

https://dspace.org/

How does it feel to be a threat?: ethnographic experiences of urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi, Kenya

Monyani, Margaret

2021
https://hdl.handle.net/10539/33800

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A THREAT? ETHNOGRAPHIC EXPERIENCES OF URBAN SOMALI REFUGEE WOMEN IN NAIROBI, KENYA

MARGARET MONYANI

Advisors: Prof Gilbert . M. Khadiagala and Prof Loren .B. Landau

Thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

School of Social Sciences,

Faculty of Humanities,

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

November 2021

DECLARATION

I, Margaret Monyani, student number 1431346, declare that this thesis titled "How Does it Feel to be a Threat? Ethnographic Experiences of Urban Somali Refugee Women in Nairobi, Kenya" is my own work that is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Except where reference is made in the text, this dissertation contains no material published elsewhere or extracted in whole or part from a thesis or any other degree or diploma. No other persons' work has been used without due acknowledgement in the main text of this thesis and that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

SIGN 

DATE 20/11/2021

DEDICATION

To Malcom,

My son,

My cheerleader,

My prayer worrier,

My source of inspiration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to extend my gratitude to the many wonderful people whose profound support me saw me through my academic journey. I would like to thank the Almighty God for his amazing grace through this tough yet transformative journey. His mercies and provisions brought me this far.

To my academic advisors Professors Gilbert Khadiagala and Lauren Landau, am eternally grateful for your exceptional guidance, mentorship, and insightful comments throughout the various stages of my PhD journey. I not only became a better scholar but person as well through your tremendous support and mentorship. I would also like to appreciate Professor Scott Fitzsimmons for his support and guidance at the University of Limerick during my stay as an Erasmus+ International Credit Mobility fellow.

I am grateful to the Andrew Mellon Foundation for funding my PhD and Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) for supporting my fieldwork. Thanks to the Erasmus+ International Credit Mobility Program for granting me an opportunity to meet and learn from other scholars at the University of Limerick.

My profound appreciation to the Somali refugee women who took part in this study, this project would not have been possible without you. Although our encounters may have been brief, your stories, passion, and perseverance continue to encourage and inspire me daily. Thank you all for sharing your intimate life stories with me.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to my biggest cheerleader—my son- Malcom. While you endured many moments of mum being away because studies, you have been a great source of inspiration. Anytime I would feel like giving up. I would look at you and soldier on. Thanks for your smiles, love and prayers which urged me on during the writing process.

***Note that some parts of this thesis have been published in:**

2020 **"***Regimes of Othering: Unpacking the Security-Migration Nexus*,**"** published on *Kujenga Amani*. https://kujenga-amani.ssrc.org/2020/07/16/regimes-of-othering-unpacking-the-migration-security-nexus/

2020 *"Regional Migration Regimes and Border Security in the Horn of Africa"* in Kamel L (Ed) Youth and Africa available at https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairs_3.pdf

2018 *"We want to be Returned too! Gender and Reintegration of returnees in Kenya*" accessed at https://www.wiisglobal.org/we-want-to-be-returned-too-gender-and-reintegration-of- returnees-in-kenya/

2018 *"A Tale of Silent Security in Little Mogadishu"* E-International Relations accessed at https://www.e-ir.info/2018/07/27/a-tale-of-silent-security-in-little-mogadishu/

***Note that some parts of this thesis have been presented in symposia and conferences as:**

Urban Governance, Refugee Rights and Policing in Nairobi, Kenya" Africa Studies Association, New York, November 2021

Regional Migration Regimes and Border Security in the Horn of Africa, New med Research Network Youth Conference, Rome Italy March 2020

Securitisation and Performative security among Urban Somali refugee Women in Nairobi Kenya" Africa studies Association, Boston Massachusetts, November 2019

Of Securitisation Regimes and the Individual and Collective Security of Somali Refugees in Kenya" European Conference on Africa Studies (ECAS), University of Edinburgh, June 2019

Impact of Security Safety Reforms on Combating Terrorism in Kenya", CODESRIA General Assembly 2018

Securitisation: A blessing or Curse to the Host? Nordic Africa Institute September 2018

Implications of securitisation on Human Security of Urban Somali Women Refugees in Nairobi, Kenya", University of Limerick Postgraduate Seminar workshop, April 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ..... *i*

DEDICATION ..... *ii*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..... *iii*

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... *v*

LIST OF FIGURES ..... *ix*

ABBREVIATIONS ..... *x*

ABSTRACT ..... *xiii*

CHAPTER ONE *14*

INTRODUCTION *14*

1.0 Introduction **14**

1.1 Contextualising the Study **15**

1.2 Research Aims **19**

1.3 Literature Review **21**

1.3.1 Migration- Security Nexus and its Implications on Migrants 22

1.3.2 Gender, Migration and Security 31

1.3.3 Adaptive Strategies of Urban Somali Women Refugees to the Securitisation 37

1.4 Hypothesis of the study **41**

1.5 Thesis Outline **41**

CHAPTER TWO *45*

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK *45*

2.0 Introduction **45**

2.1 Securitisation Framework **45**

2.1.1 The Copenhagen School Approach 45

2.1.2 The Foucauldian School Approach 46

2.1.3 Application of the SF to the Study 47

2.1.4 Critique of the Securitisation Framework 49

2.2 Performativity **52**

2.3 Standpoint Feminist Security Perspective **53**

2.4 Conclusion **56**

CHAPTER THREE *58*

METHODOLOGY *58*

3.0 Introduction **58**

3.1 Research Site **58**

3.1.1 General Country Profile 58

3.1.2 Study Area Profile: Eastleigh 61

3.2 Strategy of Inquiry **68**
3.3 Research Design **68**
3.3.1 Ethnography 69
3.3.2 Phenomenology 70
3.4 Selection of Participants **70**
3.4.1 Purposive sampling 70
3.4.2 Snowball Technique 71
3.5 Data Collection Techniques **72**
3.5.1 Secondary Data 72
3.5.2 Primary Data 73
3.6 The Fieldwork Journey **78**
3.7 Personal Reflexivity **81**
3.8 Data Analysis **82**
3.9 Validity and Reliability **83**
3.10 Methodological Limitations **84**
3.11 Ethical Considerations **87**
3.12 Conclusion **88**
CHAPTER FOUR ***89***
CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE EXCLUSION OF SOMALIS IN KENYA ***89***
4.0 Introduction **89**
4.1 The Colonial Era **89**
4.1.1 The East Africa Outlying Ordinance 90
4.1.2 The Somali-Galla Line Policy 94
4.1.3 The Special District Ordinance of 1934 94
4.2 The Kenyatta Regime's Response to the NFD Secession **96**
4.2.1 The Appeasement Policy and Use of Media 99
4.2.2 The Anti-shifta Bill 100
4.2.3 The Viligisation Program 101
4.3 The Moi Regime's Response to the NFD Secession **104**
4.3.1 Screening and Surveillance 105
4.4 Conclusion **110**
4.6 Chapter Summary **114**
CHAPTER FIVE ***115***
SOMALINISATION OF TERRORISM IN KENYA ***115***
5.0 Introduction **115**
5.1 The Terrorism and Refugee Regime Nexus in Kenya **116**
5.2.1 The 1998 US Embassy Bombing 116
5.2.2 The November 2002 Kikambala Attack 123
5.2.3 Turning Point: The 2006 Refugee Act 127
5.2.4 Westgate Mall Attack: 128
5.2.5 Garissa University College Attack 139
5.3 Conclusion **142**

5.4 Chapter Summary **144**

CHAPTER SIX ***145***

HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A THREAT? ***145***

6.0 Introduction **145**

6.1 Somali Refugee Women's Experience of Kenya's Securitisation Regime **145**

6.1.1 Implications of the Securitisation on the Journey to the city 146

6.1.2 Implications of securitisation on Somali Refugee Women's Lives in the City 152

6.2 Conclusion **174**

6.3 Implications for Policy and Practice **176**

6.4 Chapter Summary **178**

CHAPTER SEVEN ***179***

NEGOTIATING THE SECURITISATION REGIME ***179***

7.0 Introduction **179**

7.1 Urban Somali Refugee Women's Strategies of Circumvention **180**

7.1.1 Disciplinary Resistance 180

7.1.2 Strategic Silence 194

7.1.3 Everyday Politics of Mystification 197

7.2.4 Disguised Compliance 205

7.1.5 The Hope for the Future 206

7.2 Conclusion **210**

7.3 Implications on Policy and Practice **212**

7.4 Chapter Summary **213**

CHAPTER EIGHT ***214***

THESIS CONCLUSION ***214***

8.0 Introduction **214**

8.1 Thesis Findings **215**

8.1.1 Objective One Summary 215

8.1.2 Objective Two Summary 216

8.1.3 Objective Three Summary 218

8.2 Thesis Summary **220**

8.4 Contribution to Knowledge **221**

8.5 Recommendations for policy and Practice **223**

REFERENCES ***225***

APPENDICES ***258***

Appendix 1: Turnitin Originality Report **258**

Appendix 2: Participant Information Form-Refugee Women **259**

Appendix 3: Participant Information Form- Key Informants **261**

Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form **263**

Appendix 5: Interview Schedule for The Refugee Women **264**

Appendix 6: Interview Schedule for Key Informants 267
Appendix 7: Participant Observation Checklist 268
Appendix 8: Research Ethics Clearance 269
Appendix 9: NACOSTI Research Permit 270
Appendix 10: NACOSTI Research Permit 271
Appendix 11: NACOSTI Research Authorisation 272
Appendix 12: Ministry of Education Research Authorisation 273

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of Kenya *61*
Figure 2:First Avenue Outside the Olympic Mall *63*
Figure 3: Shopping Malls along Jam Street, Eastleigh *64*
Figure 4: A Map of Eastleigh *67*
Figure 5: Map of North Frontier District *93*
Figure 6: Diagram of Resultant Insecurities *174*

ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	Armed Conflict, Location and Event Data
ACSRT	African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism
AP	Administrative Police
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BMA	Border Management Authority
CERSR	Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
CBP	Community Policing Programs
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CBK	Central Bank of Kenya
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CS	Copenhagen School
COK	Constitution of Kenya
COVID	Corona Virus Disease
DC	District commissioner
DIA	Defence Intelligence Agency
DO	District Officer
DRA	Department of Refugee Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoK	Government of Kenya
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HIAS	Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HOA	Horn of Africa

ICG	International Crisis Group
ICPAT	Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
ID	Identity Cards
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IG	Inspector General
IPOA	Independent Police Oversight Authority
IPA	Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis
IR	International Relations
ISIS	Islamic State
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KEBS	Kenya Bureau of Standards
KIHBS	Kenya Integrated Household and Budget Survey
KDF	Kenyan Defence Forces
KHRC	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KTN	Kenya Television Network
KSH	Kenya Shilling
LATF	Local Authorities Transfer Fund
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MPFA	Migration Policy Framework for Africa
MRC	Mandate Refugee Certificate
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MSG	Marine Security Guards
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation-Kenya
NAK	National Alliance Party
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NCPD	National Council for Population and Development
NFDLF	Northern Frontier District Liberation Front
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPPPP	Northern Province People's Progressive Party
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Centre
NEP	North Frontier District

NER	North Eastern Region
NFDLF	North Frontier District Liberation Front
NFD	North Frontier District
NSIS	National Security and Intelligence Service
NSA	National Security Agency
OAU	Organization of African Union
RAS	Refugee Affairs Secretariat
RCBO	Refugee Community- Based Organisations
SDO	Special District Ordinance
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SF	Securitisation Framework
SYL	Somali Youth League
SSRC	Social Sciences Research Council
TV	Television
UBL	Usama Bin Laden
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
VOK	Voice of Kenya
VOA	Voice of America

ABSTRACT

The post September 2001 era has been characterised with securitisation of migration, that is, the framing of migration in terms of the threats to the security of states, rather than in terms of the security of migrants. Such framing ignores how securitisation creates a multitude of insecurities for migrants and their families. This ethnographic qualitative study sets out to challenge this dominant state centric perspective of the migration-security nexus. Taking the vantage point of migrants, it introduces an understanding of "securitisation from below" by focusing on the experiences of urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi, Kenya. Seventeen voluntary respondents that were selected through purposive and snowball techniques, were interviewed from Eastleigh in Nairobi. The interviews were scheduled and undertaken at a time and place convenient to the respondent. The data was collected through interviews and participant observation which was designed to examine the critical links between Kenya's securitisation regime, the resultant vulnerabilities it produces, and urban Somali refugee women's everyday resistance to the surveillance and discrimination. Employing what Lonsdale (2000) calls "agency in tight corners", the study explored how the refugee women as active and wilful actors in the securitisation process, develop subtle strategies of interaction with state power, so as to circumvent, protect themselves from, and resist the restrictive regime. They perform their resistance in a number of different ways including disciplinary resistance, disguised compliance, strategic silence, politics of mystification, and self-definition and development. The study findings suggest that, through subtle everyday resistance, urban Somali refugee women have been able, to some extent, manifest some form of agency and diversity and validated their shared experience of the discrimination, and reaffirmed their identity as refugee women. While doing so, they have defied the discriminatory policing, countered the state-driven exclusionary discourse on Somalis, and deconstructed the representation of Eastleigh as a terror hotbed. The study findings also demonstrate that the securitisation of the urban Somali refugee women is a cyclic and multi-layered process that not only involves various government agencies at various levels, local citizens as crucial agents to the process, but also, the refugee women themselves through everyday resistance. The humanized accounts of the urban Somali refugees presented in this study illustrate how international security and global politics are shaped and lived by non-state actors. While exploring the experiences of urban Somali refugee women, the study sheds light on the experiences of refugee women, whose voices are little heard, and shows ways in which contemporary national and international migration policies impact on their security. This prioritization of increasing invisibility in relations of dominance, and of studying experiences of these refugee women is fundamental to the study of the insecurities of migration, and the way international politics of migration may create insecurity for migrants.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"We do not want to be told that there are loyal Somalis, let loyal Somalis come out and show us their loyalty. Let them be put in a camp where we can scrutinize them and know who amongst them are good"

G. G. Kariuki, 1965[1]

1.0 Introduction

Contemporary migration governance is exercised through the prism of threats and risks especially for host states that seek to "manage" migrants through regimes of securitization. Securitisation refers to the "repositioning of areas of regular politics into the realm of security by increasingly using narratives of threat and danger, aimed at justifying the adoption of extraordinary measures" (Ferreira, 2018:89). This is particularly common in the post September 11 era where migration is increasingly being framed in terms of threats to the state as opposed to the threats it poses to migrants themselves. This kind of framing ignores the ways in which the securitisation jeopardises the security of migrants as well as their families. This study sets out to problematise this dominant state centric view of the link between migration and security. Taking the vantage point of migrants, the study introduces an understanding of "securitisation from below" by focusing on the experiences of urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi, Kenya. The Kenyan government has historically viewed Somali refugees, especially those in urban as a threat to the Kenyan state and its people. (Lind et al 2017; Scharrer, 2018; Mwangi, 2018; Wairuri, 2018; Maina, 2019; Freeman, 2019; Hurlbert, 2020; Žák, 2020). This kind of portrayal has created an enabling environment for the government to institute restrictive measures and practices against them. While many studies

[1]Godfrey Gitahi Kariuki was the first Member of Parliament for Laikipia district at the onset of Kenya's independence in 1963. He stated the above quote to parliament in 1965 to reaffirm government's prejudice against Somalis who were seen as rebels. See Hansard, *Republic of Kenya, House of Representatives Official Report Volume V Second Session*, 1 June-30 July 1965, (Nairobi, 3 June 1965), Cols. 144-146

have focused on the resultant human rights violations of the securitised migration regime, insufficient attention has been paid to the diverse ways in which the urban Somali refugee women understand the said regime that subjugates them, and their reaction to it (Jaji, 2014; Whittaker 2012, 2014; Scharrer, 2018; Hurlbert, 2020). Thus, this study endeavours to address this gap by exploring ways in which urban Somali refugee women perceive, understand, internalize, and respond to the restrictive migration regime.

The study begins by exploring the modalities the state employs in constructing urban Somali refugees as a threat. It then proceeds to foreground the experiences of urban Somali refugee women affected by the securitisation, and how they challenge the securitised migration regime through various subtle everyday resistance strategies. I argue that Somali refugee women have been able, to some extent, manifest some form of agency and diversity and validated their shared experience of the discrimination, and reaffirmed their identity as refugee women. While doing so, they have defied the discriminatory policing, countered the state-driven exclusionary discourse on Somalis, and deconstructed the representation of Eastleigh as a terror zone. A bottom-up conceptualisation of securitisation allows for the inclusion of voices of migrants that are conventionally excluded by a state centric perspective. Hence, while the main contribution of this study is to enrich security studies, it also challenges the composition of actors and themes that embody the International Relation's (IR) theory.

1.1 Contextualising the Study

Since the early 1960s, Kenya has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers from the neighbouring countries which for many years have experienced conflict and political instability, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Uganda. Until the early 1990s, refugees and asylum seekers were "entitled to full status rights such as the right to apply for work permits, settle in urban centres and move freely in the country, access educational opportunities and apply for legal local integration" (Campbell, Crisp and Kiragu, 2011:48) Thereafter, Kenya's refugee regime became more restrictive, with the encampment of refugees was adopted. The change in Kenya's refuge management approach coincided with what was unfolding globally. The period immediately following the Second World War saw states welcoming refugees and asylum seekers, who were considered an important entity in the politics of the day. This continued into the

Cold War era when refugees were treated as people who needed protection from their politically unstable home countries. Consequently, throughout this period, security as a term was used in favour of refugees as they were seen as people who were fleeing politically unfriendly states (Gili, 2010).

However, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a shift in how migrants were perceived as a security threat. After opening their doors to refugees – whether to protect them or as a source of cheap labour – many states began to adopt more restrictive policies (Fielding, 1993). There are various reasons why countries started to shift from permissive to more restrictive immigration regimes, reflecting a trend in refugee management. For instance, there was a proliferation of drivers of migration, just as there was a decline in interstate wars (Guy, 2008). The more restrictive regimes were also as a result of the changes in the dynamics of labour markets and the need to protect the social and economic rights of domestic work forces (Blotevogel et al, 1993). Despite these changes, even in the 1970s immigrants continued to be classified as guest workers. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, Western countries dropped the ideological imperative of resettling refugees, and this became the responsibility of the "country of first asylum" (Lambo, 2012). Henceforth, refugees were perceived as a threat to national borders and security and were transformed from "victims of insecurity to criminals and terrorists" (Ibid:63).

Lambo (2012) explores the East African context in relation to the changes that occurred in the post-cold war era. He argues that a myriad of intra-state conflicts were experienced at this time, resulting in many people crossing borders for safety. Kenya became a home for hundreds of thousands of migrants, among whom the Somalis were the majority (Hyndman and Nyland, 1998). The Kenyan government moved quickly to enforce the encampment policy and to hand over the responsibility of refugee determination to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Horst, 2006). This remained the case, as shall be demonstrated in Chapter Five, until the mid-2000s when the government became involved in refugee management. All through the 1980s, Somalia experienced conflict which led to the breakdown of Somalia, and subsequent fall of Said Barre's regime in the early 1990s (Lind et al. 2017). Thereafter, hundreds of thousands of Somalis ran to Kenya for safety as refugees.

This study's focus is on how the Government of Kenya (GoK) depicts Somali refugees as a security threat particularly in the context of what is seen as a "war on terror". Kenya's migration regime has undergone a drastic paradigm shift from what seemed to be more hospital and receptive to one of the most stringent regimes in Africa. Hence, the portrayal of Somali refugee as a security threat has become politically embedded within national security debates through what Bigo (2002) calls the "governmentality of unease". Thus, the securitisation of urban Somali refugees has elevated them to a level where they are conspicuously the "most undesirable" in the country. The analyses of Kenya's securitisation regime in Chapter Four and Five shows that, migration governance ebbs with counter terrorism measures where Kenya's government has adopted violent and reactionary tactics over the years. This hard approach to refugee management, has in many ways, impacted on the wellbeing and safety of urban Somali refugees. It has also created an avenue for their abuse and exploitation by security agents. While the restrictive measures have been implemented at the national level, they are greatly shaped by the global war on terror (GWOT) which is "the product of transnational harmonisation of policies and law around counter-terrorism, immigration and integration to manage Muslims and Islam as a transnational risk category across Western states and the Americas" (Humphrey 2014:86).

There are a number of studies that have examined securitisation of migration in the European context (Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Bigo, 2002; Karyotis 2007). This is especially on aspects of surveillance of migration especially in regard to South to North mobility. The aim was to determine how migration policies in Europe have shaped border managements as well as deportations and detention of migrants. There is a general consensus among scholars of migration that the linkage of migration to terrorism became formalised in the aftermath of September 11 in the European Union (EU) (Karyotis 2007; Huysmans and Buonfino (2008); Togral 2011). Other scholars like Karyotis (2007) disagree with this assertion. He argues that the linkage of migration to insecurity has always existed in the EU, the 9/11 terrorism only exacerbated the situation. Similar construction of migration as a threat has been evident in the United States of America (USA). According to Tirman (2006), unlike in the case of the EU where migration has been portrayed as a threat to national identity, in the US the issue has been about social security, in particular competition for job opportunities and welfare. However, after 9/11, terrorism became

the basis for framing discourse and policies in relation to migration which particularly affected Arab and Muslim migrants (Tirman 2006).

Many countries in Africa have also adopted stringent policies in relation to migration. According to Abebe (2019), countries like South Africa, Botswana and Algeria have adopted strict visa policies especially in relation to African migrants. In South Africa, migrants have experienced xenophobic attacks. There is perception that migrants are creating stiff competition for livelihood opportunities and are involved in criminal activities such as drug trafficking. In response, Abebe argues that the South African government:

> "Responded to attacks on non-nationals living in the country with calls for more restrictive border controls and 'Operation Fiela'[2], an interagency initiative *de facto* targeting non-nationals for arrest and, presumably, deportation. In some cases, these concerns have led to xenophobic tendencies and violent attacks that have taken the lives of migrants and destroyed their properties – for example, the attacks seen in South Africa in 2008, 2015 and 2019" (Abebe, 2019:)

Landau and Kihato made similar observations whereby, "South Africa's National Assembly passed legislation to set up a new "armed service" called the Border Management Authority (BMA) that, if it is ever established, would subsume security roles currently fulfilled by the police and have the exclusive right to perform "border law enforcement functions" including dealing directly with irregular arrivals and asylum seekers" (The New Humanitarian 5 July 2017). Tanzania has also experienced a change in migration policy such that during Julius Nyerere era (1964–1985), refugees were regarded as an economic asset but over the years this has changed. Refugees are now considered a security threat, and as such in 2019, the Tanzanian government came up with a repatriation plan for Burundian refugees (Al Jazeera 27 August 2019)

Coming back to the Kenyan context, the portrayal of urban Somali refugees as a threat has resulted in their marginalisation and discrimination. This kind of framing particularly within a context in

[2] *Fiela* is a Sesotho term meaning "to sweep away; to clean up; to remove dirt" ().

which durable solutions are obscure, a dearth of livelihood opportunities and politically unstable environment back home in Somalia has greatly impacted on their individual and collective security. It is against this background, that I explore the implications of securitisation on urban Somali refugee women and their innovative response to it.

1.2 Research Aims

Humanised accounts of securitisation have not received adequate attention within academic as well as policy research (Hansen 2000; Gerard and Puckering, 2013; Jaji, 2014). Heeding the call of feminists such as Innes and Steel (2018) and others, who argue that power needs to be unpacked form the perspective of analysing people's everyday lived experiences, the study weaves a compelling narrative that foregrounds migrant agency of urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi, Kenya. It then employs the concept of performativity (Innes, 2016) to explore how urban Somali refugee women experience securitisation outside state centric narratives. The aim is to illustrate, the various ways through which refugee women, through their everyday interaction with the securitisation regime, not only engage with the state but also move beyond it so as to produce forms of everyday resistance at the individual and community level. The study begins with a theoretical discussion of securitisation, feminist security and performativity, and how they apply to the study. It then turns to examine, how the urban Somali refugee women find room for manoeuvre, to negotiate surveillance and security and sovereignty during their journey to the city, and their stay in the city. I focus on the impact of securitisation on individual and collective security from the point of view of urban Somali refugee women themselves. Lastly, I analyse their demonstrations of agency through what Scott (1990) calls "infrapolitics" in countering the othering and exclusion resultant from the securitisation regime.

I consider a critical feature of this study to be that it emphasizes on the agency of the refugee women, which is both academically valuable as well as critical in shaping migration policy in Kenya. The rich ethnographic data collected through in-depth interviews and participant observation, allows for a better understanding of the dynamics of securitisation experience, as it captures individual as well as collective similarities and differences across the studied sample. The qualitative ethnographic data collected, reflect a cyclical and heterogeneous humanised accounts

of securitisation which fluctuate between agency and domination as the women negotiate with the restrictive regime.

The research specifically focuses on refugee women, and the main objective of the study is about their gendered experience as refugee women, who live in urban areas where they are considered de facto illegal. In addition, however, their experience demonstrate the position of refugee women as individuals who, in the securitisation context, play a key role in creating their individual and collective security. Researching refugee women gives a picture of complex social relationships, which are constantly negotiating with a restrictive refugee regime for survival in the host settings. Framed by an intersectional lens, the study illustrates the complexity of refugee women's lives, and provides context specific lived experience of the refugee women. Combining an intersectional approach with qualitative ethnographic methodology is particularly resourceful, as it takes into consideration factors like race, class, ethnicity, gender, and nationality.

The study proceeds as follows: firstly, it begins by providing an overview of the various restrictive migration policies, security laws and extraordinary measures that constitute Kenya's securitisation regime. This section is premised on the securitisation theory to explore in detail how the exclusionary migration regime emerged, is secured, and maintained. The second part draws attention to the experiences of urban Somali refugees amid securitisation. The aim is to provide an understanding, of how the Kenyan government's surveillance institutions intersects with patriarchy, hence affecting the various dimensions of the refugee women's lives. The third part employs Lonsdale's (2000) concept of "agency in tight corners", to explore how urban Somali refugee women, as active and wilful actors in the securitisation process, develop strategies in their everyday life to circumvent, protect themselves from, and to resist the restrictive regime. Some of the strategies discussed include performance of disciplinary resistance, self-definition and development, strategic silence, disguised compliance, and politics of mystification.

Picking up on this focus as well as drawing on the rich literatures (within and without the academy), I ask the following questions:

1. How do urban Somali refugee women who are fundamentally stigmatised, persecuted and oppressed by the securitisation regime tackle the material, corporal and psychological consequences of this discrimination?

2. How do they nurture their own identities, sense of worth, and relationships as a response/ resistance to the punitive measures?
3. How can these refugee women's experiences be written in ways that take securitisation seriously, but does not reduce the refugee women to the oppressions that they face; by understanding them on their own terms, in their own voices, in the fullness of their hopes, fears and lived realities?

To answer these questions, the study adopts an intersectional perspective which is sensitive to diverse and subjective experiences, and consequently does not rely on assumptions of universality and objectivity. While the thesis centers on the experiences of selected urban Somali refugee women, it does not seek to generalise their experience of securitisation as representative of all urban refugees. I recognize that refugees irrespective of their gender, are complex and the experiences presented in this thesis are meant to provide an illustration of a bottom up understanding of securitisation.

By so doing, this study accordingly, endeavours to contribute both theoretically and empirically to the understanding of how gender plays into increasingly securitized migration discourse and how this, in turn, affects women's experiences of seeking asylum in Kenya. On a theoretical level, the thesis suggests an alternative bottom-up conceptual framework through which the concept of securitization can be operationalised and empirically explored. This research strengthens existing security studies literature and has the potential to offer insights to academics and policy makers around the world. It will be of interest to academics and students interested in gender, migration, and security.

1.3 Literature Review

This section provides a review of literature important in understanding the securitisation regime in Kenya and its implications of urban Somali refugee women's lives. The reviews is classified into four themes that are adopted from the research objectives. They are as include the migration-security nexus debate, implications of securitisation, gender, migration, and security and adaptive strategies against securitisation.

1.3.1 Migration- Security Nexus and its Implications on Migrants

For over two decades now, IR scholars have been preoccupied with the inter linkage between migration and security. This scholarship has intensely developed in the European union and the US where immigration is largely linked to security challenges such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and organised crime (Lazardis and Khursheed, 2015). Securitisation actors most of whom are mainly political elites continue to portray immigration as a threat to identity (MacSweeny, 1999; Hansen, 2000) national security (Bigo, 2002, 2008, 2012; Innes, 2015) and livelihoods (Mbiyozo, 2019; Maina, 2019, Žák, 2020). Léonard and Kaunert (2020) note that the demarcation is based on various factors, including but not limited, to the place of origin, education and skills and cultural background. This paradigm shift has led to adoption of stricter immigration laws and border practices by various governments around the world. There has been tremendous growth of scholarship on this subject matter. The early 1990s saw the birth of the Copenhagen school whose analyses pioneered international relations focus on securitisation of immigration (Grieco, Ikenberry, and Mastanduno, 2015).

Since then, the migration-security nexus debate has largely focused on national security related aspects and the safety of citizens. Mavroudi and Nagel (2016) argues that the linkage of migration to security is as a result of the increase in the number of irregular migrants. He, however, adds that there are no conclusive research findings that show migrants can be a threat to the state. Some scholars have focused on examining the correlation between terrorism and securitisation especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks (Bigo, 2002; Huysman, 2000-2012; Freedman, 2012). Even so, both terrorism and securitisation are not novel occurrences in the international arena. As a matter of fact, states have experienced as well as perpetrated terrorism since their formation in 1648 following the adoption of the Westphalia treaty. The difference is that, after 9/11 terrorist attacks, terrorism increased in frequency and magnitude.

There is a strand of literature arguing that securitisation preceded terrorism. Scholars like (Ronald, 2008) argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union coupled with the end of the Cold war resulted in an influx of migrants which became a novel security challenge for states. In his seminal work, "Security, Stability, and International Migration" Weiner examines how migration impacts on state's security. He notes:

> "More people want to leave their countries than there are countries willing or capable of accepting them. The reluctance of states to open their borders to all who wish to enter is only partly a concern over economic effects. The constraints are as likely to be political, resting upon a concern that an influx of people belonging to another ethnic community may generate xenophobic sentiments, conflicts between natives and migrants, and the growth of anti-migrant right-wing parties" (1993:93)

Weiner (1993) adopts a transnational perspective to explain how migration may create insecurity for states. He argues that one way this happens is through ungoverned international mobility that violates state sovereignty and borders According to him, securitisation has always been around and is not linked to terrorism. He observed that due to the massive refugee flows that were experienced in the aftermath of the cold war, "governments may force emigration as a means of achieving cultural homogeneity or asserting the dominance of one ethnic community over another" (Weiner, 1993:98). In his argument, Karyotis posits that securitisation did not start after 9/11, but instead, it accelerated "dynamics that were already deeply rooted in the emerging European internal security regime" (2007:11). Drawing on these arguments, it can be said that migration made way into the international security agenda after the 9/11 attacks. The reaction of the United States of America (USA) coupled with the proliferation of counterterrorism measures thereafter sort of sanctioned the migration-terrorism link.

The enhanced securitisation of migration since the 9/11, and subsequent terror attacks by terror organisations globally, especially in Europe, resulted in states adopting a myriad of institutions with the sole aim of managing irregular migration flows some of which doubled up as counterterrorism measures. Notably, Europe that was known for its open border policies, bought into the new norm, and turned to adopting restrictive migration policies. This paradigm shift became more prevalent after the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks as Europe felt to be targeted too. At the supranational level, immigration and asylum made it top onto security agenda at the United Nations (UN) table. More than ever before, refugees and asylum are linked to terrorism as many UN resolutions on terrorism prominently feature refugees and asylum seekers. Terrorism is now being used by many states as a justification for the adoption of strict immigration policies. As Godwin-Gill notes:

> "The already restrictive, hostile and generally repressive measures which states were already taking towards refugees and asylum seekers-such as mandatory detention, denial of support, denial of access to procedures, denial of legal services and representation aid to appeals, and government-government agreement on removals-have been given spurious justification by the terrorism agenda. For some states (or rather for some governments) that has been an opportunity to introduce yet more stringent laws and policies, often in the aftermath of a terrorist incident, but generally under a carefully constructed cloud of fear" (2008:7).

The most pressing question that has preoccupied migration scholars is whether migration has really been securitised and its implications on the contemporary society. For some, migration is indeed a security issue in the contemporary society (Choucri, 2002; Huysmans, 2006; van Munster, 2009; Koser, 2011). To support this argument, Adamson (2006) opines that, migration is an international issue which brings into play border management and border regimes, hence; states must, as a critical matter address problems of irregular migration and human trafficking. In addition, once inside the borders of a host country, migrants are perceived as a potential threat to livelihood opportunities and the distribution of scarce social services, as well as an additional burden on enforcement of the law and public order. For Huysmans (2006) migration becomes a security issue because of two factors: firstly, the change in the geopolitical context due to the end of the cold war, and secondly, the social economic and political changes as a result of globalisation.

Karyotis (2007) agrees with these assertions and drawing on the case of Greece he observes that, indeed migration has been securitised especially in instances where it is linked to terrorism. Huysmans who has extensively studied securitisation of migration in the EU, argues that state apathy towards immigrants is because they are perceived as a threat to "a collective way of life that defines a community" (2006: 45-46). In such a case, immigrants are seen as a catalyst for internal turmoil. Initially immigrants in the EU were perceived as a threat to livelihoods as they were portrayed as unthankful people taking advantage of the welfare system. As a result, a stiff competition for social goods ensued between citizens and the immigrants. For Lahav (2010), while securitization of migration is not a new, it is its linkage to criminality, that has formalised the nexus.

Contrast to the above stance, there are some scholars who are opposed to the idea of securitisation of migration. To them, migration has not been securitised at all. In fact, it is the dramatization of the migration issue by securitisation actors that makes it appear a threat to host societies (Léonard, 2007; Boswell, 20076; Léonard and Kaunert, 2020). Léonard argues that "it is the framing of migration as a security issue which gives it political priority and justifies the subsequent introduction of extraordinary legal, policing and policy measures to manage migration" (2007:12). She adds that, when migration is framed as a security issue, and migrants are depicted as dangerous objects that need drastic measures to manage them, normal societal challenges such as poverty, unemployment and crime are often then blamed on migrants. Boswell (2007) warns against making the presumptions that migration has been securitised, or the argument that 9/11 has intensified the process. She alludes that, it is the tailoring of the European Union's (EU) foreign policy around the issues of counter terrorism that has made it appear that migration has been securitised. To support her argument she observes that, in fact, "political discourse and practice in Europe have remained surprisingly unaffected by the terrorism threat" (2007:589). She draws the attention of critical security scholars to the "institutional interests and cognitive factors conditioning processes of securitisation (or non-securitisation), if we are to better understand whether or not migration has become articulated and addressed as a security problem in a post-9/11 context" (2007:593). While I agree with her proposition on the need to problematise rather than assume the securitisation process, I also observe that she does not take into consideration some of the key insights by critical security scholars.

As a result of the above outlined entrenched divide between the two schools of thoughts, some scholars argue that, whether migration has been securitised or not remains unresolved (Ullah and Huque, 2019; Ullah and Kumpoh, 2018). With the increasing securitisation of migration, many scholars have been preoccupied with the different approaches of understanding migration (Choucri, 2002; Collyer, 2006; Huysmans and Vicki, 2009). The diversity in the different perspectives on the migration-security nexus, ultimately reflects an entrenched disciplinary divide between migration and critical study scholars. Nevertheless, my study goes beyond the divide to question to what extent, by what means, and with what effects migration has been securitized in Kenya over the years. I envision that, answering these questions will help yield more productive and enriching knowledge on securitisation. The aim is to determine the impact of framing

migration in terms of security to migrants, especially in the way they understand, internalise, and respond to the securitisation. My argument is that, while the state centric perspective of security neglects migrants' security, migrants' experiences of the securitisation should not be unheeded.

To do so, this study draws on critical studies literature that focuses on migration governance especially the stringent migration measures that characterises border management. Some studies have focused on how migration has come to be associated with social ills such as terrorism, crime, diseases among others (Bigo 1998; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 2006) Scholars of critical studies like (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008) reiterate that in the post September 11 era, many states have adopted border controls that are a manifestation of authoritarian form of governmentality. Bigo (2002) argues that contemporary migration governance should be understood as a relationship between the restrictive migration policies and border practices, which is catalysed by surveillance and profiling mechanism. Other scholars have examined different aspect of securitisation such as the impact of exclusionary migration measures on migrants in the European context (Guild, 2003; Squire, 2009; Aradau et al, 2010; Lazaridis, 2011; Jones, 2012). Yet other scholars, have focused their attention on how technology and digital forms of surveillance and data management has been used in migration management (Lyon, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Amoore, 2006; Epstein, 2007; Huysmans and Buonofino, 2008; Ajana, 2013). Moeckli observes:

> "The securitisation of migration and the refugee policy permeates both the international and national level, manifesting itself in the tightening of immigration laws and the subordination of the immigration machinery to national security agencies. Automatically associating foreign nationals with the terrorist threat, these changes have profound impacts for the human rights of immigrants in western and non-western states" (2008: 460)

Another strand of literature that is important to this study, is on the "how" migration governance is undertaken by different states. For some securitisation scholars, it is all about exceptionalism politics or what Bigo (2002:2) calls "governmentality of unease". Huysmans and Buonifino (2008) refer to the use of violence to manage migration as "politics of unease". In such instances, the liberal states adopts migration measures that are meted through violence as a justification to secure

and defend its sovereignty. Some other scholars look at migration governance through the normal application of law (Basaran, 2008). In this study, I focus on migration governance in the context of "War on Terror", where migration governance is characterised by a myriad of surveillance techniques, through which migrants are depoliticized and placed within spaces of exception, and how such spaces of exception gradually become regularized and legalized within the polity. Thus, contemporary migration governance is characterised by regimes anchored on tougher border controls, restrictive domestic refugee regimes that are cold toward the rights of immigrants. For instance, creation of internal borders has become commonplace through the adoption of encampment policy which demarcates no go zones for immigrants. Such policies are used as an "othering" tool which characterizes refugees as a threat to themselves (Hovil, 2007), to their country of origin (Sommers, 2001) and to host states (Crisp, 2018). I draw our attention to the lived experiences of migrants who interact with the said policy measures and institutions. This dissertation explores what Marchand (2008) calls the "migration-insecurity nexus" by investigating the lived experiences of urban Somali refugee women amid securitisations. As we shall see, over the years the Kenyan government has continued to adopt draconian policies and measures in relation to asylum seeking. While the human rights implications of the said policies have attracted considerable attention both in academic and policy circles, the reaction of the refugees and asylum seekers have remained largely unexplored.

Yet again, there is a growing focus of IR scholar on the growing impact of migration in international politics, more specifically the interlinkage between global politics and migration. Among the key issues that are under interrogation is the impact of migration on international relations (Bourbeau 2002; Shain and Barth 2003), migrants' role in international political economy (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Balkian 2016), how globalisation shapes migration trends (Castles and Miller 2009) and the impact of the current unfolding reality of the Coronavirus on mobility (Kainz, 2020; Dickerson and Jordan 2020; Mbiyozo, 2020; Mora and Rutkowski 2020). Some other scholars have been preoccupied with migration magnitudes and the growing feminisation of migration (Meyer, 2016; Le Goff, 2016; O'Neil, Fluery and Foresti, 2016; Maymon, 2017). Mbiyozo (2018) and Balkian, (2016) assess the place of gender and identity in migration and assert that, these are critical factors that shape the migratory journey and experiences outside the state-centric perspective of migration. Hansen (2002) talks of 'the two blind spot' to

draw our attention of how securitisation eliminates gender as an important aspect in international politics. While acknowledging the importance of the above contributions, my study does to some extent focus on the migration policies that governments adopts to deal with migration flows. However, its scope goes further to include the reaction of migrants to the punitive measures. In sum, the study aims to unearth the nuances that characterise the response and interactions between state machinery and urban Somali refugee women in particular. This is despite the growing concern of terrorism.

In the Kenyan context, a growing strand of literature has sought to examine the issue of state control and mobility of people. Some have questioned the motivations behind the adoption of the restrictive refugee regime (Abuya, 2007; Maina, 2019; Mwangi, 2018; Wairuri, 2018; Žák, 2020). Abuya argues that a critical historical analysis of the global and regional security dynamics is vita in understanding the securitisation of migration in Kenya. As a matter of fact, refugee regimes are shaped by particular social and political context. This is buttressed by Lambo's (2012) analysis of the post-cold war era and how the global dynamics shaped migration governance. According to Abuya "history serves to remind us from where we came and of the road ahead, as well as the possible consequences of the measures taken" (2007: 53). A critical factor that is explored in this study is the use of state violence and collective violence in migration management. This according to Lind et al (2017), Branch (2011) and Whittaker (2015), has become historically embedded, and a convenient tool employed by the government in the seclusion of Somalis in the pre- and post-independence. The segregation of ethnic Somalis which was later extended to Somali refugees has caught the attention of many scholars. Lind et al (2017) explores the interconnection in the modalities of state violence in the colonial and post-colonial era by the different Kenyan presidents. Branch (2014) interrogated the various discriminative polices regarding business, taxation, and movement in the North Frontier District (NFD) that were used against ethnic Somalis. He notes a punitive and degradative approach to the management of Somali people in a way that portrays them as the 'other'. Similar observations are made by Lochery (2012) who explores how identity and ethnicity plays out when it comes to accessing national identity cards among Somalis.

The role of terrorism in shaping migration governance in Kenya has been explored as well (Voppen, 2017; Mwangi, 2018; Hurlbert, 2020). Hurlbert (2020) maintains that the current

punitive refugee regime in Kenya was born out of the domestic pressure to provide security for the Kenyan people against Al shabaab. Maina's (2019) assessment of the refugee regime development in Kenya highlights the punitive measures that ebbs with war on terror. Freeman observes that "Kenya's governmental responses and shifts in policy and practice have tended to accelerate in the immediate aftermath of Al Shabaab attacks. During these times, security and nationalist discourses are used to justify such moves" (2019: 92). Some studies contend that, the restrictive regime has not solved the security concerns in the country (Mwangi, 2018: Wairuri, 2018; Voppen, 2017). Instead, according to Breidlid, (2021) and Ngirachu, (2014), the government is using the exclusionary discourse to push political interests. This is evidence by the Somali refugees whose presence in the cities is argued to provide networks for the Al shabaab terror group to organise and execute terror activities in the country (Botha, 2014). Thus, over the years, the Kenyan government has adopted a highly restrictionist rhetoric against internal mobility of refugees through the adoption of the encampment policy. Despite its generosity in hosting large numbers of refugees, Kenya's porous borders coupled with high corruption among security and migration officers, remains a big challenge in containing refugees to the camps (Carrier, 2016; Foulds, 2016; Mwangi, 2018; Freeman, 2019). Through various public announcements the Kenyan government continues to prioritise the security dimension of the refugee regime. In the last two decades, Kenya's fragile security environment coupled with numerous terrorists has offered the Kenyan government an entry point in justifying surveillance, policing and regulation of migration (Balkian, 2016, Mwangi, 2018; Žák, 2020). The government rationalises the use of restrictive measures on refugees because they are perceived as a threat to national security. This is evidenced in the way the refugee policy has been merged with national security (Freeman, 2019). As the Kenyan government through its various security agencies execute exclusionary measures against these refugees, the surveillance regime relies on refugees to reproduce its disciplinary aspect.

From the discussion above, the criminalisation of migration is not a Kenyan issue but rather, as migration literature show, the post September 11 period has been characterised by the use of migrants as scapegoats (Bigo, 2002, 2008). This is manifested in the way restrictive migration polices have been adopted in many parts of the world (Karyots, 2007; Boswell, 2007, Bourbeau, 2014). Apparently, the construction of asylum as a security in Kenya does not solve tangible security issues but rather addresses the public fear and anxiety. (Botha, 2014; Voppen, 2017).

Botha further notes that between 2011 and 2015 Kenya suffered over 100 terror attacks resulting in the locals calling on the government to take drastic measures towards the terrorism threats. In addition, regulation of asylum has used by politicians to gain political millage especially around election time. For instance, during the 2017 elections campaigns, the Jubilee Government was put on the spot by opposition leaders and the masses for failing Kenyans by allowing terrorists to attack Kenyans. In summary, refugees and asylum seekers are portrayed as security threats not to solve security problems facing the country but rather for other political and economic reasons. While this scholarship has provided a space for continued interrogation of the migration-security nexus, there is a dearth of studies that unpack this nexus in the African context let alone theorisation of migrant's experiences.

Closely related to the objective of this study, is the scholarship that underscores the interlinkage between securitisation and rights and safety of migrants. Using the case of Greece Khayrotis (2012) observes that security practices impacts the asylum-seeking process. Similar observations are made by Mbiyozi (2018) about female migrants who face xenophobic in south Africa as a result of punitive migration practices. Hammerstad (2014) explores the complex but significant links between South Africa foreign policy towards Zimbabwe and immigration policies towards Zimbabweans, and how the complexities results in xenophobia. Balkian's (2016) study of the Somali refugee in Kenya reveals how security practices have execrated the exploitation of Somali refugees in Nairobi turning them into 'Walking ATMs". Freeman (2019) examines securitisation of migration in Kenya and concludes that, it has adversely impacted the human security of migrants. Voppen (2017), Ngirachu (2016) and Omondi (2017) highlight the growing challenge of accessing livelihood and social services among the refugee community in the city. Focusing on the political elite discourse, Voppen (2017) argues that government led securitisation against Somali refugees has heightened since the deployment of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into Somalia. In my analysis of the Kenya's securitisation regime, I recognise the importance of national, regional, and global social and political factors and underscore the role of various agents in the securitisation process. Taking the debate further, Samora (2013) analyses how securitisation impacts the lives of native Somalis who live and work among Somali refugees. These scholarly contributions provide an understanding of the securitisation process and possible effects. However, they mainly focus on the why and the agents involved. As they do so, a common trend is the

presentation of an explanatory model of securitisation from the perspective of the elite. Consequently, these studies are silent on the role of migrants in the process. Despite the advances in gender and migration scholarship, some other aspects of migrant's experiences, like shall be demonstrated in this thesis, calls for further inquiry. The objective of this study of is to draw attention to Somali refugee women's subaltern experiences through validation of their voices and retrieval of their narratives. This is done in a manner not to necessarily elevate them as heroes nor underestimate the oppressive nature of migration governance architecture.

1.3.2 Gender, Migration and Security

African migration has for a long time been viewed from the male lens. This was evidenced by the exclusion of women experiences in migration literature According to feminists' gender can be defined as "a set of socially constructed characteristics describing what men and women ought to be", in contrast to sex which is a biological trait (Tickner and Sjøberg, 2007: 196). For them gender is a social and cultural construction that varies across time and place (Tickner, 1992). Youngs observes that says, "the concept of gender keeps to the fore the relational nature of categorizations of male and female and signals the importance of not taking either as given or necessarily natural." (2004:77). In Africa, the concept gained academic and policy research attention in the early 1960s and 1970s (Mbiyozo, 2018; O'Neil, Fleur and Foresti, 2016). Feminists maintain that to neglect gender is to "create a narrow conception of security and that it does not account for changing realities in international affairs" (Etten, 2014: 2). Even so, the complexity of the concept of gender has been widely discuses in IR feminist literature. According to Hooper:

> There is no consensus on either the nature or significance of gender identities, how they are produced, or whether they should be reinforced, modified, or abolished, even among feminists, who by no means have a monopoly on gender theory (2001:20).

A keen look at migration literature, reveals an unsystematic incorporation of women into refugee research and policies (Callarmad, 2003). This has been detrimental to the eradication of the structural challenges facing women empowerment on the African continent. The publication of the "UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women" (1991) and "Guidelines on Sexual Violence" (1995) shows a positive paradigm shift on the gender debate. The early 1990s saw the

adoption of not only these gender specific policies, but also and increase scholarly attention to gender and refugee women (Kibreab, 2004; Crawley, 2001; Forbes Martin, 2004). According to Mbiyozo (2018) more women are migrating independently on the continent which has resulted in the "feminisation of migration". It is therefore imperative, for scholars to study the intersection between migration and gender to provide an understanding of the resultant vulnerabilities of the migratory process. This is important as migration trends for women are dynamic and continue to evolve. The historical presentation of women as individuals with less autonomy in migration has since been overtaken with time. Migration literature mainly focused on gendered causes as well as consequences of migration.

When it comes to gendered causes of migration, scholars highlight various reasons such as the desire for a better life among others. Jaji's (2012) study on urban self-settled Somali refugee women in Nairobi, highlights factors such as political persecution, need to maximize one's potential and escape from poverty as some of the reasons why the women move to the cities. Similar observations are made by (Madhavani and Landau, 2011) and (Mbiyozo, 2018) who contend that search for livelihoods is a key determining factor in the mobility of the refugees from counties of origin and or from the camps to the cities. In addition, refugees may migrate to cities in order to escape from the physical insecurity (Maina, 2019; Davis, 2016) and other sexual based violence such as rape (Hyndman 2000; Milner 2006) that is rampant in the camps. Most importantly, the outlined factors play out differently for refugee men and women. Observably, the gender differences in roles and relations coupled with the structural patriarchal inequalities in the African context have an impact on the migratory process. This according to Lindley (2007) is across board the receiving, transit and receiving countries. A study by the International Rescue Committee (2020) argues that conflict which is a major cause of refugee flow on the continent alters family structures and social networks. During civils strife societies are destroyed and, in some cases, women may be forced to take up family responsibilities which they are not socialised into. Being the sole breadwinner or a household head is some of the responsibilities that women assume, yet they are hardly prepared. Jegede (2012) also argues that during conflict women are at ahigh risk of being raped, recruited as slaves and soldiers.

In terms of the gendered ramifications of migration, O'Neil, Fleury and Foresti (2016) content that, while the number of women migrating for various factors has grown in leaps and bounds, both the positive and negative impacts cannot be ignored. For instance, while migration may be a means to access livelihoods and other opportunities for the betterment of the family, it equally has its own risk and vulnerabilities for refugee women. Similar observations are made by Pophiwa (2014) who notes that, refugee women's movement trends and experiences in general differ from those of men refugees. The same applies to push and pull factors that characterize their migration. Women are vulnerable to abuse and have a higher chance of facing risks such as trafficking and sexual exploitation. This is especially common in what Mbiyozo (2018:3) refers to as the 'less-regulated and less-visible' spaces which expose women to 'triple discrimination which is a nexus between 'Xenophobia, racism and patriarchy'.

In her study of the protracted displacement and its impact on remittances in Eastleigh, Lindley (2007) argues that migration has inherent ability to shift gender relations. For instance, the livelihood opportunities that migration accords refugee women, empowers which then alters gender relations in their favor. Milner holds a contrary view as he notes "migration can also entrench traditional roles and inequalities and expose women to new vulnerabilities as the result of precarious legal status, exclusion and isolation" (2006:2). In sum, while access to livelihoods can be empowering to refugee women, the migratory journey and process is characterized by risks which increases refugee women's vulnerability. For instance, in their study on Malta refugee women Salt and Pickering (2013) observe that, refugee women are exposed to various risks before and during transit as well as in the host state. Before transit, women are faced with gender biased patriarchal structures which may frustrate their decision to migrate.

In Africa, the patriarchal structure creates inequalities and hierarchies which impact the decision to migrate. Lindley (2007) argues that usually since the needs of men and women are dissimilar, this affects how, why and the length of migration. Boyd and Grieco (2003) adds that, gender shapes the migratory decision-making process as it determines reasons why individual migrate, who should migrate as well as the consequences of migration on the migrants themselves. For example, the role of women as caregivers in the households may ultimately motivate or discourage migration. During transit, refugee women are exposed to various vulnerabilities and risks such as

verbal, sexual, and physical abuse. Using the case study of South Africa, Mbiyozo (2018) postulates that, at their destination, refugee women encounter risks such as poor housing, sexual abuse, precarious legal status, and low wages. All in all, Waiganjo (2018) observes that, each refugee mobility situation is unique as it is shaped by the culture of the migrants, the culture of the host communities and the nature of the pull and push factors that necessitated the refugee flow. Challenges such us difficulties in attaining refugees' status, culture shock or apathy from the host community cuts across all genders. Even so, it is the combination of the various outlined factors that make refugee women the most vulnerable globally (Ibid)

In the Kenyan context, similar observations have been made about Somali refugees. While highlighting the insecurity facing Somali refugees and girls in camps, the former Director of United Nations (UN) remarked that "women are raped in their homes, in the bushes and many times on the roads." "New arrivals don't have shelters to sleep in and end up sleeping in the open outside the camps, exposing themselves to security risks." (UN Women, 2011:651). According to Eveliina (2015), the tendency of governments and UNHCR to focus on basic service provision, has resulted in minimal attention being given to the real threats that refugees face in host settings. For instance, the Somali refugee women that flee from conflict have found themselves in host settings with no guarantee of refuge. They are caught up in a kaleidoscope of violence whereby they escape from a particular type of violence from their country of origin and end up experiencing another type during transit and at their destination. Urban refugee women are no exception as they take up the non-traditional roles of being family heads as well the discrimination that comes with the refugee status (Freeman, 2019). In Nairobi, where security agents actively employed by the government in refugee management, refugee women face arbitrary arrests, sexual and verbal assault among others forms of abuse (Foulds, 2016. Balkian, 2016, Mwangi, 2018). Besides, the competition for the meagre resources and livelihood options in the cities has strained family relations thus leading to high domestic violence.

Securitisation of migration further complicates the refugee women situation in urban areas. In Kenya where the government enforces the encampment policy, the refugee women are exposed to several agents who play out in their experience of violence. They include the security agents, gangs, terrorists, fellow refugees, and the host community. Elsewhere Wigget (2013) has argued

that the breakdown of society as a result of conflict or war lessens the pressure on men as security providers but ultimately places the burden to cater for one's security on women. Even before migration to the host state, women play a subordinate role in their families and communities. For Somali refugee women, leaving the camp means placing themselves outside the refugee protection architecture. They operate in limbo as their protection is no longer in the hands of UNHCR or the Kenyan government. Living as de facto illegal migrants in the city coupled with the securitisation further entrenches their subordination and vulnerabilities. Similar observations are made by HRW (2000) study of refugees in Tanzania. The report reads "the collapse of traditional societal support mechanisms…in particular communal support systems for the protection of vulnerable individuals may no longer be present" (2000: 131). The change in gender roles is also affects men who are either left behind as their wives move to the city or vice versa. Wiggett remarks, "refugee men may have a difficult time in accepting either the new role of women or their own inability to support fully their families" (2013:15). This conflict or interchange of social roles may lead men in exerting their dominance over refugee women especially where they feel emasculated.

According to Mertus (2004), the fact that women occupy the subordinate role in the society makes them an easier target for violence and abuse. This is especially since they face a challenge if accessing resources necessary to combat the abuse. This is buttressed by Shalhoub-Kevorkian, (2009) study of the Palestinian families. In this study, it was revealed that, to navigate sexual abuse, early marriage or limitation of women ability has been embraced in this community. According to Kihatso (2007) a gendered approach to the study of migration is important in explaining the complexities of refugee women's lives. She notes "women have agency in the migration process, they actively participate in making decisions to move, enter relationships that have strategic benefit and, in some cases, consider themselves less vulnerable than me." (Kihatso, 2007:417). While there has been growing attention on the experiences of refugee women in Africa, some aspects remain unexplored. Scholarship on securitisation of migration and how restrictive migration regimes add to the vulnerability of refugee women is still limited. Global scholarship on securitisation of migration demonstrates that "immigrant women are often trapped in abusive relationships largely through migration policy, language impediment, lack of finance and cultural and social isolation" (Hiralal, 2017:3). Kallivayalil (2010) study of South Asian American refugee women argues that gender-based violence is shaped by their experience in the host community as

well as cultural norms in which in this case refers to the patriarchal ideologies. Kiwanuka's work on the intersection of gender she notes, "indirectly, the state functioned to fuel intimate partner violence among migrant women through policies related to immigration legislation that are aimed at policing and deporting undocumented migrants in South Africa and that limit access to some essential services in the absence of legal documentation" (Kiwanuka 2010: 177). Other physical commences of gender-based violence among refugee women as highlighted by Hynes and Cardozo (2000), included; exposure to sexually transmitted diseases, homicide, unwanted or early pregnancy and serious injuries. Pittaway and Bartolomei (2018) focus on the psychological consequences of violence against refugee women such as suicide and mental health problems.

Another strand of literature highlights the dearth of the legal channels to report the violence against refuge women. To begin with, most refugees in the city have adopted invisibility as a coping strategy. Coming out to report violence to the police carries a possibility of the arrest because of illegally staying outside the camp (Balkian, 2016; Mwangi, 2018). This, however, only applies to those who did not get authorisation from the camp officer when leaving the camp. Statistically, most of the refugees and even the respondents interviewed in this study are in the city illegally (Žák, 2020). The ignorance of the legal systems that govern refugee rights and protections coupled with the unresponsive international and local refugee bodies also make it hard for refugee women to access justice in the face of violence (Human Rights Brief Volume, 2000). Dynamics of securitization of refugee women consistently victimises them and entrenches the discrimination of the refugee status. Rather than finding safety in the host state, they become a target of government machinery and ridicule of the host communities who portray them as a threat (Gerard, 2014). While this unfolds, their experiences remain unknown as they are overshadowed as their portrayal as threats is amplified by securitisation actors and the media. The linkage of urban Somali refugees with terrorism, means that their refugee status is undermined and access to protection politicised. The objective of this study is to present an understanding of the plight of urban Somali refuge women amid securitisation which is largely unknown.

Most importantly as Malkki (1997) argues, apart from being gendered, the refugee status is inherently heterogenous as it comprises diverse individuals encompassing various characteristics such as nationality, race, social class, economic and political backgrounds. My study sought to

explore the experience of urban Somali refugee women within the framework of diversity and heterogeneity. The respondents were mainly the self-settled urban Somali refugee women in a country that has adopted a stringent refugee regime and to what extent the regime impacts on their safety and well-being. This is against the background of literature on securitization has far adverse ramification on migrants' rights and safety in Africa and the globe. of migration which shows that the problem with securitized migration regimes. Certainly, the defiance of the encampment policy and mobility to Nairobi can be deemed as refugees voting with their feet against securitization.

