

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Research Report entitled '*The Failure of UN Diplomacy: The case of Iraq from the 1991 post –Gulf War to 2003*' is my own unaided work and that the assistance obtained has been only in form of professional guidance and supervision; that no part of this research has previously been submitted to any other institution of higher learning or university.

DEDICATION

This piece of work is dedicated to all those who relentlessly endeavoured to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi crisis that threatened the stability of the Middle-East Region and the entire world.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	: Cable News Network
CW	: Chemical Weapons
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency
MOU	: Memorandum of Understanding
NPT	: Non-Proliferation Treaty
NNPT	: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
UN	: United Nations

UNMOVIC : United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNSCOM : United Nations Special Commission

US : United States

WMD : Weapons of Mass Destruction

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ABSTRACT

This research attempts to examine and explain the failure of UN diplomacy that was applied in Iraq from 1991 post-Gulf War to 2003. In order to achieve this, UN diplomatic instruments that included diplomatic negotiations, UN Resolutions, sanctions, and weapons inspections have been rigorously analysed within the context of ascertaining their diplomatic effectiveness.

The report specifically focuses on the impact that was made by the diplomatic tools in an effort to peacefully disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the report explores factors that undermined the use of the diplomatic instruments.

A number of factors have been responsible for the failure of the UN diplomacy in Iraq. They include, among others, a structural problem in form of an enforcement mechanism in the UN Security Council Resolutions; lack of complementarity in the use of the diplomatic instruments, and implemented at an earlier phase of the disarmament crisis; use of the UN by some of its key members to pursue their interests; flaws in the overall US/UN policy toward Iraq; deeply entrenched hostilities between Iraq and the West especially US and Britain; the approach within which sanctions were modelled discouraged key diplomatic dialogue and negotiation; and the nature of the UN of being an association of sovereign countries largely limited diplomatic efforts to resolve the disarmament crisis.

Thus, the report reveals factors ranging from the ineffectiveness of the UN diplomatic instruments to the flaws in the external influence- that is, the policy of the UN and some of its key members to have failed the UN diplomacy in Iraq.

**THE FAILURE OF UN DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAQ FROM THE
1991 POST-GULF WAR TO 2003**

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