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**The media as a non-state actor in international relations:
a case study of the New York Times' coverage of the
Darfur conflict in 2004**

Chutel, Lynsey

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The Media as a Non-State Actor
in International Relations:
A case study of the *New York Times*'
coverage of the Darfur conflict in 2004.

By

Lynsey Chutel
Student Number 330194

I bear witness that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted in fulfilment for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand. It has not been submitted before any other degree or examination at any other university.

Lynsey Chutel

13 November 2014

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1. Introduction

The media's role is to disseminate accurate and objective information about particular phenomena but the media itself is rarely an objective institution. In international relations, the media exists as a non-state actor, able to exert power through its representation, reinforcement and the possibility to challenge the narrative of a particular conflict or intervention. The media's description of such international relations phenomena, its interpretation of events and even the decision to highlight one issue over another show that the media is a contested space. The hypothesis of this paper is that the media does not play the role of neutral observer in a conflict. Using the *New York Times*' coverage at the start of the Darfur conflict as a case study, this paper aims to study how the newspaper reported on the conflict, exploring how the description of the conflict, its root cause and actors involved, as created by the coverage as well as the calls for international intervention demonstrates the role of the media as a non-state actor.

Using discourse analysis, and discussing power and agency through representation and language, it will draw on critical theoretical positions in international relations and media studies, this paper will attempt to show how the media is situated within discourse, where it creates and recreates historical representation through language and metaphor. Then in order to situate the discourse on the Darfur conflict, this paper will give an outline of the conflict and the debates that have emerged about the representation of the conflict, especially those critiquing the media coverage of the Darfur conflict. This paper will also specifically discuss existing analysis of the *New York Times* coverage of the Darfur conflict.

Against this backdrop it will use a method of mixed methodologies to analyse the coverage. The sample will be made of articles from the newspaper's coverage of the first year of the conflict in order to investigate how the *New York Times* interpreted the conflict and how this narrative may or may not have developed in the newspaper's first engagement of the conflict. Content analysis will be used to identify a particular pattern which set the foundation for discourse analysis. The representations created by the media will be analysed and discussed through a method of framing, in order to show how description and context reinforce meaning, whether new or existing. In doing so, this also demonstrates the media's agenda setting role in highlighting

particular conflicts or specific details of that conflict as a news agenda and how this has the ability to influence or recreate an existing discourse within international relations.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. The Media in International Relations Theory

The depiction of failed states by the media and the narrative created around the subsequent intervention efforts by international actors has created a new dimension to international relations and places the media within the international relations community not only as an observer, but as an actor. This paper analyses the framing of the Darfur conflict in the *New York Times* from the assumption that the media should be seen as a non-state actor, able to influence the debate and narrative of global conflict. In this depiction of the media as non-state actor, Luke and Tuathail (1997: 719) argue that the media not only communicate foreign policy and its implications but also serve to subvert foreign policy by challenging international institutions to react. This creates a clash between established methods of implications represented by the traditional order of the statesman or policy actor to one in which chaos and a disruption of global order through the images of war and conflict become the primary source of information and action.

The power of the media in this geopolitical arena is seen as a post-modern interpretation of an eighteenth century phenomenon in which non-state actors such as professionals and academics challenged the established system of governance and fiscal management in central Europe and whose ideas shifted power and gave way to new systems and policies of government. In this twenty first century interpretation, the media challenges the global system of governmentality and order as it is implemented through intervention, creating a new system of power that does not only rely on inherited systems of global power. This challenge is most obvious in what Luke and Tuathail (1997:718) refer to as the “something must be done” school as seen in the Balkans conflict in the early 1990s in which attention to the violence preceded any concrete foreign policy reaction from international and state institutions.

In a post-Cold War era, global ideology has been refashioned into one in which order competes with chaos. In this rationalised international space, failed states are seen as chaos, outside of a political order in which a functional state is characterised by autonomy, sovereignty, legitimacy

and power. In this rationalised political space, the United Nations represents an “institutionalised site of power...an incipient but largely imaginary world government composed of sovereign autonomous nation-states, working collectively as equal partners to make the world a safer, better and more secure space” (Luke and Tuathail, 1997:709) or as interpreted by Huntington (1993) a post-Cold War era of the “west versus the rest” (Luke and Tuathail, 1997:725). So when media like the *New York Times* create a message in which states outside of this order are represented as having little agency in their own conflicts and that stability can only be brought through the intervention of international governmental institutions such as the United Nations, the media not only displays power, but also submits and reproduces the power of a dominant ideology.

The media serves as one of the main source of information for the public on issues in international relations and thereby serve to bear witness to events and bring the public’s attention to particular occurrences and in turn to spark and ventilate debate that would otherwise have happened behind closed doors among political elites (Hill, 2003:274). In the case of humanitarian disasters or conflicts, the role of the media is aimed at bringing attention to human suffering with the intention of encouraging the public and policy makers to call for change. In the newsroom, the aim of coverage of instances of violence and suffering are meant to simplify a complex international incident without trivialising human suffering while also bringing to the fore key political questions about these events (Seaton in Thussu and Freedman, 2003:47-51).

Here, the aim of foreign reporting is to communicate conflict in a manner that allows a viewer thousands of kilometres away in a completely different social and cultural setting to understand that this event is not ordinary and demands action (Corera in Thussu and Freedman, 2003:257). In this paper’s analysis of the coverage of the Darfur conflict, the point of departure was often to bring to attention a brutal conflict in what was described as a remote part of Africa to an audience in the United States who were perceived to have influence in curbing this conflict and with the newspaper even suggesting intervention strategies to the actors involved.

The reputation of the media is built on a dedication to accuracy and objectivity, but the media is not a neutral actor and instead a space of political contestation as it is a non-state political actor

and it is often in the strategic interest of the actors involved in the conflict to shape how conflict is communicated.

As the nature of war has evolved, information is also seen as a weapon of war and how the perceptions of the opponent, supporter and those affected by the conflict is shaped in the media has become integral as policy makers and political leaders in democratic societies understand that in order to achieve a particular objective, they can use the media to defuse criticism and mobilise support (Brown in Thussu and Freedman, 2003: 88). In the case of the Darfur, various actors in the conflict, from the United Nations diplomats to rebels and militia, the United States policymakers attempted to, and were often successful in influencing the narrative around the conflict. In order to understand this relationship between the media, its subject and its audience within international relations, it is important to understand the theoretical framework that illuminates this relationship.

2.2. Theories Of Media And International Relations

2.2.1. Traditional Theories

Within the realist framework, policy is created at the level of the elite and so policymakers have little interest in the perspective of the public or the media. Realism views international politics as an interstate struggle therefore domestic actors should not influence an inherently self-interested foreign policy. Practically, public opinion should not be allowed to interfere with state interest in the international arena. This assumption is reliant on the idea that the public are largely not interested or simply ignorant of foreign issues and that policy makers act from a morally acceptable position because they act in the interest of the state, which is at the centre of realist theory (Robinson, 2012:179-180).

The liberal framework of international relations encourages the role of public opinion and the participation and feedback from the media on foreign policy. Based on the democratic peace theory (Robinson, 2012:181) first argued by German philosopher Immanuel Kant and later formulated by Michael Doyle, the democratic peace hypothesis argues that democratic states avoid the use of force due to a number of factors such as the inherent liberal desire to cooperate and the role of a participatory public that serves to curb executives (Hill, 2003:235-237).

Although the media exists as an independent entity from government, within international relations the media also facilitates the spread of liberal values such as democracy. For example, Nye (1996 in Robinson, 2012:181) argues that the United States Information Agency has used the Voice of America news service to access audiences abroad and communicate a particular message or facilitate a democratic agenda. However, it is important to note that countries that are not necessarily examples of liberal democracies also have similarly structured state-owned international media agencies, such as China's CCTV and the Russian agency RT. These can still be seen as examples of soft power, through which powers spread influence through ideas rather than influence.

As the liberal framework is open to direct influence from the media and public opinion, this approach has also allowed civil society to play a more active role in policy making. Activist groups have in certain instances successfully lobbied policymakers to intervene in humanitarian crises (Robinson, 2012:182). For example, groups like the Save Darfur coalition were able to lobby the American Congress that contributed to the conflict becoming a foreign policy issue that both Houses of Congress voted on to implement sanctions on Sudan and a position that reflected when the American Ambassador to the United Nations uses his position on the United Nations Security Council to lobby for intervention in the Darfur conflict.

2.2.2. Positivist Media Theories – The Media as Apolitical Observer

One of the fundamental theoretical frameworks of media is functionalism, a positivist model that outlines the basic functions of the media in society. Positivist media theory is reliant on the assumption that society functions in an objective reality that exists independently of human beings. This interpretation lends itself to analysis through scientific means with the expectation of an observable, objective result. McQuail argues that functionalism provides a basic structure about the role of the media in society. From the functionalist perspective, all militaristic, economic and cultural institutions, private or state-owned, serve to maintain social equilibrium (Fourie, 2007:186). In this holistic society, the media is just one of the wholes that contribute to a harmonious and cohesive society (Fourie, 2007:119).

One of the most prominent functionalist models of the mass media is that developed by C.R. Wright who argued that the main function of the media is to inform and entertain people. In this way, the media contributed to the cultural growth for individuals and society either manifestly or latently (Fourie 2004, 265). Media scholar Robert Merton was the first to distinguish between the latent and manifest functions of the media within in a holistic society, arguing that one function of the media may benefit one sector of society, while damaging the other (Luke and Tuathail, 1997: 709; Fourie, 2007: 186).

Due to the assumed objectivity of a positivist theory, functionalism positions itself as an apolitical media theory and so because of this perspective often fails to take into account the role the media plays in creating a hegemonic culture through reinforcing a dominant message. As McQuail argues, functionalism has a conservative bias so much so that the media is seen as a “means to maintaining society as it is rather than as a potential source of change” (McQuail, 1987:69). The functionalist model fails to account for those outside of the dominant culture, which is seen as a democratic, monotheistic modern society. Further, critics argue that Wright’s model does not adequately address the political functions of the media. That is true of functionalism as a whole, as it fails to account for the fact that the media does not function in the same way for all individuals or groups.

The linear model of functionalism often fails to account for feedback and therefore in doing so fails to interpret social change and transformation (Fourie, 2007:187). Due to this critique of functionalism, it is difficult to apply it to this analysis of the coverage of the Darfur conflict because it fails to account for the social impact of the media and how the media exerts power within the sphere of international relations as a non-state actor. Understanding how the narrative around the conflict was created is key in understanding the role of the media as a non-state actor and because it is unable to take into account the message outside of a dominant narrative, this theory is insufficient for this particular paper.

2.2.3. Agenda Setting and Creating Public Opinion

Despite this inherent criticism of functionalism, the models it has created contributes to understanding the role of the media, especially through its attempt to illustrate the direct effects

of mass media and reporting. The theory of agenda setting describes the media's ability to identify and communicate to a society which issues are important and therefore worthy of the individual's and system's attention. Due to the media's surveillance function it provides information to the audience about the conditions of the world outside of their immediate social context, in a sense bearing witness. The argument of proponents of the agenda-setting theory is that in deciding which stories to cover and how to convey that message the media decides the significance of particular issues in the broader social context, thus setting the agenda (Infante et al. 1997, 365-367).

Lomax et al (1983:17) define agenda setting as “the process by which problems become salient as political issues meriting the attention of the polity.” In this definition, the media's capacity to set the agenda of public policy is based on a temporal sequence of events in which the news media report on an event, which in turn influences the public perception of the importance of this particular event and the issues related to it, which in turn serves to influence how public policy makers react to that particular issue (Lomax et al, 1983:17). Referring specifically to the framing of a media narrative, McCombs and Ghanem (2003:67) argue that “the media's agenda sets the public's agenda” defining agenda setting as “a theory about the transfer of salience from the mass media's picture of the world to those in our heads.” McQuail (1984:276) describes this theory as a “plausible but unproven idea” and this is arguably because it remains impossible to measure the response of the individual and the structural system to the angle of a particular message because interpretation is such a subjective phenomenon.

Still, researchers have employed a number of methods in order to assess whether media reportage is in fact able to influence public opinion and subsequently public policy. Lomax et al (1983) created a research design that emphasised pre-test and post-test measurement of the reaction of control groups in order to measure agenda-setting capacity. In the past, pre- and post-testing have been difficult because journalists do not reveal their stories or their sources before publication. In this specific study, the researchers made up of sociologists, political scientists and communication researchers worked with a television news programme that was set to publicise the results of an investigation into fraud in home-based healthcare.

The group was able to prove that while exposure to the issue had influenced how a targeted audience viewed the topic, the same exposure and increase in public awareness did not influence policymakers in a uniform manner. The report showed greater influence among government elites than among interested elites however, the issue still had low importance on the policy agendas of these government elites (Lomax et al, 1983). Given the complexity of this research design and the sheer scale required to test a very specific media topic, it would be difficult to repeat this research design. Still, the study is of interest to theorists studying agenda setting because it shows that media reports do go some way in prioritising issues for the public and policymakers.

Wood and Peake (1998) assessed agenda setting specifically from the perspective of a state president. Evaluating the economy of a president's attention to foreign policy, Wood and Peake (1998) monitored the reaction of American presidents in the Bosnian conflict, issues involving the then Soviet Union and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict using a comparative analysis based on data collected from the 'Public Papers of the President' and a television news search, using the PANDA data set to measure the perceived attention president's paid to particular foreign policy issues. The aim of the study was to measure foreign policy agenda and the study revealed that a combination of factors influenced how foreign policy issues came to dominate the agenda, among these issues was the role of competing media topics and other geopolitical issues.

The findings of the Woode and Peake (1998) study are relevant to this research paper too. For example, as a dominating geopolitical discourse, the narrative on the War on Terror, informed by American President George W. Bush's post-September 11th foreign policy influenced much of how the media reported on the role of religion in inter- and intrastate conflict, in particular what was described as fundamentalist Islam. Sudan was at the time identified as one of the states who were potential training grounds for global terror network Al-Qaeda and under the War on Terror policy, humanitarian intervention was often part of the military intervention of the United States government (Mamdani, 2009:274). It is for this reason that Mamdani argues that the media, civil society and lobby groups framed the conflict as an 'Arab versus African' dichotomy. This aspect of agenda setting also shows how the news agenda exists within an existing political discourse.

Assessing the agenda-setting role of the media in international relations lies within the sphere of public opinion research. In an attempt to explain decision-making in international relations, foreign policy analysis has focused on the role of media and public opinion in shaping policy. Foreign policy analysis has outlined two perspectives on the agenda-setting role of the media, namely the pluralist and the elite model. The pluralist model is based on the assumption that power is dispersed throughout society and no one group dominates the public policy decision-making process and therefore assumes that while public opinion and the media are able to influence policy, the media and public opinion cannot in turn be influenced by domestic and international political systems. The elite model in turn argues that power is concentrated with elite groups who dominate both society and political systems and therefore influence the media (Robinson, 2008:169).

One of the methods the media uses to set the agenda and create or influence public opinion on a particular topic is through framing. According to Entman (Reese, 2003:10)

to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem or definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.

Outlined in *Projections of Power* (2003), Entman's model of cascading network activation argues that this perceived reality or framing of an international relations phenomenon, begins with the administration, then is communicated to elites who may then reinterpret or reframe it and then it is passed along to the media who turn the phenomenon into a news item and communicate it to the public. Public feedback is perceived through voting behaviour, opinion polls and similar measures (Gamson, 2005:324; Lindner, 2009:26).

However, Gamson (2005:324) argues that this model largely ignores the role of civil society influencing the message about a particular movement. Gamson (2005:325) argues that feedback is also perceived through protest or disagreement with the administration's message. For example, while the Bush Administration was quite successful in creating a narrative that justified the invasion of Iraq on the War on Terror and the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the protest from the anti-war movement created a new media frame that essentially set a new agenda. Similarly, Mamdani (2009:34) argues that the Save Darfur protests and awareness campaign

influenced the narrative on the Darfur conflict, arguing that the movement “globalised” the conflict.

McCombs and Ghanem (2003:67) expand the definition of agenda setting as a theory that describes the “transfer of salience from the mass media’s pictures of the world to those in our heads...[so that] the elements prominent in the media’s pictures become prominent in the audience’s picture.” This happens on two levels: Firstly the media communicates the importance of an object such as a political issue or event or public institution; and then the media communicates the attributes of that object, in which the media may attempt to tell the audience how to think about that particular event, issue or institution (McCombs and Ghanem (2003:68-69).

For example, at the beginning of 2004 the *New York Times* communicated to its audiences that it was important to shift focus from the conflict in the south of Sudan, to the growing conflict in the west, specifically Darfur. The manner in which the conflict was framed – which this paper will show included a number of differing frames – attempted to communicate how the public should perceive the conflict, such as whether it was genocide, the level of brutality, and who the victims and perpetrators of this violence were. The newspaper employed various linguistic frames to create this picture in the minds of its audience, as will be demonstrated later in this paper.

2.3. Critical Theory In International Relations

2.3.1. Creating And Reinforcing Discourse

Critical theory as applied in international relations has done away with the idea that there is a scientific method that is able to analyse and predict an objective perspective of the international arena. A post-positivist theory, instead, critical theory in international relations is rooted in the idea that because politics is constituted by language it cannot be a neutral framework of analysis with language playing a key role in constructing state identity and thereby creating a representation of outsiders or opposing policies, known as the other (Hill, 2003:9).

Based on constructivist theories, critical theory is sometimes described as a blend of “Marxist political economy, Hegelian philosophy and Freudian psychology” (Heywood, 2003:135). A number of schools of political theory have since branched out from these constructivist theories but what remains a common characteristic is critical theory’s resistance and critique to traditional theories such as liberalism and realism. Inherent in critical theory is a self-awareness that it is a theory drawn from experience of negating the status quo and so therefore remains a particularly subjective analytical framework. This has also made it a particularly abstract school of thought, which has made it a difficult framework to apply to the practical world because in its critique of traditional theories it is difficult to measure or predict an outcome as one may in more positivist theories (Roach, 2010:2).

Despite this, this rejection of the status quo has given rise to a number of contemporary theories such as feminism, post-colonialism and of interest to this particular paper, communicative action theory. Developed by second-generation Frankfurt School theorist, Jürgen Habermas, communicative action theory argues that Marxist theory was too concerned with the goal of the proletariat’s emancipation to account for a collective consciousness or discourse mediated through language and religious and cultural symbols (Roach, 2010:62), meaning that the symbols society creates through interaction are mediated through communication actions such as language.

Habermas based communicative action theory on human communication as a form of socialised learning that seeks to share content and intent that is mutually understood between the speaker and the listener, or in the case of the mass media, between the sender and the receiver. At the individual level, the speech draws on the beliefs, values and thoughts to justify the moral or ethical intent and understanding is created through a struggle of compromises or concession that may lead to mutual acceptance of the content and the intent of the speech act (Roach, 2010:63).

