is their motivation for choosing the military.

This chapter offers an insight into the reasons why former soldiers who participated in this study chose the military career path. The chapter explores how former soldiers organised different events into their autobiographical stories, which form the foundation of their personal identity and self-understanding and allow them to respond to the question "Who am I"

(Polkinghorne, 1991). It highlights different narrative breaks marking the crisis-turning point of their lives and reinforce Polkinghorne's (1991: 135) argument that stories of personal identity differ from literary productions in that they are constructed within an unfolding autobiography and incorporate the accidental events and unintended consequences of actions.

In this chapter, I argue that the army is an institution that helps youths to deal with different ruptures in their lives and to access different forms of capitals. These ruptures are associated with political, social and economic realities which undermine their potential. This argument provides an insight into how former Congolese soldiers remembered different events or circumstances that motivated their military involvement.

To fully grasp the meaning-making of military involvement, this chapter is categorised into three sections. The first focuses on the narrative break characterising different crises-related turning points in the lives of former soldiers. As I previously highlighted, soldiering was not the first choice for most of the former soldiers. Certain events in their lives influenced their decisions to join the Congolese Army and narrative is appropriate in this context as it allows the cognitive process that gives meaning to temporal events by identifying them as parts of a plot (Polkinghorne, 1991: 136). These events resulted from the socio-economic context of the country.

The chapter reveals that in the context of the DRC, marked by high unemployment rates, especially among youths (see AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA, 2012; World Bank, 2017), the army became for many youths, with or without university degrees, the last resort offering jobs, further education and other long-term benefits. The section to follow examines the context of conscription and its influence on the decision of young people to join the army. Lastly, the chapter dwells on nationalism as a motivation for joining the Congolese Army. A great number of participants reported that what attracted them to the army was that feeling of nationalism or patriotism. Significantly, patriotism is also considered a motivation for rebellion against the government of M.S.S with the attendant hope that it would result in a better life for the people of the DRC.

4.1. Personal motivation

While the ultimate role of the military is to defend the territorial integrity of the nation, the findings of this study suggest that the motivations for joining the army was not often premised on patriotism/nationalistic altruism. It follows that other motivations such one's life goals and ambitions often steered people in the direction of the military career. These were either the result of their failure to find a proper job and fulfil their masculine roles, or their inability to afford the costs of education or the need to retaliate against the (soldiers') violence that they were subjected to in their civilian life. In this context, many chose the military profession with the hope to fix what they were unable to achieve in their lives. Participants highlighted various reasons. This section examines the different self-motivations that participants raised during the field work.

4.1.1. Lack of opportunities

The findings of this study indicate that in most cases young people's dreams were disrupted by the socio-economic crisis of the country. The inability to find proper employment opportunities to realise their dreams led them to embrace a military career. The DRC is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of mineral resources, yet it has one of the poorest of the populations in the world (Kandala et al., 2011). More than 70% of Congolese live on less than USD 1 a day (AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA, 2012:13). More than 70% of the youths are unemployed. Less than 100 of the 9000 university graduates from Congolese universities each year are employed. This situation is a result of the scarcity of jobs, the irrelevance of skills to the real needs of employers and the stagnancy of retirement particularly in public sector.

The difficulty in finding a good job leads young graduates to turn to the informal sector, becoming street vendors, money changers (commonly called *Kambistes*), and traders, operators of public telephones or security staff. A study conducted in Kinshasa suggests that the informal sector accounts for 70 percent of employment in the region, compared with 12 percent for the formal private sector and 17 percent for the public sector (Herderschee, Kaiser and Mukoko Samba, 2012: 78). The lack of employment opportunities also justifies the high rate of migration among the youths in search of greener pastures elsewhere. Some of the respondents who indicated that the worsening economic situation in the country compelled them to join the

army highlighted this. One of the participants stated that this was the motivation for him and many others:

> Among us we had people who studied; there were *licenciés* (graduates). They could also become ministers one day, the CEOs and so on, but they chose to become soldiers because of the situation of our country (Jack and Mark interview, November 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English).

This quote expresses young people's disappointment with the choice of joining the army being justified by their failure to find better opportunities despite having their academic degrees. DRC is a place where young people struggle to get access to resources. The emphasis on having *licenciés* shows that the army is filled with young people endowed with cultural capital in the form of educational qualifications, which, according to Bourdieu, determines status and relative positions within a social field. The cultural capital in the particular field of the DRC is by itself a result of prestige because it is not possible for everyone in the society to get to that level. The emphasis on the fact they could become ministers, CEOs and so on shows the high expectations of youths about the opportunities that the cultural capital could offer them. However, all the capitals, as Bourdieu indicates, are interlinked; one cannot exist without another. The cultural capital without economic capital is useless. Young people who completed their degrees at university were now confronted with the challenges of positioning themselves within the main field by finding a job commensurate with their qualifications to enable them to convert their cultural capital to symbolic capital. Because of the scarcity of economic capital, these young people's dreams were dashed, and they were left with no other choice than to enrol in the army.

The study presents evidence indicating that soldiering was not part of former soldiers' initial dreams as they were forced into the institution by the lack of job opportunities. Studies have shown that in an economically stable country with manifold career options the propensity to join the army is limited (Bailey et al., 2002; Kleykamp, 2006). The report of the American Army on youth attitudes toward the military reveals that unemployed youths are more likely to show attraction towards enlisting in the US Army but even at that, it is not definitive (Bailey et al., 2002). Similarly, Kleykamp's study found that the ambitions for education significantly influence the decision of joining the labour market rather than enlisting with the defence forces. Furthermore, the study reveals that half of youths aspiring for a higher college degree prefer to work rather than to join the military compared to their counterparts who were satisfied with a high school diploma (Kleykamp, 2006: 283).

What these studies reveal concerns American youths and it is obvious that the American economy is far better than the economy of the DRC. The reluctance of the youths in the US to join the army is informed by the fact that the chances of finding a job in the labour market are increased as their level of education increases. It follows that unemployment rates in African countries such as the DRC are far higher than those in western countries. For instance, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has reported that the unemployment rate was 4.7 percent in 2016 (BLS, 2017). More importantly, unemployed people in western contexts receive unemployment insurance benefits (BLS, 2017), which gives them short-term relief before finding a job. This kind of advantage is scarce in many African countries. The situation is worse in the DRC where young people's future remains obscure because of economic stagnation. Many people with university degrees are unemployed thus, soldiering has become a space of solace for young people, who after acquiring cultural capital have been disappointed. This suggests the *transferability* of their cultural capital to a different field. They decided to join the army with the hope to benefit from better career opportunities.

Anecdotal evidence has shown that many people with academic degrees in the DRC turned out to be in informal sector after failing to find job in the public sector. During Mobutu's regime all those who joined the army with a degree from university or college were accorded the rank of lieutenant. This was also a way of attracting to the army as many young people with qualification as possible. It also allowed them to take up positions of authority that they expected given their qualifications.

Since corruption, war and political instability have significantly impacted on the economic growth of the country, there have often been shortages of jobs for young people who freshly graduate from universities. Many turned out to be resourceful, doing menial jobs in informal sector. The graduates engage in petty trading or activities commonly known in Kinshasa as '*cambistes*'.[15] Others who desired to further their education but were deprived of resources to achieve this goal decided to enlist, hoping to be offered the opportunity for further studies. Kleykamp states that military service provides a means for members of the non-college population with high educational aspirations to attain their goals; young men who aspire to attend college are more likely to join the military than work or pursue some other activity one year after high school graduation (Kleykamp, 2006: 286). Taylor, Clerkin, Ngaruiya, and Velez

[15] *Cambistes* are money changers found in every street corner, particularly in Kinshasa, usually sitting under an umbrella at a small table that serves as office with a $ symbol drawn on a piece of cardboard.

point out the complexity of military engagement and the commonly intrinsic and extrinsic factors leading to it. The authors argue that these motivators might include money for education, job training, and gainful employment in the absence of other options, and/or a desire to serve one's country (Taylor, Clerkin, Ngaruiya, and Velez, 2015: 143).

Young people's involvement in the army can be said to be in pursuit of some advantages in terms of *cultural* and *symbolic capitals*. Large numbers of Congolese soldiers were recruited during the time troopers got much more benefits, like rations at subsidised rates, shelter, education (for officers and children) and specialised training even though many of them did not benefit from these advantages due to ethnic biases in allocating resources. The guarantees of going abroad for training within the army were perceptible through the foreign military relations the DRC (formerly known as Zaire) established with many African, American and European countries. The DRC has long established bilateral military assistance relationships. By the late 1960s until early 1991 they had bilateral relationships with Belgium, the United States, Italy, Israel, and Britain. Much of the aid provided by these countries was in the form of grants, though part of the assistance was also provided by military technicians and advisers. The DRC's Western allies also availed specialised training to Congolese military personnel. Belgium directed its aid primarily to ground forces and military schools; Israel provided military training in the form of advisers, instructors, and technicians, and some Zairian military personnel trained in Israel; Italy worked with the air force; and the United States provided logistics support. Subsequently, France replaced Israel for airborne training and Italy for the air force.

By 1992 foreign military training relationships with Zaire's major allies had largely melted because of the country's deteriorating political situation characterised by human rights abuses. Zaire and Egypt entered into a military pact in February 1980. Egyptian military instructors trained the Zairian Civil Guard unit.[16] Upon the arrival of the AFDL, L.D.K had much interest in South-South military cooperation especially with Angola and China perhaps because of his Marxist ideas. It is also important to stress that this internationalisation of the armed forces was motivated by the wealth of DRC. This explains the involvement of many countries in the DRC conflict. It is interesting to emphasise that the military became a large employer and a space

[16] Article entitled, 'Zaire: Foreign military relations can be found at: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-15157.html

for upward mobility in a context where war was a growing industry amidst the collapse of other opportunities.

The first elements of the newly implemented *Police d'Intervention Rapide* (Police of Rapid Intervention) were trained in Angola. Angolan troops were instrumental in protecting L.D. Kabila from being ousted in an attempted coup of 1998. The military relations between the DRC and Angola continued even during the reign of Joseph Kabila. Apart from certain advantages, life in the military also shapes an individual's personality by instilling discipline, professionalism, commitment among other traits. The armed forces are also viewed as a source of respect that members could also draw from the society. In the quest to form an integrated army following the peace deal signed in Sun City in 2003, the DRC concluded cooperation agreements with countries such as Belgium to train and equip a combat brigade for Ituri. South Africa played a supervisory role to the process, whilst the US and the Netherlands presented a variety of additional support and Angola trained the new integrated brigades (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005). It must however be noted that recently these relations have become strained, compelling Angola to announce the withdrawal of its troops from the DRC, to 'keep neutrality' following the on-going political crisis and the ensuing violence caused by Joseph Kabila's intention to seek a third term which was against the country's constitution.

Taylor, Clerkin, Ngaruiya, and Velez state, quoting Todd Woodruff, Ryan Kelty, and David Segal's study, that service members respond to both institutional and occupational motivations (Taylor, Clerkin, Ngaruiya, and Velez, 2015: 144). The findings of this study reveal that former soldiers were not only led by the desire to serve their country, but also by their own interests to benefit from various forms of capital including pecuniary advantages. Building from the work of Perry and Wise Taylor, Clerkin, Ngaruiya, and Velez, (2015: 146) stress that three factions explain the motivation to join the public service; that is, rational (pursuit of policy objectives), affective (emotional attachment to a group or community), and normative (a sense of duty or desire to 'give back). While I totally agree with this point, I will also add that pecuniary motivation is important and helps people to maintain the high moral standard. Without proper reward for individual efforts, the desire to eagerly respond to motivational values will fade. This is what led Jean-Jacques Rousseau to affirm that the natural man knows neither good nor evil, and lives in the present, without worries of tomorrow, but he is corrupted by the society in which he lives (Rousseau, 2016). The importance of pecuniary benefice has also been mentioned by Taylor, Clerkin, Ngaruiya and Velez (2015) who highlight that the

institutional–occupational rests on four factors – institutional, future orientation, occupational, and pecuniary – that explain enlistment motivation. They specify that pecuniary motivations relate to financial concerns such as money to repay college loans or an enlistment bonus. Interestingly, their education-related indicator questions are related to both future orientation and pecuniary factors (Taylor, Clerkin, Ngaruiya and Velez, 2015: 145).

Lack of parents' support to their children's education was another personal motivation some participants indicated as a reason for joining the army. These former soldiers reported that they lived in families frequently torn apart by frequent conflicts. The consequence of this factionalism between parents is that the father, perceived as the main income earner and the pillar of the family, abandoned the children, living a carefree life and refusing to pay for their education. In such situations, mothers were then faced with the complicated struggle of pulling the family together. Financially limited, the little income mothers could garner was used to buy food for the family and could barely cover the children's schooling. Faced with the lack of support from the father, children viewed the army as the last option of their lives.

A typical example came from Olenga. Olenga was 46-years old, married and the father of several children. He lived with his wife and some of the children; other children were left in the Congo. Olenga joined the Congolese Army in 1987 after failing to complete his secondary school for lack of support and was trained as a warrior in Kitona, being ranked sergeant. He mainly worked as a body-guard of senior military officers and political leaders of the country. He was deployed to Kitona following Mobutu's ousting in 1997 and witnessed the death of many of his colleagues due to the heartless treatment and became sick because of the unhygienic living conditions and the dearth of healthy food they were given. He ran away from Kitona to enrol in the national police in Kinshasa with the rank of quartermaster sergeant. He was forced to flee the DRC due to the political turmoil and sought asylum in South Africa in 2006. The South African Department of Home Affairs denied him refugee status several times for no apparent reason. While Olenga was waiting for an appointment at Home Affairs for his refugee status decision, he worked as a security guard in a private company with a low-pay. In the following quote, he explained how he joined the army:

> What pushed me into the army was because we lived a very difficult life; I have my father and mother, but [my] father was not taking care of us, there was too much injustice and negligence. So that suffering, you see no one to pay my school fees, too much problems, which led me to enrol in the army. (Olenga interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

This quote suggests that Olenga was pushed into the army because of the lack of *cultural and economic capitals* which he expected from his father. Bourdieu distinguishes two cultural capitals. The primary cultural capital includes values which are inculcated in the children and often remain engraved in their memories and are difficult to be forgotten. The institutional cultural capital is mainly the education sanctioned by an award. Dumais (2002:44) argues that the acquisition of cultural capital and consequent access to academic rewards depends on the cultural capital passed down by the family, which, in turn, is largely dependent on social class. However, the family also provides economic means which enable children to have access to this institutional cultural capital.

In patriarchal societies, the father is often the main provider and this position confers him power that sometimes he misuses. In my interaction with former Congolese soldiers, many drew a clear distinction between education and instruction. Some regarded the family as the primary dispenser of the education. Those who digressed from violent acts often (see chapter six) rationalised their attitudes by the quality of the education they received from their parents. More importantly, a soldier's family atmosphere and their proclivity and readiness to integrate into the army remain instrumentally influential. Many former Congolese soldiers emphasised that when the country was stable, the candidate's family was consulted before they were accepted into the army. However, the regime of political instability and the disorder in the country have made it feasible for the military to violate such procedures in the recruitment of soldiers.

Olenga's case suggests that various 'push' factors in families ranging from poverty, violence and parents' failure to fulfil their responsibilities towards their children have become chief motives for military decision-making. This case shows that the army became a place of refuge for soldiers who experienced socio-economic hardships and lack of care from their families. Olenga's statement suggests that soldiering became a place of refuge for those neglected children; victims of family violence. These were individuals who lacked cultural capital support. This suggests that Olenga just like many other individuals joined the army not out of patriotism but for survivalism after he was deprived of education and other support. Olenga's statement indicates that he was already economically disadvantaged at the time of joining the army. Thus, in constructing a narrative of how they came to be in the army, family neglect was a central justification. While the other discourses are equally crucial, the above quote is a victim-narrative where Olenga is deprived of choices. Joining the army exposed Olenga to a

double suffering; suffering caused by the lack of support from the parents and suffering resulting from pursuing a career outside his dreams.

Another participant, Tango, enrolled in the army after completing *his examen d'état* (the equivalent of Matric in South Africa) in 1989 when he was 20. He completed various trainings in various places such as Mvula-Matadi, CETA Camp, including Egypt from 1991 to 1992 and was given the rank of warrant officer. He was also trained as criminologist and officially empowered to make arrests. He said that he became demotivated by the way the army was disorganised after unseating Mobutu and left for South Africa in 2009. He was first using an asylum seeker permit which he abandoned for the benefit of a work permit in order to work as a delivery agent in a private company. Married, Tango declared that he lived with his wife and child. Shedding light on the motivation to join the army, Tango indicated that he was influenced by his friends:

> I joined the army because of my friends' influence. Before they were not telling me that they were going for military enrolment, because they felt that I would denounce them. One day, one of them said to others, since we are so close it is not good to hide the news from him. They approached me and said, you know as it is now, we have decided to enrol in the army, but we did not tell you because you are weak in spirit and we thought since you are much involved in prayer you won't like it. I was upset that they hid the news from me and treated me as somebody who is weak in spirit. In that anger and with their influence I decided to join the army and all of us were sent for training. (Tango interview, November 2015 - My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

The analysis of this quote suggests that Tango joined the army due to the influence he received from his friends. The fact that his friends were afraid that he would report them to their parents if he knew that they were recruited in the army confirms how many Congolese families detest their siblings' decision to enrol in the army. The most striking point is how his friends who secretly enrolled without telling him treated him as weak in spirit and godly person. This suggests that the military expects its members to develop a type of hegemonic masculinity which they deemed godly people like Tango would detest. Interestingly, the focus on his spirituality suggests that because *habitus* is *durable* and *transferable*, Tango's friends were tempted to believe that he would *reproduce* the same *cultural capital* (here religious values and practices) even if he enlisted in the military.

Although, religion, particularly Pentecostalism uses the military language of war in the fight against perceived forces of darkness/evil, this narrative suggests that soldiering and religion are two contrasting *fields* with opposing doctrines. More importantly, it also depends on how

religion is defined as some religious beliefs might promote violent practices through their institutional rituals. What reinforces this perception is the masculine behaviour the army promotes, which encourages soldiers to hold weapons and kill, which, in the beliefs of many people (particularly Christians) is seen as ungodly. This is because Christian religion is believed to train people to become meek, tolerant, humble and non-violent in their interactions with others while some forms of religion also teach a great deal of intolerance. Christian scriptures recorded that when John the Baptist, who came as the forerunner of Christ, was preaching repentance, soldiers asked him what they should do about their own career (see Luke 3: 7-14). What John the Baptist required from them was not about walking away from the army, but he told them to refrain from extorting money and accusing people falsely, and to be content with their pay (Luke 3: 14). John's advice to soldiers is a clear indication that the army was already reputed as corrupt and intrinsically immoral in some of its practices and that soldiers' use of power and authority to intimidate people already existed in the olden days.

The repugnance of civilian towards soldiers was also highlighted by a religious leader (who was not part of this study) who reported that he was reluctant to assign church responsibilities to a soldier. But the soldier who was a member of his church group reminded him that he was also entitled to salvation, using the case of a highly respected centurion who needed help from Jesus to heal his servant and his request was granted (see Matthew 8: 5-13). Tango's decision to enrol in the army was a proof that he was not what his friends thought about him; he could use his *personal capital* to fight for other form of *capital*. Tango's reference to the scriptures is also worth noting as it spells out how he went through a process of integrating two competing discourses of war to make sense of his place in the army in spite of his religion. In the case of the army, what youths seek to achieve the most is symbolic capital.

4.1.2. Revenge: ‘I joined the army because soldiers beat my father’

There were some participants whose motive for joining the army had to do with their experiences as civilians. Some of the former soldiers chose the army to retaliate against the ill-treatment received from soldiers as civilians prior to enlisting with the army. Many people chose the army after witnessing military violence against their family members or after being themselves victims of military violence. In this context, the army became a place of protection for themselves and their families, whilst offering them the power to avenge the violence they suffered from soldiers. Another participant, Lokole, told his story. Lokole was 65 years old, married and father of several children. He joined the Congolese army in 1969 and went for training in Israel. Ranked colonel, Lokole trained the troops of 311th battalion. He came to South Africa in 2004 to seek asylum and was granted refugee status. He was unemployed and received support from his children to survive. When asked about his motivation to join the army, he indicated the quest for revenge:

> Military service, I was an athlete. When I finished my studies, I was devastated because soldiers beat my father. I said I must join the army to learn what pushes soldiers to commit violence. (Lokole interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

What this quote illustrates is that DRC is a field where survival depends on the amount of power accessible to individuals. More specifically *military power* gives right to the *normalisation* or *doxalisation* of extra-legal practices. We can draw from this quote that Lokole joined the army with a rebellious attitude. As in the previous cases, the army was not part of his dreams. He was an athlete and probably thought about doing something related to his area of focus but the beating of his father by soldiers was traumatic and unbearable, compelling him to change his life plans. In this context, Lokole upon noticing his powerlessness to prevent his father’s beating or even to exert revenge on those who humiliated his father found solace in joining the army, so he could acquire the necessary amount of power to achieve his goals.

I interpret Lokole as a powerless man because of: one, the emphasis on being ‘devastated’; and two, the decision he took to join the army to gain some power he lacked during his civilian life. Lokole’s frustration resulted from the lack of appropriate *capital* to face the situation. The question arises as to why Lokole had not thought of the judicial system of his country to lodge a complaint against the aggressors of his father. What is the connection between the abuse of his father and his decision to be enlisted in the army? Lokole’s decision to become a soldier

indicates the need to accumulate the appropriate capital. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) argue that the existence or the functioning of capital can only be in relation to a field. In joining the army, one of the advantages Lokole sought was access to the resources of a hegemonic masculinity (Hinojosa, 2010: 180). As Hinojosa (2010: 180) explains, material resources important to a hegemonic masculinity, such as economic security and physically able and fit bodies, are offered by military training and service. This appropriate capital is what I call *military capital*. More importantly, in the context of the DRC this military capital can go beyond the limits up to corporal assaults such as beating people. One of the characteristics of this military capital is the *symbolic domination* which in most of the cases is reified in the form of physical violence used as a threat particularly against civilians who sometimes showed resistance. Soldiers' violent practices or actions are the result of [their] habitus and capital within the army field (Dumais, 2002: 46). In this context, joining the army becomes a means of gaining this *military capital* which is indispensable to resist external threats directed either to oneself or to one's family members.

The shock resulting from the beating of his father by soldiers led Lokole to set a goal of becoming a soldier in order not only to learn about the origins of soldiers' violence (Polkinghorne, 1991), but more importantly to provide security to his family and to avert being placed in a *de-masculinised* position of being helpless to protect his family. As Lokole stressed, he wanted to be part of the army to learn about what motivates soldiers to commit violence. His concern was to see whether violent behaviour was the only objective of military training. He then confirmed that the use of violence was taught and practiced in military training as an expression of masculinity. During our interview, Lokole explained that the origin of soldiers' violent behaviour was linked to their uniforms and guns. In essence, violence is said to be deeply entrenched into the military experience though it required from soldiers a sense of self-control, which many of them lacked, to resist the temptation of unleashing violence.

Although, this was part of Lokole's statement, the retaliatory motivation has also led many other individuals to enrol in the army. While some participants explained that they decided to join after being victims of military violence, it is unclear if a soldier who rationalises his enlistment within the army as a result of the violence of other soldiers against some of his family members would subsequently adopt the same behaviour towards other civilians and produce poor performance. This finding is in line with the study of Baaz and Stern (2010)

where many soldiers reported that they joined the army because of the anger against soldiers and a quest to protect themselves and their families against military violence.

4.2. Forced enrolments

This category discusses people who joined the army against their own volition; they were conscripted. This happened in the Congo on several occasions. In those days, I witnessed instances, when soldiers were deployed in the city of Kinshasa to arrest all boys and conscript them. Many of the young people who were forced to join the army returned as soldiers after many years of being separated from their families. Others disappeared and never returned. Parents used to hide their children (particularly boys) from 18 years old and above. This forced recruitment happened mainly when there were youth protests. It was a political manoeuvre to stop the youths from popular uprising. In this section, I examine two kinds of practices related to forced conscription: the students' protest movements and child soldiers.

4.2.1. Students' protests

In 1968, members of the general union of students, founded in 1961 shortly after Lumumba's assassination with the aim of achieving Lumumba's vision, contested Mobutu's regime. With eggs and tomatoes, they protested against the visit of Hubert Humphry, the vice-president of the United States of America. The Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), Mobutu's newly created political party, suspended the general union of students and decreed the youth league of the MPR as the only students' representative at universities. In 1969, students who protested against the Zairian government demanding the improvement of social and academic conditions were violently repelled, leaving at least sixty students killed. Violence erupted again two years later when students remembered the death of their fellows who fell in the shooting of 1969. As punishment, students of Lovanium (current University of Kinshasa) and their fellows from the University of Lubumbashi who sympathised with them were all enrolled in the army (see Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1997 – my translation from French to English).

The movement that started in 1968 continued and intensified in 1990s. In May 1990, the then Zaire experienced the suspension of most of its foreign aid after the army cracked down on protesting students, killing 100 in Lubumbashi (Beaugrand, 1997: 3). This situation was at the root of the collapse of the already crumbly economy and hyperinflation. Many of the former

Congolese soldiers who participated in this study indicated that they joined the Congolese Army against their will. Some recounted that in 1982 the main political opposition party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), led by Tshisekedi, was founded and attracted many people, including students, who were tired of Mobutu's dictatorship and his unique political party, the MPR established on 20 May 1967. Tshisekedi is one of the thirteen parliamentarians who denounced Mobutu's mismanagement and wrote him a letter in 1980 asking for political reform (Kodi, 2008). The multiparty democracy announced by Mobutu in 1990 was the result of their struggle. There were often raids at Universities where students were arrested and conscripted. Many of them were sent to different military centres and returned as soldiers after undergoing some years of training. The training was at the same time a form of punishment and a preparation to the military service. One of my professors at University, who was also conscripted, reported that as part of punishment, *fufu* was cooked in big drums with a big fire in an open space and when those cooking were all sweaty, they intentionally poured their sweat drops into that *fufu* before serving it to the enlisted who were not allowed to refuse eating it.

44-year Tshirawa was married and the father of three. Ranked lieutenant, he was trained in several places like CETA and Kibomango. He left the country in 2001 shortly after Laurent_Désiré Kabilla's death, because he felt that his life was in danger. Since he came to South Africa in 2001, Tshirawa was on asylum seeker permit. The South African Department of Home Affairs denied him refugee status for no apparent reason. He worked as a security guard in a private security company without social protection. He explained his experience of force enlistment:

> I got involved in the Zairian army in 1994 at the age of 20 after completing my secondary school. At university, there were spies whose mission was to track down any students' protests. They lived in students' residence, in a place called Kawele where they were fully equipped in arms and ammunitions. There were many cases of death and kidnapping of students during that period. Their drama unfolded during Tshisekedi's first meeting at the University, in 1995. At the end of the meeting, students decided to accompany Tshisekedi back to his residence in Limete. On our way, we were attacked by government's spies who set off stun grenades and tear gas at us; many students died in those clashes. I lost my cousin in this ambush. We fought and forced them out of the University premises. But they threatened to return by incessantly bullying us and throwing tracts. I felt under death threat and this led me and my friends to join the army for our safety. (Tshirawa interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Again, this case shows that Tshirawa's decision to become a soldier was motivated by the need to accumulate *military capital*, which was considered as the guarantee for security against external threats.

Gero was 52-years old and an agricultural engineering student in 1985. He was arrested in the students' protest movements and was taken to Kibomango for military training. This military training which was first seen as a form of punishment converted him into becoming a soldier. He was part of the second promotion of military special service, *garde-civile* and went for a three-year training in Egypt. After being granted the rank of lieutenant, Gero went for another three-year training in agricultural extension in Portugal. In the beginning of liberation war, he was on special assignment in South Africa until AFDL took over power he never returned to the DRC. He left the Congolese Army with the rank of captain. Gero was granted refugee status and worked as a security guard in Johannesburg. Gero explained how he was forced to join the army:

> I was forced to join the army in 1985. I was a student in agronomy. When I got my *diplôme d'état* my parents registered me at the faculty of agronomy at the University of Yangambi (in agricultural engineering). There, we were arrested because of students' protests against the government and sent to Kibomango military training centre. Then I said since I have already done this military training let me just carry on in the army. (Gero interview, December 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

The military itself is a cultural capital which can be used by those in power to prevent others from gaining the same power (Dumais, 2002). The army therefore becomes what Goffman (1961) refers to as a total institution, putting the individual to a regimented pattern of life that has little or nothing to do with the person's own desires or inclinations. Military education is a form of cultural capital aimed to change people's minds and worldview. In this context, those in power felt in danger and had used the army to discourage any insurrectional movement that could be triggered by students. Political rulers had even succeeded in discouraging the subversive movements of these young students by instilling in them the military ideology (cultural capital) based on discipline and obedience to authority. In other words, the army had transmitted to these young students a patriarchal ideology in which only the voice of authority prevailed.

4.2.2. Child soldiers

Another case of forced enlistment is related to child soldiers. The protracted wars that have blighted the DRC since 1996 led many warring parties in need of manpower to recruit children. The particularity and the complexity of these wars is that there are large numbers of armed groups engaged in the brawl with many changing sides. Children are regularly snatched from their schools or families by different armed groups to be made soldiers. These prolonged wars have caused the death of millions of people of whom approximately half are believed to be children under age.

Conscription of children into the army was also practiced during the war of liberation. Looking to topple Mobutu, L.D.K needed manpower to achieve this goal and made use of underage children. An approximate number of 30,000 children from as young as 7 years old fighting or living in different warring parties in DRC has been reported (McMullen et al., 2013). According to Ebenga and N'landu (2005: 75), child soldiers were very instrumental in the AFDL forces, as they led many of their most dangerous operations. This involuntary recruitment was applied even to children commonly known as *Kadogo* (in Swahili meaning little or small). Children were taken from schools and forced to join the army, facing the threat of being killed if they objected this decision. These child soldiers unwillingly carried heavy weapons. As a case in point a participant who was recruited as a child soldier recounted how he was forced to become part of the AFDL troops before joining the regular army when L.D.K. became president.

33years old, James was forced into the army as a child soldier at the age of 14. He reported that he was taken by force from school in Kisangani during the liberation war of L.D. Kabila in 1996. James spent three years in the frontline and was involved in various battles from Kisangani to Mbandaka. James reported that they were called to use heavy weapons without appropriate training in weapons handling. These weapons were so powerful that every time they used them to shoot, their effects were felt even in the brain and noticeable in the urination and defecation which turned to become blood. This caused many of them to experience some physical and mental impairment afterwards. James left the army during the waves of Disarmament Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) initiated by the Congolese government with the support of multi-donor trust fund. However, he claimed that many child soldiers were left with nothing despite the huge amount of money donated by donors for their resettlement. The only thing they were given was three cooking pots and $10

to start business, which was insignificant. James said that many of them left the country, some, like him, living as asylum seekers in South Africa. He explained:

> I joined military service in Kisangani in 1996. I was at school; Kabila (the father) came to collect us. It was not about volunteering, they took us by force. If they looked only and saw that you had good physical looking, you can carry firearm, they took you. (James interview, December 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

This excerpt reveals the complicated situation in which many child soldiers found themselves. Being conscripted as a child soldier, as James was, forced them to become violent and get involved in killings. While the military is a career of increasing skills and sophistication, the recruitment of James and his colleagues was based on muscular bodies. One of the reasons justifying the prevailing use of children in the army is that children lack agency and the ability to critically think and can easily be inducted into the doctrine of killing. Reading this quote reveals how James and his peers were offended by being forced to enrol into the army. Because of this forced recruitment, child soldiers' youthhood and chances of furthering their education were destroyed. Forcing children into the army became the reason for the amount of landmark reparations that needed to be paid to former Congolese child soldiers. This took place during the trial of Thomas Lubanga, a warlord, who abducted and enrolled children - boys and girls - as young as 11 into his armed movement, the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) in the eastern Ituri region of the DRC. During the trial the ICC Judges argued that the damage of the lost childhood was incalculable (News24, October 2016).

4.3. Desire to serve the country

In their narratives, many former soldiers indicated that what drove them into the army was the love of their country, the desire to serve their country as well as the aspiration to do away with the political status quo and autocratic regime which was characterised by mismanagement. Two points form the discussion of his section. The first examines how former soldiers conceptualise nationalism and apply it in their military involvement and the second examines how political crisis of the country led many university graduates to enrol in the army.

4.3.1. Nationalism

To the same question regarding the motivation to join the army, some participants responded that the choice of joining the army was not primarily for money. In that regard some respondents indicated that they wanted to depart from the popularly known professions whilst others mentioned discipline because they seemed to be undisciplined before joining the army. However, the main motivation for many participants was the sense of nationalism. Orwell (1945) argues that nationalism is linked to the longing need for power. The abiding drive of each nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for themselves but for the nation or other unit(s) into which they have chosen to sink their own individuality. Nationalism implies self-denial, placing primary emphasis on the promotion of national culture and interests. Referring to the work of Terhune, Druckman notes that the nation achieves personal relevance for individuals when they become affectively involved in the homeland, motivated to help their country's goal oriented, and gain a sense of identity and self-esteem through their national identification (ego involved) (Druckman, 1994: 44). Smith however adds that nations require shared memories to give their often-heterogeneous citizenry a common habitat, a source of pride and dignity, and a common destiny (Smith, 1996: 384). In this context, what motivates the social behaviour is the desire to belong, to achieve goals and accumulate power (McClelland, 1975; Druckman, 1994). People see the nation as providing them and their progeny with security and safety as well as status and prestige in return for their loyalty and commitment.

The eruption of the 1959 riots against the Belgian colonial regime was a clear indication that the struggle for independence for the Congo was rooted in a narrative of national dedication and pride, a kind of condition for the creation of a Congolese national identity. The starting point for military involvement was when Mobutu succeeded in his coup d'état. He wanted to forge the nationalist feeling by proclaiming the return to authenticity. The doctrinal foundation soon followed the founding of the party and took the form of the Manifesto of the Nsele published in May 1967. Nationalism, revolution, and authenticity were identified as major themes of what turned to become Mobutism (Matende-Kasongo, 2008). The dictum of the authenticity was, 'We want to be who we are and not what others want us to be'. For example, Christian names were banned, and the mode of dressing was changed, especially for women wearing loincloths instead of skirts and trousers and men no longer using the tie. The idea was to create and have appropriate symbols, values and shared memories, some distinctive customs

and traditions, a general location, and sometimes a proper name which is the basis of a substantiated nation as noted by Smith (1996: 386). This corroborates Hearn's year view built from Billig's year concept of banal nationalism, that nationalism is crucially sustained not so much through explicit ideological exhortation, but through implicit, repetitive, symbolic reinforcement (Hearn, 2007:660). The foundation of nationalism is on tiny items, tales, advertising, naming streets, climate reports, etc., assuming the existence of nations. The army's mission is to protect the values of the nation by killing those who threaten them. By so doing, Mobutu's aim was to forge a national frame pushing people to understand their identity, their environment and the way of relating to others without forgetting their values (Skey, 2009).

The most important element of Mobutu's ideology was national unity. The objective was first to do the opposite of the colonial system which imposed a passport of mutation, a kind of passport established by the colonial administration to control the mobility of indigenous people from one province to the other (see Bianga, 1978; Braeckman, 2010). Mobutu abolished this colonial law by encouraging the free movements of the populations in the various provinces of the country without restrictions and without fear of being in a strange environment. At the political level, even if it was sometimes theoretical, tribalism was not tolerated. Mobutu himself wanted to materialise this national unity by the appointment of the ministers originating from all the provinces of the country and especially the appointment of the governors of the provinces in provinces different of their own. He also encouraged ministers appointed to form their cabinets with people originating from different provinces. In this quest to unite all the ethnic groups into one nation, the national army was composed of the inhabitants of different provinces of the country. With this concept of nationalism in mind, the military, like the governors of the provinces, were not constrained to work in their provinces of origin; they were often sent to work in other areas that were foreign to them.

However, in the last moment of his reign Mobutu almost compromised the so-called national unity for his own benefit. On the 24 April 1990, Mobutu was forced to democratise the country by introducing the multiparty system. Looking for different manoeuvres to hold on to power, Mobutu sought to divide political opposition and the population by resorting to ethnic strife. In 1991, he introduced the *territoriale des originaires* (territorial of natives) by assigning natives to the key positions in the local administration and the public or parastatal companies. This decision was contrary to the slogan of national unity he promoted since the beginning of his rule, which aimed at giving key positions to non-natives. The division of the opposition leaders

(mainly from Kasai and Katanga) led to the development of tribal and exclusionary discourse. The large coalition of opposition groups formed by main opposition parties collapsed and each party was identified in terms of the ethnic group of the leader. This is what explained the resentment and xenophobic violence against Kasaians who lived in Katanga between 1991 and 1995 (Gorus, 2000; Dibwe dia Mwembu, 2005). Despite this deviation, the Congo has remained united and today with the political turmoil affecting the country, many Congolese remember Mobutu as the father of national unity.

National unity instituted and forged in the minds of people engenders "power seduction" (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994: 2) which engendered desire within many people to voluntarily enrol in the national army. Many former soldiers indicated that they were driven to the army by nationalism/patriotism or the desire to serve their country. This national ideology was entrenched through slogans, names, gestures, dressing code, songs, etc., which was a way of engraving the love of the nation in people's minds and leading some to dedicate their lives in order to defend it through military service.

The discussion here concerns those former soldiers who claimed that they were moved by the love of their country and culture that they wanted to defend through enlistment. A number of studies have engaged with the concept of nationalism (Billig, 1995; Hearn, 2007; Skey, 2009; Penrose, 2011). The most significant contribution comes from Billig (1995) with his concept of banal nationalism referring to the everyday representations of the nation which builds a shared sense of national affiliation amongst people. It must however be noted that the maintenance of nationalist sentiments, especially in the context of the military is dependent on many factors because the nation is a process, and a non-linear one, that is reversible' and identifies a number of factors, war, 'natural' disasters, migration and ideological threat, that may cause hot outbursts of nationalist fervour (riots, civil conflict or war) or [to stretch our analogy a little further] the gradual heating of largely taken-for-granted national identities (Skey, 2009: 341).

Former soldiers reported that this nationalist sentiment was reified through voluntary recruitment of those who were led by the desire to serve their country. In order to draw attention to the diverse ways of flagging the nation, during peacetime or during conflict, soldiers were mindfully prepared to the scrupulous observance of the rules. Mundane practices such as the saluting the national colours (flag) which they also enforced civilians to respect, the wearing of uniform particularly when on duty as well as the use of deictic language such as 'we', 'our',

‘us’ and ‘here’ to signify the nation (Skey, 2009: 332) were a way of enforcing nationalism. This is because, as Skey observes, it is generally the daily forms of life, lived in and understood in relation to a world of nations, that underpins the more visible (and sometimes virulent) aspects of nationalism (Skey, 2009:334). McClintock (1993: 61) views nationalism as radical constitution of people's identities, through social contests that are frequently violent and always gendered. This gendered form of nationalism is what not only motivates soldiers to express masculine values of protection by taking up arms, but also reinforces them as good or real men (Nagel, 1998).