1.3.3 Adaptive Strategies of Urban Somali Women Refugees to the Securitisation

The recognition of the migration-security nexus calls for the interrogation of the responses of the migrants to the securitisation process. International Relations experts need to join their counterparts from the fields of psychology, social work, and criminology in exploring the concept of performativity and agency among migrants. Psychology boasts of a vast literature that seeks to explore how individual face adversities, conflict, or failure (Crush et al, 2017, Bimba, 2017). A number of migration scholars have also touched on this particular subject. Some have examined how refugee women overcome the dynamics of asylum-seeking process (Carrier and Lochery, 2013, Mbiyozo, 2018). Others have explored strategies refugee women adopt to access livelihood and social services at their destination. In their study, Madhavan and Landau (2011) emphasize the importance of social capital in migrants' mobility. They identify two types of social capitals including homogenous capital which encompass "tightly knit groups with whom the individual shares certain exclusive characteristics such as ethnicity, nationality, and kinship are often described as possessing "bonding capital" (Woolcock 2001). The second type is the bonding capital which refers to "interactions among kin, friends, and fellow citizens" (Madhavan and Landau, 2011:475). Most importantly is the value of "thick trust" that necessitates the functionality of these social capital (Aguilera and Massey 2003).

In a study of the Somalis in Nairobi, Mutiso et al (2019) found out that they fundamentally rely on their lineage and clans for support. While recognising the importance of social networks as an integral adaptation strategy for Somali refugees, Iazzolino and Hersi (2019) contends that, the support received is not homogenous. This stems from the fact the kind of support or protection offered is dependent on the strengths of one's social network. Some clans may be more dominant

and powerful than others. A study of refugees in Hargeisa shows that migrants who belong to somewhat powerful networks and clans are never considered "newcomers' on arrival (Maria et al, 2017). Another observation is that migrants from clans and lineages from south central Somalia are likely to face discrimination, high unemployment, and insecurity upon arrival in Hargeisa. Maria et al's (2017) study on migrates in Beirut concludes that identity based social networks maybe critical for the survival of migrants but therein lies the inherent inequality. For instance, there have been tensions between migrants from what is considered the dominant lineages in Beirut and those from smaller clans. This is because of the perceived marginalisation of those with weaker identity ties as they face challenges in accessing resources and security. These findings corroborates Iazzolino and Hersi (2019) conclusion that the informal nature of social capital breeds fragmentation and pluralisation of authority. The use of social capital among Somali refugees in Nairobi is limiting in the sense that it does not allow for large scale mobilisation. Instead, refugee women are depended in individualised networks for survival.

Closely related to the above is economic partnerships. Crush et al, (2017) study on female Somali migrants reveals a deliberate move to avoid setting up business in crime zones or areas that residents are likely to be targeted by perpetrators of xenophobia attacks. Access to livelihood is important for survival of refugees in the city. Waiganjo (2018) highlights the challenges that refugee women face in Xenophobia-Afrophobia townships. He observes that the Somali refugee women are forced to employ male salespersons to run the businesses on their behalf. To cushion themselves form any potential financial risk of incurring loses, the refugee women have formed merry go rounds that offer support to members. Just like in Hargeisa, Egypt and Johannesburg, the Somali refugee community is well known for their business niches (Pophiwa, 2014, Maria et al, 2017; Mbiyozo, 2018, Iazzolino and Hersi, 2019). In Nairobi, Eastleigh has come to be known as 'the little Mogadishu'. In Johannesburg the 'Somali Place' is located right being the Home Affairs office in Pretoria.

Residing and setting up businesses in these business niches is important for security reasons. Maxwell observes that "although businesses do not bring more returns as in the locations, setting their businesses at that place was a way of negotiating a safe place" (Waiganjo, 2018:214). Usually as Carrier (2019) has observed, the Somali places are characterised by 'Somaliness". The Somali

culture, language food and naming of business is evident in these settings. Hence, importation of the Somali culture into the host settings has been identified as an adaptive strategy. The social and cultural norms demand the domestication of women. As such women are to keep away from the public (Shaffer 2013; AlSharmani 2007; Cawo 2014; Jinnah 2010). However, as this study shows, such punitive patriarchal norms are detrimental to the safety and rights of refugee women. As Mharaj and Memera (2018) notes, this kind of seclusion may either hinder or facilitate access to livelihoods and other social services especially in a transnational territory. To navigate transnational territories, studies show that refugee women embrace education at a tool of self-development (Waiganjo, 2018;Mbiyozo, 2018; Carrier 2019). Education serves to help one access good jobs, increase their capacity to participate in family decision making, and boost one's confidence, freedom, and dignity.

Research shows that refugees are likely to develop stress related disorders from myriad of factors (Riki, 2004; Johnson 2005; Brandt et al 2019). Trauma coping which refers to the capacities to deal with the mental and psychological trauma. Arev (2018) explores those various resources that migrants use to deal with their stress during their journey and settlement in the host state. Mcarthur (2013) he argues that one's capacity is depended on the type and extent of resources that refugees have before they leave their country of origin. To him, "while it is important to understand and address mental health problems of refugees, it is also respectful to honour their capacity for resilience and to foster positive adaptation by helping them obtain and protect internal and environmental resources" (2013:47). Mbiyozo's (2018) study on Somali women refugee in south Africa, reveals that, through sharing their traumatic experience with families' friends and acquaintances, the refugee women are able to keep their sanity. Seeking help from organisations such as the Action Support Centre, female migrants in Durban engage in various social activities such as narrating self-experiences accounts, songs, and poetry (Memela and Maharaj, 2018).

Resorting to 'denialism' (Goldstein 2001) has been found to be counterproductive. Babugura (2007) contents that mental health requires that migrants talk about what is considered "unspeakable" part of their migrant experiences. Platforms like the South African Somali Women Networks has provided refugee women a safe space to narrate their stories as a way to recollect and build their lives. Similar platforms are provided for by the UNHCR office in Nairobi, that has

a trauma desk that refugee can report violence and psychosocial and legal assistance (Jaji, 2014) Johnson (2005), recognises the adverse consequences that trauma has on refugee women's lives. Social media platforms have come to be recognised as platforms that offer refugees a safe space to talk about their traumatic experiences. Pottie et al (2020) studies how social media is critical in information sharing. It does not only allow families and relatives to connect and help each other, it is also used to share available opportunities for jobs.

While the above scholarship provides an understanding of how refugee women cope in urban areas, they are too general. My study is context specific in the sense that it seeks to explore adaptive response in a securitised setting. The study looks at these strategies as a form of resistance to the punitive refugee regime. Borrowing from other IR scholars, this study conceptualises resistance as the capacity of refugee women to challenge the subjectification in the hands of the power wielders who in this case is the Kenyan government and the patriarchal society (Bourbeau 2014, 2015). While doing so, I highlight the intersection between patriarchy and the securitisation regime. While presenting the narratives of Somali refugee women, the study also points out the positive and negative implications of the resistance. There are scholars who mainly focus on the positive implications of resistance (Bice, 2003; Joseph, 2013; Evans and Reid 2013). In contrast, some scholars argue that resistance especially violent protests can attract negative consequences such as arrest. For instance, Guillaume argues that, in IR "the tryptic [sic] constituted by resistance, the everyday and the international does not readily fit the idealized images of the international: the realm of exceptional events conducted by states and statesmen, or their proxies' (2011: 459). Security studies scholars emphasize that resistance whether subtle or otherwise may be used by migrants to contests a securitisation context (Bourbeau and Ryan 2018). Bourbeau adds that securitisation can be destabilising to migrants. Hence resistance to them is not means "to take the issue out of the security realm (i.e., to de-securitise it) but rather to build social and community resilience in the face of an increasingly securitised world" (2015:84). There is a considerable literature on violent resistance in the context of violence, human rights violation, and conflict. (Davis, 2012; Joseph, 2013; Ryan 2015; Malkk and Sinkkonen (2015). This study takes the debate further to allow for the theorisation of resistance in a securitisation context is important in providing a more nuanced and pragmatic account of Somali refugee women. This study will an

important step forward in theorising resistance which is important to IR scholars which centers around power.

1.4 Hypothesis of the study

The study demonstrates how the government of Kenya has over the years developed surveillance techniques to monitor, track and target Somali refugees. The study is guided by two hypothesises. To begin with, the punitive refugee regime has in the long run led to the infringement on the refugees' human security by allowing for extreme human rights abuse such as, arbitrary arrests, inhibit access to or damaging of livelihoods, torture, and extrajudicial killings. The hypothesis underlying this study is that the securitisation of urban Somali refugees in particular is related to a governmentality of unease (Bigo, 2002). This kind of governmentality of unease is rooted in exclusionary asylum discourse and exceptional measures which constraints internal mobility of Somali refugee women. The regime draws a boundary between norm and exception as well as propagates the deserving refugee politics.

To this end, the regime ensures there is a clear dichotomy between Somali refugee women and the rest. This is demonstrated in how the Somali refugees are portrayed as the most *undesirable* among other refugees hosted in the state. This boundary distinguishes and separates a sphere where the discourses of government articulate exclusionary discourse, which is applied through various policies and practices from a sphere where there is nothing, except anarchy and unending violence against refugee women. While this kind of construction does impact on the agency of Somali refugee women, they continuously concoct ways to resist the securitisation. The study hypothesises that while the refugee women may seem completely powerless and at the mercy of the Kenyan government, they have devised ways albeit subtle to negotiate the dynamics of the securitisation. The resistance is performed which ultimately results in new identities and realities.

1.5 Thesis Outline

This thesis is categorised in eight chapters outlined as follows:

Chapter one highlights the background, aims and objectives of the study. Chapter two outlines the theoretical framework that constitutes the guidepost of this study as well as contextualises the

major themes of the research. The chapter discusses the theories employed in the analysis of the experiences of urban Somali refugee women which include securitization, performativity, and feminist security.

Chapter three describes the methodology of the study. This chapter highlights the process, that is, both systematic and empirical methods that were employed in the course of the study. The chapter starts by reviewing the geographical and social as well as political settings of the study site. It also presents the research design and methodology, selection of participants, the data collection procedures, ethical considerations, and finally, data analysis interpretation and presentation techniques.

Chapter four explores the historical contextualisation of exclusion of Somalis in Kenya. In this chapter, I explore the historical prejudicial treatment of ethnic Somali population-and by extension Somali refugees- by the Kenyan state, which ultimately jeopardised their lived experience of asylum seeking, wellbeing and safety. To do so, the chapter provides a historical account of the restrictive policies and measures adopted by the colonial and post-independence regimes of presidents Kenyatta and Moi. It then provides critical analysis of the historical accounts in light of what is currently happening to Somali refugees in Kenya.

Chapter five explores the "Somalinisation" of terrorism in Kenya. To do so, the chapter examines the various terrorist attacks the country has experienced, and specifically those dating between 1998-2019, as well as the state's response to the attacks. The aim is to provide an understanding of why and how security-focused narratives/measures that depict Somali refugees as threatening, violent, and terrorists evolved and perpetuated by the Kenyan government, and its impact on refugee policy. Following Freeman's observation, the chapter affirms "that major terrorism attacks have led to an accelerated pace of refugee policy changes, human rights abuses (including extra-judicial killings and mass arrests), the unconstitutional removal of refugee services, coerced repatriations, and blaming 'outsiders' for social ills" (2019:93). The chapter illustrates how the many terrorists attacks Kenya has experienced, have impacted the refugee regime, and this is reflected in broad national security policies such as the anti-terrorism measures and various

concrete policies such as Usalama Watch and Nyumba Kumi[3] that have shaped the implementation of refugee regime.

Chapter six is based on ethnographic data generated from lived experiences accounts and documented conversation with Somali refugee women in Nairobi. This chapter sets out to challenge the dominant state centric perspective of migration and security. I echo Marchand assertion that, securitisation is clearly gendered, thus "creates different types of insecurity and violence for men and women, depending on their varying social and economic positions and the relations of power between them" (2008:1387). Drawing on one on one in-depth interviews with a selected number of urban Somali refugee women, the chapter analyses the implications of the securitisation regime on their individual as well as collective security.

Chapter seven adopts Lonsdale's (2000) concept of "agency in tight corners", to explore how the Somali refugee women as active and critical actors in the securitisation process, develop strategies in their everyday life to circumvent the restrictive regime, protect themselves from and resist it. The strategies explored here come in many varieties but are generally individualised, disguised, and anonymous. I argue that, by adopting these subtle strategies, the refugee women have adopted a form of resistance that, on the one hand, answers their needs of safety and wellbeing and, on the other, responds to the existing repressive securitisation regime. The lived experiences presented in this chapter, serve to provide a unique perspective of how refugees make meaning of securitisation and how they respond to it. Most importantly, the chapter shows that, the way in which urban Somali refugee women perceive, understand, and internalize the restrictive regime, determines how they ultimately respond to it.

Chapter eight outlines the conclusion and summary of the major arguments/key findings as well as recommendations for the study. The conclusion sums up the different arguments made in the thesis and also links them to broader discourses on gender and securitisation The concepts of securitisation, gender and performativity run through the chapters to demonstrate how urban Somali refugee women strategize, against Kenya's securitisation regime in order to build a life for themselves and their families in the city. The chapter summarizes and concludes the entire study

[3] Swahili word for Ten households

and presents theoretical reflections on securitisation, gender and security based on urban refugee women's experiences in Nairobi.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

This chapter explores the theoretical framework employed in explaining developments in asylum and immigration policy in Kenya, and its impact on urban Somali refugee women lives. They include securitisation performativity and standpoint feminist security perspective.

2.1 Securitisation Framework

The study applies insights from the Securitization Framework (SF) in examining to what extent, for what reason, in what context and with what effects immigration is constructed as a security issue in Kenya. I focus on two versions of securitisation drawn from existing literature. They include: the speech act approach by the Copenhagen School (CS) and the Foucauldian approach (also referred to the as sociological approach) by the Foucauldian school. Both approaches have been very critical in the reconceptualization of security which is important in understanding the migration-security nexus. Since both schools have invaluable contributions to the field of security studies, I will blend key arguments from both schools in my analyses of the securitization of urban Somali refugee women as a threat to Kenya's security. The two versions are discussed below.

2.1.1 The Copenhagen School Approach

According to Hammerstadt (2014), the CS focus has been on the discursive nature of security. The proponents of the school, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde posit that "securitization is understood as a speech act: by declaring an issue a matter of security, its urgency and priority becomes established. The issue is taken out of ordinary politics and into the sphere of emergency politics, where existential threats must be countered by urgent response and where exceptional measures (including violence) are justified due to the existential nature of the threat" (1998: 26). The aim was to challenge the narrow focus of the traditional state-centric definition of security/threat in military terms. The CS is considered the pioneer of constructivism and critical approaches which emerged to provide an expanded definition of security. According to these new approaches, the focus of the security referent has shifted from state to society where individual and multiple actors

are allowed to be engaged simultaneously in socioeconomic, historical, and political contexts (Hammerstadt, 2014). The CS provided a perspective that was a departure from the realist and neo realist perspectives, that had dominated security studies up to the end of the cold war. Khadiagala observes that "the decisive turn in new conceptions of global security came with the post-cold war perspectives on human security, in an attempt to transcend the previous fixation with state and military security by restoring the centrality of individuals, groups, and societies in the security enterprise" (2006:129).

Guided by a constructivist perspective, the CS maintains that security is a social construct which is shaped by a particular socio-political context (Buzan et al,1998). The CS argues that, the securitisation process has three important features which include: (a) a referent object which refers to who or what is being threatened, (b) securitisation actors who are the individuals who identify and declare the threat, and (c) the audience whose responsibility is to decide whether the declared threat need to be dealt through extraordinary means. When the audience agrees that indeed the issue is a threat, the securitisation actor then employs exceptional measures which may go against the established rules (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). However, I argue that securitisation is not necessarily "going against the rules". It is in fact the authoritarian application of rules. The study agrees with critics of the CS who argue that the speech act which is the epistemology of the Copenhagen school is too narrow to explain the securitisation process. According to Balzacq (2005) speech acts fail to recognize external threats because it focuses too much on internal threats. He further reiterates that; language does not construct reality but rather influences people's perception of reality. To him, securitisation is too complex a process to be constructed by discourses alone. Karyotis (2012) adds that, speech act fails to capture the reality of the dynamic process through which issues are raised on the security agenda. In this study, the speech acts will only be referred to in so far as it helps establish how they are being employed to reinforce seclusion of the Somali refugees in urban areas.

2.1.2 The Foucauldian School Approach

Following Foucault's concept of biopolitics, this approach defines securitisation as a process that is shaped by power relations, bureaucratic and institutional interests which determines which issues are threats, and which extraordinary measures to be employed in dealing with the threats.

(Wilkinson, 2007; Bigo 2002; Roe 2008; Stritzel 2011; Bourbeau, 2014). This approach posits that securitisation is beyond "dramatic speech acts, and more about controlling populations through bureaucratic procedures, surveillance and risk management—techniques of government" (Huysmans 2006:38). Just like the CS, the Foucauldian approach also maintains that exclusionary discourses and practices ultimately "create or reinforce divisions between 'us' and 'them', using the enemy 'other' on the outside as a tool for strengthening the community bonds between insiders" (Huysmans 2006:268). Both the CS and Foucauldian approach also agree with the fact that, securitisation is a highly political process which requires significant number of resources and planning to depict and deal with a threat. Through securitisation the state reinforces its control over its territory and citizenry.

The SF has been extensively used in migration and security studies especially after 9/11. In fact, the idea of securitization is now understood in several ways: as "a conceptual move, a framework of analysis, and an empirical and political theory of security" (Guzzini 2011:330). There is expansive literature where the SF has been used in analysing the process through which migration is constructed as a threat. For instance, among others, scholars have identified how states use the media in the securitisation process (Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008), what security practices are used to frame migrants as a threat (Basaran, 2008) and migration governance modalities (Bigo, 2002). This work adopts a constructivist and critical approach to analyse Kenya's securitisation regime, in which existential threats are defined in terms of state sovereignty and the "war on terror" ideology. While recognizing the fact that security studies have taken on a "global character" and that "international security is a relational matter" (Buzan et al. 1998: 9), this research limits its scope to Kenya. Besides, this study recognises the importance of the socio and political context that has shaped Kenya's securitisation regime. In particular, the relations of Kenya and Somalia are explored since the colonial days and how the rhetoric changes from Somalis being "rebels" in the pre-9/11 era to "terrorists" in the post 9/11 era. By so doing, this thesis provides an understanding of the application of the SF in an Afrocentric context as well as contribute to deepening the understanding of securitization as a theoretical concept.

2.1.3 Application of the SF to the Study

When applied to the Kenyan context the SF provides an "increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and,

not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is successful)" (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). The framework offers insight into how and why Somali refugees have become to be seen as security threats. Drawing on the work of prominent writers from the CS and Foucauldian School, this thesis provides an understanding of what takes place when migration becomes securitized. The primary point that should be taken from this work, is that threats, are not necessarily, or possibly are not ever, genuinely threatening to existence. Besides, securitisation, and the insecure society are not natural phenomena, they are created from political and social norms. Many times, securitized topics do not even pose a real threat, but instead, one that is imagined.

While accepting Balzacq's argument that the discursive component of the securitization might not represent the complete process, this thesis uses what he terms as the "standard securitization model", by adding that non-emergency discourses and relaxing the legitimization process, can adequately portray Kenya's securitization regime (2008:76-77). For this reason, this thesis draws on the strength of Bourbeau'stwo logics of securitisation-logic of exception and logic of routine[4]- to develop a dynamic and critical understanding of the securitization process and make the analyses of Kenya's securitised migration regime more useful to the "real" world (2014: 260). Therefore, by borrowing from critical thoughts of the Foucauldian school scholars (Bigo, 2002, Blazacq, 2008, Alder and Pouliot, 2008, Bourbeau, 2011, 2014), I argue that securitisation is a mainly a performance, that is, an act of doing security.

By so doing, I first of all, challenge the idea that exclusionary discourse is the "inescapable and exclusive initiator of the securitisation process. Since on some occasions, speech acts only seek to legitimise established security practices – even though these speech acts may be made under the umbrella of exception as if existing security practices were non-existent" (Bourbeau, 2014:194). I am also reminded of Alder and Pouliot's work where they argue that "not only is language the conduit of meaning, which turns practices into the location and engine of social action, but it is itself an enactment or doing in the form of "discursive practices" [...] discursive practices, thus, are socially meaningful speech acts, according to which saying is doing" (2008:396). Secondly,

[4]He defines logic of exception as 'speech acts that legitimise exceptional policies and practices in the face of an existential security threat, and logic of routine meaning' (), and the logic of routine as 'a process of securitisation consisting of a series of routinised and patterned practices, carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals, in which technology holds a prominent place' (Bourbeau, 2014:191).

conceptualisation of securitisation as a performance "helps to mitigate the strong tendency of the logic of routine to picture the securitisation process as flat. Critical moments, in which agents step out of routinised practices and habitual boundaries to transcend the field of action, do exist in contemporary world politics. On some occasions, political discourses represent a critical juncture or turning point that profoundly transforms security practices so that they are no longer routinised, unintentional and unreflective" (Bourbeau, 2014: 191). In line with the argument that, securitisation is a performance, the study explores the various modalities through which Kenya's political and security elites "perform" security. Lastly, even though the SF framework would seem to be an appropriate model for this research, a number of additional shortcomings and criticisms must also be acknowledged. Three of which are importance to this study include: the neglect of the voices of the less dominant in society, resistance, and the gender perspective.

2.1.4 Critique of the Securitisation Framework

Gad and Petersen identify three areas of criticism of the SF: "explanatory potential of the theory, the normative political implications resulting from the theory, and the inconclusive classification of normal and exceptional politics" (Gad and Petersen, 2011:316-317). This study is situated in the first area of criticism. Given that securitisation actors are the powerful in society, the experiences of the less dominant in global politics are cut almost completely from the framework, presenting them at best as part of an audience subject to a securitising move by a more powerful actor (McDonald, 2008). I note that, when this understanding of securitisation is applied in migration contexts, migrants are ignored from the process as they "are portrayed as passive protagonists and subjects of securitisation, who lack agency and a voice to impact upon how migration is framed and managed" (Mcsweeny, 1999:43). It rips them of their voice to challenge the exclusionary discourse and extra ordinary measures that are instituted against them. The focus on the urban Somali refugee women's resistance to the securitisation regime provides a critical yet overlooked perspective on migrants' experiences in the context of securitisation. Following this point of view, an alternative understanding of securitization from the vantage of the migrants is examined. The study argues that securitisation is a cyclic process with multiple actors. Through a compelling narrative that foregrounds migrant performative agency, the study presents urban Somali refugee women as important actors in the securitisation process. It also provides an understanding of "securitisation from below" which competes with the state centric notion of

securitisation. Through their everyday interaction with state power, urban Somali refugee women engage with the state as wilful and critical actors in international security. In this study, urban Somali refugee women's response to the restrictive regime though subtle can be a risky, both from the perspective of state stability and the human security of the refugees themselves.

Critical to this study, is the notable absence of resistance by securitisation scholars (Rose, 2006). In this thesis, resistance refers to a subaltern practice that defy or challenge powerful regimes (Scott, 1990). Indeed as (Widder 2003), remarks, traditionally, power and resistance have been considered as necessarily opposed a view, however, which is increasingly being neglected. I note that, a focus on resistance is critical because, not only is resistance shaped by existing power relations but it also, paradoxically, reinforces and/or creates power relations. Both the CS and Foucauldian school have devoted time on examining the process through which threats are constructed yet the deconstruction of threats remains largely under-theorised. Hence the intention of this study is to move beyond the confines of the logic of exception and logic of routine to explore another aspect of securitisation which is-resistance. To do so, I adopt the concept of "everyday resistance" that examines how urban Somali refugee women employ various performative acts to undermine the restrictive migration regime. The type of resistance explored in this study, differs from what Scott (1990) calls, "organised resistance" such as demonstrations or oppositional campaigns.

Most importantly, the experiences of urban Somali refugees explored in this study are centred on the "two blind spots" as identified by Hansen (2000) as a critique of the SF. They include: "security as silence" and "subsuming security". The former, security as silence, is a result of the Copenhagen School's epistemological reliance on speech acts, which causes a problem in situations in which the insecurity of an individual or group cannot be raised, either because they do not have the appropriate platform from which to do so, or because raising an issue as a security problem may increase the threat being faced by an actor attempting a securitising move (Ibid). This, Hansen argues, excludes gender form international politics. While this work agrees in part with Hansen's critique, that SF privileges the voices of elites and ignores the marginalized, the study argues that "silence" does not necessarily mean powerlessness. In fact, the narratives of urban Somali refugee women affirms Shorto's argument that "silence is not necessarily a sign of disempowerment, and that by portraying it as such, the various means by which silence can be used to challenge iniquities

are ignored" (2016:4). Glenn adds that, if silence is an absence of speech, it is an absence "with a function" (2004: 32). This work demonstrates many strategies through which "silence can play a crucial role in challenging oppressive regimes and social injustice in situations where direct, voiced challenges cannot succeed" (Gal, 1989:1). Among the many other strategies, the Somali refugee women have adopted various ways of using what I call "strategic silence" to challenge Kenya's securitisation regime.

Subsuming security is the resultant of the Copenhagen's Schools argument that a referent object is only threatened when declared so by a securitisation actor. This assertion is very challenging when it comes to determining whether gender can qualify as a referent object. Hansen (2000) argues that the fact that gender is usually subsumed under other categories such as nationality, ethnicity, religion among other, makes it difficult for it to be considered as a distinct referent object. For example, in the case of urban Somali refugee women, securitising gender runs counter to the "war on terror" ideology. Hence, while recognising intersectional nature of urban Somali refugee women experiences, the study argues that subsuming of gender under more dominant discourses such as "war on terror" is another means of silencing gender concerns.

To address the two critiques by Hansen (2000), the study recognises the role of performativity as espoused by Innes and Steel (2018). According to her, the study of non-speech acts allows for the consideration of individual experiences as well as the capturing of non-speech activities. I take note that, including the body acts in the analysis of securitisation has two implications. Firstly, even in cases of verbal silence, security might be "spoken" through performances. The study provides many instances where the refugee women challenge the government through non-verbal strategies. Secondly, introducing the bodily aspect of a speech act allows the theorisation of situations in which speech acts and the actions of the securitising actor do not line up, "highlighting the need to refocus discussion in the direction of the difference between the two" (Hansen, 2000:299-303). The performativity concept and its applicability to this study is explained in detail below.

2.2 Performativity

For many years, the discipline of IR has been faced with the task of defining what it means to "act". Alexander defines performativity as a "social process by which actors, individually or in concert, display for others the meaning of their social situation" (2006:32). Schechner (2004) posits that performances encompasses both every day and grand structured activities. Ringmar adds that, performances are meant to express messages and as such "the actors borrow meanings from discourse, reaffirm these meanings through their performance, and then return them to discourse as the audience interprets the events staged before them" (2012:2). Performativity as a concept is used in this study so as to understand the everyday resistance of urban Somali refugee women to the securitisation regime. The argument is that the performative response by these refugees is subjective, as is largely depended on their understanding of the intention of the regime and their need to survive in urban areas. Most importantly, I recognise the role of agency in performativity.

This study follows a definition of agency as a "temporally embedded engagement by actors of different structural environments [...] which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing situations" (Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 970). Anderson and Ruhs argue that migrant agency should not be oversimplified to imply "choice" as has been in many policy discussions. Instead, agency should encompass "understanding decision making, the room for manoeuvre, opportunity structures and migration trajectories within the contexts of modern nation-states and the global capitalist system" (2010:178). In the case of Somali refugee women, I argue that agency is not about choice but rather, how even while in the state of exception, faced with astounding levels of seclusion, they continue to resist, find room for negotiation, and undermine the restrictive regime. Therefore, I conceive agency as a contestation of surveillance and discrimination by the restrictive regime.

It is important to note that, agency is a dynamic issue which can be challenging to delimit. For instance, answering the following questions may be problematic: what actions constitutes agency? Should agency be determined by the outcome of the actions? What criteria determines agency? While these are important question to ponder about, the aim of this study was not to find definitive

answers, but rather, to show that urban Somali refugee women are important actors in international security and not "the less dominant" as portrayed by top-down model of securitisation. In so doing, the story of these women provide a counter argument against Eurocentric literature that tends to portray women form the global south as helpless and hopeless without agency (Cumbers et al. 2010). Hence, when the refugee women shared their stories of everyday resistance, I construed this as agency and explored how their narratives portrayed agency as well as the resultant ramifications of their resistance. Since the kind of resistance strategies, the refugee women engaged in, did not necessary overhaul the restrictive regime, I suggest that the outcomes of people's actions should not be used as a criterion for determining agency. I was guided by Emirbayer and Mische's argument that agency transcends favourable outcomes because "people's actions may transform or reproduce structures" (1998:972). The aim of this study is not to determine the superiority of state control over refugee women, as espoused in the works of Agamben (1998) or those scholars that borrow heavily from his thoughts, or the superiority of refugee women's defiance of the encampment over the restrictive regime as espoused in the "autonomy of migration" literature (Brassett and Vaughan-Williams, 2013). Instead, I examine the intersection between agency of the Somali refugee women, and the disciplinary sovereign power of the securitisation regime where contestation and ambivalence prevail (McNevin 2013).

In the analyses of urban Somali refugee women's resistance, I recognize them as knowing and reflexive individuals who make sense of the securitisation regime, and exercise their agency to attempt to transform themselves, others, or their environments in an effort to secure their well-being. They perform their subjectivities in a number of different ways, including what I call performance of disciplinary resistance, disguised compliance, strategic silence, politics of mystification, and self-definition and development. In sum, performativity as a concept is critical because it offers a means to reconceptualize securitisation without excluding migrants or castigating them as a threat or reducing them to a passive subject position.

2.3 Standpoint Feminist Security Perspective

Feminist scholars argue that the international system is predominantly "male-centric" which raises a normative and empirical challenge. They advocate for the inclusion of women's experiences and gender as an analytical category in security studies. According to Tickner (2005), a comprehensive

definition of security will only be achieved by acknowledging the gender-hierarchical nature of global political structures as well the inclusion of experiences of women in the analysis of security. Security from the feminist point of view, is defined in terms of emancipation and empowerment. Tickner defines security as "diminution of all forms of violence, including physical, structural and ecological" (1997:625). At the heart of feminist thinking is the rejection of the state centric definition of security in favour of the individual or community-based perspective (Roe, 2014). For this reason, feminist scholars constantly question the state as the main security provider. While it acknowledges that the state provides some form of security, the gender perspective is concerned with the expectation of the subject subservience. This is because having a state as the main a security provider, impedes the ability and voice of individuals in the identification of insecurity or creation of their own security. According to the feminist perspective, acknowledging the state as the sole provider of security has two critical ramifications. To begin with, state violence becomes a normalised and legitimate means of those who are seen as a threat to state security. This implies that, the use of state violence against those labelled as terrorists or irregular migrants becomes acceptable. Secondly, in line with Innen's (2016) argument, when the state is the main provider of security, security of the state means security of the individual-which is not always the case. This relegates those individuals who face insecurity within what is considered a secure state.

According to Basch security needs to be linked to empowerment of the individual since, "victimization and agency are seen as two parts of a reality that should be addressed together rather than as opposites, as is usually the case" (2004:7). She adds that the goal of security should be about "freeing individuals and groups from the social, physical, economic and political constraints that prevent them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (Basch, 2004:9). By re-centring security, individuals become the referent object and their subjective experienced is acknowledged. The assumption is that women's experience of global politics differs from the male-centric field of security studies (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2007).

Feminist scholars also conceptualise security as a process as opposed to an ultimate goal to be achieved. According to Tickner (2005) this process involves identifying the structural inequalities as well as finding ways are produced and reproduced by the global political system. Feminist thinkers maintain that these structural inequalities infiltrate the social and political settings of the society which results in the insecurity of individuals especially women. In their

reconceptualization of security, feminist thinkers also disregard the idea that insecurity is the lack of security which can be resolved by simplify providing some form of material security. Instead, to them security is "an ongoing process that is subjective, temporally and contextually contingent, and constituted through varied experiences of identity, social and cultural relations, power and violence" (Innes, 2016:6). Context is very critical in the reconceptualization of security since human agency is depended on and shaped by context. A state centric definition is very limiting as feminist thinkers argue that such a perspective ignores the role of context (context could be war, conflict, violence, marginalisation among others). In the case of Somali refugee women, securitisation and patriarchy are the contexts through which they have to navigate.

This study argues that the experiences of urban Somali refugee women can be understood from the "standpoint" of women. This perspective emphasises the unique nature of men and women experiences and "that women are, by and large, underprivileged relative to men and experience reality through work in ways men often do not, can thus be useful for understanding the experiences of women within a broadened security framework" (Philips, 2014:331). The standpoint feminist theory is critical in examining the gendered implication of the securitisation regime on urban Somali refugee women in Kenya. By presenting the experiences of urban Somali refugee women amid securitisation, this work confirms the assertions by Ebru that:

> "approaching security issues through a gendered lens allows for the rejection of the assumption that power, control, and violence are necessary to ensure safety. A comprehensive security can only be achieved if the relations of domination and submission in all walks of life are eliminated, and gender justice is achieved" (2014:6).

Following Roe's arguments, a focus on women's experience has important normative and empirical value. The standpoint perspective maintains that "by conducting research from the standpoint of women, a more objective form of knowledge can be generated though the revelling of new and more complete truths" (Roe, 2014:127). Even so, the perspective is not without some criticisms. For instance, the standpoint perspective tends to look at women experiences as homogeneous and ignores the in-group difference that may exist. According to Hudson, "the security needs of Western women and women in the developing world are different to the extent

that no global sisterhood can be assumed" (2005:157). She, therefore, suggests for an intersectional perspective that takes into consideration factors like class, age, race, ethnicity among others, which many a times intertwine with gender as an identity (Hudson, 2005:158). Other scholars like Mohanty, agree with this sentiments as she disagrees with the tendency of Eurocentric scholars for portraying women from the global south as "uniform and monolithic subjects" (Mohanty, 2005:35). Black and feminist scholars also recognise the intersectional perspective because of its ability to engage and make visible the experiences and voices of women of colour (Guruge and Khanlou, 2004). According to Gqola (2011), intersectionality does not just help in countering Eurocentric thoughts, it also allows for new ways of reconceptualising gender and women experiences. In my study of the humanised accounts of urban Somali refugee women amid securitisation, intersectionality provided the lens through which their everyday resistance strategies can be explored. This is in line with Jordan-Zachery's, (2007) thoughts that, intersectionality is critical in exposing the "within-group conflicts and tensions" in the way Somali refugee women experiences varies. In sum, intersectionality challenges the homogenies construct of gender as espoused by the standpoint feminist security perspective. In so doing, it enables researchers, to understand how women negotiate and renegotiate with the various dimensions of power. In my analyses of the experiences of Somali refugee women account of their experiences of the restrictive regime, beside them being women as well as refugees, their experiences are shaped by other factors such as marital status, age, economic status and so forth.

2.4 Conclusion

The securitisation framework is important to this study as it helps to understand the various restrictive policies and measures that have been adopted by the Kenyan government in relation to migration and asylum. In essence, the securitisation agenda is usually driven by the need to defend a state's interests and sovereignty which explains the monstrous resultant disseverance between refugee security, and the restrictive immigration policies, which in many ways impact on refugee safety and wellbeing. The SF also helps to explain the tendency for states to highlight particular security concerns while neglecting others. While I acknowledge the invaluable insights of the SF in examining why states frame migration as a security threat, the framework is incapable of explaining how securitisation impacts on the safety and well-being of migrants, and how migrants negotiate the process. Hence the feminist security perspective and performativity are important

perspectives that shift the focus from the state to the individual and allow for the examination of lived experiences of Somali refugee women. The feminist security perspective is particularly beneficial because, it shows how the securitisation process is characterised by both every day and structural violence which ultimately impacts refugee women's individual as well as collective security.

By employing the feminist perspective, the study demonstrates how gender shapes the experiences of the Somali refugee women. Adopting a gender- sensitive approach is important in the sense that; it not only allows us to better understand the adverse consequences of securitisation on refugee women, but also, provides an understanding how perceptions about gender shape migration governance. A feminist perspective also shifts our focus onto non-dominant or marginalized spheres of the migration-security nexus debate which allows for the examination of invisible insecurities. This study sets to challenge the state centric presumption of security by exploring the security of urban Somali refuge women which falls in the non-dominant category. The standpoint security approach also helps articulate security while taking into consideration factors like power relations and identity. Most importantly, by employing the feminist approach, the study is able to present an empirical as opposed to abstract account of insecurity of individuals who operate outside the narratives of the state.

The concept of intersectionality is also critical to this study in many ways. For instance, it helps unveil the various hidden factors that determine the security of urban Somali refugees such as age, ethnicity, nationality class among others. Following Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach, thoughts, I note that, an intersectional approach makes it possible to "look at the 'marginalised within' a marginalised group, since the former tend to become invisible because of multiple subordinate-group identities" (2008:381). In sum, the study demonstrates that Somali refugee women in Eastleigh Nairobi were intersectionally invisible, since their experience and reaction to securitisation varied on a case-by-case basis. As this dissertation continues, the themes and theories that have been addressed in this chapter will continue to be referred to, as I explore the evolution and development of Kenya's securitisation regime, and its resultant acute dynamics on the lives of urban Somali refugee women.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter explains the methodology and research design employed in the exploration of the experiences of securitisation of urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi. It begins by providing a general profile of Kenya as a country in which the research was carried out. It then narrows down to Eastleigh, a neighbourhood in Kenya's capital Nairobi which was the specific research site. It then provides a brief summary of the field work journey and explains how the participants were selected. The research design is discussed under section 3.3. Section 3.5 outlines the data collection techniques that were used in the study, including, one on one in-depth interviews and participant observation. The subsequent sections describe how the data was analysed and the challenges faced in the course of field work. A description of ethical consideration is presented in section. 3.11. Overall, the chapter highlights the process, that is, both systematic and empirical techniques which I employed in the course of the study.

3.1 Research Site

3.1.1 General Country Profile

The study site was in Eastleigh, Nairobi Kenya. Kenya is a multi-ethnic country located on the east part of Africa. The World Bank estimates that, as of July 2020, the country's population was at 53,527,936. Kenya obtained its independence from the British way back in 1963 and in 1964 it was declared a republic with Jomo Kenyatta as the first president. Kenyatta's reign lasted until his demise on 22 August 1978. He was succeeded by President Moi who ruled for 24 years until 2002, when he was removed as a result of constitutional term limit of two years. President Kibaki was the third in line and he ascended to power on 30 December 2002 through the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an arrangement that had been achieved through a pre-election pact between the National Alliance Party (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). President Uhuru Kenyatta took power in 2013 and was re-elected in 2017.

Immediately after independence, Kenya was governed through a Westminster model of governance premised on multi-party democracy. The country was divided into eight semi-federal regions known as Majimbo[5]. The 1963 Constitution of Kenya (CoK) allowed the Majimbos to undertake certain functions. This system of governance did not survive for long as the constitution underwent changes that favoured a centralised form of governance which lasted for about five decades. In 2010, Kenya amalgamated a new constitution that introduced a two-tier governance structure: the national and county governments. The two levels of government are inter-dependent and distinct in accordance with Article (6) (2) of the Constitution. The Constitution distributes functions between the two levels of government as either exclusive, concurrent, or residual under Article 186 and the Fourth Schedule (CoK, 2010).

Economically, the country is mainly depended on the agricultural sector, which contributes to half of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Other sectors like tourism, manufacturing and financial services also contribute immensely to the economic sector. As of now, Kenya is considered the economic powerhouse of East Africa. Since the early 2000s, the country's economic growth has been consistent due to many factors such as the growth of strong institutional backing and the demand for political accountability. Major economic progress has also been witnessed as a result of mobile phone based innovations such as Mpesa which has been replicated at the World Bank level (Mbithi et al, 2018). Unfortunately, due to the COVID19 pandemic, the country's economic growth was hard hit in 2020 as many people lost jobs and key business ventures closed down due to the lockdown measures.

Turning to the security context, Kenya has faced many challenges as a result of violent extremism and terrorism. Being located in the Horn Of Africa (HOA) and its proximity to Somalia has made the country an easy target for terror organisations. The Horn of Africa is a highly volatile region that has been characterised by protracted conflicts in many of its member states. Kenya stands out as one of the most peaceful countries which has made it a number one destination for refugees (Omolo, Macphail and Peixoto 2016). The demand for Kenya to resolve terrorism and other insecurity challenges has stretched its capabilities. As shall be discussed in the subsequent sections of this thesis, the killings of innocent people at 1998 US Embassy bombing, the 2015 University

[5]Federal units of government

of Garissa attack and the 2019 Dustin Hotel attack are some of the recent testimonies to this. The emerging terrorist attacks by the Al- Shabaab group based in Somalia, have not only undermined the country's security but its economic growth as well. In addition to terrorism, the country has faced other security challenges such as human trafficking and the easy circulation of small arms and light weapons which have further entrenched terror activities in the country. There is also a risk of Al-Shabaab opening a corridor for Islamic State (ISIS) to penetrate East Africa as it is now willing to cooperate with ISIS, after the decline of Al–Qaeda, further increasing the terror threat levels. It is within this context, that I situate this study on Kenya's migration regime with a view of providing an understanding of the emergence and evolution of the merging of Kenya's national security and the refugee regime.

Figure 1: Map of Kenya



Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc

3.1.2 Study Area Profile: Eastleigh

Eastleigh is a suburb in the outcasts of Kenya's capital Nairobi comprising of estates such as California, Mathare, Kamukunji and Majengo, which started off as a predominantly Asian neighbourhood. When Nairobi became the main station for the East African Railway, it became a

pull factor for many Indian traders (Carrier and Mathews, 2020). During that time only Kenyans that worked for the whites or companies lived in the city. The Indian traders who moved to Nairobi settled in Eastleigh. In no time, the Indians had created robust business structures and dominated business ventures in Nairobi. However, there was a policy change in the 1940s that allowed families to join their kinsmen who were working in the city. At this particular time, the rich Asian businessmen were moving to better neighbourhoods such as Parklands and Westlands. The locals that came from the rural areas to join the members of their families working in the city settled in Eastleigh. In the early 1960s, after the abolishment of segregated residential places policy, Somali traders moved to Eastleigh and settled there.

The civil war that erupted when President Said Barre was ousted from power led to the influx of Somali refugees in Kenya in the early 1990s. They ran away from the anarchy and lawlessness back home and fled in masses to Kenya. Immediately the Kenyan government adopted the encampment practice and Somali refugees were placed in the Dadaab camp. Since some of the Somali refugees were established businesspersons back home, they left the camps and moved to Nairobi as there were no trading opportunity in the camps. They moved to Eastleigh, and once more it became an immigrant's quarter. Since the early 1990s, Eastleigh has experienced immense transformation in terms of diversity of population. The area is now inhabited by local Kenyans and migrants from Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Uganda among others. The area has also become a hub of various businesses owned by both refugees and the locals. The businesses ranges from, international money transfer services, real estate, property letting import and export, retail, hawking, long distance transport companies among others. Most of the refugees are Somalis but others including Ethiopians, Eritreans, Ugandans, Congolese, Rwandans, and Burundians also reside here. While a considerable number of successful businesses are owned by Somali economic migrants and refugees, many of them work as casual labourers in the informal economy (Moret et al, 2011)

Figure 2:First Avenue Outside the Olympic Mall



Source: Kimo Quaintance

The exact number of Eastleigh residents is unknown but UNHCR's estimates of refugees and asylum seekers in the whole of Nairobi is 80 898 as of 2020 (UNHCR, 2020). The presence of Somali refugees and Somalis in the Eastleigh area has given it a somewhat 'Somali' outlook. The vast businesses in the area and the trade networks formed amongst Somali refugees and Kenyan Somalis haves greatly transformed the landscape of Eastleigh making it a Somali enclave. This transformation has resulted in the area being dubbed "Little Mogadishu" as it is "clearly soaked with Somaliness" (Carrier and Lochery, 2013). The "Somaliness" is evidenced by the various aspects of Somali culture including the Somali language that is widely spoken in the area. Other visible aspects of Somali culture include religion, mode of dressing, food, the Somali names on the many of the shopping malls and other observable practices. In the words of Carrier (2019) Eastleigh is one informal business space where businesspeople do not strictly adhere to rules but are not hiding from the authorities.

Over the years, as the area develops, so has the cost of living. More refugees have migrated into the neighbourhood in the last two decades. In one of the interviews, one local Kenyan remarked:

> "Eastleigh imekuwa kaa Runda siku hizi (Eastleigh has become like Runda)[6]. This place never used to be like this. Now we have rental houses going for Ksh40 000(400USD) or even Ksh50 000(500USD). The refugees have lots of money. That is why they can afford to stay pay such rent while the rest of us are being pushed to the slum areas" (Anonymous, July 2020).

According to the administrative area chief, as of 2017 Eastleigh had over 50 shopping malls. While this points to the accelerated commercial development in the area, there is a downside to it. For instance, it has led to overcrowding living no room for future infrastructural expansion. The roads are generally narrow and in depilated state resulting in poor garbage, sewer, and drainage system.

Figure 3: Shopping Malls along Jam Street, Eastleigh



Source: Kimo Quaintance

[6]Runda is a leafy well to do neighborhood in Nairobi

Even though Somali refugees have lived in Eastleigh for decades, they remain a relatively close-knit community. There is some degree of cordial relations with Kenyans evidenced through trade, sharing of social amenities such as schools, hospitals among others (Goldsmith 1997; Campbell 2005). Notably, Eastleigh has allies among Kenyan elites, and there have been attempts to incorporate Eastleigh more into the Kenyan mainstream. Eastleigh has been spoken of positively as a major business hub, one that should be included in Kenya's development agenda, Vision 2030 (Carrier 2016: 7). The current MP for Kamukunji—the constituency of which Eastleigh is a part—has also advocated for the estate and is part of a broader group of Kenyan Somali politicians who have influence at the highest level. Somalis are no longer marginal in Kenya, politically and economically, and influential figures in Eastleigh are also active on social media and mainstream media to promote the estate and its business (Carrier 2019; Hassan, 2019).

The choice of Eastleigh as a research site is premised on the following reasons. To begin with, the Kenyan government has made the area a target for security measures against Somali refugees who are a dominant population here. Over the years, the neighbourhood has become an important site for the interplay between Kenya as a state and the Somali people. Eastleigh has always been seen as a peculiar hub from the rest of Nairobi because of the concertation of the Somali population in the area. For a very long time, it has been a site for rivalry between the state and the perceived "terrorist-Somali-refugees" making the area an international centre stage for war on terror. While the neighbourhood has greatly transformed in the last two decades, behind all this development, oscillates a discourse of a Somali as an "outsider/threat" and impeccable business person.

As shall be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections, the Kenyan government has always treated the Somali people as rebels. The relationship between the Kenyan state and the Somalis deteriorated since the colonial days. Exclusionary measures were instituted against them including the Wagalla massacre, the 1989 screening exercises among others. After the arrival en masse of Somali refugees in the early 1990s, the Kenyan government continued to institute regular discriminatory screening exercises meant to determine between Kenyan Somalis and Somalis from Somalia. In the last decade, these measures have been taken a notch higher. All this has been heightened by the securitization of refugee policy in Kenya following the Kenyan military's operations against Al Shabaab in Somalia, and reprisal attacks by Al Shabaab that have rendered

Somalis further suspect. Such exercises have regularly targeted Eastleigh over the years, most recently being the Usalama watch during which many were rounded up in Eastleigh and elsewhere and held in Kasarani stadium (Iazzolino, 2019). This suspicion of Eastleigh as somewhere alien and dangerous—a place of otherness—even made it into international cinema. In the film *Eye in the Sky*, Eastleigh is portrayed as under the control of Al Shabaab militia driving around in "technicals" pickup trucks with powerful machine guns (O'Neil, 2018). This portrayal is suggestive of how this part of Nairobi is perceived by some Kenyans as a dangerous part of Mogadishu dropped into the capital city of Kenya.

The presence of Somali refugees who are associated with terrorism in the city poses a great security concern for the Kenyan state, and this has been used by the Kenyan government to justify its military response towards them. The government maintains that as long as the Somali refugees are in the city, then the country is at risk of conflict spill overs from Somalia as well as the entrenchment of Al shabaab activities in the country. This is evidenced by a comment that was made in 2011 by Assistant Internal Security Minister Orwa Ojode who said, "Al Shabaab is a big animal with its head in Eastleigh, Nairobi and its tail in Somalia" (The Standard 20 October 2011). The comment revealed the government reservations towards Somali refugees and why excessive force was being used to refoul them back to the camps and Somalia.


In addition, Eastleigh is termed as a highly volatile area. It has come to be associated with criminal activities such as muggings, money laundering, sell of illegal arms and human trafficking. In an interview with a local government officer, he reported:

> "We have so many Somali men who have been caught selling illegal arms. Every month two or three individuals are arrested in connection with the sale of arms. And they have well-established networks that allows for the movement of the arms form Somalia to the camps then to Nairobi. It is well coordinated. Some come directly from the camp to venture into the business of selling arms. We have caught some ferrying pistols in polythene bags. That is why the police must be on the watch all the time. Kupigwa Ngeta (mugging) and phone theft are common occurrences. Both

refugees and locals are victims of crime in Eastleigh area" (Anonymous, August 2018).

In many ways, Eastleigh does appear to be gaining a firmer foothold within Kenya, giving more security for its businesspeople and their trade. Indeed, Eastleigh business is even gentrifying in some ways, moving away from the "low-end" model, with new malls built with slicker designs and incorporating mainstream Kenyan chain stores and banks too. In some ways, the Eastleigh economy is formalizing. Somalis have also expanded well beyond Eastleigh within Nairobi, now owning many businesses in the central business district too, demonstrating their stronger footing (Hassan 2019). Yet Eastleigh and Somali business in general are still at risk of the fluctuating politics within Kenya. Somalis—Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees—have proved useful scapegoats for the state on numerous occasions and might prove so again, even with more allies in the higher echelons of Kenyan society and politics. Understanding the estate and its power to attract in-migration is an exercise in scalar analysis, requiring both attention to its local and national context, and to its numerous links to elsewhere.

Figure 4: A Map of Eastleigh



Source: Google Maps, 2021

3.2 Strategy of Inquiry

Urban Somali refugee women's experiences of securitization is a study situated in the constructivism paradigm. Constructivism is premised on the idea that reality is socially constructed thus, truth is relative and dependent on one's perspective (Bryman, 2012). While this paradigm recognizes the importance of human subjective creation of meaning, it does not out rightly reject some notion of objectivity (Yin, 2003). This is in line with the social constructivist nature of security that rejects "objectivist stands of an independent social world" (Watson 2009:15). I argue that the portrayal of Somali refugee women as a "security threat" is done through exclusionary discourse and measures by the Kenyan government; likewise, the response of the Somali refugee women is through various individualised subtle resistance strategies aimed at deconstructing the securitisation. The constructivist perspective allowed for the understanding of Somali refugee women experiences amid securitization while at the same time allowing for close interaction between the researcher and participants. Through personal narratives, the Somali refugee women were able to describe their views of their *lived* reality in a securitisation context. This allowed for understanding the concept of securitization from the migrants' point of view.

3.3 Research Design

I employed a qualitative case study as the main research design for the exploration of Somali refugee women's lived experiences of securitisation in Kenya: how they make sense of the exclusionary measures and practices, negotiate the impact of securitization and their response to it. The qualitative research methodology was selected because of its flexibility which allows for open ended approach in exploring phenomena. According to Denzin and Lincoln "a qualitative approach is characterised by initiatives whereby researchers interpret or make sense of human experiences within settings; in that respect, subjectivity and a socially constructed reality are common in such research" (2003:35). The qualitative approach adopted in this study sought to blend elements of ethnography and hermeneutical phenomenological approaches to collect, analyse, interpret, and describe urban Somali refugee women's experiences and everyday resistance strategies to the securitisation regime.

3.3.1 Ethnography

The ethnographic approach employed in this study provided rich, holistic insights into Somali refugee women's views and experiences through in-depth face to face interviews and the collection of detailed observations. According to Mahler and Pessar, "ethnography is a methodological approach which focuses on 'the perspectives and understandings of subjects' actions and beliefs that facilitate the definition of potential interventions that reflect and respect local knowledge" (2006:30). The ethnographic approach was adopted because it allowed for "getting inside" of the lives urban Somali refugee women in order to explore and understand their unique realities in negotiating the restrictive refugee regime. The approach was also suitable for the study because it is concerned with how people make sense of the world as opposed to objectivity (Ali, 2016). This then allowed for the rich description of the lived experiences of the Somali refugee women as their different perspectives were considered throughout the ethnographic lens. Since ethnographic studies require long time to study patterns and behaviour of phenomena, I spent about nine months in the field collecting data.

I note that, employing ethnographic methods on participants who are aware of being profiled or are under surveillance can be challenging because, it could further contribute to their vulnerability. Indeed, as Ali (2016) notes, researchers need to be aware of the fact that contemporary systems of surveillance can impact on their data collection all through to publication. This is what Simpsons calls "ethnographic refusal" meaning "when study participants explicitly critique the research methods and or when participants remain silent in fear of surveillance" (2007:67). A case in point, is when Martinez (2016) was studying Southern California black and high school students, who refused to be video recorded as that seemed to be a form of surveillance, they were familiar with in homes and public spaces. The researcher dealt with the issue by modifying their research methods to include audio instead of video recordings. He advises that:

> "When conducting research among fragile and highly surveilled populations, we must attend to these matters in order to identify moments when our tools index systems of surveillance already questionable to these participants" (2016: 60).

During my data collection, I had a similar experience whereby the participants felt uncomfortable when I asked for consent for audio recording. The first five participants I spoke to were categorical that they did not want to be recorded. The audio recording never became a reality as I had to

abandon the idea all together. In this case, I borrowed from Ali and Martinez's (2016) experience, by constantly checking how the data collection procedure unfolded and then making suitable changes where necessary. The revision of the methods was done in a manner not to jeopardise the main objective of the study. I also realised some refugee women felt uncomfortable when I took detailed notes during the interviews. Some went silent as soon as they saw me write down notes. In such cases, I resorted to taking mental notes of the important information and observations which was initially a bit challenging. In addition, I adopted an informal style of interviewing which allowed me to focus on what they said rather than note taking. I then opted to internalising the questions and allowing an open-ended discussion. Immediately after the interview, I would sit somewhere and write down all the important details. Besides, I had a research assistant who would help in debriefing the interview.

3.3.2 Phenomenology

In this study the phenomenological approach was vital in the analysis of the *phenomena* of exceptional discourses, policies, and practices, as well as the lived experience of Somali refugee women who are the recipient of the exclusion. According to Manen "phenomenology is the study of the world as experienced in everyday life situations and relations, particularly as it is experienced by those who live it" (2017: 816). Hence ethnography and phenomenology were appropriate for this study as they "emphasize the insider perspective and take into account that the lived experience is multidimensional in that a number of different aspects occur simultaneously and influence the meaning derived from and assigned to an experience" (2017: 817).

3.4 Selection of Participants

I employed purposive sampling and supplemented snowball techniques in the selection of participants.

3.4.1 Purposive sampling

This technique was utilised in selecting participants who had the knowledge and experience of the topic under study. While employing purposive sampling, I was keen on the availability and willingness of the participants to participate in the study. Other factors like the ability of the participants to recount their experiences was also considered. This technique allowed me to be in

control of the research, as I was able to determine who can be interviewed by virtue of their knowledge or experience (Figueroa, 2020). Since I was specifically interested in Urban Somali refugee women who could clearly tell their personal experiences, a criterion was adopted to allow for participants who could give more vivid and rich self-experiences accounts. The criteria was as follows:

1. They should be political refugees who are either registered, unregistered or asylum seekers
2. They should have settled in Nairobi by early 2013 and at that time they should have been at least 18 years old. The age factor was important for it enabled the researcher to get participants who are able to recount their experiences before and through the extensive securitization.
3. They should have experienced a significant securitization extra ordinary measure such as Usalama watch. Besides, major securitization events that occurred between 2010 and 2014 like "Usalama Watch" remains the most historic and that is why those who experienced it were the most preferred for the study.

The main focus was on the refugee women and the justification for that is, because their perspectives are not usually sought from them directly and in most cases, men speak on behalf of the entire community. Yet, there are gender specific situations that are critical yet go unheard. To corroborate the degree of validity of the information gathered from the refugee women, the information was cross- checked with other participants such as: the refugee women, local administrators, NGOs officers, the police, and local Kenyans.

3.4.2 Snowball Technique

Using this method, I was able to request the first few participants, who had already been purposively selected, to suggest any other participants with similar experiences or situations to take part in the research. The snowball technique was adopted because of its ability to scale down on time and also because it "provides the researcher with the opportunity to communicate better with the samples, as they are acquaintances of the first sample, and the first sample is linked to the researcher" (Hejazi, 2006:). In addition, this type of chain selection works well in situations where

participants are not willing to reveal their identities such as illegal migrants, criminals, drug addicts (Magnani, Sabin, Saidel and Heckathorn, 2005). The topic under study was sensitive in nature because, it targeted a vulnerable population who live in spaces where they are under constant surveillance. Therefore, I had to rely on the first few participants I met to locate their acquaintances whom they knew would be beneficial to the study. Through the snowball technique participants were identified through other respondents, CBOs and NGOs that work with urban refugees in Nairobi.