An example of a communicative action event relevant to this paper is the narrative created by the *New York Times* to communicate to its audience the global importance of the Darfur conflict, drawing on a moral imperative to insert the events surrounding what began as an isolated conflict into public discourse in the international community, especially among American audiences.

Through a shared meaning of the role ethnicity in African conflicts, based on a historic paradigm created by the Rwandan genocide a decade before, the newspaper was able to set the agenda of international relations discourse on this particular topic, and in so doing reinforcing an existing, dominant discourse on conflict in Africa.

Within communicative action theory, society creates norms through a collective consciousness created by shared and accepted meaning. In a society, this collective meaning and shared acceptance gives rise to institutions and laws and a departure from this mutual understanding leads society to strive for justice through participation in order to bring about greater stability and accountability (Roach, 2010:64).

Applying communicative theory to real world examples, Habermas compares the Bush Administration's intervention in Iraq versus the U.S.-led NATO invasion of Kosovo; Roach (2010:65) argues that despite his scepticism of NATO's potentially paternalistic intentions, Habermas is more sympathetic to this operation because some sort of deliberation took place prior to action. Conversely, the Bush Administration's justification that the imposition of a democratic order, even by means that may be hostile to international order, brings freedom to autocratic states undermines the understanding that democracy is created by individual meaning and understanding and not through the exertion of state power politics. Similarly, even though the Darfur conflict was not formally declared genocide by the international community, nor was this agreed upon through deliberation in formal structures such as the United Nations, nonetheless, a narrative of genocide was created through debate which critics have argued, have both hindered and helped the need for international intervention in the Darfur conflict. While communicative action theory is helpful in understanding how communication creates specific meaning within international relations, it does not here explain how power is created through that meaning. For this we turn to discourse analysis and hegemony.

2.3.2. Power and Agency in International Relations Discourse

Key to understanding how subjective meaning is created and used within the theoretical framework of international relations theory is to understand the role of agency in relation to structuralism within a society. Communicative action theory is based on an extended critique of

modern social theorists, among them Max Weber and Emil Durkheim whose theories inform the basis of analysis of agency and structuralism in International Relations theory, with agency here concerned with the exertion of power (Roach, 2010:60; Wight, 2006:206). Weber derives a more individualist understanding of society in which “human beings directed their actions to each other in terms of meaning...consciously seeking to achieve certain ends” by pursuing or discarding certain choices as a means to reaching an end. Meaning is created by the individual and it gives rise to “subjective understanding”, and so the study of society was consequently concerned with the “interpretive understanding of social interaction” (Wight, 2006:64-65).

Alternatively, Durkheim argued that the individual does not create social interaction and is instead required to adjust her interactions according to existing structures of society such as language, religion labour, all interactions the individual did not create. Durkheim argued that “social life must be explained, not by the conception of it held by those who participate in it but by profound causes which escape consciousness” (Wight, 2006:66-67). Language is one of the way in which that meaning is created and social interaction, whether consciously or subconsciously, as a characteristic of social life because it is the tool through which the *New York Times* creates meaning and reinforces ideology through the particular representation of conflict. From this position, ideologies are “propositions that generally figure as implicit assumptions in texts, which contribute to producing or reproducing relations of power” and agency (Fairclough, 2010:15).

While these theories are often presented in opposition to each other or separately, within international relations they form the basis of understanding for international relations as both structure and agent. In *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (2006) Wight sets out an extensive ontological and heuristic argument on the role of agency and structuralism in analysing phenomena in international relations. An exhaustive study of agency and structure in international relations, Wight argues that agents and structures should be used in international relations theory as a level of analysis in the same manner that the discipline has used the individual, state and global level of analysis that should transcend the dichotomy that international relations phenomena are either the result of individual choices or structural forces

(Wight, 2006: 72,89). From the assumption of the media as a non-state actor, one may argue that the media exists as an agent within a particular structure of international relations.

Within international relations, Wendt suggests that agency and structure are interrelated, arguing that rather than “there can be no social act outside of a social context, but equally that social contexts in and of themselves, do not act” (Wight, 2006: 99). The value of this approach is that in assessing social outcomes, it does not pit agential versus structural factors, forcing the empirical research to prove one over the other, but rather requires that the research consider both. This approach is particularly helpful in understanding the role of social institutions, such as the media, in international relations phenomena as this paper seeks to understand the role of media in constructing meaning when reporting on a conflict.

Within the agency-structure framework, the institution is “a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals” so for example culture and language could be seen as institutions. But institutions can also be constructed from a network of organisations, such as the media, for example. From this perspective, an institution is constructed by human actors but at the same time is not reliant on the same people who created it in order for it to exist (Wight, 2006:202-203). For example, the *New York Times* as an institution exists as an institution as a 163-year-old daily newspaper that has built a reputation of accuracy and reliability and maintains this reputation despite more than a thousand different staff writers who continuously change throughout the years. Its relevance as a report of international relations is built on a consistent record of coverage of events outside of the United States, through bureaus who regularly change staff. While reporters bring a different individualist perspective, the newspaper’s editorial standard is maintained through gatekeeping mechanisms such as fact checking and editing.

Institutions differ from organisations in that organisations are subject to the rules, norms and expectations of external structures like religion or culture. Yet there are organisations that exist in a dual role as both physical organisation and social institution, such as the government, business corporations and as this paper argues, the media. Within this understanding of institutions it is important to understand whether these organisations have intentions and

therefore have agency. Wendt argues that an institution has intentions when it possesses a complex web of attitudes about the world that create an institutional belief of the world.

For example an institutions belief in engaging in war is reliant on its position about what war is, what conditions of conflict create war, who qualifies as an adversary and a series of other attitudes that articulate an institutions intentions and order that institutions role in the society within the discourse on war and therefore creates meaning or contributes to or challenges the discourse (Wight, 2006:204). In the case of newspapers, while news articles are based on fact and are therefore attempt to be objective or neutral, newspapers themselves express their intent through editorials, publishing a particular opinion under the newspapers masthead, signalling the organisation's position on a particular matter and therefore, one can argue acts as an acknowledgement of the role the media plays in society. This is why the sample includes the opinion and editorial sections of the newspaper.

The critique of the institution as an entity possessing intentions is the realisation that even though an institution may outlive the human actors who created it, the intentions of an institution cannot be separated from the attitudes of the personnel who staff and operate these institutions. The objectives of an institution are also influenced by how the people who act within it see their role in relation to the institution and the society in which it functions (Wight, 2004:205). For example, as this paper will show, the media's role in reporting conflicting has changed as journalists see themselves working for the state, to critiquing the state to individuals tasked with bearing witness to the atrocities of conflict. In the *New York Times* sample specifically, news reporters and columnists interpreted their roles of newsgathering in different ways therefore signalling differing intents, namely to inform with news reports and persuade with editorials, respectively.

At the same time, institutions should not be seen as simply playing out their allotted roles in society, but rather that in creating meaning these institutions exert agency over society (Wight, 2004:205). Analyses such as the one this paper attempts go some way in understanding the power these institutions such as the media play. It is important that newspapers and the journalists they employ understand how their work as an action of communication, influences

society in the hope that that influence is exercised responsibly and for the audience to understand that the message they receive is not neutral and is open to interpretation and scrutiny. Individuals cannot shirk responsibility by arguing that they are enacting the norms and expectations of an institution and institutions cannot function within a social framework without accounting for its influence over institutions, organisations and individuals within that society. Spivak argues that agency is located within accountability and the assumption of subjectivity and action with intent (Wight, 2004:206).

Thus, the approach of agency and structure within a framework of critical international relations theory is important to this paper because it critiques how meaning is created, and how this creation of meaning and discourse may be assessed as an international relations phenomenon. Critical theory shows that the media does not create a neutral message, but rather that this is subjective and created in relation to the status quo. Further, the media does not play the role of neutral observer in conflict situations but rather that as a social institution the media has agency. This is why it is important to understand the role of the media as a non-state actor in international relations within the context of the critical theoretical framework of how the media functions.

2.4. Critical Media Theory

2.4.1. Understanding Meaning And Discourse In Media

Within the media, critical theory is also situated in the constructivist approach and in its broadest is concerned with the political economy of media, arguing that the media and subsequently public opinion are subject to the goals of the elite in order to maintain the status quo or ideology. The media thus creates a message that reinforces hegemonic ideology (Robinson, 2010:182). The propaganda model is a constructivist approach that argues that the media serves the goals of the dominant elite even in democratic societies. Herman and Chomsky argue that the economic structure of the mass media – characterised by size, ownership, its reliance on advertising as a source of income and sources such as government officials and business people – ensure that the media creates a message that reinforces the dominant message while marginalising minority voices (Herman and Chomsky, 2001:280). The propaganda model is most often used in analysis of the role of ownership and the market in the creation of message and creates a framework through which to discuss the relationship between the media and society as producer and

consumer. While this theory is fundamental in the critique of the mass media this paper is concerned with agenda setting through reportage and so will not directly apply the propaganda model. Still, this is particularly helpful when discussing the role of sources in creating representations.

Critical media theory has also broadened to demonstrate and critique how the specific message created by the media contributes to the status quo. Cultural studies is situated “between the theoretical concerns of structuralism and political economy...[with] emphasis on different frameworks of knowledge that encode and decode a programme” (Sardar, 2000:59). Cultural studies is concerned with how texts reinforce hegemony, rooted in the idea that ideology – “the dominant ideas and representations in a given social order” – is reinforced through the “consent of the majority of subaltern or subordinate groups to a given socio-political constellation” (Kellner and Durham, 2001:6-7). In analysing media texts, the assumption of cultural studies is that every text is site of contestation in which the message and the meaning created by the signs of linguistics that make up the text either reinforce the dominant hegemony, is negotiated but showing slight disagreement or is oppositional to the dominant or intended message or meaning (Sardar, 2000:59). This understanding demonstrates the role of the media as an institution that contributes to the creation of meaning and social interaction, as demonstrated in the critical understanding of international relations.

Within cultural studies, Althusser interprets ideology as a “representation of the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Heck, 1992:122). As in the communicative action theory within the critical framework of international relations that argues that communication is a form of socialised learning that relies on the beliefs and values that a particular individual holds in society (Roach, 2010:63), ideology in the mass media represents a set of “rules which determine an organisation and the functioning of images and concepts” within that organisation (Althusser in Heck, 1992:123). In other words, the images and concepts are subject to ideology in that they create and reinforce society as a structure, and the individual negotiates and creates her own meaning within this structure.

Media scholars often use semiotics as a method to explain how concepts and signs create a negotiated meaning, in which ideology is created through a system of semantics. This is based on the approach that all cultural practices, including language and communication, have an inherent meaning that can be analysed (Hall, 1997:36). Created within ideology and hegemony, language is built on a negotiated meaning that is arranged in a code that combines the signs of linguistics in order to create or reinforce meaning (Fourie, 2004:334-339). When a sign or combination of signs holds a particular meaning within a particular social context, this secondary meaning creates what Roland Barthes referred to as a myth, which are “connotations which have become dominant hegemonic” meanings (Heck, 1992:125). As a method semiotics attempts to map how meaning is created, however because culture is fluid and interpretive, the meaning of signs is also fluid and open to interpretation, which creates an unintended “circle of meaning” that never derives a final meaning (Hall, 1997:43).

Further, because this paper aims to analyse the role the media plays in international intervention rather than how the media creates meaning, semiotics as a theoretical approach is not sufficient. Instead, my aim is to assess how the media framed the conflict and how it described the subsequent call to action and intervention in the conflict in order to show that the media plays a role as non-state actor in international relations. While semiotics helps us understand how the message is created, it is important to understand how the message was framed and represented and for this reason representation is a useful theoretical framework. Still within the critical media framework, discourse analysis looks at how knowledge is produced through language (Hall, 1997:44).

Discourse is not purely about language but how it is practiced, how language creates a topic or narrative and how this topic is meaningfully communicated and reasoned. As a critical theory, discourse not only communicates a topic but in so doing creates rules and a set of accepted norms that specify the manner in which the topic is communicated and reasoned and excludes other ways of talking about it. In particular, when discourse refers to or is created to communicate about a particular topic, for example the Darfur conflict, it becomes “a common institutional administrative or political drift and pattern” through which meaning is created (Hall, 1997:44). It is in this way that the relationship between knowledge and power are created.

Michele Foucault looked at how power was situated in institutional apparatuses and their technologies in order to regulate the conduct of the individual in society. These technologies consisted of language, laws, administrative measures and philosophic positions, for example (Hall, 1997:47).

Foucault (Hall, 1997:47) argued that knowledge is a form of power and in turn power is evident in how knowledge is applied or not. Foucault was influenced by the notion of hegemony and saw knowledge of a particular topic as created by power. For example, the knowledge that is created around the Darfur conflict has a bearing on how international actors react to it and in turn that knowledge is created through established institutional apparatuses and technologies, namely the language used to describe the conflict and the newspaper as the mass media platform.

For Foucault, there is no one particular truth about the Darfur conflict, but rather a regime of truth that demonstrates institutional power that has the will to create knowledge and therefore truth. A common critique of Foucault is that because of his analysis of power and how it is created and reinforced, that his notion of what constitutes discourse is too broad and his rejection of truth vulnerable to relative interpretation (Hall, 1997:43;47-49). Still, the value of understanding the discursive formation for this paper is in understanding how the particular representation of the Darfur conflict influenced the international community's reaction to the conflict.

2.4.2. Representation in International Relations

International relations in particular is concerned with how particular representations come to be accepted as true, so much so that they are able to influence the reaction of actors to a particular event or phenomenon. Dunn defines power as “the practice of knowledge as a socially constructed system, within which various actors articulate and circulate their representations of “truth” (Dunn, 2008:80). Within historical representation, scholars study how society creates its own truth regime when it consumes, reproduces and circulates a particular discourse. These representations are reproduced and circulated in contested spaces, and some representations are viewed as more dominant than others due to the hegemony of that particular paradigm, or cluster of beliefs that create this specific regime of truth.

Representations themselves are created through language and do not exist as neutral symbols, but are created through power and in turn are able to exert power as actors within a specific discourse are given knowledge on a particular phenomenon and in turn act upon what they know, creating material implications. In international relations this truth regime, or representation of knowledge, can sometimes create a framework from which decisions are taken surrounding issues such as intervention (Dunn, 2008:79). For example, colonial era representations of Africa (Dunn, 2008:83; Gruley and Duval, 2010:39), and orientalist views of Asia as the exotic other (Gruley, 2009) have influenced how the international community may view intervention in these areas. When studying historical representation of the Congo, for example, Dunn (2008) found that a belief in the “inherent savagery” of the region influenced the international communities attitude toward political intervention in different ways, ranging from an attitude that argued that civilisation must be brought to the region to the idea that violence was a characteristic of this so-called “inherent savagery” and so nothing could be done about conflict in the region.

These representations also exhibit the system of hegemony within the international system by investigating which group or actor is allowed an authoritative voice or position of influence. Representations become true not because they are fixed but rather because of the strength of a particular representation as alternating representations compete for greater social acceptance (Dunn, 2008:82). But allowing a particular actor to speak does not guarantee they have access to the discursive space, as this research paper will show. Sudanese refugees who personally experienced the conflict are often quoted, but that does not mean that they themselves have agency, rather, their experiences are used to reinforce a particular narrative. And again, with the African Union for example, officials from the organisation are rarely quoted even though they are often quite literally on the frontline of the intervention process in Darfur.

As a text, the media creates a basic framework from which policy makers and other foreign policy actors create meaning about a particular event (Dunn, 2008:87). From the assumption that the media is a non-state actor in international conflict, as a reader one is able to understand the power of the media in the geopolitical arena. The knowledge the media creates is not in a vacuum, and instead the meaning derived from it is negotiated not only between the paper and

the audience, but from a greater discourse. Further, the media exerts its own power when it chooses to represent the conflict and the actors involved in the conflict in a particular way. In order to examine how the *New York Times* discussed the necessity of the United Nations intervention in the Darfur region, a particular area of cultural studies is important, namely representation. While the media strives to be apolitical and objective, representation is by its very nature political. From at least the 1960s marginalized groups such as women, gay and lesbian and black people have critiqued the manner in which their particular cultural groups are portrayed in the mass media (Durham and Kellner, 2001:24).

The earlier analyses of cultural representation in the media was primarily concerned with the “images of particular social groups, decrying negative images and affirming more constructive ones” (Durham and Kellner, 2001:24) but as the media was increasingly recognized as a space of contestation, representation began to scrutinise how media narratives created meaning and in so doing reinforced a hegemonic ideology. In this paper, how the *New York Times* chose to represent the various groups involved in the conflict in Darfur is under scrutiny, analysing how the journalists made use of cultural representations in order to create a narrative of disaster and the need for United Nations intervention as well as the narrative that put forward that the United Nations, and the United States in particular, were depicted as the saviours of this crisis while maintaining the narrative that the African Union intervention was effectively inept. Still the challenge in this analysis is that while assessing these representations is important, it must be measured against the facts of the conflict and the efficacy of the intervention efforts.

Nonetheless the manner in which the race and ethnicity of the affected people is portrayed is of the utmost importance because much of the motivation for intervention was hinged on whether the situation in Darfur should be classified as a genocide. Further, race was the basis on which victims of the conflict were identified, sometimes to the exclusion of alternative frames of meaning, which looked at black African actors in the conflict not only as victims but as perpetrators. As a cultural ideology, race is accepted as a social fact, “a self-evident characteristic of human identity and character” (Downing and Husband, 2006:2). But while racism is now socially condemned, ethnicity as descriptor is socially acceptable especially as a political identity (Downing and Husband, 2006:12).

As tools of culture, race and ethnicity are able to create difference and categorise groups and peoples and in so doing often serve to 'other' groups that are viewed as subordinate to the dominating class or group. Structuralist thinkers argue that meaning is created in these differences, for example, the concept of blackness exists because it exists in opposition to whiteness. The challenge with this argument is that it does not take into account the nuances of human communication existing in an ahistorical space (Ferguson, 1998:66-67). In the media in particular, these categories and differences become the explanatory model to represent events or phenomena that occur within a particular racial or ethnic group. For example the idea that post-colonial Africa was inherently violent and that the majority of conflict on the continent was due to tribal warfare rather than socio-economics issues is one based on the notion that chaos is a characteristic of Africa in the realm of international relations.

