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Citizenship and Values Education in Post-Genocide Rwanda: An Analysis of the *Itorero* Training Scheme for High School Leavers

Sylvestre Nzahabwanayo

A Thesis submitted to the Wits School of Education, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This research investigates the citizenship and values education notions at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for high school leavers (HSLs) in post-genocide Rwanda. It establishes the attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards this scheme. The thesis contributes to the existing literature on citizenship and values education in post-genocide countries, on the use of indigenous programs of citizenship education, and on the contextual framework of citizenship and values education. The methodology guiding this thesis is a mixed-method design; it is both quantitative and qualitative. In terms of conceptual framework, citizenship and values education models are applied to the analysis of the scheme in order to establish a model deemed preferable to competing models. In relation to citizenship education, the thesis engages with the civic republican, liberal, communitarian, cosmopolitan and radical democratic notions, with the main aim of determining the extent to which these notions inspire the *Itorero* training scheme. With regard to values education, the study engages with character education, care ethics, cognitive moral development approach and values clarification, and attempts to establish the extent to which these values education notions inform the *Itorero* training for HSLs. The thesis reveals that the *Itorero* training is committed robustly to the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship. While there is nothing inherently wrong with the civic virtues emphasized by these concepts (e.g. self-sacrifice, courage, patriotism, connectedness, and common good concern), I argue that the civic republican/communitarian paradigm, as practiced in post-genocide Rwanda, runs the risk of reducing 'good citizenship' to blind patriotism, unqualified loyalty and uncritical obedience to the ruling party. It is suggested that the civic republican and communitarian notions be replaced by the 'critical-democratic-cosmopolitan' notion of citizenship.

Concerning values education, the thesis shows that the *Itorero* training relies heavily on character education. Though this approach allows HSLs to be conversant with values and taboos of the Rwandan culture, I argue that the overreliance on character education raises serious concerns. This is the case, particularly because some studies (e.g. Arthur, 2008; Boyd, 2010; Kohn, 1997; Liu, 2014) have found character education deficient mainly in two ways: first, it is perceived as 'indoctrination'; second, it is not deemed sustainable. It is not clear from the present study how the

Itorero training scheme addresses these limitations pertaining to character education. Therefore, there are strong reasons to believe that the *Itorero* training for HSLs runs the risk of simply being a 'bag of virtues approach' or a 'fix-the-kid approach'. The thesis recommends engaging with other approaches such as care ethics, cognitive-developmental approach and values clarification. It is also suggested that the distinction between citizenship and character education should be maintained, or rather reintroduced. In short, the thesis suggests a new model for citizenship and values education in post-genocide Rwanda.

The thesis demonstrates that, according to HSLs, the quality of trainers, the content, and the training environement constitute best predictors of the success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. The thesis indicates, however, that HSLs seem displeased with the quality of trainers, chiefly because of the presence of sexual abuse and harsh forms of corporal punishment on some training sites. Hence, the thesis shows that it is important to recruit experienced, mature and morally blameless trainers.

The findings of this study show that, according to trainers, HSLs' motivation and prerequisites constitute best predictors of the success of the *Itorero* training scheme. Yet the thesis demonstrates that there are serious problems affecting both the motivation and prerequisites of HSLs. The motivation is negatively affected by the lack of enforcement mechanisms to make the attendance to *Itorero* training compulsory. In reference to prerequisites, the study notes that while HSLs have the requisite epistemological tools to grasp *Itorero* teaching, their parents indoctrinate them with ethnocentric and xenophobic ideas, which affects the assimilation process of the *Itorero* teaching, particularly with regard to the unity of Rwandans. In order to increase the motivation of HSLs, the study recommends that the certificate issued at the end of *Itorero* training be part of required documents for HSLs to enroll either in public or private institutions of higher learning in Rwanda. As to HSLs' prerequisites, the present study suggests that organizing and reinforcing *Itorero* for parents at the village level [*Umudugudu*] be considered as a matter of immediate urgency.

Key words

Citizenship, citizenship education, values, values education, *Itorero*, post-genocide Rwanda, trainers, high school leavers.

DECLARATION

I, **Sylvestre Nzahabwanayo**, declare that this is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination at any other university, nor has it been prepared under the aegis or with the assistance of anybody or organization or person other than the University of the Witwatersrand.

Signed at Wits School of Education on this 8th day of November 2016



Sylvestre Nzahabwanayo

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the Government of Rwanda for its sponsorship;

To my wife Alphonsine Imanishimwe, my son Arnaud-Pallotti Nzahabwanayo and my daughter Alicia-Sandra Nzahabwanayo for their unwavering love, care and support.

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Special appreciation goes to the Government of Rwanda particularly the Rwanda Education Board (REB) for giving me the sponsorship. I have been longing to do this PhD program for quite some time, but failed to secure funding. The sponsorship from REB rekindled my hopes towards academic progress.

This project could not have been achieved without the study leave granted by the University of Rwanda, College of Education (UR-CE). I thank sincerely the UR-CE leadership for having released me from my academic duties so that I can concentrate on this PhD program.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

12 YBE	: 12 Years Basic Education Program.
A LEVEL	: Advanced Level.
ACE	: Armenian Civic Education.
ANOVA	: Analysis of Variance.
ATE	: African Traditional Education.
CE	: Citizenship Education.
CEASS	: Civic Education for Armenian Secondary Schools.
CFA	: Confirmatory Factor Analysis.
CFI	: Comparative Factor Index.
CID	: Rwanda Criminal Investigation Department.
CIVED	: Civic Education.
CNLG	: National Commission for the Fight against Genocide [*Commission Nationale de Lutte contre le Génocide*]
DEST	: Department of Education, Science and Training - Australia.
DIT	: Defining Issues Test.
DPA	: Dayton Peace Accord.
DUDC	: District *Ubutore* Development Centre.
EDPRS	: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy.
EETS	: Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale.
EU	: European Union.
FBiH	: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
GFI	: Goodness-of-Fit Index.
GoR	: Government of Rwanda.
H_0	: Null Hypothesis.

HSLs	: High School Leavers.
ICCS	: International Civic and Citizenship Education Study.
IEA	: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.
INES	: Institute of Higher Learning of Ruhengeri [*Institut d'Enseignement Supérieur de Ruhengeri*]
INILAK	: Adventist Lay Institute of Kigali [*Institut Laïque Adventiste de Kigali*]
IPB	: Polytechnic Institute of Byumba [*Institut Polytechnique de Byumba*].
IRDP	: Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace.
ITD	: Institute for Training and Development.
JAA	: Junior Achievement Armenia.
KMO	: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy Test.
MINEDUC	: Rwanda Ministry of Education.
MRND	: National Revolutionary Movement for Development [*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développment*].
NEC	: National Electoral Commission.
NIC	: National *Itorero* Commission.
NISR	: National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
NURC	: National Unity and Reconciliation Commission.
O LEVEL	: Ordinary Level.
PCA	: Principal Component Analysis.
RDF	: Rwanda Defence Forces.
RDRC	: Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission.
REB	: Rwanda Education Board.
RMSEA	: Root Mean Square Error Approximation.
RNP	: Rwanda National Police.
RPA	: Rwandan Patriotic Army.

RPF	: Rwanda Patriotic Front.
RS	: Republika Srpska.
SD	: Standard Deviation.
SPSS	: Statistical Package for Social Sciences.
SROM	: Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure.
SUDC	: Sector *Ubutore* Development Centre.
TOSCA	: Test of Self-Conscious-Affect.
UN	: United Nations.
UR	: University of Rwanda.
UR-CBE	: University of Rwanda, College of Business and Economics.
UR-CE	: University of Rwanda, College of Education.
VE	: Values Education.
VMS	: Visions of Morality Scales.

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CHAPTER 1

RESEARCH OVERVIEW

My interest to conduct this study originates from a profound concern with regard to the future of Rwanda, 22 years after the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi by extremist Hutu. It would not be wide off the mark to note that one of the root causes of the genocide was a distorted understanding of citizenship. The latter was confined to ethnic belonging. Since the Tutsi were portrayed by colonialists (both Germans and Belgians) to be of Hamitic origin, they were perceived in the eyes of fellow Rwandans as foreigners, as invaders and not really *bona fide* Rwandan citizens (Adejumobi, 2001; Kabwete Mulinda, 2002; Prunier, 1995). This situation suggests therefore that one cannot address the reconstruction of Rwanda sufficiently while ignoring the issue of citizenship. As Davies (2004) points out, citizenship education is a crucial facet of reconstruction in post-conflict countries.

In this context, in addition to formal citizenship education, Rwanda decided in the 12 November 2007 Cabinet that its traditional citizenship education school – "*Itorero*" – be restored to enable Rwandans re-learn values and taboos of their culture. The latter was officially launched on 16 November 2007 by President Paul Kagame and immediately started its activities. By 2012, *Itorero* had trained an estimate of 243,284 ordinary Rwandans. In 2013, it became the National *Itorero* Commission (NIC) as per law No. 41/2013 of 16/06/2013 determining its mission, organization and functioning. Pursuant to Article 6 of the same law, its objective consists of: "Bringing up a patriotic Rwandan who has values and taboos of the Rwandan culture and who has the culture of *Intore*".

Though this non-formal school has been established for all categories of Rwandans, it is compulsory mainly for all high school leavers (HSLs). The scheme designed for this category comprises a theoretical training phase, i.e. moral and political education [*Gutozwa*] for three months, and a practical one in the form of national service or volunteerism [*Urugerero*] for a period of seven months (National *Itorero* Commission [NIC], 2012). This thesis focuses mainly on the training phase meant to

convey to HSLs values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. It is worth explaining my twofold choice. First, I opted for the training phase because, to the best of my knowledge, the practice of conveying cultural values and taboos as part of citizenship education is not common to many countries. On the other hand, the idea of community service is widespread in several countries. Second, I selected HSLs for the reason that they belong to the category aged below 20, which constitutes half of the population of Rwanda (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda [NISR], 2012). It is my conviction that this big proportion of Rwandans deserves special care and attention, because they constitute tomorrow's social, political and economic force. In view of this context, the present thesis seeks to answer the following questions:

(i) What are the citizenship and values education notions informing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs?
(ii) Are these dominant citizenship and values education notions helpful and desirable for post-genocide Rwanda?
(iii) What are the attitudes of learners and trainers towards this scheme?
(iv) What are the actions to be taken for improving the current citizenship and values education of HSLs?

In the main, the present thesis contributes to the existing literature on citizenship education in two important ways. Firstly, though citizenship education has become a buzz word since the 20th century (Heater, 1990; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Vogel & Moran, 1991), there is a dearth of research on the topic in post-genocide countries. As a matter of fact, large scale citizenship studies such as the 1971 International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement Civic Education Study (CIVED, 1971; CIVED, 1999), the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS, 2009), and most recently ICCS (2016) included no post-genocide country except Israel in the first two studies. The present thesis serves to fill this gap; it critically investigates the citizenship concept at work in post-genocide Rwanda with a special focus on the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs.

Secondly, this study observed that in many African countries formal citizenship education is widespread, but it has not yielded the desired results (Harber, 1997; Mhlauli, 2012; Otiende & Oanda, 2000). This is evidenced by tribal wars, current weak popular understanding of democratic institutions, and weak inclinations towards political involvement beyond voting in parliamentary or presidential elections

(Davies, 2004; Quaynor, 2015; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald & Schulz, 2001). This study argued that the limited success of formal citizenship education is due to the low priority that teachers give to the subject, and the continued predominance of didactic, teacher-centred pedagogy (Harrison & Baumgartl, 2002; Neubauer, 2012; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Formal citizenship education in Rwanda is no exception to this situation (Freedman, Weinstein, Murphy & Longman, 2008; King, 2013).

In view of this, a number of studies (e.g. Ake, 1996; Antal & Easton, 2009; Neubauer, 2012; Ogot, 1999; Osaghae, 2006) have found that there is a need to revitalize African non-formal or indigenous citizenship education practices. Nevertheless, this does not mean that African Traditional Education – ATE (or *Itorero*, for that matter) was a perfect, healthy and strong citizenship education program without notable deficiencies. Rather, the idea is that citizenship education in today's Africa should draw on its cultural heritage and adapt its good practices to today's situation and demands. It is in this context that the post-genocide Rwanda appealed to its traditional citizenship education school, *Itorero.*

Despite this strong invitation to build on African indigenous practices in citizenship education, little attention has been paid to the evaluation of its implementation. The present research aims to fill this gap. It strives to assess the extent to which the current *Itorero* avoids the problems of traditional African education practices, chief among which is indoctrination, as opposed to reflective thinking (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003). This raises the questions: Are the citizenship and values education notions guiding the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs desirable and helpful for post-genocide Rwanda?

Citizenship education – as it is done in post-genocide Rwanda – is 'values-explicit'. While research indicates that the 'values-explicit' approach is criticized for being biased and indoctrinating students (Kerr, 1999), only a limited number of studies have been conducted to substantiate this claim. The present thesis also contributes to filling this gap. It seeks to investigate the extent to which *Itorero* training – by teaching HSLs values and taboos of the Rwandan culture – avoids the problems encountered by 'values-explicit' approaches, that is, that tend to involve bias and indoctrination of students.

In short, the present thesis focuses on non-western conceptual and practical resources for conducting citizenship education in Africa: it includes an account of the strengths and limitations of a non-formal traditional training programme (*Itorero*) that inducts youth into citizenship education.

In terms of conceptual framework, citizenship and values education models are applied to the *Itorero* training scheme in order to establish a model deemed preferable to competing models. In relation to citizenship education, the thesis engages with classical notions of citizenship, including the civic republican, liberal and communitarian, and also modern ones – mainly the cosmopolitan and radical democratic notions, with the aim of determining the extent to which these analytical constructs inspire the *Itorero* training scheme. With regard to values education, the study engages with character education, care ethics, cognitive moral development and values clarification, and attempts to establish the extent to which these values education notions inform the *Itorero* training for HSLs. In brief, the conceptual frame for citizenship education includes civic republicanism, liberalism, communitarianism, cosmopolitanism and radical democracy; for values education the frame comprises character education, care ethics, cognitive moral development and values clarification.

In order to investigate and analyze HSLs' and trainers' attitudes towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs, the present thesis uses the Force Field Theory of Change as developed by Kurt Lewin (1951). In this regard, the thesis (i) identifies *driving forces* of *Itorero* for HSLs, that is, forces that contribute positively to the occurrence of the change; (ii) outlines *restraining forces*, i.e., forces that oppose the change or forces that attempt to maintain the status quo; (iii) indicates concrete actions to be taken for driving forces to be strengthened; and (iv) suggests strategies to be envisaged in order to weaken or eliminate restraining forces.

The methodology guiding this thesis is a mixed-method design; it is a quantitative-qualitative study based on both desk research (the study of pertinent books, articles, journals, reports, various studies, etc.) and field research. A survey made of closed and open-ended questions was conducted among 996 HSLs and 116 *Itorero* trainers. The researcher also used focus group discussions with HSLs coupled with interviews with both trainers and National *Itorero* Commission (NIC) officials. In total,

four focus group discussions with HSLs, four interviews with district trainers, and three interviews with NIC officials were conducted. The data collection took place from early January 2015 until the end of March 2015.

In order to analyze quantitative data, the present research used two software packages: SPSS 22 and AMOS 22. Data analysis techniques employed in the present study involved: (i) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) – which allowed me to classify lists of items into factors; (ii) Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) – which enabled me to ascertain whether the structure arrived at in the classification fits the data; (iii) descriptive statistics on obtained scales; (iv) comparison of two independent groups (T-test); (v) comparison of more than two groups (Analysis of Variance – ANOVA); and (vi) the determination of best predictors by means of simple regression and backward stepwise multiple regression.

Qualitative data deriving from focus group discussions and interviews were analyzed using Thematic Content Analysis. The latter involved both the vertical and horizontal approaches. The vertical approach was meant to reduce the volume of transcripts by retaining the summary or paraphrasing main ideas. It also produced limited quotations or 'quotable quotes', and a list of ten points providing the core of each focus group discussion or interview. The horizontal approach aimed at comparing materials at the bottom of transcripts, i.e., the ten points, which led to the identification of emerging issues. In the end, recurring themes were captured. These themes were related to research objectives and research questions, and were included in the presentation and discussion of findings.

The present thesis comprises 12 chapters. Chapter 1 provides the research overview. Chapter 2 is a general introduction to the study. It provides the background to the research, depicts the journey of citizenship discourses in Rwanda, offers a brief note on the Rwandan genocide, briefly describes *Itorero* as a site for a new citizenship discourse, outlines research objectives and questions, and shows the rationale of the study.

The purpose of chapter 3 is threefold. First, it clarifies the notion of citizenship by providing its historical background, dimensions and boundaries. Second, it examines the concept of values education as a facet of citizenship education. Next, it explores considerations on citizenship education both globally and on the African continent.

In chapter 4, I consider the journey of citizenship education in Rwanda, in particular. This reflection assesses the extent to which the failure to establish a viable citizenship education program in post-colonial Rwanda contributed to the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. The chapter also shows that citizenship education is envisaged by the current Government of Rwanda as key towards the promotion of unity and reconciliation among Rwandans. The revived *Itorero* is critical to this process.

Chapter 5 discusses premises of the conceptual framework that help to identify the citizenship and values education notions at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In this regard, notions or conceptions of citizenship and values education are explored, and resulting conceptual frames articulated. In this chapter, I also articulate the Force Field Theory of Change of Kurt Lewin (1951) as the working theory to investigate and analyze the attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the empirical literature; it reviews some studies conducted on citizenship and values education. It first explores citizenship education in post-genocide countries, i.e., Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and in the Jewish community after the holocaust. It also discusses an empirical study of citizenship education in Israel and four conceptual pieces of research on post-apartheid South Africa. Second, the chapter provides a brief overview of some empirical studies on approaches to values education. Finally, I review some studies conducted on the revived *Itorero* (and its parent *Ingando*). In fact, it is important to grasp findings from other studies, because they help in the discussion chapter, especially with regard to confirming, qualifying, extending, contradicting, and/or opposing my own findings.

Chapter 7 provides methodological considerations and model building; it details the research design, selection of research participants, research instruments and sample size, data collection procedure, approach to data analysis and interpretation, ethical considerations, and reliability and validity issues.

While chapters ranging from 1 to 7 can be called ‘lead-in’ chapters, chapter 8 and 9 could be termed ‘core’ chapters. In fact, chapter 8 identifies the citizenship education notion that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs mostly works with. It starts by detailing background characteristics of respondents. Later, factors generated by the

description of a good citizen are examined in a bid to highlight the dominant conception of citizenship. Once the leading notion is identified, it is compared to citizenship notions in other post-genocide or post-conflict contexts. At the end, an attempt is made to answer the question as to whether the dominant citizenship notion is desirable and helpful for post-genocide Rwanda.

Chapter 9 focuses on outlining the values education notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. To this end, four factors on values education are examined in a bid to identify the predominant features. The chapter also examines whether the description of the aims of values education varies within subgroups. Equally, qualitative evidence demonstrating the extent to which each values education notion informs *Itorero* scheme is provided. Finally, I ask whether the values education notion identified as dominant in the *Itorero* training scheme is desirable and helpful for post-genocide Rwanda.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12 constitute 'lead-out' chapters; they focus more on the future of citizenship and values education in post-genocide Rwanda. In this regard, chapters 10 and 11 investigate attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards the *Itorero* training scheme, respectively. These two chapters are premised on the view that the approach used and the training environment in which citizenship and values education take place indicate to a considerable extent the image of 'a good citizen' being communicated and values being passed on. The argument here is that the training environment ethos, culture and climate are immensely revealing; they implicitly teach some values and indirectly express the image of a 'good' citizen being fostered (Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, Losito & Kerr, 2008). In view of this, one cannot adequately analyze *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs – as a citizenship and values education program – while ignoring HSLs' and trainers' assessment of practical issues.

In this regard, in chapter 10, I highlight the ways in which HSLs appreciate *Itorero* training in relation to issues such as the content, the quantity and quality of trainers, the training environment and organization. In the end, a multiple regression approach is used to establish – according to HSLs' perceptions – the weight with which each factor predicts the success of *Itorero* training.

In chapter 11, I investigate trainers' attitudes towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. The following issues are assessed: quality and availability of training manuals, regular training for trainers, satisfaction about the remuneration, motivation and prerequisites from learners, class size management, training environment, duration of the training, encouragement of discussion and deliberation, enhancement of critical thinking skills, and trainers' participation in the evaluation and impact assessment of the whole training. In the first instance, background characteristics of trainers are considered. Second, descriptive statistics on the assessment of *Itorero* (by trainers) are generated. Third, a regression technique is used to outline – according to trainers' perceptions – the best predictors of the *Itorero* success. Finally, a comparative discussion of HSLs' and trainers' attitudes is conducted.

Chapter 12 seeks to suggest possible actions towards improving the *Itorero* training for HSLs. In this chapter, first and foremost, major findings of the present study are highlighted. Second, necessary steps to be taken for the betterment of the *Itorero* training in educating HSLs for citizenship and values are captured. Key findings and corresponding actions are organized along the following lines: the citizenship and values education notions at work in the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs, quality of trainers and trainees, content, training environment, organization and logistics.

I then indicate key findings of the present thesis. In relation to citizenship education, the thesis reveals that the *Itorero* training for HSLs is committed robustly to the civic republican/communitarian notions of citizenship. While there is nothing inherently wrong with the civic virtues emphasized by these concepts (e.g. self-sacrifice, courage, patriotism, connectedness, and common good concern), I argue that the civic republican/communitarian paradigm as practiced in post-genocide Rwanda runs the risk of reducing 'good citizenship' to blind patriotism, unqualified loyalty and uncritical obedience to the ruling party, i.e., the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). It is suggested that the civic republican and communitarian notions be replaced by the 'critical-democratic-cosmopolitan' notion of citizenship and citizenship education.

With regard to values education, the thesis shows that the *Itorero* training relies heavily on character education. Though this approach unambiguously allows HSLs to be conversant with values and taboos of the Rwandan culture, and contributes to the transformation of their behavior and mindset so that they can meet the

expectations of the Rwandan society, I argue that the overreliance on character education raises serious concerns. This is the case particularly because such an approach has been found deficient mainly in two ways: first, it is perceived as 'indoctrination'; second, it is not deemed sustainable (Arthur, 2008; Boyd, 2010; Kohn, 1997; Liu, 2014). It is not clear from the present study how the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs addresses these limitations pertaining to character education. Rather, what is noticeable is that values education, as it is done in *Itorero,* looks like the cultivation of supportive behavior towards the government in office; its content focuses on understanding what the government wants and the crafting of dispositions required for the implementation of defined policies. Therefore, there are strong reasons to believe that the *Itorero* training for HSLs runs the risk of simply being a 'bag of virtues approach' or a 'fix-the-kid approach'. The thesis recommends engaging with other approaches such as care ethics, cognitive moral development and values clarification. It is also suggested that the distinction between citizenship and character education be maintained, or rather reintroduced. In short, the thesis suggests a new model for citizenship and values education in post-genocide Rwanda.

The thesis reveals that HSLs appreciate greatly the content offered in *Itorero* training. It is highlighted that on account of *Itorero*, HSLs have a good command of Rwandan history, national development programs and priorities, and the *Ndi umunyarwanda* ('I am a Rwandan') program. It is also shown that *Itorero* enables HSLs to be liberated from ethnocentric ideologies prevalent in their families. However, the thesis indicates that HSLs seem displeased with the quality of trainers, chiefly because of the presence of sexual abuse and harsh forms of corporal punishment on some training sites. The thesis argues that these two issues are to be addressed with great care, because – according to HSLs' perceptions – the factor 'trainers' constitute the best predictor of the success of *Itorero* training ($\beta = .33$). The thesis suggests to recruit trainers who are experienced, mature and of good character.

This study also shows that – according to trainers – the motivation and prerequisites of HSLs play a crucial role in ensuring the success of *Itorero* training. It is revealed that in trainers' views these two factors correlate positively and significantly with the success of *Itorero* training. Their respective prediction weights (β) are .27 and .21.

Yet there are serious problems affecting both the motivation and prerequisites of HSLs. The motivation is negatively affected by lack of enforcement mechanisms to make compulsory the attendance to *Itorero* training. In reference to prerequisites, the study notes that while HSLs have the requisite epistemological tools to grasp *Itorero* teaching, their parents indoctrinate them with ethnocentric and xenophobic ideas, which affect the assimilation process of the *Itorero* teaching, particularly with regard to the unity of Rwandans. In order to increase the motivation of HSLs, the present study recommends that the certificate issued at the end of *Itorero* training be part of required documents for HSLs to enroll either in public or private institutions of higher learning in Rwanda. As to HSLs' prerequisites, it is suggested that organizing and reinforcing *Itorero* for parents at the village level [*Umudugudu*] be considered as a matter of urgency.

Drawing on attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs, the present thesis contributes to the existing literature on the civic and citizenship contextual framework, mainly that which has been developed by CIVED and ICCS (Schulz et al., 2008; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). In fact, the thesis reveals that there is a conglomeration of factors influencing the success of citizenship and values education. They include trainers' competencies, individual characteristics of trainees, family background or home environment of trainees, the wider community, the training environment and the prevailing government narratives and ideologies, i.e., the public discourse mainly in relation to political, economic, social, and cultural matters. The existence of various factors influencing citizenship and values education has also been pointed out by Quaynor (2015) who recommends willingness to look for civic influences beyond the civics classroom and the school.

CHAPTER 2

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

2.1. Introduction

This chapter constitutes a general introduction to the study. It provides the background to the research, depicts the journey of citizenship discourses in Rwanda, offers a brief note on the Rwandan genocide, describes briefly *Itorero* as a site for a new citizenship discourse, outlines research objectives and questions, and shows the rationale of the study.

2.2. Background to the research

My interest to conduct this study originates from a profound concern with regard to the future of Rwanda 22 years after the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi by extremist Hutu. It is very possible that one of the root causes of the genocide is a distorted understanding of citizenship. The latter was confined to ethnic belonging. Since the Tutsi were portrayed by colonialists (both Germans and Belgians) as being of Hamitic origin, they were therefore perceived in the eyes of fellow Rwandans as foreigners, as invaders and not really *bona fide* Rwandan citizens (Adejumobi, 2001; Kabwete Mulinda, 2002; Prunier, 1995). A discussion of the Hamitic hypothesis is worthwhile as it sheds light on its role in the Rwandan conflict.

The Hamitic hypothesis was advocated by European colonialists and anthropologists in order to explain differences among the peoples of North, East, South East, Central and West Africa. The Hamitic hypothesis has evolved in steps (Sanders, 1969). The earlier version, which actually gained currency in the sixteenth century, was that the Hamites were savages, ‘natural slaves’ and Negroes. Later, Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1798 brought another version, which regarded Hamites as Caucasian. This conclusion was formulated after Napoleon’s expedition discovered that Egyptians were Negroids with a highly advanced civilization, which actually constitutes the cradle of western civilization. Therefore, the existence of two types of

Negroes was postulated by Napoleon's expedition: 'genuine Negroes' and other blacks, 'lesser Negroes' of Caucasoid white type (Hamites). In this context, the Hamitic hypothesis advanced two ideas: (1) that it was these Caucasoids (superior Negroes) who taught the genuine Negro how to manufacture iron; and (2) that Caucasoids were so politically sophisticated that they organized the conquered territories into highly complex states with themselves as the ruling elites. Since then, it was a widely held belief in the western world that everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by these Caucasoids (Hamites), a people inherently superior to the native population.

The Tutsi in Rwanda were believed to be part of the Caucasoids (Hamites); hence the Rwandan society was depicted (by German and Belgian colonialists) as comprising three races: a 'conquering race' (the Tutsi), a Bantu race (the Hutu) and the Twa, considered to be pygmies. However, this depiction of the Rwandan society is highly contested (Shyaka, 2003). Indeed, the situation on the ground demonstrates that Tutsi, Hutu and Twa have the same language, religion and culture. If the Tutsi were really of Hamitic origin, would they not have imported and imposed their language, religion and culture? The absence of linguistic, religious and cultural Hamitic traces in Rwanda suggests that assertions according to which the Hamitic Tutsi have walked their way into Rwanda and imposed themselves upon the other groups by *soft power* are implausible.

In short, by virtue of the Hamitic hypothesis, only the Hutu and Twa were considered by colonialists (Germans and Belgians) as genuine citizens. It followed that the Tutsi, depicted as alien, enemy and "white man in black skin" (Adejumobi, 2001, p. 164; Kabwete Mulinda, 2002, p. 50-51; Prunier, 1995, p. 10-11) had no place in Rwanda. This distorted understanding of citizenship introduced by colonialists (Germans and Belgians) contributed enormously to the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. This situation suggests that one cannot address the reconstruction of Rwanda adequately without considering the issue of citizenship. As Davies (2004) points out, citizenship education is a crucial facet of reconstruction in post-conflict countries. In view of this, it is important to appreciate the journey of citizenship discourses in Rwanda.

2.3. Citizenship discourses in Rwanda

The present subsection aims to examine various citizenship discourses that dominated the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence eras, as well as the period after the genocide in Rwanda. In this subsection, an attempt is made to explain the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi within the context of citizenship. This approach is premised on the view that researching citizenship education properly in Africa cannot turn a blind eye to the historical and contemporary contexts (Quaynor, 2015).

2.3.1. Citizenship discourses before colonialism

It is argued that prior to the arrival of colonialists (Germans from 1899 to 1919 and Belgians from 1919 to 1962), the three groups existing in Rwanda (Tutsi, Hutu and Twa) understood themselves as one people, i.e., as Rwandans (Hintjens, 2001; Kabwete Mulinda, 2002; Lemarchand, 1996; Ndangiza, 2003; Prunier, 1995). In other words, citizenship was attributed to all Rwandans with no discrimination or segregation. It is suggested that Tutsi, Hutu and Twa categories simply stood for socio-economic classes defined on the basis of the number of owned cows. The Tutsi owned more cows, the Hutu fewer, and the Twa much fewer (Hintjens, 2001; Lemarchand, 1996; Ndangiza, 2003). Since leaders were wealthy and owned more cows, they were therefore Tutsi at the time of the arrival of colonialists.

Furthermore, different studies (e.g. Czekanowski, 1917; Hintjens, 2001; Honke, 1990; Lemarchand, 1996; Ndangiza, 2003) reveal that mobility or rather social fluctuation between the three classes was a common phenomenon. Such social fluctuation was most frequently associated with one's improvement in terms of social welfare, i.e., the number of owned cattle. The idea is that one could easily move from one class to the other. In characterizing this fluctuation, Lemarchand (1996) maintains that in the pre-colonial feudal Rwandan society, until the early 20th century, an individual could be both Hutu in relation to his patrons and Tutsi in relation to his own clients. The central argument here is that Tutsi, Hutu, Twa were unsettled social identities; they were not crystallized or fixed ethnic groups. In short, it is argued that

before colonialism, concepts of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa did not refer to three different citizenships. Instead, Rwandans understood themselves as one people.

2.3.2. Citizenship discourses under colonialism

Inspired by anthropological scholarship of the time (reference is made here to the Hamitic hypothesis explained earlier), German colonialists postulated the idea that the three groups in Rwanda were different. At this point, there is a fundamental epistemological shift, which brings about a citizenship divide. The initial difference which was based on the socio-economic status of an individual is turned into a racial one: Tutsi are portrayed as Ethioped, Hutu as Bantu, and Twa as Pygmoid (Kabwete Mulinda, 2002; Prunier, 1995). Furthermore, Germans depicted Tutsi as superior to the remaining groups with reference to (i) their racial features (expressed in their stature and nobility); (ii) economic welfare (their wealth through cattle herding), and (iii) political skills (‘men born to command like Romans’) (Louis de Lacger, 1959).

It is worth noting that while German colonialists defined Hutu and Tutsi as different races, Belgians turned this theory into the very basis for the administrative apparatus of the colonial state. In fact, in 1930s Belgians ordered a national census to formally distinguish Tutsi and Hutu and put these differentiations in identity cards (Mamdani, 2001). I am arguing that while Germans – through their indirect rule – engineered the Hamitic hypothesis, Belgians put it into practice by exclusively giving political power to the Tutsi. Belgians supported the Tutsi by completely maintaining them in leadership positions and receiving many of their children into the formal school, which welcomed few Hutu.

A number of studies (Harroy, 1984; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Kagame, 1972; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Shyaka, n.d.) suggest that, unfortunately, the Tutsi and Hutu internalized these stereotypes. It is argued that the Tutsi started perceiving themselves as superior to Hutu and Twa. The Tutsi promptly adopted their ascribed nobility and collaborated willingly with European historians in inventing their past to legitimize their superiority. Furthermore, it seems that the Tutsi allied themselves to Belgians to oppress the Hutu and Twa. Some scholars (e.g. Hintjens, 2001; Shyaka, n.d.) argue that the connivance between the Tutsi monarchy and the Belgians went

on until 1950 when Belgian officials and Catholic European clergy started to fear the anti-colonial radicalism from Tutsi elite who had launched the claim for independence.

Dissatisfied by their Tutsi clientele, Belgians shifted their support to Hutu elites encouraging them to be ready to inherit the post-colonial state structures because they are 'authentic inhabitants of Rwanda'. At this stage, Hutu are rehabilitated, which led to the 1959-1962 'Social Revolution' calling for liberation of the occupation from both 'Hamites' and 'Bazungu' (whites). Briefly, when the Tutsi started demanding independence in 1959, colonialists (Belgians) retrieved power from them and gave it to Hutu elites. They also encouraged the Hutu to chase away the Tutsi (portrayed as foreigners and invaders) and get their property. In 1959, many Tutsi fled to neighbouring countries mainly Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Kenya.

At this juncture, it is worth noting that Belgians supported either party (Hutu or Tutsi) depending on Belgians' selfish interests. The tragic feature of the story, however, is that both Tutsi and Hutu accepted this support with its associated stereotypes and leadership privileges without measuring long term implications. The independent Rwanda replaced monarchy and Belgian colonial rule in 1962, but it almost operated like them because it sought to systematically organize revenge against Tutsi who were portrayed as 'foreigners' and 'invaders'.

In sum, three things emerge from this historical sketch. First, as seen previously, before colonialism all Rwandans (Tutsi, Hutu and Twa) enjoyed citizenship in a fully-fledged sense. Second, with colonialism, citizenship is distorted and thwarted: Tutsi were no longer considered as genuine citizens; they were treated as immigrants, foreign occupants and oppressors. Only the Hutu and Twa were portrayed as *bona fide* or genuine Rwandan citizens. Third, the distorted understanding of citizenship led to the '1959-1962 Social Revolution' in the course of which Hutu convinced to be 'owners of the land' chased the 'invader' (Tutsi) away. The first wave of Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Tanzania, Kenya and elsewhere started at this time (in 1959 and 1962).

I concur with Harroy (1984) that the divide between Rwandans stems from the fact that Tutsi and Hutu failed to maintain and defend their pre-colonial civic national identity against the colonial regime. The idea is that instead of forcibly resisting

notions of racial inferiority and superiority brought by colonialists, Tutsi and Hutu naively adopted and internalized them; they allowed themselves to be manipulated by both Germans and Belgians. I tend to believe that Rwandans are not innocent to the evils that befell them; they were not merely passive, inactive and 'acted upon'.

2.3.3. Citizenship discourses after independence

The after independence period could roughly be divided into two major phases: the regime of Grégoire Kayibanda (1962-1973) and the regime of Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994). These two periods entertained different discourses of citizenship. During the regime of Grégoire Kayibanda, citizenship and Hutu ethnicity were one and the same thing (Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 2002). Kayibanda cultivated some hatred towards the Tutsi. In his speeches, he often referred to Hutu as a people who have been offended, humiliated, and despised by the Tutsi 'invader'. Kayibanda was removed from power by a coup d'état organized by Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973.

The first years of Habyarimana's regime (1973-1980) – with his *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* [National Revolutionary Movement for Development - MRND] – tended to be relatively tolerant towards Tutsi (Hintjens, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 2002). Though Tutsi were subjected to the quota system[1], they could engage in private sector, local teaching, medical or agricultural works (Newbury, 2002). At the beginning of Habyarimana's regime, the Tutsi gained some political rights; they were considered as an indigenous minority with political rights translated into proportional representation in parliament, embassies, in the cabinet, even in the army (Mamdani, 2002). However wanting, here appears the rehabilitation of Tutsi as Rwandan citizens.

Research shows that despite Habyarimana's attempts to integrate the Tutsi who were in the country in social life, he opposed categorically the return of thousands of Tutsi who had fled the country following pogroms in 1959, 1962 and 1973, on the pretext that the country was small (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Mamdani, 2001).

[1] The quota system followed the formula according to which "9% was for Tutsi and 90% was for Hutu in areas, such as civil service and education" (Hintjens, 2001, p. 34).

And yet, the Tutsi in exile were subjected to different forms of discrimination and exclusion. That is why they started harnessing the idea of returning home; they organized themselves under the umbrella of a political organization known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with a military wing known as Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) based in Uganda.

With the beginning of the liberation war launched by RPF on 1 October 1990, the citizenship discourse depicting Tutsi as of Hamitic origin, invaders, immigrants, and outsiders reappeared vigorously (Mamdani, 2001). Consider at this point the speech made by one of MRND prominent leaders, Léon Mugesera, addressing himself to Tutsi: “I am telling you that your home is in Ethiopia, that we are going to send you back there quickly, by the Nyabarongo [River]” (Human Right Watch, 1999, p. 84). This speech was translated into reality because during the 1994 genocide, a good number of Tutsi were killed and their bodies thrown into the Nyabarongo river, a way of ‘sending them back home’.

While the first years of Habyarimana’s regime had sought to redefine and recognize the Tutsi as Rwandan citizens, from 1990 to 1994, following the RPF liberation war, Tutsi were again systematically denied citizenship; they were constantly portrayed as enemies to the nation and foreign invaders who had unlawfully occupied the land. Hutu (‘owners of the land’) were encouraged by Habyarimana’s regime to stand up and defend their nation, which led to the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. In the next subsection, a brief note on the Rwandan genocide is provided.

2.3.4. Brief note on the Rwanda genocide

This note is not intended to provide an exhaustive account of the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in 1994. The latter is very complex; unveiling complex issues around it goes beyond the scope of the present study. Other studies (e.g. Caplan, 2007; Des Forges, 2007; Hewit, 2004; Lemarchand, 2009; Mamdani, 2002) provide a more detailed account. Drawing on these works and based on my personal experience as someone who witnessed the genocide, I only highlight key elements here. This is done by answering the following questions: Who was killed? When were they killed and why? Who killed them? How and when did the genocide end?

The Rwandan genocide targeted mainly the Tutsi re-portrayed by Habyarimana's regime as 'invaders' and 'enemies'. However, the moderate Hutu, who opposed Habyarimana's ideology, were also massacred. Equally, the Hutu who offered a hiding place to the Tutsi – and later discovered – were perceived as traitors, hence killed. In total, more than a million people were killed in three months. The Rwandan genocide targeted all Tutsi: children, men, women, elderly, elite and uneducated, rich and poor, those in good health and disabled.

Though the genocide reached its climax in 1994, the Tutsi had already been targeted and massacred in early periods like 1959, 1962, 1973, and 1990. However, the systematic and massive killing lasted from 6 April until mid-July 1994. There is a series of events that led to the 1994 genocide. As discussed previously, colonialists (Germans and Belgians) transposed Hutu and Tutsi concepts from social classes into racial identities where Hutu were portrayed as 'genuine citizens' and Tutsi as 'invaders' of hamitic origin. I have already demonstrated that the first and second republics perpetrated the ethnic divide and reduced Rwandan citizenship to Hutu. I also showed that when the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) – the RPF armed wing predominantly comprising young men and women from Tutsi refugees – launched the liberation war on 1 October 1990, the anti-Tutsi campaign of extremist Hutu gained more momentum.

International pressure led Habyarimana to initiate peaceful negotiations with the RPF in Arusha, Tanzania. These negotiations reached an agreement of power sharing with RPF. However, this arrangement displeased many extremist Hutu. When Habyarimana and his Burundi counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira were coming from Arusha on 6 April 1994, their plane was shot down as it was attempting to land in Kigali. Nobody survived the airplane crash. The genocide started the very same evening; Tutsi were accused to be the ones behind the shooting down of the airplane, an accusation they rejected. But until now, the situation remains unclear as to who the real agent was behind the downing of the plane.

The killing was systemically organized by extremist Hutu. It involved soldiers, police and militia (called *Interahamwe*). These squads quickly executed Tutsi and moderate Hutu leaders. They erected checkpoints and barricades countrywide. National identity cards were used to identify and kill Tutsi. Furthermore, security forces mobilized all civilian Hutu to engage in the killing as a way of 'defending the nation'.

In this context, civilians were armed with machetes, traditional weapons and other munitions. The genocide took the form of killing, raping, mutilating the Tutsi, destroying and stealing their belongings. The RPA decided to launch a serious fight nationwide and stopped the genocide on 5 July 1994. From then onwards, a new citizenship discourse emerged and has been upheld.

2.3.5. Citizenship discourses in post-genocide Rwanda

As mentioned previously, the first two republics of Rwanda perpetuated a distorted understanding of citizenship; the latter was associated with Hutu identity. One can rightly say that the first two republics were Belgian marionettes; they were inspired by the divide-and-rule practices of European imperialism (Sundberg, 2014). On the other hand, as it is argued by a number of scholars (Hintjens, 2001; Sundberg, 2014), the post-genocide government (the government of unity and reconciliation) is expected to break away from ethnocentric divisions. It is committed to building unity and reconciliation among Rwandans. In view of this, citizenship is no longer defined on ethnic basis; it is rather founded on Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*]. In other words, national identity prevails over ethnic identities. Rwandans have decided to put aside their differences and focus on similarities. In post-genocide Rwanda the promotion of unity and reconciliation is taking place through an inclusive citizenship discourse.

The driving philosophy of post-genocide Rwanda is to go back to the origin, i.e., the authentic Rwanda before colonialism where Rwandans understood themselves as one people. In view of this, the pre-colonial period or traditional Rwanda is taken as the Golden Era (Sundberg, 2014) precisely because – according to the present-day Government of Rwanda narratives – it was characterized by unity, social harmony and patriotism.

2.4. The revived *Itorero*: A site for a new citizenship discourse

Rwanda is one of several African countries known for making good use of home grown solutions to curtail social and political ills. Such a conviction is premised on the belief that its tradition/culture holds good practices which can be adapted to

today's context and can be used as a means to addressing prevailing challenges. One of these 'good traditional practices' is '*Itorero*'[2]. The latter was a non-formal school geared towards providing the youth with a multi-faceted education: military and physical, moral and political, rhetoric and recreational. It was a channel of inculcating Rwandan values, taboos, spirit and identity in the youth with the aim of developing them into full-fledged active participants in the implementation of national programs. It ensured unity and cohesion among Rwandans. By virtue of *Itorero*, Rwanda had become a well-organized, unified and strong kingdom by the time of the arrival of German colonialists in 1899.

When colonialists (Germans from 1899 up to 1919, and Belgians from 1919 until 1962) came to Rwanda, they were amazed at its organization and harmony, which made it difficult to invade and govern (NIC, 2011). They sought to identify the source of this order, not so common to African kingdoms of the time. They found out that *Itorero*[3] was the basis of this machinery, and decided to abolish or rather thwart it by reducing its purpose to the mere learning of traditional songs and dances for entertainment purposes.

As a consequence, Rwandans were left with no forum to learn their values and taboos; their source of unity and harmony had faded away; they were left to themselves (NIC, 2011). In addition, as seen previously, colonialists made Rwandans believe that they were different; that the Tutsi, the stranger, had been oppressing the natives, the Hutu and Twa. In the long run, Rwandans became divided, hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, which culminated in the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. I argued, however, that in this process Rwandans were not only passive, inactive and being 'acted upon', but they had a hand in it.

After a series of meetings of high officials to look for ways and means to address various problems post-genocide Rwanda was dealing with, it was decided during the the 12th of November 2007 Cabinet that '*Itorero*' be restored to enable Rwandans re-

[2] I regard *Itorero* as part and parcel of what Adeyemi and Adeyinka (2003) called 'African traditional education'. Details about *Itorero* will be provided at a later stage in chapter 4.
[3] Details on principles, features and elements of *Itorero* will be elaborated on in chapter 4.

learn values and taboos of their culture. The revival of the *Itorero* programme was officially launched on the 16th of November 2007 by President Paul Kagame. By 2012, *Itorero* had trained a total of 243,284 ordinary Rwandans. In 2013, it became the National *Itorero* Commission (NIC) as per the law No. 41/2013 of 16/06/2013 which determined its mission, organization and functioning. Pursuant to article 6 of the same law, its objective consists of: “Bringing up a patriotic Rwandan who has values and taboos of the Rwandan culture and who has the culture of intore”.

Though this non-formal school has been established for all categories of Rwandans, it is compulsory mainly for all HSLs. The scheme designed for this category comprises a theoretical training phase, i.e. moral education [*Gutozwa*] for three months, and a practical one in the form of national service or volunteerism [*Urugerero*] for a period of seven months (NIC, 2012). This research focuses only on the training phase meant to convey to HSLs values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. The basis of my choice is twofold.

First, I opted for the training phase because, to the best of my knowledge, the practice of conveying cultural values and taboos as part of citizenship education is not common to many countries. On the other hand, the idea of community service is widespread in several countries. Second, I selected HSLs for the reason that they belong to the category aged below 20, which constitutes half of the population of Rwanda (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda [NISR], 2012). It is my conviction that this big proportion of Rwandans deserves special care and attention because they constitute tomorrow’s social, political and economic force.

2.5. Research objectives and questions

In light of the context discussed above, this study aims to:

- Identify the citizenship and values education notions informing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs.
- Establish whether the dominant citizenship and values education notions are helpful and desirable for post-genocide Rwanda.
- Investigate the attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards this scheme.

- Formulate actions to be taken for improving the current citizenship and values education of HSLs.

In view of the above aims, the present thesis attempts to respond to the following questions:

- What are the citizenship and values education notions informing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs?
- Are these dominant citizenship and values education notions helpful and desirable for post-genocide Rwanda?
- What are the attitudes of learners and trainers towards this scheme?
- What are the actions to be taken for improving the current citizenship and values education of HSLs?

2.6. Rationale

In the main, the present thesis contributes to the existing literature on citizenship education in two important ways. Firstly, though citizenship education has become a buzz word since the 20th century (Heater, 1990; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Vogel & Moran, 1991), there is a dearth of research on the topic in post-genocide countries. As a matter of fact, large scale citizenship studies such as CIVED (1971), CIVED (1999), ICCS (2009), and most recently ICCS (2016) included no post-genocide country except Israel, in the first two studies. The present thesis serves to fill this gap; it critically investigates the citizenship concept at work in post-genocide Rwanda with a special focus on the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs.

Secondly, Africa, to some extent, traditionally had strong educational mechanisms devised to ensure vibrant membership in the society (citizenship). Through its principles, such as "preparationalism, functionalism, communalism, perennialism and wholisticism"[4] (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003, p. 431-433), it aimed at fashioning fully

[4] Preparationalism implies that "the role of learning and teaching was to equip boys and girls with the skills appropriate to their gender in preparation for their distinctive roles in the society" (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003, p. 432). Functionalism refers to the idea that traditional educational practices in pre-colonial African societies were predominantly "practice-based and utilitarian"; it was a participatory kind of education in which people learned through imitation, initiation ceremonies, work, play, oral literature, etc (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003, p. 432). With regard to communalism, in African traditional

fledged citizens ready to play a significant role in the society. This is also evidenced in its content which comprised physical, social, and spiritual aspects (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003).

Colonialism disrupted and sometimes obliterated sage mechanisms of African Traditional Education (ATE) meant to induct young people into responsible members. Indeed, colonialists did not want to develop critical African citizens (Abdi, 2008; Antal & Easton, 2009). They introduced formal citizenship education principally designed to assist and maintain the colonial administration. Currently, in Africa, citizenship education takes various forms: formal (school based), non-formal (organized training not leading to formal certification), and informal, which is knowledge acquired through daily experience learning (Antal & Easton, 2009).

Formal citizenship education is widespread in many African countries. However, it does not yield many noteworthy results (Harber, 1997; Mhlauli, 2012; Otiende & Oanda, 2000). This is evidenced by tribal wars, the current weak popular understanding of democratic institutions, and weak inclinations towards political involvement beyond voting in parliamentary or presidential elections (Davies, 2004; Quaynor, 2015; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Besides, it is argued that formal citizenship education is less helpful due to the low priority that teachers give to the subject, and the continued predominance of didactic, teacher-centred pedagogy (Harrison & Baumgartl, 2002; Neubauer, 2012; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Formal citizenship education in Rwanda is no exception to this situation (Freedman et al., 2008; King, 2013).

In view of this context, a number of studies (e.g. Ake, 1996; Antal & Easton, 2009; Neubauer, 2012; Ogot, 1999; Osaghae, 2006) have found that there is a need to revitalize African non-formal or indigenous citizenship education practices.

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education, “all members of the society owned things in common and applied the communal spirit to life and work. Children belonged to the community and every member of the community had a stake in their upbringing” (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003, p. 432). As to perennialism, it indicates that in most traditional communities in Africa, education was perceived “as a vehicle for maintaining or preserving the cultural heritage and status quo” (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003, p. 433). Finally, with wholisticism, African traditional education “provided little or no room for specialization; it equipped both boys and girls to undertake a multitude of occupations with required related skills” (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003, p. 433).

Nevertheless, this does not mean that African Traditional Education – ATE (or *Itorero*, for that matter) was a perfect, healthy and strong citizenship education program without notable deficiencies. Rather, the idea is that citizenship education in today's Africa should draw on its cultural heritage and adapt its good practices to today's situation and demands. It is in this context that the post-genocide Rwanda appealed to its traditional citizenship education school, *Itorero.*

Despite this strong invitation to build on African indigenous practices in citizenship education, little attention has been paid to the evaluation of its implementation. The present research aims to fill this gap. It strives to assess the extent to which the current *Itorero* avoids the problems of traditional African education practices, chief among which is indoctrination, as opposed to reflective thinking (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003). This raises the question: Are the citizenship and values education notions guiding the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs desirable and helpful for post-genocide Rwanda?

Citizenship education – as it is practiced in post-genocide Rwanda – is 'values-explicit'. While research indicates that 'values-explicit' approach is criticized for being biased and indoctrinating students (Kerr, 1999), only a limited number of studies have been conducted to substantiate this claim. The present thesis also contributes to filling this gap. It seeks to investigate the extent to which *Itorero* training – by teaching HSLs values and taboos of the Rwandan culture – avoids the problems encountered by 'values-explicit' approaches, which are predominantly bias and the indoctrination of students.

It is hoped that the present study will inform users (policy makers) of African traditional models in citizenship education on other parts of the continent. Strengths and weaknesses of traditional models in citizenship education will be known. Furthermore, this study aims to contribute to the improvement of citizenship education of HSLs, which is crucial for the reconstruction process of Rwanda. In a nutshell, it is hoped that researchers and educationalists will benefit from this study in terms of citizenship and values education practices in a post-genocide context, the use of indigenous programs of citizenship education, and the contextual framework of citizenship and values education.

It is true that the 1994 genocide perpertrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda involved ethnic issues. The present thesis, however, does not address the question of ethnicity *per se*. The question of ethnicity is simply discussed in relation to 'Rwandanness' (putting the Rwandan identity above all other identities and/or affiliations) as one of seven values fostered by *Itorero* teaching. While it is possible and even attractive to investigate the problem of ethnicity in post-genocide Rwanda, particularly the 'de-ethnicisation project', the present thesis leaves such a consideration to other studies.

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter provided a general background to the research. It was shown that the distorted understanding of citizenship that dominated the colonial era as well the post-independence period largely contributed to the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. I argued that to break away with the past, the Rwandan Government of unity and reconciliation advances an inclusive citizenship discourse through *Itorero*. In this regard, special emphasis is placed on the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs, which is the focus of the present study. It was made clear that the present thesis aims, firstly, to identify citizenship and values education notions informing this scheme; secondly, it establishes HSLs' and trainers' attitudes pertaining to it. Finally, the gap that the present study attempts to fill was articulated. In the following chapter, I provide general considerations on citizenship and values education.

CHAPTER 3

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CITIZENSHIP AND VALUES EDUCATION

3.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it clarifies the notion of citizenship by providing its historical background, dimensions and boundaries. Second, it examines the concept of values education as a facet of citizenship education. Next, it explores considerations on citizenship education both globally and on the African continent.

3.2. Background and history: Classical and modern notions of citizenship

Citizenship is a rather contested, complex and ambiguous concept (Oliver & Heater, 1994; Ramphele, 2001; Riesenberg, 1992; Wayne, 2004). Indeed, though utilized on many occasions and by various categories of users, though inherent within us – because we are citizens of a certain country, the concept of citizenship is unfamiliar to many of us. It is like we are dwelling in a house with which we are not sufficiently acquainted.

The difficulty of defining citizenship is due in part to the intricacy in coming to a common agreement as to what the construct refers to. In fact, “there is no consensus on what citizenship means” (Wayne, 2004, p. 249). Furthermore, it is argued that even if difficulties of definition and consensus were overcome, still the issue of clarity would remain. In this regard, Riesenberg has this to say:

> Citizenship is not as clear. There is no single office in which its essence is defined. It has no central mission, nor is it clearly an office, a theory, or a legal contract. We know where a monarch sits: on a throne in a palace. But we cannot place citizenship that easily. [...] Nor is citizenship complete in any single or simple person, place, or, more abstractly, situation, for history has witnessed a great variety of citizenships, each with its defining goals and powers. And if it resides in no definite place, it comes out of no single book fully. (Riesenberg, 1992, p. xvi)

Our task seems tremendous: Where shall we locate the meaning of citizenship? If ever established, would it win consensus and bring clarity? Though citizenship is a

contested, complex and ambiguous concept, Carr (1991, p. 374) reminds that contested concepts have the “uncontested common core” by virtue of which they convey a certain message. This tends to suggest that the daily use of the concept ‘citizenship’ presupposes a certain grasp of general ideas it is associated with. This research takes the following working definition: “Citizenship is normally taken to mean the membership of and participation in the activities of a community or group communities” (Bailey, 1998, p. 14). As we shall see later, this definition is inspired by communitarianism. And yet, communitarianism competes with other citizenship perspectives, such as liberalism and civic republicanism (Arthur & Cremin, 2012). At this juncture, I examine various perceptions of citizenship throughout history.

3.2.1. Classical citizenship

In this section, I explore citizenship in Ancient Greece (Sparta and Athens), in Republican and imperial Rome, and finally during the Middle Ages era.

3.2.1.1. Greek citizenship: Sparta and Athens

It is argued that the chief idea recapitulating the system of citizenship upbringing in Sparta is *agogé*[5]*.* The latter entailed learning and singing about past heroic deeds, but also and more importantly to undergo the most demanding training in military skills and most unremitting discipline (Heater, 2004; Oliver & Heater, 1994). The end result of *agogé* was to produce physically and morally strong males and females who would serve in the Spartan army. A citizen was one who had successfully undergone this twofold training.

In contrast, while Sparta was emphasizing mainly military training, Athens had come to establish a kind of balance of civilian elements. Therefore, the military training was “softened with a meaning of civil excellence and political wisdom” (Heater, 2004, p.

[5] According to the Greek-English Lexicon (1948, p. 18), *agogé* is a Greek term which means “behaviour”. However, there is also a second meaning associated with this concept: *agogé* mainly refers to the rigorous education and training regimen mandated for all male Spartan citizens. It encouraged conformity and the importance of the Spartan state over one's personal interests and generated the future elites of Sparta.

457) through some political, moral and religious education. The whole education system dedicated to this end was termed *ephebia.* Put differently, while in Sparta citizenship emphasized military/physical and moral strength, in Athens citizenship was associated with both military skills and political wisdom.

However, as Faulks (2000) argues, there are noticeable common elements related to the practice of citizenship in Sparta and Athens. First, in both places, the citizen meant somebody well trained to participate not only in public life but also ready to defend the community. Second, the emphasis was laid on duties and obligations. In other words, the obligations of citizenship permeated all aspects in the *polis*; citizenship and the *polis* were one and the same thing. But it is essential to indicate that obligations generally did not take the form of statutory duties. Rather, they were perceived by citizens as opportunities to be virtuous and to serve the community. The idea here is that to the citizen of the polis, civic virtue was freedom, and the primary source of honour and respect. Third, the polis (or city-state) was considered as prior to, and constitutive of, the individual. Fourth, in Sparta and Athens the status of citizenship was highly exclusive: children, slaves and foreigners were not considered citizens. As far as women were concerned, while they were excluded from citizenship in Athens, in Sparta they were very powerful and enjoyed many freedoms. Expected to raise strong children, Spartan women were themselves very strong and experienced in combat.

3.2.1.2. Citizenship in republican and imperial Rome

In republican Rome, citizenship was “tied closely to political participation” (Faulks, 2000, p. 19). Put differently, the idea of ‘political agency’ prevalent in Sparta and Athens is carried over while the aspect of military fitness is left aside. In republican Rome, a citizen was expected to participate actively in public affairs.

During the Roman imperial age, on the other hand, citizenship acquired quite a different meaning. It was no longer attached to political participation; instead, it meant being protected by the law or enjoying judicial safeguard. Here the status of citizenship became detached from an ethic of participation and was increasingly a thin and legalistic concept. Faulks (2000, p. 19) outlines the reason behind such a conception as follows: “the idea of citizenship as an expression of common interests,

political agency and the fulfillment of human potential is replaced by a somewhat more cynical view of citizenship as an instrument of social control". The point here is that the Roman Empire extended citizenship to all conquered people in order to contain sources of social discontent. It was a way of ensuring its legitimacy and maintaining social control. In short, at this particular time, citizenship was mainly understood in the context of legal protection, i.e., the enjoyment of the right of *habeas corpus*[6]. Those made 'citizens' enjoyed the protection by the law; they were placed under the safeguard of the rule of law.

3.2.1.3. Citizenship during the Middle Ages era

During the medieval period, the context of citizenship changed. Indeed, the focus was no longer the pursuit of honor through the exercise of citizenship, but rather the search for personal salvation (Faulks, 2000). The authority of church over state made the former the focus in terms of loyalty and moral guidance. People were no longer interested in worldly fame arrived at through civic virtue; they were rather after salvation achieved by self-contemplation and prayer. In this regard, Augustine argues that individuals should not concern themselves with temporal life and should instead turn inwards to self-contemplation and prayer (cited in Clarke, 1994). In brief, the practice of citizenship during the middle ages was not pronounced, because the period was mainly religion dominated and there was limited interest in politics and military/physical training. People focused mainly on the salvation of their souls, and the attention to worldly fame was very minimal.

However, the practice of citizenship – as participation – continued to find expression in Italian city-republics, mainly Florence and Venice. These cities were inspired by the Greek practice of citizenship. In their conception of citizenship, they included an ethic of participation which was almost non-existent during this period. With modernity came a new form of citizenship.

[6] *Habeas corpus* is a Latin sentence literally meaning 'you have the body'. The right to *habeas corpus* entails that a warden should bring the prisoner before the judge in due time to justify the prisoner's detention. It is a right protecting people against arbitrary arrest and detention; briefly, it allows them to enjoy the 'due process of the law' (Yackle, 1985).

3.2.2. Modern citizenship: From the French Revolution to date

It is argued by a number of scholars (e.g. Faulks, 2000; Oliver & Heater, 1994; Parker, 2003; Riesenberg, 1992) that the modern notion of citizenship emphasizes the following elements: establishment of the direct relationship between the individual and the state; freedom and equality; and recognition and enjoyment of rights (legal, civil, political and social) by all people. According to Faulks (2000), there are a number of factors underscoring the emergence of such a citizenship concept. They include: the separation between church and state, the separation between religion and politics, the development of the liberal state, the struggle of social movements (women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, sexual minorities), and the triumph of capitalism.

Riesenberg (1992, p. xviii-xix) calls Greek citizenship "first citizenship" and the modern variety "second citizenship". He goes on to contrast the two types of citizenship and notes that while the first version of citizenship is always partial, the second one is universal; based on birth or other specified requirements. In first citizenship, political participation was emphasized. As Parker (2003) argues, in Sparta and Athens, political engagement was an essential requirement of citizenship. A citizen was expected to take an active role in the 'polis'.

Put differently, with first citizenship, there was no room for political apathy and the community survived because of the contribution of each member, which could take the form of military action and battlefield death. On the other hand, under second citizenship prevalent in modern times, personal heroism is not expected or needed from all; the financial support of the hardworking class is reasonably accepted as a valid form of commitment.

In brief, with modern citizenship, the contribution to the well-being and development of the community is not necessarily achieved through direct political involvement or military action, but also – for example – by financial contribution via taxes. While first citizenship sacrificed the individual for the sake of the community, the second re-establishes the priority of the individual over community. In first citizenship, only duties and obligations were put forward; in the second, rights and entitlements are acknowledged. In a nutshell, classical and modern citizenship differ by virtue of the dimension of citizenship they underline.

3.3. Dimensions of citizenship

The historical approach enabled us to have an idea of citizenship. However, there is a need to further our understanding of this concept by outlining its dimensions. The question is: What does citizenship imply? Which powers and privileges does it procure? Citizenship has legal, political and social dimensions.

3.3.1. Legal dimension: Citizenship as a legal status

In our previous definition, we said that citizenship entails membership of a community and participation in its activities. This understanding refers mainly to the civil aspect of citizenship. But citizenship is also a legal status. Legally speaking, the status of citizenship is granted according to three major modalities: *Jus soli*, *Jus sanguinis* and naturalization. In most cases, countries adopt a combination of two or all of these criteria (Adejumobi, 2001; Oliver & Heater, 1994). The *Jus soli* modality entails that any person born in the territory of a country is automatically given citizenship. It is a kind of citizenship obtained via birth in a territory. This is the case for instance in the United States. By *Jus sanguinis*, citizenship is granted by virtue of one's parents. It is citizenship by descent or ancestral claims. For instance, if either of one's parents is an American citizen, automatically the child gains U.S. citizenship. It is also the practice in Germany. The modality of *naturalization* refers to a series of processes put in place by various countries to grant citizenship otherwise than by territory or birth. In this case, each country establishes its own scheme (Adejumobi, 2001).

All this tends to suggest that the legal dimension of citizenship has to do with rights, entitlements and privileges that citizenship procures, like the right to vote, to stand for election, to own property, etc. The person is under the protection of the law by virtue of which she enjoys those rights. This legal dimension has been explored at length by Marshall (1964). Though the main concern for Marshall was to provide a historical development of the concept of citizenship, in so doing he perceives citizenship as a blend of *civil*, *political* and *social rights*.

According to Marshall (1964), civil rights (an 18th century notion) encompass rights necessary for individual freedom, such as personal liberty, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. Institutions in charge of upholding civil rights are courts of justice. Political rights (19th century), on the other hand, refer to the right to participate in the exercise of political power. Parliament and councils of local government are institutions in charge of enforcing these rights. Finally, social rights (20th century) point to economic and social welfare, which is placed under the direct responsibility of two institutions: education system and social services. Referring to the historical background discussed previously, at this juncture, we realize that the legal dimension is highlighted by the Roman Empire and the modern type of citizenship. As a legal status, citizenship allows a legitimate participation in the political life of one's community.

3.3.2. Political dimension: Citizenship as political agency

The idea of citizenship entails political participation. A citizen is expected to be interested in what happens on the political scene and have a stake in it. However, levels of participation may differ, depending on various factors. The active participation in political matters ensures that individuals are citizens and not subjects. While citizens are active in political life, subjects are denied the chance to influence public decisions. As Phelan (2001) noted, the citizen is not a consumer of rights and privileges, but an active member in the public deliberation and decision making that produces law and policy.

Fundamental to the political dimension of citizenship is the idea of participation which is generally understood in terms of contributing to decision-making, deliberation, policy formulation, elections, referendums, opinion polls, etc. However, political participation does not suggest that all citizens (the *demos* or populace) will have to have a say directly about all issues at stake. Not only does the size of current modern societies make direct participation impossible, there is quite a wide range of matters which a large number of citizens are ignorant about. This requires the expertise of those who are knowledgeable (elites or professionals). Therefore, citizens may participate either directly or through representation, depending on the

nature and scope of the issue at stake. As our historical sketch demonstrates, the political dimension was emphasized in Greek citizenship (Sparta and Athens), and in Republican Rome. A citizen enjoys legal protection and participates in the political life of the community. But more importantly, she lives a more fulfilling social life by feeling at home in the community of which she is part.

3.3.3. Social dimension: Citizenship as social identity

When one is asked: 'Who are you?' He/she would most likely say: 'I am a Rwandan', or 'I am a South African' in response. People normally identify themselves with their countries and homelands. This practice is very revealing as it clearly demonstrates that citizenship is a recognized status (legal dimension), a practice (political dimension), but also a feeling (social dimension). It is a feeling of being at home, a feeling of belonging to a community (Osler & Starkey, 2005).

Staeheli and Hammett (2010) develop further this understanding of citizenship as a status, practice and feeling. They argue that citizenship as *status* is rooted in constitutions and jurisprudence; it involves the legal conditions of citizenship, including who can be a citizen and the rights and responsibilities they carry. On the other hand, citizenship as a *feeling* reflects the importance of an affective sense of belonging to a political community and the sense of solidarity that comes from citizenship. As for the *practice* of citizenship, it draws on the awareness that people have of their relationships with other citizens, which draws them into collective activities.

Staeheli and Hammett (2010) maintain that these three elements of citizenship (status, feeling, and practice) are presented as mutually reinforcing. In fact, a legal standing not only enhances the feeling of belonging, but also provides the basis for claims against exclusion. A feeling of belonging makes people more likely to participate in civic affairs as active citizens, while participation tends to reinforce the feeling of belonging. Also, holding a legal status often subtly compels people to behave in certain ways as citizens.

Indeed, citizenship gives identity, recognition and acceptance within and outside the community. Consequently, the state is expected to ensure that its citizens are

nationally, regionally and internationally recognized and accepted with the required sense of dignity. In view of this observation, citizenship is thought to cover both the fair treatment in the home country and protection abroad (Phelan, 2001). In a nutshell, citizenship as social identity countervails all forms of discrimination and exclusion of minority groups on whichever basis: gender, race, social status, religion, language, sexual orientation, etc. Being granted legal citizenship and yet being continuously perceived as an intruder to the community is undesirable. A person may fully exercise her rights and participate in the political life; but, if she is always perceived as an 'invader' in the community, she will never feel fulfilled. The social dimension is alive with modern citizenship which, among other things, recognizes the importance of social rights.

I now demarcate possible boundaries of citizenship. The question is: What are the possible ways of exercising citizenship as status, practice and feeling? It seems that citizenship unfolds in various degrees.

3.4. Boundaries and binaries of citizenship: Minimal/maximal, thin/thick, passive/active

Citizenship has been demarcated along certain boundaries or binaries by a number of authors (e.g. Bubeck, 1995; Faulks, 2000; Isin & Turner, 2002; McLaughlin, 1992). It would be difficult to review all divisions associated with the concept of citizenship. At this point, I only focus on the main recurrent binaries.

After laying down four major features of citizenship (identity, virtues, extent of political involvement and social prerequisites), McLaughlin (1992) presents citizenship as a continuum with two endings: *minimal* and *maximal*. Minimally, the identity conferred on an individual by citizenship is merely seen in formal, legal, and juridical terms. Therefore, a citizen is one who has a certain civil status, with its associated rights. On maximal views, the identity is enriched and conceived in social, cultural and political terms. In this context, a citizen must have a "consciousness of him or herself as a member of a living community with a shared democratic culture involving obligations and responsibilities as well as rights, a sense of the common good and fraternity" (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 236).

The feature of virtue can also be understood in the categories of minimal and maximal[7]. Minimally, virtues required from the citizen are loyalty and responsibility, and a good citizen is therefore one who is "law abiding and public spirited" (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 236). Maximally, on the other hand, citizens are viewed as "requiring a more extensive focus for their loyalty and responsibility" (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 236).

Political participation in its minimal view is depicted as the mere task of voting for representatives, while the maximal understanding would focus on full participation to democracy (McLaughlin, 1992). This entails that, maximally, political participation implies for instance holding leadership positions, partaking in decision making, advocating for change, etc. Social prerequisites in their minimal form are to be understood as granting the formal legal status. The maximalist view would be to insist that social disadvantages of various kinds be considered (McLaughlin, 1992).

We notice that minimal citizenship tends to focus mainly on the legal dimension (simply meeting one's obligations and enjoying one's rights), while maximal citizenship encompasses all dimensions: legal, political and social. It goes beyond legal obligations and strives to contribute to the improvement of the governance and social welfare of one's country.

Considering the focal point of the content of citizenship, either in terms of rights or duties, two types of citizenship emerge: *thin* and *thick*, *passive* and *active* (Bubeck, 1995; Faulks, 2000; Isin & Turner, 2002). Thin citizenship puts forward rights and entitlements. It is not so much concerned with active civic participation. It is rather passive, just being concerned with legal status (Faulks, 2000). In this context, we can rightly say that citizenship in the imperial Rome and modern citizenship fall into the thin citizenship category. On the other hand, thick citizenship designates mainly active and selfless participation in public matters (Faulks, 2000). It implies total commitment to the promotion of public interests at the expense of personal wills. One can rightly say that minimal and thin citizenship notions have a lot in common;

[7] It is important to note that the binary 'minimal'/'maximal' relates mainly to forms of life and not just incidental events like voting.

equally, maximal and thick citizenship views tend to coincide. It is also worth noting that thick citizenship was prevalent in ancient Greece (Sparta and Athens).

According to Kymlicka and Norman (1994), it is noteworthy that there is a tendency among some scholars to denigrate thin citizenship and elevate thick citizenship. However, other scholars such as Faulks (2000) argue for a well-balanced appreciation of both types and urge that they be considered as complementary and mutually enriching. In my opinion, this observation makes sense. For instance, during elections, people are expected to exhibit thick and active citizenship by voting. But the rest of the time when there is no compelling political activity, they should be left free to pursue their own business; here they are thin and passive citizens.

As mentioned earlier, several other categorizations of citizenship have been introduced; yet, providing an exhaustive inventory is beyond the scope of the present study. Reference is made here to divisions such as parochial/subject/participant citizenship (Almond & Verba, 1963); abandonment/activity citizenship (Cohen, 2013); the personal responsibility/participation/justice driven citizenship (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004); state-based/liberal/cosmopolitan/social justice citizenship (Sears & Hughes, 1996); and autarchic/autonomous citizenship (Galston, 1989).

At this juncture, I wish to acknowledge the possibility of analyzing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs using citizenship dimensions (legal, political, social) and binaries (minimal/maximal, thin/thick, passive/active) as a conceptual framework. However, in the present thesis I prefer to engage with citizenship conceptions (civic republicanism, communitarianism, liberalism, cosmopolitanism and radical democracy) to be addressed at a later stage in chapter 5, particularly because they assume, accommodate and incorporate citizenship dimensions and binaries. I am of the view that analyzing the *Itorero* training for HSLs by means of citizenship conceptions yields a richer analysis.

After grappling with the notion of citizenship and its historical background, dimensions and boundaries, I now consider the concept of citizenship education. This will help establish the relationship between citizenship and values education.

3.5. General considerations on citizenship education

In general terms, citizenship education is to be understood as the transmission of knowledge, skills, values and attitudes that will enable young people to participate meaningfully in the community of which they are part, locally, nationally, and globally (Arthur, Davies & Hahn, 2008). Given the complexity of citizenship as a concept, there is a plethora of approaches to citizenship education. In fact, the latter raises a serious concern because there is no agreement as for its content and mode of delivery[8]: "Disagreement is rife about what citizenship means and consequently about the educational processes most appropriate to support citizenry status, role and qualities" (Heater, 1990, p. 310).