3.5 Data Collection Techniques

3.5.1 Secondary Data

The data collection was undertaken in two stages. The first stage involved a thorough desktop literature review and retrieval of archival information. I was keen to get academic and policy research materials on Kenya's securitisation regime. This provided me with knowledge and grounding on what the law says about refugee governance, what changes have been made over time and any documented effects on refugees so far. Some of the collected documents included speeches, statements and (social) media outputs and policy documents such as the Suppression of Terrorism (2003), the Refugee Act 2006, the Terrorism Bill 2003, the Crime and Money Laundering (Prevention) Bill, the 2014 Amended Refugee Act, the 2014 Security Law (Amendment) Bill among others. Other documents that were collected include National Assembly Hansards and newspaper articles with elite speeches. International migration/refugee instruments such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol, African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA), Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa, Inter-governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) 2012 Migration Policy Framework. Some other documents were retrieved from UNHCR. They include UNHCR guidelines, newsletters, annual strategic plans, briefs annual reports on urban refugees and urban refugee policy. Besides official reports, policy documents, academic journals, books, and newspaper articles were also analysed. These sources are used on their own as primary data as well as formed the basis for in-depth interviews to gain deeper understanding of the topic under study.

3.5.2 Primary Data

The second phase of data collection entailed field work in Eastleigh, Nairobi. In this study, a combination of ethnographic methods including one on one in-depth interviews and participant observation were used to yield a thick description of the lived experiences of urban Somali refugee in Nairobi. Given the nature of research which requires a researcher to get into the lives of the participants, I was aware of possibilities of the data collection procedure being influenced by the type of relationships created with the participants as well as the nature of their story. I therefore remained flexible in the way I engaged the participants. For a period of nine months, the participants retold their story of seclusion and how they circumvented the discrimination.

3.5.2.1 Interviews

The interviews were conducted in an informal and conversational manner, at a time and place convenient to the participant. The semi structured interviews were preferred because they allow the interviewer "to adapt the research instrument to the level of comprehension and articulacy of the respondent, and handle the fact that in responding to a question, people often also provide answers to questions we were going to ask later" (Fielding and Thomas 2002:124).I conducted interviews with each participant on days and times convenient to them which allowed for space in which they could share their stories unreservedly. Before interviewing the participant, I explained the purpose of the interviews, gave assurances of anonymity, and explained to participants that they would not receive any incentives for being interviewed. I also sought the participants consent to describe their experiences. The participants names and other identity details were omitted for their own security and to protect their identity. Throughout this thesis their names are pseudonymised. According to Figueroa (2017) ethnographic researchers need to be aware of the possibility of committing a "breach" in the course of interviewing surveilled participants such as migrants. He argues that, sometimes the information being sought by the interviewer could be the same being used to seclude the migrants.

Regarding this issue, I was reminded of Vossoughi and Escudé's advise that, ethnographic researchers need take a scholarship stance that moves the research exercise from "*surveillance* to *relationship* by acknowledging the ways that our methods shape our research over time" (2016: 42). This can be done by personifying the very tools of data collection depending on the context.

Borrowing from this line of thought, particular care was taken to ensure that the refugee women were comfortable with talking about their experiences, and that they were aware they could terminate the interview at any point. I had made prior arrangement with Amani Counselling Centre based in Nairobi for those who might need counselling. The interviews were mainly conducted in Swahili and English. The interview questions revolved around the refugee women's experience of the journey to the city, their lives in the city, their interactions with security agents and how they accessed opportunities in Nairobi.

Two groups of participants were interviewed: the Somali refugee women and key informant who were key stakeholders who are in charge of urban refugee affairs. The focus was on the Somali refugee women, the other participants were meant to corroborate the collected data from the refugee women. I settled for one-on-one in-depth interviews because it is an effective method for studying experiences, attitudes, and opinions. Based on reviewed literature, as well as consultations with some key informants from organizations and groups working closely with urban Somali refugees in Nairobi, it was of great importance to establish an open and relaxed environment when conducting interviews with urban Somali refugee women, as many were likely to have experienced trauma or adversities that may be hard or uncomfortable to talk about. To this end, some of the questions in the interview schedule had to be changed or removed if the participants felt uncomfortable answering them. During the interview sessions, I was keen to note the tone and body language of the participants, hence whenever a participant felt uncomfortable with a question or being asked to provide more details, I withdrew to avoid rehashing of the past trauma. Some of the stories told by the refugee women during the interviews, were either unique to the individual or in some cases the themes cut across the group.

Additionally, throughout the field work I had many informal conversations, in market stalls, on the bus, with taxi drivers and with ordinary Kenyans. These conversations provided an understanding of how refugees are perceived especially by the locals. Let me also mention that mobile communication was very useful during the data collection. I planned for interviews and scheduled meetings through call and text messages. I was able to cross check data and make clarifications through the mobile communication. It was interesting that in some cases, it is the participants that offered to share their contact information especially the businesswomen who

invited me to be their client in future or asked me to make referrals for them. Some shared their business cards with me. In some instances, the participants called to volunteer additional information they felt they had left out during the interview. The fact that I had their contacts, is the reason I was able to call and organise meetings to countercheck initial data collection in 2018 after the general elections.

A total of 53 interviews were conducted, of which 24 were Somali refugee women, 8 Somali refugee men and 9 Kenyans, I area chief, 1 Assistant Chief, 2 Police Administrative officers, 3 Officers from Refugee Community- based Organisations (RCBOs), 1 UNHCR officer, 1 Religious leader and 2 Nyumba Kumi leaders. In order to ensure the representativeness of the research sample, the categories of age, level of education and clan were put into consideration in the selection process. Of the 24 Somali refugee women, I narrowed down to seventeen narratives that are analysed and presented in this study. My interviewing experience was fruitful as some of the refugee women were happy to share their stories. The willingness of the participants to share their experiences, allowed for an opportunity to build trust and relation with the refugee women which was critical to the data collection process.

3.5.2.2 Participant Observation

To allow for participant observation, I relocated from Eldoret to Nairobi so as to be closer to the research site[7]. And to contextualise the refugee women narratives, I was keen on observing their everyday lives. I accompanied some women to their workplace. Some invited me as they took lunch with their children in schools where we sat and socialised. One participant invited me to her home so I can see how her house was vandalised and the door broken down by the police during Usalama Watch. As Delamont remarks:

> "Participant observation is used to cover a mixture of observation and interviewing. In the field the researchers' aim is to understand how the cultures they are studying 'work', that is, to grasp what the world looks like to the people who live in the fishing village, the boarding school, or the mining community. The researchers need to discover what 'their' people believe; what they do at work and in their

[7]Courtesy of Funding from the SSRC Next Generation Research Fellowship

> leisure time; what makes them laugh, cry and rage; who they love, hate and fear; and how they choose their friends and endure their relations. This is done by living with the people being studied, watching them work and play, thinking carefully about what is seen, interpreting it and talking to the actors to check the emerging interpretations" (2011:3).

The observation visits provided rich insight into the strategies, challenges, and experiences of the participants related to securitisation. I was able to have first-hand experience of their daily lives through the interesting and valuable observations about key noticeable features in their environment. For instance, I was able to see how they are surveilled by the government. On two occasions, I saw Somalis being stopped and asked for identification by the police.

According to Borich, "observation becomes a scientific tool and method of data collection for the researcher when it serves a formulated research purpose; is systematically planned and recorded; and is subjected to checks and control on validity and reliability" (2016:63). In this study, a checklist was developed so as to guide the researcher to identify the visible changes in the social and economic lives of urban Somali women refugees. I was keen to take systematic and comprehensive field notes of what happened at a particular time. I need to mention that the observations were not events but rather an ongoing process that provided important information relevant to the study. There are various advantages of using participant observation as a data collection technique. For instance, participant observations unveils what interviews may not reveal as "frequently people do not tell an interviewer all the things he might want to know" (McGrath and Rudman 2019: 30) because it "affords access to the 'backstage culture'" (Demunck and Sobo, 1998: 43). Delamont observed:

> "One of the biggest problems is that informants often want to help researchers, by showing and telling what they think investigators want to see and hear. Equally, informants may systematically hide things, and tell lies, to protect themselves, their secrets or their privacy. Researchers who prefer fieldwork to the quicker method of interviewing hope to get beyond the informants' impression management, even

> though sometimes they discover that their informants initially believed them to be spies, tax collectors or loose women" (2011:12).

There are various reasons for this. According to McGrath and Rudman, "so many facets of daily lives are so seemingly mundane, that many people would not think to tell an interviewer, either because they assume it is unimportant or may not even be consciously aware of it" (2019:). Therefore, participant observation allows the researcher to access such tacit and mundane details. Yet, another benefit of participant observation which is important to the understanding of the lived experiences of Somali refugee women is that it allowed for a closer examination of their interactions with their environments. Hence, I was able to observe, first-hand, not only how the participants interacted with their physical environment, but also, the social environment such as family, fellow refugees, friends, neighbours, government officers, the police, strangers, and service providers that interact with them.

I wish to add that, the of process observation did not proceed in a linear manner, but rather was characterised by multiple loops requiring constant and ongoing process of reflection. Some scholars have noted the emotional attachment that some researchers may face in the course of participant observation (Tedlock, 2003). Delmont observed:

> "Once accepted by actors at a fieldwork site, researchers have to guard against 'going native': abandoning the researcher perspective and adopting the views of the actors in the setting. Some researchers are reluctant to leave the field even when no further useful insights or data are being gained because actors in the field site have become friends, and the fieldwork comfortable" (2011:11)

In fact, according to Zhao and Ji (2014) when a researcher has close contact with participants, it may bring about sympathy and identity, which, in turn, may reduce the researcher's level of criticism. Thus, Baker recommends that "despite the level of involvement with the study group, the researcher must always remember his primary role as a researcher and remain detached enough to collect and analyse data relevant to the problem under investigation" (2006:172). My experience during the data collection was that the choice between objective emotional detachment and emotional involvement were not mutually exclusive. I allowed the circumstances and the setting

of the observation to determine which was more appropriate. For a fact, for me to get the in-depth understanding of the refugee women I needed to be "involved" to some extent while maintaining my role as a researcher. I adjusted depending on what was appropriate for the setting at any given time. Unlike other researchers who venture into unknown research settings, being Kenyan and having been to Eastleigh before, I started off my data collection with some basic knowledge on what to expect and the topography of the research site. Furthermore, 2017 being an election year in Kenya, I was keen to understand when to stop going to the field as many of the participants would have felt the "pressure of being surveilled". However, I ensured my assumptions do not interfere with the study objective. Besides, I enjoyed socialising with the participants, meeting up with them at home and joining them at their place of work.

I employed a technique of observation dubbed "observer-as-participant" as proposed by Baker, (2006). This technique "enables researchers to detach themselves emotionally from the people being studied so that they can record, evaluate and analyse data more accurately and objectively" (Manen, 2017:819). To do so they maintain "brief contact" with the participants. In my case, while I had relocated to Nairobi so as to be close to the research site, I did not live in Eastleigh. I only came on in the morning on my field workdays and left as soon as am done. According to Takyi (2015) partial immersion during participant observation means that the researcher may fail to fully understand the context under study. This, he argues, may result in biased interpretation of data. However, in my case "full immersion" into the lives of the refugee women was not a feasible option because of disadvantages associated with the "Observer-as-participant" and again this was an urban setting. My participants had other pressing personal responsibilities such as work and families which made it impossible for me to stay with them full time without adding pressure on them. Therefore, I endeavoured to use whatever time I was with a participant to observe and learn as much as possible. As a researcher, I was more interested in their *experience/lives* rather than their *habitus*. The fact that I could not spend time or live with the participants fulltime also reveals how dynamic life is for them in the city.

3.6 The Fieldwork Journey

I first of all obtained the Research Ethics clearance from the University of the Witwatersrand Research Ethics Committee before proceeding for field work. In line with National Commission

for Science, Technology, and Innovation-Kenya (NACOSTI) requirements, I also obtained a research permit valid for a year before embarking on data collection in March 2017. At the beginning of the field work, I spent three months locating participants, creating rapport, and scheduling interviews. Due to the sensitivity of the research question and the difficulty of conducting research on "surveilled" individuals, two significant issues need to be mentioned here.

First, on arrival in Eastleigh, I obtained "unofficial" approval from the local government administrators (the area Chief and sub chief) to conduct research in the area. I kept their offices updated on the purpose and progress of the research throughout this field work. On arrival, the administrative Chief's directive was that I should obtain additional authorisation from Kamukunji Education Officer before embarking on data collection. While the research work and the analyses were not interfered by the authorities in anyway, on my own volition I decided to avoid locations and topics that could be considered too sensitive by the authorities. Secondly, most participants including, government officials, urban Somali refugee women and the Kenyan people that shared their insights with me, did so in an unofficial way and mostly asked not to be quoted. In most cases, the participants were very cautious during the initial meetings and became more willing to share their views and feelings in later ones.

To relax personal interactions, an unstructured interview technique was used leaving the participants to freely talk about issues. Nevertheless, the entire process by which the data was generated needed to be reasonably reliable and the validity of the data was carefully assessed by cross-referencing to identify the levels of uncertainty before inferring any meaning from it (King et al. 1994: 23-25). To corroborate the degree of validity of the information gathered from the refugee women, the information was cross- checked with different people with various backgrounds including local Kenyans, local administrators, NGO officers, the police, as well as written information in the form of scholarly papers and news.

In terms of accessing the refugee women, I contacted the Headteacher of Eastleigh primary school to allow me to speak to the refugee women who brought food for their children during lunch hour. This is where I met the first three participants to my study. I also went to Eastleigh UNHCR clinic where I managed to locate more participants. I visited local NGOs that work with refugees such

as Heshima Kenya and HIAS Refugee Trust of Kenya. Thereafter, all other participants I talked to were referred to me by fellow refugee women. For a period of three months, I mainly conducted in depth interviews with the participants. Once I developed trust and relation with the participants, I introduced the idea of participant observation. While the interviews were ongoing, I was also recording observations of their daily lives. This was important as the information gathered through observation complemented the interviews. The first phase of official data collection started in March 2017 and went on until mid-July 2017. I took a break because of the 2017 general elections that were held in August 2017 and a rerun thereafter in October 2017. The electioneering atmosphere did impact on the field work given that the Somali refugees and the terrorism issue was among the most contested during the campaigns. Uhuru Kenyatta's government was on the spot for using refugees for political mileage. As the RFI observed:

> "There have been counter-accusations that even some of the refugees are being given voting cards to vote for the Jubilee government of President Uhuru Kenyatta and the timing of the closure could be rhetoric considering it goes against our constitution and our international obligations. So, it could very well be that it's being done for political purposes." (23 May 2017)

Besides, historically Kenya's general electioneering period is usually characterised by volatility. As a result, Kenyans tend to "leave" from high volatile areas and the city to their ancestral home for their own safety. Refugees are no exception. Quartz Africa observed:

> "It is only prudent to get out, says Asad Hussein, A Somali refugee who was born in Kenya and studies at a local private university in Nairobi. He is going back to stay with his family in the Daadab refugee camp in North-Eastern Kenya" (6 August 2017)

I therefore took a break from data collection and only resumed in July 2018, after I came back from University of Limerick, where I was on a five months Erasmus Mundus International Credit Mobility Fellowship. The Fellowship was timely as it gave me an opportunity to reflect on and analyse the initial data that I had collected. I also got a chance to interact with the refugee

organisations in Limerick such as UNHCR Ireland and Doras Luimní[8] so as to understand the Irish refugee governance system. However, since this was not a comparative study, the information gathered form Irish refugee organisation was for learning purposes hence was not analysed and incorporated in this thesis. I renewed the research permit in 2018 and scheduled more interviews after the initial data analysis to enrich the existing data. Given that the question of Somali refugees had been among the issue mentioned on campaign agenda by presidential aspirants, it was interesting to learn how the refugee women fared during the electioneering period. I was able to locate some of the participants and had follow up interviews to enrich my data. This provided an opportunity to cross check my initial findings for accuracy and gain a deeper understanding of their experiences.

3.7 Personal Reflexivity

As aforesaid, Somali refugee women are a "surveilled" population and being aware of this fact shaped my data collection experience. I was well aware that some of my participants may have undergone some traumatic experiences in their stay in the city. According to Hesse-Biber, "researchers need to listen to the form in which the content is told. Different people talk in different ways, so listening to the way a respondent frames her story can also reveal important information" (2007:164). Guided by this assertion, throughout the data collection journey I reflected on my own biases, body language and data collection tools. I committed to remain non-judgmental and be open to hearing different perspectives from the participants. I refrained from pushing for certain answers and only asked questions that would allow the participants to recount and own their experiences. To do so, at all times, I tried to consider various factors such as my own biases, mental state, preconceived ideas as well as the participant's mental state. I was also keen of the power dynamics that may influence the interview process given that I studied at a diaspora institution.

In reality, keeping the balance was a big struggle for me. In some cases, I was emotionally disturbed by some of the experiences that the refugee women recounted especially those regarding abuse and rape. I was also conflicted at how some locals felt that "they deserved" the harassment

[8]Doras Luimní is an independent non-profit organisation, working to support and promote the human rights of asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants in the Limerick region through personal advocacy, integration development and advocacy campaigns at local and national level

by the state and some of them were not shy to refer to Somalis as terrorists. At times, they advocated for profiling against the refugees and their refoulement to Somalia by the government. These were tough moments because I struggled with being focused, non-judgemental and open minded. All in all, I allowed the participants to provide their varied perspectives as that was their truth. I listened to the Somali refugee women recount their harrowing journeys to the city, the profiling and discrimination in the city which made them feel "targeted". At this point, I reminded myself that there are always three sides of the story, and so I should embrace the different vantage points. In fact, that is why I adopted the semi-structured interview technique because it allowed the participants to talk freely about their lived experiences. However, all this was not without challenges. For instance, I had to make sure that my own thoughts and perspectives do not interfere in the way I ask questions or interpret the participants' narratives. I therefore had to keep this in mind, even as I analysed and presented the data.

3.8 Data Analysis

Data analysis for ethnographic studies is usually an ongoing process. In this study, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was utilised in analysing the data. According to Smith and Osborn:

> "The aim of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is to explore in detail how participants are making sense of their personal and social world, and the main currency for an IPA study is the meanings particular experiences, events, states hold for participants. The approach is phenomenological in that it involves detailed examination of the participant's life- world; it attempts to explore personal experience and is concerned with an individual's personal perception or account of an object or event, as opposed to an attempt to produce an objective statement of the object or event itself. At the same time, IPA also emphasizes that the research exercise is a dynamic" (2008:53).

This perspective was adopted because of its ability to allow researchers to examine in detail how participants make sense of their lives, assign meanings to certain experiences as well as how their perception about what is happening to them. The analysis involved a detailed examination of the

urban Somali refugee women's lifeworld. The data analysis proceeded in two stages: the descriptive analyses then theoretical analyses (Gibbs, 2007).

In my descriptive analysis, I categorised the data and looked for emerging themes. I began by reading through the interview responses and field notes: searching for phrases and statements that were repeated in the participants narrative. The most important phrases and statements were then condensed into relevant themes and categories that describe the everyday resistance strategies of the urban Somali refugee women. I looked for expressions of "agency in tight corners" in the events the refugee women described. I identified phrases and narratives that indicated subtle resistance strategies as representative of reaction towards the restrictive regime. Thereafter, I undertook what Alase (2017) calls "textural description" which refers to the description of *what* and *how* the participants' experienced a particular episode; a description which included verbatim quotations. The next step was writing a "structural description" which means a description of the "setting and context in which the phenomenon was experienced." (Creswell 2013:194). Afterwards, I wrote a description of the refugee women experience which captured both the verbatim quotes and the context in which the episode unfolded. I was keen to analyse what encompassed their self-experiences accounts, what context shaped the narratives, how they emphasised or stressed certain occurrences or words and what they omitted in their narration. The last step of the analysis was the theoretical analysis where I examined the experiences of the women in light of other scholars' findings.

3.9 Validity and Reliability

In this study, three criteria were adopted in building a coherent justification for the emerging themes. They included: triangulation, prolonged data collection time period and member checking. Creswell and Miller (2000) posit that, validity is critical in determining the accuracy of the findings. Triangulation involves multiple analytical tools to multiple methods of data-collection, as well as multiple researchers and multiple theories or paradigms. In this study, I made use of multiple methods of data collection including literature review, interviews, and participant observation. The participant observation allowed me to merge the narratives of the refugee women with the reality. The study also drew on several theoretical approaches including securitisation, performativity, and the standpoint feminist theory.

In addition, spending adequate time during data collection is an important technique for ensuring reliability and validity. Given that this was an ethnographic study, I spent about nine months in the field in order to understand the lived experiences of the participants. In the course of interview transcription, I ensured that any possible errors are minimised as much as possible. Creswell (2012) also suggests member checking as an important technique for collection and interpretation of data. He defines member checking as a process "where the researchers' interpretations of the data are shared with the participants, and the participants have the opportunity to discuss and clarify the interpretation and contribute new or additional perspectives on the issue under study" (2013:283). In my case, when I came back to the field in July 2018, I scheduled interviews with some of the participants that had been previously interviewed. The aim was to crosscheck the authenticity of the initial findings.

I also endeavoured to stay alert through the data collection journey so as to ensure that I collected relevant, accurate and quality data. Creswell reminds researchers that "during the process of conducting a study as well as at its conclusion, you need to be mindful of the quality of the research" (2012: 282). He adds: "the improvement of practice, the quality of policy debates, and the advancement of knowledge all call for high-quality educational research" (2012:283). To do so, I continually evaluated the research process and readjusted the data collection tools accordingly to make sure that quality data is gathered. Furthermore, the sampling of participants and selection of the research site was undertaken carefully and for the appropriate reasons. I worked to ensure that, the research process is thorough by taking every hint and lead seriously. Each participant's narrative was detailed and analysed through a systematic procedure.

3.10 Methodological Limitations

Marshall and Rossman (1999), contents that perfectly designed research does not exist. Just like every other study, there are some limitations that my study faced that need to be acknowledged. The first is in regard to the perspective adopted in exploring the experiences of urban Somali refugee women amid securitisation. I did not consider the holistic reality of all refugees in urban settings. Instead, I focused mainly on refugee women of Somali origin. In fact, the aim of my study was not to generalise findings to the broader population of refugee women in Eastleigh. The

purpose was to describe in detail the current realities of participating Somali refugee women, hence the choice of engaging a very small group. However, it is clear that collaborating with as larger group of refugee women (and men) may yield additional perspectives. Furthermore, the fact that the vast majority of primary participants came from Somalia, signifies that woman from a range of backgrounds may experience life in Eastleigh in a different manner. This is not reflected in my study; due to reticence to engage in formal research processes, some women's perspectives may unfortunately be overlooked. Nevertheless, the quality of information yielded through this exploration of humanised accounts of securitisation certainly demonstrates that the objectives initially set out were achieved. Such ethnographies provide a wealth of information that can act as a platform for further explorations in a range of contexts.

Secondly, the nature of this research topic poses a challenge since the study is about explaining causality. The study attempts to explain how the securitisation regime is having an impact on the wellbeing and safety of urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi. Explaining causality in the field of social sciences is not unproblematic. In many cases identifying causal factors can prove to be extremely difficult. This is because explaining how the cause, which is the independent variable, affects the dependent variable requires proving the importance of one factor over a large range of possible factors (Theofanis and Radaelli, 2009). Usually, there is the risk of prejudging the importance of the cause while reducing the peripheral vision of the researcher (Dyson, 2002; Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007). My study faced a similar challenge since multiple factors affect the lives of urban refugees and thus isolating one of them –the securitisation regime– can be very tricky. Therefore, I had to draw the causal inferences cautiously to minimize uncertainties that would otherwise affect the outcome of the study. I undertook an historical rerun by interviewing those women refugees who were directly been affected by governments measures against urban refugees.

Thirdly, Landau (2004) notes studies on urban refugees are faced with various methodological limitations such as locating the participants given that urban refugees use invisibility as a coping strategy. In my case, I employed the snowball technique by requesting participants to give recommendations on who else can be interviewed. Some of the participants could barely express themselves in Kiswahili or English and that's why I made use of the services of a language interpreter in such cases. Besides, a majority participants only agreed to be interviewed with the

assurance that they remain anonymous. This was not only among Somali refugee women but also key informants from government departments, from International Organizations or human rights organizations. Consequently, this is what has been done throughout my research. Since an important part of the research focuses on capturing the responses of participants, the individual participant becomes less important. It is the participant's knowledge of the study question that is more relevant. As DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree argues, "during interviewing, the interviewee may share information that could jeopardize his or her position in a system. This information must remain anonymous and protected from those whose interest's conflict with those of the interviewee" (2006: 319). In my study, individual participants, were concerned with how their comments would affect their position within their organization. However, they also feared how their comments would affect the position of their organization in the larger system. Therefore, many participants would only agree to being quoted as 'staff member from International Organization', 'human rights lawyer' or another generic term that reflects their position in the system. While this is far from ideal, the data collected still holds relevance.

Closely related to the above, researching a topic that touches on issues of national security and terrorism can be challenging. According to Goredema and Botha (2004) such issues are held in high secrecy because they touch on matters on national and societal security. For this reason, my research was to a certain extent impacted by the inaccessibility of certain key information especially those regarding government's policies and practices against urban Somali refugees. The government officials that were interviewed to corroborate the urban refugee women's narratives, were keen to note that they would prefer to be anonymised. The same challenge was evident when interviewing the urban Somali refugee women. There were instances where in some cases the participants were hesitant to share their stories for fear of being tracked down by the police. To deal with this, I made use of other alternative secondary sources of key information in order to inform the study and overcome this limitation. The quality of the research was therefore not significantly compromised by these limitations.

Lastly, my field experience revealed that in last decade Eastleigh has become a site of intense academic and policy research. The participants reported that they have been interviewed way too many times, yet their lives remain the same. In some cases, I came across participants who had been paid before to be part of various studies and so they demanded the same in this case. I

therefore employed openness, engagement and rapport building as a way of managing expectations of participants in the study.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Various ethical issues were addressed throughout the data collection process as well as the writing of this thesis. The ethical issues that were adhered to in this study included: anonymity, confidentiality, and benevolence. The aim was to protect the rights, dignity, and privacy of the research participants. To begin with, I received an Ethical Approval from University of the Witwatersrand, which is mandatory for research projects on human beings (See Appendix II). I proceeded to get a research permit from NACOSTI, in line with ministry of education's requirements in order as to carry out research in Kenya. Given the sensitive nature of the topic under study, I was granted further authorisation from the Kamukunji Education Office before I embarked on the data collection. To ensure confidentiality, various measures such as anonymising the data and storing that data on a password protected cloud account were adhered to. During the actual data collection, participants were furnished with all the relevant details concerning the aims and objectives of the study, the procedure of the interview and the intended use of the data. A participant information sheet and consent form were also provided to the participant to gain written or verbal consent. I took each participant through the information on the consent and participant participation sheet for the participants to make informed decision. The participant was allowed to choose the venue and time convenient for the interview.

As a researcher I recognised that refugee women and asylum-seekers are at risk of being vulnerable due to a number of factors which calls for specific ethical considerations when carrying out research on this group. According to (Figueroa, 2014, 2016) ethnographic researchers of surveilled communities need to be guided by accountability to the participants rather than imagined future audience or beneficiaries of the research report. He argues that, to achieve this, ethnographic researchers like in my case need to adapt their methods after carefully listening to the participants. He adds: "this kind of ethnographic engagement involves attending to key ethical dilemmas that arise throughout the research process: such dilemmas are emergent and often unanticipated prior to beginning data collection" (Figueroa, 2020:69).

Following Figueroa's school of thought, I ensured the following. To begin with, during the initial data collection any ambiguous questions that could easily be misunderstood were dropped from the interview schedule or rephrased. Since the study question touches on national security, I was aware that the participants could reveal some sensitive information hence the objective of the study was made clear to them beforehand. In addition, the rights and wishes of the participants such as omission of real names were adhered to during the report writing. By adopting semi structured interviewing, I ensured that a safe space was created for the participants to recount their experiences. Before agreeing to be part of the study, the participants were furnished with all the required details of the study and given a choice to share what they felt comfortable as well as stop the interview whenever they felt uneasy. During the interview, I was observant to note any non-speech cues that indicated discomfort such as facial gestures or long silences, and at that point, I refrained from engaging further on that particular question. During the writing of this thesis, I avoided plagiarism and was keen to acknowledge other people's works that were referred to.

3.12 Conclusion

This was a qualitative case study that centred on the experiences of urban Somali refugee women in Eastleigh, and their response to the acute dynamic of securitisation. A standpoint feminist perspective coupled with performativity using ethnography was used in the analyses of their experiences. The participants were purposively selected through a snowball process. The data was systematically coded for themes and the emergent data formed the standpoint and their lived experiences of the urban Somali refugee women in a securitisation context.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE EXCLUSION OF SOMALIS IN KENYA

4.0 Introduction

The Kenyan government's portrayal of Somalis as a threat to the state has always been entangled with its approaches to domestic security since the colonial days. In order to fully understand the Kenyan government hostility towards Kenyan Somalis/ Somali refugees, a historical account of the state and ethnic Somali relations is important. Lind et al suggests that "the current relationship between Somali refugees and the Kenyan state should be assessed in view of the longer history of state–society relations between the state and ethnic Somalis" (2017:122). Therefore, how the Kenyan state has historically viewed and treated the ethnic Somali population has contributed to the "othering" of Somali refugees, resulting into their lived experience of asylum seeking, wellbeing and safety in jeopardy. The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of how Somalis and later Somali refugees have been constructed as "the other" through a historical examination of governments policy and practices towards Somalis and Somali refugees. I start off by providing a historical account of the restrictive policies and measures adopted by the colonial and post-independence regimes of presidents Kenyatta and Moi. I later on provide theoretical reflections in light of what is currently happening to the Somali refugees in Kenya. The following section outlines the exclusionary measures that each of the regime undertook against the ethnic Somalis.

4.1 The Colonial Era

Owing to the uniqueness of the Somalis and the Northern Province as a whole, the colonial government established and adopted administrative laws and techniques different from those applied in the hinterland. According to Branch (2014), the Somali indigenous system was characterised by a strong element of unity that was very distinct form the Kenyans form the Southern provinces. Thus, the Somali inhabitants of the British East Africa received different treatment from the government of the day. The colonial government officials were well aware of this fact and for some like Sir Charles Eliot, the Commissioner for the East Africa Protectorate, argued that "if it were possible to detach the districts inhabited by Somalis it would be an excellent

thing to form them into a separate government" (Castagno, 1964:170). The same position was held by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, when in I946 who advocated for a British entire Somali region of East Africa. The colonial government thereafter adopted prejudicial governance policies against the Somalis which are discussed below, included the East Africa Outlying Ordinance, the creation of the Somali-Galla demarcation, the separation of the Jubaland region from the Kenyan colony in 1926 and the Special District Ordinance of 1934.

4.1.1 The East Africa Outlying Ordinance

The North Frontier District (NFD) was a creation of the East Africa Outlying Ordinance which declared some areas in the Northern part of Kenya closed to outsiders. In 1926, the NFD was proclaimed a closed district, and local commissioners were given exceptionally strong powers. The area was later defined as a "special district" (Special Districts Ordinance 1934), and the movement of persons entering and leaving the NFD was restricted. Any resistance to any of these measures was met with military counter attacks. Besides, all political parties were banned in the region and the entry and exit from the region for both Somalis and non-Somalis was only possible by the authorisation of the regional administration. Since the creation of Archers Post in 1908, NFD was administered by the military until 1925 when civilian administrators like R.W Hempstead, T.D Butler and D.R Crampton were posted in the region (Anderson, 2014). The amended 1924 East Africa Outlying Ordinance completely sealed off the NFD from the rest of the country and was run under different taxation regime. The ordinance banned any missionary activities in the NFD area. As Abdullahi notes:

> "The 1924 ordinance sealed the NFD region off the rest of Kenya colony where different colonial regulations were imposed. Such regulations included different taxation rates: a tax of ten shillings was imposed on the NFD residents while other communities in Kenya paid fifteen shillings. The NFD Somalis paid the NFD poll tax while the rest of the Kenyan communities paid the Native Hut and Poll tax. This taxation created a sense of unique ethnic feeling from 1931 as indicated by the fact that Somalis viewed themselves more special than the rest of the Kenyan communities" (1997:57).

Kenyans from the hinterland could not be allowed to enter the NDF without special approval. The same restrictions applied to Somalis who wanted to travel to other provinces. For some, these

restrictions were likened to the South African pass system[9]. The restriction were also extended to grazing land and water supply (Anderson, 2014). In addition, some of the modern governance strategies such as local councils that were being utilised in the hinterland were never executed in the NDF. Hence, it was until 1961 when the African District Councils Ordinance of 1950 was introduced in the NFD. The growth of towns and modern infrastructure was stippled by the colonial government which heavily relied on local indigenous governance structures such as stipendiary chiefs, headmen, and the police. The colonial officers also relied heavily on the native court system headed by Khadis and guided by Sharia in the resolution of judicial disputes (Whittaker, 2010).

The colonial administration was mainly concerned with the establishment of administrative structures and maintenance of law and order thus very little attention was paid to the social and economic development of the region. However, various challenges including the frequent raids by Abyssinian soldiers on its neighbours plagued the smooth running of the frontier district. For instance, it is reported that in 1925, the Abyssinians raided and stole approximately five thousand camels in the Marsabit area, during which nine people lost their lives (Murunga, 2009). In the 1930s, the colonial government continued to adopt more restrictive policies to govern the NFD. The policies were formulated by the governor in charge of the Kenyan colony in consultation with administrators in charge of NFD and Colonial Secretary based in London. Some of the policies that were adopted included the forced labour policy which demanded that NFD inhabitants were to provide free labour for roadworks. This policy received immense resistance from the Ogaden and Degoda people and was later scrapped off in 1932. According to a 1939 circular by the Officer in Charge of the NFD, the forced labour regulation was important in the making of "the NFD more productive and profitable". The envisioned development was going to benefit not only the Somalis but the colonial government as well as the British empire.

The Somalis that resided outside the NFD came to be known as the "Alien Somali" a term which was later used to describe Somalis staying in urban centres. Scharrer (2018) argues that the use of

[9]The *Pass Laws Act of 1952* required black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a passbook, known as a Dompas, everywhere and at all times. The Dompas was similar to a passport, but it contained more pages filled with more extensive information than a normal passport. Within the pages of an individual's Dompas was their fingerprints, photograph, personal details of employment, permission from the government to be in a particular part of the country, qualifications to work or seek work in the area, and an employer's reports on worker performance and behaviour

the term Alien Somali implied they were considered non-native. This categorisation of non-native was attributed to "their intermediary status in the socio-economic hierarchy due to their service to the colonial state, but also from their own attempts to be treated as "Asians", set apart from the "African" population" (Scharrer, 2018:496). This is because, the Alien Somalis worked for colonial government as clerks and security personnel while some were businesspersons

Figure 5: Map of North Frontier District



Source: Whittaker (2015)

4.1.2 The Somali-Galla Line Policy

Since the Somali inhabitants of the NFD were mainly nomads, they kept migrating westwards leading to the displacement of other tribes like the Galla Mijikenda, Kamba and Borana. In 1919, the NFD adopted the Somali-Galla Line policy that was meant to stop the migration of Somali westwards. The aim of the Somali-Galla Line was to stop the encroachment of the Somali on Galla grazing line. Thus, any Somali who defied this policy was fined a tenth of his cattle or three months imprisonment (Whittaker, 2014). Observably, this policy had long term effect on the confinement of nomadic Somalis to their allotted areas. However, in some cases, some clans like the Degodia and Auliyahan defied the policy time and again. To remedy this, the NFD administration imposed heavy penalties and intensive patrolling by the Kings Rifles[10] soldiers who managed to forcibly return them to their grazing zones (Lind et al, 2017). In summary, the Somali-Galla line policy was meant to achieve three important aims: to create designated areas for Somalis where they would leave without disturbance from other communities, keep Somalis away from the Kenyan highlands and protect Gallas from being displaced by the Somalis. I note that this policy was not just about the restriction of the movement of the Somalis into the Wagalla territory, it also inhibited the formation of common identity of Somalis and non-Somalis from other regions of Kenya.

4.1.3 The Special District Ordinance of 1934

The Special District Ordinance of 1934 did not only restrict the movement of Somalis out of NFD, but it also had a restriction on internal movements. It stipulated that for an individual to travel from district to another, they had to obtain an authorisation from the District Officer (DO). Before issuing a travel permit, the DO was expected to counter check with his colleague at the destination district. This was a directive by the Officer in Charge of the NFD which demanded due diligence be carried out before the issuance of travel permits to Somalis. Article 18 of the Special District Ordinance of 1934 stipulated that:

> "No person shall leave the district or area to which this ordinance has been applied unless such person is in possession of a valid passport or other document satisfactorily

[10]The King's African Rifles (KAR) was a multi-battalion British colonial regiment raised from the various British possessions in East Africa from 1902 until independence in the 1960s. It performed both military and internal security functions within the East African colonies

> establishing his identity issues to him in such form and under such conditions as the governor in council may from time to time prescribe" (SDO, Article 18)

According to a directive by Gerald Reece, the Officer in Charge of NFD, the reason for travel had to be ascertained before a permit is issued. Getting a travel permit was important because the SDO accorded the NFD administration the powers to arrest any suspicious person. The Special District Ordinance of 1934 also granted the DCs in the NFD more powers to rule compared to the DCs in Kenya hinterland. For instance, the DCs were allowed to use any form of means to maintain law and order as well as control the grazing rights of pastoralists (Scharrer, 2018). Any area that was deemed overgrazed was kept out of bounds until it recovered.

I note that, the ordinance was implemented without keeping in mind the adverse impact it would have on Somalis who were mainly pastoralists as there was no consideration for their need to travel in search of water and green pastures. The traders were not spared either. The amount of paperwork required for one to leave the NFD or travel within was too much as such many livestock traders were discouraged. Many opted to sell their livestock through the African Marketing Organisation that was established in 1933. The organisation dubbed as the "Supply Board" by the Somalis had a monopoly on livestock business. The livestock were bought at a fixed price which led to the exploitation of many livestock traders. The buying or selling of livestock to non-resident of districts was completely banned.

In the 1940s, nationalistic feelings started to grow and spread in the hinterland and to avoid the spread, the NDF was put on total closure such that no resident could leave the region without special authorisation. Despite the restrictive measures by the colonial administration, the Somalis in the NFD did not relent on their desire for a unified Somalia. According to Muturi:

> "The Special District Ordinance of 1934 was meant to hinder social interaction between different groups in the NFD. It demarcated the area into tribal zones in order to prevent Islam from galvanizing the people in the NFD against the colonial administration and, reportedly, to stop epidemics from spreading to livestock in the rest of the Kenyan hinterland" (13 April 2015).

In 1943, the Somali Youth League (SYL), was founded in Mogadishu. This offered the Somalis a platform to express their nationalism and express their solidarity in the fight for a "One Somalia"

(Muturi, 13 April 2015). While SYL was met with great resistance form the Kenyan government, it was unstoppable. It spread across the NFD which was a major setback to the Special District Ordinance of 1934 which was used to target and dilute the identity and unity of the Somalis. In 1947, SYL opened an office in in NFD but in 1947, "its activities were perceived as a threat to the colony, as they encouraged disregard of tribal boundaries and assisted the immigration of 'alien' Somali into the Colony" (Turton 1972:137). The colonial government responded to this new development by confining the activities of the SYL in the NFD. Thereafter, there were more attempts of unification of the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland between 1958-1963. In 1960, a referendum was held to determine whether the NFD should remain part of Kenya or be part of the newly independent Somalia. While the people voted in favour of joining Somalia, the British government ignored the outcome of the referendum (Samora, 2013). In 1962, the Kenyan Somali representatives from NFD who attended the Lancaster House Constitutional rooted for the secession of the Somalis to join the greater Somali which had attained independence on 1 July 1960. Both the NFD leaders and Somali government were of the opinion that the responsibility for settlement was exclusively Britain's and that the Somali claims should by no means be used by Britain to retard the granting of Kenyan independence.

4.2 The Kenyatta Regime's Response to the NFD Secession

I note that Kenya's independence did not mean freedom from subjugation and harassment for Somalis in the NFD area. Hence like the British, Kenyatta's government conceived Somali mobility as a threat to its borders and systems of governance. The Kenyatta government embarked on sealing the porous borders that allowed for the thriving of guerrilla activities as well as cross border support for Somali secession. In fact, some government officials were of the idea that a physical wall surrounded with a thorn filled trench and a fifteen-mile demilitarised zone be built, though this never came to pass (Murunga, 2009). According to Whitaker (2012) and Mburu (2005), Kenyatta's approach to Somali secession was largely drawn from colonial administrative practices. The forced viligisation program that came in effect in 1966 was mainly about restricting nomadic mobility and distinguishing native Somalis from the Shiftas. The Kenyatta government treated the Somali grievances as a non-issue. This was evidenced by a comment made by the then Minister of Defence, Dr Njoroge Mungai who said that: "Somalis should retrace their footsteps back to Kismayu, Mogadishu and Herisa, if they dislike being integrated with their African brothers in

Kenya" (As quoted in Abdullahi, 1997:1). The statement clearly shows how dismissive the Kenyatta government was as far as the NFD issue was concerned. Thereafter, the secessionist leaders sort diplomatic avenues to resolve the matter. In September of 1963, the secessionist leaders attended the Rome Talks of September but that did not resolve the matter as the Kenyatta government resolved that "not one inch of Kenya would be given up. The Somali Republic had no rights in the seventh region and would get none" (The Times, 24 September 1963)

The struggle for the unification of Somalia continued even after Kenya's independence in 1963 and Somalia pursued this through various avenues including regional and continental bodies. However, the secession issue received mixed reactions from international community given the ideological differences between radical and moderate leaders on the continent. The formation of Organisation of African Unity (OAU) provided a platform for discussion of such issues. The OAU as a continental body maintained that this was nothing more than a border issue between Kenya and Somalia. In September 1967, under the chairmanship of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia a resolution was made about the secession issue. This was done at the OAU summit in Kinshasa and the agreement ended the four-year shifta war. Even so, the root cause of the Shifta war which was the unification of Somali remained unresolved. The Declaration on Kenya-Somali Relations read:

> " 1) Both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of paragraph 3 of Article III of the OAU Charter; 2) The two Governments have further undertaken to resolve any outstanding differences between them in the spirit of paragraph 4 of Article III of the OAU Charter; 3) The two Governments have pledged to ensure maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing destruction of human life and property" (OAU Resolution on Border Disputes, 1964)

It was signed in a follow up meeting on 28 October 1967 by President Kenyatta of Kenya and the Prime minister of Somalia, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. However, the accord was interpreted differently by the two leaders. For instance, in his public speech on 20 October 1968, President Jomo Kenyatta termed the dispute as "a little quarrel" which had since been resolved (Lewis, 2002:56). He then, announced a relaxation of the 5-year state of emergency in the North-Eastern Province. In contrast to this, on 14 October 1968 in his address to the majority political party, the

Prime Minister Mohamed Egal said that his government's policy was to "stand on one leg ready for war and with the other ready for peace" (Touval, 1963:15). Kenya's attorney General Charles Njonjo remarked that "Kenya could never agree to surrender part of her territory. Kenyans, be they Boranas or Somalis, who did not support Kenya "should pack their camels and go to Somalia" (Njonjo as cited in Ogenga, 1992:23). This statement shows that the government's strategy was that all those deemed a threat to the state were to be expelled without mercy. It also confirmed that the Kenyatta government considered the NFD inhabitants as "aliens". These tensions between Kenya and Somalia, were however, soon eclipsed by the Ogaden war.

Thereafter, the Kenyatta regime embarked on combating what it termed as the 'shifta[11] menace'. As of 1964, the NFDLF became outlawed, and its activities banned in the NFD region. All the initial attempts to grant autonomy to the NFD region were reversed. The Kenyatta government revoked any policies granting autonomy or supporting a unified Somalia. The NFDLF was termed as shifta. The main political parties in Kenya-KANU and KADU were of the view that NFD remains part of Kenya. However, KADU as the main opposition party advocated for autonomous governance of the NFD. Through its leader, Ronald Ngala, they advocated for decentralised from of governance. According to Ronald Ngala:

> "Autonomous regions, comprising the people who wish to live together in Kenya, and providing for the rights of minorities, can be a solution to the problems of suspicion, problems of fear, problems of insecurity, and even problems of secession- a comment that related to the Somali secession attempts" (Drysdale, 1964:119).

The KANU leaders were of a different opinion. They advocated for a centralised government where all critical governance issues were to be discussed at Kenya's capital Nairobi. They were opposed to the idea of granting autonomy to the NFD and other regions in Kenya as they supported a unitary form of government. Kenyatta made the following remarks during his official visit to Mogadishu:

[11]The word 'shifta' was a derogatory term used by the Abyssinians in the 1920s to describe Oromo pastoralists who fled to the Kenya colony from Abyssinian misrule and enslavement

> "We regard the NFD as part of Kenya. We also regard Somalis who live in the NFD and elsewhere as our brothers. They are part and parcel of Kenya, and we would like them to live in Kenya in that fashion ... This is a question which we can discuss with the Somalis in the NFD, this being a domestic affair of Kenya (Thompson, 2015:67)

This led to a violent conflict as Somalis and the Oromo joined hands to fight for the secession of the NFD. The Kenyatta government termed them rebels and enemies of the state. The secessionists leaders did not relent and in fact did not see themselves as Shiftas as the government of Kenya did. During the conflict, some of the NFD leaders that were opposed to the secession like the chief of Aballa Ogaden, Omar Shuria were killed by the Shiftas. This was a tactic that was adopted to discourage any sell outs in the NFD. From 1964 onwards, the Shiftas became more strategic, they began to target police posts and military bases. In response Kenya signed a treaty with Ethiopia on 31 January 1964 to join hands in fighting the Shiftas. Ethiopia was already occupying Somali and her ascension to the treaty was in a bid to justify the occupation. The treaty was about mutual military assistance should any of the members be attacked by Somalia. In addition, intelligence gathering, and military training was provided by Ethiopia to the Kenyan government.

4.2.1 The Appeasement Policy and Use of Media

After the signing of the Arusha Declaration which ended the shifta war, the Kenyatta government also adopted other policies like rewarding the anti-secessionists Somalis by allowing them freedom of movement. For instance, two Somali chiefs Omar Shuria of the Abdalla in Garissa District and Sheik Farah of the Gerri in Wajir district received preferential treatment for their loyalty to the government. They were promoted to the position of Senior Chief. They also received bravery awards and many other privileges such as trade licences that allowed them to trade outside the NFD. The children of Somali chiefs that supported the government were given jobs and allowed to study outside NFD. However, the anti-secessionist Somalis were very few and they became a target of the Shiftas. Some like Farah were killed because the government of Kenya did not provide them with security.

During the Shifta War, a radio war ensued between Radio Mogadishu and the Voice of Kenya (VOK). Radio Mogadishu mainly broadcasted its programs in Somali language. It had good

coverage in the NFD region because of its diversity in programming ranging from songs, poetry, and music. The VOK on the other hand broadcasted in Kiswahili. The Somalis were not very conversant with Swahili language. Besides, those who spoke Swahili were viewed negatively as it was considered a Bantu language. To counter this, the Kenyatta government employed Somali presenters at the Voice of Kenya (VOK). Unfortunately, those that were employed did not have a good command of the Somali language and they became a source of ridicule. The Kenyan government was forced to call on the Somali government to stop the inflammatory statements that were being broadcasted on Radio Mogadishu. Through Radio Mogadishu, the Shiftas were referred to as "nationalists". This was not well received by the Kenyatta government which maintained that this "adds credence to the widely held view that the gangs of armed bandits and cutthroats, who are currently menacing the North-Eastern region as well as the norther parts of the coast Region, operate for the territory of the Republic with full knowledge, if not outright support of the Mogadishu government" (As quoted in Thompson, 2015:121). The Kenyatta regime was vehemently against the portrayal of the Shiftas as nationalists for that would fuel the precarious conflict situation in the NFD. Thompson noted:

> "One Ishmael Muhammad Ali on Mogadishu radio in a program on February 11 entitled 'the needs of the Somali people advocated a jihad in Kenya's NER, again elevating the conflict to a religious one. He accused the Kenyan government of being responsible for months of elimination…*en masse* of the Somali people of the NFD (an oblique reference to shifta causalities), and for doing its best to 'fool the NFD Somali inhabitants there wished to cooperate with the Kenyan government and participate in impeding regional elections. Somali denied not only Kenya's claims, but also the willingness of the Somali of the region to participate in the elections and described them as a 'false plot'" (2015: 213)

4.2.2 The Anti-shifta Bill

In September 1964, the Kenyatta government enacted and adopted the Anti-shifta Bill. The bill was meant to strengthen the fight against the Somali shifta by allowing the detention of Shiftas in the camps to be created every district of the NFD. The government worked together with the media to portray the shifta as criminals and rebels who are a danger to the state. The Drum Magazine, The Reporter and The Standard were among the widely used newspapers that were used to spread

this propaganda (Muturi,13 April 2015). The government also sent out posters pamphlets that showcased the government plans for the NFD region. This was meant to win over the Somalis who still supported the secession. The posters had pictures of the Somalis who had ditched the secessionist movement and how they benefitted from the government. The leaflets were meant "to assure Somalis that under the Kenya Bill of Rights, they will enjoy complete religious freedom, freedom of thought, speech and action within the law, the protection of the law and the security of the existing individual and tribal land rights" (Ogenga, 1992:18). However, this was just another hoax by the Kenyatta government to win the loyalty of NFD inhabitants and dilute the secessionist movement.

From 1966 onwards, the secessionist movement intensified its activities in the NFD region. They targeted police posts, military camps and killed the police. The Kenyan government launched ruthless counter attacks. In June 1966, the Kenyan government issued a directive requiring all Somalis to register with the authorities, failure to which, they will be prosecuted. Intelligence report had led the government to believe that there were Somalis flocking into the country form Somalia in large numbers. However, the exercise was faced with many challenges especially the mere fact that it was hard to tell between a Kenyan Somali and a Somali from Somalia. Besides, it was possible for a Somali from Somalia to come in and get registered and still go back to Somalia. The compulsory registration was reinforced with other stringent policies such as dusk to dawn curfews for civilians. In addition, all vehicles that travelled within and outside the NFD were required to get police escort, making it difficult to have frequent travels.

4.2.3 The Viligisation Program

In the same year, the government instituted viligisation as a counterinsurgency strategy. A total of 28 villages, 15 of which were in the North-Eastern Province (NEP) were created. The inhabitants were expected to live within designated villages where screenings to separate the natives and rebels was carried out. Just like the colonial war against the Mau Mau fighters, this was a replica of collective punishment by the Kenyatta government. Whittaker writes:

> "the similarities between the Kenyan campaign against shifta and the British campaign against Mau Mau a decade earlier are unambiguous […] Perhaps the most striking similarity between colonial and postcolonial counterinsurgency was the use of

> villagisation. Nonetheless, and just like Mau Mau-era, villages, those established in NEP were little more than detention centres for suspected shifta sympathisers. The similarities between British and Kenyan counterinsurgency should not, however, obscure certain discontinuities" (2014: 648)

The Kenyatta government also retained many British experienced army officers who were very instrumental in the villagisation. I note that, in essence, the colonial structure of law and order was maintained by the newly elected government as many of the provincial and district officers had served in the colonial government. Besides, a good number of British officers who had fought against the Mau Mau were recruited into the army and police. A case in point, is Inspector General Richard Catling, who headed the police unit until the end of 1964.

The Kenyatta government maintained that the aim of viligisation was to separate civilians from insurgence, as such, the policy allowed for routine screening of villagers and movement was monitored and prohibited. The natives were expected to carry their identification documents at all times and observe strict curfew hours. The government also enforced stock seizures. Somalis being mainly pastoralists, their livestock were targeted and killed in order to cripple the Shiftas. The government maintained that viligisation helped in determining the legible Kenyans from the insurgencies, and that the villages would be helpful in making sure the locals have access to healthcare, grazing land, schools, food, and water. However, as Whittaker (2015) notes, the villages were more or less detention centres for those suspected to be shifta sympathisers. Immediately after the villages came into place, the government ordered the district and provincial governments officials to create awareness. The officers visited the villages and "enlightened" the people on the benefits of viligisation. One argument for viligisation was that, for proper governance and development planning the pastoralists had to "settle down". There is no way the government would properly develop the NEP while the pastoralists remained on the move.

The Kenyatta government did not however allocate adequate resources for the viligisation program. Thus, water shortages, inadequate food and overcrowded school became the norm. As noted by Lind et al (2017) the program was largely characterised by indiscriminate violence against the native Somalis. Whittaker adds that the violence was administered through routine screening exercises. He provides a case scenario:

> "For example, in Garissa district in May 1967, a screening exercise was held in the township, after tracks were found leading in that direction from the scene of a landmine incident, in which ten police personnel were injured. During the screening exercise, residents of the town were collected together at Jaribu primary school, where they were kept without food or water for a sustained period, and men were beaten, and women were raped" (2014: 645)

Authoritarian colonial styles were also adopted during the viligisation program. The residents were subjected to restricted movements and curfews. According to Whittaker:

> "The Kenyan government likewise used them after the declaration of a state of emergency in December 1963. During 1964 and 1965 all urban areas in the NEP were under constant curfew, and by the end of 1966 curfew conditions prevailed throughout the entire NFD. Under the terms of the orders, residents of the affected area were required to remain within the premises at which they normally resided between the hours of 6.30 pm and 6.30 am. Anyone found outside between these times was considered subversive" (2014:645)

The Alien Somalis staying in urban centres were not spared by these counterinsurgency measures as they were considered to be allies of the Shifta war. This had adverse social and economic ramifications on them, especially since, they had been enjoying government privileges. As if this was not enough, the Kenyatta government resorted to killing livestock that belonged to NFD inhabitants in what seemed to be systematic pauperisation. For instance, in 1966 the Kenya military with the permission of government killed thousands of camels as a means to "get the nomads out of the bush" (Abdullahi, 1997:138). As a result, the people were starved, and hunger ravaged the region, and this was especially very devastating to nomads whose main source of livelihood was livestock. Through Dr Njoroge Mungai, the Kenyan Defence minister, the Kenyan government justified the move by stating that "the whole bill for this massacre lies fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Mogadishu Government" (Africa Digest, 1965:73). From this statement, the Kenyan government alluded to the fact that the Somali government was responsible for the escalation of the conflict as well as the resultant killing of livestock.

I observe that, application of the outlined emergency laws in the NFD sems to point to the fact that at that time, Kenya was run by two separate regimes; the prejudicial NFD regime and the other which applied to the rest of the country. The regime practices employed in the NFD were responsible for massive human rights abuse as well as the construction of its inhabitants as a threat. Hence the NFD became a technical war zone as well as a virtual police state. The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) made the following observations about the emergency laws:

> "The regulations created offences that were punishable without due process. Possession of a firearm, or consorting with or harbouring someone with a firearm, was punishable by death. Harbouring someone who may act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of public security was punishable by life imprisonment. Even the owning, operating or use of boats or any other means of transport on the Tana River was made a crime liable to imprisonment. Entry into the region by people other than civil servants and members of the security forces was prohibited" (KHRC, 2008:25)

I note that, the authoritarian and prejudicial policies that were instituted in the NFD led to marginalisation of the region as far as development was concerned. The governments focus was on combating the rebels as opposed to developing the region. Hence in sum, the Kenyatta government NFD governance strategy was mainly about security, maintaining law and order. His policies were more about containment as opposed to development hence during his reign no substantial development was undertaken in the region.

4.3 The Moi Regime's Response to the NFD Secession

Throughout the 1980s, the NFD was marred with insecurity and just like his predecessor, Moi adopted the colonial strategies in maintaining law and order. The military was deployed extensively to remedy the situation leading to the death of at least 400 civilians in 1984. In early 1989, the Kenyan government reported that the Sebule border had been invaded by Somalia armed forces where Kenyans were attacked, and six elephants killed. In September 1989, the Somali army launched an attack on Garissa town which resulted in the death of the Kenyan policemen while some were kidnapped. As Ogenga notes to avoid a repeat of such incidences in the future "violence was employed arbitrarily, unpredictably and brutally against people who were deemed 'enemies'

of the state" (1992:24). Meanwhile, the relationship between Kenya and Somalia worsened. The Kenyan government intensified its military presence in the NEP after Somalia was actively involved in the Ogaden war of 1978 to 1979. According to Whittaker (2014), the Kenyan government feared perhaps Somalia would advance its military activities into the NEP. During president Moi's era collective punishment was extensively used but the most noticeable historical incidences were recorded in 1980, 1984 and 1989 (Lind et al 2017). Security forces were allowed power to implement these draconian measures with impunity. A case in point is the 1984 Wagalla Massacre which claimed approximately 3000 lives mostly Degodia men (Freeman, 2019). This shows how state security machinery were continually used in marginalising not just the native Somalis but the north region as a whole.

4.3.1 Screening and Surveillance

By the end of 1989, Somalia was plagued with conflict and at the verge of a civil war and thus, the Kenyan government started to shift focus to the poaching problem. The poaching especially on the Tsavo was particularly blamed on the native and alien Somalis. The Kenyan government associated the poaching in NEP to rebellion to the state while that in the other parts of the country was treated as normal criminal activities. Following the 5 September 1998 attack on travellers, between Gartuba and Bangale where twelve lost their lives and many were injured, the government adopted a shoot-to-kill policy against poachers (Murunga, 2009). Dr Richard Leakey was appointed to spearhead the implementation of this new policy. I note that, the policy was a strategy by the government to legitimise violence against the Somalis.