While the misuse of ethnicity and race has often been reviewed, little research into the causes for this lack of complexity exists. At a plenary session on the role of race and ethnicity in the media's reportage of international affairs, scholars argued that the use of ethnicity as both a descriptor and a source of conflict distracted from the real cause of conflicts giving little context to a vital subject matter. There was an admission that reporting on Africa in particular was prone to relying on racial and ethnic categories. Furthermore, when women in conflict situations were featured in a news report, a description of their circumstances made use of an inherent sense of vulnerability based on their ethnicity and gender (Allen, 1995:17). The role of race and the importance of creating as accurate and as nuanced a framing of race as possible in the narrative of the Darfur conflict was particularly important because it influenced whether the international community would see the conflict as genocide which would in turn influence their reaction.

3. Literature Review

3.1. Background To The Conflict

3.1.2. A Historical Perspective Of The Darfur Conflict

Modern Sudan began as a colony shared by Egypt and the United Kingdom, which divided the country between north and south, with Egypt ruling the north of the country and the United Kingdom the south. After 1956, power was centred among the elites in the northern Nile Valley

region of the country, whose ethnicity, loosely described as Arab, only made up two per cent of the population. Power was soon challenged and the country's governance has been characterised by instability with the first civil war erupting soon after independence and ensuing conflicts after communist elite took power in 1971 and then an Islamic elite in 1976. In 1983, a second full-scale civil war broke out between the Islamic northern government and a southern rebellion movement known as Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, which militarised and became the SPL Army, which gave rise to the twenty year north-south conflict. A smaller rebellion in the east of the country also took shape during this conflict which saw the then overwhelmed government first make use of paramilitary forces, later known as the Janjaweed (Brosche, 2003:3-4).

This marginalisation and unhappiness by less dominant tribes was also seen in the west of the country. By the early 2000s a combination of marginalisation and ethnic identity saw members of the Fur, Zaghawa and smaller groups band together to form the SLA. The SLA began its military campaign before concretising its political strategy and so when the group required political and logistical support it turned to John Garang and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army who were locked in ongoing battle with Khartoum from the country's south (Flint and De Waal, 2005:77; 81). At this time another Darfur rebel group emerged, the Justice and Equality Movement.

Rejecting what it viewed as the SLA's failure to develop a proper political identity, JEM had its roots in the National Islamic Front that brought Omar al-Bashir to power and many of the leaders of JEM had supported Hassan al Turabi. Many of JEM's members belonged to the Kobe branch of the Zaghawa tribe as well as smaller tribes of the Darfur region but what united them now was a disappointment in the Khartoum government for failing to end the marginalisation and resultant poverty of the region (Flint and De Waal, 2005:88-89). It is important to note that while elements of both these groups identified as Arab, the government still embarked on a campaign to crush the rebellion, showing that the source of the violence was more political and economic than it was ethnic.

Both rebel groups carried out a series of attacks on government assets such as police stations as the rebellion spread across the region. The al-Bashir government chose to ignore the political solution put forward by some of its ministers and instead embarked on a military campaign that had seen success in the Massalit rebellion from 1996 to 1999. The government had unleashed the Janjaweed on the region – militia groups that had formed throughout the ongoing Sudanese and Chadian civil wars (Mamdani, 2009:255-256).

Going ahead of the military, the Janjaweed ignored the rebel troops in the Jebel Mara Mountains and instead chose to terrorise villages in some of the most brutal methods. Over two years the Janjaweed carried out a brutal and systematic attack on civilians while the army and Sudanese government did little to stop them, making use of sexual violence, mutilation, abduction, extortion and committing mass atrocities in a calculated attempt to deter civilians from supporting the rebel groups (Flint and De Waal, 2005:38-39).

3.1.2 Ending the Violence – The Role of the African Union

Under the African Mission in Sudan, or AMIS, the so-called Institute for Security Studies Agreement was instrumental in ending the initial conflict in the Darfur region and the violent campaign by the Janjaweed. Negotiations by the African Union were able to bring about a ceasefire agreement along with a ceasefire commission that consisted of representatives from the government of Sudan, the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement along with an African Union appointed chairperson and a deputy chairperson from the European Union as well as a representative from the Chadian mediation (Institute for Security Studies, 2004).

The mandate of the commission was to plan and implement the provisions of the ceasefire, manage the movement of forces, coordinate investigations and monitoring in accordance of the agreement and strove to ensure that future conflicts did not occur in Darfur (Institute for Security Studies, 2004). This report argues that while the ceasefire is still technically in place, it is impossible to assess its efficacy outside of events such as the UNAMID force, Comprehensive Peace Agreement or the subsequent secession of the south and the formation of the independent state of South Sudan.

Within the larger context, the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese government in the north and rebels in the south was significantly quelled by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed in 2005, ending the civil war between the Sudanese government and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army. The agreement was preceded by talks sponsored by the African Union that also made provision for a government of national unity that allowed local political leaders to play a key role in designing a roadmap to the end of the violence in Darfur (Hoile, 2005:3-4).

But the peace agreement was unable to bring about permanent peace and between 2008 and 2009 hundreds of civilians were once again killed in renewed tensions between the south and the government despite the United Nations Mission in Sudan. For example, conflict in the town of Abyei saw up to fifty thousand people displaced and by 2011 an estimated 250 000 people were displaced (Bellamy, 2011:67). The tensions culminated in a referendum in 2011 which saw the south secede as an independent South Sudan. Unfortunately the new state is still plagued by internal conflict and political instability with scores of civilians dying in 2013 and 2014.

3.1.3. The Involvement of the United Nations and the Darfur Peace Agreement

The United Nations based its engagement in Darfur on the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. Born from the African Union-lead talks in Abuja from 2003 to 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement made provisions for wealth agreement through a Fiscal and Financial Allocation Monitoring Commission; a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority that consisted of commissioners from each of the fighting factions and a continued provision for a ceasefire agreement and the protection of internally displaced people (Hottinger, 2006:46-49). United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon also continues to stress that the solution to Darfur's ongoing instability must be a political one and that interaction in the region must be based on the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Intervention in the region was guided by Resolution 1779 that established the hybrid African Union/United Nations Operation in Darfur, known as UNAMID mandate (United Nations Press Release SC/9131 2007, 1). The mission was based on the observer mission of the high level of experts first dispatched to Sudan with Resolution 1713 and which was the United Nations' main

diplomatic organ in the region (United Nations Press Release SC/8845, 2007:1). Resolution 1779 extended the panel's powers and requires that it coordinate its efforts with the existing African Union Mission in Sudan and authorises that the United Nations sends a mission of peacekeeping troops to the region who are mandated to implement the conditions of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

With only two hours before the mandate of the hybrid African Union and United Nations operation in Darfur, UNAMID, expired in July 2008, the Security Council again voted to extend the mission for another twelve months with Resolution 1828 which also once again condemned the ongoing violence in Sudan and in the Darfur region specifically and called for the safety and protection of aid workers as well (United Nations Press Release SC/9412, 2008:1). The UNAMID hybrid force still functions in the region with military personnel of just over twenty thousand and over four thousand civilian staff (United Nations, 2014).

3.2. Darfur as genocide, and the responsibility to protect

In much of the media coverage of the conflict, the Darfur conflict was described as the first genocide of the 21st century, which was also the premise of the media's call for intervention in the conflict. The Darfur conflict is a watershed moment in the history of the principle responsibility to protect and its implementations. In 2005 a United Nations High Level mission was dispatched to the south-western Sudanese province to investigate claims of atrocities and crimes against humanity. It was the first time that the United Nations would use the responsibility to protect as benchmark against which to assess the role of the Sudanese government. Under the new principle, sovereignty was seen as a responsibility of the state towards its citizens to protect them and the high level mission found that "the government of Sudan had manifestly failed to protect the population of Darfur from large-scale international crimes, and has itself orchestrated and perpetuated these crimes" (United Nations in Bellamy 2011:30). While this declaration did not expressly declare the conflict as genocide it did call on the international community to exercise its responsibility to protect.

The principle of the responsibility to protect was only adopted a year before the high level mission called on the international community to act on it. The Darfur conflict is of particular

interest because it served as one of the earliest arenas in which the principle of the right to protect was debated. The principle of responsibility to protect was formally adopted as a by heads of state and various international non-governmental organisations at the World Summit in 2005 as a guiding principle on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. In accordance with chapters seven and eight of the United Nations Charter, the responsibility to protect called on the world body to use the necessary diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful means to “help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (Bellamy, 2011:24).

The definition of genocide and crimes against humanity by which the responsibility to protect is guided is according to the definition set out by the United Nations Genocide Charter. Published in 1948 in response to the atrocities committed during World War II, the charter makes provision for the occurrence of genocide in both war and peacetime. In it, genocide is defined as a “crime of intentional destruction of a national, ethnic, racial and religious group, in whole or in part” (Schabas, 2008:3). The 1948 Convention on the Prevention of Genocide outlines any of the following acts as a crime under international law which: “Killing members of the group; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (United Nations, 2005). According to Article One of the Convention, signatories must undertake to prevent and punish these crimes, still, the primary responsibility to act lies with the state in which these acts are occurring – in the case of Darfur this responsibility lies with the Omar al-Bashir government.

One of the earliest instances that the Darfur conflict was declared genocide was when the 108th American congress passed a resolution “that the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan are genocide, and urges the Administration to refer to such atrocities as genocide” (Resolution 467, 2004). The resolution further criticized the United Nations Human Rights Commission for what it called the failure to act according, especially its failure to support U.S.-sponsored resolutions to condemn the al-Bashir regime and urged the United Nations and the Secretary General to declare the conflict genocide.

The United Nations did not follow suite and in none of the resolutions on the matter from 2003 to 2008 did the Security Council refer to the conflict as genocide. It certainly condemned the Janjaweed specifically for carrying out a campaign of violence against civilians in the Darfur region but it did not refer to the systematic violence as ethnic cleansing (United Nations Press Release SC 8160, 2004). The Security Council implemented a number of measures against individuals identified by the High Level Mission as leading or perpetuating the violence, such as targeted sanctions (United Nations Press Release SC 8700, 2006).

Even when the matter is formally referred to the International Criminal Court, the Security Council's resolutions do not make specific reference to the indictment. Instead, members of the Security Council such as the United Kingdom's and the United States' Ambassadors to the United Nations in their personal capacity welcome the International Criminal Courts decision to prosecute Sudanese officials on crimes against humanity and this is recorded in the minutes of the meeting but is not recognized in the resolution itself (United Nations Press Release SC/9412, 2008:1).

While sovereignty is often a deterrent to any international action, the principle of the responsibility to protect argues that states must begin to see sovereignty as a duty rather than a privilege. According to the office of the special advisor on the prevention of genocide, sovereignty no longer exists to protect a state from "foreign interference" but rather the "charge...that holds states accountable for the welfare of their people" (United Nations, 2005). It is the responsibility of the international community to assist the affected state and then use diplomatic and humanitarian means at their disposal to protect vulnerable populations.

One could argue that the need for adoption of the principle of responsibility to protect was born from the fact the existing genocide charter does not make provision of a monitoring system and so guidelines such as the responsibility to protect provide an early-warning mechanism. The 1948 Genocide Convention also does not set out any particular course of action in the event that acts of genocide are identified. When the then American Foreign Secretary Colin Powell declared in September 2004 that ethnic cleansing was taking place and that the government and

the Janjaweed militias were responsible for this, his announcement came with the caveat that “No new action is dictated by this determination” (Flint and De Waal, 2005:131).

As a test case for the responsibility to protect, many critics believe that the principle failed in Darfur. While an ethical commitment to the right to protect existed it failed to translate into political will to intervene despite the fact that certain governments like the United States considered the violence as genocide. Some critics go further arguing that the responsibility to protect actually caused “genocidal violence in by encouraging dissatisfied groups to launch suicidal rebellions in the hope of provoking a disproportionate response and triggering external intervention” (Bellamy, 2011:53).

While the Security Council referred to the responsibility to protect, it did not lead to a direct intervention by peacekeepers. The Security Council instead sought to impose various measures of deterrence against Sudan such as targeted sanctions and referring the matter to the African Union and inevitably forming a hybrid force with the African peacekeepers on the ground in order to strengthen the mission (Bellamy, 2011:43). The responsibility to protect did not bring about the strong response of direct intervention as expected if conflict is characterised as genocide, it serves the purpose of this research paper as a measure against which the moral imperative of intervention may be assessed.

3.3. Decontextualising Darfur

Mahmoud Mamdani and Alex De Waal are arguably the foremost authors on the representation of the Darfur conflict. A writer and activist, De Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation and a research professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University and has dedicated much of his research on the horn of Africa, and has written extensively Sudan. In 1984, De Waal wrote *Famine that kills: Darfur Sudan*, which was revised in 2004 and has published a series of articles on the Darfur conflict, specifically focusing on the ethnic make-up of the region, it's political history and the climate change that has contributed to the tension in the region.

Identity has played a key role in how the Darfur conflict was portrayed and De Waal provided one of the first in-depth studies of the dynamic of cultural identity in the region. In “Who are the

Darfurians?” (2005:192) De Waal argues that the region is exemplary for the fluidity of identity and how this identity was influenced by nomadic or pastoralist lifestyle and later by the Native Administration process of the British colonial era which sought to ethnically categorise groups and appoint proxy tribal leaders. Still, De Waal argues that the influence of colonial era administration and the appointment of local proxies is over-emphasised and instead argues that the politicization and militarisation of the African and Arab identities in Darfur occurred in post-colonial rule as a result of disenfranchisement.

Working with journalist and filmmaker Julie Flint, De Waal authored *Darfur: A short history of a long war* (2005). The book is the most detailed historical account of the region and the ethnic make-up of the Darfur region identified by this researcher. This is important because ethnicity has come to largely influence the narrative of the conflict. In an attempt to illustrate just how complex Darfur society is, De Waal and Flint (2005, 3-6) describe the village of Dor, in the north of the province of Darfur as a microcosm of the regions fluid racial and ethnic structure, in one of the earliest studies of identity in the Darfur conflict.

The majority of the inhabitants of Dor describe themselves as belonging to the Zaghawa, Fur, Tunjur and Kaitinga groups. There are also the Seinga, Berti, Jawamaa, Masalit, Jallaba and Rizeigat groupings. The three main languages spoken are Fur, Zaghawa and Arabic and more than half of the village’s marriages have crossed these cultural lines (De Waal and Flint 2005, 3-6). As so many of the cultures and ethnicities in this village overlap, whether villagers choose to identify as Arab was reliant on economic advantages and livelihoods. Villagers who have accumulated livestock may refer to themselves as Zaghawa – a Saharan group originating from the Chad-Sudan border region who have gradually migrated south due to thousands of years of desertification and the expansion of the Sahara desert.

Zaghawa is often used interchangeably with Arab as a personal identifier contextualised within Sudan’s cultural and political history rather than the contemporary understanding of Arab as an ethnic identity or even a race. Still, this identifier as Arab by the Zaghwa and other tribes did not protect them from attacks by the so-called Arab al-Bashir government. In Sudan, ‘Arabisation’ as an ethnicity took place as Islam spread across the country in the eighth and ninth centuries and

again during tribal clashes in the fourteenth and fifteenth century. It is not based on race, but rather on a hybrid culture that has developed over centuries (Mamdani 2009, 106).

Mamdani's *Saviours and Survivors* is a more critical discussion on the conflict based on the explicit premise that the popular representation of the conflict does not give adequate understanding of the root cause of the conflict, the geopolitics of the region and an authentic characterization of the actors involved in the conflict. In outlining the colonial and post-colonial history of Sudan, Mamdani argues that the internal conflict was rooted in British colonial politics that sought to favour some groups above others in order to effectively administer the region and exploit its oil reserves. Mamdani dedicates much of the book to explaining this context in an attempt to debunk the idea that the conflict was based on ethnicity and therefore constituted genocide. Instead, Mamdani dismisses the American and United Nations intervention in the region as an extension of the paternalistic colonial approach to the conflict (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2009: 1282).

One of the main critiques of *Saviours and Survivors* was that the conflict was presented as genocide, encouraged by a movement Mamdani argues did not adequately understand Darfur which in turn fell unwittingly into the Bush Administrations' discourse on the War on Terror narrative. Mamdani argues that the "Arabisation" of the Darfur conflict has little to do with the historical context of the region but rather serves to position the conflict within the meta-narrative of the War on Terror effectively positioning the call for intervention in the area from media and civil society as part of the United States' foreign policy at the time. For example, the description of the Janjaweed as an Arab movement launching an insurgency as well as the counter-insurgency in southern Sudan by the Turabi Islamist group is an over-simplification of existing regional tension that was perpetuated by the media, aid organisations and awareness campaigns. Mamdani argues that the unquestioning use of ethnicity as the source of the conflict has over-simplified it and therefore negatively affected the response from the international community, arguing

...the War on Terror has provided the coordinates, the language, the images, and the sentiment for interpreting Darfur. In so doing the War on Terror has displaced the history and politics of Darfur... (Mamdani, 2009:71).

A critique of Mamdani's argument that the conflict is mistakenly situated within the discourse on the War on Terror is that Mamdani himself "sporadically inserts the War on Terror into the conflict with little evidence or success", (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2009: 1283). Instead, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh argues that Mamdani uses the War on Terror contextualisation of Arab as perpetrator without historically constituting Arabs and Muslims within the framework of orientalism, which is arguably how the process of othering this particular ethnicity began. Still, Mamdani is commended for placing the critique of the use of the War on Terror narrative in an African point of departure within a geopolitical sphere (Edozie, 2009:662).

Ethnicity has certainly played a role in the greater north-south Sudanese conflict, which saw two distinctly ethnicities who identified as African and Arab, with a historical differences that were exacerbated by British rule, compete over resources and political power that lead to a bloody conflict for over two decades. But even this description is a simplification of a complex social structure that exists throughout the country (Wai, 1981:17). Brosché (2008:5) argues that the Arab/African dichotomy holds value in explaining the cultural history of the region because the locals themselves make use of this description, however the meaning is not as simplified as depicted in the media and the description of Arab or African may describe a host of different tribes. Conflicts between these various groups in the Darfur region have occurred for at least 75 years before the Darfur conflict gripped headlines. These conflicts have occurred over grazing rights, boundaries and local politics. Brosché (2008:6) further argues that the source of these conflicts was not ethnicity but rather due to increased environmental degradation, with desertification becoming an acute threat to the livelihood of locals during the 1970s and especially in the 1980s.

Another reason cited for the instability in the region is the political marginalisation of some of the tribes, especially the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit (Brosché 2008:11). The political marginalisation of the Darfur region began as early as the 1960s when the lack of political representation for Darfur in the newly independent Sudan saw the emergence of the Darfur Resistance Front. Two other groups emerged after this, the Sooni and the Red Flame, both with intentions of a military coup or to secede that were never realised. None of these groups were

able to achieve any real political representation for the region and the Arab-Fur war of 1987 to 1989 only served to increase this marginalisation (Brosché, 2008:7).

