

https://dspace.org/

Improvement of Nigeria’s Security Sector Governance to effectively control terrorism

Ossai, Vincent

2022

https://hdl.handle.net/10539/40966

Ossai, Vincent. (2022). Improvement of Nigeria’s Security Sector Governance to effectively control terrorism [PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg]. WireDSpace.

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

University of the Witwatersrand

School of Governance

Improvement of Nigeria's Security Sector Governance to effectively control terrorism

By

Vincent Ossai

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Submitted for re-examination

ABSTRACT

This research explored the means of enhancing Nigeria's security sector governance to effectively counter the threats of terrorism and its facilitation by terrorism financing. For this purpose, the subsisting status of the necessary requirements that can strengthen the sector was assessed. These requirements are those advocated in the traditional Security Sector Reform paradigm and in the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform. There are several of these but the ones concentrated on are: civil democratic oversight, human rights and good governance as well as its derivates including the country's anti-corruption profile especially with relevance to the required transparency and accountability of the sector. Access to gainful employment as a means of poverty alleviation and to help reduce involvement in terrorism was equally assessed. The data for this purpose were sourced from relevant documents and the submissions of purposefully sampled experts.

The result of the assessment showed that the subsisting quality of the above requirements, are deficient in terms of their efficacy to boost Nigeria's security sector governance to effectively counter terrorism. This therefore, necessitated the following improvements; namely: development and application of better strategies to mitigate this crime and its illicit financial supports; strengthening the capacity of the sector through improved human resources, budgetary and equipment supports; better intelligence management; improvement of policy and legal supports; improvement in the collaboration of constituent institutions in the sector as well as complementary international cooperation supports.

Others are: strengthening of the various oversight institutions and the proficiency of their functionaries as well as improvement of human rights standard of the sector through enforcement of civilized and ethical conducts of security operatives and complemented with sanctions for breaches. Further improvements revolved around provision of good governance including enhancement of Nigeria's anti-corruption profile including the required transparency and accountability standard, entrenchment of professional responsibility etiquette and effective administration of sanction schemes. Further improvements include: provision of gainful employment opportunities through requisite skills and entrepreneurship development programmes as well as provision of supports to the private sector and investment in public infrastructure.

Consequent upon the foregoing, it is expected that when the above improvement measures are undertaken and proficiently applied, that they can help to strengthen the capacity of Nigeria's security sector governance to more effectively control terrorism in the country.

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of security in the School of Governance in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

_____

Vincent Ossai

June 2020

DEDICATION

To the glory of ALMIGHTY GOD, this research is dedicated to my father, Mr Benson Ossai Ezeogbua (late). He paid the supreme price for the Security of Nigeria and to my lovely wife and children, who always resonate the grace of God in my life.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the glory of God Almighty, this research was successfully completed, through the contributions of the under listed persons. I am indeed very grateful to them. These are: Prof. Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, my very cherished supervisor who saw me through this project with such priceless intellectual guidance and commitment as well as Prof. Gavin Cawthra, Dr. Horacio Zandamela and Dr. Kambidima Wortela for their vital directions and guidance.

My revered selfless brother Oliver Ossai who not only laid the foundation but set the stage of my educational career and Barrister Geoffrey Oputa for his priceless supports that not only spurred the commencement but the successful completion of this project; Mr Innocent Mmuoh for his unique care and counsels as well as Mr. Isaac Isiguzo for his subtle heart-warming encouragements, yet unassuming, Ms. Perpetual Nwosu for her exemplary dedication and invaluable assistance as well as late Rev. Frank Onuzo from whom I benefitted the unique resilience that aided me throughout the process of this project. I am also grateful to Mr Chidi Agbapu, Mr. A.B. Okauru, Mr. Remi Adewumi and Mr. Thomas Oputa who consistently challenged me to undertake this project and rekindled in me that rare optimism for success.

Mr. F. Oyakhilome and Mr. O.O Onovo, who both will ever remain my inspiration and respectively laid and sustained the foundation of my law enforcement career as well as Dr. ABC Ojiakor, Mr. George Williams, Mr. Olugbenga Tiyamiyu, Mr. Charles Ahize and Mrs Nkiru Lawal. These rare gems have always been there for me and positively demonstrated same all through the period of this project.

Others are: Dr. Joseph Dada, Dr. Iyabo Ogunniran, Dr. Sola Banigo, Dr. Ifeoma Chinedu, Dr. Y. Ayandele, Mrs. Lara Ojeah and Mr. Tunji Oba for their prayers, fantastic counsels and encouragements. The assistance and valuable guidance by the following are also well appreciated. These are: Dr. Anthony Ohanyere, Ms. Phindile Mohanoe, Dr. Lawrence Opara, Onyeka Okpor, Felicia Ikegbuna, Dr. Irene Osemeka, Michael Gbogboade, Chiedozie Nwosu, Isioma Obi, Catherine Churchill, Zibusiso Manzini - Moyo, Nasreen Abdalla and Mbali Nxumalo.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACHPR	AFRICA CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHT
ACJA	ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
ACOTA	AFRICA CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE
ACSS	AFRICAN CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
AFRICOM	U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
AI	AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
AU	AFRICAN UNION
AUFSSR	AFRICAN UNION POLICY FRAMEWORK ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
CACOL	COALITION AGAINST CORRPT LEADERS
CCB	CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU
CISLAC	CIVIL SOCIETY LEGISLATIVE AND ADVOCACY CENTER
CLO	CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANISATION
CLEEN	CENTRE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT EDUCATION
CSO	CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS
CTD	COUNTER TERRORISM DEPARTMENT
CTITF	COUNTER TERRORISM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE
CVE	COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
DIA	DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DSSS	DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY SERVICE
ECOWAS	ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
EFCC	ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION
EU	EUROPEAN UNION
FATF	FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
GEM	GLOBAL EDUCATION MONITORING
GIABA	INTER-GOVERNMENT ACTION GROUP AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING IN WEST AFRICA
GTI	GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX
G7 COUNTRIES	CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, JAPAN, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATE OF AMERICA.

HDR	HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
HURIWA	HUMAN RIGHTS WRITERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA
ICPC	INDEPENDENT CORRUPT PRACTICES COMMISSION
IMF	INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
IPOB	INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF BIAFRA
JIAB	JOINT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS BUREAU
LEDAP	THE LEGAL DEFENCE AND ASSISTANCE PROJECT
KD	KAIAMA DECLARATION
MASSOB	MOVEMENT FOR THE ACTUALISATION OF THE SOVERIGN STATE OF BIAFRA
MEND	MOVEMENT FOR THE EMANICIPATION OF THE NIGER DELTA
MOU	MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING
MOSOP	MOVEMENT OF THE SURVIVAL OF OGONI PEOPLE
MSP	MINISTERIAL STRATEGIC PLAN
NACTEST	NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY
NBS	NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS
NCS	NIGERIA CUSTOMS SERVICE
NDIC	NIGERIA DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
NDLEA	NATIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
NDVF	NIGERDELTA VOLUNTEER FORCE
NEITI	NIGERIAN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
NEMA	NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
NEPN	NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY OF NIGERIA
NFIU	NIGERIA'S FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT
NGOs	NIN-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
NIA	NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NIS	NIGERIAN IMMIGRATION SERVICE
NNDCMP	NIGERIA'S NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL MASTER PLAN
NNSS	NIGERIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
NPO	NON-PROFIT ORGANISATION

NSA	NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
NUJ	NIGERIA UNION OF JOURNALISTS
NSCDC	NIGERIAN SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS
OECD	ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
OIC	ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COUNTRIES
PCVE	PREVENTION AND COUNTERING OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
PFSSR	POLICY FRAMEWORK ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
PLAC	POLICY AND LEGAL ADVOCACY CENTRE
SALW	SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
SDG	SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL
SERAP	SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
SIEP	SHELL INTERNATIONAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION INCORPORATION
TI	TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
TTIMG	THREATS OF TERRORISM AND INTERVENTION MEASURES GENERAL
UN	UNITED NATIONS
UNCHR	THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
UNDP	UNITED NATION DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
UNESCO	UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANISATION
UNGA	UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
UNICEF	UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND
UNJTF	UNITED NATIONS JOINT TRANSITION FUND
UNODC	UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES
UNSC	UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
USDEA	UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
WAJO	WEST AFRICA JOINT OPERATIONS
WHO	WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..... **II**

DECLARATION..... **III**

DEDICATION..... **IV**

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..... **V**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..... **VI**

TABLE OF CONTENTS..... **IX**

CHAPTER 1 ..... **1**

OUTLINE OF THESIS **1**

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND..... **3**

1.1 Introduction 3

1.2 Background of study..... 7

1.2.1 Demographic and geographic configuration 7

1.2.2 Evolution of Nigeria's Security Sector and Challenges..... 8

1.2.3 Nigerian Civil War and entrenchment of military governance 12

1.2.4 Developmental and governance challenges..... 15

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 16

1.4 PURPOSE STATEMENT 18

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS..... 18

1.6 ASSUMPTIONS..... 19

1.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 19

1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY..... 20

1.9 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER ONE 21

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction..... 22

2.2 Early manifestation of terrorism in Nigeria 22

2.3 Emergence of terrorists activities in Southern Nigeria 23

2.4 Emergence of terrorists activities in Northern Nigeria 25

2.5 Governance factors in the development of terrorism in Nigeria..... 28

2.5.1 Governance factors that induced terrorism in Southern Nigeria 32

2.5.2 Governance factors that induced terrorism in Northern Nigeria 34

2.5.2 (a) Religion and toxic education doctrines..... 34

2.5.2 (b) Infiltration of international terror groups..... 36

2.6 Terrorism financing..... 37

2.7 Institutional capacity 41

2.8 Inter-agency cooperation 44

2.9 International cooperation 47

2.10 Democratic Oversight 50

2.11 Human Rights 53

2.12 Good governance and its dividends..... 56

2.12(a) Nigeria's corruption profile 60

2.12(b) Nigeria's employment status..... 65

2.13 Theoretical framework..... 71

2.13(a) Security sector reform (SSR) paradigm 71

2.13(ai) Components of security sector reform 74

2.13(aii) Relevance of SSR 76

2.14 AU policy framework on Security Sector Reform (AU-PFSSR) 79

2.14(a) Critical components of the framework 80

2.14(b) Justification for AU-PFSSR..... 82

2.15 Complementary theoretical frames..... 85

2.16 Conclusion 87

CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction..... 90

3.2 Conceptual framework 90

3.3 Research methodology..... 92

3.3(i) The Interpretivist paradigm..... 92

3.3(ii) Research approach..... 94

3.3(iii) Research design..... 96

3.3(iv) Data collection techniques..... 99

3.3(iv a) Document Analysis..... 99

3.3(iv b) Interview technique 101

3.4 Sampling technique..... 102

3.5 Reliability and validity..... 105

3.6 Ethical considerations 108

3.7 Data analysis 109

3.8 Conclusion..... 112

CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S SECURITY SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

4.1 Introduction 114

4.2 Threats of terrorism in Nigeria 114

4.2.1 Terrorism casualties..... 116

4.3 Terrorism financing..... 120

4.3(i) Sources of terrorism financing..... 122

4.3(ii) Further inducing factors of terrorism financing in Nigeria..... 126

4.4 Nigeria's strategic interventions 128

4.4 (i) Amnesty strategy..... 129

4.4.2 Nigeria's counter terrorism financing measures..... 132

4.4.2(i) Legislative measures 133

4.4.2(ii) Process improvement..... 134

4.4.2(iii) Challenges in Nigeria's counter Terrorism Financing intervention 137

4.4.3 Institutional capacity..... 140

4.4.3(a) Budgetary supports and accountability standard..... . 142

4.4.3(b) Intelligence management capacity..... 144

4.4.3(c) Quality of human resources support..... 145

4.4.3(d) Legal and judicial support..... . 148

4.4.4 Interagency collaboration among Nigeria's security institutions 153

4.4.4(a) Instances of interagency conflicts 155

4.4.4(b) Factors responsible for the present status of interagency cooperation in Nigeria..... 157

4.4.4(c) Jurisdictional challenges and power consciousness 157

4.4.4(d) Corruption and poor ethical standard 158

4.4.4(e) Poor human resources provisions 160

4.4.5 Nigeria's international cooperation efforts..... 162

4.4.6 Conclusion 168

CHAPTER 5: NIGERIA'S SECURITY SECTOR REFORM INTERVENTIONS

5.1 Overview 171

5.2 Civil Democratic Oversight..... 171

5.2.1 Actors and institution in Nigeria's civil democratic oversight..... 172

5.2.1(a) The Legislature 172

5.2.1(b) Office of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice 177

5.2.1(c) Office of the Auditor General of the Federation 177

5.2.1(d) The Judiciary 178

5.2.1(e) Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)..... 179

5.2.2 The content of Nigeria's civil oversight scheme..... . 183

5.2.2(a) Legislative improprieties 191

5.3.1 Status and improvement of Nigeria's human rights standard..... 194

5.3.2 Conceptualisation of human rights..... 195

5.3.3 Analyses of human rights violations in Nigeria..... 196

5.3.4 Nigeria's human rights standard 198

5.3.5 Constraining factors in Nigeria's human rights administration..... 201

5.4.1 Imperative of Good Governance..... 203

5.4.2 Nigeria's corruption profile..... 208

5.4.3 Nigeria's anti-corruption efforts..... 215

5.4.4 Constraints against Nigeria's anti-corruption programme 218

5.5.1 Nigeria's employment programme 220

5.5.2 Unemployment rate in Nigeria 2010 – 2018..... 222

5.5.3 Factors that induce unemployment in Nigeria 225

5.5.3(a) Uncommon factors 225

5.5.3(b) Common factors 227

5.6 Conclusion 229

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER INSIGHTS

6.1 Overview of research objectives and questions 232

6.2 Conclusion and findings 233

6.3 General recommendations..... 235

6.4 Improvement in institutional capacity..... 241

6.5 Developing a robust research and development scheme..... . 242

6.6 Logistic improvements 243

6.7 Improvement of intelligence management..... 244

6.8 Countering Terrorism Financing..... 246

6.9 Improving Interagency Cooperation..... 249

6.10 Improving Nigeria's International Cooperation..... 251

6.11 Improving Democratic Oversight 252

6.12 Improving Human Rights Standard..... 254

6.13 Improvement of Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Programme..... 257

6.14 De-radicalisation as a Good Governance requirement 260

6.15 Improving Employment Programme 262

6.16 Further theoretical insights and suggested areas for future studies 265

APPENDIX (I) - Documentary Sources **.....**..... 271

APPENDIX (II) - interview questions and sampled respondents..... 273

REFERENCES..... 279

CHAPTER 1:

Outline of Thesis

The roadmap for the achievement of the objective of this research is as follows; namely:

Chapter One: contains the Introduction and Background of Study. This covers contextual understanding of terrorism and its threats with terrorism financing as a major facilitating factor. Others are Background of the Study; Statement of Problem which concentrated on the issues under study including the gaps that created the basis for embarking on this research upon which the purpose of the study was derived. These issues are accordingly interrogated and constituted the research questions and objectives.

Chapter Two: contains reviews of relevant literatures on all the issues introduced in chapter one. These are: Nigeria's strategic efforts, institutional capacity of the sector, interagency cooperation and international cooperation. Others are civil democratic oversight, human rights, imperative of good governance including provision of employment opportunities as means of poverty alleviation.

Furthermore, the appropriate theoretical framework which provided the foundation for the above analyses was introduced and explained. This includes Security Sector Reform (SSR). In view of the need to vary the SSR model to suit Nigeria's peculiar security situation, the AU-PFSSR and complemented with the ECOWAS PFSSR was used to augment the traditional SSR model. The derivable concepts from these theories as already listed were appropriately put in context and upon which the conceptual framework was based.

Chapter Three: involves the conceptual framework and methodology which includes the plan based on the concepts derived from the theoretical paradigms above. This is followed with the research methodology including the research process utilised to source for and analyse the required data. It includes the paradigm, approach and design as well as the techniques for data collection. To guarantee the authenticity of the derivable data, the merits of the required reliability and validity considerations were explained.

Chapter Four: involves the analyses of data on (a) institutional capacity of Nigeria's security sector to counter-terrorism and relative to the threats of the crime and terrorism financing as a major facilitator.

Chapter Five: involves the assessment and improvement of the necessary security sector reform requirements that can help the country's security sector to effectively counter terrorism. Specifically, the quality of civil democratic oversight, human rights administration in Nigeria was analysed. The imperatives of governance and its dividends specifically the country's anti-corruption profile as well as the provision of employment opportunities for the purpose of poverty alleviation that can help to reduce involvement in terrorism and the need for their improvement were presented and analysed.

Chapter Six: includes the conclusion from the analyses of all the issues contained in the preceding chapters with recommendations for improvement.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

The incidence of terrorism including its sustenance by several factors, especially terrorism financing, are notable security threats to Nigeria. It is therefore the conception of this research that these threats can be mitigated through effective counter measures revolving around the improvement of the country's security sector governance. This objective is achievable by enhancing the notable security sector reform requirements that are most relevant to Nigeria. These requirements include those advocated in the traditional SSR Paradigm and in the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (AUPFSSR) (2013) and as given more domestic impetus in the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (2016).

The most critical of these requirements which can complement Nigeria's security sector governance capacity to control terrorism, are as follows: Institutional capacity of the country's security sector, civil democratic oversight and the standard of human rights in the sector. These requirements can be complemented by good governance and for which reason, the country's anti-corruption profile, provision and access to qualify employment opportunities are selected and accordingly considered for possible improvements.

Nevertheless, it is important to first provide understanding of the concept of terrorism and to contextualise such factors that instigates it in Nigeria with terrorism financing as a major facilitator. Relevant historical, socio-economic and political occurrences in the life of the country which possibly acted as background for the inducement and sustenance of this crime, are analysed.

Terrorism is understood as any act of terror induced by pecuniary motives and carried out alone by the citizens of a country or in connivance with external elements. These cover political, religious and |\socio-economic purposes and characterized by the destruction of lives and property including those of law-abiding citizens and legitimate institutions and structures. It is also conceived as any act that violates the criminal laws of a state which can endanger life or cause serious injury or death to any person, group of persons; or cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage. It is calculated or intended to do the following: (a) Intimidate, coerce or induce any government, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing, any act or to adopt or abandon a particular stand point or to act according to certain principles or (b) Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or create a public emergency or (c) Create general insurrection in a state (Article 1, subsection.3 of African Union Convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism, 1999 P. 207).

Terrorism is further viewed as "premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience" (US Department of State 2015) P. 406). More so, it is technically conceived as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by semi clandestine individuals, groups or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons whereby in contrast to assassination, the direct target of violence are not the main targets (UN Special Reports 2013; 2014 P. 780).

Furthermore, The US Federal Bureau of Investigation Report (2015) defined terrorism as the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. This was reiterated in its Joint Terrorism Task Force Report (2020 p.1) as violent criminal acts perpetrated by individuals and or groups linked to designated foreign terrorist organisations or sponsored by states (US FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force Report 2020 p.1).

Based on the above definitions, the concept can of terrorism be used for ideological, nationalist, propagandist and political purposes with its origin in revolutionary political violence. According to Obi (2010), terrorism is now associated with illegal unconventional war against a society or against an established, but resented order. It can be intended to attract attention through acts of extreme violence as well as to spread grief and fear.

Given the above definitions, it is necessary to understand how Nigeria is threatened by this crime. Indications show that the country stands out as one of the worst affected by this crime because of its poor intervention programme due to bad governance and poor security sector reform application (Yogboyalu and Akinola 2019 p.1 and Wilson 2018 p.1). Terrorism creates a vicious cycle of socio-economic challenges in Nigeria. Apart from loss of lives and property, the country has witnessed unimaginable capital flights in terms of both investments and human resources. The country's educational sector has also been adversely affected because many educational institutions in terrorist prone areas in the country have been forced to close down due to terrorist onslaughts. Many industries have also collapsed, leading to the retrenchment of numerous citizens, thereby exacerbating the unemployment situation in the country (Olowojolu 2016 p.72).