Voluntary systems of recruitment were conducted through public announcements on radio or TV. Those interested responded to the country’s call. Nevertheless, not all the young people who voluntarily presented themselves were taken: having strong body with masculine characteristics was an important selection criterion. Prospective soldiers were firstly subjected to medical examinations to see if they were physically fit for military’s mission of protecting the nation. For instance, one of the participants who claimed that he joined the army because he longed to serve the country indicated that they examined their feet. Those candidates with flat feet were rejected because of the belief that anybody with flat feet was likely to become breathless and unable to run for 30 Km (Barrett, 1996; Locke, 2013). The aim of this preliminary check-up focusing on aptitude and medical fitness was to recruit men with potential ideal of masculinity, independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual, and rational (Barrett, 1996: 130). Lande (2007) uses the metaphor of ‘breathing like a soldier’ that a good soldier is expected to demonstrate, stressing that it is not “a taken-for-granted” corporeal activity of soldiers, considering it as the social sinew that holds together social institutions by anchoring norms and beliefs in viscera (Lande, 2007: 97). In the following statements, participants explained how the desire to serve the nation attracted them to the Congolese Army. Rambo, aged 38, joined the Congolese Army in 1996 after dropping his undergraduate studies in financial management and was ranked sub-lieutenant. He worked at the first brigade of the *Groupe Spécial de la Sécurité Présidentielle* - Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP). Rambo was deployed in the battlefield in places such as Pueto and Dubindela in 2000. He decided to quit the Congolese because of tribalism and moved to South Africa where he started a family with a South African woman. He lived in South Africa by informal trading in flea markets. He described his motivation to join the army as follows:

> Joining the army is about determination. You decide to join the army to serve your homeland. That's what motivated me to join the army. (Rambo interview, July 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Jack and Mark were friends and interviewed together. Respectively 41 and 35 years old, the first (Jack) was a shop owner and the latter (Mark) a truck driver. Both were married and fathers of several children. They were recruited into the Congolese army in 1998. Since they both had their *diplôme d'état* (the equivalent of South African National Senior Certificate), they went for a six-month training in Angola and became lieutenants. The ill-wages and miserable conditions of Congolese soldiers compelled them to desert and move to South Africa in 2005. Jack was granted refugee status, and Mark was on a relative permit which he got by his South African wife. In a similar vein, the choice to serve the country is what moved Jack and Mark to the army:

> Motivation, anyone who enrols in the army has first that heart of patriot. You choose to serve your country; you are not motivated because I saw they pay soldiers too much money or there was any promise. Our objective was to serve our country. We were moved by patriotism. (Jack and Mark interview, November 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Another account about the desire to serve the country came from John. John was 69 years old, married and father of several children, and he left in the DRC since 2002. He held a bachelor's degree in social sciences and served as a Colonel in the Congolese army, mainly in the ex-*Forces Armées Zairoises* (ex-FAZ) from 1966 to 2002. He was deployed in several African countries, the last one being Rwanda in 2001. John completed various training in different military training academies and centres such as EFO, Kibomango, CETA, etc. He was forced to flee the DRC, a few years later after the AFDL came into power, and sought asylum in South Africa, being granted refugee status in 2002. When asked about his motivation to join the army, he provided the following account:

> The slogan of nationalism, authenticity and Mobutism is what arose in me the desire to serve in the national army. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

From these quotes one can see that power results from the nationalist sentiments which moved participants to the army. First of all, it is important to stress that the country or the nation or

the state is a huge field in need of various forms of capitals. In the next chapters of this study I will spend more time to discuss the concept of capital. One of the most important state's capitals is the capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police) (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994: 4). The state's responsibility is to work out certain representations which hold good for the collective (Durkheim 1992 in Loyal, 2016, page unstated). States accomplish an array of responsibilities including mandatory regulations, security maintenance, international relations sustenance (including warfare), and the regulation of the market and labour power (Loyal, 2016). One of the major roles of the state is the maintenance of social order which leads to the use of symbolic violence. As such, "symbolic violence, then, is the crucial mechanism through which social order, and the hierarchies and structures of domination it sustains, is reproduced over time" (Von Holdt, 2013: 115).

The state's use of symbolic violence is justified by the fact that it is the incarnation of both, the objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and the subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994: 3-4). According to Weber, states have the monopoly of legitimate violence through which they exercise domination (Loyal, 2016). The establishment of such a monopoly involves, on the one hand, securing and extending the boundaries of a territory, to a considerable extent by means of the use of violence against external opponents; and on the other, it involves the internal pacification of the territory. Claiming to join the army by patriotism or nationalism means that these participants sought to accumulate political power which reflected in the accumulation of *symbolic capital*, *symbolic power* and *symbolic violence* (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994; Bourdieu, 2014; Loyal, 2016). Serving the country procures a certain honour. In this context, soldiers who claimed to join the army as expression of their nationalism were in search of symbolic capital because the army in general provides soldiers with prestige and honour. Enrolling in the army means building the network in order to get access to other resources available in the field. The fact that some who completed the University were confronted with socio-economic difficulties to access better positions equal to their qualifications in civil society, the army became a place that procured access to those resources they could not get as civilians.

The army is part of the state's structures used as instrument of maintaining and reproducing the social order. The maintenance and reproduction of the social order entails an expanded materialism, or a materialist theory of the symbolic, where symbolic and material forms of

domination co-exist (Loyal, 2016 page unstated). Since the state operates more profoundly, in and through us, soldiers are the agents whose mission consists of reifying state's presence in people's everyday lives. Thus, mundane facts of controlling or arresting people are expressions of symbolic power recognised to soldiers who are endowed with *State capital* (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994).

The commonly held perceptions in the DRC is that soldiering is a profession of low-class people; those who did not find anything else to do in life. Although the army's ranks are not only filled by the lower levels of the society, but the majority of its candidates are those who are socially and economically disadvantaged, as Kleykamp states, the socioeconomically disadvantaged are more likely to enlist (Kleykamp, 2006: 277). The findings of this study, however, reveal that nationalism/patriotism was an important aspect of the military motivation and a key determinant of soldiers' access to other forms of the capitals in the state field. Other former soldiers reported that their nationalistic feelings were aroused after being in contact with members of the family who joined the army before.

4.3.2. 'I wanted to follow in my father's footsteps'

During my interaction with former Congolese soldiers, a greater number of them indicated that their decision to join the army was influenced by their parents or siblings who were soldiers before. Some even indicated that the military was their vocation, stressing that many of their siblings were in the Congolese army before and during their enrolment.

Paul was enrolled in the Congolese Army at the age of 23 during the second republic led by Mobutu Sese Seko and went for training in several places such as Maluku and Kotakoli (Equateur province) in 1987, being ranked warrant officer. When L.D.K came into power he was deployed to Goma. The tough living conditions of soldiers and the frequent incursions of Rwandan forces in the East of Congo compelled them to desert and return to Kinshasa. During the second war of 1998 they were treated as spies and placed under arrest for two months of torture in prison. This is what forced him to seek asylum in South Africa. He was granted refugee status in 2003 and works in the informal sector. In the following account, he explained his motivation to join the Congolese armed forces.

> My father also was a soldier. When I was growing up I liked that job [being a soldier]. The day I went to enrol myself my father didn't know. Just after my *diplôme d'état*, there was a new unit, *garde-civile*, I went to register to write an exam and I was taken

> to Maluku for two years in 1987. (Paul interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

The same account was provided by, Charly. A 48-year Charly dreamed about becoming a soldier like his father who worked in the air force and was recruited into the Congolese (the then Zaire) army in 1986. He completed his military training Kitona, Kotakoli, and CETA. At the end of his training he was appointed warrant officer 2nd class in a newly created unit, *Service d'Action et de Renseignement Militaire* (SARM). Charly was deployed to different provinces to work. During the war of 1996, Charly was deployed to Kisangani. When Kisangani fell into the hands AFDL, Charly and his colleagues walked, for 1100 Km, from Kisangani to Mbandaka. He was forced to flee the country after the fall of Mobutu's regime and moved to South Africa where he was granted refugee status in 2012. His involvement in the army and various warzones caused him to lose his wife who engaged with another man in Kinshasa. He lived alone, working as a security guard in a private company in Johannesburg. Charly indicated that he joined the army to fulfil his dream:

> I joined the army because my destiny was to be a soldier. Not only it was my destiny, my father also was a soldier of the Zairian Army; my father was a soldier in the Zairian armed forces. So, my father was a soldier when Belgians were in this country, in public forces; my father was already a soldier. He continued in the Zairian armed forces as a pilot… I always dreamed in my life that I must serve my country. I served my country in any circumstance at the time of Zaire, currently Congo, at peacetime and wartime. (Charly interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

What emerges from these quotes is that these participants' motivation to join arose from the motivation they received from their parents who had joined the army first. It means that these participants learnt something from their parents – soldiers. According to Bourdieu (1977; 2014), learning is explicit and gained through discourse, but is often tacit and embodied. Perhaps what attracted these participants to the army was the way their parents – soldiers dressed, spoke, defended them in the face of adversity. This is what Bourdieu refers to as *hexis*. Bodily *hexis* is the expression of all the factors which make up one's habitus – embodied in our physical being. It is in bodily *hexis* that the personal combines with the social. The body is at the same time what one acts upon and the repository of cultural and symbolic value (Halbwachs, 1992). Importantly, following in the father's footsteps is also a way to ensure the continued existence of the military identity which has the powerful symbolic meaning of protection, particularly in the context of the DRC. Having a soldier in the family is a guarantee of security and protection against external threats. This family identity was epitomised in a

military slogan, '*mwana ya soda azali soda*' (in Lingala translated as: a child of a soldier is a soldier). Children seek to follow in their fathers' footsteps to preserve the military identity within the family.

In the second quote above, it is clear that although Charly dreamed of becoming a soldier in his life, this dream was reinforced by the presence of his father in the army. This military identity confers a kind of security that other families without soldiers do not enjoy. In a similar vein, another former soldier, Sankara gave his account about how he joined the Congolese army. Sankara, aged 50, was recruited into the Zairian Army in 1987 and worked in a special unit called CIRCO. Married, Sankara's wife and three children lived in the DRC. During the power sharing government in Congo, Sankara was positioned amongst the troops of MLC where he became a warrant officer. After the 2006 presidential election, fighting broke out between the ruling party, the PPRD, and the MLC in the heart of Kinshasa. The search for MLC troops involved in those clashes, of which Sankara was one, compelled him to exile to South Africa in 2007. Sankara held an asylum seeker permit and worked as a security guard. He indicated that many of his elder brothers were already in the army and that all of them joined the army because they had soldier's blood:

> My big brothers fought the war of 80 days. In my family there are only soldiers, senior officers. Yes, in my family we are only soldiers, but also high-ranking soldiers…we have soldier's blood. (Sankara interview, July 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

What is interesting in this quote is that the use of the concept of soldier's blood is the conceptualization of masculinity and the preservation of military identity which provides some kind of security to the family and to themselves as Sankara could recall how he saw his elders performing as soldiers, how they were untouchable and how they imposed themselves in their interaction with civilians. The army here is the place promoting masculinity and offers some kinds of privileges that civilians do not have. In any case, a career choice, especially in the context of military service, can have many implications. In the context of the DRC, it concurs with the popular military saying that the soldier's child is a soldier. The discourse drawn from this statement is that military service is hereditary or socially constructed, and children who choose the military service are driven by the idea of following their parents' model or legacy. This directs attention to the importance of parents' behaviour in the way children are socialised. This adage is epitomic of military power and is often used when soldiers want their children to

be recognised for the same rights to which they are entitled, such as the right to free public transport. Getting free transport is one of the 'rights' soldiers are entitled to and shows how the military becomes attractive through privileges as well as how in everyday life soldiers are set apart from and privileged over civilians creating military identity as desirable.

More importantly, both quotes above reveal that the most powerful principle of the symbolic efficacy of cultural capital no doubt lies in the logic of its transmission. First, the process of taking over embodied cultural capital and the duration necessary for its development are subject to the cultural capital objectified in the entire household. Second, the inceptive gathering of cultural capital, the prerequisite for the fast, easy growth of every kind of valuable cultural capital, begins, immediately, simply for the heir of families gifted with solid cultural capital. With reference to this, the learning process is accompanied by the entire phase of socialization. It results that the transmitting of cultural capital is undoubtedly the most excellently concealed practice of hereditary transmission of capital thus, Sankara's reference to the *genetic discourse* when justifying the reason for joining the army. Consequently, the transmitted cultural capital is proportionately weighed in the strategies for its reproduction, as the direct and visible forms of *trans- mission* tending to be more strongly censored and controlled (Bourdieu, 1986).

Parental or elder models are more decisive in the way children are influenced to replicate their own careers. This is in line with Kleykamp's (2006) study which found a high correlation between military presence and youth enlistment decision. The author stresses that having a parent serving on active duty and living in a country with a high military presence is significantly associated with military enlistment among youth (Kleykamp, 2006: 283). However, this is a quantitative finding where the author only notices the association without stating or explaining how military presence influences or what leads to enlistment decisions. Indeed, military presence seems to be a great motivator but there must also be a strong reason that compels youth to follow their parents or elders' career path. My study reveals that former soldiers were driven to the army following the example of their elders mainly because they admired the masculine characteristics of their siblings, the way they looked when they wore their military outfits and the way they were feared by civilians, and more importantly the guarantee of security that parents' military identity provided to the family. Some parents encouraged their children to do the same thing as them, but here many stated that when they decided to join the army their parents were unaware, which reveals somehow that should they know before they might have stopped them from joining the army. However, when they were

already soldiers their parents agreed with their choice of joining the army and encouraged them in their military profession. I had observed in the DRC that in general, renowned people dissuade their children or siblings from following in their footstep without explaining to them the strengths and weaknesses of their professions. They rather encourage them to study other disciplines like accounting, law or medicine. But once children have already embarked on that career they receive their parents' support.

Another motivation factor in line with the desire to serve the country is the need for change viewed as a way of coming to term with uncertainty for the future. This hope for change formed the discourse of the war of liberation led by L.D.K in 1996.

4.3.3. War of liberation and youth's aspiration for change

Billig's notion of banal nationalism is not without criticisms. One of them is that the formation of a nation is dynamic because states are often faced with political crisis and wider socio-economic factors. These political crisis and economic factors which have often been overlooked need to be incorporated in the conception of the theories of the nation (Skey, 2009). The liberation war of 1997 was also psychological because L.D.K exploited the dire socio-economic conditions of the people to legitimise his insurrection aimed at changing the country's political system. The AFDL programme covered two phases. First is a "re-democratization" of society through a Western liberal democratic model of an independent legislature, executive and judiciary. Respect for human rights and democratic norms were also promised. The second, a "reconstruction and development" phase involving rehabilitation of the roads, support to the informal sector, primary health care for all, a decent education and housing system, restoring purchasing power for wage earners and promoting independent trade unions (Skanthakumar, 1997).

The liberation war was sought to capture people's attention through new types which manipulated the spectacular and the symbolic. L.D.K had understood that the population was angry with Mobutu because of the collapse of the country's socio-economic system and political institutions due to rampant corruption and abuse of citizens. Many people lost their jobs during the sad looting of 1991 and 1993 which deepened people's unemployment and poverty. Young people, especially those with university degrees became increasingly concerned about their future. This is what explained the regular protest movements of youths

against the Mobutu regime. On the other side, Kabila whose rebellion aimed to oust Mobutu and take over power understood that these youths were ready to enlist in his armed struggle. The country was divided; each town that fell in the hands of the rebellion was managed independently. The images of the cities under rebel control seemed economically stable with organised people with good living standard. In addition, many multinationals headed more towards Kabila to negotiate contracts rather than Mobutu who was already regarded as an outgoing president. Recognising the importance of mineral exploitation in the war effort, L.D.K imposed a "war tax of 15 percent to foreign firms and appointed two of his brothers, Florent Kambale Kabila as mining minister in charge of fees collection and Gaetan Kakudji, as governor of the mineral-rich Shaba province (Reno, 1997: 58). Revenues generated from mineral exploitation were instrumental in Kabila's effort to present an apparent improvement of the living conditions of the populations of the cities under his control, and to reach Kinshasa. This aroused the yearning of those still under Mobutu's control to be 'freed'. So many people, particularly youths at universities, found that Kabila's rebellion was, to borrow Christensen and Utas' (2008: 522) words, "a last chance [to become] somebody" with social standing – a way out of their misery – and got enrolled as AFDL troop members to dislodge Mobutu from power and give the opportunity to L.D.K to govern the country.

Amani, aged 39, was ranked sub-lieutenant in the Congolese army. He was married, and his wife and children lived in the Congo at the time the interview was conducted. A Holder of an honour's (BA, hons) degree in International Relations and a certificate in fitting and turning, he was recruited in Lubumbashi to the AFDL led by L.D.K and was subsequently deployed to different fronts in cities like Kisangani, Lubutu, Walikale. When L.D.K became president, Amani went to military training at the Tanzanian military academy and at Saint Cyr in France in 2003. He was enrolled in the French legion to work in Waziristan, Afghanistan, (the hilliest area located between Pakistan and Afghanistan) in 2004. The dire living conditions of soldiers in the DRC led him to desert the army and to move to South Africa where he was granted refugee status in 2012. Thanks to his fitting and turning training qualification, Amani was employed in a fitting and turning company in South Africa. Amani explained how he made his decision to join the army as follows:

> Well, it started during the AFDL revolution at the time of Mzee L.D.K. We were among the students at that time who were recruited. You know, with Mobutu's 32 years of dictatorship, each Zairian at that time wanted a change and when AFDL rebellion started, I was among the students who decided to join the ranks. When we joined the ranks, we were lined up, we went in different fronts, of course before the Mobutu

> regime could be overthrown, we were in Kisangani, Lubutu, Walikale, after Kinshasa fell. (Amani interview, July 2015 – My translation from French to English)

This quote suggests that people, especially intellectuals, felt that they were kept in a system of violence (to be discussed in the chapter to follow) that became unbearable due to its detrimental effects on people's development. The violence in this case was transformed into dictatorship characterized by a system of looting of resources by a minority to the detriment of the majority. Violence was the only way to silence the opponents and to ensure the continuation of this dark system. The protest movements and the war of liberation were a response to a system that lost all credibility. According to Le Saout (1999), the protest movements depend on the "political opportunities structures" as they allow or fashion protestors' actions. If political opportunities structures are open to protestor's claims, the expansion of demonstrations can be contained. On the other hand, if political opportunities structures remain unresponsive to protestors' demands, protest movements can be expanded and become difficult to crush (translated from French to English – my emphasis).

As it emerges from this quote, youth longing for change is a sign of the degeneration of a system unable to deliver for the betterment of the people. This motivated youths from various universities who were upset with Mobutu's oligarchical system of ruling. As previously highlighted, students are those who already stood against Mobutu's dictatorship from 1968 until 1990s, organising various protests. Many found themselves in the army as a result of their involvement in those demonstrations. The only difference is that in the previous case, the enlistment was a strategy of the government to quell 'revolutionaries', but in this case, students and young academics decided to enrol in the army of liberation to end a terrifying and dictatorial regime that kept them in extreme poverty for 32 years.

Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony is relevant to this case. The symbolic violence and theory of hegemony are two concepts that this study relies on extensively. Gramsci submits that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas (Bates, 1975: 351). In his model, Gramsci explains that societies are divided into two classes: civil society and political society. Civil society is composed of churches and intellectuals while political society is formed by institutions. Accordingly, although political institutions initiate the ideology, its successful implementation depends on the civil society. Civil society includes intellectuals who are the marketing managers of contending cultures. The intellectuals succeed in creating hegemony to

the extent that they extend the world view of the rulers to the ruled, and thereby secure the 'free' consent of the masses to the law and order of the land (Bates, 1975: 353). This suggests that the continuation of any hegemony is dependent on the extent to which intellectuals back it. This is what explains that the decline of Mobutu regime started to become more visible when intellectuals in the mass protests objected the ideology of *mobutism* on which it was built for more than three decades. This also explains why in the beginning, L.D. Kabila's revolution baptised the 'liberation war' was successful because of the intellectual's support of the new ideology which was seen as sign of new hope especially for the youths. As Amani highlights, the youths' incentive to join L.D. Kabila's rebellion was because they lost trust in Mobutu's regime and sought to defend their future. Kabila's rebellion received massive support and took the form of popular uprising merely because people longed for the eradication of what was termed 'Zairian evil' characterised by 32 years of dictatorship, hoping that the new regime would improve their living conditions. Drawing from my own observation as one of the youths during the late phase of Mobutu's era (see also Chitando and Chirongoma, 2012; Cuvelier, 2014), what was motivating young people was that there was no hope for opportunities (which is still the case even now) that could help them to express their masculinities. Economic capital is a contributor of the making of man. The Congolese society is still imbued with images of male stereotypes of the main provider. The lack of economic capital becomes an affront to male cultural norms of masculinity roles. The inability to fulfil this gender norm leads to what Robertson terms "male gender role strain" (Robertson, 2009: 2). By supporting Kabila's rebellion, they hoped to be economically empowered in order to access jobs and have the means to live up their masculinities. During Mobutu's reign there was an apparent youth's desire to be enrolled into the Zairian army. This impetus slowed somewhat because of the socio-economic crises and the precarious standard of living that affected many soldiers and their families. But when AFDL took control of the country, there was fresh hope and the revival of youths' interest in military enrolment because AFDL's struggle was considered as a struggle for the liberation and the improvement of the Congolese living standards.

The soldiers who were despairing during the reign of Mobutu had returned with the hope of seeing their living conditions improved. Since they longed for change in the country, these soldiers, supervised by the Rwandan troops who helped L.D.K to overcome M.S.S, showed exemplary behaviour in the beginning of the regime. Those who worked with M.S.S had responded positively to the AFDL's appeal to lay down their weapons and adhere to the new *doxa*. This *doxa* brought by AFDL was extended to social lives of the people and imposed in

the big cities. For instance, in Kinshasa, the system of people standing in the taxi while travelling or stealing in the streets was ended. The practicality of the change of mentality was the use of vicious violence. Throughout his journey to Kinshasa, Kabila forced people to behave in a different way; those who were caught misbehaving were severely reprimanded. Some people who were caught in illegal acts had their legs or hands chopped off. In Kinshasa people who did not comply with the new rules were publicly lashed. This cruelty was virulently criticised and denounced by human rights organisations. Although some of the ways of punishing people were against human rights principles people seemed to be happy about it because they wanted radical change to forget about the cruel dictatorship they experienced during Mobutu.

For many, the army was experienced as place of discipline, order and transformation; an appropriate place where they could dedicate their lives to serve the nation, even though this was not the primary motive for enlisting. But many also conceptualised the Congolese Army as a place of injustice and disappointment for hampering their dreams of successful life depending on the reality and motivations that drove them into the army. Of note, even those who benefited off many training trips abroad during their military career expressed their disapproval and saw their involvement in the Congolese Army as a waste of time because of the economic challenges they faced. Gero even went further to question himself about why he compromised his life to serve in the army of an ungrateful country.

> What pains me the most is that my father sent me to study agronomy which is the crossroad of sciences; I got nothing [from the army]. I did animal breeding but got no benefit of it. So, what worries me is that I got nothing from what you call army. Therefore, I will never allow my child or my grand-child to serve in the Congolese army because I, their grand-father or their father, was not rewarded by the army. Why will I send my child to the [Congolese] army? Am I mad? (Gero interview, December 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

Although endowed with valuable cultural capital in form of skills Gero felt that the system (the army) failed him by not offering him the appropriate opportunity to use and benefit from his academic skills. This suggests that the army became a misfit environment for Gero. This can be explained by the fact that the military was not a freely consented choice of his life; he was forced into it, and the skills he brought into the army were outmoded. Gero suffered what Bourdieu terms *hysteresis effect* (Bourdieu, 1984) occurring “when the habitus lags behind the objective material conditions which gave rise to it and with which the habitus has to catch up”

(King, 2000: 427). The emphasis on ‘I got nothing’ shows that although he inhibited his own skills to embody the military habitus, the army failed to provide him access to other forms of capitals, particularly economic capital. He found himself confronted with military *hegemony* or *symbolic violence* where he was forced to conform to another *cultural capital* based on the principles of obedience and humility. Since all his dreams were ruined by virtue of enrolling in the army Gero continued to live in the past, regretting why he could not use the skills for which his parents spent a lot of money for him to acquire them. His anger and disappointment result from the poverty in which he found himself in a foreign country and particularly from the loss of masculinities. This loss of masculinities is exemplified by his inability to be with his family and provide for them. He felt like he betrayed himself and his parents at the same time. His pain was also exacerbated by the fact of being forced to leave the army and to flee to South Africa where he continued to experience other forms of *symbolic violence* which he used to explain the loss of masculinity exemplified by the exiled condition that prevented him from going back to his country as well as the humiliating attitudes civilians showed him in South Africa (to be discussed in chapter seven of this study).

A respondent, Taty who was born in 1962, got his degree of engineer in Polytechnique at the University of Kinshasa in 1985 and started working as technical director in a private Company in Kinshasa for a couple of months until he met one renowned army General in the then Zairean Army who attracted him to the army. The same year he was sent to EFO (*Ecole de Formation des Officiers*), a military academy located in Kananga, for a three-year training which he successfully completed. In 1989, he was first sent to CETA military camp as a trainee and lieutenant parachutist. At the completion of this training in parachuting he was appointed instructor. Taty completed various specialized trainings in France and Italy which contributed to his promotion to the rank of captain first and ended with the rank of colonel. He was deployed in various theatres of operations particularly in Rwanda (Kigali) where he was even shot in the face in 1991 and in Kolwezi (Katanga) to quell the xenophobic conflict that opposed the natives of Katanga to those from Kasai in 1991.

He decided to leave the army and country in 2004 after being involved in several wars: first as a member of the Zairean troop who unsuccessfully thwarted the advance of L.D.K’s rebellion of 1996 and as a member of the AFDL troop to fight rebel group of RCD that attempted to oust L.D.K. in 1998 with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. Taty explained in the following quote that he found himself empty-handed with many difficulties in South Africa:

> I don't like to talk about my time in the army because these are bad memories of my life. I gained nothing and today I am wounded. It's not important to talk about it. I served the country [DRC] with all my energy for all my life but I found myself with nothing. I fought in Rwanda, Angola, Kenge and I got nothing. I went several times to Europe, what did I earn? Today, in South Africa, I am faced with people who are complex, hard to understand me to grant me refugee status (Taty interview, December 2015)

The analysis of this quote highlights the violence Taty suffered first in the DRC and then in South Africa. The violence in the DRC was triggered by the unrewarding way his military career ended. It was also caused by the fact that the knowledge he accumulated through different trainings in foreign countries during his military career in the DRC fell in limbo. Taty's quote highlights the struggle for accessing resources in the new country, particularly access to documentation. Despite the existing policy aimed at widening freedom and protection through the promotion of refugees' temporary incorporation into the local areas, refugees' access to documentation has always been challenging in South Africa. Landau (2006:308) rightly argues that "South Africa has failed to meet its domestic and international obligations".

Taty stresses the loss of prestige and honour first in the DRC and then in the new country where no one valued his soldiering identity, denying him the identity he disserved which justified his move and his settlement in the new country. His identity was not fixed; it was still mutating. The political and administrative field of South Africa did not allow him to restructure his life. Taty was looking his life in various fields of the new society. Access to economic capital depended on his access to legal capital reified by access to documentation acknowledging his stay in South Africa. This quote reveals that Taty was frustrated because of the hardship he experienced to survive in the new environment, particularly to get along with people who he saw as complexed. Bourdieu (1977) explains *hysteresis effect* as the failure for habitus to adapt to modified *field* conditions. This is one of the reasons many of them expressed the need to return to the DRC because they suffered *symbolic violence* in the host setting in terms of not being recognised the legal status they deserved, not being respected and doing *downgrading* jobs as civilians.

The unwillingness to talk about military memories suggests that these memories became chaotic and suffused with feelings of inadequacy and shame. Importantly, in the migration context, these memories were tied to distressing feelings of uncertainty, inferiority, worrisome self-doubt, humiliation and shame. These moments exacerbated the 'felt' threat or vulnerability

that migration inflicted on former soldiers. Nations were often defined as a hierarchical social system to which their members, men and women, socially subordinate (McClintock, 1993). This is also what justifies juveniles' decision to enrol in the army in order to protect the nation. However, the reading of these quotes suggests that the theory of the nation is somehow contested. While people joined the army for their love for the nation, these quotes reveal that they also expected some reward from the nation in return. This reward is what sustains people commitment to serving the nation as "contested systems of cultural representation that limit and legitimize peoples' access to the resources of the nation-state" (McClintock, 1993:61). These quotes show that former soldiers contested the notions of the nation because of its failure to deliver as they expected from it.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have showed that the search for access to various forms of capitals is what justifies young people's motivations for joining the army. These capitals are social, economic, symbolic and political. These different motivations can be tied together as a search for meaningful masculinities which incorporate dimensions of economic success, violence through revenge or defence and their role in an emerging nation. The context of the country marked by the lack of jobs for youths, the need for retaliation, the involvement in actions considered as subversive political movements, as well as the privileges related to the military identity in the DRC inform the motivation for joining the army.

Polkinghorne (1991: 143) argues that "narrative structuring functions to make stories meaningful through the various formats in which they are expressed. Here, I have limited my point to highlighting different discourses pertaining to participants' military involvement. As findings clearly reveal, soldiering was not the primary choice for many of them; former soldiers mainly dreamed about other better-paid professions than soldiering. However, their dreams were sunk by different ruptures which were mainly linked to the social, economic and political environment of the DRC. These ruptures could be the lack of jobs, revenge for the violence they experienced from soldiers and the need to gain respect, as well as the need for political change in the country. In this context, joining the army was hoped to offer them a way to fix the rupture they had experienced in their lives. The aim of this decision was ultimately the search to regain various masculinities which many of them failed to reach in the army.

Now that participants had joined the army in various circumstances, I show, in the next chapter, how the army prepared soldiers to inculcate new ethics or tradition aimed at imbuing them with the capacity to inflict pain and violence.

Chapter five: The socialising process of the making of a soldier

The term evil shuts down the possibility of explanation. Labelling people or political groups as "evil" sets them aside and condemns them as the impenetrable others, unable to be understood – outside the world of evil (Kraft, 2014:24).

5.0. Introduction

The previous chapter examined different motivations and circumstances that influenced many young men's choice of enrolling in the army and becoming a soldier. Two forms of narrative break were prominent: the lack of opportunities and the political context of the DRC. In the previous chapter many former soldiers reported that having experienced different ruptures the army became the last option they embraced to fix the various ruptures of their lives. Importantly, although the army was not part of the dreams of many young people, it became a source of power to gain access to various forms of capital.

Following their enrolment into the army, the question is to know what these young people became. How was their initiation to soldiering conducted? This chapter examines the various ways in which the army changes young people to embody its principles. Significantly, the respondents highlighted that civilian life and military life are two different worlds. The army is an institution dominated by principles which are beyond common understanding. Given that the army requires order, discipline and obedience, the socialisation process within the army implies candidates ought to be subjected to various forms of violence. This chapter seeks to address the main research question that focuses on exploring how Congolese former soldiers living in Johannesburg remember war/violence in which they were involved during their military career and how the contexts of mobility influence their discourse of war and violence.

In this chapter, I discuss the process of 'the making of a soldier' that former Congolese soldiers went through. In the process of the making of a soldier, much emphasis was put on the development of a new lifestyle which differed from the civilian life. This new way of life was inscribed in the discourse concerning the military ideology. Ideology in the military was more about taking soldiers to the level of forgetting themselves to act in accordance with the professed creed. The impact of ideology such as dying for the country and the importance of discipline in the flawless execution of seniors' orders within the army were discussed by participants. Soldiers vowed to remain faithful to their superiors and to their mission, viewing

themselves as ‘friends of dead people for the sake of their country’ (Makemba interview, August 2016 – my translation from Lingala to English).

The chapter first highlights the trauma resulting from the preparation of soldiers’ mind about the enemy and the wartime causing fear and compelling soldiers to engage in brutality and massive killing which they viewed as legitimate defence. The chapter discusses the way soldiers embody military masculinity through the normalisation of violence and killing.

5.1. Forging soldiering spirit

Participants reported that military and civilian lives are two different worlds with different beliefs and principles. When candidates were enlisted in the military, efforts were made to help them evolve from civilian mentality to military tradition. The definition of a soldier is in contrast to civilian; the word ‘civilian’ was even used as an insult to those soldiers who failed to perform accordingly. The aim was to show the demarcation line between civilian life and military life in order to heighten what was expected from the candidates. The process of making a soldier consisted of making them as cruel and as merciless as possible when they were in front of the enemies. Through this process soldiers were endowed with symbolic power, symbolic domination and symbolic revolution (Landry, 2006 – my emphasis). Soldiers were socialised in order to carry over an external and tyrannical domination. In the war context, soldiers were controlled to act more or less voluntarily “according to the interests or wishes of the dominators” (Gates, 2002: 101). Importantly, this preparation aimed to trouble soldiers’ mind to fear the enemies for their own protection in a more efficient way. The fear of the enemies means that soldiers were conscious of human maneuverings in the warzone. For instance, participants reported that they were warned to shoot on everything that moved in the warzone because of the beliefs that the enemy may turn, by the power of magic, to take the form of an animal to avoid being identified.

One of the qualities expected from the good soldier was truthfulness, which I will explain in the next section of this chapter. The truth here was perceived as the current accepted way of understanding the world (Myhrmann, 2016). This comprehension is created through a social process in which people are engaged with one another. Thus, the way we construct the world is not ontological, but epistemological and our judgement of the world is the product of our interaction with one another. It is important to stress that knowledge and truth are not the same.

Social constructionism strongly denies the existence of an objective fact encouraging human's creation of their own versions of reality (Myhrmann, 2016). Truth is difficult to define because even philosophers' attempts to define it were all challenged. I agree with Pardi (2015) to simply admit that the truth here means a statement about the way the world actually is. The world referred to in this context is the military world which views truth according to its own realities and makes of it an acceptable and legitimate knowledge. This truth is neither objective nor absolute; it is subjective and relative as well as susceptible to be questioned by those who do not belong to the military world. Truth is perceived as the communication of language or thought in the army making 'truthful' soldiers blameless. When comparing themselves with civilians, as it will be explained later in this chapter, former soldiers stated that they were truthful because, unlike civilians who were unstable and could change the version of the story at any time to meet their interests, they (former soldiers) remained steadfast in what they professed and believed. This is what led former soldiers to refer to civilians in the DRC as '*basenzi*' a word that I will spend time to explain as well. Taty, a former colonel in the Congolese army explained how soldiers understood truth and lie in the following account:

> An officer never lies; he always says the truth (smiling while looking at me). That's why I say to you that *basenzi*, civilians don't understand soldiers' [violent] acts. (Taty Interview, December 2015 – my translation from French to English)

Soldiers are motivated by the need to comply with these principles without questioning them even when these principles stand against their own convictions. The truth here can also be considered a kind of violence soldiers suffer as a result of standing against their own principles. Through the induction process soldiers acquired a set of mentally and bodily dispositions adapted to their field of activity as well as to the social structures surrounding them. The truth here is formed of certain military dispositions or values translated into actions of obedience of the chain of command in the execution of order. Saying the truth is not about remaining truthful in a strict sense, but it is mainly about remaining resolute or stable or unshakable in the military principles, one statement and one belief regardless of the cost. Since soldiers reported that they vowed to obey their superiors, saying or remaining truthful was meant to do whatever they were asked to do even if it was about killing or risking their own lives. Looking to probe Taty's statement about truthfulness, this is the explanation he provided:

> Military truthfulness means when they ask you to torture or kill an enemy, you don't have to argue. You can't save somebody's life and lie to your superior that you killed that enemy as he ordered you to do. That's not military spirit. There's not truth because you stand against military principle of obedience. (Taty Interview, December 2015 – my translation from French to English)

What Taty meant to highlight in his statement is that military truthfulness mostly means obedience to the command which is part of the military principles. In this context, soldiers' violent acts were more than blameless; they were a positive attribute that showed strength of character rather than the weakness of civilians. They were superior (in strength and morality). Those who did not understand the logic behind their violent acts were labelled *basenzi* (to be discussed in the section to follow). The army is a total institution. Total institutions are defined by a "place of residence and work, where a large number of like-situated individuals [are] cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time together [leading] an enclosed round of life" (Davies, 1989: 84). Goffman describes the dimensions of the term *total* as follows: First, social engagements are domiciled within the same space and same authority. Second members' everyday activities obey to the team-working spirit. Third, the sequence of daily activities to take place is planned in advance and enforced by a hierarchical system of ruling formed by a body of officials. Lastly, the numerous compulsory actions are unified into one reasoning strategy avowedly intended to achieve the formal mission of the institution (Davies, 1989). This total institution promotes a central feature of life and reasoning which is in stark contrast with any opposing view.

Another interesting feature of the military institution is the promotion of team-working spirit. The findings of this study indicate that this team working spirit was reified through rituals that bound troop members together, especially in wartime. That is why participants reported that the team working spirit compelled soldiers to rescue their colleagues who were injured in the frontline. As a case in point, John gave this account:

> When one of you steps on the mine or he is shot others can't just leave him there alone. When you step on the mine other colleagues come to rescue you. They can cut a big tree and brightly place down there without you removing your foot because if you remove your foot the mine explodes. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Participants further explained that they made sure that their members who died in the frontline were buried. Team working spirit was a way of strengthening military spirit among soldiers

that differentiated them from civilians. Members of the army were trained to abandon their individualities in favour of the team with the aim to guarantee that the army was one operating body. In their study, Maringira and Nunez (2015) found that punishment was sometimes collective rather than individual and aimed to heighten the importance of teamwork.

Being an enclosed institution with less communication with the outside world, the army conducted trainings in isolated and conducive places inaccessible to civilians. The aim of these trainings was to forge the joint effort spirit among soldiers. During this moment, soldiers were totally separated from their families, and their wives and children were banned from visiting them. The purpose of this moving away was to break any ties a young recruit may have to civilian life (and associated femininity) and to turn them into a man (Burns, 2008: 422). The beliefs soldiers adopted consisted of regarding the training ground as a sacred place to which only those who were recruited to fulfil the noble mission of protecting the country had access.