The screening of the native Somali was an exercise that demanded that all native Somalis aged 18 years and above to carry a special identification card (The Pink card). While it was intended that the exercise would last only three weeks, it was later adopted and institutionalised, and native Somalis were treated as second class citizens (Lochery, 2012). The adoption of the pink card points to the importance of identities for the internal control on what government consider "illegal entities". It was going to be challenging for the state to act when illegal individuals cannot be connected with their legal identities or with their geographical location. Therefore, the pink card became a mandatory requirement when traveling, accessing government services, any financial transactions be it land acquisition, banking, and education. This exercise mainly targeted the

Somali businesspersons that were seen to be financing the secessionist movement in the NFD by crippling their business engagements in the region. The screening was likened to the old Kipande system[12], which was vehemently opposed by many Kenyans as it entrenched discrimination and marginalisation of the Africans. As a result, many lawyers and human rights organisation came forth to greatly condemn the pink card and termed it unconstitutional as well as discriminatory. Indeed, when the screening was eventually rolled out, it turned out to be inhumane and many Somalis fervidly resented it. Many of them fled to the neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda while some sought refuge in Europe and North America. They lived in the neighbouring East African countries as stateless persons, a condition that saw many suffer as they were persecuted, arrested and in some cases detained. According to HRW:

> "As a direct result, many people were forced to seek refuge in Europe and North America and thousands fled to neighbouring East African countries, living as a stateless and persecuted diaspora subject to further hardship and indignities. Some were arrested and detained in Tanzania and Burundi. Scores of long-term residents in Tanzania were caught up in the sweep, deprived of their livelihood and imprisoned under appalling conditions. It was reported that, at least two thousand Kenyan citizens deported to Somalia were suffering great physical hardship as they are forced to survive without any recognized status—either as legitimate refugees or citizens of either country, and without any adequate humanitarian assistance" (HRW, 5 September 1990).

Gitobu Imanyara, a legal expert and the then editor of The Nairobi Law Monthly made the following observations about the screening:

> "To the best of our knowledge none of the above persons is a magistrate or a judicial officer. Yet all persons of the Somali ethnic community resident in Kenya who are of eighteen (18) years and above" are required to furnish to the above persons "such documentary or other evidence of the truth of their registration. How the "truth" is to be established is not indicated. Yet there can be no denial that the screening panels are adjudicating authorities. Those who fail the screening test are being locked up. Upon

[12]A special card system used in the colonial era to control the local population

"successful screening," those who pass are issued with certificates of registration..." (The Nairobi Law Monthly, November 1989)

This is because from a legal point of view the screening exercises went against the Section 76(9) of the old constitution which stated that:

> "A court or other adjudicating authority prescribed by law for the determination of the existence or extent of a civil right or obligation shall be established by law and shall be independent and impartial; and where proceedings for such a determination are instated by a person before such a court or other adjudication authority, the case shall be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time" (The Nairobi Law Monthly, November 1989)

Gitobu Imanyara therefore questioned the legal basis of the exercises. He added:

> "Under what law are the screening panels established? Gazette Notice No. 5319 contained in the Kenya Gazette dated 10November 1989 is not a legal notice capable of constituting an adjudicating authority. But assuming that it does so, where are the safeguards to ensure their independence and impartiality. How do they go about their screening exercises? How is arbitrariness of the proceeding curbed? What opportunities of appeal lie from decisions of these screening panels? What was the criteria used in constituting these screening panels? Are the records of these panels open to court scrutiny? These are questions that beg answers do not abuse and insults from the 'honourable' M.P.s who have denounced us for expressing a view contrary to their chorused vitriol" (The Nairobi Law Monthly, November 1989)

However, the government continued to justify the screening exercise. For instance, in November 1988, the Minister of state Hussein Mohammed who was also the Member of parliament for Dujis in Garissa District reported that, there are several aliens who had sneaked into the country illegally from Somalia (Ogenga, 1992). The Washington Post wrote "according to the government, the purpose of the screening is to flush out persons who have crossed the border illegally from war-torn Somalia and who, after bribing Kenyan officials, obtained forged or falsified citizenship papers" (27 December 1989). The Moi regime maintained that the alleged aliens were into illegal acquisition of residency and dubious business. The Weekly Review wrote:

> "The current screening of ethnic Somalis in Kenya may, on the face of it, appear unusual, but those anxious for an explanation probably need not go much further than the deterioration in recent months of the security situation in North- Eastern Province and surrounding areas.... If the intention of the current screening exercise of ethnic Somalis is to root out rebels whom Barre complains have sought sanctuary in the county, then the Somali government has every reason to be pleased. As for local Somalis, some of them may find the exercise inconvenient, and probably even a discriminatory one. But the security factors involved appear to have led the Kenya government to decide that the move was imperative. Being a neighbour of Somalia and having sizeable ethnic Somali population within its borders, Kenya can barely escape some consequences of the internal strife in Somalia" (17 November 1989)

The Africa Watch which was against the inhumane treatment of native Somalis and refoulement of refugees made the following observations:

> "The Kenyan authorities are also using the influx of Somalis seeking sanctuary to impose a discriminatory and repressive screening process on its ethnic Somali community, which has suffered a history of persecution [....] Some 3,000 refugees staying in makeshift shelters in Liboi, North Eastern Kenya, received no food or assistance from the Kenyan authorities since arriving in Kenya [….] The refugees were harassed and beaten by Kenyan security forces, and three arrested for 'inciting resistance' against deportation. All refugees have now reportedly been returned to areas in Somalia where heavy fighting persists or have fled to escape forcible repatriation.... The authorities have increased security sweeps and identity checks of Kenyans of Somali origin and Somalis living in Kenya. The arrival of the refugees is being used as an opportunity to impose compulsory screening on all Kenyan-Somalis, in order to identify 'illegal aliens'…" (17 November 1989)

Lochery (2012) examines the 1989 screenings where in order to differentiate between Kenyan Somalis and Somalis from Somalia, the Somalis were expected to provide a detailed account of their genealogy. The screenings were a clear strategy by the government to question the identity of Kenyan Somalis. The 1989 screenings were extended to areas outside of NEP, especially in urban areas such as Eastleigh. The Washington Post observed that "in parts of Eastleigh, a Nairobi

neighbourhood where many ethnic Somalis and Ethiopians live, critics say, some children have been left alone as one or both parents have been dragged away by authorities" (27 December 1989). Since then, as shall be discussed in the next chapter, Eastleigh has become a centre for government screening exercises. Iazzolino and Hersi (2019:374) contend that, "the relationship of the Somali population is-à-vis the state is defined by the legacy of the irredentist insurgency that broke out after Independence in the mostly Somali-inhabited north-east of the country and by current state security anxieties due to Kenyan armed intervention in Somalia Eastleigh residents often face police raids in their homes as well as businesses and arbitrary arrests and other forms of harassment". They were and still are subjected to intense government scrutiny in form of police stops and searches.

The same strategy was later rolled out and adopted during the acquisition of national identity cards process. To date Somalis, are expected to prove their identity in order to attain the national ID card. Lochery notes that "the documents were not only designed to differentiate Kenyan Somalis from "Somalis from Somalia" but also to make differences among Kenyan Somalis more visible – or, to use James Scott's term, "legible" (2012:616). I observe that, the screenings were just not about demarcating the insiders from outsiders but specifically determining the territory where the insiders belong. The state employed its security agencies in executing the screening exercises something that still persists up to today. Lochery writes:

> "Police raided homes, businesses, hotels, restaurants, and matatus public mini-buses in Eastleigh and Pangani, checking for identity papers. Police surrounded a mosque in Eastleigh, arrested worshippers, and confiscated identity cards" (2012:624).

These kind of screening exercises resulted in some Kenyan tribes being elevated as more "Kenyan" than others. Many Kenyans started to perceive themselves through tribal lens and the integration among the various tribes became a distant dream (Lochery, 2012). In the early 1990s, the government continued to execute screening exercises in the NEP. However, with the introduction of multi-party politics coupled with constitutional reforms, the emergency regulations that governed the NFP were lifted in 1991. The native Somalis were now able to engage in the social and political process. Even so, recognition of Somalis as "Kenyan" still remained a distant dream. In his account in 1993, a Somali parliamentarian explained how an immigration officer told

Somalis that were barred from entering the passport issuing office that: "A Somali, whether from Somalia or from Kenya, is a Somali because mtoto wa nyoka ni nyoka (The child of a snake is a snake)" (Freeman, 2019: 93).

The screening exercise had varying consequences on different groups of people. For instance, according to Africa Watch (17 November 1989) a majority of those that were deported were women. This could be attribute to language barrier. Many of the Somali women were illiterate and did not have a grasp of Kiswahili which is a national language. The other reason according to Human Rights Watch (HRW) was that the screening committees consisted of mainly men making it hard for the women to freely express themselves. The HRW reported:

> "The large number of women detained and subsequently deported can also be attributed to the fact that the screening committees were made up entirely of men, making it culturally difficult for women to assert themselves and insist on their rights. A number of families reported that women who had been brought from Somalia to Kenya for marriage were automatically rejected in the exercise—although under Kenyan law their marriage to a Kenyan made them eligible to be considered Kenyan citizens. This was not recognized during the screening and such women were immediately arrested and deported. Somali women married to Kenyan citizens also had problems being identified by elders and other members of the community—and their vulnerability was compounded at times, according to friends and relatives, by personal rivalries and family disputes associated with the common practice of polygamy. In addition, as women normally move to the town or village of their husband, in instances where women married into communities outside their vicinity, they have few relatives and other people, if any, who are able to vouch for their ancestry" (5 September 1990)

4.4 Conclusion

Freeman is right to argue that "the current manifestation of othering of Somali refugees in Kenya should be understood within a much longer historical trajectory of exclusion" (2019:97). Scholars like Lind et al (2017) Branch (2011) and Whittaker (2015) have studied the seclusion of Somalis in the pre- and post-independence era. They have concluded that various authoritarian strategies employed in the seclusion of Somalis have been replicated over the years. Hence, by examining

the trajectory of governments social and political control since the colonial period through what Whittaker (2015) calls "state violence and collective punishment", the above discussion reveals a connection between the current government apathy towards Somali refugees which manifests in the form of discriminatory measures and encampment. The various strategies of containment and discrimination have been replicated all through the pre- to post-colonial period and they include the use of military to subdue those deemed as a threat to the government, screenings, arbitrary arrests, detentions, and restricted movements.

I note that, the top-down execution of state violence and collective punishment, is still evident in the way the government handles the Somali refugees that reside in Eastleigh today. The adoption of the encampment policy and practice can be looked at like a replica of the viligisation program by the Kenyatta government. Through the villages, the Kenyatta government sort to draw a demarcation between the insurgences who lived in the NFD and the natives who resided in the hinterland. The targeting of Eastleigh a terror zone is a strategy by the government to reinforce the encampment policy. The confinement of refugees in the camps is more or less like the viligisation program. Hence the Kenyan government tries to show its power and control by controlling the movement of refugees. The camp provides a "site" for forceful viligisation of refugees who are deemed to be a threat to state security. To do so, the government institutes state violence, forceful screening exercises and collective punishment to those refugees who defiantly leave the camp to settle in the city. A repeat of the colonial strategies of extortion, restriction of movement, arbitrary arrests, requirement of specific authorisation documents and refoulement are evident in the way the government manages urban refugees.

I also observe that, Kenya's post-colonial government have continued to employ the top-down authoritarian form of rule in maintaining social order (Scott 1989). The restriction of refugee movements, the use of military as in the case of Usalama watch and collective punishments are some of the ways the state systematically controls what it considers "undesirable refugees". Having the monopoly over the movement of refugees makes surveillance possible. Following Scott's (1989) assertion that through such "processes the state makes its people "legible" by gathering information on its subjects in the various roles they play in society". Through this "legibility" the Kenyan government is able to demarcate between the "most undesirable Somali refugees" and the other refugees. This reminds me of Torpey's thoughts that "a state's ability to

have a grip on its populace is depended on the ability of modern state's capacity to penetrate more deeply into society" (1998:243). Thus, forceful screenings and encampment are the tools the Kenyan government has employed to have control over the refugees in the country. Torpey notes that "individuals who remain beyond the embrace of the state necessarily represent a limit on its penetration" (1998:244). Hence, the government is well are that if the Somali refugees remain in stealth mode that would be challenging as afar as having total control is concern.

Hence, acting as "surveillance state" the Kenyan government does not only exclude the Somalis from "key institutions of society, such as the labour market and the housing market, and even from informal networks of fellow countrymen and family" (Engbersen and Broeders 2007:1595); but also, through selective inclusion of specific categories of citizens through mandatory screenings and special documentation (such as the pink card). The NFD was thus constructed as what Engberson what calls a "factory of exclusion" and of people habituated to their status of the "excluded" (Engbersen, 2001:242). This is seen in the way the government gave preferential treatment to chiefs who supported the anti-secessionist movement and disregarded those who did not. The aim was to discipline the institutions and social networks Somalis use to rebel against the government or those they need for their daily lives. All those in support of the Somali secessionist agenda including the SPYlL were targeted as a strategy of exclusion through delegitimization and criminalization of its activities in the NEP.

Being a surveillance state meant developing and implementing detection tools aimed at exclusion. For instance, the screening exercises were not only necessary for detection and identification, that is, connecting Somalis with their true identities-but also for extradition, as states have gradually found out that "unidentifiable individuals are constitutionally rather invulnerable to expulsion" (Van der Leun, 2003:108). The seclusion of Somalis was only possible when identity has been established. If not, their execution would be resisted from within the polity (lawyers and judges) and international community, in addition to personal resistance from the Somalis themselves. The building of the factory of exclusion was reinforced by the protractible conflict in Somalia with its resultant cross-border effects and the manner in which Kenyan politics is characterised by tribal leanings. As the Kenyan government adopted restrictive policies to control and police Somalis, "the state has attempted to forge a Somali identity "from above" and has imagined – and presented – it as a largely criminal identity and security threat" (Murunga 2009).

The chapter also points to another critical ingredient of securitisation which Bigo (2002) calls a "regime of truth" or as Bourbeau (2014) terms as "logic of exception". I observe a paradigm shift in the exclusionary discourse that was used in the seclusion of native Somalis. I note that, while the othering of the Somalis still remains to date, there is a paradigm shift in the exclusionary discourse: from bandits, rebels or shifta, and poachers to terrorists/Al Shabaab. During the colonial era where the colonial regime governed them as "aliens" and their status was "undefined, ambiguous, and contestable" (Weitzberg, 2017:419). Over the years, as the country began to face terror attacks from terror organisations like Al-Qaida and later on Al-Shabaab, Somalis have come to be associated with terrorism. Since then, as shall be discussed in the next chapter, Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees and asylum seekers – have been associated with Al-Shabaab. This has fuelled the anti-Somali attitudes among Kenyans because exclusionary discourses have been created about them. For instance, the government maintains that the presence of Somali refugees in the country provides links to Al-Shabaab militants to carry out their heinous acts. Such potent myths have provided justification for extra ordinary measures against them resulting in social, economic and in some cases legal seclusion. As Freeman writes:

> "In Kenya, Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks fuel and create increasing tensions with all Somalis in Kenya, be they Kenyan Somalis, Somali refugees, and asylum seekers, or Al-Shabaab militants. It is no exaggeration to say that Somalis (the outsiders within) have come to be collectively conflated and associated with social ills, most notably terrorism in Kenya" (2019:92)

The draconian policies that aimed at movement restriction can be characterized as a means through which the Kenyan establishment gradually eroded the powerbase of native Somalis in the NFD. The demarcation of the NFD from the hinterland the Kenyan government attempted to "control the flow" of 'illegals/ criminals/rebels" to other parts of the country by creating a buffer zone. These attempts proved ineffective and, because of the eruption of the secessionist movements that were supported by "Somalis as well as concerns that such discrimination could have a potential rupturing effect on the fabric of the Kenyan society were voiced" (Santhiago, 2005:10). Through the numerous discriminative policies connections were being made between native Somalis and the security of the state. Hence, myriads of policies emerged from the Kenyan government, utilizing conventional security apparatus to address the apparent threat, but also offering amnesties

to the ant-secessionists (Ibid: 9). Coverage of these incidents characterized the native Somalis as essentially criminal and rebellious.

Driven by the need to assert the country's territorial sovereignty a heavy-handed Kenyan government response was adopted. The native Somalis were then left in a perpetual state of uncertainty as to their legal status and were demonized and objectified as outsiders and threats by the government of the day and the (Liow: 2003; Widyawati, 2008). The native Somalis saw this as a threat to their own individual security, which motivated the resistances against governments that led to the shifta war. They resisted the villagisation program and some fled to neighbouring countries. Government policies and media representation of these events constituted an interconnected incremental securitization driven largely by the Kenyan political elite, through which native Somalis were categorized in stark distinction to other Kenyans and added to an insecurity discourse. This categorisation placed the native Somalis below the other Kenyan citizens with adverse ramifications.

4.6 Chapter Summary

The chapter has discussed the historical repression of the native Somalis in Kenya since the early 1960s. The chapter outlined the various strategies that were used by the colonial, Jomo Kenyatta and Moi regimes against the native Somalis. The context that shapes the mechanisms employed is presented in a detailed manner. The aim was to demonstrate how the current exclusion of Somali refugees is rooted in the Kenya's government conflict with Somalis and the inhabitants of the NFD. The outlined historical background demonstrates how both the colonial and post-colonial regimes employed various authoritarian policing mechanisms to govern the movement of Somalis in Kenya. Some of these strategies included but not limited to "policies restricting the movement of Somalis, forced viligisation in certain areas of NEP, screening exercises, and policies allowing for military coercion and collective are all part of a larger approach of the state administration to systematically control a segment of its citizenry" (Lochery, 2012). In the next section we explore how government securitisation strategies morphed with the influx of refugees especially those of Somali origin.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOMALINISATION OF TERRORISM IN KENYA

5.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored the historical context that has shaped the relationship between the Kenyan government and Somalis, and by extension Somali refugees. In this chapter, I take the discussion further, to explore the conflation of Somali refugees with insecurity and terrorism in the post September 11 era. As discussed in chapter one, Kenya has been a refugee hosting nation since the 1960s. However, in the last decade the country has been a target of terrorist activities, and this has greatly impacted on the refugee hosting situation. This makes it worth exploring the securitisation of migration and asylum in Kenya, and the recent association of Somali refugees with terrorism. To do so, the chapter examines the various terrorist attacks the country has experienced, and specifically those dating between 1998-2019, as well as the state's response to the attacks.

The aim is to examine why and how security-focused narratives/measures that depict Somali refugees as threatening, violent, and terrorists evolved and perpetuated by the Kenyan government, and their impact on refugee policy. Following Freeman's observation, the chapter affirms "that major terrorism attacks have led to an accelerated pace of refugee policy changes, human rights abuses (including extra-judicial killings and mass arrests), the unconstitutional removal of refugee services, coerced repatriations, and blaming 'outsiders' for social ills" (2019:93). The aim of this chapter is neither to deny that indeed Kenya is faced with terrorists' threats, nor that there are elements of policies, laws and state institutions which need transformation in light of the new risks. The chapter makes use of data from multiple sources including newspaper articles, policy analysis, legal cases, and court orders, to NGO reports, academic papers, media sources and official speeches. The chapter is guided by the following questions:

1. How does the Kenyan government define the problem of asylum to which it responds?
2. What strategies does the government employ in the Somalinisation of terrorism in Kenya?
3. How has the said strategies shaped the refugee regime in Kenya?
4. What does the securitisation regime intend to achieve?

5.1 The Terrorism and Refugee Regime Nexus in Kenya

Kenya has experienced a number of terrorist attacks since the 1998 US Embassy bombing. For the purposes of this study, the terror attacks are classified into three categories. The first wave (1998-2004) which includes the first major incident of terror attack, the 1998 bombing of the US Nairobi Embassy and the subsequent events related to it. Four years later Kenya suffered the Kikambala hotel attack in Mombasa and an attempted plan to bring down an Israel plane at the Mombasa Airport. The second wave of terror attacks began in 2007 but there is very little reportage of incidents between 2008 and 2012. The third Wave of terror attacks began around 2013 to 2020. During this period Kenya experienced the worst terror attacks resulting in hundreds of deaths and causalities. Available statistics show that between 2011 and 2014 Kenya experienced approximately 112 terror attacks that claimed hundreds of lives, and many of injuries (Botha, 2014). Hence, from 2011 onwards there is a notable convergence of restrictive security laws and immigration affairs which is significant in the securitisation of asylum in Kenya. This manifests in the form of escalation of amendments of security laws, adoption of anti-terror laws and the constitution of anti-terror institutions. In the next section, I present four case studies of the major terrorist attacks in Kenya since 1998 to 2019, the GoK's response to the attacks and their implication on refugee regime. They include: the 1998 US Embassy bombing, the 2002 Kikambala attack, the 2013 Westgate Mall Attack, and the 2014 Garissa University attack.

5.2.1 The 1998 US Embassy Bombing

On 07 August 1998, a terrorist's bomb exploded outside of the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. The explosion caused severe damage to the Embassy and surrounding structures, including almost complete collapse of the Ufundi building adjacent to the Embassy. The bombing resulted in the death of 224 Kenyans, 12 Americans and over 5000 were wounded (Kelley, 2001). The terrorist attack was linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist group. On this particular day, the Al Qaeda group claimed responsibility for the simultaneous attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The plans to bomb the embassy started way back in 1993 and 1994 when the master minds relocated and settled in Nairobi and Mombasa. Mohamed Saddig Oden-a Palestinian engineer, arrived and settled in Mombasa where he ran a fishing business as a cover up, contacted other Al

Qaeda members in the country, built and funded a network for the terror organisation in the country. On the list was one Harun Fazul alias Abdul Karim-a Comoros citizen- who was involved in both the 1998 and 2002 attacks in Kenya. He arrived in the country in 1996 and set up a gem business in partnership with a US citizen named Wadih-el-Hage. In 1997, Wadih-el-Hage moved to Somalia as a coordinator of Al-Qaeda activities. He later on returned to Kenya and headed an Al Qaeda cell in Mombasa. After the attack, he was arrested and deported to the US for trial due to his involvement in the 1998 bombing (Mickolus and Simmons, 2002). Harun Fazul fled to Afghanistan after the attack but returned sometimes in 2002 disguised as an Islamic preacher (Moustapha, 2002, Botha 2017). According to Mutinga (2004), upon his return, Fazul settled in Lamu where he was involved in youth empowerment programs. He set up three football teams namely Kabul, Al Qaeda and Kundara (Muiruri, 2003). Just before the 2002 Kikambala attack, he got married to a Kenyan woman but after the attack he fled the country. The above events paint a picture as to how the terrorists had ben freely operating in country, taking advantage of the loopholes in the immigration laws, and corruption, to disguise as businesspeople while planning terror attacks. Mingling with the locals and creating networks through marriage and business, is what has made it easier to recruit locals into terrorism.

As Muiruri et al. notes "Kenyans facilitated intelligence and logistical support in the form of forged documents, marriages, and business contacts for the foreign terrorists" (29 November 2002). In fact, it is a Kenyan driver that delivered the track loaded explosives into the US embassy in Nairobi. The US Department of Justice (1998) reported that, some of the terrorists masqueraded as sponsors of NGOs. For instance, the Help African People, an organisation based in Germany had a branch in Nairobi headed by Wadi-El-Hage. Harun Odeh, one of the key planners of the 1998 bombing once worked with Help African People.

Notably, the initial planning of the attack took place in Afghanistan under the leadership of Osama Bin laden. According to Copinger (2003), Osama bin Laden's fatwa dated 23 February 1998, provides a reference point for the attacks against US Embassies in East Africa. However, Alusa (2019) argues that the Fatwa did not specifically mention Kenya as a possible target. Indeed, the Fatwa did not even specifically mention the killing of civilians. Copinger maintains:

> “Bin Laden's fatwa cleverly combined a well-supported call for defensive jihad against perceived Western aggression with a totally insupportable call for directing that defensive jihad against non-combatants around the world. He cleverly uses the doctrinal credibility of his call to arms to hide mask the unacceptability of the means that he advocates using in the conflict. This gives us in the West several areas for reflection” (2003:60).

The *Fatwa* as quoted in Copinger read in part:

> “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, 'and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,' and 'fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God. This is in addition to the words of Almighty God, and why should ye not fight in the cause of God and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated and oppressed women and children, whose cry is 'Our Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will help!" We-with God's help-call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's US troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson” (2003:62).

The key masterminds included Mohammed Al’Owhali, a Saudi national and Mohammed Saddig Oden, a Palestinian engineer. While in Afghanistan, the two underwent training in explosives, hijacking, kidnapping, bomb making, surveillance and security. Two other key planners that were mentioned in relation to the attack are, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Muhsin Musa Matwali Atwa. Fazul rose through the ranks and became Al Qaeda’s key man in the East African region, and eventually the commander in chief of the Al shabaab terror organisation (Botha, 2016). He was also involved in the 2002 Kikambala attack on the Paradise hotel. Fazul died in on 7 June 2011 after a military crossfire in Afgoye region in Somalia. The other key planner Muhsin Musa

was critical to the attack because of his unrivalled bomb making expertise. According to The Standard:

> "His experience in explosives was unrivalled and he grew to become the most coveted talent within the Al Qaeda ranks. His role in the attacks was clear from the beginning: He built both bombs to perfection - inflicting the most destruction in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Experts say that the two bombs used almost 15.4 metric tonnes of explosives. Because of this, he too was placed on a US most-wanted list. He was killed on April 12, 2006, following a raid in a remote village in Pakistan" (The Standard 7 August 2020)

Five days before the attack, on 2 August 1998, Al'Owhali arrived in Nairobi and stayed in Ramada Hotel located in Eastleigh. In the next three days, he met Azzam and other key players as they planned on how to execute the attack (Muiruri 2003). The attack revealed how well planned the Al Qaeda movement was especially in the East Africa region. The terror group was well organised with sophisticated operations, financial networks and leadership rooted in strong Jihad principles. By the time of the attack, Al- Qaeda was a global organisation. The East African region and specifically Kenya, was a fertile proxy ground to hit back at the West which the organisation was vehemently opposed to. According to Keller et al:

> "East Africa was an area where Muslims were predominately repressed. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda operations were able to capitalize on the lax border security in the region and found that they were able to carry out their missions effectively [….] U.S. foreign policy helped to create conditions favourable to al- Qaeda; Washington largely ignored East Africa and was insensitive to local and regional factors" (2005:1).

Beside the Al Qaeda considered the West and its ideologies "infidel" which needed to be eliminated. Whittaker notes that the Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, maintained that the "Americans were infidels and their garrisons propped up a corrupt, insufficiently Islamic Saudi elite" (2016:56). The terror group was also not happy about the presence of the USA in Saudi Arabia which is considered as a Holy place by Muslims. Besides, America's involvement in the Middle East through the invasion in Somali, the Gulf and Yemen was interpreted as some form of imperialism. As a retaliation, the terror group targeted American allies which in this case included

Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya's cooperation with the American government and strategic location was key in the invasion of Somalia. Al Qaeda also capitalised on the same location factors. However, there are other factors as articulated by Keller et al that made Kenya an easier target which include:

> "The large contingent of American citizens at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam made the embassies a target priority. From a security standpoint, both embassies were quite vulnerable to attack. The embassy in Kenya was the hardest to secure because of its proximity to a nearby busy intersection [….] The Marine Security Guards (MSG) were not trained to detect and deter vehicle bombs or terrorism. The closed-circuit televisions did not have a recording function to monitor long-term surveillance. The delta barriers and security gates were not working at the time of the attack" (2005:12)

This was not the case for Tanzania, as it had few American Nationals. The embassy was equally very well secured. In the next section, I discuss the responses of the Kenyan government to the attack. It is worth noting that until the 1998 terror attack, the linkage of refugees to terrorism in particular had not emerged. Evident here, is a scenario where terrorism is perceived to be an issue perpetrated by a "Muslim-foreigner". There is still some level of denial that local nationals too, can be perpetrators of terrorism. However, Eastleigh which is the research site for this study, was already being used by terrorists as a hideout when planning their attacks.

5.2.2.1 The Kenyan Government Response to the US Embassy Bombing

The US Embassy bombing provided clear evidence that terrorism was finally home, yet the Kenyan government remained laid back in the way they responded to the attack. Interestingly, while many Kenyans were shaken by the bombing, they did not demand for a retaliatory attack by the government. A study conducted by Kiprop (2014), observes that terrorism was a "distant" occurrence for many Kenyans. Many of them, had never had of such incidences except in foreign countries such as Lebanon, Cairo, Palestine, and Israel. To many of them, terrorism was a foreign occurrence. Owala et al explains that in many developing countries such as Kenya had "not in the past had many acts of terrorism originating from the country itself and have for a long time reported on terrorist acts in other countries" (2013:1).

Media briefings were held by President Moi and President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, where they called upon a speedy investigation into the incident by the US with the support of the international community (Associate Press Archive 2015). The president assured Kenyan government's commitment to work with the FBI team in gathering of evidence and flushing out the perpetrators who, at this point in time, were perceived as foreign nationals. However, the Kenyan government did not treat the terror attack as a serious threat that needed immediate military intervention. This was surprising as a majority of the victims were Kenyans. Through the media briefings by the head of the state, it was clear that the government had no plans for a counterattack. The Kenyan President Daniel Moi pledged "to bring the perpetrators of the heinous crime to book" (The Washington Post, 8 August 1998). He added (as quoted in Alusa, 2019):

> "Kuleta vita kwetu sisi watu wa amani hatujui ni kwanini. Watu wa Kenya hawana vita na mtu yeyote- (We do not know why war has been brought to our peace-loving nation. The people of Kenya are not at war with anyone)" (KTN News 2018:1:01)

President Moi's reaction reclaimed calm which was a great contrast to his authoritarian leadership style (Alusa, 2019). This was partly due to the fact that terrorist attacks were infrequent and the 1998 bombing was considered a criminal act as opposed to terrorism. That terrorists were taking advantage of the porous land borders and coastline to enter the country had not dawned on the government. In addition, the role of maintaining law and order had traditionally rested with the police in Kenya. Observably unlike today, the military had no training to combat terrorism. These factors might have caused the government, not to employ the military in the counterterrorism efforts after the 1998 US bombing. Likewise, there was no securitisation of terrorism or the linkage of the refugees to the attack at this point.

Scholars like Barkan and Cook (2001), argue that the government's reaction could be attributed to the fear of the repercussions of a full- scale counterterrorism campaign. There were already feelings of marginalisation among certain groups in the country that had been aggrieved by the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. These groups were reluctant in cooperating with the US government in the campaign to fish out the suspects. This was especially at the coast, where the FBI had been sent to hunt down suspects. Muslim leaders therefore urged the Kenyan government not to cooperate with the FBI, as that would aggravate their feeling of being "targeted". While it was

evident that Al Qaeda had established some serious links in the country, many of the marginalised groups remained opposed to the counter terrorism measures after the bombing. A good case in point was when in early 2004, Muslim leaders appealed to the Kenyan government to drive out the FBI from the country, and instead conduct its own investigations into the bombing (Packard 2004).

There are various reasons why the Muslims were opposed to the counter terrorism measures. Top among them was that they were on the receiving end of these campaigns. Some scholars argue that, apart from the adverse ramifications the measures would have on the Muslims, the real issue here was that the Islamic Organisations that were targeted in the sweep were serving the poor households something the government was not doing. There was fear that this kind of aid would be lost and a majority of families that were depended on these organisations would suffer in the long run. The counterterrorism measures targeted Muslim NGOs and some of them like, Al Haramain, were actually deregistered by the government as they were seen to be a conduit of terror activities in the country. Many others were closed after donors cut off funding after the launch of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) by the US. Employees of these organisations lost their source of their livelihood, and this further contributed to the dissent.

The bombing had an impact on the Kenya-US bilateral relations in the sense that after the attack Kenya became a strategic partner on fighting terrorism especially in the Horn of Africa (Mogire and Agade, 2011). The Kenyan government received immense support in combating terrorism from the US. However, a majority of the counterterrorism measures that were adopted thereafter were deemed as anti-Islamic. Hence, the Muslim community was vehemently opposed to the new measures and the Kenyan government responded to this dissent with equal force. Many Muslims ended up being arrested, detained, and in some cases killed for opposing the counterterrorism measures. The government's hard stance and reactionary tactics towards the Muslim community was condemned by the Supreme Council of Muslims and human rights organisations as the arbitrary arrests were in violation of human rights (Botha, 2014). According to Schaefer (2006) and Botha (2013), the Muslims felt targeted and marginalised as they faced gross human rights abuse. Many of them felt that their needs were disregarded by the government and their felt that their social and educational needs had been unheeded while their cultural and religious values denigrated. The same marginalisation was felt in political spaces.

5.2.2 The November 2002 Kikambala Attack

On Thursday 28 November 2002, terrorists believed to be linked to Al Qaeda terror group, bombed the Israeli- owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala on the North Coast of Kenya. One of the key planners of the 1998 US embassy bombing, Fazul, was also involved in the attack. According to media reports, two suicide bombers Fumo Mohamed Fumo and Haruni Bamusa were involved in the attack (BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 10 May 2005). One of them drove a vehicle carrying explosives into the wall of the hotel whereby the car was exploded immediately. Another suicide bomber in possession of an assault rifle and a Tokarev pistol blew himself right at the entrance of the hotel. Sixteen people died while 80 others were injured during the hotel attack, including the suicide bombers (BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 10 May 2005). Simultaneously, three other key players- Saleh Ali, Saleh Nabhan and Issa Osman Issa-fired two rocket propelled grenades were fired by at an Israeli airliner at the Moi International Airport, Mombasa. Both missiles narrowly missed the aircraft. Once again, these attacks triggered fears in the hospitality industry, with tourism suffering a setback due to a drop in the number of incoming tourists (Agutu, 2003). The two attacks seemed to target Israeli interests on Kenyan soil unlike the 1998 US embassy bombing which targeted the Americans and their interests.

As Botha notes "these bombings illustrate how extremist ideas and the previously alien concepts of suicide operations and martyrdom had become further embedded within Kenyan" (2013:5). This changed the perception of terrorism as relating to "far-and-removed happenings associated with foreign places such as Lebanon, Beirut, Jerusalem and Somalia" (Kiprop, 2014:194). It was a reality that, terrorism was closer home and locals were actively involved in it. Before the 1998 US Embassy attack, Kenya had no historical experience of religious fundamentalism. Initially, it was assumed that the terror attacks were being orchestrated by Al Qaeda members who were living among the minority Muslims in the country. This phenomenon may be attributable, at least in part, to such factors as growing anti-US sentiment in response to GWOT, which has been interpreted by some as a war on Islam.

5.2.2.1 Kenyan Government's Response to the Kikambala Attack

Kenya's response to the Kikambala attack, can be described in a number of ways. Some of the measures were immediate while some were long term. To begin with, while the 2002 Kikambala

terrorist attack was orchestrated by Kenyans, there were mixed reactions from the government. Some government officials acknowledged the eminent threat, and the presence of the perpetrators were locals. For instance, on 29 June 2003, Minister for Internal Security Chris Murungaru, acknowledged that "Kenya's war against terrorism will only be won by accepting that the problem exists" (As quoted in Botha 2014:6). Other key government officials also acknowledged that Kenya was facing these attacks as a result of corruption. The failure of the government to prevent another attack after the 1998 US embassy bombing was greatly attributed to corruption. While the government was already aware of the existence of Al Qaeda cell in the country, corruption was a major setback. Many government agencies especially the police and immigration department were on the hotspot for failing to nab the suspects. Some of the suspects were evidently foreigners and they capitalised on the loopholes in the immigration department to acquire fake documents such as national IDs and passports that allowed them to freely stay in the country. For instance, the ease with which Mohammed Saddig, a terrorist who was traveling on a fake passport, left Nairobi via the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 6 August 1998 (later arrested at Karachi airport in Pakistan), is evidence of inefficiency on the part of the Immigration department.

However, a number of other government officials maintained that Kenya was simply collateral damage in the enmity between the US and the Islamic fundamentalists. For instance, in July 2005, Alfred Mutua, the then government spokesman was quoted saying "We do not think there is an element of terrorism in Kenyans; it is foreigners using Kenyans as conduits" (England, 2005). For those who were of this view, they maintained that the attacks were planned abroad, and Kenya was just caught in the mix of the fight of the US and its enemies. In fact, after the attack, Kenya's ambassador to Israel, Ambassador John Sawe, said: "there is no doubt in my mind that Al-Qaeda is behind this attack, because we have no domestic problems, no terrorism in our country, and we have no problem with our neighbours, no problem whatsoever" (Reuters 28 November 2002). Khadiagala (2004), sheds light on this denial by some government officials. He argues that the systemic denial was a result of the perception that Kenya was a victim because of its geographical location and political stability, rather than a source of international terrorism. Perhaps also, the government was afraid of alienating Kenyan Muslims who compose between 5 and 15 per cent of the country's population, and who would bear the brunt of any counterterrorism efforts, since most of the terrorist suspects are from the Muslim community (Botha, 2017). The government's official

denial of the terrorist threat was further fuelled by the inability or unwillingness to acknowledge the wider context that led to the growth of terrorism, which would imply an admission of the erosion of governance structures, notably weak intelligence capabilities and law enforcement (Khadiagala, 2004).

Unlike in the case of the 1998 US embassy bombing, where the government's response was more diplomatic, after the Kikambala attack the GoK swung in action. In just two months, over 800 suspects had been attested in Mombasa (Botha, 2016). The police launched a campaign to nab the perpetrators which led to an arrest of approximately 1200 people, a majority who were foreigners. This received a lot of criticism from the citizens and human rights organisations because of the alleged widespread violation of people's rights. The government's response was termed discriminatory as it was perceived to target the Muslims and ethnic Somalis. Former Mayor of Mombasa Najib Balala was quoted saying "Harassment and intimidation -by the government-have always been there for us. Now we are already branded as second-class citizens because we are Muslims and Arabs" (Reuters 28 November, 2002).

As aforesaid, while international terrorism was evidently home, the government had not made much progress as far as anti-terror legislation is concerned. Hence after the Kikambala attack, the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003, was enacted. The Bill, which was a replica of the US Patriot Act, was vehemently opposed by individuals, human-rights organizations, Muslim organizations, and some parliamentarians who argued that it would target certain factions of Kenya especially the Muslims. It was also feared that the bill would infringe on their basic human rights. The proponents of the Bill agreed that, since Kenya was in the process of enacting a new constitution, the argument that the Bill violated the constitution was misplaced. Githu Muigai, a constitution review commissioner remarked that the Bill was a "an excellent example of the kind of law we should never enact" (Africa News Update, July 2003). One of the claims against the Bill was that it gave the police too much power in dealing with terror suspects. For instance, the police were allowed to search and execute extra judicial actions against terror suspects. The police were accorded power to arrest and hold terror suspects without allowing them to contact their relatives or lawyers. In addition, the police were allowed to apply force and even shoot those who resisted the arrests.

The bill was taken back to parliament for amendments specifically those sections that deemed controversial. In the year 2006, a revised version of the bill was presented in parliament, and that too, was faulted in the grounds that it was funded by the American government. The bill was not passed, and that meant that the country remained without a particular regulation to combat terrorism. In the year 2004, the Crime and Money Laundering (Prevention) Bill was adopted. The Bill gave the mandate to legislative agencies to take over any property or finances that were associated with terror activities (Majteny, 2005). Additionally, there was the significant approval of the Prevention of the Organized Crime Law 2010 in parliament to facilitate financial control on terrorism. It led to the banning of 33 groups that were perceived to be involved in terrorism in one way or another. Examples of such groups include Al Shabaab, Mungiki and Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). All these efforts were meant to strengthen the legal institutions in handling terror cases because that is what the country had been grappling with for a long time (Botha, 2013). However, proper legislation against terrorism should be characterised by both pre-emptive and prophylactic features to take care of the gaps that may arise from the domestic criminal justice system.

One important strategy for combating terrorism is starving terrorists of financial resources (Khadiagala 2004). Hence, thereafter, an anti-money laundering task force was constituted to review and propose a national policy on combating terrorism financing. The task force worked in conjunction with the US Interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group to develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance program (Royce 2004). The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) adopted some administrative measures to help deal with locating, tracking, and freezing financial assets belonging to persons identified with terrorist activities (Greenstock 2002). Despite these changes, the numerous Hawalla[13] systems which allows the transfer of money without paperwork remained a challenge.

The frequency of terror attacks remained sporadic till 2008 when the attacks became intense and frequent with a lasting impact. For instance, in 2008, the Somali group al-Shabaab targeted a police

[13]Hawala is an informal method of transferring money without any physical money actually moving. Interpol's definition of hawala is "money transfer without money movement." Another definition is simply "trust." Hawala is used today as an alternative remittance channel that exists outside of traditional banking systems. Transactions between hawala brokers are made without promissory notes because the system is heavily based on trust and the balancing of hawala brokers' books

station in Wajir, freeing three detainees who were suspected of having links to al-Qaeda. According to VOA:

> "More than 4,000 civilians have been killed in Al-Shabab attacks since 2010, according to records compiled by the independent group Armed Conflict, Location and Event Data Project, or ACLED. The majority of the deaths were in Somalia – where the population is almost entirely Muslim – with smaller numbers stemming from attacks in Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti. More than 3,000 of the deaths have occurred since 2015" (Voice of America 15 January 2020)

While the terror attacks remained infrequent since the 2002 Kikambala attack, one critical development that is important to this study unfolded: the adoption of the 2006 Refugee Act which I consider a major turning point in as far as the Kenya's refugee regime is concerned. This is discussed below:

5.2.3 Turning Point: The 2006 Refugee Act

The Refugee Act is the first official document that forms the basis of refugee regime in Kenya. The Act stipulates refugee rights and duties, sets up offices in charge of refugee affairs, outlines Kenya's commitment to refugee rights and entitlements as provided by international refugee instruments, and recognises the principle of non-refoulement (Scharrer, 2018). The adoption of the refugee Act was a reinforcement of the merger of national security and refugee policy. As aforementioned, the presence of refugees especially those from Somalia, in the country had been linked to the proliferation of arms and light weapons as well as terrorism. The Refugee Act was enacted in 2006 and operationalised in the year 2007. The Act provides the definition of refugee status as well as outlines the rights and duties of refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, refugees are accorded freedom of movement and right to work. The Act also provides a framework for the Kenyan government to be fully involved in refugee affairs. This is evidenced by the creation of the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) which is "responsible for all administrative matters concerning refugees in Kenya, and shall, in that capacity, co-ordinate activities and programmes relating to refugees" (Article 6 Section 1).

In addition, the Act established an office of the Commissioner of Refugee Affairs responsible for "coordination of all measures necessary for promoting the welfare and protection of refugees" (Article 7 Section 1). The Act also provides a well elaborated appeal system. It outlines refugee rights and safety by addressing core statutory obligations. Firstly, onus was now placed on camp officer to "receive and register all asylum seekers and submit to the Committee all applications for the determination of their refugee status; ensure refugees in the camps are issued with refugee identity cards or refugee identification passes; manage the camps in an environmentally and hygienically sound manner; co-ordinate the provision of overall security, protection and assistance for refugees in the camp" (Article 17 Section (a-h)).

Whereas the Refugee Act in itself may not be classified as a securitisation measure, its implementation provides a basis to seclude refugees. For instance, while the Act allows refugees to seek and gain employment, it also prohibits their movement. Refugees are only allowed to move outside the camps when they get authorisation from the DRA. The authorisation to get out of the camp is only granted where one is seeking medical services or education. Search for employment is not provided as a valid reason to leave the camp. More so, work permits are granted at the immigration offices based in Nairobi and not in the camps. That means refugees cannot get authorisation by the Camp Officer to seek employment or start businesses outside the camp. In addition, if found outside the camp without permission, one can be jailed for six month or fined Ksh 20000 (200 USD). Freedom of movement is a critical human right. It determines access to other rights like education, health among others. Initially the Refugee Act reinforced the encampment policy by only providing limited reasons for leaving the camp. It did not necessarily state that refugees need to stay in camps but in many ways restricted the movement of refugees.

5.2.4 Westgate Mall Attack:

On 21 September 2013, Al Shabaab militant stormed the Westgate mall hurling grenades and firing indiscriminately at the shoppers. This went on for 80 hours and resulted in 67 deaths injuring 150 others. Immediately after the attack, Al shabaab tweeted: "the Mujahideen entered #Westgate Mall today at around noon and are still inside the mall, fighting the #Kenyan Kuffar inside their own turf" (Edmund and Richard, 2013:1) This was followed by another tweet that stated their refusal to negotiate. It read: "For long we have waged war against the Kenyans in our land, now it is time

to shift the battleground and take the war to their land" (Edmund and Richard, 2013:1). From the tweets, it is evident that the Westgate Mall was attributed to Kenya's invasion into Somalia.

In 2011, the Kenyan government deployed Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) into Somalia in what came to be termed as Operation Linda Nchi. The decision to invade Somalia seemed to be important for both national and regional security. The instability in Somalia had provided a fertile ground for piracy activities in the Gulf of Eden and the Indian ocean, humanitarian workers and tourists were being kidnapped as well as the massive refugee influx from Somalia to Kenya who were running away from drought and Al-Shabaab (Kay, 2013). The Operation Linda Nchi was also a defining factor in the 2013 general elections. The government needed to demonstrate that it can protect its own citizens. In addition, the invasion was a move by Kenya to show case its power in regional political dynamics. Ethiopia and Uganda had previously made attempts to stabilize Somalia and Kenya may have wanted to prove its capability in addressing regional security threats. However, the operation fuelled tensions and suspicions between the Kenyan government and the Somali community. The following year, in December of 2012, the Kenyan government issued a directive halting all activities at urban refugee centres. The reception and registration of asylum seekers was stopped. While the directive targeted the Somali asylum seekers and refugees, it had an effect on all refugees. The directive read in part:

> "The Government of Kenya has decided to stop reception, registration and close down all registration centres in urban areas with immediate effect. All asylum seekers/refugees will be hosted at the refugee camps. All asylum seekers and refugees from Somalia should report to Dadaab refugee camps while asylum seekers from other countries should report to Kakuma refugee camp. UNHCR and other partners serving refugees are asked to stop providing direct services to asylum seekers and refugees in urban areas and transfer the same services to the refugee camps" (Kituo Cha Sheria and 8 others v Attorney General,2013)

In response, seven refugees teamed up with Kituo Cha Sheria, a Non-governmental organisation that deals with issues of refugee rights and safety, moved to court to challenge the directive. In their appeal, they argued that the directive was a violation of the dignity and rights of the refugees. The directive was nullified by the court on the ground that it was a violation of the refugee rights

especially the right to movement. The decision of the court to overturn the directive was guided by human rights as opposed to security. According to Kituo Cha Sheria the court was guided by the following:

> "First, the policy is unreasonable and contrary to Article 47(1). Second, it violates the freedom of movement of refugees. Third, it exposes refugees to a level of vulnerability that is inconsistent with the States duty to take care of persons in vulnerable circumstances. Fourth, the right to dignity of refugees is violated. Fifth, the implementation of the Government directive threatens to violate the fundamental" (Kituo Cha Sheria and 8 others verses Attorney General, 2013).

According to one witness, the attackers were mainly Somalis and the Mijikenda people as they spoke Swahili. One witness had this to say: "these people knew people by their names" (The Standard, 19 July 2014). The government instituted a man hunt for the suspects which degenerated to a "tit for tat" killings. During the exercise security agents were implicated for murder and human right abuse.

5.2.4.1 Kenya Government's Response to the Westgate Mall Attack

The first year of Uhuru Kenyatta's first term in office saw the country experience one of the major terror attacks in Kenyan history. Following the Westgate Mall attack, the government's political discourse at the time started to take the security-driven trajectory. The government reiterate its commitment to employ high-tech technology surveillance mechanisms to nab the perpetrators. Hence, Kenya's government response to the Westgate Mall attack manifested in three ways: the launch of a screening exercise to fish out terrorists dubbed Usalama Watch, adoption of the Nyumba Kumi neighbourhood surveillance program, amendment of security laws as well as the amendment of the 2006 Refugee Act as discussed below.

In March 2014, the Kenyan government issued yet another directive requiring all the refugees to relocate the camps citing logistical and security challenges. Ole Lenku, the Minister of internal minister issued the directive as follows:

> "There are no other designated refugee camps outside these areas. Any refugee found flouting this directive will be dealt with in accordance with the law. Consequently, all refugee registration centres in urban areas - Nairobi, Mombasa, Malindi, Isiolo and Nakuru - are hereby closed" (The New Humanitarian 11 April 2014)

All refugee agencies were asked to close down their offices and move their operations to the camps. A week later, six people lost their lives through a grenade attack at an Eastleigh hotel. In response, the government swung in action by erecting roadblocks, instituting a search and arrest operation that lasted months. Operation Usalama watch[14] was officially launched on 5 April 2014 (IPOA, 2014). The operation specifically targeted the Somali refugees who reside in Eastleigh but was later rolled out in other parts of Nairobi like South B and C. Through Usalama Watch the government entrenched the security discourse by portraying Eastleigh and its inhabitants as "dangerous".

In an "an effort to disrupt Al-Shabaab support within Kenya" the government resorted to the rhetoric of dirt and cleanliness as espoused by Mbembe's (1992) postulations on the "vulgarity of power" and Harrow's (2013) readings of the "politics of dirt". I argue that the construction of the Somalis as "dirt" draws from the colonial regimes strategies as discussed in Chapter four, where autocratic military antics were used to demarcate "rebels/alien" in the NFD from the hinterland. This as aforesaid, was evident in the many restrictive policies against Somalis that were perceived to be a threat to its sovereignty and security. In his editorial note, Mandera County Senator, and political economist Billow Kerrow had this to say:

> "In early 1950s, thousands of Kikuyus were detained in concentration camps by the colonialists following attacks by Mau Mau. Uhuru's father was one of the victims of this horrendous action by the British, and survivors are still seeking remedy in Britain. Today, thousands of Somalis are held in similar detention camps at various police stations and Kasarani stadium in Nairobi undergoing profiling. The script is the same; the actors are

[14]The operation was informally named 'Operation Safisha Eastleigh'(Operation Clean Eastleigh) in government corridors.

different. The British Gulag policy that incarcerated Kikuyu's is now the government's prescription for Somalis" (The Standard 13 April 2014)

According to IPOA, the main aim of Usalama Watch was to "flush out" criminals and Al-Shabaab sympathisers, which I argue that in the process led to Eastleigh and its resident being framed as dirt, filth, and undesirable. In its report, IPOA stated that the objective of the operation was:

> "The declared purpose of this new Operation was to flush out Al- Shabaab adherents/aliens and, search for weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs)/explosives and other arms so as to detect, disrupt and deter terrorism and other organized criminal activities" (IPOA 2014:2)

In government circles, Usalama Watch was referred to as "Operation Sanitise Eastleigh". For the government, this was a cleaning exercise meant to remove "dirt" which in this case were Somalis. In one of the interviews with my participants, I came to learn that the locals and refugees actually referred to Usalama Watch as 'Osama Watch'. It can be noted that right from the naming, planning and the execution of the Usalama watch, the deployment of the rhetoric of dirt and cleanliness by the Kenyan government was apparent. By referring to the exercise in medical terms such as "operation" draws our attention to the logic of disease. The pathologisation of the exercise sanctioned the use of state violence in order to "surgically remove" the unwanted malignancies who in this case were the unwelcome-terrorist-Somali- refugees. The same rhetoric of dirt and cleanliness also found its way into the media and a managing director of the Daily Nation remarked that "every two-bit Somali has a big dream to blow us up, knock down our buildings and slaughter our children'. Let us start shooting!" (The Daily Nation, 20 March 2014). Usually surgical procedures bring about healing, but in the case of the operation Usalama Watch, I take note that this was not the case. According to Human Rights Watch:

> "The round-up operation, which began on April 1, 2014, has been riddled with abuses […]. Government security forces have raided homes, buildings, and shops; looted cell phones, money, and other goods; harassed and extorted residents; and detained thousands – including journalists, Kenyan citizens, and international aid workers – without charge and

> in appalling conditions for periods well beyond the 24-hour limit set by Kenyan law" (HRW,12 May 2014)

Despite the adverse ramifications of the operation, it appeared the government only managed to scare the terrorists into hiding. Botha (2014) notes that, while the operation managed to somehow disrupt terror structures in Eastleigh, it also exposed the weakness within government security structures. For example, allegations of widespread corruption were reported during the operation. The portrayal of Eastleigh and its inhabitants as "dirt" accorded the government the justification to use state sponsored violence and repression against the Somali refugees. Yet another political analyst, Hassan M Abubakar, had reservations about the exercise. He noted that, Somalis "have also become a football, frequently kicked by the country's president, his deputy, and the security establishment" (African Arguments, 23 June 2014). As quoted in Lind et al, one Muslim leader expressed his disappointment in the government on the way the operation turned out. He said:

> "We met with the President ... We told him that Usalama Watch is a bad operation that will not work, and you cannot hold people in a camp without charge. We gave him proposals on what needs to be done including strengthening the National Intelligence Service, and employing Muslim members to infiltrate the community and stop making Muslims feel like suspects yet we are also targets" (2017: 130)

The manner in which the operation was executed, was also an extension of the rhetoric of cleanliness and dirt. As Lind et al (2017) opines, the exercise could be likened to "killing a mosquito with a hammer". During the operations about 6100 security officers were sent out for the one-week exercise, compared to the 5000 that were sent to Somalia during the operation Lind Nchi in 2012. Determined not to leave any hidden dirt uncleaned, the government executed violent arrests and detention of the Somalis at the Kasarani centre as part of the cleaning process that was meant to remove and return the dirt to Somalia. The US Department of State confirms "police often stopped and arrested citizens to extort bribes; those who could not pay were jailed on trumped-up charges and sometimes beaten" (2014:6). According to Ahmedkadar Ali, a Somali Kenyan blogger:

> "We support any operation that will weed out all kinds of criminals but what we are against is the nature of the operation. The government needs to adopt smart

> policing, intelligence gathering and fighting corruption within the police force rather than targeting a specific community […] Somalis have been the scapegoat for police failure. Corruption is the biggest obstacle to a stable Kenya security-wise. What the police are doing is a short-term, reactionary strategy that will yield nothing" (The New Humanitarian, 11 April 2014)

It seems that the government preferred the use of excessive force. During the "Operation Sweep Nairobi Clean" in March 2014, Nairobi County Police Commandant Benson Kibue, issued a shoot to kill directive, which came under sharp criticism from the civil society. During a media briefing, the Deputy President Ruto said: "terrorism can and must be fought mercilessly and defeated wherever it occurs" (BBC News 23 September, 2013). In another interview, he reiterated that: "terrorists who shoot innocent people should expect to be met with similar force" (UNHCR, 25 June 2015). Similar remarks were made by the Mombasa County Commissioner, who declared that terrorists: "are not people to be arrested since they have also killed others. If we find any of them, we will finish them on the spot" (As quoted in the United States Department of State Report, 2014). However, IPOA came forth to issue a counter media briefing to clarify when excessive force is allowed.

Through its minister of Internal security, Ole Lenku, the government continued to defend its actions. He said:

> "People who are definitely seeking asylum in Kenya, who are refugees in Kenya - we agreed during the tripartite agreement reached in November that their return should be voluntary. So, all we can do is to keep engaging the government - which we are doing consistently" (The New Humanitarian Law, 11 April 2014)

Let me mention that the operation did not actually provide any security as espoused in its naming. Instead, the arbitrary arrests reinforced the idea that Somalis were indeed a threat to the Kenyan state and its people. IPOA later on commissioned an inquiry into police brutality during the operation and in its report, the Authority, concluded that refugees were subjected to serious human right violations. The report read in part:

> "There were complaints of detainees being beaten during arrests and at Police Stations. The detainees and members of the public further complained of harassment, being roughed up, inappropriate touching and demand of receipts for household items such as electronics and other home appliances. Failure to produce receipts, to the members of the National Police Service, resulted into either confiscation of the household goods, illegal arrest or extortion of bribes by the officers" (IPOA, 2014:11).

There were allegations of those arrested being detained for more than the constitution stipulated time frame of 24 hours. Some were detained for up to fifteen days before being brought before a court of law. In some cases, they were shuttled between various police stations or detention centers. IPOA notes that:

> "Article 49 (f) of the Constitution of Kenya requires that an arrested person is brought before a court of law as soon as possible but not later than Twenty-Four (24) hours after arrest. This right applies to any person and is not pegged on citizenship. As noted in the observations, the IPOA monitoring team found that some persons were detained beyond the Constitutional requirement of Twenty-Four hours, in some cases with detainees being held up to fifteen days before being brought before a court of law" (2014:12).

Since the government had been criticised for targeting Somalis in Eastleigh, Ole Lenku responded as follows:

> "The arrests have been made across the country and not in Eastleigh alone. "Let the criminals escape to other countries. Our exercise is to secure Kenya," he added, noting that a "state of lawlessness has existed in Eastleigh for more than 20 years" (The New Humanitarian, 11 April 2014)

Usalama Watch was later rolled in Mombasa County, specifically in Majengo, Bondeni and Ganjoni areas. Over 300 youth were arrested but later on released after the intervention of Governor Joho Hassan. When analysed within the securitisation framework, Usalama Watch as a securitisation move that went against the "rules" and was overtly discriminatory especially towards Somali refugees in urban areas. To begin with, it only targeted refugees of Somali origin who were

then arbitrary arrested and taken to detention centres for questioning. Discrimination, according to the 1966 International Convection on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination is"

> "Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life" (Article 1 Section 1).

The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) provides for legal evictions within certain limits. Article 11 of CESCR states, "where evictions do occur, appropriate measures are taken to ensure that no form of discrimination is involved" (Article 11 of CESCR). This article was violated by the Kenyan government when only Somali refugees became the target of Usalama watch as opposed to all the residents of Eastleigh. According to the Constitution of Kenya (2010) Article 27 (4)

> "The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, age, disability, religion conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth" (CoK Article 27 (4)).

It is not just the constitution that was contravened, even international refugee instruments that Kenya is part to were also violated. For instance, the forceful return of Somali refugees to Somalia went against the principle of nonrefoulement outlined in both the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the 1969 Organization of African Union (OAU) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa:

> "There were also allegations of forceful deportations of Somali refugees and asylum seekers to Somalia in contravention of the refugee principle of non-refoulement, provided under Article 2 (3) of the 1969 Organization of African Union (OAU) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, to which Kenya is a signatory and Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention" (Article 2 (3)).

In May 2014, it was reported that some 350 refugees had been deported back to Somalia. The matter was once again challenged in court, but the court upheld the government's decision. To rubberstamp its use of state sponsored violence, the National Police Service Act was tabled for amendments to allow for the use of "justifiable" force to protect "life and property" (National Police Service Act, Part VII:45-72). The amendments allowed the police to kill suspects or accomplices who attempted to resist arrest. While fighting crime is not bad in itself, the adoption of the amendment was a reaction to terrorism and its perpetrators who are supposedly the urban Somali refugees. Similar reactions, as the ones I discuss below, were instituted against all forms of threats that challenge the states sovereignty.