The major terrorist group in Nigeria, the Boko Haram sect has committed numerous atrocities that continue to attract global attention. As a result of the casualties due to their activities including the arrest of a Nigerian Farouk Abdul Mutalab who attempted blowing up a US airliner, this group was classified as an international terrorist organization and led to the blacklisting of Nigeria as the 6th most terrorism - prone country in the world (US State Department Report 2015 p.2). The terror acts of this group as at 2019include; the killing of over 30,000 persons, abduction of over two thousand persons including more than 400 hundred students, displacement of over two million persons, destruction of public and private utilities and

other economic losses to the country worth billions of dollars, killing of over two thousand security operatives; etc. (National Emergency Management Report 2019, National Bureau of Statistics Report 2019).

While tracing the level of insecurity in Nigeria, Obi (2015) stated that since the beginning of Niger Delta insurgencies in 1990 till when Boko-Haram commenced their terrorist activities, that the country has witnessed serious security threats including bombings, suicide attacks, assassinations, kidnappings. All these according to him, led to loss of lives and properties and adversely affected business activities which consequently frustrated local and foreign investments and consequently retarded the country's economic development. Obi (2015) further observed that the country continued to witness a more vicious security challenge threats since the commencement of its present civilian regime. This included challenges in the North East, South-South and Western Nigeria made up of militia groups in the South, insurgency in the North, kidnapping in the East and South, ritual killings in the East and West. These threats seem to be on the increase. It is on this note that Ohanyere (2018) (p.3) observed that if proactive countermeasures are not taken now, that the situation can become worse.

All the above terrorism threats are very serious in the country and continuously expanding due to the increasing capacity of terrorists which are mainly sustained by the following; namely: arms, strategic, organizational, intelligence, operational, personnel and financial supports. Of all these illicit financial supports which is conceived as terrorism financing is the most significant in Nigeria. It is also the most adverse because it can be utilised to procure other supports. The criminalisation of terrorism financing was first given an international legal impetus through the International Convention for the suppression of the financing of Terrorism (1999).

The Report of the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force Report (2009) described terrorism financing as all such distinct activities involving raising, storing and concealment of funds and eventual utilization of same to sustain terrorist organizations and infrastructure and transferring these funds to support or carry out specific terrorist attacks. These funds according to the report are generated through legal or illegal means. Legitimate humanitarian or business organizations are also knowingly or unknowingly used to funnel financial or logistic supports for terrorist acts.

NFIU Report (2013) stated that Terrorism Financing implies any direct or indirect provision of, or collection of funds unlawfully and willfully by a person or organization with the intention or, with the understanding of utilizing same either totally or partly, for the purpose of perpetrating an act of terrorism. Such funds in this case include tangible or intangible assets, either movable or immovable, however acquired. Others are legal documents or instruments in any form including electronic or digital, title to, or interest in such assets including but not limited to bank credits, travellers' cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit, etc. The Financial Action Task Force Report (2014) stated that

terrorists not only depend on funding from both legal and illegal sources, but also the transmission of same through formal and informal conduits.

The thriving of terrorism financing in Nigeria are due to several reasons which terrorists leverage on to source funds. These include: the country's excessive cash-based economy, weak fiscal regulatory system, corruption, porosity of the country's border which aids cross border currency trafficking, etc. It is envisaged that improvement in Nigeria's security sector governance could control these challenges (CTITF Report 2009; NFIU Report 2013; Shehu 2016 p.2).

It is important to note that the country's security sector seem unable to effectively contain the threats due to terrorism and as facilitated by terrorism financing mainly due to limitation of its security sector governance. These threats limit the government's capacity to cater for the citizenry who consequently suffer neglect leading some to express their intolerance by getting involved in criminal activities and feeling morally unperturbed because they see the political leaders as corrupt (Felter 2018 p.3, UNODC 2018 P.4, Moon 2015 p.1).

The foregoing underscores the need to improve Nigeria's security sector governance. This implies the administration of human and state security requirements for effective protection of both the country and its citizens, their public and private assets from both internal and external security threats e.g., due to terrorism. This is in adherence to, and practice of rule of law and with due consideration of the civil democratic control of the sector. The constituents of this sector include security institutions responsible for the protection of a country's sovereign territory and integrity, its assets, citizens' lives and property and those involved in the formulation interpretation and enforcement of the required laws and policies, as well as non-statutory stakeholders including civil society groups (Cawthra 2014).

The above views are in line with the position of Ball and Fayemi (2008). They stated that Security Sector Reform involves the efficient administration of all state institutions and stakeholders with a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion. It also includes non-statutory security actors which have emerged as important actors in the provision of security. Aluko (2015) stated that this sector represents a whole range of both state and non-state actors that are involved in the operations and governance of security forces and individuals saddled with the management of the justice element.

The quality of the relevant security sector reform requirements is also crucial for the effective administration of the sector. There are several of these requirements but those deemed most critical to the Nigerian situation were selected for this study. These include: the institutional capacity, civil democratic oversight and the human rights standard of the sector. Because of the observation that interagency cooperation and international cooperation can also complement the institutional capacity of the sector

and accordingly help to boost the country's security sector, they were advocated and analysed as complementary requirement that can help in the country's counter terrorism programme.

It should also be noted that all the above requirements can thrive better under a regime of good governance because it is a relevant requirement for the development of any country's security sector and Nigeria is not an exception. According to the Mo – Ibrahim Foundation Report (2020), good governance entails the provision of political, socio-economic, public goods and services which the government as a matter of responsibility should provide and which every citizen is entitled to and has the right to expect from the government. Other related requirements that are propagated in the necessary good governance framework and equally complementary for effective security sector governance are anti-corruption profile, provision of employment opportunity as a critical poverty alleviation need. The above requirements were analysed to identify the shortcomings that need to be resolved to ensure that their effectiveness contributes in the improvement of the country's security sector governance capacity.

The research and data analyses used a qualitative framework, intepretivism paradigm and interpretive design. The data collection relied on documentary analysis and interview techniques involving respondents who were purposefully sampled because of their experience and expertise on the subject of investigation. The resultant data were subjected to qualitative analyses and from which the necessary recommendations for the strengthening of the country's security sector governance were derived.

1.2 Background of Study

It is important to note that an understanding of Nigeria's current security challenges should put in perspective, the complex and dynamic context that define the country. In this case, the country's demographic and geographic configuration, its colonial heritage and consequent evolution of its security sector, its civil war and military regimes as well as developmental and governance challenges can constitute the relevant background provide that this research is anchored on.

1.2.1Demographic and geographic configuration

Nigeria's National Security Strategy (2014) emphasized the need for any strategy developed to counter its security challenges to be based on a proper assessment of the country's geo-strategic environment. Nigeria is made up of thirty-six states and a federal capital territory and is composed of more than two hundred and fifty ethnic groups and languages with multiple variations in dialects and an estimated population of over two hundred million persons which is approximately 2.4% of the entire global population. The population is also made up of more than 50% of persons whose age is below 30years and from among whom, are the ones with higher propensity to commit terrorism crime. It also has an approximate 911,000 square km land mass out of which 33% is very mush arable with good weather for agriculture. The country is also endowed with oil and mineral resources approximately 37 billion barrels of petroleum reserve and

about 137 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves and over 34 varieties of mineral resources in commercial quantity (Nigeria's National Security Strategy 2014 and 2017 p.4).

These challenges are further exacerbated by geographic external factors. First is the Gulf of Guinea where Nigeria's maritime area of about 84,000 nautical miles is located. This area covers seventeen coastal states extending from Senegal in West Africa to Angola in Southern Africa with a coastline of approximately 2.9 thousand nautical miles. The country's maritime area with vital natural resources is majorly located in the Gulf of Guinea. All the foregoing should have ordinarily contributed to the country's strength but has unfortunately constituted a serious Achilles heel especially in the precipitation of trans-national crimes such as terrorism.

Nigeria shares borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic in the North-East, which contributes to the suitability of the region for terrorist groups because these countries are historically associated with sectarian and cross border conflicts. The region favours by Boko Haram, whose insurgent activities present the worst threat to Nigeria's peace and security (UNODC Report 2018; US Counter Terrorism Report 2018). The foregoing challenges are inevitably sustained by contagious historical and cultural relationships which induce citizens of these troubled countries to quickly seek refuge in Nigeria. Consequently, opportunities are provided to other international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, ISWAP, etc. to take advantage of the ensuing confusion to recruit and radicalize the vulnerable ones (Majekodunmi 2015; Onuoha 2009).

1.2.2 Evolution of Nigeria's Security Sector and Challenges

Several developments also influenced the development of Nigeria's security challenges and consequent security sector. The colonization of Nigeria and globalisation, contributed to this situation. According to Africa Security Brief Report (2016), the Nigeria's security sector is a product of colonialism. Assensor and Yvett (2002) in their analysis of the evolution of the security system of most West African states including Nigeria observed that before the colonization of these countries that militarism significantly existed in their historical and political evolutionary processes. Modern militaries in these states metamorphosed from the armies created by the colonists for their political needs to counter resistance of colonial policies as well as to act defence reserve in the event of any war.

This situation entrenched such unfavourable militarized psyche in these states and extended to the post – colonial period. Salihu (2016) averred that these policies acted as precursors of political instability due to the adverse environment against post – independence stable and peaceful polity in these states because the political culture that was consequent upon these colonial policies provided fertile ground for authoritarian rule and military adventure into the polity of these states.

The ethnic bias exhibited by the colonists in the recruitment of personnel into the armies and police of colonized states including Nigeria was also an important factor in the evolution of their security sector. Salihu (2016) noted in this case that the recruitment style of the colonists was tainted with ethnic bias and

favoured certain ethnic groups especially in Nigeria where Northerners were favoured because of the belief that they possessed the martial trait required for military service. This bias was carried over in the post – independence security structure of these states.

Furthermore, African leaders failed to review the situation through the reformation of the inherited security structure, and doctrines but rather exploited the selfish benefits of this inheritance. Salihu (2016) also noted that some of these leaders adopted several selfish measures including biased recruitment and promotion policies which favoured their preferred ethnic groups in order to consolidate their hold to power as well as adopted political patronage in the security institutions.

Though Nigeria became independent in 1960, the British continued to train the country's military and law enforcement operatives in accordance with their protectionist orientation. This was done without instilling in these operatives, the needed obligation to the sovereignty of Nigeria and with sparse attention on the need to be subordinated to civil authorities based on democratic ethos. Even the laws and policies that were used to govern the country's military and police forces were based on British orientation and some of them have not been reviewed till date. These policies were meant for the governance of the military, the customs and the police. This is in spite of the creation of several security institutions especially out of the police without any clear-cut separation of their powers and distinct authorities of the new agencies from the existent laws from which they were created. This trend could have been a reason for the friction among these traditional law enforcement agencies and the new ones (Ahire 2002).

The country was also not granted full economic independence as the country's resources especially its oil and gas sector continued to be managed by the British including the exploitation of these resources and the repatriation of the accrued revenues using Nigerian acolytes and thereby indulging their corrupt tendencies. This situation is further compounded by the unbridled exploitation of both the country's natural and human resources by the country's colonists and their foreign allies with attendant consequence on the progress of the country especially through the instrumentality of multinational corporations (Otusanya, Lauwo and Adeyeye 2012). This consequently engendered poverty and poor human development thereby militating against good governance and gave room for selfish elitist tendencies due to corruption, all at the expense of the country's security sector; (Crossdel and Agbakor, 2015).

Western countries did not also bother about the military incursions and disruptions of Nigeria's political governance because of their desire to continue to enjoy the generous supply of Nigeria's crude oil considered to be very attractive and easy to refine this was aptly captured by Siollum (2009) who noted that Nigeria's relationship with Western countries was mainly motivated by the economic interest of the later and not their desire to assist Nigeria nor to support its democratic growth. He noted that in spite of its present democratic government, the country's administration has continued to be dominated by the same military actors who were involved in the sporadic overthrow of democratically elected governments.

Some were also active participants in the country's civil war and in the squandering of the country's oil resources. All these stalled the country's democratic development and constrained the entrenchment of a healthy civil democratic oversight supervision of the country's security institutions.

The 1958 – 1962 Defence Agreement between Britain and Nigeria was also very crucial in the development of Nigeria's security sector (Wyss 2016). This agreement was part of British global cold war strategy through establishment of a long-term interest in sub-Saharan Africa. The agreement initially appeared favourable to Nigeria because of the anticipated British assistance to help enhance the capacity of its military. Nevertheless, it was also conceived as a neo-colonial instrument that could subjugate Nigeria's security system to the apron string of the British.

Percox (2004) observed that the British defence consideration recognized the strategic importance of Sub-Saharan Africa including Nigeria and therefore strived to derive the accruable benefits through a formal defence agreement. This significantly formed the basis of the Anglo – Nigeria 1958 - 1962 Defence Agreement. Nigerian elites then believed that a defence agreement could benefit Nigeria's security system including its Armed Forces. Though Nigerian independence elites agreed to enter into this agreement which was formalized in October, 1960, the then opposition took exception to this and considered it as a neo-colonial strategy that could diffuse the gains of Nigeria's full independence from Britain. Nevertheless, Idang (2018) noted that in spite of the wide condemnation of this agreement that it was not without some ardent supporters and sympathizers.

For this reason, the agreement was not fully acceptable in Nigeria and ignited serious opposition especially from the then Nigerian student's union. This consequently led to its abrogation in 1962 which meant that it was short-lived. It should be noted that much as Britain had granted Nigeria independence in 1960, that its interest in trying to sustain its defence aspirations in Nigeria was very suspicious and could be counter-productive in the country's quest to establish and maintain an independent armed forces that would not be remote - controlled from London.

Further to this, Britain wanted to use the agreement as part of its global cold war strategy. Wyss (2016) conception in this case was that Britain wanted to use the derivative of this agreement to complement its defence capability. According to him, British military planners intended to acquire defence facilities in Nigeria in order to strengthen and sustain Britain's capacity in the event of any war and with consideration of the Soviet capacity who was then conceived as the only potential enemy. It was therefore reasoned that the defence pact with Nigeria, could be used to prevent the infiltration of Soviet Union into Nigeria's military system and for which the allegiance of Nigeria was necessary to prevent such intrusion.

The precursor to this agreement could be said to be consequent upon the Britain Joint Planning Staff Report (1957) which included Nigeria among other British Commonwealth countries because of what was considered as Nigeria's strategic importance in its capacity to complement Britain's defence needs in terms

of sea, air, communications network and defence personnel requirements. Consequent upon this Nigeria was expected to provide staging posts to reinforce the British military capacity especially in terms of being used to host British strategic reserve and as an air transport base, all for the cold war interventions and prevention of an absolute war. In his interpretation of Nigeria's role on this case, Wyss (2016) averred that Nigeria was to be used by Britain as a means of fulfilling its defence planning first and foremost, for the protection of British interest rather. He noted that it was not mainly for the defence of Nigeria specifically, or for that of Africa generally because the continent was not considered to be threatened by any global war. The existent facilities in Nigeria then were considered by Britain to be relevant in its strategic defence calculations all of which, Britain intended to extract and utilize through the 1958 – 1962 agreement.

The point that Britain did not maintain a very direct involvement in Nigeria's security administration after granting it independence was raised by Kaye and Yales (2004). They noted that successive British governments maintained a passive position to regarding their external commitments to defence and security matters in their former African colonies. This partial involvement in spite of the abrogation of Nigeria's Defence agreement with Britain saw British Officers engaged in the rebuilding Nigeria's post – independence military immediately after the country's independence. Because of some understanding, they were involved in the training and monitoring schedules in the country's military. Nigerian military personnel also continued to train in British institutions especially in the Royal military Academy, Sandhurst. More so, under the auspices of the British Nigeria Defence Cooperation, the British government has been assisting Nigeria in various conflict prevention intervention initiatives for the purpose of promoting good governance and to complement the country's security sector including the enhancement of the professionalism and development of their capacities.

It was consequent upon the foregoing that the relevant UK ministries sought to agree with the country's independence advocates in their various meeting for a defence agreement with Nigeria that will grant British the unrestricted right to overfly Nigeria and to use Kano airport as an air staging post for British military aircraft and to use Port-Harcourt and Lagos seaports in the event of any war to transport aviation fuel as well as military equipment and supplies. Before the abrogation of the agreement, the British benefited from the above concessions but did not reciprocate enough to significantly develop Nigeria's defence system. This was in spite of the belief by Nigerian officials then that the British will help to develop Nigeria's armed forces. Nevertheless, before the termination of the agreement, Nigeria's armed forces had been modelled in line with British military doctrines most of which have subsisted till date.

Nigeria's relations with the US also influenced the development of Nigeria's security sector. Being a world power, its activities inevitably contributed to the development of Nigeria's security system. Much as the US was not in a hurry to engage Nigeria in any security pact immediately after the former's independence, it was very alert to ensure that Russia did not overtake it in this direction and as such complemented the British effort to establish a beneficial defence agreement with Nigeria in their perspective on this

development. Griffin and Pearsall (2018) further noted that though America understood the potential of Nigeria as a vital partner to help in its cold war challenges, the country instead concentrated on development aid while relinquishing cooperation regarding the security sector to Britain.

Nevertheless, they noted that with the increased influence of the cold war in Africa, and Nigeria's quest to minimize its dependence on Britain for the development of its defence needs and capacity, the US was pushed to review its aid policy on Nigeria and included military supports to it. This policy shift according to Faseke (2020), was probably consequent upon the view of the American government then that Nigeria was influential in Africa and was capable of dictating the course of events in Africa. This was also probably consequent upon the concern of the US, that the Soviet Union was gradually gaining serious ground in Africa.

Allegiance to any of these super powers was a delicate foreign policy matter for Nigeria and was careful not to align with any of these super powers. This situation had implications for the development of Nigeria's security sector such as the independence of the country's security sector and could subject the sector to their control and in consonance with the fear expressed by Kahuni (2017) about these super powers. The country's international cooperation scheme to counter terrorism according to Wilson (2019), while the USSR supported Nigeria during its civil war, the US stand was almost that of indifference during the war. This contributed to the straining of relationship between Nigeria and the US (Devermont 2017). This persisted until the regime of Jimmy Carter due to the hand of friendship that he extended to Nigeria and which re-established a cordial relationship with Nigeria and which according to Awotokun (2020), contributed immensely to Nigeria's adoption of the US presidential system of government.

Faseke (2020) further notes that the foregoing had positive impact on Nigerian American relations such that the hitherto strained relationship between the two countries resulted in a robust diplomatic relationship. This elicited more interest in Nigeria's affairs by America and upon which the former leveraged on to learn. Nigeria has since then, been an important US partner and for which it had received several security support assistances from the latter. According to the US Bureau of African Affairs Report (2020), the US foreign assistance to Nigeria includes supporting Nigeria to strengthen its democratic institutions, promote good governance and the mitigation of corruption. Other areas in this report include security support assistance targeted at saving lives and property as well as development of institutional capacity including that of the country's security sector.

1.2.3. Nigerian civil war and introduction of military governance

The Nigerian civil war lasted from 1966 to 1970. This war shook the very fabric of Nigeria's existence and one of its major regions almost seceded. Apart from the unimaginable loss of lives and property, the consequences of this war, which the country has not yet recovered from, contributed to its dilapidated security sector. The military emerged as a predator instead of a protector and assumed the posture of a

supreme authority that should control other institutions and is never to be subordinated. This delusion spread to the Nigerian Security Sector and is the reason why the military dominated the country's governance for over thirty years.

It needs to be brought to the fore that immediately after the war, many of the soldiers who participated in the war especially those of Eastern Nigeria who were defeated, utilized their war experience for criminality. The reason for this trend includes the displacement many of them economically due to the seizure and acquisition of their properties that were domiciled in major cities of Nigeria by the Federal Government. Being entrepreneurial and industrious by nature, they needed a commencement platform for their businesses but had no capital or asset support. They consequently became willing recruits for organised criminals in the South Western part of the country who were already entrenched as drug dealers and money launderers from which they earned huge revenue (Ellen, 2009).

While some of them laundered the proceeds of their criminal activities into legitimate businesses, some others could not forsake their criminal vocation and transferred same to their following generations. This trend took its toll on the education of the children in the region (Osuchukwu, 2014). Trading in legitimate and illicit goods was the main occupation of majority of them to the extent that most of their children took up similar apprenticeship positions in these illicit businesses with little or no education. Ellen (2009) corroborates this view and stated that the South Eastern indigenes of Nigeria often explain their prominence in illicit trade by reference to the Nigerian civil war and alleged that they had a semi-detached status in Nigeria, which prompted them to seek their livelihood outside the ambit of the state.