Another important finding of this study is that soldiers, as Feaver and Kohn (2000: 31) show, believe that they are more "religious" than civilians. Their religiosity means that soldiers abide by rules and this makes them believe that societies could better be governed if they apply "military mores", a claim that civilians reject believing that the army has nothing to offer in "civic renewal" (Feaver and Kohn, 2000: 31). Although military seniors were appointed by the civilian authority, the army still had the power to overthrow their civilian masters particularly in countries often marked by political crisis (Wiking, 1983). The observance of military mores is what former soldiers used to rationalise violence they perpetrated, calling civilians '*basenzi*' for lacking principles. Through military training and regulations soldiers learnt about what their mission was and strived to live up to their mission. To illuminate the special character or behaviour of a soldier, a former Congolese soldier likened it to rite of circumcision.

> Military training is a baptism of fire. It is a rite of circumcision because it helps to pass from childhood to adulthood, from civilian to soldier or from ignorance to knowledge. (Gero interview, December 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

The circumcision rite, in Congolese culture, remained sacred and mysterious and could not be revealed to any uninitiated individual particularly women. In his narrative Gero reported that circumcision in his culture took place when boys became teenagers. Before that age, they displayed childish behaviour such as crying for food, being closer to their parents or playing with girls. When they reached the age of circumcision they were taken far from their village

where they spent two weeks. The ritual of circumcision was at the same time the rite of passage from childhood to adulthood. On their return to the village, change was very much noticeable: young men ended childlike behaviours as they were prepared to become mature, seeing themselves as new beings and gaining a lot of respect and consideration from the entire village. Participants reported that the rite of circumcision was similar to military service which required them to be taken far away to be prepared for military ideology in which masculinity and its associated values formed the key part of the training. On their return to the city, they were no longer the same for they learnt higher moral standards, greater loyalty and more competence than civilian (Feaver and Kohn, 2000) which compelled them to overcome fear and civilian attitude of selfishness of thinking that only their lives counted (this civilian's thinking is feminised). This learning passed through some principles that soldiers needed to internalise as part of their life. However, the question that comes to mind as part of the discussion to follow relates to which teachings were based on military principles.

5.2. *Makila na biso po ya ekolo*

The thrust of this section is to highlight the normative role of rituals in constructing masculinity in the DRC's army. Here, I examine this construct within the context of the spiritual/supernatural belief that underpins soldiering in the DRC. The leading argument is that rituals in the DRC army are aimed at producing masculinity, considered a vital ingredient in promoting nationhood.

There is a popularly known proverbial say in Lingala, *Okoki kosimba nioka?* (Can you touch a snake?). The message conveyed through this question is that the snake is a dangerous and scary animal. The primary reflex of anyone who encounters a snake is to run away. Touching a snake is an act of bravery, a way of not only doing away with fear, but also becoming dangerous by turning the abnormal into normal. It is often reported that those called to lead are subject to this kind of ordeal or test which marks the rite of passage from childhood to adulthood. It is used when during induction rite which may involve the killing of their kinship; in other words, it is a way of 'cutting ties' with the 'normalities' such as family and friends and with people who once were regarded as close relationships (Hinton, 2004). Through this kind of expressions, the initiation's aim is to change the person's mind and behaviours to see abnormal as normal and the normal as abnormal.

Similarly, soldiering is a high-risk profession which requires breaking away from fear in order to fulfil it with efficiency. When soldiers joined the army, they were exposed to this kind of symbolic violence leading to the production of a mechanical and unconscious acceptance (Landry, 2006). For instance, the prevailing principles about the sacredness of life change; soldiers applaud what we who are not part of the army condemn. Participants gave example of 'immoral songs' they were taught to sing or drug they were forced to sniff or smoke in the army as a way to become 'adult' and 'warrior'. Thus, enrolling in the army involves entering a special behavioural frame that is governed by rules different from those of [civilian's] everyday life (Lomsky-Feder et al., 2008). In this process, soldiers were required to understand the role of the army for a country. Through this initiation, their bodies, spirits and souls were totally transformed to view killing, for example, as acceptable.

5.2.1. Soldiers' bodies belong to the nation

Bourdieu argues that fields agents are forced to subject or sublimate themselves in order to adapt to their structures and to reach the ends that are immanent within them (Bourdieu, 2000). Through my interaction with former Congolese soldiers in Johannesburg, it became evident that their bodies, spirits and souls were totally transformed to rationalise even human rights violations such as killing, rape or sexual violence as morally and ethically acceptable. These acts were legitimatised as long as they contributed to the advancement of the State. Sometimes lethal actions and other cruel acts were perpetrated in the name of self-defence. Since the primary mission of the country's army is to ensure national security and integrity, defending the nation from external aggression and threats, and maintaining peace and security within its borders, the discourse supporting this military philosophy was that killing and perpetrating other human rights violations were normalised. To achieve this goal, more work had to be done on soldiers' bodies, minds and spirits. This preparation started by convincing soldiers to relinquish the right over their bodies which were bought by the nation. John, 69 years old, who joined the Congolese army in 1966 and left in 2001 with the rank of colonel, had the following to say:

> Right, in our time, once you enrol in the army, they give you let's say 6000 *Francs Congolais*[17]. With that amount, it means that your body doesn't belong to you anymore; your body belongs to the state. You have no order to give to your body. You blood has been bought... (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

The process of soldiers being paid to enrol in the army symbolically represented selling one's individuality. Secondly the meaning of this payment was that the individual's body was sold to the state. From the beginning, the state exercised a kind of power on the individuals by determining an amount to be given for the possession of their bodies and also making them believe that they lost ownership upon their bodies. In every sale transaction it is the seller who determines the value of their property, but in this case the state used its symbolic power to give a lump sum to the individuals as a way to use their bodies. The role of the state is to guarantee security by producing and maintaining social order. Bourdieu argues that it is the central bank of symbolic capital, the institution with a monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2014). The state has the monopoly of the legitimate use of power and violence against external foes. The state, according to Bourdieu, is "the field of power or bureaucratic field with the monopoly of legitimate, physical and symbolic violence" (Bourdieu, 2014: 346). By accepting to be bought by the state soldiers became subject to "the symbolic authority of the state" which could use them to maintain order through violence (Von Holdt, 2013: 119).

What is critical about John's quote is that by moving to the camp, candidate soldiers changed their status and identity to act on behalf of the state, and the amount of money given was a *cultural and symbolical representation* of power (Bourdieu, 1980). It is that process which *legitimised* the use of the candidate's body in the fulfilment of military mission which on the rebound was the state's mission. Through the act of exchanging money against the human being, the individual died and through his body the nation emerged. As a result, soldiers lost their autonomy, becoming part of the nation that could use them at its convenience. Being part of the nation, soldiers became the carriers of *symbolic and physical violence* (monopoly of the state that they represented) used as a way to dominate and maintain social order.

On numerous occasions, the mere mention of soldiers conjured negative emotions in people who openly blamed soldiers for their brutality, especially at the difficult moment when the DRC was facing political unrest resulting from the prolonged war and its costs on people as well as on the economy. During interviews conducted with former Congolese soldiers,

[17] The current exchange rate is 1350 Franc Congolais to the dollar. This amount is the current equivalent of 5 US dollars.

military's image was seen as embodying violence; killing became even a necessity in some cases. Soldiers were often depicted as the cruellest and heartless people involved in the transgression of human rights principles and appropriating animalhood.

Makemba, aged 48 was married and father of several children. Makemba is an engineer specialised in hydraulic or pneumatic machine. He was recruited into the Congolese army in his late twenties and completed various training which elevated him to the rank of major. He was deployed to Angola in 1988 to back UNITA troops since Mobutu, Jonas Savimbi's ally, often offered various supports to UNITA in its struggle for power in Angola. He was forced to flee the DRC because of serious death threats, sought asylum in South Africa in 2004. In capturing the logic of the army and contrasting the general perceptions of civilians about soldiers, Makemba's account is instructive:

> They taught us fake doctrine on patriotism, telling us that what we do is to stand for the interests of our country…There are vows we were called to make. For instance, in Congo we said, '*makila na biso pona ekolo*' (in Lingala meaning our blood for the country); in Angola what were we taught by UNITA? When they said, "Gendelele!" we responded, "*keremus na pas de Angola*" (in Portuguese meaning until peace in Angola. (Makemba interview, December 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Kraft's (2014: 23) study analysing testimonies of perpetrators of violence at the South African TRC found two categories of influences that support sustained violence in crimes of allegiance: (1) an abbreviated ideology that idealizes oneself and vilifies one's adversary and (2) the use of war to justify any act of illegality. The use of the word '*fake doctrine*' underscores the context in which Makemba spoke. Since he claimed to have embraced Christianity, he stood against the army's principles. This way of viewing things by Makemba is a form of rationalisation of his conduct as a soldier. But he remembered perpetrating a number of atrocities when he was in the army. *Tokowa po ya ekolo* or *Gendelele, keremus na pas de Angola* were not mere doctrines, as I will further show, but they were embodied by Makemba and other soldiers during their military involvement. In that moment the discourse held about fake doctrine did not prevail. These doctrines were *doxas* which were successfully inculcated into soldiers' habitus with the aim to establish and preserve the social order and the unity of actions in the military field, especially in times of war. It is clearly known that the army imposes a worldview to all its members, which in most of the cases, is captured through doctrines. As Thiselton (2007: 92) argues, "this doctrine offers an enduring stability that served the need of

safeguarding and nourishing a [soldiers'] consciousness which [at the early stage] was still fragile, and which remained in constant danger of disintegration". In this context, habit, training, habituation, and stable regularity play a key role of integrating and shaping character, will and desires as a coherent, well-ordered, healthy whole. What is at stake through these doctrines is the production of military capital characterized by risk-taking, endurance and fearlessness in the face of adversity. These doctrines are institutionalised by the use of weapons of symbolic violence. These doctrines aimed to secure the misrecognition of individuals, and hence the recognition of the dominant position of the state that soldiers were called to protect and defend in the army field at the expense of their own lives.

The institution's power rests upon teachings or principles it promotes. For instance, while Christian or Islamic denominations rely on the bible or Koran to draw their principles, the army's teaching or ideology is based on the military regulations, governing the conduct of those who seek to fit in. The message conveyed in the military ideology aims to incite members to develop and embody masculinities, an important factor in the army, in order to overcome fear. Masculinities, as conceived, lead members of the military to the normalisation of violence. The army placed high value on soldiers who displayed these violent behaviours and those who were unable to perform in the army were feminised, a great emphasis was placed on the development of this ideology. Participants reported that they underwent rituals aimed at transforming their bodies to respond to the army's expectations. Makemba further explained that:

> A soldier is not afraid of death; a true soldier can't be afraid of death, I tell you. Because you live with death, you eat with death and you clothe death. Witness, I tell you; I inform you that military uniforms are taken to cemetery where they spend two or three days before you wear them to tell you that you are a dead's friend; you are brother of those who are dead and you and those who are dead are the same. (Makemba interview, December 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

What is highlighted Makemba's quote above is that the fostering of military habitus is done through symbolic violence. The analysis of this quote denotes a symbolic funeral for the person's individual self and individual decision-making. So along with the selling of their body, in this ritual the old self dies and there is no new individual self – only the team that is the army. The army requires the overcoming of fear by likening soldiers to dead people. The association of death with the military highlights the idea of overcoming death. Becoming fearless of death symbolically means overcoming or defeating death. More importantly, even

the area where training takes place was sometimes surrounded by cemetery (an area that is feared). These areas were generally regarded as the dwelling places of dead people who, according to some local beliefs, are not dead. Some of the risk-taking practices are performed in order to remove the fear which is attributed to civilians or femininity. The above Makemba's quote highlights the soldier's cultural capital based on fearlessness. They are taught new behaviour in the way of navigating the field. This habitus acquired in the army through military training is key indicator of their capacity to navigate even in difficult fields. Masculinity can only be fostered in an environment that is considered appropriate for military training. The resources available in such environment are sufficiently used to perform rituals related to masculinity and nationhood. Training often took place in isolated sites surrounded by trees, mountains, rivers and cemeteries because habitus is a product of the field. The principle of the dynamics of a field lies in the form of its structure and, in particular, in the distance, the gaps, and the asymmetries between the various specific forces that confront one another. The forces active in the field are those which define the specific capital. A capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

The importance of the rituals consisting of taking military attire to the cemetery before wearing them correlates with Obućina (2011) and Mahanta (2012) argument about the impact of myths on the mental state of people. Reinforcing the sacredness of the uniform, soldiers stated that wearing military uniform symbolised great responsibility. Pfanner (2004: 94) states that military uniform is a distinguishing feature of a state's army reflecting "order and discipline and calls for subordination by displaying a variety of insignia, including badges that indicate rank and emphasize the hierarchical structure of armies". It is true that military uniform has a powerful social meaning and allows soldiers to identify themselves as part of a country and also to recognise their ranks and show respect to those who are highly ranking. Nevertheless, what Pfanner is unaware of is that military uniform has a powerful cultural meaning and that the rituals performed before wearing it, as findings of this study reveal, symbolise power and remove fear from soldiers. Beyond the fact of being a distinctive element, military uniform is an indicator of symbolic violence and confers to those who wear it the symbolic power to command and to be obeyed. The existence of the state goes along with "a process of concentration of instruments of legitimation, as well as the development of a symbolic apparatus and symbolic rituals surrounding the royal power" (Bourdieu, 2014: 67). Participants recounted that soldiers were trained to consider themselves as the incarnation of the power of the state when they wore uniform and the people were socialized to be submissive to the

authority of the bearer of this special clothing featured with the national flag and army's emblem. Military paraphernalia is part of the state's linguistic capital, an establishment of an official language, a form of linguistic contract "between all the agents of a community, a code that each person must respect on pain of being unintelligible, being dismissed as barbarian or talking gibberish" (Bourdieu, 2014: 67). Military uniform was the embodiment of power; soldiers in uniform considered themselves as superior and were often prompted to committing violence. Civilians who, in some confrontations, dared to touch military uniforms were severely lambasted. Makemba's discourse about the power of military uniform was corroborated by Lokole, a former colonel who stressed that military uniform was the embodiment of demonic forces which operated in soldiers' minds to engage in violent acts.

> Do you know that the devil works in us in the military service? Umh! (laughing) Umh, do you know? So that we can oppress civilians, the devil holds us through military uniform. If you don't control that uniform you will do a lot of bad things; you will kill, torture and disturb people's lives because of that uniform. You will become normal only if you remove it. (Lokole interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Again, from Lokole's quote, it is clear that the individual agency was lost. Soldiers became uniform which symbolised the State. Similarly, some participants indicated that sometimes civilians' attitudes, attempting to resist soldiers' symbolic power incarnated though uniform forced them to act violently. A good illustration was provided by another participant, Loleko. Loleko was 64 years old, married and father of several children. He enrolled in the army following the eighty days war in 1978, and was ranked captain. He completed his infantry training in Kitona in 1980. He was also trained as an immigration officer and criminologist. He left the army in a horrible condition after escaping death, and entered South Africa in 1999. He was granted refugee status and was unemployed. He spent his time reading books, and sometimes offering services to the people who relied on his military and political experiences. This is the account he provided:

> …We arrested and seriously tortured a man […] because the man was difficult and tried to undermine our uniform and power; that's why I gave order to my team soldiers to torture him. (Loleko interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

What I get from this is that power of the army is everything. To undermine a soldier's power is to bring the most violence punishment on oneself.

The discourse about uniform being the embodiment of death had an effect on civilians because in the DRC the first reflex of civilians in viewing soldiers wearing uniform was to run away. This can be likened to somebody who runs from a danger they see coming to them. On several occasions, some former soldiers who were involved in war recounted that whenever they lost any of their members in confrontation with the enemies in battlefield, they returned to collect their uniforms. The motivation behind was that the uniform symbolised "sameness of appearance" and homogeneity and also "strengths and power" (Pfanner, 2004: 93-94), the contenders can use their uniforms to blend in and become difficult to be identified as enemies. While I agree with Pfanner's understanding of uniform, from interview responses, it is evident that military uniform has a powerful cultural and supernatural meaning and that the rituals performed before wearing it symbolised power that controlled soldiers' actions. Therefore, the military uniforms used in war guerrilla carried power that drove the beliefs of fighters. As such, abandoning the uniforms to the enemies could have an impact of the supernatural powers troop members possessed. Military uniform is "a fetish object, sexualised by generations of men and women, representing as it does so many male attributes of disciplined strength and channelled aggression" (Mayes and Hetherington, 2012). There are myths in the discourse concerning the wearing of military uniforms. Modern armies believe that winning the battle depends on the increasing technicalities of war, reified by the use of advanced and more and more sophisticated technologies. In this case, combat takes the form of distant action, and depends more on the quality of the weapons and the technical training of those who use them than on physical power and collective aggression of the soldiers concerned. This study's data shows another way of conducting war in the African context; traditional practices governing the beliefs of the members of the armed forces taking part in the hostilities prevail against modern way of conducting war.

5.2.2. Subject to martial law

According to participants, loyalty and faithfulness were qualities that the nation required from soldiers and those who failed to observe these requirements were court-martialled. The pressure to remain loyal and faithful and to avoid being accused of treacherousness was another justification they gave for their heartless actions. For example, military ideology and the wearing of uniform were so binding that those who tried to escape from the battlefield could pay a heavy price resulting in death penalty. It was better for soldiers, as participants reported, to die as heroes in the frontline rather than running away from the enemy. Escaping was

considered as a serious transgression of the vow of '*tokowa po ya ekolo*' (dying for the nation) they continuously made. Refusing to fight to defend the country was construed as a betrayal of the ideals of the army and those soldiers caught in that attitude were depicted as 'undisciplined' treacherous and subjected to the full extent of the 'law'. This is because they were viewed as contesting the national making of a soldier's body and denying the nation that symbolically bought them its right over their bodies. Associated with this was also soldiers' unethical conduct or misbehaviour such as misappropriation or selling of military equipment. Participants reported that soldiers who refused to fight or embezzled army's funds or goods were depicted as 'undisciplined' because they failed in their duties and deserved heft sentence. John, the former colonel in the Congolese Army, explained:

> Ah, it is a very big offense. When we went to war, if you run away from the war [you refuse to fight], if they catch you, you will be judged by the court-martial. If the court-martial decides that you must *passer par les armes* [you must be executed], they execute you. [Same applies] when you embezzle military effects, for example selling cartridge, military equipment. Even when you take [army's] fuel and sell it, it is an embezzlement of military effects, you will be executed. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

What is interesting in John's quote is that crimes against the army became the most serious ones. At the same time earlier, they saw crimes again civilians as being almost self-inflicted because of civilians' weaknesses. Running away from the war was seen as betraying the vow made to die for the nation; it was betraying the ideals of the army by which soldiers had to abide. It showed the power that the institution had to force its members to comply with rules and regulations. I remember when John used the French expression '*passer aux armes*' during the interview, I asked him to explain its meaning for me. In his response, he raised his voice with his eyes widely opened, saying 'You will be shot dead'. This body language showed not only his disappointment that I did not know the meaning of this expression, but he was looking to show the seriousness of what he was talking about. Military leadership had a role to play in keeping this spirit alive in soldiers' conducts. The role of the military leadership in motivating soldiers to fight fearlessly to fulfill their vows will be fully discussed further. The consequence resulting from embezzling military properties shows how the army was a very strict institution requiring values of honesty, discipline and loyalty from its members. However, the bad example of top-ranking officers involved in shady deals and misappropriation of state's properties and the difficult living conditions of many soldiers in the Congolese army generated illegal practices of stealing from the army and also from civilians in order to survive. Herein, I

argue that this logic can only stand in stable political situation developing good policies aimed to improve the living conditions of soldiers, which in the case of Congolese armed forces remain a utopia even today. The inculcation of military ideology implied derogatory way of portraying civilians and their lifestyle.

5.3. Military discipline contrasting *'musenzi'*

The word '*Musenzi*' has often been used by soldiers particularly when they engage in discussion with civilians in the DRC. During my interactions with former soldiers who participated in this study the word *musenzi* often emerged. Before exploring the context in which this word was used it is important to understand its origin. Etymologically, the report entitled *Tanganyika: Espace fécondé par le lac et le rail* indicates that the term *musenzi* originated from the name Zanzibar. Indeed, some authors even refer to the Greeks who called the littoral zone of East Africa between the Cape Delgado to the south and the river Jiuba in the north Zingis, Zingisa or Zingium. Asians called it *Zinj* or *Zenj*, from the Persian word *zanj*, which became *zang* in Arabic, meaning 'negro'.

The word 'bar', added to it, is 'bahr' of Arabic origin meaning 'sea', 'coast'. Important to be specified, the Swahili term 'sea' is 'bahar' [bahari], Bara then having the sense of a bare land. Referring to Burton's study, Omasombo states that the meaning this author gives to the word 'Zanzibar' runs alongside: 'zanj' meaning Negro and 'bar' understood as area; Zanzibar is referred to as Black Country (Omasombo, 2014 – my translation). Quoting Verbeken (1954), Omasombo submits that Arabs also called *Zendji-bar* or 'land of Zendji' to mean country of blacks or slaves. This label seemed to be at the origin of the Swahili word 'mzendji' 'mshenzi' in Bantu languages to denote a 'non-civilised',' a 'barbaric' or 'savage', *musenzi* or *basenzi* (when they are many) (Omasombo, 2014 – my translation).

During 1970s with the creation of a special division called *Kamanyola* within the Zairean Armed forces, the army was in support of the president Mobutu and of the unique political party, MPR which was above the state. Instead of being at the service of the nation, Mobutu's army, particularly special divisions which he created for his own advantage, significantly contributed to the "establishment of a political culture based on ethnicity and authoritarian patterns of governance" (Van Wyk, 2007: 7), which culminated in the creation of the political philosophy of the regime called *Mobutism*. Defence and security systems were adjusted to the progress of the regime. Mobutu, as president of the Republic, was in charge of defence policy, while he was the supreme commander for executive actions of the defence. He had also served as minister of the defence and homeland security for twenty-five years (Banywesize, 2013 – my translation). The army became an instrument of repression and terror at the service of an ideology, *Mobutism*. Soldiers were involved in repressing, expropriating or killing civilians, repeatedly calling them "*civil pamba*" or "*basenzi*" (Civil worthless or uncivilized)

(Banywesize, 2013 – my translation). Unfortunately, this alarming situation has been perpetuated by the current regime using extreme violence against political opponents and population demanding peaceful transition of power to the democratically elected institutions. In their quest to dominate, soldiers often present themselves as men, different from civilians, regarding them as *basenzi*. Therefore, the civilians represent the barbaric backward and feminised and the military are the masculine, rational and moral people who need to keep the barbarians under control. This is a reflection of the ongoing power of racist colonial logic in the postcolonial era. Most expressive are instances in which soldiers use masculine forms to express dominance particularly in their interactions with civilians. Military masculinity is connected to representations of language use as well as sexuality and ethnicity. Various forms of military jargons give rise to the cultural model of the othering of civilians as inferior. Kiesling (2007: 668) refers to it as the vernacular and argues that this language has "covert prestige for men in uniform, because it indexes toughness and a kind of working-class masculinity". Soldiers engage in a range of military coding, which sometimes is intelligible and insane, as a way of expressing dominance and authority. They are mostly used to do away with what is regarded as taboos, another way of expressing their masculinity and *de-civilianising* (e.g. singing immoral songs or promoting unwelcoming practices). In most of cases, the language used by the soldiers in their interaction with civilians is far from being unintelligible. This vocabulary includes "meaningful semiotic resources" enabling soldiers to impose a particular masculine order in which positions of power, authority and solidarity are enacted and/or contested (Milani, 2011: 183).

5.4. The meaning of '*musenzi*' in the military truth

The word *musenzi,* particularly in the context of my study, is not only used when soldiers repress civilians, but it is essentially used to mean that civilians are not emotionally stable, especially when they face challenges. In migration setting former soldiers relied on this word to mean that they are unemotional even when they faced various challenges due to the change of their identity in a new environment. The lack of stability is a feminised representation of civilians (civilians represent the female as in the emotional, the natural etc.). On the other hand, masculine qualities of rationality and logic and consistency and self-discipline or self-control were used to define soldiers. Many of the participants reported that there is a huge difference between civilians and soldiers in the sense that civilians often 'lie' and the lack of 'education' compels them to condemn soldiers' acts. Even in the re-solcialising process imposed by the

realities of the new context, former soldiers reported that sometimes it was hard to mingle with civilians. The 'educated' soldier is the one who walks according to military regulations and remains faithful to his seniors. The 'education' here is less about *institutionalised cultural capital* (e.g. gaining degrees from schools), but more about thoroughly observing military principles and flawless discipline in the execution of orders. The discipline is also noticed in the way one's behaviour is displayed in front of people. The following excerpt most strongly highlights former Congolese soldiers' conception of *musenzi*.

> Soldiers are violent, yes, because we see ourselves as extra-terrestrial. We see ourselves as superior to others. That's why in military language we say, '*Civile azali musenzi*'. Even at home although we are taught to respect our wives, but my wife remains *musenzi*. There is a total confusion with *musenzi*. His powerful weapon is lie. He can be seated but will not stand to give the chair to an elderly person. He doesn't respect and honour those who are older than him. (Taty, Interview, December 2015 – my translation from French to English)

Herein, Taty is drawing from the discourse of power and morality. Being a soldier confers some superiority based on a militarised version of morality. The morally correct position is the military one. The civilian cannot be expected to be moral. This is a justification for what otherwise would be socially condemned actions. Morality is also taught in families but in most cases, it is difficult to apply. For soldiers, moral values are engraved in his conduct and become the basics of his life to the extent that even after departing from the army they continued to apply some of them. Discipline is the result of symbolic violence within the army where soldiers allowed themselves to be dominated by the army's doctrine. Soldiers see being disciplined as the ultimate act of morality – even when that means acting in ways that otherwise would be immoral. This discipline is also objectified in the way of behaving in front of elders (e.g. let elders have their seats), which is the replication of the respect of military hierarchy.

Since the army is reputed as a place of high moral values, a *musenzi* basically is someone who does the opposite of what is required in the army. The army is regarded a place of respect and order where everyone must be given the place, they deserve according to the rank they occupy. In this sense, the elderly person has more rights than the younger. Former soldiers used the existing moralities (such as respecting elders) and twisted them to make sense in a military context. The application of these existing moralities in the army is very important as the same moralities are also used (to be discussed in the chapters to follow), to justify their non/engagement in violent behaviours. The elderly person in the context of the army is the one

with high rank and seniority which needs to be acknowledged in every situation. Being a hierarchical institution, soldiers' understanding of discipline means that junior officers must show respect to senior officers. For instance, when a lower-ranking soldier encounters a superior he must stand to strike hand salute. In social gatherings, the senior cannot stand while the junior is sitting. The junior must stand and yield the seat to the senior. Those who fail to follow this principle are *basenzi* who, in most cases, are civilians. Here soldiers are drawing on a gendered colonial narrative whereby the feminised barbarian cannot be expected to behave in the way the masculine enlightened man does. This conception of hierarchy worked perfectly among soldiers in the DRC and they often applied it in their interactions with civilians. The importance of soldiers is reinforced in the daily ways with a clear separation from civilians. For instance, in the DRC soldiers freely use public transport without paying. In most cases, the public transport is difficult in big cities, particularly in Kinshasa, an overcrowded city with an estimated population of 10,000,000 people who often fight to ride a bus. Drawing from my own observation as inhabitant of Kinshasa, soldiers always took the front-seat, next to taxi-drivers. Although soldiers travelling free of charge is a loss of income for private bus operators, the presence of soldiers next to the taxi-driver is sometimes viewed as a source of relief and security to the latter, sparing him from police harassment throughout the journey. Sometimes when the taxi-bus came, people fought to get a seat, but soldiers were onlookers. When the bus was full and about to move, soldiers often forced (I was also victim of this military brutality) people who sat next to the driver to exit and leave the place to them. This 'abuse of power' would sometimes be supported by the driver who found in soldier's presence a source of protection against potential police hassle on the road. Even when the bus came to the next station, civilians who were in the front seat were ordered to get out and concede their seats to soldiers. This is the depiction in which soldiers occupied the role of colonial master and expected civilians to play the role of servant. This uncomfortable situation often created tensions between civilians and soldiers and in most cases, those civilians who tried to oppose resistance were pulled out and soldiers took places they occupied. Interestingly, in the case where the discussion concerned a civilian with a commander of the army, a military officer who perhaps was there would intervene to order the civilian to step aside and leave the seat to the senior officer. During that quarrel between civilians and soldiers I could hear soldiers calling civilians *basenzi* because they tried to ignore the seniority entrusted by military uniform by refusing to relinquish their seats. Participant stressed that in the army they were taught never to argue with the chief; soldiers were instructed to listen and comply without questioning the order as Paul put it:

> Yes, we say *sika-sika* [now now]! The chief speaks you listen. You comply. Don't ask; comply first and ask later. (Paul interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Paul's quote shows how a form of symbolic domination was anchored in soldiers' subconscious to regulate their conduct and attitudes vis-à-vis their seniors. Landry argues that under the effect of such domination, each of the acts of knowledge initiated by the dominated group inevitably takes the form of an act of recognition of the imposed social order and, consequently, of an act of submission (Landry, 2006 – my translation from French to English).

However, Taty and some other participants also referred to civilians as *basenzi* because, according to them, civilians lie too much. Again, lying here is not necessarily in the genuine sense of not saying the truth, but it is more about not remaining constant in one's position. He later said that soldiers were consistent in the way they spoke; their yes remained yes, they tagged on that yes, no matter the cost it could entail. In other words, contrary to civilians, soldiers were not afraid of the outcome of their actions. What characterised soldiers, was that they were constant in their positions and did not change their statements or their vows to suit particular interests in particular circumstances. On the contrary, civilians could say yes in the morning and no in the evening. The shift from yes to no was more about where their interests laid. In most cases they were afraid to face the reality and ended up changing the version of a story. In their view, this was the evidence that civilians were *basenzi* or 'uneducated'.

The notion of moral values of the army will again be examined in the next chapter because it distinguished the post military lives of former soldiers in their daily interactions with others in the community. Former soldiers reported that discipline in the army was like what the heart represents for human body. In other words, they wanted to stress that without discipline the army would not exist. Many former Congolese soldiers who participated in this study mentioned that disciplined soldiers were often promoted and undisciplined soldiers found military service hellish and were often exposed to punishment and arrest. An eloquent account came from Wembo. Wembo, aged 45, was a sub-lieutenant in Congolese army. He was recruited at the age of 23 after completing his metric certificate. Married and father of two children, Wembo's wife and children were left in the Congo. He deserted the army because of the high treason observed in the behaviour of many high-ranking officers in the Congolese Army (the then Zaire) during the AFDL rebellion in 1997. He was also deployed to Kitona following the fall of Mobutu where they were left to die because of poor diet and sanitation.

He came to South Africa in 2000 and was granted refugee status. Wembo worked as a security guard in a private company. In his description of a disciplined soldier, Wembo explained:

> I didn't have problem in the army because I was obedient to my seniors. Even when they [military authorities] do wrong don't speak too much; keep secret because if you speak and he comes to know you are in trouble. You will be arrested and put into jail. (Wembo interview, September 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Wembo's quote also highlights the importance of moral values within the army which were objectified in the conduct of any worthy soldier. This aligns with Baaz and Verweijen's (2013) study which found that Congolese soldiers who lacked discipline to their commanding authorities were more exposed than those obedient soldiers who committed sexual violence. The observance of discipline is through obeying his superiors and remaining loyal to the commitments made at the oath consisting of being loyal and respectful to the seniors. As a response to the question related to the conception of discipline within the army, the following statements from some participants are illuminating.

> …So, discipline of the army is a true discipline because in the army you'll find all kinds of people and for those people to be in order there must be a true discipline. You will find both, educated and uneducated people, everyone. You can train a street kid and make him a good soldier; you change him until he obeys *mbala ombala*[18] because in the army you can't bring your *biyombi* (foolishness); you have to obey *mbala ombala*. It means you must obey any time any moment everything; do what they want, you know; and you obey anybody who is your superior, and continuously perform salute to him from morning until evening; he goes there you salute; he comes here you salute him. (Gero interview, December 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

What can be drawn from Gero's quote is the significance of discipline and authority in military education. The relationships between seniors and juniors are characterised by symbolic power conferred to the seniors by their ranks, creating two categories: dominators and dominated. In these rapports the authority of the dominator is sacred and cannot be challenged. The dominators enjoy symbolic power resulting from the symbolic violence whereby the dominated comply with the dominators' instructions. Gero's statement that a stubborn person can be turned into good soldier suggests that discipline entails subordination to the authority by letting

[18] *Mbala ombala* is part of the military jargon in Lingala. I didn't translate it because the participant explained it in English in the next part of his statement. It is used to show that something is repetitive. In this context, it is used to stress that soldiers must comply or follow as said or take heed or assent or adhere to their seniors' orders all the time without questioning them.

one’s body to be totally transformed to the dominant culture. This transformation of the person brings the idea of habitus as structuring structure. In this case the military habitus’ purpose is to discipline the body and mind to fit within the legitimate culture. The legitimate culture or moral values here mean the army promotes a certain ideology and expects its members to embody it. The dominator’s authority, the discipline of learning, the necessity of rules and punishment are the prerequisites of a successful bodily transformation. Lokole explained:

> Good, you see the army; what is killing the country today is the non-implementation of law, even if you pray law, military regulations, if you don’t observe military regulations it is difficult to do military service. You must obey military regulations like God's commandments if you want to be a good soldier (Lokole interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Like in the previous excerpt, here Lokole stressed the importance of military regulations. It means that soldiers have to know these regulations in order to conduct their lives accordingly. Discipline is one of the core messages of the military regulations. Discipline is bounding; it is what fosters soldiers’ habitus, forcing them to do what they are required even if this is against their wish. A practical example of military discipline was given by John in the following statement when he responded to the question related to his involvement in the Angolan war as allies of Savimbi. John said:

> But it is an order; in the army an order is an order. If you disobey your superiors, you will go through fire; it is a refusal of order and you will be executed. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Again, this case highlights the various forms of violence that former soldiers experienced which compelled them to engage in some practices even when these practices are against their own principles or norms. Nicolaescu and Cantemir (2010: 6) note that “symbolic violence is, fundamentally, the imposition of categories of thought and perception on the prevailing social agents”. The violence resulting from the non-compliance with order may be physical but with symbolical meaning. This is one of the characteristics of total institutions, suggesting a prevailing coercive and normative mode of compliance (Davies, 1989).

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the general perception about soldiers (in the DRC) was totally different from the way they viewed themselves. In their accounts, former soldiers reported that violence, in its various facets, was rationally perpetrated as part of military practices. This military violence could only be understood by those who were involved in the army.

In the process of making of a soldier, the chapter has shown that candidates who joined the army had their mind refashioned through training which aimed to help them remove civilian spirit by internalising military doctrine. The first thought was to consider soldier's body as a sold body, '*tokowa po ya ekolo'*. The analysis of interview responses reveal that the promotion of the nationhood required that soldiers developed masculinity, a key factor in the protection of the nation which is considered vulnerable and in constant need of protection. As such, soldiers needed to be transformed, through training (which took place in isolated and conducive areas) and military norms, in order to rationalise violence in their effort to protect the nation. The need to remain loyal and faithful to their vows and to protect the nation compelled soldiers to heartlessly inflict violence to others. As such, these findings reveal that soldiers were *statised* into war machine because their lives were set apart for the nation. This relationship between male body and the nation was established through some rituals.

Discipline was another important element that soldiers were taught to internalise. Since discipline for soldiers meant full submission to the wishes of the seniors, killing and any other violent acts became normalised and understood as the perfect execution of commanding officers' orders. What was once seen as abnormality in civilian life became normality in the army because, as Meger quoting O'Sullivan notes, "strong identification with a group leads to a replacement of individual ethics" (Meger, 2010: 122). '*Basenzi'* or uneducated was derogatorily used to describe captious who were unaware of the logic of the army but also those who were unfaithful to their principles or beliefs. As shown, the social construction of violence was completely transformed as the realities of the army, an institution with particular principles, could not be compared with those of ordinary life. The rejection of civilians' behaviour as taught in the army led one of the participants to state, 'where logic ends the army begins'. The production of useful behaviour for the army implied breaking with civilian's spirit. That is why soldiers' training took place far away from civilians' sight.

Given that military is a highly masculine institution, masculinity as constructed in relation to coloniality and ongoing colonial hierarchies were noticeable between senior officers and non-commissioned officers, and particularly between soldiers and civilians. It is important to examine soldiers' methods of practicing military hegemonic masculinity in the way former DRC soldiers remembered war and violence. This forms the core discussion of chapter to follow.

Chapter six: Military tradition, commandment, loyalty and gender

6.0. Introduction

Having examined the socialisation process in which soldiers were taught an ideology that stands in contrast with what is commonly known, in this chapter, I examine the way some former DRC soldiers living in South Africa recalled the experience of war and violence in which they participated and particularly, the meaning they made of some lethal actions they perpetrated during their active years in the military. In other words, this chapter focuses on practical actions of former soldiers and the meanings attached to them according to the military philosophy. As part of my research questions on how military involvement was remembered, I emphasised the influence of context in the construction of the discourse of war and violence by former Congolese soldiers. The contexts here refer to the preparation before engaging in the war, the internalisation of doctrine and the current situation of migration. This remembering and/or forgetting were done taking into cognisance the lived realities of the former soldiers in a new context. While some adopted a contrasting position about the military and its realities, others adamantly rationalised their military acts, insisting that their actions constituted normal practice.

Six points formed the core of this chapter. The first point provided insights into the acculturation of soldiers into the military tradition of violence and war. The emphasis is on the creation of myths aimed at inculcating the military mentality of fearlessness and bravery on the battlefield. The second point relates to the symbolic meaning of military violence. The third is concerned with the ritual practices that that soldiers underwent in preparation for war, which visibly supersede the western methods of conducting war in Africa. The fourth point deals with the moral logic leading soldiers while in the frontline. In the fifth point I reflect on soldiers' meaning of rights in the battleground and their understanding of what they termed 'spoils of the war'. Lastly, I discussed questions related to military and gender through the prism of male soldiers' perceptions of their female counterparts focusing more on the characteristics of masculinity as key determinant who a man is and who a woman is than physical traits.

6.1. Shoot on everything that moves

In the previous chapter, I showed how the masculinity informs the making of aggressive, heartless and fearless soldiers. In this section, I examine how soldiers were put under pressure in order to engage in lethal actions. The point leading to this discussion is underpinned by the military tradition that refraining from killing an enemy is tantamount to putting soldier's life in danger. Therefore, the fear of losing their lives by sparing the enemy's forced soldiers to become cruel and merciless on the battlefield. The leadership of the military inculcated a belief in witchcraft into soldiers. Consequently, the soldiers lived under the illusion that they had to kill their enemies who could turn into any creature (animals or any animated body) and attack them.