In terms of content, citizenship education depends on a multifaceted conglomeration of factors which are specific to each and every country (Arthur et al., 2008; Staeheli & Hammett, 2010; Steiner-Kramsi, Turney-Purta & Schwille, 2002). So, "there is a lack of agreement on the specific content that should be included" (Arthur et al. 2008, p. 490). However, whichever content a country may choose, citizenship education materials would include possible areas such as "national history, constitution and political systems, citizen and human rights, international organizations and relations, economic and welfare, media, environmental issues and civic virtues" (Torney-Purta et al., 2001, p. 163). It should also be noted that philosophies of education (in this case citizenship education) are often informed or influenced by political goals. According to the Crick's Report (1998), there are three strands of effective citizenship education: political literacy, moral and social responsibility, and community engagement.

As far as the mode of delivery is concerned, citizenship education may be formal, non-formal and informal. Formal citizenship education is part of the curriculum in primary and high school. It is usually associated with certification and includes education and training in the school. It has a sequential curriculum and an

[8] For instance, according to Arthur and Cremin (2012, p. 37), citizenship education can be understood as a "curriculum" (a subject in its own right or something informing other subjects), a "culture" (a matter of atmosphere or ethos in which the interaction between members of the school community allow for citizenship to be 'caught' and not 'taught'), and a "community" (citizenship is achieved through activity with the local, national and/or global community).

established structure of assessment (Chioncel & Jansen, 2004). Formal citizenship education can be a specific subject; integrated with social science subjects; integrated across all subjects, or as an extra-curricular activity (Arthur et al., 2008). On the other hand, non-formal citizenship education refers to all systematic or well-organized educational interventions outside the formal system. It is a kind of state intervention in post-school learning (Chioncel & Jansen, 2004). According to Sutherland (2001) formal and non-formal citizenship education strands constitute 'taught' citizenship. Finally, the informal citizenship education is to be understood as the unorganized, unsystematic, and/or unintended lifelong learning at home, work, and through the media (Chioncel & Jansen, 2004). Sutherland (2001) calls it 'caught' citizenship.

In the context of Rwanda, citizenship education takes these three orientations: formal, non-formal and informal. Formal citizenship education is termed 'political education' (Ministry of Education [MINEDUC], 2008b), and it is a specific subject of its own in high schools. In primary schools, citizenship education is called 'social studies' (MINEDUC, 2008a) and is taught as a separate subject. Informal citizenship education is the daily learning experience of all Rwandans. In this research, I am not concerned with these two types of citizenship. Rather, my focus is on the non-formal citizenship education scheme devised for HSLs. As said earlier, I opted for it because it stands out as original and to some extent unique to Rwanda in as much as it teaches specific values and taboos.

3.6. Citizenship and values education

As mentioned previously, citizenship is a broad and complex concept (Van Gunsteren, 1998). Consequently, citizenship education lends itself to different interpretations and approaches. Fundamental to approaches used in citizenship education is to establish whether it should be 'values-neutral' or 'values-explicit'. Put differently, as Kerr (1999, p. 9) argues, the question goes as follows: "Should citizenship education promote distinct values – a nationally accepted system of public values and beliefs, or should it take a neutral stance to values and controversial issues, leaving the decision to the individual?" The idea here is to decide whether citizenship should be a 'private' or 'public' matter.

Some scholars (e.g. Kerr, 1999; McLaughlin, 1992) maintain that countries which take citizenship as 'values-neutral' promote a 'thin' or 'minimal' conception of citizenship education; nations that advocate citizenship as 'values-explicit' are committed to a 'thick', or 'maximal' citizenship education. However, research reveals that the two positions have their inherent problems. While the 'values-explicit' approach is criticized for being biased and indoctrinating students, the 'values-neutral' approach is reproached for failing to help students to deal adequately with real-life and controversial issues (Kerr, 1999).

In the context of post-genocide Rwanda, particularly in relation to the scheme meant for HSLs, citizenship education provided in *Itorero* is 'values-explicit', which explicates the phrasing of my research topic as 'citizenship and values education in post-genocide Rwanda'. As mentioned previously, the law establishing the NIC clearly stipulates that its mission consists of "Bringing up a patriotic Rwandan who has *values* and *taboos* of the Rwandan culture" (law No. 41/2013 of 16/06/2013, article 6 – emphasis added). The present research, among other things, will seek to answer the following question: To what extent does the citizenship education scheme for HSLs avoid the problems encountered by 'values-explicit' approaches such as bias and indoctrination of students? In what follows, I consider values education and attempt to demarcate its contours.

3.7. Values education

When it comes to defining values, one realizes that there have been as many definitions as writers. In this section, I take values to mean "principles, fundamental convictions, ideals, standards or life stances which act as general guides to behaviour or as points of reference in decision making" (Halstead & Taylor, 1996, p. 4). There are various types of values: social, political, moral, artistic, cultural, religious, etc. My concern here is mainly with moral values. The difficulties involved in defining values unveil problems associated with their origin. Where do values come from? These difficulties also point to the intricacy of values education.

Two major answers are provided to the question of the origin of values: relativism and moral universalism. According to relativism, values have no independent or

objective existence. They are mere inventions of either societies/cultures (cultural relativism) or individuals (individual relativism). Relativism denies the possibility of upholding universal values and argues that values change and differ across time and space. Two movements or broad theoretical orientations underpin the defence of relativism: postmodernism and multiculturalism.

Postmodernism in its epistemological form postulates the existence of multiple, context and/or culturally dependent knowledges and truths. This view leads to moral relativism, which postulates that there is no universal good, and that 'right', 'good', and 'moral' vary from context to context, from culture to culture. Finally, the multiculturalism characterizing today's society has implied the profusion of alternative modes of thinking and consciousness, which makes it impossible to prefer one point of view to another. All are equally valid (Halstead & Taylor, 1996).

If values are relative to culture, society and individuals, how is it possible to teach them? Unlike relativism, moral universalism on the other hand is the view that values have objective and universal existence. It follows that moral values transcend cultures, societies and individuals.

How do we overcome the relativism-universalism conundrum? On the one hand, relativism is right as it warns against the danger of believing that all values constitute universal and absolute standards[9]. Indeed, some values are cultural or individual products. In other words, certain values change from one society to the other, in time and space. For instance, while in patriarchal societies the dowry is paid by men, in matriarchal ones it is done by women. However, moral universalism is also right because there are some values that transcend cultures and individuals. They cut across society, time and space, like respecting other people's lives and property, telling the truth, etc. However, I am not suggesting that these values are absolute – which is, of course, not required by universalism.

Values education is premised on the view that there are values that can be established as meaningful to all humankind, irrespective of individual, social and cultural circumstances. It also stems from the conviction that it is important for a

[9] Of course, it can only do so implicitly – since explicit advocacy would violate its own relativist logic.

society to transmit its core values to younger generations. Thus, we can understand values education as “the explicit attempt to teach criteria for determining levels of goodness, worth, or beauty” (Superka, 1976, p. xiv).

Values education is the responsibility of several institutions, such as the family, church, school and the state. In this research, we are concerned with values education as envisaged by the state in the framework of citizenship education. We focus on values education involved in *Itorero* for HSLs in post-genocide Rwanda.

The following section considers the situation of citizenship education in the world and in Africa in general as this will allow us to locate the concern of Rwanda in educating its youth for citizenship.

3.8. Citizenship education in the world: International trends

The importance of citizenship education worldwide cannot be overstated. If citizenship education is broadly understood as the preparation of young people for their roles and responsibilities as citizens – and in particular the role of education in that preparatory process (Kerr, 1999), it is safe to say that no country can afford to devote anything less than complete and unwavering attention to this task.

It is argued that citizenship education gained momentum internationally in the 1960s when researchers in the field of political socialization started to investigate how young people acquired knowledge and developed the skills necessary for undertaking their roles as citizens in democracies (Hahn, 2010). Research also shows that the era after 1990 represents a revival in the interest in different aspects of citizenship (Deželan, 2009). As a matter of fact, Isin and Turner (2002) maintain that more than fifty per cent of all scientific literature on citizenship was published after 1990. It is therefore affirmed that citizenship has become the "buzz word" among thinkers across the political spectrum (Heater, 1990, p. 293; Vogel & Moran, 1991, p. x).

The question one might ask pertains to the reason behind such a revival. According to Kymlicka and Norman (1994), there is a series of factors that contributed to the resurgence of the interest in citizenship education worldwide. They include issues

such as low voter turnouts and concerns about civic disengagement among the youth, increasing cultural diversity and concerns about social cohesion, and growing awareness of large-scale problems like climate change that require commitments of individual citizens and larger political bodies alike.

Furthermore, in the present-day world, the vast majority of nations tend to adopt some form of democracy. Given that democracy is 'the rule of the people, by the people and for the people' (Abraham Lincoln), it requires people's participation in the governance of the nation. It follows that for individuals to exercise their sovereignty, they need to be trained. Citizenship education serves to fill this gap; hence its resurgence. This situation suggests that the concept of citizenship in contemporary modern societies is primarily linked to the notion of democracy (Thayer-Bacon, 2008; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004).

Looking at the world or international trend, reference to citizenship education involves a series of terms, such as civics, social sciences, social studies, world studies, studies of society, political education, life skills, and moral education. Research also indicates that citizenship education – in its formal form – is related to other areas of knowledge mainly history, geography, economics, law, politics, environmental studies, values education, religious studies, languages and sciences (Kerr, 1999). Moreover, the shape that citizenship education takes is greatly influenced by prevailing historical, cultural and social context.

Broadly speaking, approaches to citizenship education vary in relation to targeted aims or goals, which leads to three strands of citizenship education: education *about* citizenship; education *through* citizenship, and education *for* citizenship (Kerr, 1999). Education *about* citizenship is concerned with providing students with sufficient knowledge and understanding of national history and the structures and processes of government and political life. On the other hand, education *through* citizenship goes further than education about citizenship; it allows students to learn by doing and encourages active participation. Finally, education *for* citizenship is the highest form. It accommodates and supersedes the two previous versions precisely because it provides students with knowledge, understanding, skills, aptitudes, values and dispositions for them to take actively and responsibly their roles in society. Research shows that most countries are inclined towards education *about* citizenship given

that it is easy to teach and measure. Does citizenship education in post-genocide Rwanda reflect these trends?

A number of large scale studies have been conducted on citizenship education the world over. However, much of it has been about the situation in Europe, North and Latin America. African countries have not received much attention on these cross-national studies. For instance, Neubauer (2012) provides a detailed review of such studies with a special focus on Europe. They include studies, such as CIVED (1971); CIVED (1999); ICCS (2009); Harrison and Baumgartl (2002); Holford and Edirisingha (2000); Bîrzéa et al. (2004); Chioncel and Jansen (2004); Eurydice (2005); and De Weerd, Gemmeke, Rigter and Van Rij (2005).

Another comprehensive review of studies on citizenship education worldwide (The Americas, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Africa and the Middle East) is arguably to be found in the work of Hahn (2010). Overall, Hahn (2010) outlines the following five major conclusions on the status of citizenship education in the world: (i) Deliberate civic instruction may enhance civic knowledge, but civics courses or lessons alone tend to have little, if any, effect on student civic political attitudes. (ii) When civic education incorporates active, participatory learning activities and there is an open climate for discussion, then students may develop democratic attitudes. (iii) Students' and teachers' understandings of concepts, such as democracy, citizenship, participation, and rights, vary according to the particular culture in which individuals are socialized. (iv) Notions of identity are multilayered, flexible, and complex. (v) Implanting civic education in divided and post-conflict societies poses particular challenges.

Building on these earlier findings, the present thesis notes that civic education in divided and post-conflict societies poses particular challenges. My intention in this research is to investigate how post-genocide Rwanda prepares its youth (mainly HSLs) for citizenship with specific focus on *Itorero* devised for this category. More precisely, I engage with the following questions: What is the citizenship concept that post-genocide Rwanda is working with? Which values notion is it relying on? What are the attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards the *Itorero* training scheme? In the following section, I discuss the situation of citizenship education in Africa. It is reasonably assumed that the situation of citizenship education in Africa shapes and

informs, to some extent, the nature of citizenship education in post-genocide Rwanda.

3.9. Citizenship education in Africa

Educating young Africans for citizenship in the 21st century is of paramount importance. In fact, it has been shown that in sub-Saharan Africa, youth currently make up a large portion of the population, with 43% of the population under the age of 14 (UNESCO, 2011). In this context, as Quaynor (2015) argues, the future of the political landscape in Africa largely depends on how young people conceptualize the notion of being 'a good citizen'. In other words, the ways that young people understand and enact citizenship will shape the direction of their nations and continent.

One of the most striking observations about research on citizenship education in Africa is that large scale international studies, such as CIVED (1971), CIVED (1999), ICCS (2009) and recently the ICCS (2016) included no countries from the continent (Quaynor, 2015; Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, Kerr & Losito, 2010; Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Torney-Purta, Schwille and Amadeo, 1999). This situation tends to suggest that citizenship education in Africa is under-researched. Thus, while there is an explosion of research on how individual countries educate young people for citizenship, there is a dearth of research on the general situation of citizenship education in Africa. In what follows, I historicise the practice of citizenship education in Africa starting with the colonial period.

It would be rather contentious to advance the idea that there was citizenship education in Africa under the colonial rule. As indicated previously, programs of citizenship education were non-existent during the colonial rule, for colonialists did not want to develop critical African citizens (Abdi, 2008). Rather, with the exception of some remnants of ATE, it was after political independence that citizenship education in Africa can be re-envisaged. My argument here is that the liberation of Africa came with responsibility: the cultural, political, social and economic fate of Africa was placed in the hands of Africans themselves. Therefore, there was a need to have a high profile civic education in order to provide young Africans with

knowledge, skills, values and attitudes necessary for them to play their role in society. However, the current situation where most African countries have been ravaged by wars and conflicts suggests that citizenship education provided by post-colonial states might have been deficient in some ways.

The idea is that in the post-colonial era, the ruling African elite did not engage in the development of viable and expansively constructive political education except in some limited civics instruction cases that were primarily designed to ensure the loyalty of the public to the military rulers and civilian dictators (Abdi, 2008). Hence, there is a need to rethink and revisit the ways through which sub-Saharan African nations engage with citizenship education.

Research (e.g. Harber, 1997; Mhlauli, 2012; Otiende & Oanda, 2000) suggests that in Africa citizenship education takes three forms, namely formal, non-formal and informal. Though the formal paradigm is the most widespread, it is seriously problematic. In what follows, I discuss problems associated with formal citizenship education in Africa.

Previous studies suggest that there is a strong correlation between citizenship education and formal education attainment (Dalton, 1996; Nie, Junn & Stehlik-Barry, 1996). The idea is that formal education is likely to encourage active citizenship. As a matter of fact, formal education is strongly linked to political knowledge, interest and involvement (Dalton, 1996). According to Nie et al. (1996), formal education is almost without exception the strongest factor in explaining what citizens do in politics and how they think about politics.

Though post-colonial states in Africa were committed to expanding access to education as a way of creating ‘good citizens’, i.e., well-informed, knowledgeable, and with problem-solving skills, it has been shown that a large number of people have never been inside a formal school, because African countries found themselves unable to meet their promises of providing education for all, chiefly due to limited financial means (Mhlauli, 2012). However, many African children who have had an opportunity to access formal schooling have been educated in schools either run by non-democratic or less than democratic states; hence, they exhibit poor democratic literacy (Harber, 1997; Otiende & Oanda, 2000). In addition, I argue that the teaching and learning style in most African schools focus on rote learning and memorization

and fails to encourage practical skills, critical thinking or autonomous participation (Harber, 1997; Otiende & Oanda, 2000). A number of studies (e.g. Freedman et al., 2008; Harber & Serf, 2006; Porteus et al., 2002) confirm the idea that in most African schools there is an authoritarian culture, which actually prevents democratic or inquiry based methods in civic education.

It is also argued that formal citizenship education in Africa tends to avoid the discussion of conflict in order to promote national unity (Enslin & Divala, 2008; Freedman et al., 2008; Groth, 2006; Quaynor, 2012). Furthermore, it is revealed that in most African countries citizenship education tends to focus on patriotism (Waghid, 2009). Such a patriotic citizenship education model raises serious concerns particularly because it is likely to compromise the abilities of students to advocate for their own rights as well as wider social justice in local, national, and global contexts (Enslin & Divala, 2008).

In short, there are observable efforts of post-colonial states to enforce 'good citizenship' among young Africans. They include: (i) attempting to expand access to formal education; (ii) developing educational policies congruent with African priorities (e.g. *Ujamaa* in Tanzania, *Harambee* in Kenya, *Kagisano* in Botswana); (iii) adopting language policies (e.g. the use of English as a medium of instruction preparing young people for the international market); (iv) promoting indigenous knowledge systems; and (v) Africanizing the social studies curriculum (Mhlauli, 2012). These undertakings, however, did not yield substantial results. Reference is made here to continued conflicts in most African countries. Clearly, citizenship education in Africa needs to be revisited.

In order to improve citizenship education in Africa, a number of studies (Abdi, 2008; Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003; Antal & Easton, 2009; Appiah-Kubi, 1999; Avoseh, 2001; Grant & Asimeng-Boahene, 2006; Gyekye, 1996; Mhlauli, 2012; Muhimpundu, 2002) suggest various actions to be taken. According to Muhimpundu (2002), citizenship education in Africa should empower young people to be autonomous and versatile (multi-talented). It should focus on the following areas: literacy and numeracy, moral education, civic education, and political education. She argues that educating young Africans for citizenship should be incumbent not only upon the school, civil society and the family but also the media. Other scholars advocate

building on the indigenous knowledge systems and practices to rescue citizenship education in Africa.

3.9.1. Building on the indigenous?

Given the general failure of African post-colonial states to foster a viable citizenship culture and given the limited success of formal citizenship education in Africa (Torney-Purta et al., 2001), some African scholars (Abdi, 2008; Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003; Antal & Easton, 2009; Avoseh, 2001; Grant & Asimeng-Boahene, 2006; Mhlauli, 2012) urge for the rediscovery of African traditional citizenship education practices and adaptation to today's context.

According to Mhlauli (2012, p. 106), African traditional citizenship education was meant "to induct new members of the society through the transmission of their cultural heritage to the young in order to develop a feeling of national pride in people. The major aim of this indigenous citizenship education was to train individuals to be useful and acceptable in the society". He goes on to observe that: (1) this education was collectivist in nature as it put more emphasis on the society as a whole rather than on the individual; (2) each member of the society had a responsibility to the young ones; and (3) its vehicle was the oral tradition, through proverbs, riddles, stories, songs, myths, and legends (Mhlauli, 2012). However, it is important to acknowledge that this romantic depiction of ATE has also encountered serious criticisms (e.g. Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004)

Avoseh (2001) maintains that, unlike today's school-based type, citizenship education in traditional Africa was a lifelong process. He opines "in order to ensure that individuals were equipped with the necessary knowledge, skills, values and moral incentives they need to be active citizens, the traditional society puts in place a lifelong education system that stretches from the womb and touches up with the grave" (Avoseh, 2001, p. 482). He points out that citizenship education was organized along pseudo structures such as child-rearing practices, age-grade organizations, initiation ceremonies, apprenticeship systems, and festivals-marriages, births, rituals and funeral ceremonies (Avoseh, 2001).

Some scholars (e.g. Appiah-Kubi, 1999; Grant & Asimeng-Boahene, 2006; Gyekye, 1996) advance the idea that instead of relying on western models of citizenship

education, teachers could draw on the African wisdom embedded in proverbs. A proverb is a popular saying expressing a truth or pointing to a moral behaviour; it is a wise, succinct-reference to facts drawn from experience (Grant & Asimeng-Boahene, 2006). This school of thought maintains that candidate proverbs for citizenship education are mostly those that focus on issues such as virtue/morality, knowledge, responsibility, and humanity/community.

It seems, according to these views, that formal citizenship education in Africa should be complemented by a non-formal one (Chioncel & Jansen, 2004; Holford & Edirisingha, 2000). Hence, citizenship education in today's Africa should draw from its cultural heritage; it has to revive and adapt traditional citizenship education practices which were destroyed during colonial times as "an essential item in Europe's onslaught on the African body and mind" (Abdi, 2008, p. 152). Antal and Easton (2009, p. 602) call this whole project "building on the indigenous" and define the indigenous as "whatever the people consider important to their lives, whatever they regard as an authentic expression of themselves". The revival of *Itorero* as a citizenship education platform in post-genocide Rwanda could be understood in this general African framework.

However attractive the idea might be, in my opinion, in appealing to African traditional practices of citizenship education, one should not ignore some of the problems of ATE as a whole, chief among which is indoctrination, as opposed to critical thinking (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004). Be that as it may, such an appeal to build on the indigenous should be mindful of the problems associated with indigenous knowledge systems, mainly the failure to meet at least some of the requisite epistemological conditions: belief, justification and truth (Horsthemke, 2004). This study seeks to establish the extent to which *Itorero*, the Rwandan citizenship education school meant for HSLs, deals with the problems of ATE – mainly indoctrination, as opposed to critical thinking.

3.10. Conclusion

This chapter has clarified classical and modern notions of citizenship along with dimensions and binaries of citizenship. It also provided general considerations pertaining to citizenship education and showed its relationship with values education. Finally, it gave the general picture of the situation of citizenship education in the world and in Africa. I now consider the historical journey of citizenship education in Rwanda. It will be shown that educating the youth for citizenship is also a particular project in Rwanda.

CHAPTER 4

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN RWANDA

4.1. Introduction

After discussing the concept of citizenship education as practiced globally and on the African continent, I now consider the journey of citizenship education in Rwanda in particular. This reflection will allow us an understanding of how the failure to establish a viable citizenship education program in post-colonial Rwanda contributed, to some extent, to the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. This section also shows that citizenship education is envisaged by the current Government of Rwanda as a key to the promotion of unity and reconciliation among Rwandans. The revived *Itorero* is critical to this process.

4.2. Citizenship education before colonialism

In pre-colonial Rwanda, the family was in charge of children's education until they become 18 years old (Erny, 1981; Mbonimana, 2011). This was done mainly through the evening gathering. In terms of knowledge, girls and boys received nearly the same instruction (for instance poetry). However, with adulthood, differences started to emerge. While girls were given domestic skills, boys were provided with hard skills. Besides, young boys were placed in *Itorero* to learn how to defend the family and the nation. It is worth noting that young girls were denied access to *Itorero*[10]. Since the latter served as a citizenship education school, it implicitly indicates that women in traditional Rwanda (before colonialism) might have been considered as 'second class citizens'. In what follows, I discuss general features of ancient *Itorero*.

[10] As it will be clarified in the subsection 4.2.7, *Itorero* teaching insisted primarily on military education. It was not encouraged to subject young girls to such training, because in traditional Rwanda it was a taboo for young girls to become soldiers.

4.2.1. Ancient **Itorero** *in the academic literature*

Itorero, in pre-colonial Rwanda, has attracted the attention of a number of studies (e.g. Codère, 1973; Erny, 1981; Heremans, 1973; Kagame, 1961, 1962, 1971, 1972; Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008; Mbonimana, 2011; Muzungu, 2003, 2006; NIC, 2011; Ndaruhutse, 2008; Sundberg, 2014 ; Vansina, 2004). But these studies tend to treat *Itorero* superficially; they address it merely as one of several aspects of pre-colonial Rwanda. Muhimpundu (2000) in her study *Education à la citoyenneté et sa portée: Cas du Rwanda* [Education for citizenship and its scope: Case for Rwanda] pays little attention to citizenship education in pre-colonial Rwanda. The starting point of Muhimpundu (2000) is colonial Rwanda – with the establishment of the colonial school – as though there was no citizenship education before the arrival of colonialists. To the best of my knowledge, no systematic study on *Itorero* in pre-colonial Rwanda has so far been produced. Sundberg (2014) came to the same conclusion in the recent study on *Itorero* using an ethnographic approach. The implication of this state of affairs is that the present review relies on pieces of information available in the above mentioned studies. It is crucial to note that these sources sometimes contradict each other.

4.2.2. Accessibility to ancient **Itorero**

According to Mbonimana (2011, p. 121), the concept '*Itorero*' comes from the Kinyarwanda verb "*Gutora*", which means "to select", to "choose" or "elect". In this context, *Itorero* would mean a 'place for selected people to be trained or educated'. Nevertheless, the NIC (2011, p. 15) tends to have a different opinion; it holds the view that *Itorero* comes from the verb "*Gutoza*", which means "to train for the best" or "to bring out the best in young people".

The noticeable disagreement on the etymology of the word '*Itorero*' is quite revealing, particularly in relation to the accessibility of *Itorero*. For Mbonimana (2011), echoing Vansina (2004) though admission to *Itorero* worked on the basis of family heritage – because a boy inherited his place from his father, *Itorero* was actually meant for only a few people. It was only accessible to those who had (i) connections to the royal court, to local military commands, to other grand chiefs; and

(ii) resources to finance the son's living (Codère, 1973). This observation implies that not every young boy was enrolled in *Itorero* as a citizenship education school. Hence, *Itorero* was selective and exclusive in this regard.

According to NIC (2011), *Itorero* was open to everybody suggesting that all young men were eligible for enrollment in *Itorero*. In other words, all males with no exception underwent *Itorero* training. Still, according to some other sources (e.g. Ndaruhutse, 2008), there were two categories of *Itorero*: *Itorero* at the local level and *Itorero* at the royal court. While the *Itorero* at the local level was accessible to every male aged 18, *Itorero* at the royal court was highly selective. It was meant for only a few people, mainly Tutsi, i.e., those who were able to afford the cost pertaining to such training, but also who had good connections to the royal court. How do we reconcile the three positions?

In my opinion, this last version (i.e. Ndaruhutse, 2008) seems to be the most plausible. This position is justified by the presence of various *Amatorero* throughout ancient Rwanda (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008), and also by the existence of a special *Itorero* at the loyal court (Sundberg, 2014). I would like to proffer the idea that while some young boys from ordinary Rwandan families accessed the local *Itorero* (in support to the NIC view), those from wealthy families accessed *Itorero* at the royal court (in support to the exclusive view). It follows that, on the one hand, there were local *Amatorero* [plural of *Itorero*] spread across the country under the direction of regional chiefs. However, the latter had to seek permission from the king in order to initiate *Itorero*. Initiating *Itorero* without permission from the king was considered akin to launching a rebellion[11] (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008). It is worth noting that a family could not send all children to local *Itorero*. Some sources (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008) indicate that the father had to select among his sons the one whom he deemed fit to undergo the local *Itorero* training. Young boys with illness or physical handicaps were denied access to *Itorero*.

On the other hand, the king formed his own *Itorero* at the royal court – the most prestigious of its kind (Sundberg, 2014). It is argued that best performers from local

[11] For instance King Rudahigwa, well known for supporting *Amatorero*, ordered the closure of a particular *Itorero* '*Indashyikirwa*' in Bugesera, which belonged to the chief Ruhorahoza, because the latter had failed to seek permission from the king.

Amatorero could be promoted to *Itorero* at the royal court (Ndaruhutse, 2008). There are reasonable grounds for believing that the quality of training was different in the two cases. Equally, opportunities offered to graduates from the two schools were likely to vary in several respects. But what did young people learn in *Itorero*, be it locally or at the royal court?

4.2.3. *Ancient* Itorero *teaching*

Though the structure, operations and target of *Itorero* have changed across time and region (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008; Mbonimana, 2011; Sundberg, 2014) it is generally argued that, in terms of content, *Itorero* concentrated on military training and sport[12] (Codère, 1973; Erny, 1981; Kagame, 1961, 1962, 1971, 1972; Muzungu, 2003, 2006; Ndaruhutse, 2008; Vansina, 2004). In fact, every new king was expected to come up with his *Itorero* as a way of preparing his army for defending the nation (Vansina, 2004). Most scholars tend to agree that during *Itorero* training military education took centre stage; military strategy, weapons management and physical exercise/sport were emphasized. Sport involved activities like body struggle, jumping, racing, throwing, shooting and physical endurance (Sundberg, 2014). For instance, Ndaruhutse (2008) has explored at length military accomplishments of *Amatorero* in Buganza, Gisaka and Buyenzi.

In pre-colonial Rwanda the core mission of *Itorero* (be it at local level or at the royal court) was primarily to train Rwandan warriors (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008). Other domains of *Itorero* teaching (e.g. moral and political education) were add-ons. Towards the end of the 19th century other aspects of the training included recreational entertainment (traditional songs and dances), and Rwandan literary knowledge comprising poetry, debate and rhetoric (Mbonimana, 2011).

With regard to moral education, young people were instructed about core values ('dos') and taboos ('don'ts') of the Rwandan culture, which they had to adhere to without compromising. Some of the values that were encouraged include unity, patriotism, heroism, humanity, Rwandan spirit, military courage, perseverance,

[12] One can see here similarities between ancient *Itorero* and citizenship education in Sparta and Athens: the emphasis placed on physical and military training.

endurance, discipline, dignity, eloquence, generosity towards the poor, moral responsibility, and self-control. As for taboos, they included despicable practices such as bloodshed, betraying the nation, discrimination, and cowardice (Mbonimana, 2011; NIC, 2011). In relation to political education, *Itorero* was an opportunity for the nation to inform young people about its programs, agenda and priorities so that they could selflessly join in their implementation (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008).

All these subjects were not studied every day. It was up to the coordinator of *Itorero* training to draft the timetable for the day. It was also allowed for young boys to choose areas they wanted to specialize in. Sometimes during the evenings there was a gathering in the course where trainees would share activities that they had accomplished or intended to pursue for the community [*Imihigo*] after graduating from *Itorero*. Whoever had nothing to say was admonished and could not drink the beer of heroes [*Inzoga y'imihigo*] (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008). But how was *Itorero* organized in terms of composition and logistics?

4.2.4. Ancient Itorero *composition and organization*

The composition or population size of *Itorero* varies from one author to the other. According to Heremans (1973) and Lugan (1997), *Itorero* comprised between 150 and 250 young boys, while Erny (1981) and D'Hertefelt (1962) claim that it put together 100 to 200 trainees. Other sources put the number of trainees between 40 and 100 (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008; NIC, 2011). Trainees were generally aged between 12 and 15 or 18.

In terms of practical organization, there are different narratives. According to some sources (e.g. Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008), parents incurred expenses pertaining to the *Itorero* training. They were requested (i) to send one or two cows [*Ingishywa*] to produce milk for their son; (ii) to provide a food store commensurate to the duration of the training; and (iii) to avail a 'servant' who would prepare meals for the trainee and take care of cows. These conditions could have excluded some poor young people from *Itorero* training. It is indicated by Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara (2008) that some children from poor families – who could not meet these

requirements – after completing the daily activities of *Itorero* training, worked for families near the training site in exchange for meals.

However, according to Ndaruhutse (2008), it seems that the royal court met all the expenses pertaining to *Itorero* training nationwide (local and at the royal court) by drawing from the taxes basket called '*Amakoro*' or '*Amaturo*'. Parents only contributed towards the establishment of shelter (huts) for their children. Trainees also received a special dress (proper to the training) from the royal court.

In relation to naming, each and every *Itorero* had its own name. Names given to *Amatorero* referred to courage and bravery (Ndaruhutse, 2008). The names were coined by grand chiefs and trainers. In other words, each intake had its own name along with a detailed performance contract on the basis of which it would be evaluated and eventually rewarded.

Itorero was organized along two phases: the instruction phase and the volunteer phase. The instruction phase involved teaching. As for the volunteer phase, it was an opportunity for trainees to demonstrate that they had internalized the instruction. In other words, upon completion of the instruction phase, trainees passed the volunteer phase either by serving in the military or performing other national service activities. At the end of both phases (theoretical and practical), best performers were rewarded with herds of cattle and plots of land. In order to discourage mediocrity and to promote excellence, poor performers were admonished and shamed in the presence of all participants (NIC, 2011). Best performers were also placed in leadership positions or given other responsibilities. In my opinion, given the richness of its teaching, it is quite uncontroversial that in pre-colonial Rwanda *Itorero* represented the present-day university.

4.2.5. The core mission of ancient Itorero *and its benefits*

The overall purpose of *Itorero* (organized locally and at the royal court) was to produce 'good citizens'[13] for the Rwandan society. As mentioned previously, *Itorero* training was a platform meant primarily to provide young boys with military and

[13] In the present thesis, I am using the term 'good citizen' to refer to the 'model citizen' or 'ideal citizen'. Features or characteristics of a good citizen are not fixed; they are context specific. In chapter 12, I will argue that in the context of post-genocide Rwanda, good citizenship should entail critical, democratic and cosmopolitan features.

physical skills. However, other skills related to moral and political education, recreational entertainment (traditional dances and songs), poetry, debate and rhetoric were emphasized. The main objective was to inculcate in young boys a Rwandan identity with a strong sense of patriotism[14], which could involve shedding one's blood for the benefit of the nation. In a nutshell, *Itorero* provided a comprehensive education, with the notable exception of reading and writing (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008).

There was a huge difference between an *Itorero* graduate and one who did not undergo *Itorero* training, called 'a rural dweller' [*Umunyamusozi*]. The *Itorero* graduate had a good command of military skills; he was civilized and adept in social, political and administrative matters of the nation. He made a difference in society; he was polite, eloquent, well-informed, clean, highly motivated in the place of work, and conducted himself well, i.e. in accordance with the requisite social and cultural norms. In view of this, grand chiefs and auxiliaries of the king were recruited from *Itorero* graduates (Ndaruhutse, 2008; NIC, 2011; Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008).

It is important to note that the conduct of *Intore* (*Itorero* graduate) was closely monitored after the completion of training. Those who misbehaved could be punished severely by depriving them of all their possessions [*Kunyagwa*] (Muzungu, 2003). In view of this, *Itorero* graduates respected their contemporaries who did not get the chance to undergo *Itorero* training. In other words, the *Itorero* graduate lived in harmony with the rest of the neighborhood.

All this goes to show that *Itorero* training had many benefits (Codère, 1973; Erny, 1981; Kagame, 1961, 1962, 1971, 1972; Muzungu, 2003, 2006; NIC, 2011; Ndaruhutse, 2008; Vansina, 2004). Not only did it enable young people to acquire knowledge, skills, values and attitudes required and expected of a 'good' Rwandan citizen, it also reinforced social bonds and kinship. In fact, it was key in uniting Rwandans. Those who trained together at the end were friends and understood themselves as 'one' people (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008). Thanks to *Itorero*, pre-colonial Rwanda was perceived to be a prosperous, respected, and proud nation. It is against this background that before colonialism the following

[14] In ancient Rwanda, patriotism meant 'love for the country and the king'.

sayings were formulated: ‘Rwanda is a country flowing of milk and honey’ [*U Rwanda rutemba amata n’ubuki*], referring to production; ‘God spends the day out, but comes to rest in Rwanda during the night’ [*Imana yirirwa ahandi igataha i Rwanda*], referring to peace and a safe haven; and ‘Rwanda attacks but it is never attacked’ [*U Rwanda ruratera ntiruterwa*], alluding to courage (NIC, 2001).

4.2.6. Relationship: Trainee-trainers in ancient **Itorero**

Trainers facilitated the learning process and encouraged trainees to excel in all areas of the training. This was important for the trainers as they were rewarded on the basis of the performance of their students. Trainers also served as role models. However, there were cases where trainers were corrupt; they could request donations (a cow) from the trainee’s parents in exchange for promotion. But such malpractices were rare and severely punished (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008).

4.2.7. Young girls and ancient **Itorero** *training*

As mentioned previously, in pre-colonial Rwanda, while during adulthood young boys were educated in *Itorero*, young girls followed a different kind of education. They were placed under the guidance of elderly and wise women (mainly the mother and aunts) who provided them with knowledge, values, attitudes and skills required and expected of a good wife. This type of school was called ‘*Urubohero*’ (Ndaruhutse, 2008); young girls learned about basketry, cleanliness or hygiene in the house, child rearing and how to entertain the husband. One can rightly say that young girls enjoyed a different kind of ‘citizenship education’, i.e. one linked to private or domestic life. In short, in ‘*Urubohero*’ young girls learnt values of a Rwanda woman; there was no interaction between young girls and *Itorero*. Put differently, citizenship education in pre-colonial Rwanda was organized along roles that boys and girls were expected to play in society.

Furthermore, since *Itorero* teaching insisted on military education, it was not encouraged to subject young girls to such training. In fact, it was taboo for young

girls to become soldiers. Research shows that some local chiefs who attempted to come up with *Amatorero* for young girls were severely punished and sent into exile. This is the case of Basomingera, the chief of Bwanacyambwe, who was exiled to Burundi (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008) for having initiated *Itorero* for young girls.

In conclusion, citizenship education in pre-colonial Rwanda was taken seriously. It was organized according to gender roles that boys and girls were expected to play in society. However, the programme was more systematic for boys than for young girls. While *Itorero* training prepared young boys to be defenders and leaders of the Rwandan society, *Urubohero* prepared young girls to become good wives. In pre-colonial Rwanda it was assumed that boys should acquire public virtues and girls should display private or domestic ones.

4.3. Citizenship education under German and Belgian colonial rule: 1899-1962

As mentioned previously, Rwanda was colonized first by the Germans (1899-1916) and then by the Belgians (1916-1962). When the Germans arrived in Rwanda, they introduced the modern school, which progressively replaced *Itorero*. The modern school[15] served a twofold purpose: to train auxiliaries for the colonial administration, and to educate assistants for Catholic missionaries, i.e., catechists, seminarians and priests (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008; Ndaruhutse, 2008; NIC, 2011; Rutayisire, 2011). Colonial education did not provide 'genuine' citizenship education to young Rwandans.

In fact, by introducing the modern school, colonialists and missionaries were only pursuing their selfish interests: they wanted to train people who would assist them in their work. In other words, the education provided in the modern school had an instrumental rather than intrinsic value. Young Rwandans were not given knowledge, skills, values and attitudes that would enable them to play significant roles in society. They were only given knowledge, skills, values and attitudes needed by either colonialists in their civilizing mission or Catholic missionaries in their evangelizing

[15] The first modern school was introduced first in 1910 and closed in 1915 due to the First World War; the second school was initiated by Belgians in 1919 at Nyanza.

endeavor (Ndaruhutse, 2008; Rutayisire, 2011). As a matter of fact, graduates of the modern school in 1923 carried out the following activities: census, collecting taxes, settling disputes, being catechist, and other colonial administrative duties.

The 'civic education' provided in the colonial school focused on transmitting the knowledge of colonial powers (Germany and Belgium) and structures. Students were required to respect and obey their colonial masters and their authorities (Muhimpundu, 2000). The modern school was not geared to ensure the well-being of Rwandan people; instead, the focus was on guaranteeing the success of colonialists and missionaries. The point being made here is not that the colonial school did not benefit young Rwandans. For instance, due to the the colonial school, young Rwandans learned reading and writing; they were introduced to other bodies of knowledge in addition to their own indigenous beliefs and practices. In short, they were open to the world. But all this – in the end – was meant for the selfish interests of colonial masters. Rwandans did not acquire skills to develop themselves; they were rather provided with skills needed by colonial masters.

In view of this characterization of the modern school introduced by colonialists, it would not be an exaggeration to say that there was no citizenship education during the colonial regime (Muhimpundu, 2000). In fact, under colonial rule, Rwandans were not 'citizens'; they were, rather, 'subjects'. With the exception of Tutsi in leadership positions, they had no say in the political administration of the country. At this point, it is important to recall that while Germans utilized 'indirect rule'[16] by maintaining existing administrative institutions and leadership, Belgians transformed the whole administrative machinery to suit their ends (Rutayisire, 2011). They exclusively gave leadership positions to Tutsi whom they believed to be superior. Besides, as mentioned with regard to citizenship discourses in the colonial era, colonialists (Germans and Belgians) dismantled the unity of Rwandans by transforming social-economic classes (Tutsi and Hutu) into antagonistic racial or ethnic groups.

[16] By applying 'indirect rule', German colonialists, specifically Richard Kandt, administered Rwanda by relying on existing structures, i.e. the King and his Chiefs. See Rutayisire (2011). Local chiefs were confirmed in their functions by the Resident who seconded the King.

Furthermore, with the arrival of colonialists (Germans and Belgians), the *Itorero* which taught Rwandans to be 'good' citizens was abolished. Rwandans had no forum to learn military skills (because colonialists had their own army), their values and taboos (because these were labelled by the colonial masters as primitive and inadequate), or their traditional civic obligations (Rwandans had only to comply with the vision of the colonial regime). More importantly, due to the abolition of *Itorero*, friendship, patriotism and unity among Rwandans were diminished severely (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008; NIC, 2011). In the next section, I systematically examine various factors that could have led to the abolition of *Itorero*.

4.3.1. Factors that contributed to the abolition of ancient Itorero

A series of factors contributed to the complete abolition of *Itorero* by 1924[17] (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008; Muzungu, 2003, 2006; NIC, 2011; Ndaruhutse, 2008; Rutayisire, 2011; Sundberg, 2014). The first factor is that *Itorero* was perceived by colonialists (both Germans and Belgians) as an obstacle for them in imposing their order and ideology. Upon their arrival in Rwanda, Germans and Belgians were impressed by the organization and harmony of the kingdom, which, unfortunately, made it difficult to invade and govern (Rutayisire, 2011). They then started conducting research to find out about the backbone of the prevailing unity and harmony (NIC, 2011). They came to find out that the latter was the result of the education provided by *Itorero*. Subsequently, they sought to abolish or rather distort it. Apart from recreation and entertainment (dances and songs), all other aspects of *Itorero* were abolished after being labeled vehicles of fetishism (NIC, 2011; Ndaruhutse, 2008; Rutayisire, 2011).

The second factor is the introduction of the modern school, which to some extent replaced the traditional one, i.e., *Itorero*. As seen earlier, most of *Itorero* graduates occupied leadership positions. With the arrival of the modern school, things changed. Only modern school graduates with reading and writing skills were given official responsibilities. This state of affairs propelled people to shift the focus from *Itorero* to

[17] It can be argued that the abolition of *Itorero* was a process, i.e. *Itorero* declined gradually in time.

the modern school (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008; NIC, 2011; Ndaruhutse, 2008).

The third reason is the famine *Ruzagayura*, which befell on Rwanda from 1943 to 1944 (Maison des Jeunes de Kimisagara, 2008). During this famine, Belgian colonialists asked the population to double their efforts in working; they were to focus on farming. Given that the attention was focused on intensive work, people had no time for *Itorero*. Furthermore, parents could not afford to send young boys to *Itorero*. Not only were they unable to meet the costs associated with its organization, but also the youth constituted significant manpower needed for intensive work.

Fourth, the Catholic Church played a significant role in the abolition of *Itorero*. Catholic missionaries advanced the idea that the teaching provided in *Itorero* turned people away from God and prevented them from being baptized. The *Itorero* teaching was labelled Anti-Christian; its content, with the exception of traditional songs and dances, was taken as a vehicle of fetishism. In this regard, the *Itorero* graduate could not be admitted to the journey to priesthood (Ndaruhutse, 2008; Rutayisire, 2011). The section below considers citizenship education after independence.

4.4. Citizenship education under the first and second republic: 1962-1994

Citizenship education in Rwanda during the first (1962-1973) and second (1973 - 1994) republics did not make a significant step forward in providing the youth with democratic principles, virtues and skills. And yet, given the introduction of democratic institutions, which replaced monarchy and the colonial regime, there was a need to educate people for them to play significant roles in the new political landscape. A number of studies on citizenship education in Rwanda (e.g. King, 2013; Muhimpundu, 2000) reveal that despite the willingness (apparent in policies and legal texts) to educate young Rwandans for citizenship, the first and second republics failed to make good use of the school to produce a responsible citizenry. Schooling was rather used as a key instrument of the state in contributing to the construction, awareness, collectivization, and perpetuation of inequality of ethnic groups in Rwanda (King, 2013).

It is suggested by Muhimpundu (2000) that citizenship education after independence was merely meant to provide 'information' on newly created state institutions and to inculcate the ideology of the regime. In this regard, major emphasis was laid on topics, such as the republic, democracy, the nation, the state, different political regimes, national symbols (flag, coat of arms, national hymn), political authorities, and main historical dates. It is noteworthy that this type of citizenship education tends to resemble, in several respects, what Kerr (1999, p. 14) calls *citizenship about* which "focuses on providing students with sufficient knowledge and understanding of national history and the structures and processes of government and political life". This kind of citizenship education produces 'minimal', 'passive', and 'thin' citizens.

Furthermore, during the first and second republics there were no teacher training colleges. As a result, primary school teachers were only selected from young people who failed secondary school; there were given a temporary training in teaching pedagogies as a way of bridging the gap (Muhimpundu, 2000). The lack of qualified teachers also extends to citizenship education. In other words, there were no teachers prepared and qualified to teach citizenship education. It is no surprise therefore that citizenship education during this period was deficient; teachers could not provide what is not in their intellectual repertoire.

As a consequence, the vast majority of Rwandans during the two republics lacked substantial knowledge of public institutions and democratic principles. To make the matters worse, there was no other appropriate forums at which these gaps could be filled. Citizenship education was reduced to blind obedience and unconditional respect for public authority. In view of this, the quality of civic education provided during the two republics was in many ways a form of political indoctrination.

I also argue that during the two republics, instead of fostering national identity, education was focused rather on ethnic and regional identities (King, 2013; Muhimpundu, 2000). We recall and consider at this point citizenship discourses prevailing during this period: they were ethnocentric; Hutu and Rwandan citizenship were one and the same thing. In this context, the school was a reflection of ethnic divisions and regional rifts (between the South and North). In other words, the school was a site of ethnic and regional discrimination in terms of accessibility. This kind of

school could arguably not produce responsible citizens. It is in this context that the school contributed to some extent to the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi.

Overall, it is noticeable that the poor quality of citizenship education in the period 1962-1994 correlates positively and strongly with the inadequate content and teaching methodologies, poor preparation of teachers, the school environment characterized by ethnic and regional divisions, and the prevailing social and family context, which failed to remedy the weaknesses of the school (King, 2013; Muhimpundu, 2000).

It is also important to note that during the two republics, no attempt was made to restore *Itorero* as a citizenship education school meant to convey to young people the Rwandan identity. *Itorero* slipped into oblivion; it did not recover from the colonial hangover. Only a shadow of it, i.e., traditional songs and dances for entertainment purposes survived. The abandonment of *Itorero* seems to be one of the factors that exacerbated ethnic and regional divisions among Rwandans. The latter had no forum to learn Rwandan values and taboos; their source of unity and cohesion had faded away. These divisions culminated in the 1994 genocide.

4.5. Citizenship education in post-genocide Rwanda: From 1994 to present

As discussed previously when addressing citizenship discourses, post-genocide Rwanda is committed to promoting an inclusive citizenship. In this regard, narratives of the government of unity and reconciliation emphasize national identity, i.e., *Rwandanness* at the expense of ethnic identities (Tutsi, Hutu, Twa). This fundamental shift aims to correct long-established distorted understandings of citizenship. The willingness to promote an inclusive citizenship discourse in Rwanda is manifest in the importance accorded to citizenship education in and outside the school.

4.5.1. Citizenship education in the school

In relation to formal training, citizenship education in post-genocide Rwanda is a compulsory subject in primary and secondary education[18]. In primary school (Grade 1 to Grade 6), it is called 'social studies'. It is taught in two lessons per week (Grade 1 to 3) and five lessons per week (Grade 4 to 6), respectively. The social studies programme in primary education covers a wide range of topics meant to instill in young people the values of citizenship reflecting the realities and needs of post-genocide Rwanda (MINEDUC, 2008a). In secondary education (lower and upper secondary), citizenship education is termed 'political education'. In both cases, it is a compulsory but non-examinable subject with the weight of two lessons per week. At lower secondary level (also called 'Ordinary Level' or 'O Level'), political education builds on elements provided in primary education to strengthen citizenship knowledge, skills, values and attitudes in learners (MINEDUC, 2008b).

At upper secondary level (also called 'Advanced Level' or 'A Level'), political education recapitulates and deepens some of the aspects provided in previous stages. It enables the learner to: (i) contribute to the rehabilitation of national unity among Rwandans; (ii) develop and consolidate a patriotic spirit; (iii) analyze Rwanda's politico-administrative structures and their evolution; (iv) contribute to the explanation of gender existence in the development process of the country; (v) harmonize personal character with respect for human rights and International Humanitarian Law; (vi) take part in the fight against the HIV/AIDS in Rwanda and elsewhere; (vii) describe the process of revolution and the role of the movements that fought for independence; (viii) explain the problems of independent Africa and its politico-administrative organizations; (ix) recognize the existence of international politico-financial organizations; and (x) understand the concept of underdevelopment and develop a sense of entrepreneurship (MINEDUC, 2008b).

In post-genocide Rwanda, citizenship education goes beyond primary and secondary school curricula. Educating Rwandans for citizenship is also the explicit

[18] It should be noted that in the course of this research, there was a review of the curriculum. According to the latter, citizenship education in primary education is called 'Social and Religious Studies' with the weight of four periods per week (1 period = 40 minutes). In lower secondary school, it is termed 'History and Citizenship' with three periods per week (MINEDUC, 2015).

concern of a number of institutions like the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (*Commission Nationale de Lutte contre le Génocide* – CNLG), and the National *Itorero* Commission (NIC). At this juncture, it is important to note that among the above mentioned institutions, the NIC was established with a specific mandate to educate Rwandans for citizenship. For this reason, in what follows, I devote special attention to the revived '*Itorero*'. I attempt to trace its roots, legal framework, structure and organization, teaching and target groups.

4.5.2. Out-of-school citizenship education: from **Ingando** *to the revived* **Itorero**

The out-of-school (non-formal) citizenship education landscape in post-genocide Rwanda changed over time; it evolved from *Ingando* to *Itorero*. In other words, *Itorero* emanates from and is a continuation of one wing of *Ingando*. One could rightly say that the present-day *Itorero* evolved from *Ingando*. But the following questions arise: What is the context that inspired *Ingando*? And how did *Ingando* change into *Itorero*?

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan Government of unity and reconciliation faced a substantial challenge: nation-building. There was pressure to put in place mechanisms to reinforce social cohesion and peaceful coexistence among Rwandans. It is crucial to recall that after the genocide, the Rwandan society saw the influx of several returnees from various corners of the world. The returnees included mainly Tutsi who had been in exile in DRC, Burundi, Uganda, Europe and elsewhere since 1959, 1962 and 1973. They are usually referred to as "old caseload returnees" (Sundberg, 2014, p. 74), because they spent quite a long time outside Rwanda. Equally, Rwandans who had fled the 1990-1994 war mainly to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and elsewhere returned home; they were usually referred to as the "new caseload returnees" (Sundberg, 2014, p. 74).

In order to craft a common Rwandan identity for these different categories of people, in 1996 the Government of Rwanda under the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports initiated a forum to educate them for citizenship. This forum was called '*Ingando*'. In 1999, *Ingando* was placed under the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

(NURC). The term "*Ingando"* comes from the verb "*Kugandika*", which means "to retreat", "to prepare oneself for the battle" (Beraho, 2007, p. 7). In the pre-colonial Rwanda, *Ingando* was a strategic retreat where elders, leaders and youth would come together to address societal and national challenges such as war, famine, and drought. However, it was most frequently linked to military defense and state expansion; it often took the form of immediate military training and strategizing (Beraho, 2007).

In post-genocide Rwanda, *Ingando* camps have to be understood along two categories (i) "re-education camps" and (ii) "solidarity camps" (Purdeková, 2011b, p. 242). The *Ingando* 're-education camps' targeted – and still targets – those perceived as *potentially dangerous*; these include people like old caseload and new caseload returnees, former combatants (ex-soldiers), confessed *génocidaires*, released prisoners, prostitutes, and street children.

Ingando solidarity camps, on the other hand, targeted people who were defined as *potentially resourceful*[19] for the state. These include Rwandans whose alignment with government rationale is mostly needed; mainly the educated elite and the youth (Purdeková, 2011b). It comprised people like *Gacaca* judges, politicians, church leaders, community leaders, women's associations, secondary school teachers, and university entrants (Mgbako, 2005; Turner, 2014).

The *Ingando* curriculum for both categories (re-education and solidarity) focused on military training, manual labor, lectures on the history and vision of Rwanda, political education, and cultural activities. It is worth noting that ex-combatants were not subjected to further military training; they only performed physical exercises. Mgbako (2005) argues that the length of *Ingando* has varied from a few days or weeks to months.

Ingando solidarity camps were generally organized from 1996 to 2007. In 2007 they were replaced with the revived *Itorero*. It must be noted that the *Itorero* training, or the revived *Itorero*, took over the *Ingando* 'solidarity camp' wing only. The wing of 're-education camps' is still located in *Ingando* under the Rwanda Demobilization and

[19] It seems odd that street children and prostitutes are merely seen as 'potentially dangerous' and not seen as 'potentially resourceful'.

Reintegration Commission (RDRC). It is important to understand and keep this distinction in mind because it suggests that in addition to the training currently organized by the revived *Itorero,* there are other camps for old caseload returnees, new caseload returnees, ex-combatants and ex-soldiers conducted under the auspices of the RDRC (Turner, 2014).

There are noticeable differences between solidarity camps organized by *Ingando* and *Itorero* training. *Ingando* solidarity camps were tougher than the current *Itorero*. In fact *Ingando* solidarity camps were more oriented towards military training and national defense. Trainees were dressed in military uniform and had weapons. On the other hand, in the current *Itorero*, military training is only basic. In relation to HSLs, *Ingando* solidarity camps trained *only university entrants*, i.e., those who were awarded government sponsorship for higher education. The current *Itorero* training targets all HSLs with no exception, i.e., university entrants and those who do not get government sponsorship.

A number of studies (e.g. Beraho, 2007; Mgbako, 2005; Purdeková, 2011b; Sundberg, 2014) that closely scrutinized *Ingando* and *Itorero* expose the reason why these forms of training are important to the ruling political party in Rwanda since 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). These studies suggest that the RPF got the idea of using training retreats from "Ugandan mobile schools of political education (known as *chaka-mchaka*) initiated by Yoweri Museveni" (Purdeková, 2011a, p. 248). *Chaka-mchaka* is an anomatopoeic Swahili word capturing the sound made by marching military boots. It is argued that *chaka-mchaka* political education schools helped Museveni and his National Resistance Movement to win the hearts and minds of the Ugandan population. Since the vast majority of RPF members – including President Paul Kagame himself – attended these schools and saw their political strength, the RPF expedited their institution in order to boost its political popularity.

Put differently, the claim being made in these studies is that *Ingando* and its offspring *Itorero* seem to constitute ideological machinery meant to produce or manufacture a type of citizenry desired and designed by the ruling political party (in this case the RPF). In the present thesis, I will attempt to assess the validity of these claims. In the following section, I consider the legal framework behind *Itorero*.

4.5.3. The revival of Itorero*: Legal framework*

As seen previously, after the genocide, Rwanda faced substantial challenges. In order to address them, the idea was that it should draw thoughtful strategies from the positive elements of its culture. It is in this context that the following cultural practices were adopted: *Gacaca* courts (grassroots justice systems that addressed several cases of genocide suspects), *Abunzi*-mediators (those in charge of settling minor disputes at the local community; only big issues go to courts), *Umuganda* (a monthly communal work gathering members of the village to conduct public work), and *Itorero* (NIC, 2012). This was in line with article 8 of the 2003 Rwanda Constitution, and the conclusions of '*Urugwiro* Village Debates'[20], both of which draw insights from Rwandan culture in order to curtail prevailing ills. Article 8 of the preamble to the 4 June 2003 Rwanda Constitution states: "Considering that it is necessary to draw from our centuries-old history the positive values which characterized our ancestors that must be the basis for the existence and flourishing of our Nation".

The idea of reviving *Itorero* was mooted during the national leadership retreat which was hosted by the Akagera Game Lodge in March 2007. This decision to restore *Itorero* was endorsed by the cabinet meeting held on 12 November 2007. *Itorero ry'igihugu* [national *Itorero*] was officially launched by President Paul Kagame on 16 November 2007 in the Rwanda Parliament. On 24 December 2008 the cabinet meeting established the task force in charge of *Itorero ry'igihugu*, which was hosted by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). In 2013, *Itorero ry'igihugu* became the National *Itorero* Commission (NIC) as per law No. 41/2013 of 16/06/2013, determining its mission, organization and functioning. Pursuant to article 6 of the same law, its objective consists of: "Bringing up a patriotic Rwandan who has values and taboos of the Rwandan culture and who has the culture of *Intore*".

In the law establishing the NIC, *Itorero* is defined as "a platform for educating Rwandans and training them to understand their shared values and taboos in their coexistence, be patriotic and contribute to national development" (article 2, section 2). According to the same law, the *Itorero* graduate referred to as "*Intore*" is characterized as "a person who is taught the values and taboos of the Rwandan

[20] These were debates organized between May 1998 and March 1999. They were meant to craft the structure, organization and vision of the new Rwanda. They took place in the office of the President by the name "*Urugwiro* Village".

culture and who contributes to promoting their observance" (article 2, section 1). The idea was that the type of a 'good citizen' or the 'model citizen' to be produced by *Itorero* is called *Intore*. The latter is expected to have proficient knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos and, more importantly, to live up to them. In order to fulfill its mandate, NIC developed an established structure and organization.

4.5.4. Structure and organization of the revived Itorero

The NIC is headed by a Chairperson and a Vice chairperson. These are assisted by five permanent and fulltime commissioners and four directors responsible for (i) finance and administration; (ii) planning, monitoring and evaluation; (iii) mobilization and training; and (iv) national service. Each directorate has various units responsible for different programs of *Itorero*. The structure has one staff at each district (called *Itorero* district coordinator) in charge of coordinating *Itorero* activities at decentralized levels in partnership with the coordination committees at district, sector, cell and village levels. Members of *Itorero* coordination committees locally are actual members of administrative committees at district, sector, cell and village level. However, much of the work is done at the sector level. At each level, there are a number of trainers mentored to organize and supervise activities of *Itorero*.

Itorero also has structures in all private and public institutions whose coordination committees are the governing body of those institutions. Recently *Itorero* was launched in all secondary schools. The head office of NIC is located in Kigali City, and its main training centre is situated in Musanze, Northern Province. NIC also borrows infrastructure from other public and private institutions (e.g. the Rwanda Defence Force – RDF military camps, premises of private and public high schools) to organize many of its trainings.

4.5.5. *Revived* Itorero *target groups*

The revived *Itorero* targets all Rwandans from the age of seven and above. In view of this, there is a series of training sessions organized for people belonging to the same category or same profession. For instance, there is an *Itorero* for secondary school teachers, health workers, artists, university senior managers, coffee farmers,

journalists, high school leavers, etc. *Itorero* is committed to train all Rwandans from various backgrounds: public servants, personnel of the private sector, educated and non-educated, those inside the country and those outside (Rwandan diaspora mainly students schooling abroad). By March 2013, a total of 1 098 599 Rwandans had been trained (NIC, 2013).

As mentioned earlier, before colonialism, *Itorero* was segregatory: females and males with disabilities were excluded. Modern day *Itorero* is committed to train all Rwandans without discrimination. Nonetheless, while other categories are trained as time and means allow, HSLs constitute a special group. Every year all HSLs are trained, i.e., university entrants and those who are not qualified for higher education. The idea is that HSLs are considered as a priority group.

4.5.6. Revived Itorero *teaching*

As mentioned previously, traditional *Itorero* focused primarily on military training and sport, and the second consideration was given to moral, political, cultural and rhetoric education. In the revived *Itorero*, major emphasis is rather placed on moral and political education. Military training does not take centre stage anymore; trainees receive military training and physical exercises as a way of fostering discipline; it is not a way of training a professional army. The weight given to cultural activities (traditional songs and dance) has also been reduced; they only occupy evening recreation. Literary education (poetry, debate and rhetoric) is almost non-existent.

In relation to moral education, the revived *Itorero* teaches values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. The NIC has defined key values that every Rwandan should at least know and live by. These are Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*], patriotism [*Gukunda igihugu*], integrity [*Ubunyangamugayo*], courage [*Ubutwari*], self-sacrifice [*Ubwitange*], love for a well-done work [*Gukunda umurimo no kuwunoza*], and upholding one's dignity [*Kwihesha agaciro*]. Taboos have also been defined. They include issues like shedding the blood, inattention to result, avoidance of accountability, untrustworthiness, being covetous, etc. (NURC, 2009).

With regard to political education, the revived *Itorero* insists on the history of Rwanda and national development programs, mainly Vision 2020 and Economic

Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy I and II (EDPRS I & II). The latter are development programs meant to uplift Rwanda from poverty and make it a middle income country by 2020. The historiography of Rwanda – as depicted in *Itorero* – makes a distinction between three periods: the pre-colonial Rwanda or 'golden age'; the 'dark age' (colonial rule: 1899-1962, first and second republic: from 1962 to 1994); and the 'renaissance' (1994 to present). The *Itorero* teaching advances the idea that Rwanda should seek development while upholding positive values of the 'golden age' where all Rwandans understood themselves as one people. This grounds the tendency to re-traditionalize post-genocide Rwandan society (Sundberg, 2014).

Itorero also strives to provide trainees with proficient knowledge of the vision that Rwanda has set as a nation (Vision 2020 and EDPRS I & II). All Rwandans are expected to have a clear understanding of these national programs. More importantly, *Itorero* enables trainees to be aware of their respective role or contribution in achieving these development programs. Furthermore, *Itorero* holds the view that in order to achieve development, there is a need to change or improve the mindset of Rwandans [*Guhindura imyumvire*]. In view of this, *Itorero* is meant to allow Rwandans have a right mindset and attitude. In short, it crafts or moulds Rwandans with a mindset and attitudes consistent with values and taboos of the Rwandan culture, Vision 2020 and EDPRS I & II.

4.5.7. Revived Itorero *for high school leavers*

Citizenship education is meant to ensure that young people obtain knowledge, skills, attitudes and values necessary for them to take up their roles in the community of which they are part responsibly. Given the depth of the tragedy it experienced, Rwanda cannot envisage its prosperous future while neglecting the quality of life of its youth[21], mainly HSLs. Since they are seen to constitute tomorrow's leadership and force, they deserve special consideration and care. For this reason, a special *Itorero* training scheme, comprising two phases, has been devised for HSLs. The first phase, which can be called roughly theoretical, is dedicated to the values and

[21] As noted previously, half of the population of Rwanda is aged below 20 (NISR, 2012). Most of the high school leavers are actually 20 years old.

taboos of the Rwandan culture mentioned earlier. The first phase takes three months[22].

The second phase is community service during which HSLs carry out various activities that are of public interest[23]. The present research focuses only on the first phase, i.e., training in values and taboos of the Rwandan culture as part of citizenship education. Indeed, the aspect of national service is common in several countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Namibia, Ghana and Israel (NIC, 2011). However, the theoretical phase of the training whereby young people are instructed explicitly about cultural values and taboos tends to be unique to Rwanda. It is this *uniqueness* which motivated my choice of research topic.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter provided an historical account of citizenship education in Rwanda. It was shown that citizenship education in pre-colonial Rwanda was conducted by *Itorero*. However, German and Belgian colonialists abolished *Itorero* because it was the backbone of harmony and unity of the Rwandan kingdom. The abolition of *Itorero* had negative consequences for the Rwandan social fabric; its unity and harmony were destroyed. The first and second republics did not want to revive *Itorero*. Rather, the two regimes identified citizenship with Hutu identity; they cultivated structural hatred against Tutsi which culminated in the 1994 genocide. It has been shown that

[22] Initially, the intended period was three months. But as we shall see later, the training period has been increasingly shortened due to financial constraints.

[23] According to the NIC, national service (a term preferred to 'volunteerism'), should be understood as: "A self-motivated action, performed by an individual or a group of individuals who contribute their time, skills, advice, talents and passion to the provision of services for the benefit of the larger community, without expecting a salary. The volunteers might however be entitled to stipends intended to cover some of the expenses incurred for the accomplishment of the volunteering activity" (NIC, 2012, p. 3). The placement is done on the basis of one's skills and the priorities of the receiving institution. Bearing in mind the minimization of costs linked to transport and accommodation, HSLs are usually placed near their homes. Most of the time, they are engaged in activities related to education, health, economic affairs and entrepreneurship development, infrastructure and ICT, environment and conservation, safety and security, governance and leadership, to mention but a few (NIC, 2011). A special forum for all HSLs who underwent national service has been established under the name "Volunteers Forum". The latter links *Itorero* graduates to any organizations (local, regional or international) in need of volunteers.

by reviving *Itorero,* the leadership of post-genocide Rwanda intends to lead Rwandans back to their values and taboos. The revived *Itorero* is portrayed as a means to reinforce unity, cohesion and peaceful coexistence among Rwandans. In what follows, I provide the conceptual framework guiding the present study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CITIZENSHIP AND VALUES EDUCATION

5.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses premises of the conceptual framework that undergird the identification of the citizenship and values education notions at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In this regard, notions or conceptions of citizenship and values education are explored, and resulting conceptual frames articulated. While it is also possible to analyze *Itorero* using citizenship dimensions and binaries outlined earlier, I prefer to engage with citizenship notions, particularly because they assume, accommodate and incorporate citizenship dimensions and binaries; hence, they yield a richer analysis. In this chapter, I also articulate the Force Field Theory of Change of Kurt Lewin (1951), which will help to investigate and analyze HSLs' and trainers' attitudes.

5.2. Classical notions of citizenship and citizenship education

Classical notions of citizenship and citizenship education are civic republicanism, liberalism and communitarianism. Some authors (e.g. Ciprut, 2008; Delanty, 2000; Gaus & Kukathas, 2004; Gonzales et al., 2004; Honohan, 2002; Van Steenbergen, 1994) take civic republicanism as a variant of communitarianism. In my opinion, it is not helpful to subscribe to this classification at this stage; though they share some important elements civic republicanism and communitarianism deserve to be considered separately. First, basic tenets of each notion are provided; next, a critical assessment pertaining to the notion as a whole is conducted. Since this research is meant to analyze the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs, the extent to which these conceptions inform the scheme will be demonstrated.

5.2.1. The civic republican notion of citizenship and citizenship education

5.2.1.1. Civic republicanism and citizenship

The civic republican notion of citizenship has attracted the attention of a good number of scholars (e.g. Dwyer, 2010; Heater, 2004; Honohan, 2002; Sandel, 1999; Van Steenbergen, 1994). For civic republicanism, a 'good citizen' is one who demonstrates a strong sense of active political participation or civic engagement, self-government, and selfless dedication to the good of the political community (Honohan, 2002). The idea is that in civic republicanism there is no room for citizen apathy and passivity. Politics is not the business of a small class of elites; rather, citizens take part in public life and have a say in the governance of the state. This is the whole mark of self-government.

Furthermore, it is argued that in this theory the good of the public community takes precedence over private interests (Heater, 2004; Honohan, 2002; Sandel, 1999; Van Steenbergen, 1994). Civic republicanism maintains that citizenship goes hand in hand with the possession of civic virtue understood as putting public interests above self-centered ones. In this regard, it prescribes virtues such as courage, patriotism, devotion, military discipline and statecraft (Van Steenbergen, 1994). However, according to Van Steenbergen (1994, p. 42), dedication to the public community does not stifle individuality; rather, it makes it radiant and fulfilled: "Serving the public community may make individuality appear and enable the individual to mark his or her place in history. This is where he or she achieves fulfillment and possibly happiness ('public happiness')". In addition, under civic republicanism, individual rights are subordinate to one's duties and responsibilities (Heater, 2004; Sandel, 1999).

Referring to the discussion of the citizenship background and history, it would seem that the civic republican notion of citizenship was prevalent in Sparta, Athens (even though the Athenian notion of citizenship was hierarchical and exclusive), Republican Rome, and medieval Italian city-republics. It emphasises the political dimension and maximal, thick and active citizenship. According to Honohan (2002), civic republicanism won the support of several philosophers, such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau and Arendt. However, Honohan (2002) suggests that there

are other tenants of civic republicanism, such as Cicero, Harrington, Wollstonecraft, Madison, Skinner and Pettit.

5.2.1.2. Civic republicanism and citizenship education

Citizenship education under the concept of civic republicanism focuses on civic virtues, placing the public above the private, subordinating personal interests to the common good, and prioritizes duties over rights (Sandel, 1999; Heater, 2004). In fact, civic republicanism holds the view that the health of the state stems from its virtuous citizenry, which is arrived at through the formative project.

> The formative project rejects the idea that government should be neutral towards the values and ends its citizens espouse. It seeks social and political arrangements that cultivate in citizens certain habits and dispositions, or civic virtues…It makes character a public, not merely private concern. (Sandel, 1999, p. 210)

The formative project of civic republicanism has been elaborated by Aristotle, Machiavelli and Rousseau. Aristotle maintains that a 'good citizen' must have the knowledge and the ability both to rule and to be ruled (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1277b7). But for this to happen, the citizen must be trained or shaped accordingly. Citizenship education therefore "would involve teaching the knowledge and skills required both for the active role of 'ruling', such as the skills of public debate, and for the passive role of 'being ruled', such as knowledge of why it was important to be obedient to the law of the state" (Carr, 1991, p. 375). Referring specifically to laws, Aristotle has this to say: "For as man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development, so he is worst of all when divorced from law and justice" (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a30-4).

Machiavelli (1974) shares the view that the health of the state is partly due to the good character (*virtú*) of its citizens: "*Virtú* is the core of an ideal of citizenship which requires people to put their country first, notably by limiting their pursuit of wealth, taking up office when needed, fighting in the militia, paying taxes, and deferring to the better qualified" (Machiavelli, 1974, p. 225). According to Machiavelli (1974), human nature is deficient but can be improved by education. The latter does not allow citizens to be corrupt, which would amount to putting particular interests ahead of the common good.

But the question arises: How should the state instill *virtú* in citizens? Machiavelli (1974) suggests some strategies: giving incentives to best performers and exposing citizens to the examples of heroic men of great *virtú* whom they should emulate. Machiavelli was also convinced of the importance of civic religion in inculcating *virtú*. He contended that the idea of a higher power instills fear or shame in citizens, which makes them slower to abandon their duty.

Rousseau (1973), like other republicans, emphasises the importance of ideological shaping of citizens: “It is not enough to say to the citizens, ‘be good’; they must be taught to be so” (Rousseau, 1973, p. 142). He also underscores the importance of incentives and the respect of laws in fashioning a virtuous citizenry (Honohan, 2002).

Despite the above mentioned strengths, the civic republican notion of citizenship and citizenship education has been criticized on several grounds. First, it can be argued that it runs the risk of sacrificing individual rights (Mouffe, 1992). In fact, the extent to which good citizens submit themselves to the will of the state for the sake of the common good is not clear. For instance, Rousseau (1973) argues that people must be forced to be free if we want them to choose the general will over the private. Here lies the risk of indoctrination and fanaticism. Second, the civic republican model of citizenship education does not recognize the private sphere as an important domain (Heater, 2004; Honohan, 2002). Third, Honohan (2002, p. 6) argues that due to its emphasis on the common good and civic virtue, civic republicanism has been labeled as “inherently oppressive, moralistic, exclusive, militaristic and masculinist”.

Drawing on basic tenets of civic republicanism, the present thesis will establish the extent to which this citizenship concept informs the *Itorero* training. Despite its drawbacks, civic republicanism seems to represent a middle ground between liberalism and communitarianism, which are examined in the next sections.

5.2.2. The liberal notion of citizenship and citizenship education

5.2.2.1. Liberalism and citizenship

According to Walzer (1989), the liberal notion of citizenship is characterized by the valuing of the following features: equality and individual freedom; competing conceptions of the good; priority of the right over the good; dualism between the

public and the private spheres; dualism between morality and politics; neutrality of the state; and rejection of the formative project. It is plausible to contend that the origins of the liberal model of citizenship are traceable to the Roman Empire and early-modern reflections on Roman law when citizenship meant being protected by the law and enjoying a certain number of rights.

In fact, while the civic republican notion of citizenship emphasized duties and responsibilities, and excluded certain categories from the realm of citizens (women, slaves and children), the liberal notion of citizenship acknowledges the values of the individual. It is with the liberal notion of citizenship that the rise of individual rights occurs and recognition of equality of all people gains significance. There are a number of factors that sparked the rise of the liberal notion of citizenship and they include the development of the liberal state; the separation between church and state; the separation between religion and politics; the struggle of social movements (women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, sexual minorities); and the triumph of capitalism (Faulks, 2000).