This war witnessed the use of child soldiers many of whom did not survive those who while those who survived were left to their fate after the war, they were neither properly reintegrated nor granted educational or vocational training opportunities which rendered them unfit for employment. Many others who had families could not fend for their dependents resulting in a generation of hopeless individuals who had no means of survival and this was passed on from one generation to the other (Nigerian Tribune October, 2013). Those of them who had mastered the use of arms resorted to criminality and influenced the next generations. This was the main reason for the high incidence of armed robberies immediately after the war. The upcoming ones who should have been made to go to school could not afford education because the military government then introduced high school fees that their mostly unemployed parents could not afford. Oyeniyi's (2013) warning on the adverse consequence of not properly reintegrating child soldiers is very instructive in this case.

The end of the war ushered in successive military governments. The involvement of the military in the political administration of Nigeria affected the quality of governance in the country. Thus, the military institution is seen as an anathema in any civilized setting because the military as an institution is just never capable of taking on the complex problems of a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria. According to Kukah

(2010p.5), Pluralism demands the opposite of command and control, strict hierarchy and unquestioning obedience to order, which are the key characteristics of military institutions. He noted that, if the military failed in reconciling the conflicting identities in Nigeria, it is because in governance, they are neither equipped nor possess the same qualities to administer a society such as Nigeria. He advised that the management of plural societies is the product of consensus, dialogue, collaboration, shared values that create a basis for integration and commonality of vision and mission all of which are the hallmark of good governance.

Agbese (2015) posits that decades of military rule in Nigeria created a legacy of corruption, lawlessness, ethnic animosities, mass poverty and communal violence that could sap the energies of any serious administration. All these inflicted a big blow on good governance in the country. Thus, military regimes left the succeeding civilian administrations with weak democratic structure. To date, these administrations fear the military and they have not been able to properly subordinate the former to civil authority as envisaged in the country's constitution and as a vital condition for a viable security sector reform.

The military governments also did not entrench an efficient international collaborative scheme that could elicit relevant international support assistance that could positively influence the country's security sector. Instead, the successive civilian administrations inherited international sanctions and de-certifications of the country by the international community (US International Strategy Report, 2000). These military regimes also foisted the trait of conflicts amongst the various law enforcement and security agencies in the country (Obot, 2004).

The above conditions not only induced Nigeria's security challenges, but aggravated them in the form of bad governance and series of conflicts. In this vein, Siollum (2009) also asserted that Nigeria has been staggering from one conflict to the other which had adversely affected the development and progress of the country. This, according to him, has been characterized by the usurpation of power by the military ten times, the brutal previous killing of three heads of state, about thirty years of military dictatorship and civil war with such heart rending casualties including the death of more than one million persons. Furthermore, Ohanyere (2018) observed that the level of insecurity in Nigeria is unprecedented. He noted that Nigeria has had almost two hundred religious and political crises including seven major military coups, one civil war, the Niger Delta insurgencies, terrorist activities in Northern Nigeria including the Boko-Haram and the militant activities by the Fulani Herdsmen.

Nigeria's President Presentation (2015) is instructive in this case. It linked the evolution and sustenance of Nigeria's security challenges to the following; namely: the Nigerian civil war, the June 12, 1993 struggle, the Niger Delta militancy, the on-going separatist movement and agitations by a section of the country, the numerous communal conflicts nationwide and the Boko-Haram insurgency. He traced their remote and immediate causes to injustice, corruption and repression orchestrated by bad governance. He also raised

alarm on the consequence of environmental degradation especially as a causal factor of militant extremism. He singled out the frequency of the drying up of Lake Chad which he said, has led to severe poverty and the displacement of over five million persons and with the potential to exacerbate militant extremism and other criminal activities in the country.

1.2.4 Developmental and governance challenges

Bad governance including corruption which caused development challenges equally laid the foundation for the origin and sustenance of security challenges to the country. In its preamble, USAID Report (2015) oobserved that in spite of Nigeria being a major oil exporting country, the largest economy, most populous nation, and largest democracy in Africa, it is yet to be able to deal with its serious developmental challenges. The report noted that the country has unfortunately not been able to achieve this objective as 65% of its population live in extreme poverty with the possibility of surpassing China and India as the country with the highest number of extremely poor persons. The situation is complicated as the country harbours the highest number of out of school children with 98% of this number in Nigeria's Northern region where they can easily be recruited by terrorist groups (National Bureau of Statistics Report 2019).

The country's economic growth has not significantly alleviated poverty. Its job creation profile has not only been grossly insufficient relative to its population growth. It has also not been evenly distributed geographically leading to higher levels of unemployment in some regions of the country, especially Northern Nigeria. Relative to the World Bank Gross National Income Index estimated at slightly above $2.7, Nigeria's estimate is worse than the baseline because over one hundred million Nigerians live below $1.25 daily (USAID 2015). In the same vein, the World Bank Report on global poverty Index (2018) reported that 92.1% of Nigerians are presently living below $5.5 Dollars a day and making the country the worst poverty-stricken Nation in the world. This situation is further compounded by the country's gross inequality in income distribution and worsened by the high level of corruption in the country. It is estimated that 10% of Nigerians own almost one third of the country's total national income (World Bank Report 2018).

Iweala (2012) noted that Nigeria was assessed by many as incorrigible and hopeless in the early 2000s and observed that this was because the country was infested with corruption, trapped in debt and battered by a seriously unbalanced and volatile macro-economy. The consequence of this according to her, included the collapse of the country's national institutions such as law enforcement institutions, the civil service, poor health care, educational and social services delivery as well as infrastructural decay, excessive poverty and wide inequality all of which, have negative consequences on the country's security sector.

She noted that Nigeria was not expected to be bridled with such unacceptable situation having earned more than $300 billion from its crude oil sale from the mid-70s to 2001, if its resources were not only mismanaged but squandered through corruption. This was compounded by unrealistic borrowing from the Paris club which accumulated up to $30 billion. Citing excessive corruption as the bane of the country, she

observed that this climaxed during the four decades of military dictatorship. She stated that top and middle level public officials as well as politicians were involved in the stealing of the country's resources most of which they transmitted into foreign bank accounts and some used to purchase and invest in foreign assets. She traced the foregoing challenges to the complexity in governing the country and noted that the country colonialists and politicians took undue advantage of the country's religious and ethnic divides to orchestrate division in the country instead of engaging in development.

Nwannenaya and Abiodun (2017) corroborated the above submissions and noted that these have the propensity to induce cross border insurgences. For these reasons, they focused on the propriety of effective orientation and educational programmes, effective legislative and legal supports, good governance, efficient intelligence gathering and application and above all, the strengthening of relevant agencies to effectively counter terrorism.

These challenges can be argued to have subsisted because of the country's failure to learn from past lessons as well as a lack of developmental vision. Due to lack of required action, the situation was complicated with the emergence of new security threats as the underlying factors were not addressed. This was because it was wrongly believed that these challenges could be solved by military and security approaches. He therefore stated that these problems are not military creation but consequent upon governance failure (Ayodeji 2018).

1.3 Problem Statement

The threats of terrorism in Nigeria are so serious and have been expanding in spite of the various counter measures adopted by Nigeria especially by its security sector. This underscores the need for the improvement of its security sector governance. This should include the critical requirements of security sector reform that are most relevant to Nigeria's situation. Unfortunately, this has not been adequately undertaken by Nigeria (Wilson 2019) especially with due cognisance and especially in the application of relevant requirements of the traditional security sector reform and both the AU and ECOWAS policy frameworks on security sector reform in spite of being obligated to these guiding instruments. The applications of these requirements are very critical for the improvement of any country's security sector but it appears that Nigeria has not embraced this reality and has been treating this issue with levity and without the needed political will. This is such that the quality of these requirements especially those that can help its counter terrorism efforts have remained poor (Omoruyi 2011 and Garba Shehu 2019). This situation could possibly be related to the unsatisfactory standard of such initial requirements of desirable security sector governance such as the sector's institutional capacity, democratic oversight supervision, human right standard as well as complementary good governance requirements such as the country's human right standard and provision of employment opportunities as a means of poverty alleviation that help to reduce involvement in terrorism. This essentially underscores the need for the country to

strengthen its security sector governance by exploring means of improving all the above initial requirements the institutional capacity of the sector to be complemented with efficient interagency cooperation and international cooperation initiatives. Other improvements that are necessary are the civil democratic supervision of these agencies, the country's human rights standard, good governance including effective anti-corruption scheme to ensure transparency and accountability in the sector as well as employment creation as an instrument of poverty alleviation.

Also, recent trends in Nigeria have revealed the potential growth of terrorism due to its facilitation by illicit financial supports (NFIU, 2014; GIABA FATF Report, 2009) especially as contextualised relative to Boko Haram's expansionist programme in the Lake Chad region by Maza, Koldas and Askil (2020). The consequential threats due to this illicit support have hardly been given the desired attention that is based on appropriate threat analysis to unravel the manifestation, sources and distribution of terrorism financing as well as those factors in the country's fiscal governance that enables its thriving.

No doubt, the country's security and law enforcement institutions had previously adopted various measures to improve their counter terrorism efforts but they focused more on the existing threats of this crime at the time and devoted more attention at tackling the symptoms with insufficient forecast and comprehension of the underlying causal factors. Also, the several strategic policies to counter this crime, until recently placed much emphasis on physical security than on human security imperatives which might have been instigated by many years of military administration (Wahab 2020). An example is the concentration on boosting the country's military capacity against coup d'états with little consideration then on the mitigation organised crimes like terrorism (Yagboyaju and Akinola 2017).

More so, the country's anti-terrorism plans which has over the years been conceptualised of terrorism, within the prism of religious extremism and resource control protests. It did not properly consider the intricate issues related to this crime including human security needs that could have been provided through good governance. Furthermore, Nigeria has over the years, adopted various legislative and policy initiatives to counter the growing incidence and threats of this crime but all these measures appeared reactionary and lacked the required sustainability and proper integration into an enduring strategic plan with the required security sector governance content (Ijide 2020).

While not suggesting that improvement of the country's physical security capacity is not necessary, it is important to note that without adequate consideration of human security needs and appropriately integrating it into the country's counter – terrorism programmes based on robust security sector governance imperatives, it will be very difficult to successfully counter terrorism and achieve desirable peace.

The need to strengthen the country's security sector governance capacity by improving these requirements to effectively control the situation can therefore not be overemphasized (Abegunde, 2013). Thus, the

subsisting counter-measures embarked by the country seem not to have been anchored on efficient security sector governance imperatives. They seem to be concentrated more on strengthening state security apparatus than the required integration of human and state security requirements (Bassey 2015 p.1, Aiyede 2015).

Such contending issues with potential to adversely affect Nigeria's security sector governance also seem not to have been adequately addressed. These include: proper resolution of Nigeria's civil war and the various conflicts that had befallen the country, conflicting interests among the various sections in the country. The many years of military dictatorship and transmutation of many military personnel into the country's democratic governance without the required democratic qualification as well as the country's present constitution which is a military creation, have also not helped matters.

1.4 Purpose statement

This study is concerned with how to improve Nigeria's security sector governance to effectively control the security challenges posed by terrorism with terrorism financing as a primary facilitator. For this reason, the research will undertake the following:

(1) Analyse the threats of terrorism with terrorism financing as a significant facilitator in order to formulate appropriate security sector governance counter measures.

(2) Analyse Nigeria's institutional and strategic capacity as a constituent of security sector governance and to recommend means to effectively manage terrorism

(3) To analyse and recommend means of improving Nigeria's governance and security sector reform governance requirements that can help to boost of its Security Sector capacity to counter terrorism.

1.5 Research Questions

The following research questions concentrate on strengthening Nigeria's Security Sector governance capacity to effectively counter the threats of terrorism including terrorism financing as a primary facilitator.

(1) Has Nigeria's present security sector governance capacity been able to effectively manage terrorism and its financing in the country?

(2) How can the subsisting institutional capacity of Nigeria's Security Sector be improved to effectively manage the country's terrorism challenge?

(3) How can the country's Security Sector Reform and governance requirements especially the sector's democratic oversight, human rights standard as well as its anti-corruption and provision of employment be improved to manage Terrorism?

In addressing the research questions above, the following assumptions are made:

1.6 Assumptions

(1) That the level of terrorism threats to Nigeria with terrorism financing as a facilitator, may justify the need to urgently improve the country's security sector governance capacity to more effectively, manage these threats

(2) That the strategic and institutional capacity of Nigeria's security sector including funding, equipment, training, judicial and intelligence supports may be inadequate and could require improvement to be able to effectively manage the threats of terrorism in the country.

(3) That the necessary security sector reform and governance requirements which can help to mitigate the threats of terrorism in the country, might not be satisfactory and could require improvements.

1.7 Research Objectives

This study emanates from the need to ensure that the containment measures adopted by Nigeria to mitigate the incidence and threats of terrorism are made more effective. Thus, the achievement of this objective can be realised through strengthening of the country's security sector governance.

The study applies appropriate qualitative analysis and relies on a suitable theoretical framework including aspects of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and complemented with the African Union Policy Security Framework on Security Sector Reform (AUFSSR) as well as the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform. Consequent upon the same objective, SSR is evaluated relative to its importance for articulating the required reforms that can help mitigate the threats of terrorism. Given the qualitative background of this study, the data collection techniques relied on document analysis and interview technique based on purposive sample of specialists in the sector.

The following steps were therefore undertaken in line with this main objective. These are: examination of the threats of terrorism and its illicit support due to terrorism financing (TF), assessment and improvement of Nigeria's strategic and institutional capacity. Part of the objective is also based on the assessment and improvement of aspects of security sector governance. These include: imperatives of democratic oversight of the country's security sector, efficient human rights administration as well as good governance initiatives such as improvement of the country's corruption profile, access to quality employment opportunities as a means of poverty alleviation that can potentially minimise involvement in terrorism. The study's primary objective is to develop appropriate recommendations to improve Nigeria's containment measures to mitigate the incidence and threats of terrorism. Nevertheless, achievement of the above objectives encountered certain inevitable limitations as presented below.

1.8 Limitations of the study

The trend of terrorism, its threats and inducement by terrorism financing are continuously evolving with complex diversifications including expansion of its membership and mode of operations that are not easily comprehensible. This evolution also includes more opportunities to terrorists to source for funds with which they acquire resources including sophisticated weapons for their operations. The trends are also replete with psychological, political and socio-economic developments that are not limited to specific circumstances. All these require extra dexterity to understand the issues that are most relevant in a study of this nature. More challenging is that the manifestation and threats of this crime are very difficult to comprehensively deal with in only one study because of their long span history as well as their complex connectivity and structures.

This research is also constrained by its limitation to absolutely predict the future occurrences of this crime, which cut across different periods and pose the challenge of choice or preference for one period over the other. Also, the perpetrators of this crime in Nigeria can possibly be influenced by their co-conspirators in other climes and whose characteristics and actions are convert but still affect the trends of the incidence of this crime in Nigeria. The resources to equally investigate all these are quite demanding and posed extra demand on the limited resources for this study.

More so, because of the negative conception of this crime especially because of its devastating threats on society, its evaluation and whatever applicable interventions to check it, are susceptible to bias. While it is common to exaggerate the incidence, it is also common to underestimate preventive and control measures. It is therefore not unlikely that this bias played out in the evaluation of Nigeria's strategic intervention programs by experts who participated in this research.

It is also important to note that due to the high sensitive nature of the information required for the mitigation of this crime; accessibility to required information is very difficult thereby posing a consequential limitation on the research process. More so, this crime is transnational in nature and those involved in the monitoring and appraisal of its trends and consequential counter measures are guided by nationalistic and personal reservations and are therefore sceptical in correctly evaluating other countries' efforts to avoid being accused of sovereign infringements that may result from whatever responses they provide.

Furthermore, it is most likely that the data collection process was affected by some leakages in the data management system of the institutions relied upon to source required information. This could have also been compounded by their poor collection and retrieval techniques. These data sources are also not fool-proof and may be due to the corruption and dereliction on the part of officials. Furthermore, this research did not directly extract the information used for the resolution of the research questions from the perpetrators of these crimes. This doubtlessly posed such challenges including difficulty in the authentication of the sources secondary data.

The data used for this research are either already documented from expert submissions on those already convicted for terrorism. Accessing this information was also challenging and made more complicated by the non-direct contact with the convicts of this crime and those awaiting trial custody of the law enforcement agencies interview them.

Nigeria's civil war is one incident in the history of Nigeria with serious implications for the development and manifestation of terrorism in the country. These implications are further discussed. However, it is unfortunate that the records of this war including its vital relics and artefacts were destroyed, not properly kept or shielded from research use. Accessing the original data for use in resolving the issues in this research that are related to this were therefore difficult. This study therefore depended on secondary sources to make up for this deficiency.

Nevertheless, the required systematic steps were taken to ensure that the above challenges did not constitute any significant impact on the research process and attendant results.

1.9 Conclusion of Chapter one

In this chapter, the meaning and implications of terrorism, including its threats, are explained. These threats are multifaceted and adversely affect the citizens and the country including loss of lives, property and discouragement of investments in the country. Several factors which tend to support the growth and expansion of this crime especially terrorism financing was also explained.

The required understanding of the context which prompts the trends and manifestation of this crime is introduced including relevant socio-economic, political and geographic background. These include: Nigeria's demographic and geographic configuration, the effect of colonization on the development of its security sector, as well as developmental and governance challenges out of which bad governance including the incidence of corruption, is given a prime place.

The development and application of effective security sector governance requirements covering human and state security strategies is not only indicated, but underscored as requiring further improvements. The foregoing gave rise to the need to explain the purpose of this study and therefore threw up relevant questions that when answered subsequently in the research, can help in the achievement of the objectives of the study as already envisioned.

All these were not without certain limitations which were also explained. These revolved around the complexity of terrorism and its illicit financial supports, difficulty in sourcing information, bias of respondents and inability to have direct access to the culprits of this crime all of which the research process tried to control.

CHAPTER 2:

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This research aims to recommend the means that can be utilized to strengthen Nigeria's security sector governance to counter terrorism effectively. Therefore, understanding the various factors that can help achieve this objective through a proper review of related literature is essential. This section, therefore, includes a review of how Nigeria's security challenges evolved, including related terrorist activities and their emergence in the country's two main regions. Terrorism financing, and its sources, being a significant illicit factor contributing to the thriving of terrorism in the country, is contextualised using relevant literature.

Within the context of terrorism, counterterrorism and terrorism financing, literature focusing on the governance requirements of the security sector is explored. It is a key assumption in the research that governance improvement in the security sector can mitigate the threats of terrorism. Thus, critical governance requirements such as the sector's institutional capacity, the need for interagency cooperation, and the potential for international cooperation support are presented and analysed. Additional relevant areas investigated include the sector's civil democratic oversight, respect for human rights and efficient anti-corruption standards.

Further dividends of good governance, including access to quality education and employment opportunities, are also highlighted.

2.2. Early manifestation of terrorism in Nigeria.

This section includes a history of the various developments before and after Nigeria's Independence that could have laid the foundation for the various crises witnessed by the country. It also includes the development of terrorist activities at Nigeria's North and South regions.

The development of terrorism in Nigeria can be attributed to the emergence of various groups. Some groups formed to pursue legitimate objectives but resorted to militancy because of unfriendly government policies. According to Aghedo and Osumah (2012), Nigeria has, since colonial times, been embroiled in various forms of violent activities which caused serious security challenges to the country. The notable initial ones included the 1918 Egba and the 1921 Oke Ogun crises, which manifested more in Iseyin in the Oyo State of Nigeria. During these crises, over ten thousand persons were killed. Oyeniyi (2007) attributes the cause of these crises to the introduction of indirect rule and the new court system in Western Nigeria, by the colonialists, after the amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates of the country. These actions effectively resulted in the demotion of chiefs in the region. In 1929 Eastern Nigeria experienced the

Aba Women's riot and in 1949, the Enugu colliery strike led to the shooting of twenty-one miners. In 1953, Northern Nigeria experienced the 1953 Kano riots.

Several protests were also recorded after Nigeria's independence. Prominent among these was a twelve-day revolution by Adaka Boro against the Nigerian State for the alleged marginalization of the Niger Delta region. The secessionist quest by South Easterners, and the declaration of the Republic of Biafra in 1967, led to a civil war in the country. During this period, the Agbekoya Parapo protest of 1969 also erupted in response to the government's non-consideration of local farmers in the sale of agricultural produce. According to Adeniran (1974), this caused revolts against government officials, during which several prisoners were set free by the rampaging protesters.