In this study, I make a case for the argument that the soldiers' killing and cruel behaviors on the battlefield is a result of the the fearlessness that is connected to a sense of superiority that draws on gendered and colonial notions of them being morally stronger than civilians. While I am not praising or celebrating the cruelty of soldiers on the battleground, I am interested to highlight the role of context in legitimizing soldiers' use of massive violence in wartime situations. The violence discussed here sometimes goes beyond the convention about war between two opposing sides. This argument is corroborated by evidence produced by participants. As an illustration, I present in the following lines the story of a former Congolese soldier who was conscripted as a child soldier during the liberation war of L.D.K.

The majority of the soldiers who fought the liberation war and marched in Kinshasa on the 17 May 1997 were child soldiers popularly known as '*Kadogo*' (Swahili word meaning small or little), but in this context it meant child fighters who were forcibly recruited by rebel groups at gunpoint. Armed rebellion is a "life-and-death situation" in which enforcement is critical and those who fail to comply could be subjected to persecution, leading to death" (Gates, 2002: 116). After a quick training on arms drills, they were deployed to the combat zone. The training consisted not only on the use of weapons, but also on their indoctrination to behave pitilessly as warriors. Kinshasa was taken without much effort on their part. A participant who belonged to the then FAZ during that time told me that AFDL troops entered Kinshasa as if they were going to the loo; by which he meant that they did not have to think about it or expend any effort because ex-FAZ troops were instructed not to fight. James had this to report,

> Whenever they sent us to finish the whole village, they gave us formal instruction: shoot on everything that moves even on a chicken or a dog. They said to us, 'during fighting

> that chicken or dog you see is not a mere animal. It can be a human being who by using charms has transformed himself into a chicken, a dog or even cattle. If you spare it, that chicken or dog will turn to kill you'. This brought fear in us and we erased villages by killing everything: males, females, children and cattle. Most of these kinds of operations were conducted early in the morning around 2am when people were deeply asleep. (James interview, December 2015 – my translation from Lingala to French)

What emerges from James' statement is the strange, bizarre and horrible picture used to define the enemies and also the people of the area occupied. While soldiers are trained to become fearless which is an expression of masculinity, we see here that the fear of death was mobilised to make them ruthless. Henriques (2015) argues that fear connects profoundly to the experience of pain, making us foresee the pain, and taking escaping measures to increase our distance from the feared stimulus. This 'strategic' way of training soldiers to perpetrate massive killings in the battleground validates the findings of Gates's (2002) study on the micro foundations. The micro foundations reveal, as explained by Congolese rebel officer, that rebellious movements prefer child labour because children are good soldiers; they are obedient to orders; they are unworried about their families; and they are fearless to kill or commit any acts of cruelty. Gates (2002: 128) adds that "children offer a possibility for rebel groups to meet the reservation level of benefits and the compatibility constraint that they might not be able to meet with adult recruits". My data supports that, in most cases, former soldiers navigated various homologous fields before joining the army. Nevertheless, this case shows that child soldiers were conscripted when they were neither teenagers nor youths. The United Nations reported that children as young as 8 or 9 years old were associated with armed groups which means that they did not have chance to be in contact with other fields able to influence their habitus. In this context, armed forces are the most influential field of soldier's lives and significantly deform their identity to make them as violent as possible.

Myth, as Obućina (2011) states, is the expression of emotions, but it allows man to learn a new and strange art; the art of expressing, and that means of organizing, his most rooted instincts, his hopes and fears. The reason for creating these myths is also to get soldiers involved in war rituals whose efficiency requires the participation of the fighters. Former soldiers reported that their senior officers made use of "traditional beliefs, folklore, myth, metaphor, and social stereotyping" to foreclose in soldiers' attitudes any tactics or behaviour leading to the minimisation of deadly actions in the warzone (Mahanta, 2012: 230). In this context, they believed that overcoming the enemies was less about having skilled and well-trained soldiers, but more about performing ritual practices.

The instructions received from the commanders produce two effects. First, they are in a 'patriarchal' situation of most powerful dominating less powerful (Van Dijk, 1993). The top brass was considered as most powerful and soldiers who are under their command were less powerful. They used their power enactment to control the mind of the troops. Their speech was used as direct command or order, but at the same time as threats to incite soldiers to get involved in the action of killing. The non-observance of these instructions could be considered as a wilful rejection of seniors' authority and could result in various types of sanctions, including execution as shown in the previous chapter. In this context, soldiers who swore to die for the country and to be obedient to their seniors would prefer to execute orders given to avoid physical or psychological suffering. Seniors' discursive power was aimed to curtail soldiers' freedom (less powerful) to judge by informing them about possible deterrents they may be facing (Van Dijk, 1993).

Explaining the conception of human nature and the motivation behind the emergence of violence, Makemba gave the following illustration.

> A man has two sides; both sides are invisible, but you only see a man there. After five minutes he can shift from one side to the other. The left side is for Satan; the right side for God. Both sides are diametrically opposed. When his interests are under threat, he can use the wrong side to defend himself or his [people]. That's how man came to discover weapon. In the army we were told that the weapon is to be used to kill the enemy. According to each part's motivation, they make us believe that the opposite party to combat, the enemy to fight is the most dangerous. (Makemba interview, December 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Makemba revealed that a man was at the same time good and evil, positive and negative, and that both sides were used depending on the situation or interest. His account about a human being having two sides stressed that good and evil side were common in some versions of Christianity. Men were only good towards those who were good to them, but when they felt under threats the evil side emerged. Makemba's conceptualisation of a human being "provides an interpretative scheme or an existential hermeneutic for making sense out of life, providing meaning especially to those aspects of life that are perceived as inimical to human existence or dangerous to human wellbeing" (Akrong, 2000:1). Makemba provides a double creation of reality presenting events in people's life in terms of a grapple between the forces of righteous and wicked, and human life is often confronted in this complex system of interconnection between positive and negative powers (Akrong, 2000). The army gave the rights to soldiers to deal with what they perceived as negative forces, dangerous and inimical to their lives and also to the life of their citizens. From their enrollment in the army soldiers were aware of their

mission and were trained to face the enemies. It was clearly stated to them that the aim of military service was to kill. The foe was the one to be killed although sometimes the people that soldiers were called to protect turned to become victims of military widespread violence. During confrontation with the foes, only two options were possible: either they killed the enemies or they were killed by the enemies.

The report from many of the participants in this study is that the aim of the army is to develop the evil side of human nature in the behaviour of soldiers. Their behaviour was represented as the ethical / moral behaviour in comparison to the evil of the enemy. In this way they could recast their violence as justifiable and morally correct. These characteristics were associated with the dominant forms of masculinity related to the army. Former soldiers reported that the uniform and gun were two items symbolising masculinity and embodied power and that soldiers in uniform were prone to violence. This correlates with the views of interview respondents, who previously stated that there was a ritual performed prior to the wearing of the uniform; soldiers were taken to the 'cemetery' for two days. Debos (2013) has shown for example how in Chad combatants from different armed forces have lived on gun even when they were not mobilized for war. The same realities are also observed in the DRC where firearm allows soldiers to exercise power over civilians. But what is less known is how these soldiers who crossed the borders and found themselves in a foreign country remember their military experiences and what social practices they use to maintain or deny their military identity and power.

6.2. Symbolic meaning of physical violence

Participants in this study reported their violent actions aimed to send a powerful signal. The meaning of this military violence is discussed in this section.

6.2.1. Kill their men and rape their wives

In the previous chapter I discussed the way soldiers were made into fearless and merciless people. The visible indicator of this socialising process of soldiering was violence which became not only inevitable but necessary to 'educate' people. In the same vein, the focus of this section is to highlight the rationale for violence and show how it became part of the lives of soldiers, as well as the meaning it took. During my interactions with former soldiers, they regrettably reported that in many cases, people were unaware of the logic behind the violence soldiers perpetrated. A participant stressed that the army was perceived as the end of the logic, 'Where logic ends, the army begins' (Tango interview, November 2015 - My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English). Some of them addressed the following question to me, "If they ask you to kill; what do you do?" The phenomenological approach assumes that people's descriptions of their members' experiences are valid sources of information about their own thoughts and beliefs and focused on how people understand these experiences. According to this approach, the researcher's goal is to make sense out of the participants' making sense of the world (Kraft, 2014). Relying on the social constructionism, I am looking to bring out what has remained hidden, the 'non-said of the said' of the former Congolese soldiers' narratives of violence.

The discourse resulting from these accounts is more complex. As I have argued above, soldiers' civilisation was the observance of military regulations. My view is that soldiers' violent acts give rise to two opposing situations. First, it is peaceful coexistence and respect for human life and the military logic is informed by violence used an instrument of protecting territorial integrity. When soldiers resort to violence they become starved of society's affection because they go against its rules, while the army applauds it. Violence against soldiers was both physical and psychological. Soldiers declared that they were punished twice; first, they were victimised when they failed to fulfil their higher-ranking's orders. This victimisation was regarded as the infringement of the military regulations which they were called to practice without defect. The second punishment came from the society that blamed soldiers because of their violent actions.

Soldiers drew on the gendered colonial narrative in which they viewed civilians as feminised barbarian who cannot be expected to behave in the way the masculine enlightened man (soldier in this case) does. The use of the word *musenzi* to identify civilians was because soldiers considered that civilians lived without order and did not understand the duties soldiers were called to perform. Bienga (in his fifties) was ranked colonel and worked in the *Division Spéciale Présidentielle* (DSP). Bienga travelled in many countries in the world to be trained in military administration and in armoury. He was forced to flee the DRC and move to South Africa in 1999 because his name was in the list of wanted officers. His wife who remained in Congo died for lack of proper medical care when she fell sick. Bienga was on refugee status and unemployed in South Africa. In his comment, Bienga indicated the soldiers in the Congo were punished in several manners. Sometimes they were drugged so that they could commit massive crimes, but people only pointed accusing fingers at them'. (Bienga interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Stressing the importance of discipline, which, I previously explained, Makemba recounted how discipline led to committing what I termed 'immoral' decisions because they had to obey their commanders' instructions as they were taught. The commands issued were to be followed scrupulously. Usually, they had to repeat this word, 'execute first and complain after' or 'shoot first and question later'. Makemba stressed that even if the order was 'wrong', they were forced to comply with it. In the following excerpt Makemba reported how they experienced the notion of order and discipline:

> During the war, you are there and individuals offer to surrender to you. These are war prisoners, but when the chief came; he was somewhere and when he comes he tells you, 'kill these people'. But according to the army's principles you cannot kill them, they are war prisoners who have handed themselves over to you. There were many things. (Makemba interview, December 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

What is visible in this excerpt is the power of the symbolic violence expressed in the language used to talk to soldiers. Symbolic violence is a key point in this discussion, showing that even the army men had to live to certain expectations of masculinities in the army with which they were not really comfortable. According to Landry (2006), symbolic violence is not promptly understandable. However, a critical look at this account reveals that because men have two opposing sides: good and bad, they are not always good or bad. Their involvement in the army does not always make them only evil or only good. But here former soldiers presented an

inverted logic in which they seemed to be saying that what people typically thought was bad in fact was good in the army. This distinction between good and bad was the result of different fields they navigated before joining the army's field. Importantly, when Makemba referred to the law of war he showed that he was aware of the cultural capital regulating different warring parties in the battleground, but in this context, he was unable to resist the hierarchy that superseded his own knowledge. In this case he became complicit with such domination. What matters for soldiers was the fulfilment of their duties as required in strict obedience as they vowed. Referring to the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions encapsulated in the famous statement of Jean Pictet, former Vice President of the ICRC:

> If we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not wound him, if we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must not kill him, if there are two means to achieve the same military advantage, we must choose the one which causes lesser evil (Goodman, 2013: 820).

Goodman (2013) shows how in principles killing is constrained because judged unnecessary when attacking forces are not at risks any longer. This article discusses two tracks that govern the decision to kill, injure, or capture an adversary – the definition of *hors de combat* and the restraints on the use of force. However, my data reveals that the 'modern law of armed conflict' (LOAC) rule is trampled underfoot by belligerents in conflict zone. This major weakness of the 'Restraints on the Use of Force' principle can be justified by the fact that while the unnecessary lethal actions against unarmed and defenceless enemies is prohibited, "these practices reflect pragmatic strategic and policy choices, not legal obligations" (Goodman, 2013: 825).

6.2.2. The symbolic meaning of sexual violence

Another theme which emerged from the analysis of interview responses was sexual violence perpetrated in the battleground. Sexual violence was described by former soldiers as the expression of masculinity aimed at sending an 'educative message' to the future generations of a specific territory. Since the eruption of political violence in the DRC, different warring parties have adopted rape as a tool of conquest. Dr Mukwege, an expert in reconstructive surgeries for rape victims and the 2014 Sakharov Prize awardee, comments that this type of violence has little to do with sex and much more with power through a sort of terrorism (Nallu, 2015). Rape and other forms of sexual violence in the DRC have become common practices regularly

committed by men in uniform. For example, recent reports from local health centres in South Kivu state that an estimated 40 women continue to experience sexual violence every day (Nallu, 2015). What is less explored is how soldiers themselves perceived rape and what meaning they ascribed to it. To this question, Taty, a former colonel to the Congolese Army, provided the following answer:

> …All that a soldier does in the battlefield has a meaning and it is done to obey hierarchy's orders; they do it to leave marks for the future generations. When we went to Lwilu, some kilometres away from Kolwezi [in Katanga], we were ordered to kill their men and rape their wives. It is part of the non-conventional war. These vicious orders are given by the authority to utterly discourage the enemy. It happens everywhere in the world; even France recently did it when they bombed in Syria. These are sabotages, but when civilians see this, they don't understand and start criticising soldiers. These are savage practices aimed to discourage the enemy, for instance we erased houses and we defecated in their pots… Several years later, these savage practices will teach future generations to avoid making the same mistakes for which their parents paid. France, for example, used fragmentation bomb in Syria. People don't understand when they see France bombing Syrian territories sometimes unoccupied territories. These bombs are destroying the soil. You will see even after 100 years those bombed places will produce nothing; Syria will learn from it. (Taty Interview, December 2015 – my translation from French to English)

The above quote from Taty's interview shows that violence is not chosen randomly but is carefully selected for its symbolic meaning and its educative effect - for the message it sends. And what makes violence effective is how enduring this message can be. Taty draws on the colonial method of treating the native. The belief motivating the use of this brutality is to cause fear in the victims and to have them subdue to the authority. The military is the defender of the state. Soldiers are *statised* to carry the mission of the state consisting to protect the national territory and its interests. There is a belief that where there is insurrection, the interests of the state are threatened. All those who have arisen against the authority of the state are considered enemies and must be rendered harmless. That is why Taty said to me:

> You people you don't understand. If they tell you as you are going there kill their men and rape their women. The order has already been given. What can you do? Since you vowed to remain obedient to your superiors there is no way you can negotiate or object this order. The only thing you have to do is to execute the order. (Taty Interview, December 2015 – my translation from French to English)

One of the means by which the state fights against those who threaten it is violence. The mission of soldiers as representatives of the state is to respond to violence against the state through violence. This military violence is even reflected in the killing of the enemies of the

state. This violence here has a symbolic value, consisting to reshape or restructure what has been disintegrated by restoring order and discipline. In this context, soldiers did not act as individuals, but rather as the state's capital. Thus, they did not consider themselves as perpetrators of violence, but rather as instruments at the disposal of the state which uses them to accomplish its missions.

In Taty's quote, two words are significant: kill and rape, expressing actions. In addition, two sexes are the targets of these violent actions. In the patriarchal societies, men are viewed as the providers and protectors while women represent not only the weaker sex, but also the foundation of the society itself. The kind of men to kill and women to rape is unspecified, but these actions are so significant. It means that the cruel acts are to be inflicted not only on the belligerents viewed as insurgent, but on all the people who live in the village. This is a clear indication that the violent actions do not spare any life. Another key element in this quote is that the identity of giver of order is concealed, but it presumably comes from the senior officer and the tone used expresses power, expecting efficiency and immediate results. The way soldiers execute this order is *habitualised* in the sense that their personal judgement was shunned because they were expected to co-operate with symbolic power of the army. In this military action, the order given consisted of killing or destroying men and women, two human resources that sustain the survival of the society. We see two different actions with the same purpose. Baaz and Stern argue that rape humiliates (feminises) the enemy, or (as is often the case in the DRC), other men by defiling their women (nation/homeland) and demonstrating to the opposing side their incapacity to protect those under their care (Baz and Stern, 2010). Masculinity promoted by the army implied having strong men committed to the protection of the nation (McClintock, 1993), but also to the discipline in a paternalistic sense. Nation is feminised needing the protection of the masculine man. In the battleground this logic enters into play. Two forces are at stake: the more masculine is the one who conquers the feminised adversary. In this fighting warring parties could rely on whatever means enabling them to prove their masculinity. One of the ways of expressing masculinity was the use of sexual violence, a physical form of violence with significant symbolic meaning. Brutal practices such as rape of women and children were used as a victorious declaration demonstrating the powerlessness of the dominated warring party to defend and protect women and children considered vulnerable groups. Women and girls are assimilated to the nation and are viewed as vulnerable and weak (McClintock, 1993). The idea of violence whose message is enduring does – rape has lasting humiliation – especially when pregnancy results. There is a reminder for the woman and the

communities for the entire lifetime. In this battle rape becomes a means of sending a strong message of victory of the masculinised man over the feminised man who is unable to look after his vulnerable category of people (women and children). Male's aggressiveness in war is the embodiment of misogyny compelling them to resort to evil and denigrating practices (such as rape), viewed as human rights violations in peacetime, against the enemy.

The findings of this study are in contrast with Baaz and Stern's (2010) study on the complexity of violence, where soldiers denied being ordered to rape. The authors gave credit to their accounts for their openness and the vicious critics against their commanders. This study reveals that if soldiers were asked to kill and rape, contrary to the argument made by Baaz and Stern (2010), rape became a military strategy because it was not a simple act of raping that counted here, but the message it conveyed. This message consisted of 'educating' the future generations to avoid the mistakes that led their forbearers to be put under this kind of humiliating practice. This narrative gives us much insight in understanding soldiering acts. Previously, I explained what soldiers meant by truth and lie. They stated that they remained steadfast in the execution of order even if what they were asked to do put their lives in danger. Therefore, for soldiers, rape becomes the right and ethical thing to do in contexts where; 1) being 'truthful' is the key valued attribute and 2) where all things civilian and feminised are degraded or seen as barbaric and 3) where following orders and obeying the rules of the army are much more important than obeying the rules of society and 4) where punishments need to be symbolically effective in their message. Soldiers did not lie (moral logic of the army) but conveyed the meaning that soldiers refused to disobey their commanding authorities when they ordered them to kill or rape. The execution of authorities' order became a way of validating soldiers' violent behaviours in the battlefield. Through discipline soldiers' docile bodies were "subjected, used, transformed and improved" (Foucault, 1975) to fulfil the army's mission. Thus, they did kill or destroy the enemies' properties as required to obey their superiors and also to remain faithful to their oath. What this narrative also tells us is that killing or rape was not perceived as crime because if it was constructed as such soldiers would either refrain from doing it or just do and accept it. This case shows the determination by soldiers to comply with the notions of discipline and obedience, products of military capital which durability and transposability reflect in their post military lives (see chapter seven). Taty's and other soldiers' actions should be considered within a context in which soldiers were under the pressure of their military vows to respect their seniors and delve into violent practices. As Moghaddam's study (2005) exploring the staircase to terrorism, from the perspective of the mainstream, soldiers were disengaged from

the morality of the society, particularly because of their promptness to commit acts of violence against civilians. It is important to stress that sometimes soldiers (as individuals) did not approve these violent acts. However, from the military's perspective, what soldiers were doing was 'morally acceptable' as violence would be expected against the enemies viewed by the government and its agents as amoral. Thus, Taty's viciously attacked civilians who were critical to soldiers' acts, calling them *basenzi* because they were unaware of the army's regulations and particularly of the symbolic message of military violence.

In this statement, Taty's main rationale for perpetrating violence was that it would serve as lesson for future generations. This correlates with Nancy Scheper-Hughes's statement that "the military is not an educational, charitable, or social welfare institution; violence is intrinsic to its nature and logic" (Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 223). Scheper-Hughes discusses military violence in relation to "legal loophole of the *crimen exceptum*-that is, the 'extraordinary crime' that warrants extraordinary and often cruel punishment (Scheper-Hughes, 1992). To support this rationale about military violence, Taty used the case of France's bombardment in Syria stressing that these methods were not new; they have always been used by different armies to teach a powerful lesson to the enemy and to the generations to come. In other words, this violence aimed to "instil feelings of terror and helplessness in a population in order to influence decision-making and to change behaviour" (Moghaddam, 2005: 161). Because the state is obsessed by the fear of subversion or criminality, various forms of violence (torture, sexual violence and killing) become a means through which the state attempts to proclaim an "incontestable reality" of its control over the citizens (Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 224). I had no evidence to confirm or invalidate Taty's point, when he referred to France as using the fragmentation bomb in Syria, but the point Taty was making is that this is a universal characteristic of the state to "monopolise the meanings of symbolic or physical violence" (Von Holdt, 2013: 126). Referring to France as example of this kind of violence may also lead to understand that some military practices could be inspired by what others did.

Although, Taty explained that they received orders from their superiors to kill and rape, other former soldiers who participated in this study situating their argument in the Christian context dismissed this affirmation, claiming that they witnessed rape, but not the way it is widespread in the DRC today. It is important to indicate that although they were all soldiers, not all of them went to war. Some stated that they did not participate in the war, but even those who participated in the war, some only mentioned the cases of rape as being perpetrated by rebel troops. The way former soldiers responded when raising this sensitive topic about rape revealed

the ideology that was leading them at the time of the interviews. Those who embraced Christian faith were more concerned about spiritual healing and sought to adopt Christian position when the topic was raised. Nevertheless, Taty indicated that since it was an order received from the hierarchy in the fulfilment of their duties and a universal characteristic of war, the rape he committed was not regarded as rape; it was a punishment meted out to the enemies. Taty did not express any regret to talk about it because in his view it was part of the routine in the accomplishment of his soldierly mission.

> Why should I suffer from what I committed during my military career? I don't suffer of it at all. What I did, the violence and any other forms of cruelty I perpetrated cannot affect me today, because it was part of the fulfilment of my duties as a soldier. (Taty Interview, December 2015 – my translation from French to English)

The analysis of Taty's interview suggests that some former soldiers did not carryover guilt from their activities in active service. This contradicts studies suggesting that former soldiers suffer nightmares arising from their activities in active service. Specifically, this contradicts Maringira's (2014) findings that atrocities committed by former soldiers in active service return to haunt them when they left the military. Furthermore, this correlates with Bourdieu's notion of state which contends that soldiers were called to act in the name of the state. For instance, all the former soldiers interviewed for this study disclosed that at the entry point to the army they were duly informed that they no longer had control over their bodies because it became a property of the military-meaning that it has been *statised.*

The army and police are the state's instruments to achieve the state's mission of guaranteeing order and security throughout the national borders. Rebellious or subversive movements are viewed as a threat to the state. If the threats are internal, those involved in them are referred to as what Scheper-Hughes calls "disorderly citizens" or outlaws whose actions weaken the social cohesion and order. Military violence is appropriately preconized for dealing with these lost citizens. The soldiers involved in this kind of violence do not view themselves as acting individually; they act as a state. Their violent acts are rationalised through the instrument of the state and not viewed as human rights violations. These soldiers operate "under the political ideology of favors and privileges" which consider that human rights cannot logically be applied "to criminals and marginals, those who have broken, or who simply live outside, the law" (Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 228). This ideology was inculcated into the mentality of soldiers

helping to transform them into state-subjects. This is evident in Taty's dismissal of any remorse emanating from his violence activities during his military service. Taty also lamented that he was pained by the living conditions that migrating from Congo to South Africa caused him and not the role he played as a soldier in active service for his country.

On the other hand, the age of signing to the military could also influence the impact of psychological effects of military actions on former soldier. This is the case of child soldiers who are forced to join the army without clear understanding of the consequences of their actions. One of the child soldiers, now a former soldier, interviewed for this study claimed that they used to shoot with heavy weapons. These weapons weighed heavily that some of them were unable to carry them. He disclosed that some of his peers were experiencing mental problems in their post-military caused by the heavy sounds of these weapons which had a deep physiological effect in their bodies whenever they used them. However, for those who joined the army at adult age, with a clear understanding of the ideologies guiding the military, the findings of this study suggest that they had no challenge of ill-health arising as a result of their soldierly involvement.

Condemning rape and looking to justify military behaviours towards women, Loleko mentioned that the massive rape we currently witness in the Congo was made in Rwanda. He explained:

> These are current soldiers, eheheheh!! It is an ideology brought by Rwandans, not Mobutu's soldiers. Yes, some soldiers are doing it, we can't ignore; it does happen, but to my knowledge it wasn't that time [during Mobutu's regime] like a soldier raping a woman, in the sense of massive rape. When you conquer a city or village and start raping women, this wasn't the case in Mobutu era. In military camps, sometimes a soldier could rape a soldier's child because in most of the cases soldiers are not able to court a woman, like openly telling a woman, 'I love you' it is difficult for many of them. That's why sometimes they rape, but these are criminal law offences; we can't ignore it. It is an offense in the common law. But in the sense of raping women after conquering a territory I had never seen that. I had never witnessed these cases; this is an imported ideology from Rwanda. (Loleko interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

The first observation is that Loleko was drawing a distinction between the Army during Mobutu period and the current army concerning the conception of rape. The question that could be raised is to know who the current soldiers are. The current soldiers are mainly those soldiers who were part of the AFDL troops. The term 'current soldiers' was also derogatory because what Loleko was looking to highlight was soldiers without 'military education and experience'.

In the beginning of the AFDL ruling the cohabitation between AFDL troops and ex-FAZ members was difficult. Since ranks were all dissolved there was no order and respect of the hierarchy. Many of the military officers who served in the Zairean Army were demotivated; some even abandoned the army. Throughout the journey of liberation, L.D.K's troops with those of his allies were already reported of engaging in indiscriminate attacks on civilians, extrajudicial executions, rape, and destruction of property, with the result of massive displacement of population. What emerged from this quote was the need for identity construction consisting of identifying himself as a good soldier and blaming the Rwandans for violence. This actually fitted given the tension in political relations between the DRC and Rwanda; former soldiers presented Rwandan troops as the incarnation of the evil that even Congolese soldiers display today. The striking point in Loleko's statement is also the sense that there are different kinds of rape – some are good and some are bad. Baaz and Stern's (2009: 495) study exploring Congolese soldiers' motivations for rape found that their participants distinguished "between 'lust rapes' and 'evil rapes' and … their explanations of rape [was associated with] notions of different (impossible) masculinities".

The conceptualisation of femininity is also linked to idea of virginity and chastity. Women, victims of rape were socially constructed as 'polluted'; those who were still young saw their chances of getting marriage narrowed. Those who were married before being raped were rejected after they were allegedly victims of sexual violence. This validates Banjeglav's argument that "rape [is] not only a reward for the victorious soldier, but also a means for destroying the social relations among the conquered population, by creating a divide between polluted females and emasculated males" (Banjeglav, 2009:10). In understanding gender beliefs, femininity is also associated with timidity, the inability to speak when facing strange people. The reading of the above excerpt clearly shows that sexual violence in the DRC existed before the war, but as Loleko emphasised, it was not as severe as currently experienced. Although he referred to sexual violence as cases of criminal law offences, many of these cases went unnoticed or were sometimes solved in cultural/amicable means including compensation or shaming processes (Baaz and Stern, 2010). The 'minor cases' of rape raised by Loleko which other soldiers in the study of Baaz and Stern referred to as "lust rape", took place in the context where soldiers were unable to approach women in an appropriate manner. Their inability to declare their feelings to women could also be justified by the conflictual relationship between soldiers and civilians, but more importantly by their socio-economic conditions which reduced their chances of being accepted by women who expected to love men able to fulfil their heart desires; soldiers were unlike to respond to this requirement. So here, Loleko is relying on a

popular discourse of male sexuality (as one aspect of masculinity) that suggested that without consensual sex men would rape. It is a very common way of understanding male sexuality in many societies including the DRC.

This rape Loleko was referring to is rationalised in the context of the prevailing logic of the army, '*civil azali bilanga ya militaire*'; it was used first as a way for soldiers to overcome their frustration and express their masculinity. Like soldiers indicated to Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern (2008) in their study on making sense of military violence, financial and material resources determined a successful celebrated man who was able to keep, support and pay woman. Rape was used by "an emasculated man" as hegemonic masculinity performance, was the result of financial deprivation (Baaz and Stern, 2010:48). However, my data says so much more than what these authors found. The interesting part is the way Loleko distinguished between moral/acceptable rape and immoral/unacceptable rape. In other words, the context shaped the meaning of violence. The 'imported rape' was justified by the war outbreak and particularly by the collapse of the legal system. Nevertheless, importantly, Loleko was a member of the ex-FAZ troops; he was taken to Kitona where he experienced the death of many of his colleagues and risked his own life. Since the rape was exacerbated during the liberation wars (used as weapon of the war) when L.D.K first came with his allies and broke up, the ex-FAZ troops sought to differentiate themselves from the liberation army; Rwanda and Uganda troops were often singled out as perpetrators of massive sexual violence.

While the army was often perceived as a place that trains soldiers to commit violence, many soldiers stated that some values they acquired before joining the army compelled them to refrain from taking part in such atrocities. These values were provided by families, schools or Universities and churches. The point to note in this instance is that some former soldiers joined the army with a certain identity; their habitus was at the same time a product of their military involvement and what they learnt in other fields before joining the army. There is a perceivable difference in the way former soldiers reported about violent acts and social class is the marker of this contrast. Social class is used in this study to refer to other fields different from the army which significantly impacted on the formation of former soldiers' habitus. By social class former soldiers referred either to their academic qualifications or their ranks in the army. Families, schools or universities, and religious involvement were also viewed as fields which significantly impacted on the conduct of some of them in the army.

In response to perceived criminal behaviour of soldiers in the battlefield, for example the case of rape, drawing on the popular discourse of family as bedrock of the society, a good number of former soldiers digressed from these criminal practices, emphasising the role of family education and university background. Some participants explained it as follows:

> Well, there, it depends on a person's motivation [for joining the army]; it also depends on the education you have received… Well rape, it depends on education of the person, but as for me, in my case, my upbringing prevented me from raping. There are soldiers who are uneducated from their families, who enter or who allow themselves to do staff like that, but I never did it because I received good basic education; I studied, I have a university degree, you see. (Amani interview, July 2015 – My translation from French to English)

While the military promoted violence and ignored some illegal practices of preying on civilians, some participants condemned those extortion acts, relying on their education prior to joining the army.

> That's his [soldier raping] education; it is the education he received from his father and mother... I say this is how he was raised up. The way I was raised what belongs to someone is for someone. It is not because I am a soldier. (Sankara interview, July 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

From these quotes, participants draw on different discourses of the family education different from what they learnt in the army. According to these quotes, participants considered themselves morally more educated as well – knowing better than to rape like uneducated men. Ironically, some former soldiers capitalised on the dominance of the family, religion or academic trainings of the Congolese environment and used it to highlight their 'exemplary' conducts during military career. Although the change of the environment the *durability* and *transposability* of the habitus could never be completely wiped out, but at the same time that did not make them rigid. It is a fascinating contradiction that can also be understood as a way of withholding the traumatic truth of violence in order to fit in the new reality of peaceful coexistence.

Another example concerning soldiers' attitudes of taking distance from violence is of the participants who used their social positions within the army and regarded those who dived into violent acts as undisciplined soldiers. Soldiers who misbehaved were treated as lost sheep and the concept of discipline resurfaced and was used as tools to delegitimise their violent acts. The

social position refers to the highly-ranking officers in the army who gave orders that lower-ranking soldiers were supposed to execute as John explained.

> Those who commit sexual violence are undisciplined soldiers and when you are caught you must account to *bureau 2* because *bureau 2* is also in the battlefield. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

This quote is in contradiction with several studies on sexual violence in the DRC (Briggs 2007; Baaz and Stern, 2009; Meger, 2010), which stress that warring parties with no exceptions were involved in sexual violence. Essentially, the national armed forces of the DRC (FARDC) and the national police force including the UN peacekeeping troop members were caught obtaining sexual slaves from villagers in exchange for milk and bread. In addition, many high-ranking authorities ignored the rape committed by the troops under their command. Others even encouraged them to rape because they understood the rape perpetrated by their troops as a way to sooth the male soldiers' unfulfilled sexual urges and an irrepressible sex drive (Meger, 2010) to be in better psychological condition for efficiency in the battle or as a morale-boosting reward after battle.

Although soldiers were prepared to kill and rape, they were also aware that their own lives were exposed in the frontline and therefore resorted to some rituals of protection. This is discussed to follow.

6.3. Performing *Tshizaba* in the battleground

The findings of this study suggest the primacy, in most cases, of the use by soldiers of traditional rituals for the fulfillment of their military duties and challenge the western conception of the army and war techniques. When soldiers got involved in a war they knew very well that they only had two options: either live or die, but they did not go to the theatre of war to behave like terrorists willing to lose their own lives. The need for protection in the frontline necessitates their involvement in rituals practices with the aim of protecting themselves from the enemies' bullet. They narrated that they engaged in war with the ambition to overpower the enemies knowing very well that there would be inevitable deaths on both sides. The ideal for them was to counter the enemies' ambition of invading their country, bearing in mind that they could lose their own lives in such encounter. The involvement in some rituals was aimed at protecting themselves to become invisible and invincible to the enemy's shot. In addition to the need for protection, rituals performed were a "joint, emotional,

volitional and intellectual activity [forming] the 'community spirit,' 'sense of togetherness,' 'we-feeling'" (George, 1956: 124).

Tshizaba (in Tshiluba, one of the local languages of the DRC) is water blended with herbs and roots. It has variety of applications and is particularly useful for people who are about to engage in a fight. In Equateur province for example, the account I was given was that when a lion or leopard was killed, they took its skin and bones to prepare a sanctuary in which they placed the animal head and skin. Some of its bones were immersed and kept in a bottle. When it was fighting time, people would go to the sanctuary to perform rituals consisting of washing their heads, hands and feet with the 'sacred' water. By so doing, they were no longer ordinary human beings; they embodied the lion or leopard's spirit and acted accordingly. In the front, they were difficult to be overpowered because the spirit of lion or leopard acted in them. M.S.S himself, former military officer, adopted animal print wearing a hat made with the skin of leopard to symbolise the power he incarnated as an African dictator. That is why in many songs aimed at praising him, some referred to him as *elima* (in Lingala meaning monster).

In his accounts, John who referred to these rituals as *Tshizaba* explained how they were performed:

> This ritual often took place in the army before going to fight. After performing the ritual every soldier had to use this 'magic' water [*Tshizaba*] to wash his face, hands and feet. The rituals were sealed by the killing of a rooster of less than a month that one thousand members of the battalion were encouraged to partake of the flesh of the officially designated sacrificial bird as a sign of their adherence to the rituals. The rituals concluded by asking each soldier to pass under the legs of the commanding officer. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

The use of the cockerel is also significant. The cock has different traits that are deduced from its behaviour. Apart from announcing the end of the night and the beginning of the new day through crowing, the rooster is a fighter, conqueror and aggressive, always raging. It often happens in matrilineal cultures in the DRC that, when a sister's children were sick, an accusing finger was always pointed at her brothers (maternal uncles). When the situation worsened especially when the causes of children's disease were believed to originate from witchcraft, the families of both parents met. During this meeting, the maternal uncles were often asked to utter a word of healing in favour of the sick and to offer them a rooster symbolising their non-involvement in the children's illness. The maternal uncles' duty was also to protect their sisters' children against any evil attacks. The word they uttered carried power to defeat those evil forces

tormenting children's lives. In most cases, this word objectified by a donation of a rooster which the sick person was required to eat contributed to a speedy healing.

Former soldiers mentioned that when they came out of the ritual procedure, they were immediately given the firearm to go to the combat zone. They testified that this ritual powerfully functioned for them when they were in the frontline; they were shielded from enemies' bullets which failed to spot. In his account, another participant who testified about the existing of the ritual without taking part in it confirmed however that the only evidence they had about the effectiveness of the rituals was that many of their colleagues who were involved in them came back from different confrontations with the enemies with perforated regimentals without being wounded by bullets. Amani explained:

> No, there are others who did it [rituals]... those who believed in magical powers. They went through rituals, some worked, others did not work ... but as far as I'm concerned, I did not engage in those rituals to protect myself. I simply prayed to my God. I had my rosary in my hand, my rosary in my pocket then I prayed. Some went and returned from the battlefield with outfit perforated by bullet without being hurt; others who underwent the same rituals did not return alive; they were dead, you know. (Amani interview, July 2015 – My translation from French to English)

The case of Amani shows the influence of religious power through the use of religious weapons such as rosary. The term rosary has origin and application in the Roman Catholic Church to which Amani belonged. Rosary is a form of prayer used especially in the Catholic Church named for the string of knots or beads used to count the component prayers. While Amani claimed that he did not partake in other forms of rituals, he was more driven by religious rituals which involved "a pattern of defined behavior, externalizing in a sensible form some religious emotion or idea" (George, 1956: 118).

As stated earlier, concerning the femininity or the masculinity of a soldier, the feat of leadership of the military was evaluated in terms of the number of soldiers under their command during the war. Participants reported that for instance, the leader of a battalion was in charge of eight hundred soldiers and was more concerned by the number of soldiers who survived after the war. The assessment was positive when he lost less than half of the troop members; on the contrary, he was viewed as incompetent and feminised leader when more than half of his team fighters were killed in the battlefield. The pressurised condition in which the appointed troop leader drove them to rely on rituals. The pre-war rituals aimed "to expel the fear and '*good conscience*', to increase the hate as well as to protect soldiers against enemy

weapons, although their forms varied from group to group. Some involved drinks, others the spiritual bathing of the troops or the consumption of meat with medicines, but there's only a reference to symbolic cannibalism - which is, yet, a strong reference in folk imaginary". (Granjo, 2006: 2). These rituals were also performed with the aim to prepare the psychology of the fighters to engage in the battle. George (1956) argues that psychologically, the factor of precise repetition characteristic of ritualism seems to strike a deep chord and satisfy a need of human nature. It is important to mention that the fear of being overcome or killed was not only the concern of the troop leader. Participants acknowledged that at individual level, each fighter was also afraid of losing their own life in the combat zone; some consulted *shaman* for protection. They carried along with them herbs, animal skins or bones, eggs or any other symbols given by their soothsayers as protection, which, in their beliefs, were connected to life (Granjo, 2006). However, the rituals performed under the guidance of the commanding leaders were compulsory in the sense that everyone had to partake in these pre-war ritual ceremonies with the aim of allowing life to run sequentially. Additionally, it was aimed at conserving energy, dissipating confusion and providing an element of predictability by relieving anxiety and breeding a calm assurance that the stuff life is under control (George, 1956). Former Congolese soldiers shared different views about relying on rituals before engaging in the warzone. These views are highlighted in the following accounts.