With regards to boundaries of citizenship, it is important to note that liberalism advocates a kind of citizenship similar to modern (second), thin, passive and minimal types of citizenship as opposed to the Greek (first), thick, active and maximal citizenship. The liberal theory emphasizes the legal dimension of citizenship.

According to Walzer (1989), the liberal theory of citizenship has been supported by several philosophers[24], such as Rawls, Rorty, Dworkin, Raz and Kymlicka. Upon close examination, one realizes that core features of liberalism model of citizenship are actually *liberty-related* and *equality-related*. Hence, Kartal (2002) suggests that the whole idea of liberalism can be summarized along a twofold premise: (i) *individual liberty*, which means that the individual takes priority over society and has to be left free from societal pressures to choose his/her values and to realize his/her end in life; (ii) *egalitarianism*, which entails treating each individual as equal and as enjoying equal citizenship rights. The content of these two premises is now going to be analyzed.

[24] In terms of historical classification, there is classical liberalism and modern liberalism. The former includes philosophers such as John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer and T.H. Green. Modern liberals include among others those mentioned in the text. For a detailed analysis of the history of liberalism, see Gray, J. (1995). *Liberalism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

The first premise outlines a specific conception of the person. Liberalism depicts the person as prior to society and free from any conceptions of the good established by society. As a consequence, society is simply an aggregate of individuals pursuing their defined ends and goals, and it has no authority to impose any conception of the good or mode of life as the most preferable (Mulhall & Swift, 2007). In other words, liberalism denies the view that the person is shaped by society and its values; it rules out the idea that the person derives her self-understanding and conception of the good from society. Rather, as fundamentally free, the person has to define for herself the type of life which she judges to be worthwhile. This is the whole essence of the acceptance of competing conceptions of the good and the idea of priority of the right over the good.

In line with the idea of individual liberty, liberalism maintains that the state should be neutral as far as morality is concerned. It recommends the separation between morality and politics, the public and private sphere. From this recommendation it follows that the state is invited not to impose upon citizens a certain conception of the good: "If one citizen's opinion about how to live her life is as good as any other's, or if there is no way of knowing who is right, then it would seem to make sense for the state simply to treat those opinions as equally valid" (Mulhall & Swift, 2007, p. 10). The corollary of this argument is that since the state itself cannot know and prescribe any conception of the good and good life, it is impossible for it to envisage shaping citizens via the formative project[25]. Not only would it be infringing upon people's freedom, but it would also be against their higher order interest to frame, revise and rationally pursue their conceptions of the good (Mulhall & Swift, 2007).

The rejection of the formative project leads to the neglect of political participation. Indeed, for the liberal citizen, what matters most is not active participation in public space. Under the liberal model, the citizen understands him-herself in relationship to him-herself and not to the state nor to the community.

[25] There are two strands within liberalism on the basis of the endorsement or rejection of the role of the state and the formative project. The type of liberalism which espouses the neutrality of the state towards competing conceptions of the good life and the rejection of the formative project is called 'procedural liberalism' or 'anti-perfectionist liberalism'. This is the view of Rawls (1971), Rorty and Dworkin. On the other hand, liberalism which endorses the role of the state in defining conceptions of the good life, and which supports the relevancy of the formative project is called 'perfectionist liberalism'. This is the position of Raz. For more details, see Sandel (1999); Mulhall and Swift (2007).

It is also essential to note that the liberal model of citizenship emphasizes individuals' rights and entitlements at the expense of obligations and duties. Put simply, under the liberal model of citizenship, the person is a "calculating bearer of rights and preferences" (Van Steenbergen, 1994, p. 38). Civic commitment and engagement is subordinate to achieving one's ends.

The second premise of the liberal theory of citizenship points to the recognition of the equality of all people. This is in contrast to Aristotle's view that slaves, women, children and laborers do not qualify as citizens (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1260a11; 1278a20). Aristotle excludes children, slaves, women and laborers from the realm of citizens, and he gives reasons for each category. Children have yet to develop reason; slaves lack completely the deliberative faculty in their soul. As for women, Aristotle contends that the deliberative faculty in a female is present but ineffective. He claims that "for the slave has not got the deliberative part at all, and the female has it, but without full authority, while the child has it, but in an undeveloped form" (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1260a11). With regard to labourers, he observes that due to their being absorbed in the manual labour, they fail to develop their minds, which is a prerequisite for political activity (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1278a20). However, by denying them the status of citizenship, Aristotle is not saying that children, slaves, labourers and women are useless. He rather acknowledges that their existence is for the benefit of free citizens, because they are capable of carrying out a series of activities commensurate with their capacities. This notion is manifestely hierarchical and exclusive, to say the least. Liberalism, on the other hand, believes in the equality of all humankind, and therefore its conception of citizenship is not exclusive. How does liberalism conceive of citizenship education?

5.2.2.2. Liberalism and citizenship education

It is essential to recall that there are two strands within liberalism: (a) procedural or anti-perfectionist liberalism, which advocates the neutrality of the state and the rejection of the formative project; and (b) perfectionist liberalism, which admits the intervention of the state in the definition of the good, and acknowledges the importance of the formative project. Each of these strands will be considered separately because they yield quite different pictures of citizenship education.

5.2.2.2.1. Procedural liberalism and citizenship education

According to procedural liberalism, the smooth functioning of the polity does not necessarily rest on virtuous citizens. Hence, the formative project is uncalled for: "procedural liberalism imposes heavy restrictions on the formative project. It rejects all civic virtues whose justification depends on comprehensive moral ideals" (Sandel, 1999, p. 211). Furthermore, proponents to this view believe that check and balance mechanisms are enough to counteract oppression: "liberal democracy could be made secure, even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. Institutional and procedural devices such as the separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, and federalism would all serve to block would-be oppressors" (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 359).

In this context, citizenship education amounts only to teaching young people how to exercise their rights and respecting check and balance mechanisms put in place. Besides, according to Tomasi (2001), in this tradition it would be unwarranted to draw up a list of liberal virtues:

> the good political liberal citizen is a person who is skilful at the art of exercising her rights….Political liberals do not think any single catalogue of the virtues of a good human life can be worked out in advance and ascribed to citizens en masse…There is no neat catalogue of the liberal virtues that might be printed up and passed around (Tomasi, 2001, p. 75-78).

In the next section, I turn to the perfectionist liberal model of citizenship education.

5.2.2.2.2. Perfectionist liberalism and citizenship education

Unlike procedural liberals who admit that societies can function well in the absence of a virtuous citizenry, perfectionist liberals believe that virtue is essential for the success of the polity. The idea is that "the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its 'basic structure', but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens" (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 352). That virtue is essential for the survival and success of the polity has also been emphasized by Galston (1988, p. 1279): "To an extent difficult to measure but impossible to ignore, the viability of liberal society depends on its ability to engender a virtuous citizenry". He goes on to observe that: "The broad hypothesis is that as the proportion of non

virtuous citizens increases significantly, the ability of liberal societies to function successfully will progressively diminish" (Galston, 1988, p. 1281). In this context, citizenship education should instill in young people a strong sense of virtues. But what are these virtues?

Galston (1988) and Kymlicka (1997) have outlined the virtues that are required from a liberal citizen. According to Galston (1988), a liberal citizen is expected to have the following virtues: courage, law-abidingness, loyalty, independence and tolerance. Courage is defined as the willingness to fight and even die on behalf of one's country. Loyalty refers to the propensity to respect laws; it is the developed capacity to understand, to accept, and to act on the core principles of one's society. Since the liberal society is characterized by individualism and diversity, the liberal citizen is to devise corresponding virtues: to individualism corresponds the virtue of independence; while to diversity corresponds the virtue of toleration.

Kymlicka (1997) proposes a different list of liberal virtues: (a) public spiritedness or public reasonableness, which is the ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, and the willingness to engage in public discourse; (b) a sense of justice, which is the capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, and to moderate one's own claims accordingly; and (c) civility, which refers to the way we treat non-intimates with whom we come into face-to-face contact.

In conclusion, though liberalism (both procedural and perfectionist) deserves credit for having contributed to the formulation of the idea of universal citizenship by outlining that people are born free and equal, it faces serious problems. In my opinion, it reduces citizenship simply to legal status, and overstates the rights that the individual holds against the state. Besides, it promotes a passive, subjective, thin, minimal, and private citizenry with little room for political participation and civic engagement.

Procedural liberalism[26] seems to have more problems than perfectionist liberalism. It can be challenged on several grounds: conception of the person, priority of the right over the good, and state neutrality. In what follows, I consider these criticisms in a more detailed manner.

[26] As Sandel observes, "Procedural liberalism contrasts more sharply with civic republicanism than does perfectionist liberalism" (Sandel, 1999, p. 211).

In relation to the conception of the person, a critique is presented that liberalism's picture of the person as someone separate from her conception of the good ignores the extent to which people are constituted as the people that they are precisely by those conceptions themselves (Faulks, 2000; MacIntyre, 1981; Mulhall & Swift, 2007; Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1990). In this context, it is argued that the liberal theory conceives of the person as an atom or, rather, as an "unencumbered self" (Kartal, 2002, p. 114; Mulhall & Swift, 2007, p. 158).

With regard to 'priority of the right over the good', liberalism is reproached of preaching subjectivism since it maintains that individuals' choices of ends, values and conceptions of the good are arbitrary expressions of preference, essentially incapable of rational justification (Faulks, 2000; MacIntyre, 1981; Mulhall & Swift, 2007; Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1990). As for the state neutrality, a critique is advanced that denying the possibility to know the good and the good life, denying the state the power to endorse a certain way of life as worthwhile, leads to moral skepticism (MacIntyre, 1981; Mulhall & Swift, 2007; Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1990). Moral skepticism is a position that since there is no possibility of knowing the truth, there is no possibility of knowing what is good. I see that the contentious idea here seems to be that in a context where knowledge of the good is not possible, one is rightly entitled to choose, frame and pursue one's own conception of the good. But in actuality, a life does not become worth living simply because one has chosen it freely. In view of this, I concur with Mulhall and Swift, (2007) that procedural liberalism's pretension to neutrality is misleading.

I argue that by separating the person from her conception of the good, liberalism unveils its opposition to teleological ethics. It maintains that neither ends nor conception of a good life can be established *a priori* and imposed on the person. Rather, the person has to choose her own ends and may not subscribe invariably to those defined by society. Besides, by advocating the priority of the right over the good, liberalism displays its opposition to utilitarianism. It holds the view that individuals' rights can never be sacrificed for the sake of the good of society. The debate is actually about the balance to be struck between individuality and community. We see that liberalism tends to be one sided by taking the defence of individuality. My argument is that the value of both individuality and community should be acknowledged. Furthermore, by enacting laws (reasonable laws), the state

prescribes some conducts and prohibits others. Therefore, to ask the just and legitimate state to be neutral towards competing conceptions of the good does not seem plausible. The state has to define and recommend some 'goods' to some extent for the sake of ensuring social order.

In this research, liberalism will be considered mainly in the procedural sense and I will establish the extent to which the liberal citizenship notion is at work in the *Itorero* training. The communitarian notion of citizenship education is sometimes portrayed as an attempt to remedy the weaknesses of liberalism. The next subsection considers the major arguments of communitarianism.

5.2.3. The communitarian notion of citizenship and citizenship education

5.2.3.1. Communitarianism and citizenship

It is argued that the communitarian[27] notion of citizenship relies fundamentally on the following elements: a conception of the person as a social being, the priority of the community over the individual, the common good, common perception of the good, and active political participation or involvement in public life (Carney, 1992; Etzioni, 1993; Mulhall & Swift, 2007; Sandel, 1982; Van Steenbergen, 1994). Communitarian philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer may differ on their conclusions, but they share some fundamental tenets.

Unlike liberalism which perceives the person as an isolated self, privately modelling and pursuing her own conception of the good, communitarianism affirms that the

[27] Delanty (2000, p. 30-35) distinguishes between three strands of communitarianism: "liberal communitarianism, conservative communitarianism, and civic republican communitarianism". The liberal communitarian notion of citizenship as propounded by Charles Taylor is committed to the view that what is at stake is not just participation in the political community, but also the recognition of minority groups' cultural identities by the dominant cultural community. A conservative communitarian view of citizenship is concerned with creating a sense of responsibility, identity, and participation at micro levels of society, such as within the family, in schools, and in enforcing laws and regulations. The civic republican strand is a communitarianism of participation that strongly emphasizes the associational character of citizenship. Its defining features are commitment to and participation in public life and it basically ignores 'social struggles in the private domain'. While some scholars (e.g. Waghid, 2005) subscribe to this classification produced by Delanty (2000), the present thesis considers only common features of communitarianism in general, without devoting more time and space to its debatable subdivisions.

person is part and parcel of the community from which she receives identity, self-understanding and values. The basic idea is that there is no possibility of conceiving the individual outside the community. This suggests that the liberal "unencumbered self" (Mulhall & Swift, 2007, p. 158) is replaced by the "embedded self" (Carney, 1992, p. 274). Communitarian citizens understand themselves as situated within a community and strive to uphold the tradition and virtues that it has nurtured. This conception of citizenship relies on two major assumptions: (i) individuality is derived from the community and determined in terms of it; (ii) loyalty and education in loyalty cause both the community and the individuals belonging to it to flourish (Van Steenbergen, 1994). In communitarian theory, the individual is not left alone to determine the good; rather the community by virtue of its culture, beliefs and traditions, provides the 'good' and the 'virtuous', which are transmitted through education. This view is in sharp contrast to liberalism (mainly the procedural strand) advocating the priority of the right over the good, or the existence of competing conceptions of the good.

Again, contrary to the liberal citizen who condones the dualism between the public and the private spheres, communitarian citizens, being part of the community, are mindful of the common good to which they subordinate their self-interests. Communitarianism focuses on society bonds and norms. It takes the well-being of the community as a priority. What matters most here is not individual flourishing, but rather the welfare of the community. It is in this context that Sandel (1999) affirms that liberalism (as individualism) is the politics of rights, while communitarianism is the politics of the common good. It can be argued that communitarianism places emphasis on political and social dimensions of citizenship; it promotes a thick, active and maximal citizenship.

5.2.3.2. Communitarianism and citizenship education

Different scholars (e.g. Arthur, 1998; Avineri & De-Shalit, 1992; Etzioni, 1993) affirm that communitarianism places strong faith in citizenship education to ensure the well being of society. These scholars argue that the citizen is to be shaped first by the family, the school, the community and in the end by the state. According to communitarianism, citizenship education should focus on the transmission of values

that the community has defined as core to its survival: “There is clearly a strong concern for values and morality in communitarian thought and an emphasis on citizenship education and a desire to identify the shared core values that can be taught” (Arthur, 1998, p. 362). Communitarians believe that citizenship education enables the youth to appreciate the value of the community; it instills in them a sense of commitment to its maintenance. Some communitarians even suggest that a year of community service be organized to allow the youth to meet and share experiences. More importantly, the community service would serve as an antidote to the egocentric mentality of the youth (Arthur, 1998).

The communitarian theory has been criticized for overemphasizing the authority of the community. Some take it as very conservative; to others it is likely to lead to totalitarianism (Avineri & De-Shalit, 1992). One can also observe that communitarianism, through its emphasis on our attachment to community, places considerable constraints on individual freedom and autonomy (Arthur, 1998). The present thesis will establish the weight of communitarianism within the *Itorero* training.

In sum, contrary to liberals’ emphasis on rights and entitlements, civic republicans acknowledge the importance of duties and active political participation as constitutive elements of citizenship. However, civic republicans do not deny people’s liberty. They rather put it at the service of the public good; hence there are some commonalities between liberalism and civic republicanism. Indeed, instead of opposing the two models, it is better to see them as complementary (Sandel, 1999). As noted by Walzer (1989, p. 217), “the passive enjoyment of citizenship requires, at least, intermittently, the activist politics of citizens”. Besides, as noted previously, the reader should bear in mind that procedural liberalism contrasts more sharply with civic republicanism than does perfectionist liberalism (Sandel, 1999). As mentioned earlier, in the present thesis, liberalism will be understood mainly in the procedural sense. On the other hand, republicanism and communitarianism have in common the insistence on the common good, active political participation and the formative project. The only difference between the two notions is that in communitarianism the good is defined by the community, while in civic republicanism it is prescribed by the state. We now consider modern notions of citizenship.

5.3. Modern notions of citizenship and citizenship education

Modern notions of citizenship include cosmopolitanism and radical democracy. According to modern notions of citizenship and citizenship education, classical conceptions are outdated and fall short with regard to addressing today's social and political realities. Modern notions of citizenship education provide alternatives that suit the needs of today's world characterized by globalization and multiculturalism.

5.3.1. The cosmopolitan notion of citizenship and citizenship education

5.3.1.1. The cosmopolitan notion of citizenship

There is a large and growing body of literature around the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship (e.g. Appiah, 2008; Audi, 2009; Davies, 2005; Gutmann, 2002; Heater, 2004; Koutselini, 2008; Nussbaum, 1994, 1996; Osler & Starkey, 2003, 2005; Reilly & Niens, 2014; Staeheli & Hammett, 2010; Taylor, 1989; Tuomi et al. 2008; Waghid, 2007). Unlike civic republicanism which perceives citizenship as a relationship between the individual and the political community; unlike communitarianism, which emphasizes the attachment to one's ethnic or cultural community; and unlike liberalism, which overstates the freedom of the individual, the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship views the individual in relation to the large world community, i.e., the community of humanity (Osler & Starkey, 2003).

Research indicates that cosmopolitanism[28] is not a present-day phenomenon. Olive and Heater (1994) argue that traces of cosmopolitanism exist in ancient Greece and Rome mainly with philosophers known as stoics, such as Zeno, Chrysippus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. These philosophers understood themselves primarily not in relation to their nation, but in relation to their humanity. Indeed, the ancient Athenian

[28] Audi (2009) distinguishes between extreme, moderate, and minimal cosmopolitanism. For extreme cosmopolitanism, interests of humanity come first in any conflict between them and national interests. Moderate cosmopolitanism would give high but not absolute priority to human interests. Minimal cosmopolitanism need only prefer the interests of humanity when other things are equal. The present thesis takes cosmopolitanism in a general sense as giving priority to human concerns over concerns of any other kind.

philosopher Diogenes Laertius also asserted: “I am a citizen of the world” (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006, p. 681).

However, cosmopolitanism as a philosophy was developed mainly during the Enlightenment by Immanuel Kant (1975). Reference is made here to the second formulation of his categorical imperative, which advocates always treating humanity in ourselves and other people as an end and never as a mere means to an end. But what is cosmopolitanism in the main? It is “a worldview that celebrates human diversity. It is a way of looking at the world from a perspective that accepts that all human beings are equal in dignity and rights” (Osler & Starkey, 2005, p. 24).

In this context, a cosmopolitan citizen is one who views herself as a citizen of a world community based on common human values (Anderson-Gold, 2001). The human values that cosmopolitanism advocates are actually human rights, peace, justice and equality. The world community the cosmopolitan citizen belongs to also has institutions, particularly those of the United Nations (UN) (Osler & Starkey, 2005). Cosmopolitan citizens “act locally, nationally and globally...They have a sense of solidarity with those denied their full human rights, whether in local communities or in distant places. They accept shared responsibility for humanity’s common future” (Osler & Starkey, 2005, p. 24).

I personally think that cosmopolitanism has some viability. Indeed, one cannot overlook the fact that today’s world has become a village. In this context, to perceive oneself only in the boundaries of one’s nation betrays an anachronistic mindset. Humanity has no nationality. According to the cosmopolitan notion, classical conceptions advocate national citizenship. The latter promotes a narrow, ethnic or state-centred citizenship, which actually does not reflect and address today’s social and political realities. Hence, the call for post-national citizenship (Brooks & Holford, 2009) is justified. This does not suggest that cosmopolitan citizenship replaces or suppresses national citizenship. It is a way of expanding horizons beyond one’s nation, reaching out to humanity and defending its dignity wherever human abuses and violations are taking place.

5.3.1.2. Cosmopolitanism and citizenship education

Cosmopolitan citizenship education strives to provide learners with knowledge, skills, values and dispositions for participating in the community at any level, local, national or global: “Education for cosmopolitan citizenship must necessarily be about enabling learners to make connections between their immediate contexts and the global context; it encompasses citizenship as a whole…It also implies recognition of our common humanity and a sense of solidarity with others” (Osler & Vincent, 2002, p. 124).

For a cosmopolitan citizen to act locally, nationally, regionally and globally, certain virtues are required. Drawing on Arendt’s philosophy of ‘worldliness’, Smith (2007) outlines basic virtues, which cosmopolitan citizenship education should aim at. First, good cosmopolitan citizens should have a kind of ‘irony’, i.e., the ability *to step back* from their ties and commitments without disowning them; second, they should develop a “heightened feeling or care for the world” (Smith, 2007, p. 46). In practice, this suggests that for instance, cosmopolitan citizenship education should empower the learner to campaign for the strengthening of existing international human rights laws, to call for more effective international mechanisms for detecting and responding to rights violations, and to protest against third world debt or global poverty (Smith, 2007).

Despite its strong commitment to defending humanity in all people, the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship and citizenship education has been criticized. According to Miller (1998, p. 60), it undermines and dilutes the very notion of citizenship: “genuine citizenship is such that cosmopolitanism is either utopia (and thus unrealistic) or really about something different from and weaker than citizenship”. In other words, for Miller (1998), cosmopolitan citizenship does not have a real ground, i.e., a tangible concrete community. This is supported by Neff (1998), who maintains that citizenship is a legal status and that cosmopolitan citizenship has no legal backing, be it in the natural law or positive law. Neff (1998) goes on to observe that the goals that cosmopolitanism prescribes can be achieved simply on moral grounds, without implying the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship.

In my opinion, what is clear here is that these criticisms point to the difficulties of implementing cosmopolitanism. The latter is a laudable ideal but hardly defensible in

reality. Though we exist in a global world, human rights violations are committed, and there are no bodies or organizations that can guarantee effective and consistent intervention. Notwithstanding these criticisms, cosmopolitanism remains attractive and deserves credit for acknowledging the need to transcend boundaries of national citizenship, and embrace humanity in other people who may inhabit a place different from ours. In view of this, a number of authors (e.g. Bromley, 2009) indicate that currently there is a broad increase in cosmopolitan emphases of universalism and diversity in civic education curricula in much of the world. Drawing on key features of the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship, I will establish the extent to which this citizenship concept informs the *Itorero* training.

5.3.2. The radical democratic notion of citizenship and citizenship education

Different studies have investigated the radical democratic notions of citizenship (e.g. Abowitz & Harnish, 2006; Benhabib, 2002; Delanty, 2000; Gutmann, 1996; Habermas, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Heater, 2004; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Mouffe, 1992; Phelan, 2001; Waghid, 2006; Young, 1989). The radical democratic notion of citizenship depicts itself as an alternative to civic republicanism, communitarianism and liberalism. It considers citizenship in relation to democracy, and denounces the flaws of classical conceptions.

The radical democratic notion sidelines civic republicanism and communitarianism because they sacrifice individuals' rights for citizenship, by advancing the idea of the priority of the common good over private interests. Equally, radical democracy takes liberalism to be faulty, because it sacrifices citizenship for the individual, as it overemphasizes individual liberty (Mouffe, 1992). Hence, radical democracy claims to reconcile successfully individuals' rights and citizenship within democracy. There are three major strands within radical democratic notion of citizenship: direct democracy, discursive democracy, and feminist or universal differentiated citizenship.

According to direct democracy, classical notions do not offer a richer view of citizenship as participation in political life. Civic republicanism does refer to political participation, but its understanding is mainly state-centered: though people

participate, the whole business of politics is driven by the state. Direct democracy is committed to a conception of citizenship understood as *strong political participation* in order to "bring about social change by means of transforming politics" (Delanty, 2000, p. 37). Radical democracy understands political participation in terms of grassroots or direct democracy whereby a citizen is to participate with no intermediary. For this participation to be efficient, citizens should have good communication and deliberative skills. The discursive democracy strand addresses this need.

According to discursive democracy, civic republicanism, communitarianism and liberalism rely on an already established consensus. It maintains that citizenship cannot be exercised within the boundaries of a given consensus. In other words, the "overlapping consensus"[29] of John Rawls (Delanty, 2000, p. 42) is to be replaced by the 'use of public reason' of Habermas. This tends to suggest that citizenship entails the capacity to contribute to the formulation of the consensus through public deliberation. Habermas (cited in Delanty, 2000, p. 41) believes that "discursive democracy is a democracy that is based on informed public debate and is responsible to the demands of an active citizenry". In his view, citizenship entails the capacity to deliberate on issues of public interest.

Furthermore, radical democracy advances the idea that strong participation coupled with public deliberation should not be the privilege of a few individuals. It denounces the exclusion endorsed by classical notions (e.g. Plato and Aristotle), which take equity and autonomy for granted, and by so doing exclude women and other minority groups from politics. Liberalism does this to the extreme as it separates the public from the private (where women are mostly active). Besides, virtues advocated by civic republicanism and communitarianism (such as courage, patriotism, self-sacrifice, and devotion to the common good) are also mainly masculine. The third strand of radical democracy, i.e., feminist or universal differentiated citizenship, serves to remedy these ills.

[29] John Rawls takes overlapping consensus to be the beliefs about the government that citizens happen to hold in common (Bull, 2008, p. 451).

According to feminist or universal differentiated citizenship, the classical notion sidelined certain categories of people based on gender, culture, ethnicity, nationality, race, sexual orientation and socioeconomic status (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Phelan, 2001; Young, 1989). This approach to citizenship argues that citizenship must take into consideration these differences. Universal differentiated citizenship strongly suggests that "members of certain groups would be incorporated into the political community not only as individuals but also through the group, and their rights would depend, in part, on their group membership" (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 370).

In exploring further this idea, Abowitz and Harnish (2006, p. 666-675) perceive differentiated citizenship along four types: "feminist, cultural, reconstructionist and queer citizenships".

Feminist citizenship discourses maintain that the canonical literature of citizenship has been androcentric and patriarchal, and felt pleased to exclude women. This point is also emphasized by Heater (2004) who acknowledges that though "citizenship has existed for nearly three millennia, ...with very minor exceptions, women have had some share in civic rights in the most liberal states for [only] about a century" (Heater, 2004, p. 203). In his view, "citizenship is a status invented by men for men" (Heater, 2004, p. 203). Differentiated citizenship is a recognition that women should be given special representation rights for the purpose of inclusion.

The *discourse of cultural citizenship* states that citizenship has been culturally normed for a long time. It refers to the right to be different and to be accepted as holding cultural beliefs and practices which might be at odds with those of the majority. It is an invitation to perceive cultural difference as a resource and not a threat (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006).

The *reconstructionist discourse of citizenship* focuses particularly on groups who have been excluded from citizenship because of their socioeconomic conditions like the poor and the working classes. It advocates strategies for expanding their powers and rights (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006)

Queer citizenship advocates the rights of gays and lesbians whose sexual orientation is not yet welcome in certain societies. Phelan (2001) points out that they

are sometimes depicted as ‘strangers’ before whom the immediate attitude would be fleeing: “Rather than flee from strangeness, sexual strangers may offer one another and others new ways of questioning the current tight fabric of citizenship and national identity” (Phelan, 2001, p. 4-5).

Radical democratic citizenship education should aim at imparting to learners knowledge, skills, values and dispositions about strong political participation, public deliberation and acceptance of differences. In my opinion, arguments advanced by radical democracy seem plausible. However, one has to bear in mind that present-day democracy is representative not only due to the complexity of modern societies but also because a good number of public matters to be addressed necessitate special skills from experts, which the common *demos* or populace does not have. Based on key features of the radical democratic notion of citizenship, I will establish the extent to which this citizenship concept informs the *Itorero* training.

In conclusion, classical and modern notions of citizenship and citizenship education discussed in this section constitute analytical constructs or premises for the conceptual frame informing the study, particularly in relation to citizenship education. In other words, the thesis will endeavor to answer the following question: To what extent does the Rwanda’s *Itorero* scheme for HSLs embrace civic republican, liberal, communitarian, cosmopolitan, and/or radical democratic notions of citizenship? I now consider the resulting conceptual frame in a more detailed manner.

5.4. Recapitulation of the conceptual framework of citizenship education

The conceptual framework informing the present thesis – particularly in relation to the identification of the citizenship notion guiding the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs – is the ‘citizenship education conceptual frame’. The latter encompasses citizenship concepts discussed earlier (i.e. civic republicanism, communitarianism, liberalism, cosmopolitanism and radical democracy) and takes them as analytical constructs. However, I am not suggesting that the ‘citizenship education conceptual frame’ describes the ideal citizen; it is only a frame capturing all citizenship descriptive typologies discussed previously. In view of this, it should be understood simply as a conceptual or analytical frame.

It is in terms of this conceptual frame' that the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs will be analyzed. In other words, I will establish the extent to which some aspects of this frame are at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. The question here is: Which citizenship orientation does the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs take? Is it skewed towards civic republicanism, communitarianism, liberalism, radical democracy or cosmopolitanism?

As mentionned in Chapter 3, while there is a possibility of analyzing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs using citizenship dimensions (legal, political, social) and binaries (minimal/maximal, thin/thick, passive/active) as a conceptual framework, I prefer to engage with citizenship conceptions (civic republicanism, communitarianism, liberalism, cosmopolitanism and radical democracy) particularly because they assume, accommodate and incorporate citizenship dimensions and binaries. Analyzing the *Itorero* training for HSLs by means of citizenship conceptions yields a richer analysis.

To this end, each citizenship notion/component of the frame will be represented by a number of items or statements capturing its depiction of good citizenship. A complete list of these statements will be presented to respondents so that they can tell (using a four-point Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; 4 = strongly agree) the extent to which each item is emphasized by *Itorero* training. In this regard, the presence of the civic republican notion of citizenship will be investigated by means of the following features: placing public interests above private ones; fulfilling one's duties and responsibilities; being loyal to the state; and serving in the military.

The communitarian notion will be represented by the following attributes: being a role model; respecting core values of one's community; preserving the community's common good; putting the national identity above all other identities; and reducing social inequalities. As for the liberal notion of citizenship (understood in its procedural form), it will be investigated using the following characteristics: pursuing one's private interests; enjoying one's rights and privileges; obeying the law; and having the ability to question ideas.

I will use the following items to investigate the cosmopolitan notion: viewing oneself as a member of the world community; fighting human rights violations locally; fighting human rights violations globally; and protecting the environment. Finally, the radical

democratic notion of citizenship will be captured by means of the following items: participating actively in politics; respecting minority groups; joining a political party; and participating in elections.

This approach is deemed appropriate because upon the identification of the citizenship notion informing *Itorero*, it becomes feasible to outline strenghts and weaknesses of *Itorero*. Put differently, the conceptual frame gives direction to the analysis of *Itorero*.

We now turn our attention to notions and approaches of values education as one of the facets of citizenship education. This is crucial for analyzing and appraising mechanisms through which *Itorero* conveys values and taboos of the Rwandan culture to HSLs.

5.5. Values education notions and approaches

The major purpose of this section is to engage with theories of and approaches to values education. The latter serve as premises of the conceptual framework to be used for the identification of the values education notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In this regard, after exploring approaches to values education (and their underpinning theories) in general, the resulting conceptual frame is provided.

Citizenship and values education are presented as essentially compatible, mainly according to civic republicanism, perfectionist liberalism and communitarianism. Indeed, as established while addressing these conceptions, the health of the state depends on the virtues of its citizenry. These virtues are arrived at through values education.

The idea is that a decent society cannot turn a blind eye to the moral quality of the lives of its citizens. It is not the suggestion of this thesis that the state should interfere with people's privacy. Nor is it being argued that the state should compel people to submit blindly to its set of ideologies. Rather, I am of the view that it is a worthwhile thing for education not only to provide knowledge and skills for *doing*, but also and more importantly values and attitudes for *being*. This echoes the idea of

Theodore Roosevelt who strongly affirmed that: “To educate a person in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society” (Sim & Low, 2012, p. 381). Those who planned the 1994 genocide had arguably been ‘trained only in mind’. But something had certainly gone enormously wrong with their training in morals; hence the revival of *Itorero* as a platform whereby Rwandans can relearn values and taboos of their culture.

However, despite the emphasis on the importance of values education, there is no agreement as to how it should be conducted. Should we teach values by being active or passive, partial or neutral? Should we focus on the content or rather on pedagogies? We are faced with two major theories in values education: traditionalism and progressivism (also called constructivism). These theories first depict human nature and then proceed by indicating what should be done for it to fit in society.

5.5.1. Values education theories: Traditionalism and progressivism

According to traditionalism, human nature is essentially corrupt[30]. In order to curb this evil doing inclination, there is a need to convey moral values to allow the youth to fit better into society directly (Carr, 1991). This view is supported by Emile Durkheim (1961) and Thomas Hobbes (1968). The latter, in his book *Leviathan*, maintains that humans in the state of nature are quasi beastly; hence life is “solitary, poor, brutish, nasty and short” (Hobbes, 1968, chapter xxiii, p. 9). It follows that salvation lies in the transition to civil society where our lives and property are protected by the sovereign (though for Rousseau this is the beginning of inequalities in society). In a nutshell, for Hobbes, the beastly nature is addressed by human socialization. Traditionalism is committed to the view that the flawed human nature should be redeemed only by engagement in social life (Carr, 1998). It follows that values education reshapes the corrupt human nature so that man can better live in society with others.

[30] It should be noted here that the traditionalist view has its source in the Judaeo-Christian tradition where humanity is depicted as intrinsically evil and corrupt, and can only be redeemed by God’s grace (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005; Kerlinger, 1958).

On the other hand, progressivism[31] maintains that human nature is essentially good, and any form of socialization or initiation in traditional values is likely to amount to nothing rather than indoctrination and corruption (Carr, 1991). This view has been advanced by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1973; 1974) who regards human nature as in danger of social corruption (Carr, 1998).

How can the two traditions be reconciled? In my opinion, it would be unwarranted to contend that human nature is totally bad. Human beings certainly have limitations. These limitations, however, do not depict their whole essence. Humans are also, naturally, capable of much good. This amounts to saying that traditionalists have to some extent "overweighed the case against human nature as selfish and anti-social, though they have been right to remind us that there are many natural human dispositions of a negative character which require to be restrained or controlled in the general interests of individual and social wellbeing" (Carr, 1991, p. 185-186). In other words, though human nature involves some negative inclinations, it also has positive features. It follows that values education is meant to control these negative human dispositions.

I tend to believe that progressivism is plausible as it encapsulates positive features inherent in human nature. Nevertheless, it would be rather naive to assume that we are utterly innocent to the extent that we do not need initiation into social values altogether. In this regard, "it is just not reasonable to portray human nature as innocent of or untainted by any negative, destructive or selfish qualities and to characterize human society or culture as almost wholly negative and corruptive in its moral influence on the individual" (Carr, 1991, p. 186). In view of this, values education seeks to nurture good natural dispositions.

In short, we can reconcile progressivism and traditionalism by saying that values education is desirable; it serves to cultivate good aspects latent in human nature (in support to progressivism), but it also serves the purpose of curbing our tendencies to do wrong (in support to traditionalism). However, traditionalism and progressivism disagree on the way values education should be handled. For the former, it should

[31] Progressivism has its roots in the Enlightenment philosophy where humanity is perceived to be essentially good. This is an argument against traditionalism (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005; Kerlinger, 1958).

be done by *acting directly* on the learner to take control of any inclination to do wrong; for the latter, we should *indirectly assis*t the learner to develop spontaneously her naturally good inclinations.

5.5.2. Values education approaches

Approaches to values education align themselves to theories of values education. In this context, traditionalism includes character education and care ethics. Traditionalist values education approaches are also called “direct, heteronymous, narrow, and unintentional” (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005, p. 59). They are teacher-centered and focus on the content, i.e. *values*. Progressivist approaches, on the other hand, favor a cognitive-developmental approach and values clarification; they are called “indirect, autonomous, broad and intentional” (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005, p. 59). These progressive approaches are learner-centred and put much emphasis on the pedagogies, i.e. they focus on justifying rationally one’s choices instead of inculcating values. We now turn to a detailed consideration of these approaches.

5.5.2.1. Character education

It is difficult to define character education since it has meant different things to different people. According to Sim and Low (2012, p. 383) “there is not one universally held theory of what character education is, nor how best to teach it. There is so much fundamental disagreement that the only agreement among scholars is probably the acknowledgement of its importance”. Character education is interested in transforming the behavior of learners so that they meet expectations of their society. In so doing, it is committed to the view that for people to be good, they should know the good.

Based on certain conceptual studies (e.g. Lickona, 2011; Lockwood, 2009; McLaughlin & Halstead, 1999), character education can be defined as the development and cultivation of values and virtues. In other words, it is ultimately concerned with the kind of person the youth will grow up to be (Sim & Low, 2012).

Hence, it involves a strong belief in the force of instructing the youth about virtues. One of the basic precepts of character education is that a society should identify its core values and virtues, which in turn have to be *inculcated* in the youth. Advocates of character education are Bennett (1991), Kilpatrick (1992), Lickona (1991, 2004), and Wynne and Ryan (1993) to mention but a few.

Character education utilizes six teaching techniques: (1) instruction in basic values and virtues; (2) establishing and enforcing behavioral codes; (3) telling stories with moral lessons; (4) modeling desirable traits and behavior; (5) holding up moral exemplars in history, literature, religion, and extolling their traits; and (6) providing school and community outreach opportunities for learners to exercise good traits and pursue good values (Arthur, 2008).

Despite its popularity and support by many politicians (Bergman, 2004; Kohn, 1997), character education has been severely criticized on two major grounds. First, it has been perceived as 'indoctrination' (Arthur, 2008; Kohn, 1997; Noddings, 2002). The idea is that it takes the learner as a passive receptacle, which has to swallow up pre-established values and virtues of the society without constructing meaning out of them. There is little to no emphasis on reflection and moral judgment here. Nodding (2002), Boyd (2010) and Liu (2014) observe that a major feature of character education is its strong dependence on community with a *consensus* on core values. Besides, I argue that character education does not answer the question whose values and which virtues are to be taught. Noddings (2002) warns that fascist and totalitarian states have been especially enthusiastic about character education. Consequently, Noddings (2002) and Bergman (2004) conclude that since character education is indoctrination, it is actually a moral *mis-education*; it cannot involve or include the courage to denounce and correct a tradition that has gone wrong.

Second, it is contended that character education is not sustainable (Kohlberg, 1975; Kohn, 1997; Liu, 2014). In fact, it is unlikely that values learnt through mere inculcation will be internalized and applied to new situations. Though character education techniques may succeed in temporarily triggering a particular behavior, it seems unlikely that they will leave the learner committed to that behavior (Kohn, 1997; Liu, 2014). On the basis of these two weaknesses, Kohlberg (1975, p. 673) labels character education as a "bag of virtues approach", while Kohn (1997) calls it

a ‘fix-the-kid approach’. I will establish the extent to which these criticisms are valid when addressing the values education notion guiding the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs.

At this juncture, I would like to demonstrate to what extent character education, as a variant of traditionalism, relies on a pessimistic view of human nature. It actually relies on the premise that since being good is not our natural disposition, the best the society can do is to instill in us those habits and values it judges good, whether we like them or not. According to advocates of character education, if this inculcation process does not take place, we are likely to go back to the Hobbesian state of nature. Character education, unaccompanied by critical thinking is deficient. Care ethics attempts to remedy the weaknesses of character education.

5.5.2.2. Care ethics

Care ethics and character education, as expressions of traditionalism (which upholds that human nature is essentially corrupt), share the conviction that values education should be directed at producing *better people* and not just better principles of reasoning (Bergman, 2004). Furthermore, care theorists respect the virtues, although they disagree with character education theorists on how they are best taught. In fact, unlike character education which upholds a flee-floating list of virtues, for care ethics virtues are relational. Care ethics is much more concerned with the caring relation than with caring as a virtue (Bergman, 2004).

Nel Noddings, widely known as the founder of care ethics, roots values education in care. She emphasizes the view that being a fully fledged person requires to be able to care for others, because we ourselves are the product of caring. She contends that being cared-for is our original condition. In the absence of care, we would not have arrived at some level of growth and maturity in the community: “The need to be cared for is a human universal. We are born absolutely dependent on the caring of others” (Noddings, 1992, p. 45). However, much as we are the product of care, we are not naturally inclined to care for others; we have to learn caring.

According to care ethics, the purpose of values education is “to produce people who will engage successfully in caring relations. We want our students to be prepared to care for those they encounter directly and to care-about the suffering of people at a

distance" (Noddings, 2010a, p. 394). Noddings goes further and formulates an alternative to Kant's categorical imperative and notes that "Always act so as to establish, maintain, or enhance caring relations" (Noddings, 1995, p. 188). She defines caring as attending to the particular needs, opinions and expectations of others. This definition of caring echoes the account of Martin Buber (1970) with regard to his depiction of ethical relationships in *I and Thou* (Engster, 2004). When one has successfully transposed into the cared-for, the care-giver is deeply moved and stands in a better position to provide genuine caring. Noddings calls this state of affairs "engrossment" or "motivational displacement" (Noddings, 2010a, p. 391). In engrossment, I become conscious of the situation of the person in need and I dedicate myself to attend to those needs (Bergman, 2004).

In order to produce and maintain the required caring relation, care ethics suggests four strategies: modeling, dialogue, practice and confirmation. Modeling refers to the idea of setting an example so as to shape and influence the behavior of learners in caring: "We have to show in our own behavior what it means to care. Thus we do not merely tell [our students] to care and give them texts to read on the subject; we demonstrate our caring in our relations with them" (Noddings, 1995, p. 190).

Dialogue designates the capacity to hear and understand the needs of the cared-for, and to seek jointly the way forward to address them: "The purpose of such dialogues is usually to identify needs, to learn what the cared-for is going through, or what the carer is aiming for, and then work cooperatively on meeting the needs" (Noddings, 2010b, p. 147).

Practice refers to the idea of providing learners with the opportunity to engage in caring: "All students should be involved in caring apprenticeships" (Noddings, 1984, p. 188). Confirmation involves the process of recognizing something admirable, acceptable, and struggling to emerge in each person we encounter despite the *prima facie* weaknesses of the person. Thus "when we confirm someone, we identify a better self and encourage its development" (Noddings, 1995, p. 192). In a nutshell, according to care ethicists like Noddings, Slote (2007, 2010) and Gilligan (1982), being able to care for others is the essence of values education.

Care ethics has been criticized mainly on the basis of its characterization of care. At this point, I wish to outline two major criticisms. First, care ethics runs the risk of

encouraging the exploitation of the caregiver as it accords little importance to caring for oneself. In this regard, being moral is almost indistinguishable from being exploited (Hoagland, 1991). It can rightly be said that the caregiver model advocated by care ethics would seem to be a martyr, servant, or slave (Bubeck, 1995). In my opinion, the major idea inherent in this criticism is that the 'care', as characterized by care ethics, is likely to lead (especially) to women's exploitation. This is because, according to care ethics, a good caregiver selflessly gives herself without considering or complaining about the unjust distribution of caring activities.

The second criticism, which is actually related to the first, is that care ethics neglects justice and contains no mechanisms by which care can be regulated so as not to become morally corrupt (Halwani, 2003), i.e. preventing the cared-for to become mature and own his/her existence. The idea here is that in the long run too much caring may render the cared-for eternally dependent; it is likely to stifle his/her growth.

5.5.2.3. The cognitive-developmental approach

This subsection discusses the notions of progressivism or constructivism. As discussed previously, the corner stone of this tradition is the idea that human nature is innocent but in danger of social corruption. This view harbors a cognitive-developmental approach. Unlike character education and care ethics, which perceive morality as something external to be imparted to young people, the cognitive-developmental approach maintains that "morality is a natural product of a universal human tendency toward empathy or role taking, toward putting oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings. It is also a product of a universal human concern for justice, for reciprocity or equality in the relation of one person to another" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 675). This approach has been supported by Piaget (1932), Dewey (1964) and Kohlberg (1975). The question one might ask is: How does the cognitive-developmental approach conceive of values or moral education?

According to the cognitive-developmental approach, values education should aim at enriching the learner's moral reasoning (thinking) so that he or she can move from the prevailing stage to the next higher one. The focus here is on promoting the

development of the learner's moral judgment. Kohlberg states "the approach is called *cognitive* because it recognizes that moral education, like intellectual education, has its basis in stimulating the *active thinking* of the child about moral issues and decisions. It is called *developmental* because it sees the aims of moral education as a movement through moral stages" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 670 – emphasis added). According to Kohlberg, humans develop moral reasoning in stages. Values education should therefore help the learner to move from the prevailing stage to the next. Kohlberg (1975) stipulated three levels of moral development, each comprising two stages: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional[32].

Unlike character education and care ethics which are teacher-centered and heteronymous, the cognitive-developmental approach puts the learner at the centre of the process, and encourages her to engage her *reasoning* and *thinking* capacities. The cognitive-developmental approach uses techniques such as moral dilemma discussion, moral exemplars and just community schools. According to Kohlberg, moral dilemma discussions (preferably real life-based instead of hypothetical ones) are a useful method of moral development (Snarey & Samuelson, 2008). With regard to moral exemplars, Kohlberg puts emphasis on Martin Luther King, Jr. and Socrates. In his view, in addition to their exemplary moral reasoning and empathic moral emotions, they have taken tangible moral action (Snarey & Samuelson, 2008). As for just community schools, they provide a way for teachers and administrators to embody justice and care in their treatment of students and each other, and hence

[32] The three stages and their corresponding subdivision go this way: pre-conventional level (stage 1: the punishment-and-obedience orientation; stage 2: the instrumental-relativist orientation); conventional level (stage 3: the interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation; stage 4: the "law and order" orientation); and post-conventional level (stage 5: the social-contract, legalistic orientation; stage 6: the universal-ethical-principle orientation). At the preconventional level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong. But the child interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favours) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels (Kohlberg (1975). At the conventional level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 671). At the post-conventional, autonomous and principled level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups (Kohlberg, 1975).

constitute a way for students to develop these moral values (Snarey & Samuelson, 2008).

The cognitive-developmental approach has been the target of several criticisms based mainly on its emphasis on moral reasoning. For Liu (2014), Kohlberg's moral education fails to capture or account for the content of morality and ignores moral sentiment. According to Gilligan (1982), Kohlberg's theory of moral development is biased towards a more male-oriented morality of justice at the expense of a morality of care and responsibility that better suits female moral perspectives[33]. Kohn (1997) supports this criticism and points out that Kohlberg has emphasized moral reasoning, a cognitive process, to the extent that he may have slighted the affective components of morality, such as caring.

Furthermore, Kohlberg himself acknowledges the limits of the cognitive-developmental approach. He concedes that it focuses on the structure or form of morality and not on its content:

> We do not claim that the theory of cognitive moral development is sufficient to the task of moral education...There are three major areas in which the cognitive developmental approach to moral education is incomplete: 1) the stress placed on form rather than content; 2) the focus on concepts of rights and duties rather than issues of the good; 3) the emphasis on moral judgement rather than behaviour. (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 58)

In my opinion, what these external and internal charges unveil is that in order to yield useful results, the cognitive-developmental approach should be combined with other approaches in values education (character education, care ethics, and values clarification). Though logical reasoning (which is its cornerstone) is important for sound moral judgment, the latter is not the only factor determining moral behaviour. One can be smart in terms of logical reasoning and moral judgment, and yet lead a morally impoverished life.

[33] Kohlberg, in fact, used an all-male sample to arrive at his 6-stage process.

5.5.2.4. Values clarification

Values clarification approach is part of the progressive tradition. As noted earlier, this school of thought is committed to the conception of human nature as innocent, and perceives external socialization as likely to lead to indoctrination. I also characterized progressive approaches as indirect, autonomous, broad and intentional. It follows that these basic tenets of progressivism are embroiled within values clarification. Indeed, the latter maintains that "human beings hold the possibility of being thoughtful and wise and the most appropriate values will come when persons use their intelligence freely and reflectively to define their relationships with each other and with an ever-changing world" (Raths, Harmin & Simon, 1966, p. 39).

Unlike character education, values clarification is not as concerned with transmitting to the youth a predetermined set of values. Equally, unlike care ethics, values clarification does not aim at teaching people how to care for others. People are to care if and only if they prize doing so; caring is not a must; it is an option. The major concern of values clarification is to create conditions conducive for the youth to develop their valuing process. Thus "clarifying avoids moralizing, preaching, indoctrinating, inculcating, or dogmatizing... It is an honest attempt to help a student look at his life and to encourage him to think about it, and to think about it in an atmosphere in which positive acceptance exists" (Raths et al., 1966, p. 80). Values clarification sets out to assist learners in taking sound decisions in a common climate of confusion and indecision.

Like the cognitive-moral developmental approach, values clarification does not deal with values as such; rather, it focuses on the valuing process. Both approaches emphasize logical reasoning in choosing among alternatives. However, contrary to the cognitive-developmental approach, the envisaged outcome of values clarification is not to achieve a higher moral stage; but to be clear (and not confused or undecided) about what is important and meaningful in one's life.

Louis Raths, the forerunner of this movement, puts forward seven steps of the valuing process: (1) choosing freely; (2) choosing from among alternatives; (3) choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative; (4) prizing and cherishing; (5) affirming; (6) acting upon choices; and (7) repeating (Raths et al., 1966). In this endeavor, the teacher does not aim at transmitting or

imposing her own values. The teacher is a facilitator in the process of helping the learner to make sense out of her various experiences. Raths puts this point very strongly in the following terms:

> As teachers, then, we need to be clear that we cannot dictate to children what their values should be since we cannot also dictate what their environment should be and what experiences they will have. We may be authoritative in those areas that deal with truth and falsity. In areas involving aspirations, purposes, attitudes, interests, beliefs, etc., we may raise questions, but we cannot 'lay down the law' about what a child's values should be. By definition and by social right, then, values are personal things... We are interested in the processes that are going on. We are not much interested in identifying the values which children hold. (Raths et al., 1966, p. 37)

It is clear from the aforementioned that the values clarification approach does not seek to instill values; rather, it helps the learner to be aware of her values, and have justification for them, i.e. being in a position to identify consequences pertaining to freely chosen values. The method used in this approach is the quasi Socratic dialogue between the teacher and the learner, which involves a strong use of critical thinking skills.

Values clarification has been the target of several criticisms. Some charges take it as value free, relativistic, superficial and without cogent theoretical or research base (Kirschenbaum, 1977). In my view, this charge has some plausibility, because values clarification does not pass moral judgment on people's behaviour or conduct. What matters most, if not solely, is the justification of one's own choices and preferences. Problems are clearly rife with this invitation to base morality on personal choices and their rational justification. There is no possibility of discriminating between a subjectively justified but manifestly worthless and an intersubjectively or objectively worthwhile lifestyle.

Other criticisms of values clarification are directed towards its lack of empirical study guaranteeing its effectiveness, its lack of sustained theoretical argument and its teacher-neutrality (Harrison, 1976). I find values clarification claims hardly tenable. Indeed, I do not see how values education can take place without upholding a clear set of values that people or a society agree upon as meaningful to their lives. In my opinion, values clarification – on its own – is ill equipped to serve the purpose of values education; it better fits for the choice-making or decision-making education.

Besides, it overemphasizes the autonomy of learners and overlooks consequences that are likely to derive from its abuse and misuse.

Values clarification and the cognitive-developmental approach, as strands of progressivism, insist on the freedom of the learner in values education. They do not buy into the idea that values education should aim at transmitting the society's 'bag of virtues' to the youth as is the case with character education. Nor do they subscribe to the view that values education should teach the youth about caring as contends care ethics. Rather, they entertain the conviction that values education is fundamentally geared towards enabling the youth to think critically about their own choices and preferences. I now consider the conceptual framework resulting from these values education approaches. This frame will help to determine the values education notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs.

5.6. Recapitulation of the conceptual framework for values education

The conceptual framework informing the present thesis – mainly in relation to the identification of the values education notion guiding the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs – is the 'values education conceptual frame'. The latter groups together values education constructs discussed earlier: character education, care ethics, cognitive moral development and values clarification.

It is in terms of this 'values education conceptual frame' that the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs will be analyzed in order to determine the values education notion deemed preferable to competing notions. Put differently, I will establish the extent to which some aspects of the frame are at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. This will amount to answering the following questions: Which values education notion is dominant in the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs? Does *Itorero* favour character education, care ethics, cognitive moral development approach or values clarification?

To answer these questions, each values education or aspect of the frame will be represented by statements capturing its depiction of the aims of values education. A list of these statements will be presented to respondents so that they can tell the extent to which the aim is emphasized by *Itorero* training. This will be done using a

four-point Likert scale with 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; and 4 = strongly agree.

In this regard, aims of character education are considered to be the following: teaching the learner core values of the community; and telling the learner taboos/interdictions of the community. Care ethics is represented by two items: teaching the learner to care for others; and teaching the learner to speak and listen to others. The aims of the cognitive moral development approach are understood as: developing the learner's reasoning capacities; and developing the learner's moral judgment. Values clarification is represented by the following aims: initiating the learner to choosing freely; and inviting the learner to measure consequences of his/her actions.

This approach is deemed appropriate because once the dominant values education in *Itorero* is identified, then it becomes feasible to establish the strenghts and weaknesses of *Itorero.* In other words, the conceptual frame allows to analyze *Itorero* critically, which is the target of the present study.

5.7. The working theory guiding the investigation of attitudes of HSLs and trainers

The present study uses the Force Field Theory of Change of Kurt Lewin (1951) as the working theory to investigate and analyze the attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. According to this theory, if one wishes to produce change in a social setting, one should identify the forces beneath that change. On the one hand, there are *driving forces*, that is, forces that contribute positively to the occurrence of the change. In other words, these are forces that move towards a positive region and encourage the change to occur. On the other hand, there are forces that oppose the change, i.e., *restraining forces*. These are static forces that attempt to maintain the status quo. It is worth noting that it is not enough to identify driving and restraining forces; it is also important to establish the intensity or the magnitude of each force.

As far as this study is concerned, what is at issue is the change to be produced among HSLs undergoing *Itorero* training. In other words, my concern is to investigate – according to HSLs and trainers – the extent to which the *Itorero* training scheme is well suited to convey values and taboos to HSLs as part of citizenship education. In view of this, the following items were suggested to HSLs to be assessed as driving or restraining forces: citizenship and values education content, approaches used by trainers, quality and quantity of trainers, learners' prerequisites, training environment in terms of food and accommodation, duration, discussion and deliberation, and the development of critical thinking skills.

With regard to trainers, the following items were suggested to be assessed as driving or restraining forces: the quality and availability of training manuals, regular training for trainers, satisfaction about the remuneration, motivation and prerequisites from learners, class size management, training environment, duration of the training, encouragement of discussion and deliberation, enhancement of critical thinking skills, and trainers' participation in the evaluation and impact assessment of the whole training.

Drawing again on the theory of Lewin (1951), for change to be successful[34], once driving and restraining forces have been identified, there is need to (1) strengthen driving forces, and (2) weaken or eliminate restraining forces. Applied to this study, by virtue of HSLs' and trainers' assessment, this research will indicate (i) concrete actions to be taken for driving forces to be strengthened, and (ii) strategies to be envisaged in order to weaken or eliminate restraining forces.

[34] Lewin (1951) distinguishes between three phases of change. The first step called 'unfreezing' involves the identification of the problem or need. The second step called 'moving' or 'change' occurs when the driving forces have equalized or trumped over restraining forces. With the third step called 'refreezing', change is stabilized at the new level; here it is a period of stability and evaluation. It could be argued that *Itorero* is currently at the second stage. The decision of effecting change among HSLs has already been taken; what remains to be done is to find out how this change can take place effectively, i.e., how driving forces in training HSLs for citizenship and values can trump restraining forces.

5.8. Conclusion

This chapter provided conceptual tools that will help analyze the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In relation to citizenship education, classical (civic republicanism, liberalism and communitarianism) and modern notions (cosmopolitanism and radical democracy) were explored. These conceptions form the 'citizenship education conceptual frame' that undergird the present study. With regard to values education, traditionalist approaches (character education and care ethics) as well as progressive ones (the cognitive moral development approach and values clarification) were engaged with. These approaches constitute the 'values education conceptual frame' to be used in identifying values education notions at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. The present study will establish the extent to which each aspect of the citizenship and values education conceptual frames inform the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. The chapter also dealt with the theoretical framework guiding the investigation and analysis of HSLs' and trainers' attitudes. I now turn to the empirical literature relevant to the present thesis.

CHAPTER 6

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE: A REVIEW OF SOME STUDIES ON CITIZENSHIP AND VALUES EDUCATION

6.1. Introduction

This chapter first explores citizenship education in post-genocide countries, i.e., Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and the Jewish community after the Holocaust. It also discusses an empirical study on citizenship education in Israel and four conceptual pieces of research on post-apartheid South Africa. The questions here are as follows: How did other post-genocide or post-conflict societies conduct citizenship education? Which citizenship notion(s) did they decide to work with? Answering these questions will help to establish whether the way citizenship education is conducted in post-genocide Rwanda resembles or differs from the practice in other post-conflict contexts.

Second, this section provides a brief overview of some empirical studies on approaches to values education. The chosen cases do not necessarily pertain to a post-conflict background. Rather, they reflect the experience of some countries whose citizenship education programs are 'values-explicit'. Finally, I review some studies conducted on the revived *Itorero* (and its parent *Ingando*). In fact, it is important to grasp findings from other studies, because they will help in the discussion chapter, especially with regard to confirming, qualifying, extending, contradicting, and/or opposing my own findings.

6.2. Citizenship education in post-genocide countries

Before venturing into citizenship education in post-genocide countries, it is crucial to clarify the following concepts: genocide, post-genocide and post-conflict. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9/12/1948) takes

‘genocide’ to mean “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”.

Given this definition, post-genocide countries could be roughly understood as those nations that experienced the genocide as depicted by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. So far, the following genocides have been recognized by UN: American Indian genocide, Cambodian genocide, Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide, the Holocaust, the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda, and the Darfur genocide. In the present thesis, I will limit myself to Armenia, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Jewish community after the Holocaust. On the other hand, the term ‘post-conflict’ is a term commonly used in political science, economics and development literature to indicate a society that has recently experienced a violent conflict that affected the daily lives of many citizens (Chetail, 2009).

Citizenship education in post-genocide countries (i.e. Armenia, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Jewish community after the Holocaust - Israel[35]) is under-researched. As a matter of fact, large scale citizenship studies such as CIVED (1971), CIVED (1999), ICCS (2009), and most recently ICCS (2016) do not cover any post-genocide countries except Israel in the two first studies. Besides, the most recent review of literature on citizenship education in post-conflict countries (Quaynor, 2012), and the renown review of literature on citizenship and citizenship education (Neubauer, 2012) are almost silent on post-genocide countries. This seems to suggest that citizenship education in these countries is undocumented.

[35] Objections might be raised that Israel is not a post-genocide country, because the Holocaust took place before the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948. Here I am broadly referring to the experience of Jews after the Holocaust and the early years of statehood.

6.2.1. Citizenship education in post-genocide Armenia

The story of citizenship education in Armenia is intrinsically bound up to the history of the country. In the present study, for easy reflection, the point of departure is the Armenian genocide in 1915, which leads to the consideration of civic education of Armenians in diaspora, under the Soviet Union, and during the post-soviet period.

When the Young Turk regime in the Ottoman Empire killed[36] one million to one-million-and-a-half Armenians from 1915 to 1918, some of the latter came to escape and found refuge in many countries especially France, USA, Italy and other western countries (Achikyan, 2005; Panossian, 2002; Tovmasyan, 2004). Though they were in a foreign land, Armenians in the diaspora educated their children in citizenship; they instilled in the youth the Armenian identity, sense of nationalism and love for the homeland. In this regard, Panossian (2002, p. 137) maintains that "diaspora nationalism focused on retrieving the homeland. Post-genocide Armenian identity therefore came to be associated with a 'lost homeland' and the need to regain it – or to at least have free access to it". It can be said that citizenship education in the diaspora was meant to encourage the young generation of Armenians to work for the recovery of the lost homeland or nation. A number of scholars (e.g. Achikyan, 2005; Panossian, 2002; Tovmasyan, 2004) argue that citizenship education of Armenians in the diaspora emphasized attributes like patriotism, self-sacrifice, civic nationalism, building national identity, and the readiness to recover and defend the motherland. In light of this characterization, one can rightly say that citizenship education in the Armenian diaspora – shortly after the genocide – followed the civic republican and communitarian models.

During the period 1922-1991, Armenia was part of the Soviet Union. At this time, citizenship education with the title 'Man and Rights' was meant to explain the Soviet Armenia's constitution, structures of the government, the supreme Soviet, the communist party legitimacy, the Soviet understanding of democracy, and people's rights living under the Soviet regime (Tovmasyan, 2004). At this time, 'citizenship education' (also called *vospitanie*) was used as a medium to communicate the

[36] The Young Turk regime organized the systematic killing of Armenians – considered a disturbing minority – with the express purpose of putting an end to their collective existence. Armenians were targeted particularly because they were advocating equal rights within the Ottoman Empire (Facing History and Ourselves, https://www.facinghistory.org/. accessed on March 4, 2016).

ideology of communism to young people (Council of Europe, 2005). According to Kellas (1998), the Soviet regime was committed to the view that a 'good citizen' is the socially minded citizen of a socialist society who would also realize in his or her private life the values of a classless, egalitarian, and collective society.

In 1991, Armenia acquired independence from the Soviet Union. In the course of this period, there was a need to foster national identity and define the political direction for the new country. In this context, a number of initiatives were taken in relation to citizenship education as a formal (through separate/specialized subjects, integrated approaches or cross-curricular themes), non-formal (through extra-curricular, extra-mural or out-of-school activities organized by schools and often connected to the formal curriculum), and informal (through incidental learning and whole-school organization and ethos) (Council of Europe, 2005) .

In fact, the prime concern of many organizations (local and international) was the same, i.e., civic education, but their approaches were different. They were doing it in different ways, in different periods and for different groups of people (Achikyan, 2005), most frequently taking directions that were inconsistent with the state's policy goals (Council of Europe, 2005). The idea is that there were many local and international organizations (mainly from the USA) involved in the elaboration of civic education text books. These organizations include (i) Civic Education for Armenian Secondary Schools (CEASS) - College of Education, University of Iowa (COE); (ii) Armenian Civic Education (ACE) - Institute for Training and Development (ITD); and (iii) Civics Project - Junior Achievement Armenia (JAA) (Tovmasyan, 2004).

Upon close scrutiny of these civic standards, it can be observed that, on one hand, civic texts books elaborated by USA-based organizations focused on preparing responsible citizens devoted to democratic values and principles; they were democracy-oriented. Democratic principles and values were emphasized particularly because as a member of the European Union (EU) Armenia has to reinforce education for democratic citizenship. The latter is required of all EU member states. In view of this, democracy is the new part of the Armenian national identity (Terzian, 2010). On the other hand, civic education texts elaborated by local or Armenian organizations aimed at educating feelings of respect and pride regarding the

homeland, the nation, nation's history, traditions, and national distinctiveness (Tovmasyan, 2004).

It is worth noting that the citizenship education curriculum in the independent Armenia also took into consideration two contexts: Armenian culture and global elements (Terzian, 2010). In other words, a balance is struck between local and global perspectives where the civic education in question emphasizes ideas of openness, tolerance and human rights.

Overall, based on studies that I have just refered to (e.g. Achikyan, 2005; Council of Europe, 2005; Panossian, 2002; Tovmasyan, 2004), it can be concluded that citizenship education in post-genocide Armenia shifted in emphasis. What is noticeable is that, shortly after the genocide, Armenia in the diaspora was committed to civic republican/communitarian notions of citizenship. Reference is made here to qualities that were emphasized in the diaspora, such as patriotism, self-sacrifice, civic nationalism, building national identity, and the readiness to recover and defend the motherland. What is interesting to note here is that citizenship education can take place even on foreign soil.

At this juncture, it is worth noting that the citizenship focus changed slightly with independence in 1991 and the entrance in the European Union. Elements of (radical) democracy and cosmopolitanism were introduced. In view of this, in addition to the civic republican/communitarian paradigms, the present-day Armenia is working with other citizenship notions; they include (radical) democracy (in reference to the emphasis on democratic principles and values), and cosmopolitanism (in reference to ideals of openness and tolerance). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that according to the Council of Europe (2005), even today there is still a *strong orientation* towards the *patriotic model* with the goal to promote *loyalty to the state*. This situation suggests that although Armenia engages with various citizenship notions, the civic republican/communitarian concepts prevail.

I suggest here that Armenians in the diaspora can be compared to the thousands of Tutsi who fled Rwanda following pogroms in 1959, 1962, 1973 and 1994, and who found refuge in various countries mainly Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Kenya and Congo (DRC). Given that the current leadership in post-genocide Rwanda is

relatively Tutsi dominated, this study will establish whether post-genocide Rwanda entertains a similar notion of citizenship.

6.2.2. Citizenship education in post-genocide Bosnia-Herzegovina

It is extremely difficult to discuss with precision about citizenship education in the post-genocide Bosnia-Herzegovina, because since the end of the genocide in 1995, the country is still deeply divided. The dissolution of Yugoslavia resulted in the warfare in which Bosnian Serbs – willing to be autonomous or join Serbia – had the opportunity to kill 800.000 Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) whom they considered as traitors or allies to Turkey (Bose, 2002). The warfare went on until 1995 when the USA decided to intervene militarily and put an end to the conflict by means of the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), signed on November 21, 1995 at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio (Bose, 2002). Though this accord stopped the conflict, it partitioned the country, because one of its major resolutions was to separate rival ethnic groups. It is in this context that Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into two entities: the Republika Srpska (RS) for Serbs (Eastern orthodox), and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) for Bosniaks (Muslims) and Bosnian Croats (Roman Catholics). These two entities are divided physically by the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (Hawrylenko, 2010; Oluić, 2005; Soule, 2003). However, other studies (Chandler, 2000) suggest that one district, Brćko, was left untouched due to its isolation and neutrality during the war. This district sits near the Northwest corner of the state.

The Republika Srpska is a mini-state of its own; it is populated by Serbs and organized in municipalities. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is meant for both Bosniaks and Croats; it is organized in cantons and ten municipalities: Bosniaks control five municipalities, Croats are entitled to three, while the two remaining municipalities are shared by both ethnic groups (Oluic, 2005). Although Bosnia-Herzegovina state structures exist as the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, their authority is weak particularly, because each entity (The Republika Srpska and FBiH) has its own constitution, administration, police, army, judiciary, health care system, etc. (Oluic, 2005). In other words, Bosnia-Herzegovina follows the Federal system of government where the self-rule is combined with the shared rule. The office of the

President involves a tri-cameral body: there are three presidents elected, one representative of each of the three ethnic groups. The presidents rotate into the Chairman of the Presidency position every eight months during a four-year term (Miller, 2014). Besides, the International Community continues to play a significant role in terms of enforcing the Dayton Peace Accord. This is done through presence of the UN's office of the High Representative and European Union Special Representative (Guzina, 2007). The UN High representative has – among other things – the right to take the final decision on matters of dispute between the two entities (Guzina, 2007)

Owing to these intense internal divisions, it is sometimes argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina is too weak to function as a self-supporting state (Bose, 2002). These same divisions make it difficult to come up with a national identity. In fact, except Bosniaks, the rest (Serbs and Croats) do not perceive themselves as Bosnians. What complicates the matter further is that while, on the one hand, Bosniaks were pushing for the abolition of the Republika Srpka and the formation of one nation (Bosnia), Serbs, on the other hand, were requesting to be autonomous as a state or be part of Serbia. In addition, Croats were claiming to be a mini-state as Republika Srpka and lead a separate life from FBiH (Oluic, 2005; Soule, 2003).

This fragile situation makes it difficult to envisage citizenship education because "since the 1992-1995 war, no true shared sense of Bosnia identity, or citizenship, exists" (Oluic, 2005, p. 94). According to Guzina (2007), the prevailing situation in Bosnia makes citizenship practices *almost impossible*. However, according to some studies (e.g. Miller, 2014), Bosnian political elites – mainly presidents – tend to invite people for national identity; they are not ethnic dividers.

In light of these developments, citizenship education focuses primarily on teaching the youth in each entity about democratic principles and values while safeguarding ethnic divisions. Since there is no possibility of coming up with a national citizenship curriculum, citizenship education draws heavily on programs elaborated by Civic Education Center, a USA based institution. These civic programs are (i) *We the People*; (ii) Citizen Project; and (iii) Civitas International. It is in this framework that Bosnian teachers are being trained by the Civic Education Center, and American

teachers go to Bosnia to share their experiences in civic education mainly under the auspices of the Civitas International project.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there are 'timid' attempts to initiate citizenship education envisaged as promoting unity and reconciliation among the divided ethnic groups. In this regard, two initiatives are worth considering: the introduction of 'Culture of Religions' course and Mostar Gymanisum. The 'Culture of Religions' course is a project which involves students learning about the major religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism, and Judaism). This course is meant to build tolerance and understanding among the various ethnic and religious groups (Hawrylenko, 2010). The project is of paramount importance precisely because religion is one of the root causes of divisions among the three ethnic groups. Unfortunately, this dimension of the conflict is most frequently ignored. Through the 'Culture of Religions' course, students from all ethnicities are expected to learn about and better understand the 'other' ethnic and religious groups, which *hopefully* will lead to sustainable peace in the long run. The only challenge is that this course is not yet offered throughout the entire country; hence, its success is limited (Hawrylenko, 2010).

Secondly, the Mostar Gymnasium is a high school, which serves as another model of reconciliation. While in other schools students from ethnic groups study separately and follow different curriculums, the Mostar Gymnasium has integrated Bosniaks and Croatian students. The administration of the school is run jointly by Bosniaks and Croats, and students attend biology, chemistry, physics, and information technology classes together. However, sensitive subjects, such as history, geography and language are taught separately. Besides, students interact during sports, school activities, and student council. The Mostar Gymnasium holds strong promises in the eyes of many people as a symbol of post-war reconstruction and reconciliation in a country divided by ethnic conflicts (Hawrylenko, 2010).

In short, it can be concluded that after the genocide, as far as each separate entity is concerned, Bosnia-Herzegovina works with an 'ethnocentric' notion of citizenship, mainly because each ethnic group clings to its own identity. In Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, however, (radical) democratic notions of citizenship are noticeable.

Reference is made to programs introduced by Civic Education Center, a US based organization.

The way Bosnia-Herzegovina had decided to address its conflict contrasts sharply with the inclusive model adopted by Rwanda. The paradigm espoused by Bosnia-Herzegovina to overcome conflicts does not seem to be an inspirational model for post-genocide Rwanda. As mentioned previously, Bosnia-Herzegovina has adopted a 'cleavage model': each ethnic group has been given its territory and it has developed its own institutions, an arrangement that is likely to perpetuate and aggravate the division. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs are developing along different trajectories. Serbs are still perceived as fascist aggressors and enemies.

Post-genocide Rwanda, on the other hand, opted to focus on the unity of its people; fostering national identity is a key priority. Rwandans are encouraged by the leadership to understand themselves as one people, and not as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. *Ubunyarwanda* - Rwandanness is a cherished value. In post-genocide Rwanda, all ethnic groups live together, there is no territory allocated to Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. Victims and perpetrators of the genocide are living together, and sharing the toils of life, which is expected to reinforce reconciliation and cohesion. Already at this stage, there is evidence suggesting that the two countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda) might be entertaining different citizenship notions. This study will establish the magnitude of this difference.

6.2.3. Citizenship education in Cambodia

Citizenship education in Cambodia is better grappled with when placed in the historical context characterizing the country. The starting point for our reflection is the Cambodian genocide conducted by the Khmer Rouge during the period 1975-1979 which entailed the loss of almost 1.7 million people (Kiernan, 20120; Krkljes, 2015).

