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DISCUSSION

INDOCTRINATION OR EDUCATION IN THE HISTORY CLASS - THE KALLAWAY/MORROW DEBATE

Don Margetson

In his discussion(1) of Peter Kallaway's article "Indoctrination in the History Class?" Wally Morrow wishes to argue that Kallaway's notion of indoctrination by omission is absurd or ineffectual. The notion is, it is claimed, absurd in so far as that, if true, it would mean non-indoctrination was in practice impossible; this is argued in the discussion of theses A, B, and C(2). The notion is ineffectual in so far as practically anything a teacher taught would excuse the teacher from the charge of indoctrination by omission; this is argued in the discussion of thesis D(3). In place of talking about indoctrination by omission Morrow suggests (p 50) that it would be more appropriate to talk of failure to contribute to someone's education. What I intend here is to attempt to show (in I and II below) that Morrow's argument is unsuccessful, and that consequently the question of whether or not indoctrination by omission is possible remains an open question; and to suggest (in III below) that a positive account of indoctrination, referred to by both Kallaway and Morrow, does not exclude the possibility of indoctrination by omission.

I (a) I shall begin with what Morrow calls the "modified Kallaway thesis", thesis D, for it is at this point that Morrow suggests that speaking of indoctrination by omission is less appropriate than speaking of failing to educate in a certain respect. He does not

argue explicitly for this suggestion. Instead, his procedure is to argue for the rejection of the notion of indoctrination by omission; having done this in the earlier part of the discussion he then puts forward his suggestion as an "... offer (of a) way out of the difficulties" (p 50) which he takes to be implicit in the notion of indoctrination by omission. Let us consider this suggestion more closely.

Introducing his suggestion, Morrow says "It would seem much more appropriate to say of a teacher who 'fails' as specified in the modified Kallaway thesis not that she is indoctrinating but simply that she is failing in this respect to contribute to the education of her pupils" (p 50). In the succeeding paragraph Morrow says "The omissions being spoken of in the modified Kallaway thesis look like suggestions for what could count as omissions from someone's education". In effect Morrow is suggesting that thesis D could be changed in this way: in thesis D the final expression "indoctrinating by omission" should be replaced by the expression "failing in this respect to contribute to the education of her pupils", or by the expression "(permitting) omissions from someone's education". I shall ignore the latter formulation and concentrate on the former, since my argument is in principle the same for both formulations and it would be unnecessarily tedious to go into both in detail.

Before looking at the effect of the suggested change to thesis D it is necessary to clarify one point about what is being changed. "Indoctrinating by omission" is being replaced (in the formulation to be considered in detail) by "failing in this respect to contribute to the education of her pupils". We must be careful about the phrase "in this respect", for at first sight this phrase might seem to make the expression "failing in this respect to contribute to the education ... etc" look more modest, and perhaps more plausible, than the expression "indoctrinating by omission". But this modesty or plausibility is more apparent than real. For the notion of indoctrinating by omission under discussion clearly implies the qualifier "in this respect" since the claim is that even when some things are taught others, which ought to be taught, are not. These omissions lead to the charge of indoctrinating by omission, and, since they refer to some rather than all of the things which could be taught, "indoctrinating by omission" in effect means "indoctrinating by omission in this

respect" where "in this respect" refers to what is omitted. Proper expression of this logical point would require that "indoctrinating by omission" be expressed as "indoctrinating by omission in this respect". If this were done, the notion of "failing in this respect to contribute to someone's education" would sound no more plausible than "indoctrinating by omission in this respect". For the sake of simplicity we may talk of "indoctrinating by omission" and "failing to educate", so long as we understand that the qualifier "in this respect" is applicable in both cases. I have also simplified the expression "failing to contribute to someone's education" to failing to educate" since I do not think that whatever distinctions there may be between these two expressions are of concern to us here.

Bearing these points in mind we may now return to consider the effects of Morrow's suggested changes to thesis D. Morrow's thesis D would read as follows:

D (Morrow) Any teacher of school history or civics who fails to teach something that could be taught that is concerned in some fairly direct way ... etc ... can be accused of failing to educate.

But now Morrow's thesis D suffers from precisely the same defect as Kallaway's thesis D, that is, that "The thesis can now be said to be too weak to do any real work" (4). For, just as "On the modified Kallaway thesis (D) any teacher of school history or civics who managed to teach even just one 'item' that is concerned in some fairly direct way ... etc, can escape the accusation of indoctrinating by omission" (p 50), so on Morrow's thesis D we can say: any teacher of school history or civics who managed to teach even just one 'item' that is concerned in some fairly direct way ... etc, can escape the accusation of failing to educate.

(b) A further and related problem arises out of the attempt to reject the notion of indoctrination by omission in favour of the notion of failing to educate in Thesis D. This further problem may be articulated by following Morrow's notation, suitably extended. That is, let Td be the person teaching items in the subclass Xd (the class of things which Td could teach), where Xd is a subclass of Yd (all the things that could be taught as specified in thesis D). We need to introduce one refinement here. According to thesis D, Td has to teach

only one item in Yd (and this item will of course fall within the subclass Xd of Yd). However, we are not considering the whole of Xd, but only one item within it. Let us refer to this one item that is actually taught as XEd.

We now find ourselves in this position. Td teaches XEd, in virtue of which he escapes both the accusation that he is indoctrinating by omission, and the accusation that he is failing to educate. Expressed in a different way we could say that, in virtue of Td having taught the same thing, namely XEd, Td may be praised both for having non-indictrinated and for having educated his pupils. This, on the face of it, appears unobjectionable - it is at least not counter-intuitive that a teacher could be both educating and avoiding indoctrination at the same time.

But now we face a problem: on Morrow's argument the distinction between "educating" and "avoiding indoctrinating" is unintelligible. This is so because the criterion (XEd) for identifying some action as "educating" is the same criterion as is required to identify some action as "non-indoctrinating". This remains true no matter how many items Td taught: suppose that Td taught more than XEd, that is, he taught XE^{n}d, where n is the number of items taught. Now even if XE^{n}d approached or coincided with all the instances falling under Xd, we would still have to say that Td escaped both the accusation of indoctrinating by omission and the accusation of failing to educate, because we have no way of distinguishing the one from the other. In other words, Morrow's argument makes it systematically impossible for us to distinguish non-indoctrinating from educating.

(c) My conclusions in regard to thesis D are, then, that

(i) Morrow's argument cuts two ways: it renders both Kallaway's thesis D and Morrow's thesis D ineffectual in that both are too weak to do any real work;

(ii) the suggested replacement of the notion "Indoctrinating by omission" by the notion of "failing to educate" in thesis D makes education and non-indoctrination systematically indistinguishable; &

(iii) the claim that "it would seem much more appropriate to say of a teacher ... etc, not that

she is indoctrinating (by omission) but simply that she is failing in this respect to contribute to the education of her pupils" is not supported by the argument put forward and must therefore be regarded as remaining unsettled.

II Having discussed thesis D it should now be easier to discuss theses A, B and C. These may be considered together since we may treat them as logically similar. They are similar in that in each thesis particular classes of things are referred to, and the argument in connection with theses A, B, and C concerns the relationships between these classes rather than the relationships between any particular instances and the classes into which they fall (as was the case in thesis D). Let us consider this in more detail.

The crucial argument(5) that Morrow uses to support the rejection of theses A, B, and C may be outlined as follows:

1. There are certain classes of (mental) objects, Ya, Yb, or Yc, which could be taught.

2. Indoctrination by omission can be avoided only if the whole of Ya, Yb, or Yc is taught.

3. Any individual teacher Ta, Tb, or Tc could teach only a small subclass of Ya, Yb, or Yc, namely Xa, Xb, or Xc.

4. Therefore no individual teacher can avoid indoctrinating by omission.

We have seen that Morrow wishes to reject the notion of indoctrinating by omission and to replace it with the notion of failing to educate. If now, in the argument just outlined, we substitute "failing to educate" for "indoctrinating by omission" we are faced with the conclusion that no teacher can avoid failing to educate.

Thus, on Morrow's argument, not only is teaching without indoctrinating impossible, but avoiding failure to educate is impossible too. This I take to be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument.

III Finally, we must ask what has led to the impasse and whether there is a way out of it? It seems to me that Morrow's argument is based on a misleading interpretation of Kallaway's comments. Morrow has interpreted Kallaway's

comments (6) as referring to all the instances falling into a certain classification, Ya, Yb, or Yc.

But Kallaway's comments could more fruitfully and more correctly be regarded as referring to certain classifications themselves. What I mean by this may be put in this way: Kallaway may be interpreted as claiming that certain kinds of attitudes and activities may be required of a teacher who is to escape the charge of indoctrination. In the case of indoctrination by omission the teacher will escape the charge of indoctrination only if he engages in such kinds of activities as challenging the child's prejudices/areas of closed thinking, and so on as mentioned by Kallaway.

Now it does not follow from the fact that a teacher should engage in a certain kind of activity that he must (or even could) engage in all the instances falling into the kind of activity in question. Morrow, it appears, has confused the notion of "engaging in kind of activity K" with the notion of "engaging in all the instances falling into kind of activity K".

If we see Kallaway's argument as being based on the view that a teacher could escape the accusation of indoctrinating by omission only if he engaged in certain kinds of activities (such as those he mentions), then indoctrination by omission does seem to be possible. Moreover, it appears to be possible along the lines suggested by both Kallaway and Morrow. Consider, for example, the following comments. Kallaway suggests (7) that it is a "... state (of) 'open-minded', 'flexible' or 'critical' thinking which is the characteristic of a truly educated person", and Morrow is attributed with the suggestion "... that for education to take place (as distinct from indoctrination), beliefs must come to be held rationally".

A teacher's conscious attempts to prevent or to foil open-minded, flexible, or critical thinking, the promotion of rationally held beliefs, and so on, would, on Kallaway's and Morrow's accounts, be anti-educative. There does not appear to be any good reason why a teacher's intentional omission of certain views, facts, attitudes, arguments, etc, especially if this were done systematically with a view to preventing open-minded, flexible, or critical thinking, the promotion of rationally held beliefs, and so on, should not be properly regarded as indoctrinating by omission.

Footnotes

(1) Morrow W "Education in the History Class?" in Perspectives in Education Vol 1 No 2 May 1976

(2) Ibid pp 48, 48 and 50 respectively

(3) Ibid p 50

(4) Ibid p 50

(5) Ibid p 50: "But even on this thesis the main problem is still that Xc cannot ever even approach Yc; Tc can always be accused of indoctrination."