> There are people who rely on rituals, but not all the soldiers. Those who believe in God go with 'new testament'; it helps them. Sometimes when they are faced with ambush in the terrain of operations they miraculously come out. Before going for war military chaplains came to distribute this small bible to soldiers. (Wembo interview, September 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

In the same vein, Gero shared the following view:

> I know that only God protects heaven and earth, but every people have their own culture. There are people I heard, Mai-Mai, I didn't work with them, but I heard that they fight like if what. As for me, I don't believe in those things, but I saw it in Angola. Savimbi's soldiers I saw in Wambo, I saw it. They had drums, some [noisy] things ko-ko-ko-ko-ko. When you heard the sound of those drums, it meant unquenchable fire was coming. (Gero interview, December 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

Lokole gave his comment as follows:

> No, that one I don't know. Firearm must be clean. Firearm is your father and mother as we were taught; it must be clean, you see. It is not about water. You will see we are all in the army and those rituals were there, but we are not the same. Some came with

> magic; others had fetish, but I know that if I get involved in those things I will end up in trouble (Lokole interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Interestingly, Makemba offered the following narrative about the use of rituals:

> Makemba: The largest population of Africa from North to South is formed by Bantu. A Bantu is someone who values life. Thus, in order to protect life, a Bantu has always performed rituals although bullet does not forgive. They used to keep us in a drum for 24 hours; they cook you for 24 hours. We are in a drum and they light fire, but when we went to the battlefield some died others survived.
>
> Dos: What does it mean when you say that they kept you in a drum?
>
> Makemba: This was water inside, water; they heat you in water for 24 hours, can you imagine!
>
> Dos: Was that water hot?
>
> Makemba: But they cook you like a chicken or a goat in that water for 24 hours.
>
> Dos: Didn't you feel pain?
>
> Makemba: No, you don't feel pain; you stay there for 24 hours until tomorrow morning. Immediately when you come out of the drum, they give you a firearm, but there were those who died in the war. I know a guy from Ndjili (in Kinshasa) I am the one who brought his belongings to his parents; he died.

The motivation behind ritual practices is rationalised by the fear of losing troop members which is viewed as an act of incompetency on the part of the officer leading the battalion. John, an officer who spent 29 years in the Congolese Army, revealed what led many of them to use *gri-gri* during the war.

> I will tell you a secret; we use charms, the *gri-gri* sometimes the battalion commander; for example, if I lead a battalion and I know I have my fetish, I will share with others. This is because in war, there are deaths on both sides. You will for example go with a battalion or a regiment of perhaps 1200 people. They can kill 400 and you return with others, there you will always be highly rated. But when you come with a platoon of 40 people out of 1200, you will be poorly rated; you're not a good military leader, you have lost the troupe. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Nevertheless, the emphasis on traditional rituals of protection is in contradiction with the value they also placed on the modern tactics of war. These soldiers mentioned that they underwent

various weaponry trainings and war fighting skills, but when they were about to engage in the battle these techniques were superseded by traditional practices and beliefs; many relied more on charms for protection and success. The response from John and other participants suggests the variety of fields that forged the individual's habitus. Enrolling in the army did not necessarily contribute to the disappearance of the previous habitus. The reluctance of some former soldiers to get involved in some rituals was informed by the previous beliefs which contributed to the shaping of their habitus which continued to control some of their conduct even when they were in military service. Secondly, the fear of losing their lives is what drove people to rituals. Rituals are forms of symbolic violence, a form of communication with profound social consequences (George, 1956). George (1956: 120) indicates that "ritual is a word or form which expresses more than it indicates and so has power beyond its literal denotation". Whether eating together, being put in drums or washing hands together, the military meaning of these ritual ceremonies was to avoid social disorganisation by promoting the unity of action which determined efficacy and success. George (1956: 123) argues that "complacency in repetition of accepted behavior patterns tends to draw the members of a group together". Another goal achieved through rituals is the promotion of team working spirit and social solidarity among soldiers. Former soldiers mentioned that because they were bound through rituals, they were able to rescue some of their fellows who were injured in battleground at their own risk. Passing under the feet of the military leader was so significant. First, it symbolised the leader's responsibility to look after the troops put under their command. Nevertheless, more importantly it was the sign of subordination to the authority that the leader incarnated. This symbolic gesture helped to bind soldiers into an ordered social structure (George, 1956) that the army promotes.

Former soldiers' accounts of rituals of protection during war reminded me of the story told by a pastor who was sitting next to one of his church members at the stadium. When the team that both supported scored, the member who was thrilled turned to his pastor and said, "Pastor, this goal came from far. It is a *Nganga* (Lingala word meaning soothsayer) called Mort-Mort[19] who went to search for it". This discourse indicates that there are multiple Christian discourses and shows that attachment to amulets overshadows the Christian faith of some churchgoers when they come under pressure.

[19] Mort-Mort literally death-death is one of the most popular diviners, reputed to have the skill to communicate with the other world, that many soccer teams consult during tournaments to secure their victory.

Participants also indicated that although, they often used traditional means of protection not all of them survived the war; some participants recalled that they also saw some of their troop members being felled by the bullets of the opposing camp. John, who noted that ritual practices were no guarantor that one would survive the war, explains this:

> But yes, people [soldiers] fall. I remember for example in Bukavu, we were cooking in the makeshift made of drums, a bomb fell there and we were scattered; there were many deaths and injuries. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

The above response suggests that performing rituals was not a guarantee of security for soldiers in the battleground. However, the symbolic power of rituals, as active sharing of the deepest spiritual aspirations and sentiments, is that they offer a certain psychological security soldiers needed in order to be efficient in the battlefield. Even though rituals were performed, some fell and others were taken by fear. Fear is inherent to human nature as one of the participants indicated to me that soldiers were the most fearful people. However, this fear was purposefully inculcated in soldiers' mind during their military training in order to forge military masculinity (Woodward, 2000). Woodward states that "fear is experienced but controlled; in this model of military masculinity; the soldier admits fright but conquers it to his advantage" (2000: 651). The fear of soldiers is a form of violence resulting not only from the need to preserve their lives, but also more importantly from the pressure to overcome the enemy. Losing the battle in front of the enemy was a sign of femininity. The aim of these ritual practices was to prepare the body to resist the bullets in the battle site. As George (1956) contends that the ideas contained in, or enacted by the ritual are important for this teaching function. However, it is the symbolic blend of word and gesture in the external rituals that gives them their tremendous force. In this sense, the body is viewed in metaphors of war as 'bulletproof': this is a tough male body able to endure pain (Maringira and Nunez, 2015:327). Soldiers went through aggressive and courageous methods in the rite of indoctrination to enable them to cope with painful and hardship experiences of war (Barrett, 1996). The question from which I sought answer was that given the fact that the discourse about ritual practices led the spirits of soldiers in the battlefield to which factors their colleagues' death could be ascribed. The answer to this question shows that the efficiency of the superstitious rituals of protection obeys to a moral logic which soldiers were called to observe in their conduct. The lack of this moral logic in the behaviour of a soldier was prejudicial and could lead to the loss of life in the war zone.

6.4. The moral logic in the frontline

While rituals are believed to be a powerful source of protection, their efficiency depends on how soldiers who are involved observe some military requirements which become the moral logic. According to participants, soldiers were bound to a moral logic, which determined their survival in the battleground. Some participants believed that those soldiers who misbehaved in war lost their lives for not complying with morality driving the beliefs of the soldiers. In the following account, John told me how they were prepared to follow this moral logic in the frontline:

> After being involved in rituals, the chief commander will explain to us how we must behave in the battlefield. When you are hungry for example, you find a farm. Before entering the farm, say, 'I am a soldier at the service of the nation. I enter here not to steal, but to eat' and you eat manioc[20] or peanut or sweet potato. But don't go out with something from the farm, not even a piece. In that case you have not stolen. When you see villagers for example and confiscate their belongings, you have extorted them. You have committed a crime that can become harmful to you in the war. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

John's declaration is instructive because it shows the kind of argument of beliefs that sustain soldiers in the battlefield. Herein, we notice a shift in understanding the moral logic. The socio-economic landscape of the DRC has led soldiers to develop survival strategies characterised by everyday violence exercised on civilians in forms of extortions epitomised as *civil bilanga ya soda* (in Lingala literally translated as he cornfield of the soldier is civilian). Soldiers rationalised their illegal practices by the poor living conditions many of them experienced. Poverty was viewed as an affront to their masculinity and compelled them to develop survivalist mechanisms characterised by violence which they viewed as means to reassert their masculinity. However, this quote reveals that soldiers who in peacetime turned civilians into their fields sought to become morally blameless during war. The question that came was to know what justified this shift. Why was it that during the wartime the actions of soldiers were controlled by the logic of what was wrong and what was right? To answer this interrogation, I concur with the argument that the coherence of social life rests on the convictions we share about its moral meaning (Tipton, 1982). We can analyse their position in the light of the cultural beliefs of the Congolese people. Tipton argues that while our thinking is influenced by social

[20] Manioc is a plant of the tropical regions with sweet or bitter cassava. The sweat cassava can be eaten without being cooked; the bitter cassava is used to make flour.

and economic conditions, the latter do not do it for us, but "they intersect with culture in speech to provide the crux of social action" (Tipton, 1982: 185). First of all, there was a popular belief that soldiers who got involved in stealing during the war was unlikely to return alive. This belief remained engraved in the mind-set of the soldiers and compelled them to become disciplined during the war. Secondly, the rituals performed were so binding that their efficacy required of each troop to be ethically irreproachable. Bourdieu defines rituals as "strategic practices for transgressing and reshuffling cultural categories in order to meet the needs of real situations" (Bell, 1997:78). As I previously indicated, rituals were a form of violence which regulated soldiers' behaviour in the battlefield. In addition, before being given the firearm, they passed under the feet of their chief commander which was a sign of obedience to the person who sent them. In this context, soldiers' moral question of what to do was raised in terms of the regulations of the rituals and instructions of the commander. Tipton (1982) argues that an act is right, not solely by virtue of its consequences, but because it conforms in itself to rules of action taken as relevant by reason. Their acts became right when they were commanded by the authority and when they were posed in accordance with the ethical virtues of their ritual beliefs. The words they uttered were a form of prayer addressed to those who held symbolic power over the land. By uttering this word before entering the soldiers performed another ritual that consisted of seeking permission from the nature to allow them the right to pick something from the farm. By so doing, soldiers guaranteed their own protection and maximised the efficiency of the rituals in which they partook.

While it is true that the army requires equipment of high quality and competent human resources to win the battle, the findings of this study suggests that ritual is an important aspect that has been neglected in academic research focusing on the military in Africa. The data indicates that soldiers were driven by their beliefs that supplementing weapons and ammunition by sacrificial rites of protection is a guarantee to success in the warzone. However, the findings of this study also suggest that the efficiency of the military rituals is dependent on rule-compliance and agreement-keeping founded upon the principles of integrity, justice, competence, and utility which soldiers had to internalise during wartime. Unlawful or improper acts or conducts particularly during wartime had harmful consequences not only on soldiers' lives, but also on the whole military institution whose aim was to cause damage to enemy by preserving the lives of its members. This situational moral binding was occasioned by the particular beliefs prevailing in the warzone for the protection of soldiers' lives and may not apply to other contexts of soldiering. John's answer revealed the putative belief that those who

stepped on the landmine or died in the war operations while they relied on superstitions for their protections transgressed moral obligations which warranted their fate. Stressing the importance of dedication ceremonies in the military warfare in the African context, Makemba reported that immediately they were out of the ritual drum in which they spent twenty-four hours, they received firearms and engaged in the war. This discourse shows how some powerful army's crafted beliefs played a role in the way of waging war. Makemba's declaration about the military use of rituals of war urged us to critically examine the basis upon which African culture was found. History teaches that there was technology in African in the ancient times - for example, fire was produced, especially by striking small blocks of pyrite, a natural iron sulphide, and probably also using wooden fire drills. Fire was used in a wide range of activities, such as heating, lighting, cooking food, flint heating to facilitate size, etc. The first set of weapons developed in ancient Africa was used first for hunting and later for resisting enemy's attacks. In terms of religion, African people were often regarded as animists, believing that objects, places, and creatures all possess a distinct spiritual essence. However, the colonial masters came with different concept of development which compelled Africans to abandon their cultural legacy. This gave birth to the term civilisation - in this sense, western development is regarded as modern civilisation. Under colonialism African beliefs were seen as dangerous and frightening – even associated with Satan in the Christian worldview. Therefore, they were discarded by colonialists as nonsense. Rather they were attributed great power but an evil power. By doing the same thing, this seems like another example of coloniality – the way that a colonial logic continues into the postcolonial era. In this case with African rituals are deemed to be dark and evil but powerful and Christianity represents modernity and enlightenment. For example, the spear or gun used in ancient Africa could kill only one person but the advent of the colonisation brought new technology resulting in weapons of mass destruction. Of course, this weapon has an indisputable advantage, that of dealing effectively with the enemy's aggressions but it is also the basis of many conflicts in the world. However, it is instructive that African people were forced to abandon their own beliefs by the colonisers because "while the African heritage differs radically from European cultures, the latter has profoundly altered African moral, intellectual and cultural traditions in the last century" (Conrad 1982:187). The foundation of this civilization is the notion of progress in the belief in a process of civilization whose outcome would be a perfect society (Boursiquot, 2007 – my translation). According to Boursiquot (2007 – my translation), modern culture maintains a myth - scientifically grounded in evolutionary theories - in which our western society is the

achievement of a progressive transition from a barbarous pre-social state of humanity to that of civilization.

The imposition of modern culture is a form of violence that Africans have experienced on the part of colonizers who wanted to transform barbaric to civilized people. Thus, for example, in the domain of the army when talking about war techniques, particular emphasis is placed on the rational character of war, which consists in the exponential destruction of the enemy's camp. Modern warfare is technologically conceived relying more fully on a soldier's ability to master the use of complex equipment (Woodward, 2000), and “pictures of equipment, uniforms and dramatic action dominate war reporting, disguising the humanity of the men that drive the war machine” (Mayes and Hetherington, Undated). Of particular interest is the rational, planned, scientific, expert and coordinated character of any military action. However, the case mentioned by Makemba is very significant. Ritual is “a cultural creation and, as such, involves all the neuroses that make us humans” (Bell, 1997: 58). Being cooked in a drum for twent-four hours was another form of technology aimed at sophisticating the military body to become more destructive, more invincible and more dominator of the enemy in the battleground. Returning to Bourdieu, the use of rituals reminds us precisely of the habitus emanating from a field that these soldiers navigated before their enlistment in the army. The knowledge gained has remained engraved in their memories and continued to guide their actions. Because Bourdieu defines habitus as mental dispositions and products of history and experience that is durable and transposable, this case indicates how it was transposed to be used as valuable resource in the army. Soldiers making use of rituals in the army is a clear demonstration of their rootedness in a particular form of social structure and their role in maintaining that structure (Bell, 1997). This habitus demonstrated that even if former soldiers were taught modern techniques and sophisticated means of war, these techniques and modern means needed a dose of rituals drawn from their cultural heritage to function effectively. The rite of cooking them in the ritual drum acted to shield them from the enemy’s bullets and to render them powerful on the battleground. After going through twenty-four training, soldiers were under duress to pass under the legs of their leader. Ritual models connections of interrelated ideas that express values basic to social life but does so by objectifying those values in symbols that are emotionally experienced by participants in the ritual (Bell, 1997). The passage through fire symbolised dangerous ordeal aimed to turn soldiers into warriors. The meaning stressed in the symbolism of these activities indicates that soldiers were not only subordinate to the military authority, but more importantly, the authority had the duties to protect them particularly during

the battle. It is the reason why their assessment was based on the number of survivors after engaging in the battlefield. This empowering and protective rite suggests “unity, exclusiveness, and constancy” of corporate groups and classes (Bell, 1997: 55). Amani’s testament that some of their colleagues returned from the war with uniform perforated by bullets without them being hurt is a proof that these rituals had a great power of protection. This case is also a challenge to the modern techniques of war in the sense that scientifically it is difficult to understand that bullets could pierce uniform without wounding the person wearing it.

Another interesting point that led the discussion was about how soldiers behaved following the defeat of the enemy and the conquering of the territory. In the section to follow I discuss what former soldiers termed authorised practices which followed the conquering of the enemy.

6.5. No, it is called spoils of the war

As stated earlier, in the context of militarisation, particularly in warfare, the right became wrong; the wrong was viewed as right. Although, there are warring regulations, some violent behaviour was difficult to avoid and became acceptable. In my discussion with some former Congolese soldiers, there was a trend that soldiers who engaged in the war deliberately violated people’s rights in the conquered territories by snatching their properties. Some of them referred to this brutality as spoils of the war which they downplayed. This argument is clearly evidenced by participants in the following statements.

> No, no, it's called spoils of war. Any military in the world knows; you can read for example in the Bible, you will see that, soldiers took the spoils of war after a territory had been conquered. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Makemba narrated his own experience of spoils of the war in the following quotes:

> …before going to war, I could have from 10000 to 20000 US dollars and when I came back, there was again spoils of war, what you hijack from the people you have conquered, in Angola there are lots of diamond and mercury.
>
> Dos: Did you also hijack women?
>
> No, I was not very strong on that side, sometimes, but not really; there were soldiers who hijacked even women. (Makemba interview, December 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

These accounts are not in contradiction with the principles guiding the ritual practices because the spoils of the war were authorised practices which took place after a territory was conquered. However, what matters here, is the way they claimed that their actions were acceptable. It is common knowledge that in many instances, participants want to universalise their behaviour. Their reference to the bible, 'You can read for example in the bible', is a way of telling the story that makes it seem as if this is a timeless practice acceptable at all times. The reference to the Bible even suggests it has a moral basis. Of note, I was curious to look at the bible that they referred to and realised that there were at least twenty-seven instances about spoil and plundering during war. Most of these occurrences are in the Old Testament. The blatant case is what is narrated about David and the giant Goliath. Following the defeat of Goliath by David, Philistines became the subjects of Israelites who plundered their camp; even their wives were taken by Israelites. This case suggests that these former soldiers drew on the bible to interpret or justify their acts of violence.

In most cases, when the village was conquered the people of that village surrendered all they had for fear of being killed. Some villagers ran away leaving everything behind. In this case, soldiers looted the village, taking with them whatever valuables they found. The situation was even worse if the village was suspected as being the cradle of enemies. Amani said:

> If a village was reported as hosting enemies there was no pity. Our actions were not only about plundering. People who were suspected as colluding with the enemies were killed. (Amani interview, July 2015 – My translation from French to English)

In their articulations about violence, former soldiers relied sometimes on emotional prevalence, sometimes on the prevalence of moral evaluation, or on neutrality where both reactions could be evoked at the same time (Bucciarelli, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird, 2008). Makemba was reluctant to answer the question about having women as spoils of the war but narrating his story in hilarious manner I could read in his face that it was a common practice which involved many soldiers including him. His reluctance to openly accept could be explained by the risk of darkening the identity of pastor that he was looking to show off to the community.

While the former soldiers who participated in this study were all men, they presented different gender perceptions in the army which forms the discussion to follow.

6.6. Reconceptualisation of femininity and masculinity

The patriarchal conception of womanhood has always considered women as tender, motherly, vulnerable and in constant need of male protection. This portrayal of women also finds expression in the labour market, where women are excluded from some sectors viewed as exclusively male. This dichotomy also manifests in the wage differences between male and female staff. While patriarchal hegemony has prevailed in African societies, much attention has not been paid to some institutions like the army which employs both men and women. More so, less focus has been given to how men perceive their female counterparts in the armed forces. This section seeks to provide an insight into the conception of gender hegemony in the army. The argument underpinning the discussion suggests that military manhood or womanhood is not about genetic differences between men and women, but more about the capabilities to embody the military hegemonic masculinities. A female soldier entails some level of masculinisation. From my participants I leant that women who joined male-dominated institution emulated a male identity, rejecting being seen as vulnerable women. Refusing to be called women was a way of rejecting an identity relating to male domination.

As described above the representation of conflict or violence is also gendered. This gender difference is based on the social construction of masculinity and femininity. Banjeglav (2009) argues that women's bodies are made equal with the body of the nation. Women represent the nation because of their symbolic and reproductive role. Threats to the nation are construed as feared or actual violation or rape of an innocent female (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998:444). This suggests an excessive masculinity values to prevent or retaliate against such menaces or harm. This justifies the military's emphasis on overcoming the effeminate stereotypes by displaying masculine characters. Military's use of violence is seen as an easy way to achieve masculinity particularly as a way to exercise power over other men who in this context are feminised.

Military masculinity is "linked with heroic and mythic values such as honour, loyalty, and righteousness" (Tickner, 2001:57). The overemphasis of the male role in war and violence has led many researchers to turn a blind eye to the potential role of women in time of armed conflict. Women have rarely been regarded as potential armed and aggressive adversaries and more inclined to become active in peace-making since they are afforded more room to engage in such activities (Banjeglav, 2009). While the dominant view suggests that men are stronger than women, I argue that these traits –weakness and strength-are gender neutral. As a case of illustration, Banjeglav indicates that at the outbreak of Yugoslavian war about 700000 people

left the country to eschew conscription and over 9000 desertions were recorded (Banjeglav, 2009). These overwhelming numbers concern men who were given much military attention. Women's role in the war has often been overshadowed and Brubaker and Laitin (1998) express the need of conducting more studies focusing on the warring tasks of women in the frontline. In the review of Alcinda Honwana's work on child soldiers in Africa, Owino shows the complexity of women's role in civil wars in Angola and Mozambique where they served as "guards, carriers of ammunition and messengers, spies, 'wives' and sexual partners, and sometimes as fighters on the frontline" (Owino, 2008: 182-3). These are secondary roles which lead to consider women as weaker sex. Although the army promotes a particular masculinity for its members, military is not only male prerogative. Many women are increasingly enrolling in the army alongside their male counterparts. Baumeister's (2013) study reports that women were forced into fight for the protection of their lives and their camp in case of attack. Baumeister further stresses that the new combat skills women acquired were instrumental in ending continuous sexualised abuse and domestic slavery as well as in supporting their forced husbands in combat. Forced wives also consider their partaking in direct war as a getaway from being a victim by becoming a perpetrator. This involvement in violence offers to women more security, confidence and power. Moreover, through better access to food and looted items, participating in combat can improve the circumstances of their lives within the fighting group (Baumeister, 2013).

There is a swing in the conceptions of femininity and masculinity in the military; armed forces are built upon a culture that uses discrimination against women to strengthen camaraderie and punishes those that show feminine characteristics (Lewis, 2015). Being a man or woman in the logic of the army is less about physical traits, but more about the capacity to perform duties. The perception of women has evolved for both, men and women, for soldiers came to learn that those who chose to serve under the flag were remarkable women; even women themselves believed that they reached male's level and rejected feminine identity. Although participants in this study were only men, but the interesting part of it is how they constructed manhood and womanhood within the army. The following statements are the evidence of this claim:

> How will you call her woman because she has already worn military body; it is a matter of fighting; you must be clever. We are one; we are doing the same job without any distinction of sex; we have one aim how you can you call her woman? … She is no longer a woman of *makusa* (makusa in Lingala meaning kitchen), no! Will you take her as a woman of *loyi-loyi* [laziness], no! You are running away [from bullets], she is also running away [from bullets]; you are carrying weapons, she is also carrying weapons.

> Why will you call her woman? (Gero interview, December 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

The reading of this quote highlights the transcendence of sex in the military, showing how soldiers view themselves almost as alien but always masculine. In a similar way, Tango narrates how the meaning of manhood and womanhood was shifted during the military training.

> No, I'll tell you this. A woman is a woman, but there are women like those who engaged in the army with us. They received the same training as us. We did not consider them as women anymore; they were like men, they received training as men. There are women who parachuted with us in CETA barracks. After training they appoint you [somewhere] based on your performance, but not because you are male or female, never! We saw women who were stronger than men ... another example, when we were in CETA barracks there were men who fled when they saw that training became hard, but there are women who endured until the end. Now what do we say? Those who fled are not men; they are women because a man endures. At that moment, as I said, the woman becomes a man because she endured. She is stronger, tougher than the man who escaped and she will not even accept to be called *mwasi* [woman]. Another example, there are soldiers like we saw at the training centre, when the whistle blows for morning drill, you will always see them in bed, *abeleke* [malingerer]; they pretend to be sick to avoid racing; but there are women who got up at 4 o'clock, 3 o'clock to run. Women did this, but men *abeleke*. (Tango interview, November 2015 - My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

This quote indicates that being identified as woman was less about biological differences, but referred more to being weak, incapable to fulfil soldier's duties since soldiering was primarily conceived as male institution. This was again emphasised by Amani in the following statement:

> Yes, the army is for men, for people able to endure. No, you know, woman is always seen as weaker than a man. When you make a mistake or fail to perform duties, they treat you as a woman, because a woman is physically viewed as weaker than a man. (Amani interview, July 2015 – My translation from French to English)

In this case, women who joined the army were tougher, aggressive and enduring, rejecting female identity because they belonged to male institution and performed male tasks. John recounted how the women who were part of his team rejected their feminine nature:

> Oh, the women who parachuted with us, if you call her *mwasi* [woman], she will say, 'no, I'm not a woman. I am a man'. She will ask you the question, 'you see me wearing a loincloth here; we are all wearing military uniforms; we are parachuting together, we all make the free, high altitude and opening jumps with or without equipment, day or night '. (John interview, July 2015 - My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

To begin with, it is important to stress that the analyses of gender relations that follow are man's view, an enlightened man known as a rigorous analyst of the social world, but a man whose conception of masculinity responds to certain characters (Krais, 1999). The analysis of these quotes reveals that the army remains male institution with "training standard' requiring skills and attitudes' development through self-analysis, self-judgment and self-evaluation according to the attainment of a specific ideal" (Green, 2003: 119).

What these statements reveal is that masculine performances and principles are what the army values more than genetic differences between men and women, and these qualities can be borne by both, men and women. The army promotes a social order which seems hermetic, unbreakable, constituting a closed and perfectly ordered universe (Krais, 1999). However, what is interesting is that behind the 'invariant' of masculine domination, men and women engaged in the army significantly contribute to the "the movements and transformations of the social order of gender" (Krais, 1999: 217). Participants shared a number of descriptions of their views of ideal soldiers. However, what particularly stood out were their ideas about how soldiers were required to behave in order to achieve such ideal and be considered as masculinised. The view expressed is that soldiers "were required not only to move in certain ways and habitually train their bodies to perform in certain ways but to train themselves to act in the world through very specific means" (Green, 2003: 109). Women who joined the army wanted to fit in that framework by harnessing their bodies to an obsessive body practice (Foucault, 1979). This suggests that the mechanism or 'technology' works when the normalizing 'gaze' constructs a person as more or less conforming to that norm. This gaze then becomes internalized as each individual defines and 'sees' herself or himself in those terms. Thus, each becomes his or her own 'personal trainer' (Green, 2003).

Soldiers unable to perform their duties decently were considered as idle and often referred to as *mwasi* (in Lingala meaning woman) which in most cases is derogatory term meaning unable to perform men's duties and good for the child rearing or kitchen duties. In most cases, these soldiers became malingerers, a trick they often used to escape the challenging military training. However, women who joined the army and successfully performed their duties were differently perceived; they could not be referred to as *mwasi* or idle because they developed tough and aggressive attitudes viewed as male. Since the army required aggressive, vigour and powerful people, women who successfully embodied military tradition were reconstructed as men. Hence, they shared the same power relations; the way of behaving and addressing them changed because they were no longer women, but they were perceived as men.

This case calls for the interrogation of the social construction of patriarchy as it is held in many societies. From these findings, this study reveals that in the views of former soldiers who participated in order to become part of the army women and men had to become like men by rejecting all forms of womanliness. That is why women who performed well in the army rejected female identity. Refusing to be portrayed as such was due to the fact that these women carried heavy weapons alongside their male counterparts and were trained to become merciless as their male counterparts. Refusing to be called women was a way of rejecting an identity relating to male domination, the form par excellence of symbolic domination and of female submission. This was also a way of challenging "the social order exerts on women, in words of the dispositions spontaneously attuned to that order which it imposes on them" (Bourdieu, 2000: 171). What is less known are the social consequences resulting of the rejection of this existing social order on these women who embraced the army.

While many former soldiers praised female soldiers' prowess in the army, some disclosed that in the battlefront it was rare for women to lead the offenses. Such roles, they emphasised, were left to men while women mostly played supporting roles. Sometimes the physiological make up of women was seen as hindrance of their performance in the battlefield. Amani, a former lieutenant, explains:

> They [women] are, but not always engaged in fighting with the enemy. Women are mainly aligned in the department of logistics, medicine; they may be nurses, doctors. I have never seen women warriors directly involved in the fight. Women, if they are there, are not in the combat units that which directly deal with the enemy troops. They are in the so-called rear base, i.e. an area that is about 100 kilometres from the enemy where they were lined up in supplying tasks of ammunition or in sewing departments - for example, to the logistics base where they have to cut out military uniforms, gala dress, costumes. (Amani interview, July 2015 – My translation from French to English)

From the onset, the relationship between man and woman is of the dominator and dominated, one in the form of opposing dichotomies (up / down, big / small, etc.). While men are the subjects of matrimonial strategies through which they work to maintain or increase their symbolic capital, women are always treated as objects of these exchanges in which they circulate as symbols, capable alliance builders (Bourdieu, 1990 – my translation). The symbolic value awarded to women is that of the mother of the nation, tender, meek and bearer of the family. This conceptualisation of the woman provides some symbolic capital to the family, community or society. As such, whenever women get involved in what seems to be male's role, society views those values as being endangered. As Bourdieu rightly argues, "in modem

societies, the privileged role that women play in specifically symbolic production, both inside and outside the domestic unit, always remains masked and, in any case, diminished" (Bourdieu, 1990: 3).

The army maintains in its logic, philosophy, principles and practices a system of principles in which the basic structures of the male worldview are clearly expressed. In this context, as Bourdieu (1990 – my translation) puts it so well, the social structures which impose themselves in the sexual division of labour and mental structures, the masculine order is imposed on the mode of evidence, as perfectly natural. This is a form a symbolic violence that Bourdieu conceives as "essentially part of masculine domination" (Bourdieu 1990: 11), compelling women to live up to certain expectations of masculinities that are required by the army. While many gender studies focus more on physical violence against women as a form of male domination, I argue that it is difficult to understand men's physical violence against women in everyday life without relying on symbolic violence, that violence which is not perceived as such because it is nothing other than the application of a social order, a vision of the world rooted in the habitus of the dominated and the dominant (Krais, 1999). In other words, physical violence results from the symbolic violence, which is the product of *androcentrisation*.

Herein I argue that it is important to appreciate the complexities around the military masculinities. Being a female soldier entails some levels of masculinisation but being masculinised does not mean that female soldiers become men. The military forces women to inculcate a *hexised* body to identify themselves as belonging to this male-dominated institution. It follows that women's bodies are *hexised*, *masculinised*. Women who enrol in the army consider to be liberated from the male symbolic power over women. This suggests a form of what Bourdieu calls "symbolic revolution" calling "into question the very foundations of the production and reproduction of symbolic capital and, in particular, of the dialectic of pretension and distinction which the principle of the production and consumption of cultural goods is treated as signs of distinction (Bourdieu, 1990). Gero's question, 'How you can call her a woman?' also sounds very derogatory. Yet, female soldiers refused to be identified as women but it is not known whether they were happy to be referred to as men or it was a form of resisting male domination in a particular context of the army – perhaps because the values of the army are so masculine. Being a woman was an insult in the army. This is also a form of symbolic violence whereby women were looking to deny their own identity in order to look like men because if they did not do so they could be de-valued. This is also applied to other men who

sought to live up to certain expectations of masculinities in the army which maybe they were not comfortable with.

This case contests the use of the biological or affective argument to justify women's less involvement in lethal acts by espousing Durkheim's sociological contention that women commit fewer homicides because they 'do not participate in collective the same way' (DiCristina, 2006: 219). In other words, women are not offered the same opportunities as men simply because of, to use Bourdieu's words, the transformation of history in nature, cultural arbitrary in natural (Bourdieu, 1990). If women were exposed to the same realities as men, they would also be involved in violence as men do. This is what marks the gender differences in Durkheim's general theory of homicide. Gender differences in social locations "concerns the distribution of homicide opportunities, [which] are shaped by three variables: collective sentiments related to collective things, the religion of humanity, and anomie (DiCristina, 2006: 219). Women could be able to perform role socially conceptualised as male's role if they were offered the same opportunities as men. Placed in a specific field, women can be trained to use firearms, shoot and kill. However, playing men's role in the society does not change women's nature, i.e. they do not become men. Even if they do what is known as male's role, women are still women in their nature.

In this case, women perhaps claim male identity as a form of resistance against men's domination, more importantly exhibiting manly virtues required by the army they gain symbolic capital meaning recognition and honour from their male counterparts. In fact, what is at stake here is that the army imposes through its mechanisms and functions a symbolic violence in which 'eternal masculine' is reproduced. Women suffer and knowingly or unknowingly accept this symbolic violence meted by their male counterparts in their struggle to look like men. This symbolic violence was tolerated and even accentuated by women themselves as they rejected their feminine identity to embody masculinised identity. By refusing to be called women, they adopted the view of the dominator by negating, devaluing and humiliating female image (Krais, 1999). In other words, women *habitualised* masculine image as superior and female image as inferior. As Krais rightly argues, "this submission, or even incorporation, of the dominant point of view strongly brings to light what domination means—it always also means bearing within yourself that which destroys you" (Krais, 1999: 215). The fact that men themselves acknowledged that some tasks could only be successfully performed by women, particularly playing the spying role shows that although they pretended to look like men by altering their feminine identity, enrolling in the army did not take away

their feminine nature. In fact, men took advantage of their feminine nature to fulfil the military mission that could be difficult to achieve if women were not involved. More importantly, preventing women to be in the frontline in some circumstances also shows that women had some limitations even in the army; they were still under men's protection.

Women's enrolment in the army constitutes a breaking of the doxa of masculine domination (Krais, 1999). First, the difference between men and women was less in terms of genetics, but more socially constructed. Second, this social construction leads the sexual division of labour where some tasks were defined as male's tasks and others appropriately female. Third, women were able to perform what was regarded as men's tasks if they were given the same opportunity. However, in doing so they gave up the identity and assumed qualities of being a woman. In this way, the logic of what constitutes a man or woman is not challenged. The meekness or tenderness of women did not necessarily mean that they could not embark on violent acts. Women who partook in tasks conceived as male considered themselves as being liberated from the 'inferior' status of being women. Fourth, the social definition of manhood and womanhood was a form of habitus that was incorporated by the dominated and the dominator. This social construction was also a form of symbolic violence that the dominated suffered by virtue of accepting it as an intangible way of organising social rapports in the community. Fifth, because of this unequal and selfish social construction of rapports between men and women, the need to reach the dominator's level became a goal the dominated sought to achieve. Women who accessed male's institution preferred to identify themselves and to be identified as men, rejecting their female identity regarded as inferior. This move earned them symbolic capital in form honour and recognition from their male colleagues. Bourdieu argues that "symbolic capital is at the heart of masculine domination" (Krais, 1999). However, this gender role shift was also a symbolic violence they suffered, consisting of abandoning their own identity in order to embody male. The need to maintain that level of honour and recognition led to the rejection, denigration and devaluation of female identity because of the dishonour and humiliation that it conveys. As such, women participated knowingly or unknowingly to the symbolic violence which consisted to maintain women in inferior positions in society.

Conclusion

This chapter's focus was on the gendered military tradition and the way violence is conceptualised in the army. In examining former soldiers' rationale for the use of violence during war, I discussed how participants' minds were prepared before engaging in the war. This preparation aimed at instilling fear in soldiers' spirit by forcing them to actively get involved in killing. The fear created in soldiers' mind constrained them to fulfil their superiors' orders by becoming violent and merciless. The analysis of data also showed that killing and violence, particularly sexual violence was part of the orders former soldiers received and was symbolically conceptualised as expression of military masculinity with the aim to correct or regulate the behaviour of the generations to come.

The use of traditional rituals of protection was motivated by the fear of being killed or losing members. This is an important finding showing different ways of doing war, particularly in the African context. While former soldiers indicated that they were skilfully trained and equipped with modern weapons, their bodies were also ritually prepared to become efficient and invincible in the battlefield. A particular point developed concerned the moral logic leading the troops particularly in the battleground. This moral logic was the consequence of the rituals performed and conditioned their success in the front. However, following the conquering of the enemy this moral logic did not apply. The study also found that the spoils of the war were regarded as the rewards or windfall gains resulting from their effort of conquering territories. Soldiers were involved in plundering the enemy's territory, which they referred to as spoils of the war, which they even used biblical reference to support.

Another important finding highlighted in this study was the meaning of femininity and masculinity. Findings revealed a meaning that is in variance with the social construction of femininity and masculinity. The army promoted the emergence of hegemonic masculinity; femininity was used in the army not to emphasise physical traits between male and female, but to deter female's behaviour (which could be displayed by both men and women) among the troop members. Drawing on the accounts of participants who were all men, being identified as men or women was not determined by physical appearance. It follows that in the army men and women alike regarded themselves as men and valued the performance of one another, and that women in the context of the army were understood as weak men or women, unable to efficiently perform military duties. However, since this study only focused on former male

soldiers, further investigations with particular emphasis on female soldiers will provide further insight. However, since former male soldiers praised female soldiers and acknowledged their remarkable performance in their accounts, I believe that these accounts reflected the realities about gender perceptions within the army. There is a shortage of literature on military gendered roles in Africa despite the existence of many studies on war and violence, particularly in the countries experiencing political upheavals. This study takes the research on gender roles and perceptions beyond the everyday argument about the perception of manhood and womanhood in the African context by showing how the prevalence discourse of weakness, vulnerability and tenderness associated to womanhood is contested. In the chapter to follow this study is concerned about what former soldiers had become in South Africa after leaving the Congolese Army.