To begin with, to stamp its authority and credibility, the Kenyan government instituted radical amendments to the 2006 Refugee Act. The aim was to officialise the encampment policy. The Amendment read: "Every person who has applied for recognition of his status as a refugee and every member of his family shall remain in the designated refugee camp until the processing of their status is concluded" (Security Laws (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 2014, 46 (December 2014)). Their relocation to urban centres was left to the discretion of the camp officer. Another provision of the amendment was that the number of refuges was to be reduced significantly. It read:

> "1) The number of refugees and asylum seekers permitted to stay in Kenya shall not exceed one hundred and fifty thousand persons. (2) The National Assembly may vary the number of refugees or asylum seekers permitted to be in Kenya. (3) Where the National Assembly varies the number of refugees or asylum seekers in Kenya, such a variation shall be applicable for a period not exceeding six months only. (4) The National Assembly may review the period of variation for a further six months" (Security Laws (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 2014, 47 (December 2014)

By reducing the number of refugees, the Kenyan government was reasserting its authority on who is allowed and who is not allowed in the country. Lind et al (2016) observed that should this law be implemented to the later, it would result to the refoulement of 400,000 refugees. The Security Law amendment was challenged in court and on 25 February 2015, the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi nullified the capping of refugee numbers. The Court noted that placing a cap on the number of refugees and asylum seekers that may be

present in Kenya would invariably result in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of refugees and "violate the principle of non-refoulement, which is a part of the law of Kenya and is underpinned by the Constitution." (High Court Judgment, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v. Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 227 of 2016)

Thereafter, a neighbourhood surveillance program was launched by President Kenyatta- The Nyumba Kumi Initiative (Ten Households). This was envisioned as a citizen led neighboured surveillance program to help curb crime through information sharing and accountability. It drew about 210,400 clusters of which were mapped in 2015. Nyumba Kumi's a genetic cluster of security; the initiative is meant to strengthen community policing at the household level (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Muchangi, 2016). According to President Kenyatta, Nyumba Kumi was meant to enhance collaboration between the government and the state in combating crime. In his state of the Nation address he described the program as "the most extensive new investment in security since independence." (Kenyatta, 2014). In June 2014, the president issued a warning to all terrorists in form of well-crafted advert sent to all media houses. The warning read:

> "Run and hide because there will be thousands of cameras and millions of pairs of eyes watching you, citizens and residents of Kenya we are together in the fight against terror" (Uhuru Kenyatta TV, 2014: 0.23).

He urged all Kenyans to work together since "Ulinzi unaanza na mimi. Ulinzi unaanza na wewe" (security begins with me, security begins with you). He also promised to erect cameras in all major cities. He said:

> "CCTV cameras will soon be operational in major cities and towns. Cameras that can pick out faces in crowds and send them to command and control centres. That will use facial recognition technology to identify threats and relay the information to the response teams" (Uhuru Kenyatta TV, 2014: 1.30-36)

He added that, he is aware that every Kenyan "feels the anger, and our impulse is to strike out, to fight back. Yet we must not do so indiscriminately" (Uhuru Kenyatta TV, 2014:0.54). This new pronunciation of high-tech security to combat crime and terrorism contrasted majorly with the

state sponsored violence that refugees had experienced in March and April of the same year. In his state of the nation address, on 4 April 2019, he gave a progress report in which he stated that:

> "Almost 2000 CCTV cameras are working in Nairobi and Mombasa, offering real time 24-hour security monitoring. This has greatly assisted our police in solving complicated crimes […] to foster security, the Government has repossessed 5,050 assorted weapons illegally held by civilians as part of the ongoing firearm verification process" (Kenyatta 4 April 2019).

5.2.5 Garissa University College Attack

On 2 April 2015, four suspected Al shabaab terror group members, entered and killed 148 students and injured several others at the Garissa University College. This is among the bloodiest terror attack since the 1998 US Embassy bombing. Conversely as opposed to targeting a "high end" site as had been in the case of the case of the US embassy and Westgate mall, the terrorists in fact targeted a pastoral area. This according to Flanagin is "part of a perceptible shift in modern terror tactics; increasingly, the world's terror organizations seem to be turning away from attacks on subway cars and airport terminals, to focus lethal attention on institutions of learning" (2015:2). Thurston (2016), clarify that terrorist organisation often target learning institutions because students are an important symbolic target. Learning institutions also mostly unsecured and rich site for casualties because of the large numbers that congregate there.

5.2.5.1 Kenya Government's Response to Garissa University College Attack

Just like in the case of Westgate Mall, the government's response followed much less the same script. According to Voppen (2017), the government was under serious scrutiny as the regards its slow response to the attack. Some questioned why the university was not secured given its proximity to Somalia making it an easy target. For 12 hours, the four gunmen held over 700 hundred students as hostage. Five suspects were arrested in connection with the attack while five were killed by the Kenya police. By the time the attack occurred, the rhetoric of blaming Somalis for the terror attacks was already entrenched. It can be argued that, perhaps the government's security concerns were real. After the attack, Al shabaab went on twitter and took responsibility

of the attack. The organisation claimed that the attack was retaliatory to Kenya's invasion of 2012 operation Linda Nchi. The Daily Maverick has similar sentiments. It reported:

> "Kenyan troops entered Somalia in October 2011 in an effort to stop the Islamists from crossing the long, porous border between the two countries and kidnapping people - but their presence achieved the opposite effect, provoking al-Shabab to increase its activity in Kenya" (Daily Maverick 1 October 2012)

However, I note that even before operation Linda Nchi, Kenya had suffered other major attacks that have been discussed in this chapter. Hence, I argue that Kenya being targeted by terrorists, is part of the complex global war on terror and that placing the blame on KDFs involvement in Somalia does not suffice. Opposition politicians and civil society groups started to ramp up criticism on the Kenyatta administration, questioning whether Kenya's involvement in Somalia was actually weakening the security situation at home. In line with the already established rhetoric, the government once again resorted to draconian tactics meant to reiterate its power. This according to International Crisis Group (ICG) ultimately threatened:

> "to lose further hearts and minds. Instead of closing ranks as they managed – just – in the aftermath of Westgate, Kenya's political elites have bought into the deadly discourse of ethnic and religious recriminations. Not only are there plenty of immediate grievances to exploit, but nearly two decades of radicalisation and recruitment in Kenya means that the threat is both imminent and deep. The absence of a common Kenyan Muslim agenda and leadership has meant little resistance to the extremist message" (ICG 25 September 2014).

Thereafter, on the 11 April 2015, the Kenyan government announced its plans to close the Daadab camp within three months. The Deputy president of the Republic of Kenya insisted that the camp should be closed immediately, and its occupants repatriated to Somalia. He said, "UNHCR had three months to close Dadaab and make alternative arrangements for its residents otherwise, Kenya would relocate them by themselves" (BBC News 11 April 2015). Once more the government was reinforcing its authority in determining who is allowed into its territory and who is not. From the year 2011, the government always linked the insecurity and terror attacks to the presence of Somali

refugees in Kenya (Voppen 2017). However, it is until the year 2016, when this rhetoric started to appear in official communication. According to the Washington Post, the Deputy President (DP) who was vehemently in support of the closure of the camp said it was a "centre for recruitment, radicalization and training and planning for terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab " (Washington Post 26 May 2016).

The decision to close the camps would have had both humanitarian and political repercussions. The government maintained that the camps had become breeding grounds for terrorism. The Deputy president noted that, "the way America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change after Garissa" (BBC News 11 April 2015). The government's motivation for the closure of the camp remains about national security. It can also be attributed to asylum fatigue as a result in frequent terror attacks and the changing ethnic composition in the country. During the World Humanitarian Summit which took place in Istanbul on 23-24 May 2016, Ruto alluded that the international community had failed Somalia which has been struggling to have a proper government in place since the early 1990s. *He added*, "the refugee camp poses an existential security threat to Kenya" (Reuters 23 May 2016). According to these statements the government of Kenya believed that the Westgate Mall and the Garissa University attacks were planned in Daadab Camp.

The use of a security discourse by the Kenyan government added another layer to the already complex situation, as it was used by the Government of Kenya to legitimize the decision to close the camp. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits states from expelling or returning a refugee to any situation in which their life or freedom would be in jeopardy (Mogire 2009: 19). However, states can make exceptions on grounds of national security. The problem here is that this exception is for individuals, not for groups of people. However, I wish to mention that there is no evidence to show that indeed the camps are training grounds for terrorist. This was simply another illiberal application of state violence to a fundamental regulatory function of a sovereign state which is: determining who enters, moves within, and leaves its geographical territory. Hence closure of camps and scapegoating refugees is not a rational response by the Kenyan government. For a fact, there is no refugee that has been arrested or convicted in relation with the terror attacks in Kenya. Kenya's security problem is complex and dynamic as a result of poor security management. The government needs to adopt a rational and objective strategy in combating the insecurity.

The closure of the camp is not the issue, as they are expected to be temporal as host states in conjunction with UNHCR pursue durable solution for the refugees. The only challenge is that, so far, the Kenyan government has not been committed to pursuing sustainable and long term solution for Somali refugees. Hence as Voppen notes with "a shrinking global asylum space for Somali refugees and no local integration in Kenya, voluntary repatriation is the only option when the camp is indeed going to be closed" (2017:62). While repatriation is another viable option, it has to be "based on free and well- informed choice" (Mogire 2009: 20). With a general election due in August 2017, the deadline for closure was further revised to November 2017. The decision was challenged and nullified by the High court in February 2017 as the closure of the camp was in contravention of international refuge law which Kenya is part to. To date the camp still remains open. The plans to close it were retracted after pressure from the international community.

In May 2016, the DRA was disbanded by Karanja Kibicho, the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. All refugee service providers were asked to relocate to the camps and UNHCR was to immediately repatriate all urban refugees back to Somalia. This is yet another authoritarian application of "rules" or performance of security. The directive too was challenged in court and in February 2017 the High Court of Kenya nullified the decision terming it unconstitutional and in violation of international refugee instruments to which Kenya is a signatory. The Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) took up the mandate of DRA with amendments to the Refugees Act 2006 being made to legally anchor it into law. The RAS was mandated to spearhead the review process of the Refugees Act, 2006 which was tabled and passed by Parliament in 2017 but was rejected by the President for lack of sufficient public participation (Lind et al 2017). In March 2017, Kenya signed the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia.

5.3 Conclusion

The analysis of Somalinisation of Somali refugees in Kenya provides a useful case study through which to illustrate the coexistence of both the logic of exception and the logic of routine espoused by Bourbeau (2014). From the discussion above, it is evident that, Kenya's refugee regime which began with an ad hoc adoption of an encampment practice as a temporal solution to the influx of refugees in the early 1990s, has developed into an institutionalized and bureaucratized archipelago.

As a result, the securitisation regime has grown to include policies and practices and technocratic routines based on the discriminatory power of the politicians, migration officials and the police which is never subjected to debate or democratic control. The relationship between Kenyan government and Somali refugees is one filled with suspicion and animosity. Kenya maintains that the terrorist attacks suffered over the years were orchestrated by Al shabaab. In addition, I observe that the linkage of Kenya's securitised refugee regime to a localised war on terror, tends to have gained momentum over the years, whereby the political elite continue to rally for the authoritarian implementation of exclusionary policies and measures. Observably, the policies and measures are growing in number and intensity. One securitisation move or policy seems to "breathe life into another". While the policies and measures that have been adopted over time are not necessarily identical, at times they diverge or overlap.

The portrayal of urban Somali refugees as terrorists which has created a "desirable" and "undesirable" refugee demarcation, resonates strongly with the securitisation process that allows securitisation actors to admit or expel immigrants as discussed in Chapter two. Refugees who leave the camp to stay in the city are excluded from the security provision apparatus yet remain subject to the states sovereign powers, in this case, through the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS), in a manner consistent with Bigos's (2002) "governmentality of unease" or Huysmans and Boufuno's conceptualisation of "politics of unease" (2008: 3). The result is what is termed as "hyper-securitization" whereby securitisation of migration has developed extensively to the extent it has blurred lines between counterterrorism and immigration policy. At the same time, the perceived threat of Somali refugees arising from increased numbers Somalis in urban areas was constructed and kept alive through a localised global war on terror discourse.

I also note that the events in Kenya show how securitisation is a "performance" such that the government does not just speak security, it performs certain acts to stamp its authority. The above discussion provides numerous instances where the political elite politicise security issues by identifying particular moments that aggregate the said issues into actualisations of security rhetoric that ruptures normal procedures of law. I also note that the performance is both evident in everyday policing and institutionalised. Performative securitisation has made the Kenyan government the centre of attention as the main securitisation actor and the exclusionary discourse it generates; and

this has made the government appear legitimately violent, and—a force to be reckoned with as far as fighting terrorism is concerned. Performative securitisation succeeds in so far as public interpretations of the various acts of violence against unwanted Somali refugees successfully assign to the state a reality and consequentiality that then orients future action.

5.4 Chapter Summary

The chapter explored the various terrorist attacks that Kenya experienced between 1998 and 2019 and the government's response. The aim was to demonstrate how the government has continued to merge the refugee regime with counter terrorism measures.

CHAPTER SIX

HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A THREAT?

'How does it feel to be a problem?' (Du Bois, 1903: 4).

6.0 Introduction

This chapter is based on ethnographic data generated from lived-experiences accounts and documented conversations with Somali refugee women in Nairobi. This chapter sets out to challenge the dominant state centric perspective of the migration and security nexus. I echo Marchand assertion that, securitisation is clearly gendered hence, it "creates different types of insecurity and violence for men and women, depending on their varying social positions and the relations of power between them" (2008:1387). Drawing on one on one in-depth interviews with a selected number of urban Somali refugee women, the chapter analyses the implications of the securitisation regime on their individual as well as collective security.

6.1 Somali Refugee Women's Experience of Kenya's Securitisation Regime

In my analyses of the gendered implications of securitisation, I acknowledge that gender dynamics and gender (dis)order are applied and practised differently depending on time and space. In other words, the practise of gender relations are not constant but are influenced by many factors such as class, marital status, legal status, age among others. In addition, gender relations can be challenged and negotiated and can have contradictory outcomes during displacement, conflict and refugeehood, as such, a securitisation context can increase women's vulnerability. It is important to note, an intersectional perspective is embraced in the analyses of the urban Somali refugee experience. I argue that, while refugee women are the most likely vulnerable group in a securitisation context, the types of vulnerabilities they experience may vary depending on age, class, level of education, marital status, and race. I note that, urban areas inherently have challenges that would impact on the security of individuals with or without securitization. And so, to make sure the experiences analysed in this study are in the context of securitisation, the questions revolved around:

- Reasons why they left the camps to settle in the city
- What threats/insecurities they were exposed to on their way to Nairobi
- What challenges they faced once they arrived in the city especially as regards to access to social services, livelihoods, and personal safety
- Threats emanating from being deported back to the camp or Somalia by the police.

Besides, allowing urban refugee women to speak and contextualise their own about securitisation, is important in exploring the notion of security and provides an understanding of non-state-based view of security through embodied experience. To add, the names of refugee women referred to are anonymised all through the thesis.

6.1.1 Implications of the Securitisation on the Journey to the city

Generally, the refugee women's experiences of the journey to the city are in many ways intertwined with their camp experience. The interviewed women narrated the sacrifices and distressing journeys that they made to the city. Along with the physical and emotional trauma of the migration, some of the refugee women arrived with immediate debts to the smugglers who got them from the camps to the city. The refugee women's stories of costly and terrifying journeys from the camp to Nairobi underscore the financial and physical consequences of apprehension by security agents. The following three narratives revealed that the refugee women were driven by various motivations to relocate to the city were varied; but the goal was to get a better life.

While recalling her journey to Nairobi Samira said:

> "I had wanted to come here since 2011. My cousin who lives on second street had been living in Nairobi since 2005. But then I got married it was hard to leave immediately after the wedding. You know it would not look good, so I decided to take my time to get to build a family first. Three years after my marriage, by then I had one child I managed to convince my husband to allow me to come here. I told him my cousin had secured a job for me. He agreed and that is how I ended up here. Initially he would come visit then go back to the camp but six months later after I had rented my own house, he shifted here too" (Samira, July 2018)

In her narrative Khadija said:

> "I wanted to go to Europe or USA. I know some people who went there and am hopeful that I can too. Being in the city am able to visit the UNHCR office and explain my situation to them. If you stay in the camp, you miss out on many opportunities of work or getting the connections to relocate. Two of my friends who had been living in Eastleigh for eight years went to the USA. You see... it is possible even though it is not easy. I have been here for three years now. Life is not easy especially because of the police but am sure one day I may go abroad" (Khadija, August 2018)

Zahara who came directly from Somalia to Nairobi reported:

> "I was very young when I came to Nairobi. That was in 2012. I must have been around 15 years old. We were running away from the rebels that invaded my village… El-gal village. I just followed my neighbours, and we ran away. The rebels were fighting and killing people, so we ran away. I did not even understand that I was going to cross borders into Kenya. I just stuck with my neighbours from El-gal village and that is how I found myself in Nairobi. When we first came to Nairobi, we lived in South C. I continued to live with my neighbours and their relatives in South C until 2015 when I got a job here in Eastleigh. My salary was not that much. I was earning about Ksh 3000 per month (USD 30) so I moved in with my friend so we can share rent" (Zahara, July 2017)

For those who had fled situations of active conflict in Somalia, they reported significant exposure to risk and a lack of access to protection in their country of origin as the main reason for coming to Nairobi. Somali being a failed state, it is characterized with situations of generalized violence and insecurity manifesting in forms of rape and other forms of sexual violence, recruitment to terror groups, and the risk of kidnap, loss of livelihoods among others (Botha, 2014). The urban Somali refugee women consider the actions of terror groups such as Al Shabaab as threat to women and girls, especially for those who refused to comply with strict laws concerning dress and behaviour that had been imposed by the terror group.

Sabrina recalled how she relied on smugglers to travel to Nairobi. This is what she had to say:

> "The decision to leave the camp is not an easy one. Travelling from the camps to Nairobi is an expensive and risky affair. I had to pay a long-distance driver who ferries livestock to

> a slaughterhouse in Nairobi to take me and my children to the city. I was not alone. We were three women and two men. One of the men is my nephew and the other was a husband to my friend. They were travelling as a family. No one is sure they will make it to the city. There are so many police on the way but the driver assured us that he will take care of them (the police). Luckily we got here safely" (Sabrina June 2017)

Reliance on illegal means is particularly problematic for refugee women with low or no income as the smugglers demand up front hefty payments. According to one Amal:

> "I had to pay Ksh 60 000 (600USD) to get myself and family to Nairobi. Initially we had negotiated for Ksh 20 000 (200USD) but you know these smugglers can really be unreliable. They (smugglers) changed their mind last minute and I had already sold my small kiosk in the camp to raise the cash, and so I was compelled to agree to the new demands of paying an extra 400USD" (Amal, June 2017)

Amal's account demonstrates the extortionist nature of the journey to Nairobi. This narrative is supported by Zena's experience (below) who reported how men are forced to pay more money to stop their wives or women in their company from being raped. Meeting the demands of the smugglers is crucial to getting one to the city without which they will not. According to one government official: "If the women do not have more money to pay, they will be asked to pay with their bodies" (Participant Interview, July 2018). This quote points to the fact that women's bodies become a form of currency where there is lack of finances. According to Salt and Stein (1997), extortion and violence characterise the smuggling business. The smugglers facilitating mobility to the city expose men and refugees to violence through differing means.

In addition to the extortion, the refugee women reported to have experienced or witnessed some form of harassment from the smugglers. This was partly attributed their to traveling without an adult male or the silencing of the male companions. Freedman's (2016) study of Syrian refugee women who migrate to Greece reveal that during transit they are at high chance of rape and assault. Most importantly, the refugee women there was the insecurity that comes with having to trust smugglers with their goods, lives, and monies. In their studies, Gerard (2014) and Freedman (2016)

argue that the internationalisation of borders and the stringent border management is the reason the smuggling business thrives in the European Union (EU). In fact, securitised border management practices coupled by the subornation of refugee women by patriarchy allows for the use of smugglers for transit. Without sufficient resources, the refugee women cannot afford safe and secure means of transport.

Similar observations are made by Freedman's (2015) study on Nigerian women who attest to have engaged in transactional sex or prostitution to 'pay' the smugglers. In securitisation contexts, use of own bodies to cross border has become commonplace since "rape can be used as a toll or a price for crossing borders, sexual services may provide or guarantee passage, and in some instances, money can be paid to avoid being raped" (Gerard, 2014:130). In my study, the refugee women provided accounts of where their friends, acquaintances and relatives were forced to 'pay' for transit by engaging in prostitution. In some cases, the smugglers or the contracted male chaperons demanded for inappropriate sexual relationships or marriage in exchange for being accompanied to the city. Sabrina narrated:

> "You can pay them to get you to the city but along the way they start demanding for other things like sex or marriage. And by that time, you are in the middle of nowhere. If you do not agree they can force themselves on you. Some women had no option but to agree to their new terms. To avoid such occurrences, I travelled alongside my nephew and my friend's husband. I advise those women who want to come over here never to travel alone or in company of male strangers. At least get people you know to escort you here. Otherwise, you risk being harassed by these people (smugglers)" (Sabrina, June 2017)

According to Zena:

> "Sometimes it does not matter whether you have your husband with you. They (smugglers) can do anything to you. Some women were touched inappropriately, and their husbands were asked to keep quite or face the consequences. I was lucky that I did not face such. One of my friends told me how she was almost raped while coming here. The husband had to pay more money to save the wife. They know the easiest way to get more money is threaten to rape a wife in the presence of the husband because that will be demeaning to the man" (Zena, June 2018)

Zena's narrative shows how the journey from the camp to the city is characterised by kaleidoscope of violence. For many of refugee women interviewed, their journey from the camp to the city was characterised be sexual violence. Even in the company of male chaperons or partners, the women were still at high risk of sexual violence. The men are threatened or extorted if they intervene. Gerard and Pickering research on women in transit from Libya to Malta points to the "kinds of power relationships that dominate during the journey whereby those perpetrating the violence also facilitate transport and navigation, the price of passage may be rape" (2013: 346). In my study, the refugee women are at the mercy of the smugglers. The smugglers are not accountable to any authority and the refugee women cannot report the perpetrators since they are defying the government by travelling to the city.

Some researchers have studied issues of violence that refugees face when in transit outside the camp (Hamood, 2006). According to Pickering and Gerard and Pickering (2013) refugee women are at high risk of experiencing opportunistic and sexual violence when in transit especially when crossing interstate borders. In addition to sexual violence, some Somali refugee women were most likely to be exposed to physical and sexual abuse in the hand of smugglers as well as the loss of personal items. According to Weber and Grewcock (2011) the proliferation of smuggling networks is as a result of a phenomenon called "deviancy amplification". When states illegalise mobility of migrants either across or within the borders, it creates a conducive environment for the smuggling networks to grow. This exposes the migrants who use these networks to high risks of physical insecurity (Nevins 2008)

From the interviews, it appears that the journey to the city was riskier for the single and unaccompanied refugee women. For married refugee women especially those from well off backgrounds, their travel arrangements were made, and their safety well taken care of by their spouses. But for single or unmarried women they often had to step out of their respective gender roles and act independently of their male family and community members, to ensure themselves of access to money and resources in order to survive the journey to Nairobi. For instance, Amal explained:

> "I am single parent of four children -3 girls and one boy- when I came here, I carried my daughters from the camp for fear of them being raped. That was in 2012. Even though the girls had to stay out of school for a whole year before getting a school in Nairobi. We came

> in June, and I did not have the money to enrol them in School right away. So, they had to say at home till the next year. But I still think the decision to bring them along from the camp was in their best interest. I could not risk leaving my girls in the camp. I do not want them raped! You know how it is when a girl is raped. She will be forced to marry the rapist by the elders and if she refuses then no one will marry them" (Amal, June 2017).

Amal's case paints a picture of the dilemma that refugee women face while leaving the camp. On one hand there is a promise for a better life but on the other hand is the risky journey. Then there is the risk to the vulnerable children that are left behind in the camp by some refugee women. Yet again, there is the restrictive regime that makes them unwanted guests in the city

The refugee Somali women recalled different scenarios on how they moved to Nairobi. For some married refugee women, the decision to move to the city was the husband's. Some families moved at once while in some cases the men went ahead of the families only for the family to join them later. However, some the refugee women deliberately left for the city ahead of other family members. The vulnerability of Somali refugee women continues even after safely arriving in the city. One NGO official noted that:

> "Somali refugee women are an easy target for sexual harassment in the city even after fleeing the same in the camps. Usually, they are afraid to report sexual violence or even share with their family member because of the risk of being punished. They may end up being circumcised a second, third or even fourth time for confessing to have been raped" (Anonymous Official, June 2017)

I observe that the violence these refugee women face during their journey to Nairobi, is based both on their ethnicity as Somalis as well as gender. The securitisation agents devalue or other them on the grounds of their ethnicity, and this removes any need for the security agents, smugglers, and patriarchs to respect them by gender. This translates into "double" seclusion and makes them a soft target for sexual violence usually to humiliate them and their communities.

In this study, defiance to moving to the city may imply both agency and the lack thereof. For instance, in order to get to the city illegally, urban Somali refugee women utilise their bodies as

currency through engagement in smuggling or forging intimate relationships with their male counterparts to gain their protection. At the same time, this internal mobility has been instrumental in justifying summary deportations, dispossession, arbitrary arrests, and other forms of physical, sexual, and mental violence. Indeed, the securitisation experiences of urban Somali refugee women are, to varying degree, a veritable testimony of gendered vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the restrictive regime, coupled with the coercive dominance of the patriarchal society, has driven these refugee women to count on their vulnerability to forge subtle modes of resistance to the domination. The violence that Somali refuge women are subjected to during transit ultimately compromises their individual as well as collective security. Hence the already gendered repercussions of unequal patriarchal structures are heightened because of the securitisation.

6.1.2 Implications of securitisation on Somali Refugee Women's Lives in the City

Similarly, to the journey to the city, Somali refugee women face a kaleidoscope of violence once they arrive in Nairobi as they must get a place to stay, jobs among other critical services. A majority rely on the family as well as social networks to settle in the city. They help them find a place to stay, schools for their children and job opportunities. However, being de facto illegal in the city makes urban Somali refugee women vulnerable to various forms of exploitation. Often their safety and well-being become their personal responsibility. They must learn to navigate police harassment among other challenges. In sum, the refugee women are exposed to a myriad form of violence in their homes, workplaces which makes living in Eastleigh very risky.

6.1.2.1 Infringement on Womanhood and Privacy

In order to differentiate between Somali refugees and Kenyan Somalis, the police/securitisation agents engage in "reading of the bodies". Which according to many participants is a violation of their privacy. Ado had this to say:

> "As a married woman no other man is supposed to touch you. Your body belongs to your husband. But the police do not want to know or hear this. A friend of mine was asked to remove her burqa..and so many other incidences like such have occurred. You know when such a thing happens you cannot even tell your husband, you will be in trouble. He would think you were stripped naked. Again, the police know that we Somalis do not have the vaccination scar on our hands like Kenyans

do, in some cases some women have been told to pull up their buibui (veil) so that the police can confirm whether they have the vaccination scar. That is very disrespectful especially if it is the male police" (Ado, June 2018)

From Ado's narrative, there is a notable intersection of dominance of the patriarchal society and the restrictive regime. The refugee women have to navigate between yielding to the demands of the securitisation agent as well as keeping their dignity as dictated by the patriarchal society. In addition, their stay in the city as "unwanted" guests is shaped by the fear of being arbitrary arrested by the Kenyan police and taken back to the camps or Somalia. The fear instilled by the securitisation creates a feeling of being constantly surveilled which serves as a disciplining mechanism. The securitisation regime demands unconditional submission and many urban Somali refugees narrated how they are always careful not to do anything "wrong". This has a bearing on their womanhood. Many of the participants reported that the securitisation regime has in a way veiled their identity as women in two ways.

According to Subrina:

"After the Westgate Mall attack, life was tough. We all became terrorists. All eyes were on us. The Somalis. I mean the refugees. Everywhere in the news, in the market and on social media people were talking. They said we are all terrorists, and we need to be sent back to Somalia. I am just Amal. …a mother .I wake up to go out to hustle for my children. I have no idea how a terrorist looks like. I have never met or interacted with any of them. Yet here I was being branded as one of them. I remember my aunt was arrested by the police just around that time when the mall was attacked. She was asked to produce the terrorists. According to the police we women are hiding the terrorists. That we know them, but we are unwilling to hand them in. Elections are soon coming up and Eastleigh is on the spot again. Am not sure what will happen to us this time round" (Subrina, June 2017)

Sabrina's account shows how, the refugee women are perceived as terrorists or Al Shabaab sympathisers or in some cases terrorists. The government continues to use them as scapegoats for the terrorism acts by terror organisation such as Al Shabaab. The fusion of terrorism and urban Somali refugee women is prejudicial and goes against refugee and human rights principles of non-discrimination.

Zahara explained:

> "I am just an ordinary woman minding my own business here. I am not a terrorist! I do not know any terrorist either. Honestly even when the Mall was attacked, I was still a small girl. I even did not know my way around Nairobi. How can I be a terrorist! It gets tough even at the market. You are working or even attending to your customers and people are busy discussing how Somalis need to be chased away. How can I be a threat to this country which I now call home? You see we ran away from war back in Somalia so we can find peace here but am not sure whether its peaceful here anymore" (Zahara, July 2017)

Zahara's experience demonstrates how the exclusionary discourse and policies their refugee status has been "pronounced" over and above their identity as women. In a study of refugee women in France, similar accounts are echoed where they felt that their identity as women had been overshadowed by the refugee status (Freedman, 2016). The interviewed refugee women described the apathy they experienced from the locals as they looked at them with "Scorn and disbelief" (Freedman 2016:180). The frustration and stigma associated with the refugee status is also highlighted in Hunt's study (2008). Her respondents narrated how discriminatory discourse and practices shaped their asylum-seeking journey and experience. It played out during the refugee determination process as well as in the access of basic needs such as employment and healthcare. In Hunt's study, the refugee women counteracted the discriminatory access to employment by taking up voluntary jobs. For my respondents, securitisation gives less importance to how the urban Somali refugee woman identifies herself but rather forces her into a particular narrative in which she is both a threat and victim. From Zahara's narrative they are seen as gatekeepers of terrorism. They are expected or presumed to be hiding the real terrorists or having information on possible attacks. In this case, the Somali refugee women are perceived as being vulnerable to and at the same time custodians of radicalisation. This results in the securitisation of the Somali refugee woman as the potential hidden terrorist who should be protected as well as a victim to be rescued from radicalising elements lest they too become a terrorist. From the above narratives, privacy has become a privilege and not a right. Wanunda's narrative provides an understanding of how securitisation violates privacy of Somali refugee women. She recounts a 2014 ordeal that left her traumatized:

> "They stormed in my house during Usalama Watch. It was around 10pm in the night and so as expected I was already asleep with my three children. My husband had gone back to the camp to bring the ration. I did not have my hijab on. I was in my night dress. I felt violated…. really disrespected! How could he walk onto somebody's wife like that? They do not respect our privacy…The policeman did not care that I was "naked". He did not give me time to cover myself even though I asked him to stay away from my bedroom. He just kicked the bedroom door (curtain) and got in. I could not tell my husband about it because he would send me back to my parents for allowing another man into the house and even worse allowing him to see me naked" (Wanunda, June 2017)

Wanunda's narrative reveals the challenges that the refugee women face when police discrimination intersects with patriarchy. Hynes and Cardozo (2000) point out the various factors that could result in violence against women. Among them gender inequality and domination, culture and values, and patriarchal power and control structures that allow subordination of women. For Marsh, Purdin and Navani (2006) when inequality and discrimination is institutionalised it allows for the adoption of cultural and social values that advance prejudice. In fact, it is the inherent institutional inequality that allows for Gender-Based Violence (SGBV). The intersection with of systemic discrimination with other factors such as sexual orientation, race, class, nationality ethnicity religions further heighten individuals' vulnerability (Davis, 2016). In securitisation contexts, the exclusionary discourse and practices propagates migrants' vulnerability to gender-based violence. The same applies to the severity of harm and inability to repot the abuse. As a Muslim woman, Wanunda is expected to always be veiled and no other man except for her husband is supposed to see her naked (in this case without the veil).

In their study of Muslim women in Indonesia and India, Wagner et al, argue that veiling among Muslim women is "an archetype in all monotheistic religions as the female body is portrayed as seductive and sinful hence […] a woman's duty is to be chaste while men are absolved as 'victims' of female seduction. Even more surprisingly, is that fact that women are held responsible for the rise in xenophobia and related trouble is attributed to women becoming less modest" (2012:530). When the participant was narrating her story, it was evident that she felt she had let her husband down as well as her religious beliefs. The Quran provides that both men and women should embrace modesty in their dressing. Women are to "lower their gaze and guard their modesty"

(Qur'an, 24:31–32). In addition, "women should not display their *zeenah*[15]; they should draw their *khimar*[16] over their bosoms and should display their charms or beauty only to their husbands, fathers, and sons (and other family)" (Qur'an, 24:31–32). For some scholars, women wearing the veil is a symbol of an unacceptable value system that debases women (Haddad, 1985; Young, 2001). But other scholars argue that women wearing the veil identifies them as a Muslim and defines their role in society and their relationship with men—giving them respect and recognition (Razack, 2004). Wanunda's case shows the dilemma of Somali refugee women who are torn between cooperating with the demands of securitisation regime while remaining true to the values bestowed on the female body as a measure of modesty in the patriarchal Somali society. Failure to adhere to any of them does attract punishment.

Another infringement on women's privacy comes in the context of accessing financial services. Since many of them lack documentation, they cannot open bank accounts or use the Mpesa[17] services. This means that they have to depend on Kenyans or those that have requisite documentation. Wanunda had this to say:

> "Getting a sim card is a challenge because they will ask for your ID. I had to ask my neighbour to register one for me. But this is very challenging when it comes to Mpesa, I have to ask for her ID to go collect or deposit money. That is very inconveniencing" (Wanunda, June 2017)

Juman who has relative in diaspora had this to say:

> "When my cousin would send me money, I would have to request my friend to allow the money to be sent in her name then we go pick it with her ID. I did not have my documents then and that was the only option. The problem with that kind of arrangement is that you really need to have someone you can trust. Otherwise, a selfish person will just go withdraw the money and use it. In any case it was sent in their name. Or I have heard of a case where an old woman was conned. The person who went to receive the money on her behalf demanded half of it as pay. But for

[15]Charms Beauty or ornaments
[16]Veils
[17]A Mobile transfer services

me I think one bad thing about such an arrangement is that people always know how much you have..That is not good" (Juman, July 2017)

From the narratives above, it is clear that apart from the infringement on one's privacy, it also excludes the refugee women form participating in the formal economy. Having to depend on friends and neighbours increases their vulnerability. In some instances, the participants confessed to engage in "Mattress Banking" which simply refers to keeping money under the mattress instead of the banks. This is a risky venture which is detrimental to their security.

6.1.2.2 Increased Sexual and Gender Based Violence and Physical Insecurity

Securitisation has contributed to urban refugee women's vulnerability which has exposed them to blackmail and sexual abuse. The Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) that refugee women face "part of a continuum of violence and discrimination in which gender rights suffer before, during, and post-conflict" (Simon Butler and McSherry, 2019:9). My respondents reported the prevalence of SGBV during their journey from Somalia to their stay in the camp and the city. Simon Butler and McSherry, (2019) argue the SGBV needs to be characterised as a global public health issue that qualifies as a crime against humanity. This is because of its adverse ramifications on the individual's, mental, social, reproductive, and physical health.

The United Nations Secretary-General's (2017) report, dubbed "Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach" notes that, adults may face SGBV in form of transactional sex, sexual assault, human trafficking with intent of prostitution and exploitative relationships. Children may face SGBV in form sexual assault, trafficking with intent of sexual exploitation, rape, child prostitution among other forms of sexual violence. Some Somali refugee women endured abusive and exploitative relationships as a means of survival. In a TV Documentary named "Sex Tourists" a number of Somali refugee girls narrate how they were lured into holiday marriages by male refugees who come from diaspora for summer holidays[18]. The girls narrate how they agree to such marriages with the hope of moving to the diaspora with their husbands only to be left without notice. According to one government official:

[18] Channel 4 News (14 August 2018) 'Sex Tourists' Duping Somali Virgins into Marriage' available at https://youtu.be/vBIXQ4lFEDw

> "The first thing a majority of them do once they arrive in the city is to get married. They do it for survival. A few years down the line cases of abuse become rampant" (Anonymous, July 2017).

From the documentary, the refugee women engage is such marriages for survival and as steppingstone to a "good" life. Usually the 'husbands" pay their families money as dowry and take them through all the traditional Somali marriage rights. The challenge is when they are left without notice and divorce. Ado had this to say:

> "It is like you are married but you do not have the husband. Someone comes pays dowry to your parents, weds you and then disappears. I know of two women who went through such. The men went back abroad and left them pregnant without a cent. They changed their numbers so they cannot be reached. You see such a woman cannot remarry even if she got someone else because people saw you getting married" (Ado, June 2017)

Freedman (2012: 47) argues that when women use sexual or marital relations as survival strategy, it precludes agency. Usually, they have no choice given the unequal power relations of a patriarchal society, and in the case of my study, the discrimination resulting from the securitisation. Drawing on Freedman's thoughts, I would like to suggest that agency should not be used to mean that one's actions should lead to good outcomes. From the interviews and the documentary, some refugee women get married to secure the welfare of their whole families and not necessarily for themselves. Ado argued that many refugee women/girls are aware what they are getting into. Annoyed, she explained:

> "If they say it is not good, they have to give other solutions! Of course, it is not good. [. . .] It is still better than being a single and jobless mother. Besides this thing has been going on for a while. Some mothers even encourage their girls when these men come for them. It is not like they are kidnapped. Noo..some even come to the parents and bring them goodies. The girls are always hopeful of leaving this chaotic Eastleigh and settle in diaspora" (Ado, June 2018)

Basing on the narrative above, I would like to suggest that we should not simplify the decision to enter a "holiday marriages" by always labelling it "wrong" thereby leaving no room for agency or

resistance. By so doing, we take agency away from the women who enter such marriages for their own fulfilment, status, or economic reasons. Some of the participants also narrated how they too were asked for sexual favours in exchange for jobs, accommodation among others. Some men who pose as UNHCR agents defrauded refugee women in the name of helping them to get papers. Some participants narrated how they directly or knew of someone who was a victim fraud and swindling by imposters pretending to be "UNHCR officials" or immigration "experts".

According to one government officer, crime is rampant in Eastleigh hence the numerous reports that reach his desk on a weekly basis. The refugee community especially the women are not spared. They are also on the receiving end of criminal activities. Refugee women experience attacks both in private and public spaces. In the private space, which mainly is the home, some of the respondents had their houses broken into and property stolen. In public apses such as shopping centres, schools or streets, the perpetrator usually unknown would target refugee women and girls.

The officer notes that some refugees especially the male ones have sometimes been caught selling guns.

> "There are also young people mostly boys aged between 12 to around 22 that are terrorising the refugee women and locals. One was actually killed in broad daylight. They steal, mug, beat and terrorize refugee women and Kenyans" (Interview June 2017)

For some of the refugee women, Eastleigh was a safe haven compared to the camp. Hawa explains

> "Since I learnt how to handle the police am no longer scared. I just give them what they want, and they would not do anything to you. But again, as women we are careful not to walk in Sakatis (rat routes). You also make sure you get home early. You know here we are considered terrorists and so no one comes to your rescue should anything happen to you" (Hawa, June 2017)

Asha and Wanunda also agree that physical insecurity is an issue for many Somali refugee women. They actually have a high rate of being raped or physically injured just like in the camps. Asha explains

> "There are young boys who have formed gangs that terrorize us here in Eastleigh. For instance, there are those who call themselves Baghdad boys, if they find you in a dark corner, they rob you. That is why I carry my handbag and money safely when am going out to the shops. They are not scared of anyone even the police. They will just steal from you in a broad daylight" (Asha, July 2017)

Wanunda paints the dilemma that Somali refugee women have to deal with when they cannot get help from the police due to lack of the refugee Mandate certificate.

> "Going to the police to report is like freely handing yourself to den of lions. Even before explaining your case, they (Police) will first of all ask for your papers. If you do not have, they will treat you like you deserve the rape or whatever it is that you went to report!" (Wanunda, June 2017)

The area government officer confirms that there are terror gangs in Eastleigh. One notorious one is called "Superpower"**.** In an interview with Cawo she confirms that she knows some children dropped out of school to join the gangs. She said:

> "It is painful to see your son waste his life on the streets! We wanted them to study hard and have a better life that we did not get. I would love my kids to finish school and go to Europe so that they can take me there too" (Cawo, Interview 2017)

In her narration, she brings up the seclusion that these children sometimes face in school. Their classmates call them terrorists on the playground. Yet not all can handle that well.

> "Like my friend's son came home one day and told her mother that he is not going back to school again. Upon inquiry, he revealed that he had been bullied in school. He was called a terrorist!" (Cawo, June 2017)

Some of the teachers that were interviewed reported that during the periodic forceful returns or when their parents are arrested, some refugee children do drop out of school. Hibaaq recounts her experience as follows:

> "I came to Kenya with my parents in 2005, I was just thirteen years old. We ran away from the war that had broken out in my village. When we crossed the border, we went straight

to the camp. We lived there for two years then my father came to Nairobi to start a business. He promised to come for us. Two years later we all moved here. My mother and three siblings came along. I liked the idea of being in the city. By the time I got here I was 19 years old. I and my mother joined my dad in running his shop. His business was doing well. Life was good compared to the camp. But before long my mother was diagnosed with breast cancer. I wanted to join college, but I could not because my father who had since married another wife abandoned us and so the sole responsibility of taking care of her was on me. I am the first born. We tried getting her to the UNHCR clinic but the doctor there could not do much because we had no papers. No NHIF so things became difficult. The only thing we did is to pray for Allah to heal her. She did not make it! She died in 2015. I think she gave up. My father left. My brother was killed for allegedly being part of a gang. He had dropped out of school. I am here trying to get my life together. I need to fend for my two girls. They are all I have. My life has become void" (Hibaaq, June 2017)

From the interviews, the most common types of violence that urban Somali refugee women face include forced or scam marriages, rape, and prostitution. These forms of violence thrive as a result of cultural norms and values that devalue refugee women's wellbeing rights and safety not only during moments of heightened securitisation, but also during times of "peace". While male refugees are not exempted from the violence, refugee women are more prone due to the use of sexual violence as weapon of war, constrained access to protection and social services (Anani, 2013). According to Hynes and Cordozo (2000), the implications of violence cannot be underplayed. The impact of violence on refugee women manifests in the form of physical injuries, suicide psychological and mental trauma, contraction of sexually transmitted diseases and early or unwanted pregnancies. Pittaway and Bartolomei (2018) work points to the gendered nature of gender-based violence. For instance, rape may result in pregnancy and death during childbearing especially when the victims are too young. The highly patriarchal and adherence to Islamic ideals has resulted in victims of rape in the Somali community being shamed and ostracised. The refugee women who engage in transactional sex for survival are shamed together with their men who are seen not to be protective enough of their women resulting in collective guilt.

As aforesaid, the violence is further entrenched due to first, their subordinate status in their culture and highly patriarchal Somali society, and secondly, exacerbated by the securitisation. Many of

the interviewed participants, reported to have been victim or witnessed some form of verbal or physical abuse. Although the frequency and perpetrators of the abuse varied. Some refugee women had been physically abused more than once, and a majority claimed to have been manhandled by the police. When asked who they were abused by, the police came top on the list followed by criminal gangs. From the narratives it can be said that the experiences of Somali refugee women are strongly characterized by a multifaceted form of violence, which intersects with securitisation and other challenges such as illiteracy, unemployment among others.

In sum, SGBV against refugee women can be categorised as structural and every day. Each of the two categorisation unfolds thoughts their refugee journey from their country-of-origin Somalia to when they self-settle in Nairobi Kenya. The structural violence is rooted in the discriminatory asylum-seeking policies and practices. In their work, Pittaway and Bartolomei (2018) found out that systemic discrimination is evidenced by the policies and regulations regarding access to basic needs such as shelter, healthcare, and protection. Purkey (2011) allocation of one ration card per family is constitutive of structural violence and it forces refugee women to be depended on the men especially if the card bears the card of the male head of household. In the Kenyan context, structural violence aims to disempower refugee women as it places power and control in the hands of security agents and or male refugees who are heads of households. The consequence is that it perpetuates refugee women vulnerability at individual and societal level.

Everyday violence is characterised by the exclusionary discourse that portrays refugee women as threats as well as the harmful traditional practices. Usually, structural violence provides a basis for the execution of everyday violence. My study findings reveal that Somali refugee women face everyday violence such as physical assault, verbal abuse, unwelcome physical contact, and domestic violence. The patriarchal structure which functions to support traditional practices that degrade women, has led to victims of rape forced to undergo Female genital Mutilation (FGM) as punishment. In some cases, they married off to their perpetrators to avoid stigma. Both structural and everyday violence is multifaced, dynamic and occurs at various level in the community.

6.1.2.3 Impact on Family and Relationships

Securitisation has also had substantial implications on urban Somali refugee women's family lives and relationships. For instance, the forceful eviction and refoulement of the Somali refugee women

has in almost every case involved the traumatic and tragic separation of families. According to Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a right to family relation and ordinary everyday life, is considered a primary human right. The African Charter also places specific emphasis upon the family unit and the need to protect families – the forced repatriation process as it has been carried out has been particularly injurious for families. However, from the interviews with Somali refugee women in Nairobi, this right is drastically affected in a securitisation context. There were many cases of separated families where some women had to leave some of their family members in the camp. Take the case of Bilha who has been forced to take up the sole responsibility of raising her family following the death of her husband:

> "My husband was a very hardworking man. He ran many businesses, but he was not always lucky. He started by selling camel milk way back in 2012, the business was not doing well. He closed shop. In 2013 he started another business but due to constant harassment from the police he could not take it anymore. One of his cousins was arrested and it was said that he was a gang member. The police came for my husband the same night, they said he is an accomplice since they ran the business with the cousin. That was around August 2013, He would be called to the police anyhow. The police would interrogate him left right centre. Another cousin of his who has links with the police helped him clear his name. And just as he thought things were getting better, the government launched Usalama Watch in early 2014. We were arrested and taken back to the camp. We managed to return after a month. At this point he had just given up. One of his friends gave him the idea of going to Yemen. We borrowed money and made all the arrangements. He left in July of 2014 and that is the last time I saw him (silence). He did not make it to Yemen. The boat that he was in drowned. Life has never been the same since then. I have had to play both mother and father to my children. It is not easy..." (Bilha June 2017)

For some refugee women who relocated to Eastleigh before other family members, prolonged stay away from their children was very challenging. The separation form their friends, family and children had a toll on their psychological and emotional wellbeing. In her narrative, Juman explains how she succumbed to psychological pressure and sank into deep depression.

> "The first time I moved here, I came alone. I left my kids with my mother in the camp. At first, I was very optimistic about getting a good life for them. But when I landed here, I started missing my children very much. It was very difficult to me. Yes, I could talk to them but that means I need of have airtime daily, yet I was just starting life. I could not visit them often as I did not have money to travel back and forth to the camp. I brought them after two years. They now live with me and am happy" (Juman, July 2017)

Similar experience was shared by Ado:

> "Staying away from my children was the hardest decision I had to make when I moved from the camp. My youngest was one and half years. I had to stop breastfeeding her when I got the opportunity to come to Nairobi. That thing made me sink in depression. Every time I was just thinking whether they are fine or not. Anytime I would hear my neighbour's child cry, I would remember my own child. I was paralysed psychologically and at some point, I almost left the job I was doing just to go back and stay with my children. But my friends would encourage me to work hard, get my own place and then bring them over. And for sure after seven months, I brought them here" (Ado, June 2018)

For the unmarried refugee women, the right to a family life is also impeded by the difficulty in starting new relationships when they are in the city. This is because of strict religious norms that does not allow them to date or marry non-Muslims unless they convert to Islam. Besides given the close-knit nature of the Somali community, a majority only have networks amongst themselves as opposed to the larger Kenyan society. There have been a number of studies on the social, cultural, and economic lives of Somalis in Eastleigh (Campbell, 2006; Carrier and Lochery, 2013; Carrier,2019). The findings reiterate that the society is close knit and a majority confine their lives to Eastleigh suburb. Pavanello et al. (2010), notes there are very few intermarriages between Kenyans and Somali refugees. This lack of motivation to integrate in the larger Kenyan society could be attributed to a lack of integration policy. Some Somali refugees learn Kiswahili, in order to facilitate business relations, as well as to navigate difficulties faced at the hands of security agents. The narratives of various participants, demonstrate how securitisation can become physically embodied and an impediment for relationships to form. The violence inherent in the

securitization process expresses itself in the internalisation of "human inequalities" (Holmes 2007). Many refugee girls and single women have become vulnerable and take chances with temporal relationships so as to sustain themselves in the city. The securitisation has also affected refugee children as they witness their families getting disrupted. This evidenced by the majority who are dropping out of school to join terror organisations or gangs such as the ones dubbed "Superpower" and "Baghdab Boys".

6.1.2.4 Threats to Access to Social Services

The restrictive regime has in many ways led to health risks especially when the refugee women play the hide and seek game with the security agents leading to delayed treatments. In addition, the fear of constant surveillance and the resultant repercussions has affected the health of many refugee women. The surveillance exacerbates health risks in tandem with other variables such as accessibility, affordability, and willingness to seek care. Lack of proper documentation or low income further complicates access to health care and other social services like accommodation. Eastleigh has one designated UNHCR clinic that serves the registered urban refugees. Since many of the Somali refugee women interviewed in this study do not have prerequisite documentation, it means that they cannot access treatment at this facility. Therefore, they have to make use of government/private hospitals where they have to pay for health care service. Even so, access to basic health care has been substantially impaired by the insecure environment.

Lack of access to the medical services is particularly a big challenge for the elderly refugee women, those with disabilities, chronic conditions, or in need of psychological assistance. Some of the participants with medical conditions that were interviewed provided an insight on how exclusion from the healthcare services by the restrictive regime affects refugee women. The participants noted that there was no discrimination in private clinics if they could pay. However, this suggests that the access to such facilities is tied to one's financial resources. Mariam recounted her experience as an expectant mother where she had to rely on Mkunga[19] for delivery services.

> "Mariam: I could not get treated at Pumwani even though it is very close to where I stay. I did not have papers then. Nikaamua mimi nitaenda tu kwa Mkunga (I

[19] Traditional birth Attendant

decided that I will use a traditional birth attendant). There is Mama Fatuma (a traditional birth attendant) who stays down the street. She has helped many women and I was sure she will help me too

Me: Did you attend any antenatal clinic?

Mariam: No…I did not go to any hospital. I used to go to mama Fatuma to check if everything is okay. She can tell if the position of the baby is okay or not. Besides I know women who went to seek her services, and they delivered well. She helps a lot.

Me: Did you have any plans in case of any complications or emergencies?

Mariam: To be sincere, I did not plan for anything. I was sure everything would be fine. Even hospitals do not guarantee everything. How many cases have we heard about hospitals especially this Pumwani maternity hospital? Many women are losing lives and their babies. So, for me I was sure I will be okay. Then to be honest my papers were not in order, so I knew I would not be treated without identification. Unless niombee jirani ID (I borrow my neighbour's ID) (she laughs) Mama Fatuma is a woman who knows her work well. She is also cheap. I mean I have never heard of a woman who died while being delivered by mama Fatuma. She knows her work well" (Mariam, July 2017)

According to Chavez "the lack of pre- and postnatal care can have serious consequences for mother and child. […] in the case of HIV-infected pregnant women, exclusion from the healthcare system means that the risk of infecting the child after birth increases almost 15 times" (2007:67). Pendo recounts her experience of discrimination at Pumwani maternity hospital:

"I went to Pumwani once because the baby was not kicking for days. I was scared that maybe the baby is dead. But when I got there, I was asked to first pay for Ksh100 for registration. I did not have such money. I only had fifty Kenya shillings, but they turned me away. I asked my sister-in-law who lives on third street to lend me some money. She

> did send me some money via Mpesa, but still I stayed at the hospital for about 6 hours before the doctor got to attend to me" (Pendo, August 2018)

In a study conducted on Swedish non documented migrants, Khosravi (2010) notes that, living clandestinely adversely affects the health of migrants. I note that living in a context where one is considered a threat also "causes enormous stress and psychological suffering, which according to the participants led to sleep disorders and psychosomatic illness" (Khosravi 2010:2). One participant who asked me to accompany her to her house so that I can see for myself how the police broke her door and forcefully entered her house. The 50-year-old said she tripped and fell injuring her knee but could not get medical attention right away as the police took her to Kasarani centre. As Romero-Ortuno notes, "accessibility to healthcare means that it should be non-discriminating, affordable, and that information about it is easily available" (2004:23). In the Kenyan context, access to healthcare is a stipulation of the Refugee Act but that remains just on paper. For urban Somali refugee women, the undesirable status coupled with the high cost of healthcare makes it inaccessible.

Other concerns that were raised by the participants relate to finding accommodation especially after Usalama Watch. With the introduction of the Nyumba Kumi initiative, landlords are expected to conduct a due diligence before leasing a house to anyone. Accordingly, urban Somali refugees are forced to rely on wealthy refugees or Kenyan Somalis to sub-let residential houses or business space. The process of subletting is marred with manipulation and in some cases sexual assault has been experienced. As a result, the refugee women were facing precarious living conditions. However, some Kenyans differ with these narratives, they argue that Eastleigh has become an expensive hub because of the refugees. New residential apartments have recently been bult in the area and they go for as a high as 500 USD per month. According to one of the locals:

> "These refugees will soon turn Eastleigh into "Runda" we will be forced to move out because we cannot afford such monies. They get lots of money from UNHCR and they also run big businesses here and that is why they can afford such rent" (Interview, July 2017)

Holmes (2007) posits that, the quality of housing has an impact on all other aspects of people's lives. Being able to afford a house in what is considered as the "secure and decent" parts of Eastleigh remains a challenge for most refugee women who live from hand to mouth. For those with meagre finances, they are forced to rent "cheap shanties" which makes them vulnerable to theft and physical insecurity. Living in deplorable houses means that their health is at risk because of the poor drainage system that are a characteristic of such neighbourhoods. Wanunda had this to say:

> "You are likely to lose your house and belongings when you go to the camp unless you keep paying rent. Most of these women come to the city for a better life. They have to be here, find work so that they can pay the bills. But when you have been arrested and taken back to the camp definitely your hustle is affected. Unless you have people to support you some have ended up staying even for six months in the camp and when they come back, they have lost their house and possessions. It means they have to start all over again. It is not easy for the poor women with young children" (Wanunda, June 2017)

From the narrative, it is evident that poor housing has an impact on one's social networks and access to livelihoods. Moving into new houses or neighbourhoods aggravates social isolation. While is ordinarily correlated with safety, in the case of urban Somali refugee women who live in fear of security agents, home is infused with a terrifying sense of surveillance and insecurity. For some refugee women, securitisation did not seem to affect their daily lives much, as they could still access housing, public transportation, and healthcare. Some participants also reported, to be enjoying some cordial relations with Kenyans. This suggests that securitisation does not necessarily result in a total exclusion from access to certain rights and services, as such, urban Somali refugee women experienced different degrees and forms of exclusion in their daily lives.

6.1.2.5 Precarious Livelihoods

Many of the interviewed women especially those working for fellow refuges or local Kenyans expressed the high vulnerability they are exposed to as compared to male refugees. Given that many refugee women lack the necessary skills to get into forma employment, unskilled work comes in handy. However, as Mbiyozo (2018) argues, unskilled work has historically been

underpaid and undervalued. Therefore, my respondents found themselves in what O'Neil, Fleury and Foresti (2016) term as "deskilling" whereby they opt to take up jobs that are not in congruent with their skills and qualifications. For most Somali refugee women, they engage in small scale business, domestic work, and sale jobs. The competition for the meagre job opportunities with locals and fellow refugees, further heightens their abuse. Invisibility as a survival strategy also provides grounds for exploitation. Employers take advantage of their de facto illegal status in the city to underpay or not pay them. Zahara's narrative gives a clear [picture of how workplace abuse occurs. She explained:

> "I work in a hotel owned by an Ethiopian but getting paid sometimes is so hard. I think they take advantage because am young. I just do not know! It is now three months and I have not received my salary. I asked my aunt to go talk to them. They promised to pay after two days but they have not. I cannot report the matter to the police because I do not have the papers. It is like am working for free. My aunt has talked to her friend to take me as a salesgirl in her shop at Bangkok Mall. I will start next week" (Zahara, July 2017)

One government official explained how some women refugee face sexual harassment in the hands of real or potential employers. While the 2007 Refugee, Act stipulates that refugee have a right to work, the labour laws are silent on refugee rights in the workplace. The Kenyan labour laws to do offer any protection to refugee women. This coupled with the lack of documentation makes it hard for the refugee women to report workplace abuse and exploitation. There is a general fear of job loss, arbitrary arrest. Mbiyozo's (2018) assessment of female migrants in South Africa, the lack of access to information on legal protection in the workplace provides room for abuse. She adds that, "women are also more likely to have their documentation status linked to and defined by their husbands' statuses, thereby reducing autonomy, particularly in cases of abuse or divorce. The government official had this to say:

> "We have received reports of some Somali refugee girls who were working and were sexually harassed at work. But most of the do not come forth because of the stigma or some choose to handle the matters out of government's offices" (Anonymous, July 2017)

From the account above, the failure to report workplace abuse maybe due to the fear of being arrested. My respondents spoke of how the wearing of hijab makes them an easy target for the police. The security agents target and exploit small business ran by refugees in the city. After the Usalama watch which led to the closure of many businesses, some of my respondents spoke of how they have become careful in how much they invest. They are aware of the financial risk that comes with running a business that incurs losses especially due to looting. Some respondents who earlier run businesses got discouraged and opted for employment.