(6) Ibid p 47 second paragraph

(7) Kallaway P "Indoctrination in the History Class?" in Perspectives in Education Vol 1 No 1 February 1976 p 14

'LEADERLESS' GROUPS - CHAOS AND CONFUSION

Tessa Phillips

In his article "The Effects of 'Leaderless' Groups in Teacher Training" (1), Mervyn Skuy seems to suggest that 'leaderless' groups should be introduced into the teacher-training course. He supports this by quoting an article by Powell and experiments done by Webb & Gribb. However, he does not take into account that some students were subjected to such groups in the 1975 HED (PG) course, to their great dissatisfaction.

(My discussion will be concerned with student-led as opposed to tutor-led groups as this is the contrast Skuy seems to have in mind (eg he cites Webb & Gribb in connection with student-led groups) and he seems to use 'leaderless' and 'student-led' interchangeably.)

The Theory of Education course in 1975 was conducted, unwittingly perhaps, as an experiment which assessed the effects of student-led groups. The class was divided into seven groups with a tutor from the Education Department for each group. The tutors had different ideas as to how much leadership and guidance they should give their group. Consequently the groups were run in different ways. These ranged from one in which the tutor did not appear at many of his tutorials, leaving the students to carry on by themselves, to highly-structured tutorial groups with the tutors playing a definite role in the seminar.

The students who were left in the student-led groups and those whose tutor was present but did not participate, found the tutorial sessions absolutely fruitless. Many of the students were so dissatisfied with the lack of structure that they asked to be transferred to other groups; some felt so strongly about this matter that they were seriously considering giving up the course altogether if their requests were not met. They felt it a waste of time to have enrolled in a teacher-training course merely to be left in student-led groups. All students enrolling in a teacher-training course have had extensive experience in 'student-led' groups; eg in social groups, at parties, and even in the canteen. During their school and university careers they will have had arguments and discussions with their peers and will have had time to practise and develop

the '... variety of social and intellectual skills which are of the greatest educational significance; ...' (mentioned by Skuy.)

In contrast to this, what students wanted was discussion where a tutor, necessarily one who knew more about education than they did, could lead their discussion and arguments. This would help the students understand their subjects in depth and develop the relevant concepts about education as well as the techniques of teaching.

It is not necessarily true that tutor-led groups are authoritarian or that the tutor is there to hand out '... bodies of complex knowledge ...' On the contrary, the 1975 students found that the structured seminar groups, ie those led by tutors, were the groups which resulted in most student participation. The students in those situations felt that their discussion was guided towards tackling crucial issues in the seminars. They felt that this was more useful than quests for personal 'leadership'. This suggests that even if in Powell's studies '... there was a marked emphasis on providing information ...' it does not follow that groups should be student-led; on the contrary it may be better for tutors to run the tutorials in a different way. In fact the experience of the 1975 students indicates that all the skills Skuy mentions are more effectively developed in a group with an adequate tutor.

In his discussion Skuy mentions the inappropriateness for the training of teachers of '... the kind of learning tested in examinations ...' It may be true that the kind of learning tested in examinations is not necessarily the most appropriate for the training of teachers, but it does not follow from this that student-led groups would solve this problem.

Finally, let me mention two further implications of student-led groups. If the presence of the tutor adds nothing to the education of students in a group, then universities have no business offering courses. Surely the whole aim of courses is for students to be guided by the greater knowledge and experience of the members of the faculty. In a student-led group there is no such guidance available. In addition, it is obviously much easier to leave students to run their own tutorials, since this requires no preparation or skill on the part of the tutor. It requires an intelligent and diligent tutor to ensure that students really obtain the maximum benefit from tutorials by directing their enquiries and arguments in the light of his knowledge.

It would surely be farcical to offer a teacher-training course at all, let alone charge for it, if tutors were a hinderance rather than a help towards learning. One of the ways a teacher-training course could show students how to teach would be by the way the tutors themselves taught and conducted seminars.

Footnote

(1) Skuy M "The Effects of 'Leaderless' Groups in Teacher Training" in Perspectives in Education Vol. 1 No 2 May 1976. All references are to this article.

CLASSROOM CONTROL - A COMMENT

Paul Beard

All too frequently students expect the initial trauma of a first teaching practice to be the problem of classroom control. Such related fears are voiced mostly by the new entrant to the profession; though clearly the problem of control in 'white' South African schools has not reached the stage or proportion experienced in the major city schools of Europe or America.

What can be done to assist the student teacher and prepare him for critical situations arising in his day to day classroom activities?

J Hidden in "Can Classroom Control be Taught" (1) writes interestingly about a Course she initiated in a London College of Education, and perhaps a short statement about this Course is appropriate in that such a study could well provide a service to students in South Africa.

The 'Classroom Control Course' formed part of the studies for a one year Postgraduate Certificate in Education (HED (PG)). It was one of five optional courses and allocated two hours per week over a period of two half term blocks. Numbers taking such a course varied from between fifteen to twenty five students.

Initially the emphasis in studying classroom control was on encouraging pupils' study behaviour and of discouraging their non study behaviour. ie. control emphasis was on rewarding desired behaviour rather than on punishing undesirable behaviour.

During teaching practice students were asked to keep a record of their successes, difficulties and general observations, and the applicability of behaviour modification to their work. This gave initial discussion stimulus, especially as to the usefulness and limitations found in individual schools.

A second element of the course arose from the question 'What might be preventing students from encouraging study behaviour in their pupils? and its answer that the cause could be twofold:

(a) lack of self confidence on the part of the student due to being plunged, on teaching practice, into the full teaching situation:

(b) certain ineptitudes on the part of the student, born of his inexperience in managing the activities of a group of between twenty five to thirty individuals.'

Practical exercises were used, based on common classroom situations, as well as short five minute lessons recorded on video tape. After discussion the opportunity of re-recording was then given to include improvements. Subsequently Hidden found that it was more effective to progress from the exercises based on commonly observed classroom situations to ones based on research studies(2). A third element was the use of 'critical incidents', these ranged from 'pupils arriving late, forgetting books etc' to more complex ones (3).

Ways of dealing with the critical incident ranged from open discussion to short problems asking for immediate reaction. Hidden found that the latter treatment worked better as the course progressed for students were more relaxed and less inhibited by each other's reactions. Such incidents proved useful in opening up discussion on relationships between teacher and pupil. ie when is a class being aggressively nasty? When is it just being affectionately teasing? A further treatment using 'critical incidents' was to engage in role playing situations. It was more difficult to execute but provided an excellent basis for discussion.

Finally, the concluding element examined various authorities on discipline and punishment, and the student was required, for assessment purposes, to write 'one long or two short pieces of work'.

Students' comments on the course agreed that the video exercises were most useful, followed by the critical incidents - discussion and role playing and the study of behaviour modification. The least useful was seen to be the study of articles <u>about</u> discipline and class control.

Conclusions were ambiguous. 'It cannot be said positively that those students who took part in the course had any less difficulty in coping with the experience of teaching than the ones who had not taken the course.' Nor were there any substantial differences in final teaching practice grades

One clear result was apparent from the replies of students

who had been teaching for at least one year. The course was seen unanimously as worth while, and perhaps more important, that it should be offered to all students rather than being offered as an option.

One student wrote 'I felt this was the most useful of the various courses offered - at least we did discuss some of the problems likely to be encountered in the classroom and this is what worries all teacher trainees.'

Hidden is led to conclude that whether or not this course demonstrated that classroom control could be taught in any direct way, it had important indirect results on student-teacher confidence and attitudes. Students who had been given the opportunity of discussing difficulties and problems in a specific course on classroom control were in a much better position to believe that they had the power to improve on different situations.

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(1) Hidden J "Can Classroom Control be Taught?" in Education for Teaching Spring 1976 no 99

(2) Rosenshine B "Enthusiastic Teaching" in School Review 78 (4) 1970

(3) Bishop A J and Whitfield R C Situations in Teaching McGraw-Hill 1972.

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ARTICLES

A NEW META-THEORY OF EDUCATION (I)

Zak van Straaten

In this brief paper I shall (a) sketch the outlines of a new meta-theory (or philosophy) of education; (b) delineate the merits of the theory; and (c) show how the theory can be related to one basic meta-theoretical claim of R S Peters.

(a) One fundamental sentence in meta-theory is:

Education is the transmission and acquisition of paradigms. This principle can be interpreted on at least two levels.

1. The first interpretation is that education is a multi-dimensional, polymorphous process which consists in the transmission and acquisition of an inter-animated set of paradigm-imbedded theories. In his Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas Kuhn argues that in normal science scientists are taught to fit their experience of nature into 'paradigms' (2). A 'paradigm' is a set of methodological, epistemological and experimental rules which determine one's perception, thought and experience of nature. Scientists are not free to choose any paradigms they wish. On the contrary Kuhn points out that they qualify for membership of the professional scientific community by demonstrating their facility at problem solving within the prevailing paradigms.

We can distinguish between 'major' and 'minor' paradigms. The distinction is one of scope. 'Major' paradigms

determine fields of information and the form and adequacy of the particular theories which occur within the scope of their frameworks. For example, if the subject is physics then the major paradigm is the Einsteinian world picture (3). This major paradigm determines the boundaries and limits of contemporary physics. The minor paradigms, whose conjunction constitutes contemporary physics, all have to be consistent with this major world view. Examples of minor paradigms are the theories of magnetism, x-rays and electron interaction in atoms.

According to Kuhn, paradigms generate puzzles for research scientists to solve. These can usually be solved inside the paradigm. However sometimes 'anomalies' arise which can only be solved by rejecting the paradigm and using a new paradigm whose justification consists in its ability to solve the anomalies and generate solvable puzzles for future research. On Kuhn's model of natural knowledge a change of major paradigm cannot be a completely rational change. When you discard a major paradigm to espouse a new one there is no third major paradigm in the background which acts as a reference point which you can use to evaluate the respective virtues of the competing paradigms. It is more like exchanging a pair of green tinted concave spectacles for rose coloured convex ones. At the moment of interchange the subject does not have any vision to speak of since it is only his spectacles that allow him to see properly. Change of major paradigm is therefore a revolutionary process.