Chapter seven: ‘Exiled’ – ‘refugees’ and ‘civilians’: Post military life in South Africa

7.0. Introduction

This study provides an insight into different phases of the lived experiences of soldiering: from recruitment, training, active service to post-military life in the context of migration. As a way of reminder, I have shown that soldiers joined the army because of different circumstances. I have also outlined the process of socialization of soldiers into the military tradition/culture in which soldiers were prepared to embody and promote masculinity as a way of life. This was followed by the discussion about the way the logic of the army presented a conception of violence different from the civilian understanding of violence. In the aftermath of military life, this chapter encapsulates the lived realities of post-military life in a foreign country. The chapter highlights how former DRC soldiers living in South Africa negotiate their military identity in a new country. The argument leading this chapter is that migration influences the identity of soldiers. They no longer find themselves in a context where these military identities matter in the same way. This suggests that when former soldiers from the DRC arrive in South Africa they acquire new identity; not as soldiers but as refugees or civilians. This study pays particular attention to the lives of former DRC soldiers in South Africa, particularly in Johannesburg, a city reputed for violence and crime originating from the apartheid’s politics of “ghettoization” of urban marked by unequal disparities of wealth and extreme poverty (Palmary, Rauch, and Simpson, 2003: 102).

The chapter starts by laying out elements of military discipline and how soldiers’ discipline has been transposed as part of their everyday lives in South Africa. The chapter then presents soldiers’ perceptions of South Africa, discussing how they felt that they lost their military power and exploring different ploys they used to renegotiate this power in their social interactions. In this section, I highlight the role of the context in claiming military identity and power, arguing that soldiers’ identity is context-specific. This suggests that when soldiers migrated from the DRC to South Africa, their identity was also affected to become inert and redundant; they assumed new identity in a new environment.

7.1. Military discipline in daily interactions

One of the findings that emerged from my fieldwork suggests that military discipline was used as regulator of former soldiers in their interactions with their community members. This

military discipline was used as a distinguishing feature between those who were in the army and civilians.

The day I came to Makemba's shop where we agreed to meet for an interview I found him eating spaghetti and salads. He was so generous that he also ordered food for me which I pleasantly enjoyed. I found that sharing food together was a good way of closeness which could make him to become more open to me and share the information of which I was in need. The woman selling food referred to Makemba as a good pastor because, according to her, he paid his debts with no trouble. But Makemba dismissed that identification saying,

> Before being a pastor I'm a soldier; I have learned what is called discipline. I am not like some other pastors who use bible verses to justify their wrongdoings. (Makemba interview, December 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

This quote is very instructive. Makemba is drawing on military culture to justify his disciplined conduct that, in his convictions, distinguishes him from others in the community. The discipline learned from the army was *transposed* in the religious sector and in his interactions with others. Herein the discipline became a *doxa*, an unwritten rule that regulated Makemba's conduct, compelling him to pay his debts and avoid cheating on others. This discipline also won him *symbolic capital* in the form of respect and honour from people as a result of unfailingly paying the money that he owed. For the woman to promptly respond to Makemba's request to give me food before the payment means that he gained honour and consideration by virtue of being a good payer of debts. Herein Makemba presented his life with more emphasis not on him as an individual but on the army as a place of social interaction forging the character of its members to form coherent, unified team intent on conveying not only a sense of competence, but also a sense of morality. This case suggests a:

> Form of remembering [which] is embodied, and as such it collapses the distance and the linearity that history introduces to time; juxtaposing the past and the present and returning [former soldiers] to the originary events of their [military] faith from which the passage of time would divorce them (Argenti and Schramm, 2010: 5).

The above excerpt captured my attention because it shows two discourses opposing each other. The woman who sold food identified Makemba as pastor and expected him to embody Christian values of honesty and trustworthiness by paying his debts abidingly. From the woman's statement, I came to learn that Makemba was a good customer because he was often given food with delayed payment. The woman gave him food without reluctance because he was regarded a good debtor which was linked to his identity as a pastor. However, Makemba

stood against this view; for him it was the discipline learned from the army which he used when he interacted with his creditor. This discipline was essential as it informed Makemba's identity of being good with people and paying debts. Importantly, Makemba who claimed to be a pastor criticised his fellow pastors who, according to him, used the bible verses to cheat people. Even though his act of paying debts was in line with bible's principles, Makemba regarded it as primarily the result of his military education where he was taught discipline. Again, here the qualities of the military are seen as good even though they allowed for such horror to happen. In this sense, discipline became an asset that distinguished Makemba from other people in the community. For Makemba, being a soldier superseded his identity as a pastor. His criticism of pastors who use the bible references to swindle people correlates with the previous discourse he made of a human being having two sides, the good and evil ones; the use of each of them depended on the context. The evil mainly emerged when the man sought to serve his own utility. Makemba's view highlighted the idea that contrary to what people thought even a pastor was to be untrusted.

In many cases, pastors in the DRC have been used to serve political purposes. The development of beliefs about witchcraft, spirit possession or supernatural forces has been a powerful method aimed, sometimes, at increasing pastors' manipulation and cheating behaviours (Shariff and Norenzayan, 2011). In Makemba's view, for a pastor to be considered morally upright and honest, he ought to imbibe the notions of discipline, best learned through the army. Makemba's behaviour had been programmed to consider discipline as the core element of trust and honesty even for religious leaders (O'Farrell, 2005).

It is also important to stress that the popularity or the reputation of many Congolese pastors in South Africa has been tainted, particularly, because of their attitudes to the current political situation in the DRC. Some were accused of being corrupt by the Congolese government to subdue their members' behaviours towards political leaders while others were viewed as reckless for their passivity towards the political crisis of their country and the kind of teachings they promoted in their churches. Many of them who were regarded as *collabo* were victims of combatants' attacks and were exposed to the popularly known practice of *mutakalisation*[21] (see Inaka, 2016). Many of the Congolese churches were forced to close because of the pastors'

[21] *Mutakalisation* is a Lingala jargon from the word *Mutakala* (meaning nudity). In this context, it means public humiliation consisting of insulting, undressing and even beating those who are accused of colluding with the current regime in the Congo, particularly politicians, and putting their pictures on social media.

unethical conduct which combatants saw as not in line with the ideology of their combat. Some pastors were also accused of contributing to the breaking of marriages and the increase of divorce cases especially in the diaspora. While Makemba did not deny his identity as a pastor, he looked to differentiate himself from other pastors by bringing to his pastoral ministry the notion of military discipline. With the notion of habitus or embodied culture, Bourdieu (1977) described how 'objective social structures' become inscribed in people's bodies and generate subjective experiences of social class. Although no longer in the army, for Makemba, discipline became one of the great virtues the army inspired which he expressed in his interactions with people to regain honour and respect from the community.

Sometimes former soldiers experienced problems socialising with their fellow Congolese in South Africa. This was the result of what they called the lack of discipline, returning to the previous discourse about the lack of discipline by civilians. Taty, for example, reported that he was uncomfortable engaging in relationships with many civilians in the Congolese community because of what he saw as their sense of inferiority (or inferiority complex) and their inability to understand his [military] language. This is how he put it:

> I prefer to stay alone. I don't like to socialise with civilians because they are complexed and their level of understanding is too low. What will I talk to them about which they will easily understand? Many of them are uneducated and undisciplined. Remember what I told you, civilians are *basenzi* full of inconsistencies and lies. (Taty interview, December 2015 – My translation from French and Lingala to English)

The idea emerging from Taty's statement is that he has transposed the same language to his current context – it is remarkably similar to how he described his actions in the DRC. Taty's view is informed by the military tradition in which the conducts of soldiers are shaped to uphold certain principles such as order, obedience and discipline, Taty hardly find these qualities among civilians. The field of the military is regulated by various 'rules of the game' that Bourdieu conceptualised as *doxa*. Viewed as unchallenged 'shared beliefs' constituting a field, *doxa* "underpins the related notion of symbolic power, which is particularly relevant in Bourdieu's understanding of social relations in modern societies" (Deer, 2008: 121). Being a symbolic form of power, doxa's requirement is that "those subjected to it do not question its legitimacy and the legitimacy of those who exert it" (Deer, 2008: 121-2). For instance, one of the key principles that govern the military field is 'obedience to the last command'. Obedience is part of the symbolic capital the former soldiers acquired from their early involvement in the military. The inculcation of these military traditions in the field of the army is grounded in what former soldiers referred to as a form of education. All these principles and ethics that govern

the military shaped their habitus. In the field where they are able to re-enact their identity, soldiers sometimes apply violence, particularly in their interactions with civilians to impose this *doxic* ruling. These military principles are a form of symbolic capital in that soldiers are feared, respected and honoured in the DRC. However, in a foreign country, the honour and respect they enjoyed in the DRC were no longer applicable and their military capital was undermined. In a foreign country, a foreign field, these military rules were threatened by what Hardy calls "heteronomy in the field" (Hardy, 2008: 126). As the quote above suggests, declaring that civilians are uneducated and undisciplined is Taty's own way of expressing his contempt and a sense of superiority to civilian, making it difficult for him to socialise with them. This is a consequence of the military tradition inculcated in him which has made him rigid suggesting "*hysteresis* effect" or inertia in the habitus; a field condition affecting individuals within this social space (Hardy, 2008: 133). Taty's expectations were to find the same customs and practices to which he was used in the army were far from being met. In this context, it shows the discrepancy between Taty's military habitus and the structures of the South African environment. This discrepancy happened because the rules of the game were not the same in both, the military field and the migration setting. While the military norms and DRC where these norms were applied tolerated autocracy and patriarchy, the South African context promoted the freedom of expression. By so doing, Taty only allowed his "already successful [position] to succeed further, [becoming unable to recognise] the strengths and weaknesses of relative field positions" (Hardy, 2008: 135). In the new social field, former soldiers felt that they were dislocated, disempowered and that the military habitus acquired in the army was in stark contrast with the realities of the new milieu. In the DRC, the military was conceptualised as a dominant institution, which exercised control over the dominated civilians. Even the language used by soldiers was that of domination, which was sometimes difficult for the dominated people to decipher. Unfortunately, the new milieu did not allow the development of the military habitus of domination. In the contemporary South Africa, those who used to be dominated considered themselves as emancipated and rejected the 'imperialist allure' the previous dominator attempted to perpetuate. There is a reversal of power relations. This is a symbolic violence affecting former soldiers which derives from the loss of power that gave them ascendancy over civilians in the DRC.

In my interaction with former Congolese soldiers, they repeatedly referred to civilians as 'uneducated' people because unlike soldiers, as they stressed, civilians had no principles for their lives. Many of the former soldiers indicated to me that military was a matter of principles

they were inculcated, which many claimed were still in their blood (see also Maringira, Gibson and Richters, 2014), mentioning that they still felt their military spirit in the way they interacted with people whether in social gatherings or in their workplaces. Discipline was key especially in the working place and earned some of them promotion. What is interesting to note here is that the way these former soldiers conceived the army and discipline conveys a sense of relativism and was in contrast to how discipline is broadly understood in ordinary life. Although they ran away from the army what they blamed was not the military service per se, but the political context of the DRC which they viewed as hostile to their lives. They viewed military norms beyond reproach and imagined a kind of world founded in these principles. What is interesting here is the contradiction emerging from these former soldiers' view of the army. Although many of them reported that they experienced and perpetrated such horror in the army which deeply affected many, yet they still spoke about their 'army days' with fondness and respect. The observance of military principles is what they regarded as education, discipline and truth.

Through my interaction with former Congolese soldiers residing in Johannesburg, it became evident that many still relied on some military principles they were taught to deal with some situations of their lives in their encounters with their fellow Congolese within the community. They claimed that these values or ideologies were part of their lives and could no longer depart from them. These principles were also used as a way to distinguish themselves from others, particularly civilians who they referred to in the previous chapter as *basenzi*. One of these principles is tolerance. This was also a tendency in former soldiers' accounts that the discipline in the army contributed to develop in them the spirit of tolerance in their interactions with others and work together under the national flag. Some of the soldiers emphasised that military doctrine promoting tolerance was lacking among civilians, particularly when they debated about the political crisis of the DRC. Those who tried to support a different point of view were regarded as *collabo* (anti-combatants) disserving the treatment of *mutakalisation* (see Inaka, 2016). Particularly, among those who identified themselves as combatants, no one was allowed to hold a positive opinion about the current Congolese government. The following statement from a former soldier recalling his own encounter with civilians called combatants is illuminating:

> What I observe they [civilians] don't have military principles; they have the spirit of hatred, you see. That's why in a discussion, they don't want you to criticise their leader. Yet, soldiers don't have the spirit of hatred. They don't want that. If the government does wrong, we will raise it, but they ah! No, it becomes noise, I say ah! My wife is afraid of them [combatants] because she is a civilian. 'Oh, they will kill you', she tells me, but since I have military spirit, I am not afraid [of them]. If they call me I will go; I am not afraid; if you look at the internet you will see me speaking in political-talk show (Loleko interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Herein there is a contradiction. Civilians act with hate and soldiers are presented as ones without hate. Talking about tolerance Loleko is drawing on the principles of democracy. However, while in Congo former soldiers were intolerant toward civilians, in South Africa, they felt oppressed and required tolerance from civilians. In addition, tolerance within the army was only applied between soldiers. This statement fits with the previous discussion about the inverted logic of the army. What is critical in the quote is that Loleko is promoting military spirit which continues to lead him in his interactions with others. The qualities of this military spirit exclude emotion and fear which are defined as civilian behaviour and feminised. Loleko reported that he participated in a Congolese private broadcast where he criticised one of the prominent Congolese opposition leaders. The supporters of that leader who are mainly combatants disliked what he said about their leader and decided to attack him at his home. He was first attacked in a cybercafé and went to open a case against his aggressor. During the time the aggressor was kept in the police cell, his comrades were summoned to attack Loleko and his children unless he withdrew the case. But Loleko was adamant that his aggressor should face the full wrath of the law and refused to withdraw the case. Combatants increased pressure threatening to harm his family and his wife was terrified. Finally, the matter was resolved in amicable ways and he decided to ask the police to release the detainee. In his account, he reported that his wife was afraid of them because she is a civilian, but he was not. He kept on facing them on several occasions and freely gave his opinion about the political situation in the DRC even if it was contradictory to their views. This is reinforced by the worldview of these former soldiers who considered their refugee status as arising from the political crisis in DRC. Expressing the need to return not only to their country, but also to their military career, all of them conditioned their return on political change in the DRC. In South Africa, they were opportune to talk about politics. Their involvement in politics while in South Africa is an important element that helps to understand that their identity in the foreign country changed. Some of them motivated their political action through the popular proverbial expression, 'if you don't mind politics, politics will deal with you'.

What is clear is that their military habitus was situational. Most of the extracts show how the values of the army remained patterned in them. However, it was situational because they could not permit themselves some practices they were used to when they were active soldiers in the DRC. For example, in South Africa, although, the context was similar in the most important ways (they experienced poverty, lack of education opportunities, etc.) and therefore they remained the same they could not attack, arrest or extort civilians for fear of being arrested. In this context, they even viewed themselves as diminished and feminised which became source of their distress as it will be shown in the next section. However, military spirit is the meaning Loleko gave to why he was not afraid. It is what justified why he spoke out about the political situation and even why he decided to withdraw the case. His military identity is what helped him manage an otherwise fearful situation.

7.2. Perceptions about South Africa

After being forced to leave the army and the country, former soldiers reported that they were faced with some distress in the foreign country. This distress is exacerbated by the reality of the new environment where they experienced dire living conditions and loss of their military power. The thrust of this section is to highlight the influence of the new environment on military identities of former Congolese soldiers. My argument is that while former soldiers left their military career and could not fully claim this identity in South Africa, some of their military practices became *habitualised* in their daily lives. In order to grasp some methods used to renegotiate power, it is important to explore former soldiers' views about South Africa.

7.2.1. South Africa is a rotten country

Participants reported that they experienced a lot of challenges in the host country. These challenges negatively impacted on their identities. In addition, being subjected to immigration and administrative controls was seen as humiliating soldiers. This is how 50-year-old Warrant Officer Sankara described South Africa:

> Huum! [I have] Ngunda [asylum seeker], not [refugee] status; this country [South Africa] is rotten. Is this a country? I am using a *ngunda* of six months, three months. So just see sometimes I escape the police because as a *mbila* (soldier), I can perceive them as they are coming closer to me. You know, we [former soldiers] came with our power from Congo. There is no law in this country; Congo is better than this country. (Sankara interview, July 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

By referring to South Africa as a rotten country Sankara was trying to show how the system contributed to the loss of the privileges he used to enjoy in the Congo (such as inflicting violence without being threatened or getting free services, etc.). Beside the evidence he brought to the home affairs and the number of years he spent in this country, he was denied refugee status and continued to be treated as asylum seeker with a renewable permit of six or three months. Worse still, he reported that even when holding this asylum permit, he still faced police arrest or harassment which led him to use the word 'rotten'. The use of this word shows a clear reversal of roles because in the past Sankara could easily oppress others for not meeting his needs. However, the most important lesson to draw from this quote resides in the way Sankara navigated the South African environment. What was helping him to survive was his identity as *Mbila* and the skills associated with this identity, which are part of the military capital. In this context, the power of his identity as *mbila* was useful; this power meant different tricks he could use to even escape from the police when he located them from far. The notion of power still comes back in his statement. This power refers to different rooms of manoeuvre soldiers in the DRC have to justify even violent acts they inflicted against civilian population. The reading of this quote reveals how military spirit became entangled in the creation of post military identity. This entanglement considers the practices associated with soldiers' assumptions about good soldier and the forces that constrain their ability to convey this identity. Among the practices associated with good soldiers is the capacity to resist in the face of adversity which is viewed as expression of masculinity. Camouflaging/blending which was part of their military training was used as military capital helping former soldiers to navigate the new place. Although they found themselves in a new milieu where their military identity

could not be fully claimed, the need to 'remember' the army in order to maintain a sense of resistance was an important mechanism that forced former soldiers to the partial reproduction of the military capital. In light of this equation between commemorating drawing power from military experiences to face the adverse challenges of the post military lives in the foreign country, the emphasis on memory became clear. The achievement of some living stability in the migration setting was sustained by the military memory. Like in the case of Cole's study with Ambodiharina people (in Madagascar), it was clear that the power of the army was closely tied into the practices through which [it was] remembered (Cole, 2001: 141). In turn, remembering the military experiences worked as a powerful technique that former soldiers used to produce themselves in a very particular and acceptable way. What they were looking to do also was to keep up that soldiering identity and its conceptualisation even in the minds of the people with whom they lived in the Congolese community in South Africa. Another interesting perception of South Africa was more in relation with how the former soldiers were treated by the fellow Congolese in different circumstances. Because they were unable to enjoy the benefits related to their military identity as it used to be when they were in the Congo, they then became critical of the South African environment.

7.2.2. South Africa is *Lycée Bosangani*

Former soldiers' impressions that civilians did not respect them in South Africa made them refer to South Africa as *Lycée Bosangani*.

Here I would like to provide the readers with some historical background of this term in Lingala in order for them to understand the contextual meaning of this expression in relation to foreigness. *Lycée Bosangani* is one of the well-known Catholic high schools of Kinshasa previously known as *Lycée Sacré-Coeur* (in French literally meaning Sacred-Heart High School). The shift of names from *Sacré-Coeur* to *Bosangani* is less explained. But from the political history of the DRC, this name dates back to 1973 with the *Zairianisation* process also known as *authenticity* initiated by president M.S.S. *Zairianisation* was a politically driven policy consisting of clearing the country from the lingering leftovers of colonialism and the western influence in order to generate a distinguishable national identity. Thus, many changes were to be made either in the country or in individual life of citizens. The most blatant changes included the name of the country and its cities as well as the rejection of Christian names and adoption of Zairean names. *Bosangani* is a Lingala term meaning gathering, or togetherness.

The term was used to promote equity in terms of access to education as well as peaceful coexistence among learners forming the school community.

In order to better understand the origin of this expression (*Bosangani*) it is necessary to go back to the time of the public force when the military personnel were locked up in barracks and zones of operation of which access was generally prohibited to the civilians. Nevertheless, today with the decaying conditions of military camps, the overcrowding and the lack of maintenance, many barracks have become unrecognizable, compelling soldiers to seek shelter in the city. Despite this, from the FAC, the FAZ up to the FARDC, the Congolese armed forces maintain that they cannot mingle with the rest of the civilian population. In the same way, as during the public force, the army was considered self-centred and ruthless body trained for fighting and killing. In the eyes of many Congolese, the army is an instrument of repression because many of them were convinced that there was nothing to gain by socializing with the army and did all possible to avoid contact with soldiers. The army is often seen as the oppressor of the people in the Congo and this hostility had worsened because of the actions of the network of intelligence services whose mission was to track down all dissidents (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005).

Lycée Bosangani in the context of this study becomes pejorative. Participants used this term to express their remorse or their disappointment of meeting each other in a foreign country where they now faced humiliation from those who yesterday used to respect them. Many of them reported that it was difficult to socialize with civilians as they neither did share the same ideology, nor did they see things in the same direction. Ideology for soldiers was less a mere slogan; it was the embodiment of power which could be reflected on the way they spoke, thought and acted. Now when they found themselves in the midst of civilians the feeling they had was that they gathered with wrong people whose behaviour they judged unacceptable. For instance, Sankara, a former warrant officer emphasised that what pained him most and made him remember the army:

> …This is *Lycée Bosangani* [mixture or potpourri]. Someone who perhaps was selling eggs or water in the DRC is now playing with you (Sankara interview, July 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Referring to someone who could sell eggs or water is very instructive because these are the people soldiers used to racketeer or extort. However, this differentiation no longer exists in South Africa; civilians have lost the fear of soldiers and could address them anyhow. Former

Congolese soldiers used different images to describe what they have become in South Africa. A good illustration was provided by Johnson. 53-year Johnson joined the army in 1985 after completing his secondary school. He was married and lived with his wife in South Africa. He was trained in Kibomango, Maluku and Mikonga before becoming a sergeant. He was deployed to Katanga province. He was forced to flee the country in 1991 after being accused of causing the death of a soldier in a clash between different units deployed to Kasumbalesa, and sought asylum in South Africa, being granted refugee status. Johnson lived by informal business with the support of some of his friends who were in power in the Congo. He used the image of becoming old in the foreign land to explain his powerlessness:

> A foreign land will always remain a foreign land. We always say if you become old in a foreign land, who will draw water for you? (Johnson interview, October 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Through the term *Lycée Bosangani* former soldiers meant associating with civilians, which resulted in the loss of military power they had over them and in the disrespectful attitude of civilians towards them in South Africa. In the following quotes, former soldiers explained the pain caused by this 'unnatural' association. Jack and Mark explained it in this way:

> So, I have realised that I have gone down to the level of civilian because I am in a foreign country. What law can I enforce; what law can I make? I find myself as a civilian. So, we are confused; we accept it because we are in a foreign country; we suffer in the same way as civilians; the work civilian does here is also what we do. (Jack and Mark interview, November 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Explaining his frustration during the interaction with civilians, Tshirawa, a 44-year-old lieutenant, narrated:

> …When we gather at Tungulu[22] place to talk politics, sometimes you see someone, the way he is arguing, you see this is really a civilian's argument; you look but there is no way you can bring out to avoid confusing the person; you just swallow it with pain. Sometimes you say to yourself what this person is doing now if it was in Congo, I was going to discipline him, but since we are in a foreign country let's just accept. You will see somebody who does not know you as we meet at that *Tungulu* place, he is rude to you telling you sometimes '*nakobeta yo*' [I will beat you]. (Tshirawa interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

[22] Tungulu, a Congolese naturalised Belgian, was part of the democratic forces that fought for genuine change in Congo. He was harshly killed on his holiday in Kinshasa after he allegedly stoned at president Kabila's convoy in 2010. His body has never been given back to his family for proper burial according to the Congolese traditional customs.

Tango, a 46-year-old warrant officer, questioned himself about the civilian identity he was to take after leaving the army:

> …After leaving the army many questions come to mind. People start calling me, who was a soldier, civilian! Someone who was respecting me, but today I have become civilian. Sometimes when you sit you think ah-ah-ah! When I was a soldier could civilian slap or insult me? He couldn't. He respected me because I was wearing uniform, but since I don't have uniform anymore, he refuses to respect me. You feel like I have become empty of the power I had is finished. (Tango interview, November 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

What is emerging from these quotes is that former soldiers are drawing on the discourse of free society to define South Africa. A free society is the one that offers to people living in it "the right to act, speak and think as [they] choose, without oppressive restrictions imposed on [them] by others, including those in authority" (Butler, 2013: 20). While in the DRC former soldiers with their military power coerced, directed, threatened, intimidated, pressurised, imposed themselves on, interfered with or manipulated civilians they were now faced with new realities in South Africa where freedom of expression is promoted; people can talk to one another without fear of being punished. This is in contrast with the realities in the army where the voice of the senior could not be challenged as well as in the DRC where soldiers' voice was similar to the voice of the colonial master. DRC was a good place to be a soldier and that the new field of South Africa has rendered them powerless. Former soldiers reported that even those who could not approach them when they were 'big men' in their home country and those who could be beaten under their command had the courage to play with them in South Africa. The image of big men used referred to the power soldiers had in the DRC which they could use to prove their mettle in the clash with civilians and to access some privileges relating to their identity of being soldiers in the context of the DRC. These former soldiers expressed their disappointment to be in an environment different from the DRC where they were unable to claim their military identity and enjoy the privileges this identity provided. Similarly, Jack and Mark expressed their wish to reinstate the Congolese army if they were to go back home as they wished because of the myriad advantages military identity affords in the Congolese environment. This is how they bragged to me about soldiering in Congo:

> Being soldier in Congo offers a lot of advantages. The first one is that you are free and protected. You can do a lot of things and no one will disturb you. Even getting involved in crime will not expose you to criminal charges. But here [South Africa] for a little thing you want to do you are afraid of the law. But in Congo whether you beat someone or rape a woman your military identity is protecting you; no one will threaten you. That's why if today I go back to Congo, I must reintegrate into the army. I will never cope to be civilian to allow being disturbed by soldiers. That's also one of the reasons many people choose the army… (Jack and Mark interview, November 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Similarly, in the following quotes participants highlighted the specific privileges soldiers enjoyed in the DRC which they regretted that South African environment could not offer them. Colonel John explained how, due to jealousy, he beat his wife, leaving her half dead. However, when asked about whether his wife took legal action against him for this domestic violence, he replied as follows:

> Where would she report me? Have you forgotten that we, soldiers, are the leaders of the country? Where would she report me? Soldier is the ruler of Congo. Where can you report a soldier? Even Mobutu told us [soldiers] that civilians were our field. Have you forgotten that? (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mix of French and Lingala to English).

In a similar vein, commenting on soldiers' privileges in the DRC, Sankara had the following to say:

> Many interventions, we buried people free of charge. When I come, how much is the cross? 15$; give him 5$. Casket, how much? 200$; Take 50$. I first seize a bus for free up to the cemetery. My team is inside; we burry [the corpse]. We have done a lot in that Kinshasa. A soldier, in Kinshasa, is like a small king. (Sankara interview, July 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

The reading these quotes shows the psychological suffering caused by the loss of power these former soldiers were facing. What caused this suffering is, first of all, the change of environment that had a negative effect on their identity. They suffered because the new environment not only did not recognise their military identity, but also made them lose the benefits associated with this identity in the previous field. These advantages are what Bourdieu terms, *capital*. The first form of capital linked to military identity is honour and recognition. The soldier was expecting this capital from civilians. The foreign environment contributed to the loss of this capital as none of them was respected anymore. Order and discipline no longer prevailed, military identity was contested. These quotes clearly show that these former soldiers

were in total frustration; they no longer recognised themselves in this new setting and there was nothing they could claim there. This did not stop them from trying to hold onto the forms of respect and honour as described above regarding discipline and honour. These findings challenge studies that stigmatising former military personnel as potentially violence-prone, contributing to insecurity in the cities where they migrate. Yes, there may be insecurity in those cities, but here I dispute that the insecurity is attributed to former soldiers coming mainly from other countries, who as demonstrated by this study's data, were completely stripped of all the powers they enjoyed in their home country. Their experience in the foreign country was perplexing and annoying, and they rejected the kind of life they were subjected to. Military violence which is part of the military practice is only effective where there is congruence between military capital and the field. Their experience with a particular location of the DRC had led to the development of certain practices which had become *habitualised*. In this case, the South African milieu was different, not allowing the development of military practices. There is an incongruence which compelled soldiers to adapt to the new situation because even the skills and values acquired in the DRC were not, in most cases, needed in South Africa.

In this 'chaotic' situation former soldiers had to adapt by developing some methods of renegotiating power particularly within the Congolese community. These methods which sometimes worked were used consciously and unconsciously, but in most cases, they were reminded that South Africa was not the Congolese army. Let us see in the section to follow how former Congolese soldiers behaved to affirm their military power in their various interactions with their fellow Congolese within the community.

7.3. Negotiating power: 'The end justifies the means'

I have highlighted previously how military knowledge continued to shape the post military lives of the former Congolese soldiers in South Africa. In this section, the argument is that former soldiers acquired new *habitus* by compromising and negotiating the reconstruction of their identities. The use of their military knowledge or experiences was strictly contextualised and depended on both the social constructs of war and violence as well as on the realities of migration. This featured former soldiers' struggles to rebuild their lives and gain acceptance within the community. Although, soldiers still relied on their military experiences to deal with some problems of their lives, the new environment reshaped them and they needed to get involved in new social relationships. Their attitudes correlated with Gardner, Pickett and

Brewer’s (2000: 486) argument that “social hunger, aroused when belongingness needs were unmet, would result in selective memory for socially relevant stimuli”. Former soldiers often represented themselves in the past using their military identity to symbolically constitute the social groups (Alonso, 1988). This section is a discussion of different ways former Congolese soldiers used to express military knowledge, identity and power in their interactions with other people in the community. I argue that these methods are mainly nonviolent and used in accordance with the realities of the new environment where former soldiers needed to reconstruct their identity. Let us discuss different strategies they deployed in dealing with people.

7.3.1. Military behaviour in social gatherings

Foucault (1998: 100-1) acknowledges that a discourse can symbolise "an instrument and an effect of power, but [it can also become] a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy". Although former Congolese soldiers left both the field of the army and the DRC, where they saliently expressed their power, some of the military practices were *habitualised* and were sometimes used as expression of their power in South Africa. Former soldiers asserted their power by trying to link to the realities of the new environment.

Nanjundeswaraswamy and Swamy (2014) emphasise that leadership depends on culture, traditional beliefs, norms and values, and a preoccupation. The authors further stress that "transformational leadership has the characteristics of individual influence, spiritual encouragement and intellectual stimulation" (Nanjundeswaraswamy and Swamy, 2014: 57). The leadership I refer to in this section applies to theories of the 'great man' considering leaders as exceptional people, born with innate qualities, destined to lead and behaviourist focusing more on what leaders actually do rather than on their qualities (Bolden et al., 2003).

Former Congolese soldiers who participated in this study viewed themselves as leaders by virtue of their involvement in the army. Drawing from my own observation both, in the Congo and in South Africa, I noticed that ex-soldiers enjoyed leading rather than being led. This leadership was noticed either in their behaviour or in taking up some responsibilities within the community.

69-year-old colonel John for instance reported to me that he used his military experience as a way of coping with the dire living conditions of the host country. In this context, he always sought to be acknowledged in any social gathering; he was always surrounded by people wherever he found himself. He was always attracting people to him, mainly former soldiers who knew him, whether in combatant movement or in his home.

One day 'combatants' gathered at Yeoville Recreation Centre which they nicknamed '*Place Tungulu*'. They were busy discussing the political downfall of the DRC. Immediately John appeared with some of his cohorts. Standing there he became the object of the crowd's attention and I heard him instructing the crowd:

> This is the right moment for our country's liberation. We need you, young people to be ready so that when we organise weapons. We will equip you all to go for fighting.

One person in the group commented, "Yes, we are ready, but where are the weapons?"

John replied to him, "That's not your problem; you just be ready".

The striking point is that people were engaged in discussing various political topics related to the DRC, but when John came and started addressing them, they all abandoned their discussion and carefully listened to him. This also reminded me about John referring to himself as the vice president of Congolese Diaspora in South Africa (a movement which I never heard about since living in South Africa). This happened as I tried to get explanations on how he came to have his picture taken with former President Jacob Zuma, Premier Helen Zille, Deputy Minister of home affairs and the director general of home affairs. However, I saw John taking the lead in every gathering concerning migrants in South Africa. He reported to me that he was even consulted to be part of the group of those Congolese accused of plotting to overthrow the president of the DRC from South Africa; they tried to convince him that they were provided weapons and promised good payment if they succeeded in ousting Kabila. According to him, he replied to them using a popular say, "*On n'apprend jamais au vieux singe à faire des grimasses*" (literally, you cannot teach old dog new tricks). In this say, John was looking to stress how important the role he played in the Congolese community was. As a community leader, John claimed to be aware of anything that took place within the Congolese community. John's leadership was not only in political gathering even when he spoke about his church involvement in South Africa, he claimed to be the co-founder of some churches. This is illustrated with a case of a church called "*Assemblée Chrétienne de Kinshasa*" (ACK), a Pentecostal church based in Kinshasa whose branch in Johannesburg John claimed to be the initiator.

> I am the co-founder of ACK in South Africa. When I left the [church] *Message* known as *Branhamiste*, my late sister-in-law took me to pray here. We started praying in a bedroom. When we moved out of the bedroom, we took a small room on ground floor. When the owner of the church came [to South Africa] we got a big church there. Until now if you ask the pastor of ACK who the legal representative of ACK in South Africa is, he will tell you that it's John. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Another participant reported that in his church they referred to him as a pastor for his performances and that even the pastor concurred with congregants that he was truly a pastor.

> They even call me pastor where I pray. The pastor of that church says that I am a pastor because he sees me praying and preaching well. They called me and decided to consecrate me. That's why today I am a pastor. (Loleko interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

Another visible behaviour concerned the way of addressing others in the community. Maringira and Núñez (2015) argue that military training thus simultaneously creates the body and the identity of a soldier, and, in turn, creates forms of hegemonic masculinity. Military training works as technologies of the self, implying certain modes of training and modification of individuals, not only in the obvious sense of acquiring certain skills but also in the sense of acquiring certain attitudes (Foucault, 1988). Former soldiers believed that yelling at people was one of the ways of expressing their masculinities. After leaving the army and finding themselves in South Africa, many of them still kept on shouting in their interactions with others who often reminded them that they were no longer in the army. This way civilians used to remind them about the loss of their military identity was also affecting because, as they reported, it showed how civilians lost their fear of soldiers and became disrespectful in South Africa. Former soldiers reported that sometimes they imposed themselves as leaders of a group discussion, choosing who could speak and who could not speak, which they saw as the embodiment of the army in the way of acting in their interaction with civilians. They sometimes forgot and thought that they were in front of their fellow soldiers. In the following account, John justified the use of high pitch of voice whenever he addresses people:

> If I am among civilians, they always tell me, 'you talk to us like a soldier; we are not soldiers'. I always have a military tone; I always shout. Even here at home you will see they say, 'don't take us like in the army. I always say to them, 'it has already entered my blood, 29 years!' (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

What emerges from this quote is the formation of *habitus*. Shonkoff (2012 :21) argues that "habitus, to a large degree, remains perpetually unfathomable to the individual who embodies it". Like the work of art [it] always contains something ineffable which communicates, so to speak, from body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words or concepts, and which pleases (or displeases) without concepts. One of the characteristics of the army as a total institution is that the high-ranking officers feel superior, regarding non-commissioned (sub-officers) as inferior, weak, blameworthy and guilty. Social mobility between the two strata is grossly restricted; social distance is typically great and often formally pre- scribed; even talk across the

boundaries may be conducted in a special tone of voice (Davies, 1989). This conceptualisation is replicated in the civilian-military relations whereby soldiers regard civilians as inferior and expect obedience and respect from them. The tone conveyed the expression of power which John was looking to articulate. According to Paruk (2014: 40), "power has been traditionally defined as the ability to realize wishes and to produce the effects one wants to produce'. The wishes here are to draw attention, to impose discipline and order and to be listened to. This is what soldiers were taught in their interactions and this is what remained in their lives and it is what they also wanted to impose when they interacted with other people in the community. However, civilians' reaction against former soldiers' pitch of voice is a reminder that they became emancipated and rejected military authority. This emancipation resulted from the change of location or field that misrecognised the military identity of former soldiers. For former soldiers, this civilian's attitude was an affront to their identity. What is clear here is that the socialising of former soldiers and civilians reveals a kind of social anomy characterised by the lack of order that former soldiers were trying to correct by imposing a way of life. There is a sense of continuity with the past and that the past confers identity on individuals and groups allows us to see collective memory as one of the elementary forms of social life (Misztal, 2003). Language became "the social mechanisms guiding memories, bodily practices, habits and religious symbolic systems, is the vehicle for the past's influence over the present" (Misztal, 2003: 128). More importantly, a significant point to be raised from this quote is that the formation of the habitus depends on the length of people's exposure to a particular field. Put differently, the appropriation of habitus is dependable on time which is a feature of a privileged lifestyle (Thomson, 2008). When John insisted in the number of years spent in the army he wanted to emphasise how he was totally transformed to embody the army's spirit which even after leaving the army continued to guide his conduct. Even the day I went to interview him at his home, John qualified the polite way of knocking the door I adopted as civilian, saying to me,

> "I did not hear you knocking because you were knocking like a civilian; you must knock as a soldier".

Looking to know how knocking as a soldier should be different from the civilian's one, John replied,

> You should make the door shake when you knock to awaken the attention of people who are inside. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

Similarly, Jack, sub-lieutenant, 41-years old, acknowledged that he unknowingly adopted military method in his interaction with others and often received a lot of critics from people around him.

> To me this still applies; even my wife can tell you. She always blames me saying, "You think we are in military training here so that you shout at me; you think you and I have been in the army? Right, it is already in the blood those things, but you shout not to harm her or anybody because she is your wife. You can't do anything wrong to your wife, but it is already in the blood. Even my family, my friends and those who know that I am a soldier often blame me for that. (Jack interview, November 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

As these quotes show, soldiers tried to distinguish themselves from others by applying some methods of asserting power. More importantly, many of them did not see themselves as former soldiers; thus, the use of present when they referred to themselves as soldiers and not as former soldiers.

Lastly, during the interview with Bienga, a colonel of the ex-FAZ, who also invited me to his house, I observed the presence of many people. These were tenants staying in the same building with him and they periodically came for consultation, raising different issues such as the increase of bill of water and electricity, they also sought advice from him about how to lodge their complaints against rental and rate increases they viewed as exorbitant. Bienga often interrupted the interview and patiently listened and advised accordingly. Looking to know who those people were and why they came to seek advice from him as a tenant. He replied to me,

> These people are tenants like me, but they come to me for complaints because I am the trustee of this building. My task is to be the bridge between tenants and the body corporate managing the building. I deal with a range of issues from the cleaning of the building to tenants' complains about the way the body corporate is billing them. That's why you see them coming to me (Bienga interview, November 2015 – my translation from French to English).