Other groups were established for the purposes of regional and ethnic preservation, and their activities involved some level of militancy. These groups included, among others, the Arewa Consultative Forum, O'Odua People's Congress, Movement of the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, Mambila Militia Group, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Groups prompted by religious extremism manifested more in the Northern part of Nigeria and included the Shiite Fundamentalist Group, the Maitatsine Group and recently the Boko Haram sect.

2.3. Emergence of terrorist activities in Southern Nigeria

The historical account of the emergence of conflicts and consequent terrorist activities in the Niger Delta region commences in 1958 when oil was first discovered and continues until 2009, when the Niger Delta militants were granted amnesty. Tamuno (2011) traces this development from 1958 when crude oil from Oloibiri (presently in the Bayelsa state of Nigeria) was first exported in commercial quantities, through the quest for a coastline for Biafra during the civil war years (1967 to 1970), to amnesty in 2009. He notes that Nigeria has not known real peace since then and that the long era of oil wars in the Niger Delta also contributed to threatening the interests of foreign stakeholders.

The development of terrorism marked a turning point in Nigeria in the 1990s with unprecedented crises in the country's South-South region, Nigeria's main oil revenue base. This resentment culminated in sporadic protests targeted mainly at the country's federal institutions and the oil multinationals that operated in the region, both of which were accused of complicity in the region's neglect, exploitation, and environmental degradation. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by the murdered activist, Ken Saro Wiwa, fuelled the clamour for resource control and vehemently denounced the continued oil exploitation by Shell Petroleum Company, the largest multi-national oil company in the area at the time. The demands for resource control were articulated in the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990).

According to UNPO Report (2020), the agitation by MOSOP attracted some sympathy even beyond the shores of Nigeria. It caused severe embarrassment to the then Nigerian Military Government under the late military dictator, General Sani Abacha. For this, in defiance of international pressure, Ken Saro–Wiwa and his nine co-comrades were classified as terrorists and killed by hanging in 1995.Rather than acting as a deterrent, this military action sparked off several protests in the region that culminated in several violent agitations, which provoked further uprising against the government and oil companies in the region. Consequently, in 1998, the Ijaw Youth Council (Ijaw is the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria and inhabits most of Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta) continued protracted insurgencies in the region (Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe 2013).

The Council released the Kaiama Declaration (KD) in 1998, the same year in which it claimed ownership of the oil deposits in all Ijaw land spanning over 60% of the exploratory oil fields in the Niger Delta. This Council gave an ultimatum to all oil companies and workers in the region to vacate all Ijaw land by the end of 2008 until the issue of resource control in the region was resolved. This action infuriated the Federal Government of Nigeria, which in response, declared a state of emergency in the region and followed up with the deployment of security operatives, including military and police personnel, for the protection of oil facilities and related assets as well as to drive out the Ijaw militants who had seized these assets.

The confrontation between the Nigerian security agencies and the intransigent Ijaw Youth Council led to the arrest and death of many Ijaw youths and triggered a series of further military actions. The Nigerian Military authorities providing security for Chevron and Texaco oil workers shot at protesters from the companies' helicopters, killing two protesters in the process. This incident sparked more disturbances, during which many police officers were murdered by the protesters, thereby escalating tensions in the region (Tamuno, 2011).

These events pushed the Nigerian government to order the military bombardment of Odi, one of the major oil-producing communities in the region. The Nigerian Military razed the community, and more than two thousand of the indigenes of the community were exterminated, with many others rendered homeless (Nwajah 2015, p.4). The community has yet to be compensated for the loss caused by this action despite their appeals to both the government of Nigeria and the United Nations (UN). Nigeria was consequently indicted by many domestic and international human rights groups, including Amnesty International, which continues to refer to this unwarranted military campaign and the killing of several resource control agitators, as a gruesome blemishon Nigeria's human rights record; (Amnesty International Reports 1999; 2000; and 2001; Environmental Rights Action Report 2002).

Rather than act as a deterrent to further communal protests in the region due to the military bombardment of Odi, many other communities were unrelenting in their challenge and protests against the continued oil exploration in the region. For example, the Odioma community came under fire by the military after

protesting against another multinational oil company in the region. These developments triggered another series of protests in the region and gave birth to many militant groups that wreaked havoc until the Federal Government initiated and implemented the Amnesty programme for militants in the region (Epelle 2010; Human Rights Watch 2003).

Despite all these protests being predicated on grievances, other motives cannot be ruled out Ikelegbe (2011) and Gilbert (2014) warned that the Niger Delta militants posed a severe threat to the area. According to them, besides using the unemployed youths for political thuggery, they were used as local militants to attack, bomb, vandalize and destroy oil pipelines, lives and property in the region. For more than a decade, this category of youths constituted the larger population of militants in the terrorised areas. They kidnapped both expatriates and local oil workers and held them for ransom, thereby contributing to a general state of insecurity.

2.4. Emergence of terrorist activities in Northern Nigeria

Since Nigeria's independence, the three major terrorist groups that have unleashed the worst terror in the country are the Niger Delta militants, the Maitatsine group and Boko-Haram. Though several other intransigent groups engaged in terrorist-like activities, these were ethnic and community-based pressure groups that did not attract much national and international attention (Imhonopi and Urim, 2016).

Boko-Haram group could be described as having caused more danger than all the other groups emerging in Nigeria. This group is linked to several international terror groups, especially Al-Qaida, from which it has received funds, and ISWAP. It was designated as an international terrorist group in 2013 after a Nigerian member of the group, Mutallab, was arrested and convicted by US authorities for attempting to blow up a US airliner. It is of interest that the designation as an "international terrorist group" was delayed until 2013, despite this group having been unleashing heavy casualties on the Nigerian nation since 2009 (Danjibo 2013).

The Maitasine group was masterminded by Mohammed Marwa, a Muslim immigrant from Cameroon, in 1945 and preceded the emergence of Boko-Haram. Marwa gained popularity for his hard-line controversial interpretation of the Holy Qur'an. The activities of this controversial Muslim preacher predate Nigeria's independence. He displayed a conservative demeanour and was radically opposed to the use of material acquisitions, including cars, radios, watches and bicycles. Officially, Maitasine was exiled by the British colonial government, but he returned to Kano after Nigeria gained independence (Osaghae 2002).

He was arrested in 1962 for breach of public order. After his release, he continued his campaign. By 1972, he had garnered a massive following after luring several ardent followers, especially the Yan Tasine (notorious armed radical religious insurgents in Northern Nigeria). During this era, the Maitasine group engaged in clashes that resulted in the loss of numerous lives, including the 1972 clash in a Mosque in

Kano, Nigeria (Adesoji 2011). Maitasine was arrested again in 1975 for slander, abuse and assault of constituted authorities. After this, he continued to gain increased followership and endorsement by religious authorities and instigated many confrontations against law enforcement agencies coupled with his continued whipping up of sentiments that the mainstream Muslim teachers were not doing enough for their communities. Many unemployed youths were attracted into this fold and used to cause considerable mayhem. By 1980, the Nigerian military moved in to control the situation, and the clashes resulted in the loss of an estimated five thousand lives, including the ringleader, Maitasine himself (Ewi, 2013).

In 1982, another series of crises erupted near Maiduguri, a major city in Northern Nigeria. These crises involved Maitasine followers and military authorities and led to the death of an estimated 3 350 people. Subsequently, Musa Makaniki, a close associate of Maitasine, took over the group's leadership and coordinated several violent attacks in Northern Nigeria in 1984. These clashes left 1 000 people dead and an estimated thirty thousand inhabitants homeless. The same spate of clashes led to the death of hundreds of people in 1985. The group's new leader had to escape to Cameroon to evade a series of onslaughts by Nigeria's military authorities but was eventually arrested in 2004.

Though several other militant groups with terrorist postures emerged and operated in Northern Nigeria after the Maitasine group, the most dangerous group among these remains the Boko-Haram sect. Boko-Haram was founded as a Sunni fundamentalist sect guided by strict adherence to Sharia doctrines and consequently transformed into a Salafist-Jihad's Sect in 2009. Boko-Haram was influenced by Wahhabi extremist indoctrination and constituted around the burning desire of this sect to Islamize Nigeria (Omonobi, 2011). The group completely opposes Western education and ideology and is dissatisfied that the country's wealth is controlled by the minority elite group, especially Christians, in Southern Nigeria.

On the origin of this sect, Onuoha (2010) observes that its emergence was somewhat controversial. In his opinion, the sect emerged in the mid-1990s. Initially, it claimed to have more than 40 000 members drawn from Nigeria and neighbouring countries such as Niger, Chad and the Benin Republic, and Somalia and Mauritania (Onuoha, 2010). The group, though disjointed, operates a cell-like structure in the Northern region of Nigeria. Aghedo and Osumah (2012), citing Omonobi (2011), observe that this sect is not monolithic but factionalized into two, including those who misrepresent Qur'anic doctrines and those determined to satisfy their criminal desires.

According to African Arguments (2015), the membership of the Boko–Haram's sect seems to be populated mainly with persons of Kanuri extraction. The publication attributes this to the founding of the sect in 2000, in Maiduguri, with a predominantly Kanuri population. Apart from the support it received from the seat of government in the city, the claim of the Kanuri majority in the sect was further evidenced from the report that most of the sect's insurgents killed by Nigerian security forces were of Kanuri descent. This publication questions why an ethnic group that constitutes only 8% of Nigeria's Muslim population dominates the sect.

It further observes that Boko-Haram could therefore be seen as a tribal insurgent group because it articulates the grievances of the Kanuri people against the Nigerian state and the Northern Hausa–Fulani establishment.

Ref World (2020) further notes that the Kanuri and the Hausa Fulanis were strange bedfellows. These groups came into conflict during the 1804 Sokoto Jihad, which caused a severe rivalry between them. Nevertheless, it is adduced that the Boko-Haram was not deterred from collaborating with the militant Fulani herdsmen despite this rivalry.

Searcy (2020) observes that Boko Haram intends to sustain the Uthman Dan Fodio's Sokoto Caliphate legacies. In addition, it seeks to shift the Northern power base to the Kanuri dominated Bornu state for the socio-economic growth of the Kanuri people, who feel marginalized by the Hausa Fulani oligarchy.

Apart from the militant activities orchestrated by all the groups in Northern Nigeria, another stimulant of terrorism in Northern Nigeria was the adoption of Sharia Law in 2000 by most of the states in the Northern part of the country. This fuelled ethno–religious conflicts and does not align with Nigeria's constitutionally declared secular status. It brewed tensions between the minority Christians and the majority Muslims in the Northern part of Nigeria. Though the adoption of Sharia in Northern Nigeria was used to assuage the Muslim majority in the North who had been critical of decades of misrule, poverty and their rulers whom they regarded as corrupt, the adverse consequences eventually outweighed the intended benefits (Obi, 2006).

Another situation that potentially aided the emergence of terrorism in this region was the hard-line Islamic adventurism by Muslim students in the North. These students were involved in sporadic protests and aggravated the upsurge of Muslim militancy in the North (Danjibo 2013).

According to Agbiboa (2015), the consequences of the introduction of Sharia cannot be ruled out as having stoked terrorism in Nigeria. He states that the Sharia Law debate, which manifested in the country immediately after its return to democratic governance, was consequent upon the politicization of religion. He links this to the politicisation and manipulation of religion which manifested in the Sharia Law debate, which induced serious controversies in the country immediately after its return to civil democratic governance in 1999. This controversy was further exacerbated when Zamfara state became the first state in Nigeria to introduce Sharia Law in its criminal justice system and for which introduces Sharia courts were established and granted the power to entertain both civil and criminal matters.

Felter (2018) notes that many analysts believe that the emergence of Boko-Haram was consequent upon religious and ethnocentric divisions that have for years constituted a significant challenge to the development of Nigeria. He traces this problem to the colonial administration in Nigeria, which merged the several territories in Nigeria that had little or nothing in common apart from their geographical proximity.

He also observes that since colonial times, Christians in Nigeria have always been anxious about the domination of the country's polity by Muslims whom they feared could use their political dominance to islamise the country's institutions by imposing Sharia Law in the country to diffuse westernization.

Boko-Haram is also influenced by radical Islamic teachers in Khartoum, whose main objective is to Islamize Nigeria. Its nominal head is Sheik Abubakar Shekau, whose existence to date is shrouded in confusion based on the Nigerian government's claim that he was murdered and the recent claim that he committed suicide (Campbell 2020). The strategy of this group involves suicide bombings, target assassinations, and mass killings, claiming several innocent victims from government and privately-owned corporate institutions. The group also unleashes mayhem against churches, schools and mosques. Members of the group are primarily unemployed and disgruntled youths from Northern Nigeria, most of whom are illiterate or pupils of Almajiri Qur'anic schools where they learn to memorize the Qu'ran and thereafter engage in street begging on the streets (Nigeria's Security Strategy, 2014).

2.5. Governance factors in the development of terrorism in Nigeria

Against the background provided regarding the emergence of terrorist groups in Nigeria, one must also understand that governance and security sector reform factors played a significant role in this case. Even before Nigeria reached the current catastrophic level of terrorist activity, Obi (2006) predicted that the West African region was very vulnerable to terrorism because of its political instability, poverty, socio-economic and governance crises, as well as conflicts that had ravaged the region. Thus, issues related to bad governance including poor handling of religion, corruption, poverty, institutional failure and mismanagement of resources, lack of autocratic dispositions of government institutions, etc are notable in this case.

Clarke (2010) also focused on governance-related reasons that could have potentially stimulated terrorism in Nigeria. These are: (i) onshore, and offshore conflicts with corporate oil companies; (ii) ethnic divisions; (iii) Muslim - Christian divides; (iv) practice of Sharia law in Northern states;(v) demands on the Federal government for genuine democratization; (vi) discontent of Southern Nigerian citizens; (vii) irredentist pressures from the oil-producing states for oil resource control; (viii) internal politics shaped by the elites and the military; (ix) political turmoil over democracy; (x) economic disparities.

Aghedo and Osuma (2012) echo the above positions and note that the country's leadership failed to entrench unity among the various ethnic nationalities, which was worsened by regional, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences. Chinwokwu (2013) lists the following contributory factors: unemployment, poverty, underemployment, the rise of indigenous new elites, executive lawlessness, marginalization, relative deprivation, oppression, neo-imperialist class and government's insincerity and insensitivity.

Zumve, Ingyoroko and Akuva (2013) support the above to some extent. They explain that the violent uprising, either by Boko-Haram terrorists or the militants in the Niger Delta, was consequent upon the frustration and attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment and economic distress or deprivation resulting from official corruption. They observe that the above trend was a product of a prolonged failure of the Nigerian state to show commitment or fulfil the obligations acceptable as standard or beneficial for all its citizens. They also stated that though religious and ethnic variables influence terrorist acts in Nigeria, official corruption and state neglect of the masses appeared most significant (Zumve et al., 2013).

Onuoha and Ezirim (2014) also provide several salient reasons why West African countries, especially Nigeria, have become havens of transnational crimes such as terrorism. They observe that although the West African States gained political independence before any other region in colonial Africa, they had failed to achieve a high degree of political stability due to corruption, weak or failed governance institutions, conflicts and porous borders. They emphasize that the Nigerian Boko-Haram's growing audacity, it's contagious networks in Nigeria's neighbouring countries and its affinity with international terrorist groups is one of the most prominent developments contributing to growing terrorism concerns in West Africa (Onuoha and Ezirim, 2014).

Onapajo (2013) notes that regardless of Nigeria's claims about the success of its counter-terrorism measures, terrorist activities in Nigeria are becoming more devastating. He attributes this situation to several reasons with governance and security sector reform implications. These include:(i) the deficient institutional capacity of the security agencies responsible for combating terrorism; (ii) inefficient intelligence sourcing; (iii) politicization of the research on Boko–Haram that associates the group with ethnic bias and presents its activities as Northern Nigerian vengeance against the South. According to Onapajo, the latter was evident in Nigeria's former president's allegation that some Northern elites supported Boko–Haram. Other factors at play include a lack of political will to deal with the problem and the criticisms of the security institutions for human rights violations in their counter-terrorism efforts (Onapajo, 2013).

Okoro (2014) observes that regardless of the various reasons advanced as the cause of terrorism in Nigeria, its underlying cause is the result of a governance crisis, especially in the Northern region of Nigeria, where extreme poverty frustrates communities and prompts them to resort to violence. He elaborates on this position and specifies the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of governance and security sector reform requirements as the reason for the expansion of terrorism. According to him, good governance and efficient security sector are challenged with weak and ineffective political institutions, poorly resourced security institutions, a lack of efficient and credible judicial structures and the pervasive corruption that erodes the resources required to make the necessary improvements.

Furthermore, Coker and George – Gency (2014) consider a significant reason for insecurity and lack of peace at the expense of sustainable development. Agbiboa (2015) further notes that pervasive poverty, corruption, abuse of human rights by law enforcement agencies and systematic impunity in crime control, all of which the Nigerian government have failed to address, creates the enabling environment for the manifestation of terrorism.

Similarly, the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) Report (2015) anchors Nigeria's present security challenges, especially terrorism, to governance failure. According to the report, these challenges are symptoms of bad governance that will linger unless the underlying governance problems are resolved. The ACSS Report evaluates Nigeria's security sector as not sufficiently capacitated to |effectively deal with insecurity, due to the following reasons: (i) Nigeria's security sector is excessively controlled by the executive, which diminishes the required legislative oversight of the sector; (ii) lack of experience of members of the various oversight institutions; (iii) the absence of a complementary strategic telecommunications policy that can boost the ability of relevant Non–Governmental Agencies (NGOs) to perform their oversight functions effectively. Exacerbating this status quo is a lack of trust between Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and security operatives. The excessive militarization of the sector poses a challenge for adequate subordination of security agencies to the required civil democratic supervision (ACCS, 2015).

USAID (2015) observes that Nigeria's present state of insecurity is a consequence of several years of a lack of good governance. This report lists factors such as the absence of economic growth and opportunities in the country's North-East region, limited political participation, ethno-religious extremism, poor education and health care provisions and extreme levels of corruption as contributors to the spate of terrorism activities in the country. The situation is worsened by the corrupt status of the country and factors that hinder its democratic governance, including (i) social forces that induce conflict and armed insurgencies; (ii) ineffective public institutions that fail to perform at the expense of the public interest; (iii) inability of the state to establish and maintain public security, which consequently encourages reliance on private security arrangements and (iv) the acute underdevelopment of the country's local government structures.

Further to the above, Moon (2015) states that insecurity and extremism have taken root in Nigeria because of mismanagement, bad governance and injustice. He observes that when there is absolute despair and little hope for a better future and when leaders do not demonstrate their concern for their people through inclusive governance, the people will inevitably seek other means of respite. He further notes that no country can tackle this threat alone, no matter how powerful or resourceful because these crimes are borderless.

Adedire, Ake and Olowojolu (2016) concede that terrorism threats in Nigeria are alarming, primarily due to the insurgencies of Boko - Haram. They further acknowledge that these challenges are consistent with

poor governance and security sector deficiencies, exacerbated by include (i) unemployment, (ii) weak institutional structures, (iii) corruption and (iv) arms proliferation. They anchor this position on the structural theory of revolution, which centres on the view that weaknesses in state structures could provide the precursor for revolution. For example, a government confronted with economic and security problems is susceptible to attacks by insurgents (Abedire et al., 2016).

More so, Atelhe, Anyabe and Abunimye (2016) note that the increasing rate of crises in Nigeria, including terrorism, results from the various security agencies' lack of capacity to counter these crises. They assert that Nigeria's security sector needs urgent transformation and reform. According to them, this is justified because the country's security institutions are ineffective. The situation is worsened by heightened insecurity, the absence of the rule of law, and human rights violations. The alarming increase in the incidence of crimes in Nigeria, especially terrorism, and the sophistication of terrorists, requires the urgent reform of the country's security sector. They, therefore, advise that this should include adequate resourcing of security agencies, addressing endemic corruption in Nigeria's law enforcement agencies, and improving governance (Atelhe et al., 2016).