2. The second interpretation of 'Education is the acquisition of paradigms' is that education is a multidimensional, polymorphous process which consists in the transmission and acquisition of an ideology. The word 'ideology' has been interpreted in many ways but for my present purpose the following will suffice. Statements about society are ideological if they are ultimately to be derived from prescriptive principles which are embedded in, or definitive of some of the paradigms or conventional beliefs of a speech community.

It is because ideological statements help to define the social existence of a speech community that the members of the community rely on the ideological statements to tell them how they ought to act in given circumstances. Ideological statements are therefore always true relative to a speech community or society. In a socialist country teachers are required to explain and emphasize the importance of the inevitable historical processes in history which will ultimately vindicate Marxist socialism. Whereas in a

liberal capitalist democracy one is taught to be suspicious of 'communism' (however defined) both inside and outside of school. More positively, one sort of ideological bias is displayed in the efforts schools make in our kind of society to achieve a delicate balance between encouraging individual initiative and encouraging community co-operation. All of these kinds of activities are linked to webs of belief into which ideological statements are woven.

It is transparent that this second interpretation of my basic principle implies that education is necessarily concerned with the acquisition of a certain ideology (in the sense of ideology defined above) and a set of behavioural paradigms which reflect certain social values (4). This conception of education is almost wholly about values, and can never be value neutral.

(b) The generality of the theory allows us to claim merits for it which we would not be able to claim for a more restricted and sectional theory like that of Peters.

(i) My meta-theory can explain the difference between conservative and radical theories of education along the following lines. The conservative theorist is one who allows no choice as to the ideological paradigms which are transmitted. However, if the ideology is amenable to the existence of certain minor political stances within it then the conservative never allows for more than a very limited choice of stance within the major ideology. For example, if the major ideology is liberal capitalism then the conservative might allow a stance on individualism which is not immediately inconsistent with the major perspective. When it comes to the transmission of particular disciplines like physics or history, each one possessing its major and minor paradigms, the conservative likewise either allows no choice in the schooling process or may under certain circumstances allow a very limited choice. The radical theorist by contrast is someone who could allow the student, within the limits of practicality, to choose his own major ideology, and might in fact encourage (insofar as this is possible) a dispassionate discussion of various ideologies, and alternative systems of social and individual existence. The radical will point out to the student that in particular disciplines there often is an alternative set of paradigms and will encourage the student to choose the paradigms which he would find most useful or congenial.

(ii) This meta-theoretical perspective on education can also explain how and where ideology enters into competing theories of education. It emphasises the extent to which different theorists are forced to make choices in respect of ideological involvement in education. In addition one can use the theory to explain how and where systems of values and accounts of normative behaviour enter into object language theories.

(iii) The theory also explains how we are to determine the form and content of the particular disciplines to be transmitted in education. The content at least depends on the attitude one has to the major and minor paradigms which one believes to be true. At any given period in its history a speech community or homogenous society possesses a stock of knowledge which is directly derived from the sum of its major paradigms. On the basis of one or another educational theory the professional educational managers decide which of the paradigms should be taught at the primary and secondary levels of schooling. They decide, for example, that the Great Trek and traditional grammar are to be taught but that the history of the Viet Nam war and transformational grammar are to be omitted. The form of any particular discipline will naturally depend on the form of the relevant paradigm. So if the paradigm is set-theoretical mathematics a special method of teaching, namely 'new mathematics', which emphasises model-theoretic or set-theoretic methods of understanding fundamental equalities will be employed.

(iv) My theory shows up the transparently false claim of the theorist who asserts that one does not have to understand anything about the superstructure of education to teach a discipline since it is sufficient to be a good practitioner in that discipline. Such a theorist might say, for example, "to be a good teacher of physics you only need to be a good physicist." The a priori falsity of such a view is guaranteed by the observation that one only becomes a good physicist by a display of allegiance to the prevailing paradigms in physics, and by exhibiting in numerous tests a facility at problem solving within the paradigms. How could one be a good teacher of physics unless one were aware of the paradigmatic nature of the enterprise?

(v) The authority that teachers have is institutionalised in various ways. An adequate meta-theory should

justify the teacher's authority. In my theory the teacher has authority in virtue of the easy access he/she has to a multiplicity of paradigms. This fact guarantees the direction of the authority relationship. It flows in most cases from the teacher to the students. However in some cases the students will have access to paradigms outside the teacher's experience. The student might understand Japanese tea ceremonies, Zen Buddhism, or the Electron Microscope. In those cases the flow of authority is reversed. This is a more natural justification of authority relationships in education than those which depend on elaborate conceptual analyses of such concepts as 'discipline', 'punishment' and 'authority'.

(c) One of Peters' most basic claims is that education is the initiation into worthwhile activities. He sometimes talks of the claim as though it were a conceptual truth, but at other times treats it like a contingent regularity. If the principle were contingent one would have to put such stringent controls on what counted as 'worthwhile' that too much would be eliminated from the field of education. We might not be able to do this since the criteria for 'worthwhile' activities are relative to a speech community or individual. It is more realistic to view the principle as a conceptual truth which cannot be falsified by experience. It is also a transparently normative claim. However Peters has claimed that it is not for the philosopher to make normative judgments about educational practices and policies (5). Perhaps a philosopher, as philosopher, should not get involved in ground level normative disputes, but that sort of attitude should not preclude him from analysing the various relations between the paradigms which he perceives to be operative in a given context and the normative judgments which are imbedded in those paradigms. If some paradigms have normative or ideological implications then the philosopher of education ought to expose these implications in his analyses of the paradigms.

Peters' justification of the principle depends on the acceptance of the centrality and importance of certain liberal ideas and institutions. But I do not want to give a philosophical account of 'education' which is as inextricably connected to liberal institutions and institutionalised practices as Peters' account undoubtedly is. Nor do I want to delimit 'education' as Peters attempts to do (6). The difficulties he gets into in his attempt to defend his 'differentiated concept' of 'education' suggest that he is trying to get too much empirical mileage out of a philosophical definition.

In my meta-theory the claim that education is the initiation into worthwhile activities can easily be maintained and justified. Firstly, I can, unlike Peters, recognise the normative nature of the claim without inconsistencey. Secondly, much is gained by seeing that every speech community must always judge its own prevailing paradigms to be worthwhile. If a society or speech community always values its own web of paradigms and theories, such a valuation is sufficient justification for being keen and determined to transmit the chosen paradigms. My paradigmatic perspective is broad and flexible enough to include what is valuable in an institutionalised account of education, and to allow that the basic connection between 'education' and 'worthwhile activities' transcends the parochial restrictions of Peters' paradigm.

A meta-theory should make the basic connections, and spell out the implications. But its justification depnds on its usefulness in organising experience and theory. My slightly ironic hope is that experience will justify my theory.

Footnotes and References

(1) I am indebted to Miss P Morris for discussing these issues with me.

(2) Kuhn T S The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd Edition) Chicago 1970 See also Feyerabend P K Against Method New York 1974

(3) Kuhn uses 'paradigm' ambiguously in his book. As I have used the term it is often equivalent to 'theory' whenever it is not being used as defined in section (a).

(4) See Peters' way of skirting the question of ideology in "The Aims of Education - A Conceptual Enquiry" pp 14ff in The Philosophy of Education R S Peters (Ed) (Oxford 1973)

(5) Peters R S "The Philosophy of Education" in J W Tibble (Ed) The Study of Education pp 62ff (London 1966)

(6) Peters says of those who might disagree with his reading of 'desirability condition' in the concept of education, "They have a concept of education; for they use the term to refer to what goes on in schools and

universities. But they have not our concept." (Hirst P H and Peters R S The Logic of Education p 21ff London 1970). Peters is aware of the special pleading in his account as he goes on to say, "The only trouble about this way of dealing with the objection is that people who lack our concept of education are, at the moment, rather numerous."

ACQUIESCENCE TO AUTHORITY IN THE TEACHER-TRAINING SITUATION

Allen Zimbler

The practice of using global psychological measures as predictors in academic and other situations has become less acceptable in recent years in terms of its limited effectiveness. Entwistle (1), in providing support for the rejection of the use of such global measures as the IQ for predicting school attainment, discusses the use of personality dimensions in predicting performance. Because the idea of fixed cognitive abilities such as intelligence has begun to be mistrusted, research workers, according to Entwistle, have explored other psychological dimensions.

Entwistle in fact discusses the changes in personality produced by different situations, and suggests the need to study the personality correlates of these changes. He concludes :

> Research on personality and attainment seems to be approaching this stage and it will be interesting to see what impact it has on the real world of teaching
>
> (Entwistle, 1975 p 261)

One of the areas of interest which has received considerable attention by workers in the field of psychological research is concerned with the degree to which authoritarianism may become a part of the personality. In fact, there has been considerable discussion revolving around the question of whether there is such a psychological entity as an authoritarian personality, and if so, whether any measure of authoritarianism as such would have predictive effect when related to behavioural indices.

The present writer (2) attempted to investigate whether performance in a teacher training situation was affected by authoritarianism per se, or whether the reactivity of trainee teachers to a system of authority was a more important determinant of behaviour. It was considered appropriate to investigate such concepts in a teacher-training framework, in terms of the assertion that the teacher training situation represents an example of a situation in which the skills of authority are taught

within a system of authority for application in a like system.

The study rejected the use of the concept of authoritarianism per se, on the grounds that any deep knowledge of psychological theory must necessarily view psychological process within a definitive context. Thus, authoritarianism would have to be viewed in terms of a cognitive style which related against a backdrop of dependence on external authority. This raised the issue of acquiescence to authority, and the possible value of distinguishing, as Zimbler's study did, between the authoritarian person as such, and the individual who acquiesces to a system of authority.

What this implies is that authoritarianism cannot simply be viewed as being vested in the person, but also refers to the social structure. Limerick (3) asserts:

> It is in this sense that authority is a social-system level concept - it is a concept which applies to a group of people, or an organisation; it is a right vested in one person (or unit) in a system by others in the system, a right related to the fulfillment of the needs of the total system.

In Limerick's sense, the practice of authority involves two sets of actors, those who fall under the umbrella of authority, and those who wield it. This implies a mutual contingency, in which extant reactivity, according to Shetty and Carlisle (cited by Limerick) 'could be an expression of technological,cultural, and personality variables'.