Given its geopolitical location, the Darfur region has often been the stage of intra- and internal conflict. Bordering Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic, the country's porous borders have made it prone to conflict and instability. More specifically, the Darfur region has a history of being the location of proxy wars between Chad and Libya. During the 1970s, the Chadian civil war was in part fought from Darfur as Chadian rebels and then leader Muammar Gaddafi's forces fought over Libya's role in Chad. When the anti-Libyan Hissène Habré seized control of Chad in the early 1980s, the Khartoum government allowed Gaddafi to use Darfur to launch an attack on Chad. Years later, Habré's successor, current President Idriss Deby launched a counter-offensive on Libya from Darfur (Duvall & Gruley, 2012:33).

What this has led to is a highly militarized zone which was the scene of thousands of government troops, paramilitaries and rebels moving through the area, with rebels readily available to willing allies, exacerbating social divides in the country. When drought struck the region between 1984 and 1985, it was the Abbala nomadic group who were most affected. Given the Khartoum government's lack of will to develop the Darfur region, Libya's Gadaffi used the group as proxy fighters, providing arms, aid and an ideology of Arab supremacy which saw the Abbala and other disaffected nomadic groups begin to identify the pastoralists as an adversarial group identified as 'Africans' (Duvall & Gruley, 2012:33).

According to Duvall and Gruley (2012), who conducted a study on the evolving news narrative on the conflict in Darfur as presented in the *New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, the Abbala group who were recruited and armed by Gadaffi became the Janjaweed, with the name itself translated as "The Arab Gathering" (Duvall and Gruley; 2012:33). Taking their name from a movement which began in the Chadian civil war and was later high-jacked by Gaddafi, the Arab Gathering attempted to unify Sahelian tribes as Arab (Mamdani, 2009: 218). Within the context of the Darfur conflict, De Waal and Flint (2005: 38) argue that The Gathering were in fact secretive group who did in fact have roots in Gaddafi's strategy of Arab Supremacy but were

in fact a smaller, more elite grouping who had ties to the Khartoum government's powerful security cluster with roots in the Abbala group.

The Janjaweed feature prominently in the narrative of the conflict, portrayed as the perpetrators of the violence in the region and so it is important to situate the group within the political environment of Darfur. The Abbala Rizeigat tribe originated long before the formation of Sudan as a modern state as a nomadic group that moved across what became the Chadian, Libyan and Sudanese border. De Waal argues that the group's political fate changed after the drought of 1984 to 1985. While the tribe survived near devastation despite little aid from the Khartoum government, they had forever exhausted their assets and many were forced to find work in the cities, changing the very socio-political culture of the Abbala Rizeigat. Many chose to work in oil-rich Libya where the now disenfranchised young men adopted an Arab supremacist ideology in line with Gaddafi's vision of an Arab belt across the Sahara (De Waal, 2005:44-49).

In the Abbala Rizeigat Gaddafi found a group that were ripe for recruitment and a had a strong historical presence in Chad. Amid already mounting tensions between the pastoralists and nomadic tribes, Gaddafi recruited the northern Mahamid branch of the Abbala Rizeigat, lead by the aging Sheikh Hilal Mohamed Abdalla who also had a strong ties with their kinsmen across the border in Chad (Flint & De Waal, 2005:44-49). Mamdani (2009:256) argues that the due to the drought, the very fabric of the nomadic lifestyle was challenged not only in Darfur but across the Sahel with Chadian nomads especially hard hit. It is for this reason that many of the recruits to the Janjaweed as a paramilitary group were unemployed teenage and preteen men who were affected by what became a generational crisis. Mamdani describes the Janjaweed phenomenon as "an antisocial and outlaw phenomenon" who became deadly when they were recruited by army and government officials who had ethnic and cultural links to the variety of nomadic tribes who made up the Janjaweed (Mamdani, 2009:257).

Flint and De Waal argue that the political origins of the Janjaweed are more concentrated, specifically in one of the prominent figures of the Janjaweed is Abdalla Sheik Musa Hilal, one of the men who is sanctioned by the United Nations for crimes against humanity and has been indicted by the International Criminal Court. The grandson of Sheikh Hilal Mohamed Abdalla,

who was removed from his position under al-Bashir's predecessor President Gaafar Nimeiry, Hilal was driven by an ideology of Arab supremacy and held strong ties with the al-Bashir government and many in the Khartoum security cluster. He was reinstated as a Sheikh in the Darfur region. The Janjaweed was first used by the al-Bashir government to crush an SPLA rebellion in the 1990s with such efficacy that many villagers could not tell the difference between government troops and the militia group. When asked about the Janjaweed, Hilal has denied ties to them, describing the group as "outlaws highwaymen from Chad" and "bandits, like mutineers" that he and the Sudanese government have been fighting (Flint & De Waal, 2005:38) Still, once the initial conflict died down, villagers who tried to report the actions of the Janjaweed were simply ignored.

When the United Nations Security Council began to take action regarding the Darfur conflict, militia now commonly referred to as the Janjaweed were condemned and blamed for the atrocities that took place. The Security Council did not refer to the systematic violence perpetrated by the Janjaweed as ethnic cleansing but it did implement a number of measures, such as targeted sanctions, against individuals identified by the High Level Mission as leading or perpetuating the violence, among them was Musa Hilal (United Nations Press Release SC 8160, 2004; United Nations Press Release SC 8700, 2006). Further, members of the Security Council welcomed the International Criminal Court's decision in 2008 to prosecute some of these men for crimes against humanity (United Nations Press Release SC/9412 2008, 1).

The Janjaweed are important to understand because if the Darfur conflict were in fact a simple narrative of Arab perpetrator versus Arab victim, then the Janjaweed are the villains in this story, and as the content analysis will attempt to show, the language used to portray the Janjaweed reinforced this image. A critique of this is in no way an attempt to excuse the actions of the Janjaweed, but rather it is show how the narrative was framed without giving any real context to the actors in this conflict. It is thus also important to understand who the victims in this conflict were as illustrated, the identity of African is fluid in the region and is more likely to be a political affiliation rather than an ethnic identifier.

Arabisation had occurred in Sudan as a post-colonial “civilisation” project in which an Arab culture was adopted as an ethnic identity and was adopted and reproduced by the political elite as a means of maintaining minority power. Africanism thus developed during the Cold War era in which a growing discontent with the ruling elite fostered a unified political identity that was situated in the post-colonial independence narrative. Africansim, or Sudanism – a call for a more unified Sudan – became the main critique of Arabism and found its political roots in the embattled south of the country (Mamdani, 2009:201-202). Mamdani (2009:204) argues that Sudan’s problems lay in the political, not cultural division, exacerbated by the south’s adoption of Africanism as a political rhetoric. De Waal (2005b: 10) argues that Darfur’s political context was “shoe-horned” in the north-south division in the country and as disenfranchised young men adopted the identity Arab, educated young men of the non-Arab or pastoralist tribes, began to adopt the political identifier African.

3.4. Reporting On The Darfur Conflict

As discussed earlier, the conflict that this paper is concerned began in 2003 and yet the main reportage of the conflict only occurred almost a year afterward. Much of the mainstream media coverage of the Darfur conflict only occurred after much of the fighting had occurred and journalists and analysts argue that this was due to the al-Bashir regime’s efforts to hide the conflict from global attention by creating a media blackout. This was first done by overtly preventing the media from covering the conflict as was the case when the government shut down the Khartoum bureau of the Qatari English and Arabic 24-hour news network Al Jazeera and expelled its correspondent for what the Sudanese National Security Authority described as “preparing and transmitting a number of programmes and materials stuffed with false information and poor, biased analyses and with pictures and scenes selected to serve its ends” about events in the Darfur region (Sudan Tribune, 2003; Bacon, 2004).

Later, as media attention on the Darfur conflict became more intense, the al-Bashir government introduced strict visa regulations that took months to process. In many instances journalists were not allowed to travel to Darfur without a government escort which further limited access to scenes and sources that may have been important to in order to portray an accurate picture of the conflict (Kristoff 2004; Bacon, 2004). In instances when the media were able to travel to Darfur,

it was often as part of a United Nations envoy however even this was not free from government interference despite the al-Bashir's pledges to cooperate with the United Nations. For example, early in the coverage, the government is accused of relocating a large refugee camp before the visit of then Secretary General Kofi Annan, moving more than a thousand people to a location with better living conditions for the sake of the UN inspectors. *New York Times* Journalist Mark Lacey's main source is an unnamed Sudanese government official who confirms that hundreds of displaced people were in fact evacuated from the site (Lacey, 2004).

Still, while news reporters struggled to gain access to the area, public opinion on the issue gained momentum through a number of opinion-editorials that focused on the moral obligation of the international community to intervene in the then growing crisis (Bacon, 2004). Human Rights activists John Prendergast, was on one of the first writers on the topic publishing an essay title "Sudan's Ravine of Death" in the *New York Times* (2004). Prendergast, who would later go on to found the Save Darfur campaign, travelled to Darfur with then activist Samantha Power, who was then working on her book, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. The essay is an account of Prendergast's visit to what he describes as rebel-held areas in the Darfur region.

The activist describes a "sinister scene" in which the bodies of civilians are piled up after they have been executed by "the Arab-led government" placing the blame on the al-Bashir government, and describes the United Nations efforts to create a roadmap to peace with the Sudanese governments as a "plan in which the wolf will guard the henhouse." Prendergast also draws parallels to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and argues that immediate intervention is necessary in order to ensure that such an event is not repeated. In fact, much of the early narrative on Darfur draws on parallels to the Rwandan genocide. Comparing the United Nations Security Council's reaction to the Darfur crisis to that of the Rwandan genocide, Melvern (2006) assessed the decision making process of the council and found that in both conflicts the United Nations Security Council failed to communicate with the media over the dimensions of the conflict and actions taken to stop it.

The assumption that the conflict in Darfur may be classified as genocide is further echoed in an essay by contributor James Traub (who authored the books *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the era of American Power* in 2006 and in 2008, *The Freedom Agenda: Why America Must Spread Democracy – Just not the way George Bush did*). In his essay “Never again, no longer?” long form journalist Traub draws a comparison to Kosovo rather than Rwanda, using phrases such as ‘pogrom’ to draw clear similarities between the Darfur and the Balkans conflict (Traub 2004).

It is important to note however that while he does not call it a genocide, Traub’s writing echoes the *New York Times*’ argument that origins of the conflict along ethnic lines necessitates international intervention. Traub describes Bush’s unwillingness to send troops as a consequence of realist politics and specifically the advice of Colin Powell reflected in a 2000 campaign debate in which Bush said if a similar situation to Rwanda in 1994 were to occur under his presidency, he would not favour sending troops. Traub argues that this is a reflection of the policy of Colin Powell who as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the time of the Balkans conflict, opposed sending troops to Kosovo in the 1990s, in spite of then Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright’s view that this was moral timidity (Traub2004).

Much of the narrative and public opinion created by the Darfur conflict was based on the international experience of the Rwandan conflict in what was seen as the failure of the international community to take notice of and prevent genocide. Calls for intervention in Darfur were based on the opportunity to stop what could be the first genocide of the 21st century. Similarly, the early coverage of the Darfur conflict centred on the world’s failure to take note of the atrocities in Darfur and the media’s failure to learn the lessons of failing to bring attention to this humanitarian disaster (Malvern, 2006:101; Kothari, 2010:222; Tsatsou and Armstrong, 2014:9)

The parallels drawn to Rwandan and other genocides are what has provided the basis for the emphasis on ethnicity in the Darfur conflict. In an attempt to create public opinion around the conflict, a number of activists groups arose with the purpose of spreading information and pressuring government to act against the genocide in Darfur. These groups often made use of a

simplified narrative of Arab perpetrator versus African victim and drew on parallels to Rwanda in order to spur action. In many instances, these non-governmental organisations funded research projects and information brochures to spread public information about what they referred to as genocide in with the aim to encourage the public, especially the American public, to pressure their government officials to intervene in Darfur.

One of the most prominent of these civil society organisations was the Save Darfur campaign. In what became a *New York Times* bestseller, activist John Prendergast teamed up with Hollywood actor and star of the film *Hotel Rwanda* (which depicted the 1994 Rwandan genocide) to pen the book *Not On Our Watch*, with the foreword written by World War II Holocaust survivor and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Elie Wiesel. Published in 2006, the book gives a brief description of the conflict as a genocide written from the perspectives of Cheadle and Prendergast as they come to know of the conflict and become part of a campaign to bring awareness to what they describe as a hitherto ignored conflict (Cheadle & Prendergast, 2006:xi-xiii).

With the subheading ‘The mission to end genocide in Darfur and beyond’ the book not only focuses on raising awareness but also encourages readers to become active campaigners against genocide and outline steps to becoming a successful activist on Darfur. Educating a burgeoning civil movement against genocide in Darfur, the book lists the political obstacles to peace, naming the government as the main perpetrator for using the Janjaweed to exterminate particular tribes in the south of the then Sudan but also laying blame at the feet of the rebels (Cheadle & Prendergast, 2006:64-75). They also list the top ten reasons for inaction from the United States (Cheadle & Prendergast, 2006:91-97).

Cheadle and Prendergast also list a number of organisations that they encourage readers to join. Described as ‘The Upstanders’, the list includes the Genocide Intervention Network (IG-Net), Students Taking Action Now: Darfur (STAND) and the largest among them, the Save Darfur Coalition (Cheadle & Prendergast, 2006, 132-139). The Save Darfur Coalition, one of the largest American organising groups calling for intervention in Darfur and aimed to portray the conflict as a moral issue in order mobilise public interest, and in so doing eclipsed the political issues at play during the conflict. Mamdani argues that the Coalition has portrayed Darfur’s Arab citizens

as settlers and it's African citizens as the indigenous inhabitants of Sudan's western region in order to portray the conflict as genocide (Mamdani 2009, 62; Hoile, 2009:62).

Using the Save Darfur Coalitions membership kits, Mamdani cites the factsheet distributed to new members as an example of the campaign's use of race and ethnicity to create a moral imperative to intervene in Darfur, rather than a politically motivated reason:

Lighter skin northern Sudanese Muslims, dominating the government, have oppressed darker-skinned southern Sudanese Christians and Animists. Then as the world caught on to that particular problem, the Sudanese government in Khartoum and its violent allies turned their deadly ire on the darker skinned Muslims in the western province of Darfur (Mamdani 2009, 62).

Mamdani also goes to great length to refute the numbers used by these groups to illustrate that the genocide was in fact taking place and argues that these groups were able to influence the media's narrative of the conflict.

3.5. Analysis of News Coverage of the Darfur Conflict, emphasising the *New York Times*

Due to the parallels drawn between the then recent Rwandan genocide and the Darfur conflict and the perceived failure of the media to sound the alarm on the unfolding crisis in Rwanda, the media coverage of the Darfur conflict is often analysed. Existing analysis has looked at how the media created the image of the Arab perpetrator versus the African victim in what was described as an unfolding genocide that the world failed to take notice of.

In an interview with The International Journal of Press/Politics (Waisbord, 2008), United Nations Special Envoy to Darfur Jan Eliasson noted the difficulty the international press faced when covering Darfur. For example, journalists required government issued permits to enter Darfur and security protection and were also further challenged by environmental factors such as the size of the area and ongoing violence in the southern parts of the then Sudan. Eliasson further criticised what he called an exaggeration of the ethnic factors driving the conflict arguing "it is hard to make a distinction between different sides based on skin colour (Waisbord, 2008:77).

The use of religion as a cause of conflict by the media was also a worrying factor as Eliasson argued “everyone in Darfur are Muslims” which contradicts the idea that the victims of the conflict were black Christians, a narrative that formed the basis for a number of religious campaigns in the United States particularly. Eliasson’s primary complaint about the coverage of the Darfur conflict is that it failed to adequately describe the political situation in the country, choosing to focus on the humanitarian crisis rather than the political situation. To the media’s credit, Eliasson cites the media’s “enthusiastic” coverage of Resolution 1769 which authorised a peacekeeping intervention in Darfur (Waisbord, 2008:79).

Other coverage of the conflict chose instead to focus on the imaging of the humanitarian crisis, as Eliasson pointed out. Much of how the issue was framed drew on the message from non-governmental organisations working in the area. Ali, James and Vultee compare how the United Nations Children’s Fund and the international news agency the Associated Press used the imaging of children to create differing messages on how the humanitarian conflict was unfolding, on the premise that the “images of children are critical sites in which narratives about the legitimacy, justification and outcomes of war are inscribed” (Wells, 2008:55 in Ali et al., 2013:3).

Generally, the study found that UNICEF chose to remove affected children from backgrounds of dilapidated tents in refugee camps in order to create the image that the UN-run programmes in the region were in fact a success while the photographs of the Associated Press maintained a certain environmental context for the purposes of news media. Further, while the press photographs had a commercial goal as well as being bound by the professional norm of truth-telling, the agency’s photographs served instead to reinforce the humanitarian work the aid agencies were doing in the region and especially the successes they had achieved (Ali et al, 2013:19), which one could argue was due to the symbiotic relationship between aid agencies and the media.

Ali et al. (2013) do not, however, argue that there is more truth to one message than there is to the other, instead this study shows how a narrative is created to fulfill a particular goal. The comparison carried out by Ali, James and Vultee does not ask whether a particularly Western

paradigm or ideology informs the images and in so doing does not necessarily look at the messages created by the images as political messages (Ali et al., 2013:19). Furthermore, because this is an analysis of the photographic images, the manner in which meaning is created differs to that of words used to create a narrative in a newspaper article.

Writing for the European Sudanese Public Affairs Council, veteran BBC journalist Martin Bell assesses the coverage of the Darfur conflict in the *New York Times* as well as influential American newspaper the Washington Post, Britain's Sunday Times Magazine, and the BBC current affairs television programme Panorama. In an episode titled 'The New Killing Fields', Bell argues that Panorama has fallen short of its usual journalist standards in failing to portray both sides of the conflict thereby failing to uphold the broadcaster's commitment to accuracy and to reflect "all significant strands of opinion" (Bell, 2005). Bell's greatest indictment of the coverage is that it does not give adequate exposure to sources who may have contradicted the 2004 broadcast that already described the conflict as a genocide, citing specifically the failure to quote aid organisation Medicines Sans Frontieres as well as any African Union officials who may have disputed this classification.

Bell's criticism of the print media is equally withering, arguing that the Sunday Times' use of racialised tropes made use of factually incorrect and culturally insensitive descriptions while the Washington Post is accused of publishing incorrect figures of the death-toll as well as demonising the al-Bashir regime in order to justify military intervention. The former journalist is especially critical of what he describes as the *New York Times* determination to call the conflict a genocide, using ethnic tropes such as black and Arab and describing that whole villages of black Africans have been wiped out by Arab Janjaweed militia in order to illustrate that the killing was systematic and therefore in line with genocidal practices. Bell points out that while the *New York Times* has described the conflict as a genocide, the paper has also admitted that it "it is impossible to travel in Darfur to verify these claims" (Reeves, 2004 in Bell, 2005).