Even so, finding employment remains a big challenge to many urban Somali refugee women. The International Rescue Committee (2020) carried out an assessment of the benefits of employment for refugee women in Germany, Kenya, and Nigeria. Their report demonstrates that, in Kenya and Germany, working refugee women had greater freedom and independence. The interviewed women mentioned benefits such as the great fulfilment, confidence, and surety of meeting ones needs. Being admired and respected in the society was highlighted by the Germany respondents. Their Kenyan counterparts, spoke of the networking and self-growth and development that came with being employed. For the Nigerian respondents, having a job is an important aspect of one's identity and dignity. In my study, work was a critical factor in the survival of my respondents. While Eastleigh is a business hub, getting a job for many refugees is not easy. The IRC (2020) maintains that access to employments is dependent on the labour legislation of each country. In some countries, the labour laws clearly stipulate migrants' rights to work but in others like Kenya, the labour law is silent. In my study, it was revealed that, refugee women had to rely on other refugees who had connections to get a job. In my field work journal, I made the following observation:

> "Some job categories remain inaccessible for refugee women such as carrying and arranging cloths bales, or in the construction industry. This is because such jobs are perceived to best suited for men. The refugee women only work as food vendors at the construction sites. Most construction sites I bypassed mainly had male employees. The women (some Kenyan some refugees) came in as tea or water vendors. They were not on site as constructors rather to offer supportive services. This points to inaccessibility of certain jobs for female refugees. The same

> observation I made when I traversed the malls, it is men who worked in Luggage storage usually located on the basements of the mall" (Personal Notes, May 2018)

The same applied to nursing mums or those with young babies also had limited choices in terms what they can pick as jobs. In such a scenario, motherhood then becomes an impediment for employment. This is what Mariam had to say about this:

> "My employer did not want me to bring my baby along. She said I will not be able to work well if I bring along my baby. I was coming to work as a house help. That is why I could not bring her even though she was still breastfeeding. I had to stop her from breast feeding so I can get the job. I thought to myself she is one and half..she will survive. It was tough but I needed the job. The opportunity to come to Nairobi was here and I was not going to let it go" (Mariam, July 2017)

Mariam experience, is what Chavez describes as "the cruel paradox of many undocumented migrants who work to clean houses, cook food, wash dishes, and take care of other children while they have no home to clean and their own children are minded by others" (Chavez, 1997:28) I had a chance to interview three grandmothers who had to take up the responsibility of baby-sitting their grandchildren so that their daughters can go work as live-in-house maids.

> "My daughter works as a house help in South C. When she is at work, I take care of the baby and when she gets some money she shops for us, and that is how we survive. She comes back every Friday to see her baby and spend time with the family" (Interview, 2018)

Working in the informal sector is particularly problematic for the refugee women. A part form being marginalised form the mainstream labour market, many are forced into dehumanising work with little pay. They are largely exploited by the employers who are mainly Kenyans or fellow refugees. A main and widespread consequence of this, is that these refugee women, even if they do get the mandatory refugee certificate, remain caught in the informal sector and fail to find regular formal jobs. Given the risks and chances of being arrested associated with moving through public space, on one hand, and the urgent need to work and earn money, on the other, the exigencies of everyday movement create a major challenge for urban Somali refugee women. Such fears and anxiety are particularly intense during forceful returns period.

Hawa, a tea vendor explains how she had to heavily rely on Kenyan Somalis and/or male relatives who were already settled in the city in order to get the space to put up the tea kiosk. Since a majority of Somali refugee women face exclusion from formal employment, they resort to informal employment. They run small scale business or get employed by fellow refugees or Kenyans as salespeople, cleaners, cooks, or house maids. From the urban Somali women refugee narratives, it is increasingly getting difficult to even acquire business space in Eastleigh for those who want to engage in business. They argue that many Kenyans landlords especially after the Usalama watch and introduction of the Nyumba Kumi initiative, have become a little reluctant to lease their properties to Somali refugees because of the perceived link to terrorism. Amal a tea vendor explains that before Usalama watch life was far much better.

> "Before that fateful night of 21 April 2014, I was doing well in my small business. I came to Kenya in 2010. I did not have an issue getting my first business space. But after we were rounded off and taken to the camp during Usalama watch things changed. I stayed in the camp for a month and upon return my landlady did not want to continue renting me the space. It took me about three weeks to get another place" (Amal, June 2017)

According to Bailey (2004), urban refugees face immense setbacks when they engage in livelihood activities in many host cities like Johannesburg, Kampala, and Cairo. The participants also explained how forceful returns led to the loss or damage of assets that are key to their livelihoods. Some women reported that they lost their assets during police round offs. Exclusionary discourse and measures have contributed to the loss of livelihood assets, for instance, production materials and financial capital. Many of the participants note that the biggest challenge they face in the city is restricted movement. They are always looking for ways to navigate the restrictive regime which in some cases may require them to stay indoors or move to other parts of Nairobi or in extreme cases go back to the camp. Restricted access to their regular asset base is detrimental to income generation which makes them dependent on their relatives and family members or humanitarian organisations.

For some Somali refugee women, their shops and homes were looted during Usalama Watch. Because a majority of these refugees do not have access to credit, it meant some would have to depend on the informal saving groups called chamas (merry go round) to get loans to restart their

business. In some cases, some would turn to friends or relatives for loans to restart the businesses. In some other instances, the Somali refugee women could not restart the business after asset loss and so they had to look for employment as salespersons or housemaids. In summary, recovery from asset loss was depended on extent of the loss and the ability of the individual to secure finances to restock the assets. Residence loss was also reported as a major threat to livelihood. Some women had to go to the camp for long time or move to a different place other than Eastleigh (Mostly South B or C). The longer they stayed in the camp, the higher the chances, they had to relinquish their residential places. Sumaya narrates how her family lost a whole electronics shop during Usalama watch.

> "I was at work…at our shop on 8th Street, with my husband at around 6 PM. We were just closing for the day when suddenly the police stormed in and demanded that we produce our documents. You see I do not have the documents yet…We were forcefully put into the GK Land Rover. We were not even given time to lock the shop. So, we left the shop open. They did not care. Already the commotion had attracted a crowd and so as soon as we left, they stormed into our shop and stole everything. After three hours my husband through his friends managed to get us out of Kamukunji Police station. We returned home to an empty shop. We had made so much progress but now look at me. I now sell camel milk. That was two years ago but we have never recovered" (Sumaya, June 2017)


For some Somali refugee women, their houses were broken into in the night of the Operation Usalama Watch. Some of the research participants were convinced that the police too were involved in asset theft, claims that were refuted by the Administrative Police Officer in charge of Eastleigh Police post. The same sentiments are shared by the Police Commandant In charge of Kamukunji Division who maintained that "our work is to fish out criminals and not to steal or harm people" (Interview, 2017). Haawo narrates how she lost all her academic certificates which is making it difficult for her to secure a job. She said:

> "I had just finished my certificate in Hotel and Tourism management. I was promised a job in Doha by my cousin who is already working there. My cousin was going to help me secure an air ticket. My responsibility was to acquire travel documents and all the required papers. Now I lost everything, and I just feel like I lost my future. One can easily see that

it is not the important documents that were lost nut opportunities as well" (Haawo, June 2017)

For some urban Somali refugee women, they end up working in prostitution as a means of providing for themselves and their families. From the narratives, financial distress is the reason some resort to this. However, there is a high social price that comes with engaging in prostitution as a Muslim woman. They are likely to be excluded from their community and ostracized by their families, this exacerbates their vulnerability and exposure to sexual abuse. The implications of the securitisation regime on urban Somali refugee women are summarised as follows:

Figure 6*:* Diagram of Resultant Insecurities



Source: Author

6.2 Conclusion

The standpoint Feminist theoretical framework discussed in chapter three, is a critical framework of exploring the Somali refugee women's lived experiences in the context of securitisation. When exploring lived experiences of women, Davis (2008) posits that, a feminist perspective considers

the various of differences resulting from gender, class, culture, race and power. The feminist perspective allows the analysis of how each category of difference (in this case gender) makes "the individual becomes more vulnerable, more marginalized, and more subordinate" (Davis, 2008: 71). This chapter outlines how the intersection of patriarchy and securitisation results in the marginalisation of the refugee women. The securitisation regime is meted through violence in which the state's depiction of the Somali refuge women as "undesirable", in many ways deems their refugee's status which in this case erodes their protection. Marginalised even in their own ethnic communities, urban Somali refugee women suffer from a double burden. They are not only exposed to seclusion from the Kenyan government and society at large but placed at the very bottom of a hierarchy of suffering based on patriarchal structures. Notably, while the refugee women are faced with intense discrimination, their lived experiences continue to get insufficient attention in both academic and policy research.

In my study analyses, the impacts of the securitisation on the lives of the refugee women emanate from a broad spectrum of live experiences. The most prominent is the harassment form the police officer, institutionalised insubordination by patriarchal social and cultural structures as well as apathy from the local Kenyans. This is line with previous studies (Mbiyozo, 2018; O'Neil, Fleury and Foresti, 2016, Mwangi, 2018); Freeman, 2019). Even so as shall be demonstrated in the next chapter, Somali refugee women have exercised agency albeit minimally in challenging the discriminative refuge regime. This is despite the constraining dynamics of securitisation. In Nairobi, the Somali refugee community remains close knit with minimal opportunities for integration with the local community. The hostility and apathy from Kenyans partly emanate from the competition for few available job opportunities. The locals living among the refugees, view them as competitors and undeserving of the jobs as they are catered for by the UNHCR.

The analyses of the implications of the securitisation of migration on Somali refugee women is important in the development of migration, gender, and migration literature. The study findings provide a more nuanced understanding of the threats refugee women face in a securitisation context. For instance, the lack of supportive labour law has led to workplace abuse and exploitation of refugee women. Furthermore, since many of the refuge women live illegally in the city, they are unwilling to report any form of abuse in private or public spaces. The everyday violence is exacerbated by the securitised migration regime policies.

In my study, the threats that refugee women face manifest both at the individual and collective level. There is however a difference in the type of threats younger girls and adult women face. For instance, when a young girl is raped, she will be married off to avoid shame. When it comes to adult women, being raped is a reason enough to be divorced. Thus, the continuum of the threats faced by the refugee women oscillate between every day and systemic violence. It has been documented that violence experienced in public may spill over in private spaces (O'Neil, Fleury and Foresti, 2016). This is especially where the community's honour and integrity is at stake. Marrying off rape victims to their perpetrators or divorcing a wife for allowing the police to 'touch' (read rape her) while hand cuffing her; are some of the means of keeping the society's honour.

Most importantly, is the diversity and dynamic nature of the refugee women's experience of the securitisation regime. I argue that Somali Refugee women's differential experiences are an outcome of factors such as age, class, ethnicity, marital statuses, and nationality, which interrelates with the restrictive refugee regime, that treats them as undesirable and a danger to the state. The findings portray the link between securitisation and gender as well as the disjunction between the theory and practice of refugee hosting. Overall, the reality of refugee hosting in Kenya, illustrates the challenges Kenya faces in balancing its legitimate national security concerns with refugee hosting and protection. Politicisation of refugee hosting raises the issue of legal protection of refugee women.

6.3 Implications for Policy and Practice

The discussion demonstrates how Somali refuge women face an array of threats in the hands of the Kenyan government and in their own communities. This calls for a strategic and long-term protection strategy. While Kenya has genuine security concerns as discussed in chapter four and five, there is need to balance its approach in dealing with security threats. Punitive measures as demonstrated in this chapter do not necessary remedy the concerns instead in provides grounds for development of other issues such as human trafficking and smuggling. Therefore, there is need to embrace protection strategies that would foster the integration of the long-term refugees in the country. The policies must consider particular adverse implication arising from the current refugee regime and how they inherently worsen Kenya's security situation. Recognising that refugee women are at higher risk of SGBV and other forms of violence, a more proactive as opposed to

reactive strategy should be adopted in refugee management. Faced with discrimination from both the government and the locals, refugee women are at risk of losing their dignity and privacy as well as exposure to SGBV. While there are local organisation like Kituo Cha Sheria and Refugee Consortium Kenya, and international bodies like UNHCR that offer work to ensure rights and safety of refugees is achieved. The government needs to rethink its reactionary approach to refugee governance.

Most importantly, a major challenge lies with the repressive patriarchal norms. There is need to challenge social norms that normalise the degrading of women and use of violence against them. UNHCR, local refugee organisation in conjunction with the Kenyan government should work on sensitising communities on SGBV. Some of the refugee organisation I spoke to are already rolling out these programmes. However, their involvement is tied to their budgets which in many cases are constrained. This has led to sporadic implementation of what should be long term civil education and awareness creation on SGBV. The study findings on Syrian refugee men by Veale et (2020) demonstrates the effectiveness of awareness creation on SGBV. The men were guided on emotional regulation through the creation of a safe space for airing and addressing their problems. In the end, the men embraced dialogue in the place of violence in ad learnt how to deal with their issues. In 2014, a similar initiative dubbed the Men Engage Lebanon Country Network was adopted to sensitise men on matters SGBV (Bartelink et al 2017).

In line with Hansen's (2000) "two blind spots" that excludes gender from IR, there is need to discuss power and its dynamics. While at it, the international community has the responsibility to work with individual states in adopting programs that address the structural drivers that lead to the "silencing" of refugee women's experiences, rights, and safety. The legal reforms should be carried out keeping in mind that the violence against refugee women is multi-layered. Mbiyozo (2018) assessment of South Africa refugee regime concludes that parodic and short-term interventions are less likely to effectively effect change. There is need for the Kenyan government to work with its partners on migration in the region, to adopt a programming that effectively challenges the existing power dynamics and the intersection in the structural drivers that exacerbate violence against refugee women in their country of origin, during transit and at their destination. The African Union's (AU) Gender, Peace and Security Programme (2015-2020) aims

at ensuring gender equality and women's rights on the continent (Hendricks, 2017). The program objective is to ensure the adoption of gender policies by member states. Lasting solution to gender issues affecting migrants entails the gender mainstreaming of national and local polices, regulation and practices to uphold women and girls' rights and safety. The AU recommends that member States must ensure gender-sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting with clear indicators to measure participation or contribution by sex, age, and socioeconomic background (Ibid). Consequently, the Kenyan labour laws need to be revisited to include provisions that protect refugee women against workplace abuse and exploitation.

6.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has outlined the various threats that urban Somali refugee women are exposed to as a result of the restrictive regime. Through self-experiences accounts, the women describe the implications of securitisation on their daily lives. The chapter examines in detail how urban Somali refugee women experience the process of being enforced as a security threat. The chapter explores and concretises how the state uses exceptional measures and policies to manage, regulate and control the lives of urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi. The argument herein, is that the private lives of these refugees as regards their gender, safety and family life has been regulated by the securitisation regime. This in turn, has resulted in the exclusion of these women refugees from state protection.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NEGOTIATING THE SECURITISATION REGIME

7.0 Introduction

An examination of the implications of Kenya's securitisation regime on the lives of urban Somali refugees in the previous chapter, provides an opportunity to explore how they respond to it. In line with Lonsdale's (2000) concept of "agency in tight corners", I explore how the refugee women, as active and wilful actors in the securitisation process, adopt subtle everyday resistance strategies that helps them counter, cope with, deconstruct and resist the securitisation regime. The everyday resistance strategies explored in this chapter, constitute what James Scott aptly terms the "weapons of the weak".[20] They include acts of disciplinary resistance, disguised compliance, self-definition and development, strategic silence, and politics of mystification. The strategies come in many "varieties but are generally quiet, disguised and anonymous" (Scott 1989:37). I argue that, by adopting these subtle strategies, the refugee women have adopted a form of resistance that not only, answers their needs of safety and wellbeing, but also, responds to the existing repressive securitisation regime.

The chapter also analyses participants' fluctuating positions of identity as they engage in a myriad of relations with the dominant Kenyan regime, the Kenyan community, and fellow refugees. The argument herein is that the securitisation process is not only restricted to political elite and local Kenyans, but also urban Somali refugee women who engage in the process through everyday resistance. Given that the participants operate in a "state of exception" as a result of staying outside designated camps, the nature of resistance adopted by the Somali refugee women is "individualized, indirect, and oriented toward short-term, rather than systemic change" in order to both survive as well as undermine repressive domination of the restrictive regime (Scott 1990:86). The chapter attempts to specifically answer the question of if and how urban Somali refugee women resist the restrictive regime – and if and how the Kenyan government thwarts or reacts to such resistance.

[20] Elsewhere he also refers to them as everyday resistance or infrapolitics

7.1 Urban Somali Refugee Women's Strategies of Circumvention

Urban Somali refugee women's narratives reveals their creativity and agency in developing individualised subtle resistances strategies, which enables them to better cope with the restrictive regime. Their resistance are performed in a myriad form including performance of disciplinary resistance, strategic silence, disguised compliance, politics of mystification and self-definition and development. I note that, collectively, these everyday acts of resistance do not result in complete overhaul of the restrictive regime as "they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority" (Scott 1990:92). In this regard, the urban refugee women's form of "everyday resistance exhibits an alternative form of resistance; one that is not as dramatic and visible as rebellions, riots, demonstrations, revolutions, civil war and other organized, collective and/or confrontational articulations of resistance" (Scott 1990:92). The strategies are discussed in the following section.

7.1.1 Disciplinary Resistance

This basically refers to the attempts by the refugee women, to create counter narratives about securitisation regime to reject that which they consider discriminatory, sexist, and xenophobic. Establishing counternarratives that oppose the dominant securitisation regime is one modality assumed by the Somali refugee women, which is rather personalised and hidden (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2018). For instance, as shall be seen shortly, stereotyped notions of the police as cruel, inconsiderate, incompetent, and dangerous are constantly established and (re)established by the refugee women in their personal spaces. In this study, disciplinary resistance strategies are presented in form of humour, anger, ridicule and bearing of witness as discussed below.

7.1.1.1 Humour as Disciplinary Resistance

Humour is one of the avenues employed by the participants in dismissing the disciplinary regime. Both Boler (2006) and LeBoeuf (2007) define humour is a form of art as well as a critique which exposes human and social vices, by use of mockery and satire. Take the case of Ado who had this to say about Usalama Watch:

> "Living in Eastleigh has its ups and downs just like any other part of this city. The only difference is that as a Somali apart from paying rent, you have to pay the police for your survival here. Otherwise mutasumbuana bure (They will keep disturbing you)..The other day they came here to conduct Osama Watch (referring to the Usalama Watch), instead of looking for terrorists, they were targeting our pockets.. But again, like they say, if you cannot beat them, then you should join them but, in my opinion, if you cannot beat them, do not join them (bursts into laughter) instead you pay someone to beat them on your behalf" (Ado, May 2017)

Another participant recounted how her son was arrested by the police, and taken to Kamukunji police station:

> "So, someone purporting to be a police officer calls and asks me...wewe mama unajua kwenye kijana yako yuko? (Are you aware of your son's whereabouts?). I asked which son because I have three. In fact, I asked them confidently since I did not want to give them the impression that I was scared or something. If they dictate fear, then they overpower you. They put the phone on loudspeaker and asked my son to introduce himself. Then the police started hitting him, I think they wanted to play with my emotions. They know as a mother I would not withstand the pain of my child being beaten. Actually, I knew what they wanted. They wanted me to Mpesa them, so I told them to 'mupelekeni Somalia basi' (Take him to Somalia if you so wish). The police were surprised by my response, they asked 'wewe mama kichwa yako ni mzuri' (Are you mentally, okay?)" (Participant Interview, 2017)

In the two scenarios, both the participants use humour to explain police extortion. Though humorously presented, they symbolically launch an attack on the integrity of the police and confirm the allegations of Kenya's police corruption assertions that have been widely cited in many academic and policy research (IPOA, 2014, Balkian, 2016). Through humour spiced with ridicule, the participant raises the question of their well-being and safety in the hands of the police that should provide their protection. Few scholars have written explicitly about the potential of humour in effecting societal change or in this context subverting repressive domination. For

example, Benton who has studied humour in the Soviet Union, refutes the potential of political jokes in effecting change. He writes:

> "But the political Joke will achieve nothing. It is the relentless enemy greed, injustice, cruelty and oppression-but it could never do without them. It is not a form of active resistance. It reflects no political programme. It will mobilise none" (1988:88)

Griffin (1994) and Speier (1998) also dismiss humour as a resistance strategy. They maintain that humour is a toothless dog mostly adopted by the weak, and as such it is characterised by a sense of powerlessness. However, for scholars like Boler humour "speaks truth to power" (Boler, 2006:48). Though subtle in nature, Orwell asserts that "every joke is a tiny revolution" (Orwell 1945:484). These statements reveals that humour is potentially "a site of resistance" to power (Connery and Combe 1995:11). In the case of Somali refugee women, I note that humour offers the refugee women a medium to voice their resentment and disapproval of the restrictive regime through their opinions, feelings and attitudes in a personalised space not controlled and dominated by the powerful. Hence, despite the discrimination they experience daily, the refugee women make fun of and ridicule the ones (in this case the police) who inflict violence on them. In line with Lilja and Vinthagen (2018) thoughts, I argue that humour is a promising method of feminist resistance, that allows the refugee women to deconstruct the exclusionary discourse hence enabling them to speak in a securitisation context where ordinarily their voices would be thwarted. This is to say, despite the acute dynamics of securitisation the refugee women, use humour and comedy to cope and resist.

According to Weaver "humour can provide relief, it can change the social dynamics of the speaker, and the audience [. . .] which amounts to a change of context and is a way of fighting back. It may have to be hidden, only to be released under guarded circumstances, with that one can trust, but it is there" (2010:31). T'hart also agrees that humour "symbolically cuts the oppressor down to size, while supporting the spirit of the oppressed, serving as a true weapon of the weak" (2007:1). In the case of Somali refuge women, I note that, humour is used as one form that Hewitt describes as "reverse-humour" which picks up a certain well-known stereotype to mock the oppressor (in this

case the police). The refugee women use humour to transform discrimination "into a plaything, in an attempt to acknowledge its social presence while rendering it meaningless" (Hewitt, 1986:237).

Both Peterson (2008) and Johansen (1991) argue that humour does have revolutionary capacity and can be used to turn oppression upside down. How this works will be depended on the context but most importantly is the ability for humour to present a new framing of circumstances. Examples provided in the narratives show the participant "not accepting the seclusion as defeat" rather she humorously place the police in the "you are the threat" category. Echoing Sorensen's thoughts, "because of its irrationality, humour has an ability to affect relationships in surprising and unpredictable ways and undermine traditional sources of power, such as the police and the military, which are firmly based in rationality" (2008:185).

7.1.1.2 Anger as Disciplinary Resistance

Anger as a form of resistance is demonstrated by Natalie's story outlined below. When I met Natalie at her camel milk kiosk along Golole Street in Eastleigh in May 2017, I was not aware that just two months ago her family had made it in the news headlines. In fact, she thought I was a news reporter from one of the media houses making a follow up on her son's story. Her account is as follows:

> "It is now two months since I lost my son. He was killed by the police. A very young boy with a promising future. The police took the most precious thing away from me. I will never forget. My son was killed in broad day light on the streets of Eastleigh... It pains me whenever I remember it. On March 31, 2017, I was at home when I received the news that my son had been shot. My husband called me and told me to rush to Kamukunji police station. He (the husband) was already there as he received news before me. The police said that they were terrorist. Let me tell you the truth..yes my son used to walk around with bad boys. We had been told about that. Walikuwa wanafanya hii wizi kidogo kidogo (They were petty thieves). But he was not a member of the Superpower Gang as some people said. Neither was he a terrorist as alleged by the police or people. We had warned him when we heard about his bad ways. His father asked him about it and warned him.

> By the time I learnt of his demise, the bodies were already taken away to the mortuary. He was shot alongside his other cousin. So, two young boys' lives were cut shot just like that. Well, I do not know who shared the video on the internet about the shooting. We received many calls from media houses. Our story was shared on TV. Hata polisi walikuwa wamekatalia hio miili. Vile waliona hio mambo iko kwa TV they softened a bit. (The police were adamant about releasing the bodies for burial but when the video about the cruel shooting went viral, they obliged after some time.)
>
> Najua waliona aibu vile waliona unyama wao umewekwa wazi kwa mitandao na radio na TV..kila mahali (I know they got embarrassed as their cruelty was exposed all over social media platforms, on radio and TV). At least people saw the police for who they are! They kill innocent boys and call them terrorists! Why did they not arrest them?" (Natalie)

This was one very emotional interview among the many I ever held during my data collection. While she recounted the loss of her son, the rage and anger towards the police was evident. This could be seen in the way she employed gestures while describing the incident. While expressing her anger, loss and disappointment, the participant provided a counter narrative against the police in protest of the framing her son a terrorist and the locals who called her son a gang member. It can be argued that anger as a site for resistance, allowed the participant to question the legitimacy of the authority of the police. In this particular instance, the participant uses anger as a critic to the very regime that seeks to exclude her.

Natalie's son's death caught media attention and the government was forced to respond. Two government officers from the homicide unit in the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), and those from IPOA visited the scene of the shooting and immediately commenced investigation into the killings (The Standard, 3 April 2017). In addition, IPOA issued a statement through its spokesperson, Dennos Oketch which read:

> "The Authority appeals to any member of the public including motorists, pedestrians and anyone else who may have witnessed the unfolding events or may through any means have become privy of credible evidence on the incident to report to IPOA. All information will

be treated with utmost confidentiality. IPOA remains committed to being independent, impartial and fair in all its mandate operations." (The Standard 7 April 2017)

In addition, Kenya's Amnesty International Executive Director, Irũngũ Houghton had this to say about the incident:

> "Every person accused of a crime should have their guilt or innocence determined by a fair and effective legal process. But the right to a fair trial is not just about protecting suspects and defendants. It also makes societies safer and stronger. Without fair trials, trust in justice and in government collapses" (Ombati, 7 April 2017)

Tal (1996) posits that, anger as a symbolic expression of resistance comes out of defiance to pressure to suppress one's bad experiences. Thus, rather than silence, Natalie's decision to provide her side of the story embraces resistance. Natalie does not buy into the "you are all terrorists narrative" but provides her "oppositional speech act" about what she thinks about the police (Johnston, 2005:123-124). Her reference to the police as "cruel" is a counter narrative meant to deconstruct the dominant narrative of refugees being a threat. Scott (1990) advises that in order to understand anger as a form of resistance, it is important to consider the relationship between self-reflexivity and the dynamics of power relations at hand. For anger to achieve the potential for change it has to be voiced. This is seen in the studies that examined Black social movements globally even in the most recent case of Black Lives Matter. The expression of anger in such historical moments has been instrumental to galvanizing individuals to fight against injustice and oppression (Banks, 2014; Rickford, 2016; White, 2016).

Natalie's son's story made into the headlines and went viral on many social media platforms. It evoked emotions countrywide and the police were put on the spot for the inhumane way they handled the situation. As Ahmed (2004) argues, emotions are important avenues for resistance since they tend to become more powerful as they circulate. The anger, disappointment and loss that was felt by Natalie's family, though situated at the heart of Eastleigh circulated to other parts of the country leading to what Lilja and Johansson (2018) calls "circulating resistance". Circulating resistance is very important tool for creating a "we" feeling. The story making its way

to BBC documentary[21] means that the anger and loss was able to "travel transnationally, affecting people in new venues and thereby being recognized, assumed, made sense of, performed, as well as sometimes rejected in these venues" (Ibid:68). While this particular story made it into the headlines, still, it did not seem to evoke any grand systemic changes as far as extra judicial killings are concerned. It appears isolated cases of resistance are not enough to destabilize the hegemonic disciplinary regime.

7.1.1.3 Ridicule as Disciplinary Resistance

The story of Natalie's son was mentioned by at least six other participants during the interviews. They were aware of what happened to her son, and they expressed their disappointment in the way the police handled the issue. In fact, in one of the interviews, a participant called the police who killed the two boys a "killer cop". Monali had the following to say:

> "When Rashid was posted here, he initially was doing a good job..he arrested all petty thieves that were disturbing people in this neighborhood ..but recently things have changed. Huyu kijana ni hatari. (This boy is dangerous) I think he has been sent to finish us and our children. The way he is killing people like chicken is not right. I think he is a government 'project'. You know he is Somali like us . They want to make it look like Somalis are killing each other" (Monali, June 2018)

Ahmed Rashid, the cop at the centre of the killings is part of six other police officers dubbed "Pangani Six". By referring to him as a government 'project' or "hatari" (dangerous), the participant is building an alarming image of police so as to express feelings of resignation and disagreement towards the government. According to a BBC Africa Eye documentary, Rashid is quoted saying "We have a responsibility to get these criminals either alive or dead and that is unnegotiable" which is deduced by the participants as the government's masked strategy to engage is extra judicial killings[22] (2:46). Narratives from other participants revealed that, those opposed to Ahmed's activities in the area felt that "having a Somali police officer as the head of crime in

[21]BBC Africa Eye (10 September 2018) Hunting Down Gangsters with Kenya's Ahmed Rashid - Full Documentary – available at https://youtu.be/pOjYnSAAcnQ

[22]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOjYnSAAcnQ

the area" was meant to trick them into thinking that the government is not after the Somali refugees, rather, it is about maintenance of law and order. In another instance, a participant portrayed the police as incompetent. She said:

> "If at all the government... I mean police with all the training they undergo are unable to locate the terrorists. They have been hunting Al-shabaab all these years without success, how do they expect me as a civilian to know their whereabouts?" (Participant Interview, 2017)

Yet another participant had this to say:

> "You are being paid a salary to work. I mean the police are being paid to look for the criminals but instead they want us to do the work for them. When they come and forcefully drag us out of our workplaces to go and show them Al shabaab. What is that? What does that even mean? It shows someone who is inconsiderate and perhaps does not understand their work as the police. The Al-Shabaab are somewhere laughing as they watch them hunting them in vain" (Participant Interview, 2017)

The above accounts depicts how the refugee women are creating a protest narrative about the police in their personal spaces. Echoing Scott's remarks that, "everyday resistance is a subtle form of contesting public transcript that may make prescribed roles to resist the abuse of power" (1985:137), I argue that, through disciplinary resistance the refugee women try to counter the existing narrative of Somali as a threat. To interpret the refugee narratives presented above, I am reminded of Foucault and his work on discursive production of truths. Foucault argues that one criterion for the production and maintenance of discourse is through exclusion of certain ideas, especially that which perceived as outlawed, deceitful, or threatening (Foucault, 1993). This hierarchical categorisation of knowledge is what defines what is acceptable and what is not.

The story of Rashid as a "Killer Cop" clearly illustrates a discursive struggle between the Kenyan government and the refugees. While the government maintains that the police are well trained government officers who are doing their job of maintaining law and order; the refugee women refute this narrative and instead, term them as "rog-trigger-happy" officers who are out to "finish"

them. From the perspective of refugee women, the government is taking their lives for granted and so are their concerns, opinions, and perspective which the government dismisses as outright lies and less legitimate. This results in an intricate network of power and resistance where, police brutality is met by refugee women's disciplinary resistance, which in turn strengthens the very restrictive regime they protest. I argue that the discursive struggles between the Kenya government and the refugee women are to be seen as sites of power and resistance, where government's exclusionary discourses and refugee women's resistance seem to produce, reproduce, and reinforce each other.

7.1.1.4 Bearing Witness as Disciplinary Resistance

Yet another way the refugee women contest the restrictive regime is bearing witness. Two participants recounted how they bore witness of the murder of Natalie's son. One mentioned to have been interviewed by a news reporter from one of the mainstream media houses while Tendai recounted her interview with a human rights organisation. This is what she had to say:

> "I was here at my shop when I heard the gun shots. People ran to see what was happening. Some ran into hiding. As you can see my shop is on third floor, we ran to the balcony and that is when I saw the police with his foot resting on the boy's head. I do not know if he was dead at that point but what I know is that he had already been shot and was bleeding too much. Women were crying and screaming. It was horrible. I could not sleep for days. That incident haunted me for days. The boy was lying close to those flower beds (pointing to the murder spot). When the human rights people came here a week later, I told them what I saw" (Tendai, July 2017)

> Me: What made you volunteer to be interviewed by the human rights people?

> *Tendai:* For how long will we continue to keep quite while we lose our kids? (At this point she raises from her chair and volunteers to walk me to the balcony to show me where the shooting happened) Those boys did not deserve to die. Those were small kids, they were not armed. The police should have arrested them and then called their parents to discuss the issue

Me: Earlier you mentioned how the police harass refugee women in Eastleigh. Were you not afraid speaking against them? What if they come after you?

Tendai: No.. No..watoto wetu hawawezi uliwa ovyo ovyo na ninyamaze (I cannot keep quite while our kids are killed indiscriminately). I do have kids too. That day it was another woman who bore the pain of losing a child, who knows tomorrow it could be me. If we do not speak for ourselves who will. Besides, the human rights people said they will not quote our names. Honestly, I would not care if they did. The police need to be stopped and that will not happen if we keep fearing what they will do to us if we tell what they do to us" (Tendai, July 2017)

By bearing witness, the participant was able to voice her frustrations and concerns about the incident. Hence, the opinions of refugee women which would have been ignored or punished, if overtly declared, were able to reach the media and the human rights organisations, and according to the participant she had made a real difference. Therefore, it can be argued that, bearing of witness, is one of the powerful tools that refugee women can get their counternarrative out in the public.

In another instance, a participant narrated how she resorted to legal recourse in fighting the government. However, this was only possible because of her knowledge of her rights and privileges as stipulated in the international refugee instruments. The story of Naina a single mother of three, puts this into perspective:

"We are not goats or cows to be zero grazed…we are human beings who have a life to live, and we cannot live that life if we are caged in a camp. I had been living in Nairobi since 2006. When I was arrested sometimes back because of lack of papers I contacted this NGO (Consortium of Kenya) and asked them to help me get the papers. I knew about them while I was still living in the camp. They always came there to organise seminars. So, when I came to Nairobi, tried to apply for papers and nothing was happening. For three years I kept going for interviews but in many cases, they would be rescheduled. In 2011, I was arrested by the police while

> coming from the mosque, I did not have the papers. They took me in for two days. My people came for me, but I remembered those NGO people. I looked for their contact, booked an appointment then they picked up my case" (Naina, Interview 2017)

During the court process, Naina had to bear witness against the very regime that was trying to subjugate her. Naina is among many urban Somali refugee women who choose to legally fight the regime when need be. They do not just succumb to the pressure to go back to the camps. They stand their ground and use available opportunities to fight for their rights to remain in the city.

7.1.1.5 Use of Social Media Platforms

Social media platforms are also important avenues for generating and circulating disciplinary resistance. The narratives were full of incidences of how the participants relied on WhatsApp or Facebook groups and messenger to share information on police harassment. Some explained that social media platforms especially WhatsApp have been very helpful in disseminating information about police whereabouts in Eastleigh. "Through WhatsApp groups people are able to post updates of police whereabouts anytime anywhere" (Ado, May 2017). When it comes to information sharing, the social media platforms were very critical. In general, the participants spoke of the value of social media platforms prior and during their journey to Nairobi. The refugee women pointed to the wealth of information that they share among themselves and how it shapes their lives in the city. For some, the information shared has been critical in accessing opportunities, evading police arrests as well as helping them detect and deal with fraud and misinformation. Many appreciated the role of social media during their journey to Nairobi without which, it would have been challenging. This helped inform them in detail about the accessibility and safety of various routes, smugglers, and the estimated costs. They kept in contact via WhatsApp and Facebook. They also thought that the trip from the camp to Nairobi would have cost them more without social media platforms.

Above all, once they arrived in the city, the refugee women valued social media communication with fellow refugees especially as regards finding job opportunities, housing and, most

importantly, sharing information about possible police arrests. Jamila and Natasha provide examples of this:

> "People are in many WhatsApp groups. Ukiona polisi wengi mahali unaambiana (If you spot the police anywhere, you share it with the rest). Or just when you have a problem say you have been arrested and you need money or want to tell your family" (Natasha, June 2017)

Jamila had this to say:

> "I have some relatives in the camp. I am able to link with them through WhatsApp. It is easy because you can even hold video calls, share voice notes. Also, if I want to travel you can follow up with those traveling to and from the camp to find out if they have any issues" (Jamila, Interview June 2017)

Apart from the general use of social media platform in communication, the refugee women also use them to counter government's narrative. According to Ado, when Natalie's son was brutally murdered, she and other women who are friends with Natalie, quickly formed a WhatsApp group to fundraise for the bereaved family. She said:

> "I have known Natalie for many years and so when this happened, I mobilised other women and we created a WhatsApp group. But I will tell you for sure, women were saddened by what the police did, initially it was just a group of women, but we later added other family members including men. We wanted to help raise money to help with the burial arrangement. This was an easier way to convene and share information. In fact, at that time things were so hot, you would not want to start having physical meetings all over the place. Who knows the police might think you are up to something? (Ado Interview, 2017)

Ado's friend who was at her place when I went to interview her adds that:

> "We were so pained with the death of Natalie's son. I was so angry at the police for saying that the boy was a terrorist. No, he was not. It was sad to know that some people were already buying into the government's lies. But those who knew Natalie and her son stood

with her through and through. I was in about three WhatsApp groups at that time and that story was discussed for days if not months. I could tell from the comments that people were not happy with what the police did" (Participant Interview, 2017)

In a study of youth and resistance in Eastleigh, Žák makes similar observations. He notes:

> "An informal WhatsApp group made up of Eastleigh residents called 'the Kamukunji Fact Files' was set up to share information about police harassment and crimes in and around Eastleigh. In this forum, the government's rhetoric was inverted, and it was the police that were painted as a threat or as one former member of the Superpower gang I spoke to put it: 'the terrorists are the police'" (Žák, 2016:754-755)

While social media platforms are important, I argue that they should not be overvalued as far as negotiating the securitisation regime is concerned. This is because of; firstly, determining the authenticity of social media information can be challenging. Misztal notes that, while social media enables the "extension of one's social network with weak and latent ties and allow information to circulate on an informal basis; this creates uncertainties about the truthfulness of information that is shared online" (2000:188). Whereas Somali refugee women are often aware of the uncertainty that surrounds social media information, they cannot do without it. Ado had the following to say:

> "Yes the internet is good..you get to learn a lot. In these groups people share many things but in such a group you cannot tell who who is. Sometimes you are just added to groups without your consent..they might tell you.. ohh this group is for fundraising but after a while people start discussing the police. Yes you want to know what the police are up to but since the day I heard that my cousin's phone was tapped and he got arrested for recruiting for Al-Shabaab..I am so scared. I only join groups that I know the administrator" (Ado Interview 2017)

From the narrative one can gather that, although social medial platforms are important avenues for making the refugee women's voices visible, the government equally uses them as a surveillance tool. Through state regulation, surveillance technology, and punitive action, the Kenyan government has made social media platforms a "banopticon" which forces Somali refugee women to exert self-censorship and self-regulation (Bigo, 2007). Hence, the government's tapping of

phone conversations and spying of Facebook and WhatsApp groups as mentioned by the participants, serves to kill their interest in discussing police discrimination. In addition, the social media platforms are known to be a fertile ground for spreading rumours and speculative information of which have costed some of the participants. Ado recounted a story of how refugee girls are lured through the internet for fake marriages or non-existent jobs. She said:

> "My neighbour's daughter got lost. We were very worried. She went to school and never came back. We searched everywhere in vain. After three days, it was discovered that she was living with a certain young man that they met on Facebook. Funny enough the mother is not even on Facebook, but the girl was using a friend's phone to talk to this guy. So, the internet is good but sometimes you have to be very careful" (Ado Interview, 2017)

In their article on rumours and migration, Carling and Sagmo (2015) argue that rumours are an important factor in migration decision-making. They refer to the definition of rumours by DiFonzo and Bordia as "unverified and instrumentally relevant information, statements in circulation that arise in contexts of ambiguity, danger or potential threat, and that function to help people make sense and manage risks" (2007:13). In the case of refugee women, the rumours and speculative information shared online may raise a false alarm about a future situation-say a police raid- upon which they may act. This shows that the social medial platforms may further entrench the vulnerability of the refugee women, because it exposes them to unverified information. Hence, validating the authenticity of online information becomes key when using social media.

In sum, while the disciplinary resistance strategies discussed above appear subtle and piecemeal, they also show the ability of refugee women to use humour, anger, ridicule, and social media to shift away from hegemonic exclusionary discourses and gesture towards a space in which the refugee women are able to speak on their own terms. Hence, while the Kenyan government through the police try to subdue the refugee women into silence, they detract and shift away from the disciplinary regime, by attempting to create personal spaces where they can freely express their views and opinions.

I note that, the effectiveness of the modalities of the disciplinary resistance adopted by the refugee women, lies in the personalisation it allows as regards their views, feelings, and interpretation of

the disciplinary regime. In this way, they not only create empowerment by displaying personal, subjective meanings of the restrictive regime, but also generate a sense of complicity amongst themselves. This according to Johnston, is an important dimension of what he calls "oppositional speech acts" especially in securitisation contexts where outrightly challenging the regime is definitely risky (2005:123-124). Such individualised acts of resistance also work well in the context of "War on Terror" which is characterised by legal restrictions on freedom of expression. Thus, disciplinary resistance strategies give voice to actors like migrants with an alternative provocative discourse framing. In this case, they provide an alternative medium for refugee women to express alternative meanings to government's discrimination. Thus, disciplinary resistance, can potentially serve as a war machine by shifting the scripts of exclusionary discourse such that refugee women can speak on their own terms.

7.1.2 Strategic Silence

The narratives of the Somali refugee women draw attention to the use of what I call "strategic silence*"* as a resistance strategy. Strategic silence are subtle non-verbal body gestures that differs from organised resistance that is usually characterised with demonstrations, lifting banners, and chanting against oppressive regimes. Silence as a strategy has both positive and negative effects especially since its part and parcel of socialisation in a in a patriarchal setup. For my respondents silence seems to be emancipatory as opposed to being oppressive. This is in contrast with Segal et al (2020) argument that silencing women violates their autonomy and results in low self-esteem. My respondents spoke of how silence enables them to be in control of their space. Silence was also seen as a strategy to avoid deportation and arbitrary arrests. While the respondents are well aware of the exploitation they face in public and private spaces, silence was deemed important for self-preservation. For them silence is a more peaceful option. Protesting against the government and the oppressive patriarchal structures may result in refoulement, physical assault, early marriage, FGM and detention.

Nevertheless, Maji and Dixit (2020) contrary argument is that silence is demeaning and is mostly adopted in situation where individuals are faced with minimal options of resistance. Bisel, Messersmith, and Kelley (2012) posit that, silence is a social cultural construct that works against the individual as it usually benefits the other party which in this case is the Kenyan government

and the patriarchs. It is driven with a 'fear' of annihilation by those in power. Shorto (2015) argues that strategic silence as opposed to self-silence assumes a critical consciousness; the ability to recognise oppression and injustice and the willingness and ability to protest injustice in the form of non-speech acts. It goes beyond the failure to recognise injustice, or acceptance of it as a natural part of world order (Kabeer, 2010:19).

Emilia's account brings into perspective the issue of strategic silence. She said:

> "When Natalie's son was killed Eastleigh was shaken'. This was not the first time someone was being killed here but the fact that the shooting was carried out in broad day light…. also targeting unarmed young boys, many people got scared. I know many people condemned the act. The refugee community especially the women asked the Eastleigh Business Community leaders to intervene and ask the police to stop killing our children. I remember there were proposals for all Muslim women to 'withhold sex from the men' until the women were assured of their safety. These businessmen with big monies are always on TV with politicians fundraising for some irrelevant things. We wanted them to use their connections at this point and petition the government on our behalf, but it seems nothing happened. You see when there was a terror attack …like recently we were asked to close our shops in solidarity with those who lost their lives. But when refugees are at the receiving end of police brutality, no one comes to protest on our behalf. Suddenly everyone starts saying we are terrorist and so we deserve it. As women we were ready to organise a protest, but the government got wind of it and it never came to pass" (Emilia, June 2017)

The narrative reveals how women use their bodies and sex as a weapon of communicating disapproval and dissent. It also suggests that securitisation pushes women to continually depend on patriarchal structures that are in fact, a source of their discrimination and oppression. This is seen in the way the women were asking men to use their positions in society to speak on their behalf. A number of studies on resistance highlights several examples of women using silence to hold regimes accountable for oppressive practices. For example, in Argentina, some of the mothers of the "disappeared" – political dissidents abducted or illegally detained by the military junta

during Argentina's Dirty War - gathered in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, walking silently around the square wearing white headscarves to symbolise the nappies of their dead children in a protest that eventually, helped to bring down the government (Parpart, 2010).

Other silent protests mentioned include those by the Kurdish Mothers of the Lost in Istanbul against patriarchal injustices and oppression and the Women in Black protests against Israeli occupation of Palestine. These demonstrations, Parpart argues, "illustrate both the power of collective silence and the importance of symbolic performances for challenging social injustice and mobilizing public opinion" (Parpart, 2010:22). Furthermore, she highlights how silent acts performed daily can also be means of resistance to oppressive regimes. For instance, women in Afghanistan living under Taliban rule and forced to wear burqas have shown resistance by wearing platform shoes and other Western clothing underneath them (Armstrong, 2002).

Some scholars question the efficiency of silence as a resistance strategy by the less dominant society. They argue that it may lead to self-liberation but hardly leads to any substantial societal change. To illuminate on this issue Scott argues that everyday forms of resistance like in this case silence usually makes no headlines because:

> "Most subordinate classes are, after all, far less interested in changing the larger structures of the state and the law than in what Hobsbawm has appropriately called "working the system... to their minimum disadvantage" (Scott, 1985: xv).

More recent examples of strategic silence was in Sweden in 2017, where women wore "pussy hats" and gathered to sing in support of their "sisters" in the US, and elsewhere, against the sexism of Donald Trump (Lilja and Johansson 2018:87). The main purpose of designing the hat in such a symbolic manner was to make the women visible. Wearing the hut publicly made concerted statement against Donald Trump and protested his discriminatory policies towards women, the LGBT community, Muslims, immigrants, and other minorities (Ibid).

Medusa was one of the women who witnessed the killing of the Natalie's son. She had this to say:

> "When I saw that boy lie there helplessly it real pained me. They were actually two of them I found myself screaming and wailing as if it was my own son. I even removed the burqa

and threw it down in anger. At that point I did not care what people would say. I knew it goes against our customs as Muslim women because as a married woman needs to cover herself fully. But at that point I felt the Burqa was suffocating me. I was in pain. I wanted to express myself freely" (Medusa, July 2017).

The removal of burqa and the withholding of sex can be argued to be some of the strategic silence strategies employed by the refugee women. In addition, in the case of Somali refugee women, I made the following observations as much as the symbolic performances like the removal of burqa and withholding did not stop police discrimination, such seemingly small gestures can actually be important vectors for change. For instance, they challenge the idea that "voice" is the sole sign of women's agency because by so doing, it ignores the various ways women can challenge securitisation through strategic silence. Through various symbolic performances refugee women interviewed were able to illustrate personal yet subjective creativity in countering the securitisation regime.

7.1.3 Everyday Politics of Mystification

The counterstrategies of urban refugee women like manipulation of their identity, age, and marital status—are a typical form of "individual self-help" used to sabotage the securitisation regime. The study findings suggest that a vast majority of the refugee women have entered into various dynamic relationships with the state and fellow refugees in order to render themselves "unrecognisable". They adopt variants strategies in which the refugee women fluctuate form "identifiable" to "unidentifiable" (Staring, 1998). Hence, through various strategies they modify and conceal their personal identity and/or illegal status for fear of apprehension and refoulement. Thus, it can be said that the refugee women counter exclusion and harassment with a strategy of *passing,* which refers to "a performance in which one presents oneself as what one is not, a performance commonly imagined along the axis of race, class, gender or sexuality" (Kanuha 1999:28). First of all, they lie about their age to avoid arrests. A case in point is Mwikali whose account is as follows:

"When I got married to my husband, I was very tiny. You would think am just a girl. Not once or twice I was mistaken for a school going girl. So, one time, I was walking in town. The police called me. The police were walking behind me. I knew I am done. I did not have papers at all. At first, I ignored but then I decided to face them. I was so scared. I was

already thinking how I will convince them to take the 10 USD I had so that they do not arrest me. I turned and looked at them very frightened... Let me tell you, immediately they saw my face one of them said, huyu ni mtoto wa shule achana na yeye (This one is a schoolgirl, leave her alone). At that point I wanted to laugh but I just nodded my head in agreement and walked away" (Mwikali, August, 2018).

Secondly, some like Natasha mask their marital status in order to pass off as maiden and unmarried. This is her story:

"In 2014 during the Usalama Watch (she laughs), I was at home with my husband when the police came to our plot. We live at the far end of the building so we could hear them knocking at our neighbours' doors, interrogating, and dragging some out. I panicked and I was scared that we would be arrested. We quickly switched off lights and then my husband went to peep through the window. My eldest daughter who is 22 was at her cousin's place for a sleep over. Then my husband comes back to the bedroom where I was hiding and asks me to get one of my daughter's dresses and quickly wear it. The plan was that he would tell the police I was his daughter, so that if they take him then I would remain behind and take care of the younger children. Indeed, when they came, they asked for my ID, my husband said I was a student, we showed them my daughters school ID. Lucky enough it was a bit dark they did not scrutinise the photo. My husband asked to talk to them outside. After a few minutes he came back. Of course, he had to part with some money and that is how we escaped that day. But our problems were far from over, two days later they came back. This time I was alone in the house. I do not know if it is the same police that had come earlier. Though I suspected they were the ones. They did not even ask me for identification documents. They only asked me for my husband. I do not know kama walikuwa wameona wamepata ng'ombe ya kukamua (It is like they had discovered a cow to be milked) (Laughter...). I told them he went to his other wife's house. They left but promised to return later in the evening" (Natasha, June 2017).

Thirdly, some refugee women hide their refugee status from other people such as neighbours, colleagues, employers, or government officials. The accounts of the refugee women as regards identity fluctuation were corroborated by key informants' accounts. For instance, an interview with

an Eastleigh Primary school teacher revealed that some urban Somali refugee women do not reveal their identity when they come to admit their children especially when they can afford it. One teacher noted that "you will only know they are refugees when they come to ask for permission to take their kids to the camps for census" (Anonymous, July 2017). This also applied to accessing social services like medical care they do not reveal their identity especially in private health care clinics. Some acknowledged that, they only reveal their status when it can get them something like when they need medical services from the designated UNHCR clinic in Eastleigh.

Fourthly, they sometimes keep off their nationality completely and camouflage as Kenyan-Somalis. Natasha, had this to say:

> "To survive in Nairobi, one needs to be smart. Do not just tell anyone your issues. You live like someone without a name, home, or an address. Make sure no one especially the police knows you, or where you stay or what you do. Even among us Somali refugees, you just do not share your information. What if someone is a spy? You are afraid of the police because you can be stopped for questioning or arrested anytime" (Natasha, June 2017).

Lastly, critical to the identity fluctuation is wearing of the "hijab "that often allow the refugee women to remain anonymous and avoid arrest, to protect themselves from the regime's logic of "veiled-dangerous Muslim Somali refugee" and "unveiled not so dangerous refugee". I note that, while on one hand the Hijab makes them invisible to the state, it is still counterproductive to their general safety and well-being. This is because invisibility as a resistance strategy disenfranchises and alienates individuals (Beauchamp, 2014). In addition, when looked at it from a social cultural angle where the hijab is part of culture one can argue that, in fact the hijab in itself makes them "visible". The visibility as a result of wearing the hijab then exposes urban Somali refugee women to police harassment and anti-Somali attacks by the locals. Habbani's study on Muslim women in Australia demonstrated that:

> "The ethnic characteristics that make immigrants distinct in the Australian (western, English-speaking) social context and among a predominantly white population affects them in critical ways in relation to how the community perceives and interacts with them. Such characteristics can be based on skin colour, physical,

> and facial features, or accents and publicly observable cultural differences, such as attire (often to do with religion, e.g., Muslim hijab)" (Habbani, 2014:176).

In my study, the visibility of my participants as "Somali Muslim women" makes them prone to police harassment and this again makes their experiences different from men. Many of the participants narrated how veiled Muslim women were always targeted by the police, and this contributed to their feelings of lack of safety and security. Halima recounts her experience as a hijab wearing woman:

> "It is sometimes hard to hide from the police. They just know us from the hijab. And again, our appearance is different from the Kenyans, so it is easier to spot a Somali woman. Let me tell you something, a friend of mine though married was forced to remove her Niqab[23] to pass off as unmarried school going girl to avoid being arrested by the police. Another friend of mine who is married to an Ethiopian though Somali, and Muslim stopped wearing the hijab totally. She only wears when going to the mosque. Otherwise on these other days she only wears Kemis[24]..When I asked her, she told me 'At least the police no longer stop her anyhow because they assume she is Ethiopian'. So, when you see such things, you ask yourself, how far should a woman go to in order to feel safe in this country" (Halima, July 2018).

These findings resonate with work on experiences of Syrian refugee women in Turkey. Herwig (2017) explores the unique methods of adaptation by the Syrian women in preventing harassment and discrimination – from draping their hijab in the way Turkish women do, to using polygynous marriages as a shield of defence. For these women, marriage also became a tool of legitimising themselves within the Turkish society, since "Turkey does not have an established asylum system, and until recently referred to Syrian refugees as "guests" (Herwig, 2017:64). There is still only an exceptional legal regime of temporary or subsidiary protection under which Syrian refugees cannot

[23] A face veil worn by some Muslim women which may or may not leave the eyes uncovered.

[24] Habesha kemis is the traditional ankle length dress is usually worn by Ethiopian and Eritrean women

access international protection. This puts them in a position of limbo in which they have fewer rights and entitlements than refugee status holders.

In the case of Somali refugee women, I note that, in some cases they were able to avoid arrests especially when the police were unable to correctly "read" bodies. Even so, this was an unpredictable strategy to be relied on. Just like in the case of refugee documentation, refugee bodies can also be "unreliable 'texts'—both for the police and refugees" (Balkian, 2016:19). However, in cases where there was any doubt as to the accuracy of an individual's purported identity, they succeeded in thwarting arrest by simply refusing to cooperate with the state's identification efforts. One participant had this to say:

> "When they asked for the papers, I refused to give them (the papers) to them (the police). I was scared they will not return them. So, I just stood there. I mean I refused to talk. They asked me…. are you dumb? and I just stared at them like I did not hear anything" (Participant Interview, 2018).

Another participant narrated how they navigate the situation by tricking the police with fake Mpesa transactions. She said:

> "A friend of mine sent the police money and immediately sent the request for a reversal to Safaricom (she bursts into laughter). The police then called her and threatened to look for her and arrest her. But nowadays they (police) are clever…when you tell them you want to send the money via Mpesa they take you to the nearest Mpesa agent and ask you to withdraw the money and hand it to them" (Participant Interview, 2018).

The narrative reminds me of Pratt's study on detention of immigrants in Canada where the success of the process is depended on the state's ability to correspond the immigrants travel documents to their identity, which mirrors Foucault's outline of the relationship between the confession and punishment by the sovereign. She notes:

> "Both legitimize and expedite the sanction. Both render the subject of the sanction complicit in their own subjectification. And the withholding of both results in a more onerous challenge for the authorities, who must work harder to achieve their desired

objective. Moreover, the refusal to sign is often the only bit of leverage left to some detainees in their efforts to avoid deportation. For all of these reasons, the signing, like the confession, is a key regulatory technique and guiding preoccupation of authorities" (2005:49).

Broeders and Engbersen also writes:

> "The strategy of non-cooperation shows that many immigrants are not docile persons who fully cooperate with the authorities. Many of them are difficult to manage by state officials, and they are able to very effectively frustrate the administrative processing of return programs" (2007:1603).

Indeed, the refugee women's accounts show how they engage in what Schirmer calls "reverse state of exception which implies instances where migrants strip themselves of their identity in order to evade state control" (Ellerman, 2008:1). Besides, the identity fluctuation strategies show how important it can be for the refugee women to lie. While the state aims to trace, identify, and extradite the refugee women, they try to stay out of sight by obscuring their identity. I note that, the motivations for concealing or switching one's identity are depended on the context as well as anticipated rewards or repercussions. This is in line with Broeders and Engbersen assertions that:

> "The nation-state is an exclusive club in which rights and privileges are awarded to citizens and semi citizens (denizens) only. However, decades of immigration research has shown that access to the clubhouse, the territorial state, does not necessarily depend on membership status or even advance approval. Irregular migration comes in many shapes and sizes. Many of those we call irregular migrants started their journey perfectly legally, for example, by traveling on a tourist visa, and became "illegal" or "irregular" when they stayed on after its validity expired. Most typologies of irregular migration are therefore set up around three main criteria. There is legal and illegal *entry,* legal and illegal *residence,* and legal and illegal *employment*." (2007:1594).

It is important to note that, defying the encampment policy to stay in the city in itself denies the refugee women the right to state's protection which makes it possible for them to adopt fluctuating

identity tactics. Being in the "state of exception" is what becomes the very justification for the switching of identity. Identity fluctuation strategy, its reasons, as well as its negotiation, also remind me of Bhabha's (1994) idea about mimicry and mockery. He outlines how middle- and upper-class black women don wigs in order to conceal their curly hair. In so doing, they manage to imitate and blend in with the coloniser as well as ridicule them. Lacan rightly argues that:

> "The effect of mimicry is camouflage […] It is not a question of harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled background, of becoming mottled" (1978:99).

Thus, identity fluctuation can be conceived of as a form of resistance that not only prevents arbitrary arrests, but also, an act of "self-preservation" that counters the domination of the restrictive regime. As such, even though in a state of exception, the refugee women still have some level of autonomy to challenge the regime. In reality, it is the very fact of being in limbo, that places the refugee women in a position where resistance is possible, as they have nothing to lose. This in turn undermines the disciplinary power of the restrictive regime.