The results of Zimbler's study tended to suggest two distinct personality roles, each indicating a qualitatively different pattern of response to authority from the other, and neither suggesting an authoritarian personality as such. When compared with teacher trainee performance specifically, the only personality type to achieve predictive effect indicated a passive, acquiescent kind of person who would presumably accept the dictates of the authority structure. It is interesting that only such a measure of reactivity to authority had predictive effect, and that the more explicit and conventional measures of authoritarianism did not yield any measure of performance in an authority situation.

The overall relevance of the study is that in identifying and focussing on the acquiescent response process, it indicates the need to consider the structural perspective

within which obedience or acquiescence to authority, exercising, in Weber's terms, 'legitimate power', may be restrictive in its 'authoritative' (Limerick 1975) operation. In such a situation, the proactive, self-assertive individual would not be motivated in the interests of organisational goals alone. Even where one of the objectives subserving the organisational goal may be self-development, as in the teacher training situation, the authoritative system would nevertheless demand acquiescence. This, in turn, would act in a manner which could deny the recognition of self-assertive forms of behaviour, and could tend instead to recognise forms of behaviour which are essentially self-denying. In the sense in which personal growth and the development of human potential involve finding freedom within and from the restrictive constraints of structured environments, the authoritative system would ultimately restrict its own requisite development, by restricting that of its members.

In terms of this argument, the teacher training situation would, then, be in danger of selecting out individuals who conform most closely with the authority structure being imposed, and who are thus credited for their acquiescence. The teacher training situation can be seen to be important in that it represents an authority structure on which a great proportion of the moulding and development of young individuals depends. The teacher training situation, then, trains people within one authority structure to internalise a 'code' of authority which they then transfer and translate into another authority situation.

The code of authority employed in the teacher training situation may be linkened to what Paterson (4) terms a 'sapiential'authority, which indicates a right to be heard based on knowledge. Any transmission of knowledge, then, which adopts a conventional authoritative approach, may be described in the above terms. The essential point is that it is not only the taught content which is conveyed in the teaching process as such, but also the code of authority. Not only does the educational system provide functional skills and educational content which select and determine the direction of the entry of its incumbents into the broader structure of society; it also provides functional roles based on the adoption of the code of authority, and by our argument, gives favourite selection to those individuals who do accede or acquiesce to the demand characteristics of the structure.

If such selection does occur, then preferential consideration might be given to individuals who (i) adopt codes of

authority unquestioningly, and (ii) convey such codes in a like manner. If in the latter case we can distinguish the so-called authoritarian personality, defined in the terms of acquiescence which this study seeks to clarify, then our educational institutions may favour certain individuals - those whose occupation of positions of authority will in no way allow for the optimal development of the resource potential of individuals within such institutions.

Ultimately, however, acquiescent responsiveness must depend on the nature of its context in order to determine its appropriateness. Limerick (1975) identifies what he calls a 'synthesis-oriented structural authority', which, he asserts, is not an impersonal submission to contract, but a 'voluntary system of interpersonal submission'.

> The exercise of authority - the rightful use of the categorical imperative - may therefore not be seen by recipients to be an act of aggression but to be supportive social contribution. And obedience to the command may be seen by the obeyer not as an act of undignified submission, but as a mature act of social responsibility.
>
> (Limerick 1975)

Thus, depending on the nature of the situation of authority, acquiescence could be viewed as acceptance, a form of response which is characteristically distinct from acquiescence as it is defined above. The criterion of appropriateness, must, however, be taken into consideration when viewing the nature of an individual's response to an authority structure. This must both be from the point of view of the structure itself, and its stated purpose, as well as from the point of view of the individual as a potentially self-determining actor. Thus while it might be said that a teacher training college favours a candidate who adopts an acquiescent personality role, it might equally be said that the teacher training college is favoured by an individual whose mode of response to authority is characteristically acquiescent.

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EDUCATION AND CHANGE

Clive Nettleton

At a formal level, the link between education and change is one of logical necessity. A necessary part of education is that the person being educated should learn something, and whenever a person learns something he changes in some way or other. Naturally there are varying degrees of change dependent on the importance of what has been learned. The change involved in learning to tie one's shoelaces is trivial in comparison with the change involved in learning to read. The former is a simple skill which may give a child a certain additional independence and, initially, some satisfaction. But it then becomes a very trivial part of one's daily routine. Reading on the other hand is a very complex skill which can continue to be developed and used in different ways throughout one's lifetime. The change brought about by learning to read is extremely important to a whole range of activities in the individual's life.

Learning provides the link between education ahd change. But, while change is a necessary part of education, it is insufficient as a criterion for education. Teaching, training, schooling and indoctrination all also have a basic aim that people should learn something, and are similary connected with change. The important problems arise out of consideration of the kind of change which is promoted by the different processes. That education involves change is true, but it could also be seen as both obvious and trivial. However, a further examination will show that the necessary logical relationship has extremely important implications.

The fact that education necessarily involves change means that the decision as to what people shall learn is of great significance. This is most obvious in regard to young children who are not able to decide for themselves what they will learn. The initial learning of the child is decided by his parents and later by educational authorities and teachers. At this time and in later years, the child will learn not only the content or skills which are presented to him, but also from the methods used and the environment in which he is taught. In schools, the decision about what shall be included in the curriculum affects what will be learned by the child and this may change him in significantly different ways. It will, to a greater or lesser extent, determine

what kind of a person he will be. If people were taught only Maths and Science from an early age they would surely be different from people who were taught only History and Poetry. The inclusion or exclusion of areas of learning is important as is the method by which and the environment in which people learn.

The interrelation between these three factors has become an increasingly important consideration for education theorists. (eg Bernstein (1), Illich (2), Holt (3), Friere (4).)

However we are still left with the difficulty posed by the fact that other concepts closely linked to education such as teaching, indoctrination, training and schooling also have a necessary link to change via the notion of learning. What distinguishes the concept of education is the kind of change which is pomoted. We can approach this through a consideration of two very different types of change.

1 Adaptive Change:

The pace of change in the past fifty years, political, technological, scientific, economic, social and so on has been spectacular. Particularly in the developed nations, the 'knowledge explosion' has resulted in a demand for educational objectives which will enable people emerging from schools to adapt to the accelerating pace of technical and social change.

The proponents of this view argue that in simpler societies education was primarily the initiation of the young into a fixed body of knowledge and skills which formed the basis of the operation of society. These societies were relatively static so what was learned while the person was young would be of direct use to him in adult life. Today the major feature of society is that it is changing very rapidly. Initiation into a fixed body of knowledge and skill of the kind passed on in simpler societies is no longer possible. The prime aim of education in such a situation, it is argued, must shift to providing the child with the knowledge and skills necessary to adapt to changes as they occur. What the child learns in his education should not be specific in the old sense of fitting him into a particular role, eg. king, hunter or even motor mechanic, as any one of these roles could become redundant in a short space of time, but things which will enable him to change his role easily with minimum dislocation to himself and to the society. There is still a sense in which this may require initiation into a fixed body of knowledge and skills related to adaptation to change, but these will probably change as the

direction and pace of change themselves change.

This notion of education as acquiring the necessary skills to be able to adapt to change seems reasonable, but it contains a crucial error. It suggests that people have no control over the situation in which they find themselves, and that change will continue without their being able to do anything about it. On this account change is something which happens in the world, decided and guided by people or forces beyond the control of the individual, or at least a significant number of people. It could be argued that this is in fact the way that things are, and there is a considerable body of evidence to support such an argument. But, even if it is a fact that this is so at present, it is very questionable whether this is the way that things ought to be, or whether it is the role of education to help with the maintenance of the present position.

Education on this account is a very narrow concept concerned with enabling people to adapt to change without having any control over their own situation or that of others. People must learn to adapt to changes initiated by others in terms of the needs, interests and values of particular societies. The political arrangement of societies in nation states means that educational objectives are set by governments and educational authorities in terms of the needs and interests of the nation rather than the individual. The institutions through which the individual is taught and learns what is required by the society is the school.

Schools are social institutions set up for the purpose of getting people (notably children and young adults) to learn certain things thought to be desirable or needed by the society in which the institutions exist. The criteria for what is considered desirable are crucial. If the decisions about what the individual is to learn are made solely in terms of criteria such as political or economic self-interest then the individual will be seen purely as a unit to be manipulated in terms of those interests. At one extreme, schooling excludes the notion of morality and seeks to manipulate the individual into adapting to a useful role in society, with what is useful being determined by others. Schooling on this model consists of learning appropriate to fulfilling a particular role, and to enabling the individual to adapt to changing circumstances.

Now it could be argued that the only way to ensure that people's basic needs for survival are met, is to have schooling decided on this basis. To support this, the fact that very large numbers of people in many countries

(probably the majority of the world's population) live in circumstances in which they do not have sufficient food to ensure survival can be cited. Moreover it is arguable that the only way out of this difficulty is through strict centralised control in which individual interests are ignored in order to promote the general welfare. In certain circumstances this has proved a highly successful policy, for instance in China since 1949. On this view, the main consideration in deciding what shall be learnt is to what extent people learn what is necessary for their role in the development of adequate means of providing basic necessities for all.

On the face of it, this is a reasonable argument, but the problem about the decision of the direction of development and change, and how such decisions are to be taken remains unresolved. The limited framework of learning within the adaptive schooling context prevents the individual from being able to make adequate judgments about the actions necessary to ensure desirable directions of change or development. What the individual learns is decided by those controlling society in order to ensure successful adaptation, but excludes learning which might help the individual to assess the worthwhileness of the changes being made.

2 Autonomous Change

Opposed to the adaptive change view is one which places an emphasis on learning which is aimed at enabling people to make judgments about the value of change and to take action in terms of those judgments. The emphasis here is on learning which will enable people to participate in and control change. The assumption underlying this view is that people are able to make decisions on the basis of which actions will be taken by themselves or others which will in some practical way affect the situation in which they live. Further, it is assumed that people are not only able to make decisions and judgments of this sort, but that they ought to do so. They should not merely have to adapt to changes as they occur, but should understand the reasons for the changes, be able to assess their worthwhileness and be able to make their own decisions about action in regard to them.

As in the case of adaptive change there is in autonomous change a close link between education and society, but the nature of the relationship is different. The aim of education on the autonomous change view is to produce individuals who are able to think clearly about what changes are needed and to make informed and rational judgments about courses of action to be pursued. The individual is not

manipulated into adjusting to changes decided on by others. If changes are to be made that substantially affect his life, he must understand the implications of such changes and participate in making the decisions which lead to the changes. By both what he learns and the way in which he does so, the individual will be educated to see the implications of the decisions he takes. Change for the autonomous individual comes as the result of a rational choice about what ought to be done.