Bell (2005) is especially critical of *New York Times* columnist Nicholas Kristof who he accuses of blatantly ignoring sources and evidence that may have refuted his claim that the conflict was in fact an example of ethnic cleansing. While he credits the former columnists coverage for

bringing attention to the conflict, Bell argues that Kristof's message will bring prestige for American foreign policy rather than address the root causes of the conflict (Bell, 2005). Still, the weakness of Bell's criticism is that while it criticises the sensationalism of the coverage of the conflict, it too is prone to hyperbole and only really focuses on a few select examples to reinforce his point rather than providing a balanced assessment of the coverage.

Analysing the *New York Times*' framing of the conflict from 2003 to 2006 Kothari (2010:217) undertakes a quantitative study of the coverage and assesses the graphicness of the coverage to show that framing of a conflict relies on graphic images and descriptions. Kothari categorised the reports and used a Graphic Index Average to assess the news articles. Stories categorised as public events carried the message of the "United States as saviour of the Sudanese people" and relied on both African and Western officials as sources; while stories categorised as investigative relied on an "ethnic conflict frame" with Sudanese refugees as their sources; while those reports categorised as hybrid stories – a combination of investigative and event type story and relied on a combination of these - took on a fatalist frame as an inevitable conflict.

Using interviews with the individual journalists who covered the conflict, Kothari argues that there is a direct correlation between the journalists reporting goals and the framing of the story, which is in line with the argument of this research paper that coverage of the conflict is framed in a specific manner to encourage a certain agenda. Kothari (2010:220) argues that the coverage had an unbalanced view of a particular cultural group due to access, reinforcing Eliasson's argument that the media did not give enough coverage to the refugee camps where they may have seen a more balanced view of just who the victims of the Darfur conflict were (Waisbord, 2008:76).

Kothari's study is helpful in showing just how the coverage used graphic imagery to frame the narrative of the conflict while also showing that in doing so that the *New York Times* may have trivialised alternative perspectives of the conflict (2010:222). While the study argues that the coverage is in line with the hegemonic view of conflict in Africa, it does not outline how these frames were created which this paper believes gives insight into how the media not only reports on peacekeeping interventions but also performs a civil duty in lobbying for action. Furthermore,

this study does not discuss how the United Nations and the peacekeeping intervention in the area were portrayed in the media.

In a study of how Nicholas Kristof's writing in particular serves as an example of bearing witness, Tait (2011:1228) argues that Kristoff wrote specifically with the intention to shock his readers, "to induce in them an approximation of his own embodied experiences." He places himself in his articles – a style that is allowed by the standards of a column – thereby making himself an actor in his reports and specifically a member of the West who must act to end the genocide. From the beginning of his coverage, Kristof moves away from the statistical and political debate on genocide and instead focuses on a call to action to his readers and the necessity of intervention by the United Nations, which reflects the call of many of the aid agencies working to raise awareness of the genocide.

Kristof often draws parallels to previous incidents of genocide such as Rwanda and the Holocaust and by ignoring the regional political dimensions calls on his readers to formulate a narrative of the Darfur conflict within the parameters of these previous genocides. Tait (2011:1231) concludes that Kristof's example of bearing witness as a journalist is "conceptualised as both the act of assuming responsibility and the failure to do so." For the purposes of a textual analysis, this is an effective study of Kristof's writing, however for the purposes of this research paper the failure to account for ignoring the political parameters of the crisis does not fully contribute to an understanding of the role of the media in international relations.

Gruley and Duvall (2012) are one of the few studies to conduct their content analysis based on reference to a specific tribal identity. Based on a comparative study of the evolving narrative of the conflict in the *New York Times* and The Washington Post, Duvall and Gruley (2012:41) specifically searched for mention of the Abbala and Bagara nomadic groups and found that only 7 per cent of the 1 200 articles published between 2009 and 2003 and used in the sample that made reference to tribal identity, this was despite the fact that the conflict was predominantly described as a tribal conflict. Still, Gruley and Duvall (2012:42) argue that the description of "the Darfur narrative was not monolithic but changed over time, becoming less dependent upon

stereotypes of African warfare.” Duvall and Gruley specifically created a research design that sampled many articles over a period of a few years to show that the media itself was able to challenge a dominant news narrative from within, with news reports seeking and producing deeper analysis of the Darfur story.

Still, Duvall and Gruley (2012:44) note that the closest either newspaper came to critiquing the tribal narrative is in a *Washington Post* editorial published on the 19th of November 2006, entitled “The Arabs are victims, too” that argued that reportage had favoured one tribe over the other, rather than specifically critiquing the use of the tribal narrative itself. While a comparative study of two newspapers showed that the media as an institution within a particular political environment recreate the same hegemonic message, the advantage of such a broad study over such a lengthy period of time is precisely because it shows that news narratives are fluid, capable of change as different voices, in this case journalists and sources, are added to the meta-narrative which gives it more dynamism. In summary, much of the critique of coverage of the conflict illustrates that the not enough nuance was given although does not often situate this within discourse analysis, and rarely within the context of the media as a non-state actor in international relations.

4. Methodology

The aim of this paper is to understand that the media does not play the role of neutral observer when reporting on conflict, but instead the media acts as a non-state actor in the international relations arena and is able to exert influence on the discourse of that conflict. In order to do this, a case study is selected and analysed in order to show how the media chose to describe a particular conflict and what the subsequent call for intervention was, based on this description of conflict. The case study used is the *New York Times*’ reportage on the conflict in Darfur and the texts used to understand this are the articles from the daily newspaper itself. In order to understand how the media set the agenda on Darfur, a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis will be used, namely content analysis and discourse analysis using framing.

4.1. Mixed Methodologies Approach

Quantitative data analysis allows one to collect and sort data and in doing so identify patterns while qualitative data analysis allows one to interpret that data. Quantitative methodologies used within the context of media research, allow for phenomena such as news production and audience reaction, where possible, to be numerically measured. In the same context, qualitative analysis “embraces methodologies that are theoretically framed by critical or interpretivist social science” (Guntner, 2000:23). In this analysis, elements of quantitative research methodology were used to collect the sample while qualitative research methods were used to assess the sample.

The epistemological critique of the mixed method approach is based on the embedded methods or paradigm arguments. The embedded methods argument is rooted in the positivist approach which argues that the selection of a particular method demonstrates a commitment to a particular epistemological position, meaning that each method is grounded in a particular tradition of interpretation of the social world and therefore cannot be combined (Bryman, 2012: 629). The flaw with this argument is the connection between epistemology and methodology is difficult to demonstrate. The paradigm argument views quantitative and qualitative methodologies as separate paradigms, representing a particular set of beliefs, assumptions or values which are inherently incompatible and therefore cannot be intertwined beyond a superficial level (Bryman, 2012:630). A paradigm is created when inconsistencies within an established discipline continue to challenge the assumptions of the field so much so that a new discipline evolves. According to Bryman (2012:630), similarly to the critique of the embedded methods argument, the very idea that methods can be viewed as paradigms cannot be demonstrated.

Alternatively, the technical approach to mixed methodology research is to employ methodologies as a strategy to achieve a particular end in social science research, emphasising the strengths of data-collection and data-analysis. As the aim of this paper is to demonstrate the argument that the media’s narrative plays a role in the public’s understanding of a conflict and uses a specific sample to show this, the technical and not the epistemological approach is the approach to mixed methodology that this particular research project draws on. There are a number of ways in which

mixed methods can be combined, such as triangulation – which combines quantitative and qualitative data and uses both to reinforce the results – and offsetting – which draws on the weaknesses of each methodology and combines them to strengthen the methodology (Bryman, 2012:631;633).

This paper draws on a combination of processes, namely sampling, context and illustration. In some cases, quantitative research can be quite static which in fact allows one to identify regularities through a specific and credible form of data collection, such as sampling (Bryman, 2012: 638;644). For example, quantifying the instances in which particular descriptions of perpetrators or victims were used in a sample of selected articles from the *New York Times*, shows a pattern, which helps to create a pattern of characteristics of the coverage which in turn gives rise to the narrative created by the paper. A mixed methodologies approach further allows one to provide context to the quantitative approach while also using the quantitative data to illustrate the findings (Bryman, 2012:645-646). In this paper, the qualitative data used to establish patterns is contextualised by the framing analysis of those descriptions, which will in turn illustrate just how the *New York Times* created a certain narrative.

4.2. Qualitative Analysis

Language forms the basis of the narrative created by the *New York Times* and is therefore the fundamental unit of analysis of this paper. Language and the words that create meaning in language are seen as more than the medium through which research is communicated and instead language is treated as a “topic rather than a resource” (Bryman, 2012: 522). Social science research presents two approaches to assessing language as a topic, conversation analysis and discourse analysis. Conversation analysis is the analysis of talk “as it occurs in interaction in naturally occurring situations” (Bryman, 2012: 522). Rooted in ethnography, it makes use of recordings of natural speech. However, as this study uses written and edited language as a unit of analysis, discourse analysis will be used.

Discourse analysis as a theoretical framework for understanding how knowledge is produced has already been outlined earlier in this paper. As a methodology, discourse analysis “emphasises the way versions of the world, society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in

discourse” (Potter in Bryman, 2012:528). Discourse analysis inherently rejects the idea of neutral language and instead is concerned with the intention of the topic and the actors who have created the specific discursive. Epistemologically, discourse analysis rejects realism arguing that there is no external reality and therefore no definitive representation or privileged analysis thereof can be provided. Discourse analysis is instead a constructivist approach, arguing that reality is created by the actors involved in the discursive event and that the meaning created from that event is but one of the representations possible (Bryman, 2012: 529).

Within international relations, discourse analysis is able to demonstrate an “institutionalised discourse...by proving that metaphors regularly appear in the same texts” (Neumann, 2008: 62). These representations may vary within the text and this allows the researcher to discover relationships between various representations and even to track how representations and the discourses within which they exist are able to evolve and show social and cultural changes. As discussed in the theoretical framework, it is important to analyse discourse in international relations because the historical representations produced and circulated within discourse, in turn influence how phenomena and the appropriate actions are interpreted (Dunn, 2008:81; Neumann, 2008:62). For example, discourse analysis may be able to explain how the representation of “Africans” in the Darfur conflict changed over time, from targeted victims to one in which rebels were seen as perpetrating violence which in turn changed how the international community intervened in the conflict, such as who they chose to sanction.

As a methodology, discourse analysis makes use of repetition of themes and metaphors in order to establish a pattern but it is also important that discourses create their own memory and so are formed on the memory of its predecessors and metaphors tend to echo previously used metaphors or narratives (Neumann, 2008:69). In principle, this means that repeated themes may appear in a myriad of representations and therefore has an infinite number of interpretations (Neumann, 2008:71). Yet, these repetitions also show that discourse exists within a specific hegemony, and the repetition of metaphors and themes symbolise the reproduction of power (Neumann, 2008:71). The aim of discourse analysis in international relations is then not only to show patterns, but to demonstrate how those patterns reinforce certain power structures and how even these structures are able to change.

In a study such as this research project, the unit of analysis is language and how metaphors and descriptions are created by the news coverage of the Darfur conflict in order to interpret the source of conflict and the appropriate measures that should be taken to quell the violence, an action that allows the media to act as a non-state actor. But, these descriptions are not politically neutral and instead, they reinforce a dominant discourse, such as the representation of ethnicity through the paradigm of the War on Terror or the representation of the United Nations as the only legitimate international actor, at the expense of the African Union. Discourse analysis in this study allows the researcher to situate these linguistic representations within the greater discourses, both dominant and more marginal discourses, competing for attention. In this way, language is not just a means of neutral communication, but rather a “social system with its own relational logic [which] produces reality for humans by mediating these sense data” (Neumann, 2008:61).

As language is inherently constructivist, meaning is negotiated and constitutes a particular representation, which according to critical discourse analysis, gives language power. Based on Foucault’s interpretation on the relationship between knowledge and power, critical discourse analysis therefore explores the relationship between discourse and reality, with discourse as a generative mechanism rather than a self-referential sphere (Bryman, 2012:537). With texts in particular, critical discourse analysis places discourse practice within the socio-cultural practice and assesses how a text is produced and consumed (Fairclough, 2010:59). While language is by no means the only means of creating meaning, this paper focuses on language constructed or produced a particular position of the Darfur conflict for its audience and in so doing, foregrounded and backgrounded particular aspects of the conflict.

In any media representation, Fairclough (2010:4) argues that the author or creator has to choose what to foreground and background, meaning which details will be highlighted or emphasised and which details will be understated or even excluded and in so doing a particular agenda is set. On this basis, media texts are analysed through asking

1. *How is the world (events, relationships, etc.) represented?*
2. *What identities are set up for those involved in the programme or story (reporters, audiences, ‘third parties’ referred to or interviewed?)*

3. *What relationships are set up between those involved (e.g. reporter-audience, expert-audience or politician-audience relationships)?* (Fairclough, 2010:5)

The premise of this paper is already to understand how events, specifically the Darfur conflict and the subsequent international intervention were represented. As this description often made use of ethnicity, the analysis will explore how ethnic identities were represented but also how the identities of institutions such as the United Nations and the United States government were created in this particular narrative and what attributes they were given. As the reaction of the audience is not always immediately obvious from the analysis of the newspaper sample, the analysis will be conducted from the point of departure that through agenda setting, a particular audience reaction is encouraged. In addition, where the paper makes a specific request to readers to react or contribute to the Save Darfur campaign for example, this will be specifically noted.

Framing has already been outlined in as a tool of agenda setting in the theoretical framework and this paper uses framing as a basis for understanding how discourse was created in relation to the Darfur conflict in the reportage of the *New York Times* in 2004, when the paper, its staff and audience first began to make sense of the events surrounding Darfur. Just as media becomes one of the main sources of text from which to analyse discourse, media frames create “the central organising idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (Ghanem in McCombs and Ghanem, 2003: 70). From this perspective, the representations created are based on metaphor, and attributes used to describe actors in the conflict. These attributes include, but are not limited to; ideology, issue positions and qualifications. In this study, the attributes inform the nodes created in the content analysis process in order to organise the data. These attributes describe the perpetrators, for example, the Arab militias and Sudanese government, “black Africans” as victims, the “United States” and “United Nations as intervening actors. The characteristics attributed to these actors are evident in how these actors are framed.

In summary, this research methodology makes use of both quantitative and qualitative methods to establish the pattern of the narrative used by the *New York Times* to communicate the Darfur conflict in the first year of the conflict and in turn looks at how the media as a state actor

reproduced a particular discourse on the conflict, but also how this was challenged by the same media as the narrative evolved. Content analysis of a particular sample will collect and code the data in order to show the pattern through prevalence of particular metaphors. Once the prevalence of these dominant representations has been demonstrated, the representations themselves will be analysed in order to show how they exist within a particular discourse and how they representations recreated or challenged this discourse which in turn influenced how actors in the conflict were regarded and how the subsequent reaction to these actors was outlined.

4.3. Quantitative Methodology

4.3.1. Selecting The Case Study And Sample

This research report relies on a particular case study for both the qualitative and quantitative methodologies employed. The aim of the study is to assess how media narrative communicates the urgency for international peacekeeping initiatives. The selection of the case study in international relations allows one to conceptualise the research from the general to the specific, in this case the narrative communicated by the *New York Times* about the need for intervention in the Darfur conflict in order to assess how the need for intervention and the right to protect are communicated in the media (Klotz, 2008:45).

While analyses based on case study often rely on comparison, this study makes use of a singular case study. The rationale for this is because the case study examines how a narrative is created and looks at the variables within a particular set of data, in this case the image and metaphors created by a number newspaper articles recording the Darfur conflict. Darfur is of particular interest as a singular case study because although it was an example of internal conflict, Darfur garnered much international public attention, which is an effective unit of analysis to establish how the media communicates the need for intervention (Baxter and Jack, 2008:554).

The sample of this study comes from a specific newspaper, namely The *New York Times*. This media was chosen because it has the reputation for being a reliable and accurate source of information on international relations that is accessible to the general public. A larger sample may have created a more concrete correlation or shown how the narrative of the study evolved, but the aim of this study is to look at how the *New York Times* first made sense of the conflict as

a non-state actor. Additionally a smaller sample is easier to manage and allows for the researcher to explore with more depth how the narratives were recreated within the scope of the research report.

The sample was collected using the LexisNexis database, which is one of the most internationally comprehensive databases for newspaper searches, among other sources. Using a basic newspaper search method using the term “Darfur”. The search command was run specifically within LexisNexis’ *New York Times* database, from the 1st of January 2004 to the 31st of December 2004. This date was chosen because it is the first time the newspaper began to cover the conflict and records how this coverage continued throughout the first year of the conflict as the *New York Times* came to grips with describing the conflict and its actors. By December that year, this paper argues that the paper began to repeat the description of the conflict and the intervention process. Also, the end of a calendar year presented a legitimate reason to close the sample.

The sample searched for articles over 300 words long which produces a longer text capable of demonstrating the context of a particular representation as well as its relationship to other representations. The search yielded 123 articles in total, which included one article of less than 300 words that was accidentally included by the researcher when selecting the articles. The articles were then further sorted into categories, specifically news articles; columns by staff writer Nicholas Kristof, whose coverage of Darfur earned him a Pulitzer Prize, a prestigious award in media; columns by guest authors such as activist and author of the book *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, Samantha Power and United Nations commander in charge of the organisations mission in Rwanda and author of *Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, Romeo Dallaire; and *New York Times* editorials, which do not cite a specific author but rather represent the position the newspaper has taken within the conflict itself. The sample yielded five editorials, seven columns by guest authors, 13 columns by Kristof and 87 news reports.

4.3.2. Content Analysis

Content analysis as a methodology allows the researcher to organise the sample and create a

quantified description of the patterns and characteristics identified in the sample. The aim of content analysis is to create a quantitative account of the raw materials of the sample (Bryman, 2012:289) This allows one to keep track of the representation of the sample which in turn allows one to refer to discourse analysis as the frequency of a particular representation may indicate a pattern of discourse, showing how a mixed methodology approach is able to strengthen the research project.