Other tactics that are employed in keeping off the police radar included relocating to other parts of Nairobi or country during forced evictions, locking themselves inside the house, avoiding routes regularly patrolled by the police or using Kenyans to acquire services which require official documents for instance Mpesa transactions. Passing as a response to securitisation is driven by the fear of refoulement. It was apparent that the urban Somali refugee women are always conscious of the fact that they are constantly under government surveillance. This explains why they are always looking for ways to minimise interaction with the government officers especially the police. For instance, for some during forceful evictions or when they get wind of police presence in the area, they opt to stay away from crowds and public places. Many opted to stay indoors in order to avoid possible apprehension.

I also made note that, by "making the government predictable", the refugee women were able to remain unidentifiable. To make sense of this, I am reminded of Scott's argument that "true" resistance is reinforced by a well thought out hidden script. He says: "being able to develop this hidden transcript discreetly *nourishes* the spirit of resistance, like embers ready to flare up into

flames when the circumstances become favourable, and a *public* transcript of resistance can emerge" (1990:188-191). Making the government predictable requires the refugee women to be cunning and calculative. Arbitrary arrest of Somali refugee women is not anything new. This has been reported in many research findings on urban refugees (IPOA, 2014, Balkian, 2016). The urban Somali refugee women in some cases take advantage of the loopholes in the Kenyan government system. The police have come to be associated with corruption. Ado notes that:

> "It is like we are banks for the police where they can withdraw money whenever they feel like! It is such an unpleasant experience that some have opted to befriend the police. Especially now that elections are around the corner. Many will be arrested and because that they prefer to pay the bribes without questions" (Ado, June 2018).

Sagaal remarked:

> "It makes life easier for those who have the money. Some pay them 'kitu kidogo' then you will be informed If something is coming up..may be a raid or something. But you see how many of us have that kind of money to waste on bribes? So the ones who have the money pay them in advance in exchange for critical information" (Sagaal, May 2017).

Fawazhad the following to say:

> "Once you give them some money they soften. They do not arrest you anyhow. Wanakuheshimu. (They respect you) But if you got nothing like myself, you will be harassed..they will call you names..ooh you are a terrorist as they drag you to the police station" (Fawaz, June 2017).

From the narratives, it is evident that one's economic status determines whether they can have access to police networks or not. Those who resorted to physically hiding from the police would then seek help from their neighbours in getting supplies from the market. By forming good relationships with the locals, the participants explained how such friendships came in handy in evading the restrictive regime. Depending on the services needed they would have to pay someone to get it done or it is a reciprocity of good relations with Kenyans.

7.2.4 Disguised Compliance

From the interviews it also emerged that urban Somali refugee women employed the disguised compliance strategy. The story of Pakhi shows how some urban Somali women refugees indeed go back to the camp during forced evictions. Pakhi has been staying in Nairobi in 2011. She came straight from Somali to Eastleigh. Pakhi has been staying in Nairobi since 2011. She came straight from Somali to Eastleigh. She notes:

> "When things are 'hot' we ran back to the camp. For the many years I have stayed in Nairobi, we just know once a terror attack happens… be ready to be hunted down by the police. I do have some family members who still live in the camp. In 2014, during the Usalama watch I temporarily relocated to the camp. I better go rest in the camp rather than be harassed by the police. And in any case, I have observed that the forced evictions are not an everyday thing. They only happen when there is a terror attack or when elections are around the corner" (Phaki, July 2017).

From the narrative, it is apparent that refugee women played along with the regime by taking advantage, when possible, of the opportunity to run into hiding or pay money in lieu of arrest, detention, or forcible relocation or deportation. The powerless can "act as if" they comply to evade, resist, or even subvert the powerful (Scott 1987, 1990). For instance, agreeing to the police arrest and search is also another disguised compliance to the securitisation regime. Some also narrated how they have had to pay for fines for being in the city without authorisation. According to Ellerman,

> "In the state of exception, resistance arises from the circumstance that the individual already has lost all claims against the state and thus has little to fear from defying state orders. In other words, the power of resistance lies in the freedom from constraints that limit the scope of noncompliance for those who still have sufficient standing to fear the loss of rights. Hence, individuals comply because they do not want to incur the costs of punishment, or because they value the gains accruing from regulation" (2008:5)

Central to disguised compliance is information sharing and collaboration, particularly during heightened securitisation. Levi's (1988) concept of "quasi-voluntary compliance" implies that individuals are motivated to comply under two circumstances; to avoid the adverse effects of failing to uphold the sanctions or when they are sure that other individuals in the same situation will comply too. The interaction and communication amongst refugee women was vital for creating new strategies for negotiating the restrictive regime. Amal's narrative suggests that belief and trust in other refugees has seen her through the worst while she remained the target of the Kenyan government. Her story sheds light on this issue:

> "For us Somalis we welcome each other. It will be very bad if I knew something, and I do not share it with my neighbours. What will it benefit if my friend or fellow woman is arrested just because I did not warn her in advance? One time I lived with my neighbour's children, when she had issues with her papers and was forced to go back to the camp. Today it might be her but tomorrow I might be in her shoes. That is why for the six months she was away I took care of her two girls fully. I am not the only one, many of my neighbours too have taken in other people's children" (Amal Interview, 2017).

In sum, disguised compliance in itself may imply both refugee women's resistance to forms of domination and subversion through capitalising on their vulnerability and thus reproducing female gender roles; on the other hand, it implies resistance to discrimination of the restrictive regime by the Kenyan government.

7.1.5 The Hope for the Future

The determination to rise against the power relations inherent in the restrictive regime and patriarchy, primarily dominated by men was evident through their own pursuit of freedom, self-development, and better life. For most refugee women, they are driven by "the hope for the future". Therefore, the self-development strategies adopted were usually shaped by the envisioned future. For some refugee women like Suhasini, humanitarian aid is not enough for one to live a good life. The economic security that these women seek goes beyond access to livelihoods include sustainability. This is to say having a secure livelihood is not just about access but sustainability as well. To achieve this, some of the urban Somali refugee women engage in group livelihood

activities, such as running a food/tea kiosk, selling camel milk, clothes among others small scale businesses. This helps to reduce utility costs that come with running a business. But most importantly, the participants explained that they opted to run businesses as a group such that should one be forcefully returned to the camp or arrested by the police, then the business wont collapse because the others will step in. Aisha's story is as follows:

> "I run a milk kiosk with Halima (A Kenyan Somali) and Khadija (fellow refugee) near Madina Hospital. Initially I was selling camel milk, but the business did not go well so I had to close shop. Later on, I talked to Khadija who is my neighbour and asked her whether I could help her with the tea kiosk. I was actually tired of staying in the house and I just needed somewhere I can go when children are in school. I went there and worked for two months, I then asked them if I could join them as a business partner and they agreed. Already Khadija was working with Halima. We all contribute to the rent and other expenses, and we share the profits too. One-time Khadijas son was in trouble with the police, I had to go help her, so we let Halima run the place. One time me and Kahdija had to go to the camp for the census, it was a long break from work, but Halima just continued with the business until we returned" (Aisha, July 2018).

Even though this was not a calculated move, their partnership has come in handy especially during forced evictions. In some instances, they have to let Halima run the camel milk kiosk when the other partners are in hiding from the police. Some refugee women also look for opportunities for onward mobility with the hope of getting a better life abroad as well as an escape route from the securitisation regime. This is Kalman's story regarding this:

> "I have been following up my resettlement claim for years. In fact, that is the reason I moved to Nairobi. One of my cousins was lucky and got selected way back in 2009. I came to Eastleigh in 2011, I tried to submit my claim, but the interviews got rescheduled so many times. I gave up after some time. I think I also got a job and life was going well. I almost gave up on that dream of going abroad. So, in 2014 I decided to try again and since then I have been consistent. But imagine just when I got selected end of 2016 then Trump came to power. All over a sudden we

were asked to wait that USA does not want refugees again. So let me wait and hopefully things worked out soon so I can finally go to America" (Kalman. July 2017).

While resettlement opportunities are not explicitly made by UNHCR, some of the participants were well aware of the possibilities. Like Kalman her knowledge of opportunities of resettlement perhaps through the testimony of a family member was critical to her decision in seeking resettlement. The participant also seemed to be well aware of her human and legal rights in achieving her "dream". The UNHCR offices in Westland Nairobi do have an office where refugees can present their claim for resettlement. A few get a chance to present their cases in person, but a majority write letters to the office detailing their reasons for wanting to be resettled. According to Bourbeau *"*securitization of an issue is a disturbance or the shock in the face of which a resilient strategy is deployed in order to challenge, counter, and debunk the issue at hand" (2015:383). Many of the participants were happy to talk about their achievement especially as regards being able to take care of themselves and their families. In many interviews, they dismissed the government for poking noses into their lives, yet they are self-reliant.

However, as outlined in the previous chapter, a majority of these refugee women only work in the informal sector which further entrenches their marginalised status. Working in the informal sector implies that the refugee women are trapped in a space where they are delinked from the mainstream labour market and by extension cannot access the "good/formal" jobs. According to one of the Nyumba Kumi leaders, this has led to some refugee women opting to engage in livelihood activities that do not require lots of investment or capital to start in case of business. There is a lot of uncertainty that surrounds their stay in the city and that as why many of the women invest sparingly.

> "Some have suffered loss after the other until they have lost hope. They no longer want to be in business anymore they would rather even get a man to marry them or in some extreme cases some cases some opt to secretively engage in prostitution" (Interview, 2017).

The religious repercussions that come with openly engaging in prostitution makes them do it clandestinely. Some participants also revealed that quite a number also aim to marry into seemingly financially stable refugee families or Kenyans where they are assured of citizenship

thereafter. Amal narrates how her sixteen-year-old daughter ran off with a Kenyan man to Mombasa.

> "My daughter left home and got married after we were locked out of the house for failing to pay rent. When I was forcefully returned to the camp during Usalama Watch I took long to come back. Even though my husband came ahead of me he never paid rent. So, the landlord put another padlock on my door. He (husband) then went off to live with another woman. I think my daughter got married because I could not provide for them" (Interview July 2017).

Notably, various factors including education level, quality of social networks, personal abilities determine the kind of livelihood options the refugee women would engage in. Some would leave the camp after a thorough research of the possible livelihood options they would go for should they decide to move to Eastleigh. For Sabrina she had been visiting the cousin from time to time and so she had an idea of what to expect in the event she moved to the city. Some were invited by friends, relatives, or close acquaintances for job openings. In some cases, some of the urban Somali refugee women narrated how their relatives in diaspora through their connections/networks in the city planned for them to come stay and work in Eastleigh.

However, a few just came because they were optimistic that they will get jobs in the city. It is important to note that urban Somali refugee women are not a homogeneous group. While a majority live from hand to mouth, the study findings revealed that some of them, even though a very small percentage, are indeed economically well off and are able to take care of themselves and their families comfortably. In an interview with some Kenyans there is a perception among the locals that Somali refugees are well off. One of the locals that was interviewed registered his displeasure with the presence of perceived economically well-endowed refugees in Eastleigh. She said:

> "These refugees are the ones making life expensive in Eastleigh. The landlords are now hiking rent here…we have houses where one pays up to 500 dollars a month (Ksh 50, 000) Such houses have been put up for the rich refugees… Even we Kenyans cannot afford such… said the participant" (Interview, 2017).

The perceived rich refugees run established businesses in the Eastleigh suburb. Such refugee women usually opt to run individual business and, in some cases, employ fellow refugees or Kenyans to provide human resource in their well-established businesses. The effects of the securitisation are felt across the various social economic categories of women even though not uniformly. When businesses are affected due to extra ordinary measures by the Kenyan government, the participants employ various performative strategies to recover depending on the loss incurred, for example, opting for employment. This happens in cases where an individual was employed before but because of the securitisation dynamics they lost their business or were forced to discontinue. For instance, Hibaaq reported that even though her camel milk kiosk was not destroyed during Usalama Watch, her failure to pay rent for the two months she stayed in the camp led to the landlord locking her kiosk and auctioning her merchandise. "When I came back, I could not go back to her business because I did not have capital" (Hibaaq, June 2017) That is how she ended up securing a cleaning job at a nearby private hospital. She is hopeful that one day she will go back to herself employment because she was making more money and it also gave her some flexibility to attend to her family well.

7.2 Conclusion

What then are the implications of these findings to the understanding of the migration-security nexus? In Chapter 2, I analysed the Securitisation framework and pointed to some of the gaps that are critical to this study some which the findings reaffirm or challenge. My findings reinforce the idea that securitisation neglects migrants as important actors in the process (Hansen, 2000; Žák, 2016; Balkian, 2016). Indeed, the typical top-down approach of securitisation, has resulted in its proponents focusing mainly on the state security. I note that such a perspective, at best, produces some interesting and suggestive conclusions, but just as a skeleton is not a living body, the resultant knowledge does not represent the living reality of migration-security nexus debate. Such an approach does not demonstrate in any depth the part played by migrants in the unfolding of securitisation process. With the thoughts and actions of migrants largely neglected, this results in theoretical dispositions that lack humanised specificity and treat migrants as objects while documenting their exploitation.

Therefore, basing on the finding of this study, I reiterate that there still exists a gap in the way in which the experiences of migrants operating within the state of exception can be incorporated in the existing securitisation framework. There is need for further research which centres the refugee lived experience within the securitisation theory to buttress our understanding of migrants who are directly impacted by restrictive migration policies. I note that, more focus has been on the expansion of the securitisation modalities to transcend the speech act debate. Scholars like Bigo (2002,2007, 2016, 2018, 2019), Balzacq (1995,1998, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2011) and Huysmans (2006) have extensively studied the various security practices and administrative structures adopted by the states to entrench securitisation. Bourbeau (2014) bolstered their efforts by examining the various ways in which security practices and exceptionalism security discourses compliment and reinforce each other. While this is notable, the limitation lies in the fact that, the very people who are targeted by these state practices and restrictive structures are relegated to the periphery of security studies as mere "sites" for securitisation as opposed to important actors in the process that have agency to challenge, resist or evade the restrictive regimes.

While acknowledging the role of migrants in the securitisation process, I also argue that gender matters when it comes to contesting securitisation regimes. Securitisation regimes rely heavily on the direct surveillance, evaluation and sorting of human bodies along the lines of gender, race, ethnicity, sexual identity, age, and health status (Adey, 2009; Amoore, 2006; Calavita, 2006; Salter, 2008; Wonders, 2006; Martin, 2010; Mountz, 2004; Rygiel, 2011;). The gender performativity such as -lying about age and marital statuses and use of hijab- was very evident in the way Somali refugees reacted to the securitisation regime. To sum up, "securitisation from below" allows for the theorization of security as a process and experience involving various actors. This perspective enables a consideration of security actors other than the state, as well as their practices. Conceptualizing security as resistance is particularly useful because it implies an actor approach to analyses of security as practice.

This finding of this chapter reinforces the hypothesis of this study which is the agency of refugee women. Indeed, the refugee women are not passive objects of the discriminatory refugee regime. The study findings reveal the multiple nuances of their refugee experiences, the power dynamics of the refugee regime, the intricate and subtle ways the refugee women resisted the discrimination and the 'new worlds they created in the host setting. Not only are they victims of securitisation,

but they are also wilful agents and silent witnesses of the unfolding discriminatory refugee regime. The growing literature on feminisation of migration needs to go further to interrogate refugee women's experiences "at their destination". There is need for empirical studies that explore their culture, family life, religion, and resistance in their newly formed worlds. This will guard against the romanticisation of refugee women's experiences and subaltern history of migrants.

7.3 Implications on Policy and Practice

The study findings reveal some critical perspectives for effective policy responses. Clearly, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, Kenya's refugee regime has evolved to become punitive and egalitarian by the day. The use of security agents in migration management ultimately criminalises the migration process which adversely affects potential as well as existing migrants. The punitive nature which manifests in form of arbitrary arrests, harassment by security agents and other forms of violence against refugee women has not in any way stopped their mobility to the city. As a matter of fact, one of the unintended findings of this study is that the number of refugee women leaving the camps to city is on the rise. Many of the interviewed were either single mothers, widows or those who left their husband in the camps and moved to the city on their own. Existing research shows that, securitised migration regimes do not deter mobility. Instead, they open avenues for irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling. This in turn exacerbates violence against female migrants (Salt and Pickering, 2013, Gerard, 2014) The study findings point to the fact that restrictive regimes disproportionately affect refugee women. The encampment policy has led to refugee women seeking clandestine modes of sneaking t the city. As the thesis attests, during the journey and even in the city, their rights and safety is violated. This is heightened by lack of mechanisms for recourse as they likely not to report the abuse due to the fear of apprehension.

The participants were well aware of the risks of using smugglers, the possibility of facing harassment form the policy as well as the backlash they get from their own community for failing to adhere to social, cultural, and religious norms. Despite all these, they still move to the city in large numbers. Their desire to move to the city is not prohibited by these challenges. Instead, the restrictive regime inhibits a dignified and safe migration of refugee women. I propose for refugee regimes that are cognisant of reality that more women are on the move hence tailor its policy development that offers protection to them. The 2007 Refugee Act is a good starting point that

needs amendment to sort the contradictions. For instance, while the Act postulates that refugees have a right to work, it still uphold the encampment practice. This works against refugee women and allows for exploitation and workplace abuse especially for those outside the camp. Notably, the gender aspect is missing in many of the refugee policies that have been adopted over the years.

Most importantly, the narratives of the refugee women reveals resentment towards the security agents. The refugee women believe that the police are the source of their problem. However, they seem to lack of an understanding of how the police get involved in migration management. The police are part of the larger system of government which is concerned with refugee management. The policies are debated and passed in parliament. Other government organs including the judiciary, legislature, and executive work together to produce the punitive measures. There is needs to create a platform that would allow deliberation between the refugee community and the security agents. The Nyumba Kumi Initiative is a good starting point except that it has been turned into 'terrorist hunting' site. As opposed to the initial goal of fostering relations between the police and the locals to ensure flow of intelligence information.

7.4 Chapter Summary

The chapter analyses the various individualised resistance strategies adopted by Somali refugee women in response to the acute dynamics of securitisation. Though more explicitly "subjective", the chapter looks at the experiences of the refugee women themselves, the forms in which their own major resistance are expressed. Of these, the most notable are disciplinary resistance, strategic silence, disguised compliance, self-definition and development, and politics of mystification, which often, either directly or implicitly, make symbolic statements about the restrictive regime.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THESIS CONCLUSION

8.0 Introduction

This thesis fundamentally examined the subjectification process of urban Somali refugee women, that is, how Kenya's securitisation regime dominates them as well as how they forge resistance to counter the domination. I therefore drew on the narratives of seventeen urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi, to examine the critical links between Kenya's securitised migration regime, the resultant vulnerabilities it produces, and urban Somali refugee women's everyday resistance to the surveillance and discrimination. In so doing, the study argues that the securitisation of the urban Somali refugee women is a multifaceted process involving not only multiple government agents at different levels, local citizens as crucial agents to the process but also the refugee women themselves through their resistance. In exploring the experiences of urban Somali refugee women, the study brings to light refugee women voices that have been relegated to the periphery of migration and security studies, hence, demonstrating how contemporary national and international migration policies impacts on their wellbeing and safety. Besides, a focus on the invisible dominance which is characteristic of securitisation regimes is important in exposing how international politics of migration governance may create insecurity for migrants.

This chapter presents the thesis findings, summary, and conclusion. The summary of findings are discussed as per the following research objectives:

1. To document and analyse the various policies, institutions and practices that constitute the securitisation regime in Kenya and how it results in the seclusion of urban Somali refugee women
2. To identify and analyse the perceived and or real gender-based threats/insecurities experienced by the Somali refugee women as result of the intersection of securitisation and patriarchy.
3. To identify and explore the various everyday resistance strategies that the urban Somali refugee women employ as a response to the extensive securitisation

8.1 Thesis Findings

The thesis findings are summarized below as per each research objective.

8.1.1 Objective One Summary

The first research objective was to document and analyse the emergence and evolution of Kenya's securitisation regime. The analyses of Kenya's securitisation regime since the early 1990s revealed that, securitisation of migration and asylum in Kenya predated the events of September 11. However, the asylum-terrorism nexus as an increasing institutionalized security continuum was cemented after the adoption of the Refugee Act in 2006 and its amendment in 2014 which officially adopted the encampment policy coupled with the proliferation of anti-terror agencies and counterterrorism measures thereafter. While the numerous terror attacks that were experienced between 2011-2015 led to an escalation and transformation in the securitisation of asylum, it is important to note that, securitization took place at various stages and degrees. In addition, the development of the securitisation regime from the pre to post September 11 period demonstrates a mixed record. On the one hand, many of the adopted measures such as encampment were restrictionist and reflected the government's apathy towards refugee affairs. On the other hand, in the post September 11 era, a link between asylum, security and terrorism was not explicitly made, and it appears plausible to conclude that securitization of migration stemmed mostly from the perceived threat that terrorism posed to Kenyan state and its people. The Kenyan government maintained that the terrorist attacks suffered over the years were orchestrated by Al shabaab. Hence, the analyses located the accentuation and criminalization of urban Somali refugee women in the localization of the global war on terror in which predominantly Muslim Somali refugees became the local and regional embodiment of contemporary global terrorism. Thus, driven by the rhetoric of "disease, dirt and cleanliness" the state infiltrated and employed a multiplicity of institutions, practices, and measures to manage their mobility especially those living in urban areas.

The motivation of Kenya's government in the entrenchment of the securitisation into refugee law, institutions and social structures still requires further research. However, to draw a parallel with the securitization of migration in South Africa, it can be understood as insecurity politics and not about livelihood opportunities. According to the research findings, the referent object of security

remains unclear. Notably, by adopting explicitly discriminatory policies and consistently criminalizing urban Somali refugees, the Kenyan government has capitalised on the "war on terror" discourse, as a political strategy, and through pragmatic acts ensured the success of its political agenda at the expense of urban Somali refugees. In line with Bigo's (2002) assertions, Kenya's securitisation regime has been used to affirm the state as the main actor in international security, sustain the war on terror discourse and scapegoat urban Somali refugees to mask some of the shortcomings of the Kenyan government.

8.1.2 Objective Two Summary

The second objective was to explore the lived experiences of urban Somali refugee women and the implication of securitisation on their individual as well as collective security. The focus was on Somali refugee women's real or imagined socio economic and physical threats/insecurities that arises from the intersection of the surveillance and patriarchy. The aim was to provide an understanding how the Somali refugee women interpret, (re)construct and relate with the securitisation regime. Even though research findings suggest that the Kenyan government and locals do not usually distinguish between refugee men and women when it comes to securitisation, the seclusion has gendered implications that were addressed in this study. The narratives of the urban Somali refugee women revealed multifaced experiences when travelling from the camp to the city as well as navigating and settling in the city amid securitisation. The difference in experiences was shaped by various factors such as age, marital statuses, social and economic class which resulted in a myriad of themes. The most prevalent themes identified were the kaleidoscope of violence experienced during their transit to and their stay in the city, the challenges they faced in accessing livelihoods and social services; and the traumatic experiences that impacted on their privacy, womanhood, family, and relationships. The ethnographic approach employed in the study, allowed the refugee women to voice their unique and context specific experiences that challenged the generalisation of a migrant woman as weak, hopeless and in need of help. The Somali refugee narratives also revealed the extent to which they are targets of securitisation, the reasons for seclusion and the impact of exclusionary securitisation regime on their livelihoods, health, safety, well-being, and dignity.

From their narratives it was evident that securitisation regimes are characterised by both structural and direct violence resulting in adverse gendered ramifications. The securitisation has made the

migratory journey as well as the stay in the city very expensive and risky. This is especially because urban Somali refugee women often have limited access to financial and social resources to continually negotiate with the restrictive regime. The resultant structural social and economic inequalities exacerbated by the restrictive regime can be likened to what Runyan and Peterson call "gendered divisions of violence" (2010:143-144). Hence, these inequalities coupled with the fear of forced evictions, has forced the refugee women into exploitative work or in some cases encourage them to stay in abusive relationships for survival.

Observably, Kenya's securitisation regime is premised on, refreshed by, and adaptively reproduced through violence as a prosaic practice in the everyday life of the Somali refugee women. The violence experienced by these refugee women is either structural or direct. Structural securitisation is meted through policies and practices that seek to keep the refugees out of the city. A good case in point is the encampment policy that demands that all refugees stay in designated camps. Getting out of the camp without proper authorization from the Kenyan government and UNHCR becomes punishable by law. There is also what I call everyday securitisation which is mainly propagated by the police and the locals. This manifests in form of arbitrary arrests by the police as well as the socially engrained exclusionary discourse that links them to terrorism.

Besides, the violence that urban Somali refugee women face amid securitisation neither starts with the implementation of the extra ordinary measures. but rather, it should be seen as a continuum. For many of the participants there is not really a clear demarcation between "securitisation moments" and "peaceful moments". Their experience of violence is not restricted to situations of execution of extraordinary measures like Usalama watch. From the interviews, it emerged that the extent of violence may be intense and appears "visible" during the execution of extra ordinary measures, but it mirrors daily experience of violence against the urban Somali refugee women. To add, they are not only confronted with violence during heightened securitisation moments but also during their journey to the city and in the camps suggesting a continuum of violence. The continuum of violence makes it hard to distinguish between moments of heightened securitisation and peaceful ones, the private and public as it runs through social, cultural, and economic relations.

Moreover, mobility of urban Somali refugee women from the camp to the city is "in and of itself shifts and restructures traditional gender divisions of labour, the nature of the household and of the community. Shifting places can lead to shifting identities and new, complex forms of gender, race/ethnicity and communal belongings, forms of identity and repertoires of struggle" (Ronaldo, 2008:1234). More to the point, the threats the urban Somali refugee women are exposed to are not new especially in a patriarchal system from in which they live. securitisation only exacerbates the situation as it provides more avenues for domination and violence against refugee women by patriarchs, gangs, Kenyan police, the locals and even amongst the refugees themselves, while closing the avenues to report the same. From the research findings, discrimination resulting from securitisation and gender bias overlap. The two are mutually intensifying and inextricable. The threats/insecurities emanate from the fact that Somali refugee women have to deal with both an already oppressive patriarchal society and securitisation which further aggravates the situation. From the Somali refugee narratives, insecurity is experienced and expressed in practice, roles, and relationships. Hence, Kenya's securitisation regimes magnifies discrimination, oppression, and violence against urban Somali refugee women.

Attention was also paid to the changes in gender relations that occurred as the government enforces the securitised refugee regime. The intensive fluid internal mobility that the Somali refugee women resort to as a coping strategy, ultimately provides an opportunity for reconstructing gender relations. From the narratives, a Somali refugee woman remains the primary caregiver to her household. This is especially so in cases, where the women moved to the city ahead of their husbands in order to get a better life for their families. In such cases. then the woman becomes the sole breadwinner. Or even in instances where the men are suspected to be part of terror groups and taken in by the police, the woman then assumes the responsibility of being the head of the family. Thus, securing a livelihood becomes their main responsibility.

8.1.3 Objective Three Summary

The third objective of the study sought to explore the everyday strategies that urban Somali refugee women employ to counter the acute dynamics of securitisation. The consideration of gender in securitisation contexts is very important, given the reality that refugee men and women face varying levels of exposure to the restrictive regime. Hence, the way in which urban Somali refugee

women perceive, understand, internalize, and accept securitisation informs how they can become exposed and respond to the discrimination. My findings have drawn our attention to another dimension of securitisation where, "hidden transcripts" as opposed to the "public transcript" is the way Somali refugee women act and talk about the oppressive regime behind its back (Scott, 1990). The narratives debunk the oversaturated portrayal of the refugee woman as a figure deserving pity and desperately needing to be rescued. While there is no denying the unique form of violence refugee women face, similarly, the subtle forms of resistance the refugee women embrace amid securitisation cannot be negated. In other words, they change their strategies in response to the dynamics of the restrictive regime, looking for methods of circumvention and employ gender to renegotiate the regime.

Two important observations emerge from the findings. First of all, the forms of everyday resistance that the refugee women adopt are shaped by both personal circumstances and the "war on terror" context. This kind of resistance renders the created internal border porous, and the states control over its territory tenuous. Their resistance to securitisation is in itself, organized in ways that challenge and go beyond nation-states. In addition, the individualised acts of resistance are intended to mitigate or negotiate the implications of the securitisation regime or to advance their claims on the said regime. Observably, the securitisation does not translate in homogenous form of exclusion. Instead, the process is dynamic with differential actions, shaped by a particular context involving multiple actors among them local Kenyans, Kenyan government, UNHCR and fellow refugees. Thus, the exclusionary nature of the regime is understood, internalised, and renegotiated on a case-by-case level. I also observed that since the urban Somali refugee women are not a homogeneous group, their reaction to the regime and their awareness of it varies. While some refugee women openly seek to resist the exclusionary regime, others are content with their subordinate position in society, yet subvert it unknowingly. As such, the Somali refugee women are able to resist and respond to the restrictive regime in different ways which oscillate between disguised obedience to subversion.

The second observation is that the form of resistance adopted by these refugee women is not necessarily directed at the immediate source of appropriation. In as much as, the objective of the refugee women is typically to meet pressing needs such as safety dignity and wellbeing, they lack

galvanising capacity which is necessary to push and effect change. This is because the refugee women are operating in the state of exception where they have lost claims again the state. Besides, by virtue of their invisibility emanating from their de facto illegal status, the inferior position in the patriarchal society and the individualised nature of the strategies, makes their resistance insignificant to social change. From the findings, it was evident that their safety lies in their anonymity. The Kenyan government, which is the main securitising actor, has remained silent and continues to deny the insubordination of the Somali refugee women. This is understandable because, admitting to such, would mean accepting that the exclusionary measures are unpopular which is detrimental to state security and sovereignty. Thus, the nature of the resistance acts themselves, coupled with the inexplicitly of the Kenyan government, have connived to create a kind of complicitous silence that relegates Somali refugee women's resistance from historical record.

8.2 Thesis Summary

The theoretical and empirical contribution of this study was about determining the experiences of refugee women in a securitisation context. To this end, a qualitative ethnographic study was conducted among Somali refugee women in Nairobi. The study accordingly sought to explore, the implications of securitisation on the lives of urban Somali refugee women and their response to the restrictive regime. The experiences of Somali refugee women revealed that, when a gender perspective is employed in the study of security, the state's pursuit of security is predominantly constitutive of violence. Besides, for a state to secure its borders and manage irregular migration, it plays into hierarchal dichotomies of desirable versus undesirable refugee.

A gendered empirical account that demonstrates how these dichotomies play out was provided in this study. While a number of studies on refugee women experiences have pointed to the problematic stance of generalising experiences of refugee women, this study revealed some shared themes in the way Somali refugee women interact, internalise, and respond to securitisation. It has illustrated how the securitization of migration exacerbates gender inequalities, by making refugee women's safety and well-being, dependent on being compliant with the disciplinary demands of the securitisation regime. The framing of Somali refugees as the most undesirable has led to dilution of their refugee protection. The experiences of urban Somali refugee women exposes how

living as a de facto illegal migrant in urban areas is especially detrimental to refugee women. This is because it keeps them in a constant state of fear of being deported to the camp or back to Somalia, arbitrary arrests, gender-based violence, loss of womanhood/privacy among many other threats.

In sum, further research of humanised accounts of securitisation must be undertaken in order to shed light on the voices of refugee women that are little heard in the context of securitisation. As Nordstrom has noted, "what we hear and do not hear about the world we occupy is no accident […] Shaping knowledge, and a lack of knowledge, constitutes a basic element of power. Silences, spheres where knowledge has been kept from public awareness— are undeniably political" (1998:81). Hence, Kenya's securitisation regime should not be blindly replicated in other contexts without proper interrogation on how it impacts the lives of migrants. Instead, I suggest further research into refugee women's experiences amid securitisation to produce a more rigours understanding of how refugee women can be both active and wilful agents as well as victims of securitisation.

8.4 Contribution to Knowledge

States are often considered the main actors or in some instances the only actors in International Relations. Thus, a problematisation of securitisation away from the state centric nature of power remains tenuous. However, I argue that urban Somali refugee women constitute important actors in international security. The study illustrates an experiential supposition of securitisation taken from the perspective of urban Somali refugee women in Nairobi. The aim is to offer a means of moving beyond state-based and state-centric conceptualisation of securitisation by looking at migrants as agents and actors in the securitisation process. This decentred approach provides an avenue to challenge the "elite high politics" typical in IR, thus, focusing on how migrants as global subjects experience securitisation in their everyday life. It is important to note that, securitisation is not the only prism through which one could analyse urban Somali refugee women's experiences, rather, I explore refugee women as important actors in international security. The study envisions securitisation as a performance which is acted out by people operating in a space of exception. Therefore, securitisation is defined in this study as process of "doing" security by the state within a specific context. By exploring the everyday resistance strategies of the Somali refugee women, the study demonstrates their agency as securitisation actors. Hence, while the main contribution of

the study is to engage migration and security studies, it also redefines the actors of IR. As has been demonstrated in this thesis, securitisation is continually accompanied with subjective reactions/response from the urban Somali refuge women. The refugee women are far from passive objects of clay to be "moulded" at will. Hence, the evolution of Kenya's securitisation regime is a continual process of interplay between governmental predetermination of the appropriate behaviour for the refugee women, which the refugee women themselves try to conform to, resist or reshape to their advantage.

To conclude, I suggest a "securitisation from below" perspective of securitisation whereby the process of securitisation is deconstructed and renegotiated by the targeted individuals. Through the "securitisation from below" approach, we can clearly see ways through which migrants are uncoupled from security provision apparatus and placed within spaces of exception. A decentred theorisation of securitisation is critical in probing the prevailing theoretical underpinnings as regards the interlinkage between sovereignty, territory, and migration governance. I, therefore, recommend a "securitisation from below" model which provides an avenue to explain, both the various acts of resistance to securitisation, strategies identified in this research and through what means they become important in reshaping the power dynamics through which the regime unfolds. This happens in the following ways: firstly, such a model allows for the inclusion of non-state actors that are important in the development and execution of extraordinary measures. Secondly, it allows for the restrictive policies against migrants to be understood as authoritarian application of rules as opposed to "going against the rules". This implies that the extraordinary measures adopted by the Kenyan government against the Somali refugees are in fact "an application of the law rather than a deferral of the law". Thirdly, a "securitisation from below" model reconceptualises political belonging to the state as a multifaceted and highly dynamic construct shaped by geographical, legal, social, and economic context which moves beyond the *us* versus *them* dichotomy. Such a perspective then allows for inclusion of agents and actors that would ordinarily be placed in spaces of exception. Fourthly, such a model places the people targeted by the securitisation regime at the centre of the theory. Hence, instead of focusing on the state as the main securitisation actor and how it excludes certain individuals from its territories and security architecture, the model shifts our attention to migrants who are on the receiving end of the securitisation process. In addition, incorporating gender and agency into the theorisation of

securitisation provides a rigorous representation of the dynamics that shape the process. Nonetheless, the intention of this proposition is not to suggest that all other conceptualisations of securitisation should be discarded; rather, the "securitisation from below" model should be devised in a manner that addresses the gaps in current versions of SF as well as contribute to a better understanding of the migration-security nexus.

8.5 Recommendations for policy and Practice

Kenya remains a desired destination for many migrants and refugees in the East Africa. One notable trend is the increasing number of female migrants. As this study has shown, women migrants continue to susceptibilities during migrant journeys and stay at their destination. Their experience differs immensely from male migrants and other members of the society. The refugee women are faced with two-fold difficulties of the refugee status as well as the subordinate status in the patriarchal society. There is need for the Kenyan government to adopt gender sensitive migratory policies. Gender neutral polices that are currently in place are blind the unique experiences and vulnerabilities that refugee women encounter. Coupled with the punitive nature of the refugee regime, refugee women's vulnerabilities are exacerbated. The refugee women have resorted to smugglers as a means to getting from the camps to city. Punitive measures that are meant to deter irregular migrants ultimately affects the genuine migrants especially women who are fleeing violence in such of refuge.

The politicisation of migration has resulted in the apathy towards Somali refugees. Many Kenyans believe Somali refugees provide links for terrorists in the country. This kind of framing makes it hard for progressive and gender sensitive refugee laws and practices. The political elite need to be sensitised on the need to adopt refugee frameworks that enhance refugee rights and safety. This will in fact cement Kenya's position as an economic powerhouse and peace haven in the Horn of Africa. Global scholarship migration documents its various benefits. The Kenyan government should be keen to tap into these potential benefits. The challenge is the volatile political climate and rampant insecurity in the Horn of Africa. This is a reality that governments have to navigate. Given the transnational nature of migration, any progressive migration polices will have a regional impact. Guided by empirical data and political will, the Kenyan government can adopt migration regulations that balance the pros and cons of migration. All in all, the governments security

concerns should be kept into consideration. In addition, a gender perspective should be adopted in the refugee policy formulation and execution to take care of refugee women rights and safety. Last but not least, there are many international frameworks such the AU's Migration Framework that the Kenyan government can borrow a leaf from. This will be critical in gender mainstreaming refugee laws and policies in the country.

REFERENCES

Abebe, T. (2019) "Securitisation of Migration in Africa: The Case of Agadez in Niger", in *ISS Africa Reports*, No. 20 (December 2019), https://issafrica.org/research/ africa-report/securitisation-of-migration-in-africa-the-case-of-agadez-in-niger

Abdullahi, A. (1997) *Colonial Policies and The Failure of Somali Secessionism in The Northern Frontier District of Kenya Colony*, C.1890-1968 Unpublished Thesis, Rhodes University

Abuya, E.O. (2007) "Past Reflections, Future Insights: African Asylum Law and Policy in Historical Perspective@, 19 *International Journal of Refugee Law* 51 (2007).

Adey, P. (2009). "Facing airport security: Affect, biopolitics, and the pre-emptive securitisation of the mobile body." *Environment and Planning* - Part D 27 (2):274-296.

Adler, E and V Pouliot, (2011) "International Practices", *International Theory* 3, no. 1: 16.

Africa Watch (1989) 'Forcible Return of Somali Refugees; Government Repression of Kenyan Somalis', November 17, 1989: *Africa Watch*

Agamben, G. (1998) *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Agutu, M. (2003, June 6) "Agency to underwrite terrorism risks". *Daily Nation.* Retrieved March 12, 2020, from http://www.nationaudio.com

Aguilera, M.B. and D. Massey. (2003). "Social capital and the wages of Mexican migrants: New hypotheses and tests," *Social Forces* 82(2): 6

Ahmed, S. (2004). Affective economies. *Social Text 79*, *22*(2), 117–139.

Alusa, D. (*2019*) *Kenya's changing counterterrorism policy: From the unsecuritization to the securitization of terrorism*. PhD thesis, Murdoch University

Alase, A. O. (2016). *The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on small-sized publicly traded companies and their communities* Unpublished doctoral dissertation, North Eastern University.

Al-Sharmani, M. (2007). Contemporary Migration and Transnational Families: The Case of Somali Diaspora (s). The Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Program, the American University in Cairopdf (t. http://www.aucegypt .edu/ ResearchatAUC/ rc/ cmrs/ Documents/ Mulkial Shamani. Pdf (accessed 12.02. 2020)

Alexander, J. C. (2006) "Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy." Pp. 29-90 in Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual,

edited by J. C. Alexander, B. Giesen, and J. L. Mast. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Al-Jazeera (27 August 2019) 'Tanzania to send back all Burundian refugees from October', Available at www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/tanzania-send-burundian-refugees-october-190827180318193.html Accessed on 13 March 2021

Ali, A. (2016) "Citizens under suspicion: Responsive research with community under surveillance". *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, *47*(1), 78–95.

Amoore, L. (2006) "Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror", *Political Geography* 25, 3: 336-351

Anani, G (2013) "Dimensions of Gender-Based Violence Against Syrian Refugees in Lebanon" (2013) 44 *Forced Migration Review* 75-78 at 75.

Anderson, B. and and Ruhs, M. (2010) 'Researching Illegality and Labour Migration', *Population, Space and Place*, 16/3: 175–79.

Anderson, D.M.(2014) 'Remembering Wagalla: State Violence in northern Kenya, 1962–1991', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 4: 658–76.

Aradau, et al (2010) "Acts of European Citizenship: A Political Sociology of Mobility" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, 4: 945-965

Arev, T. (2018). "Between clothes and the body: national and gender identity among Eritrean women refugees". *Journal of Refugee Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fey028

Armstrong, S. (2002). *Veiled Threat: The Power of the Women of Afghanistan.* New York: Four Walls, Eight Windows.

Atta–Asamoah, A. (2015) "The Nature and Drivers of Insecurity in Kenya". *East Africa Repo*rt, 2. Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

Babugura, F. K. (2007).The Impact of Forced Migration in the Northern Uganda. UNISA: PhD Dissertation

Bailey, S. (2004). *Is Legal Status Enough? Legal status and livelihood obstacles for urban refugees."* The Fletcher School, MALD Thesis.

Baker, L. (2006). Observation: A complex research method. *Library Trends, 55*(1), 171-189. doi: 10.1353/lib.2006.0045

Balkian, S. (2016) "Money Is Your Government': Refugees, Mobility, and Unstable Documents in Kenya's Operation Usalama Watch." *African Studies Review* 59, No. 2 (2016): 87–111. doi:10. 1017/asr.2016.36.

Balzacq, T. (2005) "The three faces of securitisation: Political agency, audience and context" *European Journal of International Relations,* 11(2): 171-201

_____(2007) "The policy tools of securitization: Information, exchange, EU foreign and internal policies", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, 1: 75–100.

_____(2011). *Securitization Theory. How security problems emerge and dissolve*. London, Routledge.

_____(2005) The Three faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context, European Journal of International Relations, 11 (2): 171-201

_____(2010) "Constructivism and securitisation Studies", in Dunn Cavelty, Myriam and Victor Mauer (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies. London and New York:Routledge: 56-72.

Banks, A.J. (2014) *Anger and racial politics: The emotional foundation of racial attitudes in America.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Barkan, J, D. and Jennifer G. C. (2001) 'U.S. Policy Towards Kenya in the Wake of September 11, Can Antiterrorist Imperatives be Reconciled with Enduring U.S. Foreign Policy Goals?' *Africa Centre for Strategic Studies*
Available at www.csis.org/Africa/ANotes/ANotes0112.pdf. Accessed October 2020.

Basaran, T. (2008) "Security, law, borders: spaces of exclusion", *International Political Sociology*, 2(4): 339–354.

Basch, L. (2004) "Human Security, Globalization, and Feminist Visions", *Peace Review* 16(1): 5–12.

Bartelink et al (2017). "Working effectively with faith leaders to challenge harmful traditional practices"; 2017.

BBC Africa Eye (10 September 2018) 'Hunting Down Gangsters with Kenya's Ahmed Rashid - Full Documentary' Available At Https://Youtu.Be/Pojynsaacnq

BBC Monitoring Newsfile, "Kenyan police say 'key' suspect in Mombasa terror attacks has Yemeni links", 27 December 2002.

BBC News (11 April 2015) 'Kenya tells UN to close Dadaab camp after Garissa attack', BBC

Beauchamp, T. (2014). "Surveillance", *Transgender Studies Quarterly* 1(1–2): 208–10.

Bice. M (2003) "Governance and Resistance in World Politics: Introduction." *Review of International Studies*, No. 29 (2003): 3–28.

Bigo, D. (2002) Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives* 27: 63–92.

_____(2007). "Detention of foreigners, states of exception, and the social practices of control of the banopticon." *In Borderscapes: Hidden geographies and politics at territory's edge,* edited by Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr, 3-33. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

_____(2012). Analysing Transnational Professionals of (In)security in Europe. In R. Adler-Nissen (Ed.), *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR* (pp. 114–136). London: Routledge.

_____(2016a). Digital Surveillance and Everyday Democracy. In L. Weber, E. Fish- wick and M. Marmo (Eds.), *The Routledge International Handbook of Criminology and Human Rights* (pp. 496–510). London: Routledge.

_____(2016b). Sociology of Transnational Guilds. *International Political Sociology, 10*(4), 398–416.

_____(2018). Dramaturgy of Suspicion and the Emergence of a Transnational Guild of Extraction of Information by Torture at a Distance. In E. Guild, D. Bigo and M. Gibney (Eds.), *Extraordinary Rendition: Addressing the Challenges of Accountability* (pp. 30–52). London: Routledge.

_____(2019a). Shared Secrecy in a Digital Age and a Transnational World. *Intelligence and National Security*, *34*(3), 379–394.

_____(2019b). Beyond National Security, the Emergence of a Digital Reason of State(s) Led by Transnational Guilds of Sensitive Information: The Case of the Five Eyes Plus Network. In B. Wagner, M. C. Kettemann and K. Vieth (Eds.), *Research Handbook on Human Rights and Digital Technology* (pp. 33–52). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Bigo, D. and Tsoukala, A. (Eds.) (2008) *Terror, insecurity and liberty: illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11* (London: Routledge).

Bhabha, H. K. (1994): *The Location of Culture*. Routledge.

Blotevogel, et al (1993) "From Itinerant Worker to Immigrant? The Geography of Guestworkers in Germany". In King, R. (ed.), pp. 83–100.

Boler, M. (2006) "The Daily Show, Crossfire, and the Will to Truth", Scan Journal of Media Arts Culture 3(1) http://scan.net.au/scan/journal/display.php?journal_id=73

Borich, G. D. (2016). *Observation skills for effective teaching: Research-based practice*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Bourbeau, P. (2015) "Migration, Resilience and Security: Responses to New Inflows of Asylum Seekers and Migrants", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41:12, 1958-1977, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2015.1047331

Bourbeau, P. (2014). "Moving Forward Together: Logics of the securitization process." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43(1): 187-206.

Bourbeau,P. and C.Ryan (2018) "Resilience, resistance, infrapolitics and enmeshment". *European Journal of International Relations*, 24(1), 221– 239.

Botha, A (2013) "Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalization and Extremism," *Institute of Security Studies* Paper 245

_____ (2014a) "Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization among Individuals who Joined Al-Shabaab in Kenya." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37, no. 11 (August): 895-919.

_____ (2014b) "Radicalisation in Kenya. Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council." *Institute for Security Studies Papers* 2014(265): 28-28.

_____ (2015) "Radicalization to Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: A Political Socialization Perspective." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 15.

_____ (2017) *Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: Radicalization from a Political Socialization Perspective.* London: Lexington Books.

Boswell, C. (2007) "Migration control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the absence of securitization." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 45.3 (2007): 589-610.

Boyd, M. and E. Grieco, (2003), *Women and Migration: Incorporating Gender into International Migration Theory* http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=106

Buzan, et al. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lon- don, Boulder: Lynne Rieder Publishers.

Broeders, D., and Engbersen, G. (2007). "The fight against illegal migration: Identification policies and immigrants' counterstrategies." *American Behavioral Scientist*, *50*, 1592–1609.

Branch, D. (2011) *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011* Yale University Press.

Bryman, A. (2012) "Social research methods" *Oxford university press*, (2012).

Brassett, J.C and Vaughan-Williams, N (2013) "An agenda for resilience research in politics and international relations". *Politics* 33(4): 221–228

Brandt et al (2019). Risk of Psychosis Among Refugees: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis. *JAMA Psychiatry.* 2019;76(11):1133–1140.

Breidlid, T. (2021) "Countering or contributing to radicalisation and violent extremism in Kenya? A critical case study, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 14:2, 225 246, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2021.1902613

Bwakali, D. J. (2001). "Gender inequality Africa". *Contemporary Review*, 279(1630), 270–272.

Calavita, K. (2006) "Gender, migration, and law: Crossing borders and bridging disciplines." *The International Migration Review* 40 (1):104-132.

Campbell, E.H. (2005) *Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and migrant trade networks in Nairobi,* Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration Global Migration Perspectives No. 47.

Campbell, E. H. (2006) ''Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities of Integration''. *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 396-413.

Campbell, E., Crisp, J., and Kiragu, E. (2011). 'Navigating Nairobi: A Review of the Implementation of UNHCR's Urban Refugee Policy in Kenya's Capital City', *Policy Development and Evaluation Service* (PDES), UNHCR.

Carling, J. and Sagmo, T. H. (2015, January 13-15). *Rumour and migration*. Paper presented at The Changing Face of Global Mobility, International Migration Institute, Oxford, UK.

Carrier, N, and Lochery, E. (2013) "Missing States? Somali Trade Networks and the Eastleigh Transformation." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7, no. 2: 334–352. doi:10.1080/ 17531055.2013.776275.

Carrier, N. C. M., and Mathews, G. (2020). Places of Otherness: Comparing Eastleigh, Nairobi and Xiaobei, Guangzhou as Sites of South-South Migration. Migration and Society, 3 (2020), 98-122. https://doi.org/10.3167/arms.2020.030109

Carrier, N. (2016) *Little Mogadishu: Eastleigh, Nairobi's global Somali hub*. London: Hurst and Co. Publishers

_____(2019). "Mobile People, Phones and Photography: Somali Visual Practices in Nairobi's Eastleigh Estate." *Africa 89* (2): 225–245

Castagno, A. A. (1964) “The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: Implications for the Future.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 2, no. 2: 165–188.

Cawo M.A. (2014) “Threatened Identities and Gendered Opportunities: Somali Migration to America.” *Signs*, vol. 39, no. 2, *The University of Chicago Press*, 2014, pp. 459–83,

Channel 4 News (14 August 2018) ‘Sex Tourists’ Duping Somali Virgins Into Marriage’ Available At https://youtu.be/vBIXQ4lFEDw

Chavez, L. R. (1997). *Shadowed Lives: Undocumented Immigrants in American Society*. New York: Harcourt College Publishers.

_____(2007). The condition of illegality. International Migration, 45(3), 192–196

Ceyhan, A. and Tsoukala, A. (2002) “The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies”, *Alternatives* 27, Supplement S. (2002): 21–39

Collyer, M. (2006). Migrants, migration and the security paradigm: Constraints and opportunities. *Mediterranean Politics, 11*(2), 255–270

Copinger, T.R. (2003) “Is Osama Bin Laden's ‘Fatwa urging Jihad against Americans’ dated 23 February 1998 justified by Islamic law?”, *Defence Studies*, 3:1, 44-65, DOI: 10.1080/14702430308405051

Cumbers, et al. (2010) “Class, Agency and Resistance in the Old Industrial City”, Antipode, 42/1: 46–73.

Crawley, H. (2001). *Refugees and Gender Law and Process*. Bristol: Jordan Publishing Limited

Creswell, J. (2012). Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative research (4thed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.

_____(2013). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, *CA: Sage*

Creswell, J. W. and D. L. Miller (2000). "Determining validity in qualitative inquiry." Theory into practice 39(3): 124-130

Crisp, J. (2000). “Africa’s Refugees: Patterns, Problems and Policy Challenges”. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* Vol. 18, No, 2, pp. 157-178

Crisp, J. (2018) “Mobilizing Political Will for Refugee Protection and Solutions: A Framework for Analysis and Action. World Refugee Council Research” Paper No. 1, June, *World Refugee Council and Centre for International Governance Innovation*, Waterloo.

Crush et al. (2017) Harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development in Southern Africa, Southern African Migration Programme, International Migration Research Centre, *Balsillie School of International Affairs*, 2017

Dahir, L.A and Masinde, J. (6 August 2017) Nairobi is becoming a ghost town as a tense and tightly-contested election nears, Quartz Africa

Daily Maverick. (2012) The war against al-Shabaab: Round two begins now. *Daily Maverick,* 1 October. Available from: <http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-10-01-the-war-against-al-Shabaab-round-two- begins-now> [Accessed 2 October 2020]

Davis, K. (2008). Intersectionality as buzzword: a sociology of science perspective on what makes a feminist theory successful. *Feminist Theory, 9*(1), 67-85.

Davis D (2012) "Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence". Final Report. Cambridge, MA: *United States Agency for International Development and MIT Center for International Studies*

Davis, L (2016) "ISIL, the Syrian Conflict, Sexual Violence, and the Way Forward: Syrian Women's Inclusion in the Peace Processes" (2016) 48(4) *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 1157-1190 at 1173

Delamont, S (2011) *Ethnography and Participant Observation* SAGE Publications Ltd: London DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781848608191

Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. (2003). Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Strategies of qualitative inquiry* (2nd Ed.) (pp. 1 - 45). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

DeMunck, V. C. and Sobo, E.J. (Eds) (1998). *Using methods in the field: a practical introduction and casebook.* Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Desai, A. (2010). "Between the push and the shove: everyday struggles and the re-marking of Durban". *African Studies*, 69(3), 423–437

Dickerson, C. and M. Jordan (2020) "New Immigration Limits Cause Anxiety in Families and Business", *New York Times*, 21 April 2020.

Dicicco-Bloom, B. and Crabtree, B.F. (2006) "The Qualitative Research Interview". *Medical Education*, 40, 314-321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2929.2006.02418.x

DiFonzo, N. and Bordia, P. (2007). *Rumour psychology: Social and organizational approaches*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association

Dover, P. (2005) “Gender and Embodiment: Expectations of Manliness in a Zambian Village”. Ouzgane, Lahoucine and Robert Morrell (eds.) *African Masculinities Men in Africa from the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 175-187.

Du Bois W.E.B. (1903), *The Souls of Black Folk,* Chicago, A.C. McClurg and Company.

Drysdale, J. (1964) *The Somali Dispute.* London

Dyson, K. (Ed.) (2002). *The European State and the Euro*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Edmund B and Lough, R (September 21, 2013) Islamists claim gun attack on Nairobi mall, at least 39 dead, *Reuters*

Ellermann A, (2008) *States against Migrants: Deportation in Germany and the United States* New York: Cambridge University Press

Emirbayer, M and Mische, A. (1998) ‘What is agency?’ *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 103, No. 4 pp. 962-1023

Engbersen, G. (2001). The unanticipated consequences of panopticon Europe. Residence strategies of illegal immigrants. In V. Guiraudon and C. Joppke (Eds.), *Controlling a new migration world* (pp. 222-246). London: Routledge.

Engbersen, G. and Broeders, D. (2009). The state versus the alien: Immigration control and strategies of irregular immigrants. *West European Politics*, *32*, 867–885.

England, A. (13 June 2004) FBI’s most wanted leader of al-Qaeda cell indicted for US embassy bombing escaped, Associated Press.

Etten T. (2014) “Questions of Gender and International Relations” Available at https://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/05/questions-of-gender-and-international-relations/ Accessed on 20 November 2021

Evans B and J. Reid (2013) “Dangerously exposed: The life and death of the resilient subject. Resilience: International Policies”, *Practices and Discourses* 1(2): 83–98.

Eveliina. L (2015) “Refugees’ Conceptualizations of ‘Protection Space’: Geographical Scales of Urban Protection and Host–Refugee Relations.” *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 2, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 45–77, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48503249.

Eschle, C and Maiguashca, B. (2007) Rethinking globalized resistance: Feminist activism and critical theorizing in international relations. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 9(2): 284–301.

Farmer, A (2006) “Refugee Responses, State-Behavior, and Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Case Study of Sexual Violence in Guinea’s Refugee Camps” (2006) 9 *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal* 44-84 at 45. 19

Ferreira, S. (2018) “From Narratives To Perceptions in The Securitisation Of The Migratory Crisis In Europe”, *E-International Relations*

Fielding, A. (1993) “Migrations, institutions and politics: the evolution of European migration policies”. In *Mass Migrations in Europe: The Legacy and the Future,* London, Belhaven Press,(40-62) (1993).

Fielding, N. and Thomas, H. (2002) “Qualitative Interviewing”. Nigel Gilbert (ed.), *Researching Social Life* Second Edition. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 123- 143.

Figueroa, A. (2016). Citizenship, beneficence, and informed consent: The ethics of working in mixed-status families. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 29*(10), 66–85.

_____(2017). Speech or silence: Undocumented students’ decisions to reveal their citizenship status in school. *American Educational Research Journal, 54*(3), 485–523.

_____(2020) Embodying the breach: (In)securitization and ethnographic engagement in the US. *J Sociolinguistics*. 2020;24:96–102.

Flanagin, J (April 2, 2015) ‘Why Terrorists target Schools and Universities’, *Quartz*.

Foucault, M. (1993) “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth”, *Political Theory* 21(2): 198-227.

Forbes, M. S. (2004). *Refugee Women*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Foulds, K (2016) “The Somali Question” in D. Bentrovato, K. Korostelina and M. Schulze (eds) History Can Bite: *History Education in Divided and Postwar Societies* (Gottinge: V&R Unipress, 2016)

Freeman, L. (2019) “They’re all terrorists: the securitisation of asylum in Kenya” in A. Tschudin, C. Moffat, Buchanan-Clarke, S., et al. (eds) *Extremisms in Africa.* Vol. 2. Gauteng, South Africa: Tracey McDonald Publishers, pp. 92–123

Freedman, J. (2012). “Analysing the Gendered Insecurities of Migration: A Case Study of Female Sub-Saharan African Migrants in Morocco.” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 14:1, 36–55

Freedman, J. (2015). *Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate*. Hampshire: Palgrave Mcmillan.

Freedman, J (2016) “Sexual and gender-based violence against refugee women: a hidden aspect of the refugee "crisis”, *Reproductive Health Matters*, 24:47, 18-26,

Gad, U.P. and Lund, P. (2011). “Concepts of Politics in securitization Studies.” *Security Dialogue* 42(4-5):315-328

Gal, S. (1989) “Language and Political Economy”. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18, 345–367

Gerard, A. and Pickering, S. (2013) “Gender, Securitization and Transit: Refugee Women and the Journey to the EU”, *Journal of Refugee Studies* 27 (3). 338–359.

_____(2014). Crimmigration: Criminal justice, refugee protection and the securitisation of migration. In B. A. Arrigo, and H. Bersot (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of international crime and justice studies* (pp. 587-611). Routledge

Gibbs, G. R. (2007) *Analyzing Qualitative Data* (Book 6 of The SAGE Qualitative Research Kit).London: Sage.

Gill, N. (2010) “New state-theoretic approaches to asylum and refugee geographies”, *Progress in Human Geography* 34 (5):626-645. doi: 10.1177/0309132509354629.

Ghib, LS (2018) “Understanding the feminisation of migration, international migration, and public policy”. *PhD Thesis*, Bocconi University, Italy.