In contrast to adaptive change, in autonomous change, the direction and control of change are removed from the top of the hierarchy and placed on a far wider basis.

This notion of the role of education also has implications beyond the educational field. The structure of most societies is such that decisions about change are made from the top, and schools aiming at adaptation exist within this kind of a social framework. The adaptive school model is almost universal as a result of the almost universal existence of hierarchical social organisation. Bernard Williams (6) has argued that hierarchies need to maintain themselves by preventing people from understanding the way in which the social structure works. He maintains that once people do have this understanding it is impossible for that hierarchy to survive.

Educative schooling would promote this kind of understanding. The main thrust of the deschooling arguments in recent times has been against the role that adaptive schooling plays in ensuring that people adapt to the forms of the society in which they live even if the structures of that society discriminate heavily against them.

The distinction between the adaptive and autonomous views of change enables us to make a clear distinction between schooling which is educative and schooling which has other aims or effects. The importance of this distinction can be seen by considering the relationship between the notions of education and morality.

3 Autonomy, Adaptation and Morality

When it is decided that children shall learn certain things in certain ways this involves a decision to change them in accordance with what is thought in some way to be good for them. Both adaptive schooling and educative schooling have this element as a necessary consequence of their aim of promoting learning. But what is "good" for people? Is it

possible to say that educative schooling is good for people where adaptive schooling is not? To answer a question about what is good for people is to answer a moral question.

Now there are clearly great difficulties about what criteria we could use in order to identify the moral, a topic that would require far more space than is available here. I can only state, crudely and unargued, a position which seems to me to offer a useful framework from which to develop the relationship between education and morality further. G J Warnock (5) has suggested that morality is concerned with the alleviation of the human predicament, which he relates to the fact that people have certain fundamental needs such as the need for food, air and shelter and certain psychological needs, without which they cannot be described as doing anything more than existing. It is also a fact that for many people these necessities are not provided or available. Warnock suggests that the fact that people do not have these basic things is due to certain limitations. He lists five major limitations: limited resources, limited information, limited intelligence, limited rationality and limited sympathies, and suggests that the purpose of morality is to countervail these limitations in order to alleviate the human predicament. The limitations which Warnock stresses provide a framework within which we can consider the differences between educative and non-educative schooling.

For instance decisions made about the distribution of limited resources are, on the adaptation view, aimed at ensuring that people change to meet new conditions of distribution rather than deciding prior to the event whether such distribution is just or rational. In order to ensure that people do not question the change and continue to adapt, the amount of information will probably be limited, and sufficient trivial or irrelevant information will be provided to prevent the possible development of people's interest in areas where change is not thought to be desirable by those who have made the decisions.

Under these conditions, the possibility of rational, sympathetic judgment is virtually eliminated. Schooling is concerned with promoting this kind of approach. People are trained from an early age to adapt to decisions made for them by others. They are taught, and learn, to accept the curriculum as it is presented and not to question its value. Schools demand that they act on the basis of rules without an explanation being given for the purpose of those rules.

By following a rule a person may make a morally correct

decision, but he cannot act morally. For instance someone may adhere strictly to the rule which prohibits lying. When challenged, even though he has himself made a gross error, been careless, inconsiderate or whatever, this person always tells the truth. His reason for doing so is that he has an absolute belief in the rule that one shall not lie. It simply never occurs to him to lie in any situation. Suppose that in a particular situation he has been asked a question and responds by telling the truth. Let us suppose further that because of his telling the truth a great deal of good results for a lot of people, whereas if he had told a lie the result would have been very harmful for those same people. In this case following the rule would have had morally desirable consequences, but it would not have been a moral act, because there was no consideration of the implications of following the rule. If the truth had resulted in forty innocent people being shot, this would in no way affect the decision to tell the truth by someone committed to telling the truth on the basis of belief in the rule.

Adaptive schooling promotes a situation in which the individual is trained to adapt to changes which are decided by others. The individual is not required to judge whether the change is desirable, but to adapt to changing circumstances. He learns to follow rules rather than to make judgments. The most basic and vital decisions about what shall be learned and how, which are fundamental in changing the individual, are placed beyond his capacity for judgment. On the adaptive model, children learn to follow rules without an understanding of their purpose. The person who adapts to change, irrespective of the value of that change, does not act morally even though his decision to act in a particular way may result in good rather than ill.

On the other hand educative schooling requires that the individual attempt to overcome the limitations to the alleviation of the human predicament. Overcoming these limitations depends on the person acting autonomously.

For instance, in order to overcome the limitations of information and rationality it is necessary that the individual understand what it is to be rational and to base his judgments and actions on sufficient information. Adaptive schooling restricts the information available. Fundamental decisions are made on the basis of information only available to certain people in the hierarchy. 'Experts' abound and the 'ordinary man' is trained to accept and adapt to changes made on the basis of information to which he

either has no access, or which is presented in such a way that he cannot understand it. Limiting information is a necessary part of adaptation which needs to exclude the possibility of serious consideration of alternatives. A function of educative rather than adaptive schooling is to provide sufficient information to enable people to make rational moral judgments.

In order to make rational judgments, it is essential that people have more than sufficient information. Rationality determines to a large extent the way in which information will be used. More factual knowledge is not sufficient. The function of educative schooling is to provide an adequate system within which the information can be organised so that it is not the mere possession of facts. Williams's example of the problems for a hierarchical society in raising consciousness quoted earlier will serve to illustrate this point. People who have limited understanding will know certain facts about their situation. In particular they will know their own and others positions in the hierarchy. They will probably also know that there are differentials in terms of wealth, prestige, power and so on between the various levels. However they lack understanding. They do not know why things are as they are and what the real alternatives are to the present situation. This is partly due to limited information and, perhaps more substantially, to a limited conceptual framework. The notion of morality with its emphasis on judgments made in terms of their relation to the amelioration of the human predicament provides a fundamental criterion for educative schooling which is clearly in opposition to the rule bound adaptive view of schooling. It also explains why most schooling is not educative.

Adaptation, by excluding the possibility of rational moral judgments, also excludes the possibility of the rise of a challenge to the existing hierarchies which depend on the limitation of autonomy. Rational moral judgments directly threaten hierarchical control. But educative schooling is as fundamental a need for people as the need for food and water.

Even in this highly technological age the basic needs of a very significant percentage of the world's population are not satisfied for a variety of reasons. The principal reason can be laid at the door of limited rationality and limited sympathy on the part of those who control the hierarchical systems which maintain this situation. The resolution of this position does not seem to rest on the possibility of a sudden change on the part of the people on

the top of the hierarchy in whose interests the system is maintained. What is needed is an increase in the knowledge and understanding of the people at the lower levels, which is aimed at giving them the knowledge and skills to change the situation in a way that could be beneficial to all.

Now, it could be argued, that this is a reasonable argument in principle, but it is highly suspect from any practical point of view. Doubts about its practical effects are extremely strong - hierarchies do not give way very easily. However, there are critically important implications for education in this position.

Educative schooling, with its emphasis on autonomous judgments can be seen to be crucially related to countering the ill effects of the human predicament. It is closely related to its role in countering the limitations to the alleviation of the human predicament, and to finding a solution to the provision of the basic needs of the bulk of the world's population. It is thus that the decision about educational activities is essentially a moral decision. Education should aim to enable people to know and understand their own position and that of others, and attempt through this to lessen the limitations on the provision of fundamental necessities. That educative schooling unlike adaptive schooling, runs counter to the interests of powerful hierarchies is true. But this has been a problem for education since at least the time of Socrates.

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MORAL CONFLICT

Susan Kramer

This paper will, in the main, attempt to criticise Jonathan Bennett's description of the distinction between 'morality' (moral rules or moral principles) on the one hand, and 'sympathy' on the other, as illustrated in his article "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn" (1); secondly, I will suggest a possible alternative way of seeing the tension between these two tendencies; and thirdly, I will attempt to answer briefly the delicate question of how, in such a dilemma, one could decide what to do.

Let us take Bennett's own usage of the two terms 'morality' and 'sympathy': 'morality' he enlarges upon as 'a set of principles of action which (a person) sincerely assents to, so that for him, the problem of acting well or rightly or in obedience to conscience is the problem of conforming to those principles.' (I am going to use the phrase 'moral rules' very loosely - interchangeably with 'moral principles' or 'morality'. To argue the distinction would lead me away from what I most want to say). As for 'sympathy', he writes: 'I use this term to cover every sort of fellow-feeling', including pity and compassion and concern. 'Obviously, feelings can impel one to action, and so can moral judgements; and in a particular case, sympathy and morality may pull in opposite directions.' Bennett describes a 'difference between general moral principles and particular, unreasoned emotional pulls.'

Without examining the three examples of varying types of this situation given by Bennett, I would like to suggest a further example of particular relevance to the South African political situation: Let us imagine that we live as 'Whites' in South Africa. Our upbringing, perhaps our education, maybe our eyes and ears have led us to believe that we are living in a society in which the goods are not fairly spread around. However, in the belief that a 'Black South Africa' would mean the end of an existence as we have known it for White South Africans, and would be a threat to the safety and comfort of our families, we support and hope for the duration of a White, and as we see it, immoral and oppressive régime.

I think it would not be wrong to say that Bennett would describe this situation as a tension between a morality -

(a 'bad morality') - and our sympathies in the following way: our morality leads us to accept the 'rules' promulgated by our society - patriotism urges us to protect the 'stability' of our country and to safeguard the wellbeing of our own loved ones; while our sympathies tell us that millions of others are suffering under this régime.

But this idea is confused. Perhaps it is our sympathies which lead to our concern for our 'own', while our moral principles tell us that the White government, as it exists, is not worthy of our support. What I mean to say is that, although the two terms are not fully interchangeable, sympathy, if it means 'fellow-feeling', is a central concept of morality. Sympathy is not an unreasoned gut-reaction. Even if Huck Finn is unable to verbalise his 'sympathy' for Jim, it is not merely a 'feeling', an 'emotional pull' that just emerges out of nowhere. Sympathy, as is morality, is based on a particular type of understanding of a situation. And most important, sympathy necessarily implies concern for the well-being of another, and this IS morality.