The Cambodian genocide was committed by the Khmer Rouge political party led by Pol Pot. The latter, deeply influenced by communist ideas of Mao and Stalin, wanted to turn the whole of Cambodia into an agricultural society in a bid to achieve economic self-reliance and political autonomy. The idea was to nationalize and

centralize the peasant society of Cambodia virtually overnight (Clayton, 2005; Kiernan, 2012; Krkljes, 2015; Leang, 2012; Tan, 2008). In view of this, all categories of people were compelled by Khmer Rouge militia to move from their places to rural areas in order to participate in agricultural activities belonging to collectivist farms. Khmer Rouge youngsters "forcibly evacuated the nation's cities, emptied hospitals and Buddhist monasteries, closed schools and factories, abolished money and wages, and scattered libraries. Freedom of the press, movement, worship, organisation, association, and discussion all disappeared for nearly four years. So did family life" (Kiernan, 2012, p. 74). In other words, 'productive work' became forcibly synonymous with 'agricultural work' (Clayton, 2005).

All the people who were opposed to this ideology were killed; they included mainly journalists, lawyers, doctors, professionals, and intellectuals such as students and professors, and members of the upper class (Kiernan, 2012; Krkljes, 2015). Furthermore, the Khmer Rouge killed ethnic minority groups that were present in Cambodia at that time: the Vietnamese, the Chinese, and Muslim Cham. Besides, Khmer Rouge targeted Buddhists monks and wanted their total extermination. The Cambodian genocide also took lives of those who were not fit to participate in agrarian activities, like the ill, disabled and old. The project of Pol Pot was a disaster; it failed completely. Those who went for farming died of starvation, physical injury and illness. The Cambodian genocide was stopped by the Vietnamese on 17 January, 1979, who occupied Cambodia until 1989 (Kiernan, 2012; Krkljes, 2015).

This historical sketch suggests that considering citizenship education in post-genocide Cambodia could be done using the following categorization: (i) citizenship education under Vietnamese tutelage (1979-1989); (ii) citizenship education during the state of Cambodia (1989-1993); and (iii) during the kingdom of Cambodia (1993 to present). I will consider the last two periods together because they have a lot of elements in common.

During the Vietnamese occupation, citizenship education aimed to instill in young Cambodians political and economical tenets of the communist ideology. While Pol Pot had sought to be independent from socialist blocs, the occupant Vietnamese initiated a recovery of communist systems and practices; they re-connected with the international socialist revolution taking the Soviet Union as the model (Clayton,

2005). Citizenship education was therefore used to influence students to support the solidarity of the three Communist countries in Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam), as well as the Soviet Union (Clayton, 2005; Leang, 2012; Neau, 2003). It is difficult to talk of 'citizenship education' in this period, precisely because the Vietnamese were only imposing their own vision. Cambodians almost had no say in defining the kind of knowledge, skills, values and attitudes that their children needed most as future responsible citizens. Only after the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989 can one talk of genuine citizenship education in post-genocide Cambodia.

According to a number of scholars (e.g. Clayton, 2005; Leang, 2012; Tan, 2008), from the establishment of the State of Cambodia (1989-1993) and the Kingdom of Cambodia (1993) to present, citizenship education has focused on political democratization and economic liberalization. The idea is that citizenship education emphasized on principles of democracy and market economy. In view of this, a subject called 'moral and citizenship education' has been developed for primary and secondary schools. As stated in the education policy, moral and citizenship education subject aims to instill in young Cambodians the following traits: (i) the capacity to exercise judgment and responsibility in matters of morality; (ii) a public spirit characterized by equality and respect for others' rights; (iii) being active citizens and being aware of social changes, understanding Cambodia's system of government and the rule of law; and (iv) demonstrating a spirit of *national pride* and *love of their nation*, religion and King (MoEYS, 2004). Very recently, the citizenship education momentum was reinstated; it should develop in young Cambodians a sense of *national* and *civic pride*, high *moral* and *ethical standards* and a strong sense of *responsibility for the country* and *its citizens* (MoEYS, 2014 – emphasis added). Particular attention is also given to democratic principles such as democratic election, freedom and human rights.

In view of the above characterization of the target of moral and citizenship education, it is clear that post-genocide Cambodia (from 1989 to present) works with three citizenship notions which include (i) civic republican/communitarian considerations (in reference to the emphasis placed on national and civic pride, love of the nation, high moral and ethical standards, and a strong sense of responsibility for the country and its citizens); (ii) (radical) democratic considerations (in reference to the relative emphasis placed on principles of democracy such as election, freedom and human

rights); and (iii) liberal considerations (in reference to equality, respect for others' rights, and rule of law). These three notions seem to sit together comfortably in equal proportion.

The Cambodian genocide resembles the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda in several respects. First, both genocides were orchestrated by the government leadership against its own people. Second, in both cases minority ethnic groups and opponents of the regime were eliminated. Do these similarities extend to citizenship notions entertained by both post-genocide countries? The present thesis will provide answers.

6.2.4. Citizenship education among the Jewish community after the Holocaust

Before venturing into an examination of citizenship education in the Jewish community after the Holocaust, it is important to briefly discuss the genocide perpetrated against the Jews commonly known as the Holocaust. The Holocaust chiefly refers to the period from January 30, 1933 to May 8, 1945 in the course of which Hitler and his Nazi Party killed almost six million Jews across Europe, accusing them to be traitors during World War I. Jews were depicted not only as enemies of Germany but also as of inferior race. In addition to Jews, other people were targeted during the Holocaust, especially anyone who was not Aryan, anyone who disbelieved in the Nazi Party ideology, gays and lesbians, the mentally ill, the disabled, gypsies, clergy of various faiths and immigrants of non-white ancestry (Holocaust Memorial Center, 2015). The Holocaust took various forms including putting victims into ghettos, overcrowded and filthy areas, and into concentration camps; subjecting victims to slave labour and starvation; and the 'final solution', which involved mass extermination (Holocaust Memorial Center, 2015). The Holocaust ended in 1945 when US, British and Russian forces started liberating survivors in the labour and concentration camps.

It is important to highlight here that the most significant lesson that Jews learnt from the Holocaust was to put an end to two thousand years of living in the European diaspora. Therefore, survivors of the Holocaust and Jews in other parts of the world started thinking about going back to their homeland, i.e. Israel. Here lies the

beginning of citizenship education among the Jewish community after the Holocaust, which is commonly known as 'Zionist' citizenship. The latter was meant to mobilize Jews all over the world to put their forces together so that they could retrieve their land. Ichilov, Salomon and Inbar (2005) characterize Zionist citizenship in the following terms:

> The aims of education for Zionist citizenship were to instill in the younger generation a strong loyalty to the ideas of national rebuilding and the redemption of the land. The ideal was to produce 'pioneers' dedicated to the cause of erecting the foundations of the future state, who are willing to postpone the fulfilment of their personal wishes and give priority to collective goals…The inculcation of strong national emotions was considered more important than the cognitive aspect of civic education. (Ichilov, Salomon & Inbar, 2005, p. 306)

In other words, Zionist citizenship (and citizenship education after the Holocaust) emphasized nationalistic qualities such as patriotism, self-sacrifice, self-denial for the sake of recovering the land and erecting the new state. Ichilov et al. (2005) reveal that this understanding of citizenship education continued until 1948 when the State of Israel was established and even dominated the early years of statehood. At this stage, it can be observed that Zionist citizenship has a lot in common with civic republican and communitarian notions.

After the establishment of the state, Israel saw many immigrants coming from various corners of the world – who were not necessary following democratic principles. There was therefore a need to educate them in state institutions and democratic principles and values. Hence, citizenship education shifted from a highly nationalistic focus to a more cognitive orientation centred on knowledge of structural and legal characteristics of state institutions as well as democratic principles (Cohen, 2013; Ichilov, 2005; Ichilov, 2013). It can be argued that while Zionist citizenship and early years of statehood followed the civic republican and communitarian models (Jews were strongly attached to their traditions) the period from 1980s onwards marks the beginning of the (radical) democratic notion of citizenship.

Given that current Israel is a diverse society where secular Jews, orthodox Jews, ultra-orthodox Jews and Israeli-Arabs are called upon to coexist peacefully, citizenship education insists – with difficulties – on attributes such as pluralism and tolerance, acceptance of diversity, ability to critically assess ideas, and personal autonomy. The relative emphasis placed on these qualities tends to suggest that

contemporary Israel favors liberal and cosmopolitan notions of citizenship while preserving at the same time the dual nature of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state (Cohen, 2013; Ichilov, 2005; Ichilov; 2013).

Notwithstanding all intentions to overcome differences and tensions, there persists in in Israel a perceived difficulty to define what constitutes 'Jewishness' or the national civic identity. In view of this, while Israeli Jews tend to entertain the civic republican/communitarian conceptions of citizenship, Israeli-Arabs prefer a liberal notion of citizenship, which accommodates their rights as a minority and promotes equality of all Israeli people regardless of their religion. It is also important to note that among Jews there are rifts between secular, nationalist-orthodox, and ultra-orthodox Jews, which suggests that rifts are still deep and unbridgeable in Israel (Ichilov, 2005). In view of this, I concur with Ichilov (2005, p. 60) that "educating the younger generation for citizenship in a deeply divided society is an extremely sensitive and difficult task".

The Holocaust and the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda have in common that in both cases, victims were targeted because of their identity, i.e., being a Jew and being a Tutsi, respectively. Both people (Tutsi and Jews) also share life in the diaspora and a sense of rediscovery of the homeland. Are these common points enough to suggest that post-genocide Rwanda entertains a citizenship notion similar to that prevalent after the Holocaust? This research will attempt to furnish an answer in this regard.

In general, drawing from citizenship concepts discussed in Chapter 5, it can be concluded that in the aftermath of the genocide – except in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, affected countries (e.g. Armenia, Cambodia, and Israel) tend to adopt civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship. However, after consolidating state institutions (and after relatively recovering from the respective genocide), there is a shift towards the democratic notion to ensure that principles and values of democracy are internalized. Some countries (e.g. Armenia and Israel) went even further to add other citizenship models depending on the dictates of circumstances. In this regard, in addition to civic republican, communitarian and democratic considerations, Armenia employed the cosmopolitan notion. As for Israel, it is struggling to move from civic republicanism and communitarianism through

democratic to liberal and cosmopolitan notions of citizenship. A shift from civic republican and communitarian notions to liberal, cosmopolitan and democratic notions could mean for post-genocide countries that the civic republican and communitarian notions might not be useful to be envisaged as long term citizenship models. My thesis will show how the post-genocide Rwanda positions itself in this general trend.

It is also worth noting that some post-genocide countries (e.g. Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia) failed to resist the influence from outside in citizenship and values education. In this regard, while Armenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina relied heavily on experts from the USA, Cambodia sought support from France, Italy and USA (Clayton, 2005; Dy, 2015). Unlike these countries, post-genocide Rwanda employs a home grown solution in citizenship and values education; it went back to its culture and revived the traditional citizenship education school, *Itorero*. I have to mention here that in 2008 there was an attempt by the USA through the University of California Berkeley to influence citizenship education in post-genocide Rwanda through the project led by Freedman (Freedman et al., 2008), which attempted to write the Rwandan history. The leadership of post-genocide Rwanda declined the offer and decided to put in place a team of Rwandan historians, which wrote the official version of the 'history of Rwanda' currently in use at all education levels (Byanafashe & Rutayisire, 2011).

6.3. Empirical and conceptual studies of citizenship education in Israel and South Africa

While the previous section has been historical in the main, the current subsection focuses on specific studies that sought to investigate the citizenship notion prevailing in post-genocide and post-conflict contexts via the public discourse dominant in the school or in citizenship education policies. At this point, I arguably have to choose some case studies; it would be difficult to review all studies conducted on all post-conflict or post-genocide countries. As indicated previously, findings from other studies will help in the discussion chapter, especially with regard to qualifying, extending, contradicting, and/or opposing my own findings.

6.3.1. The case of Israel

Ichilov and Nave (1981) conducted a study in Israel among 1.000 pupils, aged 14-18, from 14 high schools in the Tel-Aviv, central and southern districts of the country. In order to understand pupils' conceptions of good citizenship (which actually reflects what they have been taught), the researchers provided them with a list of thirty-six items[37], which they were asked to classify into five categories: most important (four characteristics), important (eight characteristics), somewhat important (twelve characteristics), unimportant (eight characteristics), and least important (four characteristics). The results of the study (Ichilov & Nave, 1981) showed that three items were deemed most important in depicting good citizenship: *obeying the law, being loyal to the state* and *performing one's duties to the state*. Surprisingly, characteristics that express political interest such as discussing politics with others, reading news papers regularly, and being knowledgeable about politics were not associated strongly with good citizenship. This depiction of the 'good citizen' by pupils unveils to some extent the prevailing citizenship notion in Israel at this time.

The research by Ichilov and Nave (1981) demonstrated that items expressing the citizen's attachment to the state were regarded as central characteristics of the good citizen, which suggests that Israeli students entertain a subject orientation and not a participation oriented approach to citizenship. In other words, they perceive citizenship as being passive rather than active; they associate citizenship with obedience and loyalty rather than participation.

[37] The thirty-six characteristics of a good citizen are: (1) obedience of the law of the State; (2) loyalty to the State; (3) performance of one's duties to the State; (4) care about what happens in the country; (5) readiness to volunteer in public affairs; (6) honest payment of taxes; (7) respect and honor of the State; (8) honesty; (9) an interest in what is happening in the State; (10) readiness to help others; (11) active participation in municipal affairs; (12) loyalty to the Government; (13) dedication to one's job; (14) regular participation in elections; (15) truthfulness; (16) ethical disposition; (17) refusal to pull 'strings'; (18) consideration of others; (19) obedience of public officials; (20) reliability; (21) refusal to take advantage of people weaker than himself; (22) self-discipline; (23) tolerance of others' views; (24) lack of fear to speak his mind; (25) behavior according to social norms; (26) principled behavior; (27) being good and faithful friend; (28) getting along with people; (29) active political party membership; (30) knowledgeability about politics; (31) devotion to his family; (32) readiness to compromise on occasions; (33) adherence to his opinions; (34) being a good neighbor; (35) discussion of politics with others; and (36) regular study of newspapers. See Ichilov & Nave (1981). This list was drawn up based primarily upon the study of the concept of good citizenship among American adolescents by Jennings and Niemi (1974) and upon the instrument developed by Oppenheim and Torney (1974) (Ichilov & Nave, 1981).

It can be argued that Israeli students describe good citizenship in civic republican terms. Recall and consider at this point their description of good citizenship: obeying the law, being loyal to the state, and performing one's duties to the state. The way these young people characterize good citizenship undoubtedly demonstrates what they have been taught, which suggests that in 1981 (33 years after the establishment of the Jewish State), Israel was working with the civic republican notion of citizenship.

This conclusion is consistent with results from the historical approach that we have just seen. A recommendation was made by researchers that "if Israel desires more active citizens, the agents of political socialization must cultivate a more balanced citizen orientation in the younger generation" (Ichilov & Nave, 1981, p. 375).

6.3.2. The case of post-apartheid South Africa

Two documents are critical to understand citizenship notions informing the post-apartheid South Africa: the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001); and the 2011 Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS, 2011), mainly the History and Life Orientation units. The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001) sought to identify ten values that would serve as some kind of moral compass for youth in post-apartheid South Africa. These values include (1) democracy, (2) social justice, (3) equity, (4) non-racism and non sexism, (5) *Ubuntu* (human dignity), (6) an open society, (7) accountability (responsibility), (8) the rule of law, (9) respect, and (10) reconciliation.

Upon close scrutiny of these values one is led to conclude that the Manifesto (2001) tends mainly towards democratic, liberal, and cosmopolitan concepts of citizenship. Reference is made to the relative emphasis placed on democracy, rule of law, and accountability (in relation to the democratic concept); the weight attributed to equity, equality, respect, non-discrimination, freedom, non-racism and non-sexism (in relation to the liberal notion); and the predominance of openness and *Ubuntu* – human dignity in relation to the cosmopolitan concept. It is important to note that the

communitarian[38] concept seems minimal; it is only noticeable through two values: social justice and reconciliation.

The CAPS (2011) also shows that in post-apartheid South Africa, citizenship education predominantly embraces democratic, liberal, and cosmopolitan concepts. Democratic aspects of citizenship are noticeable because the CAPS (2011) highlights the importance of democratic values, meaningful participation in society, peoples' self-governance, and exercising constitutional rights and responsibilities. With regard to the liberal aspect, reference is made to the emphasis placed on fundamental human rights, self-fulfillment, equal education opportunities and critical learning. The cosmopolitan attributes are visible through ideals such as being an open society, being sensitive to global imperatives, concern towards the environment, and tolerance towards diverse religions and belief systems. The CAPS (2011), however, also displays some elements of communitarianism; this is apparent through the relative emphasis placed on social justice, knowledge of local contexts, indigenous knowledge systems and medicine, cultural rites of passage, and cultural heritage like games.

What is surprising in these reviewed documents is that civic republican attributes of citizenship seem to be minimal in post-apartheid South Africa. The CAPS (2011) talks only of 'patriotism' to the principles of the constitution. As for the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001), it alludes to civic republicanism simply in terms of 'social honor'. But the latter is understood not as 'jingoistic patriotism' or 'slavish subservience'; it is rather a sense of honor and identity as a South African.

The minimal presence of civic republican traits and the abundance of democratic characteristics (in these reviewed studies) seem to be at odds with the conclusion drawn by Mathebula (2009). The latter, upon a conceptual study of post-apartheid citizenship education policy in South Africa, suggests that there is a tendency

[38] The presence of liberal and communitarian aspects of citizenship education in post-apartheid South Africa was also pointed out by Waghid (2004). But the latter did not find these concepts (liberal and communitarian) helpful in a post-apartheid context still characterized by discrimination. In their replacement, Waghid (2004, p. 535) suggests "compassionate citizenship" which he defines as "a matter of prompting in pupils an awareness of the misfortune or suffering of others which may have occurred through no fault of their own".

manifest in the state policy documents to *undermine* democratic participation and active citizenry and to promote *obedience*, if not *unquestioning loyalty*, to the South African government.

Overall, when one investigates classroom discourses and citizenship policies in post-conflict countries, it becomes apparent that there are variations: Israel tends to emphasize the civic republican notion of citizenship. Post-apartheid South Africa takes a different direction: it is predominantly committed to democratic, liberal, and cosmopolitan concepts.

Apartheid rule in South Africa ended in 1994. The genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi was carried out and stopped in the same year. In this context, both South Africa and post-genocide Rwanda have enjoyed 22 years of liberation. This thesis will attempt to establish the similarities and differences between the two countries in relation to their guiding citizenship notions.

6.4. Empirical literature on approaches to values education

In this section, I explore some studies on various ways of conducting values education as part of citizenship education. As a reminder, at this stage, my choice is not limited to post-conflict or post-genocide contexts, chiefly because there is a dearth of research on approaches to values education as part of citizenship education (Halstead & Taylor, 2000; Prencipe & Helwig, 2002). The situation becomes much more difficult when one investigates citizenship education at the pre-university level. In many countries, citizenship education tends to be 'value-neutral' (Kerr, 1999) and for this reason, I draw on the experiences of other countries whose citizenship education programs are value explicit like Singapore, Australia and Botswana.

It would be ideal to consider values education in post-genocide countries but available research shows that some of these countries (e.g. Israel and Bosnia-Herzegovina) are still deeply divided, which makes it extremely difficult to come up with a list of national values to be communicated to the youth (see Cohen, 2013; Gross, 2013; Ichilov et al., 1999, 2005 in relation to Israel; and Bose, 2002; Hawrylenko, 2010; Oluić, 2005; Soule, 2003 on Bosnia-Herzegovina). In view of this,

in relation to Israel, there exist four segments that actually do not agree on what constitutes the Jewish identity or 'Jewishness', namely secular Jews, orthodox Jews, ultra-orthodox Jews and Israeli-Arabs. With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs (occupying the Republika Srpska) live separately from Bosniaks and Croats (occupying the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). These two entities follow different education programs in terms of citizenship education content.

As discussed earlier, other post-genocide countries (e.g. Armenia and Cambodia) rely on foreign experts and textbooks in relation to citizenship and values education (see Clayton, 2005; Leang, 2012; MoEYS, 2014; Tan, 2008 with regard to Cambodia; and Achikyan, 2005; Council of Europe, 2005; Panossian, 2002; Tovmasyan, 2004 on Armenia). Instead of using local or traditional education programs, they resorted to external experts and textbooks on citizenship and values education. At this juncture, it is important to recall that post-genocide Armenia relies heavily on experts and textbooks from USA. As for Cambodia, it relies on French and other western experts.

This situation makes it difficult to talk about values education in post-genocide countries in a manner similar or comparable to *Itorero* in post-genocide Rwanda. As a reminder, *Itorero* was established with a specific mandate to foster patriotism and teach values and taboos of the Rwandan culture among all Rwandans.

Singapore has developed a citizenship and character education program for pre-university students in order to allow them be good individuals and useful citizens (Singapore Ministry of Education, 2016). The program revolves around three pillars, namely (i) core values; (ii) social and emotional competencies; and (iii) civic literacy, global awareness and cross cultural skills. In relation to core values, Singapore defined a list of six key values: respect, responsibility, integrity, care, resilience and harmony. With regard to social and emotional competencies, they refer to skills needed to recognize and manage emotions. This rubric of the training includes issues such as self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, relationship management, and responsible decision making. As for civic literacy, global awareness and cross cultural skills, they are concerned with skills related to citizenship competences in a global and multicultural context. My chief focus here is on approaches used to teach values.

It has been indicated (Singapore, Ministry of Education, 2016) that values are to be taught using a range of approaches: cooperative and collaborative learning; scenario-based inquiry; experiential learning; and modified values clarification. Cooperative learning puts students together as a group to work on a task or to create a product. Collaborative learning emphasizes the social interactions while working in groups, which facilitates deeper knowing. Scenario-based inquiry and case studies are strategies meant to enable students apply their knowledge to authentic issues. Experiential learning places learners in a learning situation characterized by a high level of active involvement. Values clarification is the approach that allows learners to think about and clarify their values; it consists in effective questioning to guide students to clarify their beliefs and values (Singapore Ministry of Education, 2016).

Tan and Wong (2010) show how citizenship and character education program for pre-university students in Singapore is deficient. He argues that a good moral education must not only nurture in young people a core set of moral beliefs and values, but also teach them how to apply these beliefs and values in critical and creative ways to solve the real moral problems they encounter. The idea here is that a good moral education should teach morality (a set of beliefs and values) but also, and more importantly, moral reasoning. Tan and Wong (2010) present a threefold critique of citizenship and character education in Singapore. First, it is shown that students are *inculcated* with national values for the purpose of *economic* and *political socialization*. Second, it is outlined that the lists of values, principles and definitions of good character and right conduct have already been decided for the students. Third, the author shows that moral values are seen mainly as instruments for forging national unity and maintaining national identity in Singapore.

In view of these weaknesses, Tan and Tan (2014) argue that moral education in Singapore promotes morality but fails to foster moral reasoning (creative and critical thinking skills), particularly because it is based on an inculcation or transmission approach in which a ‘good citizen’ is one who accepts and demonstrates the values and behavior prescribed for the sake of maintenance of the established social and value system. In other words, though in documents there is an invitation to engage with a series of approaches (i.e., cooperative and collaborative learning; scenario-

based inquiry; experiential learning; and modified values clarification), in practice the program relies heavily on character education.

In 2003, the Australian Government Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) conducted a study among 69 schools with the aim among other things to capture approaches that teachers were using in values education as a way of fostering good citizenship. The research revealed that Australian schools were using a combination of character education, cognitive development, and values clarification (DEST, 2003). However, the study noted the difficulty for schools to establish a common list of values to teach; hence the National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools (DEST, 2005) elaborated a list of nine values that ought to be taught. These include: (1) care and compassion; (2) doing your best; (3) fair go; (4) freedom; (5) honesty and trustworthiness; (6) integrity; (7) respect; (8) responsibility; (9) understanding, tolerance and inclusion.

In order to enhance these values in schools, two projects were set in motion (Lovat, Toomey, Dally & Clement, 2009): Values Education Good Practice Schools Project 1, and Values Education Good Practice Schools Project 2. After the implementation of these two projects, a study entitled “Project to Test and Measure the Impact of Values Education on Student Effects and School Ambience” was commissioned to measure and quantify their impact on schooling. This study (Lovat et al., 2009) revealed that the two values education programs had a positive effect on (a) student academic diligence; (b) school ambience; (c) student-teacher relationship; (d) student and teacher well-being; and, (e) parent and family participation. Particularly with regard to students, the study determined that values education had impacted positively on their engagement, inclusive manners and responsible behavior (Lovat et al., 2009).

This Australian case constitutes strong evidence suggesting that (i) values education as part of citizenship education is a worthwhile endeavor; (ii) it yields good results when combined approaches are used; and (iii) its impacts can be quantified.

Matemba (2010) conducted a study to explore the main phases of moral education as part of citizenship education in Botswana. He discovered that moral education in Botswana has evolved in three main stages. First, before colonialism, it was done

under the umbrella of the initiation school known as *bojale* (for girls) or *bogwera* (for boys) (Matemba, 2010). Second, during the colonial period, the initiation school was abolished, and moral education was fused with religious education. This situation continued in the post-independence period until 2007. Third, interestingly enough, the study (Matemba, 2010) demonstrates that from 2007 onwards, the moral education syllabus has shifted to a values clarification focus. As a matter of fact, the study reveals that the moral education syllabus in junior secondary school notes the following:

> In the Value Neutrality approach, the teacher ought not to provide authoritative answers. The teacher leads learners to discuss controversial issues as a neutral facilitator and encourages quality discussions. They [teachers] must demonstrate to pupils how moral arguments are conducted and moral conclusions made. (Botswana Government, 2007a, p. iii)

The study in question (Matemba, 2010) suggests that in most sub-Saharan African countries, before colonialism, moral education – as part of citizenship education – was one of the main components of the traditional initiation schools. During colonial times, due to the spread of Christianity and the lack of willingness of colonialists to develop and foster critical thinking skills amongst Africans, these indigenous schools were abolished, and moral education collapsed into religious education. Today, there seems to be an effort to make moral education a secular stand-alone activity, in response to prevailing religiously and culturally pluralistic societies.

To sum up, this section has demonstrated that values education as part of citizenship education is conducted in a number of ways. However, the majority of studies tend to indicate that values education yields tangible results when various approaches are combined. The present thesis attempts to identify the values education notion at work in the Rwanda's *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. It strives to establish to what extent character education, care ethics, the cognitive moral development approach, and values clarification inform *Itorero*. In what follows, I review some studies conducted on the revived *Itorero* and its parent *Ingando*.

6.5. A review of literature on *Itorero* and *Ingando* in Rwanda

While there has been a wealth of research on *Ingando* (the earliest form of *Itorero* training shortly after the genocide, i.e., from 1996 to 2007), only a limited number of studies have been conducted on the revived *Itorero*. Since the present study argues that the revived *Itorero* developed out of *Ingando*, because the former emerged from the latter in content and form, this section aims to review some studies conducted on these two platforms of citizenship education. My major focus here is to show how various studies have come to unveil the image of the 'good citizen' advanced by *Itorero* training *and Ingando*.

Sundberg (2014) conducted an ethnographic study on the revived *Itorero* during the period of August 2011 and May 2012. The study explored the *Itorero* training meant for HSLs but also *Amatorero* (plural of *Itorero*) meant for other groups. Given the anthropological nature of the study, the author lived for one year in a neighborhood in Kigali in order to experience how government narratives of a model citizen translate into the daily life of Rwandans.

The study (Sundberg, 2014) reveals that the 'good citizen' as portrayed by *Itorero* could be captured along the category of *Intore*. The latter designates a new and improved citizenry; it is the political leadership's vision of the Rwandan citizen. It is important to highlight the characterization of such a model citizen. The study indicates that *Intore* is a Rwandan who has proficient knowledge of (i) the national history, (ii) Rwandan cultural values and taboos; and (iii) Vision 2020 (Sundberg, 2014). More importantly, Sundberg (2014) shows that a good Rwandan citizen – *Intore* – demonstrates loyalty to the state leadership and ideology, has the 'right mindset', and acts as the catalyst of change in the community.

However, Sundberg (2014) raises serious concerns about such a model citizen. He argues that *Intore* is the model subject rather than the model citizen. In other words, according to the author, instead of producing 'citizens', *Itorero* might be producing 'subjects'. The author came to this conclusion after demonstrating that *Itorero* partly serves as a forum for manufacturing citizens according to RPF ideology. Besides, the study reveals that "the vast majority of participants in *Itorero* were requested to join the ruling political party – RPF" (Sundberg, 2014, p. 15, 36, 139, 140).

As far as the appreciation of *Itorero* is concerned, the study (Sundberg, 2014) indicates that it varied with age and place of birth. According to young people (HSLs), *Itorero* had been "tough but good" (p. 141). For adult people born in Rwanda, *Itorero* was compared to MRND 'animations'. The latter refer to cultural scheme of mass mobilization practiced under the late President Juvénal Habyarimana. Some parallels were also drawn "between *Intore* and *Interahamwe*"[39] (p. 142). In this regard, according to the study, for people born in Rwanda "although the *Intore* of today did not seem to pose an immediate threat, they could very well do so in the future" (p. 143). For old returnees, having grown up in Uganda, DRC, Tanzania, Burundi or Europe, *Itorero* was comparable to cultural activities mobilizing the Rwandan diaspora in the early 1990s. Although the mobilization activities in question had not started as political-military strategies, "they did turn into an arena for recruiting rebel soldiers in the early 1990s" (p. 144).

Sundberg (2014, p. 145) notes that "for those who had reached political maturity by the early 1990s, *Itorero* is not necessarily a break with the past, but rather its continuation. The perception that politics keep repeating itself rather than offering something new has been voiced by several scholars on post-genocide Rwanda (see e.g. Longman, 2011; Reyntjens, 2004; Uvin, 1998)".

Sundberg's (2014) claims should be taken with great caution, particularly because the researcher seems to take a one sided-view. Besides, most of the sources used by the researcher tend to be those produced by opponents to the current leadership of Rwanda (e.g. Reyntjens, 2004). As a matter of fact, comparing *Intore* to *Interahamwe* does not seem plausible. In my view, *Interahamwe* were highly trained militia wholeheartedly devoted to killing Tutsi. *Intore*, on the other hand, are people trained to respect values and taboos of the Rwandan culture (key to these values is respect for life). Put differently, while *Interahamwe* were squadrons of death, *Intore* are expected to be promoters of life and catalysts of positive change and development. Though *Intore* are not 'perfect' beings, the difference between them and *Interahamwe* clearly remains enormous. In view of this, the comparison drawn by Sundberg is problematic. As for the author's (Sundberg, 2014) observations that

[39] *Interahamwe* refers to the trained militia of the late Juvénal Habyarimana who carried out the systematic killing of Tutsi in 1994.

Intore are model *subjects* and that *Itorero* in part reflects the ruling party ideology, the present thesis will establish whether such claims are valid.

Turner (2014) conducted a study on *Ingando* which involved a six months field work in Kigali and the Eastern Province in Rwanda in 2011-2012. The researcher had conversations with representatives of NGOs, state institutions and diaspora organizations. The study focused mainly on *Ingando* for ex-combatants. The researcher shows that *Ingando* is an important instrument in transforming various layers of the Rwandan society into good citizens. Central to *Ingando* purpose are the education of the people and creation of citizens of the new Rwanda.

According to Turner (2014, p. 424), the good citizen that *Ingando* strives to create is a citizen who is "unblemished by the stains of the old genocidal regime". The study also notes that the *Ingando* aims "to allow RPF win the minds and hearts of the population it liberated" (Turner, 2014, p. 424).

Turner (2014) distinguishes two categories of *Ingando*. He demonstrates how the revived *Itorero* evolved from *Ingando*. Turner (2014) further notes that the Rwanda government makes an important distinction between *Ingando* solidarity camps and *Ingando* re-education camps. The study argues that solidarity camps are for politicians, civil society, church leaders, *Gacaca* judges and incoming students. Re-education camps, on the other hand, are for ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, confessed *génocidaires*, released prisoners, prostitutes, and street children. The study shows that it is the solidarity camps that were later renamed *Itorero*.

These observations are important and valid because in addition to civic education trainings currently organized by *Itorero* training, there are other camps for ex-combatants and ex-soldiers conducted under the auspices of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). The study (Turner, 2014) concludes that though *Ingando* and *Itorero* might be serving 'other purposes', they are undoubtedly reconciliation tools and platforms for creating new Rwandan citizens.

Purdeková (2011b) conducted research on *Ingando* by means of field work between March 2008 and April 2009. The researcher conducted formal interviews and informal discussions, as well as visits to camps. Primary and secondary data

materials were also consulted. Furthermore, the researcher spoke to *Ingando* organisers and participants (university entrants, ex-combatants, and released prisoners).

Purdeková's (2011b) findings reveal that the current *Itorero* is the closest relative to *Ingando*. For this reason, *Itorero* is often referred to as "advanced *Ingando*" (Purdeková, 2011b, p. 18). The idea is that *Itorero* resembles *Ingando* in several respects. In relation to the purpose of *Ingando*, the study shows that *Ingando* (i) is the social laboratory of the new citizen; (ii) is meant primarily to shape the citizen and his/her mentality; (iii) aims at the cleansing of people's minds and fostering one way of looking at things; and (iv) is a "forum for mainstreaming participants in RPF ideology" (Purdeková, 2011b, p. 17, 8, 13).

The study also indicates that, according to *Ingando* teaching, a good citizen is the one who (i) takes the defence of the country as his/her primary role; (ii) loves the nation; (iii) subjects his/her interests to the national ideal; and (iii) gives Rwanda his/her all. Purdeková (2011b, p. 29) concludes that "such a citizen is no longer a citizen but rather a 'subject'". Put differently, according to *Ingando* teaching, an ideal citizen is interpreted as a person with obligations rather than a rightful person.

Mgbako (2005) conducted a study on *Ingando* in January 2004. The study sought to evaluate the merits and limits of *Ingando* as means of fostering reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. The research involved interviews with *Ingando* participants, government officials, journalists and genocides survivors. In addition to *Ingando* for HSLs (university entrants), the study focused on *Ingando* organized for other groups, such as ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, and released *génocidaires*.

In relation to *Ingando* for HSLs (university entrants), the study reveals that students were taught that a good Rwandan citizen is "the RPF loyalist" (Mgbako, 2005, p. 217). According to Mgbako's (2005) findings, *Ingando* is an opportunity for the government to mould the opinions of young students; it is a forum meant to create a generation of RPF loyalists among Rwanda's future leaders. In other words, the study shows that *Ingando* is Janus faced: it serves the purpose to plant the seed of reconciliation, but it predominantly aims to disseminate pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination.

Mgbako (2005) recommends that an *Ingando-like* program that is free of pro-RPF spin and governmental bias, and that inspires an open and honest dialogue about history and historiography, should be integrated into the school curriculum. The study concludes that "for *Ingando* to be a successful reconciliation mechanism, Rwanda must become an open society that values political pluralism, freedom of expression, and human rights" (Mgbako, 2005, p. 203).

Shyaka (2003) conducted a study on identity and citizenship in Rwanda [*identité et citoyenneté*]. It is important to note that 'Rwandan identity' is a key concept to *Itorero* training. The researcher shows that the evils that befell Rwanda are mainly due to the confusion between Rwandan citizenship and ethnic identities (Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa). In order to exist from the vicious cycle of the Rwandan conflict where ethnicity is always appealed to by politicians to legitimate their selfish interests, the author suggests to ground the Rwandan identity on *Rwandanness – Ubunyarwanda* [*la Rwandité*] – in replacement of narrowly defined ethnic identities [*Tutsité and Hututé*]. According to the author, Rwandanness transcends all subjective ethnic affiliations and retrieves citizenship to all layers of the Rwandan social fabric. In a nutshell, according to Shyaka's perspective, a good Rwandan citizen would be one who puts the Rwandan identity before and above all other identities; he/she perceives himself/herself and others as Rwandans; a good Rwandan citizen is de-ethnicized.

The project of *de-ethnicisation* as a long-lasting solution to profound cleavages that ravaged Rwanda – though sanctioned by the present-day government of Rwanda and however attractive it might be – has been heavily criticised (e.g. Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Freedman et al., 2008; Hintjens, 2001; Mgbako, 2005; Purdeková, 2008; Sundberg, 2014). According to some scholars, while this idea is obviously conceivable, the project might not be realistic (Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Freedman et al., 2008; Hintjens, 2001; Purdeková, 2008). Still other authors contend that the *de-ethnicisation* discourse is maintained by the present-day Tutsi-dominated regime in order to legitimate its leadership (Mgbako, 2005; Purdeková, 2008; Sundberg, 2014).

The main idea underlying these criticisms is that though *Rwandanness* dominates present-day public discourse, ethnic affiliations might still be rampant in various arenas of life. However attractive and potentially useful the 'Rwandanness philosophy' might be, it should be considered with great care and caution. In other

words, one should not overstate the success of Rwandanness philosophy; it is not a be-all-and-end-all solution. As matter of fact, in the study conducted by the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (*Institut de Recherche et de Dialogue pour la Paix* – IRDP), it is revealed that 53.4% of respondents (the population was 1.436) affirm that ethnicity is still a problem in Rwanda (IRDP, 2013). The same study shows that 36.5% of respondents affirm to have been treated unjustly in relation to employment, justice and administration services on the basis of their ethnicity. Furthermore, the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (NURC, 2010, p. 54) indicates that 21.4% of Rwandans agree with the statement that "there are some Rwandans who see themselves as more Rwandan than others". The above evidence suggests that the Rwandanness philosophy has still a long way to go.

The present thesis will attempt to show to what extent claims made in these reviews and studies are plausible. More specifically, I will have to establish whether my study confirms or contradicts, qualifies or extends the image of a 'good citizen' apparent in these contributions.

6.6. Conclusion

The present chapter has shown that post-genocide and post-conflict societies (except post-apartheid South Africa) tend to adopt a civic republican/communitarian notions of citizenship. However, it was revealed that, after recovering from the respective genocide or conflict, they adopt other models (liberal, cosmopolitan and radical democracy) to transcend an emotionally charged nationalistic focus. Does post-genocide Rwanda follow this trend? The chapter also has revealed that in most countries values education – as part of citizenship education – is conducted using character education (reference is made to the defined list of values). However, it has been shown that the latter approach has been vehemently criticized as inappropriate and indoctrinatory.The present study will establish whether values education in Rwanda escapes this temptation. This chapter finally provided a review of literature on some studies conducted on *Ingando* and *Itorero*. It was shown that the two forums are meant to create a new Rwandan citizenry. Yet, there has been a concern that *Itorero* and *Ingando* look like platforms put in place in order to create loyalists to the ruling political party (RPF). This thesis investigates whether such claims are valid.

CHAPTER 7

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MODEL BUILDING

7.1. Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the thesis aims at investigating the notions of citizenship and values education at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. It is also meant to determine attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards this scheme in order to suggest action plans for its improvement. It can be argued that chapters 2 to 6 provide secondary data around citizenship and values education. These chapters are informed by *desk research* methodology, i.e., the study of books, articles, journals, reports, various studies, etc. The present chapter deals mainly with empirical or primary data obtained through *field research*. It details the research design, selection of research participants, research instruments and sample size, data collection procedure, approach to data analysis and interpretation, ethical considerations, and reliability and validity issues.

7.2. Research design

The present research follows the mixed method design; it is a quantitative-qualitative study[40]. This design is dictated by the nature of research questions, which actually seek to investigate the *extent* or *quantity* (to what extent citizenship and values education notions inform the *Itorero* training for HSLs) and the *how* or *quality* (how HSLs and trainers perceive the *Itorero* training). In addition, the choice of quantitative-qualitative design is motivated by the fact that it enhances not only objectivity and quantification of phenomena, but that it also acknowledges the value of individual lived experiences (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006).

[40] In addition to the literature review (from chapter 2 to 6), empirical data on *Itorero* from the present study are based mainly on (i) a survey with HSLs – *Itorero* graduates – and trainers; (ii) focus group discussions with HSLs; and (iii) interviews with trainers and NIC officials. The researcher found these research instruments appropriate for this thesis, because they allow access to first-hand information from people involved in the *Itorero* training. This choice is also partly justified by the lack of systematic and reliable documents produced by NIC on the *Itorero* training for HSLs. For this reason, in the present thesis document analysis (on *Itorero*) or evidence is limited.

7.3. Selection of research participants

The present study engaged with three categories of participants: (i) HSLs who underwent the *Itorero* training mostly in 2013 and who were in level one in 2015 in private and public high learning institutions in Rwanda; (ii) *Itorero* district trainers; and (iii) officials from the National *Itorero* Commission (NIC). The idea was to interrogate HSLs who recently underwent the *Itorero* training because it can reasonably be assumed that they still have a good recollection of their experiences. HSLs were selected on the one hand from the University of Rwanda College of Education (UR-CE) and College of Business and Economics (UR-CBE). On the other hand, HSLs were also accessed from the following private higher learning institutions: Institut d'Enseignement Supérieur (INES Ruhengeri); Institut Laïque Adventiste de Kigali (INILAK); and Institut Polytechnique de Byumba (IPB). For accessibility reasons, district trainers were selected only from three districts of Kigali City: Kicukiro, Nyarugenge and Gasabo. As for officials of the NIC, they were accessed from the NIC head office in Kigali. They include the NIC Chairman, Director of Civic Education, and Director of Planning and Evaluation. Though the study is about HSLs, I considered it important to gather opinions from NIC officials and district trainers in order to have a well-balanced view on the matter at hand. This also serves the purpose of triangulation, which is essential to avoid biases of one group of respondents.

7.4. Research instruments and sample size

In order to adequately answer research questions, a questionnaire was designed for HSLs. This questionnaire comprises closed and open-ended questions. HSLs were also given a chance to express themselves in focus group discussions. This allowed me not to lose their voices. As for the district trainers, one category had to fill in the questionnaire, and another was interviewed. All NIC officials were only interviewed. It is important to note that the questionnaire for HSLs and the questionnaire for district trainers were developed, piloted and validated by myself.

In designing the form and content of the questionnaire, particularly on qualities of 'good citizenship', I was inspired by other citizenship studies conducted in order to assess the citizenship concept prevailing in a certain setting. Questionnaires used in

these citizenship studies proposed to respondents a list of items depicting a 'good citizen', and at a later stage these items were reduced to a limited number of clusters or factors. Reference is made here to studies such as Ichilov and Nave (1981); Jennings and Niemi (1974); Oppenheim and Torney-Purta (1974); Dejaeghere and Hooghe (2009); Dynneson, Gross and Nickel (1992); CIVED (1971); CIVED (1999) and ICCS (2009); Shelly (1996); Green (1987); and Fouts (1995).

The following tables (1, 2 and 3) provide the sample size for each category of participants and research instruments used:

Table 1: Distribution of questionnaires

SN	Population	Sample	Total distributed	Total received
1	HSLs *Itorero* graduates.	- 500 in level I in public universities. - 500 in level I in private universities.	1.000	996
2	*Itorero* district trainers.	120	120	116

Table 2: Focus group discussions with HSLs

Group	Number of participants	Institution
Group 1	4	UR-CE
Group 2	4	UR-CE
Group 3	5	UR-CE
Group 4	6	IPB
Total	**19**	

Table 3: Interviews with NIC officials and district trainers

SN	Population	Sample	Total
1	National *Itorero* Commission officials	- Chairperson - Director, planning, monitoring and evaluation - Director of civic education	3
2	*Itorero* District trainers	- Kicukiro - Nyarugenge - Gikondo - Nyarugunga	4
Total		**7**	

It is worth noting that in relation to sample size, the present study used informal procedures (i.e. not based on a specific formula) that are acceptable in educational research (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006). All parties approached to provide relevant information are fairly represented in the study. The questionnaire for HSLs, the questionnaire for district trainers, interview guide for district trainers, interview guide for NIC officials, guiding questions for focus group discussions with HSLs are respectively in the appendix 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

7.5. Data collection procedure

The data collection took place in Rwanda from November 2014 through March 2015. It was preceded by a piloting exercise that was carried out in October 2014. The first step of data collection involved obtaining ethics clearance from the School of Education at the University of the Witwatersrand. Next, a research visa was obtained from the Rwanda Ministry of Education allowing the collection of data in Rwanda. In order to access participants, permission was timely sought and obtained from concerned institutions. These are: (i) the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC); (ii) Nyarugenge districts; (iii) Gasabo district; and (iv) Kicukiro district. Copies of authorization documents are respectively placed in the appendix 1, 2, 3, and 4.

HSLs were accessed in their respective institutions (public and private universities). They were met in class during break time. This procedure allowed the researcher to

have consent forms signed and questionnaires distributed and returned the very same day. Focus group discussions were conducted in the afternoon after classes. As for district trainers, they were accessed during the *Itorero* training for HSLs for 2014, which was organized early January 2015. The researcher had to meet them on different training sites in Gasabo, Kicukiro and Nyarugenge districts. This was the best strategy for approaching them because outside of training sites they are extremely busy with office and site duties. However, in order to conduct interviews with them, the researcher had to request an appointment with each district trainer. NIC officials were accessed at their head office in Kigali. With the exception of the questionnaire for trainers where English preceded Kinyarwanda, the Kinyarwanda version took precedence in order to facilitate easy and clear understanding.

In relation to the order of the data collection, questionnaires (for HSLs and trainers) were completed first. Thereafter, focus group discussions (with HSLs) and interviews (with trainers and NIC officials) were conducted partly on the basis of the findings in the questionnaires. This procedure is recommended in mixed method research (Creswell, 2003; Mertens, 2009); it allowed the researcher to further interrogate issues that arose from questionnaires.

7.6. Data analysis and interpretation

Once questionnaires were completed, they were checked and incomplete ones were not considered. Next, they were coded and entered into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 22). Focus group discussions and interviews were recorded using a digital recorder with the permission of participants. Later, they were transcribed, translated from *Kinyarwanda* into English, and analyzed using Thematic Content Analysis. The latter employed both vertical and horizontal approaches. The vertical approach (Van Zyl, 2014) involved reducing the volume of the transcripts by way of (i) summary or paraphrasing main ideas, (ii) limited quotations or ‘quotable quotes’ (Van Zyl, 2014), and more importantly (iii) dressing a list of ten points providing the substance of each focus group discussion or interview.

The horizontal approach (Van Zyl, 2014) involved comparing the materials that were already identified as significant at the vertical level. In short, it amounted to

comparing what was at the bottom of transcripts, i.e., the ten points, which allowed identification of emerging issues notably similarities and differences. The end result of the Thematic Content Analysis was to capture recurring themes that appeared across the texts (transcripts of focus group discussion or interviews). These themes were related to research objectives and research questions, and are part and parcel of the discussion of findings.

In relation to interpretation, data are interpreted according to research objectives and research questions. First, I present quantitative data from questionnaires in form of tables. Secondly, qualitative data from focus group discussions and interviews is used to complement quantitative data.

7.7. Ethical considerations

Issues such as informed consent, confidentiality (except in focus group discussions, because of the number of participants) of the information supplied by participants and their identities, as well as the freedom to remove oneself from the study, were given due consideration. The anonymity of respondents is also observed in the research report by the use of pseudonyms. As outlined earlier in this chapter, given that the research was conducted mainly within the NIC, districts, public and private high learning institutions, permission to conduct research was sought timely and obtained from top management of these institutions. Before collecting data, as required, the researcher was granted ethics clearance from the University of the Witwatersrand's Ethics Committee.

7.8. Reliability of scales (Cronbach's Alpha)

In order to ensure that items on scales are measuring consistently what they are expected to measure, the reliability of scales is established using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 22). The following table indicates determinants of reliability of all scales.

Table 4: Reliability of scales

Questionnaire subgroup	Reliability coefficients (Cronbach's Alpha)	Highest reliability if items deleted
1. Description of a good citizen.	.80	.82
2. Aims of values education.	.82	.82
3. Attitudes of HSLs.	.72	.78
4. Attitudes of trainers.	.31	.76

As Table 4 indicates, scales of the 'description of a good citizen' and of 'aims of values education' achieve from the onset the required reliability, i.e., Cronbach's Alpha (>.70), which entails that they are consistently measuring what they are expected to measure. In this case, it is not important to consider the column 'reliability if items deleted' because their reliability does not need to be improved. Besides, there was no much difference between the obtained and the highest reliability.

However, the situation changes with scales of 'attitudes of HSLs', and 'attitudes of trainers' where obtained reliability coefficients are of .72 and .31 respectively. This situation compels one to consider 'the highest reliability if items deleted'. With regard to the attitudes of HSLs, though the reliability obtained is good, it needs to achieve the highest level. This necessitates deleting one item that reads 'I am inconvenienced by the large number of participants'. The deletion of this item raises the reliability from .72 to .78. As for attitudes of trainers, the item to be deleted reads: 'I'm happy for the remuneration I get for the work done', which improves the reliability to .76. The deletion of these two items does not affect the study at all. Therefore, the reliability for the subscale of attitudes of HSLs becomes .78, and the subscale of attitudes of trainers achieves the reliability of .76.

Reliability and validity go hand in hand. While the former is meant to ensure that items are measuring consistently what they are expected to measure, the latter ensures that items in use are the right items to measure the concerned construct. In

other words, validity answers the following question: Do items prove to be the best to measure what is being measured? It is about the 'power of the structure' or 'the fitness of the model'.

7.9. Validity: Principal Component Analysis[41] (PCA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis[42] (CFA)

Since in this research a list of items is used specifically in the description of a good citizen, aims of values education, and attitudes of HSLs, a data reduction technique called 'Principal Component Analysis' (PCA) is utilized to scientifically justify the classification of items into factors or categories. This exercise is conducted in three steps. The first step involves the verification of two assumptions pertaining to PCA, which are: (i) the sample size adequacy measured by 'Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy Test' (KMO) – this measure varies from 0 to 1, and a good KMO should be .6 or greater; (ii) the strength of the bivariate relationship between items on scales – this is tested by the 'Bartlett's Test of Sphericity', which actually should be significant (≤ .5). The second step involves the definition of factors based on eigenvalue, i.e., the total amount of variance brought about by the item in the scale. In the present study, considered items have the eigenvalue of 1 or greater, and correlation matrices as well as varimax rotation are used. Thirdly, the scree plot is examined to identify the sharp break which marks the move in order to confirm the number of factors to be considered. It is worth noting that in the present study the cumulative total variance is also taken into account to fix the number of factors. The general rule of thumb is that a total variance of 40% is achieved.

[41] Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a technique that helps classify/reduce a list of items into factors or clusters. It is a data reduction technique. Items in the same cluster are usually related and can be named, because they share common features. For details, see Field, A. (2009). *Discovering statistics using SPSS*. Sage Publications.

[42] Confirmatory Factory Analysis (CFA) is a technique meant to establish whether the structure provided by PCA fits the data. It shows the extent to which the established model fits the data; it shows good fit or poor fit. In the present thesis, CFA was conducted using the software AMOS 22, which is usually incorporated in SPSS under the rubric 'Analyze'. For details, see (i) Byrne, B. M. (2013). *Structural equation modeling with AMOS: Basic concepts, applications, and programming*. Routledge; (ii) Brown, T. A. (2015). *Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research*. Guilford Publications.

Once factors and their corresponding items are defined, there is a need to confirm them. This is done through Confirmatory Factory Analysis (CFA) using the software AMOS 22. In the present study, the decision on the model fit is based on (i) the Goodness-of-fit Index (GFI), which states that a good GFI should be .90 or above; (ii) the Comparative Factor Index (CFI), which says that a good CFI should be .95 and above; and (iii) the Root Mean Square Error Approximation (RMSEA), which indicates that a good-fit should be .05 or less. In view of this, the following table provides the verification of PCA assumptions:

Table 5: Verification of PCA assumptions

Scales	KMO	Bartlett's Test (sign)
1. Description of a good citizen	.72	.000
2. Aims of values education	.78	.000
3. Attitudes of HSLs	.77	.000

As demonstrated in Table 5, PCA assumptions are met in all cases. The KMO in the 'description of a good citizen' is .72 which is above the required (.60), and the Bartlett Test is significant (.000 ≤ .5). As for 'aims of values education', the obtained KMO of .78 meets also the requirement (>.60) and the Bartlett Test is significant (.000 ≤ .5). In relation to 'attitudes of HSLs', the obtained KMO of .77 is good because it is above the required (.60), and the corresponding Bartlett Test is significant (.000 ≤ .5). With these assumptions met, the green light to proceed with PCA and CFA is given.

7.9.1. PCA and CFA on the description of a good citizen

The first objective of the present study is partly to identify the citizenship notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In order to achieve this objective, 21

items describing a good citizen[43] were suggested to respondents (*Itorero* graduates) to be ranked on a four point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; and 4 = strongly agree). These items were generated by the classical and modern notions of citizenship constituting the citizenship education conceptual frame. I decided not to include the fifth point 'neutral' to avoid that respondents become indifferent and choose only this option on all items, which could give unreliable responses. The four point Likert scale has the advantage of stimulating respondents to take clear position on suggested items.

Civic republicanism generated four items: placing public interests above private ones; fulfilling one's duties and responsibilities; being loyal to the state; and serving in the military. Communitarianism provided five items: being a role model; respecting core values of one's community; preserving the community's common good; putting the national identity above all other identities; and reducing social inequalities. Liberalism generated four items: pursuing one's private interests; enjoying one's rights and privileges; obeying the law; and having the ability to question ideas.

Cosmopolitanism contributed the four following items: viewing oneself as a member of the world community; fighting human rights violations locally; fighting human rights violations globally; and protecting the environment. Radical democracy contributed four items: participating actively in politics; respecting minority[44] groups; joining a political party; and participating in elections.

The initial PCA performed on 21 items describing a good citizen indicates that, based on eigenvalue, seven factors are to be retained. But the 'total variance explained' table shows that the required 40% variance is already achieved with five components. Therefore, PCA was re-run restricting the extraction to five. However, the 'Rotated Component Matrix' based on five factors reveals that some related items are loading on two different factors (cross-loading), which suggests

[43] The question was formulated this way: 'Based on the instructions you received during *Itorero* training, which of the following statements best describes being a good citizen – a good Rwandan?' For details about the list of items suggested to respondents, see the questionnaire for HSLs, which is in the appendix 1.

[44] Here minority groups should be understood in relation to categories such as gender, race, social status, religion, language, and sexual orientation.

duplication. It was therefore necessary to extract four factors whereby the total variance explained is 36.6%. This amount of variance is acceptable, because in general factors need to explain approximately 40% of the variance. Besides, the four factors extraction was confirmed by 'Monte Carlo PCA for parallel analysis' software where only the first four factors had an eigenvalue superior to those randomly generated.

With a four factor PCA, two items were eliminated based on 'Rotated component matrix output'. These include (i) the item 'Putting the national identity above all other identities' which loaded .31 while the requirement is .40; (ii) the item 'Fulfilling one's duties and responsibilities' which cross-loaded on three factors, a clear indication that this item was ambiguous.

During CFA, two items loaded poorly: these are 'Placing public interests above self-centered ones' (.016) and 'Pursuing one's private interests' (-.011). Hence, they were removed to allow the model to fit the data. Besides, following the modification indices, the item 'Questioning ideas' that had loaded previously on the 'cosmopolitan notion of citizenship' was relocated to the 'liberal notion of citizenship'.

CFA performed on a four factors model comprising 17 remaining items indicates a good fit with the data: GFI = .97; CFI = .93; and RMSEA = .039. This good-fit is acceptable though the CFI is slightly below the standard (.95). The following table provides the four factors structure.

Table 6: The four-factor structure on the description of a good citizen

Factor 1: Cosmopolitan citizen	**Loadings**
1. Fighting human rights violations globally	.66
2. Fighting human rights violations locally	.63
3. Protecting the environment	.52
4. Reducing social inequalities	.48
5. Respecting minority groups	.45
Factor 2: Conventional democratic citizen	**Loadings**
1. Joining a political party	.73
2. Participating in all elections	.57
3. Participating in politics	.54
4. Serving in the military	.46
Factor 3: Civic republican/communitarian citizen	**Loadings**
1. Obeying the law	.49
2. Being loyal to the state	.48
3. Preserving the community's common good	.44
4. Being the role model	.42
5. Respecting community's core values	.36
Factor 4: Liberal citizen	**Loadings**
1. Questioning ideas	.30
2. Enjoying one's rights and privileges	.58
3. Being a member of the world community	.42

Figure 1: The four-factor CFA model on the description of a good citizen



I now provide details on obtained factors and name them drawing on the conceptual framework. The first factor – which accounts for 18.29% of total variance – describes good citizenship as promoting and respecting rights enjoyed by all humans and non humans both locally and worldwide. This factor is termed 'cosmopolitan citizen'. It[45] includes fighting human rights violations globally (R^2 = .15); fighting human rights violations locally (R^2 = .19); protecting the environment (R^2 = .32); reducing social inequalities (R^2 = .34); and respecting minority rights (R^2 = .29). The second factor explains 6.73% of total variance. It includes under the same umbrella citizenship qualities oriented towards being involved in politics and being patriotic. For this reason, it is called 'conventional democratic citizen'. It comprises the following items: joining a political party (R^2 = .27); participating in all elections (R^2 = .53); participating in politics (R^2 = .47); and serving in the military (R^2 = .19).

The third factor depicts good citizenship as loyalty to one's national and local community. It is oriented towards the obedience to the state and its laws; it is also an invitation to respect the community's ethos. In view of this, it is termed 'civic republican/communitarian citizen' and accounts for 6.08% of total variance. It includes obeying the law (R^2 = .37); being loyal to the state (R^2 = .20); preserving the community's common good (R^2 = .25); being the role model (R^2 = .08); and respecting community's core values (R^2 = .07). The fourth factor explains only 5.51% of total variance. It depicts a good citizen as the one who is not limited in space, free from national boundaries, ideologies and obligations. This factor is termed 'liberal citizen'. It comprises the following qualities: questioning ideas (R^2 = .08); enjoying one's rights and privileges (R^2 = .13); viewing oneself as a member of the world community (R^2 = .36). It is worth noting that items are not necessarily confirmed in their respective generative citizenship notions. PCA and CFA place them according to data. Hence, some items may flip from one citizenship notion to the other. This reflects the way respondents understood the concerned item.

[45] R^2 indicates how much of the factor is accounted for by the item. It is like a regression coefficient.

7.9.2. PCA and CFA on aims of values education

The second component of the first objective of this study is to investigate the values education notion informing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. To this end, inspired by four major notions of values education, a list of 8 aims of values education was suggested to respondents to be ranked on a four point Likert scale[46] (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; and 4 = strongly agree). These items were generated by values education approaches constituting the values education conceptual frame.

In this regard, character education generated two items: teaching the learner core values of the community; and telling the learner taboos/interdictions of the community. Care ethics is represented by two items: teaching the learner to care for others; and teaching the learner to speak and listen to others. The cognitive moral development approach yielded two items: developing the learners reasoning capacities; and developing the learner's moral judgment. Values clarification contributed two items: initiating the learner into choosing freely; and inviting the learner to measure consequences of his/her actions.

The initial PCA performed on 8 items depicting aims of values education indicates that, based on eigenvalue, two factors are to be retained with the variance of 46%. However, in order to increase the variance, a four-factor model was adopted particularly because it represents 63% of the total variance explained. PCA followed varimax rotation and went on smoothly because no item proved to be loading poorly (below .40). In view of this, CFA confirmed four factors each comprising two items with the GFI of .99, the CFI of .97 and the RMSEA of .04, which indicates that the model fits the data. The following table provides the structure of factors along with their items and loadings:

[46] The question was formulated as follows: 'Based on the teaching you received, which of the following does the values education provided during *Itorero* training mostly aim at?'

Table 7: The four-factor structure on aims of values education

Factor 1: Cognitive moral development	**Loadings**
1. Developing reasoning capacities	.84
2. Developing moral judgment	.68
Factor 2: Values clarification	**Loadings**
1. Teaching measuring consequences	.82
2. Teaching to choose among alternatives	.73
Factor 3: Character education	**Loadings**
1. Teaching taboos	.79
2. Teaching core values	.78
Factor 4: Care ethics	**Loadings**
1. Teaching to speak and listen to others	.86
2. Teaching to care for others	.41

Figure 2: CFA on aims of values education



I now provide details on obtained factors and characterize them drawing on the conceptual framework. The first factor explains 32.71% of total variance. It puts together developing moral judgment (R^2 = .47) and developing reasoning capacities

(R^2 = .30) as aims of values education. In view of this, it is called 'cognitive moral development'. The second factor accounts for 14.05% of the total variance, and includes aims of values education pointing to values clarification. These aims are teaching to choose among alternatives (R^2 = .47), and teaching to measure consequences (R^2 = .36). Hence, it is called 'values clarification'.

The third factor explains 11.05% of the total variance and is termed 'character education' precisely because it depicts values education in terms of teaching taboos (R^2 = .33) and teaching core values (R^2 = .26). Finally, the fourth factor is called is 'care ethics' because it views values education as principally teaching to care (R^2 = .32), and teaching to speak and listen to others (R^2 = .22). This factor explains 10.48% of the total variance.

7.9.3. PCA and CFA on attitudes of HSLs towards the *Itorero* training

The initial PCA performed on 10 items[47] capturing attitudes of HSLs towards the *Itorero* training indicates that, based on eigenvalue, three factors are to be retained with the variance of 57%. However, in order to increase the variance, a four-factor model was preferred because it represents 65% of the total variance explained - which meets the general requirement that when items are 10 and above, generally factors should explain between 50% and 60% of the variance.

PCA followed varimax rotation and correlation matrix. It is worth noting that the item 'I had required prerequisites to undergo the training' was loading alone[48] during PCA, which suggests that the item was ambiguous. It is also important to note that when

[47] Initially, the list of items investigating attitudes of HSLs towards the *Itorero* training comprised 12 items. However, two items were not considered in PCA for following reasons: (i) the item 'I was inconvenienced by the large number of participants' was removed to attain the highest reliability coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha); (ii) the item 'Overall, the *Itorero* training was a success' was not included in PCA because it has to serve as the predicted value, i.e. the criterion. The success of *Itorero* was predicted on the basis of other scales (clusters) capturing attitudes of HSLs towards the *Itorero* training. The 10 items included in PCA are: (1) The content provided allowed me to know what it takes to be a good Rwandan citizen; (2) The content gave me better knowledge of Rwandan values and interdictions; (3) Trainers used appropriate approaches to deliver the content; (4) The number of trainers was sufficient; (5) I had the required prerequisites to understand the content; (6) The training environment in terms of food was adequate; (7) The accommodation provided was comfortable; (8) The duration allocated to the training was adequate; (9) The training encouraged discussion and deliberation; (10) The training enhanced my critical thinking skills.

[48] This means that the item was forming a cluster of its own as one item.

CFA was conducted, the model requested to use 'means and intercept method[49]' option. This restriction entailed the deactivation of the modification indices. CFA could only run on this condition.

In the final analysis, CFA performed on a four-factor model comprising nine items indicates a good fit with the data whereby the CFI is .96, and RMSEA is .05. Due to the use of the 'means and intercept method', the GFI was omitted in the text output. Table 8 provides the structure of four factors along with their items and loadings.

Table 8: The four-factor structure on attitudes of HSLs towards *Itorero* training

Factor 1: Content	**Loadings**
1. Knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos.	.81
2. Knowledge of being a good Rwandan citizen.	.81
3. Encouragement of critical thinking skills.	.75
Factor 2: Training environment	**Loadings**
1. Comfortable accommodation.	.85
2. Adequate food.	.85
Factor 3: Trainers	**Loadings**
1. Sufficiency in number.	.80
2. Use of appropriate approaches.	.78
Factor 4: Organization	**Loadings**
1. Duration adequacy.	.84
2. Encouragement of discussion and deliberation.	.64

[49] This is the CFA model without specification of either means or intercepts.

Figure 3: The four-factor CFA model on attitudes of HSLs



Factor 1 explains 35.42% of total variance. It puts together attitudes towards the 'content' and comprises the following items: knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos (R^2 = .48); knowledge about being a good Rwandan citizen (R^2 = .66); and encouragement of critical thinking skills (R^2 = .40). Factor 2 accounts for 15.12% of

the total variance, and includes attitudes towards the 'training environment'. These are comfortable accommodation (R^2 = .52), and adequate food (R^2 = .55).

Factor 3 explains 11.16% of the total variance; it is termed 'trainers' mainly because it puts together attitudes on the number of trainers and the way the latter conduct the training. It comprises two items: sufficiency of trainers (R^2 = .44), and use of appropriate approaches (R^2 = .53). Finally, the fourth factor is termed 'organization' because it encompasses items linked to the way the training is structured. These items are the adequacy of the duration (R^2 = .21); and the encouragement of discussion and deliberation in the course of the training (R^2 = .32). This factor accounts for only 8.87% of the total variance.

7.10. Conclusion

This chapter detailed the methodology in terms of research design, selection of research participants, research instruments and sample size, data collection procedure, approach to data analysis and interpretation, ethical considerations, and reliability and validity issues. The next chapter provides findings on the citizenship notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs.

CHAPTER 8

IDENTIFICATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP NOTION INFORMING THE *ITORERO* TRAINING SCHEME FOR HSLs

8.1. Introduction

This chapter identifies the citizenship education notion that informs the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs mostly. It starts by detailing background characteristics[50] of respondents. Later, factors generated by the description of a good citizen are examined in a bid to highlight the dominant conception of citizenship. Once the leading notion is identified, it is compared to citizenship notions in other post-genocide or post-conflict contexts. An attempt is also made to establish whether the dominant citizenship notion is desirable and helpful for post-genocide Rwanda. At the end, I show how findings from the present chapter speak to other studies conducted on *Itorero* and *Ingando*, particularly in relation to the image of a 'good citizen' being communicated by both platforms.

8.2. Sample characteristics

As outlined earlier, main respondents in the present study are HSLs who graduated from the *Itorero* training, and who during data collection were enrolled in public and private higher learning institutions in level I. Table 9 below provides their characteristics in terms of gender, age, marital status and period of training. As Table 9 shows, males and females are almost in equal proportion (50.6% and 49.4% respectively), which ensures that data are not gender biased. In terms of age, the majority of the sample (74%) is located between 20-24 years. Only 12 individuals (1.2%) are above 35 years. Almost all HSLs (95.7%) are single. More than the

[50] In post-genocide Rwanda, it is not lawful to ask people about their ethnic identity. The public discourse is that people should define themselves only as 'Rwandans' and not as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. It is for this reason that I could not record participants' ethnic background. It is also important to note that in Rwanda there are no well-defined social classes like working class, middle or upper class. In view of this, I could not get social-economic characteristics of HSLs.

majority of them (60.8%) underwent the *Itorero* training in 2013, a clear indication that they have a good recollection of their experiences pertaining to the *Itorero* training. Only a small number (9.8%) was trained in 2014, while 28.5% of respondents were trained in periods other than 2013 and 2014, i.e., 2012, 2011, and 2010.

Table 9: Frequencies for gender, age, marital status and training period for HSLs

Variable		Frequency	%
Gender	Male	501	50.6
	Female	490	49.4
Age	15-19	31	3.2
	20-24	716	74.0
	25-29	182	18.8
	30-34	26	2.7
	35-39	12	1.2
Marital status	Single	914	95.7
	Married	41	4.3
Training period	2014	98	9.8
	2013	606	60.8
	Others	284	28.5

8.3. Identification of the dominant citizenship notion in the *Itorero* for HSLs

In order to identify the citizenship notion that informs the *Itorero* training scheme – which is partly the first objective of the present study, its graduates, i.e., HSLs were presented with a list of 21 items to be ranked on a four point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree). As seen previously in the methodology chapter, the 21 items depicting good citizenship were categorized

into four factors by means of PCA and confirmed by CFA. It is crucial to appreciate the extent to which each of the four factors is recognized by HSLs as informing *Itorero* training.

Table 10: Descriptive statistics for factors describing a good citizen

Scale	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Skewness
1. Civic republican/communitarian citizen	17.41	1.99	9	20	-.76
2. Cosmopolitan citizen	17.38	2.23	7	20	-1.08
3. Conventional democratic citizen	10.45	2.58	2	16	-.16
4. Liberal citizen	8.47	1.91	2	12	-.31

The null hypothesis (H_0) is that all four citizenship notions (scales) are at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs with equal weight (mean[51]): H_0: $\bar{x}_1 = \bar{x}_2 = \bar{x}_3 = \bar{x}_4$. As can be seen from Table 10, the civic republican/communitarian notions prevail over other citizenship notions with a mean of 17.41 (SD = 1.99) with scores ranging between 9 and 20, which compels the rejection of the null hypothesis (H_0). As a reminder, the factor civic republican/communitarian includes the following components: obeying the law; being loyal to the state; preserving the community's common good; being the role model; and respecting the community's core values. The implication of this finding is that, according to HSLs, *Itorero* training teaches them that 'a good citizen' is one who (i) obeys the law; (ii) is loyal to the state; (iii) preserves the community's common good; (iv) is the role model; and (v) respects the community's core values.

At this point, I wish to note that it is not surprising that the civic republican and communitarian notions are grouped together by data, chiefly because some scholars (Ciprut, 2008; Delanty, 2000; Gaus & Kukathas, 2004; Gonzales et al., 2004; Honohan, 2002; Van Steenbergen, 1994) have suggested that civic republicanism is

[51] In the present thesis, the mean is represented by the symbol "$\bar{x}$".

a variant of communitarianism[52]. In view of this, there is no obvious conflict between these two citizenship conceptions. The idea is that *Itorero* conceives of good citizenship as attachment to the state but also to the Rwandan community and its values.

The cosmopolitan notion comes in second place with a mean of 17.38 (SD = 2.23), with scores ranging between 7 and 20. It encompasses attributes such as fighting human rights violations globally; fighting human rights violations locally; protecting the environment; reducing social inequalities; and respecting minority groups. In the third place is the conventional democratic notion with a mean of 10.45 (SD = 2.58); its minimum and maximum scores are 2 and 16, respectively. This citizenship notion comprises joining a political party; participating in elections; participating in politics; and serving in the military. The liberal notion of citizenship is ranked last with a mean of 8.47 (SD = 1.91), with the minimum score of 2 and the maximum score of 12. It extends to questioning ideas; enjoying one's rights and privileges; and being a member of world community.

These results show that though the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs engages with a variety of citizenship notions, it is strongly committed to the civic republican/communitarian notions of citizenship. It is important to investigate whether the appreciation/recognition of citizenship notions varies within subgroups.

8.4. Does the description of good citizenship vary within subgroups?

The present research investigates whether there is any difference in terms of ranking/recognizing citizenship notions within subgroups mainly according to gender, marital status, age and the training period. In view of this observation, parametric inferential techniques (independent t-Test[53] and ANOVA[54]) were used, given the

[52] It is important to note that during data analysis, the PCA and CFA techniques showed that civic republican and communitarian attributes of citizenship were understood nearly in the same way by respondents. This is consistent with the view of some authors who take civic republicanism as a variant of communitarianism. For this reason, the reader has to bear in mind that it is not the researcher putting together the civic republican and communitarian concepts; it is rather dictated by the data.

[53] T-test is a parametric technique used to compare the means of two groups.

[54] ANOVA is a parametric technique used to compare the means of more than two groups (3 groups and above).

assumption of normality and homogeneity of variance. In terms of gender, a statistically significant difference was found between males and females in their rating of the conventional democratic notion of citizenship: t_{988} = -3.026 where *p* = .003. However, the effect size is small (Cohen's D score[55] = 0.19). Indeed, females endorsed slightly more the conventional democratic notion than did males. Their respective means are 1.70 (SD = 2.53) and 1.20 (SD = 2.60). In relation to marital status, age, and training periods, no statistically significant difference was found within subgroups in rating citizenship notions.

These inferential results suggest that in general HSLs (who graduated from the *Itorero* training) describe the image of a 'good citizen' endorsed by *Itorero* training almost in the same way regardless of their marital status, age, and training period. The implication of these findings goes as follows: the conclusion that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is strongly committed to the civic republican/communitarian notions does not vary according to subgroups; it cuts across subgroups. Quite interestingly, this conclusion is supported by results from focus group discussions with HSLs, and results from interviews with both trainers and NIC officials. The civic republican overtone is considered in the first place.