Felter (2018) observes that Nigeria's corrupt status and inequality assisted the escalation of terrorism, especially the rise of Boko-Haram, which he notes, is merely a symptom of many years of bad governance and elite predation with severe consequences for the country. He stresses that despite Nigeria's rich natural resources, the country is home to one of Africa's most impoverished populations, with almost 50% of its two hundred million citizens living on less than $2.00 per day. He also notes that poverty is higher in the Northern part of Nigeria, where Boko-Haram has been causing severe turmoil. Oil money is also noted to have contributed to the creation of economic inequality with a very minimal number of elites controlling the country's wealth. According to Felter, this led to numerous government officials being charged for corrupt self-enrichment through the embezzlement of tens of billions of dollars from the oil sector (2018). Furthermore, he avers that terrorist activities in the country have discouraged international investments and consequently reduced its foreign direct investment inflows from $9 billion in 2011 to $3.5 billion in 2017 (2018).

Folarin (2020) stated that the threats of terrorism appear to be unending in Nigeria. He observes that Nigeria's security institutions have been confronting Boko-Haram terrorist group for ten years without much progress. Despite the relative success achieved between 2015 and 2016, since 2017, the group's activities have been escalating. This situation, according to him, was further heightened by the emergence and activities of the Islamic State in West Africa. He notes that despite military, international collaboration, and other counter-terrorism measures adopted by the Nigerian government, the threats of terrorism have not subsided. He attributes the situation to a lack of political will to deal with terrorism because of religious and ethnic affiliations and nepotism in Nigeria's security institutions. These, according to him, are further worsened by the corrupt activities of some security operatives who compromise the security strategies to

deal with terrorists. He illustrates this factor with the allegations that top security operatives steal funds earmarked for counter-terrorism operations.

Ijide (2020) affirms that the rising trend of insecurity, including terrorism challenge, carries with it, severe consequences for the economic development of Nigeria because it deters foreign direct investment in the country and with a further consequence of poverty and unemployment with the potential to induce insecurity.

Considering the rising threat of terrorism in Nigeria, the question is whether Nigeria's current security sector can adequately cope with this challenge especially through improvement of its security sector governance. According to PLAC (2017), this is possible, if necessary, changes including appropriate security reforms are considered. It observed that there seems to be a significant shift in Nigeria's security architecture with its expansion beyond the formal security actors to include non-state actors such as neighbourhood watches.

This shows that non-state actors and security institutions both provide security to communities throughout Nigeria. Some of Nigeria's citizens have therefore endorsed non-state actors regarding security, which consequently implies that statutory security institutions have lost part of their monopoly and legitimacy in the provision of security in the country.

The various constituents of effective security sector governance are highly imperative and require improvements. The UNODC (2020) undertook a special project aimed at strengthening Nigeria's counter-terrorism capacity. According to this report, the project intended to improve Nigeria's criminal justice capacity to support effective investigations, prosecution, adjudication of terrorist cases, promotion of interagency and international cooperation, enhancement of the national legal regime against terrorism and respect for human rights in line with the acceptable rule of law standards.

The literature reviewed in the preceding section provided a general perspective of the development of terrorism in Nigeria. The following sections will focus on the governance-related factors that could have precipitated the terrorism spike in Nigeria's two main regions.

2.5.1. Governance factors that induced terrorism in Southern Nigeria

To properly situate the reasons for the sustenance of terrorism activities in the two main regions of Nigeria, the need to also elaborate on the security sector governance related factors that possibly influenced the development of this crime is necessary at this point. The consensus of most scholars is that terrorism in southern Nigeria was induced mainly by governance-related factors, especially the lack of human security provisions. Kenedi (2006) links this to the exploitation of oil and consequent environmental degradation in the region caused by multinationals with the complicity of the Nigerian government. He states that the crises in the region were essentially the product of a history of injustice, inequity, a legacy of military

dictatorship and the militarization of the region. Kenedi goes further to include the actions of the globalized political economy to foster oil predation by involving the Nigerian security agencies, oil multinationals and the local elite through their politics and policies (2006).

Akinbobola (2010) focuses on the economic causes and consequences of the rise of terrorism. He reminds us that while Nigeria was the sixth largest producer and exporter of crude oil, oil exploration and production caused pollution, destruction of the environment and general underdevelopment in their area.

Oyeniyi (2010) notes that oil exploration in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria contributed to poverty and underdevelopment in the region. He noted that the exploration methods adopted by multinational oil companies aggravated the situation because of their usage of obsolete equipment with consequent environmental depletion, which denied the people their rightful livelihoods and inevitably pushed them into terrorism.

Idumange (2011) broadens this perspective and stresses that the state of neglect in the Niger Delta set the stage for violent terrorist acts of kidnapping, hostage-taking and hijacking. He states that the Niger Delta region is characterized by widespread poverty, with about 70% living below the poverty line. On this note, Zumve (2013) states that the people of the region classified as the Niger Delta, just like other parts of Nigeria, live in dehumanizing conditions and in most cases, without electricity, pipe-borne water, hospitals, housing or schools.

Terrorist activities in the Niger Delta region have also been linked to the quest for economic self-determination and tied to oil politics. In this context, Obi (2010) affirms that what was at stake was the control, distribution and redistribution of the benefits from oil production and sales and how the region's people could access a substantial part of these benefits. He observes that most of the people were alienated and bitter. He blames the Federal and state governments and oil companies, which he advises, should approach the issue from the perspective of positively uplifting the socio-economic conditions in the region.

Also, Ojokorotu (2010) states that because of the militant activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria that no responsible or sane investor would want to invest in a country characterized by insecurity, confusion and uncertainty. Besides the reluctance of new investors, existing investors would likely relocate to areas where their investments would be protected. Losing investment exacerbates the crisis of youth unemployment and further reduces the country's economic fortunes with related adverse consequences on the country’s security and democratic development.

Davieson (2014) stated that militancy in the Niger Delta is not unconnected to the destruction of livelihoods and the economic reliance of the people on multinational oil companies. He further claims that this is orchestrated by the collusion of indigenous actors whom he accuses of deliberate and selfish obstruction

of a diplomatic resolution for the Niger Delta problem because they benefit from the persistent conflicts in the region. He, therefore, states that the suffering of the people is due to the total depletion of their economic mainstay, which continues to worsen while few unscrupulous persons, who pretend to be freedom fighters, continue to be extremely wealthy at the expense of the masses (Davieson, 2014).

Similar governance-related factors that instigated terrorism in Southern Nigeria were also notable in the Northern region, with some variations. The factors that were most significant in this case include socio-economic circumstances, religion and toxic education doctrines.

2.5.2. Governance factors that induced terrorism in Northern Nigeria

As already stated, governance related developments equally contributed to terrorism activities in Northern region of Nigeria. The responsible factors are analysed as follows:

2.5.2 (a) Religion and toxic education doctrines

Northern Nigeria is located within the Sahel and the Southern-most limits of the Sahara. This region falls within an area that is potentially prone to religion-induced terrorist attacks. Backford and Wallis (2006), in this context, claim that nowadays, instead of too little religion, there is too much of it. Danjibo (2007) observes that religion in Nigeria was always utilised negatively rather than positively. He demonstrates this with the case of the 1804 Sokoto Jihad, Nigerian Civil War propaganda, the Sharia law controversy, tensions provoked by Nigeria's membership of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), contributed to the ongoing religious crisis engulfing Northern Nigeria.

The arming and training of militant groups in Northern Nigeria is also a contributing factor traced to funding from Muslim religious groups in Saudi Arabia and other radical Islamic countries such as Libya, especially during the reign of Ghaddafi.

Tell (2009) observes that the mission of Boko-Haram is congruent with the need to establish an Islamic state where orthodox Islam is practised. Boko-Haram views Western education and working in the civil service as reprehensible and supports the idea that all government institutions, including security agencies such as the police, the military and other uniformed personnel, should be crushed. Obi (2010) adds that West Africa has a substantial Muslim population, estimated at 40%, with links to Al-Qaeda. He is aligned with the perceptions of Western strategic thinkers that Muslims in West Africa, especially countries in the Sahelian belt, including Nigeria, provided sanctuary for terrorists.

Apart from the militant activities orchestrated by intransigent groups in Northern Nigeria, another factor vital to the inducement and development of terrorism in Northern Nigeria was the adoption of Sharia Law by most states in the Northern part of the country in 2000.This fuelled ethno religious conflicts in Nigeria. This was not in consonance with the constitutionally declared secularity status of Nigeria and its consequence could not be overemphasized. Tensions brewed between the minority Christians and the

majority Muslims in the Northern part of Nigeria. Though the adoption of Sharia in Northern Nigeria was used to assuage the Muslim majority in the North who had been critical of decades of misrule, poverty and their rulers whom they regarded as corrupt, the adverse consequences eventually outweighed the intended benefits (Obi, 2010). Thus, the Sharia controversy fuelled insecurity in the country, and the Boko-Haram sect also leveraged this to pursue their militant extremism.

Okoro (2014) also noted that the partial implementation of Sharia Law beginning from 2000 in twelve Northern states of Nigeria and the clamour for its full implementation by many Islamic fundamentalists possibly spurred the rise of Boko Haram. He noted that the origins and the recent activities of Boko Haram are indications of the annoyance of the group regarding the manner Nigeria's government managed the Sharia Law which was long been awaited.

Ochonu (2014) claims that the desperation to resort to a religious solution to resolve Nigeria's socio-economic and political challenges also caused severe social cracks in the Nigerian polity with the consequent engendering of insurgencies, including the persistent terrorist onslaughts of the Boko–Haram sect.

Felter (2018) noted that it is the belief of many analysts that the emergence of Boko Haram was consequent upon religious and ethnocentric divisions that has for years constituted a serious challenge to the development of Nigeria. He traced this problem to the colonial administration in Nigeria which merged the several territories in Nigeria which had little or nothing in common apart from their geographical proximity. He observed that since colonial times that Christians in Nigeria have always been anxious about the domination of the country's polity by Muslims whom they feared could use their political dominance to Islamise the country.

The use of religious doctrines for negative sensitization is also noticeable in Northern Nigeria, where pupils are negatively sensitized using traditional educational mediums. For example, Davieson (2014) notes that vulnerable Muslims were induced to believe that paying the supreme sacrifice in the fight against those considered as *infidels* was a rare privilege from God. Part of the original confession he extracted from a Boko-Haram fugitive hinted that to be a suicide bomber is a special divine calling and "receives the blessing of Allah" (p. 234). Davieson further states that though this is illusory, Muslim suicide bombers fall for this propaganda and are recruited, brainwashed and negatively sensitized to engage in terrorist acts (2014).

The above is in line with the position of Ladbury, Allamin, Nagarajan, Francis and Ukiwo (2016). They observe that Boko-Haram adopts religious indoctrination as a tool to recruit boys and girls of school age who are kept in a large house for religious teaching. Unknown to their parents, this teaching not only concentrates on Qu'ranic instruction but also included the injunction to use violence against any person opposed to the radical indoctrination they receive (2016).

The poor educational administration that operated in Northern Nigeria also contributed to the above situation. Danjibo (2013) states that in 1964, the late Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, boasted of having established over two million Qu'ranic schools in Northern Nigeria. This projection received the endorsement of the colonial government so that they could sustain their indirect rule in the country. He states that the colonists ignored the point that without proper monitoring to ensure that these schools were devoted to scholarship, they would develop into institutions used for negative campaigns.

The Almajiri educational system is noted as a consequence of bad governance in Nigeria which also contributed to terrorism in Northern Nigeria. They include the downtrodden in society whose primary means of livelihood is begging for alms. The consequences of this system are outlined in a UNICEF Report: Children under the Almajiri system are subjected to degrading jobs. This is detrimental to their health and wellbeing, a serious infringement on their rights, a violation of their development and a potential conduit to involvement in violent activities (UNICEF, 2008).

Yusha'u, Tsafe, Babangida and Lawal (2013) trace the origin of the Almajiri system to Prophet Mohammed's pilgrimage from Mecca to Medina. According to their study, the concept of Almajiri derives from the Arabic word *Almuhajrun*, which refers to the indigenous means of grasping and memorizing the holy Qu'ran in the language of the Hausa Fulani. This system further involves sending young boys to other villages, towns or cities to acquire Qu'ranic education. Yusha'u et al. further observe that this education system was semi-formal and non-secular, involving young children aged 4 -18 who are put under the tutelage and mentorship of roving Islamic teachers known as mallams (2013).

According to World Bank Report (2014 p.1), there were nearly 9.5 million Almajiri children in Northern Nigeria who roamed the streets for alms due to poverty and posed a serious national security threat, given the high possibility of their being indoctrinated into terrorist activities. Further, in Northern Nigeria, there were two types of schools: those that provided Western education, known as *Makaran Boko* and those that provided Muslim religious instruction known as *Makarantan addini* (Odimegwu, 2015). The *Almajeri* school system, which concentrated on the learning of the Qu'ran, was preferred by the Muslim elites because they sensitized their wards to follow suit and view pupils in the Western educational school with antagonism.

2.5.2 (b) Infiltration of international terror groups

The infiltration of other international terrorist groups, especially Al-Qaeda, further facilitated terrorism in Northern Nigeria. According to Bartolotta (2011), it was daunting that Al-Qaeda was expanding into sub-Saharan Africa, especially Nigeria. In their conclusion that the threat of terrorism is real in West Africa, Onuoha and Ezirim (2013) identified Al-Qaeda as the driving force, especially in Nigeria. This conclusion was based on the group's involvement in most terrorist attacks in the region and its support to other terrorist groups. According to them, this is why Boko-Haram transformed from being a mere domestic

group to an international one, which now strikes international targets, as exemplified by the bombing of the United Nations Office in Abuja in 2011.

In support for the above, Malaifa (2012) reports that Gaddafi funded terrorist groups in Nigeria in the same manner that Saudi Arabia and Iran did. According to him, these countries spent billions of dollars annually to support Islamic militant groups globally, including Nigeria. Davieson (2014) also report that UK and US secret agents in Nigeria revealed that the then Libyan leader created terrorist cells in the Sahel and supplied them with arms and ammunition. Gaddafi was also exposed for being the first person who sponsored and bankrolled Boko-Haram with the intention to disintegrate Nigeria, take over the country, and completely Islamise it. The murder of Gaddafi was also noted to further complicate the situation. According to Adetula (2015), the extermination of Muammar Gaddafi and his government in Libya and the consequent dispersal of his loyal fighters to different African and Middle East countries, created a very high possibility that these fighters could flee to Nigeria and be recruited into militant Islamic groups. He goes on to state that these dispersed religious-political extremists and movements are likely to seek new locations to export terror under the cover of international Islamic revolution (Adetula, 2015).

Having considered the development of terrorism, including factors that possibly contributed to its growth in Nigeria, it is important to note that the resultant activities associated with this crime are achieved and sustained via illicit support. The most utilitarian of these supports is illicit funding or terrorism financing.

2.6. Terrorism financing

Several illicit resources are accessed to support terrorism. These include arms, strategic, organizational intelligence, operational, personnel and financial support. Of these, illicit financial support appears the most vital because it can be utilised to procure additional support. The criminalisation of terrorism financing was first given international legal impetus by the International Convention for the suppression of the financing of Terrorism (1999).

The place of terrorism financing in terrorism is very crucial. According to Clark (2015), terrorist organizations require funding for several reasons. These include recruitment of their fighters, for the purchase of the required equipment for their activities and to expand and consolidate their operational scope as well as provide support to their members. Rock (2016) in this case noted that the extent of success and existence of any terrorist organization including Nigeria's terrorist groups are dependent on the resources they can acquire through terrorism financing.

It has really not been easy to provide a universally accepted definition of terrorism financing and for which reason; several meanings have been adduced to it. Nevertheless, Baffoe (2017) observed that it implies the several sources and avenues that terrorist organizations depend on to raise resources for their terrorism activities. These according to Freeman (2011) include donations from charity organizations supports from members and from those who support and sympathize with them as well as from rogue states and through

money laundering and black-market operations, human and drug trafficking, kidnapping and hostage taking activities.

The Financial Action Task Force Report (2014) stated that terrorists depend on funding from both legal and illegal sources and the transmission of the same through formal and informal conduits.

The NFIU Report states that "terrorism financing implies any direct or indirect provision of or collection of funds unlawfully and wilfully by a person or organization with the intention or, with the understanding of utilizing same either totally or partly, for the purpose of perpetrating an act of terrorism". Such funds in this case include tangible or intangible assets, either movable or immovable, however acquired. Others are legal documents or instruments in any form including electronic or digital, title to, or interest in such assets, including but not limited to bank credits, travellers' cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, and letters of credit (2013 p.2).

The Report of the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force Report (CTIFF, 2009) describes terrorism financing as "all such distinct activities involving raising, storing and concealment of funds and eventual utilization of same to sustain terrorist organizations and infrastructure and transferring these funds to support or carry out specific terrorist attacks" (p.2). These funds, according to the report, are generated through legal or illegal means. Legitimate humanitarian or business organizations are also knowingly or unknowingly used to funnel financial or logistic support for terrorist acts. Baffoe (2017) also conceived terrorism financing to include the various sources used by terrorist organizations and their sponsors to acquire resources for their terrorist and related activities.

There are several means that have been identified as sources and means of funds for terrorist organisations. The use of Non-profit organizations (NPOs) as vehicles for terrorist financing is also notable. According to CTITF (2009), NPOs broadly implies the many associations that are devoted to raising money to support relief work overseas. These NPOs according to the report have an estimated operating expenditure of 1.3 trillion US Dollars which is equated to the GDP of either the UK or France and employs 40million people across the globe exceeding the employment figure of the combined personnel strength of the world's largest corporations. It is also estimated that NPOs channel billions of dollars for development assistance annually.

The capacity of these NPOs can also be subject to abuse and criminal utilization. The representation in CTITF (2009) observed that though NPOs occupy a crucial position in the mitigation of such supportive conditions for terrorism, they also inadvertently provide platforms for terrorism financing. It exemplified such role of NPOs in the reduction of terrorism to include building of social infrastructures and increasing community interactions. However, it noted that the same role can also be negatively utilized to prop up terrorist activities.

Furthermore, Maza, Koldas and Akist (2020) noted that because of the observation of the role of terrorism financing in the success of the 9/11 terrorist activity, the US made it imperative for more efforts to counter terrorism financing. According to Clark (2015), this prompted the legislation by the US House of Representatives Committee Report on managing terrorism financing risk in remittances and money transfers (2017). Consequent upon this, more than $147.4 million illicit funds suspected to be utilized for terrorism onslaughts were tracked by US authorities. It was because of the same reason that many terrorist organizations changed their fund transmission methods by being very covert in their financing sources and distribution pattern especially through financial institutions. They also try to circumvent the minimum threshold requirement by splitting their monetary transfers.

More so, The NFIU study identified categorized three patterns of terrorist financing by Nigerian terrorists: (i) drug trafficking, (ii) trade and (iii) arms smuggling. The study came up with several observations using these categories, including methods used by these terrorists to raise, move and utilise funds. These include membership contributions, donations by sympathisers including Nigerians; through, bank robberies, ransoms from hostage-taking, drug trafficking, sea piracy, extortion, blackmail, trade financing and exploitation and protection fees. The NFIU Report further reveals that some of Nigeria's terrorist groups procure funding from unpatriotic individuals in Nigeria and related international organizations. (2014).

Infractions by government officials and politicians also aid terrorism financing. The FATF (2013) Report states that the quantity of illicit funds resulting from corrupt practices by government officials outweighs the amount derived from other forms of corruption perpetrated in West Africa. The report notes that the most disappointing in this case was the trend whereby politicians and top-level government officials get involved or are complicit in perpetrating organized crimes (Udama, 2013; UNODC 2015, 2016).

Specific to Boko – Haram, Margin and Demontclos (2018) noted that it funds its activities through tacit state and other sundry convert supports. In the same vein, Comolli (2015) averred that Boko-Haram also utilize legal means to fund its terror activities. He noted that between 2002 and 2009 that this sect relied on microfinance contributions by it members to fund its operations. It also relied on the loan scheme it established which enabled members to get loans of between $32 to $10,000 which acted as a means of encouraging and retaining these members to carry out its course.

Other means of raising funds by Boko – Haram as stated by Markovic (2020) includes robberies and lootings to get food, goods, cattle rustling through which it has been able to steal thousands of cattle and money by raiding villages, communities as well as farms, police stations, village markets. Fanusic and Entz (2017) stated that Boko – Haram derived almost $10 million between 2014 – 2015 from different modes of stealing and solicitation of donations. They also observed that Boko – Haram equally get funding from external sources including rich independent financiers with the resources to support the group. The example of this as mentioned earlier was Osama Bin Laden who remitted $3 million dollars to the group in 2002.