Perhaps what Bennett should say is that there are such things as moral dilemmas based on differing views of moral considerations, on conflicting reasons - and this is the basis of the tension.

The example he gives of the mother bringing her child for an inoculation is, I think, poorly thought out. Her sympathies, he says, would lead her to comfort her firghtened child and to take him out of the doctor's reach, while her morality makes it necessary for her to control her sympathies. This morality is her concern for her child's health. But the distinction drawn here is artificial: the mother's morality leads her to want to comfort her child, and it is again her morality which insists that her child be inoculated. Both ideas include sympathy and care, but one is a short-term, and one a long-term consideration.

I think that the moral 'development' theory of Lawrence Kohlberg might offer an interesting approach to this question of moral dilemmas. To describe this theory briefly, I will quote the outline from Peters and Hirst's The Logic of Education (2):

> "He (Kohlberg) holds that, though there is a difference between cultures in the content of moral beliefs, the development of their form is a cultural invariant. In other words, though there is a variation between cultures about whether or not people should eg. be thrifty

> or have sexual relationships outside marriage, there are cross-cultural uniformities relating to how any such rules are conceived eg. as ways of avoiding punishment, as laid down by authority, and so on. Children, Kohlberg claims, start by seeing rules as dependent upon power and external compulsion; they then see them as instrumental to rewards and to the satisfaction of their needs; then as ways of obtaining social approval and esteem; then as upholding some ideal order and finally as articulations of social principles necessary for living together with others. Varying contents given to rules are fitted into invariant forms of conceiving of rules. Of course in many cultures there is no progression through to the final stages, the rate of development will be different in different cultures, and in the same culture there are great individual differences."

Kohlberg divides moral development into six stages. He also says that when an individual is at a particular stage of moral development he will be reasoning predominantly at that stage, but his moral judgements will also include a form of reasoning from the stage 'below' and from the stage 'above', into which he is moving. Decisions reached at one stage of moral judgement may conflict with decisions reached at another eg. Kohlberg's Stage 4 is described (in brief) as the upholding of the formal social order, of the laws and rules of the society, whereas the two later stages question these rules on the basis of more general moral principles ie. Stage 4 says 'This is a law and it must be obeyed'. Stage 5 and 6 ask, 'Is this a <u>just</u> law, and should it be obeyed?'

It seems to me that this is the predicament in which Huckleberry Finn finds himself - to be 'scientific' - a ripening and promising Stage Fiver hampered by Stage 4 justifications. Huck in no way 'abandons' morality, as Bennett puts it, even if he (Huck) cannot express it so to himself. Conflict or dilemma brings him to experience the inadequacy of his moral code, and this awareness, as yet unarticulated, must necessarily lead to moral growth. (One of Bennett's examples is Himmler, but Himmler I find difficult to discuss as an example of a rational moral agent ... notwithstanding his tummy-aches caused by his troublesome sensitivities.)

It might be useful to try to describe Kohlberg's theory in

another way: throughout our 'development' our 'sympathies' gradually broaden and become less specific and more abstract and thus applicable to more and more situations without contradiction. At first, the individual needs to co-operate with at least one other, if only for reasons of convenience; then as the individual becomes aware of himself as part of a group and as part of a society, he forms ties of concern, and a conscience related to the approval or disapproval of the group and society. Hopefully, individuals progress beyond this stage to a deeper understanding of moral principles which transcend the rules promulgated by their society: where obedience to rules is not based on reverence for authority and fear of punishment, but on personal self-direction through conscience based on an understanding of moral principles. Thus, the circle of persons considered by an individual to have a claim on moral consideration becomes ever wider.

Kohlberg submits that only about 25% of people progress to stages 5 and 6. Many more become 'fixated' at State 4 where 'law and order' in a society must be maintained. If all this is true, then it is inevitable that there will be conflict between differing moral judgements both within the individual himself, and between the individual and other members of his society.

What to do about these dilemmas? - What is our path of action? That is difficult to answer in general terms. Perhaps it may not always be wise, assuming that we can recognise the 'best' course of action, to act on this recognition ... it might seriously endanger one's safety, and not everyone can be expected to be willing to do this. Huck does it, but then that's why he's the hero of a novel. Most people would probably be willing to compromise their beliefs if they had to. But, if we cannot necessarily urge ourselves to act on what we might know to be a 'better' moral judgement, it does not mean that we should not attempt to cultivate in ourselves, as far as possible, a particular way of viewing moral dilemmas, of reasoning about moral issues. Kohlberg's theory of stages implies a hierarchical framework which may be, and has been challenged, but it does provide a workable and not unreasonable basis for understanding some kinds of moral conflict.

As Warnock points out (Contemporary Moral Philosophy), unshakeable moral conclusions may be very difficult to arrive at due to questions such as what exactly constitutes the welfare of others; considerations of long-term versus short-term well-being, good to some versus harm or good to others; and the difficulty of predicting the course of

future events (3).

But this does not devalue the worth of moral reasoning. Which reasons must we look to then? Towards which side of the dilemma should we lean? I think we must return here to ideas of respect for persons, compassion for the suffering of others, and the notion of universalisability. I think that the broader-based 'morality' and 'sympathies' as illustrated in Kohlberg's Stages 5 and 6 ought to predominate in moral reasoning, and of course ideally, in moral action.

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(1) Jonathan Bennett "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn" in Philosophy vol 49 no 188 April 1974

(2) Peters R S & Hirst P H The Logic of Education (Routledge 1970) p 46

(3) Warnock G J Contemporary Moral Philosophy (Macmillan 1967) see esp pp 69-70

DETERMINANTS OF ARITHMETIC PERFORMANCE IN LEARNING-DISABLED CHILDREN

Frank Fincham(I)

Homan (2) has attributed arithmetic disabilities to inadequate perceptual skills, motor disinhibition, perseveration, language impairments and abstract thinking deficits. Each of these characteristics has been associated with learning-disabled children yet little is known about their arithmetic ability. The author therefore investigated the arithmetic performance of learning-disabled children as compared to that of normal achievers. An attempt was also made to establish whether varying arithmetic ability could be attributed to differences in abstract thinking.

The performance of twelve learning-disabled boys (7½ - 8½ years old) and twelve normal achievers, equated in terms of age, intelligence and socio-economic status, was compared on the Key Math Diagnostic Arithmetic Test and on Piagetian tasks of number conservation and classification. While the two groups were found to differ significantly in arithmetic scores they performed equally well on the Piagetian measures of abstract thinking. However, conservation ability was significantly related to arithmetic performance in the learning-disabled group.

The arithmetic data confirm the indirect empirical evidence suggesting impaired arithmetic performance in the learning-disabled. For example, Levine and Fuller (3) found retarded readers performed poorly on the Arithmetic Subtest of the Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children.

Little can be said with regard to the Piagetian findings owing to the lack of research with learning-disabled children. However, it should be noted that this result implies that the claims of perceptual motor theorists in the learning disability field may be exaggerated. The high incidence of perceptual problems in the learning-disabled population is widely accepted but the present finding is at variance with the postulate that such problems necessarily lead to generalised conceptual difficulties. It seems more likely that they may result in cognitive deficits specific to certain areas of functioning.

The significant correlation of conservation to arithmetic

performance in the learning-disabled group only may be the result of two factors. First, the teaching methods employed with learning-disabled children are more likely to emphasise concepts such as conservation. Second, differences in handling Piagetian tasks may only be apparent at later age levels. Although this result requires further investigation it suggests the possible utility of Piagetian tasks in assessing the numerical ability of learning-disabled children. As such tasks evaluate processes, rather than the end-products of thought, they may prove valuable in diagnosing arithmetic disabilities.

In combination the present results suggest that the relatively poor arithmetic performance of the learning-disabled group is not due to impaired conservation or classification abilities. Their ability to think in abstract terms means that other variables must account for their poor arithmetic performance.

The remaining factors enumerated by Homan (2) may be used to explain the present results. For example, Ackerman Peters and Dykman (4) found that normal and inadequate perceivers differ in arithmetic ability and therefore perceptual impairments among the learning-disabled suggest poor arithmetic performance. Perhaps the most fundamental of Homan's factors is language inadequacy, as Cohn (5) has shown that arithmetic language is as difficult to acquire as any element of verbal language. The greatest number of learning disabilities involve language disorders and this may have lead to the poor arithmetic performance found.

However, attempts to account for arithemtic disabilities in terms of a few set variables may be simplistic. Other factors including attention and memory deficits, low self-concept, a high test anxiety and unfavourable attitudes to arithmetic could have yielded the lower arithmetic score in the learning-disabled group. These variables have been attributed to learning-disabled children and have been shown to effect arithmetic performance in other populations. One therefore reaches the conclusion that the learning of arithmetic is possibly affected by a complex network of interacting factors not all of which are fully understood. Any simple account of arithmetic disabilities in general should thus be viewed critically.

In conclusion, though, the present results should also be interpreted with caution. The limited age range and number of subjects, as well as tasks used, argues against a generalisation of these findings. However, the implications of this study, as outlined above, suggest a potentially

fruitful area of investigation. The necessity for this research is emphasised by its important implications for educating children with learning disabilities.

Footnotes and References

(1) The financial assistance of the Human Sciences Research Council towards the cost of this research is hereby acknowledge. I wish to also acknowledge Mrs L Meltzer under whose supervision this study was conducted. Finally, I would like to thank Mrs A Gordon for her helpful suggestions in preparing this article.

(2) Homan D R "The Child with a learning disability in arithmetic" The Arithmetic Teacher 1970

(3) Levine M & Fuller G "Psychological, neurophysiological and educational correlates of reading deficit" Journal of Learning Disabilities 1972 5 563-571

(4) Ackerman P, Peters J & Dykman R "Children with specific learning disabilities: Bender Gestalt test findings and other signs" Journal of Learning Disabilities 1971 4 35-45

(5) Cohn R "Arithmetic and learning disabilities" In H Myklebust (ed) Progress in Learning Disabilities vol II New York: Grune & Stratton 1972

THE AIMS OF TEACHING POETRY

Margaret Meyer

The value of poetry study has, until recently, generally gone unchallenged. Growing interest in the behavioural sciences has, however, raised a number of questions which many teachers of literature find themselves ill-equipped to answer.

In a recent piece of research, I had occasion to look into the nature of poetry and poetry teaching at university level. I found many divergent opinions as to what poetry is, what it does, and how it should be taught. This article presents some information on the areas of agreement and disagreement over teaching aims and sets out the conventional aims of university poetry teaching. It is to be hoped that it will help teachers to define their individual teaching aims.