To the question aiming to know if he was financially compensated for that trustee position, he answered that it was a benevolent job, but he enjoyed doing it. Many of the participants enjoyed being placed in the position to commend which reminded them about the role they played in the army. Their military memory and practices endured in the present not only in formal commemorative practices but also in fundamental processes of social life (Misztal, 2003).

7.3.2. The use of military symbols

Drawing from the participants' accounts and from my own observation, some Congolese soldiers brought their military attire with them to South Africa and continued to use it as symbol of prestige and power. Many of them regrettably reported that they were unable to bring their paraphernalia when they left the country for fear of being identified and arrested at the borders.

56-year Mike left the country since 1997 and came to South Africa in 2000. He was granted refugee status in 2006. His wife and children were still in the DRC at the time of this interview. He joined the army in 1981 and completed various training in different places such as Kitona, Kota-Koli (Equateur province) and the *Ecole de Formation des Officiers* (EFO), and was ranked lieutenant. During the second war of 1998 Mike was deployed to several warzones such as Kamina, Kalemie and Moba. The feeling of exclusion and the fear of being killed by pro-Kabila militia group accusing him of colluding with the enemies in Katanga compelled him to run away and seek asylum in South Africa. Employed in the security sector with a low pay, Mike struggled to cater for his family in DRC. Concerning the wearing of military uniform in South Africa, Mike had the following to say:

> Something of symbolic I am left with is my military uniform that I sometimes put on. That uniform is complete… I used to wear it complete, suit, beret, and boots); when I am going to home affairs there I go with my uniform. When they [home affairs officials] see me as soldier; they call me, 'soldier get in'. Training is there; military spirit is there. (Mike interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mixture of French and Lingala to English)

In a similar vein, Tshirawa explained the meaning of different berets he brought from Congo:

> …And my wife doesn't like me to put on red beret because as I am here I have three berets in the house; I brought them straight from Congo. I have red, black and green beret. So if I put on red beret, she [my wife] knows that this man is going to fight outside. If you see me wearing black beret, aaaah! I am normal; oh! someone owes me money, oh! someone has cheated me, oh! he has done something bad to me I will go to his place with red beret, so [it means] *bafwa-bafwa*[23]. (Tshirawa interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

[23] Popular expression from Kikongo but used in Lingala when violence takes place to mean we are ready come what may.

The case of Tshirawa suggests that military capital is informed by a variety of social experiences. We see in Tshirawa's explanation what Argenti and Schramm (2009) call *embodied memory historical*, a sense of continuities between past and present by juxtaposing one onto the other. What Tshirawa was experiencing is a destruction of his identity, a form of symbolic violence inflicted by those who provoked him. The red beret served "as a means of generating power… giving meaning to a violent and disruptive past across the generations" (Argenti and Schramm, 2009: 25). The use of violence symbolised by the red beret is a form of resistance against oppression and an expression of masculinity. This case suggests that former soldiers can sometimes use violence as a way to defend against external threats.

The use of military items was a strategy of legitimation and self–affirmation for former soldiers (Argenti and Schramm, 2009). In the DRC, the paraphernalia was used not only as instrument of power and domination, but also as an instrument of prestige. When former soldiers wore this uniform, they were entitled to some 'rights' such as taking the first seat in the taxi, overriding the queue or extorting people in the street. In South Africa, because these rights were lost, former soldiers strategically used their military apparel as instrument for knowledge and construction of world and as a means of communication. The loss of honour and prestige caused by moving to South Africa became a source of suffering for former soldiers. While the new field of South Africa compelled them to adjust their habitus, they used military apparel both as a way of coping with the adversity of the foreign country, and as a way of differentiating themselves from other members in the community. They wore their uniform and used other related items to remind the world that they were still important people who commanded fear and respect. More importantly, the use of military uniform when going to home affairs suggests the need for recognition. Former soldiers put on their military attire with the hope to be given precedence of service by home affairs officials. The uniform was also used as evidence for asylum claim. Through the wearing of military uniform in South Africa, former Congolese soldiers sought to achieve social capital. Military uniform became a reminder of the military memory which they used to cope with the adversity of the foreign country. Memory is essentially social, that is, located in institutions in the forms of rules, laws, standardized practices and records. Their memory discourse was used strategically to not merely explain the past but also to transform it into a reliable identity source for the present needs (Misztal, 2003).

7.3.3 Military items in the house

Armed forces are an important aspect of power possession. The loss of power resulting from the change of location caused anxiety to many former Congolese soldiers in South Africa. Thus, the need for individuals to develop other mechanisms aimed at expressing power in different ways. Pallaver (2011) argues that persuasion, seduction, and myth are the resources of *soft power*. Stiliou and Siotou (2007) contend that photos serve as the basic channels of communication in a transnational context, transferring information, images as well as ideologies and meanings. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over man from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one minds controls another (Paruk, 2014). Former soldiers from Congo also used to convince people about their military involvement by displaying photos they took in military fatigues. These photos pasted on the wall of their houses were also used as an expression of their mettle. John explained why he kept photos of dress uniform on the wall of his house:

> These photos remind me about a lot of things. I love the army; I am a soldier. And when you enter this house and see these photos immediately you understand the identity of the owner of the house. (John interview, July 2015 – My translation from a mix of French and Lingala to English)

Pictures were used not only for convincing people about their military background, but also as a way to deal with the adversity of the host country, as Olenga explained:

> What from the army allows me to resist in this country; if I look at my photos souvenirs; those photos of mine show you that this man was there [in the army] and still procure me with some strengths. (Olenga interview, August 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

What these quotes reveal is that these images exerted power which significantly played in the identity of former soldiers by procuring them some relief when they were overwhelmed by the challenges of South Africa. They were used as a way of coping with the challenges of the foreign land. Andén-Papadopoulos (2008) argues that the greater part of information photographs carry resides not within their manifest contents, but in the way, they communicate. The use of these images suggests an opportunity for the conceptualization of memory as transmitted not only through performability of rituals but also through habit and as a communicative memory, that is, the residues of the past in language, which is a kind of knowledge/communication (Misztal, 2003). The images displayed here spoke louder than the

reality facing the concerned individual and allowed them to shift from the marginal position to cultural centrality and canonicity (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2008). We see through these quotes the *objectification* and *institutionalization* of political capital (Bourdieu, 1991). As Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura (2014) explain, objectification is reified by the evidence of photographs of the leader with prominent political figures materializing [their] network, etc. Institutionalization is about getting titles that have an institutional value: being elected chair of an organization or an executive committee member, being appointed as a formal partner to an institution, winning in a competitive bid, etc.

7.3.4. "Mon colonel - Mon général – Mon major - Mon capitaine": The power of ranks

Former Congolese soldiers also enjoyed being identified according to their military ranks. Ranks resumed in their interactions and were used as a sign of respect and honour they sought to regain from the community. However, those ranks were sometimes not their reel ranks, but they had never corrected it, rather they enjoyed being identified as such.

Although Congolese ex-soldiers were no longer operational as military since they became refugees in South Africa, many people within the Congolese community were referring to them using some military ranks. *Mon colonel (my colonel)*, *Mon général* (my general) *Mon major* (my major) or *Mon capitaine (my captain)* are the ranks which they mainly used to identify former soldiers. Their stories of war, their use of military language, and their address of each other using their previous ranks were woven into their social interactions, engaging in soldiering through which military skills continued to be celebrated (Maringira and Núñez, 2015). For instance, in a social gathering in Yeoville, somebody came and struck a military hand salute to John and remained in that position until John uttered the word *repos!* (In French which can be translated as 'at ease' or 'rest'). Looking to know about the meaning of this gesture, John answered:

> If you see like this, consider that it is not an ordinary person. That man is a soldier and by paying such respect to me it is because he knows me and he knows who I am. (John interview, July 2015 – my translation from Lingala to English)

Again, this case shows the durability and the transfer of the military capital among former soldiers in Johannesburg. Military discipline is part of the training that soldiers underwent and can be prolonged even after they left the army in a different country. Although some of their military practices remained inert because of the incompatibility with the new environment,

they, however, perpetuated this habitus in their interactions with one another within the community. In the introduction of the interview that took place at his place, John preferred to be called colonel instead of Mr John:

> Dostin: Hello Mr… He interrupted me before I pronounced his name and requested that I should address him in this way:
>
> John: [Say] Hello colonel John.

Looking to know why he preferred the title of colonel to sir, John answered,

> I am soldier and that is my rank; it must be recognised because I am still in the army. I am here unwillingly because Kabila has chased me. (John interview, July 2015 – my translation from mixture of Lingala and French to English)

Another former soldier said that he was often referred to as commando and could not stop people to call him as such.

> I don't look to be called commando, but people themselves identify me as such. They call me *sokoro* (meaning soldier) and I accept it because that's how they know me. (Johnson interview, October 2015 – My translation from Lingala to English)

The ex-soldiers interviewed were introduced to me by those who knew them and were referred to as high-ranking military officers. Some were called colonel, others captains or lieutenants, etc. With the prolonged political crisis, the proliferation of armed groups and the challenge of having an integrated army, the question of soldiers' ranks have become difficult to manage in the DRC. When L.D.K came into power, all ranks were dissolved; soldiers whether from ex-FAZ or AFDL were all called *commandants* (commanders). Confusion reigned in the army and notions of army's discipline and order were almost compromised. Many former Congolese soldiers interviewed for this study were first part of the ex-FAZ where they had access to various ranks that they continued to claim even after leaving the army and the country. In the course of the interviews, I discovered that many used their seniority in the army to justify why they did not get involved in certain violent practices, admitting however that those practices existed, but it was mainly the business of lower-ranking soldiers.

Interestingly, Congolese community in South Africa has also ranked some ex-soldiers whom they knew from the DRC. One of the participants was referred to me as a former colonel of ex-FAZ. However, during the interview, he revealed that he never reached that ranking level although he went to the University and had an academic degree. He reported that he was given

the rank of colonel by the Congolese community because they were amazed about his interventions and contributions on military issues during some of their gatherings. Because they knew him as former soldiers and given the pertinence of his contributions, they assumed that he could be a senior officer in the Congolese army and started calling him colonel, and this rank remained as his official title within the Congolese community. While he acknowledged to me that he was not a colonel and that he left the Congolese army with the grade of captain, he never dismissed being identified as colonel in the Congolese meetings because being so called gave him power and earned him precedence wherever the Congolese community met.

> Those ranks until we reach the rank of colonel, these are people's inventions. Because of my attitude the way the see me; they say, 'this is a colonel or major' all that. But I am a captain. I can't say foolishness to say I don't know what. They [Congolese] are the ones who call me colonel why because of the meetings we had in their NGO, conferences they used to organise here. You know, if you intervene in army's matters they see how brilliant you are in defending the army and then they say, 'he is a colonel' they stick it on you once. It is a bit that, but I didn't reach the rank of colonel. (Loleko interview, August 2015 – my translation from mixture of Lingala and French to English)

What can be drawn from this quote is that when Loleko talks about his attitude and the way he is seen by people, he makes references to military capital which earns him recognition from the community in terms of rank. He found himself in a situation where he demonstrated something people did not know about. This brilliant demonstration won him honneur, prestige and recognition. The rank assigned to him by the people commensurate with the military knowledge he proved to possess. This rank is a form of social capital which distinguished him from other members of the community. The fomer soldiers who worked as security guards claimed that people came to discover their military identity through the way they used their skills in various occasions to perform duties. Taty, a former colonel, eloquently illustrated that being employed as a simple security guard in Hillbrow; he was struck to notice the lack of respect for the hierarchy in that company. There was no privacy for the owner of the company who could come and sit anywhere. Taty took the initiative to organise a particular seat and space for the head of the company. When the chief came, he was amazed at seeing the change made by Taty and sought to know where he got the idea. That is how Taty revealed his military background where he learned about the respect of authorities. He pointed that it was unacceptable to let the top manager mingle with all the other workers without an office where he could work quietly and even receive visitors. This sense of discipline and organisation

convinced the boss to appoint Taty as supervisor and then later on as the manager of the company. This is how he told his story.

> It is the end that justifies the means; for example, when I was in the security company, they identified me because of my sense of discipline and organisation. That's why I was promoted from a simple security guard to becoming manager of the company. In the security company, I was putting order. I looked and said the chief can't be like this; he must have his own space and a good chair. When the chief saw my attention towards him for things like this, he saw that I was tidy, organised and disciplined. Having learned that I had military background, he appointed me as supervisor first. When he saw that I was doing my work very well to the satisfaction of everyone, he promoted me as manager (Taty Interview, December 2015 – my translation from a mix of French and Lingala into English).

The reading of this quote is very instructive, showing how habitus transposed and became a relevant resource in the field of security guarding. This habitus became *military capital*, a distinguishing element, which former soldiers used in different contexts for different purposes. The first observation which other security guards in the company hardly made was how the top manager mingled with other staff members. This shows how the army attaches particular emphasis on the notion of *hierarchy and order*. In the army the authority is sacred and must be honoured. The security guard who came from the army was endowed with *discipline* (element of military capital that is durable and transposable) which was inculcated in him in the army and could apply it differently even after leaving the army. Apart from knowing how to handle firearms and deal with security issues (asset needed by security companies), Taty also knew how to respect seniors by giving them the place they deserved. This example shows that cultural capital was not completely lost. Taty here contributed to weaving military structures into the local structure of the security company. The fact of knowing that he was a former soldier earned him some *respect* and *recognition*. As a result, the military capital became productive of new capitals, particularly social and economic. Before being identified as former soldier, Taty was not object of the top manager's attention. Until the owner of the company learned, through Taty's conduct, that he was a former soldier, Taty gained some of the *prestige* he lost by leaving the army because of his military capital forming the scarce skills of which the company was in need. Taty mobilised the *habitus* to his advantage, i.e. the habitus was a *structuring structure* because Taty realised that there were some limitations in that context and for him to rise up the ladder he had to show certain *organisational qualities* (military capital). Having served in the army he had certain skills which he activated in the context of employment in the security sector in South Africa, which earned him recognition to gain some symbolic capital in terms of promotion.

The reading of this extract shows how Taty valued the idea of organisation and discipline. Firstly, in his relationship with the chief, he categorised himself as inferior within the organisation which is here the security company. This way of identifying himself compelled him to obey the superior by putting him in the first place, providing a specific seat and working space. This sense of initiative won him attention from the chief who valued his services by promoting him. Taty reported that his services in this position were appreciated not only by the chief, but also by his colleagues within the company. Being appreciated by the top manager and other staff members of the company provided Taty with moral satisfaction which contributed to the healing from the strained conditions of the foreign country. The respect of hierarchy, tidiness, the sense of discipline and order were far to be mere words and practiced in former soldiers' daily life even after departing from the army. In the migration setting, these qualities became an asset which offered them some survival opportunities. Put differently, these qualities are what I term military capital. Many other former soldiers who worked in the security companies stated that they remarkably distinguished themselves from others because of their previous military experience which they regarded as an indispensable foundation of their personality and positionality within the company. Some former Congolese soldiers used their army's skills to start their own businesses in South Africa. It was informally reported to me that there was a former soldier who used his military skills to start his own security company which offered jobs to others. The friend who reported this information to me indicated that the former soldier claimed that his experience in the Congolese army was insightful and instrumental in the way he succeeded to run his company. Attempts to meet this former soldier were unfortunately unsuccessful. Even though the need to meet this former soldier was unmet, this example, as many others, revealed the way military skills were used to benefit former Congolese soldiers in the context of South Africa where refugees and migrants struggled to access employment. The South African environment seemingly marked by a high crime rate opened the way to the proliferation of many security companies which were in need of people with military skills. These companies are also much militarised societies where hierarchy and order are valued.

Some former soldiers were too critical especially with regard to the South African police which, according to them, were far better equipped than those in the Congo, but they were inefficient. Many reported that when they were stopped and required to brandish their permits by police officers, they thought a lot about their military life in the Congo where their role in the military meant their behaviour was highly constrained – not free but they certainly were not easily called

out for bad behaviour. However, others indicated that sometimes they changed their attitudes in addressing the police, which made South African police directly identify them as having been involved in the security system of their home country. In any case, the participants, like Makemba, expressed the wish of being soldiers in South Africa to use their skills in the fight against crime in Johannesburg.

> No, it [migration] does not make me forget; it has even amplified that [military] spirit further. Given the killings, the way crimes are perpetrated here in South Africa, and I always told myself if I could be a soldier here, I would help this country [South Africa]. I could still contribute to the security system of this country here. Given the murders, crimes and rapes committed against children, men, you see. I've always said it would be good to remain soldier so I could help South Africa. (Makemba interview, December 2015 – My translation from mixture of French and Lingala to English)

In their everyday lives as refugees in South Africa former Congolese soldiers used their military knowledge and identity to serve different purposes. While in some settings such as in social encounters the military discourse was mostly rejected because of the violent situation of the country where soldiers have been accused of being responsible of massive human rights violations, in other places, particularly in political encounters former soldiers were celebrated. This is particularly manifested in some Congolese leaders' expressions calling for the need to 'liberate' the Congo through popular uprising. In this kind of gatherings, former Congolese soldiers were warmly welcomed because people sought to learn from them different strategies to be used for the success of such plans. This study presents in the following explanations, the result from the observation of a social gathering consecrated to the examination of the political crisis in DRC held in Johannesburg.

The organisers of the meeting were convinced that organising elections with the current situation of the DRC was unimaginable and unrealistic. Claiming that the country was 'occupied', they advocated that popular uprising was the only recommended option for the liberation of the Congo from strangers' ascendancy. The popular uprisings in democratic countries have mostly taken the form of peaceful protests. Non-violent methods such as demonstrations, marches, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, occupations, and civil disobedience have been used to force for policy reforms, or regime change. The non-violent character legitimises people's actions and renders any state violence more likely to backfire, increasing sympathy for protesters and further de-legitimisation of the leaders already weakened by mass protests (Bartkowski, 2016). But in those people's understanding popular uprising meant the use of weapons to wage war. Some of the former soldiers who participated in my study attended this

meeting. The most interesting part was the way they intervened in that get-together. First, they introduced themselves as soldiers of Mobutu's army while they also worked with the army of the current regime before fleeing the DRC. This supports the words of Gardner, Pickett and Brewer (2000) that the need to belong, activated by recent social experience, would similarly serve to bias memory for relevant information. This differentiation is important to highlight because they wanted to depart from the current regime and show that they belonged to the side of the people they wanted to liberate. Secondly, it was a way of showing that the current regime did not have a good army; the army that was allegedly known as powerful in the DRC was Mobutu's. This introduction was a way of drawing people' attention to them as in this context the proponents of popular uprising were aware that the army had a key role to play for the success of this strategy. One of the participants, although not part of my study, introduced himself as a former '*Mai-Mai*[24]' militiaman, indicating that they played a key role to secure L.D.K's power, but when they renounced the current government many people in the country who condemned them came now to understand the cause of their resentment against this government. He further indicated that since the country was under 'foreign control', they (*Mai-Mai militia*) were ready for fight, but they needed a leader to equip them. Stressing the importance of leadership in his military training, a former soldier who participated in this study recounted that they were told, as leaders of troops, to avoid saying 'go', but to always say, 'follow me'. Having said this, he opened his bag full of papers and said that it was the draft of the book he was writing on Congolese mass-based popular uprisings using the example of French revolution. This was the same participant who previously reported that he used reading and writing as methods to cope with his ongoing strain in South Africa. After indicating how the awareness of ordinary people was raised with particular emphasis on liberty, equality and fraternity, he insisted that popular uprising was unsuccessful without a military arm because as in the case of France, armed insurgence against authoritarian regimes was regarded as the most sacred and the most crucial of duties. The emphasis of the importance of military in the popular uprising is an indication of how former Congolese soldiers sought to gain space within the Congolese community by convincing people about their crucial role in the struggle for the freedom of the DRC. Although most of them agreed to use the term 'popular uprising', but the

[24] Mai-Mai community-based militia groups including warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads, and politically motivated resistance fighters who are active particularly in the eastern of the DRC claiming to defend their local territory against other enemies, particularly the Rwandan forces and Congolese rebel groups backed by Rwanda and Uganda. These militia groups were actively involved in different wars particularly in support of LD Kabila. However, many of them turned against the current regime led by Joseph Kabila and found refuge in different neighboring countries.

way they conceived the role of former soldiers in its success showed that it was less about civil disobedience, civil resistance, and nonviolent resistance, but more about armed resistance.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have highlighted the military identity that came into play in the everyday life of former Congolese soldiers in the contemporary South Africa. In the DRC, soldiers had various ways of expressing power. The DRC environment was appropriate for the affirmation of this power. The chapter also showed what was left in the behaviour of these soldiers after they crossed the border and found themselves in South Africa with contrasting identities of refugees, exiles or civilians. After exploring soldiers' perceptions of South Africa, the chapter presented a variety of methods on which former soldiers built to express their military knowledge, identity and power, highlighting that these methods were nonaggressive and were used depending on the contexts in which they were located. This chapter pointed out how former Congolese soldiers made use of their military capital to renegotiate and assert power/authority/soldiering in order to fit with various realities of the migratory contexts. As such, this chapter highlights the important of context or field in the reconstruction of the post military identity/ life of former soldiers.

Chapter eight: Conclusion

At the end of this thesis, my primary task is to present the main arguments that formed its backbone before showing some methodological and theoretical contributions, as well as suggesting ways for future research. Throughout this thesis, the aim was to explore the lived experiences of former Congolese soldiers who have crossed the borders to live as refugees in South Africa. The main question that animated the discussion was how ex-soldiers remembered their involvement in the Congolese national defence forces and what the influence of the new context of migration was in the re-construction of their identity. To answer this question, I structured this thesis into eight chapters. The first, an introductory chapter, laid the foundation of this study by presenting the research question, the rationale for the study, structure of this thesis and a brief methodological overview. The chapter also consisted of presenting the security situation of the DRC by reviewing issues related to the war, armed groups and the challenges of forming an integrated national defence system.

The second chapter dealt with the theoretical framework adopted for this study. I used the theory of field and habitus developed by Bourdieu in justifying its relevance for this study. Various related concepts such as memory, symbolic violence, gender and postcolonial were also discussed. A particular emphasis of this chapter was on how Bourdieu's analytical concepts and other related theories of memories could be expanded to include the migratory context in understanding military identity of former soldiers.

In the third chapter, I described the methodology used for data collection with particular emphasis on the selection criteria of the participants, the relevance of the method, the interview mode and the data analysis techniques. Turning to chapters in relation to the presentation of data, I first, in chapter four, explored the different narratives that emerged from the participants' accounts related to the choice of the military profession, showing that for most of the participants, the army came as the last option. Many dreamed about other professions different from the military, but various circumstances of life at mainly economic, political and social levels compelled them to end up in the army.

Chapter Five emphasized how candidates who joined the military in various circumstances were socialised to better meet the military's missions. The goal was to instil in the candidates the military spirit. This spirit aimed at embodying masculinity was characterised by aggressiveness and violence. Socialisation was also about educating the military to absorb nationalistic values leading to the consecration of their bodies to the nation, *tokowa po ya ekolo*.

To stand out from civilian life, servicemen needed to be trained to brand civilians negatively (*basenzi*) and to vilify their comrades who did not respond to military ideology as civilians.

Chapter six dealt with memories of war and violence. Based on Halbwachs' theory of memory and Bourdieu's toolkit of analysis, this chapter aimed to examine soldiers' propensity to use violence, the rituals of dedication and protection in which they engaged. The chapter also showed that the army was a purely masculine institution and that the definition of masculinity or femininity was less about the genetic differences between men and women, but more about the ability to live up to the squadron's requirements in the fulfilment of duties.

As the aim of this study was also to explore the living experiences of former soldiers from their entry into the army to their exit, much focus was put on their post military lives in South Africa. The core of chapter seven was to explore the kind of life former soldiers lived in this foreign country after departing from both, the army and the Congo. Importantly, this chapter sought to understand the values, ideology or behaviour of the army that continued to characterise these former soldiers, highlighting the change that happened in their lives and the way they adjusted to civilian life in a country other than their own. In this chapter, I also explored different challenges imposed on them by the new environment and the way they dealt with those challenges. Data collected for finding chapters were analysed using the theory of memory developed by Halbwachs (1992), Cole (2001) and Argenti and Schramm, 2009) and more particularly using the concepts of habitus, capital, field and practices (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu, 1992, etc.) and insisted on the influence of the new milieu on military identity and on how the soldiering characteristics were strategically used by these former servicemen to navigate the foreign land. Finally, chapter eight was devoted first to the recapitulation of all the findings of this thesis before emphasising on its contribution at the methodological and theoretical levels. The chapter concluded with some suggestions for further studies. With this in mind, let us examine the first point devoted to the summary of the findings of this thesis.

8.1. Overview of the findings

Throughout this study, I have followed a linear style of research to look at the phases of former soldiers' life that came across as important in their narratives: 1) the recruitment 2) the making of a soldier 3) the act of war 4) the post war remaking of themselves. The analysis of data collected among former soldiers led to various findings. The first is that habitus is informed by a variety of social experiences. Soldiers have navigated different fields and accumulated various forms of habitus before joining the army. These accumulated *habituses* to some extent had an impact on the way they acted in some situations. This brings me back to the metaphorical expression that I used that these former soldiers were 'fish taken out of water'. Yet, while it is true that they have been like 'fish taken out of water', meaning out of the army, but also before joining the army they were like fish taken out of some environment that to some extent impacted their lives. Findings of this study reveal that some former soldiers reported that whenever they were in company of other people they unknowingly acted like if they were in the army until their fellows reminded them that they were no longer in the army. In their argument, they said the military habitus was already in their blood after spending two or three decades in the army.

The study's aim was to examine how former soldiers who used to operate in a particular environment behaved in a different context after they left that environment. I used the DRC as a particular environment where these former soldiers operated and tried to compare soldiers in the DRC knowing very well what kind of privileges they enjoyed and how they claimed their identity particularly in their interactions with civilians. Important to stress is that what I termed violence is different from criminality. This violence was symbolic; it was an expression of their masculinity especially when they were interacting with civilians, former soldiers wanted their presence to be remarkable. They wanted people to know that they were soldiers and to value their identity which they associated with respect and consideration from civilians. This is what I experienced when I started my field work. When I asked my friend, who was running a cybercafé to connect me to some former soldiers who were part of his social networks to participate in my study, he promptly indicated that he knew many of them. Holding my hand, he took me out; he started pointing finger to former Congolese soldiers who were working outside saying, this one is an ex-soldier; this one also is an ex-soldier. While I was very concerned by ethical obligation of not disclosing former soldiers in that way for security purpose, those who were pointed out violently reacted, shouting and asking why he was

showing them to me. Although he introduced me to them and explained that I was a student at Wits University writing my thesis on former soldiers from the DRC in South Africa, they were unsatisfied and questioned me about why I wanted to research on former Congolese soldiers in South Africa. Their reaction was the result of their military capital which in the context of the DRC gave power to soldiers to intimide rather than being intimidated; it was the expression of their masculinity which became inert or indolent in the foreign country, but could also be used anytime as a way to resist domination. This is one aspect of the conservative values former soldiers had ingrained that could not be compromised by the fact of migrating.

My effort was to explore what part of their military capital has remained engraved after they left the army. I borrowed the concept of capital from Bourdieu because I wanted to see how this military capital was instrumental to former soldiers in navigating the new field. When I talk about military capital I do not only mean it to be only material or palpable. I tried to see intrinsic qualities that these ex-soldiers learnt from the army and how they kept on displaying these values in their everyday life in the foreign country, South Africa. What I term military capital is what Halbwachs (1992), Cole (2001) and Argenti and Schramm (2009) call memory. This memory is not in terms of *lieux of memoire*, but something that has remained inscribed and characterised former soldiers as particular people in particular situations. They used this military knowledge as asset to manoeuvre their integration in South Africa; they used these memories in their effort to rework even on their images in building new social networks. This is what I called military capital which is part of the cultural capital. Military capital, as used in this study, means skills that soldiers acquired from the field of the army during their military training which have remained adorned in their attitudes/behaviour/practices and which enabled them to manoeuvre the new field of South Africa. I have presented a number of advantages that former Congolese soldiers enjoyed when they were in the DRC. This suggested how the military became attractive through privileges as well as how soldiers were set apart from and privileged over civilians, creating military identity as desirable. It is important to stress that apart from economic advantages, soldiers are more concerned by symbolic capital in terms of recognition and honour. More importantly, soldiers in the DRC have inculcated the habitus to political violence (domination) (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). However, the South African context denied them these privileges because their military identity was spatially constructed.

The aim of my study was to gain insights into a system of actions or operations that former soldiers undertake in order to legitimise themselves and sustain their integration in the host setting.

The lessons to learn from this study are many:

First, this military capital and its persistence is a result of the training that soldiers went through for a good part of their lives. Secondly, the new environment has a significant impact on the identity of the former soldiers. Since former soldiers learnt to be disciplined; discipline became one of the elements of the military capital that they used to distinguish themselves from others (mainly civilians) in the community. Military notions of discipline compelled them to control their actions, words and anything they wanted to do whenever they were in contact with other people in the community. In this context, former soldiers' efforts consisted of refashioning their identity or image in order to easily integrate the new community. This discipline was not about leading them to perpetrate violence. More importantly, the new context influenced their identity in the sense that it deprived them of what they enjoyed in their home country in the form of military rights because no one in the foreign country recognised their previous military identity. Thus, an important finding of this study is that former soldiers viewed themselves in South Africa as *spaceless*. The word was used to show the disconnection between the military identity and the new environment. This means that military power is identified and acknowledged as being context-specific. In the South African context, the identity of former Congolese solders is spatially limited. In this sense, former soldiers have lost all the rights and privileged they hitherto enjoyed in the DRC. More importantly, the new context of migration limits their power to coerce, threaten, intimidate, pressurise, or display their military authority. The loss of this identity due to the change of space is experienced by former soldiers as another form of violence. They saw themselves as victims because of their inability to behave as soldiers in the new environment. In this new environment, discipline also led them to understand that they were no longer in the DRC and to refrain from taking part in violence by understanding that this country's laws condemns the abuse of power. Refraining from violence did not mean that their military identity was completely lost, but it became inert or indolent because the new environment was not conducive for it to be used as it was previously exercised in the DRC. There is a discrepancy between the previous identity and the new environment. Because former soldiers could not express or claim that identity in the foreign land, it became *hysteresised*. This study shows that the general tendency of characterising and painting former soldiers as people who are prone to the post-military violence in some societies is not always

a truism. Living under difficult conditions, these former soldiers became aware of the loss of their privileges due to the change of location and demonstrated their ability to compare their situation in their country of origin and their current situation in the foreign country. They made conscious decisions to rebuild their image to integrate the new setting. The use of their military capital was informed by the realities of their everyday struggle for access to other forms of essential capital for their survival in South Africa.

Another important part of the argument of this study concerns the meaning of pain and grief and the way of dealing with it. The pain these former soldiers experienced was related to the change of environment. What they suffered was not the result of their violent deeds during their military activities in the DRC because, as state's agents, they considered all the violent actions they committed as part of the fulfilment of their duties. For instance, many former soldiers explained how they were given orders to kill civilians who were protesting against M.S.S. and to arrest political leaders of the opposition parties and could not be affected by these violent acts. This is what they were inculcated as ideology and because violence was perpetrated within the army, it was done following the order from the senior officers and was not something that could cause them to experience trauma. However, the trauma experienced is the result of the disappointment they received from the country that hired them to serve in its army. Many indicated that the country for which they dedicated their lives to serve had disappointed them and when they thought about it they became affected. They also indicated that political unrest of the DRC pushed them out of the army and the country because their lives were in danger and found themselves in a foreign country where they lost the freedoms associated with their 'prestigious' military identity. For instance, some said that South Africa had drawn them back because when they were in the DRC they always had the equivalence of the salaries of five generals. Listening to them speaking they pointed out that in the DRC the influence of a soldier was less about their ranking, rather it was a matter of having strong umbrella at the top. Put differently, former soldiers referred to the importance of social capital within the army. The social networks with powerful people became an asset that opened the way to accessing other forms of advantages. Their statement echoed what I had often heard the military say in their informal discussions when I was in the Congo. They often argued that what mattered in the Congolese army was not the rank, but rather the function. In other words, a non-commissioned officer placed in a strategic location became economically more powerful than a senior officer who only dealt with papers in an office. A strong social capital was needed for former soldiers to be deployed to advantageous positions such as airport, mining sector or customs where

money flew at any time. It is this social capital that they referred to as an 'umbrella'. The umbrella here refers to a 'strong man', a higher-raking official who can at the same time offer them advantageous positions and also protect them as long as they remain in those positions.

Former soldiers' pain was exacerbated by the kind of humiliation they sometimes experienced in their interaction with some people in their community. Interestingly, military training, experience and spirit became a resource which helped them to cope with various forms of trauma experienced in South Africa. Trauma resulting from the killing and other forms of violence perpetrated in the army was only experienced by those who were recruited as child soldiers because they were unaware of their actions. James recounted that he became sleepless whenever he thought about the killing, they perpetrated and many of his colleagues became mentally unstable because of the heavy weapons they used without undergoing appropriate training. However, for those soldiers who were recruited as adults there was no regret about the violent actions perpetrated because they knew the purpose of what they did as part of their duties.

The military capital became a way of dealing with adversity of the foreign land because these former soldiers reported that military training was a hard experience. Findings of this study suggest that soldiers were sometimes put under pressure in some circumstances. The aim was to force them to efficiently demonstrate their bravery in performing their duties. Something interesting about the fostering of military identity is that the area where this training was done was surrounded by resources like cemetery, river, trees which bear symbolic meanings. These resources were used as means to fulfil specific purposes of the training because under normal circumstances people cannot go to spend time in the cemetery, particularly in some African beliefs, cemetery represents a sacred world for dead people; an area that is feared. Those who spent time there were believed to have been hardened to overcome fear and symbolically defeat death.

As some of them recounted they were required to cross a river full of crocodiles using a rope tied between two trees on both sides of the river with the risk of easily becoming crocodiles' prey when fallen into the river. Others narrated how they trekked thousand miles for many days without eating; some could eat the leaves of trees without knowing whether they were poisonous or not. These hard experiences had refashioned them and were recalled as a way to resist the adversity of the foreign land they were exposed to. While they acknowledged that the realities of the foreign land were very challenging, they considered that their military

experiences enabled them never to succumb to despondency. This study has shown that the military spirit which is termed as military capital was a key element that continued to guide former soldiers living as refugees in South Africa.

Findings of this study reveal that even after embracing religious mores many former soldiers still relied on their military capital as a way to 'correct' some of the religious aspects they found as 'unfitting'. More importantly, those who were deeply involved in religion became critical of some of the principles of soldiering. Religion became a means through which former soldiers strived to rebuild their image and get access to other forms of capital, particularly symbolical and social capitals. The contestation of military principles through religious lens is a healing strategy these former soldiers used to promote the new beliefs in order to be in harmony with the religious community in which they lived.

8.2. Methodological contributions

This study employed ethnography, particularly in-depth interviews and participant observation over a period of seven months. My intention was to decipher in former soldiers' actions during their interactions with other people in the community what had changed in their attitudes and what had remained engraved and how they used their skills in specific environment and what motivated the use of those skills. For this purpose, I decided not only to limit my investigations in interviewing them, but also to go to some of the social gatherings with them in order to depict what was difficult to identify in the face-to-face interactions. This approach allowed me to have an understanding of the dynamics of former soldiers, an in-depth understanding of the meanings behind various representations of their identity. This study is in line with literature which indicated that researching on perpetrators of violence is convoluted (for example, Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003; Skinner, Hester, and Malos, 2013). One of the important contributions of this thesis is about researching former soldiers who are on the move by paying attention to the researcher's position particularly after listening to some painful stories. The study's contribution highlights the ethical challenges of conducting fieldwork among people labelled as perpetrators of violence, suggesting the ethical challenges were negotiated in migration context.

Taking a reflexive social position (see Alldred and Burman, 2005; Ting, 1998), I indicated my own influence or my position in the research process as well as my relation with participants. I reinforced the point made by Graue and Walsh (1998) that researchers should pay great

attention to building relationships with research participants and maintaining a positive attitude towards them in order not to allow attitudinal baggage to disturb the data collection, amongst other factors. One of the bigger challenges throughout data collection was the dilemma of guaranteeing my participants' safety and collecting important data at the same time, particularly when participants gave accounts of some ominous stories of their military involvement. These terrifying stories not only could put their lives in danger, but also negatively affected my own perception of them. Listening to these distressing or traumatic stories was so disturbing that I was sometimes required to undergo some informal counselling in order to recover and go back to the field. Herein I want to stress that one of the discoveries I made is that in most of the cases when we conduct research the ethical requirement consists more of guaranteeing participants' protection and not the one of the researchers. My own experience of doing research among former soldiers shows that "researchers too need to recognise the potential effect that the research may have upon themselves and should formally consider occupational health and safety issues when designing research projects" (Fahie, 2014: 26).

An incident occurred and could easily turn into physical violence because a friend who wanted to assist me locate former Congolese soldiers from his social networks started pointing finger to those who were working next to his internet café. The two men who he alluded to reacted violently and wanted to attack me. They wanted to know who I was and why I was looking for Congolese soldiers in South Africa. Seeing how the men became angry, the friend stood between them and me and began to calm them by explaining that I was a student and that I was doing research on the Congolese soldiers in South Africa. This explanation of the friend had calmed them a little but they were not ready to receive me. Their reaction to the way the friend pointed at them was a form of defence but could easily lead to bodily harm of which I would be the victim. It became difficult then to persuade them to participate in the study because of the fear that inhabited me. Thus, the study contributes to the growing literature on reflexive field methods and data collection amongst former soldiers in migration setting.

This study also contributes to the growing discourse on insider and outsider positions in research (see for example, Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Kusow, 2003). As a civilian researching on former soldiers I was sometimes treated as an outsider. But as a Congolese citizen who came from the same environment and spoke the same local languages as participants I was considered as an insider and this was advantageous in terms of access to participants. For instance, when former soldiers denigrated civilians (*basenzi*), they often stared at me, which

made me feel diminished because I felt like they were talking about me as a civilian. In this context, they had power to control the discussion. Some of them laughed, which convinced me that they were indirectly counting me as a *Musenzi*. When I went to interview John, he noticed from the beginning that I was a civilian by the polite way I used to knock the door. In a similar vein, another way of expressing power was that from the beginning of the interviews, some wanted to define the power relations by showing me how I should call them. They rejected being called *Monsieur*, preferring to be identified by their ranks (Lieutenant, captain, colonel, etc.).