Gladen, J. (2001).The Coping Strategies of Sudanese Refugee Women in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya. Michigan University, PhD Thesis

Goldsmith, P. (1997) ‘The Somali Impact on Kenya 1990-1993: The View From Outside the Camps’, in H.M.Adam and R.Ford (eds.) *Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century*, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press: 461-483.

Goldstein, J.S. (2001).War and Gender. London: Cambridge University Press

Goodwin-Gill G, (2008), “Forced Migration: Refugees, Rights and Security', in Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security”, *Hart Publishing*, Oxford, pp. 1 - 18.

Gordon, T. J. (2018, January 7). Pussy hats: The confederate flag for white feminists. *Medium*. Retrieved from https://medium.com/@shewritestolive/pussy- hats-the-confederate-flag-for-white-feminists-7a213 52b2f5e

Goredema and A. Botha (2004) “African commitments to combating crime and terrorism: A review of eight NEPAD countries” (2004) *African Human Security Initiative*, Paper 3.

Government of Kenya (2003), “Suppression of Terrorism Bill”, *Kenya Gazette*: Vol. 38.

Gqola, P. D. (2001). Ufanele uqavile: Blackwomen, feminisms and postcoloniality in Africa. *Agenda*, *16*(50), 11–22.

Greenstock, J. (2002) *Report of the Republic of Kenya Submitted to the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution* 13739 (2001).Article online. Available from www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/k.htm

Griffin, D. (1994) *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction*. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.

Grieco, J M., G. J. Ikenberry, and M. Mastanduno. (2015). *Introduction to international relations: enduring questions and contemporary perspectives*.

Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (1991), UNHCR.

Guild, E. (2003) "International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and Borders Policy: The Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2001", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8, 3: 331–46

Guillaume, X (2011) "Resistance and the International: The Challenge of the Everyday", *International Political Sociology*, Volume 5, Issue 4, December 2011, Pages 459–462, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00145_6.x

Guruge, S., and Khanlou, N. (2004) "Intersectionalities of influence: Researching the health of immigrant and refugee women" *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 36, 32–47.

Guzzini, S. (2011) "Securitization as causal mechanism", *Security Dialogue* 42(4-5): 329- 341.

Habbani, A. (2014) "The Impact of Religious Difference and Unemployment/Underemployment on Somali Former Refugee Settlement in Australia", *Journal of Muslim Mental Health*, 8(1): 39–55

Haddad, Y. Y. (1985) Islam women and revolution in twentieth-century Arab thought? In Y. Y. Haddad, and E. B. Findly, (Eds.), Women, religion and social change (pp. 275–306). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hammerstadt, A. (2014) *The Securitization of Forced Migration* in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. et al. (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*

Hamood, S (2006) "African Transit Migration Through Libya to Europe: The Human Cost, Cairo", American University of Cairo, p. 17

Hansard, *Republic of Kenya, House of Representatives Official Report Volume V Second Session*, 1 June-30 July 1965, (Nairobi, 3 June 1965), Cols. 144-146

Hansen, L. (2000) “The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29(2): 285-306.

Hassan, Y. (2019) “Interlude: Being and Becoming Mobile.” In Carrier and Scharrer, *Mobile Urbanity*, 26–38.

Hassan M. Abukar (23 June, 2014) “Kenya’s Somalis: Caught Between Power And Profiling) *African Arguments*

Harrow, K.W.(2013) *Trash: African Cinema from Below.* Indiana U P

Hejazi S. (2006) *Sampling and its variants: Introduction to Research Methodology in Medical Sciences*. Tehran: Islamic Azad University

Hendricks, C. (2017). “Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture”. *Africa Development / Afrique et Développement*, *42*(3), 73–98.

Herwig, R. (2017) “Strategies of Resistance of Syrian Female Refugees in Şanlıurfa. Movements”, Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies, 3:2, 179-194.

Hesse-Biber, S. N. (2007). *Handbook of feminist research: Theory and praxis.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

Hewitt, Roger (1986). *White Talk Black Talk. Inter-racial Friendships and Communication amongst Adolescents*. Cambridge.

Hiralal, K. (2017). “Women and migration-challenges and constraints – A South African Perspective”. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 26(2): 158-175.

Holmes, B, (2007) “Oaxacans like to work bent over: The naturalization of social suffering among berry farm workers”, *International Migration* 45(3):39–68.

Hovil, L. (2007) “Self-Settled Refugees in Uganda: An Alternative Approach to Displacement?” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20: 599 – 620

Hooper, C., (2001). *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hudson, H. (2005) “Doing’ Security As Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security” , *Security Dialogue* , 155-174.

Hurlbert, E (14 February 2020) “Kenya and the Securitisation of Refugees” *The Security Distillery*

Human Rights Watch 2000.Violence Against Women Refugees, Report Documents UNHCR Failures, 25 September 2000. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/09/25/tanzania-violence-againstwomen-refugees (Accessed 19 October 2020).

Human Rights Watch (September 5, 1990) Screening of Ethnic Somalis: The cruel consequences of Kenya's Passbook system: HRW

_____(2013) "You Are All Terrorists": Kenyan Police Abuse of Refugees in Nairobi. New York: Human Rights Watch, May 29, 2013. Accessed February 5, 2017. https:// www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/29/you-are-all-terrorists/kenyan-police-abuse-refugees-nairobi.

_____(11 April 2014) "Kenya: Halt Crackdown on Somalis." Press Release, April 11, 2014. Accessed May 5, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/11/kenya-halt-crackdown-somalis.

_____(12 May 2014) "Kenya: End Abusive Round-ups", 12 May, Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/12/kenya-end-abusive-round-ups> [Accessed 2 July 2020].

_____(23 May 2014) "Kenya: Mass Deportation of Somalis." Press Release, May 23, 2014. Accessed May 6, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/23/kenya-mass-deportation- somalis.

Hunt, L. (2008). "Women Asylum Seekers and Refugees: Opportunities, Constraints and the Role of Agency". *Social Policy and Society, 7*(3), 281-292. doi:10.1017/S1474746408004260

Huysmans, J. (1995) "Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of 'Securitizing' Societal Issues." In: Miles, R. and D. Thranhardt, eds. *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*. London: Pinter Publishers, pp.53-72.

_____(1998a) "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe." *European Journal of International Relations* 4(4): 479-505.

_____(1998b) "Security! What do you mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier", *European Journal of International Relations*, 4:2 (1998), 226-55.

_____(2000). The European Union and the securitization of migration, *Journal of Common Market Studies, 38*, 751–777.

_____(2006). *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.

Huysmans, J. and A. Buonfino. (2008) "Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK." *Political Studies* 56, pp.766-788.

Huysmans, J. and Vicky, S. (2009). Migration and security. in Dunn Cavelty et al. (Eds.), *Handbook of security studies*. London: Routledge.

Hynes, M. and Lopes Cardozo, B. (2000) 'Observations from the CDC – Sexual Violence Against Refugee Women' (2000) 9(8) Journal of Women's Health & Gender-Based Medicine 819-823.

Hyndman, J., (2000). *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism* University of Minnesota Press.

Hyndman, J. and B. V. Nylund (1998) "UNHCR and the Status of Prima Facie Refugees in Kenya", *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol. 10, no. 1 and 2, 21–48.

Iazzolino, G. (2019) "Beyond Eastleigh: A New Little Mogadishu in Uganda?" In Carrier and Scharrer, *Mobile Urbanity*, 219–237

Iazzolino, G and M. Hersi (2019) "Shelter from the storm: Somali migrant networks in Uganda between international business and regional geopolitics", *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 13:3, 371-388, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2019.1575513

ICG (25 September 2014) "Kenya: Al-Shabaab-Closer to Home", *Africa Briefing* 102, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group

International Rescue Committee (2019) Scaling Economic Opportunities for Refugee Women: Understanding and Overcoming Obstacles to Women's Economic Empowerment in Germany, Niger, & Kenya; *Author*

Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) (2014). "Monitoring Report on Operation Sanitization Eastleigh Publicly Known as 'Usalama Watch'." Nairobi, 2014.

Innes, J. A. (2016) "In Search of Security: Migrant Agency, Narrative, and Performativity", *Geopolitics*, 21:2, 263-283, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2015.1107044

Innes A and B Steel (2018) *Gender and Everyday Violence* Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security. New York: Routledge, 151-159

Jaji, R. (2012) "Social technology and refugee encampment in Kenya", *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25(2): 221-238

Jacobsen, K. (2005). *The Economic Life of Refugees*. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press.

Jegede, D. (2012). “Art, Currency, and Contemporaneity in Nigeria” in Castellote J. (ed.) *Contemporary Nigerian Art in Lagos Private Collections New Trees in an Old Forest*. Ibadan: Bookcraft. Pp. 39-52.

Jinnah, Z. (2010). “Making home in a hostile land: understanding Somali identity, integration, livelihood and risks in Johannesburg.” Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 1(1).

Johnson, A. (2005). *The gender knot: unravelling our patriarchal legacy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press

Johansen, J (1991) “Humor as a Political Force, or How to Open the Eyes of Ordinary People in Social Democratic Countries,” *Philosophy and Social Action* 17, no. 3–4 (1991).

Johnstone, H. (2005) “Talking the Walk. Speech Acts and Resistance in Authoritarian Regimes.” Eds. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller. *Repression and Mobilization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota P, 2005. 108-137

Jones, R. (2012) *Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India and Israel,* London: Zed books

Jordan-Zachery, J. S. (2007) “Am I a black woman or a woman who is black? A few thoughts on the meaning of intersectionality.” *Politics and Gender, 3*(2), 254–263.

Joseph J (2013) “Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: A governmentality approach. Resilience: International Policies”, *Practices and Discourses* 1(1): 38–52

Kabeer, N. (July 2010) Working Paper #297 - Voice, Agency and the Sounds of Silence: A Comment on Jane L. Parpart's Paper. Retrieved from http://gencen.isp.msu.edu/documents/Working_Papers/WP297.pdf

Kainz, L. (2020) “As COVID-19 Slows Human Mobility, Can the Global Compact for Migration Meet the Test for a Changed Era?” *MPI Commentary* available at www.migrationpolicy.org/news/ covid19-global-compact-migration-faces-test

Kanuha, V. K. (1999) The Social Process of »Passing« to Manage Stigma. Acts of Internalized Oppression or Acts of Resistance? In: The Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 26 (4). 27–46.

Karanja, R. (2016) ‘Reflection on the Progress of the Tripartite Agreement for the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees in Kenya’. Academia.edu (n.d.).

Karyotis. G. (2007) “European migration policy in the aftermath of September 11: The security-migration nexus,” *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 20:1, pp. 1-17.

_____(2012) "Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives, and Implications." *International Political Sociology,* doi: 10.1111/ips.12002.

Kay, N. (2013). "Press Briefing by Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia." September 24. Geneva: U.N. *Information service*.

Kelley, J. K. (4 January 2001) "Us Knew About Kenya Embassy Bombers in '96," *The East African,* 4 January 2001

Keller et al (2005) *Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An in-Depth Investigation Into the 1998 Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania;* The Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies

Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 167 (Acts No. 19), The Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014 http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/AmendmentActs/2014/ SecurityLaws_Amendment_Act_2014.pdf (27 February 2018)

Kenya Gazette. 2014. *Gazette Notice No. 2719*. April 17.

Kenyan Law Reform Commission, Security Law Amendment Act Ruling, 2015 http:// www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/media-center/523-security-law-amendment-act-ruling (27 February 2018)

Kenyatta, U. (2014) "State of the Nation Address at Parliament by H. E. President Uhuru Kenyatta." March 27. www.president.go.ke.

Kenyatta, U. (04 April 2019) Speech by His Excellency Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta, C.G.H., President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces during the 2019 State of the Nation Address at Parliament Buildings, Nairobi www.president.go.ke.

Kerrow, B (April 13th 2014) "Is Operation Usalama Watch A Somali Gulag?" The Standard

Khadiagala, G (2004). "Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism. In United States Institute of Peace." *Special Report 113, Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. United States Institute of Peace

Khadiagala, G. (2006). *Security Dynamics In Africa's Great Lake Region.* London: Lynne Rienner.

Khosravi, S. (2010) An ethnography of migrant 'illegality'in Sweden: Included yet excepted? *Journal of International Political Theory* 6 (1), 95-116

Kibreab, G. (2004). "Pulling the Wool over the Eyes of the Strangers: Refugee Deceit and Trickery in Institutionalised Settings". *Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-26.

Kiprop, L. (2014) Remembering the 1998 Nairobi Terror Attack: Cultural and Trauma Memory and the Reconciliation of a Nation, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia

King et al (1994) *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Interference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton, Princeton University Press

Kituo cha Sheria v. Attorney General. 2013. Nairobi: High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Constitutional and Human Rights Division.

Kihatso C.W (2007) @Invisible Lives, Inaudible Voices? The Social Conditions of Migrant Women in Johannesburg". In: N. Gasa (ed.), Basus'iimbokodo, bawael'imilambo / They Remove Boulders and Cross Rivers –*Women in South African History*, pp. 397–419. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Kiwanuka, M. (2010) "For Love or Survival: Migrant Women's Narratives of Survival and Intimate Partner Violence in Johannesburg". In: I. Palmary, E. Burman, K. Kiguwa (eds), *Gender and Migration – Feminist Interventions*, pp. 163–179.

Koser, K. (2011). When is migration a security issue? *Brookings*, *31*(3).

Lacan, J. (1978) "The Line and Light." In: Miller, Jaques-Alain (eds.) (1981): The Seminar of Jaques Lacan. *The four fundamental concepts of Psychoanalysis*. New York/London

Lahav, G. (2010) "Immigration Policy as Counterterrorism: The Effects of Security on Migration and Border Control in the European Union: The Consequences of Counterterrorism." New York: Russell Sage Foundation : 130-176.

Landau, L. B. (2006). "Immigration and the state of exception: Security and sovereignty in East and Southern Africa." *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 34 (2):325-348. doi: 10.1177/03058298060340021201.

Landau, L. B. (February 2004). "Research Guide: Urban Refugees." *Forced Migration Online*.

Landau, L. and Kihato, C. (2017) "*Securitising Africa's borders is bad for migrants, democracy, and development*" The New Humanitarian

Lambo, I. (2012). "In the shelter of each other: notions of home and belonging amongst Somali refugees in Nairobi". New Issues in Refugee Research. Policy Developmentand Evaluation Service: *UNHCR*

Lazaridis, G. (ed) (2011) *Security, insecurity and migration in Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Lazardis, G. and W. Khursheed (eds) (2015) *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU*. Debates Since 9/11. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Leboeuf, M. (2007) 'The Power of Ridicule: An Analysis of Satire', *Senior Honors Projects*, Paper 63.

Le Goff, M (2016) "Feminization of migration and trends in remittances". Available at: https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/220/pdfs/feminization-of-migration-and-trends-in-remittances.pdf (accessed 10 December 2020).

Léonard, S. (2007). " *The Securitization" of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School's Framework* ." SGIR Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference, 12 September 2007

Léonard, S and C. Kaunert (2020) "The securitisation of migration in the European Union: Frontex and its evolving security practices", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851469

Levi, M (1988). Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Lewis, N. (2005) 'Expanding surveillance: Connecting biometric information systems to international police cooperation', Zureik E. and Salter, M. B. (ed) *Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity*, Devon: Willan Publishing, pp. 97–112

Lilja, M. and Vinthagen, S. (2018) "Dispersed resistance: Unpacking the spectrum and properties of glaring and everyday resistance." *Journal of Political Power*, *11*(2), 211–229.

Lilja, M. and Johansson, E. (2018) "Feminism as Power and Resistance: An Inquiry into Different Forms of Swedish Feminist Resistance and Anti-Genderist Reactions." *Social Inclusion*, *6*(4), 82-94. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/si.v6i4.1545

Linda D. H, (2001) "Humor as a Coping Mechanism: Lessons from POWs,"*Humor* 14/1 (2001).

Lind et al (2017) "Killing a Mosquito with a Hammer': Al- Shabaab Violence and State Security Responses in Kenya." *Peacebuilding* (2017): 1–18. doi:10. 1080/21647259.2016.1277010

Lind, et al (2015) *Tangled Ties: Al-Shabaab and Political Volatility in Kenya*, IDS Evidence Report, No 130

Lindley, A. (2007) *Protracted displacement and remittances: the view from Eastleigh, Nairobi. New issues in refugee research*. Research Paper No. 143. UNHCR

Liow, J. (2003) "Malaysia's illegal Indonesian migrant labour problem: in search of solutions." *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 44-64.

Lochery, E. (2012) "Rendering Difference Visible: The Kenyan State and Its Somali Citizens." African Affairs 111, no. 445 (2012): 615–639. doi:10.1093/afraf/ads059

Lonsdale, J. (2000) "Agency in tight corners: narrative and initiative in African history" *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, Volume 13, Number 1, pp. 5-16

Lukes, S. (1974). *Power: A radical view*. London: Macmillan.

Lyon, D. (2005) "The border is everywhere: ID cards, surveillance and the other", in Zureik, E. and Salter, M. B. (ed), *Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity*, Devon: Willan Publishing, pp. 66–82

Macé, E. (2018). "From patriarchy to composite gender arrangements? Theorizing the historicity of social relations of gender@. Social Politics: *International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, 25, 317–336.

Mcarthur, T. (2013) Gender and violence through a hegemonic masculinity lens: a reflection from South Africa [Online] Available at: http://community.feministing.com/2013/06/17/gender-and-violencethrough-a-hegimonic-masculinity-lens-a-reflection-from-south-africa/

Madhavan, S. and Landau, B. L. (2011) "Bridges to Nowhere: Hosts, Migrants, and the Chimera of Social Capital in Three African Cities." *Population and Development Review* 37, no. 3 (2011): 473–97. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23036052

Maina A. (2019) "Securitization of Kenya's Asylum Space: Origin and Legal Analysis of the Encampment Policy". In: Schmidt J., Kimathi L., Owiso M. *Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development*. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03721-5_5

Maria et al (2017). "Urban insecurity, migrants, and political authority: Nairobi, Beirut, Hargeisa and Yangon", DIIS Report, No. 2017:13, ISBN 978-87-7605-903-3, *Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)*, Copenhagen

Marsh, M, Purdin, S and Navani, S (2006) "Addressing Sexual Violence in Humanitarian Emergencies" (2006) 1(2) *Global Public Health* 133-146 at 139.

Maymon, PL (2017) "The feminization of migration: Why are women moving more. Cornell Policy Review". Available at: http://www.cornellpolicyreview.com/t (accessed 10 November 2020).

Marshall, C. and Rossman, G.B. (1999). *Designing Qualitative Research*, (2nd Ed.) London: Sage Publication Inc

Mbiyozo, A. (2020) "COVID-19 responses in Africa must include migrants and refugee". *Institute for Security Studies*

Mbiyozo, A. N. (2018). “Gender and migration in South Africa: Talking to women migrants”. *ISS Southern Africa Report*, 2018(16), 1-36

Meyer, L. B. (2016) “Economic globalization and women’s status in the labor market: A cross-national investigation of occupational sex segregation and inequality”. *Sociological Quarterly* 44(3): 351–383

Mertus, J. (2004) “Shouting from the Bottom of the Well: The Impact of International Trials for Wartime Rape on Women's Agency”, *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* 6:1, 110-128, DOI: 10.1080/1461674032000165950

Mora, A. G. and M. Rutkowski (2020) “Remittances in times of the coronavirus – keep them flowing”. *World Bank.*

Mutuma Ma, (20 March 2014) “Are we just going to sit around and wait to be blown to bits by terrorists?', Daily Nation , 20 March 2014, <http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/Are-we-just-going-to-sit-around-and-wait-to-be-blown-to-bits/-/1949942/2252048/-/format/xhtml/-/uw6jti/-/index. html> (24 August 2020).

Mutiso, et al (2019) “Intrigues of Accessing Mental Health Services Among Urban Refugees Living in Kenya: The Case of Somali Refugees Living in Eastleigh, Nairobi”, *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*, 17:2, 204-221,

Muchangi, N. (2016) “The effectiveness of the nyumba kumi initiative as a police reform strategy in Nairobi County.”

Retrieved from https://suplus.strathmore.edu/handle/11071/4595

Mburu,N. (2005) “Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity”. *Red Sea Press* Trenton, NJ, 2005.

Moustapha, H. (2002) “Why Radicals Find Fertile Ground in Moderate Kenya, President Bush met with Kenya President Moi to Discuss Security issues.” *The Christian Science Monitor,* 6 December. Article on-line. Available from www.csmointor.com.

Mutinga, M. (2004) “How Terrorist Attack was Planned and Executed.” *The East Africa Sunday Standard*, Nairobi, 27 November. Article on-line. Available from www.eastandard.net/hm_news/news.php?articleid=789290802/content/icles/article1c 01.html. Accessed December 2020.

Muiruri, S (2003) “Terrorism: Uncovered, Intricate Terrorist Network that Threatens Kenya”, *Daily Nation Special Report*, Nairo*bi*, 22 August. Article on-line. Available from http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/22082003/ News/Special%20Report55567. .

Muiruri, et al (29 November 2002) AP Reuters News Agencies. 2002. Two Suspects Arrested After Terror Bomb on Hotel Kills 13. *Daily Nation on the web*, 29 November. Available from http://www.nationmedia.com/ dailynation/oldarchives.asp?archive=True.

Martinez, D. (2016). "This ain't the projects":A researcher's reflection on the local appropriateness of our research tools. *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, *47*(1), 59–77.

Magnani, R, Sabin, K., Saidel, T. and Heckathorn, D.D. (2005) "Sampling hard to reach and hidden populations for HIV surveillance", *AIDS,* Vol. 19, Suppl. 2, pp. S67–S72.

Mahler, S. J. and Pessar, P. R. (2006) "Gender matters: Ethnographers bring gender from the periphery toward the core of migration studies." *The International Migration Review*, 27-63.

Memela, S. and Maharaj, B. (2018) "Refugees, Violence and Gender: the Case of Women in the Albert Park Area in Durban", South Africa. *Urban Forum* 29, 429–443 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-018-9356-1

Moret et al. (2006) "The Path of Somali Refugees into Exile: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Movements and Policy Responses". SFM Studies 46, *Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies,* Switzerland

Mbembe, A. (1992) "The banality of power and the aesthetics of vulgarity in the post colony", *Public Culture* 4 (2), 1-30.

Mbithi et al. (2018**) "**Knowledge on nursing process among nurses in selected county referral hospitals in Kenya." *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications,* 8 (11) (2018)

Maclean, W (28 November 2002) Israelis Attacked in Kenya -11 die, Al-Qaeda blamed, Reuters, 28 November 2002.

Martin, L. L. (2010) "Bombs, bodies, and biopolitics: Securitizing the subject at the airport security checkpoint." *Social and Cultural Geography* 11 (1):17-34. doi:10.1080/14649360903414585

Majtenyi, C (14 November 2005), "Kenya / Anti- terrorism". 2003. Website. *Voice of America*. 14 November 2005; http://www.global security. org/ security/library/news /2003 /08 /sec-030802-27e550fe.htm.

Manen, M. (2017) "Phenomenology in Its Original Sense." *Qualitative Health Research*, *27*(6), 810–825. https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732317699381

McDonald, M (2008) "Securitization and the Construction of Security", *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–87

McNevin, A. (2013) ‘Ambivalence and Citizenship: Theorising the Political Claims of Irregular Migrants’, Millennium—Journal of International Studies, 41/2: 182–200.

Mogire, E. (2009) “Refugee realities: Refugee rights versus state security in Kenya and Tanzania” *Transformation* 26(1): 15-29.

Moore, H. L. 1988. *Feminism and Anthropology*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Murunga, G.R. (2009) “Refugees at Home? Coping with Somalia Conflict in Nairobi, Kenya.” In *African Studies in Geography from Below*, edited by Arrous, Michael B. and Ki-Zerbo, Lazare, 198–232. Dakar:

Marchand, H. M. (2008) “The Violence of Development and the Migration/Insecurities Nexus: Labour Migration in a North American Context”; *Third World Quarterly* , 2008, Vol. 29, No. 7, pp. 1375-1388

Major T.R. (2003) “Is Osama Bin Laden's ‘Fatwa urging Jihad against Americans’ dated 23 February 1998 justified by Islamic law?”, *Defence Studies*, 3:1, 44-65, DOI: 10.1080/14702430308405051

Malkki, L. H. (1997). “Speechless emissaries: refugees, humanitarianism, and dehistoricisation”. Olwig, Karen. F. and Hastrup, Kirsten (eds.) London and New York*: Routledge*. pp. 223-254.

Malkki L and Sinkkonen T (2015) “Political resilience to terrorism in Europe: Introduction to the special issue”. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39(4): 281–91

Maruf, H (January 15, 2020)Al-Shabab Attacks Killed 4,000 in Past Decade, Says Data-Gathering Group: Voice of America

Migue, P. T. and Oluoch, O.M. (2014) “Operation Linda Nchi: Kenya’s Military Experience in Somalia”, *Ministry of Defence*.

Mickolus, E. F. and Simmons. S (2002) *Terrorism 1996-2001: A Chronology*. Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press.

Moeckli D (2008) *Human Rights and Non-discrimination in the ‘War on Terror’* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. xxvi, 270.

Mohamed, M. A. (2017). “Deadly Student Protest An inquiry is opened into action by security forces.” *Network* 18: 4.

Misztal, B. A. (2000). *Informality. Social theory and contemporary practise*. London, England: Routledge.

Milner, J. (2006) "Somali refugees in Kenya: Abdication and containment', in The politics of asylum in Africa: the cases of Kenya, Tanzania and Guinea", DPhil Thesis, *Department of International Development,* University of Oxford.

Moeckli, D (2006) "The Selective "War on Terror": Executive Detention of Foreign Nationals and the Principle of Non-discrimination", *31 Brook Journal of International Law*. 495

Mogire, E. and Agade, K.M. (2011) "Counter-terrorism in Kenya", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 29:4, 473-491.

Mountz, A. (2004) "Embodying the nation-state: Canada's response to human smuggling." Political Geography 23 (3):323-345. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2003.12.017.

Munster, R. (2009) Securitizing *Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Muiruri. S (2003) 'Most Wanted Terrorist Named: Fazul Abdulla Mohammed is the Leader of an Al Qaeda Cell in Kenya', *Daily Nation,* Nairobi, 26 August. Available from http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/26082003/News/News2608200312.html.

Mutinga, M. (2004). 'How Terrorist Attack was Planned and Executed.' *The East Africa Sunday Standard,* Nairobi, 27 November. Article on-line. Available from www.eastandard.net/hm_news/news.php?articleid=789290802/content/ articles/article1c01.html. Internet. Accessed December 2020.

Mũturi N. (13 April 2015) Kenya That was Never Kenyan: The Shifta War and The North Eastern Kenya

McDonald, M. (2008) "Securitization and the Construction of Security." *European Journal of International Relations*. Volume 14, Issue 4. pp:563-587.

McSweeney, B. (1999) *"*Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School." *Review of International Studies*, 22, pp.: 81–93

Mwangi, O. G (2018) 'The "Somalinisation" of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya: the case of refoulement", *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2018): 1-19

Mavroudi and Nagel (2016) *Global Migration: Patterns, Processes and Politics*. London: Routledge.

Ngirachu, J. (2014). House chaos as Cord protests being labelled Shabaab sympathisers. *Daily Nation.*

Nevins, J. (2008) *Dying to Live: A Story of US Immigration in an Age of Global Apartheid.* San Francisco, CA: Open Media/City Lights Books

Nordstrom C, (1998) “Girls Behind the (Front) Lines,” in The Women and War Reader, eds., Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (New York: New York University Press, 1998), p. 81.

Ombati, C. (7 April 2017) IPOA Appeals for Witnesses in the fatal shooting of two suspects in Eastleigh accessed on 20 August 2020

Omolo A, Macphail, B and Peixoto, T. (2016) Citizen engagement in Kenya: From law to practice. In: *Governance for Development*. Available at: http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/citizen-engagement-kenya-law-practice (accessed 10 January 2018).

Organization of African Unity (OAU), (1971) “OAU Resolution on Border Disputes, 1964,” in Ian Brownlie, ed., *Basic Documents on African Affairs*. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Orwell, G (1945): Funny, but not Vulgar. Leader Magazine of 28.07.1945.

Ogenga, O. (1992) “Factors affecting the treatment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees in Kenya: a historical overview.” *Refuge* 12: 21-25, York Lanes Press, North York

O’Neil, T, A Fleury, A and M. Foresti, (2016) “Women on the move: migration, gender equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, ODI, *Briefing, July 2016*, www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10731.pdf.

Owala et al (2013) “Effects of Terrorism News of Readers of Newspapers: A Case Study of Taifa Leo Newspapers of Kenya.” *Academic Research International* Vol. 4 No. 4 July 2013.

Pavanello, S., Elhawary, S., Pantuliano, S. (2010) “Hidden and exposed urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya.” HPG Working Paper.

Parpart, J. L. (2010) “Choosing silence: Rethinking voice, agency and women's empowerment.” In R. Ryan-Flood, and R. C. Gill (eds.), *Secrecy and Silence in the Research Process* (pp. 15-29). London: Routledge.

Pratt A, (2005) *Securing Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada* Vancouver, BC: UBC Press .

Philips, D. (2014). *Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy.* Sage Publication.

Purdie-Vaughns, V. and Eibach, R. P. (2008) Intersectional invisibility: the distinctive advantages and disadvantages of multiple subordinate-group identities. *Sex Roles, 59*, 377-391.

Purkey, A.L (2011) "Whose Right to What Justice – The Administration of Justice in Refugee Camps" (2011) 17 *New England Journal of International and Comparative Law* 121-157 at 134.

Peterson R.L (2008) "Strange Bedfellows: The Politics of Late-Night Television Comedy". *Poroi* 5(1): 61--83.

Packard, G (2004). Muslim Leaders Want FBI Thrown Out of Kenya. *The New York Amsterdam News,* 29 January-2 February.

Pittaway, E and Bartolomei, L. (2018) "Enhancing the Protection of Women and Girls Through the Global Compact on Refugees" (2018) 57 *Forced Migration Review* 77-79.

Pophiwa, N (2014) The drivers and outcomes of feminization of migration in Africa, Pambazuka News, 26 June 2014, https:// www.pambazuka.org/gender-minorities/drivers-and-outcomesfeminization-migration-africa.

Pottie, et al. (2020) "How refugee youth use social media: what does this mean for improving their health and welfare?". *Journal of Public Health Policy* 41**,** 268–278 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41271-020-00231-4

Radaelli, C.M. and Pasquier, R. (2007). "Conceptual issues". In M.P. Vink and P. Graziano (Eds.), *Europeanization: New Research Agendas* (pp. 35–45). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Razack, S. H. (2004) "Imperiled Muslim women, dangerous Muslim men and civilized Euro peans: Legal and social responses to forced marriages." *Feminist Legal Studies*, 12, 129–174.

Ryan C. (2015) "Everyday resilience as resistance: Palestinian women practicing sumud". *International Political Sociology* 9(4): 299–315.

Rygiel, K. (2011) "Governing borderzones of mobility through e-borders: The politics of embodied mobility", in Squire, V. (Ed) *The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity* (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 143-168.

Ringmar, E. (2012) "Performing International Systems: Two East Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order." *International Organization* 66, no. 2: 1–25.

Romero-Ortun˜o, R. (2004) "Access to health care for illegal immigrants in the EU: should we be concerned?" *European Journal of Health Law*, 11, 245–272.

Runyan, A. S and V. Peterson, (1991) "The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory", *Alternatives* 16(1): 67–106.

Refugees Act, 2006. (2006) Kenya Gazette Supplement Acts, 2006. *Kenya Gazette Supplement*, 97 (Acts No. 11).

Roe, P. (2008) “Actor, audience(s) and emergency measures: Securitization and the UK's decision to in Iraq.” *Security Dialogue* 39(6): 6

_____(2014) “Gender and 'positive' security.” *International Relations, 26*, pp. 116-138.

Ronald, D. A. (2008) “Europe’s Eastern promise. Rethinking NATO and EU enlargement.” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February.

Ronaldo, M. (2008) Globalisation, Governance and Migration: an introduction, Third World Quarterly, 29:7, 1227-1246, DOI: 10.1080/01436590802386252

Rose, N., P. (2006). "Governmentality." Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2: 83-104.

Rudolph, C. (2006). *National security and immigration: Policy development in the United States and Western Europe since 1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Rickford, R. (2016). Black lives matter: Toward a modern practice of mass struggle. New Labor Forum, 25(1), 34–42.

Riki, T. (2004). “Trauma and Rhetoric of Recovery: A Discourse Analysis of the Virtual Healing” *Journal of Child Sexual Abuse Survivors*.” JAC 24(3). 653-677

Samora, M. (2013) “The Somali Question”, *World Policy Journal*, pp. 99-106

Santhiago, A. (2005) *Human Smuggling, Migration and Human Rights: A Malaysian perspective [Paper presented at the review Meeting Migration: Human Rights Protection of Smuggled Persons*, Geneva, 25-26 July 2005

Simon-Butler, A and B. McSherry (2019) “Defining Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Refugee Context” *IRIS Working Paper Series*, NO. 28/2019

Smith, J. A. and Osborn, M. (2008). Interpretative phenomenological analysis. In J.A. Smith (Ed.) Qualitative Psychology: *A Practical Guide to Methods* (2nd Ed). London: Sage.

Shaffer, M. (2012). “This is South Africa, Not Somalia”: Negotiating Gender Relations in Johannesburg’s ‘Little Mogadishu”. Dissertation The Ohio State University.

Shaffer, M. (2013). “Gender Dynamics and Women's Changing Roles in Johannesburg's Somali Community.” *St Antony's International Review* 9.1: 33-52.

Schechner, R. (2004) “Performance studies: The broad spectrum approach.” Henry Bial (Ed.), *The performance studies reader* (pp.7-9). London: Routledge

Schaefer, T. M. (2006) “When Terrorism Hits Home: Domestic Newspaper Coverage of the 1998 and 2002 Terror Attacks in Kenya.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 29:6, 577-589.

Scharrer, T.M (2018) “Ambiguous citizens: Kenyan Somalis and the question of belonging”, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 12:3, 494-513, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2018.1483864

Shorto S (2016) “Is Lene Hansen's critique of the Copenhagen School valid, or is the inability of the silent to securitize problems itself a securitizing act?” *Capita International Security*

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2009). *Militarization and Violence against Women in Conflict Zones: A Palestinian Case-study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Speier, H. (1998) “Wit and Politics: An Essay on Laughter and Power”, *American Journal of Sociology* 103(5): 1352-1401. [doi:10.1086/231355]

Scott, J. C. (1985). *Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Scott, J. C (1987) “Resistance without protest and without organization: peasant opposition to the Islamic Zaket and the Christian tithe.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29: 417-452.

Scott, J. C (1989) "Everyday forms of resistance," pp. 3-33 in Forest D. Colburn (ed.), Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

Scott, J. C. (1990) *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Salter, M. B. (2008) “Securitization and Desecuritization: Dramaturgical Analysis and the Canadian Aviation Transport Security Authority.’ *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11(4): 321-349

Salt, J. and Stein, J. (1997). Migration as a business: the case of trafficking. *International Migration, 35*(4), 467–494

Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach – Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 71st, UN Doc A/71/818 (28 February 2017).

Stritzel H (2011) “Security, the translation.” *Security Dialogue* 42(4

Squire, V. (2009) *The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum,* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Sommers M. (2001) “Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania.” *Refugee and Forced Migration Studies,* vol. 8. New York: Berghahn, 2001

Sorensen, M. (2008) “Humor as a serious strategy of nonviolent resistance to oppress sion.” *Peace and Change* 33(2):167–190.

Staring, R. (1998) Scenes from a fake marriage: Notes on the flip side of embeddedness. In K. Koser and Lutz, H (Eds.), *The new migration in Europe: Social constructions and social realities* (pp. 224-241). London: Macmillan.

Theofanis, E and C. Radaelli,(2009) “Research Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanization”. JCMS: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 47, Issue 3, pp. 507-530

Thurston, A.(2016) “Kenya’s Threat on Camp Closures Exposes Some Hard Truths IPI Global Observatory”, May 17, 2016. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/05/kenya-dadaab-al-shabaab- garissa-refugees/ (accessed April 29, 2017)

Thompson, V.B. (2015) *Conflict in the Horn of Africa: The Kenya-Somalia Border Problem 1941–2014*. Lanhan, MD: University Press of America, p. 21.

Torpey, J. (1998) “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate: Means of Movement.” *Sociological Theory* 16 (3): 239–59

The Standard (2014) “Kenyan Converts Return to Take Charge of Jihadist Killings”, 19 July

The Nairobi Law Monthly (17 November 1989) “Why the Screening of Kenyan Somalis Cannot Be Constitutionally Supported,” Gitobu Imanyara, 17 November 1989. *The Nairobi Law Monthly*

Takyi, E. (2015) The Challenge of Involvement and Detachment in Participant Observation. The Qualitative Report, 20(6), 864-872. Retrieved from https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol20/iss6/12

Tedlock, B. (2003). Ethnography and ethnographic representation. In N. K. Denzin, and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Strategies of qualitative inquiry* (2nd Ed., pp. 165-213). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Touval, S. (1963) Somalia Nationalism: International Politics and Drive for Unity on the Horn of Africa, London: Oxford University Press.

Turton, E. R. (1972) “Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule and the Development of Somali Political Activity in Kenya, 1893–1960.” *Journal of African History* 13 (1): 119–43

Tal, K., (1996) *Worlds of hurt: reading the literatures of trauma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tickner, J. A. (1992). *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Tickner, A. J. (1997) "You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists", *International Studies Quarterly* 41: 611-632.

_____(2005). "What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions", *International Studies Quarterly* 49(1): 1–21.

Tickner, J. and L. Sjøberg (2007). "Feminism". in Dunne, T., Kukri, M., and Smith, S. (eds.). *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 195-212.

Tirman, J. (2006) *Immigration and Insecurity: Post-9/11 Fear in the United States.* Cambridge: MIT Center for International Studies.

Tripartite Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the United High Commissioner for Refugees 2013 *Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees in Kenya Back to Somalia* World Bank.

Togral, B. (2011) "Convergence of Securitization of Migration and 'New Racism' in Europe: Rise of Culturalism and Disappearance of Politics", in: G. Lazaridis (ed.): *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe,* Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 219-237.

T'Hart, M (2007): Humour and Social Protest. An Introduction. In: Bos, Dennis / T'Hart, Marjolein (Ed.): Humour and Social Protest. Cambridge. 1–20.

The Standard, (20 October 2011) "Minister Says eastleigh the next Target in the Hunt for al-Shabaab Militants", October 20, 2011 The Standard

The New Humanitarian law 11 April 2014 Ethnic Somalis under pressure in Kenyan capital, The *New Humanitarian Law*

The Constitution of Kenya 2010 (Republic of Kenya) Available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010

The Constitution of Kenya 1963 (Republic of Kenya) http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/1963_Constitution.pdf

The Qur'an, 24:31–32

The Qur'an, 24:31–32

Uhuru Kenyatta TV. (3 June 2014)"Ulinzi Unaanza na Mimi, Ulinzi Unaanza na Wewe". Accessed on 10 March 2021 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2X6xFNwjaSk>.

United States Department of State, (2014) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Kenya, 25 June 2015,

Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd55d12.html [accessed 13 January 2021]

US Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation.1998. Bombing of the embassies of the US at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Salaam, Tanzania, 18 November.

Ullah, A. and Kumpoh A. (2018) "Are borders the reflection of international relations? Southeast Asian borders in perspective." *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 5*, 295–318.

Ullah, A. and Huque, A. S. (2019) "Migration led by demoralization in Bangladesh: Sense of insecurity-based decision-making model." *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 5*(2), 1–20.

Van der Leun, J. (2003) *Looking for Loopholes: Processes of Incorporation of Illegal Immigrants in the Netherlands*. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.

Van Munster, R. (2009) *Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Voppen, N (2017) *The securitization of Somali refugees in Kenya: The plan to close Dadaab Refugee camp.* Unpublished MA thesis Utrecht University, Netherlands.

Vossoughi, S. and Escudé, M. (2016) "What does the camera communicate? An inquiry into the politics and possibilities of video research on learning." *Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 47*(1), 42–58.

Wesangula, D (August 7th 2020) Three of 21 Wanted 1998 Bomb Blast Suspects Still On T he Run: The Standard

Washington Post (26 May 2016) Closing the world's largest refugee camp in Kenya could fan the flames of terrorism, The Editorial Board

Weitzberg, K.(2017) *We Do Not Have Borders. Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya.* Athens: Ohio University Press.

Widyawati, N. (2008). "Representations of Migrant Workers in Malaysia" In Are We Up to the Challenge? *Current Crises and the Asian Intellectual Community* :The Nippon Foundation

Wairuri, K. (2018). "Operation Sanitize Eastleigh': Rethinking Interventions to Counter Violent Extremism." In *Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya.* Ruteere and P. Mutahi, 135–145. Nairobi: Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies.

Watson, S.D.(2009) "The securitization of humanitarian migration: digging moats and sinking boats", *Routledge advances in international relations and global politics;74:*

Wagner, W et al. (2012) "The Veil and Muslim Women's Identity: Cultural Pressures and Resistance to Stereotyping." *Culture and Psychology* 18 (4): 521–541.

Wæver, O. (1995) Securitization and Desecuritization. *On Security*. R. D. Lipschultz. New York, Columbia University Press: 46-86.

Weaver, S (2010) "The 'Other' Laughs Back. Humour and Resistance in Anti-racist Comedy." In: Sociology 44 (1). 31–48.

Weber, L. and Grewcock, M. (2011) "Criminalising people smuggling: preventing or globalizing harm?". In *The Routledge handbook of transnational organized crime*, Edited by: Allum, F. and Gilmour, S.379–390. London: Routledge

Weber, C. (1998) "Performative States." *Journal of International Studies* 27, no. 1 (1998): 77–95. Doi: 10.1177/03058298980270011101.

Widder, N. (2003): *Foucault and power revisited*. Exeter: Department of Politics, University of Exeter.

Wanjiru C. K. (2006) "Kenya and the War on Terrorism." *Review of African Political Economy, 33*(107), 133-141. Retrieved March 21, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007116

Waiganjo, A.G (2018). "Coping Mechanisms in Navigating Xenophobia-Afrophobia-Related Challenges Within the Transnational Space: Case of Somali Refugee Women in Gauteng, South Africa," *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 649-666, August

Whittaker H.A (2012) "The socioeconomic dynamics of the *shifta* conflict in Kenya", c. 1963–8. *The Journal of African History* , 53: 391–408. 10.1017/S0021853712000448

_____(2014) Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A Social History of the Shifta Conflict, c. 1963–1968. Leiden: Brill

_____(2015) "A New Model Village. Nairobi Development and the Somali Question in Kenya, c. 1915–17." Northeast African Studies 15, no. 2 (2015): 117–140

Weiner, M. (1995) *The global migration crisis: Challenge to states and to human rights*. New York: Harpercollins College Division.

Weiner, M. (1993). Security, stability, and international migration. *International Security, 7*, 91–126.

White, K. (2016) Black lives on campuses matter: The rise of the new Black student movement. *Soundings, 63*, 86–97.

Wilkinson, C. (2007) "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitisation Theory Usable Outside." *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007): 5–25. doi:10.1177/0967010607075964.

Wonders, N (2006) Global flows, semi-permeable borders and new channels of inequality: Border crossers and border performativity. In: Pickering, S, Weber, L (eds) Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control. Dordrecht: Springer, 63–86

Woolcock, . (2001). "The place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes,"*Canadian Journal of Policy Research* 2(1): 1-1

Xinhua News Agency, Petrol bombs gut nightclub in Kenya's port city of Mombasa, 18 December 2002.

Yackley J, A (23 May 2016) "Kenya will close world's biggest refugee camp this year" Reuters

Yin, R. K. (2003) Case Study Research 3rd Edition. London, England. Sage Publication

Young, M. (2001) 'Yes to Hijab, No to Niqaab: The Sinister and the Smiling Faces of Islam', Islam for Today, accessed at : http://www.islamfortoday.com/niqaab.htm


Youngs, G., (2004). "Feminist International Relations: A Contradiction in Terms? Or: Why Women and Gender Are Essential to Understanding the World 'We' Live In". *International Affairs*, 80(1), pp. 75-87

Žák, F.T. (2020) Building a culture of resistance: securitising and desecuritising Eastleigh during the Kenyan government's Operation Usalama Watch, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 14:4, 743-762, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1831848

Zhao, M. and Ji, Y. (2014). Challenges of introducing participant observation to community health research. *ISRN Nursing*, 1–7. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/80249

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Turnitin Originality Report



Turnitin Originality Report

Processed on: 26-Nov-2021 5:01 PM SAST
ID: 1713135646
Word Count: 79370
Submitted: 1

MONYANI THESIS NOV ULWAZI COPY.docx By Test student

Similarity Index	Similarity by Source	
8%	Internet Sources:	7%
	Publications:	3%
	Student Papers:	2%

1% match (student papers from 30-Mar-2021)
Submitted to University of Witwatersrand on 2021-03-30

< 1% match (Internet from 21-May-2019)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.3366/E1755088210000479

< 1% match (Internet from 28-May-2020)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0305829814541504

< 1% match (Internet from 17-Sep-2020)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2056305118764439

< 1% match (Internet from 29-Apr-2019)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010606066436

< 1% match (Internet from 03-May-2020)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1609406919891292

< 1% match (Internet from 01-Oct-2018)
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002764207302470

< 1% match (Internet from 13-Sep-2014)
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA436675

< 1% match (Internet from 11-Jan-2018)

Appendix 2: Participant Information Form-Refugee Women

How does it Feel to Be a Threat? Ethnographic Experiences of Urban Somali Refugee Women in Nairobi, Kenya

Greetings to you.

My name is Margaret Monyani, a student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I am undertaking a study on Somali women refugees in Eastleigh, Nairobi. The purpose of this study is to understand how government policy and practice restrictions are posing challenges to their lives, and what strategies they have devised so as to cope with the situation. This study could help understand the challenges that Somali women refugees face in the restrictive urban space. Such information will be useful to other refugees, government departments and organisations that work with refugees. It could also be self-satisfactory just talking about your personal experiences with the aim of helping other refugees in the future.

I therefore kindly invite you to be part of the study. You have been selected on the basis that you are an adult Somali woman refugee residing in Nairobi. Note that, participation in this study is voluntary. The researcher in this study is a student and not an employee of the government or any organisation. You may choose to participate or even withdraw from the study later, even if you had agreed to participate initially. You may also participate and not answer questions that you don't want to. No payment/gifts will be given for participating in this study.

Participation in this study will be through an interview in Kiswahili or English which will take around 30 minutes at a place and time which is convenient to you. The interviews may require you to talk about your past experiences that are personal and disturbing in a way. All the same, remember that you can stop the interview anytime or not answer questions you are not comfortable about. In addition, for those requiring counselling services, they will be provided at Amani Counselling Centre located at KCS House, 7th Floor Mama Ngina street Nairobi by calling 0718225627 or 072262650

All the information obtained from you in the course of this study will remain private, and confidential and will be solely used for academic writing only. Your name will not be recorded or linked to the information you provide. Your confidentiality will be protected to the best level

possible. Even in the course of writing the final thesis for this study your identification details will not be included. The final thesis will be found online at wits institutional repository called WIReDSpace and will be accessible to scholars and the general reader. Do you have any questions? If so please ask at any point. Use the contact details below, for any questions or concerns in the future or more information about the findings.

If you have any questions about the study feel free to ask the researcher in the course of the study, or by email to 1431346@students.wits.ac.za or on phone at +254723146470 or contact Gilbert Khadiagala, the Head of Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, 1 Jan Smuts Avenue Braamfontein 2000 or on phone +27 11 717 1000 or email to gilbert.khadiagala@wits.ac.za . By appending your signature or providing your thumb print to this document means that you are voluntary giving your consent to be part of this study.

Appendix 3: Participant Information Form- Key Informants

How does it Feel to Be a Threat? Ethnographic Experiences of Urban Somali Refugee Women in Nairobi, Kenya

Greetings to you.

My name is Margaret Monyani, a student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I am undertaking a study on Somali women refugees in Eastleigh, Nairobi. The purpose of this study is to understand how government policy and practice restrictions are posing challenges to their lives, and what strategies they have devised so as to cope with the situation. This study could help understand the relationship between government and urban refugees in Kenya. Such information will be useful to organisations and government departments that work with refugees. It could also be self-satisfactory just talking about your personal experience with working with urban refugees with the aim of providing insights on how to better manage the refugee issue.

I am therefore kindly inviting you to be part of the study. You have been selected based on your experience of working in an office that deals with the issues of refugees. Note that, participation in this study is voluntary. The researcher in this study is a student and not an employee of the government or any organisation. You may choose to participate or even withdraw from the study later, even if you had agreed to participate initially. You may also participate and not answer questions that you don't want to. No payment/gifts will be given for participating in this study.

Participation in this study will be through an interview in Kiswahili or English which will take around 30 minutes at a place and time which is convenient to you. All the same, remember that you can stop the interview anytime or not answer questions you are not comfortable about. All the information obtained from you in the course of this study will remain private, and confidential and will be solely used for academic writing only. Your name will not be recorded or linked to the information you provide. Your confidentiality will be protected to the best level possible. Even in the course of writing the final thesis for this study, your identification details will not be included

but your department may be mentioned. The final thesis will be found online at wits institutional repository called WIReDSpace and will be accessible to scholars and the general reader. Do you have any questions? If so please ask at any point. Use the contact details below, for any questions or concerns in the future or in case you need a copy of the final report.

If you have any questions about the study feel free to ask the researcher in the course of the study, or by email to 1431346@students.wits.ac.za or on phone at +254723146470 or contact Gilbert Khadiagala, the Head of Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, 1 Jan Smuts Avenue Braamfontein 2000 or on phone +27 11 717 1000 or email to gilbert.khadiagala@wits.ac.za . By appending your signature or providing your thumb print to this document means that you are voluntary giving your consent to be part of this study.

Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form

Interviewee_____ Location_____ Date_____

How Does it Feel to Be a Threat? Ethnographic Experiences of Urban Somali Refugee Women in Nairobi, Kenya.

Consent Form

A research project conducted by Margaret Monyani and supervised by Gilbert Khadiagala and Loren Landau. By providing my signature or thumbprint below, am voluntarily agreeing to voluntarily take part of this study. I understand that I am in no way obliged to participate and may withdraw at any time with no threat to my security. I understand that whatever information I provide will not be linked to my identity but will be kept confidential.

Signature_____

Thumb Print_____

Appendix 5: Interview Schedule for The Refugee Women

Part A: Biographic information

I would like you to tell me about yourself.

Age_____

Marital Status_____

Level of Education_____

Religion_____

Clan_____

Kindly tell me about your journey to Nairobi

1. How long have you stayed in Kenya?
2. Why did you come to Kenya?
3. After crossing the border did you settle somewhere first before moving to Nairobi?
    a. If yes where
    b. If No continue to the next question
4. How did you get to Nairobi?
5. Why did you come to Nairobi?
6. How long have you stayed in Nairobi?
7. What do you do for a living?
8. What are some of the challenges have you faced as a refugee woman in the city?
9. What did you do about them?

Sometimes the government has instituted programs that require refugees to be returned to the camps. Kindly tell me about has such programs have affected your life

10. Have you had to change or lose jobs because of the return to the camps?
11. What are the common jobs that Somali women refugees engage in in Nairobi?
12. How hard or easy is it for them to access the jobs?

13. Have you ever faced discrimination in accessing jobs?

Now I will kindly request that you tell me about your physical safety in the city

14. As a woman refugee what can you say about your physical safety in the city?

15. Have you/friend/family member been faced with insecurity issues (Say robbery etc)

16. What did you do about it?

17. Who are the main perpetrators? Kenyans or fellow refugees

18. Do you think the government is doing enough to have women refugees protected?

    a. If yes how?

    b. If No why?

19. What are your thoughts being returned to the camps by the government?

    c. If No why?

20. As a woman refugee do you get any help from organisations?

    d. If yes, which one …… and what kind of help

    e. If No why

21. Do you get any help from the government?

    f. If yes what kind of help

    g. If no why?

22. How would you rate your access to schools and healthcare in Nairobi as women refugees?

23. Have you ever been denied any access to a government service?

    h. If yes which one?

    i. What did you do about it?

24. What are your thoughts about Usalama watch?

25. If you got a chance to ask the government to do something for you, what would you ask for?

Kindly let's talk about how you are able to handle the challenges of urban life

26. What do you do?

    a) When you/ relative/fellow Somali woman refugee has no job?

    b) When you need to access to services such as healthcare or education?

    c) Your physical security is threatened?

Appendix 6: Interview Schedule for Key Informants

Interview NO_____ Date_____

Organisation_____

Department_____

Location_____

1. How long have you been working with urban refugees?
2. What kind of services do you offer to urban refugees?
3. What is the nature of relationship do you have with them?
4. Why does the government have reservations on urban refugees?
5. What is the best solution to the urban refugees' phenomenon?
6. What are your thoughts about the closure of the camp by the government?
7. What are your thoughts about Usalama watch?
8. Are you aware whether the program affected urban refugees either negatively or positively?
9. Have you received any cases of physical insecurity from urban women refugees?
10. What did you do about them?
11. What is your department doing in order to relieve the plight of urban refugee?

Appendix 7: Participant Observation Checklist

LOCATION_____ DATE_____

1. Where did the observation take place?
2. Who were participants being observed?
3. What events were being observed? How was I as a researcher involved in the events?
4. What actions are being performed during the event? By which participants? What are participants saying (include direct quotes if relevant)?
5. How did the events unfold during the observation?
6. What goal were the participants involved in the event trying to accomplish?
7. What emotions are felt/expressed by the participants?
8. What emotions were felt by the researcher in relationship to the event being observed?

Appendix 8: Research Ethics Clearance

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

Research Office

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NON-MEDICAL)
R14/49 Monyani

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE	**PROTOCOL NUMBER: H16/10/12**
PROJECT TITLE	Implications of securitisation on the human security of Somali women refugees in Nairobi, Kenya
INVESTIGATOR(S)	Miss M Monyani
SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT	Social Science/
DATE CONSIDERED	21 October 2016
DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE	Approved
EXPIRY DATE	06 April 2020

DATE 07 April 2017 **CHAIRPERSON** _____ (Professor J Knight)

cc: Supervisor : Professor G Khadiaghala

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)

To be completed in duplicate and **ONE COPY** returned to the Secretary at Room 10004, 10th Floor, Senate House, University. Unreported changes to the application may invalidate the clearance given by the HREC (Non-Medical)

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee. **I agree to completion of a yearly progress report.**

_____ **Signature** **Date** 30/10/2016

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER ON ALL ENQUIRIES

Appendix 9: NACOSTI Research Permit

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MS. MARGARET MONYANI BULIMU
of UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, 0-30100 Eldoret,has been permitted to conduct research in *Nairobi County*

on the topic: *IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITISATION ON THE HUMAN SECURITY OF SOMALI WOMEN REFUGEES IN NAIROBI KENYA*

for the period ending:
27th March,2018

.....
Applicant's Signature

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/17/87841/16100
Date Of Issue : 27th March,2017
Fee Recieved :Ksh 2000



.....
Director General
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation

Appendix 10: NACOSTI Research Permit

CONDITIONS

1. You must report to the County Commissioner and the County Education Officer of the area before embarking on your research. Failure to do that may lead to the cancellation of your permit.
2. Government Officer will not be interviewed without prior appointment.
3. No questionnaire will be used unless it has been approved.
4. Excavation, filming and collection of biological specimens are subject to further permission from the relevant Government Ministries.
5. You are required to submit at least two(2) hard copies and one (1) soft copy of your final report.
6. The Government of Kenya reserves the right to modify the conditions of this permit including its cancellation without notice



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

RESEACH CLEARANCE PERMIT

Serial No.A 13366

CONDITIONS: see back page

Appendix 11: NACOSTI Research Authorisation



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone:+254-20-2213471,
2241349,3310571,2219420
Fax:+254-20-318245,318249
Email:dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
when replying please quote

9th Floor, Utalii House
Uhuru Highway
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/17/87841/16100**

Date: **27th March, 2017**

Margaret Monyani Bulimu
University of the Witwatersrand
SOUTH AFRICA.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on ***"Implications of securitisation on the human security of Somali women refugees in Nairobi Kenya,"*** I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **27th March, 2018.**

You are advised to report to **the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Interior & Coordination of National Government, the Chief executive Officers of selected Government Agencies, the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.

DR. STEPHEN K. KIBIRU, PhD.
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The Principal Secretary
Ministry of Interior & Coordination
of National Government.

The Chief Executive Officers
Selected Government Agencies.

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation is ISO 9001:2008 Certified

Appendix 12: Ministry of Education Research Authorisation

Republic of Kenya
MINISTY OF EDUCATION
STATE DEPARTMENT OF BASIC EDUCATION

Telegrams: "SCHOOLING", Nairobi
Telephone; Nairobi 020 2453699
Email: rcenairobi@gmail.com
cdenairobi@gmail.com

When replying please quote

REGIONAL COORDINATOR OF EDUCATION
NAIROBI REGION
NYAYO HOUSE
P.O. Box 74629 – 00200
NAIROBI

Ref: RCE/NRB/GEN/1/VOL. 1

DATE: 29th March, 2017

Margaret Monyani Bulimu
University of the Witwatersrand
SOUTH AFRICA

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

We are in receipt of a letter from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation regarding research authorization in Nairobi County on "**Implications of securitization on the human security of Somali women refugees in Nairobi, Kenya.**"

This office has no objection and authority is hereby granted for a period ending **27th March, 2018** as indicated in the request letter.

Kindly inform the Sub County Director of Education of the Sub County you intend to visit.

REGIONAL COORDINATOR OF EDUCATION
NAIROBI
28 MAR 2017
P.O. BOX 74629-NAIROBI

MAINA NGURU
FOR: REGIONAL COORDINATOR OF EDUCATION
NAIROBI

Noted and Authorised as directed

DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER
KAMUKUNJI
P.O.Box 74629 - 00200,
NAIROBI

c.c.
Director General/CEO
Nation Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NAIROBI