The aim of content analysis is to “provide a descriptive account of what a media text contains, and to do so in a fashion that can be reproduced by others (Guntner, 2000:50). The five main functions of content analysis identified by Wimmer and Dominick (1994) are:

1. *Describing patterns or trends in media portrayals;*
2. *Testing hypotheses about the policies or aims of media producers;*
3. *Comparing media content with the real world;*
4. *Assessing the representation of particular groups in society;*
5. *Drawing inferences about media effects.*

(Gunter, 2000:61)

4.3.2.1. Nvivo As A Research Tool

As a form of computer assisted content analysis, this research project makes use of the software Nvivo, developed by QRS International. Nvivo is able to organise a variety of data, such as newspaper articles, and is able to create and run multiple codes. These codes are called nodes in the software’s language and are flexible in that they can be created, deleted or modified throughout the research process. The codes were created according to the research question, identifying how the conflict was described, identifying the actors in the cause of the conflict and how possibilities for intervention were described. The programme also allows one to create aggregated nodes, sub-nodes to the parent nodes, or codes that fall within a broader description and further enhance the understanding this description. Nodes were also created as the represented alternatives to the dominant descriptions.

Nodes were created and described as follows, with aggregated nodes also indicated:

- Cause of conflict: This gives a broad view of how the *New York Times* described the conflict.
 - Ethnicity: Describes the root of cause of the conflict as ethnic tensions
 - African: The instances in which actors were described as Africans, specifically as black African victims.
 - Rebel: This counts instances when Africans are specifically referred to as rebels, explaining the cause of the conflict and should differ to when the Rebels were included in intervention.
 - Arab: The instances in which perpetrators were described as Arab. This may include both government and militia.
 - Janjaweed: The instances in which the *New York Times* named the Janjaweed as the perpetrators as violence. This is also important to see in proximity of Arab.
 - Militia: Instances where militia is described without ethnic descriptor, including instances where government is sponsoring these militias.
 - Alternative descriptions of conflict: This describes instances in which the conflict was not clearly described as one of ethnic divisions, but rather looked at alternative descriptions, such as a scorched earth policy.
 - The use of this term emerges specifically after a report is released and becomes part of the language used to describe the conflict, amidst the genocide debate.
 - This also includes instances where the conflict is described as a 'rebel insurrection' and other terms.
 - Regional or historical conflict: This indicates when an article actually situated the Darfur conflict within the greater regional and historical context. This includes links to the civil war, conflict between Chad, Libya and Sudan as well as local tensions over land.
 - Inevitability: This node was created specifically to code a characteristic of Nickolas Kristoff's articles. Kristoff's writing is often framed in the 'Africa is a basket case' narrative that writes about the continent as though conflict was an inherent characteristic of Africa. Although this is not a material cause of conflict,

it is aggregated under causes of conflict so as to monitor the number of times the *New York Times* coverage in general attempts to describe the conflict through interpreting its cause.

- Genocide: This looks at the number of times the term genocide was used to describe the conflict and how this was used. This is an indicator for how intervention should be approached.
 - Ethnic cleansing: This looks at how many times the conflict was described as ethnic cleansing or systematic killing rather than the term genocide itself.
 - Rwanda: The conflict is often compared to Rwanda, even though it is not necessarily referred to as genocide. This serves as a call to action and a reason for international intervention and a reason for why this should be on the agenda.
 - War crimes or Crimes Against Humanity: This is when the violence is depicted as a war crime, not necessarily genocide. This also records instances in which war crimes are described outside of a specific mention of genocide or ethnic cleansing.
- Humanitarian Disaster: These are instances when the conflict was primarily framed as a humanitarian disaster, often from the camps, and therefore required international aid, which is what made it worthy of international news attention.
- Intervention: This describes how the *New York Times* suggested that the conflict must be dealt with, according to how it saw the cause and the suggested solution for a specific problem and the actors who would have been called upon to solve this.
 - African Union: This explains how many times the conflict was seen as one that could be intervened by the African Union. This category looks at how the African Union was described (i.e. the descriptors in close proximity) and how many times the African Union was used as a source.
 - Rebels: This marks instances in which the role of the rebels has been acknowledged in ending the conflict. This is important because it gives the "African victims" agency and differs from the description of "black African" actors in the conflict as helpless victims in need of international help.

- Sudanese government: While the Sudanese government is often blamed for their connection to the Janjaweed, it would be interesting to see how the government's role for intervention is portrayed with this and how it compares.
 - Ought: Codes instances in which columns or editorials specifically call for action from the Sudanese government, rather than reflecting what has already happened. This is important because the media is attempting to play a role in describing or advising what role international intervention should take.
- United Nations: These are representations that viewed the United Nations as the main interveners. This search also includes the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations as a source.
 - Ought: Codes instances in which columns or editorials specifically call for action from the United Nations, rather than reflecting what has already happened. This is important because the media is attempting to play a role in describing or advising what role international intervention should take.
- United States: This looks at how many times the role of the United States was emphasised. Actors expected to be identified in this category were George Bush and Colin Powell and the United States State Department.
 - Ought: Codes instances in which columns or editorials specifically call for action from the United States, rather than reflecting what has already happened. This is important because the media is attempting to play a role in describing or advising what role international intervention should take.
- Reaction of the International Community: This is when journalists show how the conflict is affecting the global arena or how it is interpreted in foreign countries. This demonstrates agenda setting in how the media made the conflict relevant at home and to communities outside of the immediate conflict zone.
 - Citizen Reaction: Records instances when ordinary citizens began to take note of the conflict. This is important given the impact of campaigns like Save Darfur, in spreading the message that genocide was underway which sought to directly influence public opinion.

- This looks at instances where this was specifically invoked, where countries were specifically called upon to react to the conflict based on a moral principle.

In certain instances the codes evolved as the research did, for example, the category ought was added after the opinion editorials and columns were analysed because they would often directly call for a specific form of intervention based on a very specific description of the conflict. The code militia was included when a militia group was not described in relation to ethnicity, however, this proved to yield little results as this description was rarely used in and was found in relation to the Sudanese government, which would then place it within the ethnicity category because the government was almost invariably described within ethnic or racial terms as the “Arab elite” or the “Arab-led government”.

The other advantage of Nvivo is that it makes use of and correlates a number of different sources and so was able to include columns, editorials and news articles, providing the results separately according to the source and in relation to the coverage as a whole. Further, Nvivo is able to create “coding stripes” which allow the researcher to measure the density of codes throughout the text and in so doing is able to show how themes overlap which shows the relationship between categories which for the purposes of research shows the relationship between certain actors and representations. Unfortunately, because this research project made use of the demonstrative software model for private use of Nvivo 10, which is unable to print. This is common frustration expressed by temporary Nvivo users. In order to combat this, this paper makes use of images made of screen grabs where the information provided by the coding stripes is relevant. A weakness of Nvivo, however, is because its statistical representation is reliant on frequency, it counts the individual occurrences of each word rather than a code and so the percentage of coverage is represented as the number of times a particular word appears throughout the sample, making this very low. It is for this reason that this particular paper does not make use of this result in the analysis.

Nvivo describes itself as a software tool that may be used across a number of methodological approaches and as this paper uses a mixed methodology approach this has been especially helpful as Nvivo is able to produce results for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Nvivo

automatically creates a table that demonstrates the frequency of the use of a specific node or code, which is advantageous to content analysis because it creates a pattern and records frequency. Specific to the framing requirements of this paper in order to establish a pattern of agenda setting, Nvivo 10 is able to create a “word tree” which creates a word map of a specific search term and how it was used in all or some of the sources. The word tree creates an image that shows how often certain phrases were used and how they were described, within a selected context. This paper chose to illustrate the words within five words in order to narrow the search terms by greater context rather than just frequency.

5. Findings And Analysis

Running an initial query of the frequency of nodes, or categories of codes produced the following results, which will now be contextualised within the discourse on Darfur using framing and discourse analysis. The table differs from the original table in that it excludes columns that describe the creator of the nodes, and dates on which they were created and modified. The original table created by Nvivo will be included in appendix of this study.

Name	Sources	References
Cause of conflict	4	390
Alternative Descriptions of conflict	3	14
Ethnicity	4	296
African	4	81
Rebel	2	17
Arab	4	168
Janjaweed	4	121
Inevitability	1	4
Militia	1	3

Regional or historical conflict	4	73
Genocide	4	164
Ethnic cleansing	3	23
Rwanda	4	30
War Crimes or Crimes Against Humanity	4	24
Humanitarian Disaster	4	76
Intervention	4	614
African Union	4	70
Rebels	3	59
Sudanese Government	4	165
Ought	2	3
United Nations	4	138
Ought	3	9
United States	4	181
Ought	3	20
Reaction of the international community	4	101
Citizen reaction	3	20
Responsibility to protect	2	5

5.1. Discourse Analysis And Framing Of The Conflict

5.1.1. The Cause Of The Conflict

A narrative based on ethnicity is the dominant discourse that emerges from the coverage by the *New York Times*. The primary reason given for the cause of conflict in the Darfur region was ethnicity, with 296 references in total, 189 in newspaper articles, 25 in columns, 13 found in columns written by Kristof and four in the editorial sources. Within the newspaper articles, forty

references are made of ethnicity were specifically based on the animosity between Arabs versus Africans as the cause of conflict. Because a text search would also include instances where the term “ethnic cleansing” was used, a search was run for Arab and African instead as these were already coded within categories of the sources of conflict. The conflict is portrayed as being perpetrated by Arabs, with Africans as their victims, and even when this is explored deeper, it is still from the premise that the conflict is definitely ethnically driven or at least has “an ethnic dimension to it” (Lacey, 2004j).

In the first few months of the *New York Times*’ coverage of the conflict, this ethnic dimension is presented as an inherent fact of the conflict, but within the sample, the narrative evolves, with the paper first giving an account of just how fluid the identity of Arab and African are in this particular context (Lacey, 2004l), and that existing representations of race and identity may not be applied wholesale to this particular conflict. Increasingly, ethnicity as a descriptor as the cause of the conflict is further contextualised in the regional and historical competition for resources in the Darfur region. The conflict is also increasingly contextualised within the greater north-south conflict, rather than just a spontaneous conflict in the “isolated” west of the country. Figure 1 shows the relationship between ethnicity and the regional code as within the cause of the conflict in the first instances of media response, with a sample taken from April, and Figure 2 shows how ethnicity was increasingly placed within context, with a sample taken from late August.

Reference 1 - 0.39% Coverage	
The Arab-dominated government in Khartoum has armed nomadic Arab herdsman, or Janjaweed, against rival African tribes. The government is using aerial bombardment to strafe villages and terrorize civilians into flight. And it is denying humanitarian access to some 700,000 people who are trapped in Darfur.	
Reference 2 - 0.25% Coverage	
The Arab Muslim marauders and their government sponsors do not yet seem intent on exterminating every last African Muslim in their midst. But they do seem determined to wipe out black life in the region.	
Reference 3 - 0.19% Coverage	
he regime, in response to a rebellion begun by primarily non-Arab groups in early 2003, armed the Janjaweed militia, giving them impunity to attack.	
Reference 4 - 0.56% Coverage	
I was not prepared for the far more sinister scene I encountered in a ravine deep in the Darfur desert. Bodies of young men were lined up in ditches, eerily preserved by the 130-degree desert heat. The story the rebels told us seemed plausible: the dead were civilians who had been marched up a hill and executed by the Arab-led government before its troops abandoned the area the previous month. The rebels assert that there were many other such scenes.	
Reference 5 - 0.25% Coverage	
This formula guarantees that six months from now the Janjaweed will still be in a position to kill, rape and pillage, leaving unchallenged the ethnic cleansing campaign that has changed the map of Darfur.	
Reference 6 - 0.23% Coverage	
Some part of the answer is specific to this one situation. Nobody wanted to provoke the Sudanese government while it was negotiating with Christian rebels to end 21 years of civil war.	

Figure 1: Ethnicity represented outside of regional context

Reference 182 - 0.19% Coverage	
The state-run news agency, meanwhile, accused the country's chief opposition party of plotting the assassinations of senior government officials in coup attempt on Friday. It was the third time this year that Khartoum charged its opponents in the Popular Congress Party with plotting an overthrow. Many of its leaders, including its chief, Hassan al-Turabi, an outspoken Islamist and a former ally of President Omar el-Bashir, have been arrested in recent months. Speaking to reporters here in the capital of West Darfur State on Sunday, the Khartoum-appointed governor, Suleiman Abdalla Adam, blamed the rebels for the coup attempt, characterizing one of the two Darfur guerrilla groups, the Justice and Equality Movement, as the political opposition's military wing. "They are seeking foreign intervention," he said. "That's why they are escalating the situation."	
Reference 183 - 0.09% Coverage	
War broke out in western Sudan in early 2003, when a rebel insurrection, frustrated by what it called Khartoum's marginalization of Darfur, demanded economic and political reforms. The government swiftly struck back, deploying Arab militias across the region who quickly earned a reputation for killings, rapes and razing of villages. The Security Council has insisted that the militias, known as the janjaweed, be disarmed.	
Reference 184 - 0.04% Coverage	
"We don't have any rights in Sudan because we are black," said Mohamed Abakar Adam, 23, one of the men at the camp. "Even today, on a daily basis, we are being killed and raped."	
Reference 185 - 0.07% Coverage	
A senior Sudanese official on Tuesday called the Darfur crisis a "smoke screen" to hoodwink the international community into aiding political opponents who seek to overthrow the government. He warned that disarming pro-government militias, if done hastily and carelessly, could cause a violent ethnic war.	

Figure 2: Relationship between ethnicity and regional context

Still, despite this, the dominant narrative of the Arab versus African conflict remained, and the interpretation of Islam and Arabs as an ethnicity remained couched within this narrative, which is arguably influenced by the discourse of the War on Terror which was the dominant meaning created by international relations discourse at the time, with intervention processes also

described within ethnic tropes. The conflict is also often described as “muslim versus muslim” which in many instances is almost described as incredulous with Lacey (2004a) first reporting “Darfur's conflict is over ethnicity and resources; it pits Muslim against Muslim” and again, having sources question the resolve of the Sudanese government to maintain the decades long north-south conflict based on religion, rather than contextualising the peace process:

What makes the Christians in the south trust the government when it is going to turn around and treat fellow Muslims the way they are in Darfur,” asked Diane L. Knippers, president of the Institute on Religion and Democracy, a Christian group in Washington (Lacey, 2004d).

Kristof continues the narrative that a conflict that does not pit religions against each other is somehow an anomaly and instead traces the conflict to an almost inherent characteristic of the region, describing the tensions as ancient rather than giving a contemporary, contextual description:

In Darfur, the fighting is not over religion, for the victims as well as the killers are Muslims. It is more ethnic and racial, reflecting some of the ancient tension between herdsman (the Arabs in Darfur) and farmers (the black Africans, although they herd as well).

Kristof further places even international intervention within a paradigm of ethnicity, often using his column to shame the Arab League for failing to intervene and instead leaving the moral obligation to act to protect Muslims to the United States, writing “it's shameful that African and Muslim countries don't offer at least a whisper of protest at the slaughter of fellow Africans and Muslims” (Kristof, 2004a). Of the Arab League in particular, Kristof firmly places his interpretation of the role of the Arab League within the discourse of the War on Terror, writing, “Do they care about dead Muslims only when the killers are Israelis or Americans?” in a column titled “Bush points the way” (Kristof, 2004d). While other representations of Arabs are less vitriolic, the role of Arab as perpetrator of this conflict is firmly established by other articles in this sample.

5.1.2. Representation Of The Perpetrator

A text search of the exact term Arab, within the node of ethnicity and within the newspaper articles as a source, specifically, show that the term Arab is often framed in reference to the militias (using words such as militia, militiamen and militias) who carry out the attacks, in close proximity to action phrases such as “accused of”, “killing”, “attacks” or “attacking blacks”. The

victims of these attacks are almost always Africans, shown through phrases such as “against Africans”, “attacking black Muslims” (Sengupta, 2004b; Hoge, 2004a).

Still, this representation is often attributed to a sources such as the United Nations, aid agencies and especially the United States State Department and other diplomats describing ethnicity as a “United Nations, characterisation of the situation there” (Hoge, 2004h) and writing, “‘There has been a pattern of attacks that have been consistent, involving Arabs attacking non-Arabs,’ said a State Department official. ‘As our research shows, these attacks have been accompanied by racial epithets and references to slaves and blacks’” (Hoge and Weisman, 2004a).

The word tree produced shows that Arabs militia are also framed as being backed by the Sudanese government, with the text query revealing that the word Arab was couched near phrases such as “government backed”, “pro-government”, “equipped by”, “allied to” the government, “capital” or “Khartoum” and “loyalty to the Sudanese government”. The government itself is also described as Arab, shown by phrases such as “Arab dominated government”, “Arab led government” and “Arab elite in Khartoum” (Appendix ii).

The *New York Times* coverage made specific reference to Arabs a total of 168 times, showing that in some instances, the representation of Arab differed as the number of references outweighs that of the articles sampled. This is due to the description of the Sudanese government itself is often framed as Arab. Still, the representation of the Sudanese government is complex, as shown in another node of classification, the government as intervening force. The *New York Times* representation of the al-Bashir regime oscillates between Arab perpetrator and as a state-actor tasked with intervening in the conflict and attempting to solve it. Yet, often when the Sudanese government’s efforts in Darfur are described, they are described as a failure or worse, complicit in the conflict.

The Sudanese government’s most damning portrayal is that of the authorities as supporting the Janjaweed militia-group, due to ethnic affiliations and a history of using them as a tool to suppress resistance in both the west and the south. The *New York Times* first presents a position that accuses of the *New York Times* of sponsoring the Janjaweed when it publishes a report by

Human Rights Watch (Sengupta, 2004c). The article cites a source that this paper has identified has authored one of the principal texts on understanding the conflict, Julie Flint, as one of the main researchers and writes the article from the perspective of aid workers and reports from the United Nations. While Flint is a legitimate source, the article offers no other balancing voice. This may have helped in creating a more nuanced view in the government's involvement with the Janjaweed. By choosing to include this report, the newspaper reproduces a discourse created by aid workers in the region, themselves not neutral actors in the conflict.

The Sudanese government is most often accused of sponsoring the Janjaweed and using them as a tool to oppress black African civilians (Sengupta, 2004h; Hoge, 2004h), and arming them (Hoge, 2004g; 2004i). Government troops are also routinely represented as joining militia in the fighting (Sengupta, 2004c), and using them paramilitary forces and in some instances the Janjaweed is described as wearing army fatigues (Sengupta, 2004g; 2004l; 2004t) of the Sudanese military, in some cases going as far as incorporating the Janjaweed into the police or military as government policy (Lacey, 2004l). The identifier "Janjaweed" is used almost interchangeably with "Arab" and "militia" and the term itself is referenced 176 times in the news articles alone, and the text search reveals that the term Janjaweed is often used within proximity of active phrases such as "raiding", "attacking" and committing acts of sexual violence (Appendix iii). Figure 3 shows an example of how often the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed are represented in the same context, with coding stripes often overlapping, illustrating a definite relationship between the two as the coding shows.