Terrorist organizations are also noted to be taking advantage of on-line monetary instruments improvement including crypto currencies to source for and covertly hide the transmission of their funds. This revelation was corroborated in the Europol Report on internet organized crime threat assessment (2015). The report stated that criminal organized groups used crypto currencies in 40% of all their financial transactions in view of the ease with which bitcoins can be used to make financial remittances. This was further supported by a US Department of Justice Press Release (2020) which indicated that the US made seizures of several millions of dollars domiciled in more than 300 crypto currency accounts which were traced to terrorist groups.

The following modes of transmission of funds by the terrorist groups were also included in the report: (i) Frequent Automated Teller Machine (ATM) withdrawals, (ii) cash deposits and withdrawal from high-risk terrorist zones, (iii) depositing cash in multiple branches of the same financial institution by various persons, followed by rapid large cash withdrawals, (iv) significant deposits in foreign currencies to personal accounts over a short period, (v) physical movement of cash by cash couriers, (vi) frequent electronic transfers from foreign donors, (vii) significant cross border movement of cash, cross border trading and accessing funds held in foreign financial institutions by debit or credit cards as well as (viii) protection fees.

Banks, as well as other financial and non-financial institutions, have consciously and unknowingly been used by terrorists to transmit funds for the upkeep of members and their families, settlements to suicide bombers, the purchase of arms and ammunition and other logistic requirements (Stewart and Wroughton, 2014; Central Bank of Nigeria, 2017).

At this point, it is important to understand the various purpose of terrorism financing. These according to Ohanyere (2016) includes: payment of salaries, personal upkeep of members, the procurement of arms and ammunition including explosives and other necessary logistics, the mobilisation of members to undertake violent attacks, including suicide missions and settlements for the families of suicide bombers as well as for operational financing. Other purposes identified include surveillance and identification of targets, grants for recruits, accommodation for members and sites for the production of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

The above analysis could have shown that terrorism financing is a major support to terrorism activities and require to be mitigated. Nevertheless, this is not very easy.

Maza, Koldas and Aksit (2020) acknowledged that terrorism financing constitutes a major life wire of terrorist organizations. He observed that the tracking and combating the various sources of funding to these organizations have remained a serious challenge in the efforts by concerned state and non-state actors to counter terrorism. According to them, the reason for this is the multiplicity of sources and several reasons for which these illicit funds are sourced. It is therefore necessary to ensure that countering

terrorism financing is adequately integrated in the overall security sector governance strategies to manage terrorism especially in the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the sector.

2.7. Institutional capacity

Having examined the development of terrorism and its threats in Nigeria, with terrorism financing as a major support, the need to assess the various means through which these threats can be managed becomes necessary. To this end, the various security sector governance requirements, including the institutional capacity of the sector, are analysed.

One of the relevant components listed in the AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (2013) and supported in the ECOWAS version (2016) is the institutional capacity of the security sector. Institutional capacity includes the available resources necessary for the constituent security and law enforcement agencies to counter security threats effectively. It is therefore important at this juncture to provide assessments of these resources.

The various security institutions that constitute Nigeria's security sector have often been assessed as unsatisfactory in terms of their core objective: to provide for the safety of lives and property in the country. Ijide (2020) highlights several factors contributing to this poor performance. These according to him include: (i) insufficient funding, (ii) human resources constraints, (iii) lack of modern equipment, (iv) corruption and (v) poor security sector governance. Other factors listed include the over-centralization of security obligations and responsibilities at the centre of the federal government and the creation of multiple agencies with overlapping functions (Ijide, 2020).

The Nigerian Network on Security and Democratic Governance (NNSDG) Report (2016) points to excessive bureaucracy, personalization and corruption as part of the problem. In its support of this statement and using the Nigerian military as an example, the International Crisis Group Report (2016) noted that the Nigerian military is not only ill-equipped but is actually in distress.

According to available records regarding equipment required by the Nigerian Army, resources are grossly inadequate. Most of this equipment is not only obsolete but unserviceable. This observation contained in the Global Security Report (2020), states that the inadequacy of the required equipment to confront security challenges by Nigeria's security institutions is a clear indication that their capacity is grossly inadequate. Of the 528 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) required to equip one of the country's military battalions, only 79 were in good shape and at least serviceable. This means that only 15% of these battalions have the required capacity to be battle-ready. The same report indicated that only 136 military tanks out of the 216 required were serviceable (Global Security Report, 2020).

In addition to Nigeria's security institutions' inadequate equipment, which limits security agencies in discharging their duties, the issue of vast gaps in the skill and knowledge of their operatives was

highlighted. This situation is further compounded by a lack of the required level of professionalism. According to Ijide (2020), these gaps have negative implications in the intelligence sourcing and application capacity of these operatives. Furthermore, these institutions are not being kept abreast regarding current technological requirements, including lack of equipment maintenance culture.

The human resources capacity of Nigeria's security institutions is also singled out as requiring improvement. The workforce of these security institutions is reported as insufficient. This observation was contained in the strategic statement of the international Crisis Groups (2016) and linked to deficient and improper planning. In the 2020 edition, the Nigerian army was described as lacking the required human resources. In 2020, its workforce was estimated to be 80 000. However, this figure may not be accurate because some of this number had either absconded, died, dismissed or were voluntarily discharged, making it difficult to determine the true strength of the country's army.

The need for an improved and transparent recruitment and training programme is another vital human resource requirement. A primary objective of a transparent and efficient recruitment programme is to weed out unqualified applicants with the potential to derail the desired objective of security institutions and to ensure that the most qualified ones are selected. Appropriately qualified applicants can be used for positive capacity development that will help these institutions fulfil their organizational objectives. This seems not to be the case. Accordingly, the Nigerian Network on Security and Democratic Governance Report (2016) avers that the recruitment into the various security agencies in Nigeria has been deeply corrupted. Their essence has been so weakened due to several infractions with the result that unqualified persons are eventually recruited. According to the report, problematic recruitment practices are so institutionalized in Nigeria that senior government officials are complicit in these transgressions because of their desire to ensure that their candidates are chosen. This corrupt selection system is further entrenched by benefactors of the unqualified recruits, who ensure that they are continuously aided in their career progression (Democratic Governance Report 2016).

Security education is also a vital security requirement for the enhancement of the institutional capacity of the sector. It is helpful for positive mental development and instilling a sense of civic responsibility and equipping recipients with the required skills for employment and for meaningful livelihood. Consequently, education as a dividend of good governance can also be a tool for crime reduction by improving the capacity of security operatives to perform in their roles. Akinade (2019) anchored this on the provision of security education, which provides security operatives with the required exposure that enhance their capacity to protect lives and property. It can also help in career growth and the achievement of professional excellence. Professional excellence and accountability are vital because security responsibility is highly sensitive, and it will be perilous to entrust this responsibility to operatives that are not adequately trained.

For the above reasons, Akinade advanced the following schedules for the required security training: (i) induction training for recruits to help them understand their responsibilities and to appropriately adapt to the organizational culture of their security organizations and constituencies, (ii) skills development programmes to enhance operational capabilities, (iii) career development programmes to assist the operatives to plan, develop and manage their careers and equip them with the required capacities to cope with challenging situations, (iv) leadership and management programmes to enhance competences through real and simulated situations, (v) educational support to assist them to bridge the gap between theory and practice (2019). The above schedules can help realise the capacity building needs of Nigeria's security agencies, especially those in charge of countering terrorism. This objective is very vital and requires modern training resources and aids to achieve it. However, this was noted as a serious area of concern by that requires resolution (Nigeria's National Security Strategy 2014).

Hickey recommends the inclusion of risk management and soft skills development in the training syllabus of security agencies. He notes that critical and creative thinking, reflective reasoning and leveraging technology, constitute vital requirements that can equip Nigeria's security operatives with the needed potential to perform their given assignments effectively (2007).

Training also helps to inculcate the required etiquette and professional responsibility. Thus, without training, it will be challenging, if not impossible, for these operatives to perform effectively in their assigned roles. In this context, Ijide (2020) notes that insufficient training results in the depreciation of knowledge and can result in insufficient capacity and occupational stress leading to various hazards, including accidental discharge of ballistics.

The International Crisis Group Report (2016) observes that Nigeria's Defence training institutions lack the required training facilities. Those available are obsolete, and instructors' lack of motivation compounds the situation due to poor remuneration and welfare. The importance of training, especially for security and law enforcement operatives, cannot be overemphasized.

The institutional capacity of Nigeria's security sector is also affected by insufficient funding to address the heightened security challenges facing the country. This is worsened by the noticeable difference between the funds budgeted and actual budgetary expenditure. Iroegbu (2019) uses the military to exemplify this unsatisfactory state of affairs. He states that military expenditure depreciated from almost $2.10 million to $1.190 million between 2010 and 2018. The case of underfunding for the Nigerian police is even more severe. Records from Nigeria's budget office show that the Nigerian Police Force received a mere N25.2 billion in 2018 for its capital expenditure out of the N342.9 billion budgeted. In this case, the example provided by Ijide (2020) is very instructive. He notes that of the $6.25 billion military defence budget in 2014, only $1.8 billion of this amount was actually spent. The consequence of this situation results in the

inability of the various security agencies to purchase the necessary equipment for their security responsibilities.

Despite the above inadequacies, several additional violations have further worsened the situation. This observation is in synch with the information contained in the Transparency International (TI) and Civil Society Legislative and Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) Reports (2018). These reports observe that billions of dollars of security votes are squandered because of a lack of transparency in the appropriation of security votes. These reports concluded that the problem is complicated more by an evident lack of accountability and oversight, creating fertile ground for corruption. These reports revealed that the budgeting of public funds, using the tag of "security votes", helps to limit budgetary allocations for real security needs unacceptably and indeed provides opportunities for corruption. For example, the report shows that an estimated $670 million is budgeted for security votes in Nigeria annually, which is far higher than the Nigerian Army's and Air-Force's combined annual budgets.

The above indications suggest that the institutional capacity of Nigeria's security sector is deficient and that the various security and law enforcement agencies need to collaborate, pool their resources and explore relevant international collaborative initiatives.

2.8. Inter-agency cooperation

One of the most crucial obligations of the security sector governance programme is strengthening security institutions with the resources required to enhance their capacity. According to Onovo (2018), this has not been achieved in Nigeria because of under resourcing of these agencies. This accordingly underscores the need for institutions to share relevant resources and capacities in order to try and reduce the gap as well as help them to tackle terrorist threats.

Bristow (2013) presents a well-articulated view on interagency cooperation and central intelligence sharing as vital tools to check the threats of terrorism. He stresses that developing and delivering bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation is not easy. He cites, as an example, the US, which has over eighteen thousand law enforcement agencies which are not easy to coordinate especially in the harmonisation of their functions. According to him, the need for proper coordination through the use of a fusion centre for intelligence sharing is very critical. Bristow advises that criminal intelligence is the life wire of any law enforcement agency, wherever it is situated maximising efficiency in managing and sharing this information nationally and internationally is a critical factor in successfully tackling security challenges (2013).

Abubakar (2015) observed in this case that interagency cooperation is necessary for countering terrorism financing. Maza et al. (2020) also aver that multiagency collaboration among security agencies, financial

institutions and civil society organizations is a desirable necessity that can help to consolidate and sustain the benefits of the country's efforts to combat terrorism financing and consequently control terrorism.

Adeniyi (2013) observed that interagency cooperation among security agencies responsible for counter terrorism in Nigeria is critical for boosting the capacity of these agencies. He noted that globally, security experts and political scientists have long been concerned about the tension between institutional fragmentation and policy coordination among security agencies. According to him, this challenge stems from interagency non–cooperation especially due to conflicting roles and superiority struggles. He used the bombing at Nigeria's Eagle Square during the Independence Anniversary in Nigeria in, 2010 as a classic example. He observed that before this occurrence, the country's security capabilities were measured in terms of training and equipment capacity.

He however noted that this bombing revealed the disjuncture in the collaboration among agencies responsible for counter-terrorism in Nigeria. He further notes that this situation created new awareness on the need for cooperation among these agencies. Unfortunately, he avers that while the urgency for interagency synergy became obvious, it unravelled the years of rivalry between and among Nigeria's security agencies.

Sanders (2013), attributes the above situation to the complex definition of roles and indiscriminate usurpation of functions by the military personnel because of having been in control of the central government for many years and the consequent hangover of superiority complex over other security agencies that are new and are equally charged with internal security.

This is in tandem with the reasons provided by Odoma (2014) and revolves around superiority struggles among Nigeria's security agencies. He based this on the fact that the roles and powers of these agencies are derivable from the country's constitutional provisions and related statutory instruments which did not ascribe any senior or superior status to any security institution in the country. He therefore, frowns at the tendency of security operatives to engage in unhealthy rivalries rather than exploring avenues of collaboration, especially in areas of capacity building and intelligence exchange. He adds that rather than complement each other, Nigeria's security agencies view each other as a threat, which degenerates their respective capacities and rendering them incapable of tackling the lingering security challenges facing the nation.

Mohammed, Yusuf and Garba (2019) observe that though interagency rivalry exists amongst Nigeria's security agencies, this is not peculiar to Nigeria but a global challenge consequent upon dealing with security threats. According to Mohammed et al., the need for interagency cooperation emanates from the complexity of security challenges and the difficulty of mitigating these challenges, which underscores the need for relevant agencies involved in the role, to cooperate. They aver that this need is provided for by

Nigeria's Police Act (2007). They also note that the roles of the various security agencies can complement each other. They list these agencies as,(i) the National Intelligence Agency in charge of Nigeria's foreign intelligence, (ii) the Department of state security services in charge of internal security, (iii) the military in charge of protecting Nigeria's territorial integrity and assisting in the provision of internal security when called upon, (iv) the police in charge of crime detection and prevention, (v) Customs Control for the prevention of contraband importation and illegal arms importation through the country's borders (Mohammed et al., 2019).

In view of the foregoing, Innocent (2019) stated that the poor state of interagency cooperation among security agencies in Nigeria has eroded their credibility and consequently diminished their qualification to engage in fruitful interagency and international collaborative schemes. On this note, he averred that lack of interagency cooperation among Nigeria's security agencies is one of the causes of the poor success of Nigeria's counter terrorism efforts.

Interagency cooperation against terrorism financing is also important in counter terrorism. However, it seems that Nigeria's effort in this direction is yet to be satisfactory. An example in this case was provided in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2016). It observes that Nigeria's Department of State Security Services (DSS) is one of the important institutions for terrorism intervention in Nigeria but has come under attack by other law enforcement agencies for not cooperating with them. These agencies criticize the DSS as ill-equipped to conduct terrorism financing or money laundering investigations, which are critical in any effective counter-terror campaign but refuses to cooperate with other agencies that are better equipped to handle these roles.

As a means of resolving this impasse, Abubakar (2015) notes that the country had established a multi-agency scheme to synergise the activities of its security agencies and financial institutions to effectively control terrorism financing. Arseneult (2015), on the same note, avers the need for cooperation between Nigerian banks and security agencies in the exchange of intelligence and reporting of terrorist activities, especially by Boko-Haram. This counsel synchronises with the observation of Iloanusi (2019) that Boko-Haram was collaborating with rogue NGOs in illicit money laundering to support its activities and therefore underscore the need for the cooperation of relevant law enforcement agencies in the country to track and decimate such connections.

Obi (2017) observes that the cooperation of security agencies in Nigeria's Security Sector is vital. He notes that this expectation seems unrealisable in Nigeria due to interagency conflicts that often play out in public feuds that provoke the citizenry's discontent. He states further that it is for this reason that Nigeria's civil society is presently not willing to support these agencies with valuable information to help their crime control efforts but will instead cooperate with private security groups.

Lawal (2020), in his assessment of Nigeria's security sector, notes that citizens do not trust the sector because it has not been able to live up to their expectations to provide peace. According to him, security agencies usurp each other's respective roles and jurisdictions, exacerbating their failures, including corrupt practices that stoke up added threats.

The literature studied shows that the quality of interagency cooperation among the constituent security and law enforcement agencies in Nigeria is not encouraging. This underscores the need to explore further support, including the consideration of international cooperation.

2.9. International cooperation

From the preceding, we can infer that the quality of interagency requirement that can support the country's security sector to effectively manage terrorism has not been sufficiently achieved. As a result, relevant international cooperation initiatives are explored.

As stated earlier, terrorism is transnational in context. It, therefore, makes it imperative for Nigeria to collaborate with other countries and international stakeholders, including foreign law enforcement agencies and organizations involved in international crime control. Thus, international cooperation constitutes one of the most requirements espoused in the AU Framework on Security Sector Reform 2013 and further corroborated in the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform. The same imperative was underscored in the US International Control Strategy Report (2018).

Expressly, the UNODC (2018) threat assessment report affirmed in this case that the realization of the provisions of the UN Convention on transnational crimes with emphasis on the facilitation of Mutual Legal Assistance, extradition and technical cooperation is highly dependent on effective international cooperation. The regional action plan by ECOWAS, in collaboration with the UNODC, to counter crimes is also predicated on the same need. It includes the West African coastline initiative, the global container control programme enhancing anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing initiatives, supporting member states to improve their forensic capacity, provision of specialized technical supports on criminal justice administration.

The United Nations General Assembly third committee session (2018) also reiterated the importance of international cooperation in controlling transnational crimes through synchronizing national, regional and international strategies within the context of a proficient international cooperation mechanism. Sequel to this and during the same committee sessions, the NDLEA Statement (2019) committed on behalf of Nigeria that the country would continue to cooperate with regional bodies in the West African sub-region and other relevant international bodies, including those of the UN, to control organized crime, including tracking illicit funds derived from drug trafficking. The crucial need for this cooperation, the statement

averred, is due to the West African region (of which Nigeria was prominent) being established as a transit for ware, illicit drugs and as a source for terrorism financing.

Organized crime, including terrorism, threatens the foundations of democracy and truncates the rule of law on which good governance relies. Therefore, Nigeria whose situation is critical needs to be at the forefront of the international effort in crimes control. This position is hinged on the fact that Nigeria's population is almost 67% of the entire black people in the world. The country needs to play a dominant role in the international fight against organized crimes (Nigeria's National Security Strategy 2014). In the same vein, Nigeria is a very important regional and indeed, a global actor in international crime control especially since acceding to the UN Palermo Conversion against organised crime (2000).

According to Adedire, Ake and Olowojolu (2016), the necessity of international cooperation in Nigeria's counter terrorism efforts cannot be overemphasized. They noted that because of the international outlook of terrorism including the activities of Boko Haram, Nigeria needs to seek necessary international support to counter their threats.

Despite the above, it is regrettable that "the oversubscription of Nigeria and some of its neighbouring countries to pseudo-nationalist policies frustrates the implementation of broad-based regional strategies to deal with these crimes" (Adetula, 2015, p.5). Also, the general apathy and lack of courage in official quarters and among civil society organizations and other non-state actors in West Africa especially Nigeria to organize international discourse to rub minds on security and developmental issues, pose limitations to effective international strategies against transnational crimes. International cooperation mechanism has not been able to achieve its desired objective because of the absence of political will, bad governance, poorly equipped and de-motivated defence and security institutions, porous borders and non-involvement of the people as well as due to the menace of corruption (Adedire et al 2016 p.70).

The above submission throws up the necessity of trans-border cooperation. According to Adelaja (2014), Nigeria has a land border of over 4000 square kilometres with thousands of illegal crossings, including 1 499 illegal and 84 legal routes on these borders. He notes that though Nigeria's border problem can be linked to its colonial history, this has survived due to insufficient international cooperation in its present security sector governance.

Nigeria's National Security Strategy (2014) states that the country's international cooperation scheme against the threats of terrorism is anchored on the development and promotion of positive international cooperation programmes with its contiguous neighbours based on respect and non-interference with the domestic affairs of its other countries including its neighbours as well as the application of the principles of reciprocity with due cognizance of the need to partner with other countries to counter such threats due to globalization. Others include a contribution to international peace initiatives. Consequent upon the above, the country is involved in military alliances, defence pacts, and defence cooperation agreements.

Others include expanding the capacity of the country's embassies to procure foreign intelligence for effective counter-terrorism capably.