8.5. Qualitative evidence supporting the conclusion that the *Itorero* training for HSLs is strongly committed to civic republicanism

That the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs works with the civic republican notion of citizenship is supported by results from focus group discussions with HSLs, interviews with both trainers and NIC officials.

[55] The Cohen's D score measures the extent or rather the magnitude of the difference between the means of two groups, which is called "effect size". The latter is calculated by dividing the difference of means ($\bar{x}_1$ - $\bar{x}_2$) with the average of standard deviations, i.e., (SD_1+SD_2)/2. It can be small (≤.20), medium (≤.50) or large (≤.80).

Evidence 1: Focus group discussion results with HSLs

During focus group discussions with HSLs, I asked them to tell me briefly how they would describe a 'good citizen', based on the teaching they received in the *Itorero* training. Some of their voices are worth considering:

> "According to the *Itorero* teaching, a good citizen is one who loves the country. Loving the country at all times, this was constantly emphasized. A good citizen loves the country and is ready to fight and defend it in case its security is at stake. I remember at one time they [the trainers] put to us a saying that 'you refuse your blood to the country, and dogs eat it up without pay'. The idea is that you may refuse to fight for your country and later you die shamefully in a foreign land. Your blood which you refused for your country is still lost. We were also told that good citizens help each other…Furthermore, we were told that a good citizen should find solutions to her problems even in difficult times. Nothing is impossible to the *Itorero* graduate [*Intore*]. Even in the darkest forest, the *Itorero* graduate should find the way out." [P11]

> "Basing on the teaching I received in *Itorero*, first and foremost a good citizen is the one who loves her mother country and countrymen; she does her best to promote whatever advances the wellbeing of the country. A good Rwandan loves the country, and is ready to die for it if circumstances require that. A good citizen is not ashamed to talk about her country, she is rather proud to praise it. …Besides, we learnt that a good citizen joins selflessly in carrying out activities of common interest such as public works [*Umuganda*]; she owns them. If ever she is called to help building a shelter for the elderly or assisting those in need, she feels that she should be the first to join. A good Rwandan citizen lives up to Rwandan values and taboos, loves the country, loves work, strives to make progress, respects time, avoids doing bad and is set to do well. That is the image of a good citizen we received in *Itorero* training." [P11]

> "Without going far, we learnt that a good Rwandan citizen should observe values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. Second, she should be able to fight for the country if the situation demands that. Third, a good citizen respects laws passed by the State and follows the vision defined by the State." [P33]

In general, results from focus group discussions with HSLs reveal that based on the teaching they received, *Itorero* graduates conceptualize a good citizen or rather a good Rwandan mostly as one who puts the Rwandan identity above all other

identities; knows and lives up to Rwanda values and taboos; loves the country and is ready to fight and die for it, if necessary; and pursues public interests. Other attributes of a good Rwandan citizen that are less frequently mentioned include finding solutions to one's problems; helping those in need; respecting laws; and joining in the implementation of good (generative) policies/programs of the country. In both cases, the characterization of a good citizen tends to be largely linked to civic republicanism.

In order to investigate further the citizenship notion that informs the *Itorero* training, in the course of focus group discussions with HSLs, I detailed characteristics of the civic republican notion of citizenship and asked them whether they recognize having been exposed to this philosophy. Referring to the conceptual framework, the civic republican notion emphasizes citizenship qualities such as putting public interests above private ones; fulfilling one's duties and responsibilities; and being loyal to the state. When these attributes were brought to the attention of participants, the following affirmative answers were promptly provided:

> "As I see, I was given that picture of a good citizen." [P12]
> "That picture of a good citizen is strongly present in the *Itorero* training for HSLs." [P15]
> "That is the real representation of a good citizen I received." [P14]
> "I got that very representation." [P31], [P32], [P34]
> "That very picture is therein plainty." [P33]

Itorero district trainers join HSLs in admitting that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is committed to the civic republican notion of citizenship.

Evidence 2: Interviews with Itorero district trainers

In the interviews with trainers, I asked them to depict briefly the image of a good citizen that they communicate in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. Here are some of their answers:

> "Before I go any further, there is a slogan which we use most frequently and which could help you understand the image of a good citizen we communicate. This slogan reads as follows: 'I am an authentic Rwandan who

> loves her country and countrymen, strives for self-reliance, and upholds her dignity'. Do you understand who an authentic Rwandan is? The teaching we provide is primarily meant to allow first the learner to have the value of loving the country. When you love your country, by implication you love its inhabitants; the country is nothing rather than its people. Second, we teach that a good Rwandan citizen must work hard to be self-reliant and achieve the vision she has defined for herself. If you go for a good vision, you will uphold your dignity. That is the image of a good Rwandan citizen that we give: one who loves her country and its people, is ready to fight and die for the country, strives to be self-reliant and upholds her dignity." [P51]

> "We teach that a good Rwandan citizen is one who is smart in thinking, acting and behaving. It is also a Rwandan who loves the country and does not hesitate to fight and even die for it. But loving the country is not enough; a good Rwandan should also be self-reliant and uphold her dignity. Being self-reliant means to have good knowledge of development programs and policies of the country. More importantly, it entails being clear about one's contribution in their achievement. We also teach that a good Rwandan citizen should be a man/woman of integrity and magnanimity. Given the history of our country where doing bad has been approved quite for some time, a good Rwandan citizen is the one who is devoted to do the good and uproots the evil wherever it is. A good Rwandan citizen puts the unity of Rwandans first. Finally, a good Rwandan citizen knows and lives up to Rwandan values and taboos." [P52]

The way trainers characterize a good citizen reveals quite clearly the presence of the civic republican notion of citizenship in the *Itorero* training scheme. In fact, results from interviews with trainers indicate that a good citizen is described primarily as one who loves her country above all else, sacrifices herself for the country, and is ready to defend, fight, and even die for it, if necessary, all of which indicate the prizing of patriotism. However, trainers also insist on the following traits: upholding the dignity inherent in oneself and others, and being economically self-reliant.

Furthermore, when the researcher explained civic republican attributes (putting public interests above private ones; fulfilling one's duties and responsibilities; and being loyal to the state) to trainers, all informants candidly took cognizance of the presence of the civic republican notion of citizenship in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. They had this to say:

> "Yes. We provide the image of a good citizen who puts public interests above self-centred ones." [P52]
>
> "We teach HSLs to see first public interests and put them above personal ones. I observed it carefully, that very model is there…We use that model. As a matter of fact, we trainers have also got the spirit of self-sacrifice. We work without expecting any reward." [P53]
>
> "Yes, we teach our young people to put public interests above their own." [P54]

There is another route leading to the confirmation of the presence of the civic republican notion within the *Itorero* for HSLs. Indeed, among approaches used by trainers during the *Itorero* training for HSLs are 'sport' and 'parade'. Interviews with district trainers indicate that sport is meant to make HSLs fit. 'A good Rwandan ideally ought to be physically fit', trainers highlight. As for parade, informants mention that it allows HSLs to learn values of teamwork/working together [*Gukorera hamwe*], preserving the same rhythm or harmony [*Kudasobanya*], and having the same understanding [*Kumva ibintu kimwe*]. It is the opinion of the researcher that the very emphasis laid on 'sport' and 'parade' shows that the *Itorero* training for HSLs works with the civic republican notion of citizenship. Ideals such as 'being fit', 'teamwork', 'preserving harmony', preserving the same rhythm, and 'having the same understanding' allude directly to civic republican attributes.

As a point of interest, at this juncture, one might consider and recall the way citizenship education was done in Sparta, which of course, as seen previously, followed the civic republican model:

> The chief idea recapitulating the system of citizenship upbringing in Sparta is *agogé.* The latter entailed to learn and sing about past heroic deeds, but also and more importantly *to undergo the most demanding training in military skills and most unremitting discipline*. (Heater, 2004: 18 – emphasis is added)

There is no doubt that sport and parade – as endorsed in the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs – are part and parcel of military skills, and that they are meant to enforce discipline among HSLs. In addition, trainers in charge of sport and parade are members of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF), and the Rwanda National Police (RNP). Thus, the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs tends to be militaristic.

Further evidence supporting the claim that the *Itorero* for HSLs is committed to the civic republican notion of citizenship is actually its mission statement, which one district trainer summarizes or paraphrases in the following terms:

> "When a tree does not get water nor required nutrients/ingredients, it does not grow up; it withers away. Equally, if young people do not undergo civic education in the *Itorero* training, they do not grow up, they are half-term." [P51]

This mission statement reveals clearly the civic republican presence within the *Itorero* training for HSLs. It actually underlines the relevance of 'the formative project'. As discussed previously in the literature review chapter, the formative project is a key indicator to the civic republican notion. The latter holds the view that the health of the state stems from its virtuous citizenry, which is arrived at through the formative project. At this juncture, it is important to consider Sandel's characterization of the formative project:

> The formative project rejects the idea that government should be neutral towards the values and ends its citizens espouse. It seeks social and political arrangements that cultivate in citizens certain habits and dispositions, or civic virtues…It makes character a public, not merely private concern. (Sandel, 1999, p. 210)

From this quotation, it is clear that *Itorero* is a compelling representation of the formative project, particularly because its core mission is to mould HSLs into 'virtuous citizens'. *Itorero* is fundamentally meant to instill in HSLs certain habits and dispositions; it crafts their character so that they become 'good Rwandans'. Behind this rests the idea that one cannot envisage building a healthy Rwandan nation while ignoring the character, ends and values of its youth. *Itorero* is expected to bring HSLs to maturity; it is assumed that in its absence they would wither away, to pursue the common use of horticultural metaphor. It provides them with the required nutrients and ingredients for a healthy growth. All these assumptions point clearly to the civic republican notion of citizenship.

Based on the above mentioned evidence, it makes sense to conclude that according to interviews with district trainers, the *Itorero* training for HSLs is committed to the civic republican notion of citizenship. This view is also endorsed by the results of the interviews with NIC officials.

Evidence 3: Interviews with NIC officials

Regarding the question whether, according to NIC officials, the civic republican notion of citizenship would inform the *Itorero* training for HSLs, the answer is very positive. Consider the following voices:

> "We teach that a good Rwandan citizen is one who has values and taboos of the Rwandan culture and lives up to them. This allows her to love her country and its people and even other people from other countries; it is a person of love. Second, it is someone who is happy about the way she is treated by the country. In response, she is ready to sacrifice herself for the country, and if the situation demands that, she is ready to fight and die for the country. A good Rwandan citizen lives up to the following values: Rwandanness [not perceiving people along ethnic lines, i.e. as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa; patriotism; integrity; courage; readiness to die for the country; self-sacrifice; love for a work well done; and upholding one's dignity." [P62]

> "According to our teaching, a good Rwandan citizen is one who upholds her dignity in terms of social welfare: she is able to earn a living decently and honestly. Secondly, a good Rwandan citizen is one who upholds her dignity in terms of identity. When I say upholding one's dignity, it means that a good Rwandan citizen should work to earn a living and develop while at the same time respecting Rwandan values and taboos…The Rwandan history is such that after the genocide several people came from various corners of the world and found themselves in Rwanda. Facing such sociological mutations, there is a need to craft the Rwandan identity by teaching them Rwandan values and taboos because they were brought up in other cultures endorsing other values. Coming to HSLs, this is the priority group for us. We want to teach them to find solutions to their own problems instead of complaining. We teach them values and taboos of the Rwandan culture because they tend to embrace foreign values as the best. Briefly, we teach them to find solutions to their daily problems while at the same time respecting Rwanda values and taboos." [P63]

> "We teach that a good Rwandan citizen is one who has integrity in speaking, acting, behaving and understanding. In other words, a good Rwandan is one who hates evil, loves the good; it is one who has the sense of humanity…A good Rwandan citizen is one who values 'being Rwandan'; she is committed to humanity, unity, patriotism, working for the country, self-sacrifice and if necessary, she is ready to shed her own blood for it. It is a person of integrity, courage, and self-sacrifice. A good Rwandan citizen works hard and well, and

> upholds her dignity….Briefly, a good Rwandan citizen observes values and taboos." [P62]

These interview excerpts suggest that a good Rwandan or rather a good citizen is described primarily by NIC officials as one who (i) knows and lives up to Rwandan values and taboos, and as a result, is smart in thinking, speaking, acting, behaving and interacting; (ii) is patriotic, i.e. loves her country Rwanda and Rwandans, and even other people; and (iii) is ready to sacrifice herself – to shed her blood – and die for the country, if necessary. However, there are also other attributes of a good Rwandan, which appear less frequently. They include (i) being self-reliant or economically viable and upholding one's dignity; (ii) finding solutions to one's own problems instead of complaining all the time; and (iii) working hard to own one's destiny; (iv) hating evil and loving the good; and (v) demonstrating a strong sense of humanity and Rwandanness. It is clear that this depiction of a good citizen is deeply civic republican.

Additionally, when the researcher brought civic republican attributes of a good citizen (putting public interests above private ones; fulfilling one's duties and responsibilities; and being loyal to the state) to the attention of NIC officials, they confirmed employing this model:

> "We strongly give this image." [P61]
>
> "Yes. That is the very model we use." [P62]
>
> "That model does not differ much from what we are doing, though one cannot say that we are taking it literally one hundred percent as it is. Besides, we are not getting this model from outside. It is part and parcel of our Rwandan culture." [P63]

Significant and precising comments are made on 'being ready to fight and die for the country', 'having the spirit of self-sacrifice', and 'putting public interests above-self centred ones'. In relation to 'being ready to fight and die for the country', NIC officials unanimously indicate that to love one's country is to work for it, but also and more importantly to sacrifice oneself and even shed one's blood for it, if necessary. To reinforce their thinking they made reference to the Rwandan cultural value which view every male as an *ipso facto* potential soldier. Whenever the well-being of the country was at stake, men were ready to wake up and serve in the army. It is this

readiness spirit or rather war-ready spirit that is being transmitted to HSLs. In this regard, one informant stated:

> "Every male in the Rwandan culture was a soldier [*Ingabo*]. Whenever the well-being or security of the country was at stake, every male was ready to go and fight. So, 'serving in the military', being ready to fight and die for the country is not an attribute that we borrow from somewhere else; we draw it from our Rwandan culture." [P63]

As to 'self-sacrifice', NIC officials mention that the 'spirit of self-sacrifice' is at the heart of the Rwandan culture as well. A special reference is made to the liberation of Rwanda in 1994 when young Rwandans in exile left their studies and businesses, and decided to take arms to fight for the liberation of their country. The comments of one informant are enlightening in this regard:

> "That civic republican model understood mainly as the spirit of self-sacrifice is within Rwandans. That a Rwandan should sacrifice him-herself for the country, this is what we essentially teach. It is even our very core mission. But this is again part of our culture and history. Recently in 1994, we saw young Rwandans abandoning their studies and businesses, launching the liberation war and stopping the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. Nobody called them; this was their own initiative." [P63]

Concerning 'putting public interests above private ones', NIC officials underscored the fact that the country is above every person. They maintain that it is not surprising that one puts aside his/her private interests for the sake of those of the country. Rwandans had built up a culture that whenever the welfare of the country is at stake, it is necessary for some people to volunteer and sacrifice themselves in service to the nation [*Ibitambo*]. As a result, Rwandans expect the state to fulfill its obligations and ensure that the well-being of its citizens is well taken care of so that, in return, the general citizenry is motivated to prioritize public interests.

In short, from the interviews with NIC officials, it has been demonstrated that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is strongly committed to the civic republican notion of citizenship. The idea was not taken from outside; rather, civic republican attributes are said to be inherent in Rwandan culture.

The evidence presented below is meant to support the observation that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is also committed to the communitarian notion of citizenship.

8.6. Qualitative evidence supporting the observation that the *Itorero* training for HSLs is strongly committed to the communitarian notion of citizenship

Results of focus group discussions with HSLs and of interviews with both district trainers and NIC officials concur with the idea that, in addition to the civic republican, the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is strongly committed to the communitarian notion of citizenship.

Evidence 1: Focus group discussions with HSLs

Findings from focus group discussions with HSLs reveal that all communitarian attributes of a good citizen are unanimously recognized by all informants as being at work in the *Itorero* training meant for HSLs. As seen in the conceptual framework, communitarianism emphasizes citizenship traits such as respecting the core values of one's community; preserving the community's common good; putting the national identity above all other identities or affiliations; and improving the welfare of those in need. Excerpts presented earlier on the description of a good citizen by HSLs point clearly to these attributes, and they do not need to be repeated here. Besides, when the communitarian aspects of a good citizen were explained by the researcher, informants had this to say:

> "I really received that whole picture." [P23]
> "I see myself in that representation." [P23]
> "That illustration of a good citizen is complete." [P22]
> "That is the real figure of a good citizen we received." [P21]

This evidence testifies to the fact that the communitarian notion of citizenship is fully at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs.

Evidence 2: Interviews results with district trainers

With regard to the question on whether, according to district trainers, the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is committed to the communitarian notion of citizenship, the overall response is very positive. Referring to excerpts of the description of a good citizen by trainers, it was found that the *Itorero* for HSLs emphasizes communitarian attributes, mainly respecting core values of one's community; preserving the community's common good; putting the national identity above all other identities; and participating in activities meant to address social inequalities.

Results from interviews with district trainers suggest that the presence of communitarianism within *Itorero* for HSLs can also be established by scrutinizing one of its five training methodologies[56], which is 'evening gatherings and performance contracts' [*Gutarama no guhiga*]. These are evening recreational forums in the course of which HSLs learn Rwandan cultural practices and the elaboration of performance contracts. Under this training rubric, HSLs are initiated to six types of gatherings and performance contracts.

First, there is the 'performance contract gathering' [*Igitaramo njya rugamba*], which consists of the official presentation of community outreach activities that one commits herself to perform during a certain period of time. It is meant to allow HSLs to produce their own performance contracts detailing community activities they intend to carry out during the national service. Second, there is the 'presentation of achievements' [*Igitaramo mvarugamba*] whereby people present what they have achieved mainly in terms of social welfare. During this gathering, the best performers are rewarded and idle/non-performing ones reprimanded and/or advised. In fact, after the national service, HSLs are also expected to present their own achievements. Third, there is the 'gathering to celebrate the harvest' [*Igitaramo cy'umuganura*]. In the past, this was an occasion for Rwandans to communally celebrate economic production and prosperity. Since Rwandans were largely farmers and pastoralists, they most frequently exhibited their crops and milk products. At this point, HSLs learn to celebrate the fruits of their labor; it is a way of encouraging them to work hard in order to optimize production.

[56] The five training methodologies are: lecturing, sport, parade, practical learning, and evening gatherings and performance contracts. Primary Data, February, 2015.

Fourth, there is the 'celebration of achievements of the ruling political regime' [*Igitaramo nyizihizangoma*]. It is an opportunity to recall what the country has achieved. In this celebration, the following questions are pondered: Where have we come from as a nation? Where do we position ourselves in relation to the vision we have set to achieve as a people? The point here is to teach HSLs not only to celebrate national achievements but also to weigh up challenges ahead. Finally, there is the 'family gathering' [*Igitaramo cy'umuryango*], which was an opportunity for parents to instruct their children about values, taboos, and good behavior. Children are taught how to live with others; to initiate deep friendship; to contract alliances [*Kunywana*]; and to work together, etc. Currently, during the *Itorero* training, HSLs sit with experienced elders and are briefed about the Rwandan wisdom.

This training component of 'gatherings and performance contracts' exhibits the presence of the communitarian notion of citizenship because what is at stake here is fundamentally the preservation of the community's welfare. This methodology particularly focuses on the common good, community's prosperity and achievements, and community's values and taboos. It is deeply 'community-centered'.

Overall, based on interviews with district trainers, there are strong reasons suggesting that the communitarian notion of citizenship is, to a large extent, at work during the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. NIC officials subscribe to this view as well.

Evidence 3: Interviews with NIC officials

Results of interviews with NIC officials indicate that all informants buy into the idea that the *Itorero* training for HSLs is committed to the communitarian notion of citizenship. I am referring here to the previous characterization of a good citizen by NIC officials. As a reminder, in their description NIC officials maintain that a good Rwandan is one "who loves her country" but also the "people inhabiting that country (Rwandans)" [P61] [P62]. In this depiction, there is an implicit emphasis on community. Love for one's national community and love for one's fellow citizens are advanced as qualities of a good Rwandan citizen.

When the researcher shared characteristics of the communitarian notion of citizenship (improving the welfare of those in need; respecting core values of one's community; preserving the community's common good; and putting the national identity above all other identities or affiliations) with the interviewees, participants agreed:

> "Yes. There is no doubt, we also use that model." [P62]

> "That is the very image we give in *Itorero*." [P61]

With regard to 'improving the welfare of those in need as one of the communitarian features, NIC officials highlight that *Itorero*, among other things, aims at enabling HSLs to contribute in improving living conditions of their local community (horizontal contribution). In this regard, HSLs for instance attend to the sick, build houses for the elderly, explain to people the benefits of adhering to the health insurance scheme called 'Mutuelle de santé', and teach the local population about cleanliness, etc.

Further explanations are also provided of 'respecting core values of one's community' and 'preserving the community's common good' as communitarian qualities. With regard to the former, *Itorero* for HSLs is obviously communitarian, particularly because it prescribes a list of seven well-defined core values of the Rwandan culture, which are Rwandanness (*Ubunyarwanda*), patriotism, integrity, courage, self-sacrifice, love for a well-done work, and upholding one's dignity. These seven core values constitute the backbone of the *Itorero* training. HSLs have to internalize them; they are called to understand and make them part and parcel of their daily lives.

As discussed previously, communitarianism embodies the view that citizenship education should focus on the transmission of values that the community has defined as core to its survival. Thus Arthur (1998, p. 362) argues that "There is clearly a strong concern for values and morality in communitarianism thought and an emphasis on citizenship education, and a desire to identify the shared core values that can be taught".

The communitarian notion in *Itorero* for HSLs is also apparent due to the emphasis on community service. The latter has been pointed out by Arthur as one of the

features of communitarianism. In fact, communitarianism is committed to the view that community service would serve as “an antidote to the egocentric mentality of the youth” (Arthur, 1998, p. 362). In relation to ‘preserving the community’s common good’, NIC officials mention that it is one way of being patriotic. Based on this evidence, it is clear that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is to a large extent committed to the communitarian notion of citizenship.

Results of the present study demonstrate that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is committed strongly to the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship. Both quantitative and qualitative findings support this claim. It is not surprising to see these two notions grouped together, particularly because some scholars have suggested that civic republicanism is a variant of communitarianism (Ciprut, 2008; Delanty, 2000; Gaus & Kukathas, 2004; Gonzales et al., 2004; Honohan, 2002; Van Steenbergen, 1994). The point being made here is that civic republicanism and communitarianism share a number of features. It follows that there is no obvious conflict between these two citizenship conceptions. The idea is that *Itorero* conceives of good citizenship as attachment to the state but also to the Rwandan community and its values and taboos.

8.7. *Itorero* training for HSLs and the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship

In this dissertation, it is found that the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship is also given importance in the *Itorero* training for HSLs with a mean of 17.38 (SD = 2.23). In fact, focus group discussions with HSLs show that a fair number of participants confirm that they have been introduced to what are manifestely features or characteristics of the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship (viewing oneself as a member of the world community; fighting human rights violations locally; fighting human rights violations globally; and protecting the environment). An explanation is also provided that, though currently Rwanda enjoys peace, it is concerned with the security prevailing in other countries. For example, Rwandan security organs (i.e., the army and police) are engaged in various UN keeping missions like in Darfur, South Sudan, Haiti, Ivory Cost, and Central Africa Republic.

The majority of district trainers recognize cosmopolitan notion of citizenship as informing the *Itorero* training scheme to some extent. Special emphasis is placed on protecting the environment, and again on the presence of Rwandan security organs in various UN peace keeping missions as part of fighting human rights violations globally. It is also pointed out that Rwanda is committed to entertain good relationships with other nations and to embrace regional integration.

NIC officials also recognize the presence of the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In recognizing the model, one NIC informant states:

> "We really use that model as well." [P62]

In fact, NIC officials pointed out that the *Itorero* teaches HSLs to be open to the world. This aspect is emphasized, particularly when addressing topics of 'development' and 'globalization'. Special reference is again made to the commitment of Rwanda to fight against human rights violations through UN peace keeping missions. In other words, *Itorero* promotes the idea that Rwandans ought to be concerned for the welfare of other people, including foreign nationals; Rwanda cares for its own security, but also for the security of the world as a whole. It is also indicated that during National Service [*Urugerero*], HSLs engage in activities meant to protect the environment.

Nevertheless, it is made clear that much as *Itorero* opens HSLs to the world, its primary mission is not to train universal citizens. NIC officials indicate that, first and foremost, a good citizen should feel part and parcel of her own immediate country, which nurtured and brought her up. This is the very meaning of 'patriotism'. One cannot be patriotic while loving the entire world. One has first to defend the well-being of one's motherland. In the second place, however, one can open frontiers to initiate partnership and friendship with other nations. The idea is that given today's context of globalization, one cannot educate HSLs exclusively for Rwanda; one educates them also (albeit as a *secondary* purpose) for the global world. It is in this context that HSLs are taught human rights, regional integration like the East African Community of which Rwanda is a member, etc. Here *Itorero* seems to embody the relevance of the motto 'think globally, act locally' (Lyons and Mandaville, 2010).

In brief, it can be maintained that *Itorero* opens HSLs' minds so that they can earn a living wherever they might be. But there is no ambiguity that its specific, primary mandate is not to train 'universal citizens'. Comments by one participant are quite enlightening in this regard:

> "The *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs does not have a specific mandate to turn Rwandan citizens – in this case HSLs – into universal citizens. However, we pay heed to the idea that to educate for Rwanda today requires to open the leaner to the whole world failure to which she remains closed." [P63]

In conclusion, from interviews with NIC officials, it can be inferred that developing HSLs into cosmopolitan citizens is not the primary responsibility of *Itorero*. The latter has got the mandate to turn them into good Rwandan citizens. In addition, it opens them to the world. In view of this, it can be said that the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship is at work in *Itorero* to some extent.

8.8. *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs and the conventional democratic notion of citizenship

Results from the present study show that the conventional democratic notion of citizenship is not emphasized during the *Itorero* training for HSLs (the mean is 10.45; SD = 2.58). Data from focus group discussions with HSLs show that they partially agree with conventional democratic attributes of a good citizen, which include participating actively in politics; joining a political party; and participating in all elections organized by the government. It is noted that contributing in the implementation of government policies and programs (like participating in elections) is part and parcel of important qualities of a good citizen endorsed by the *Itorero* training.

However, the two remaining attributes (participating actively in politics, and joining a political party) are disputed vociferously by all participants. The latter contend that being a good citizen does not necessarily imply being actively engaged in politics; nor does it entail invariably joining a political party. The idea is that not only do some

regimes endorse 'bad'[57] politics – and joining them would be neither desirable nor attractive, but also and more importantly, one might respect a 'good'[58] politics in place without necessarily joining a political organization.

Furthermore, the majority of district trainers indicates that the conventional democratic notion of citizenship is at work in *Itorero* for HSLs to a rather limited extent. It is argued that a good citizen should embrace government policies and programs, such as elections and the monthly community work [*Umuganda*]. Nonetheless, there is disagreement on the issue of belonging to a political party. Some trainers maintain that it is good to choose and belong to a political party so that one can channel one's contribution in building the country. Others contend that one can be neutral – with no affiliation to any political party – and yet be a good citizen by obeying to and participating in the implementation of government policies and programmes.

All NIC officials recognize a partial incorporation of the conventional democratic notion of citizenship within *Itorero* for HSLs. Indeed, it is accepted that a good citizen is not passive, because she actively participates in the implementation of government policies and programs. This is undoubtedly a way of exhibiting patriotism. However, the idea that a good citizen should participate actively in politics and belong to a political party is rejected. It is mentioned that politics is done by some people, others do other things. One can be politically neutral (i.e., not belong to any political party) and yet participate actively in the implementation of government policies and programs. It is also emphasized that *Itorero* is quasi 'neutral' about politics. It is not directly involved in politics. Instead, its specific mission is to teach values of the Rwandan culture. But since 'patriotism' happens to be among these values *Itorero* is not as politically neutral as it is often made out to be.

In short, the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is to a limited extent committed to the conventional democratic notion of citizenship.

[57] In the context of Rwanda, 'bad politics' refers to political regimes that endorsed divisionism and discrimination on the basis of ethnic affiliations and regions (first and second republics).
[58] In the context of Rwanda, 'good politics' would mean a politics that promotes the unity and welfare of all Rwandans.

8.9. *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs and the liberal notion of citizenship

Results from the present study suggest that the liberal notion of citizenship plays a very limited role in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. The obtained mean is 8.47 (SD = 1.91). The liberal citizenship notion includes qualities such as pursuing one's private interests; enjoying one's rights and privileges; and having the ability to question ideas. Results from focus group discussions with HSLs indicate that the first two liberal attributes of a good citizen (pursuing one's private interests; and enjoying one's rights and privileges) are not endorsed at all in the *Itorero* training. The vast majority of informants do not think that *Itorero* considers these as attributes of a good citizen. Rather, it is pointed out that these character traits are among the taboos of the Rwandan culture. This claim is supported by one informant who has this to say:

> "That image of a citizen is not given by *Itorero*. Pursuing only and always one's private interests...No. I did not receive such a citizen's image." [P21]

Nearly all informants argue that a good citizen, rather than always pursuing private interests, characteristically seeks to promote the interests of the whole country. Besides, it is indicated that 'enjoying one's rights and privileges' should go hand in hand with respecting other people's rights. However, all informants maintain that having the ability to question ideas is somehow emphasized in *Itorero* training.

As for district trainers, results indicate that nearly all of them deny the use of the liberal notion of citizenship within the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. When the researcher explained basic tenets of the liberal notion of citizenship (as pursuing one's private interests; enjoying ones' rights and privileges; and having the ability to question ideas), respondents rejected the model with the following voices:

> "I have never heard about such a citizenship model ever since I have been an *Itorero* trainer. A good citizen does not work for his/her private interests with the excuse that he/she respects the law." [P54]

> "No. We do not teach that, nor can we encourage somebody to behave that way." [P53]

> "If you only and always pursue your private interests, you are no longer a good citizen." [P 52]

Concerning results from interviews with NIC officials, when I explained to them the qualities of a liberal citizen, it was revealed that the liberal notion of citizenship is denied by all informants from the outset as being at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. Consider the following comments by infortmants rejecting the model:

> "That model does not coincide with what we teach…It promotes individualism, we don't have it." [P61]

> "No. We do not give such an image of a good citizen. That is a capitalist and individualistic model…Besides, that image is not part of our culture…We, Rwandans, as many Africans, are communitarian. Our *Itorero* training is fundamentally oriented towards the communitarian model. *Itorero* does not teach HSLs to be egoistic." [P63]

> "In that model, a lot of elements are quite deficient. That a good citizen should only and always pursue his/her private interests, that is not really what we teach in the *Itorero*. You again described the model saying that 'a good citizen should enjoy her rights and privileges', in that case the citizen is becoming egoistic; she is only looking at her own interests while the *Itorero* graduate [*Intore*] pursues public interests, because her own are also served thereby. But most frequently, the *Itorero* graduate focuses on public interests. So, we do not follow the liberal model. But there is one element that I find quite interesting in the model: 'having the ability to critically assess ideas'. That is a positive element, but the rest is outright nonsense." [P63]

It is worth noting that these views conflate individualism with selfishness or self-interestedness, which is arguably mistaken. Nonetheless, the underlying idea is that *Itorero* does not encourage or teach individualism. Overall, our findings demonstrate that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is committed to the liberal notion of citizenship to a very limited extent. The liberal notion is rejected by almost all HSLs, district trainers and NIC officials.

8.10. Discussion

The present section focuses first on relating findings from the present study to other studies on post-genocide or post-conflict societies. Secondly, an attempt is made to establish whether the civic republican/communitarian notions of citizenship are appropriate and desirable for post-genocide Rwanda. Finally, I establish whether

findings from the present study confirm or contradict other studies conducted on the revived *Itorero* particularly in its depiction of the 'good citizen'.

8.10.1. How do findings from the present study speak to other citizenship studies in post-conflict or post-genocide contexts?

Results from the present study have shown that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs in post-genocide Rwanda is committed robustly to civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship. This came out when HSLs (*Itorero* graduates) were asked to describe a 'good citizen' based on the teaching they received during *Itorero* training.

The findings of this study confirm findings from other citizenship studies conducted among young people in post-genocide countries, particularly Israel (Ichilov & Nave, 1981). Ichilov and Nave found that young Jews (Israeli adolescents of 14-18 years old) depict good citizenship in terms of civic republican attributes, such as obeying the law, being loyal to the state and performing ones duties to the state. Interestingly enough, HSLs – *Itorero* graduates – in post-genocide Rwanda describe good citizenship using the same attributes. The way these young people – in both cases – characterize good citizenship undoubtedly exhibits what they have been taught.

The implication of this finding is that post-genocide countries might tend to prescribe good citizenship as attachment to the state. They seem to associate citizenship with obedience and loyalty to the state. The same attachment to the state was pointed out by Quaynor (2012) upon a thorough review of citizenship education practices in post-conflict contexts. In fact, the study by Quaynor (2012) reveals that there is a strong emphasis on national identity, national pride and suppression of difference in post-conflict countries.

Findings from the present study, however, do not necessarily tally with the case of post-apartheid South Africa. Post-genocide Rwanda and post-apartheid South Africa seem to have taken different directions in educating the youth for citizenship. Post-genocide Rwanda works with strong civic republican and communitarian models deeply rooted in traditional values and taboos, and centred around unquestioning patriotism, blind loyalty and uncritical obedience to the ruling political party. Post-

apartheid South Africa, on the other hand, is committed to democratic, liberal and cosmopolitan ideals where discussion, deliberation, freedom and openess are cherished values.

At this juncture, I wish to demonstrate how findings from the present study speak to citizenship education in other post-genocide countries, mainly Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia and Israel. As seen in the empirical literature, in the aftermath of genocide, except the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (which adopted an 'ethnocentric' citizenship orientation), these countries adopted civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship. Hence, results from the present study confirm findings of other studies conducted in post-genocide countries. Reference is made here to studies such as (i) Panossian (2002), Tovmasyan (2004), Achikyan (2005), and Council of Europe (2005) on Armenia; (ii) Clayton (2005), Leang (2012), Tan (2008), and MoEYS (2014) with regard to Cambodia; and (iii) Ichilov et al. (2005), Ichilov (1999), and Cohen (2013) in relation to Israel. It is important that I clarify this point. I will navigate from Armenia through Cambodia to Israel.

Though they were in a foreign land, Armenians in the diaspora educated their children in citizenship; they instilled in the youth a sense of Armenian identity, of nationalism, and love for the homeland. Many studies (e.g. Achikyan, 2005; Panossian, 2002; Tovmasyan, 2004) show that citizenship education of Armenians in the diaspora emphasized attributes like patriotism, self-sacrifice, civic nationalism, building national identity, and the readiness to recover and defend the motherland. The relative emphasis placed on these qualities undoubtedly reveals that citizenship education in the Armenian diaspora – shortly after the genocide – was working with the civic republican and communitarian models.

Research also indicates that after Armenia acquired independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, civic education textbooks elaborated by local or Armenian organizations took a civic republican/communitarian orientation. They aimed at educating the feeling of respect to and pride for the homeland, the nation, nation's history, traditions, and national distinctiveness (Tovmasyan, 2004). Finally, the Council of Europe (2005) argues that even today there is a strong orientation towards the patriotic model with the goal to promote loyalty to the state, which suggests that though present-day Armenia engages with other citizenship notions –

(radical) democracy and cosmopolitanism, the civic republican and communitarian conceptions still prevail.

With regard to Cambodia, a number of studies (e.g. Clayton, 2005; Leang, 2012; MoEYS, 2014; Tan, 2008) show that tough citizenship education in post-genocide Cambodia (from 1989 to present) focuses on (radical) democratic and liberal notions of citizenship, the civic republican and communitarian conceptions remain dominant. Reference is made here to the relative emphasis placed on national pride, love of the nation, high moral and ethical standards, and a strong sense of responsibility for the country and its citizens (MoEYS, 2014).

Concerning Israel, some scholars (e.g. Cohen, 2013; Ichilov, 1999; Ichilov et al., 2005) have shown that after the holocaust citizenship education among Jews took the form of Zionist citizenship. I have already shown that the latter emphasized nationalistic qualities such as patriotism, self-sacrifice, self-denial for the sake of recovering the land and establishing the new state. It is argued (Ichilov et al., 2005) that this understanding of citizenship education continued until 1948, when the State of Israel was established and even dominated the early years of statehood. It is clear that Zionist citizenship displays many if not all of the features associated with the civic republican and communitarian notions.

In a nutshell, what is noticeable is that, except the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, post-genocide countries (Armenia, Cambodia, and Israel) adopted the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship. The present thesis reveals that post-genocide Rwanda is also committed to the same citizenship notions; hence, it contributes to the existing literature on citizenship education in post-genocide countries.

It is worth noting, however, that results from the present thesis contrast sharply with the situation of citizenship education in post-genocide Bosnia-Herzegovina. Post-genocide Rwanda works with the civic republican and communitarian notions where major emphasis is laid on national identity, unity, national pride, and patriotism. In chapter 6, I argued that Rwandans are encouraged by the current leadership to understand themselves as one people, and not as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. *Ubunyarwanda* (Rwandanness) is a cherished value. In Rwanda, all ethnic groups live together, there is no territory designated for Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. Victims and

perpetrators of the genocide are living together, and sharing the toils of life, which is expected to reinforce reconciliation and social cohesion.

On the other hand, post-genocide Bosnia-Herzegovina entertains an 'ethnocentric' citizenship notion. It is guided by a cleavage model: each ethnic group has been given its territory, and it has developed its own institutions, which perpetuates and aggravates the division (Bose, 2002; Hawrylenko, 2010; Oluić, 2005; Soule, 2003). It has been shown that Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs are developing along different trajectories. In addition, Serbs and Croats do not perceive themselves as Bosnians. Only Bosniaks are proud to be called Bosnian (Bose, 2002; Hawrylenko, 2010; Oluić, 2005; Soule, 2003). In my opinion, by downplaying national identity, the model adopted by Bosnia-Herzegovina is highly likely to affect unitary citizenship. Hence, post-genocide Rwanda and post-genocide Bosnia-Herzegovina have gone different ways; the difference between the two countries in educating the youth for citizenship is enormous.

8.10.2. Are the civic republican/communitarian citizenship notions appropriate and desirable for post-genocide Rwanda?

The present study notes that *Itorero* for HSLs engages – to varying degrees – with citizenship notions predominant in the academic literature, which are civic republicanism, communitarianism, liberalism, cosmopolitanism and (radical) democracy. Rather than relying exclusively on a single citizenship notion, *Itorero* encompasses all citizenship notions, which *apparently* would make it rich and open. One might be tempted to say that flavours of all citizenship education paradigms are present within the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs in varying degrees. However, quantitative and qualitative results from the present study reveal that the *Itorero* for HSLs is committed *robustly* to civic republicanism and communitarianism. My major concern here is to examine critically whether the post-genocide Rwandan context calls for and would benefit from the overreliance on civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship. I examine the civic republican aspect first.

Citizenship education under the theory of civic republicanism focuses primarily on civic virtues (e.g. patriotism and self-sacrifice); placing the public above the private;

subordinating personal interests to the common good; and prioritizing duties over rights. While there is nothing inherently wrong with these attributes, the overreliance on them poses serious concerns.

Findings from the present study reveal that relying heavily on the civic republican paradigm renders the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs prey to civic republican problems, such as those elaborated by Honohan (2002) and Heater (2004). These include *sacrificing individual rights* (some HSLs confess that during the *Itorero* training they were treated as though they had no rights); the risk of *indoctrination* and *fanaticism* (consider teaching about and recruiting members for the ruling political party, i.e., Rwanda Patriotic Front – RPF – during *Itorero* training); and not recognizing the private sphere as an important domain (*Itorero* places much emphasis on patriotism and self-sacrifice). In addition, due to heavy dependence on the civic republican notion, the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs tends to be *oppressive* (in reference to harsh punishments given to trainees), *moralistic* (in reference to established lists of values to be taught and taboos to be avoided), *exclusive* (only certain categories of people are trained), *militaristic* (military exercises take the center stage of the training, e.g. parade), and *masculinist* (female participants commonly find physical exercises prescribed in the *Itorero* beyond their capacity). The issues of harsh forms of punishment and excessive physical exercise will be dealt with in Chapter 10.

Among the above mentioned problems, the risks of indoctrination and fanaticism deserve peculiar attention. Indeed, one of the surprising results to emerge from focus group discussions with HSLs is that while *Itorero* has got a mandate to "bring up a patriotic Rwandan who has values and taboos of the Rwandan culture and who has the culture of *Intore*" (law No. 41/2013 of 16/06/2013 determining NIC mission, organization and functioning, article 6), it is being diverted into a forum to teach about and recruit members for the ruling political party – the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). By way of evidence, nearly all informants (HSLs) promptly reveal that in their training sites lessons on RPF are provided, and interested HSLs are encouraged to take an oath of allegiance to the ruling party. In this regard, participants have this to say:

> "After being instructed about national development policies/programs, my mind was enlightened. I therefore found it necessary that I too should join the RPF. It is during the *Itorero* training that I joined the RPF, and until now I am still a member." [P23]

> "I knew and had heard about the RPF. But it is particularly in the *Itorero* training that I received substantial instructions, following which I came to have a better understanding of its principles." [P32]

> "I only came to know the RPF deeply in the *Itorero* training. We were seriously instructed about it, we had special sessions for learning its principles and raising questions, which actually enriched our understanding. Before going to *Itorero*, I just knew it [the RPF] through my parents." [P33]

However, nearly all participants seem to indicate that joining the RPF is done on a 'voluntary basis'; they appear to be convinced that there is no use of force or direct coercion. Some informants explain this in the following terms:

> "Nobody forced me at all to join the RPF. There is a common saying used by our leaders that 'results speak for themselves'. In view of this, after seeing all achievements that Rwanda recorded thanks to the RPF, and after being informed of how far we have come....I joined the RPF on my own, nobody compelled me to do so." [P23]

> "...As for taking the oath of allegiance to the RPF, I – like many others – did it during *Itorero* training because it was the right time for me; I was free, I could not do it in high school.....When you feel convinced you do it. But nobody forces you to do so". [P33]

> "Where I was trained, we were instructed on RPF principles. Later, trainers asked interested candidates to join the RPF and take oath. But only those interested could become members. Nobody was forced to join." [P46]

When the researcher asked informants (HSLs) whether it would be a good idea to invite also other political organizations to come during the *Itorero* training and inform HSLs of their agendas – so that they may choose not only one thing but among many political parties – two opposing views emerged from participants. On the one hand, some informants agree that it would be a good thing to be done:

> "I ask myself that very question. Why don't they invite other political parties? These are officially recognized political organizations...Besides, they have got a forum where they could devise ways and means to inform us about their activities." [P22]

Other participants have a different view; they emphasize that even if other political parties were invited, this would not change their choice:

> "You choose a political party based on its performance. But some political parties are simply known by name; they are credited for no achievement. How then can you choose them?" [P34]

> "...From the time I was able to apply my own judgment, I could see that the RPF has achieved a lot; its results are outstanding...Even though I weren't instructed about it, based on my own knowledge, this is definitely the political party I would go for." [P31]

In my view, these arguments are not strong enough to convince that the RPF should be the only political party to be talked about. The tremendous achievements that Rwanda has registered after the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi are not the monopoly of the RPF. As a matter of fact, the current Government of Rwanda includes also members from other political organizations. Therefore, it is not tenable to attribute all the achievements of the present-day Rwanda to a single ruling political party.

That the *Itorero* training for HSLs is an instrument for the ruling party to teach its driving ideology and recruit members, is also affirmed by a vast majority of *Itorero* trainers.

> "Yes, on our site, trainees [HSLs] were given a talk about how the RPF delivered the country from the hands of killers. At the same occasion, RPF principles were explained; HSLs came to understand how the RPF managed rescuing survivors; and they were shown the progress so far made thanks to the RPF leadership. At the end of the talk, interested trainees were asked to become members of the RPF and take the oath of allegiance. A good number of HSLs did join and took the oath of allegiance…, but nobody was forced to do so." [P54]

> "During the *Itorero* training for HSLs, because we have got powers to do so – by the way, I do not see any reason as to why we should not do it – we provided HSLs with direct instructions about the RPF. At the end, a huge number of them became members. This activity was facilitated by the officials of the sector [*Umurenge*]. It was done in the evening recreation." [P53]

One official from NIC also recognizes that the *Itorero* for HSLs does teach about the RPF and recruits its members. Consider at this point the informant's position:

> "We teach them about patriotism; we tell them about the RPF and its main good principles. Later, HSLs, on their own, request to be members of the RPF. Therefore, we say 'okay, let those interested to join the RPF come'. But nobody is forced to join the RPF, it is not good to compel someone become a member of a particular political organization. This would be bad." [P62]

The suggestion that HSLs request to join the RPF on their own and take the oath of allegiance voluntarily is rather questionable. What is interesting is that some NIC officials deny categorically that *Itorero* provides instruction on and recruits for the RPF. These informants observe that instructing about the RPF is not part of the themes to be addressed during the training. It is argued that only the '1990-1994 liberation war' is talked about as a way of providing HSLs with a tangible example of patriotism and self-sacrifice. Concerned informants contend that talking about and recruiting for the RPF would be counterproductive, because *Itorero* would be perceived as a 'recruitment forum' rather than a 'transmission of values'. It would be creating a disjuncture in the agreed upon public policy. This would also make *Itorero* a short-lived phenomenon because it would only be viewed as a political party trick rather than as an institution transmitting values. Consider the following defensive reaction from the concerned NIC official:

> "It is not possible. Teaching about the RPF is not on the training program produced by the National *Itorero* Commission (NIC), which program ought to be followed by all training sites… Nobody told me that someone came and stopped the program with the intention to instruct HSLs about the RPF. Unless they (the trainers) organize themselves to do this during the time meant for sport activities…But that agenda is not known…That is not part of the mandate entrusted to *Itorero* by the government." [P61]

It is interesting to note that these claims clearly contradict views of HSLs and even some district trainers, both of whom confess that instruction on and recruitment for the RPF is done among HSLs undergoing *Itorero* training. Now the question arises: Who is right? Who is wrong? HSLs and trainers seem to be right in saying that the *Itorero* training for HSLs does teach about and recruits members for the ruling party – the RPF. As mentioned, even one NIC official confessed to this fact.

The issue of teaching about the RPF and recruiting its members in the course of the *Itorero* training for HSLs raises serious concerns and deserves to be addressed with great care. Obviously, worries are rife about what might be seen as malpractice or

mis-education. One can rightly ask the following questions: (i) Is this citizenship education? On whose mandate do *Itorero* trainers teach about and recruit for the RPF? Could it be an excess of zeal? If so, would it be an acceptable mechanism of recruitment? Aren't trainers betraying the RPF leadership and compromising its procedures? (ii) To what extent are HSLs free in joining the RPF during the *Itorero* training? (iii) To what extent does this practice differ from indoctrination and other forms of mis-education, and indeed, fanaticism? Answering these questions in an even handed manner requires further investigation, which is beyond the scope of the present study. Suffice it to say at this point in time that this practice is likely to lead to indoctrination and fanaticism, which are actually the outcome of relying heavily on the civic republican model of citizenship education.

The point being made here is that post-genocide Rwanda does not need citizens who adore and subscribe blindly to ideologies of the ruling political party. Molding uncritical and fanatic citizens is neither desirable nor attractive in post-genocide Rwanda. In fact, the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi was itself possible partly because the then political regime had successfully produced docile and blindly acquiescent citizens. When the latter were instructed by the government to go and kill the Tutsi, they rushed into blood-shedding without hesitation. Is *Itorero* not running the risk of repeating the same mistakes? As it is argued by a number of scholars of post-genocide Rwanda (e.g. Longman, 2011; Reyntjens, 2004; Sundberg, 2014; Uvin, 1998), should we accept that Rwanda politics keeps repeating itself rather than offering something new? The argument here is that too much reliance on the civic republican citizenship notion produces uncritical citizens. It is the opinion of the researcher that such citizens are not the ideal for post-genocide Rwanda. In short, the *Itorero* training for HSLs is not consistent and coherent with its core mission. Apparently, it is meant to educate HSLs about citizenship and values, but in reality it seems to serve another hidden agenda. In my opinion, *Itorero* for HSLs does not produce cosmopolitan (open), autonomous or independent citizens with the ability to question and critically assess ideas. And it is this very kind of citizens post-genocide Rwanda really needs. Rwanda suffered a lot from fanaticism and sycophancy; it would be a pity and indeed a tragedy to perpetuate the same. Unfortunately this is what the *Itorero* training for HSLs seems to be doing, at least in part; it is creating civic identities in the image of the RPF.

Another restraining force in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is its overreliance on communitarianism, which has its own limitations. As discussed earlier, citizenship education under the communitarian model compels the youth to appreciate the value of the community and instills in them a sense of commitment to its maintenance, which is inherently good. However, the communitarian paradigm has been criticized for overemphasizing the authority of the community. While some take it as *very conservative* (Avineri & De-Shalit, 1992 – emphasis added), others maintain that it places strong limits on individual freedom and autonomy (Arthur, 1998).

The *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is likely to be vulnerable to these two aspects of criticism: being conservative, and limiting individual freedom and autonomy. It displays conservatism particularly because it establishes the list of values to be followed and taboos to be avoided. It sets limits to the autonomy and freedom of trainees because the latter do not have a say in the definition of those values and taboos. From findings of the present study, it is not clear as to how *Itorero* for HSLs avoids these communitarian problems. Hence, the civic republican/communitarian citizenship notions should be espoused with great caution.

There is need to address the overreliance on the civic republican/communitarian citizenship model. It is being suggested that liberal attributes, such as the ability to question ideas, autonomy, and independence could receive greater emphasis. Equally, I believe that the conventional democratic notion is also important to allow HSLs understand democratic principles and virtues. Finally, given today's context of globalization, the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship could be given more weight to allow HSLs be active members locally, nationally and globally. In brief, to use the citizenship education conceptual frame guiding this chapter, I am arguing for a move from the civic republican/communitarian notions to liberal, conventional democratic and cosmopolitan notions. I am suggesting that in the context of post-genocide Rwanda, the left wing of the conceptual frame (the civic republican/communitarian concepts) is a *restraining* force and the right wing (liberal, conventional democratic and cosmopolitan concepts) holds an immense potential to be a *driving* force. Further details pertaining to this point will be provided in chapter 12, which is dedicated to actions to be taken for improving *Itorero* in educating HSLs for citizenship and values.

8.10.3. How do findings from the present study speak to other studies conducted on Itorero or its 'parent' Ingando?

This thesis notes that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is committed to the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship. It has been shown that, according to *Itorero*, the 'good citizen' is one who puts public interests above private ones, loves the country and is ready to fight and die for it (patriotism and self-sacrifice), puts the Rwandan identity above all other affiliations, and internalizes values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. The present research also warns that such a citizenship model is limited, precisely because it is likely to produce unquestioning patriotism, blind loyalty and uncritical obedience to the ruling political party. In this regard, findings from the present study confirm and extend other studies (e.g. Mgbako, 2005; Purdeková, 2011b; Sundberg, 2014; Turner, 2014) conducted on *Itorero* and *Ingando*. By scrutinizing closely the two platforms, these studies unveiled the same image of a 'good citizen' with its associated problems.

Sundberg (2014) carefully scrutinized the *Itorero* training for HSLs from an anthropological perceptive. As a reminder, according to him, the 'good citizen' as portrayed by *Itorero* could be captured along the category of *Intore*. The latter designates a new and improved citizenry; it is the political leadership's vision of the Rwandan citizen. It is important to highlight the characterization of such a model citizen. Sundberg (2014) indicates that *Intore* is a Rwandan who has proficient knowledge of (i) the national history, (ii) Rwandan cultural values and taboos, and (iii) Vision 2020. More importantly, the study shows that a good Rwandan citizen (*Intore*) demonstrates loyalty to the state leadership and ideology; he/she has a 'right mindset' and acts as the catalyst of change in the community. The present thesis discovers the same image of a 'good citizen' advocated by *Itorero* training.

However, Sundberg (2014, p. 28) raises serious concerns about such a model citizen and argues that *Intore* is the "model subject" rather than the "model citizen". In other words, instead of producing 'citizens', *Itorero* might be producing 'subjects'. Sundberg (2014) came to this conclusion after demonstrating that *Itorero* partly serves as a forum for manufacturing citizens according to RPF ideology. Besides, the study reveals that majority of participants in *Itorero* were requested to join the ruling political party, the RPF. The present thesis comes to the same conclusion.

Turner (2014, p. 424) shows that the good citizen that *Itorero* (and *Ingando)* strives to create is a citizen who is “unblemished by the stains of the old genocidal regime”. The study (Turner, 2014, p. 424) also notes that “*Itorero* aims to allow the RPF win the minds and hearts of the population it liberated”. My present research confirms the idea that *Itorero* creates RPF loyalists.

Purdeková (2011b), too, reveals that, according to *Itorero* and *Ingando* teachings, a good citizen is one who (i) takes the defense of the country as his/her primary role; (ii) loves the nation; (iii) subjects his/her interests to the national ideal; (iii) and gives Rwanda his/her all. The author concludes that such a citizen is no longer a citizen but rather a ‘subject’. In other words, according to Purdeková (2011b) *Itorero* and *Ingando* teaching portray an ideal citizen as a person with obligations rather than a rightful person (Purdeková, 2011b). Findings from the present study confirm this conclusion.

However, despite the above mentioned weaknesses, the thesis notes that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs deserves credit on some issues. The idea here is that although the notion of a ‘good citizen’ at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is deficient in some important respects, it contains useful insights which need to be acknowledged. First, *Itorero* training can be commended for fostering Rwandanness instead of fostering potentially conflicting ethnic identities among Rwandans. I concur with *Itorero* teaching and Shyaka (2003) that a good Rwandan citizen would be one who puts the Rwandan identity before and above all other identities; he/she perceives himself/herself and others as Rwandans and not as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa; and he/she is de-ethnicized. Secondly, it is quite uncontroversial that some qualities of a good citizen emphasized by *Itorero* teaching are worth pursuing. Reference is made here to qualities, such as courage, integrity, working hard and working well [*Gukunda umurirmo no kuwunoza*], being self-reliant [*Kwigira*], and upholding one’s dignity [*Kwihesha agaciro*]. Third, it is also beyond doubt that *Itorero* teaching allows HSLs to know the history of Rwanda, current national development programs and policies, such as Vision 2020 and EDPRS I and II.

8.11. Conclusion

This chapter provided background characteristics of HSLs. It also showed how different citizenship notions feature in portraying good citizenship. On the whole, it can be argued that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs engages with a multifaceted notion of citizenship. The idea is that all notions of citizenship education outlined by the academic literature are recognizable within the *Itorero* but in vastly different degrees. This amounts to saying that (i) the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is *powerfully or to a large extent* committed to civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship; (ii) it is committed *to some extent* to the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship; and (iii) it is committed *to a limited extent* to the conventional democratic notion; (iv) it is committed to a *very limited extent* to the liberal notion of citizenship.

An attempt was made to assess whether the civic republican/communitarian model is appropriate for post-genocide Rwanda. The thesis notes that the civic republican/communitarian notions chiefly centered on unquestioning patriotism, blind loyalty and uncritical obedience to the ruling political party cannot be envisaged as a long-term citizenship model for post-genocide Rwanda. A suggestion is made to engage with liberal, conventional democratic and cosmopolitan notions. Findings from the present study have also been related to results from other citizenship studies where it was shown that post-genocide Rwanda like other post-conflict and post-genocide countries (except Bosnia-Herzegovina and post-apartheid South Africa) tend to adopt the civic republican/communitarian notions of citizenship. Besides, it was revealed that findings from the present thesis join other studies conducted on *Itorero* and *Ingando*, particularly in relation to the image of a ‘good citizen’ being communicated by both platforms. It was revealed that due to the overreliance on the civic republican/communitarian notions, *Itorero* training conflates ‘good citizenship’ and unquestioning patriotism, blind loyalty and uncritical obedience to the ruling political party. I will come back to this issue in chapter 12. I now turn to the values education notion that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs works with.

CHAPTER 9

IDENTIFICATION OF THE VALUES EDUCATION NOTION AT WORK IN THE *ITORERO* TRAINING SCHEME FOR HSLs

9.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on outlining the values education notion that informs the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. To this end, four factors on values education – generated by PCA and confirmed by CFA – corresponding to four notions of values education are examined in a bid to identify the predominant features. The chapter also examines whether the description of the aims of values education varies within subgroups. Equally, qualitative evidence demonstrating the extent to which each values education notion informs *Itorero* scheme is provided. The chapter also attempts to put in dialogue findings from the present study with other studies conducted on perceptions of aims of values education as a way of fostering good citizenship. Finally, I ask whether the values education notion identified as dominant in the *Itorero* training scheme is desirable and helpful for post-genocide Rwanda.

9.2. Identification of the dominant values education notion in *Itorero* for HSLs

In order to investigate the values education notion the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs works with, a list of 8 items describing aims of values education was provided to *Itorero* graduates, i.e., HSLs. The latter were asked to rank these items of on a four point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree). As seen in the methodology chapter, these items were classified into four factors generated by PCA and confirmed by CFA. The extent to which each factor is recognized as informing aims of values education (conducted by *Itorero* training) is provided in table 11.

Table 11: Descriptive statistics for factors on aims of values education

Scale	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Skewness
1. Character education	7.33	.93	3	8	-1.50
2. Values clarification	6.79	1.26	0	8	-1.27
3. Cognitive moral development	6.51	1.41	0	8	-1.06
4. Care ethics	6.43	1.31	2	12	-.87

The null hypothesis (H_0) is that all four values education notions (scales) are at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs with equal weight: $H_{0:}\ \bar{x}_1 = \bar{x}_2 = \bar{x}_3 = \bar{x}_4$. As Table 11 shows, character education outweighs all other values education notions in informing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs with a mean of 7.33 (SD = .93); the maximum score is 8 and the minimum is 3, which leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis (H_0). This finding is therefore revealing; it actually leads to the conclusion that the *Itorero* training is *strongly* committed to character education as it educates HSLs for values. As a reminder, character education comprises aims such as teaching taboos and teaching values of one's community.

In the second place comes values clarification with a mean of 6.79 (SD = 1.26). This factor comprises the following constructs: teaching to measure consequences and teaching to choose among alternatives. It is followed by the cognitive-moral development approach with a mean of 6.51 (SD = 1.41). This factor includes developing reasoning capacities and developing moral judgment. Care ethics is ranked last as an aim of values education with a mean of 6.43 (SD = 1.31). It extends to teaching to speak and listen to others and teaching to care for others.

Referring to the values education conceptual frame, these results lead to the conclusion that though the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs engages with a variety of values education approaches, it is strongly committed to character education. In other words, character education prevails over care ethics, the cognitive moral development approach and values clarification. It is interesting to investigate whether the appreciation/recognition of values education notions varies within subgroups.

9.3. Does the description of aims of values education vary within subgroups?

The present study sought to probe whether there is any difference in terms of recognizing values education notions within subgroups mainly according to gender, marital status, age and the training period. In view of this, parametric inferential techniques, such as independent t-Test and ANOVA were used, particularly because normality and homogeneity of variance were assumed.

In terms of gender, a statistically significant difference was identified between males and females in their rating of values clarification: t_{977} = -3.269 where p = .001. However, the effect size is small (Cohen's D score = 0.20). Indeed, females ranked slightly higher values clarification than did males. Their respective means are 6.92 (SD = 1.17) and 6.66 (SD = 1.34). Another difference was identified on values clarification between the group age of 15-19 and the three age groups: 20-24; 25-29; 30-34, with F_{962} = 2.75 where p = .027 considering the Least Significant Difference (LSD). However, the effect size proves to be weak (η^2 = 0.01). With regard to marital status and training periods there was no statistically significant difference found within subgroups in rating values education notions.

These results suggest that the rating of values clarification varies with gender and age. But the rating of other values education notions is not affected by background characteristics of respondents. More precisely, gender, marital status, age and training period do not affect the rating of the dominant values education notion, which is character education. This confirms the conclusion that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is unambiguously committed to character education; it is affirmed by all subgroups with no variation. What is striking is that this claim is substantiated by data from focus group discussions with HSLs and interview data with district trainers and NIC officials.

9.4. Qualitative evidence in support that the *Itorero* for HSLs is committed strongly to character education

During focus group discussions and interviews, all HSLs, trainers and NIC officials concurred with the idea that the *Itorero* training scheme works powerfully with character education as it educates HSLs for values. As discussed in Chapter 5,

character education is ultimately concerned with the kind of person the youth will grow up to be (Sim & Low, 2012). It is committed to the view that a society should identify its core values and virtues, which in turn have to be inculcated in the youth. In view of this, the NIC has established Rwandan core values to be taught to HSLs. These are: Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*]; patriotism; integrity; courage; self-sacrifice; love for a work well-done; and upholding one's dignity.

Evidence 1: Data from focus group discussions with HSLS

Findings from focus group discussions with HSLs suggest that character education is an important part of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. Consider at this point the following comments on the purpose of values education provided in *Itorero*:

> "The values and taboos that we learn are not only meant to be known or praised. No. We learn them so that they can mould our way of being and acting. We have to put into practice what we are taught. If you are taught that it is a taboo to shed blood, then this shapes your character throughout: whether you are in Rwanda or elsewhere you know that you should not shed blood. We were taught values in order to know who we are; it was clearly meant to improve our character." [P22]

> "The moral education we received during *Itorero* training emphasized mainly values and taboos of our Rwandan culture. I remember very well, the concepts values [*Indangagaciro*] and taboos [*Kirazira*] were key words of the training. I also recall that the following values were emphasized: Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*], patriotism, being peaceful, loving other people, love for a work well-done. I could see that the target was to craft a new character within us, a character deeply rooted in Rwandan values and taboos." [P3]

> "We spent a lot of time learning values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. It was clear: the purpose was to tell us what is acceptable and what is not acceptable in the Rwandan society. I could see that the purpose of the training was to improve our behavior so that we can live peacefully as Rwandans. We were told that respecting values and taboos of the Rwandan culture will enable us to live harmoniously. When there is harmony, then there is progress. But for harmony and progress to happen, there is a need to have a good character". [P5]

Furthermore, results from focus group discussions with HSLs indicate that all informants agree to have received the 'bag of virtues', which is a key indicator of character education. Some informants could even recall and spell out some specific virtues that they received and valued most, such as patriotism; self-sacrifice; putting public interests above private ones; love for a work well-done; viewing oneself primarily as a Rwandan beyond everything else; and promoting the respect of human rights.

Further evidence supporting the claim that *Itorero* works with character education is that HSLs reveal having been taught values through the use of *literature* (proverbs, slogans and songs) and the *biography of heroes* – mainly those who participated in the 1990-1994 liberation war (e.g. Fred Rwigema[59]). At this point, HSLs' responses are consistent with the instructions issued in the NIC Training Manual (2014). The latter indicates clearly that the teaching of each value should be accompanied by a 'play', a set of proverbs, slogans and songs. With regard to songs, the *Itorero* training for HSLs relies heavily on the songs of the Rwandan artist late Cyprien Rugamba and those of the Rwandan Army mainly those produced during the 1990-1994 liberation struggle. Rugamba has produced a wealth of songs full of moral teaching. His songs revolves around virtues such as integrity, courage, friendship, etc.

Previous studies on values education (e.g. DeRoche & Williams, 1998; Lickona, 1991) suggest that these two methodologies (the use of literature and moral exemplars or biographies) are strong indicators of character education. What is noticeable, however, is that while much emphasis is placed on shared or approved values, little importance seems to be given to ways of thinking and reasoning needed to be morally educated.

[59] Major General Fred Rwigema initiated the liberation war launched by RPF on October 1, 1990. After his death – only on the second day of the struggle, Paul Kagame became the head of the RPF army until the victory in 1994. The *Itorero* teaching places special emphasis on the heroism of Fred Rwigema.

Evidence 2: Data from interviews with district trainers

Results from interviews with district trainers indicate that character education is an important part of the *Itorero* training. Indeed, participants acknowledge that *Itorero* provides HSLs with 'a bag of values/virtues'. The latter comprises values of Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*]; patriotism; integrity; courage; self-sacrifice; love for a work well-done; and upholding one's dignity. However, an important comment is made by trainers that the 'bag of values' is not to be given to learners as 'closed'. Rather, it has to be transmitted 'open', which suggests that the teacher takes ample time to explain as exhaustively as possible to the learner the deep meaning of each and every value. In this regard, one informant reports:

> "In my opinion, I would not give the bag of values to the learner as 'closed'. Rather, I would hand it over as 'open'. I would not definitely close it up because the learner may open and fail to understand its content. I feel that I should tell the learner about the content in the bag." [P54]

That *Itorero* training is committed to character education is emphasized in the definition of values education entertained by trainers. According to trainers, the values education provided in *Itorero* aims at 'bringing up good Rwandan citizens'. In this context, values are not only taught to be known; more importantly, they are to be put into practice: "*Intore* knows it, does it, and pursues it" [P51]. The idea is that the first step of values education is to allow HSLs to *know* the core values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. Secondly, once HSLs know these values and taboos, they *observe* them or align their conduct to them. Third, HSLs *pursue* them, which involves engineering, creating, initiating actions that demonstrate a good command of values.

These findings echo Sim and Low's (2012) observation that character education relies fundamentally on two premises. First, it is interested in transforming the behavior of learners so that they meet expectations of their society. In so doing, it is committed to the view that for people to be good, they should *know* the good. At this point, it is important to note that this premise coincides with the objective of values education provided in *Itorero*, which is to bring up good Rwandans: those who know, observe and pursue values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. Secondly, character education is premised on a strong belief in the force of instructing the youth about

virtues. It maintains that a society should identify its core values and virtues, which in turn have to be inculcated in the youth. At this juncture, consider core values of the Rwandan culture that *Itorero* strives to pass on: Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*], patriotism, integrity, courage, self-sacrifice, love for a work well-done, and upholding one's dignity.

Finally, the existence of character education in *Itorero* is also discernible through the methodology of lecturing. District trainers indicate that lecturing is the most used approach in educating HSLs for values. In view of this, each value has got its own booklet and corresponding lecturer. There is a training manual and a specific teacher for Rwandanness, patriotism, integrity, courage, self-sacrifice, love for a work well-done, and upholding one's dignity. The idea is that *Itorero* relies substantially on didactic methods or direct instruction in educating HSLs in values. However, according to Leming (1993), didactic methods in values education are unlikely to yield significant results; they do not necessarily result into considerable or enduring impact on character.

Evidence 3: Data from interviews with NIC officials

Results from interviews with NIC officials show that character education is immediately accepted by all informants as being at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. It is mentioned that character education is the most used approach and consists mainly in lecturing about values [*Ibiganiro*]. In this context, as mentioned earlier, each value has got a trainer of its own, i.e., there is a trainer for *Ubunyarwanda*; a trainer for integrity, and so on. When the researcher explained basic tenets of character education (teaching values and taboos; giving a bag of virtues), informants took cognizance of character education in the following terms:

> "That is the approach we use most. We teach values through the lecturing method…So, we have that model." [P61]
>
> "Yes, that is what we do. We give values to the learner. We use that methodology." [P62]

The assertion that *Itorero* for HSLs is committed to character education is also supported by training activities, such as parade and sport. According to NIC officials, parade is meant to have the same vision immediately and collectively, preserving harmony, and promoting self-control. Sport is geared towards building a healthy and fit nation. The understanding attached to these two training activities suggests that the values education conducted in *Itorero* is principally oriented towards the improvement of HSLs' character.

In view of the above mentioned evidence from HSLs, trainers and NIC officials, there are enough reasons suggesting that *Itorero* is committed vehemently to character education in educating HSLs for values. At this juncture, it is important to show the extent to which other notions of values education inform the *Itorero* training for HSLs. Qualitative evidence from HSLs, trainers and NIC officials will be presented concurrently.

9.5. *Itorero* training for HSLs and values clarification

Quantitative results of the present study suggest that values clarification – particularly understood as choosing freely and measuring consequences before engaging into action – plays a role in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs (the mean is 6.79; SD = 1.26). This conclusion is supported by qualitative data from HSLs, trainers and NIC officials. However, these qualitative data reveal that, in the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs, the aspect of 'measuring consequences' tends to prevail over the construct of 'choosing freely'.

Results from focus group discussions with HSLs show that all respondents maintain to have been taught to foresee consequences before engaging into action. It is emphasized throughout the whole training that the evils that befell Rwandans were a consequence of bad political leadership. It is much highlighted that the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi was also possible largely because Rwandans perceived themselves along ethnic lines instead of viewing themselves as 'Rwandans'; hence the emphasis put on the value of 'Rwandanness' [*Ubunyarwanda*]. In other words, HSLs are taught to measure consequences mainly through a close look at Rwandan history.

In addition, it is worth noting that the aspect of 'taking into account consequences before engaging in action' is the essential driving force of teaching taboos. The whole logic behind taboos is that 'one should not engage in action '*x'*, because if one does so, consequences '*y'* will invariably happen.

In view of this, it is plain to see that values clarification might be at work in *Itorero* training *to some extent*. This does not suggest that *Itorero* trainers are 'value neutral' as the term 'values clarification' may lend to believe. On the contrary, values to be transmitted to learners are well defined. Equally, taboos to be avoided are well established. The idea is that values clarification is at work in *Itorero* in the sense that learners are taught to anticipate consequences before engaging in action, which is also revealed by trainers.

In the present study, during interviews with district trainers, all of them recognized that, *to some extent*, *Itorero* utilizes values clarification mainly in the sense of teaching HSLs to foresee consequences before engaging in action. It is mentioned that this is done largely when trainers teach the history of Rwanda, during which HSLs are brought to realize that the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi is a consequence of divisionism and bad leadership. HSLs are therefore instructed not to perceive themselves along ethnic lines, because this has had disastrous consequences. The following comment by an informant is enlightening:

> "We fear that Rwanda slips back into the evils that led to the genocide. We do not want our people to be divided again. We are open as trainers. We tell HSLs that we do not want them to listen to their parents who feed them with bad ideologies. As you see, we are avoiding bad consequences." [P53]

In addition, it is reiterated by trainers that the idea of teaching taboos actually aims at helping HSLs assess consequences of their actions and choices. A taboo is essentially a practice or behaviour that entails bad consequences.

NIC officials also recognize the presence of values clarification in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. Results from interviews with them reveal that all informants recognize values clarification – understood as weighing consequences of one's choices – as part of the *Itorero* training. As a matter of fact, it is indicated that *Itorero* teaches HSLs to assess whether actions they engage in promote and protect their dignity. In this regard, one informant reported:

> "We teach HSLs to look at things in the long term. We teach them to analyze things, to foresee consequences; we even urge them to turn their tongue several times before talking…we insist very much on weighing consequences." [P61]

Nevertheless, it is specified that values are bigger than simply weighing consequences of one's choices. In other words, the values clarification approach is just present in *Itorero* as one aspect among many others such as character education, cognitive moral development and care ethics.

9.6. The *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs and the cognitive moral development approach

Quantitative data reveal that the cognitive moral development approach is only third in popularity in influencing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs (the mean is 6.52; SD = 1.41). These findings suggest that developing the moral judgment and reasoning capacities of learners is also taken into consideration during the *Itorero* training for HSLs, if only to a comparatively lesser extent.

During focus group discussions with HSLs, when the researcher explained to participants the target of the cognitive moral development approach, which is principally to develop the moral judgment and reasoning capacities of the learner, all HSLs unanimously recognized that *Itorero* sometimes uses that particular methodology. Indeed, there is a slogan at the heart of the *Itorero* training, that '*Intore* – the *Itorero* graduate – finds always his/her way out even in the heart of the darkest forest' [*Intore yishakira inzira no mu shyamba ry'inzitane*]. The idea behind this slogan is that an *Itorero* graduate is expected to engage rational capacities to find solutions to his/her own problems.