1 Three Frames of Reference

There are three important frames of reference in discussing poetry. Poetry may be seen in terms of function or secondly, poetry may be seen as poems and what they actually are; and thirdly, poems may be seen as language. There is little common ground between these three and much disagreement within each frame. For example, those who view poetry in terms of function might regard the function of poetry as giving pleasure, or providing instruction, or offering an interpretation of life, or performing a vital function in cultivating conscious awareness of feeling. Those who view poetry as what poems actually are might regard a poem as a symbol of feeling or an illusion of experience. Finally, those who view a poem simply as language might avoid value judgements and interest themselves only in verifiable linguistic data.

Inevitably the aims of poetry teaching reflect the varying attitudes of teachers and consequently there is little agreement about teaching aims. It can indeed be asserted that it would be highly undesirable to specify precise aims since poetry is an art form in a much disputed area. No one set of rules could be applied to works of art since each work of art, if it is worth discussing at all, has generated its own set of criteria.

.1 Function

Those teachers who view poetry mainly in terms of function would see their role as primarily to show the student what the criteria are for a particular poem and how the poem can be evaluated. Many such teachers would expect that their students would learn to do this for themselves when presented with an unseen poem. The basic assumption of many poetry teachers whether explicitly stated or not is that students are to be trained in practical literary criticism. Many teachers have attempted to move literary criticism from a somewhat emotive undisciplined approach to a more standardised basis, emphasising a need for the prerequisites of understanding the nature of experience and theories of valuation and communication. The methods of practical criticism are analysis of texts in terms of feelings and thoughts expressed or implied, with close attention to underlying meanings and subtle implications. Sometimes the purpose of such study is considered to be to help students cultivate awareness and grow toward mature values.

.2 What poems are

To take the second frame of reference: those who have attempted to define what a poem actually is have reacted strongly to the idea that the aim of poetry study is to teach literary criticism. Susanne Langer (1) indeed goes so far as to question the reader's right to evaluate at all.

> There are numberless introductions to poetry that urge one to determine "what the poet is trying to say," and to judge of "how well he says it". But if the reader can make clear what the poet is trying to say, why cannot the poet say it clearly in the first place? ... If it is we who are unfamiliar with his language, then we have not to determine what he is trying to say, but what he does say; and how well he says it is not ours to judge, since we are tyros ...

The questions to ask, Susanne Langer declares, are

> 'What has the poet made, and how did he make it?'

Some teachers draw attention to the harmful effects of training students in methods which enable them to pass examinations without necessarily having any real appreciation of poetry; some also deny that the refinement of sensibilities is achieved through literary study. It is

further claimed that the methods of practical criticism encourage a contemptuous attitude towards creative minds, and do not take into account the students' own needs to experience lesser works in order to develop to full appreciation of great works.

Despite an awareness of what is regarded as the doubtful educational value of practical criticism, there would be agreement amongst poetry teachers working within a literary framework that they could help students towards independent personal discovery of how a poem works.

.3 Linguistic Frame of Reference

The third frame of reference, that of linguistics, also offers a variety of approaches to the question of teaching poetry. Linguists would generally see their discipline as having a valuable contribution to make to literary study in providing objective analysis and a theoretical basis for literary criticism. Thorne (2), for example, suggests the construction of grammars for stylistic studies:

> Reading a poem, it is suggested, is often like learning a language. When we learn a language we develop the capacity to have intuitions about its structure. A grammar is a special kind of statement about these intuitions ... the study of a grammar that someone else has provided for a poem may throw light on possible meanings in it ... Moreover this could prove to be the case without any reference at all being made to vague, quasi-explanatory glosses ...

The poetry teacher with a linguistic bias selects his own interest for special emphasis.

2 Disagreements in Practice

It is unusual to find the aims of poetry teaching explicitly stated in university literature departments, and an examination of two text books commonly used in poetry study serves to emphasise the problem.

The authors of The Owl Critic (3), a text book used at the University of Zululand, state that the aim of the book is

> to provide the University and High School student with a simple and balanced approach to Literary Criticism, to help him tackle

What purpose is served by collecting vague and ominous assertions and beliefs in this manner?

> his assignments with confidence, and to stimulate him to more advanced reading on Criticism.

In presenting the case for the study of literature, the authors remark:

> It is doubtful whether the mere fact that someone is acquainted with literature will inevitably make a better person of him; but the study of literature offers the opportunity for the widening of one's horizons, for the refinement of one's sensibilities, and for the deepening of one's understanding of the human condition.

The introductory text used at the Witwatersrand University is Understanding Poetry (4). In the Preface the authors tell us

> Poetry gives us knowledge. It is a knowledge of ourselves in relation to the world of experience, and to that world considered, not statistically, but in terms of human purposes and values ...
>
> We have access to this special kind of knowledge only by participating in the drama of the poem, apprehending the form of the poem ...
>
> Because the special knowledge that poetry gives reaches us only through form, we believe that the study of poetry should be inductive and concrete. We believe that one should observe as carefully as possible the elements of poetry ...
>
> Poems are written by human beings and the form of a poem is an individual's attempt to deal with a specific problem, poetic and personal ... Poems are read by human beings, which means that the reader, unlike a robot, must be able to recognise the dramatic implications of the form.

In The Owl Critic, then, the moral value of poetry is emphasised, while in Understanding Poetry, the study of human purposes and values is undertaken through emphasis on appreciation of poetic form.

Similarly, examination papers provide further evidence of the difficulty of stating general aims of poetry. One South African University gives a weight to the social and

historical context and what is generally regarded as traditional literary analysis; another emphasises the linguistic structures of poetry, while at a third the emphasis is on responding to the mood or feeling expressed.

Thus each department's aims depend upon the attitudes of its members and these in turn on the temperaments and training of the lecturers.

3 Areas of Agreement

Whatever the approach, poetry teachers naturally try to give their students such information and skills as they believe to be important to their aims, whether explicitly stated or not. While the aims are highly controversial, certain parameters of understanding and teaching poetry form the implicit background to most poetry courses and selected aspects of these parameters are taught or emphasised to a greater or lesser degree. It must be pointed out, however, that although a recognition of these parameters might be acceptable, it is unlikely that the view taken in the paragraphs that follow would meet with general approval; many poetry teachers might think undesirable the high degree of explicitness and categorisation. Nevertheless, the general idea of what the areas of agreement are, would be likely to receive acceptance. There are three main areas of agreement, namely, that style, context and patterns are important in poetry study.

.1 Style

First, most poetry teachers would agree that in poetry, form and content are inseparable. Meaning can often only be explained with relation to poetic organisation. Equally, it is hardly possible to separate style and meaning.

.2 Context

Secondly, most teachers would agree that language loses much (in some cases all) meaning when taken out of context. Certain features in a piece of writing give clues as to the context, that is, information is conveyed about the situation in which the event described takes place. For example, the deictives, I, you, this, that, now, then, point to aspects in the environment. In French and many other languages, the use of the second person sigular rather than the plural form conveys information about relationships. Sometimes a piece of writing may seem to be at variance with the situation in which it occurs, creating a form of deviation, namely deviation in the implication of context.

Thus we find many critics emphasising the necessity for examining the work of writers in the context of their historical setting.

.3 Patterns

Thirdly, most lecturers would agree that it would be important for students to know something about poetic patterns.

Starting on the phonological level, patterns are found in metre and rhythm. The patterns of rhythm are organised into lines which in turn are patterned into couplets, stanzas and so on. Verse form reflects the hierarchy of language in patterns of phonology, grammar and lexis. The opening lines of "The Waste Land" by T S Eliot show a grammatical pattern analogous to rhyme.

> April is the cruellest month, breeding
> Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
> Memory and desire, stirring ...

The present participle, which is preceded by a major juncture ends each line (5).

Many patterns are to be found on the lexical level, for example in the deviant use of vocabulary in unusual collocations. In Dylan Thomas' poem, "It is a winter's tale", 'twilight' is 'blind' and is able to 'ferry' while 'sail' takes the animate adjective 'stealthy'. Poetry teachers generally would point out to their students not only such patterns as have been described here but others as well, such as patterns of imagery. The function of the patterns of poetry is to emphasise certain components of the work. Many of the patterns have become conventionalised. Some patterns conform so closely to the traditions of poetic writing that they fail in their function. Poetry must therefore be considered in terms of the normal language and traditional poetic language and conventions; teachers draw attention to some of the conventionalised patterns.

The weight given to each of these parameters of poetry teaching depends on the attitude of the poetry teacher, and in practice, quite different teaching topics are often selected from what have been termed areas of agreement.

4 The aims of teaching poetry

Although it is impossible to state the aims of poetry teaching in a way that will be universally acceptable, many

South African universities follow a fourfold aim: teachers seek first to develop the student's response to poetry, secondly to give the student certain information necessary to understand poetry, thirdly, to equip the student with analytic skills which have been found useful, and finally to evaluate poetry.

.1 Response

Since the student's response may be a personal idiosyncratic one, an ideal teaching situation is usually regarded as the small tutorial, or even a one to one teacher-student discussion. Individual works from which generalisations can be made are studied in this situation. Teachers will usually try to interest the student by seeking his response to poetry; they will encourage a positive attitude towards poetry study and an awareness of the values conveyed.

.2 Information

Much information is given to the student of poetry which relates to such matters as the social context, poetic tradition, and the poetic devices which are used. The student is shown how literature relates to the life and culture of people. He is also given a set of concepts within which poetry can be discussed.

.3 Skills

Two basic analytic skills are taught to increase appreciation and interest. A skill is a set of habits used with ease, rapidity and precision. The skills which are taught are skill in recognition and skill in interpretation. Skill in recognition includes the recognition of patterns both verbal and imagistic, the recognition of features of style, the recognition of attitudes and values stated or implied in poetry and recognition of linguistic and poetic conventions and deviations.

Skill in interpretation includes discovering the themes of poetry. The term 'theme' is used to indicate the central idea of a work of literature; for example, the theme of Robert Graves' poem "Vanity" is that nothing is certain in life. Skill in interpretation also includes training in observation and the ability to make general statements from specific details. Without the skills and information, the reading of a poem need be nothing more than a momentary sensual experience for which there would be no means of recall, and about which there would be no possibility of discussion.