The most vital in this case is the country's leading role in the West African Multi-National Joint Task Force against terrorism is in keeping with its international cooperation programme against terrorism. This joint task force was conceived based on the transnational feature of this crime including its consequences which transcends national borders especially the Lake Chad Basin Mustapha (2017, p.12). The Lake Chad region is standing on a precipice due to complex security challenges notably the terrorist threats by Boko–Haram. They are leveraging the vast porous borders in the region, which, as observed by Klappen (2015), facilitates links with other terrorist groups like ISIS. It was for this according to him that the idea of multilateral security cooperation became inevitable. This provided the impetus for countries in the Lake Chad Basin Commission to reinvigorate the Multinational Joint Task Force originally formed in 1998 as a regional response against cross border security challenges. The preceding was predicated on the perception by member countries that Islamic Jihadism has both geo-strategic and global implications and could be mitigated through the development of an efficient international security cooperation system.

William, Abacan and Sowadogo (2016) also iterate that one of the international initiatives of the Nigerian Government to tackle terrorism, especially by the Boko-Haram sect, was the re-enactment of the instrument of the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (UNJTF) under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. This was one of the Commission's extra ordinary summit decisions in 2014 and equally endorsed by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council. This Multinational Joint Task Force was conceived as a framework for the international coordination of national counter-terrorism efforts to maximize the respective national efforts to achieve required multiplier gains.

Another international collaborative initiative in West Africa's counter-terrorism programme with implications for Nigeria's international cooperation in terrorism control is the Sahel G-5 Joint Force. Though this group is not Anglophone, it is a responsive counter – terrorism initiative with the potential to reduce terrorism threats in the Sahel by decimating targeted terrorist groups. It is also intended to block funding sources to terrorists in the Sahel region and can benefit Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts, including terrorism financing control. Bearing in mind that some member countries specifically Chad and Niger in this group are equally members of the UNJTF, its potential to be a vital source of intelligence to the latter cannot be overemphasized. The Sahel G-5 initiative was endorsed through a resolution of the AU Peace and Security Council759 session in 2017 and was followed in the same year with the backing of the UN Security Council.

The G5 in the Sahel comprises Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger and was formed in 2014 to boost the required security cooperation and harmonize and unify counter-terrorism and organized crime control efforts in the Sahel region. This involved creating necessary agreements in enabling the forces of member countries to engage in intelligence exchange, including the implementation of a centralized joint

command and communication network in cross-border operations to deal with common security threats. Though the G-5 in the Sahel is an important group, it has also come under criticisms. Abrahamsen (2018) avers that this initiative could be endangered by it's over concentration on physical security measures while ignoring its root causes.

Rupesinghe (2018 p.11) observes that physical security measures such as effective border control and efficient intelligence exchange among the G5 member countries are necessary. However, he cautions that the conceptualization of security as the minimization of the threats by terrorist groups is narrow as it will result in over-reliance on the military as a tool and counter-terrorism as a policy response. According to him, this will amount to "using violence as a means of checking violence instead of dealing with problems that are fundamentally tied to governance (p.2).

In her justification that West Africa does not need another anti-terrorism force, Theroux – Benoni (2019) observes that there has been a noticeable absence of synergy among the various institutional mechanisms to counter terrorism in West Africa. These forces include the Multinational Joint Task Force under the auspices of the Lake Chad basin Commission, which includes Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin, and the G5 Sahel, which includes Chad, Burkina-Faso, Niger and Mauritania. Specific to the G5 Sahel, she notes that the strategy of this Multinational Force, apart from taking on criminal groups in the region, revolves around an investment plan and emergency development programme which incorporates resilience, infrastructure, governance and security. She notes that despite an ambitious strategic plan, the achievements of this force have not been significant. Nevertheless, the importance of the group's relationship with the Lake Chad Basin, especially in terms of intelligence exchange, cannot be ruled out.

In addition to Nigeria's security sector's institutional capacity, other requirements contingent upon governance and security sector reform needs to be understood. These requirements are necessary conditions that can boost the country's security sector governance capacity to control terrorism effectively. These requirements are advocated in the traditional SSR paradigm and in the AUFSSR and ECOWAS PFSSR. They are numerous and varied, but this research concentrated on the following: (i) the need for efficient democratic oversight of the sector, (ii) the human rights standard of the sector, (iii) governance requirements including anti-corruption and (iv) other dividends of governance such as the need to alleviate poverty through employment creation.

2.10. Democratic oversight

The relevance of quality civil democratic oversight in security sector governance cannot be overemphasised. The imperative of oversight of the Security Sector is most congruent on the need to ensure democratic standards and accountability in the provision of security services. These two symbiotic functions, according to Bentinck and Born (2013), are reasonably challenging. The framework for the democratic oversight supervision of the security sector includes relevant actors and institutions in the

country's three arms of government, the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. These bodies are also complemented by independent oversight bodies, including civil society organizations and the media.

Many actors, including both state and non-state actors, are expected to play this oversight role. Nevertheless, the legislature's role in this respect, especially in the supervision of security agencies, is vital and unique. For this purpose, the country's legislature has been structured to meet this expectation based on the powers granted it in Nigeria's Constitution, especially Section (62).

As contained in its Guide to Legislative Oversight in the National Assembly by PLAC (2016), the power of exercising oversight functions over security and law enforcement institutions are provided for in the rules of both chambers of Nigeria's legislature. This responsibility requires these legislative arms to oversee the executive arm of government to implement projects for which funds have been appropriated. This role obligates the National Assembly through its relevant committees to conduct investigations into related governance matters and monitor the performance of Ministries, Departments and Agencies. Despite the above provisions, effective democratic oversight supervision of Nigeria's security institutions has not been very satisfactory because of the country's history of military administration.

Also, Omotosho and Oladeji (2019) averred that oversight function is a critical requirement of democratic governance which Nigeria should brace up to. According to them, this will ensure that the statutory role of the legislature in the promulgation of laws will improve the standard of living of the citizens and make the required impact on executive functions. Thus, the essence of legislative oversight is to obliterate waste, inefficiency and all such counteractive factors with the potential to stall oversight of the security sector including corruption and mismanagement of public resources in governance.

The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Reform Report 2020 (p.1) states that democratic oversight is a vital requirement of security sector governance and entails active involvement of civil democratic institutions in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and reformation of the security policies for the supervision of the various security and law enforcement institutions in a country's security sector. The institutions that undertake this responsibility include the legislature and its appropriate committees, CSOs, the media and the executive arm of government.

Nigeria's constitution (1999) is clear on the subordination of the Nigerian military and other security institutions to civil authority. Several laws and existing executive policies provide guidance for this purpose. These laws and policies bestow supervisory roles to civil authorities, including the legislature, judiciary and relevant ministries and senior executive advisers over military and security institutions.

Section (217) subsection (2c) of this constitution provides that the main role of the country's armed forces is to check all forms of insurrection and to complement the efforts of the civil institutions anytime they are authorized by the president for the restoration of law and order and based on approved conditions and

assent by the country's legislature. Following the above section, section 218 subsection (1) defines the supreme powers of the country's president over the armed forces. It accords him the status of the Commander-in-Chief of the country's armed forces with constitutional authority to determine the operation and use of the country's armed forces. Despite these rich constitutional provisions, including similar positions reflected in the country's previous constitutions, especially the country's 1963 Republican constitution and the 1979 constitution, the realisation of complete civil democratic control over the military and other security institutions has remained mere expectations.

Adegboyega (2013) provides further valuable insight in this case. He reiterates that there is no provision for military intervention in the Nigerian constitution under any guise. He also observes that the truth of the matter was that the restive Nigerian military was always eagerly seizing the opportunity of a discredited administration to usurp power. This situation was worsened by the brazen corruption and lack of professional responsibility that characterized the Nigerian military over the years, which also polluted the country's governance structure.

Thus, the Nigerian military has consistently maintained a notorious track record of usurpation of non-military functions that should be exclusive to constituted civil authority. The position of the Mali Watch Group (2013) is very instructive in this case. The group observes that establishing a healthy, sustainable civil-military relationship based on democratic dictates are necessary for security sector governance requirements that can help in peace building efforts is a key component of national reconciliation and for addressing the main drivers of conflict.

Omoigui (2014) stressed that traditional civil-military relations should be anchored on civil supremacy and guidance. This implies complete democratic control of the military in its role and responsibility to society as the guarantor of national security. He implied that the military should be seen as a servant of society and should exercise its powers in the interest of the citizens. This, he said, should be in response to popular will and consent. Unfortunately, this has not permeated the Nigerian military system and is traceable to how the Nigerian military evolved and remained sustained due to Nigeria's peculiar political development.

Agbese (2014) clarifies that military rule in Nigeria shifted the balance of power in favour of the military and diminished the doctrine of civilian supremacy. This instilled in military personnel, the belief that they are superior to the civilians. He notes that the military and their associates made virtually every major political decision in Nigeria for thirty years. He further extended this position and affirmed that the control of political power in Nigeria led the country's military to take it upon itself to determine the form, nature, and contents of political participation by claiming the power to determine who rules Nigeria and the terms and circumstances. Military rule, he continued, not only facilitated military supremacy over state and society in Nigeria, but also allowed the military to assume an ever-widening array of roles and

responsibilities for itself, which were often marked by a mentality that the nation's resources are spoils of war for the benefit of soldiers.

On a general note, the US Department of State Report (2012) raised concerns about the quality of civil control over these institutions. It observes that these institutions, including the Nigerian Police, the Department of State Security and the military, are expected to report to civilian authorities but hardly comply with this requirement. Such situation has not helped in effectively supervising the country's security sector. Aiyede (2016) noted in this case that Nigeria missed many opportunities to reform its military institution to be able to effectively counter external security threats and complementing domestic security within the dictates of civil democratic supervision. He noted that the activities of a onetime civilian president who was also a former military head of state in trying to change the country's constitution to elongate his tenure, was one of such events that had negative implication on the standard of the country's civil democratic scheme. According to him, this gave the unwarranted power to the military to take over the reform of the country's security sector that this president introduced. This situation and even the incidence of human rights abuses and corruption as militating factors in Nigeria's security sector were further echoed by Garba Shehu (2019).

Based on all the above narratives, the quality of civil-military relations in Nigeria is not satisfactory and constitutes and can be an impediment to the realization of effective democratic oversight supervision of Nigeria's security institutions. This has negative implications for the country's security sector governance, especially in controlling terrorism, and requires improvement. Though this improvement can help enhance Nigeria's security sector, its efficacy in achieving this objective can be complemented with the required civil conduct of the relevant security agencies, including respect for citizens' human rights.

2.11. Human Rights

Respect for human rights is both a governance and security requirement that aids the effectiveness of security sector governance. Alemika and Adeyemi (2002) tied the effectiveness of Nigeria's security sector governance to its capacity to provide safety and security of lives and property. According to them, the constitution of Nigeria (1999) provides, in Chapter IV, for a citizen's right to (i) life, (ii) human dignity and (iii) not to be subjected to torture or inhumane or degrading treatment, (iv) the right to liberty, (v) freedom of movement, (vi) personal assembly and association, to (vii) private and family life and (viii) to both movable and immovable property. These provisions are designed to guarantee the sanctity of life and property, implying that the citizens must be safe and secure, especially from criminal acts (Alemika and Adeyemi 2002).

Oraegbunam (2007) noted that the rights of every human being deserve to be respected. He traces the origin of these rights to ancient Greek and Roman laws which recognised natural law as the foundation of the principles and application of human rights. This was further extended beyond the rights of the citizens

to universal coverage. These rights are recognized in the various relevant laws in Nigeria, the most pronounced being contained in the country's 1999 Constitution sections 35 – 43. This constitution outlines the following rights, with exceptions clarified in 45(1).

These rights are: (i) the right to life, (ii) the right to dignity of the human person, (iii) the right to personal liberty, (iv) the right to private life, (v) the right to family life, (vi) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, (vii) the right to freedom of expression and the press, (viii) the right to peaceful assembly and association, (ix) the right to freedom of movement, (x) the right to freedom from discrimination, (xi) the right to acquire and own immovable property in any part of Nigeria. Because of the relevance of human rights, the UN proclaimed the universal declaration on human rights in 1948. This declaration was mainly concerned with the dignity and equality of all human beings and the inviolable and inalienable rights of every human family. According to Ofoegbu (2014), these rights constitute the foundation for justice and global peace and are universally construed because they are fundamental. They are also expected to be commonly applied to all persons regardless of their nationality, gender, ethnicity, race, religion, language, or other factors.

He expresses that the protection of individual rights, the preservation of order and the limitations of the abuse by the government are all inevitable roles of the rule of law in a democratic setting. Therefore, he notes that respect for human rights is not possible in any country that does not adhere to the rule of law (Ofoegbu, 2014). Apart from the lack of adequate consultation, which has characterized the various constitutions the country developed, various organs of government have also been indicted for the "non-workability" and violation of the Constitution's provisions, especially in respect of human rights.

Gadzama and Partners' Report (2010) aver that "it is obvious that successive governments and their various agencies exist and operate, perhaps within the borders of illegality and oftentimes outright unconstitutionally" (p. 22). It concludes that thought Nigeria has made some remarkable progress in its bid to institute constitutional governance, it has been unimpressive regarding respect for the rule of law, which is the foundation for the administration of human rights The Report blames the judiciary for this failure and notes that instead of serving as the last hope of the ordinary person because of the poor conduct of its officials, it has been complementing the abuse of the fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens.

In his analysis of the quality of human rights administration in Nigeria, Ofoegbu (2014) observes that the concept of human rights is well understood but is unsatisfactorily applied despite explicit provisions in the 1999 Constitution. According to Ofoegbu, the reason for this is bad governance, especially the passivity of government institutions and functionaries on such constitutional provision and the failure of the institutions responsible for its administration. All these, according to him, cause human rights violations (2014).

Evidence of reported human rights abuses in Nigeria abounds since its colonial administration and have continued to date. Thus, the various Amnesty International (AI) Reports have made scathing assessments of Nigeria's human rights records, especially of its various security Institutions. These assessments are presented in the agency's various reports from 2000 to 2018. The Amnesty international Corruption Perception Index (2010 – 2018) recorded worse human rights violations. The common features in these human rights abuses included extra judicial killings by the police and other law enforcement agencies, insider conspiracies amongst the various security institutions through sharing of intelligence and arms with criminals including terrorists, brutish and summary executions by the security operatives. The turning point in 2010 was the suspicious and unaccounted death of the leader of the Boko - Haram sect in police custody.

The treatment of criminal offenders, including those convicted and those awaiting trial, has also been identified as one of the very sore points of Nigeria's human rights records. According to Nigeria's Human Rights Report (2016), as of December 2015, the country had 56,620 inmates in the country's prisons, including 2% women and 1% juveniles. It reported that these prisons were heavily overcrowded because they were initially constructed to accommodate only 47,874 inmates. Worse still was that the 234 prisons, were built 70 to 80 years ago and are without basic facilities such as potable water and sewage facilities or adequate medical provisions. As a result, many prisoners died. It was also reported that the prisoners are poorly fed and malnourished and that only prisoners with money or those whose relatives brought food were well fed. Prison and other law enforcement officials were reported to be in the habit of denying inmates food and medical treatment unless bribed or stealing the money intended for the upkeep of the prisoners.

The extra judicial killings by Nigerian security operatives are perhaps the most gruesome human rights abuse in Nigeria. Odinkalu (2008) seriously indicted the police on this note. He referenced statistics available from the Nigerian police which indicated that the force killed a total of 569 citizens in 2000, 376 in 2001, 317 in 2002; 545 in 2003 569 in 2004; 252 in 2005; 329 in 2006; 785 in 2007; 857 in 2008 and 316 in 2009.

These reports revealed that the Nigeria police usually execute armed criminals with impunity. Quoting (LEDAP, 2005), these reports consistently implicated the Nigerian Police as responsible for over 60% of the extra judicial killings that took place in Nigeria. It further validated the report of the Human Rights community about Nigeria's security agencies, which they described as "trigger happy" and inefficient in the maintenance of law and order. The above incidents were substantiated by subsequent reports that revealed that these unprofessional killings were due to the culture of violence and impunity in the Nigerian security agencies (Amnesty International Report, 2010 – 2015).

Furthermore, the US Human Rights Country Report on Nigeria (2018) listed several cases of human rights abuse by Boko-Haram, which included the abduction, killing, torturing and imprisonment of children and

women and the bombing and attacking of communities and villages, including government and civilian targets. These resulted in the deaths and injuries of thousands of people and the internal (1.8million) and external (205,000) displacement of Nigerians. The report also notes that Boko-Haram recruited and conscripted child soldiers and perpetrated suicide bombings by using young women and under-aged girls who were coerced and indoctrinated to undertake these deadly missions. Most of these abducted women were also subjected to sexual and gender-based abuses (US Human Rights Country Report on Nigeria, 2018).

The reviewed human rights literature provides valuable insight into the understanding and relevance of democratic oversight and human rights as essential requirements of security sector reform. The need for their improvements to help enhance the capacity of Nigeria's security sector was also underscored. Nevertheless, they can be complemented to help strengthen Nigeria's security sector governance under the condition of good governance including ensuring satisfactory anti-corruption profile and poverty alleviation through provision of employment opportunities.

2.12. Good Governance and its Dividends

Any country that is threatened with insecurity especially due to terrorism and yet has not been able to entrench good governance in its polity can hardly achieve any meaningful result. According to Okenyodo (2016), countering contemporary security challenges directly correlates with improving the governance and oversight of the security sector.

Ibrahim (2013) observes that security is tied to social, political and economic growth and development in Nigeria and that the negligence of the security sector is responsible for the non-performance of democratic governance and its attendant violent crimes. This according to him can be resolved through good governance.

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (2018) regards good governance as the process whereby public institutions, including security and law enforcement institutions responsible for providing security of lives and property, conduct public affairs and manage public resources transparently. The report noted that this is to ensure improvement of the lots of the citizenry in such a manner that guarantees their rights satisfactorily and essentially free of abuse and corruption and with due respect and regards for the rule of law. This description avers that the true test of good governance is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights and whether the governance institutions effectively guarantee the right to health, adequate housing, sufficient food, quality education, fair justice, and personal security.

According to Nwekeaku (2014), good governance involves the enthronement of a democratic government with the guarantee of equal participation of all citizens in governance; provision, promotion and protection of the fundamental human rights of the citizens, provision and sustenance of press freedom, availability of

transparent, accountable and participatory governance at all levels of government, regular free and fair elections as well as provision of basic amenities such as potable water, electricity, quality education, health care delivery, good roads, employment and security.

Furthermore, on the constituents of good governance including rule of law, he affirms that there are ample provisions for democracy and the rule of law in the Nigerian Constitution that provide a basis for sound administration and good governance. However, achieving this state has been elusive. According to him, fundamental human rights and press freedom are elaborately provided for in the constitution but have hardly been implemented. All these he averred, largely accounted for Nigeria's poor score on good governance with consequent electoral malpractices, poverty, unemployment, maladministration, gagging the press and muzzling political opponents.

Otoghile, Igbafe and Agbontaen (2014) posit that the role of governance in the polity of any country is crucial because the growth and development of a state depend on how the government of the state sets the platform for the effective and proper discharge of authority and control. They contend that the lack of good governance is a phenomenon that has stunted the growth of many nations, especially Nigeria, which since independence in 1960, has been waiting for the benefit of a good, credible and accountable government. They observe that the search for good governance is an emergency need for Nigeria (Otoghile et al., 2014).

With reference to Nnamdi (2009), they note that the majority of Nigerians believe that poor leadership and bad governance crippled the country's progress in virtually every field of human endeavour. They also observe that Nigerian politicians formed governments without development plans and failed to fulfil their promises to the electorates based on which they were elected. Most disturbing, according to them, was that political actors use their involvement in governance as a means of wealth acquisition. Others use it as a mode of investment through sponsorship of others for political office and thereafter use them to recoup a million-fold, what they spent thus diverting these political office holders from the primary responsibility of governance which includes the provision of security to the citizenry. This was subsequently corroborated in SERAP's Transparency and Good Governance Report (2018).

Okoro (2014) also assessed governance in Nigeria as not encouraging. He frowned at the situation whereby after more than five decades of the country, majority of its citizens are unable to meet their basic human and socio-economic needs. He cited example with majority of Nigerian youths who lack access to food quality, employment and educational opportunities, efficient health care service delivery, pipe-borne water, good shelter, etc. He noted that it is even more annoying that in spite of the above poor state of governance in the country, political elites brazenly engage in corrupt activities. He noted in this case, that the magnitude of poverty in Northern Nigeria is very high and more than the country's national average to the extent that many citizens in the region are elicited into crimes including terrorist activities. He averred

that “though jihadist rhetoric is often stated by the insurgents as the core motivation of terrorism, that this narrative is more of a legitimizing and mobilizing tool than a precipitant” (p.18).