Furthermore, there is another saying which repeatedly surfaces during the *Itorero* training, that '*Intore* (*Itorero* graduate) avoids rushing into things' [*Intore ntihubuka*]. Another saying, also frequently utilized, stipulates that the '*Itorero* graduate does not complain, but gets solutions to problems' [*Intore ntiganya, ishaka ibisubizo*]. Here

again, the idea is that the *Itorero* graduate is to apply his/her own judgment so as to address his/her problems.

Results from interviews with district trainers indicate that all informants recognize the use of the cognitive development approach within *Itorero* to some extent:

> "The learner is not a tree. She has got intelligence and is able to think and construct meaning. I have no doubt that trainees makes sense out of what we give them….Through our teaching, the understanding of HSLs improves, which allows them to lead a good life." [P54]

Further evidence substantiating the claim that the cognitive moral judgment approach is used during the *Itorero* comes from the slogan put forward by trainers: '*Intore* knows it, does it, and *pursues it'.* What is most revealing here is the '*Intore* pursues it'. HSLs pursue known values, which involves engineering, creating, or initiating actions that demonstrate a good command of values. Undoubtedly, this aspect of 'pursuing values' develops the capacity for moral judgment of HSLs.

More importantly, the presence of the cognitive moral development approach is revealed through 'practical learning' [*Imikorongiro*], which is one of the methodologies used by *Itorero* trainers. These are activities or exercises carried out by HSLs and serve as a vehicle to teach a web of values. For instance, there is the practical learning exercise of 'moving the roof from one house to the other' [*Gusigasira igisenge*], in which the following values are learnt: unity, cooperation, leadership, having the vision, being able to anticipate dangers and obstacles, and caring for the welfare and security of others. Other practical learning activities include 'crossing the river' [*Kwambuka uruzi*], and 'running with a friend with closed eyes until you reach the destination' [*Kurandata*]. The methodology of practical learning holds the potential to contribute to the development of the moral judgment of HSLs. By exposing them to various puzzling situations, this approach is likely to stimulate their thinking and heighten their reasoning capacities; it cultivates their creativity and imagination.

To conclude, one informant mentioned that the Rwandan context in which values education takes place dictates developing capacities of the learner and opening her mind:

> "There is a cloud covering the brain of all Rwandans due to the sad history we went through. The values education provided in the *Itorero* training for HSLs serves the purpose of removing this cloud so that our people become new Rwandans. Values are tools that help our people become Rwandans fit to achieve national visions and programs; they do also aid in teaching civic education." [P51]

In view of the above sentiments, there are strong reasons to believe that *Itorero* is committed to some extent to the cognitive moral development approach in educating HSLs for values. Results from interviews with NIC officials back up this idea.

The presence of the cognitive moral development approach in *Itorero* for HSLs is recognized by majority of NIC informants. It is argued that practical learning activities [*Imikorongiro*], in which HSLs discover certain values and taboos for themselves, develop their moral judgment. Once the basic tenets of the cognitive moral development approach (developing the moral judgement and reasoning capacities of the learner) are detailed by the researcher, one informant recognizes the presence of this approach in *Itorero* in the following comment:

> "Yes, we use it to develop and improve the mindset of HSLs, which is part and parcel of our core mission". [P61]

Surprisingly enough, one informant denies the presence of the cognitive moral development approach in *Itorero*. The informant makes it clear that *Itorero* is still using character education, and that the mostly used approach is to lecture on values:

> "We don't yet use that model. We are still values-centred. What we do, we tell you about values, we instruct you about them, we constantly repeat them to you." [P62]

This disagreement among informants is most likely due to the fact that practical learning activities – which actually testify most to the presence of cognitive moral development approach in *Itorero* – are still a new methodology. Hence, the informant

denying its presence might not be aware of it yet. What is also noticeable is that this methodology is not yet well developed in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs.

It can be concluded that in the course of the *Itorero* training, HSLs are only shown the way; but it is up to them to follow this path by applying their own judgment. Hence, there are enough reasons to believe that the cognitive moral development approach is *to some extent* at work within the *Itorero* training. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that there is comparatively little emphasis on this aspect.

9.7. The *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs and care ethics

Results of the present study indicate that care ethics is ranked as least present in the *Itorero* training for HSLs (the mean is 6.43; SD = 1.319). Although care ethics is seen as least influential, it is nonetheless recognized as being at work to some extent in *Itorero* for HSLs. Results from focus group discussions with HSLs show that once informed about the basic tenet of care ethics – to produce people capable of engaging successfully in caring relations – all participants (*Itorero* graduates) confirm to have been initiated into caring in one way or the other.

Results from interviews with district trainers also indicate that 'caring' is part of *Itorero* for HSLs. It is indicated that this is inevitable because all values in the end tend towards 'caring' in some sense. So, 'caring' pervades all values. For instance, the value of 'hospitality' demands, among other things, that one welcomes everybody with respect and dignity regardless of the social status: it could be seen to entail 'caring'. This way of reasoning can be applied to all values cherished by *Itorero*. The view of one informant is worth considering:

> "Yes, we teach HSLs about caring; we teach them to be the eye of their neighbours. The education we give is meant to allow HSLs be concerned about their neighbour's quality of life. We even tell HSLs to advocate and appeal for their neighbours to concerned authorities in case they cannot do it for themselves." [P54]

NIC officials subscribe to the view that the whole purpose of the values education endeavour is, among other things, to promote 'caring'. This tends to suggest that the

end result of all values is also ‘caring’. In other words, each and every value serves as a vehicle for ‘caring’. Consider for instance the Rwandanness (*Ubunyarwanda*), i.e., perceiving oneself and others as ‘Rwandan’, and not along ethnic lines. This core value unveils ‘caring’ because perceiving others otherwise implies packaging them in belittling stereotypes associated with being a Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Similar arguments could be advanced with regard to the other values.

9.8. Discussion

The present section focuses primarily on putting in dialogue findings from the present study with other studies conducted on perceptions of aims of values education as a way of fostering good citizenship. Secondly, an attempt is made to establish whether character education as an approach to values education is appropriate for post-genocide Rwanda.

9.8.1. How do findings from the present study relate to other values education studies?

The present study notes that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is strongly committed to character education as it educates HSLs towards certain values. The findings of this study also reveal that *Itorero* engages with other values education notions, such as values clarification, cognitive moral development approach, and care ethics. This finding is consistent with results from other studies conducted in countries whose citizenship education programs are ‘values-explicit’ (e.g. Australia and Singapore). These studies have found that most of the time in values education – as a way of fostering good citizenship – character education is combined with other approaches (DEST, 2003, 2005; Singapore Ministry of Education, 2016; Tan & Tan, 2014; Tan & Wong, 2010).

In fact, as observed earlier, in 2003, the Australian Government Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) conducted a study among 69 schools with the aim – among other things – to capture approaches that teachers were using in values education as a way of nurturing good citizenship. The research revealed that

Australian schools were using a combination of character education, cognitive development, and values clarification (DEST, 2003). The following values were listed: (1) care; (2) compassion; (3) doing your best; (4) fair go[60]; (5) freedom; (6) honesty; (7) trustworthiness; (8) integrity; (9) respect; (10) responsibility; (11) understanding; (12) tolerance; and (13) inclusion. There is a number of similarities between the Australian study and the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In the first place, both studies employ character education combined with other approaches. Besides, in both instances, a list of values to be taught is established. As a reminder, the list produced by *Itorero* comprises the following values: Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*], patriotism, integrity, courage, self-sacrifice, love for a work well-done, and upholding one's dignity. The only difference between the two cases is that *Itorero* has not yet put in place mechanisms to measure the impact of its prescribed values; the DEST (2005) has already done so.

Findings from the present study also indicate similarities with the way values education is handled in Singapore for pre-university students, where there is heavy reliance on the transmission approach or character education (Tan, 2010; Tan & Tan, 2014), despite the indication that other approaches such as collaborative and cooperative learning, scenario-based inquiry, experiential learning and values clarification can be used (Singapore Ministry of Education, 2016).

Findings from the present study also contradict findings from earlier studies in values education – as a way of encouraging good citizenship among young people – which deemed character education inappropriate (e.g. DeHaan et al., 1997; Matemba, 2010). In a study conducted to explore the main phases of moral education as part of citizenship education in Botswana, Matemba (2010) demonstrates that from 2007 onwards, the moral education syllabus has shifted to a values clarification focus – suggesting that character education is completely absent.

DeHaan et al. (1997), in their study of the evaluation of values teaching strategies, conclude that values education – as an aspect of citizenship education – should aim at improving three areas of moral growth and change: moral reasoning (thoughts), moral affect (feelings), and moral behavior (actions). It is clear that character

[60] 'Fair go' in the Australian context means to request someone to be reasonable.

education – the favored approach of *Itorero* for HSLs – tends to restrict itself mainly to moral behavior. It pays comparatively little attention to moral reasoning and moral affect.

Overall, it can be observed that a few studies are in support of character education as a valid method of values education in fostering good citizenship among young people. This leads us to consider whether character education would be the appropriate and desirable approach in educating HSLs for values in post-genocide Rwanda.

9.8.2. Is character education an appropriate and desirable approach to be used in educating HSLs for values in post-genocide Rwanda?

Results from the present study indicate that the *Itorero* training is strongly committed to character education in educating HSLs for values. In view of this, the *Itorero* training displays some limited advantages related to character education: it contributes to the transformation of the behavior of HSLs so that they can meet expectations of the Rwandan society; and it allows HSLs to know values and taboos of the Rwandan culture.

However, we note that that the overreliance on character education raises serious concerns particularly because character education has been found wanting in a number of ways. As the conceptual framework of this study shows, character education rests on a strong belief in the force of instructing the youth about virtues and values; it recommends that societies identify their core values and virtues, which in turn have to be *inculcated* in the youth (Bennett, 1991; Kilpatrick, 1992; Lickona, 1991, 2004; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). In view of this, character education is vehemently attacked on two major grounds. First, it is perceived as 'indoctrination' (Arthur, 2008; Kohn, 1997; Noddings, 2002); second, it is not deemed sustainable (Kohlberg, 1975; Kohn, 1997; Liu, 2014). In what follows, I discuss these criticisms and demonstrate how they are relevant for the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs.

In the first instance, the claim is made that character education is indoctrinatory, particularly because it takes the learner to be a passive receptacle to be filled with pre-established values and virtues without so much as being given the opportunity to

construct meaning out of them. Being a traditionalist approach, character education relies on the premise that since being good is not our natural disposition, the best that society can do is to instill in young people those habits and values it judges good, whether learners like them or not. This approach raises serious concerns. In fact, it is questionable whether an imposed set of values will be internalized to result in improved behavior.

At this point, the caution about indoctrination is relevant for the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In fact, *Itorero* does not indicate to what extent trainees (HSLs) contribute in the definition and establishment of the values to be taught. Besides, it is worth noting that in its teaching methodology, *Itorero* relies heavily on direct instruction about values, with little attention being given to meaning-making, critical thinking enhancement, and moral conflict resolution skills. The idea is that there are strong reasons to suggest that HSLs are very passive in the whole exercise of values education provided in *Itorero*.

Second, it is indicated in the pertinent literature that character education is not sustainable (Kohlberg, 1975; Kohn, 1997; Liu, 2014). In fact, it is unlikely that values learnt through mere inculcation will be internalized and applied to new situations. Though character education techniques may succeed in temporarily triggering a particular behavior, it seems unlikely that they will leave the learner internalizing the values guiding this behavior and upholding them in other circumstances (Kohn, 1997; Liu, 2014). In other words, the lack of sustainability of *Itorero* teaching in values education derives from its teaching methodology, which is predominantly lecture-centred. As Leming (1993) argues, didactic methods in values education are unlikely to yield tangible results; they do not necessarily result in significant or enduring impact on character.

It is not clear from the findings of the present research how the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs avoids the problems associated with character education (indoctrination and lack of sustainability). In view of this, results from the present study show that *Itorero* runs the risk of simply being a “bag of virtues approach” (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 673), or a ‘fix-the-kid approach’ (Kohn, 1997). In other words, *Itorero* is essentially meant to mould HSLs by inculcating values of Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*], patriotism, integrity, courage, self-sacrifice, love for a work well-

done, and upholding one's dignity in order to suit government narratives; it tends to be an opportunity to craft docile and uncritical citizens. Put differently, using the concepts of Heater (2004), values education as it is managed in *Itorero* looks like the cultivation of supportive behavior towards the government in office; its content focuses on understanding what the government wants and on the crafting of dispositions required for the implementation of defined policies.

What is again worrying is that so far no mechanism has been put in place by the NIC to establish the extent to which transmitted values have been internalized. In other words, there are no instruments developed specifically to assess the success of *Itorero* in educating HSLs for values. A corollary to this state of affairs is that so far no study has been conducted in this regard.

All this seems to suggest that character education might not fully benefit post-genocide Rwanda. I am not suggesting here that young people in post-genocide Rwanda should not be taught values. Arguably, they should be taught values necessary for community cohesion and peaceful coexistence. But those values should be taught by means other than a mere character education approach. This study suggests that it is time for *Itorero* to consider doing away with character education. While educating HSLs for values, *Itorero* could gain more by engaging with other values education approaches (care ethics, the cognitive moral development approach, and values clarification). However, in so doing, *Itorero* should guard itself against their specific limitations. I am suggesting a move from character education to care ethics, the cognitive moral developmental approach and values clarification. The idea here is that the left wing of the conceptual frame (character education) is a restraining force; on the other hand, the right wing of the frame (care ethics, cognitive moral development and values clarification) holds the potential to be a driving force.

How would care ethics benefit *Itorero* for HSLs? Unlike character education, which upholds a flee-floating set of virtues, for care ethics virtues are relational. Care ethics is much more concerned with 'caring relations' than with caring as a virtue. In this regard, instead of teaching HSLs a set of values about caring, *Itorero* would rather *practically* foster in them the establishment, maintenance and enhancement of caring relations. However, in accommodating care ethics *Itorero* should also take care to

avoid its problems, which are (i) encouraging the exploitation of the caregiver as little importance is accorded to caring for oneself; (ii) neglecting justice; and (iii) not containing mechanisms by which care can be regulated so as not to become morally corrupt. The idea is that there is a need to set reasonable limits to caring; otherwise in the long run, it may hinder the development of the cared-for.

In educating HSLs for values, *Itorero* can retrieve from the cognitive-moral development approach the aspect of enriching HSLs' moral reasoning (thinking) so that they can move from the present to the next, higher stage. In this regard, instead of using lectures exclusively or predominantly, *Itorero* could consider the use of moral dilemma discussions, preferably real life-based instead of hypothetical ones. While drawing from the cognitive moral development approach, *Itorero* should guard itself against the belief that logical reasoning is the only factor determining moral behavior: one can be smart in terms of logical reasoning and moral judgment, and yet lead a morally impoverished life.

In relation to values clarification, *Itorero* could incorporate the aspect of logical reasoning in choosing among alternatives, and enabling the learner to think critically about his/her own choices and preferences. In drawing inspiration from values clarification, *Itorero* should avoid its limitations, which are being value free, relativistic and superficial (Kirschenbaum, 1977)

9.9. Conclusion

On the whole, the quantitative and qualitative data show that in educating HSLs for values, *Itorero* engages with all approaches of values education outlined by the academic literature. However, findings tend to indicate that the *Itorero* training for HSLs relies heavily on character education. Other approaches, i.e., values clarification, cognitive moral development and care ethics are used to some extent. The chapter also compared and contrasted findings from the present study to results generated by other studies in values education. Finally, consideration was given to the appropriateness and desirability of character education in educating HSLs for values in the context of post-genocide Rwanda. It was suggested that instead of relying heavily on character education, *Itorero* could draw on defensible or attractive

features of other values education notions (care ethics, cognitive-moral development approach, and values clarification), while avoiding their respective problems. The present thesis reveals a big drawback within *Itorero*: by relying heavily on the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship, *Itorero* conflates citizenship education and character education. Details about this issue will be provided in Chapter 12 where I will indicate actions to be taken for improving values education for HSLs. In the next chapter, I investigate attitudes of HSLs towards the *Itorero* training.

CHAPTER 10

ATTITUDES OF HIGH SCHOOL LEAVERS TOWARDS THE *ITORERO* TRAINING

10.1. Introduction

The present chapter is premised on the view that the approach used and the training environment in which citizenship and values education take place indicate, to a considerable extent, the nature of 'a good citizen' being communicated and values being passed on. In other words, the training environment ethos, culture and climate are immensely revealing; they teach some values and express the picture of a good citizen being fostered (Schulz et al., 2008). In view of this observation, one cannot adequately analyze the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs – as a citizenship and values education program – while ignoring the assessment of practical issues, such as the content, the quantity and quality of trainers, the training environment and organization. The quality of these aspects manifests clearly through an examination on HSLs' and trainers' attitudes towards the *Itorero* training. The present chapter focuses on HSLs' attitudes.

As discussed in the methodology chapter, statements capturing attitudes of HSLs were classified and confirmed into four factors by means of PCA and CFA respectively. At this stage, I consider descriptive statistics generated for these factors in order to highlight the way HSLs appreciate each factor (set of attitudes). In the end, a multiple regression[61] approach is used to establish – according to HSLs' perceptions – the weight with which each factor predicts the success of *Itorero* training.

[61] Multiple regression is a research technique where predication is done based on more than two predictors.

10.2. How do HSLs assess the *Itorero* training?

As said earlier, the third objective of the present study is to investigate the attitudes of HSLs towards the *Itorero* training scheme. To this end, a list of 12 statements was presented to them to be ranked on a four point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; and 4 = strongly agree). These statements were generally evaluative; they particularly aimed at assessing the quality of the training. As discussed previously, 10 out of these 12 statements were reduced to four factors by means of PCA, and confirmed by CFA. At this point in time, it is important to examine the way HSLs appreciate four factors.

Table 12: Descriptive statistics for factors on attitudes of HSLs

Scale	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Skewness
1. Content	10.92	1.35	3	12	-1.51
2. Trainers	6.31	1.36	2	8	-.72
3. Organization	5.45	1.52	2	8	-.22
4. Training environment	4.82	1.77	2	8	-.00
5. Overall attitudes HSLs	27.51	4.23	10	36	-.38

It is apparent from Table 12 that HSLs are satisfied with the content provided in *Itorero*; the mean for this factor is 10.92 (SD = 1.35) with scores ranging between 3 and 12. The factor ‘content’ includes the knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos; the knowledge required to be a good Rwandan citizen; and the encouragement of critical thinking skills.

The implication from this finding is that, according to HSLs, *Itorero* is efficient in these three aspects: it successfully provides the knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos; it equips HSLs with required knowledge to be good Rwandan citizens; and it

allows them develop their critical thinking skills[62]. *Itorero* is therefore commended for this achievement.

However, results indicate that HSLs seem particularly dissatisfied with trainers, because the mean is 6.31 (SD = 1.36), with scores ranging between 2 and 8. These results suggest that there might be problems with either the quantity or quality of trainers, which calls for further investigation. It is worth noting that the situation worsens when it comes to the 'organization' where the mean is 5.45 (SD = 1.52) with scores ranging between 2 and 8. The training environment is no better; it has the mean of 4.82 (SD = 1.77) with scores ranging between 2 and 8. These findings tend to suggest that there might be serious problems with the organization and training environment of the *Itorero* training meant for HSLs. The factor 'organization' refers to the adequacy of the training duration and the encouragement of discussion and deliberation in the course of the training. As for the 'training environment' factor, it incorporates questions of quality of accommodation, food, etc.

In short, results indicate that while HSLs are happy with the content, they seem to be displeased with trainers, organization and training environment, which arguably calls for further consideration. It is for this reason that the overall appreciation of *Itorero* training does not fare better: the mean is 27.51 (SD = 4.23), with scores ranging between 10 and 36. At this juncture, one may ask whether the assessment provided by HSLs is unanimous or reflects only the opinion of a certain group of respondents.

[62] What is apparent here is that though *Itorero* relatively encourages HSLs to think critically, it also makes them submissive. Reference is made here to teaching about and recruiting members for the ruling party, the RPF, in the course of the *Itorero* training for HSLs. In view of this, the present finding does not contradict the claim made earlier in Chapter 8 that *Itorero* tends to produce uncritical, docile, and child-like citizens. Rather, it is further evidence that *Itorero* might be Janus-faced. As Mgbako (2005) argues, *Itorero* apparently serves the purpose to plant the seed of reconciliation, but it seems inclined to disseminate pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination.

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10.3. Does the HSLs' assessment vary within subgroups?

The present study sought to establish whether the appreciation of the five scales (trainers, content, training environment, organization, and overall attitudes) by HSLs vary within subgroups, i.e., according to gender, marital status, age and training periods. In view of this, parametric inferential techniques (independent t-Test and ANOVA) were used, given that normality and homogeneity of variance were assumed.

In relation to gender, there is a statistically significant difference between males and females in their appreciation of all five components (p =.000; α = .05). The situation regarding gender goes as shown Table 13 below:

Table 13: Comparison of five scales on HSLs' appreciation according to gender

Scale	T-test	Cohen's D Score	Mean/Male	Mean/Female
1. Trainers	t_{985} = -5.525 where p = .000	.35	6.07	6.55
2. Content	t_{988} = -5.026 where p = .000	.33	10.70	11.14
3. Organization	t_{980} = -4.968 where p = .000	.31	5.22	5.69
4. Environment	t_{986} = -3.827 where p = .000	.24	4.61	5.04
5. Overall attitudes	t_{972} = -6.918 where p = .000	.44	26.61	28.44

It is evident from Table 13 that female HSLs appreciate trainers, content, organization and the training environment more than their male counterparts. However, this difference in appreciation, though statistically significant, is very slight, specifically with regard to the environment, because the effect size is small (Cohen's D score = .24). In relation to trainers, content and organization, the effect size is medium (Cohen's D scores are respectively .35, .33 and .31). These results suggest that though there is a statistically significant difference between males and females in their appreciation of trainers, content, organization and environment, that difference is not carrying great weight.

With regard to marital status and age-group, this study shows that in the appreciation of the four scales (trainers, content, organization and environment) no statistically significant difference was found between (i) married and single HSLs; and (ii) HSLs in various age groups. Rather, a statistically significant difference was found in the appreciation of the training environment across training periods particularly between the year 2014 and other periods, and the year 2013 and other periods, with F_{982} = 4.83 where p = .008. The mean of the training environment for the year 2014 is 4.63 (SD = 1.75); for the year 2013 it is 4.72 (SD = 1.74); and for other periods (2012, 2011, and 2010) the mean is 5.09 (SD = 1.82). However, the effect size[63] is weak (η^2 = .01). These results suggest that the training environment is slowly deteriorating (notice the decrease in value for the mean of the training environment). In other words, as years go on, the training environment becomes uncomfortable. In fact, as we shall see later, owing to the 12 Year Basic Education Program (12 YBE), the number of HSLs is increasing. As a result, there is a congestion on training sites, which makes it difficult to provide appropriate accommodation. The appreciation of other factors (trainers, content, and organization) does not vary across training periods.

When comparing overall attitudes, with regard to gender, a statistically significant difference was found between males and females. In fact, females are more appreciative than males. The mean for females is 28.44 (SD = 3.83) while the mean for males is 26.61 (SD = 4.41). The effect size is medium, because Cohen's D score is .44. The implication is that overall, female HSLs are more satisfied with the *Itorero* training scheme than their male counterparts. In relation to marital status, age group and training period no statistically difference was found in overall attitudes. In other words, the overall appreciation of the *Itorero* training scheme does not vary with marital status, age group and training period.

At this juncture, the question arises: According to HSLs' perceptions, which of the four factors (content, trainers, organization and training environment) constitutes the best predictor of the overall success of the *Itorero* training?

[63] The effect size when comparing more than two groups is called 'eta squared' (η^2). The latter is obtained by dividing the sum of squares between (SS between) with the sum of squares total (SS total). Its interpretation is the same like Cohen's D, which means it can be small (≤.20), medium (≤.50) or large (≤.80).

10.4. Identification of the best predictor of *Itorero* success

The present study sought to scrutinize attitudes of HSLs by investigating the best predictor – among the four factors – of the overall success of the *Itorero* training. To this end, a multiple regression technique was used by means of the software SPSS. Put differently, on the assumption that the best available rating of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is the overall perception of its success ('Overall, the *Itorero* training is a success'), the latter is used as the dependent variable (*Y*), and a regression equation predicting *Y* on the basis of four predictors (X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4) is derived as follows: $\hat{Y} = b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + b_4x_4 + a$, whereby x_1 refers to the content; x_2 corresponds to trainers; x_3 stands for the organization; and x_4 represents the training environment. In this equation, following letters are to be understood this way: $\hat{\mathbf{Y}}$ is the predicted value of the success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs; **x** is the predictor; **b** is the slope, i.e., the amount of change in the criterion or the predicted (Y) produced by a one-unit change in the predictor (*X*); and **a** the intercept, i.e., the value of *Y* when *X* is equal to zero.

It is worth noting that while running multiple regression, except homoscedasticity, linearity and independence of errors, the two remaining assumptions, i.e., multicollinearity and normal distribution of errors were met. I tried to remove outliers by means of Mahalanobis and Cook's distance and it made little difference. The null hypothesis (H_0) to be tested here is that all four predictors (factors) have no impact on the overall success of the *Itorero* training. In other words, H_0: $\beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta_3 = \beta_4 = 0$. The Table 14 indicates the regression weight of each predicator along with the statistical significance (*p* - value; α =.05).

Table 14: Best predictors of *Itorero* success according to HSLs

Predictors	**Regression weight (β)**	**Sig (α =.05)**	**R^2**
1. Trainers	.33	.00	
2. Content	.27	.00	.37
3. Training environment	.14	.00	
4. Organization	.04	.16	

As Table 14 shows, three out of four predictors have a significant impact on the overall success of the *Itorero* training, which leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis (H_0). The significant[64] predictors in order of importance are trainers, content and training environment.

Put differently, these results can be summarized this way: A multiple regression was run to predict the overall success of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs from trainers, content, training environment and organization. Three of these variables (trainers, content and training environment) statistically significantly predicted the overall success of *Itorero* for HSLs, $F_{978} = 142.95$ where $p = .000$, $R^2 = .37$.

Based on these results, the predicted success of *Itorero* training for HSLs ($\hat{Y}$) can be expressed with the following equation:

$\hat{Y}$ = .33 Trainers + .27 Content + .14 Training environment + .04 Organization + 20

In relation to the weight of each predictor, results indicate that – according to HSLs' perceptions – among the four factors, *the best predictor* of the success of the *Itorero* training for HSLs is the factor 'trainers' (β = .33). This finding is hugely revealing: it actually says that – according to HSLs' perceptions – the quantity and quality of trainers correlate positively and significantly with the overall success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. The factor 'content' emerged as the second most significant predictor (β = .27). The third predictor is the factor 'training environment' (β = .14). The factor 'organization' does not prove a significant predictor (its *p*-value > .05). In short, according to these results, trainers (their quantity and quality), the content and training environment correlate positively and significantly with the overall success of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs.

The implication for these findings is that, according to HSLs, for improving and optimizing the output of *Itorero*, a lot of emphasis should be placed – in order of importance – on trainers, the content and training environment. The idea is that, among other things that *Itorero* should focus on, priority is to be given to trainers,

[64] These predictors can be called 'significant' only in relation to items under investigation. Since they explain only 37% of the success of *Itorero*, it is an indication that there are other factors influencing the success of *Itorero* that the present study might have not identified; hence the reference to desirability of further studies.

content and training environment. It is therefore important to probe how these factors stand in the actual happening of the *Itorero* training for HSLs. This is done by considering the views of informants on the three factors under investigation. The question is: Based on their lived experiences, how do HSLs appreciate trainers, the content, and the training environment? Though not statistically significant, the organization of the training is also important for the overall success of the *Itorero* training. Hence, it will be considered very briefly.

10.5. Is the quantity and quality of trainers appropriate?

This thesis shows that, according to HSLs, the quantity and quality of trainers constitute the first predictor to correlate positively and significantly with the overall success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs ($\beta = .33$). Given this weight, it is important to examine closely the quantity and quality of trainers.

In relation to quantity, results from focus group discussions with HSLs indicate that trainers in training sites are in good number. Some participants mentioned that trainers are even more than required, which is likely to pose the problem of coordination. But in general, focus group discussion results suggest that there is no problem in terms of quantity of trainers.

However, results from focus group discussions with HSLs reveal that problems are rife when it comes to the quality of trainers. A couple of things are disclosed here: (i) some trainers are sexually abusing young girls undergoing the *Itorero* training; and (ii) some trainers are administering forms of harsh and crude corporal punishment. I consider these two issues at length.

10.5.1. The issue of sexual abuse

One of the most striking results to emerge from focus group discussions with HSLs is that trainers are not well appreciated in terms of quality. Nearly all informants indicate that the moral behaviour of some trainers is appalling. More seriously still, the vast majority of participants emphasize that in many training sites, trainers

sexually abuse young girls undergoing the *Itorero* training. At this juncture, it is worth considering participants' voices:

> "It looks like some trainers are not trained at all prior to come and train us. On my training site, there was a site manager, who, in the evening, used to go out with young girls to have sex with them; then he would bring them back very late in the night. That is a big issue. What kind of trainer is he? More seriously still, he was the site manager! We had come to *Itorero* to learn values and taboos, and yet some of us were indulged into sexual misconduct! Having sex before marriage is not condoned by Rwandan values; it is a taboo, it is a sin; it is not a value. That man was in the wrong place at the wrong time. His conduct is neither desirable nor acceptable; he does not qualify as a trainer." [P11]

> "Some trainers lack good conduct. Imagine someone who, during the day, teaches you about values and taboos, but in the evening, calls you and invites you to go out. We could see our colleagues (young girls) going out with trainers and coming back drunk late in the night. In the morning, those girls could not wake up for the morning run with others. Missing the morning run was usually punishable. But because trainers knew where concerned young girls were, they would not punish them; rather, they would say that they are sick... The conduct of trainers was shocking." [P34]

> "Some trainers do not observe values and taboos that they teach; they are just lagging behind them. Imagine a trainer who, during the day, teaches you values and taboos; but in the evening the same trainer comes to snatch a young girl from the group, and takes her to take alcohol and have sex. What kind of trainer is he? It was too much...And when the concerned young girl(s) come(s) back late in the night, you could see her drunk; some were sad, others kept quiet, and some others were deeply afflicted." [P35]

> "I disliked the conduct of trainers. Those who were in charge of our security are the ones who were having sex with us." [*Nanenze imyitwarire y'abatoza. Abari bashinzwe kuducungira umutekano nibo badusambanyaga.*] [P2/95]

> "I disliked the fact that some trainers were having sex with trainees – young girls." [*Nanenze ko abatoza basambanyaga abana b'abakobwa.*] [P4/526]

Respondents, mostly females, mention that their colleagues might obey such distasteful invitations from trainers mostly out of fear of being beaten or being asked to lay down on the ground *[Kuviringitwa]*. *Kuviringitwa* refers to a form of punishment commonly inflicted on HSLs undergoing *Itorero* training. A trainer may ask the trainee to lay down on the ground most frequently in places that are wet and dirty. Trainees (HSLs) hate this form of punishment, particularly because it is humiliating. Not only is it given in the sight of all trainees, but also at the end of it, one's clothes are very dirty.

The issue of sexual abuse should be addressed with great care. In my view, the case goes beyond affecting the success of *Itorero*. Arguing from a rights perspective, I maintain that it is the right of young girls to enjoy protection from harm in the course of the *Itorero* training. Therefore, since this protection is not guaranteed, further and thorough investigation should be conducted and culpability established. This might be done by concerned *Itorero* stakeholders, especially the National *Itorero* Commission (NIC) and the Rwanda Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

The argument being made here is that HSL victims of sexual abuse during the *Itorero* training are to be identified, medically treated, psychologically supported, and legally compensated. In fact, there is also need to establish whether such sexual abuses and atrocities do not lead to unwanted pregnancies and the transmission of HIV/AIDS among affected young girls. Equally important, culprits are to be identified, prosecuted against and brought to court.

The present study reveals that the conduct of some *Itorero* trainers is morally problematic, because some trainers sexually abuse young girls undergoing the training. It is argued that this does not only hamper the success of the *Itorero* training; it also constitutes a serious crime. A call for establishment of culpability is made for victims to be given justice and fair compensation. Referring to the Force Field Theory of Change (Lewin, 1951), it can be argued that the conduct of some trainers constitutes a restraining force to the success of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs.

10.5.2. Interrogating corporal punishment

In this study, what is surprising again is that, according to nearly all informants, in most training sites, inhumane, unkind and harsh corporal punishment is inflicted on trainees. In this regard, informants report:

> "We were given harsh punishment during the *Itorero* training. I remember that one day, a trainee was punished severely. Indeed, trainers compelled him to do all sorts of things: he was asked to lay down, later he was asked to run, and then he had to bend his head down and put his legs up for quite a long time. Later, they poured cold water on him, and forced him to do much more tiresome things. At the end, the fellow got so exhausted that he could hardly breathe. They had to rush him to the hospital; he was admitted and placed under intensive care. Lucky enough, the guy recovered. That was a sad experience, because the fellow could even die of this mistreatment." [P15]

> "We had one trainer who was very cruel. If I were to meet him today, I am not sure whether I would look into his eyes. He used to beat us seriously on the head with a big stick. That was inhumane....He would not even hesitate to ask you to lay down in dirty places, then he would walk over you on the back with shoes. I remember that one of our colleagues was walked over, and got seriously injured in his sides and taken immediately to the hospital." [P24]

> "Some trainers used to come to train us while drunk, mainly in the morning. Should you approach such a trainer, you would feel that he is smelling [of] alcohol... Such a trainer most of the time was irritated, uttered bad words, and issued harsh corporal punishment all the day. In short, a good number of trainers failed showing good standards and serving as role models." [P33]

HSLs indicate that some trainers have little or no knowledge of human rights; they beat trainees like animals. A few informants also confess that in the course of the *Itorero* training, they are subjected to violent physical and military exercises beyond their capacities, which compromise their physical and psychological health. In brief, HSLs describe abuses which they are subjected to in many terms: humiliation

[*Kuviringitwa*]; hostility; being beaten up for no reason [*Gukubitwa bikabije kandi nta mpamvu*]; hard and harsh corporal punishment; being traumatized – "Words from trainers are not flavored with values and taboos, they are traumatizing." [*Amagambo abatoza bavuga ntabwo arimo indangagaciro na kirazira, araduhahamura*.] One respondent summed up these physical abuses in the following terms: "Trainers treated us like beasts." [*Abatoza badufataga nabi nkaho twari inyamaswa*.]

As mentioned previously, the *Itorero* training tends to be militaristic. Results from the present study reveal that HSLs express discontent with regard to this militaristic orientation that the training takes. In fact, the core mission of the training is to teach to HSLs values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. If this is the case, why do activities such as drilling, marching, parade, and highly demanding military physical exercises take center stage?

It can be concluded from the evidence of focus group discussions with HSLs that some *Itorero* trainers inflict corporal punishment that compromises the dignity and respect of trainees. This also constitutes a serious restraining force (Lewin, 1951) for the success of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs. Further investigation is to be conducted on this issue, because such practices constitute torture, human rights violations and abuses.

In conclusion, based on evidence in the form of personal testimony about trainers sexually abusing young girls, and administering harsh corporal punishment to trainees, I claim that the quality of some[65] *Itorero* trainers is wanting. This is alarming particularly because, as seen previously, the factor 'trainers' is *the first predictor* to correlate positively and significantly with the overall success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs ($\beta = .33$). The implication is that – in HSLs' perceptions – having morally problematic trainers is likely to affect the success of the *Itorero* training for HSLs tremendously. If this is the situation with trainers, then what about the content?

[65] It is difficult to provide the approximate percentage of trainers engaging in these practices; hence the need for further investigation. Suffice it to say that the issue of sexual abuse was raised in four out of five focus group discussions conducted with HSLs. The issue of harsh corporal punishment was mentioned in all five focus group discussions.

10.6. How do HSLs assess the content?

The overall assessment of the content is very positive. This is very encouraging because according to HSLs the content is the second predictor of the overall success of the *Itorero* training (β = .27). Results from focus group discussions with HSLs indicate that for nearly all participants, the content provided in *Itorero* allows them successfully: (i) to grasp what it takes to be a good Rwandan citizen; (ii) to know Rwandan values and taboos; and (iii) to be purified from ethnic ideologies imposed by parents. However, it has to be noted that HSLs are not yet in position to critically assess the limitations and problems with regard to the content. Reference is made here to the issue of being civic republican/communitarian oriented and relying heavily on character education.

In relation to good citizenship, informants (*Itorero* graduates) confess that, thanks to the content provided in the *Itorero* training, they came to understand what it means to be a good Rwandan citizen. In their views, the latter amounts to the following: to put the Rwandan identity above all other identities or affiliations; to know and live up to Rwandan values and taboos; to love one's country and being ready to fight and die for it, if necessary; to pursue public interests; to uphold the dignity inherent in oneself and others; and to be economically self-reliant. Nevertheless, results also indicate that other attributes of a good Rwandan citizen are mentioned with much less emphasis. They include finding solutions to one's problems instead of complaining; helping those in need; respecting laws; and joining in the implementation of generative national policies and programs. By way of illustration, the following comments constitute an enlightening assessment of the *Itorero* content:

> "The whole purpose of civic education provided in the *Itorero* training is to create good citizens. Should you have bad citizens, you will be in trouble harnessing them. You need to mould your people first. Good citizens are crafted; nobody is born so. People embrace the shape you give them. In the *Itorero* training, there is no doubt, we were fashioned into good citizens; we became what we were taught." [P11]

The content provided in the *Itorero* focuses on the history of 'good' politics and 'bad' politics in Rwanda; the vision of Rwanda (e.g. Vision 2020, Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy – EDPRS I & II, One Cow per Poor Family

Program[66] – *Girinka*); national development programs and policies; the *Ndi umunyarwanda* program[67] – I am a Rwandan program; and entrepreneurship skills (initiating and managing small income generating projects).

These aspects of the content are well appreciated by HSLs. In fact, the latter maintain that such content allows them to be better acquainted with Rwandan society, be integrated into it, and to contribute to its betterment. This is very important because HSLs have spent most of their time in schools; they need therefore to be informed about what is going on in their society.

Furthermore, nearly all informants admit that the *Itorero* content emphasizes knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos. Since some HSLs are not well-versed in this, and others were born outside of Rwanda and brought up in foreign cultures, the teaching about Rwandan values and taboos attracts their attention. They admit that the kind of values education they are provided in *Itorero* enables them to: (i) know and use values and taboos of the Rwandan culture to bring solutions to their problems and develop; (ii) be good Rwandans; (iii) be agents of social cohesion; (iv) appreciate the distinctive identity of Rwandans; and (v) be clear about what is acceptable and not acceptable in Rwandan society. In short, according to HSLs, the target of the values education provided in the *Itorero* is to heighten their sense of humanity and foster the Rwandan identity, which they enjoy a lot.

Finally, HSLs indicate that the content taught in the *Itorero* training is informative and satisfactory, because it liberates them from 'bad ethnic ideologies received from [their] parents'. Consider the following argument advanced by an informant:

> "In our homes, we still hear so many things from our fathers, mothers and guardians. Some of the latter tell that Rwandans are not one – as it is upheld today; they teach that tall people with a sharp nose are Tutsi; short ones with a bold nose are Hutu. Besides, more often than not, we have been instructed not to visit certain families nor interact with their children. It is true; our parents

[66] The One Cow per Poor Family Program [*Girinka*] is a development program where every poor family is given a cow to have access to milk. The program has three main advantages: (i) to reduce/eradicate malnutrition, (ii) to increase the family income; (iii) to reinforce friendship among Rwandans – the calf from the received cow is given to the neighbour, and the process goes on.

[67] This is a program meant to help Rwandans understand themselves as one people instead of focusing on potentially dividing ethnic identities.

have told us many things, some of which are detrimental to the unity of Rwandans. In this context, if one does not get a chance to undergo the *Itorero* training and learn that we are one as Rwandans, mostly likely one will grow up guided by those thwarted stereotypes. The *Itorero* training has set our minds free from the bad ethnic ideologies received from our parents." [P12]

In order to substantiate the claim that the content provided in the *Itorero* meant for HSLs is a success, it is also important to consider lessons that HSLs say to have enjoyed most: (i) being one with others – unity; (ii) giving respect and value to the other person; (iii) values and patriotism; (iv) finding solutions to one's problems instead of complaining all the time [*Intore ntiganya, ishaka ibisubizo*]; (v) the evening recreation [*Igitamaduni-Igitaramo*] – where HSLs learn their culture and present 'National Service performance contracts'; (vi) time management and punctuality; (vii) creativity, flexibility and adaptation; and (viii) advice for being a young entrepreneur.

In short, in terms of content, the vast majority of informants admit that they enjoyed the *Itorero* training. It is worth noting that some participants even wanted the *Itorero* to go on longer; for them, it ended earlier than wished: "*Itorero* ended very fast; I wish we could have continued the training, it could even go on for one year…" [P35] Using Lewin's (1951) Force Field Theory of Change, it can be argued that – according to HSLs' perceptions – the content constitutes the driving force of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs.

10.7. Is the training environment conducive in terms of food, accommodation, and sanitation?

It is important to engage with the conduciveness of the *Itorero* training environment – understood in terms of adequate food, accommodation and sanitation – because it affects the quality of the training. As discussed previously, this study shows that according to HSLs perceptions the training environment is the third significant predictor of the overall success of the *Itorero* training ($\beta = .14$). In fact, as argued previously, the training environment in which citizenship and values education take place reveals to some extent the image of 'a good citizen' being communicated and values being passed on. In other words, the training environment ethos and culture

are revealing; they *implicitly* teach some values and *indirectly* express the image of a good citizen being fostered.

In relation to food, results from focus group discussions with HSLs indicate that, in general, the meals provided in the course of the training are good. It is explained that meals comprise mainly rice, beans, maize, and Irish potatoes. An observation is made that on some occasions meat is served, but maize – nicknamed chicken [*Inkoko*] – tends to dominate the menu. Nevertheless, three comments on food are made. First, it is noted that the quantity is not enough; while trainees work hard and perform demanding physical exercises, they get little food, which is likely to compromise their wellbeing and affect their ability to concentrate. Second, trainees indicate that they are not given ample time to enjoy their little food; they are asked to eat in a hurry. Third, it is mentioned that, in some sites, HSLs on special diet for medical reasons are not properly catered for.

With regard to accommodation, results from focus group discussions with HSLs show that the housing is of more or less good quality. Yet, two comments are worth considering. First, it is mentioned that there is congestion, i.e., training sites receive the number of trainees which is beyond their accommodation capacity. In other words, the number of HSLs on training sites is not commensurate with available facilities. As a matter of fact, there are not enough rooms. More often than not, it happens that two or three HSLs sleep on the same bed, with all attendant problems, chief among which is the high risk of contamination or contraction of diseases. Second, it is pointed out that dormitories are not clean; they are full of insects [*Imperi*] despite the use of insecticides prior to the commencement of the training.

It is the opinion of the researcher that the quality of accommodation may vary from site to site. Since training sites are usually boarding school premises, in cases where the hosting school has suitable accommodation, there is no problem at all; but when there is deficient accommodation coupled with the issue of congestion, then trainees are affected. Overall, results from focus group discussions indicate that the accommodation was generally acceptable.

As far as hygiene and sanitation is concerned, during focus group discussions, nearly all participants mentioned that there are serious problems. In particular, it is mentioned that it is not easy to find clean water. Subsequently, while HSLs manage to ensure personal hygiene, it is extremely difficult to maintain hygiene in common places, such as bathrooms, toilets, dormitories and lecture halls. Besides, the number of toilets and bathrooms is limited.

It can be argued that the issue of cleanliness also might vary from site to site. In cases where the equipment and infrastructure on training sites are proportional to the number of hosted trainees, there are no problems at all. But in cases where there is overcrowding, problems of hygiene and sanitation are enormous. On the whole, according to majority of participants, the hygiene observed on training sites is not satisfactory.

Another issue is that though every training site has got a nurse, health care facilities are not adequate or appropriate. During the training, some HSLs get sick and receive mediocre medical attention.

Given the fluctuation in appreciation of food and accommodation, it is difficult to establish whether these items are driving or restraining forces. But it is clear that poor sanitation on training sites and lack of appropriate health care facilities are restraining forces to the success of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs leavers.

10.8. Is the organization of the *Itorero* training for HSLs adequate?

The organization refers mainly to four issues: the program, the training duration, the promotion of discussion and deliberation in the course of the training, and logistics. Though this factor is not a significant predictor of the success of *Itorero*, I consider it *briefly*, given its role in the *Itorero* training.

In relation to the program**,** results from focus group discussions with HSLs indicate that most participants find the training program adequate. However, it is noted that there is lack of harmonization of the program countrywide. For instance, while some trainees go to bed at 11:00pm and wake up around 5:00am; others are going to bed at 1:00am and wake up at 3:00am. This tends to suggest that there is need to

harmonize the training timetable, because some sites are following a very tight schedule, and trainees do not have enough time to rest, which makes the assimilation process and discussion among participants difficult. Certainly, if one has only slept a few hours, one is likely to feel sleepy during the day.

It was also noted that the timetable is very tight; there is too much instruction in a very limited time, which makes difficult the assimilation process and discussion among participants. A few respondents mentioned the issue of language. Indeed, the whole training is given in Kinyarwanda – with difficult terms – while some trainees (mainly those born in exile) are ill equipped to understand advanced Kinyarwanda. Some informants also brought up the issue of time with regard to religious practice saying that they were not given time for prayer during the training.

In relation to the duration of the training, results show that almost all participants find it too short (only four intensive days on the training site). It is suggested that the training could be extended to three weeks to allow trainees to cover adequately the envisaged program content. In fact, the issue of duration is a very difficult one because it keeps on being reduced drastically: in 2013, trainees spent one month in training sites; in 2014 they spent three weeks; and in 2015 HSLs spent only four days in training sites. Indeed, the reason behind shortening the duration of the training is financial; the number of HSLs keeps on increasing as a result of the free 12 Year Basic Education Program, which calls for securing more financial means. The NIC is said to receive a limited budget, which is deemed incommensurate with the yearly increase of HSLs. This raises the question if the *Itorero* training for HSLs is financially sustainable.

In order to address the duration issue, a new formula for the training has been devised. Currently, HSLs start the *Itorero* training when they are in their final year, and at this stage the training takes place in their respective schools. Secondly, when they come for the end term and long holidays, they train twice per week, mainly on Thursdays and Fridays. After completing high school, they spend four intensive days training onsite. It is difficult to view this new procedure as efficient; the content which initially was covered in one month can hardly be taught in four days.

With regard to the promotion of discussion and deliberation, results indicate that this aspect is taken into consideration. However, the time dedicated to discussion and

deliberation is very short, because trainers are rushing to complete the program. As seen earlier, this is due to the duration of the whole training, which is increasingly being shortened.

In terms of logistics, issues such as lack of didactic materials, training modules, equipment for the practical part [*Imikorongiro*], and transport fees for trainees were highlighted. It emerged that didactic materials were not sufficient to facilitate instruction. It was also indicated that the equipment necessary for carrying out practical exercises designed to integrate taught values and civic attitudes is lacking in many training sites. Second, the issue of transport was raised. HSLs do not get transport fees to and from training sites, mainly during the end term and long holidays training, which affects the turnout. The idea is that there is a huge difference between HSLs expected to attend and those who do actually participate in that particular phase of the training. Though there is an increase of HSLs due to the 12 YBE, there are still many HSLs who miss the first phase (during the end term and long holidays) of *Itorero* training, owing to lack of transport fees.

10.9. Conclusion

Using Lewin's (1951) Force Field Theory of Change, it is noticeable that according to HSLs, the major driving force of *Itorero* is the content. The latter is appreciated overwhelmingly by nearly all respondents. The content provided in *Itorero* allows HSLs to: (i) grasp what it takes to be a good Rwandan citizen; (ii) know Rwandan values and taboos; (iii) be purified from ethnic ideologies imposed by parents, and (iv) be familiar with national development programs and policies.

A number of restraining forces are also highlighted by HSLs. These include mainly the quality of trainers (issues of sexual abuse and harsh forms of corporal punishment); poor hygiene due to congestion on training sites; and the short duration. Concerns are also raised about food, health care facilities on training sites, and logistics.

The overall argument here is that for the better future of citizenship and values education in post-genocide Rwanda, the identified driving forces have to be reinforced and restraining ones weakened or eliminated. In addition, for optimal

results, careful consideration should be given – in order of importance – to three things: the quality of trainers, the content, and the training environement. These three elements – according to HSLs – constitute best predictors of the success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs.

What follows is an investigation of attitudes of trainers towards the *Itorero* training, which will hopefully enable a more balanced view on the quality of the *Itorero* training. At a later stage, I will conduct a comparative discussion on HSLs' and trainers' attitudes.

CHAPTER 11

ATTITUDES OF TRAINERS TOWARDS THE *ITORERO* TRAINING SCHEME FOR HSLs

11.1. Introduction

The present chapter deals with attitudes of trainers towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. First, background characteristics of trainers are considered. Second, descriptive statistics on the assessment of *Itorero* (by trainers) are generated. Third, a regression technique is used to outline – according to trainers' perceptions – the best predictors of the *Itorero* success. Finally, a comparative discussion of HSLs' and trainers' attitudes is conducted.

11.2. Background characteristics of trainers

Trainers who participated in the present study were investigated on the basis of the following variables: gender, age, marital status, highest level of formal education, field of study, training experience, training in citizenship education, and training in values education. It is important to be aware of trainers' characteristics, because they arguably say a lot about the quality of the *Itorero* training. Table 15 below provides results pertaining to these characteristics.

It is evident from Table 15 that the majority of trainers are males (72%); females are very few (27%); and a few trainers did not indicate their gender, hence the label 'missing' (.8%). These results reveal that the *Itorero* training might not be gender-sensitive in recruiting trainers. Besides, as discussed previously, the overreliance on the civic republican notion of citizenship makes the *Itorero* training for HSLs masculinist and militaristic. In other words, male virtues and demanding physical exercises are emphasized. The high prevalence of male trainers in training sites might be taken as additional evidence for this claim.

Table 15: Background characteristics of trainers (N = 118)

Item		Frequency	Percentage (%)
Gender	Male	85	72
	Female	32	27
	Missing (omitted)	1	.8
Age	Under 25	16	14
	25-29	23	20
	30-39	54	45
	40-49	21	18
	50-59	3	3
	60 and above	0	0
	Missing (omitted)	1	.8
Marital status	Single	58	49
	Married	57	48
	Missing (omitted)	3	2.5
Level of education	High school diploma	43	36
	Bachelor's degree	65	55
	Masters	6	5
	PhD	1	0.8
	Others	2	1.8
	Missing (omitted)	1	.8
Field of study	Languages	2	1.7
	Social sciences	17	14
	Business studies	16	11
	Sciences	30	25.4
	Education	26	22
	Missing (omitted)	27	22.9
Is your field of study related to CE and VE?	Yes	88	75
	No	27	23
	Missing (omitted)	3	2.5
Training experience	1 year	38	32
	2 years	21	18
	3 years	20	17
	4 years	9	8
	5 years	5	4
	More than 5 years	20	17
	Missing (omitted)	5	4.2
Were you trained in CE?	Yes	114	97
	No	4	3
Were you trained in VE?	Yes	116	98
	No	2	2

With regard to age, results indicate that most of *Itorero* trainers (45%) are aged between 30 and 39. However, there is also a fairly high number of young trainers – aged from 25 to 29; they represent 20%, which arguably raises serious concerns not only about their training experience but also about their knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos. During interviews with trainers, it was revealed that most of the time, these young trainers are university students; they are just recruited to fill the vacuum. Their employment is not based on a test or interview in the course of which their knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos would be assessed. In relation to marital status, results show that single and married trainers are almost in equal proportion (49% and 48% respectively).

As for the highest level of education, most of the trainers hold a bachelor's degree (55%), and a high school diploma (36%). Only a small number (5%) have Masters and PhD degrees (0.8%). A few trainers (1.8%) did not complete high school; nor did they undergo some kind of formal education leading to the award of a degree or diploma. In general, given the content provided in the *Itorero* training for HSLs, the level of education of trainers might be considered appropriate, though there is a need to consider reducing the number of trainers with high school diplomas and those with no formal degrees.

The field of study of trainers is quite diverse: it is predominantly in the area of natural science (25.4%), education (22%), social sciences (14%), and business studies (11%). Only a few trainers have studied languages (1.7%). In the present study, sciences refer to mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry, nursing, veterinary medicine and agriculture. Education includes psycho-pedagogy, early childhood education, adult education [*Normale Primaire*], and special needs education. Social sciences comprise sociology, social work, history, politics, international relations, public administration, journalism, geography, religious education, and philosophy. Business studies refer to economics, management, entrepreneurship, and accounting. It is startling to note that despite this huge variety of fields of study, more than the majority of trainers (75%) still claim that their areas of study are related to citizenship and values education. As a matter of fact, one would wonder how trainers who specialized in the sciences came to that conclusion. And yet there is a fairly substantial proportion of trainers (25.4%) who make this claim. The idea is that given the nature of citizenship and values education content, trainers suitable for the

Itorero training might be reasonably those who did social sciences, education, languages, and business studies. These results show that the NIC might not be taking into consideration one's field of study in recruiting trainers. There seems to be an assumption that everyone can become an *Itorero* trainer.

It is equally crucial to note that a good number of trainers are reluctant to reveal their field of study; hence the very high percentage of missing data under this rubric (23%). Could it be that such trainers do not want to be challenged because their field of study is arguably wholly unrelated to citizenship and values education? One may justifiably think this way, because I personally do not see why a trainer would decide not to divulge his/her field of study.

As far as the training experience is concerned, results demonstrate that a large number of trainers (32%) have got only one year of training experience, which is somewhat worrying. Besides, only a few trainers (17%) have got more than five years of training experience. These figures therefore raise serious concerns about the quality of the *Itorero* training, particularly because half of trainers (50%) have a training experience of less than three years. Finally, results show that almost all trainers claim to have received training in citizenship education (97%) and values education (98%), which is important for efficient education.

11.3. Trainers' assessment of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs

In order to investigate the ways through which trainers appraise the *Itorero* training for HSLs, a list of 12 statements was presented to them to be ranked on a four-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree). The statements were evaluative in kind; they aimed basically at assessing the quality of the *Itorero* training. It is important to note that, as mentioned in the methodology chapter, one statement reading 'I am happy with the remuneration I get for the work done' was deleted to attain the highest reliability (Cronbach's Alpha). In a bid to make sense of responses from trainers, a benchmark mean score of 2.5 or greater is considered as agreement with the statement; a mean score of less than 2.5 is interpreted as disagreement with the statement. The benchmark mean is calculated as follows: (1+2+3+4)/4 = 2.5). Table 16 provides in a descending order the extent to which trainers agree with suggested statements.

Table 16: Descriptive statistics for trainers' attitudes

Statements	Mean	SD
1. The training enhances critical thinking skills of HSLs.	3.57	.59
2. HSLs are motivated.	3.50	.66
3. Overall, the *Itorero* training is a success.	3.48	.95
4. I contribute in the evaluation and impact assessment.	3.47	.80
5. Training manuals are available and well elaborated.	3.46	.59
6. The class size is manageable.	3.45	1.0
7. The training environment is comfortable.	3.38	.63
8. HSLs have required prerequisites.	3.38	.56
9. I receive regular training in citizenship and values education.	3.34	.65
10. The training encourages discussion and deliberation.	3.25	1.2
11. The duration of the training is adequate.	2.65	1.3

It is apparent from Table 16 that trainers agree with nearly all suggested statements, because in all cases the obtained mean is above the benchmark mean of 2.5. In other words, these results suggest that trainers are happy with the fact that: the training enhances critical thinking skills of HSLs; HSLs are relatively motivated in attending the training; trainers participate and contribute in the evaluation and impact assessment of the *Itorero* training; training manuals to be used are not only available but also well elaborated; the class size is manageable, and the training environment is comfortable; HSLs have required pre-requisites; trainers receive regular training in citizenship and values education; and discussion and deliberation are emphasized in the course of the training. In view of this, trainers contend that overall, *Itorero* for HSLs is a success (the mean is 3.48; SD = .95).

This high rating is not surprising, because trainers tend to be on the defensive side. As mentioned earlier, when addressing HSLs' attitudes towards *Itorero* training, a good number of items praised by trainers here have been found wanting by HSLs. Suffice it at this point in time to recall a few of them: HSLs raised the issues of lack of didactic materials, training modules, and equipment for the practical part of the training [*Imikorongiro*]*;* they have pointed out the issue of congestion on training sites; trainees complained about some aspects of food and accommodation, and especially about poor sanitation in the training centers; and HSLs have emphasized that discussion and deliberation is not given ample time because trainers are rushing

to complete the program. And yet, for trainers, *Itorero* fares better in all these mentioned themes, which is questionable. This is what I call a 'defensive' position.

However, our results reveal that trainers are particularly concerned about the duration of the training: the obtained mean is 2.65 (SD = 1.3), which is only slightly above the benchmark mean of 2.5. These results suggest that, according to trainers, the duration of the *Itorero* training for HSLs is not adequate. Quite interestingly, this finding is confirmed by results from interviews with trainers; it also corroborates the opinion of HSLs who affirm that the current duration (only four days accommodated in training sites) is not appropriate. The issue of duration therefore calls for a detailed consideration.

As mentioned earlier, the problem of duration is intimately linked to the increasing number of HSLs as a result of the free 12 Year Basic Education program (12 YBE) introduced since 2009. In fact, it is indicated that while from 2007 to 2009 the number of trainees was revolving around 20.000 HSLs, in 2014 it reached 80.000 because of the 12 YBE program. While this increase requires greater financial means, the NIC claims that its budget remains constant. Subsequently, it becomes increasingly difficult to train HSLs longer than four intensive days.

Furthermore, it is also highlighted by trainers that, as of now, parents do not yet own the *Itorero* training for HSLs. The idea is that parents are not yet ready to contribute financially to its organization; they only take it as an activity to be fully sponsored by the Government of Rwanda (GoR). Obviously, this situation raises serious concerns about the sustainability of the *Itorero* training for HSLs particularly in the context of the continued increase of HSLs.

In short, the new approach for *Itorero* training is not satisfactory for either HSLs or trainers. The approach is such that HSLs start the *Itorero* training when they are still in their respective schools; they carry it on during the end term and long holidays (twice per week, i.e., on Thursdays and Fridays); and they complete it by spending four intensive days accommodated in training sites. This study shows that problems are rife with the newly defined formula because, according to trainers, the majority of HSLs cannot afford transport (twice per week) from their homes to training sites during holidays (March-April and June-July).

Although at this particular stage the *Itorero* training is organized at the sector level which presumably takes for granted that HSLs will walk to their training sites, the issue of transport costs remains and affects seriously the attendance of trainees. While a huge number of HSLs do not attend at all this particular phase of the training, some drop out and others join only at a later stage, which in the end compromises the quality of the training.

It is suggested by trainers that the budget allocated to NIC for training HSLs be increased in order to respond to needs brought about by the huge increase of HSLs. In this regard, the onus is on the GoR, specifically the Rwanda Ministry of Finance. Equally, the duration could be restored to three weeks to allow full coverage of the training program. This responsibility resides with the NIC.

11.4. Identification of best predictors of *Itorero* success

The present study sought to investigate further attitudes of trainers by determining best predictors of the *Itorero* success based on 10 predictors. This was achieved by means of backward stepwise multiple regression with the equation: $\hat{Y} = b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + b_4x_4 + b_5x_5 + b_6x_6 + b_7x_7 + b_8x_8 + b_9x_9 + b_{10}x_{10} + b_{11}x_{11} + a$, whereby $\hat{\mathbf{Y}}$ is the predicted value of the success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs; **x** is the predictor; **b** is the slope, i.e., the amount of change in the criterion or the predicted (*Y*) produced by a unit-change in the predictor (*X*); and **a** the intercept, i.e., the value of *Y* when *X* is equal to zero. In other words, the assumption is that the best available rating of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is the overall rating of its success (X_1 – Overall, the *Itorero* training is a success). Therefore, the latter is used as the dependent variable (*Y*), and a regression equation predicting *Y* on the basis of other predictors X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7, X_8, X_9, X_{10}, X_{11} is derived whereby X_2 = quality and availability of training manuals; X_3 = regular training of trainers in citizenship and values education; X_4 = HSLs' motivation; X_5 = HSLs' prerequisites; X_6 = class size; X_7 = training environment; X_8 = duration of the training; X_9 = encouragement of discussion and deliberation during the training; X_{10} = critical thinking skills enhancement in the course of the training; and X_{11} = contribution in the evaluation and impact assessment by trainers.

The null hypothesis (H_0) to be tested is that predictors – as put forward by trainers – have no impact on the overall success of the *Itorero* training. Put differently
H_0: $\beta_2 = \beta_3 = \beta_4 = \beta_5 = \beta_6 = \beta_7 = \beta_8 = \beta_9 = \beta_{10} = \beta_{11} = 0$.

With backward stepwise multiple regression, the SPSS output usually indicates first the extent to which all independent variables predict the criterion. Next, it shows which variables that are to be removed and the order in which they must be removed. Variables to be removed are those whose slopes or regression coefficients are not statistically significant (poor predictors). At the last stage, the SPSS output shows the perfect or final model highlighting best predictors, i.e., those whose coefficients are statistically significant. In the present study, only the perfect model is considered, because the target is to identify best predictors.

It is worth noting that while running backward stepwise multiple regression, except homoscedasticity, linearity and independence of errors, the two remaining assumptions, i.e., multicollinearity and normal distribution of errors were met. An attempt was made to remove outliers by means of Mahalanobis and Cook's distance and little difference was observed. The null hypothesis (H_0) is tested by examining the standardized coefficient (β) and its statistical significance (*p*- value, α =.05).

While running stepwise multiple regression, it was also observed that some predictors correlated poorly with the outcome (the standard is that the correlation coefficient should be .3 and above, i.e. r > .3); hence, they were removed from the regression. These predictors are: the class size is manageable (r = .13); the duration is adequate (r = .14); the training encourages discussion and deliberation (r = .11); and 'I contribute in the evaluation and impact assessment of the training' (R = .01). Stepwise multiple regression therefore engaged with the remaining seven predictors and the generated perfect model goes as follows:

Table 17: Best predictors of *Itorero* success according to trainers

Predictors	Regression weight (β)	Sig (α =.05)	R^2 %
1. X_4 = HSLs' motivation	.27	.005	.18
2. X_5 = HSLs' prerequisites	.21	.029	

As Table 17 shows, the perfect model[68] statistically significantly predicts the overall success of the *Itorero* training for HSLs, with $F_{115} = 12.741$ where $p = .000$, $R^2 = 18$, which leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis (H_0). All the two variables in the perfect model have a significant impact on the overall success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In other words, best predictors are the motivation of HSLs (β = .27) and the prerequisites (β = .21).

These results suggest that HSLs' motivation and prerequisites correlate positively and significantly with the overall success of the *Itorero* training for HSLs. The idea is that they constitute the corner stone of the success of *Itorero*; hence, they deserve to be reinforced for optimal results. It is crucial that I examine the motivation and prerequisites of HSLs at length and investigate how they stand in the actual manifestation of the *Itorero* training for HSLs. The questions to be addressed are: According to trainers, are HSLs motivated to attend the *Itorero* training? How well are HSLs equipped or disposed to follow successfully the *Itorero* training? Though not statistically significant, given its importance for the success of *Itorero*, the training environment will be considered very briefly by answering the following question: To what extent is the *Itorero* training environment conducive? In order to answer these questions, I draw from responses from interviews with trainers.

[68] This model can be called 'perfect' only in relation to items under investigation. Since the model explains only 18% of the success of *Itorero*, it is far from being 'perfect' – at least in the strict sense. This finding suggests that there are other factors influencing the success of *Itorero* that the present study did not identify; hence reference to desirability of further studies.

11.5. Trainers' assessment of HSLs' motivation

This thesis indicates that the HSLs' motivation is of paramount importance. It is the *best predictor* because it correlates positively and significantly with the success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs (β = .27). It is therefore crucial to investigate ways in which trainers assess HSLs' motivation. Results from interviews with trainers show that, to some extent, HSLs are motivated to attend the *Itorero* training. Nevertheless, there are a number of setbacks that affect the motivation of HSLs. These difficulties comprise mainly the attitudes of HSLs' parents and the new training formula.

With regard to the attitudes of HSLs' parents, it is revealed that some of them fall short of grasping the purpose, mission and benefits of *Itorero*. While some take it to be a 'cultural-dance group', others associate it with a 'religious organization'. If parents fail to have a clear understanding of *Itorero*, they will in all likelihood be reluctant to send their children for training[69]. It seems that there is a lack of awareness of the mission and purpose of *Itorero*. It is suggested by trainers that sensitization and mobilization campaigns be organized to raise awareness among Rwandans about the core mission and activities of *Itorero*. This might be done largely by the NIC. The latter, could for instance, organize something like '*Itorero* week', in the course of which a clear message on the mission and purpose of *Itorero* could be sent to all Rwandans in various sectors of life.

In relation to the newly devised training formula, trainers indicate that HSLs constantly raise the issue of transport from their homes to training sites. Though at this particular stage the *Itorero* training takes place at the sector level, some HSLs, particularly in urban areas, would still need to use public transport to and from training sites.

It is also important to note that trainers complain about HSLs' conduct. A large number of trainers mention that some HSLs are not motivated to attend the training, because they fail to grasp its relevance and purpose. It is indicated that most of them show little interest and are not attentive; they display unconducive attitudes, such as

[69] From another point of view, one can argue that parents' reluctance is perfectly justified given that their daughters are frequently molested, and their sons and daughters physically abused.

arrogance, stubbornness and apathy. Trainers lament that during the intense four-day onsite training, some HSLs are unwilling to conform to the training program; others would want to stay in their dormitories sleeping.

It is also mentioned that during the training, some trainees 'misbehave' by smoking and engaging in drug abuse. Although at times HSLs may display willingness to learn, they are at the same time lazy and like an easy, unchallenging life. These behaviors of HSLs arguably constitute a challenge. Nevertheless, it is indicated by trainers that they also see this as an opportunity, because *Itorero* has a mandate to unlock HSLs' potential to become active, hardworking and focused Rwandan citizens.

In order to increase HSLs' motivation, a number of courses of action are suggested. First, it is proposed that disciplinary measures be put in place, and acceptable forms of sanctions be administered, if necessary. Acceptable forms of sanctions would include things like running, doing some cleaning, reading a novel in a well prescribed time, etc. Some trainers also put forward the idea of starting the *Itorero* training [*Gutozwa*] at the early stages of schooling, i.e. from elementary and primary school.

Finally, trainers regret that so far there is no enforcement mechanism put in place to make the *Itorero* training compulsory for all HSLs. The absence of such a mechanism greatly affects motivation and participation. In fact, some HSLs play truant, using the pretext of family obligations and/or work requirements. A suggestion is that the certificate issued at the end of the *Itorero* training could be part of required documents for HSLs to be enrolled either in public or private institutions of higher learning in Rwanda.

11.6. Trainers' perceptions of HSLs' prerequisites

The present research reveals that HSLs' prerequisites play a crucial role in ensuring the smooth running of the *Itorero* training. Here the term 'prerequisites' refers to issues such as prior knowledge acquired in schools, psychological and ideological dispositions of HSLs, information received at home about social, cultural, political and economic issues, etc. This study shows that HSLs' prerequisites correlate positively and significantly with the overall success of the *Itorero* training ($\beta = .27$);

they constitute the second predictor. It is therefore imperative to give them due consideration.

Results from interviews with trainers indicate that, as far as the form and content of the *Itorero* training are concerned, HSLs have required prerequisites. Nevertheless, it is mentioned that HSLs wrestle with physical exercises and the unremitting discipline pervading the *Itorero* training. Informants also mention that in order to mould HSLs into fully fledged Rwandan citizens, constant training would be needed. In other words, HSLs require to be acquainted with prevailing and ever emerging national development programs and policies. In general, results show that the appreciation of HSLs' epistemological prerequisites seems positive and satisfactory. Their prior knowledge allows them to understand the teaching provided in the course of the *Itorero* training. Since they have completed high school, their intellectual background is sufficient to digest the *Itorero* content.

What is rather worrying is the lack of *suitable* ideological prerequisites. By the latter, I mean mental dispositions of HSLs, like open-and fair-mindedness, tolerance, and the like. On the contrary, they exhibit preconceived ideas and internalized stereotypes, particularly with regard to ethnic identities in Rwanda. In fact, one of the most surprising results to emerge from interviews with trainers is that HSLs join the *Itorero* training already fed with biased ethnic ideologies. This situation sets an undesirable precedent and affects the assimilation process of the *Itorero* teaching particularly about the unity of Rwandans. Apparently, HSLs find it difficult to reconcile ethnic ideologies prevailing in their homes with the *Itorero* teaching about the unity of Rwandans. This issue calls for further consideration, and I now turn to it in a more detailed manner.

It is revealed in interviews with trainers and NIC officials that some parents have not yet recovered from the formerly enforced worldview of ethnic division and separation; they keep on indoctrinating their children with hate speech and ethnic ideologies. This ethnocentric self-perception – seeing oneself as a member of one ethnic group *as against* (or *as opposed to*) other ethnicities – prevents *Itorero* from achieving its mission, which is primarily to reinforce the value of Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*]. Therefore, there appears to be a discontinuation between the 'socialization at home' [*Ku ishyiga*] and the *Itorero* training, and vice-versa. While the former teaches that

Rwandans are not one, that some are Hutu, others Tutsi, and still others Twa, the latter strongly emphasizes that Rwandans are one. Facing this contradiction, HSLs become confused, understandably. What complicates the matter further is that when HSLs leave *Itorero* and go back home with the understanding that Rwandans are one people, they are again challenged by their parents that *Itorero* is misleading them; that *Itorero* is simply doing politics. One informant explains this challenge in the following terms:

> "Some parents have not yet released their ethnic mindset. Such parents tell their children that *Itorero* is misleading them when it teaches that Rwandans are one people. In this context, you may train a high school leaver for one year; but if the fellow goes back home and is meant to believe that the *Itorero* teaching about 'Rwandanness' [*Ubunyarwanda*] is only a sham, then the whole teaching is washed away; it vanishes…We have been wrestling with this issue for quite some time. And it is not only about one side of Rwandans; it is about both sides. There are so many Rwandans across all categories who still perceive themselves as Hutu or Tutsi, and live accordingly. But the situation is improving slowly." [P61]

These ethnic ideologies constitute restraining forces (Lewin, 1951) to prevent the success of *Itorero*; they are likely to hamper its achievements. It is suggested by trainers that organizing the *Itorero* for parents be considered a matter of urgency. This entails that the *Itorero* at the village level [*Umudugudu*] could be reinforced. Parents need to be made to realize that instead of indoctrinating their children with hate speech and ethnic ideologies, they have the responsibility to feed them with values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. But for this to happen, they need to be trained and 'enlightened'.

The concern that some parents are still entertaining ethnocentric ideologies is also confirmed by the results of a number of studies (e.g. IRDP, 2013; NURC, 2010) conducted to probe the question of ethnicity in post-genocide Rwanda. Despite the present-day public discourse that Rwandans should understand themselves as 'Rwandans' and not along ethnic lines (Shyaka, 2003), a good number of Rwandans still understand themselves as Hutu or Tutsi, and live and behave accordingly.