Figure 3: Coding density at Janjaweed

The coding density at Figure 1 also shows the complexity of the representation of the Sudanese government, as the al-Bashir regime is seen as allowing the Janjaweed and at the same time is expected to intervene. The call for the Sudanese government's intervention is based on the United Nations Security Council resolution that compelled the government to "reign in" in the Janjaweed (Lacey, 2004g; Sengupta, 2004e) and prosecute the members of the Janjaweed accused of committing atrocities. The government's efforts in doing this are recorded this, especially through their continued failure to control the Janjaweed (Hoge, 2004b; Lacey, 2004l).

The narrative around the Sudanese government often makes reference to the authorities unwillingness to let journalists travel on their own or allowing locals to speak to journalists or foreign diplomats without Sudanese authorities nearby (Lacey, 2004f; 2004l; Kristof, 2004j) with Sengupta (2004g) writing

Sudan's government has been reluctant to permit free access to journalists, and so it is impossible to assess the scope of the attacks or the exact extent of the government's involvement.

Still, the *New York Times* often has access to high-level Sudanese officials such as the ministers of humanitarian affairs, foreign affairs, social affairs and even agriculture. The government is certainly given agency and the opportunity to influence the discourse on a number of occasions however, with coverage illustrating an increasing hostility towards the United States, seen especially when Sudanese officials revert questions on Darfur by comparing American involvement in Iraq at the time (Sengupta, 2004h) and negative reaction to American efforts to intervene with Kristof (2004c) opining “The Sudanese government is testing us, but so far the State Department has shown a commendable willingness to stand up to it”. While this position is quite paternalistic, this would serve to turn American public opinion against the government, reinforcing the narrative remains one of a government failing to protect its own people, hostile to an American audience and one aiding the Janjaweed.

While the Sudanese government is allowed some agency, the representation of the Janjaweed rarely evolves and the coverage rarely refers to the Janjaweed as sources. But this raises the question on whether the Janjaweed should be given a voice at all as the discourse of this conflict argues that the Janjaweed is no doubt the primary perpetrator of this conflict and the text search shows they are often also characterised through adjectives such as “marauding”, “brutal” and “horror”. Still, as the identity of Arab and African is given to fluidity, by the admission of the *New York Times* itself (Lacey, 2004l), it would be effective to present a more nuanced representation of the Janjaweed as an actor and so would give clearer insight into just how to intervene in this conflict.

For the first few months of coverage, no real explanation is given of who or what the Janjaweed are, just that they are “Arab militia known as Janjaweed”. The Janjaweed are described as “tools of the government” (Lacey, 2004k) “unleashed” by the Sudanese government specifically (Lacey, 2004k; Lacey, 2004m) to stop dissent in the region. Lacey first explores the complexity of the Janjaweed in an August 5th article entitled “Sudanese Suffer as Militias Hide in Plain Sight” in 1prisoners accused of being Janjaweed who were actually petty criminals. The term itself means “devil on horseback with a gun” and Lacey (2004g) argues that the identity is a fluid one, which may mean outlaw, but within the context of the conflict means militiamen who were uniformed and armed by the Sudanese government as proxy fighters.

Due to the fact that the Janjaweed are allegedly allied to the government, Lacey also puts forward that it would be difficult to disarm and prosecute the Janjaweed, as called for by the United Nations. This view is echoed and further contextualised by Sengupta (2004l), who in a rare interview talks to Janjaweed leader, Musal Hilal who describes himself as a “military man” showing that the government’s complex relationship with the Janjaweed, where it has used the Janjaweed in the past as a force to suppress rebellion in the south, makes this very complicated. Showing the evolving narrative around the Janjaweed, Sengupta writes in October (2004l),

Therein lies a problem for the government, which has alternately denied its links to these fighters -- calling them janjaweed, or bandits who take advantage of the war -- and defended the existence of legitimate paramilitary forces to help guard Sudan against a rebellion.

In the same month the *New York Times* magazine publishes an in-depth 7340-word feature article by Scott Anderson, who is listed as having reported for the magazine from locations such as Libya, titled “How did Darfur happen?” Due to the length of the feature and the in-depth investigative nature of the article, the framing of the conflict is much more contextualised and the actors are given much more dynamism and Anderson is able to access high-level Sudanese sources such as the governor at the time, who was later dismissed. Anderson (2004) first dismisses the image that the region is dry and isolated and gives a particularly in-depth of description of ethnicity in the region, very similar to the one given by Flint and De Waal (2006) in the literature review of this paper. Anderson’s depiction of the Janjaweed is that of young men choosing to go to war as a patriotic duty, but who choose to ignore the atrocities they allegedly commit. He further characterises the government’s perceived involvement in the conflict, as one in which the government was simply overwhelmed and ill-equipped to deal with the paramilitary force it uses to quell violence, that this inaction was seen as complicit. Still, he does not completely dismiss the role of the government.

5.1.3. Representation Of The Victims

The victims of this conflict are invariably described as black Africans, with Africans referenced 241 times in news articles, 31 times in columns written by guest authors, 24 in columns by

Kristof and eleven times in editorials (The search was conducted within the references already coded as “African” and further made use of the Boolean indicator ‘not’ in order to exclude references to the African Union). The word tree shows that the descriptions of Africans are often as victims, and framed within in the context of ‘black’, this despite the fact that identity in the region is fluid and is not based on an American understanding of race and blackness. Instead, this identity is assigned simply by whether one person’s skin is physically darker than the other’s, which falsely situates the identity of Darfuri’s into a discourse that they did not participate in in order to create a representation that an American audience would understand.

The word tree further shows (Appendix iv) that Africans are often situated in locations such as villages, given what is an inaccurate view of the geographic make-up of the settlements and towns in the region. Africans are often interviewed from within camps for displaced peoples (Lacey, 2004l) and villagers are often described as fleeing to lonely shrubs for protection (Sengupta, 2004f; 2004g) and only later is the relative wealth of the African victims shown through cattle and their lives before the conflict are depicted as more dynamic and given more context. This reference to livestock as wealth is often given within the context of the attacks themselves as the Janjaweed targeted cattle herders and raided livestock as part of the ongoing ethnic tensions over resources in the area (Lacey, 2004a; Lacey, 2004l).

The victims are often used as sources to describe the conflict and reporters use their accounts to create a representation of the nature of the violence. The African victims often describe running from their homes as militia on horseback or the Janjaweed attacked their villages, burned their homes, brutally killed friends and relatives and poisoned wells with corpses of friends. A description of the victims is almost always in relation to a wound or scar that they bear. For example, “Some of them bear gunshot wounds to the ankle, a sign that their attackers tried to keep them from fleeing. Others are marked as violated women” (Sengupta, 2004t) and “The young man, with a bullet wound in his left hip, traveled three days to reach a doctor” (Sengupta and Lacey, 2004a). Lacey (2004b) makes reference to the villagers wounds as a reason for them to refuse government orders to return to their villages,

They have the wounds to prove that Darfur remains deadly, no matter what the government says. Some of their wounds are fresh, so fresh that they plan to flout the governor's order.

Even when these displaced people have some agency, they are still framed within the narrative of the hapless victims of the conflict that has targeted them simply because of their ethnicity or race. While the trauma of the victims of this conflict is by no means refuted by this research project, it is important to note that these sources are rarely asked to give their opinions on why they may be targeted or what is at the root cause of the conflict. Instead they are either individual victims or masses of displaced people facing twin humanitarian disasters of famine and disease.

Only much later in this sample of the coverage does the representation of Africans begin to evolve, with the introduction of the rebels as actors. At first, the rebels were represented within the conflict of the north-south civil war and were quoted as saying that black Africans in the Darfur region were marginalised, but just who the rebels were and what they represented was not quite clear (Lacey, 2004g; 2004j). The African rebels are briefly discussed within the representation of the Janjaweed militia, as Lacey (2004l) describes the rebels of further muddying the identification of the militia, as they too rode on horseback or camels and have pretended to be Janjaweed in a smear campaign against the Khartoum government.

Sengupta (2004m) introduces the rebels as actors within the context of the African Union mediated peace talks in Abuja, in which the rebels and Sudanese government exchange insults until the talks break down. In this representation the rebels are not only given a seat at the table but they are also given agency as their role in the conflict begins to be explored. As violence reignites in the area in November and December, the rebels are now accused of carrying out raids on government targets such as police, and villages that were seen as loyal to the Khartoum government (Sengupta, 2004s). These attacks, however, were not described in terms of ethnicity. As an earlier discussion on the discourse of the Darfur conflict showed, the Janjaweed and Arabs were invariably presented as perpetrators of violence and a more balanced representation of the Darfuri rebel groups became a marginalised discourse.

Still some authors, especially those in the column sources of the sample, write about the rebels from the point of departure that they are the victims in this conflict. Even after the rebel-lead attacks in Darfur, Kristof (2004j) defends the rebels, writing, “The rebels have also killed and robbed civilians, but not nearly as often as the Sudanese government.” In an earlier guest column, Prendergast (2004) uses the rebels as a source as they take him on a tour of what he calls the “Darfur killing fields”, where they rebels take him to mass graves, where piles of bodies have purposely not been buried as evidence of the Khartoum government’s atrocities in the area. One may now question how many times the African sources in the news articles were in fact rebels using the media to put forward a particular narrative, especially since the media rarely made a distinction between civilians and fighters among Africans in the first few months of coverage? Still, despite this apparent sympathy towards the rebels, the rebels are often criticised as failing to articulate their position.

5.2. Depicting The Conflict As Genocide And The Responsibility To Protect and the United States as rescuer

The discourse of Darfur as the first genocide of the 21st century informs much of how the conflict was represented and how its actors were depicted. Even though no finite description was given, the description of the conflict as genocide was no doubt the dominant narrative of the conflict during this sample, even though this did not go uncontested. There were a total of 164 references made to genocide across all sources, but the description of genocide was not uniform. In the beginning, the conflict is described as genocide, with the descriptions often attributed to aid workers, United Nations officials and American diplomats (Lacey, 2004k; 2004l; Hoge, 2004f). The discussion on genocide begins as the Bush Administration considers toughening its policy towards Sudan, within the context of the violence in Darfur challenging the north-south peace process which the United States has been mediating (Lacey, 2004e).

From here on, the debate on genocide in Darfur is essentially lead by the United States and the description of the conflict as genocide is attributed to American actors. An analysis of the coding shows that references of genocide are often relation to the United States, which is referenced 42 times in direct relation to the representation of genocide, more than any other actor. Descriptions begin in which the American government is studying whether the conflict should be named

genocide, for example “The Bush administration is currently studying whether the onslaught should be branded a ‘genocide’...” (Marquis, 2004a; 2004b;). While the *New York Times* is an American newspaper and therefore has an obligation to report on the actions of its government’s foreign policy, the newspaper does not wholly regurgitate the discourse on genocide and instead fulfils its role in ventilating the debate on whether the conflict should in fact be described as genocide.

Lacey (2004j) acknowledges the atrocities in the region but openly questions whether in fact the conflict should be seen as genocide, acknowledging the fluidity of the identities in the region. The debate is located in the United States when Kugel interviews ordinary Sudanese in the diaspora, described as Arab and African in the article, and who describe the conflict as civil unrest and genocide, respectively. When the US Congress labels the conflict genocide and calls for action (Hoge, 2004g; 2004h; Sengupta, 2004d), news articles do not follow suit but columns and editorials, less constrained by objectivity, make clear their position that the violence should be categorised as genocide.

Early in the sample, Kristof states his cause through the headline of his articles, namely “Magboula’s Brush With Genocide” (Kristof 2004a) and “Dithering as Others Die” (Kristof 2004b). In these sampled articles, Kristof profiles the people he considers as victims of genocide. Judging from the title of his columns, Kristof is not engaging in the debate on whether this is in fact a genocide, rather he is categorically stating that not only is the conflict in Darfur a genocide, but that it is also the moral imperative of the United States government and citizens to intervene. Kristof reports from ‘Along the Sudan-Chad border’ in the column “Magboula’s Brush With Genocide” (Kristof 2004a), profiling some of the “1.2 million people left homeless by the genocide in Darfur.” The columnist briefly describes the heart-wrenching stories of his subjects who are identified as members of the Zaghawa tribe; for example orphaned 4-year-old Nijah Ahmed who is forced to carry her 13-month-old brother to safety, and 16-year-old Haiga Ibrahim who carried her crippled mother to safety. Kristof also recounts the stories of women who were raped by “Janjaweed raiders.” These personal accounts not only serve to create sympathy and an emotional response, they also serve to create empathy, making the individuals more personable to an American audience rather than the faceless victim of yet another African

crisis.

Kristof is the only author in this sample to incite citizen action as a form of intervention. Portraying the conflict as genocide contributes to the idea that intervention is not necessarily a political solution to the conflict but rather that it is a moral imperative to end human suffering and is in line with the *New York Times* assuming its role as non-state actor in a conflict situation by bearing witness as a moral imperative and feeding into the debate on the crisis the question, ‘What is to be done?’. Kristof writes a series of emotive columns on the subject of Darfur with the principle message that it is the moral obligation of the American government and its citizens to act on Darfur.

The columnist seems convinced that action in Darfur will be mobilised by ordinary citizens lobbying their political representatives. In his column ‘Dithering while others die’ he writes, “What can ordinary Americans do? Yell! Mr Bush and John Kerry have been passive about Darfur because voters are” (Kristof 2004b). His column “Dithering as others die” is written an ironic celebration that Americans are now paying attention to the conflict, but argues that this is still not enough. Kristof argues that “publicity” surrounding the conflict has already forced the government, who is “exterminating minorities” enough “embarrassment” to agree to a ceasefire, adding that further “publicity” may even force Sudan to disband the Janjaweed.

Giving an extremely over-simplified account of American national interest in Africa, Kristof further argues that Americans should care about the conflict because it serves to destabilise the regions, specifically Chad “which is an increasing source of oil for us [the United States]” (Kristof 2004b). Further, the collapse of Sudan will result in the sort of chaos which would be an ideal breeding ground for terrorism in the Sahel region as well for diseases such as Ebola and Polio. All of this is explained in a single sentence, almost serving to conflate the issues, giving little depth or explanation of American national interest (Kristof 2004). This short description also perpetuates the dominant media image of Africa as a place of mineral wealth, but ridden with disease, poverty and corrupt governments while failing to provide any legitimate context of the political, historical and humanitarian context of the Darfur conflict.

Even though the news articles of the newspaper do not take a single position, the *New York Times* editorial page immediately states its position in line with the discourse based on the Rwandan genocide. As the Darfur conflict first enters the news agenda, the editorial describes it as a test on whether the United States government and the world have learned from their “failure to stop the Rwandan genocide” a decade earlier (*New York Times*, 2004a). When the Bush Administration commits to studying whether the conflict is in fact genocide, the *New York Times* argues that this “...misses the point...” in the face of an ever rising death toll (*New York Times*, 2004b) and criticises the United Nations Security Council’s inability to set state interest aside in order to stop what “...increasingly looks at genocide.” (*New York Times*, 2004c) and dismisses a study that shows a decrease of conflict in the world in the face of “...war in Iraq, genocide in Sudan...(New York Times, 2004f).

Editorial sources also purposely use loaded terms to describe the conflict, such as “government-run concentration camps” (*New York Times*, 2004a), and Dallaire’s description that intervention should be tailored to the needs of Darfur, but still contextualises within a reproduced discourse of genocide, writing “The horrors in the Darfur region of Sudan are not ‘like’ Rwanda, any more than those in Rwanda were ‘like’ those ordered by Hitler” (Dallaire, 2004). The role of discursive memory is often played upon in the discourse that describes Darfur as genocide, with Kristof criticising inaction from the international community by drawing parallels to the Jewish Holocaust and Adolf Hitler’s ability to commit genocide without notice from the international community at the time, writing “hence the question attributed to Hitler, ‘Who today remembers the Armenian extermination?’” (Kristof, 2004g).

Traub (2004) draws on a historically closer genocide, arguing that Darfur should be compared to Kosovo rather than Rwanda due to the nature of ethnic cleansing. Traub places the description of the conflict as “the Cossack-like ethnic Arab marauders that the Sudanese government unleashed in order to crush a rebellion in Darfur”, comparing the Al-Bashir regime to that of Slobodan Milosevic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing, in order to maintain the political power of particular elite. It is important to note that the sample makes use of ethnic cleansing on a number of occasions, rather than the use of the term genocide. The reference is used 30 times throughout the sources, but no reason is given for this and instead this paper argues that the distinction was

not made, but rather that it was used interchangeably or perhaps to avoid the implications of genocide as per the Genocide Convention.

While the debate continued to be ventilated in the opinion section of the newspaper content analysis allowed this research paper to identify a pattern that emerged in the news section that created an alternative view of the conflict. After August in which the United States and United Nations said they would launch an investigation into whether the violence constituted genocide – findings that were yet to be published by the end of 2004 – news articles began to adopt a standard description of the violence that was written in various ways but still maintained a particular meaning:

Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed and equipped by the Sudanese government, are accused of killing as many as 50,000 darker skinned Africans, raping women and girls, destroying crops and poisoning water supplies in a campaign that the United States Congress has called genocide and that United Nations officials say constitutes ethnic cleansing. An estimated 1.2 million people have been forced from their land.

Within the political discourse of the presidential elections taking place at the end of 2004, the call to identify Darfur's conflict as genocide is increasingly influenced if not created by the political campaigns of Democrat candidate John Kerry and incumbent candidate, George Bush. While the Bush Administration defers to a study, Kerry calls on the administration to be more assertive in influencing the United Nations to intervene in the conflict as genocide (Hoge, 2004b) and again in a presidential debate in September, Kerry announces that he would send American troops to Darfur to stop the conflict (Nagourney, 2004). The presidential debate on the issue further serves to increase public awareness on Darfur on the international news agenda, but this does not mean the conflict is contextualised. Instead, it is written about as a possible foreign policy.

The Bush Administration does in fact call the conflict genocide after congress passes a bill that recognises the conflict as genocide and Powell makes a number of references to the conflict as genocide. However, within the context of intervention, it is interesting to note the shift in language. While the description of genocide is often attributed to United States officials early on

in the representation of the conflict, an abrupt change occurs and it is no longer government policy to expressly refer to the conflict as genocide, with an unnamed state department official giving this response when asked about the possibility of American intervention:

"It's a classic coalition-building problem," said a State Department official. "We're the ones with the biggest sense of urgency, because as many 300,000 people can die if we don't get this moving. What worries me is that we may not have enough time." (Weisman, 2004)

This is also around the time in which the United States is seen to increase its efforts on the United Nations Security Council to create a unified intervention effort in the Darfur conflict. This is the same time at which Powell is called to testify in front of a senate committee after his visit to Darfur on whether the Darfur conflict was in fact genocide. Powell's testimony concluded that genocide had in fact taken place but the only action the United States Congress takes after this testimony is to write a strongly worded letter urging Bush to encourage international intervention (Weisman & Hoge, 2004b). This could be because the United States was already involved in a war on two fronts, in Afghanistan and Iraq at the time, and did not have the appetite nor the resources for involvement in another conflict.