Through active engagement in reflexivity (Berger, 2013), I showed the difficulties of doing research as an insider and outsider, researcher and human being, as well as an adult in a different context. I showed how issues of power relations between the researcher (civilian) and participants (former soldiers) were fluid, complex and could be negotiated. Sometimes the image of soldiers being superior to civilian was used by participants to take over the process of the interview. Sometimes, they expected me as a researcher to know more than them. In some occasion they took me as one of them and expected me to easily understand their military jargon.

The study has also highlighted the importance of financial compensation in exchange with data. As I indicated in the methodology chapter, this study dealt with former soldiers who were not reluctant to require financial benefit before partaking in the interview. While compensating participants is often discouraged in social sciences, the reward took the form of transport and airtime to encourage their participation in the study. But one participant attempting to prolong the relationship between him and myself wanted to take me for granted. Because of his influence in the community I relied on him to get connected to other former soldiers. Since he required transport and airtime for himself, he conditioned calling other former soldiers for me by providing him with airtime and almost took me as a provider. He regularly called me to top up his phone with airtime pretending to call potential participants for me, but in reality, it was for his own benefit. The way he did it showed a form of exerting power in his relationship with me. He knew very well that I was in desperate need of people to interview and that I believed in his capacity to convince as many former soldiers as possible to participate in my study. In this relationship, this participant subjected me to docility and malleability by obliging me to pay before he could gather people for me. This correlates with Fahie's argument that "power fluctuates between the two parties; both try to steer the other" (Fahie, 2014: 27). When the

situation became unbearable for me, I finally decided to politely put an end to the relationship by no longer asking him this kind of help and relied on other sources.

Lastly, as I previously highlighted, academic research on the perpetrators of violence is an understudied area in the wide gamut of scholarship on violence. This study provides empirical evidence that indicates that a comprehensive and integrated approach to the study of violence requires incorporating the views or perceptions of the perpetrators of violence. The findings of this study suggest that violence is multifaceted and socially constructed. Therefore, this study challenges the Eurocentric understanding of violence by suggesting that the definition of violence is informed by context and the principles of the social group to which people identify themselves as members. My study offers a different approach to understanding violence, with a particular focus on former soldiers viewed as perpetrators, showing a discrepancy between what is perceived as violence and how it is understood when viewed through the lens of the beliefs and norms of the assumed perpetrators. The customs and traditions promoted in the army contribute to both the perpetration and toleration of military violence against civilians and the enemy. These beliefs are informed by the military conception of a good soldier. Thus, this study extrapolates the discussion on war and violence with a particular focus on the context in which they occur. More importantly, this study argues that excluding perpetrators from the studies of violence limits the exploration of the circuit perpetrator – victims of violence tradition. Therefore, I propose the study of violence through what I term the 'circuit of perpetrators'. This means incorporating the views of perpetrators in the study of violence. This is because while soldiers are perpetrating violence on civilians and the enemy, the soldiers can also view themselves victims of violence. My study reveals that many soldiers, therefore, face double jeopardy in terms of the influence of these pernicious behaviours on the development of military masculinities.

8.3. Theoretical contributions

Bourdieu (1986) identifies three kinds of *cultural capital*: *embodied*, *objectified* and *institutional*. While *embodied* refers to the state of mind, *objectified* is the product of inculcation and assimilation, requiring investment of time (Bourdieu, 1986). However, the findings of this study suggest that *embodied* and *objectified* forms of capital are acquired in the institution called the army. The cultural space is instrumental in people's arousal of desire of *cultural property*. Herein, I conceptualise military capital as an additional concept to

Bourdieu's concept of capital. In this study, I conceptualised military capital as a specific professional value that provides former soldiers with the requisite capacity to navigate the South African context. Herein, military capital becomes a resource that former soldiers draw upon to access other resources. This military capital was acquired through their acculturation into the military field in the DRC. The military capital accumulated comprises of several assets:

Social capital: Bourdieu has defined social capital as a source of power. In this particular case, social capital is all that takes place at the position. Many factors can contribute to the acquisition of social capital such as time spent in the army, the different barracks to which they were housed, the military schools attended, various promotions and functions and ethnicity. Social capital provides status and power. A practical illustration of social capital is called in the Congolese jargon '*umbrella*'. An umbrella is a high-profile politically influential cadre who can position them in very advantageous locations and protect them as long as they lived there. On the other hand, the military personnel placed in a strategic place must share the profits which result from this function with the influential personality that placed them there. Failure to comply with this principle could result in losing the position. This fits into the Congolese logic popularly recognised as *leyisa mpunda, mpunda aleyisa yo* (literally translated as feed the horse for the horse to feed you in return). Thus, the Congolese soldiers reported that in the Congolese army the ranks count less than the function because a high-ranking officer without function could be afraid of a lower-ranking officer with a very powerful *umbrella* that was very instrumental even in terms of promotion.

Cultural capital: cultural capital is made up of knowledge acquired in the army which gives soldiers the edge in contexts different from their own. This knowledge is evinced in the diplomas obtained, the military academies attended, the type of weapons they were able to handle, the ranks they reached, and more importantly by what they are able to do when faced with adversity. In his theory of learning Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues that in all learning, the '*how*' is extremely superior to '*what*', that is, to the actual, real content of learning. The 'how' is the key to the liberation of the subject at the same time as the privileged tool for the conquest of subsequent knowledge (Mvogo, 1990 – my translation from French to English). An important element of the cultural capital is discipline because the army is a place of obedience, order and structure. Discipline in the army can be understood through reference to the

obedience of the authority, teambuilding, execution of orders and the need to successfully achieve the task required.

Economic Capital: Economic capital consists of wages and access to other benefits which make soldiers powerful. It is known that the Congolese army is an institution of government that provides poor remuneration for its members. There are instances when soldiers have spent several months working without salaries. Sometimes money released for the payment of soldiers is diverted by senior officers. Faced with this disastrous situation, soldiers developed preying practices. These predatory functions consist not only of dispossessing civilians labelled as "fields of soldiers" of their belongings, but also of misusing the financial and material resources of the army. These misappropriations do not only concern the lowest-ranking soldiers; even the senior officers are implicated. These unfair and illegal practices are often justified by the popular slogan in the Congo: "*Qui travaille à l'hôtel mange à l'hôtel*" (who works at the hotel eats at the hotel). Herein, I must emphasize the importance of the *umbrella* in the case of the establishment of mecanisms to control and repress the offenders. Often soldiers with very strong *umbrellas* are not worried, which promotes impunity within the Congolese army.

The Congolese military field created the symbols carrying violence in the sense that:

- The personality of the individuals who belong to the army had been dispossessed in order to belong to that institution (Goffman, 1961). Membership in the army creates a double facet: first of all, being in the army means suffering symbolic violence and being in the army also produces a symbolic violence towards the outsider which is either the civilian population or the soldiers themselves. This symbolic violence is enforced through the "incorporation of social hierarchies and structures of domination into the minds and bodies of the dominated in the form of durable dispositions, with the result that such social structures appear natural and immutable" (Von Holdt, 2013: 115). Being in the military field allows soldiers to use both, physical and symbolic violence in order to establish social order. Military capital here is the sum of the various capitals (social, cultural and economic) that soldiers had accumulated in the military field.

- However, *military capital* in the foreign environment is mediated by the context in which it is applied. When soldiers leave their military field to find themselves in a new environment this military capital cannot be fully exercised as it used to be in an appropriate field. The manner in which a soldier leaving the field suffers the loss of status because he is in a post-military

field is another form of violence. So, ex-soldiers in South Africa suffer the violence of having lost what allowed them to exert this symbolic violence towards others. In South Africa, it turns out that there is a disjunction between the different capitals that built their military capital. Symbolic violence is justified by the fact that capital accumulated in a well-defined field becomes sometimes incoherent.

Bourdieu (2002) supports that a new environment can present specific properties which can be specific to a particular field. Bourdieu further argues that the structure of the field is a state of the balance of power between the agents or institutions engaged in the struggle or the distribution of the specific capital which, accumulated during the previous struggles, orients the subsequent strategies (Bourdieu, 2002 – my translation from French into English). Building on this, I argue that the change of location does not make military capital completely inactive. There are some situations where former soldiers can still capitalise on this important resource in the migration setting. On arrival in South Africa, a country marked by "high levels of violent crime, sexual violence, intimate partner violence and collective violence, as well as high levels of police violence" (Von Holdt, 2013: 113), former soldiers strategically use their military capital to navigate the new environment.

Military capital was saliently *objectified* in professional areas, particularly in security sector. The 'end justifies the means' is more significant in this context. The case of Taty taking the opportunity to put order and discipline by organising a specific space and chair for his boss in a security company is a good illustration. Impressed by this kind of organisation, when the boss wanted to know where he learned about it, Taty disclosed his military background where he was taught the respect of authority and the importance of order and hierarchy in an institution. Taty was not afraid to mention the army because he found himself in a security company where military skills were more relevant. His sense of order and discipline won him more social capital.

M*ilitary capital* was also *objectified* in the use of *paraphernalia* through which former soldiers sought *honour* and *recognition*. For instance, wearing uniform at Home Affairs was a way of seeking some *recognition* or *taking precedence* over others. It was also used as evidence for an appropriate decision determining the recognition of the bearer as refugee in South Africa. Knowing how difficult it is to be helped at the Department of Home Affairs, former soldiers put on their uniform with the hope to be acknowledged in their identity and given priority of service.

Therefore, the use of Bourdieu's theory in this study is justified by the fact that it allows us identify the continuities/ discontinuities of military capital in the behaviour of former soldiers in the city of Johannesburg. There are instances where they rely on military capital, but in some context, they refrain to use it (in this case, military capital becomes useless and costly). As such, migration shows how military capital loses its value as it no longer allows access to other capitals and how former soldiers renegotiate, recapitalise and reinvest it.

8.4. Research challenges

Several problems arose during data collection and analysis. The most serious of these was the failure by many participants to respond to the appointments made telephonically, which led to the abandonment of many appointments. Out of 30 appointments made, only twenty-one successfully responded. This was a great disappointment because it eliminated the possibility of reaching the targeted number and was also an indication about the difficulty of setting interviews with ‘perpetrators’ of violence. In line with this, there was also the security concern of the researcher when potential participants who were mainly unknown to the researcher often changed the meeting place abruptly. As outlined in the methodology chapter, many participants were chosen using snowballing. While a great number of participants consented to be recorded others categorically resisted the recording bringing security reasons. This compelled me to write down all their accounts. Writing down when someone was speaking presented two challenges: difficult to faithfully capture their accounts in their own words and the interview became lengthy. As a result, sometimes, the interviewees became tired of answering questions or demanded to stop the interview because they wanted to respond to other commitments. I also could get tired and missed important parts of the interviewee’s accounts.

A second problem concerned security of participants. One of the ethical requirements was that interviews should take place in quiet corners of public spaces to protect participants as well as the researcher. There were, however, a number of participants who required to be interviewed at their workplaces. During the interaction, they raised some sensitive topics which sometimes garnered the attention of people around. For ethical concerns, I was forced to stop the interview in order to protect participants. This abrupt end of the interview caused me to miss interesting accounts which could follow should the interview be conducted in a ‘secured’ space.

The third problem was the difficulty to follow up on some cases. During the time I was analysing data, there were some details which I missed in the first interview and which I wanted

to get from the participants. Unfortunately, many have changed their phone numbers; others refused to provide additional information, invoking security reasons. In order for data to remain ethically sound, these shortcomings remain unchanged in the analysis of my data.

Another limitation is the lack of opportunities for observation. In my proposal I indicated that one of the best places to do the observation was the place nicknamed *Tungulu* in Yeoville Recreation Centre where many Congolese, soldiers and civilians, used to gather to discuss the current political situation in the Congo. Unfortunately, given the high political tensions which could result in clashes between Congolese in the area, the South African government banned all forms of gatherings at *Tungulu* place. As a result, there were few opportunities in which I could do the observation of former Congolese soldiers.

Another challenge to illustrate is former soldiers' violence against a community leader who was supposed to connect me to them. This violence discouraged him to help me in this regard. I was also robbed. The voice recorder I borrowed from an institution was stolen in the car and I was asked to replace it with a new one. In addition, many pictures of some military items taken during the field work (which I wanted to use as appendix) were kept in the phone that was stolen at Home Affairs during the process of renewing my permit. On top of all these problems, many participants required financial compensation for their involvement in the study. However, this financial compensation was for costs such as airtime or transport but not as payment for the release of the information.

Finally, I relied on a research assistant for the transcribing of some of the interview materials for the sake of time. Although his involvement was a major contribution to the study, the reading of the transcripts was not easy because there were many spelling mistakes. This compelled me to go back to the recordings to understand the meaning to avoid some bias in the results of what was written and it was another time-consuming effort.

8.5. Further investigations

To sum up, it is important to stress that this study does not pretend to be exhaustive in answering all questions relating to former soldiers in the context of migration. The way former soldiers represent the army, the resources they have drawn from it as well as the way their post military life in the foreign land leave many opened windows which hopefully can allow further empirical scrutiny to continue this debate.

A more comprehensive, long term and multidisciplinary study involving former soldiers who have migrated in many other African countries will expand and dig out the understanding of post military life of former soldiers in foreign countries. As indicated many former Congolese soldiers left the country since the beginning of the war which led to the ousting of Mobutu Sese Seko and less attention has been paid to their experiences in the countries they have chosen to settle in. The issue of military identity and capital is an intriguing one which could be usefully investigated in further studies with former soldiers living in other foreign countries either in Africa or elsewhere in the world. More importantly, the way military knowledge is used for economic opportunity in the migration context is an area that needs further investigations. Any intervention targeting former soldiers should take into cognisance the importance of military capital and how this resource can be oriented to become beneficial for them and for the environment where they live. The implications of military capital in the post military lives of former soldiers deserve particular attention because it impacts on the knowledge, conduct and attitudes of former soldiers in their interactions with others in the communities where they live. An interesting study would explore the military implications in the economic practices of former soldiers to find out how their background in the army is influential in their decisions for business practices.

This study has examined how the Congolese community believes that the support of the army is needed in the search for solutions to the multifaceted crisis that has affected the DRC. This also allows the exploration of the transnational security and the linkage that former soldiers living in a foreign land keep with their fellows who remain in the country as well as their influence in the security system of their country. As stated in the methodology, this research only involved male soldiers who gave accounts of their experiences of working with their female colleagues. Although, their perceptions about female soldiers seemed positive, the way they portrayed women involved in the military sounded a bit derogatory and seemed to be as another form of symbolic violence. As this study has argued, it is important to appreciate the complexity around the fact that being a female soldier entails some levels of masculinity, but women's masculinisation does not lead them to becoming male. There is a need to explore whether female soldiers were happy to be referred to as men and more importantly to using Bourdieu's tools of analysis in order to test more accurately not only the *durability* and *transferability* of military capital, but also the strengths and weaknesses of women's involvement in the military service. If women wanted to be called men when they were in the army how would they prefer to be called after leaving the military service? Was it a denial of

their own identity in order to live up to certain expectations of masculinity to avoid being diminished by their male counterparts? Answers to these questions can be provided by females who underwent military experiences in their home country.

This study has shown different motivations that justify the involvement of young people in the army. These circumstances ranged from the feelings of nationalism, the desire to serve the country to forced enrolment due to political and economic motives. However, what the research did not highlight is whether voluntary or forced enrolment had an impact in the way former soldiers were committed to the fulfilment of their military duties. More in-depth studies focusing on the motivations to join the army will broaden and deepen understandings of the impact of military involvement in the level of dedication of soldiers. Findings of this study reveal that many former soldiers joined the army against their volition due socio-economic deprivations they experienced in their lives. But the aim of this study was to show how they made meaning of their decisions to join the army and not to profile them. A study exploring whether there is a link between doing a job which was not part of their dreams and the production of violent behaviour will shed more light.

Some former soldiers indicating from the beginning that they decided to enlist in the Congolese Army to respond to the popularly known principle of *tokowa po ya ekolo* or *makila na biso po ya ekolo* (we will die for the country or our blood for the country), a moral code that binds soldiers in the fulfilment of their mission. DRC soldiers' involvement in illegal activities in their interactions with civilians was the result of social disorganisation. As Hirschi (1986) notes, the wants of individuals exceed the means of satisfying them; that wants may be satisfied by illegal means, and that illegal means will be chosen by people when they conclude that the benefits are likely to exceed the costs. However, despite this social disorganisation, the moral code has been a constant reminder about what kinds of outlawed activities were acceptable and what kinds were not. For instance, military management turned a blind eye to soldiers' stealing from civilians, which they viewed as a way to supplement their scanty remunerations and to compensate their poor living conditions. However, soldiers vowed to remain faithful to their country by never betraying it. But this study showed that contrary to the military ideology, there was amorality within the Congolese army that guided many soldiers, from the senior to junior mainly senior generals to become involved in misleading the troops to allow the enemy to take over the control of the country. However, the analysis of soldiers' discourses reveals a contradiction between their unwavering commitment and acts of treason. The impact of accepted/contested leadership in the implementation/rejection of military regulations and

established principles of nationalism/patriotism could be usefully explored in further ethnographic research.

Another interesting area of inquiry is the statement made by a participant who, commenting on the socio-political situation of the DRC, said that the aggression of the DRC by foreign forces and the incapacity of the national army to conquer those negative forces was the result of a curse. This curse, according to them, came from the fact that the soldiers who took over did not recognize the merits of their elders they found in the army. They bluntly and violently dumped, killed and drove them out of the army as well as the country. What this participant expressed here is what Kratz (1989: 637) terms “genres of power” defined as culturally-recognised ways of speaking whose constitutive pragmatic definition includes a difference of authority or power. This suggests that the power of rank is dominant in the majority of conversational curses, where certain relations are premises of effect. This statement calls for particular attention to unpack the significance of the cultural beliefs of the DRC and to study its implications for the performance of the current Congolese army. It brings back to the argument previously made when discussing the issue of rituals and mystical practices of war that it is not just the training and use of sophisticated weapons that determine military performance and success, but the set of cultural values and beliefs of the military population. This becomes an important avenue for future research since some evidence shows that the resolution of certain conflicts is less about the use of weapons, but more about atonement rituals.

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Appendix 1: Former soldiers' profiles and military involvement

In this section I briefly introduce each participant of the study. This biographical section constitutes part of the background to my findings and the subsequent analysis. To comply with ethical recommendations, real names of the interlocutors were withheld - hence pseudonyms are used to identify each of them. Since interviews were mainly conducted in 2015/6 some of their biographical elements, particularly their ages or marital status might have changed. However, the change in certain elements of participants' profile has less impact on the overall relevance of the data. A total number of 21 ex-soldiers formed the population of this study.

3.8.1. John

John (not real name) is a 69-year old who served as a Colonel in the Congolese army from 1966 to 2002. John holds a bachelor's degree in social sciences. He was involved in military operations in several African countries; his last posting was to Rwanda in 2001. He fled the DRC because of on-going arrest of ex-*Forces Armées Zairoises* (ex-FAZ) troops and sought asylum in South Africa in 2002. John disclosed that he fled to exile because when the AFDL troops ousted Mobutu and started hounding troops of ex-FAZ to send them to Kitona he foresaw (as an intelligence agent) the worst that was coming and refused to be involved in it. This refusal caused him to be treated as a rebel, followed by his arrest and torture. John declared that he was married and left his wife and many of his children in the DRC and was granted formal refugee status in South Africa in 2002.

3.8.2. Amani

Amani is a 39-year old ex-soldier who holds an honour's (BA, hons) degree in International Relations from the National University of Lubumbashi and a certificate in fitting and turning. Amani's involvement in the military began during the revolution of the AFDL led by L.D.K. He was recruited in Lubumbashi when this city fell to the AFDL rebels and was subsequently deployed to different fronts such as Kisangani, Lubutu, Walikale, until the fall of Kinshasa in May 1997. When L.D.K became president, Amani and his colleagues were sent to the military academy in Tanzania to undergo training as military officers. After several months of training, Amani became a sub-lieutenant and worked in command for two to three years. Amani was also granted a scholarship to undergo training in logistics at Saint Cyr in France in 2003. As part of the training, Amani got enrolled in the French legion to work in Afghanistan, in Waziristan (the hilliest area located between Pakistan and Afghanistan) in 2004. Once back in

the DRC, Amani was disappointed by the miserable conditions of the Congolese soldiers, which compelled him to desert the army and flee to South Africa in 2012. Amani was granted refugee status which allowed him to find a job at a fitting and turning company in South Africa. Amani is married and has three children from the marriage but he lives alone in South Africa while his wife and children are in the DRC.

3.8.3. Rambo

Rambo is 38-years old and was recruited into the Congolese Army in 1996 before the advent of the AFDL. At the time, he was in his second year of his undergraduate studies in financial management at the *Institut Supérieur de Commerce* (ISC) which he abandoned for the military. He became a member of AFDL when Mobutu was toppled and was appointed at the first brigade of GSSP (Special Presidential Security Group). Rambo was first deployed to Ndjili international airport and then at the presidential sites before being redeployed to Lubumbashi to secure the presidential sites and the airport.

In the course of his military career, Rambo was deployed in the battlefield and took part in the battle of Pueto, even in Dubindela in 2000 shortly before the death of L.D. Kabila. Rambo disclosed that he left the Congolese Army because of tribalism. Being from Kasai province, he explained that he experienced marginalisation and exclusion from presidential missions. He felt that his life was at risk as he worked with people who disliked him at the GSSP and decided to leave the army. Rambo was married to a South African woman with whom he had three children. During the time of the interview he was in possession of South African temporary residence, which he got through his South African wife and was involved in petty trading in flea markets.

3.8.4. Sankara

Sankara is a 50-year old former Congolese soldier. Sankara was recruited into the Zairian Army in 1987 and worked in a special unit called CIRCO. When AFDL came to power in 1997, Sankara joined the AFDL troops to collect abandoned firearms by ex-FAZ troops all over Kinshasa. At L.D. Kabila's death, the current president took over and called for a dialogue to end the war. This dialogue culminated in the famous 1+4 formula, i.e. one president and 4 deputy presidents (Bemba+ Ruberwa+ Yerodia+ Zaidi- Ngoma). During this power sharing process, Sankara was positioned among the troops of MLC where he became warrant officer. After the 2006 presidential election, fighting broke out between the PPRD, political party in

power and the MLC; this fighting in which Sankara was involved took place in the heart of Kinshasa in the *Boulevard du 30 Juin*[26] opposite Gombe cemetery. Following this fighting, Bemba was forced to exile in Europe where he was arrested by the ICC. Since they started tracking MLC troops involved in that brawl, Sankara fled to exile in South Africa through Lubumbashi in 2007. Sankara is still an asylum seeker; working as a security guard. His military training has contributed a lot to his advancement in different companies that employed him and earned him a prestigious position as a manager in a security company he worked for at the time of the interview. Sankara revealed that he was married but left his wife and three children in the DRC.

3.8.5. Tshirawa

A 44-year old man, Tshirawa was married and had three children. He had been working as a security guard in a private security company which did not offer him social protection.

He first started his military training at CETA camp and then at Kibomango. He was ranked Lieutenant by L.D.K who recruited them in line with his vision to form a republican army to deal with external aggressions. Tshirawa's performance in the army had given satisfaction to L.D.K who decided to deploy him in his Katanga province. However, the senior officers and natives of Katanga resisted Tshirawa and his colleagues as they were not natives of Katanga. Tshirawa recounted that him and his colleagues originally from Kinshasa were exposed to various forms of suffering depriving them from financial and logic assistance and were even prevented from communicating with the president of the republic who put much hope in them. At L.D. Kabila's death, Tshirawa said that the current regime in the Congo sought to eliminate all soldiers who were trained by L.D.K. According to Tshirawa, their escape from Lubumbashi was facilitated by Zimbabwean soldiers who offered them the Zimbabwean uniform. This happened when Congolese officials paid homage to the Zimbabwean troops who were at the end of their mission in the DRC. Tshirawa disclosed that since his immigration to South Africa in 2001, he has been on an asylum seeker permit and the South African Home Affairs has not stated the reason for refusing his application for refugee in the country.

[26] Boulevard named in remembrance of the date of the country's independence, 30 June 1960.

3.8.6. Olenga

Olenga is a 46-year old former soldier who was married and has five children. He worked as a security guard in a private company and claimed to be financially unstable. Olenga lived with his wife and one of his kids in South Africa while the remaining four children were left in the DRC and might possibly join them in South Africa when he becomes financially stable.

Olenga said he joined the Congolese Army because his father abandoned him and his siblings; the suffering and lack of financial support to study compelled him to seek better fortune in the army. He joined the army in 1987 when he failed to complete his secondary school and went for military warrior training in Kitona. After completing his training, he became sergeant and worked mainly as a body-guard to senior officers in the army and political personalities of the country. In 1997, when L.D.K came into power, Olenga was among those ex-FAZ troops who were taken to Kitona. According to Olenga, many of his colleagues lost their lives in Kitona because they were subjected to inhuman treatment. The unhygienic living conditions and the unavailability of healthy food caused Olenga to contract dysentery commonly called red diarrhoea which nearly killed him. He said that after eight months of hardship, he decided to run away from Kitona and returned to Kinshasa. Once in Kinshasa, he enrolled in the national police and became quartermaster sergeant. But the political turmoil in the country forced him to leave in 2006 and sought asylum in South Africa. At the time the interview took place Olenga was waiting for his booking appointment (at home affairs) which was scheduled on 11 April 2016 for his refugee status decision.

3.8.7. Mike

56years old, Mike left the country since 1997 and came to South Africa in 2000 and was granted refugee status in 2006. His wife and children were still in the DRC at the time of this interview. Employed in the security sector in Johannesburg, Mike disclosed that he finds it difficult to pay up for the studies of his children in DRC Congo. Mike decided to join the army in 1981. Before going to the *Ecole de Formation des Officiers* (EFO), he did basic military training in Kitona. After three years at the EFO, Mike was sent to the commando training Centre in Kota-Koli (Equateur province) and was ranked lieutenant. He reported that during the rebellion of the AFDL, most ex-FAZ generals were already corrupt; they sold weapons to the enemy and never paid soldiers, and ordered them to pull out from the combat. When the AFDL took power in 1997, Mike and his colleagues were sent to Kitona. According to his account, the food they offered them in Kitona was poisoned which resulted in the death of many ex-FAZ soldiers.

Mike said he could count about 20 dead bodies on a daily basis. When the second war erupted in 1998, Mike said that he was first deployed in Kamina, then in Kalemie and finally in Moba. In Moba, an armed group called ex-Katangese formed by people who were pro L.D. Kabila expressed their discontent against Mike and his colleagues who came from other areas. They were accused of taking side with the enemy. In his account, Mike stressed that they tried, on several occasions, to eliminate him and his colleagues. These death threats compelled them to run away from Moba until they crossed the border to Zambia and finally reached South Africa.

3.8.8. Charly

A 48-year-old man, Charly dreamed about becoming a soldier like his father who worked in the air force and voluntarily enrolled in the army in 1986. After completing his secondary school, he started the first year at university, but when military recruitment was launched, he gave up on his studies to join the *Service d'Action et de Renseignement Militaire* (SARM), a newly created unit, to fulfil his dream. Charly's military training was done in places like Kitona, Kotakoli, and CETA, where he learned parachuting. At the end of his training, Charly was deployed to different provinces to work. Charly was a warrant officer 2nd class, but the chance of further promotion was hampered when the war started in Kisangani where he was deployed.

In his opinion, Mobutu lost the battle against AFDL because of the lack of unity and treason of senior military officers who demotivated them to get involved in the fighting. Charly believed that soldiers' lives were even at risk because they were endowed with firearms which unmatched ammunitions. The high ranked military officers disguised themselves by getting rid of their military uniform and deserted the battlefield. This attitude was so daunting to soldiers under their command, who finally withdrew from the battlefield. Charly reported that he and his colleagues walked, for 1100 Km, from Kisangani to Mbandaka, but through that overwhelming journey they had to protect soldiers' families until they reached Mbandaka; many pregnant women delivered on the way in very poor and risky conditions.

In his account, Charly also mentioned that he lost his wife who got involved in another marital relationship and moved to Europe with his three children because she was impatient to wait for a husband whose homecoming was uncertain. Charly said that he arrived in South Africa in 2012 and was immediately granted refugee status. He lived a lonely life working as a security guard at a private company in Johannesburg.

3.8.9. Gero

Gero, a 52-year-old man, was a student doing agricultural engineering in 1985. He was arrested in the students' protest movements and was taken to Kibomango for military training. This military training which was first seen as a form of punishment made him change his mind to become a soldier. He first worked in the presidential unit and was then posted to the maintenance department. After completing his training in Kibomango and Kitona, Gero became part of the second promotion of military special service called *garde-civile* that was sent to Egypt for three-year training and returned as chief detective. On his return, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and went again for three-year training in agricultural extension in Portugal in order to teach other soldiers gardening, irrigation and drainage system. At the beginning of liberation war, he was on special assignment in South Africa until AFDL took over power he never returned to the DRC. He left the Congolese Army with the rank of captain.

3.8.10. Jack and Mark

Jack and Mark were friends and preferred to be interviewed together; I met both of them when Jack invited me to his place to conduct interview. Mark lived in Cape Town, but he spent some days at Jack's place in Johannesburg before returning to Cape Town. Respectively 41 and 35 years old, Jack was a shop owner whereas Mark a truck driver. Led by patriotic fervour, they both reported that they enrolled in the Congolese army in 1998 to serve their country. Since they both had their *diplôme d'état* (the equivalent of metric certificate in South Africa), they were sent for a six-month military training in Angola and on their return they were promoted to the rank of lieutenant. They reported that they left the Congolese army because of ill-wages and miserable social conditions, and came to South Africa in 2005. Both were married and had children. Jack was granted a refugee status, but Mark was using a relative permit which he got through his South African wife.

3.8.11. Johnson

A 53-year old man, Johnson joined the army in 1985 at the age of 23 after completing his secondary school and went for training in Kibomango military training centre to be trained as a rifleman. After completing several other trainings in places like Maluku and Mikonga, he was sent on assignment to Katanga province. He left the army in 1991 with the rank of sergeant following a squabble between different units deployed in Kasumbalesa which resulted in the

death of a soldier from the opposite unit. Since his arrival in South Africa in 1991, Johnson was granted refugee status. As a means of survival, he declared that he ran personal business with the support of his friend who held position of power in the Congo. Married with kids, Johnson declared that he lived in South Africa with his wife. He joined the Congolese diasporic combatant movement fighting for regime change in the DRC and for this involvement he feared going back to his home.

3.8.12. Lokole

A 65-year old man, originally from Equateur province, Lokole was first an athlete. He reported he joined the army in 1969 when he was 19 years old. He completed a commando training in Israel for nine months. Occupying the rank of colonel, Lokole withheld his military unit for security reasons as he stated, but he reported that he trained the troops of 311th battalion. He came to South Africa in 2004 and was granted refugee status. Lokole said that he was unemployed and on his survival in South Africa depended on the support he received from his children.

3.8.13. Loleko

Born in 1952, Loleko, a former captain, reported that he enrolled in the army after the eighty days war of 1978 at the age of 26. After completing this preliminary training, Loleko moved to Kitona to learn infantry as part of the land forces in 1980. At the completion of this nine-month training he became warrant officer. He also completed various trainings in immigration before going on assignment to Katanga. He was then called back to be appointed as immigration officer in Bas-Congo in 1985. Back in Kinshasa in 1986, he enrolled at university to complete a degree in criminology. When LD Kabila unseated Mobutu he was compelled to go back to the army and was sent in Bas-Congo in 1998 with the rank of captain. He left the army in a horrible condition after escaping death and entered South Africa with a Kenyan passport, in 1999, where he was granted refugee status and was followed by his family in 2003. Unemployed, Loleko spent most of his time reading books in the library and sometimes offered services to young people who sought his military and political experiences.

3.6.14. Makemba

48-year old, married and father of many children, Makemba is an electromechanical engineer specialising in hydraulic or pneumatic machine. He left the Republic of Zaire in 1988 to support UNITA troops as Mobutu was Jonas Savimbi's ally who often offered various supports to UNITA to conquer power in Angola.

Makemba was promoted as major while in Angola and served as part of the UNITA troops from 1988 to 1994. He went to different training places in Angola and on his return to Congo (Zaire) in 1994, he was reappointed in the army with the rank of captain. When Kabila came into power, Makemba said that he was reappointed as major while at the same time he was converted to Christianity and became pastor. According to him, he faced serious death threats after security services discovered that he protected (for his creed) a *Kadogo* they wanted to kill. These death threats compelled Makemba to flee the country with the child soldier he was protecting and arrived in South Africa in 2004. Makemba then also helped the child soldier to move to Tanzania from South Africa.

3.8.15. Paul

Paul was enrolled in the Congolese Army at the age of 23 during the second republic led by Mobutu Sese Seko and went for two-year training in sabotage in Maluku and Kotakoli (Equateur province) in 1987. After the completion of this training Paul was appointed at the Ndjili international airport, where he worked as a warrant officer for two years before being sent to work at the border with Congo Brazzaville. He then joined the newly created unit called rapid intervention forces where he was appointed as official empowered to make arrests, a position which he occupied until LD Kabila evicted Mobutu and took over the power. Paul reported that when he handed himself over to the AFDL ruling as all soldiers of the fallen regime did, he was immediately deployed in Goma where he worked for six months. Given the precarious conditions in which they were put and the frequent incursions of Rwandan forces in the DRC, Paul and his friend felt unsafe and decided to return to Kinshasa. On their arrival in Kinshasa during the second war of 1998 they were treated as spies and placed under arrest for two months of torture in prison. After being released, Paul received the financial support from his family to leave the country and seek refuge in South Africa. Once in South Africa, Paul was granted refugee status in 2003. He works as receptionist at a Congolese freight agency.

3.8.16. Tango

Tango enrolled in the army after completing *his examen d'état* (the equivalent of metric in South Africa) in 1989 when he was 20. He completed various trainings in various places such as Mvula-Matadi, CETA Camp, including Egypt from 1991 to 1992 and was given the rank of warrant officer. He was also trained as criminologist and officially empowered to make arrests. He said that he became demotivated by the way the army was disorganised after unseating Mobutu and left for South Africa in 2009. He was first using an asylum seeker permit which he abandoned to the benefit of a work permit in order to work as a delivery agent in a private company. Married, Tango disclosed that he lived with his wife and child.

3.8.17. Wembo

Wembo, 45 years old, was a sub-lieutenant in Mobutu's army which he joined at the age of 23 after completing his metric certificate. He deserted the army during the liberation war for his own safety. He reported that his withdrawal from the army was also motivated by the high treason he witnessed from many high ranked officers in the Congolese Army (the then Zaire) who were in support of Kabila's rebellion. In 1997 when Mobutu was dislodged and following Kabila's appeal, he returned to the army and was sent to Kitona. Unfortunately, Kitona became a place where they were left to die. Poor diet and sanitation caused the death of many of his colleagues and caused him to flee through Moanda where he was hiding for several months before returning to Kinshasa in 1998 shortly before the eruption of the second war. He managed to come to South Africa through Lubumbashi in 2000 and was granted refugee status. Wembo worked as a security guard at a private company. Married with two children, Wembo lived alone and was unable to bring his wife and children, who are still in the DRC to South Africa.

3.8.18. Bienga

A former Colonel in the DRC Army, who is in his late fifties, Bienga worked in the presidential unit called DSP during Mobutu's regime. This unit mainly dominated by natives of Equateur province, where Mobutu originated from. Bienga travelled in many countries in the world to get specialised training in military administration particular orientation in armoury. He reported that he came to South Africa in 1999 transiting in Brazzaville where he was unsafe, and could not return to the DRC because he was in the list of wanted officers. His wife who remained in the country when he fled died because of lack proper care when she was sick. Bienga indicated that he was protected by the Geneva Convention in South Africa and that military insertion in

this country was hard for lack of appropriate framework to rationalise the skills he had accumulated in the army. During the time the interview took place Bienga was unemployed. Although, he claimed to be a trustee in the building where he rented a flat, his children hardly managed to go to school.

3.8.19. James

33years old, James was forced into the army as a child soldier at the age of 14. He reported that he was taken by force from school in Kisangani during the liberation war of L.D. Kabila in 1996. James spent three years in the frontline and was involved in various battles from Kisangani to Mbandaka. James reported that they were called to use heavy weapons without appropriate training in weapons handling. These weapons were so powerful that every time they used them to shoot, their effects were felt even in the brain and noticeable in the urination and defecation as it contained blood. This caused many of them to experience some physical and mental impairment afterwards. James left the army during the waves of Disarmament Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) initiated by the Congolese government with the support of multi-donor trust fund. However, he claimed that many child soldiers were left with nothing despite the huge amount of money donated by donors for their resettlement. The only thing they were given was three cooking pots and $10 to start business, which was insignificant. James said that many of them left the country, some, like him, living as asylum seekers in South Africa.

3.8.20. Taty

Born in 1962, Taty got his degree of engineer in Polytechnique at the University of Kinshasa in 1985 and started working as technical director in a private Company in Kinshasa for a couple of months until he met one renowned army General in the then Zairean Army who attracted him to the army. The same year he was sent to EFO (*Ecole de Formation des Officiers*), a military academy located in Kananga, for a three-year training which he successfully completed. In 1989, he was first sent to CETA military camp as a trainee and lieutenant parachutist. At the completion of this training in parachuting he was appointed instructor. Taty completed various specialized trainings in France and Italy which contributed to his promotion to the rank of captain first and ended with the rank of colonel. He was deployed in various theatres of operations particularly in Rwanda (Kigali) where he was even shot in the face in 1991 and in Kolwezi (Katanga) to quell the xenophobic conflict that opposed the natives of Katanga to those from Kasai in 1991.

He decided to leave the army and country in 2004 after being involved in several wars: first as a member of the Zairean troop who unsuccessfully thwarted the advance of L.D.K's rebellion of 1996 and as a member of the AFDL troop to fight rebel group of RCD that attempted to oust L.D.K. in 1998 with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. Taty had been living with his wife and some of his children as asylum seekers in South Africa.

3.8.21. Yenga

A former warrant officer in the DRC Army in his late forties, Yenga enrolled in the Zairean army in 1989 and served as paratrooper in what was known as CETA (*Centre d'Entrainement des Troupes Aéroportées/* Airborne Troops Training Center). He said that he lost interest in the army at the entrance of the AFDL in 1997 but was forced to go to Kitona for fear of reprisals. After witnessing a catastrophic experience in Kitona, he returned to Kinshasa and through his connections with some military authorities, he reintegrated into the units of the land force. However, he explained that mistreatment, tribalism and various forms of injustice forced him to resign from the army. This resignation was followed by the decision to leave the country for South Africa, which he entered through Zimbabwe in 2007 as an asylum seeker. Yenga was married and had four children. At the time of interview, he disclosed that his wife and children were still in the DRC because he could not afford to bring them to South Africa due to the fact, he survived on a lean salary he got from the private security company, where he is employed as a security guard.