Firstly, as seen previously, in the study conducted by IRDP (2013), it is revealed that 53.4% of respondents (with a population of 1.436) affirm that ethnicity is still a problem in Rwanda. The same study shows that 36.5% of respondents affirm to have been treated unjustly in relation to employment, justice and administration services on the basis of their ethnicity. Secondly, the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (NURC, 2010, p. 54) indicates that 21.4% of Rwandans agree with the statement that "there are some Rwandans who see themselves as more Rwandan than others". The above evidence suggests that the Rwandanness philosophy or the *de-ethnicisation* project (Shyaka, 2003) has still a long way to go.

11.7. Trainers' reading of the *Itorero* training environment

Although the training environment is not part of the perfect model as a statistically significant predictor of the overall success of the *Itorero* training, it is important to investigate it, given its role in ensuring the smooth running of the training. Besides, it is important to highlight trainers' opinions in order to have a well balanced view on this aspect instead of relying exclusively on the ideas of HSLs. During interviews with trainers, I suggested an assessment of the training environment along the following lines: food, accommodation, training sites or premises, logistics and organization, and trainers themselves.

In relation to food, it is described by informants as adequate because tenders are awarded according to the undertaking to meet good nutrition standards. It is explained that meals comprise mainly rice, beans, maize, and Irish potatoes. Briefly, trainers indicate that in terms of meals, during the *Itorero* training HSLs are treated like at home. On this aspect, the assessment by trainers (though slightly more positive) is almost identical to that of HSLs.

With regard to accommodation, on some training sites there is congestion resulting in poor hygiene and sanitation. Trainers and HSLs pointed out that dormitories are infested with house insects [*Imperi*]. Though required chemicals are bought in advance to address this issue, it is difficult to get on top of it. It is also noted that there is a shortage of accommodation equipment on training sites, such as beds, mattresses and buckets.

As far as training premises are concerned, trainers lament the lack of NIC-owned training sites and equipment. It is mentioned that the *Itorero* training for HSLs usually, if not always, takes place on the premises of high schools and boarding schools, which are, however, frequently ill-equipped to provide an environment conducive to successful training. Some equipment is not in place, and some available facilities may not be functional. It is revealed that some of the host high schools, principally private ones, do not cooperate in making the *Itorero* training a success. As a matter of fact, some of them do not care whether facilities mostly needed during the training (e.g. lights, utensils, kitchen apparatuses) are in place and functional. More seriously still, many of these schools seek to take advantage of *Itorero* training taking place on their premises, by way of demands to have all damaged equipment repaired and all missing items bought by the NIC.

The argument pursued here is that relying exclusively on high school (boarding school) premises substantially affects the quality of the *Itorero* training for HSLs. It is suggested that the NIC put in place its own training sites, such as Sector *Ubutore* Development Centers (SUDC) and District *Ubutore* Development Centers (DUDC) fully furnished with all the required equipment. Such centers would host the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs but also training sessions for other population categories, given that all Rwandans have to be trained.

There are a number of important comments made by trainers about the logistics and organization. First, funds are said to reach training sites very late. Trainers suggest the timely disbursement of money to sectors [*Imirenge*] that are in charge of the organization and management of the training. Second, trainers seem dissatisfied with the remuneration they get for the work done; most of them suggest an increase of the paying package[70]. Third, there are practical problems related to teaching: (i) the official program (topics to be covered and activities to be carried out) is communicated late; (ii) insufficient copies of training manuals and didactic materials; (iii) absence of a common methodology for trainers; and (iv) nonexistence of ways and means to assess the impact of the training phase [*Gutozwa*] on the behavior of HSLs.

[70] Since it appears that the respective qualifications of trainers leave a lot to be desired, the trick would be to render remuneration contingent on appropriate qualification.

In order to address these teaching-related concerns, it is suggested that the official training program be produced and communicated in good time; that more training manuals and didactics materials be made available; that a common methodology for trainers be defined; and that research instruments to measure and assess the impact of the training phase [*Gutozwa*] on the conduct of HSLs be developed.

Fourth, trainers mention that many institutions are engaged in the training activity with no clearly defined task, which leads to lack of trust within the whole training team. It is therefore proposed that responsibilities and duties for each party involved in the training be clearly defined.

Fifth, trainers mention the absence of the *Itorero* coordinator at the sector level. While in the past the *Itorero* training for HSLs was under the direct management of the district, currently it is under the sector. Unfortunately, there is no person responsible for *Itorero* training at this particular level of administration. It is therefore suggested that the position of the *Itorero* Coordinator at the sector level be created.

Finally, trainers appraise themselves. They indicate that the majority is too young to take their job seriously. This observation is in agreement with data on characteristics of trainers, according to which more than 70% are aged below 39. It is therefore suggested that more experienced trainers be recruited. Furthermore, during interviews with trainers, the latter admitted that the number of qualified and knowledgeable trainers is still low, and that some trainers are no longer up to the task because their knowledge and skills are outdated. It is important to note that the issue of qualification and skills of trainers was also pointed out in the discussion of characteristics of trainers. As a reminder, it was shown that the field of specialist study of some trainers is completely unrelated to citizenship and values education. Therefore, it is suggested that regular training sessions for trainers be organized so that they may be in a position to address adequately the challenges and local ramifications of today's ever-changing world.

Utilizing insights from Lewin's (1951) Force Field Theory of Change, the thesis shows that *Itorero* training has the following driving forces: epistemological prerequisites of HSLs (academic prior knowledge) and adequate food. It is important to note that trainers also list a good number of restraining forces: the duration (which

is found short), the lack of suitable ideological prerequisites among HSLs (HSLs join *Itorero* already fed with biased ethnic ideologies); and poor hygiene on training sites.

Furthermore, trainers complain about the following issues: (i) the quality of trainers (lack of experience and requisite field of specialist study); (ii) attitudes of HSLs' parents; (iii) new training formula; (iv) HSLs' conduct in the course of *Itorero* training; (v) lack of enforcement mechanism to make *Itorero* training compulsory; (vi) lack of NIC-owned premises; (vii) late disbursement of funds and untimely communication of offical training program; and (viii) lack of coordination at the sector level.

In brief, the overall argument in this chapter is that for ensuring a healthy citizenship and values education in post-genocide Rwanda, the identified driving forces have to be reinforced and restraining ones weakened or eliminated. In addition, for optimal results, major emphasis should be placed – in order of importance – on HSLs' motivation and prerequisites (mental dispositions, like open-and fair-mindedness, tolerance, and the like), chiefly because these two elements constitute *best predictors* of the success of *Itorero*.

11.8. Discussion on the attitudes of HSLs and trainers

In this section, I would like to bring together HSLs' attitudes and those of trainers. Actually this leads to three interesting observations. First, trainers tend to be more appreciative than HSLs. This is not surprising, because as close stakeholders of *Itorero*, they are likely to give an impression that everything is going well. They tend to be defensive of the scheme; hence their appraisal is to be taken with great caution. Second, notwithstanding trainers' defensive attitude, there is some common ground between them and HSLs. Both agree that (i) the time frame allocated to *Itorero* training (four days onsite training) is not appropriate, hence the newly defined training formula is problematic; (ii) the training environment is deficient in terms of accommodation, hygiene and sanitation; (iii) some parents still indoctrinate HSLs with ethnic bias and prejudice; and (iv) the organization and logistics are to be improved.

Third, in projecting the overall success of the *Itorero* training, results indicate that HSLs and trainers take almost diametrically opposed positions. While HSLs

emphasize the (lack of) quality of trainers, trainers emphasize the (lack of) quality of HSLs (in terms of their motivation and prerequisites). While HSLs complain about the misconduct of trainers (sexual abuse and harsh corporal punishment), trainers also complain about the misconduct of HSLs (apathy, smoking and drug abuse).

The implication of this finding is that for the *Itorero* training scheme to be a success, both good (competent and trustworthy) trainers and disciplined HSLs are needed. Nevertheless, HSLs and trainers agree that the training environment is also a crucial factor for the smooth running of *Itorero* training.

Overall, drawing on attitudes of HSLs and trainers, the present thesis reveals that there is a conglomeration of factors influencing the success of citizenship and values education. They include trainers' competencies (academic and moral); individual characteristics of trainees (e.g. their motivation); family background or home environment of trainees (consider at this point the issue of prerequisites of HSLs); the wider community (local, national, regional and supranational); the training environment; and prevailing government narratives and ideologies, i.e., the public discourse mainly in relation to political, economic, social, and cultural matters.

At this stage, this finding of the present study joins the civic and citizenship contextual framework developed by CIVED and ICCS (Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz et al., 2008). The CIVED and ICCS contextual framework places the individual trainee (student) at the centre of citizenship and values education. In this process, the trainee is influenced by different 'agents' of socialization. In other words, individual trainees exist as the central agents in the civic world, with both an influence on and being influenced by their multiple connections within civic communities. The idea is that young people learn about citizenship and values through their interactions within multiple civic communities.

Put differently, according to the CIVED and ICCS model, in citizenship and values education the individual student is located within the overlapping contexts of school and home. Both contexts form part of the local community that, in turn, is embedded in the wider sub-national, national, and international contexts (Schulz et al., 2008; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). The contextual framework for ICCS distinguishes the following levels: (i) Context of the wider community: This level comprises the wider context within which schools and home environments work. Factors can be found at

local, regional, and national levels. (ii) Context of schools and classrooms: This level comprises factors related to the instruction students receive, the school culture, and the general school environment. (iii) Context of home environments: This level comprises factors related to the home background and the social out-of-school environment of the student (for example peer-group activities). (iv) Context of the individual: This level includes the individual characteristics of the student (Schulz et al., 2008; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). The existence of various factors influencing citizenship and values education has also been pointed out by Quaynor (2015), who recommends willingness to look for civic influences beyond the civics classroom and the school.

At this point, I wish to consider very briefly the following two aspects of the contextual framework for citizenship and values education, which forcefully surface in the present thesis: (i) the role of teachers' or trainers' preparation (recall that *Itorero* trainers' academic qualifications leave a lot to be desired, and the issue of sexual abuse and harsh corporal punishment on some training sites); and (ii) the role of family background – consider the issue that parents indoctrinate HSLs with ethnocentric and xenophobic ideas. The choice of these two aspects is also motivated by the fact that though in citizenship and values education the school has been depicted as more influential in its competition with the home background (Hess & Torney, 1967), research shows that family background remains an influential variable, particularly in the political development of adolescents (Schulz et al., 2008).

The present thesis shows that there is a tendency to neglect teachers' or trainers' academic qualification and moral integrity and to assume that everyone can contribute to citizenship and values education. In view of this, based on Kerr's ideas (1999), one can legitimately raise the following questions: Should teachers/trainers in citizenship and values education be generalists or specialists? Is it trivial to envisage initial and in-service training in citizenship and values education for trainers or teachers? It would appear that one cannot envisage citizenship and values education adequately while ignoring the issue of initial and continued training of teachers or trainers.

Unfortunately, research shows a *rather limited* and *inconsistent* approach to in-service training and professional development in the field of citizenship and values education (Birzea et al., 2004; Eurydice, 2005; Huddleston, 2005). The argument here is that the neglect of the initial and in-service teacher training compromises the idea that in citizenship and values education the teacher must see him-herself primarily as "a role model, not just as a presenter of information or facilitator of discussion" (Huddleston, 2005, p. 54). In addition, such neglect ignores the fact that teachers' preparation (pre-service and in-service) relates to students' civic knowledge and engagement (Torney-Purta et al., 2005)

In relation to family background, the present thesis shows that learners (in our case HSLs) come to school or training sites not as empty slates vis-à-vis citizenship and values education. They come with a large variety of information received mainly at home. In fact, research indicates that in the context of citizenship and values education, *home* or family contexts and characteristics influence considerably the development of young people's knowledge, competencies, behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs (Kim, 2013; Schulz et al., 2008). The idea here is that what is taught at home plays a crucial role in assimilating the civic content provided in schools or other training programs. The challenge therefore lies in harmonizing the content provided in both places.

In terms of evidence, this study has shown that there is a contradiction between *Itorero* teaching and the socialization at home particularly in relation to the unity of Rwandans. While *Itorero* teaches that Rwandans are 'one', parents tell their children that this is 'mere politics'; that among Rwandans there are Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Facing this contradiction, HSLs become confused, understandably. This finding suggests that for citizenship and values education to be a success, schools (in this case NIC) should have a discussion with parents in order to ensure continuity between the civic content provided in schools/training programs and the socialization at home.

11.9. Conclusion

The present chapter has shown that trainers regard positively the *Itorero* training nearly on all suggested evaluative statements. However, the duration and the newly defined training formula were found wanting. This chapter also identified – according to trainers' perceptions – key predictors of the success of *Itorero*. These are the HSLs' motivation and prerequisites. A critical examination of these predictors was conducted in order to suggest actions to be taken for their improvement. The training environment was also briefly examined. The chapter also provided a discussion on the attitudes of HSLs and trainers. It was shown that the success of citizenship and values education is influenced by a large number of factors. I now consider actions to be taken for improving the training in educating HSLs for citizenship and in values.

CHAPTER 12

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN FOR IMPROVING *ITORERO* TRAINING IN EDUCATING HSLs FOR CITIZENSHIP AND VALUES

12.1. Introduction

The present chapter seeks to suggest possible actions towards improving the *Itorero* training for HSLs. While it is possible to approach this chapter in a speculative and open-ended way, I prefer to engage with it using the 'advocacy' approach. Put differently, drawing on findings from the present study and the academic literature on citizenship and values education, particularly in post-conflict contexts, I suggest possible actions to be taken for improving the *Itorero* training. This approach is deemed appropriate because it paves the way towards the fourth objective of the thesis, which is to 'formulate actions to be taken for improving the current citizenship and values education of HSLs'. It is problematic to claim that such actions can be formulated by being speculative and open-ended. Rather, given the reality of *Itorero* identified in the thesis, the present chapter provides theoretical and practical alternatives and outlines clearly their benefits in the Rwandan context.

In this chapter, first and foremost, major findings of the present study are highlighted. Secondly, necessary steps to be taken for the betterment of the *Itorero* training in educating HSLs for citizenship and values are captured. Key findings and corresponding actions are organized along the following lines: the citizenship and values education notions informing the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs, quality of trainers and trainees, content, training environment, organization and logistics.

12.2. In defense of a 'critical-democratic-cosmopolitan citizen' as a more nuanced notion of citizenship for post-genocide Rwanda

The present study shows that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs engages with all citizenship notions outlined by the academic literature but to different degrees: it is powerfully committed to the civic republican/communitarian notions of citizenship

(the mean is 17.41; SD = 1.99); it is committed to some extent to the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship (the mean is 17.38; SD = 2.23); it works to a limited extent with the conventional democratic notion (the mean is 10.45; SD = 2.58); and it engages only to a very limited extent with the liberal notion of citizenship (the mean is 8.47; SD = 1.91). This study establishes that the conclusion according to which the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs works strongly with the civic republican/communitarian notions does not vary within subgroups; it rather cuts across subgroups.

Challenges associated with the overreliance on the civic republican/communitarian model are outlined. Some of the challenges emanating from civic republicanism include insufficient recognition of individual rights, risks of indoctrination and fanaticism, and non-recognition of the private sphere as an important domain. It is shown that *Itorero* tends to be oppressive, militaristic, exclusive and masculinist. In relation to the communitarian aspect, this study reveals that *Itorero* for HSLs tends to be conservative, and obstructive to individual freedom and autonomy. Apart from highlighting these problems, careful consideration is paid to issues of indoctrination and fanaticism, given their gravity and prevalence. This study notes that teaching about the ruling political party – the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – and recruiting its members in the course of the *Itorero* training for HSLs might be considered as a form of indoctrination and as fanning the flames of fanaticism. This conclusion has been reached because the claim made by trainers and NIC officials that HSLs request joining the RPF on their own and take the oath (of allegeiance) voluntarily is rather questionable.

While the civic republican/communitarian citizenship notions contain positive elements, such as fostering patriotism, self-sacrifice, and common good concern, the present study makes the claim that excessive pursuit or application of this model might not be appropriate for the Rwandan post-genocide context. This is the case particularly because such a citizenship paradigm arguably produces uncritical, docile, dependent, short-sighted and child-like citizens; it encourages fanaticism and sycophancy. Rather, there are strong reasons to believe that post-genocide Rwanda might call for critical, independent-minded, clear-sighted and autonomous citizens.

My contention in this study is that the civic republican/communitarian notions chiefly centered on ‘unquestioning patriotism’ cannot be envisaged as a long-term

citizenship model for Rwanda, given their inherent problems and risks that the present study has attempted to detail. Staeheli and Hammett (2010) warn that in divided societies citizenship education policies and programs often attempt to heal social divisions by fostering a common linkage between citizens and nation, but in ways that may be ineffective and, in some cases, deeply problematic. In other words, there is a likelihood that in divided societies, citizenship education will tend to be used in an effort to create particular kinds of citizens who suit the national stories and imaginations that governments hope to foster.

These dangers linked to citizenship education in post-conflict or divided societies are playing out in post-genocide Rwanda. Reference is made here to the relative emphasis placed on patriotism and the use of *Itorero* training as a platform to teach about and recruiting for the ruling political party (the RPF). I am therefore making a claim that 22 years after the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi, Rwanda should move from the civic republican/communitarian notions of citizenship. I argue that these conceptions are ineffective and problematic in healing divisions among Rwandans. Inspired by the practice of citizenship education in other post-genocide and post-conflict contexts, the present thesis suggests a new model or conception for educating HSLs in citizenship; I call this new notion the 'critical-democratic-cosmopolitan citizen'. The term 'critical' here has a lot in common with the liberal notion of citizenship; other components of the new notion, i.e. democratic-cosmopolitan, retain their usual meaning articulated in the citizenship education conceptual frame in Chapter 5. In what follows, I characterize this new citizenship concept and attempt to outline its benefits.

12.2.1. Why should the Rwandan citizen be critical?

The notion of critical citizenship that the present study supports resembles in several respects the 'maximal' (McLaughlin, 1992), 'justice-oriented' (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004) and 'autonomous' (Galston, 1989) notions[71] of citizenship. The advantage of

[71] It is important to note that 'maximal' (McLaughlin, 1992), 'justice-oriented' (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004) and 'autonomous' (Galston, 1989) citizenship notions are sub-categories of the main category, which is 'critical citizenship'. In view of this, they should not be perceived as new conceptions being suggested or introduced. I take them as 'synonymous' with the 'critical' notion citizenship.

these conceptions is that they associate citizenship with a considerable degree of critical understanding and questioning, concern for social justice, and motivation to change society. In this regard, Johnson and Morris (2010) maintain that the critical citizen actively questions, achieves a distanced critical perspective on all important matters, and demonstrates a strong concern for social justice and a desire to improve society. The idea here is that the critical citizen is unlike the 'autarchic' (Galston, 1989) or 'minimal' (McLaughlin, 1992) citizen who is essentially obedient to government, law abiding and public spirited, but with limited rational deliberation and self-determination. Put differently, the critical citizen is autonomous; he/she has an inquiring attitude, courage and creativity to tread new paths and to question all knowledge (Veugelers, 2007).

Correspondingly, critical citizenship education aims to create a citizenry prepared and motivated to address societal problems and to contribute to social change, particularly related to injustice, exclusion and discrimination; its goal is to provide the conditions for collective social change (Dejaeghere & Tudball, 2007; Dejaeghere, 2009). In other words, critical citizenship education focuses on developing personal individualistic skills, such as critical thinking, in order to better understand and react to forms of injustice and inequalities prevailing in society (Cohen, 2010). In short, what emerges from this reflection is that the critical citizen has the ability to (1) critically assess and evaluate ideas; (2) pay attention to social injustices existing in the society; and (3) work towards their eradication.

I find the attributes of a critical citizen helpful and relevant for post-genocide Rwanda where the risks of indoctrination, fanaticism and sycophancy seem high. In fact, the present study has revealed that in the course of *Itorero* training, HSLs are not provided with enough opportunity to grapple with substantial challenges and ills that the Rwandan society is experiencing. Instead, they are predominantly told about achievements of the current government. As a result, the relative emphasis that *Itorero* teaching places on 'unreflective patriotism' could potentially undermine the need for HSLs to be critical about their country.

In essence, this thesis argues that being critical or, rather, engaging in political criticism should not be regarded as a threat or an indicator of crisis (Geissel, 2008; Klingemann, 1999; Waghid, 2009). Here, drawing on Geissel (2008, p. 52-53), I am

using political criticism to refer to the “attentive disposition” of the citizenry or the “willingness to be vigilant” in order to monitor government institutions, policies and practices. Research has shown that *political attentiveness*, and not necessarily political loyalty, should be one the objectives and missions of citizenship education. It has also been revealed that critical or attentive citizens do not pose a threat to democracy, whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied. Rather, research indicates that it is inattentive and especially inattentive dissatisfied citizens who are likely to pose a threat to democracy (Geissel, 2008).

A number of studies (e.g. Purdeková, 2008; Sundberg, 2014; Turner, 2014) have pointed out that the current leadership of Rwanda seems to be reluctant to accommodate criticism, especially in relation to the political and economic status quo. Besides, these studies point to problematic issues such as excessive state control, censorship and close surveillance. And yet, as previously discussed, criticism is not incompatible with patriotism.

In view of this situation, I am arguing that in educating HSLs for citizenship, *Itorero* should teach them to be attentive in order to critically monitor government institutions, policies and practices. As Puolimatka (1996) notes, democracy entails critical citizenship. Practically, the point I am making is that *Itorero* should encourage HSLs to develop values opposing injustice, oppression, inequalities and discrimination wherever they might occur: locally, nationally and globally. Such values seem to be absent on the list of core values that *Itorero* upholds, which are Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*]; patriotism; integrity; courage; self-sacrifice; love for a work well-done; and upholding one’s dignity. As one can see, these civic virtues are completely oriented towards civic republicanism and communitarianism.

My contention is that the civic republican/communitarian concepts of citizenship (centered on patriotism) might be, to some extent, understandable in the aftermath of the genocide. As a matter of fact, there is no doubt that the price of patriotism, self-sacrifice and dedication to the common good have served to rescue Rwanda from ethnic divisionism and bad leadership. I am arguing, however, that ‘blind patriotism’ is highly likely to lead to perpetuation of uncritical minds and attitudes. In other words, it would be a mistake to believe that patriotism is inconsistent with criticism.

As Waghid (2009) points out, being loyal to one's country does not necessarily imply that one should be intolerant of criticism.

Kahne and Middaugh (2006) take this point further and propose a distinction between blind patriotism and constructive patriotism. While blind patriots adopt a stance of unquestioning endorsement of their country, constructive patriots applaud some actions by the state and criticize others in an effort to promote positive change and consistency with the nation's ideals. According to Waghid (2009), blind patriotism is not helpful, because it cannot credibly engender peace, friendship and reconciliation.

In my opinion, it is vital to establish which of these two types of patriotism is at work within the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs in Rwanda. Results from the present study seem to suggest that 'blind patriotism' tends to take the lead over 'constructive patriotism'. Reference is made here to problematic practices, such as HSLs' entrance and oath taking in the ruling political party (the RPF). My argument is that blind patriotism is not desirable, let alone attractive for post-genocide Rwanda. Rwandan citizens need to be critical of government institutions, policies and practices for better progress and more achievements. In addition to critical skills, HSLs should acquire democratic virtues and practices.

12.2.2. Towards democratic citizenship education in post-genocide Rwanda

The democratic citizenship notion that I am advocating for post-genocide Rwanda has enjoyed advocacy by a number of scholars, such as Habermas (1996a, 1996b, 1997), Waghid (2006), Benhabib (2002) and Gutmann (1996). In this section, firstly, I aim to characterize this notion; secondly, I attempt to demonstrate to what extent the conception is desirable for post-genocide Rwanda. In demarcating the contours of democratic citizenship, the four above mentioned authors are engaged with simultaneously, because their ideas – though different in some respects – inspire and complement each other.

According to Benhabib (2002), democratic citizenship education chiefly refers to (i) making people aware of their right to political participation, their right to hold offices and perform certain tasks, and their right to deliberate and decide upon certain

questions; and (ii) educating people about their civil, political and social rights. For Gutmann (1996), democratic citizenship entails two important virtues: firstly, the capacity to deliberate as free and equal citizens in a democratic polity; and secondly, conducting such deliberations so that they are about the demands of justice for all individuals.

When combining views of these two studies, I consider the following concepts as important in the depiction of the democratic citizen: (1) political participation; (2) public deliberation as free and equal citizens; (3) and enjoyments of civil, political and social rights. I now turn to these aspects in detail and demonstrate their relevance to citizenship education in post-genocide Rwanda.

In relation to political participation, the democratic citizen is warned against the danger of "civic privatism" (Habermas, 1996b, p. 78) in which situation people withdraw into their private life and refuse to engage in the public life. Civic privatism chiefly refers to a situation where citizens are apathetic, passive, and completely absorbed into the private sphere of life, career, and personal projects (Habermas, 1996b). For Habermas (1996b), political participation is an immensely valuable asset of citizenship. Unlike Marshall (1964), who sees the enjoyment of social rights as the climax of citizenship, for Habermas (1996b) political rights constitute the cornerstone of citizenship. In his view (against Marshall), social rights are means to political rights (Carleheden, 2006).

My contention here is that, in educating HSLs for citizenship, *Itorero* does not give much consideration to political participation, holding offices and performing public tasks, which is worrying. As a matter of fact, political participation, let alone its attendant skills, does not figure at all on the *Itorero* training program. I challenge this vacuum and claim that there is a need to educate HSLs for substantive political participation and provide them with skills required to this effect.

As evidence, during data collection, I asked HSLs the following question: 'Based on the teaching you received in *Itorero* training, how best would you describe a good citizen?' 'Participating in politics' was one of the options suggested to students. Surprisingly, this item received only the mean of 2.6 (SD = .88), which is only slightly above the benchmark mean of 2.5. Results on this item suggest unambiguously that *Itorero* training is not dedicating much time and energy to initiating HSLs into active

participation in politics. In other words, *Itorero* is only supporting the cultivation of character (which predominantly implies loyalty to the current regime) and community service, but not democratic participation. My argument is that it is deeply problematic to see citizenship education *exclusively* through the lens of character education.

Put differently, using the categories of Westheimer and Kahne (2004, p. 242), this thesis is contending that there is a need in post-genocide Rwanda to move from a "personally responsible citizen" to a "participatory" and "justice-oriented citizen". A personally responsible citizen is committed to the view that to solve social problems and improve society, citizens must have a good character. The civic republican/communitarian notions at work within *Itorero* training resemble this view in several respects. Participatory citizens, on the other hand, believe that to solve social problems and improve society, citizens must *actively participate* and *take leadership positions* within established systems and community structures. As for justice-oriented citizens, they subscribe to the view that to solve social problems and improve society, citizens must *question* and *change* established systems and structures when these structures reproduce patterns of injustice over time. In broad terms, the democratic citizenship that the present thesis is recommending for post-genocide Rwanda captures ideas from these last two citizenship notions, i.e. participatory and justice-oriented. In essence, I am arguing that HSLs are to be taught required skills and virtues to actively participate in politics, take leadership positions, question and change systems and structures that prove to be deficient. In other words, 'participatory citizen' and 'justice-oriented citizen' constitute sub-categories of the main category, which is 'democratic citizen'.

The present thesis argues that it is important to enable HSLs be conversant with and committed to democratic values and principles, such as the sovereignty of the people; the rule of law and constitutionalism; majority rule and minority rights; the separation of powers; political pluralism and power sharing; fair, honest and periodic elections; respect, protection and promotion of human rights; the role of civil society; equality, liberty and order; and the interplay between private interests and the common good. Findings from the present study suggest that there seems to be a tendency in the current *Itorero* training program to ignore these issues.

Though *Itorero* training is completed by community service [*Urugerero*] where HSLs perform various activities of public interest, these young people are ill-equipped with the requisite conceptual tools to grasp and translate meaningfully their political commitments into concrete actions. As a result, the vast majority of HSLs who undergo *Itorero* training do not participate in community service. In fact, the present research has revealed that community service is poorly conceived and implemented; hence it is likely to fail if not re-conceptualized in a timely manner. During interviews with district trainers, it was revealed that the level of participation of HSLs in community service leaves a lot to be desired.

The democratic citizenship education recommended by the present thesis would allow HSLs to be active participants, critical of dogmatic authority, fair- and open-minded. Such a citizenship notion is likely to help HSLs grasp that – as maintained by Aristotle – participation in public life is intrinsically rewarding. I mentioned previously that Rwanda (like many other African countries) is on its way to democracy. The latter cannot really be brought to maturity if young people – who constitute a substantial majority of the Rwandan population, are not initiated into meaningful participation in public life. As Patrick (1999) puts it, for government of the people, by the people, and for the people there must be education of the people in the principles, practices, and commitments of democracy.

Furthermore, in addition to political participation, the democratic citizenship paradigm that I am suggesting for post-genocide Rwanda entails the capacity to deliberate as free and equal citizens, i.e. to engage in deliberative argumentation. According to Waghid (2006), echoing Habermas (1996a, 1996b, 1997) and Benhabib (1996), deliberation in democracy has to do with persuasion, consensus, reasonableness, and 'fair-minded' judgments while addressing issues of public interest. The idea here is that democratic citizenship education involves cultivating in people a sense of deliberating together freely, equally and respectfully about their common and collective destiny (Waghid, 2007). For Habermas (1996b), political participation takes shape in public discourse guided by 'rationality'. Here rationality means that consensus can only be reached on the grounds of the better argument, as opposed to coercion.

I maintain that HSLs in post-genocide Rwanda absolutely need these democratic qualities. It is not clear, however, from the present study how *Itorero* training equips HSLs with deliberation related skills such as persuasion, consensus, reasonableness, and 'fair-minded' judgment. Drawing on Waghid (2006), my contention is that fostering such democratic skills in HSLs would allow them to develop the capacity to question, interrogate, threaten and provoke one another in terms of novel ideas, perspectives and points of views. Put simply, the *Itorero* training for HSLs (as it is organized today) does not seem to foster deliberative argumentation. Rather, it tends to prescribe 'blind obedience' and 'unquestioning submission'. The democratic citizenship education that I am recommending serves to fill this gap; it is meant to foster in HSLs the ability to think, reason and discuss public matters freely and openly.

In view of this, as democratic citizens, HSLs are to learn being convincing in what they say but at the same time being able to recognize other people's voices. The point here is that democratic citizenship is not a one-way process. Though it requires deliberative argumentation, it also calls for the recognition of the otherness, i.e., the capacity to listen to one another, critically evaluate each others' points of views and offer reasons for one's judgments and actions (Gutmann, 2002; Waghid, 2005). In other words, deliberative argumentation seeks to recognize that others should be listened to. Discrimination or other forms of injustice cannot go unrestrained in the name of equal and free expression. For this reason, therefore, as Habermas (1996b) puts it, public discourse should be connected with law. It is not clear from the present study how *Itorero* teaches HSLs to recognize other people's voices in deliberative argumentation.

Finally, in addition to political participation and public deliberation, another advantage of democratic citizenship education is that it educates people about their civil, political and social rights. Results from the present study indicate that in educating HSLs for citizenship, *Itorero* is one-sided; it tells them only about their duties and responsibilities and remains virtually silent about their rights. I find this omission both threatening and suffocating. As seen previously, when clarifying the notion of citizenship, a citizen is not only a bearer of responsibilities and duties; a citizen is also entitled to rights and privileges. Inspired by Benhabib (2002), I am arguing that during *Itorero* training, HSLs should also be instructed about their civil rights (e.g.

right to liberty and property, right to freedom of conscience and religion), political rights (e.g. right to self-determination, hold and run for office, to enjoy freedom of speech and opinion), and social rights (e.g. right to health care, employment, housing, education, and old-age pension).

Producing a democratic citizenry is a matter of urgency in Rwanda, given the various forms of injustices and human atrocities that marked its (recent) past. I tend to espouse the view of Waghid (2007) that one cannot envisage minimizing and eradicating inhumane and unjust acts against humanity in the absence of a democratic citizenry. In other words, if young people (HSLs in particular) are educated to become democratic citizens in post-genocide Rwanda, it is highly likely that institutionalised and orchestrated inhumane and unjust acts will become a relic of a bygone era. Arguably, such a citizenry can only be through education. Since *Itorero* training is attracting a huge number of HSLs, it could serve as a vehicle to communicate skills and virtues required for democratic citizenship. What is advocated here is a process of nurturing love of democratic virtues and principles, i.e., democratic patriotism.

In essence, I am suggesting that the notion of 'democratic patriotism'[72] is desirable and useful for post-genocide Rwanda. Unlike 'blind patriots' who are arguably doomed to degenerate into nationalistic chauvinists, 'democratic patriots' focus their loyalty to democratic principles and practices (Kahne & Middaugh, 2006). Instead of teaching HSLs to focus their loyalty to a ruling political party, i.e., the RPF, *Itorero* training should rather help HSLs cultivate their loyalty to democratic skills, virtues and institutions. It is deeply problematic to cultivate in HSLs an unqualified love for the country, let alone for a particular ruling political party. This amounts to turning HSLs at best into unreflective patriots and at worst into nationalistic chauvinists. Undoubtedly, such a 'manufacturing process' falls short of qualifying as rationally defensible citizenship education.

[72] 'Democratic patriotism' is also a sub-category of the main category, which is 'democratic citizen'.

12.2.3. Arguments for cosmopolitan citizenship in post-genocide Rwanda

A number of studies (e.g. Gutmann, 2002; Waghid, 2007) have suggested that when left on its own, i.e., unsupplemented, democratic citizenship education displays some limitations because it works only within the limits of one's nation; it focuses exclusively on enhancing skills and virtues of citizenship specific to a single country. Hence, it needs to be complemented and extended by cosmopolitanism. The present thesis takes the latter as a third dimension of the new citizenship concept proposed for post-genocide Rwanda. In this section, principles of such a notion are explained and its benefits are outlined.

The cosmopolitan citizenship notion that I am advocating for post-genocide Rwanda has enjoyed the attention of a huge body of literature (e.g. Appiah, 2008; Audi, 2009; Davies, 2005; Heater, 2004; Koutselini, 2008; Nussbaum, 1994, 1996; Osler & Starkey, 2003, 2005; Reilly & Niens, 2014; Staeheli & Hammett, 2010; Taylor, 1989; Tuomi et al. 2008; Waghid, 2007). According to Osler and Starkey (2003), cosmopolitan citizenship does not mean asking individuals to reject their national citizenship or to accord it a lower status. Instead, education for cosmopolitan citizenship is about enabling learners to make connections between their immediate contexts and the national and global contexts; it is oriented towards the future, preparing young citizens to play an active role in shaping the world, at all levels, from the local to the global. Put differently, cosmopolitanism challenges one's attachment to the nation; it is a call for being "an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments" (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 3). The main idea here is that the cosmopolitan citizenship notion entails the openness to the world.

Furthermore, cosmopolitan citizenship implies recognition of our common humanity and a sense of solidarity with others. As Appiah (2008) puts it, we must care for the fate of all human beings, inside and outside our own societies. Osler and Starkey (2003) are therefore right when they warn that it is insufficient to feel and express a sense of solidarity with others *elsewhere* if we cannot establish a sense of solidarity with others in our own communities, especially those others whom we perceive to be different from ourselves. What is at stake at this point is the recognition and protection of humanity in all people despite their diversity.

In fact, cosmopolitan citizenship is committed to the view that though people are usually categorized along race, nationality, class, or other divisions, there is only one humankind and global problems require global solutions. It is an invitation to consider humankind as one and to make all human beings more like our fellow city dwellers (Tuomi et al., 2008). As Charles Taylor (1989) argues, with regard to citizenship, it is philosophically insubstantial and morally wrong to imagine or postulate boundaries narrower than around the whole human race.

The present thesis takes the ideas of openness to the world and recognition/protection of humanity as of vital significance for post-genocide Rwanda. When I suggest that *Itorero* take into consideration the cosmopolitan aspect of openness, I am not advocating a rejection of the Rwandan identity. In no way do I wish to discredit being loyal to good (constructive and generative) elements of the Rwandan tradition and culture. It is rather being suggested that, given today's context of globalization, there is a need to open HSLs' hearts and minds to larger identities and communities. This is particularly important for post-genocide Rwanda where people engaged in conflict and killing partly because of the failure to see and act beyond ethnic stereotypes. In fact, *opening the youth's hearts and minds to larger identities and communities* has been suggested by several studies (e.g. Davies, 2005; Koutselini, 2008; Nussbaum, 1996; Osler & Starkey, 2005; Quaynor, 2012; Staeheli & Hammett, 2010) as an efficient mechanism to transcend ethnocentric divisions and cleavages. For this reason, educating HSLs towards larger identities in post-genocide Rwanda holds the potential to allow them to transcend ethnic divisions and tensions.

The recognition and protection of humanity is another cosmopolitan idea that holds huge benefits for post-genocide Rwanda. In this regard, Osler and Starkey (2005) contend that cosmopolitanism is a way of healing rifts or divisions between citizens within a country and to create citizens who will recognize the humanity of all people, regardless of their nationality, background, race, religious beliefs and so on. In other words, cosmopolitan citizenship places emphasis on those features that unite human beings (their humanity) rather than those that divide them (e.g. ethnic affiliations in the context of Rwanda). Understood in this way, cosmopolitanism would allow HSLs to go beyond differences and focus on the common humanity inherent in all people.

Nussbaum (1996) suggests that cosmopolitan citizenship education, which emphasizes responsibility to humankind, may be the foundation to transcend inequalities and injustice at global, national and local levels and, thus, to build and maintain sustainable peace. This view is also supported by Davies (2005) and Reilly and Niens (2014), who argue that cosmopolitan citizenship education has the potential to contribute to the development of long-term peace building and to overcome community divisions in post-conflict and divided societies. This is the case precisely because cosmopolitanism gives priority to the interest of *humanity* over those of any social, cultural, or ethnic group, etc (Audi, 2009). Here, human concerns are addressed with great care and attention.

In view of the above, the cosmopolitan citizenship notion that the present thesis is defending would seek to ensure that HSLs come to consider all people (including, of course, all fellow Rwandans) not only as citizens but also as equals. I find the ideas of equality, solidarity, recognition of our common humanity, and focusing on what unites rather than what divides tremendously important in the Rwandan context where some people (mainly Tutsi) have been perceived as strangers, intruders, outsiders, and not *bona fide* Rwandan citizens. In my view, the notion of cosmopolitanism – understood as recognition and protection of all humanity – holds an enormous potential to free Rwandans from their ethnocentric thinking so as to allow them to appreciate 'others' who might be different. Cosmopolitanism is therefore crucial because it would enable HSLs to be aware that it is important to recognize the rights of all people to live a good life.

In this regard, a question can also be raised as to how *Itorero* considers gays and lesbians whose sexual orientation is not (yet) welcome in certain socities (including Rwanda). From findings of the present study, it seems that *Itorero* fails to include these groups. In addition, this study has shown that sexual abuse and inhumane corporal punishment are symptoms of the masculinist and militaristic tendencies emerging from civic republicanism. The cosmopolitan idea of recognition and protection of humanity in all people – which is defended here – serves to remedy these ills. In short, the logic of *Itorero*, when applied consistently, clearly promotes mindfulness of the rights of women and minorities.

Furthermore, the current situation is such that post-genocide Rwanda is a home to people who returned from various corners of the world because of a long-standing history of marginalization and exclusion. In this context, where old and new returnees are negotiating their identities and loyalties as Rwandans, it is crucial for young people, particularly HSLs, to cultivate skills and dispositions of openness and trust towards groups from different backgrounds. As suggested by Waghid (2007), cosmopolitanism entails hospitality and civility where the 'other' (albeit initially perceived as a stranger) is welcomed and taken care of as a good neighbor.

In essence, I find these aspects of transcending differences and focusing on humanity very useful in the Rwandan context. Undoubtedly, fostering such cosmopolitan dispositions is likely to help HSLs understand that difference is not a threat; rather, it is an opportunity to exercise cooperation, exchange skills, and in the long run to achieve progress. Given the gravity of ethnic rifts that tore Rwanda apart, nurturing a cosmopolitan identity among HSLs would arguably allow distancing themselves from their ethnic affiliations and biases. In short, cosmopolitanism is attractive and desirable for post-genocide Rwanda.

Practically, drawing on characteristics of the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship, I am arguing that Rwandans should not allow differences of ethnic membership to erect barriers between them. The idea here is that humanity has no ethnic belonging. It is therefore useful for Rwandans to recognize humanity wherever it occurs, i.e., in Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, and pledge allegiance and respect to that very humanity.

The present thesis casts serious doubts on whether it is desirable and appropriate for *Itorero* to teach HSLs only values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. As a reminder, the law establishing NIC makes clear its specific mandate: "Bringing up a patriotic Rwandan who has *values* and *taboos of the Rwandan culture* and who has the culture of *Intore*" (law No. 41/2013 of 16/06/2013, article 6 – emphasis added). My contention is that, in the context of globalization, it would make much more sense to teach HSLs values and skills needed for playing responsibly their roles in the global community. In view of this, the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs tends to be anachronistic. The present research suggests, therefore, making a fundamental shift and introducing in the *Itorero* training program cosmopolitan values and skills.

Cosmopolitan skills include dispositions like capacity to evaluate the role of the media in their portrayal of the world; capacity to appreciate the importance of actions aimed at achieving peace and the development of people; recognizing the importance of laws and international agencies in conflict resolution; developing a critical attitude toward the unequal distribution of wealth and rejecting inequalities between individuals and peoples of the world; and understanding the world as an interconnected global community with all its political, economic, social and environmental ramifications. Cosmopolitan values include qualities such as commitment to social justice and equity; respecting customs and ways of life different than one's own; expressing solidarity with the people and collectives in disadvantaged situations; giving respect and value to diversity; being concerned about the environment; and willing to influence decision-making processes at global and local levels (Tuomi et al., 2008). These skills and values are more than necessary for HSLs to fare better in the global community.

In conclusion, the transition from the civic republican/communitarian notions to the 'critical-democratic-cosmopolitan' notion in post-genocide Rwanda could be envisaged as a process; it is not something to be achieved overnight. In other words, the transition may call for stages in theory and practice. In relation to theory, I am arguing that there is a possibility to start by introducing the critical aspect, then the democratic element and finally the cosmopolitan component. This would allow a progressive phasing out of old citizenship notions (civic republican/communitarian). With regard to practice, the shift to a new citizenship notion entails some logistical adaptations. These include the time for *Itorero* policy makers to own the idea that there is need for change (appropriation); the amendment of the law establishing the NIC particulary the article stipulating the mission of *Itorero*; the revision of training manuals; organizing the training for trainers; and the acquisition of didactic materials aligned to the new citizenship notion.

12.3. General actions related to the values education notion

The present study notes that in educating HSLs for values the *Itorero* scheme engages with all approaches of values education prevailing in the academic literature. However, the *Itorero* training for HSLs relies heavily on character

education (the mean is 7.33; SD = .93). Other approaches, i.e., values clarification, cognitive moral development and care ethics are used to some extent. Their means are, respectively, 6.79 (SD = 1.26); 6.51 (SD = 1.41); and 6.43 (SD = 1.31).

This thesis shows that the overreliance on character education raises serious concerns, particularly because such an approach has been found to be deficient mainly in two ways: first, it is perceived as 'indoctrination'; second, it is not deemed sustainable. It is not clear from the present study how the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs addresses these limitations pertaining to character education. Therefore, there are strong reasons to believe that the *Itorero* training for HSLs runs the risk of simply being a 'bag of virtues approach' or a 'fix-the-kid approach'.

Furthermore, as indicated in conceptual framework, character education belongs to traditionalist approaches of values education. The latter are said to be direct, heteronymous, narrow and unintentional; they are teacher-centered and focus on the content, i.e., values. Since the *Itorero* scheme is strongly committed to character education in educating HSLs for values, it is likely to fall prey to these weaknesses of traditionalist approaches. The overall implication of the aforementioned weaknesses is that character education might not be appropriate for post-genocide Rwanda.

In view of this, the present study suggests to engage with care ethics and move towards progressive approaches in values education. The advantage is that progressive approaches are learner-centered, autonomous and broad. Instead of inculcating a pre-established set of values, they emphasize cultivating the ability to rationally justify one's choices and foster moral growth. In a round-about way, the study suggests that it would be valuable for the *Itorero* scheme to draw from care ethics, a cognitive moral development approach, and values clarification, while at the same time side-stepping their inherent weaknesses. In what follows, I elaborate on this claim.

Why and in which way would care ethics benefit the *Itorero* training for HSLs? Unlike character education, which upholds a flee-floating list of virtues, for care ethics virtues are relational. Care ethics is more concerned with 'caring relations' than with caring as a virtue. In this regard, instead of teaching HSLs a list of values about caring, *Itorero* training should rather practically foster in them the establishment, maintenance and enhancement of caring relations. In other words, what matters

most is not the ‘theory’, but rather the ‘practice’. The argument being made here is that teaching about caring could for instance commence by creating a caring environment within *Itorero* training sites. This is of paramount importance, particularly because the present study has revealed that during the *Itorero* training the relationship between trainers and trainees is problematic in light of issues such as sexual abuse, harsh and inhumane forms of corporal punishment to mention but a few, which are completely at odds with caring relationships. Recall and consider at this point the argument from Noddings, the progenitor of care ethics: “We have to show in our own behavior what it means to care. Thus we do not merely tell [our students] to care and give them texts to read on the subject; we demonstrate our caring in our relations with them” (Noddings, 1995, p. 190). The idea is that constructing an attractive edifice of ideas and values devoid of exemplary behaviors is not helpful in educating HSLs for values.

What and how would *Itorero* gain from the cognitive-moral development approach? In educating HSLs for values, *Itorero* can retrieve from the cognitive-moral development approach the aspect of enriching HSLs’ moral reasoning and creative thinking. In this regard, instead of relying heavily on lectures (didacticism), the *Itorero* scheme could consider the use of moral dilemma discussions, preferably real life-based instead of hypothetical ones. The idea of fostering moral development among HSLs is extremely important.

In relation to values clarification, in addition to teaching HSLs to measure consequences, *Itorero* training could also emphasize the aspect of logical reasoning in choosing among alternatives, and enable the learner to think critically about his/her own choices and preferences.

12.4. Developing indicators of civic growth and moral development along with assessment mechanisms

In relation to actions to be taken for improving the citizenship and values education notions guiding the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs, I wish to ask the following question: Are there tools and research instruments developed by the NIC to assess the extent to which it achieves its purpose in educating HSLs for citizenship and values? In other

words, are there instruments produced to measure and quantify civic growth and moral development among HSLs?

During interviews, it was indicated by trainers and NIC officials that in relation to values education, at each institution, public or private, there are guardians or custodians of values [*Abarinzi b'indangagaciro*]. The latter operate at the administration level of the cell, sector, district, and province and nationwide. They help to know whether overall the education provided in *Itorero* training yields tangible results by closely scrutinizing the moral conduct prevailing in the Rwandan society. Hence, they alert NIC officials to emerging and threatening behaviors likely to compromise the harmony of the Rwandan social fabric. For instance, if in high schools or universities there are serious problems of moral conduct, values custodians are the first to know about them and suggest appropriate actions to be taken in order to curtail burgeoning vices. In a nutshell, it is argued that the efficiency in values education is measured by 'scrutinizing the prevailing moral atmosphere in the Rwandan society', which is done by 'values custodians'.

In relation to citizenship education, *Itorero* trainers and NIC officials argue that since citizenship education emanates from values education (the *Itorero* scheme takes the two as essentially compatible), when values are respected, there is good citizenship. The idea is that if values are upheld, then citizenship education is also safeguarded. When the former is thriving – trainers and NIC officilas argue – the latter, too, is blossoming. It is emphasized (by trainers and NIC officials) that it is hard to imagine citizenship unguided by appropriate values and that such a kind of citizenship education would be impoverished. It is mentioned that citizenship education is successfully conducted only when values are respected and taboos adhered to. For citizenship education to be efficient, HSLs have to be imbued with core values and taboos of the Rwandan culture.

Briefly, NIC officials and trainers indicate that values custodians promote and protect both citizenship and values education. The extent to which *Itorero* is successful in citizenship and values education – according to NIC officials and trainers – can be gleaned from reports produced by values custodians. These reports – it is assumed – are concerned with the status of moral conduct in the Rwandan society, particularly about the youth.

The idea of values custodians arguably raises serious concerns. One would wonder whether putting in place values custodians is an efficient mechanism to provide relevant, scientific, reliable and measurable data about the efficiency of the *Itorero* scheme in educating HSLs for citizenship and values. What further complicates the matter is that the majority of informants acknowledge that this 'values custodians' policy is not yet fully developed. All this tends to suggest that the policy of values custodians is not sound; it is thin and vague.

Clearly, there is need to develop tools and research instruments capable of scientifically establishing the extent to which citizenship and values education provided in *Itorero* training contribute to both civic growth and moral development of HSLs. Practically, what this means is that clear indicators of civic growth are to be defined; equally, indicators of moral development are to be produced. Besides, there should be tools to assess and measure those indicators of civic growth and moral development among HSLs.

This thesis suggests that, in relation to citizenship education, in order to assess the civic growth of HSLs, the NIC could use the indicators and tools developed by the International Association for Educational Achievement (IEA) in its four cross national studies, i.e., CIVED (1971), CIVED (1999), ICCS (2009) and ICCS (2016). These indicators of civic growth are *civic knowledge* (cognitive), *civic attitudes* (attitudinal), and *civic engagement* (behavioral). The 'civic knowledge' indicator refers to (i) knowledge of civic content; (ii) skills in interpreting civic information; (iii) economic literacy; and (iv) students' concepts of democracy, citizenship and government. The indicator 'civic attitude' designates feelings towards the nation, the government, minority groups, and women's political rights. The 'civic engagement' indicator encompasses issues, such as interests in politics, exposure to political news, and participation in political activities. Instruments developed to measure these indicators are civic knowledge test, civic attitudes test, and civic engagement test, respectively (Torney-Purta et al., 2001).

With regard to values education, in order to assess the moral development or moral growth of HSLs after *Itorero* training, the NIC could draw on the indicators developed by DeHaan et al. (1997) such as moral reasoning (thoughts), moral affect (feelings), and moral behavior (actions). The idea is that after the training, the NIC could assess

the extent to which *Itorero* training has contributed to the growth of HSLs in terms of moral reasoning, moral affect, and moral behavior. Equally, the NIC could use instruments suggested by the DeHaan et al. (1997) to measure these indicators. First, moral reasoning might be measured by two instruments: (1) Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM) developed by Gibbs and his colleagues (Gibbs et al., 1984); and (2) the Defining Issues Test (DIT) developed by Rest (1986). Second, moral affect could be measured by two instruments: (1) Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) of Mehrabian and Epstein (1972); and (2) the Test of Self-Conscious-Affect (TOSCA) developed by Tangney et al. (1989). Finally, moral behavior might be assessed by means of the Visions of Morality Scales (VMS) developed by Shelton and McAdams (1990). These instruments have been established to have good construct validity and reliability.

In relation to values education, the *Itorero* training scheme could also retrieve instruments developed by the Australian Government, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (Lovat et al., 2009) in order to test and measure *Itorero*'s impact on students' effects and school ambience. This is a project worth pursuing, precisely because after the *Itorero* training most of HSLs enter public and private universities. The question this project would seek to answer goes as follows: Can the impact of values education – provided in the *Itorero* training – on teaching and school ethos, as well as student achievement and behavior, be tested empirically and observed reliably? Obviously such a project could be conducted among higher learning institutions where *Itorero* graduates are schooling. This project would particularly seek to answer the following ancillary question: Can we find evidence for the claim that values education provided in *Itorero* training has a positive impact on (a) student academic diligence; (b) school ambience; (c); student-instructor relationships; (d) student-parent relationships? Findings from this project would certainly allow the *Itorero* practitioners to know the extent to which the scheme is successful in educating HSLs for values.

So far there are no impact assessment mechanisms and instruments put in place to measure the extent to which the *Itorero* scheme is successful in educating HSLs for values. The present study shows that NIC relies only on reports produced by values custodians. It has also been indicated that so far what has been done is 'descriptive evaluation', which consists merely in establishing the extent to which planned

activities have been achieved. I argue that these mechanisms are not appropriate to establish the efficiency of the *Itorero* scheme in educating HSLs for citizenship and values. Hence, there is an urgent need to clearly define indicators of civic growth and moral development. Equally, one cannot ignore the task of developing tools for assessing those indicators.

By relying heavily on civic republican and communitarian notions and being 'values-explicit', the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs conflates citizenship education and character education. One cannot envisage improving *Itorero* training without removing this conflation. I now examine this issue in a more detailed manner.

12.5. Removing the conflation of citizenship education and character education

This thesis has entered a debate on whether citizenship education is consistent or incoherent with character education. In fact, a number of scholars (e.g. Boyd, 2010; Davies, Gorard & McGuinn, 2005; Halstead & Pike, 2006; Sears & Hughes, 2006; Suissa, 2015) are strongly committed to the view that citizenship education cannot go with character education, particularly because the latter has a tendency to be rather indoctrinatory, dogmatic and non-reflective.

According to Boyd (2010), character education relies primarily on a finite list of particular character traits or virtues arrived at by consensus; it is assumed that these virtues should form the core of all educational activities. Understood in this way, Boyd (2010, p. 384) argues that character education is "conceptually, empirically, morally, politically and educationally corrupt". He goes on maintaining that character education can be characterized as a "shallow, conservative, Christian, capitalist, and apolitical view of the good person – masquerading as the good citizen" (Boyd, 2010, p. 391). He concludes that "conflating citizenship and character education has the potential to foment an insidious cancer of the body politic" (Boyd, 2010, p. 384). In other words, it is not sound to assume that one can aim in the same way to produce both the 'good person' and the 'good citizen'. Suissa (2015) warns that when citizenship education is combined with or reduced to character education, the idea of

political education is displaced; the concept of the 'political' disappears if not addressed even in its most superficial sense.

Other studies (e.g. Althof & Berkowitz, 2006; Berkowitz, 2000; Hoge, 2002; Sim & Low, 2012), however, suggest that there is not only a possible but also a necessary relationship between character education and citizenship education. They hold the view that citizenship education actually needs a character education foundation. According to this trend, the perception of character education as inimical to citizenship education stems primarily from a misconception of what character education stands for. In this regard, Althof and Berkowitz (2006) argue that those who perceive character education as 'indoctrination' subscribe to a largely inaccurate stereotype and misrepresentation of the broad range of character education approaches. A defense is also mounted by Halstead and Pike (2006) that character education includes methods compatible with the need for promoting autonomous critical thinkers. Finally, it is concluded that character education is essential in the development of good citizenship; it supports citizenship and remains a critical element in any conception of citizenship education (Sim & Low, 2012). The *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs in post-genocide Rwanda seems to have taken this orientation: that character education is essential in the development of good citizenship.

How are we to position ourselves in the debate? It seems that the right way to alleviate the tension is firstly to acknowledge the broad relationship between character and citizenship education. Secondly, based on results from the present study, one can establish whether conflating citizenship and character education is ill-fated or healthy.

Though there is a great deal of overlap between the two terms, citizenship and character education remain significantly different in a number of ways (Davies et al., 2005; Sears & Hughes, 2006). In fact, as Davies et al. (2005) observe, both character education and citizenship education may be appealed to in order to address a crisis; they are responses to an alarm in society. However, the authors acknowledge that character education and citizenship education draw from different sources. While citizenship education concerns itself principally with skills and dispositions required for one to play significantly her role in a democratic society,

character education focuses on how to be an exemplary role model or part of a moral elite in everyday life (Davies et al., 2005). The idea here is that the domain of citizenship education is public, social and political, while character education dwells centrally on personal, moral grounds and motivation.

Such a distinction is important, particularly because confusing citizenship education with character education leads to transforming the former into indoctrination. As maintained by Sears and Hughes (2006), discourses and practices in the field of citizenship education most frequently exist in a state of tension between education and indoctrination. While indoctrination refers to teaching someone to accept doctrines (or values) uncritically, education is the opening of possibilities through engagement with evidence (Sears & Hughes, 2006).

This thesis sheds some light on the dispute; it carefully analyzes *Itorero*, a training platform meant to educate HSLs for citizenship and values in post-genocide Rwanda. The thesis reveals that citizenship education (as it is done in *Itorero* for HSLs) is strongly driven by character education. Reference is made here to the pre-established list of values that are inculcated uncritically in HSLs and the predominant use of didactic approaches [*Ibiganiro*]. As a reminder, these values include Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*]; patriotism; integrity; courage; self-sacrifice; love for a work well-done; and upholding one's dignity.

At this stage already one might reasonably raise the question as to whether these values are related to democratic dispositions and skills. In fact, looking closely at the nature of the attributes on the list, one is led to conclude that *Itorero* is much more concerned with shaping the character of HSLs at the expense of teaching skills and dispositions necessary to participate in a democratic society. There is an assumption here that by making HSLs 'good people', they are also made 'good citizens', which is arguably mistaken.

In essence, this study shows that it is extremely difficult to reconcile citizenship and character education. In other words, it is nearly impossible to strike a right balance between the two practices when addressed concurrently. The idea here is that when citizenship education is combined with character education, the latter tends to swallow up the former; hence, indoctrination emerges. This conclusion was also reached by Sears and Hughes (2006), and Winton (2007) in their examination of

citizenship education practices in Canada. The same conclusion was drawn by Tan and Wong (2010) in their study on character and citizenship education in Singapore. What these studies and my own thesis show is that conflating citizenship and character education is not attractive, let alone desirable.

It is not the contention of this thesis that citizenship education should not have a moral dimension. Understood as the acquisition of civic virtues or public morality, the moral aspect is important to citizenship education. But these civic virtues are to be acquired in as far as they relate to social and political frameworks (Davies et al., 2005), and they should be acquired otherwise than by character education given its inherent problems, chief among which is indoctrination as opposed to education in critical thinking.

Based on results from the present research, one is led to conclude that when citizenship and character education are taken as intimately related in theory and practice, chances of avoiding indoctrination are minimal. The end result is that citizenship education is suffocated by character education. In this case, what is taken as 'citizenship education' amounts to nothing more than inculcation of character traits deliberately devised to suit government narratives. At the end of the process, learners have substantial gaps in democratic civic knowledge, skills, values and dispositions.

The *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs in post-genocide Rwanda testifies unambiguously to this state of affairs. Using the concepts of Heater (2004), citizenship education as it is done in *Itorero* looks like the cultivation of supportive behaviour towards the government in office; its content focuses on understanding what the government wants and the crafting of dispositions required for the implementation of defined policies. A number of other studies conducted on *Itorero* came to the same conclusion (e.g. Mgbako, 2005; Purdeková, 2011; Sundberg, 2014; Turner, 2014).

In fact, findings from the present research reveal that for *Itorero* training, citizenship and character education are considered as one and the same thing. *Itorero* reduces citizenship education to mere character education. I am challenging such a contrived hybrid and argue that there is a need to do away completely with character education in citizenship education, so that HSLs can adequately learn democratic

principles, practices, virtues and processes; critical thinking skills; and cosmopolitan values. I am arguing for a 'critical-democratic-cosmopolitan' citizenship notion.

It would appear that countries relying heavily on civic republicanism and communitarianism tend to combine character and citizenship education. Reference is made here to countries such as Singapore (Tan & Chew, 2004; Tan & Tan, 2014; Tan & Wong, 2010) and Rwanda. In those countries, a 'good citizen' is one who accepts and demonstrates the values and behaviour of the established social and value system for the sake of maintenance. Citizenship and character education under this model focus on the transmission approach. The overreliance on this method is deeply problematic because students' reasoning, deliberation, decision making, and conflict resolution abilities – which are necessary for a democratic society – may be neglected (Tan & Tan, 2014).

According to Tan and Chew's (2004), research on citizenship and character education in Singapore, when citizenship and character education are combined neither is carried out in its own right. The point here is that both citizenship and character education become distorted. The present thesis has already shown how citizenship education under these circumstances is not addressed at all because there is an absence of the 'political', and the 'good citizen' is reduced to the 'good person'. Character education (believed to serve the purpose of values education), on the other hand, is thwarted – to some extent – chiefly because values and virtues are only taught as a means for statecraft; and the use of values teaching as statecraft has no respect for moral truths *per se* (Tan & Chew, 2004). It is argued that when statecraft is at stake, the measure of all things is not truth, justice and mercy, but what works in the interest of nation building. In other words, with statecraft as the end in view, there could never be a call to sacrifice national interests for morality's sake. Though in character education core values have been defined, they do not have an intrinsic value; instead, they have an instrumental worth. Put differently, values are defined, upheld and taught to young people in order to legitimate and sustain the prevailing national ideology.

Applying these considerations to post-genocide Rwanda, upon close scrutiny, one realizes that the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs looks like an instrument for statecraft (Mgbako, 2005; Purdeková, 2011b; Sundberg, 2014; Turner, 2014). In essence, it is

meant neither for ‘genuine’ citizenship education (HSLs are not taught democratic virtues and skills) nor for ‘authentic’ values education (values are only taught to sustain the national ideology). Instead, it tends to be a rationally and deliberately devised mechanism put in place to stimulate among young people respect, admiration and loyalty towards the ruling political party (the RPF) (Mgbako, 2005; Purdeková, 2011b; Sundberg, 2014; Turner, 2014). It is for this reason that topics such as the history of the liberation war and patriotism are accorded special consideration.

In critically interrogating character education, the present thesis is not, however, suggesting that core values should be abandoned. In chapter 5, drawing on Theodore Roosevelt, I argued that “To educate a person in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society” (Sim & Low, 2012, p. 381). It was indicated that those who planned the 1994 genocide had arguably been ‘trained only in mind’ and that something had certainly gone enormously wrong with their training in morals. In view of this situation, I am not dismissing *Itorero* as a platform whereby Rwandans learn values and taboos of their culture. In other words, what is at issue here is not so much the curriculum, i.e., the content, but rather the pedagogy. It is defensible for Rwandans to have core values. But it is deeply problematic to use so-called ‘core values’ to create loyalty to the regime and the ruling party. The present thesis argues against such an indoctrinatory approach and suggests approaches that foster critical thinking, moral reasong, and moral judgment. The thesis suggests a new model in citizenship and values education.

12.6. The suggested four-layer model of citizenship and values education

Inspired by citizenship education practices in post-genocide and post-conflict contexts, drawing on the 2016 pre-university citizenship and character education program in Singapore, and based on Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1996), the present thesis suggests reshaping the way citizenship and values education are conducted in the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs in post-genocide Rwanda. I suggest a four

layer model[73], which arguably has the potential to produce citizenship and values education immune of indoctrination.

Figure 4: A suggested four-structure model for citizenship and values education



I call the first and core layer of this structure *'being human'* [*Ubumuntu*] or rather '*I am a human being*' [*Ndi umuntu*], because it is dedicated to the construction or unlocking of humanness in the learner [*Kwigisha ubumuntu*]. This stratum aims to develop the 'self'. I am of the view that the most significant task of *Itorero* for HSLs is to build a human being. This stratum includes two major components: self-

[73] The model suggested here recapitulates my overall arguments on citizenship and values education. It can be argued that core values and citizenship competencies are meant to improve my being-with-others, and more importantly my being-human. In this sense, the three layers are directed towards the core layer (being-human). But the core layer also feeds and directs the remaining layers, i.e. being with others, core values and citizenship competences. In short, all these layers are mutually reinforcing; they enrich each other.

awareness (or self-discovery) and self-management. In relation to self-awareness, *Itorero* training should allow HSLs to understand their emotions, inclinations and weaknesses, but also their strengths in order for them to develop positive self-concept and self-worth. With regard to self-management, two things are involved. First, *Itorero* training should enable HSLs to control their own emotions, inclinations, weaknesses and their past in order to exercise self-discipline. Second, self-management entails that *Itorero* training should allow HSLs to direct purposefully their strengths and potentials in order to display strong goal-setting and organizational skills.

The second layer of the model is termed '*being with others*' or '*I am a being-with*'. It focuses on social awareness and social management. In fact, I am not alone in the world, as Martin Heidegger (1996) argues, my being is a being-with [*Mitsein*]. HSLs should therefore have skills to live with others and manage their relationships. For this reason, as far as social awareness is concerned, *Itorero* should enable HSLs to demonstrate empathy and respect for others, discern different perspectives, and recognize and appreciate diversity. As to relationship management, *Itorero* training is expected to teach HSLs how to establish and maintain healthy relationships through effective communication. Equally, it should teach them to work with others to resolve conflict.

The third layer of the suggested model is called *'core values'.* I am a human being and live with others in a particular place or community. That community, through its core values, to some extent shapes my 'being-self' and my 'being-with-others'. Here *Itorero* training is commended for having identified key values of the Rwandan people. As a reminder, these values include: Rwandanness [*Ubunyarwanda*]; patriotism; integrity; courage; self-sacrifice; love for a work well-done; and upholding one's dignity. It is hard to object to the idea that these core values hold the potential to heighten 'being-human' and 'being-with-others'.

The fourth layer is called *'citizenship competences'.* This layer comprises four elements: critical skills, democratic virtues and skills, cosmopolitan qualities, and communication and information skills. By critical skills, I mean the ability to (i) critically assess and evaluate ideas; (ii) pay attention to social injustices existing in the society; and (iii) work towards their eradication. Democratic virtues and skills

include capacities such as (1) political participation; (2) public deliberation as free and equal citizens; and (3) enjoyment of civil, political and social rights. In relation to cosmopolitan qualities, I am referring here to the idea of openness to the world, recognition and protection of humanity in all people, and respect for diversity. Finally, given that today we are in the era dominated by information and communication technologies, I argue that HSLs are to learn how to use responsibly online spaces, especially social media; hence they need what I call 'communication and information skills'.

In terms of approaches to be used during citizenship and values education in post-genocide Rwanda, the present thesis discourages the use of didactic methods. Drawing on the case of Singapore (Singapore Ministry of Education, 2016), in addition to the use of generative elements from care ethics, cognitive moral development, and values clarification, I suggest engaging with the following approaches/pedagogies: cooperative and collaborative learning, scenario-based inquiry and case studies, and experiential learning.

Cooperative learning takes place when students come together as a group to work on a task or to create a product. As to collaborative learning, it emphasizes the social interactions while working in groups, which facilitates deeper knowing. At this point, *Itorero* should reinforce the use of practical learning [*Imikorongiro*]. Scenario-based inquiry and case studies enable students to apply their knowledge to practical issues; learners become problem solvers, which allows them to practice responsible decision making. Here I recommend the discussion of real life based dilemmas. Experiential learning occurs when the learner is placed in a learning situation characterized by a high level of active involvement. Here the practice of community service [*Urugerero*] finds its place and needs to be reinforced. By engaging with these approaches, the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs is likely to conduct effectively citizenship and values education without being indoctrinatory.

12.7. Actions to be taken in relation to trainers

The present research notes that the quantity of *Itorero* trainers is appropriate. Nevertheless, some participants mention that trainers even exceed the required

number, which is likely to pose the problem of coordination, and to lead to lack of trust among the whole training team. In fact, on the *Itorero* training site, you may find trainers, members of the RDF, members of the RNP, local defense forces, officials from the sector, officials from the district, and officials from the province, to mention but a few. The specific role played by some of these people remains unclear. Are they inspecting the training? Are they in charge of security? The answer to these questions is not straight forward. It is therefore suggested that duties and responsibilities for each party involved in the training be clearly defined and communicated.

In terms of quality, understood as the capacity to facilitate knowledge, this study shows that, in general, trainers have a good command of the content to be provided. As seen previously, HSLs appreciate enormously the content they receive in their *Itorero* training. However, this study reveals that there are enormous problems when it comes to the quality of trainers in terms of their moral conduct. Substantial qualitative evidence is produced suggesting that (i) some *Itorero* trainers sexually abuse young girls undergoing the *Itorero* training, and (ii) others administer harsh, inhumane, as well as inconsiderate forms of corporal punishment.

In fact, during focus group discussions with HSLs, I asked them the following question: ‘Suppose you meet the NIC Chairman. Can you mention one thing you would request him to do in order to improve the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs?’ Unsurprisingly, all informants mentioned energetically that the first thing they would ask him to do is to address the misconduct of trainers. HSLs emphasized that trainers should be trained so that they can radiate or model the values they teach. HSLs lament that *Itorero* trainers teach values and taboos of the Rwandan culture, but they behave contrary to them. Consider on this note the opinion of an informant:

> “I insist, trainers should be reprimanded seriously. Their misconduct has dire consequences for girls they do abuse; it has also serious implications for the future of our country as a whole.” [P31]

The idea here is that one way of addressing the issue of sexual abuse is to recruit trainers who are experienced, mature, competent and trustworthy. Trainers have also to be trained and evaluated on an ongoing basis.

Certainly, other actions also need to be taken to address the wanting character of concerned trainers as a matter of immediate urgency. As seen previously, according to HSLs' perceptions, the factor 'trainers' correlates positively and significantly with the success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs (β = .33). The implication is that having morally culpable or blameworthy trainers affects hugely the success of the *Itorero* training for HSLs. Thorough investigation on the sexual abuse issue should be conducted for culprits to be identified and prosecuted, and victims should be compensated. In this regard, the onus is arguably on the NIC, in collaboration with the Rwanda CID. The idea is that HSL-victims of sexual abuse during the *Itorero* training are to be identified, medically treated, psychologically and legally supported, and financially compensated. It is also important to establish whether such sexual abuses and atrocities did not eventually lead to unwanted pregnancies and the transmission of HIV/AIDS among affected young girls. In short, the issue of young girls being sexually abused in the course of the *Itorero* training demands serious investigation and consideration.

To the question mentioned earlier as to what HSLs would request the NIC Chairman to do if they were given opportunity to meet him, the second item that majority of informants outlined is the issue of punishment. With regard to corporal punishment, enough qualitative evidence is provided by the present study to substantiate HSLs' claim that they are subjected to cruel, inhumane, degrading and inconsiderate forms of corporal punishment. This study has shown that such forms of punishment are due to the fact that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs takes a militaristic and masculinist orientation. It is therefore suggested that, in case HSLs misbehave, there is a possibility to develop other acceptable forms of punishment, i.e., which do not compromise the health, dignity and self-esteem of trainees – which, in short, are compatible with and indeed expressive of the aims and guidelines of *Itorero*. Punishment likely to involve torture, human rights violations and other abuses is to be banished. In this context, it becomes important to educate *Itorero* trainers about law and human rights.

The present thesis concludes that *Itorero* trainers should be monitored closely to ensure that their work is effective and morally blameless. They should not be left to themselves. In this context, NIC officials should go to training sites to supervise the

Itorero training for HSLs so as to ensure its smooth running. It seems that presently this activity is directly managed by the district or sector alone, and that the NIC simply elaborates the program and provides financial backing. Close monitoring and evaluation by the NIC is urgently needed and hence strongly recommended.

12.8. Actions related to trainees

This study shows that the motivation and prerequisites of learners (HSLs) play crucial roles in ensuring the success of *Itorero*. According to trainers, these two factors correlate positively and significantly with the success of *Itorero* training. Their correlation weight (β) are .27 and .21, respectively. Yet, there are serious problems affecting both the motivation and prerequisites of HSLs.

This thesis shows that the motivation of learners is affected by two things. First, parents frequently do not grasp the purpose and mission of *Itorero*. Hence they are reluctant sending their children for *Itorero* training. Second, some HSLs do not attend partly because there are no consequences attached to non-participation. It is therefore suggested that sensitization and mobilization campaigns be organized to raise awareness among Rwandans – mainly parents of HSLs – about the core mission and activities of *Itorero*. In this regard, for instance every year the NIC could conduct the '*Itorero* week', in the course of which *Itorero* graduates would share about the benefits of *Itorero* training. This *Itorero* week could also serve as an opportunity for the NIC to send a clear message to all Rwandans on the mission and purpose of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs.

Furthermore, in order to raise the motivation of learners, it is suggested that an enforcement mechanism be put in place to make the *Itorero* training compulsory for all HSLs. The absence of such a mechanism affects greatly the participation. The idea is that the certificate issued at the end of the *Itorero* training could be part of required documents for HSLs to enroll either in public or private institutions of higher learning in Rwanda. In order to curtail the misconduct of HSLs in the course of the *Itorero* training, it is also proposed that disciplinary measures be put in place, and acceptable forms of sanctions, such as doing more sport activities, cleaning

bathrooms, reading a novel in a well prescribed time, etc., be administered, if necessary.