.4 Evaluation

Evaluation of poetry includes discrimination and judgement between works of different periods and their aims in relation to the structure and context of the work. Most poetry teachers would rate certain poems as superior to others. They would try to develop in their students the ability to make this judgement in terms of how far the components of a work fulfil their proper function.

.5 Conventional Aims

The conventional aims of poetry teaching may thus be summed up as follows:

(1) To develop the student's responsiveness to poetry by

(a) eliciting overt individual response,

(b) encouraging a positive attitude in the student towards poetry and thus interesting him in the study of poetry,

(c) creating awareness of the values conveyed in poetry.

(2) To inform the student about

(a) the social context and historical traditions of poetic 'schools'

(b) the poetic devices employed in poetry

(c) a set of concepts and vocabulary necessary to discuss poetry.

(3) To equip the student with such analytic skills as have been found useful, namely,

(a) recognition of (i) poetic patterns including verbal patterns of imagery (ii) stylistic features; (iii) the poet's values and his attitude to these and other values, and (iv) linguistic and poetic conventions and deviations,

(b) the interpretation of poems through discovering the themes of poetry and through the observation of the use of different aspects

of language to illuminate the theme. This may include training in the ability to observe specific details in order to make general statements.

(4) To develop ability in the evaluation of poetry by making judgements as to the relative merits of works on the basis of how far the components fulfil their functions.

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NOTICES

EDITORIAL NOTICES

(a) We would like to welcome Mr Huw Davies of the Department of Educational Studies at the Johannesburg College of Education to the Editorial Committee.

(b) This issue (Vol 1 No 3) is the last for 1976 and the Editorial Committee would like to try to gauge the responses of readers and to get their views about modifications which might fruitfully be made in subsequent issues. With this in view we have included in this issue a brief questionnaire which we would welcome your completing and returning to the Editor at the first opportunity.

(c) In Vol 2 No 1 (February 1977) there will be a new section called INTERCHANGE. It will consist of a paper on some important issue followed by a set or series of responses, and maybe a reply from the original author, published together as a section in the journal. We would like to have interchanges on such topics as Language in Schooling, Authority and Education, Learning to Teach a Subject, The Distribution of Resources for Schooling and so on. If you have any suggestions for issues or topics which deserve this kind of treatment or, more concretely, if you have or know of a paper which might be suitable as a starting paper for an INTERCHANGE, please let the Editorial Committee know.

(d) We still (see Vol 1 No 1 pg 40) regard the DISCUSSION section of this journal as a crucial element. As you will have noted contributions for this section can be, and have been, of a variety of kinds. We are dedicated to the idea that ideas rubbing against each other produce surprising offspring. We do not really believe that you have all agreed with all the views put forward in what we have published, and we urge you, again, to respond in writing in the fullness of your disagreement with or enthusiasm for any relevant matter you come across.

EDUCATION SYMPOSIA

Programme for term 3, 1976. Unless otherwise indicated Education Symposia (formerly known as "activities meetings") begin at 9.30 in the Education Common Room. Dates fall on Fridays.

Aug 27 Prof P Hunter will lead discussion on the HED(PG) course

Sept 3 Two new films from Britain will be shown in the new main lecture theatre (L1), Education Building, beginning at 9.30. The films are entitled:

(a) Willingly to school
(b) Happy revolution

Running time is a little more than an hour. Students will be invited to attend the screening of these films.

Sept 10 Indoctrination. Prof N Boyce (Johannesburg College of Education), and Mr F Auerbach (Transvaal Teachers Association) will talk briefly on this topic; this will be followed by discussion. Interest in this topic arose from an article, and subsequent discussions of it, which have appeared in Perspectives in Education. ("Indoctrination in the History Class?" P Kallaway, Vol 1 No 1; "Barmy Whethers", P Morris, Vol 1 No 2; "Education in the History Class?", W Morrow, Vol 1 No 2; "Indoctrination or Education in the History Class - the Kallaway/Morrow debate", D Margetson, Vol 1 No 3)

Oct 8 Further discussion of the HED(PG) course. If possible this will arise from the meeting of the 27th August; details will be announced nearer the time.

Oct 22 The need for Adult Education. Dr R Lee (SACHED Evaluation Programme)

SYMPOSIUM

Symposium is a journal for education for Southern Africa published annually by the Johannesburg College of Education. The Editor will be pleased to receive contributions. The theme for this year is Education and the Challenge of South Africa's Future and contributions for this issue should be sent to the Editor by the end of August.

The Editor
Symposium
Johannesburg College of Education
17 Hoofd Street
Braamfontein
Johannesburg 2001

LIST OF SOUTH AFRICAN PERIODICALS CONCERNED WITH SCHOOLING, TEACHING AND EDUCATION

The following list has been compiled with the help of Mr A Gouverneur of the Transvaal Education Department, Education Library Service, and Miss E Dey of the William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand. We would like to try to make this list more complete and accurate and if you know of any periodicals which should appear on it, or have any other suggestions to make, the Editorial Committee would be pleased to hear from you.

1 Journals published by University/College Departments/ Faculties of Education

Educare — Journal of the Faculty of Education, University of South Africa; Tydskrif van die fakulteit opvoedkunde, Universiteit van Suid Afrika.

Journal of Education
Department of Education, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.

Perspectives in Education
House journal of the Faculty of Education, University of the Witwatersrand

Rhodes University, Department of Education, Bulletin.

Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir die Pedagogiek/South African Journal of Pedagogy
Fakulteit opvoedkunde, Universiteit van Pretoria

Symposium — A journal for education for Southern Africa, Johannesburg College of Education.

2 Periodicals published by teachers' associations

Educa — orgaan van die Suidwes-Afrikaanse onderwysunie.

Education — the organ of the South African teachers' association (Cape Town).

Mentor — Organ of the Natal teachers' society/orgaan van die Natalse onderwysersvereniging.

Mondstuk — maandblad van die Traansvaalse ondersysers-vereniging.

Nou-blad — vir Christelike en nasionale onderwys en opvoeding, orgaan van die Natalse onderwyserunie

Nou-nuusbrief
Natalse onderwysersunie (Pietermaritzburg).

Onderwysblad
vir Christelike and nasionale onderwys en opvoeding, orgaan van die Transvaalse onderwysersvereniging, die Natalse onderwyserunie en die Suidwes-Afrikaanse onderwyserunie.

Saita News — a South African Indian teachers' association news release.

Skoolblad/Teacher
OVS onderwysersvereniging

Teachers' Journal
organ of the Natal Indian teachers' society

Transvaal Educational News
Transvaal teachers' association

3 Periodicals relevant to specific subject-teaching

African Studies
a quarterly journal devoted to the study of African administration, cultures and language (WUP)

Akroterion — quarterly for the classics in South Africa/ kwartaalblad vir die klassieke in Suid-Afrika, Departement van Klassieke, Universiteit van Stellenbosch.

Archimedes — Suid-Afrikaanse vereniging vir die bevordering van kennis en kultuur (Pretoria).

Crux — guide to teaching English language and literature, Foundation for education, science and technology, (Pretoria).

Deutschunterricht in Süd-Afrika, Mitteilungsblatt des Südafrikanischen Germanistenverbandes, Departement van Duits, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit.

English Alive
: a literary magazine for high schools, Western Cape branch of the South African Council for English education.

English in Africa
: Institute for the study of English in Africa (Rhodes)

English Studies in Africa
: (WUP)

English Usage in Southern Africa
: (UNISA)

Information
: Zeitschrift des Deutschen Lehrervereins für Süd- und Südwestafrika.

Klasgids
: by die studie van die Afrikaanse taal en letterkunde.

Musicus
: (UNISA)

Scripta Geographica
: Departement van Aardrykskunde, Universiteit van die Oranje-Vrystaat

Spectrum
: Kwartaallikse tydskrif vir wiskunde- en wetenskaponderwysers/quarterly journal for teachers of science and mathematics. Federasie van Suid-Afrikaanse verenigings van Wetenskaponderwysers, (Pretoria)

South African Music Teacher
: South African Society of Music Teachers (Pietermaritzburg)

Suid-Afrikaanse Vereniging van Musiekonderwysers
: (Pretoria)

Tegnikon
: Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns (Pretoria)

Tydskrif
: vir tegniese en beroepsonderwys in Suid Afrika (Vereniging vir tegniese en beroepsonderwys, Johannesburg

UCT Studies in English
: Department of English (UCT)

Unisa English Studies
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INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Editor will welcome contributions in the form of comments on local events or issues, original articles, discussion of articles, reviews, items for the 'Notices' Section and so on.

It would be helpful if contributions were submitted according to the following specifications:

(i) the length should ordinarily be no longer than about 3 000 words;

(ii) the contribution should be typewritten on one side of A4 paper, double-spaced with good margins all round;

(iii) three copies should be provided, as well as an indication of length;

(iv) references and footnotes should be kept to a minimum but, if required, should appear at the end of the contribution.

Proofs will not be sent to authors for correction unless this is especially requested. Contributions for the Discussion section can be published anonymously provided that the contributor's name is submitted to the editorial committee. The date by which contributions for the next issue must be with the Editor appears on the back cover.

All contributions should be sent in the first instance to the Editor:

Wally Morrow
Department of Education
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

If you want any further information please get in touch with a member of the editorial committee:

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DISTRIBUTION

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Contributions for the next issue must be submitted to the Editor by 1st November 1976.

Multiple - choice questions?

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please complete this questionnaire and return it to The Editor, Perspectives in Education, Department of Education, University of the Witwatersrand by Monday 6 September, 1976.

NAME: M. B. GARDINER

POSITION: HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH, JCE

1 How many of the 3 issues have you had?

1
2
(3)

2 What proportion of each issue have you read?

0	0	0
25%	25%	25%
50%	50%	50%
75%	75%	75%
(100%)	(100%)	(100%)

3 Which articles did you find most interesting/memorable?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

4 In relation to other journals how useful/ interesting have you found Perspectives in Education?

Above average
Average
Below average

5 Have you found the discussion section stimulating?

very
moderately
hardly

6 What would you like to see appearing in the Discussion Section?

1.
2.
3.

7 Have you any suggestions for other kind of items which could go into the notices section?

1.
2.
3.

8 Would you be prepared to pay a subscription of say, R1 a year (3 issues), to ensure the continued existence of the journal?

Yes
No.

9 Write below any other comments (etc.) you would like to make.