Unfortunately neither the news articles nor the opinion section of the *New York Times* sampled in this study give any further attention to this debate. What we can see from this sample though, is that while the United States was often mentioned in reference to genocide early on in this conflict, as figure 4 shows, by the end of the year, direct reference to the United States was minimal, illustrated by the decreased coding density at figure 5.




Figure 4: High coding density for the United States in reference to genocide




Figure 5: Coding stripes taken from November and December in the sample

Interestingly, despite the emphasis on whether or not the Darfur conflict could be seen as genocide, only five references are made to the role of the policy of the responsibility to protect. These references are only found in the opinion section, in which a *New York Times* editorial

(2004a) and Kristof (2004a), briefly discuss it as the conflict becomes part of the news cycle but never again in this sample. It is a pity that the media as a non-state actor is unable to illustrate the connection between how it describes a conflict and the appropriate policy repercussions this would require and this seems like a missed opportunity to communicate an important aspect of the response to genocide since it played such a fundamental role in creating and reproducing the discourse of Darfur as genocide to the public and policy makers. This is also despite the fact 24 references are made to war crimes. However, while the atrocities the *New York Times* refers to may be classified as war crimes, and the paper even used the exact phrase (Sengupta, 2004c; 2004j; Lacely 2004l; Halbfinger et al, 2004), just what the policy implications of these crimes are is not discussed and it is instead used to generally describe the atrocities committed by the Janjaweed.

Similarly, alternative discussions on the cause and description of the conflict are hardly represented and even less so investigated. Fourteen references are made to alternative sources of conflict and these include a description of the conflict as a “scorched earth policy” (Sengupta, 2004s; Halbfinger et al, 2004) and “rebel insurrection” (Sengupta 2004h; 2004j; Associated Press, 2004). Both of these descriptions, however, are not further investigated and are instead couched within the representation of ethnicity.

5.3. Darfur As A Humanitarian Disaster and The United Nations as Intervention Actor

Throughout the time that Darfur is represented as a humanitarian crisis in 76 references. The representation of the humanitarian disaster is located within the descriptions of the refugee camps, where famine and disease are the mean causes of death. As the word tree shows, aid agencies are often used the source of the representation and are allowed agency while the victims are described as dead, dying or waiting in huddled masses for help from the aid agencies. This echoes the findings of the portrayal of the victims of the conflict and demonstrates that when unchallenged, discourses simply reinforce dominant ideas rather than seeking innovative solutions.

Within the representation of Darfur as a humanitarian conflict, the Sudanese government is again depicted as a hindrance. For example, the Sudanese government is accused of rounding up

displaced peoples in order to protect its own image on the visit of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Lacey, 2004f; 2004m) and the governments attempts to block aid through a convoluted bureaucratic system (Lacey, 2004A and 2004f; Hoge, 2004c; Sengupta, 2004r; Sengupta and Lacey, 2004a).

This is also where the role of the United Nations is emphasised, with the organisation being the principal source for describing the conflict as a humanitarian crisis rather than genocide. The depiction of Annan specifically is most often in reference to the Rwandan genocide, describing him as haunted by global inaction in Rwanda, during which time he was Secretary General of the United Nations. Statements by Annan show an urgency for the Security Council to act in line with genocide prevention protocol, with a news report claiming that Annan interrupted Council deliberations:

Mr. Annan noted that it was the first time that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide had been invoked and that he found it "inconceivable" that the Council would not respond.

(Hoge, 2004l)

While Annan is shown as urging the international community to act and appointing a committee that will consider whether the conflict constitutes genocide (Sengupta, 2004j), his power remains within Security Council and ultimately references to him decrease as the United Nations fails to decide whether the conflict is in fact genocide by the end of the conflict. This demonstrates the United Nations' inability to take decisive action, yet at this point the newspaper does not interrogate the role of the United Nations and the organisation is still seen as the only intergovernmental actor for intervention. Yet at the same time a more favourable depiction of the African Union begins to develop. It is at the point where the discourse on intervention begins to shift to the African Union with United Nations officials now focusing on increasing the African Union force already on the ground (Sengupta, 2004i). African Union officials are increasingly used as sources (Sengupta, 2004l; 2004m; 2004t, Reuters 2004e) and the description of the force as weak, changes to increasingly the only source of conflict prevention in the area.

6. Discussion

The media often becomes the first source of information for the public and policy makers on a given conflict or humanitarian crisis and given the international order's tendency to react collectively to a crisis in a sovereign state, whether it is through dialogue or military intervention, it is essential that this information is presented accurately and fairly. And while the public may not intervene directly, public opinion can in certain instances influence the manner in which state and international actors react to a crisis. As the producer of this information, the media is itself an actor in this conflict.

But the media is not simply representing objective facts and details, even within the context of news. As this paper has argued, by choosing which conflicts to focus on or ignore, how these chosen topics are described and how the role of traditional actors is depicted and encouraged, the media creates a discourse within the international relations arena. As a non-traditional, non-state actor, the media also has the power to challenge accepted norms of interaction and intervention, especially since it has the opportunity to interact with those directly affected by the conflict. In this way, the media finds itself within a historic discourse, acting as an agent that is able to create, reproduce and challenge hegemonic discourse and one that is itself subjected to the power of dominant discourse as it functions within a social system. The media does not simply produce and disseminate information, but rather it functions within a contested space itself and should be open to scrutiny and analysis as a non-state actor.

Using the *New York Times* newspaper's coverage of the Darfur conflict, this research paper has attempted to scrutinise that very function of the media as a non-state actor functioning in a contested space. Using a sample from the first time the newspaper and its staff had to make sense of the conflict and create of the events that surrounded it, this research paper has attempted to show how this meaning was created and how it did, and did not, evolve. First, in creating meaning, the *New York Times* often made use a established sources such as government and United Nations officials, a critique that would place its coverage within the propaganda model of media creation. When the paper did make use of alternative sources, such as the rebels or the victims, both from so-called Arab and African groups, it often made use of existing tropes that

weakened the agency of these groups – in the case of African victims almost completely stripping them of their agency and ignoring the role of African rebels in creating conflict.

In this way, the media exercised power by giving legitimacy to some sources over others and at the same time, the media submitted to power by recreating existing representations of actors in a conflict. Cultural studies has attempted to challenge the hegemonic view of marginalised ethnicities and in the realm of international relations, and in this paper the framing of the Sudanese actors of this conflict as well as the African Union positioned them as marginalised groups. The perpetrators and victims were framed within existing tropes, cast as the villains or victims of this conflict, giving very little nuance to these actors. Further, this failed to place the actors within a regional context or give insight into how these identities were formed, despite the fact that ethnic identity was the most common portrayal as the cause of the conflict, thereby robbing the actors of agency. Unfortunately, the *New York Times* coverage rarely challenged the dominant narrative of the west as saviour and Africa as the victim, going so far as it use its role in society to lobby for American and international intervention while also ignoring the ongoing efforts of the African Union.

The *New York Times* coverage of the Darfur conflict found itself within another dominating discourse, that of the War on Terror. The decision to portray Arabs as the perpetrators with little nuance and to literally scold the Arab League for inaction is typical of this discourse, as was the emphasis on the religion of the actors and the incredulity with which the idea that Muslims were fighting Muslims. Despite this framing, the coverage rarely interrogated the Darfur's conflicts links to the War on Terror and often justified American intervention in Sudan as part of stabilising a region that was a possible training ground for al Qaeda militants, giving little evidence or further explanation. Further, the newspaper rarely questioned the role of the United States in the country and its national interest within the framework of the ongoing War on Terror and simply shifted focus from America's success in negotiating the north-south conflict to its call for intervention in the Darfur conflict, with little context. Instead coverage chose to frame American intervention in the region within one of morality against the backdrop of the discourse of genocide and the international community's failure to intervene a decade earlier in the Rwandan genocide.

This discourse of intervening out of moral obligation in what was potentially genocide served to overshadow that of national interest and unfortunately went unchallenged by the newspaper. Depicting intervention in the conflict as a moral obligation – with very little real reference to the principle of the Right to Protect – meant that scrutiny of national policy was undermined because. The media chose instead to reproduce discourse based on memory, invoking previous genocides such as the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, Kosovo and Rwanda. This was a missed opportunity to scrutinise the role of the international community in African conflict, relying instead on discursive memory rather than creating or contributing to an alternate discourse. The imagery of these conflicts firmly placed the conflict within the atrocities faced in these wars, with little room for scrutiny of policy or narrative.

This was also a missed opportunity to question the messages created by sources such as government officials. The media regurgitated the description of genocide, attributing it to officials so as not to ultimately get it wrong as the matter was still up for discussion, and failed to highlight or question when that message suddenly changed in August of 2004. Was this due to the ongoing election race in the United States, growing opposition to the War in Iraq within the United States or perhaps due to further interrogation on the part of journalists themselves? And what of the increasingly delayed response by the United Nations, which could have been used as an opportunity to critique bureaucratic intervention processes? Instead, the coverage easily shifts focus onto the African Union as intervention force and leave as the debate on genocide hanging in the air as a barely challenged discourse, in line with the policy of the officials.

As an agenda setter, the media is able to play a role in influencing public opinion and it the media is certainly aware of this role, as calls for public action showed. But this researcher believes that public action is not enough, for otherwise the media would be an information brochure and not a non-state actor in conflict. Instead, the media's power should be demonstrated in challenging the status quo by defying dominant discourse and instead creating new representations, which leads to a richer public discourse on global conflict.

7. Conclusion

This paper has discussed the role of the media as a non-state actor in international conflict through the analysis of the *New York Times*' coverage of the Darfur conflict as a case study. It has undertaken this study on the basis that the media is a non-state actor and attempted to show the role of the media within the international relations arena, specifically within the framework of critical international relations theory. Using discourse analysis and discussing power and representation through language, it has linked international relations theory with that of media theory to show how the media is situated within discourse, where it creates and recreates historical representation. Then in order to situate the discourse on the Darfur conflict, this paper has discussed the conflict in the literature review.

Against this backdrop it undertook content analysis using computer-assisted methodology, which identified a particular pattern that set the foundation for discourse analysis. The representations created by the media were then discussed through a method of framing, in order to show how description and context reinforce meaning, whether new or existing meaning. Finally, the analysis and discussion on its findings, the paper acknowledges that the media played an important role in creating public awareness and ventilating debate on the topic, but it rarely questioned the discourse within which that debate took place. This paper suggests that through a more nuanced description of the Darfur conflict and subsequent intervention and more interrogation of the accepted narrative, the media could have created a richer contribution to the existing discourse on the Darfur conflict specifically and conflict in general.

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8.3. Appendix

Appendix i: Statistical results of content analysis, as originally produced by the Nvivo project.

Appendix ii: Word tree depicting the linguistic associations of the word 'arab'.

Appendix iii: Word tree depicting the linguistic associations of the word 'janjaweed'.


Appendix iv: Word tree depicting the linguistic associations of the word 'african'.

Name	Memo Link	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By
Cause of conflict		4	390	2014/09/15, 10:14 PM	L E C	2014/09/18, 3:10 PM	L E C
Alternative Descriptions of conflict		3	14	2014/09/20, 1:10 AM	L E C	2014/09/23, 4:51 AM	L E C
Ethnicity		4	296	2014/09/15, 10:15 PM	L E C	2014/09/23, 4:41 AM	L E C
African		4	81	2014/09/15, 10:16 PM	L E C	2014/09/23, 5:31 AM	L E C
Rebel		2	17	2014/09/20, 2:11 AM	L E C	2014/09/21, 10:38 PM	L E C
Arab		4	168	2014/09/15, 10:15 PM	L E C	2014/09/23, 5:31 AM	L E C
Janjaweed		4	121	2014/09/15, 10:17 PM	L E C	2014/09/23, 6:13 AM	L E C
Inevitability		1	4	2014/09/23, 4:33 AM	L E C	2014/09/23, 5:37 AM	L E C
Militia		1	3	2014/09/18, 3:09 PM	L E C	2014/09/18, 11:49 PM	L E C
Regional or historical conflict		4	73	2014/09/15, 10:32 PM	L E C	2014/09/23, 5:44 AM	L E C
Genocide		4	164	2014/09/15, 10:25 PM	L E C	2014/09/23, 6:17 AM	L E C
Ethnic cleansing		3	23	2014/09/15, 10:28 PM	L E C	2014/09/23, 4:47 AM	L E C
Rwanda		4	30	2014/09/15,	L E C	2014/09/23,	L E C

				10:52 PM		6:24 AM	
War Crimes or Crimes Against Humanity		4	24	2014/09/15, 10:58 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 4:55 AM	LE C
Humanitarian Disaster		4	76	2014/09/15, 10:29 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:17 AM	LE C
Intervention		4	614	2014/09/15, 10:19 PM	LE C	2014/09/15, 11:39 PM	LE C
African Union		4	70	2014/09/15, 10:22 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:20 AM	LE C
Rebels		3	59	2014/09/18, 11:40 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:24 AM	LE C
Sudanese Government		4	165	2014/09/18, 12:08 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:19 AM	LE C
Ought		2	3	2014/09/21, 3:59 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:27 AM	LE C
United Nations		4	138	2014/09/15, 10:21 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:03 AM	LE C
Ought		3	9	2014/09/21, 3:58 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:27 AM	LE C
United States		4	181	2014/09/15, 10:23 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:32 AM	LE C
Ought		3	20	2014/09/21, 3:51 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:29 AM	LE C
Reaction of the international community		4	101	2014/09/15, 11:14 PM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:33 AM	LE C
Citizen reaction		3	20	2014/09/21, 9:39 AM	LE C	2014/09/23, 6:28 AM	LE C

Responsibility to protect		2	5	2014/09/21, 3:43 PM	L E C	2014/09/23, 5:15 AM	L E C
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janjaweed



arab

it , our people
called the Janjaweed
of the Sudanese government
time ." In Darfur
and Pakistan abstaining
Mr . Idris said
region of Sudan
would not respond
2003 by unleashing
accused of backing
African tribes
in Sudan
forces and
troops
and its
and their
disarm the
the government's
A . Rahman
Beni Hussein
tribes ,
up against
led by
waged
consider himself
elder in
grandmother was
shepherd from
the other .
who is
European , African
government forces
and
and arming private
and concluded that
and the United
and their proxy
ground in
Tama , still
the Dorok ,
another
assailants and 18
attacks by largely
bare an unspoken
and water
attack . Tension
Clear Difference
deep divide
in Darfur
between
Black Sudanese fleeing
bring to justice
but understood why
African villagers
ground
survived
the
where
attacks
by
been displaced
in Darfur
recent months
their homes
their villages
troops supported
were detained
campaign
displaced
by marauding
by the northern
conflict has pitted
court sentenced 10
disarm and prosecute
either African or
First , in pitting
been hiding
little protection
from
government of arming
government of joining
government of supporting
Hillal , a notorious
has rallied
misconceptions of
his
is a Sudanese
First
large
it was
diversity , specifically
to enlist
its
mix of both
by the
calamity , where
mostly
movement by allowing
new recruit , a
and powerful
conflict
tensions
between
centuries - old
on them ,
nomadic
and burn
been
militia
attacking
attacks on
government against
non -
one million
rebellion by
villages of
week , and
18 Sudanese
loose bands
made up
of
the banner
the hands
of Sudan's many
on Wednesday said
pitting the country's
for
notorious
of
the
where
pro - government
racial by recruiting
retaliated by equipping
soldiers had joined
struck back , deploying
Sudan , May 23
draft accord
officials say
divide
between
Sudan's
February
on Sunday
police arrived
intended effect
international sanctions
marginalized west
bombs
place
But
about disarming
2003 ,
report
accusing
military
and
Sudan
and protecting
2003
region
between
raids
by
slighted
community , enraged
disarm until
estimates that
February , accuse
has accused
has issued
has pitted
the
allies
discontent
ferocity
rein
in
all
center
grievances
of
hands
leader
members
of backing
rebellion against
spokesman for
Sudan , pitting
territorial integrity . "
That is
The result ?
to disarm
to topple
affiliated
allying
forces
lies
soldier
working
with
would antagonize
the combatants , either
the government - equipped
the government encouraged
The militias are
the most powerful
their attackers as
to rein in
violence has involved
who belong to
who has absorbed
be ethnic , "
must contend
with
their struggles

but at no
her grandfather was
African
fault line
rivalry has
unity , led
dominated government
against
and
in
is
country ." If
led
government
against
and
as
cracked
in
of
to
Sudanese government
." We are not
African
farmers . Sudan's
groups . The
refugees are
BYLINE :
African
ethnic
leaders
and
black African
Islamic culture .
the villagers
who is
animal herders and
bodies lay bashed
cattle herders and
communities
allied with
throughout Darfur .
countries to avert
countrymen
Mr . Osman
Rebels and
deserts of North
elite , has ignored
Emirates , and to
farmers after two
fighters
It was
Then the
one encounters
government . The officials
government's insistence on
group , have
been
not
have all practiced
hegemony . " The government
herders
against black
who have
Islamist government of
Janjaweed
militia lays
militias armed
League
Amr Moussa ,
asked , " How
has angrily
rallied around
to
challenge
persuade
men on horseback ,
militia
known as
attacks . " I
blamed for
operating in
militiamen
She is
Some were
attacked their
had recently
in a
killed at
on horseback ,
to amputation
whom they
backed by
called Janjaweed ,
full of
known as
or " janjaweed , "
the Janjaweed
which
are
have
One woman
Some 1.6
The United
War broke
accused of
across the
affiliated with
against
black
the
and
government
has
engaging
hiding
are
by
armed
with
as a
attacking black
backed by
based nearby
called janjaweed .
earlier this
equipped by
for several
have
been
continued
destroyed
systematically
in
attacks
Darfur
the
known as
loyal to
on the
operating in
sought refuge . (
supported by
that
have
many
there have
to
attack
kill
root
trek across
with tacit
working , at
nomads
against black
and
herders
local
or African . But
origin last week ,
passengers were taken
people in Darfur .
pro - government militias
sheik spoke first ,
slave trade . In
soldiers and militia
teenager who was
tribal
leader whom
militia on
tribe
accused of
could be
just south
tribe's vast network
tribes
to defend
But today
Since early
They are
and
African
their
had friction
in Darfur
tribesmen
and the
whom the
villagers
" Numerous credible
in the
villages . Mr . Blair
voice in the
who
covers New
has loyalties
with loyalties to
workers and shoppers
world
which already
-- not least ,
and permitted
over Iraq ,