This study shows that the newly devised formula according to which *Itorero* training starts in high school and continues during the end term and long holidays raises the issue of transport for some HSLs who have to travel long distances. The NIC could therefore establish training sites in such way that they are easily accessible; alternatively, it could organize transport facilities for concerned HSLs.

As for prerequisites, the present study notes that HSLs have the required epistemological tools. However, it is shown that before joining *Itorero* training, HSLs have inherited ethnocentric ideologies and stereotypes from their families, which does not constitute a fertile ground for *Itorero* education. In other words, HSLs join the *Itorero* training already fed with biased ethnic ideologies, particularly about the unity of Rwandans; they wrestle with reconciling the teaching they receive from their parents with that of *Itorero*. While in their homes they are taught that in Rwanda there are three ethnic groups (Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa), in *Itorero* they are taught that Rwandans are one. This study shows that parents consider the *Itorero* teaching about unity of Rwandans to be mere politics. Briefly, it is revealed that there appears to be a discontinuation between socialization at 'home' [*Ku ishyiga*] and *Itorero* training.

In order to avoid the scenario of putting a new wine in old bottles, the present study suggests that organizing and reinforcing *Itorero* for parents at the village level [*Umudugudu*] be considered as a matter of immediate urgency.

12.9. Actions to be taken vis-à-vis the content

The present study notes that the content provided in the *Itorero* training is well appreciated by HSLs. The latter indicate that mostly it allows them to be good Rwandan citizens; to know Rwandan values and taboos; to be liberated from ethnocentric ideologies imposed by parents; and to be acquainted with the Vision 2020 of Rwanda, as well as other prevailing national development policies and programs. In view of this, according to HSLs' perceptions, the content correlates positively and significantly with the success of the *Itorero* training ($\beta = .27$). During

focus group discussions, when the researcher asked HSLs to indicate things that they enjoyed most, nearly all informants said that they enjoyed the content. It is therefore suggested that the momentum of providing a good content be maintained.

However, this study also notes that there are four factors, that impact negatively on the content. First, as mentioned previously, due to the increasing number of HSLs and limited financial means, the final stage (onsite training) takes only four days, which makes it difficult to cover the whole content envisaged on the training program. The idea is that trainers are rushing to complete the program. Second, HSLs observe that there is a lack of harmony in the content. Third, a few informants mention the issue of language of instruction. In fact, the language of instruction during the *Itorero* training is Kinyarwanda. Since most of HSLs were born and grown up outside Rwanda, their Kinyarwanda proficiency is not enough to get the whole content, particularly because the Kinyarwanda used during the *Itorero* training is advanced. Fourth, it is indicated that the official program showing topics to be covered during the training is communicated late, i.e., a few days before the starting of *Itorero* training.

In order to address the above mentioned challenges, this research suggests that: (i) the duration of the onsite training be extended from four days to three weeks; (i) the content be organized in a more systematic way for easy delivery by trainers and easy assimilation by HSLs; (iii) all officially acceptable languages in Rwanda (French, English, and Kinyarwanda) be used – by way of code switching – in the course of the training for affected HSLs to get the content; (iv) the training program be communicated in good time to allow enough preparation for trainers. Another suggestion is that the content delivered in the *Itorero* – mainly about the history of Rwanda – could be enriched by visiting historical sites and museums.

This thesis reveals that the *Itorero* training for HSLs faces a robust challenge, which is to teach about and recruiting for the ruling political party (the RPF). As seen previously, teaching about and recruiting for the RPF is likely to lead to indoctrination and fanaticism. The present study suggests that the NIC considers putting an end to this practice because it conflates citizenship education and political proselytizing. The idea is that teaching about and recruiting for the RPF is outside the core mission of the NIC. As the law No. 41/2013 of 16/06/2013 (article 6) clearly stipulates, the

NIC has got the mandate which is to “bring up a patriotic Rwandan who has [internalized the] values and taboos of the Rwandan culture and who has the culture of *intore”* – precision added. It is obvious that teaching about and recruiting members for the RPF is not provided for by this law. In other words, by teaching RPF principles and persuading HSLs to take the oath of allegiance to this political organization in the course of the *Itorero* training, the NIC is breaching the mandate determining its mission, organization and functioning.

In a nutshell, instructing about and recruiting for the RPF is likely to destroy (or at least seriously weaken) the *Itorero* scheme, because it tends to be perceived as a ‘recruitment forum’ rather than a medium for harnessing civic virtues and fostering Rwandan values among HSLs. This malpractice creates a disorder in the agreed upon public policy; if not addressed in a timely manner, it would make *Itorero* a short lived phenomenon.

12.10. Actions related to the training environment

The present study shows that – according to HSLs’ perceptions – the training environment (food and accommodation) correlates positively and significantly with the success of the *Itorero* training ($\beta = .14$). The importance of the training environment is also confirmed by trainers. The implication of these results from both HSLs and trainers is that for *Itorero* to be successful, special consideration is to be given to the training environment understood broadly in terms of food, accommodation, hygiene, sanitation, and the availability of training sites.

In relation to food, though majority of participants are satisfied with its quality, the present research notes three things to be addressed: First, the quantity is not enough. While trainees work hard and perform demanding physical exercises, they get little food, which is likely to compromise their wellbeing. Second, in some sites, HSLs on special diet for medical or other reasons are not catered for. Third, trainees indicate that they are not given ample time to enjoy what little food they receive. In order to improve on the feeding scheme, it is suggested that (i) the quantity be increased; (ii) HSLs be given ample time to enjoy their food; and (iii) special meals be provided to HSLs on special diet as far as reasonably possible.

As far as the accommodation is concerned, the present study shows that, despite efforts made by NIC and hosting schools, three major problems affect negatively the quality of the accommodation: (i) there is the problem of congestion, i.e., training sites receive numbers of trainees beyond their accommodation capacity; (ii) dormitories are not clean; they are infested with house insects [*Imperi*]; and (iii) there is a dearth of furniture and requisite equipment, such as beds, mattresses and buckets. Obviously, appropriate actions should be taken to address these issues. There is also a need to have more training sites. The idea is that the number of HSLs on training sites should be commensurate with available facilities. Besides, dormitories have to be cleaned in advance, and training sites which fail to meet the standard of cleanliness should not be made available. Finally, the furniture to be used such as beds, mattresses and buckets should be purchased in sufficient quantity and well in advance.

The present research notes that there are challenges associated with hygiene and sanitation on many training sites. Particularly, it is mentioned that it is not easy to find clean water. Besides, there are inadequate ablution facilities. What is troubling is that poor hygiene in some training sites leads to the contamination and disease. Another issue is that though every training site has got a nurse, health care facilities are not adequate; it is indicated during the training, some HSLs get sick and receive inappropriate medical attention. The present study suggests that hygiene and sanitation be considered as key criteria while selecting training sites. In other words, the availability of enough clean and drinking water, toilets and bathrooms should be determining factors in choosing training sites. Equally, well-equipped medical care facilities should be in place in order to treat eventual cases of illness among HSLs.

In brief, when one scrutinizes closely challenges related to the training environment (except food), one realizes that they exist mostly due to the fact that the NIC does not have its own training sites. In view of this, the present study suggests that the NIC considers building its own training infrastructure, such as Sector *Ubutore* Development Centres (SUDC) and District *Ubutore* Development Centres (DUDC) fully furnished with all the required equipment. Such centres would host the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs but also trainings for other groups of Rwandans. In fact, teaching about citizenship and values goes beyond the instruction provided in the classroom or training hall. The organization of *Itorero* training as well as the

environment in which it takes place constitute the ‘hidden curriculum’. In other words, one cannot teach values of decent housing and cleanliness while conducting the training in a filthy environment. One cannot teach civic virtues, such as the sense of responsibility and duty, time management and planning by employing irresponsible poor planners and careless timewasters. The point is that the training environment itself should reflect the content and principles taught; it should be a vehicle of civic virtues and moral values.

12.11. Organization and logistics

The present study demonstrates that though the organization is not part of significant predictors, it affects the overall success of the *Itorero* training for HSLs. The organization refers chiefly to duration, program, and the encouragement of discussion and deliberation. In relation to the duration of the training, as mentioned earlier, the present study shows that almost all participants find it too short (only four intensive days in training site). It is suggested that the onsite training could be extended to three weeks to allow trainers cover adequately the envisaged program content. It is also proposed that the idea of starting the *Itorero* training in high school and pursuing it during the end term and long term holidays be maintained.

Concerning the actual training program**,** the study indicates that most participants find it adequate. However, it is noted that there is a lack of harmonization of the program countrywide. Therefore, there is a need to harmonize the training timetable because some sites are following a tight schedule, and trainees do not have enough time to rest, which makes it difficult for them to participate actively in activities organized during the day. Besides, it is mentioned that the timetable is very tight; there is too much instruction in a very limited time, which makes difficult the assimilation process and discussion among participants. It is suggested that the timetable be more user-friendly to allow HSLs to assimilate and process the information received. Furthermore, some informants introduce the issue of religious practice, saying that they are not given time for prayer during the *Itorero* training. In this regard, the NIC could consider giving HSLs the opportunity to enjoy their right to religious freedom and expression in the course of the *Itorero* training.

As far as the promotion of discussion and deliberation is concerned, this research indicates that HSLs are taught to foresee consequences. However, the time dedicated to discussion and deliberation is very short because trainers are rushing to finish the program. It is therefore suggested that the time dedicated to discussion and deliberation be extended to allow HSLs to enhance their critical thinking and discussion skills. In this regard, the methodology of practical learning [*Imikorongiro*] should be developed and enhanced. In terms of logistics, issues such as lack of didactic materials, training modules, and equipment for the practical part [*Imikorongiro*] were highlighted. It is suggested that enough training modules, didactic materials and practical learning equipment be made available on training sites.

12.12. Conclusion

This chapter has provided a summary of the major findings emerging from the present study. It has also suggested appropriate actions to be taken vis-à-vis citizenship and values education notions guiding the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs; the quantity and quality of trainers; trainees; the content; the training environment and logistics. Given the problems encountered by the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship, the present thesis has suggested a new concept, i.e. the 'critical-democratic-cosmopolitan citizen'. In relation to values education, the thesis suggests retaining or, in this case reintroducing the distinction between citizenship and character education. A new model where citizenship education and values education are conducted separately has been proposed. It is hoped that the implementation of recommended actions would allow the *Itorero* training to educate more successfully HSLs for citizenship and values.

GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present study, entitled 'Citizenship and Values Education in Post-genocide Rwanda: An Analysis of the *Itorero* Training Scheme for HSLs', set out to achieve the following objectives: (i) to identify the citizenship and values education notions informing the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs; (ii) to establish whether the dominant citizenship and values education notions are helpful and desirable for post-genocide Rwanda; (iii) to investigate the attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards this scheme; and (iv) to suggest actions to be taken for improving *Itorero* training in educating HSLs for citizenship and values.

The methodology guiding this study is a mixed-method design. In addition to the desk research approach, a survey made of closed and open-ended questions was conducted among 996 HSLs and 116 *Itorero* trainers. The researcher also used focus group discussions with HSLs coupled with interviews with both trainers and NIC officials. In total, four focus group discussions with HSLs, four interviews with district trainers, and three interviews with NIC officials were conducted. The data collection took place from early January 2015 until the end of March 2015.

In terms of conceptual framework, citizenship and values education models were applied to the *Itorero* training scheme in order to establish a model deemed preferable to other competing models. In relation to citizenship education, the thesis engaged with classical notions of citizenship, including civic republican, liberal and communitarian, but also modern ones – mainly the cosmopolitan and radical democratic notions, with the aim of determining the extent to which these analytical constructs inspire the *Itorero* training scheme. With regard to values education, the study engaged with character education, care ethics, cognitive moral development and values clarification, and attempted to establish the extent to which these values education notions inform the *Itorero* training for HSLs. In brief, the conceptual frame for citizenship education encompassed civic republican, liberal, communitarian, cosmopolitan and radical democratic notions. For values education, the conceptual frame included character education, care ethics, cognitive moral development and values clarification approaches.

In order to investigate and analyze HSLs' and trainers' attitudes towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs, the present thesis used Lewin's (1951) Force Field Theory of Change. In this regard, the thesis (i) identified driving forces of *Itorero* for HSLs; (ii) outlined restraining forces; (iii) indicated concrete actions to be taken for driving forces to be strengthened; and (iv) suggested strategies to be envisaged in order to weaken or eliminate restraining forces.

In order to analyze quantitative data, the present research used two software packages: SPSS 22 and AMOS 22. Data analysis techniques employed in the present study involved (i) the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) – which allowed me to classify lists of items into factors; (ii) the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) – which enabled me to ascertain whether the structure arrived at in the classification fits the data; (iii) descriptive statistics on obtained scales; (iv) comparison of two independent groups (T-test); (v) comparison of more than two groups (Analysis of Variance – ANOVA); and (vi) the determination of best predictors by means of simple regression and backward stepwise multiple regression.

Qualitative data deriving from focus group discussions and interviews were analyzed using Thematic Content Analysis. The latter involved both vertical and horizontal approaches. The vertical approach was meant to reduce the volume of transcripts by retaining the summary or paraphrasing main ideas. It also produced limited quotations or 'quotable quotes', and a list of ten points providing the core of each focus group discussion or interview. The horizontal approach aimed at comparing materials at the bottom of transcripts, i.e., the ten points, which led to the identification of emerging issues. In the end, Thematic Content Analysis produced recurring themes, which were related to research objectives and research questions, and were included in the presentation and discussion of findings.

In presenting findings, the present study first starts with quantitative data. Qualitative evidence is presented in the second place as a way of supporting and substantiating quantitative data. The next step involves relating quantitative and qualitative data with findings from other studies, where possible. Finally, based on quantitative data, qualitative data and the theoretical-empirical literature, the opinion of the researcher is provided.

In relation to the identification of the citizenship education notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs, this study shows that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs engages with all citizenship education notions outlined by the academic literature to different levels. The study notes that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is *robustly* committed to the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship (the mean is 17.41; SD = 1.99); it is committed *to some extent* to the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship (the mean is 17.38; SD = 2.23); it works *to a limited extent* with the conventional democratic notion (the mean is 10.45; SD = 2.58); and it engages to a *very limited extent* with the liberal notion of citizenship (the mean is 8.47; SD = 1.91). One should not be surprised to see civic republican and communitarian notions grouped together precisely because some studies (Ciprut, 2008; Delanty, 2000; Gaus & Kukathas, 2004; Gonzales et al., 2004; Honohan, 2002; Van Steenbergen, 1994) argue that civic republicanism is a variant of communitarianism. Hence there is no notable conflict between these two citizenship conceptions.

This study establishes that the conclusion according to which the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs works powerfully with the civic republican and communitarian notions does not vary within subgroups; it rather cuts across subgroups. This is because considering marital status, age, and training periods, no statistically significant difference was found within subgroups in rating citizenship notions. A statistically significant difference was only found between males and females in their rating of the conventional democratic notion of citizenship (t_{988} = -3.026 where p< .05). However, the effect size was proved small (Cohen's D score = 0.19), which suggests that females endorsed slightly more the conventional democratic notion than did males. Their respective means are 1.70 (SD = 2.53) and 1.20 (SD = 2.60).

The thesis notes that adopting the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship might be understandable in the aftermath of the genocide. As discussed previously, except the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, other post-genocide countries (Armenia, Cambodia, and Israel) took almost the same trend. While the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship contain some positive elements such as fostering patriotism, self-sacrifice, community bonds and norms, and common good concern, the thesis warns that overreliance on these notions of citizenship is likely to lead to serious problems, chief among which are the risks of

indoctrination and fanaticism, violation of (or at least scant attention to) individual rights, and not recognizing the private sphere as an important domain. It is shown that due to the overreliance on civic republicanism, the *Itorero* scheme tends to be oppressive, moralistic, exclusive, militaristic and masculinist. With regard to the communitarian aspect, this study reveals that the *Itorero* for HSLs tends to be conservative and obstructive to individual freedom and autonomy. Among the outlined problems, careful consideration was given to the issues of indoctrination and fanaticism, given their gravity and prevalence. This study notes that teaching about the ruling party (the RPF) and recruiting its members in the course of the *Itorero* training for HSLs might be considered as a form of indoctrination and fostering fanaticism.

In order to improve the citizenship education notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs, the present study formulates a number of strategies. It is suggested that (i) a new citizenship notion be adopted; this is the critical-democratic-cosmopolitan notion of citizenship; (ii) the distinction between citizenship and character education be maintained or, in this case, reintroduced; (iii) the NIC consider putting an end to teaching about and recruiting for the RPF during the *Itorero* training for HSLs; and (iv) the NIC establish assessment mechanisms and develop instruments to measure civic growth among HSLs by investigating indicators, such as civic knowledge, civic attitudes and civic engagement.

In relation to the identification of the values education notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme, the present research reveals that in educating HSLs for values, *Itorero* is committed to all approaches of values education outlined in the academic literature. However, this research observes that the *Itorero* training for HSLs relies heavily on character education (the mean is 7.33; SD = .93). Other approaches, i.e., values clarification, cognitive moral development and care ethics are used to some extent. Their means are, respectively, 6.79 (SD = 1.26); 6.51 (SD = 1.41); and 6.43 (SD = 1.31).

The conclusion that the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs is strongly committed to character education is affirmed by all subgroups, with no variation. Variations were only observed about values clarification. In fact, in terms of gender, a statistically significant difference was identified between males and females in their rating of

values clarification (t_{977} = -3.269 where p<.05). Indeed, females ranked slightly higher values clarification than did males. Their respective means are 6.92 (SD = 1.17) and 6.66 (SD = 1.34). However, the effect size was proved small (Cohen's D score = 0.20). Another difference was identified on values clarification between the group age of 15-19 and the three age groups: 20-24; 25-29; 30-34, with F_{962} = 2.75 where p = .027, considering the Least Significant Difference (LSD). However, the effect size proved to be weak (η^2 = 0.01). In relation to marital status and training periods, there was no statistically significant difference found within subgroups in rating values education notions.

Character education has some advantages, albeit limited: it contributes to the transformation of the behavior and mindset of HSLs so that they can meet expectations of the Rwandan society; and it allows HSLs to know values and taboos of the Rwandan culture. This thesis shows, however, that overreliance on character education raises serious concerns, particularly because such an approach has been found deficient: it is perceived as 'indoctrination', and it is not deemed sustainable. It is not clear from the present study how the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs addresses these limitations pertaining to character education. Rather, what is noticeable is that values education as it is done in *Itorero* looks like the cultivation of supportive behavior towards the government in office; its content focuses on understanding what the government wants and the crafting of dispositions required for the implementation of defined policies. Therefore, there are strong reasons to believe that the *Itorero* for HSLs runs the risk of simply being a 'bag of virtues approach' or a 'fix-the-kid approach'.

What is again worrying is that so far no mechanism has been put in place by the NIC to establish the extent to which transmitted values have been internalized. In other words, so far there are no instruments developed specifically to assess the success of *Itorero* in educating HSLs for values.

In order to improve the values education notion at work in the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs, the present study suggests (i) engaging with care ethics and progressive approaches, i.e., cognitive moral development approach, and values clarification, while at the same time leaving aside their inherent weaknesses; (ii) introducing new approaches, such as cooperative and collaborative learning, scenario-based inquiry

and case studies, and experiential learning; (iii) developing assessment mechanisms and research instruments to measure the moral growth among HSLs (*Itorero* graduates in general) by means of indicators, such as moral reasoning (thoughts), moral affect (feelings), and moral behavior (actions); (iv) measuring the moral development among *Itorero* graduates mainly in universities by means of indicators, such as student academic diligence; school ambience; student-teacher relationships; and student-parent relationships; and (v) conducting values education and citizenship education *separately* in order to avoid confusion.

The present thesis also investigated attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards *Itorero* training. Such an endeavour was premised on the view that the training environment ethos and culture are immensely revealing; they implicitly teach some values and indirectly express the image of a good citizen being fostered. In other words, one could not adequately analyze *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs while ignoring HSLs' and trainers' assessment of practical issues, such as the content, the number and quality of trainers, the training environment and organization.

In relation to HSLs' assessment, the thesis shows that HSLs are satisfied with the content provided in *Itorero*; the mean for this factor is 10.92 (SD = 1.35), with scores ranging between 3 and 12. The factor 'content"'includes the knowledge of Rwandan values and taboos; the knowledge required to be a good Rwandan citizen; and the encouragement of critical thinking skills. However, the present study indicates that HSLs seem unhappy with trainers, the mean being 6.31 (SD = 1.36), with scores ranging between 2 and 8. This study notes that such a low rating is due to problems associated with the frequently defective moral character of trainers, i.e., the issue of sexual abuse and the use of harsh forms of corporal punishment. The situation deteriorates when it comes to the 'organization' where the mean is 5.45 (SD = 1.52) with scores ranging between 2 and 8. The training environment is no better; it has the mean of 4.82 (SD = 1.77) with scores ranging between 2 and 8. The factor 'organization' refers to the adequacy of the training duration and the encouragement of discussion and deliberation in the course of the training. As for the 'training environment' factor, it seeks to establish whether the accommodation is comfortable, and the food adequate.

The study demonstrates that – according to HSLs' perceptions – among the four factors (trainers, content, training environment, and organization), the best predictor of the success of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs is the factor 'trainers'. It correlates positively and significantly with the success of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs with the weight (β) of .33. The study shows that – according to HSLs perceptions – the factor 'content' is the second predictor; it correlates positively and significantly with the success of *Itorero* training (β = .27). In the third place comes the factor 'training environment' which also correlates positively and significantly with the success of *Itorero* training (β = .14). The inference from these findings is that, according to HSLs, in order to optimize the *Itorero* output, substantial emphasis should be placed – in order of importance – on trainers, the content and training environment.

The present study suggests improving the quality of trainers by (i) recruiting trainers who are experienced, mature, and of good character; (ii) training and evaluating trainers on an ongoing basis; (iii) increasing the number of female trainers; and (iv) monitoring and following up closely the *Itorero* training for HSLs so as to ensure its smooth running. It is also proposed that thorough investigation on the issue of sexual abuse be conducted for culprits to be identified, prosecuted, and victims be compensated; punishment involving or likely to lead to torture, human rights violations and abuses be banished; and disciplinary measures and mechanisms be developed.

With regard to content, this research suggests that: (i) the duration of the onsite training be extended from four days to three weeks to allow full coverage of the content on the program; (i) the content be organized in a more systematic way for easy delivery by trainers and easy assimilation by HSLs; (iii) all officially acceptable languages in Rwanda (French, English, and Kinyarwanda) be used – by way of code switching – in the course of the training; and (iv) the training program be communicated in a timely manner to allow enough preparation for trainers. Another suggestion is to enrich the content mainly on the history of Rwanda by visiting historical sites and museums.

As to the training environment, in order to improve on feeding, it is suggested that (i) the quantity of food be increased; (ii) HSLs be given ample time to enjoy their food;

and (iii) special meals be provided to HSLs on special diet. In order to improve on accommodation, this study notes that there is a need to have more training sites; dormitories have to be cleaned in advance; training sites that fail to meet the standard of cleanliness should not be made available, and the furniture to be used, such as beds, mattresses and buckets should be purchased in good quantity and well in advance. Besides, the present study suggests that hygiene and sanitation be considered as key criteria while selecting training sites. The availability of enough clean and drinking water, hygienic toilets and bathrooms should be determining factors in choosing training sites. Equally, well-equipped medical care facilities should be in place in order to treat eventual cases of illness among HSLs.

In relation to the organization, it is suggested that the idea of starting the *Itorero* training in high school and pursuing it during the end term and long term holidays be maintained. However, this study shows that the newly devised training formula raises the issue of transport for some HSLs who have to travel long distances. It is therefore recommended that the NIC establish easily accessible training sites or organizes transport for concerned HSLs. It is also proposed that the timetable be more user-friendly to allow HSLs assimilate and process the information received; and NIC considers giving HSLs the opportunity to exercise their right to religious freedom and expression in the course of the *Itorero* training.

Finally, the present study investigated the attitudes of trainers towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSL. It shows that according to trainers' perceptions, there are two variables with significant impact on the overall success of the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs. In order of importance these variables are: (i) HSLs' motivation ($\beta = .27$); and (ii) HSLs' prerequisites ($\beta = .21$).

In order to increase the motivation of HSLs, the study recommends the establishment of the '*Itorero* week' every year, in the course of which *Itorero* graduates would share their experiences of the benefits of *Itorero* training, and the NIC could send a clear message to all Rwandans on the mission and purpose of the *Itorero* scheme for HSLs. Furthermore, in order to raise the motivation of learners, it is suggested that the certificate issued at the end of the *Itorero* training be part of required documents for HSLs to enroll either in public or private institutions of higher learning in Rwanda.

As for HSLs' prerequisites, the present study notes that while HSLs have the requisite epistemological tools, prior to joining *Itorero*, their parents indoctrinate them with ethnocentric and xenophobic ideas. The present study therefore suggests that organizing and reinforcing *Itorero* for parents at the village level [*Umudugudu*] be considered as a matter of urgency.

In conclusion, the present study hopes to have contributed to knowledge production in relation to citizenship and values education in a number of ways. With regard to citizenship education, four findings are worth mentioning.

First, it is shown that though distinct, citizenship notions tend to go together – of course carrying different weight. In other words, the present study notes that citizenship notions are positively and significantly correlated (p = .00, α = .05). It is shown that there is a positive moderate correlation (r = .50) between the civic republican/communitarian and the cosmopolitan notions. In this regard, it is no surprise that in the present study the two notions closely follow each other. As a reminder, the civic republican/communitarian scale has a mean of 17.41 (SD = 1.99), while the cosmopolitan has a mean of 17.38 (SD = 2.23). However, this thesis reveals that there is a weak positive correlation between other pairs of citizenship notions (r < .50).

In particular, it is shown that the civic republican and the communitarian notions of citizenship are highly likely to go hand in hand. This confirms views of some researchers (Ciprut, 2008; Delanty, 2000; Gaus & Kukathas, 2004; Gonzales et al., 2004; Honohan, 2002; Van Steenbergen, 1994) who actually take civic republicanism as a variant of communitarianism.

Second, the study shows that post-genocide and post-conflict countries may tend to follow the civic republican and communitarian notions in educating adults for citizenship. This is the case of Armenia, Cambodia, Israel, and Rwanda. However, it is observable that after recovering from the genocide or conflict, these countries tend to move towards other citizenship notions, mainly the conventional democratic. As time goes by, these countries make a further move and embrace other notions: cosmopolitan and liberal.

Third, the present thesis has shown that countries that adopt the civic republican and communitarian notions of citizenship are tempted to conflate citizenship education and character education. The thesis argues that this is a problematic relationship and therefore inappropriate. This is the case of post-genocide Rwanda and Singapore.

Fourth, while research indicates that 'values-explicit' citizenship education is criticized for being biased and indoctrinating students (Kerr, 1999), only a limited number of studies have been conducted to substantiate this claim. The present thesis contributes to the existing literature on this topic. The thesis shows that by being 'values-explicit', *Itorero* conflates citizenship education and character education. Consequently, citizenship and values education as they are done in *Itorero* look like the cultivation of supportive behavior towards the government in office; they focus on understanding what the government wants and on the crafting of dispositions required for the implementation of defined policies. Hence *Itorero* training by inducting youth into citizenship education fails to avoid the main problems encountered by 'values-explicit' approaches, that is, bias and indoctrination of students.

In relation to values education, the study shows that all values education notions are positively and significantly correlated. A positive moderate correlation is found between values clarification and care ethics (r = 0.52). This finding is surprising, because while values clarification is a progressive approach, care ethics belongs to the traditionalist approach of values education. The implication is that the demarcation between traditionalist and progressive approaches might not be clear cut. Other pairs of values education notions are positively and weakly correlated ($r < 0.50$).

With regard to both citizenship and values education, the present research reveals that trainees – young people – might value most the quality of trainers. This raises the question of teachers or trainers preparation in citizenship and values education. The present research has shown that there is a tendency to neglect this aspect and assume that everyone can contribute to citizenship and values education. Hence the question becomes: Should trainers or teachers in citizenship and values education

be generalists or specialists? Is it trivial to envisage the initial and in-service training in citizenship and values education for trainers/teachers?

Trainers, on the other hand, tend to value most the motivation and prerequisites of learners. Here the motivation refers to individual characteristics of learners. In relation to prerequisites, this finding raises the question of the role of the family (parents) and peer groups in citizenship and values education. This thesis shows, however, that there are other contextual factors to consider for successfully conducting citizenship and values education. These are the content and the training environment.

Briefly, drawing on attitudes of HSLs and trainers towards the *Itorero* training scheme for HSLs, the present thesis contributes to the existing literature on the civic and citizenship contextual framework mainly that which developed by CIVED and ICCS (Schulz et al., 2008; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). In fact, the thesis reveals that there is a conglomeration of factors influencing the success of citizenship and values education. They include trainers' competencies; individual characteristics of trainees; family background or home environment of trainees; the wider community; the training environment; and prevailing government narratives and ideologies, i.e., the public discourse mainly in relation to political, economic, social, and cultural matters. The existence of various factors influencing citizenship and values education has also been pointed out by Quaynor (2015), who recommends willingness to look for civic influences beyond the civics classroom and the school.

The present thesis includes an account of the strengths and limitations of a non-formal traditional training program (*Itorero*) that inducts youth into citizenship education. The thesis shows that a distinct strength of *Itorero* is its content. On account of *Itorero* teaching, HSLs have a good command of Rwandan history, national development programs and priorities, and the *Ndi umunyarwanda* (I am a Rwandan') program. It is also shown that *Itorero*, at least in principle, enables HSLs to be liberated from ethnocentric ideologies prevalent in their families. *Itorero* also, to some extent, allows HSLs to be conversant with values and taboos of the Rwandan culture, and contributes to the transformation of their behaviour and mindset so that they can meet expectations of the Rwandan society. The thesis reveals, however, that by being committed to the civic republican and communitarian notions of

citizenship, *Itorero* conflates citizenship education with character education. Consequently, this non-formal traditional training program, in inducting youth into citizenship education fails to avoid the problems of traditional African education practices, chief among which is indoctrination, as opposed to 'reflective thinking'. Reference is made here to the use of *Itorero* partly as a platform to teach about and recruiting for the ruling political party – the RPF. In this regard, *Itorero* runs the risk of reducing 'good citizenship' to blind patriotism, unqualified loyalty and uncritical obedience to the ruling party. It is also shown that there are serious problems associated with the moral conduct of trainers, duration of the training, and the cleanliness of the training environment.

The present study could not exhaust the information on *Itorero* training in general and for HSLs in particular; hence it leads to other studies. A few of them are outlined here. First, it would be interesting to investigate the citizenship and values education notions that *Itorero* works with when it deals with other categories of Rwandans such as public servants, agents of the private sector, artists, journalists, and students in diaspora. This venue of research is important, precisely because the present study was limited only to the category of HSLs. Second, one might also investigate the citizenship notion at work in high school civic textbooks in post-genocide Rwanda. It would also be interesting to conduct a study on high school teachers' perceptions of the qualities of good citizenship in post-genocide Rwanda. Third, there is a need to investigate the community service carried out by HSLs and compare it to other practices in other parts of the world.

The present thesis has some limitations. First, the conceptual framework guiding the identification of citizenship and values education notions informing *Itorero* relies on a choice of items. Whether selected items are sufficiently exhaustive to measure the construct at hand – each citizenship or values education concept – is subject to debate. In other words, items that have been selected to represent civic republicanism, liberalism, communitarianism, cosmopolitanism, and radical democracy depend on the researcher's interpretation. A different researcher may come up with a different list of items, which suggests that the chosen criteria contain some blind spots. Although they render a number of issues visible, they arguably also fail to cover other important aspects. The same applies to the selection of criteria capturing the aims of values education approaches, i.e., character education,

care ethics, the cognitive-developmental approach and values clarification. In brief, the conceptual framework informing the present thesis is not claimed to be perfect, but invites critical debate – which is part and parcel of the give-and-take of scholarly disputation.

Second, it was not possible to meet all the assumptions pertaining to the multiple regression technique. In this regard, only multicollinearity and normal distribution of errors were met. Homoscedasticity, linearity and independence of errors were not achieved; an attempt was made to remove outliers by means of Mahalanobis and Cook's distance and little difference was observed. This might have affected the weight of the perfect model (R^2) obtained in the identification of the best predictor of the success of *Itorero* according to both high school leavers (37%) and *Itorero* trainers (18%). This situation suggests that there are other factors influencing the success of *Itorero* that the present study has not identified, which also calls for further investigation.

Third, the sample size of the present study was commensurate with the financial means available; it would have been better to have a wider coverage of the country mainly in relation to HSLs and trainers. Despite these two limitations, the present thesis has attempted to provide insights on citizenship and values education, particularly in post-conflict and post-genocide contexts.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Wits Ethics Clearance

Wits School of Education

27 St Andrews Road, Parktown, Johannesburg, 2193 Private Bag 3, Wits 2050, South Africa. Tel: +27 11 717-3064 Fax: +27 11 717-3100 E-mail: enquiries@educ.wits.ac.za Website: www.wits.ac.za

30 September 2014

Student Number: 721727

Protocol Number: 2014ECE020D

Dear Sylvestre Nzahabwanayo

Application for Ethics Clearance: Doctor of Philosophy

Thank you very much for your ethics application. The Ethics Committee in Education of the Faculty of Humanities, acting on behalf of the Senate, has considered your application for ethics clearance for your proposal entitled:

Citizenship education in post-genocide Rwanda: An analysis of Itorero training scheme for high school leavers

The committee recently met and I am pleased to inform you that clearance was granted.

Please use the above protocol number in all correspondence to the relevant research parties (schools, parents, learners etc.) and include it in your research report or project on the title page.

The Protocol Number above should be submitted to the Graduate Studies in Education Committee upon submission of your final research report.

All the best with your research project.

Yours sincerely,

M Mabeha

Wits School of Education

011 717-3416

Cc supervisors: Prof K Horsthemke and Dr T Mathebula

Appendix 2: Research Visa 1 from MINEDUC

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

Kigali, 06/10/2014
N°...353.../12.00/2014



MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
P.O.BOX 622 KIGALI

Re: Permission to carry out research in Rwanda - No: MINEDUC/S&T/265/2014

The Permission is hereby granted to **Mr. Sylvestre Nzahabwanayo**, Ph.D student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, to carry out research on**: "Citizenship Education in the Post-Genocide Rwanda: An analysis of Itorero Training Scheme for High School Leavers".**

The research will be carried out in Musanze and Gakenke districts, Northern Province; Kamonyi and Muhanga districts, Southern province; Rwamagana district, Eastern province; Rubavu and Nyabihu districts, Western province as well as Kigali City. The researcher will need access to relevant documents of National Itorero Commission. He will interview the officials National Itorero Commission. He will need also to interview the Itorero trainers at district level, High school leavers who completed Itorero training in 2014.

The period of research is **23rd September, 2014 to 22nd September, 2015**. It may be renewed if necessary, in which case a new permission will be sought by the researcher.

Please allow the **above mentioned researcher**, any help and support he might require to conduct this research.

Yours sincerely,

Remy TWIRINGIYIMANA
Ag. Director General,
Science, Technology and Research
Ministry of Education

Appendix 3: Research Visa 2 from MINEDUC

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

Kigali, ...06/10/2014

N°...2535...../12.00/2014

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
P.O.BOX 622 KIGALI

Mr. Sylvestre Nzahabwanayo
Ph.D Student
University of Witwatersrand
Johannesburg, South Africa
Tel: +250788548057
Email: nzahabwanayo@yahoo.fr

Re: Approval to conduct research in Rwanda under the project title: "Citizenship Education in the Post-Genocide Rwanda: An analysis of Itorero Training Scheme for High School Leavers".

I am pleased to attach a copy of research clearance, which has been granted to you to conduct research on the above title.

I wish to remind you that the research permit number should be cited in your final research report; the research should be carried out under affiliation of the University of Rwanda-College of Education, under supervision of **Prof. Wenceslas Nzabalirwa,** School of Education, UR-CE.

A copy of the final research report is to be given to the Ministry of Education of Rwanda.

I wish you success in your research.

Yours sincerely,

Remy TWIRINGIYIMANA
Ag. Director General,
Science Technology and Research
Ministry of Education

Cc.

- Minister of Education
- Minister of State in Charge of Primary and Secondary Education
- Minister of State in Charge of TVET
- Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education
- Prof. Wenceslas Nzabalirwa, School of Education, UR-CE

Appendix 4: Authorization from Nyarugenge district

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

kigali.13../11../..2014
Réf:...560.03....

KIGALI CITY
NYARUGENGE DISTRICT

TO:Sylyvestre NZAHABWANAYO
TEL:(250) 788548057
RE: Acceptence for permission to conduct a Research in Nyarugenge District

This comes to inform you that you have been accepted to conduct your research in Nyarugenge District **"Citizenship Education in Post-Genocide Rwanda:An Analysis of the Itorero Training Scheme for High School Leavers"**as requested in your application letter.

You will be expected to have maximum co-operation with the heads of Departement and participate as requested to. We hope your stay with us will be of great help to your academic knowledge.

Yours sincerely.

MUTWARA KAHIGA Ezra

Executive Secretary of Nyarugenge District
CC

-Mayor of Nyarugenge District
-Vice –Mayor in charge of Economic Development

B.P 1092 Kigali E-mail : nyarugengedistrict@minaloc.gov.rw, website : www.nyarugengedistrict.gov.rw

Appendix 5: Authorization from Gasabo district

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

December 18th ,2014
Ref.No:.....
3069/070702/2014

CITY OF KIGALI
GASABO DISTRICT
WEBSITE : www.gasabo.gov.rw
E-mail : info@gasabo.gov.rw
B.P. 7066 KIGALI.

SYLVESTRE NZAHABWANAYO
University of Witwatersrand
Tel: 0788548057

Dear Mr. Sylvester

Re: Approval for your Request

Reference is made to your letter dated 08th December 2014, requesting a permission to carry out research in Gasabo District.

I'm happy to inform you that, the permission you requested is granted, however, remember to liaise with Itorero Coordinator (+250788735318) to get some briefings on the terrain and situation in general. If there are any questions, please contact my office on +250 788517651.

Sincerely yours;

MASOZERA G. Pierre

Mayor of Gasabo District

AKARERE KA GASABO

Appendix 6: Authorization from Kicukiro district

1REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

Kicukiro, December 11 2014
Ref N°...1167.../07.01.03.05/2014

CITY OF KIGALI
KICUKIRO DISTRICT

Mr. Sylivestre NZAHABWANAYO

University of the Witwatersrand

e-mail:nzahabwanayo@yahoo.fr

Phone: 07885448057

R E: Permission to carry out Survey

Dear Sir,

With reference of your letter requesting the permission to carry out data collection in Kicukiro District regarding to write your Final year project to fill all requirement in PHD of Education at University of Witwatersrand «**Citizenship Education in post-Genocide Rwanda: An analysis of Itorero training scheme for high School leavers**» I have pleasure to inform that you are authorized to carry out your Data collection and you must submit the draft of result before to publish the final finding to the Kicukiro District.

Any assistance rendered to you will be highly appreciated.

Best Regard,

AKARERE KA KICUKIRO

Paul Jules NDAMAGE

Mayor of Kicukiro

Cc: - Vice Mayor (All)

- Executive Secretary of Kicukiro
- Statistics Department

Kicukiro District website: www.kicukiro.gov.rw e-mail: kicukiro@kicukiro.gov.rw

Appendix 7: Questionnaire for HSLs

Uburere mboneragihugu n'uburere mu ndangagaciro mu Rwanda rwo hanyuma ya jenoside: Isesengura ry'*Itorero* rigenewe abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye

Citizenship and Values Education in the Post-Genocide Rwanda: An Analysis of the Itorero Training Scheme for High School Leavers

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Igice cya mbere / *Part 1*

Urutonde rw'ibibazo bigenewe abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye

Questionnaire for High School Leavers

Igika cya mbere: Umwirondoro / *Section 1: Personal Identification*

Izina rya Kaminuza / *Name of the University*:

Igitsina / *Gender*: Gabo / *Male* □ Gore / *Female*: □

Imyaka / *Age*: .....

Urwego rwo gushaka / *Marital status*: Ingaragu / *Single* □ Uwashatse / *Married* □

Natojwe mu mwaka w': ...../ ***I underwent Itorero training in the year* :……..**

Igika cya kabili: Ibibazo / *Section 2: Questions*

Ikibazo cya mbere: Ushingiye ku nyigisho wahawe igihe watozwaga, mu nteruro zikurikira, ni iyihe ivuga neza kuba umunyagihugu mwiza – umunyarwanda mwiza? Koresha uru rwego:
Question 1: Based on the instructions you received during Itorero training, which of the following statements best describes being a good citizen – a good Rwandan? Use the following scale to express your opinion (Tick √):

1 = Ndabihakanye cyane / *Strongly disagree*	2 = Ndabihakanye / *Disagree*	3 = Ndabyemeye / *Agree*	4 = Ndabyemeye cyane / *Strongly agree*

Kuba umunyagihugu mwiza – umunyarwanda mwiza - bivuga / *Being a good citizen – a good Rwandan - involves*:	**Ndabihakanye cyane** / *Strongly disagree*	**Ndabihakanye** / *Disagree*	**Ndabyemeye** / *Agree*	**Ndabyemeye cyane** / *Strongly agree*
1. Kuba icyitegererezo / *Being the role model.*	1	2	3	4
2. Kurutisha inyungu rusange izawe bwite / *Placing public interests above self-centred ones.*	1	2	3	4
3. Kuzuza neza inshingano zawe no gukora neza imirimo ushinzwe / *Fulfilling one's duties and responsibilities.*	1	2	3	4
4. Kubaha Leta n'amabwiriza yayo yose / *Being loyal to the state.*	1	2	3	4
5. Kuba umusirikare */ Serving in the military.*	1	2	3	4
6. Kubaha indangagaciro shingiro z'igihugu cyawe / *Respecting core values of one's community*.	1	2	3	4
7. Kurinda – kubungabunga ibikorwa rusange by'aho utuye / *Preserving the community's common good*.	1	2	3	4
8. Gushira ubwenegihugu – ubunyarwanda - imbere y'andi masano */ Putting the national identity above all other identities or affiliations.*	1	2	3	4
9. Guteza imbere imibereho y'abatishoboye / *Improving the welfare of those in need*.	1	2	3	4
10. Guharanira inyungu zawe bwite gusa buri gihe / *Pursuing only and always one's private interests.*	1	2	3	4

Kuba umunyagihugu mwiza – umunyarwanda mwiza bivuga / *Being a good citizen involves*:	Ndabihakanye cyane / *Strongly disagree*	Ndabihakanye / *Disagree*	Ndabyemeye / *Agree*	Ndabyemeye cyane / *Strongly agree*
11. Kuryoherwa gusa n'uburenganzira ufite n'ibindi wemerewe n'amategeko / *Enjoying one's rights and privileges.*	1	2	3	4
12. Kubahiriza amategeko / *Obeying the law.*	1	2	3	4
13. Kugira ubushishozi bwo gusuzuma no kunonosora ibitekerezo / *Having the ability to question ideas.*	1	2	3	4
14. Kwiyumva nk'umuturage w'isi yose / *Viewing oneself as a member of the world community.*	1	2	3	4
15. Kurwanya akarengane gakorerwa ikiremwa muntu aho utuye / *Fighting human rights violations locally*.	1	2	3	4
16. Kurwanya akarengane gakorerwa ikiremwa muntu ku isi hose / *Fighting human rights violations globally*.	1	2	3	4
17. Kwita ku bidukikije no kubirengera / *Protecting and preserving the environment.*	1	2	3	4
18. Kugira uruhare rugaragara muri politike / *Participating actively in politics.*	1	2	3	4
19. Kubahiriza uburenganzira bwa rubanda nto – nk'abasigajwe inyuma n'amateka / *Respecting minority groups.*	1	2	3	4
20. Kuba umunyamuryango w'umutwe wa politiki / *Joining a political party*.	1	2	3	4
21. Kwitabira amatora yose yateguwe na guverinoma / *Participating in all elections organized by the government (local and national)*	1	2	3	4

<u>Ikibazo cya kabili</u>: Ushingiye ku nyigisho wahawe igihe watozwaga, ubona ari iyihe ntego uburere mu ndangagaciro butangirwa mu *Itorero* buharanira? Koresha urwego rukurikira:
<u>Question 2</u>: Based on the teaching you received, which of the following does the values education provided during Itorero training mostly aim at? Use the following scale (Tick √):

1 = Ndabihakanye cyane / *Strongly disagree*	2 = Ndabihakanye / *Disagree*	3 = Ndabyemeye / *Agree*	4 = Ndabyemeye cyane / *Strongly agree*

Uburere mu ndangagaciro butangirwa mu *Itorero* buharanira / *Values education provided during the Itorero training mostly aims to:*	**Ndabihakanye cyane** / *Strongly disagree*	**Ndabihakanye** / *Disagree*	**Ndabyemeye** / *Agree*	***Ndabyemeye cyane* /** *Strongly agree*
1. Gutanga ibisabwa kugira ngo uwigishwa abe ntamakemwa / *Providing what is needed for the learner to be irreproachable.*	1	2	3	*4*
2. Kwigisha indangagaciro shingiro z'umuryango nyarwanda / *Teach the learner core values of the Rwandan community*.	1	2	3	4
3. Kubwira uwigishwa kirazira z'umuryango nyarwanda / *Tell the learner taboos/interdictions of the Rwandan community*.	1	2	3	4
4. Kwigisha kwita ku bandi / *Teach the learner to care for others*.	1	2	3	4
5. Kwigisha kuvugisha no kumva abandi / *Teach the learner how to speak and listen to others.*	1	2	3	4
6. Gutyaza imitekerereze y'uwigishwa / *Develop the learner's reasoning capacities.*	1	2	3	4
7. Gutyaza ubushishozi mu myitwarire y'uwigishwa / *Develop the learner's moral judgement.*	1	2	3	4
8. Kwigisha guhitamo neza mu buryo butandukanye bwo kubaho / *Initiate the learner to choose freely among alternative ways of life.*	1	2	3	4
9. Kwigisha kureba mbere na mbere ingaruka mbere yo guhitamo icyo gukora / *Initiate the learner to measure consequences of his/her actions*.	1	2	3	4

<u>Ikibazo cya gatatu</u>: Ukoresheje uru rwego, vuga uko wemera interuro zikurikira ku *Itorero* ry'abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye:

<u>Question 3</u>: According to this scale, please express your level of agreement with regard to following statements on the Itorero training scheme for high school leavers (Tick √):

1 = Ndabihakanye cyane / *Strongly disagree*	2 = Ndabihakanye / *Disagree*	3 = Ndabyemeye / *Agree*	4 = Ndabyemeye cyane / *Strongly agree*

Interuro / *Statements*	**Ndabihakanye cyane /** *Strongly Disagree*	**Ndabihakanye** / *Disagree*	**Ndabyemeye** / *Agree*	***Ndabyemeye cyane /*** *Strongly agree*
1. Muri rusange *Itorero* ryagenze neza / *Overall, the Itorero training was a success.*	1	2	3	4
2. Amasomo nahawe yamfashije kumenya icyo nsabwa kugira ngo mbe umunyarwanda mwiza / *The content provided allowed me to know what it takes to be a good Rwandan citizen.*	1	2	3	4
3. Amasomo yamfashije kumenya neza indangagaciro na kirazira by'umuco nyarwanda / *The content gave me better knowledge of Rwandan values and interdictions.*	1	2	3	4
4. Abatoza bakoresheje uburyo bunoze mu gutanga amasomo / *Trainers used appropriate approaches to deliver the content.*	1	2	3	4
5. Umubare w'abatoza wari uhagije / *The number of trainers was sufficient.*	1	2	3	4

6. Narimfite impamba y'ubumenyi ihagije yamfashije kumva neza amasomo / *I had the required prerequisites to understand the content.*	1	2	3	4
7. Nabangamiwe n'umubare mwinshi w'abantu twari kumwe mu *Itorero / I was inconvenienced by the large number of participants.*	1	2	3	4
8. Aho natorejwe hari heza mu byerekeye imirire / *The training environment in terms of food was adequate.*	1	2	3	4
9. Aho natorejwe hari heza mu byerekeye uburyamo / *The accommodation provided was comfortable.*	1	2	3	4
10. Igihe – uburambe – bwo gutozwa bwari buhagije / *The duration allocated to the training was adequate.*	1	2	3	4
11. Mu gutozwa, kujya impaka no kuganira byahawe umwanya uhagije / *The training encouraged discussion and deliberation*.	1	2	3	4
12. The training enhanced my critical thinking skills / *Gutozwa byatumye nshobora gutyaza imitekerereze yanjye*.	1	2	3	4

<u>Ikibazo cya kane:</u> Kubwawe ubona hari ibibazo bijyanye no gutoza urubyiruko rurangije amashuri yisumbuye?
<u>Question 4</u>: In your opinion, does the Itorero training scheme for high school leavers have some challenges? (Tick √)

Yego / *Yes*		Oya / *No*	

Niba ari yego, tubwire ibyo bibazo, ingamba zafatwa, n'uwashyira mu bikorwa izo ngamba / *If yes, what are those challenges and what strategies do you suggest in order to overcome them? Who should implement those strategies? /*

Ibibazo / *Challenges*	Ingamba / *Strategies*	Uwashyira mu bikorwa izo ngamba / *The one to implement suggested strategies*
1.	1.	1.
2.	2.	2.
3.	3.	3.

<u>Ikibazo cya gatanu</u>: Icyo wakunze cyane mu gotozwa ni ikihe? Icyo wagaye cyane ni ikihe?
<u>Question 5</u>: What did you enjoy most in the training? What did you dislike most in the training?

Nakunze cyane ibi bikurikira / *I enjoyed mostly the following*:	Nanenze ibi ibikurikira / *I disliked the following*:
1.	1.
2.	2.
3.	3.

Murakoze cyane / *Thank you!*

Appendix 8: Questionnaire for district trainers

Citizenship and Values Education in the Post-Genocide Rwanda: An Analysis of the *Itorero* Training Scheme for High School Leavers

Uburere mboneragihugu n'uburere mu ndangagaciro mu Rwanda rwo hanyuma ya jenoside: Isesengura ry'Itorero rigenewe abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye

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Part 2 / *Igice cya kabili*

Questionnaire for district trainers

Urutonde rw'ibibazo bigenewe Abatoza ku rwego rw'Akarere

Section 1: Personal Identification / *Umwirondoro*

1. **Name of the District** / ***Akarere***:

2. **Gende**r / ***Igitsina***: Male / *Gabo* □ Female / *Gore*: □

3. **Age / *Imyaka***: …….

4. **Marital status**: Single / *Ingaragu* □ Married / *Uwashatse* □

5. **Highest level of formal education / *Amashuri ya nyuma wize*:**

   High school diploma / *Dipolome ya segonderi* □ Bachelors' degree / Lisansi □

   Masters /Masitazi □ PhD / Dogitora □

   Other (write) / *Ayandi (yandike)*…….....

6. **Field of study (write) / *Ibyo wize (byandike)*:**

7. **Is your field of study related to citizenship and values education? / *Ese ibyo wize bifitanye isano n'uburere mboneragihugu n'uburere mu ndangagaciro?***

   Yes / *Yego* □ No / *Oya* □

8. **For how long have you been an *Itorero* trainer? / *Wabaye umutoza kuva ryari?***
   1 year / *Umwaka 1* □ 2 years / *Imyaka 2* □ 3 years / *Imyaka 3* □
   4 years / *Imyaka 4* □ 5 years / *Imyaka 5* □ More than 5 years / *Birenze imyaka 5* □

9. **Have you received training in citizenship education? / *Ese wahawe amahugurwa ku bijyanye n'uburere mboneragihugu?***
   Yes / *Yego* □ Oya / *No* □

10. **Have you received training in values education? / *Ese wahawe amahugurwa bu bijyanye n'uburere mu ndangagaciro?***

    Yes / *Yego* □ No / *Oya* □

Section 2

Question 1: Using this scale, kindly express your opinion on the following statements about the *Itorero* training phase for high school leavers (Tick √). / *Ukoresheje uru rwego, vuga uko wemera interuro zikurikira ku Itorero ry'abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye:*

1 = Strongly disagree *Ndabihakanye cyane*	2 = Disagree *Ndabihakanye*	3 = Agree *Ndabyemeye*	4 = Strongly agree *Ndabyemeye cyane*

Statements / *Interuro*	**Strongly Disagree *Ndabikanye cyane***	**Disagree *Ndabihakanye***	**Agree *Ndabyemeye***	**Strongly Agree *Ndabyemeye cyane***
1. Overall, the *Itorero* training for high school leavers is a success */ Muri rusange Itorero ryagenewe abarangije amashuri yisumbuye rigenda neza.*	1	2	3	4
2. Training manuals are available and well elaborated / *Ibitabo mfashanyigisho birahari kandi byanditse neza*.	1	2	3	4
3. I receive regular training to upgrade my knowledge and teaching skills in citizenship and values education / *Kenshi na kenshi mpabwa amahugurwa yo gutyaza ubumenyi mu bijyanye no kwigisha uburere mboneragihugu n'indangagaciro.*	1	2	3	4
4. I am happy with the remuneration I get for the work done / *Nishimiye agahimbaza musyi cg umushahara mpabwa.*	1	2	3	4
5. High school leavers are motivated in attending the training / *Abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye bakurikirana igikorwa cyo gutozwa bafite umwete n'ubushake*.	1	2	3	4

6. High school leavers have required prerequisites to undergo the training successfully and as required / *Abatozwa bafite impamba y'ubumenyi ihagije ibafasha kumva neza amasomo.*	1	2	3	4
7. The class size is manageable / *Umubare w'abatozwa cg ubwinshi bwabo burahagije*.	1	2	3	4
8. The training environment is conducive / *Aho gutorezwa ni heza kandi harakwiye; hatuma igikorwa kigenda neza*.	1	2	3	4
9. The duration of the training is adequate / *Igihe cyagenewe gutozwa kirahagije*.	1	2	3	4
10. The training encourages discussion and deliberation / *Mu gutozwa, kujya impaka no kuganira bihabwa umwanya uhagije*.	1	2	3	4
11. The training enhances critical thinking skills of high school leavers / *Gutoza bifasha abatozwa gutyaza imitekerereze yabo.*	1	2	3	4
12. I contribute in the evaluation and impact assessment of the *Itorero* training phase / *Ngira uruhare mu gusuzuma no kugenzura akamaro k'igikorwa cyo gutoza abana barangije amashuri yisumbuye.*	1	2	3	4

Question 2: In your opinion, does the *Itorero* training scheme for high school leavers have some challenges? (Tick √) / *Kubwawe ubona hari ibibazo bijyanye no gutoza urubyiruko rurangije amashuri yisumbuye?*

Yes / *Yego*		No / *Oya*	

If yes, what are those challenges and what strategies do you suggest to overcome them? Who should implement those strategies? / *Niba ari yego, tubwire ibyo bibazo, ingamba zafatwa, n'uwashira mu bikorwa izo ngamba:*

Challenges / *ibibazo*	Strategies / *Ingamba*	The one to implement suggested strategies / *Uwashira mu bikorwa izo ngamba*
1.	1.	1.
2.	2.	2.
3.	3.	3.
4.	4.	4.

Thank you! / *Murakoze*.

Appendix 9: Interview guide for district trainers

Uburere mboneragihugu n'uburere mu ndangagaciro mu Rwanda rwo hanyuma ya jenoside: Isesengura ry'*Itorero* rigenewe abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye

Citizenship and Values Education in the Post Genocide Rwanda: An Analysis of the Itorero Training Scheme for High School Leavers

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Igice cya gatatu / *Part 3*

Urutonde rw'ibibazo by'ikiganiro mvugo n'abatoza bo ku Karere / *Interview guide for Itorero district trainers*

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1. Mushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, mwumva kuba umunyagihugu mwiza – umunyarwanda mwiza bivuze iki? / *Based on the teaching dispensed in Itorero, how would you describe good citizenship? What does it mean to be a good citizen – a good Rwandan?*

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2. Mushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, mubona ari iyihe ntego uburere mboneragihugu buhatangirwa buharanira? *What does citizenship education provided in Itorero mostly aim at?*

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3. Mushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, mubona ari iyihe ntego uburere mu ndangagaciro buhatangirwa buharanira? *What does values education provided in Itorero aim at?*

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4. Kubwanyu mubona hari ibibazo bijyanye no gutoza urubyiruko rurangije amashuri yisumbuye? Ibyo bibazo byafatirwa ngamba ki? Izo ngamba ni nde wazishyira mu bikorwa? / *In your opinion, does the Itorero training scheme for high school leavers have some challenges? What would you suggest to overcome them? Who should implement strategies you are suggesting?*

***Ibibazo* / Challenges**	***Ingamba* / Strategies**	***Uwashyira mu bikorwa izo ngamba* / The one to implement suggested strategies**
1.	1.	1.
2.	2.	2.
3.	3.	3.
4.	4.	4.

Thank you! *Murakoze*

Appendix 10: Interview guide for NIC officials

Uburere mboneragihugu n'uburere mu ndangagaciro mu Rwanda rwo hanyuma ya jenoside: Isesengura ry'*Itorero* rigenewe abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye

Citizenship and Values Education in the Post Genocide Rwanda: An Analysis of the Itorero Training Scheme for High School Leavers

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Igice cya kane / Part 4

Urutonde rw'ibibazo by'ikiganiro mvugo n'abakozi ba Komisiyo ishizwe Itorero ry'igihugu / *Interview guide for National Itorero Commission Officials*

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1. Mushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, mwumva kuba umunyagihugu mwiza – umunyarwanda mwiza bivuze iki? / *Based on the teaching dispensed in Itorero, how would you describe good citizenship? What does it mean to be a good citizen – a good Rwandan?*

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2. Mushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, mubona ari iyihe ntego uburere mboneragihugu buhatangirwa buharanira? *What does citizenship education provided in Itorero mostly aim at?*

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3. Mushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, mubona ari iyihe ntego uburere mu ndangagaciro buhatangirwa buharanira? *What does values education provided in Itorero mostly aim at?*

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4. Mubona hari ibibazo bijyanye no gutoza urubyiruko rurangije amashuri yisumbuye? Ibyo bibazo byafatirwa ngamba ki? Izo ngamba ni nde wazishyira mu bikorwa? / *In your opinion, does the Itorero training scheme for high school leavers have some challenges? What would you suggest to overcome them? Who should implement strategies you are suggesting?*

Challenges /*Ibibazo*	**Strategies / *Ingamba***	**The one to implement suggested strategies / *Uwashyira mu bikorwa izo ngamba***
1.	1.	1.
2.	2.	2.
3.	3.	3.
4.	4.	4.

Thank you! *Murakoze*

Appendix 11: Guiding questions for focus group discussions with HSLs

Uburere mboneragihugu n'uburere mu ndangagaciro mu Rwanda rwo hanyuma ya jenoside: Isesengura ry'*Itorero* rigenewe abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye

Citizenship and Values Education in the Post Genocide Rwanda: An Analysis of the Itorero Training Scheme for High School Leavers

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Igice cya gatanu / Part 5

***Urutonde rw'ibibazo by'ikiganiro mvugo n'abanyeshuri barangije amashuri yisumbuye* / Guiding questions for focus group discussion with high school leavers**

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1. Iyo wumvise ijambo "*Itorero*", ni iki uhita utekereza? / *When you hear the word "Itorero", what first comes to your mind?*

2. Ushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, kuba umunyagihugu mwiza – umunyarwanda mwiza bivuze iki? / *Based on the teaching dispensed in Itorero, how would you describe good citizenship? What does it mean to be a good citizen – a good Rwandan?*

3. Ushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, ubona ari iyihe ntego uburere mboneragihugu buhatangirwa buharanira? *What does citizenship education provided in Itorero mostly aim at?*

4. Ushingiye ku nyigisho zitangirwa mu *Itorero*, ubona ari iyihe ntego uburere mu ndangagaciro buhatangirwa buharanira? *What does values education provided in Itorero mostly aim at?*

5. Ese ubona hari ibibazo bijyanye no gutoza urubyiruko rurangije amashuri yisumbuye? Ibyo bibazo byafatirwa ngamba ki? Izo ngamba ni nde wazishyira mu bikorwa? / *In your opinion, does the Itorero training scheme for high school leavers have some challenges? What would you suggest to overcome them? Who should implement strategies you are suggesting?*

Ibibazo / Challenges	*Ingamba* / Strategies	*Uwashyira mu bikorwa izo ngamba* /The one to implement suggested strategies
1.	1.	1.

6. Watubwira ibyo wakunze cyane n'ibyo wagaye cyane igihe watozwaga? *What did you like most in the training? What did you dislike most?*

Thank you / *Murakoze*

Appendix 12: Samples of SPSS outputs

1. PCA on the description of a good citizen

Rotated Component Matrix[a]

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
FIGHTING HR VIOL GLOBALLY	.669	.122		
FIGHTING HR VIOL LOCALLY	.637		.187	
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT	.525	.219	.276	
QUESTIONNING IDEAS	.503	.257		.289
REDUCING SOCIAL INEQUALITIES	.483	.108	.380	.186
RESPECTING MINORITY GROUPS	.450	.224	.267	
JOINING A POLITICAL PARTY		.738		
PARTICIPATING IN ALL ELECTIONS	.184	.575	.234	
PARTICIPATING IN POLITICS	.113	.543		.286
SERVING IN THE MILITARY	.123	.467		
PUTTING NATIONAL IDENTITY ABOVE	.116	.319	.256	
OBEYING THE LAW	.165	.353	.491	
BEING LOYAL TO THE STATE	-.137	.449	.481	
PRESERVING CTY'S COMMON GOOD	.295		.444	
BEING THE ROLE MODEL			.429	.196
PLACING PUBLIC INTERESTS ABOVE		-.165	.425	-.111
RESPECTING CTY'S CORE VALUES	.179		.360	
PURSUING ONE'S PRIVATE INTERESTS	-.144	-.133		.601
ENJOYING RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES		.287		.588
FULFILLING DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	.267		.345	.445
MEMBER OF WORLD CTY	.425	.174	-.139	.425

2. PCA on the description of aims of values education

Rotated Component Matrix[a]

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
REASONING CAPACITIES	.848			
MORAL JUDGEMENT	.686	.366		
CARING	.521	.116	.198	.416
MEASURE CONSEQU		.821	.119	.137
CHOOSE AMONG ALTERNATIVES	.264	.732		.153
TABOOS			.791	.319
CORE VALUES		.266	.782	-.226
SPEAK AND LISTEN		.235		.867

3. PCA on HSLs' attitudes

Rotated Component Matrix[a]

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
RDAN VALUES AND TABOOS	.818		.129	
GOOD RDAN	.810		.239	
CRITICAL THINKINS SKILLS	.750	.118		.223
ACCOMODATION CONFORTABLE		.857		.182
FOOD ADEQUATE		.850	.195	
TRAINERS SUFFICIENT		.121	.806	.294
APPROPRIATE APPROACHES	.305	.189	.787	
DURATION ADEQUATE		.134		.842
DISCUSSION AND DELIBERATION	.195		.249	.648

4. Descriptive statistics outputs

Descriptive Statistics for scales on the description of a good citizen

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness		Kurtosis	
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
Civic Rep Commun citizen	996	9	20	17.41	1.996	-.764	.077	.633	.155
Cosmopolitan Citizen	996	7	20	17.38	2.234	-1.087	.077	1.848	.155
Radical Democratic citizen	996	2	16	10.45	2.581	-.168	.077	-.313	.155
Liberal citizen	996	2	12	8.47	1.912	-.319	.077	-.120	.155
Valid N (listwise)	996								

Descriptive Statistics for scales on aims of values education

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness		Kurtosis	
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
Character education	996	3	8	7.33	.937	-1.504	.077	2.517	.155
Values clarification	996	0	8	6.79	1.267	-1.273	.077	2.179	.155
Cognitive moral development	996	0	8	6.51	1.415	-1.063	.077	1.511	.155
Care ethics	996	2	8	6.43	1.319	-.871	.077	.994	.155
Valid N (listwise)	996								

Descriptive Statistics for scales on high school leavers' attitudes

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness		Kurtosis	
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
Content	995	3	12	10.92	1.354	-1.519	.078	3.187	.155
Trainers	992	2	8	6.31	1.369	-.720	.078	.474	.155
Organization	987	2	8	5.45	1.520	-.225	.078	-.309	.156
Enviro	993	2	8	4.82	1.775	.005	.078	-.799	.155
Valid N (listwise)	979								

5. Comparison of scales on the description of a good citizen according to gender

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Civic Rep Commun citizen	Equal variances assumed	2.077	.150	-.502	989	.616	-.063	.126	-.311	.184
	Equal variances not assumed			-.503	987.078	.615	-.063	.126	-.311	.184
Cosmopolitan Citizen	Equal variances assumed	1.090	.297	.196	989	.845	.028	.142	-.251	.307
	Equal variances not assumed			.196	988.241	.845	.028	.142	-.251	.307
Radical Democratic citizen	Equal variances assumed	.000	.996	-3.025	989	.003	-.494	.163	-.815	-.174
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.026	988.982	.003	-.494	.163	-.815	-.174
Liberal citizen	Equal variances assumed	.044	.835	.312	989	.755	.038	.122	-.201	.277
	Equal variances not assumed			.312	988.576	.755	.038	.122	-.201	.277

6. Comparison of scales on the description of aims of values education according to gender

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Cognitive moral development	Equal variances assumed	.517	.472	-.641	989	.522	-.058	.090	-.234	.119
	Equal variances not assumed			-.641	988.890	.522	-.058	.090	-.234	.119
Values clarification	Equal variances assumed	13.402	.000	-3.264	989	.001	-.262	.080	-.419	-.104
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.269	977.915	.001	-.262	.080	-.419	-.105
Character education	Equal variances assumed	.557	.455	-.800	989	.424	-.048	.060	-.165	.069
	Equal variances not assumed			-.800	987.443	.424	-.048	.060	-.165	.069
Care ethics	Equal variances assumed	1.422	.233	-1.631	989	.103	-.137	.084	-.301	.028
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.633	984.861	.103	-.137	.084	-.301	.028

7. Comparison of scales on attitudes of HSLs according to training periods

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Content	Between Groups	.263	2	.131	.072	.931
	Within Groups	1802.485	984	1.832		
	Total	1802.748	986			
Enviro	Between Groups	30.301	2	15.150	4.830	.008
	Within Groups	3080.170	982	3.137		
	Total	3110.471	984			
Trainers	Between Groups	3.784	2	1.892	1.005	.366
	Within Groups	1849.154	982	1.883		
	Total	1852.938	984			
Organization	Between Groups	5.739	2	2.869	1.237	.291
	Within Groups	2264.706	976	2.320		
	Total	2270.445	978			

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable		(I) Training period	(J) Training period	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Content	Tukey HSD	2014	2013	-.023	.147	.987	-.37	.32
			Others	-.053	.159	.941	-.42	.32
		2013	2014	.023	.147	.987	-.32	.37
			Others	-.030	.097	.950	-.26	.20
		Others	2014	.053	.159	.941	-.32	.42
			2013	.030	.097	.950	-.20	.26
	LSD	2014	2013	-.023	.147	.877	-.31	.27
			Others	-.053	.159	.740	-.36	.26
		2013	2014	.023	.147	.877	-.27	.31
			Others	-.030	.097	.760	-.22	.16
		Others	2014	.053	.159	.740	-.26	.36
			2013	.030	.097	.760	-.16	.22
Enviro	Tukey HSD	2014	2013	-.088	.193	.892	-.54	.36
			Others	-.460	.208	.070	-.95	.03
		2013	2014	.088	.193	.892	-.36	.54
			Others	-.372*	.128	.010	-.67	-.07
		Others	2014	.460	.208	.070	-.03	.95
			2013	.372*	.128	.010	.07	.67
	LSD	2014	2013	-.088	.193	.648	-.47	.29
			Others	-.460*	.208	.027	-.87	-.05
		2013	2014	.088	.193	.648	-.29	.47

			Others	-.372*	.128	.004	-.62	-.12
		Others	2014	.460*	.208	.027	.05	.87
			2013	.372*	.128	.004	.12	.62
Trainers	Tukey HSD	2014	2013	.140	.150	.618	-.21	.49
			Others	.018	.161	.993	-.36	.40
		2013	2014	-.140	.150	.618	-.49	.21
			Others	-.122	.099	.431	-.35	.11
		Others	2014	-.018	.161	.993	-.40	.36
			2013	.122	.099	.431	-.11	.35
	LSD	2014	2013	.140	.150	.350	-.15	.44
			Others	.018	.161	.910	-.30	.33
		2013	2014	-.140	.150	.350	-.44	.15
			Others	-.122	.099	.216	-.32	.07
		Others	2014	-.018	.161	.910	-.33	.30
			2013	.122	.099	.216	-.07	.32
Organization	Tukey HSD	2014	2013	.218	.167	.394	-.17	.61
			Others	.283	.180	.259	-.14	.71
		2013	2014	-.218	.167	.394	-.61	.17
			Others	.065	.110	.825	-.19	.32
		Others	2014	-.283	.180	.259	-.71	.14
			2013	-.065	.110	.825	-.32	.19
	LSD	2014	2013	.218	.167	.193	-.11	.55
			Others	.283	.180	.117	-.07	.64
		2013	2014	-.218	.167	.193	-.55	.11
			Others	.065	.110	.555	-.15	.28

	Others	2014	-.283	.180	.117	-.64	.07
		2013	-.065	.110	.555	-.28	.15

8. Regression on HSLs attitudes

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.607[a]	.369	.366	.569	.369	142.954	4	978	.000

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	185.130	4	46.282	142.954	.000[b]
	Residual	316.634	978	.324		
	Total	501.763	982			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.193	.150		1.281	.201		
	CONTENT	.145	.015	.275	9.614	.000	.790	1.266
	TRAINING ENVIRONMENT	.056	.011	.138	5.002	.000	.846	1.182
	TRAINERS	.180	.016	.345	11.279	.000	.688	1.454
	ORGANIZATION	.018	.013	.038	1.330	.184	.811	1.234

a. Dependent Variable: ITORERO A SUCCESS

9. Backward stepwise regression on trainers' attitudes

Model Summary[c]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.383[a]	.147	.139	.889
2	.426[b]	.181	.167	.875

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	15.772	1	15.772	19.953	.000[b]
	Residual	91.694	116	.790		
	Total	107.466	117			
2	Regression	19.494	2	9.747	12.741	.000[c]
	Residual	87.972	115	.765		
	Total	107.466	117			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Correlations		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Zero-order	Partial	Part
1	(Constant)	1.546	.441		3.504	.001	.672	2.420			
	HSLs are motivated	.553	.124	.383	4.467	.000	.308	.799	.383	.383	.383
2	(Constant)	.857	.535		1.601	.112	-.203	1.916			
	HSLs are motivated	.403	.140	.279	2.891	.005	.127	.680	.383	.260	.244
	HSLs have required prerequisites	.359	.163	.213	2.206	.029	.037	.682	.349	.201	.186

Excluded Variables[a]

Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance
1	HSLs have required prerequisites	.213[b]	2.206	.029	.201	.763
	The training environment is conducive	.222[b]	2.192	.030	.200	.693
	The training enhances critical thingking skills of HSLs	.022[b]	.208	.836	.019	.667
	Training manuals are available and well elaborated	.159[b]	1.790	.076	.165	.921
	I receive regular training in CE and VE	.126[b]	1.395	.166	.129	.889
2	The training environment is conducive	.175[c]	1.672	.097	.155	.642
	The training enhances critical thingking skills of HSLs	-.084[c]	-.745	.458	-.070	.557
	Training manuals are available and well elaborated	.097[c]	1.020	.310	.095	.779
	I receive regular training in CE and VE	.088[c]	.965	.337	.090	.849