In the light of the foregoing, he concluded that the Nigerian state has failed in its governance obligation because of its inability to carry out many of its statutory responsibilities such as developmental projects, ensuring citizen’s welfare, controlling corruption and in the mitigation of violence. He therefore warned that if the country does not brace up in providing good governance and cleaning up all the vestiges of maladministration of previous regimes in the country, that the government will end up creating opportunities for the rise of more terrorist groups in the country.

Coker et al (2014) noted that the above instances can be inimical to Nigeria’s development and with attendant consequence of lack of peace in the country. They observed that the country cannot achieve any progress because of systemic poverty, deprivations, frustration of aspirations which can push its citizens into violent activities. They further noted that Nigeria has not been so lucky to be governed by honest, transparent and accountable leadership. Consequent upon the foregoing, they concluded that the present security challenges in the country are related to its bad governance.

Campbell (2010) provided a historical perspective on this note. In his commentary on Nigeria, captured in his book, “Nigeria Dancing on the Brink” underscored the reason why Nigeria has not been able to provide good governance. He stated that Nigeria has, since the fall of the first republic, been ruled by a handful of power wielding oligarchs who have held power, lost power and lived to play again and that those who aspire to the highest office in the land cultivate the friendship of these oligarchs. He further observed that these oligarchs, whether from the military, business or political sectors, seek to protect the parochial interest of their subordinates and clients in order to ensure their continued access to the spoils of office.

The prevalence of terrorism financing has also been connected to poor governance. According to FATF (2013), the thriving of terrorism financing can be attributed to political instability, ethnic and communal violence, pervasive corruption, widespread poverty, high rates of unemployment and under-employment, especially among the youth. The report avers that these conditions can be exploited by terrorists and concludes that most of the human developmental challenges faced by countries of the West African sub-region are predicated on poor governance and weak public institutions (FATF, 2013).

Furthermore, good governance is noted to thrive on democracy and the rule of law. Nwekeaku (2014) discovered in his survey on the extent to which this has been realisable in Nigeria due to the following reasons: (i) corruption, (ii) poverty, (iii) ignorance, (iv) diseases, (v) inflation, (vii) declining productivity, (vii) mal-administration, (viii) dictatorship, (ix) ethnicity and other primordial factors as well as prevalent social vices which he noted, constituted road mines to good governance in Nigeria. He therefore advised that unless an immediate overhaul of the structural, economic, legal, educational, administrative and other

bureaucratic structures within the country's governance architecture was carried out, that rule of law and democracy would remain an article of faith as good governance shall continue to be elusive.

Otoghile et al (2014) stated that good governance is predicated on the efficient performance of the roles ascribed to the different institutions and agencies of government. Given Nigeria's present socio-economic and political conditions, good governance has become absent, and this is reflected in the high rate of poverty, unemployment, lack of transparency and accountability. Others are inefficiency of governance institutions, lack of equity, fall in the living standard of citizens, social injustice and most worrisome, organized corruption. All these, according to them, had become common features in Nigeria's political system. They further noted that the lack of selfless, non-corrupt and committed leadership had constituted socio-political and economic predicaments to Nigeria.

The context outlined above could lead to more complex security challenges. This conclusion appears to have informed Sule, Singh and Othman's (2015) analysis of "governance and Boko Haram in Nigeria" (p.35). They iterate that though governance is about providing services, in Nigeria, the reverse is the case because leaders are not answerable to the people due to corruption, illiteracy and poverty. According to them, this diverted the attention of government functionaries from how to curtail these security challenges instead of service delivery.

Bryden and Chappuis (2015), in their position on the place of governance in security sector governance, observed that it is not contestable that governance, including the requirements of accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, inclusiveness and the rule of law is central in the interaction of democracy, development and security.

More so, Dasuki (2015) in the same acknowledges the crucial role of good governance in strengthening Nigeria's security sector. According to him, this has not been easy to achieve in Nigeria due to the rapid advances in Information Technology (IT) which led to the provision of new income and wealth creation opportunities only for a few and consequently instigates resistance from the majority. He observed that this situation had increased the pressure on governments not to relent in the provision of essential services to the people while at the same time, making it very obligatory for them to be more transparent and accountable. He observes that global and regional imbalances also adversely influence the provision of essential needs such as health care services, job opportunities, education, housing and justice, which he noted are now perceived and yearned for thereby creating dissonance with consequent insecurity. He, therefore, concluded that Nigeria has been grappling with the challenge of good governance.

Based on the above narratives, it appears that Nigeria cannot boast of good governance. Accordingly, the citizens stand to be the most affected as victims, and this has the propensity of pushing them into unwholesome means to cope with the traumatic consequences of the absence of good governance.

Owutu (2013) corroborates this position. He observes that there is a clear correlation between the quality of governance Nigerians get and the degree of violent conflicts encountered by the country. He notes that lack of confidence in the country's politics, the politicization of almost every issue, official corruption and weak institutions can push the citizens of the country to resort to self-help and, with the consequence of insecurity.

All the above narratives are not only worrisome but surprising given the various natural and human resources that Nigeria is endowed with. Except for bad governance, this could not have been the case with Nigeria. Osunlaja (2015) asks why despite the abundant human and natural resources of the country, "gross mismanagement and profligacy on the part of the leaders had stifled the much-needed growth and development of Nigeria (p. 4)". "This leadership deficit he continued has become the cross Nigerians have had to bear since its independence. He further avers that the Nigerian vision is bereft of all requisites of true leadership and was most elicited by primitive and insatiable desire for wealth acquisition. The consequence of this according to him among others, results in deplorable state of the country's roads, lack of qualitative education, low standard health facilities, poorly equipped security institutions, astronomical level of youth unemployment and restiveness.

These are symptoms of bad governance and have negative implications on the country's security sector. The situation is worsened by the country's corruption status, which also negatively affects the dividends of good governance and indeed all other security sector reform requirements (Garba Shehu 2019). It is, therefore, necessary to review the country's corruption profile and its anti-corruption efforts as well as provision of employment opportunities as dividends of good governance.

2. 12 (a) Nigeria's Corruption Profile

Another relevant "good governance" requirement of any country, including Nigeria, is its anti-corruption profile based on its effectiveness in checking corruption in view of its adverse consequences on its security sector. There are several conceptualizations of corruption, but all agree that it is hostile to good governance and invalidates the entrenchment of an effective security sector. Igwe (1991), definition and as implied in the Transparency International Report (2019) and (2020) describes corruption as the readiness to sacrifice values no matter how sacrosanct or strategic to acquire wealth, divert public funds into private coffers as well as inflate government contracts and other businesses for the purpose of deriving kickbacks. It also involves discriminatory politicization and victimization in the corridors of power through unhealthy and despicable election malpractices.

Corruption is identified as one of the most constraining factors of good governance in Nigeria. Agwu (2011), identifies the culture of impunity and social injustice as strong facilitators of this syndrome. He observes that corruption is a symptom of the fundamental failure of governance, such that the higher the level of

corruption, the more elusive sustainable development. He avers that corruption increases poverty and disproportionately affects those in the low-income group because it pulls resources from the national treasury into the hands of a few politically influential people. The consequence of this, according to him, includes loss of government revenue, poor governance, failure of state institutions including security agencies, brain drain, electoral malpractices, absence of law and order, civil unrest, poor investment channels, business failures, unemployment, poverty and unsustainable development. Party ideology, which should be well-intended and executed by political office holders with sincerity of purpose as an obligation to the electorate, has been grossly lacking in the country's political configuration and constitutes a serious impediment to good governance in Nigeria (Agwu, 2011).

Irikefe (2013 p.4) observes that Nigeria's current corruption rating is very disturbing. "Nigeria was not cursed but only held down by greed and the inability of its leaders to manage its resources". He states that Nigeria works for only 1% of the population, namely, former heads of state who are among the richest in the country, business front individuals and family associates who control access to oil wealth and lucrative contracts. Others are lawmakers who are, the highest paid in the world and governors and their sponsors who manage the various state resources like private enterprises. (P.4)

According to Alegeh (2015), since Nigeria's Independence in 1960, corruption has been a serious concern. More so, corruption was the precursor of Nigeria's civil war and the country's consequent advent of military dictatorships. The report of Nigeria's Presidential Advisory Committee against Corruption (2016) utilizes the speech of the leader of the first military coup in Nigeria as a preamble in a retrospective narrative of the incidence of corruption in the country. In this speech, the coup plotters, known as the Revolutionary Council iterated that they desired to establish a strong United Nigeria free of corruption. They noted that their enemies were the following: political profiteers, swindlers, men in high and low places that requested bribes, those that sought to keep the nation permanently divided in order to remain in office, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that made Nigeria look big for nothing in the eyes of the international community as well as those that had been stealing the country's wealth.

Corruption is a significant reason for the country's weak democratic foundation, including its poor democratic oversight quality. It has also been contributing to its poor human rights standards, inefficient disarmament and reintegration programme, poor institutional and operational standard of its security sector, disharmony among the constituent security and law enforcement agencies in the sector as well as the continuous foreign exploitation of the country (SERAP Report 2018)

Corruption is singled out as one of the most severe global challenges, especially in the past thirty years. It was in consideration of its adversities that the international community prioritized the need to include it in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as contained in Report (2015). The consequences of corruption listed in this case a discouragement of entrepreneurship and professionalism and obliteration of the values of hard work and honesty. Specific to Nigeria, it is observed that the manifestation of

corruption is not only very evident but has been responsible for the inability of the country to ensure human security, which consequently escalates criminal activities in the country (World Drug Report 2017) (p.6).

The 2030 Agenda (2015) observes that corruption is a challenge that has permeated many countries globally with such negative effect on the five constituents of the agenda: the citizens, the planet, prosperity, peace and partnerships. It reported a consequent loss of resources estimated at $10 trillion due to corruption which could have obliterated poverty by the year 2020. This agenda strongly affirmed the relevance of transparency, accountability and anti-corruption in promoting sustainable development and tied to the entrenchment of peaceful and inclusive societies to checking this menace. According to Steiner (2019), this agenda fully recognizes anti-corruption as a global necessity upon which the attainment of all sustainable development goals especially those that are based on enhancement of governance institutions.

Adeyemi (2012) identified corruption as one of the main reasons the Nigerian state finds it challenging to deliver purposeful governance. He notes that when the Federal, State, and Local Governments steal all the money allocated for building schools, hospitals, and industries, the greater percentage of the citizenry, especially the youth, are denied education, employment and good health. These youths, he further observed, are therefore affected psychologically and economically such that frustrations, dejection and hopelessness remain recurring in their lives creating a very high likelihood of them being easily brainwashed with false doctrines that could instil criminality.

Olutoyin (2014) averred that corruption had been a significant feature of the socio-political, economic, cultural and religious life in Nigeria and that it is open, systemic and permeated all spheres of Nigeria's society. He further observes that corruption prompts oppressive regimes to perpetuate themselves in power and loot the national wealth. Such regimes induce bad governance such as gross violation of human rights, socio-economic and scientific backwardness, mass poverty, illiteracy and high unemployment rate. Others according to him include lack of access to adequate and qualitative education, housing, health care, transportation and communication, urban chaos and rural decay, intra and inter-communal conflicts and mutual destruction. He concluded that it was evident that sustainable development and democracy cannot be realizable in a society where the culture of corruption thrives and that it would be unrealistic to expect an effective governance of the security sector in any country that is riddled with corruption.

Makinwa (2015) reports that the cost of corruption is estimated at 5% global GDP and that this figure could be more in a corruption infested country like Nigeria. He avers that corruption accounts for the poor remuneration and welfare provisions to employees including poor medical care; non provision of qualitative education, lack of employment opportunities; etc. Relating corruption to education, he referenced the statistical analyses released by Transparency International which indicated a high illiteracy rate between the ages of 15 - 24 in bribe-infested countries. He also noted that corruption prevents the provision from getting to basic services from reaching the poor due to the misappropriation of funds

earmarked for developmental projects. It also undermines the implementation of the rule of law with the consequence of inequality and injustice as well as making the country a leading source of illicit financial flows.

The meaning and implication of corruption, especially to Nigeria's security sector, is apparent. The consequences of corruption in Nigeria's security sector governance are numerous and have been institutionalized in the country's security institutions. The resources meant to provide for the required human resources and logistic needs of these security institutions are also not provided due to corruption (SERAP Report 2017 p.1). This consequently incapacitates these agencies, including their operatives, who become de-motivated with the high possibility of being lured by criminals. All these have implications, for Nigeria's security sector and other security sector reform components critical for enhancing its governance including its dividends such as poverty alleviation through provision of employment.

The foregoing understanding of corruption shows that it portends negative implications for good governance in Nigeria including the provision of employment opportunities in the country. However, before proceeding with the determination of the subsisting status of this governance dividend, the need to understand some of the important contestations on this potential to induce insecurity are necessary at this point. Though the consequence of unemployment a potential inducement of terrorism is a contextual proposition, previous studies suggest that standard of living (unemployment or poverty) can be associated with involvement in criminal activities.

The above positions were further given credence in the US Department of State Report (2018) which linked involvement in terrorist activities, poverty and ignorance. This is in tandem with the presentation of Bush (2003) which advocated the need to confront poverty because of its adverse link to terrorism. He noted that poverty, hopelessness, failed governments precipitate conditions upon which terrorists capitalise on to unleash their dastardly acts. All these tally with the previous one advanced by Clinton (1994) which observed that the forces of terror and extremism hide under the façade of religion and nationalism and thrive on the forces of disillusionment, poverty or despair as well as the position that "the dragon's teeth of terrorism and terrorists are planted in the fertile soil of poverty and deprivation" P.1

Stern (2001) iterated that the ignorant and impoverished persons are more susceptible to crimes. Relying on traditional economic theory of crime by Becker (1968), the economic theory of suicide by Hamermesh (1974) and the postulations of Berman (2003) on the economics of crime, he avers that people with fewer opportunities are more induced into commission of crimes such as suicide bombing and involvement in religious insurgencies and the possibility of easily being recruited by terrorist organizations. To support this point, Berrebi (2007) observed that there is a growing consensus that involvement in crimes, can be due to ignorance and/or poverty. He noted that individuals that are impoverished have a greater propensity to

be involved in criminal acts, including terrorism. He also posited that individuals, who presumably will not lose anything, will be more predisposed to the commission of self-destructive crimes.

The perspectives above point to the consequences of poverty and unemployment and their role in the potential to induce terrorism but Berrebi (2007) attempted a deviation in this case with propositions that poverty may not necessarily be a significant factor for involvement in terrorism. He specifically used Osama Bin Laden as an example of such terrorism perpetrators who were wealthy and possessed appreciable education. He availed himself of the following scholarly presentation to support the above submissions. First was that of Wilgoren (2001) who reported that the terrorists who participated in the 9/11 attack of the US, were educated and skilful adults who were trained for several years in the US. They also acquired vital commercial skills with potential to develop their minds and indeed were neither reckless pedestrian youths confronted with severe economic conditions, nor hopeless. The results of the study by Hassan (2001) which concluded that economic condition cannot be used to explain involvement in terrorist activities was also supportive of this view.

Providing more insights on the link between education, poverty and terrorism, Berrebi (2007) referenced the study of Russel and Miller (1983) which surveyed 350 terrorists out of which two thirds were found to be educated including those with university and post graduate education. This result according to him, was given credence by the earlier work of Hudson and Majeska (1999) which provided a sociological analysis of terrorists in the cold war period and concluded that these terrorists generally had appreciable education including professionals made up of bankers, doctors, lawyers, engineers University Professors, Journalists and middle level civil servants with only very few uneducated ones. Results of the survey by Maleckova (2003) of 129 terrorists killed by law enforcement operatives between the late 80s and early 90s equally, indicated that their living standard was above the poverty line and were secondary and higher education holders.

In this case, Malaifa (2012) acknowledged the possibility of employed persons engaging in terrorist acts, but also affirmed that it is more authentic to postulate that a significant growth in the level of poverty in a country provides the prompting for extremist groups to lure disgruntled youths into terrorist acts.

Using Northern Nigeria where the incidence of terrorism is high as an example, he stated that 70% of the population live under the globally defined poverty line thereby making it easy for terrorist groups to mobilize the poor and destitute for their criminal plotting. He also alerted on the extra factor of youth unemployment with particular emphasis on the increase in the number of university graduates without jobs who, because of being pushed to the lowest level of desperation and hopelessness, can easily be lured into terrorism.

He further used the theoretical postulation of alienated intelligentsia to explain this and questioned why only the few alienated intellectuals and not the majority get involved in terrorism. He also pointed out that

as much as it may be true that most terrorist groups are commanded by such alienated intellectuals, that they were not most often led by well employed persons. He gave example with Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, whom he described as an articulate person but not intellectually endowed. His submission on the poor state of education in the terrorist prone areas of Northern Nigeria is also important. He noted how lack of employment opportunities constitutes impediments to socio-economic development in the country and with the potential to induce and aggravate terrorism. Using Borno State as an example of the most educationally disadvantaged in Nigeria, he estimated that only 12.82% of pupils from primary school proceed to secondary school and worse still with more of them having no opportunity to acquire vocational skills that can help them get employed.

The foregoing observations are relevant global insights that could be applicable to Nigeria. However, it should be noted that the influence of unemployment which causes poverty, is necessary for the understanding of the involvement in terrorism. This is induced more by lack of good governance including failure to provide the needed employment opportunities.

2.12 (b) Nigeria's Employment Status

The provision of employment opportunities is a critical indicator of good governance, which has the potential to complement the enhancement of Nigeria's security sector governance. Despite this, this programme appears not to have been sufficiently and qualitatively provided in Nigeria thereby being a potential factor that induces poverty and consequent criminal activities including terrorism. This section concentrates on the understanding of the concept of unemployment, its content and derivable opportunities especially to youths consequent upon which required security sector governance can be explored to improve it.

Nigeria's Bureau of Statistics Report (2017) acknowledged the non-existence of a universal standard definition of unemployment bearing in mind that its meaning has always been relative to the domestic priorities of the country in question. The Report stated that unemployment implies the percentage of persons in the Labour Force (and not the overall economically active or the entire population) seeking employment but are unable to secure one covering at least twenty hours during the reference period.

Adekola, Allen, Olawale, Isaac. Akambi and Adewumi (2016) in their analysis of the unemployment situation in Nigeria concluded that unemployment constitutes a serious challenge to the development of nations, especially those classified as under-developed, such as Nigeria. They observed that the situation with Nigeria is more complicated due to the absence of social security in the country for which reason the unemployed are more vulnerable to criminal activities.

Adebayo (2013) had also observed that the unemployment rate in Nigeria has continued to increase despite the abundant human and natural resources available in the country. He explained that the

phenomenon of youth unemployment is devastating to both the individuals and society, both psychologically and economically. Figures supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics, (2012) confirmed this. For instance, persons admitted into the prisons by age group between 2008 and 2016 showed that youths between the ages 16 and 20 years, 31,700 were admitted in during this period for criminal activities especially insurgencies.

At this point, it should be understood that Nigeria's unemployment problem is made more challenging due to the very high percentage of youths that are unemployed. Osalor (2011) espoused that the scarcest undertone of Nigeria's socio-economic under achievement, by far, is the steady rise in the involvement in crimes by the youths despite the increasing national income and the simultaneous failure of government in the provision of employment generation and poverty alleviation programmes. He avers that armed insurgency ravaging the oil rich and volatile Niger Delta region and the wanton destruction of lives and property by Boko-Haram in the Northern part of the country are now global knowledge. He also noted that decades of social and political turmoil have helped turn the strategically located African nation into an established domain for international drug smugglers.

The statistics supplied by the Nigerian Prison Service as reported by Okafor (2011) supports the above narrative and blamed this more on the involvement of youths to prove the relationship between unemployment and crime. The study provided a logical insight into the involvement of youths in sundry crimes in Nigeria. According to him, there has been increase in the involvement of youths in various anti-social activities and offences because of unemployment. Such offences include arson, assault, murder, abduction, stealing, armed robbery, sex offences, and unlawful possession of arms and so on.

These include: 40,170 youths in 2005, 19,122 in 2006, 16,236 in 2007, and 25,317 in 2008. As regards the youths between ages 21 and 25 years, 39045 youths were admitted in 2004, 34,600 in 2005, 28705 in 2006, 57,736 in 2007 and 28,049 in 2008. Also, for persons between ages 25 and 50 years, 63,100 persons were admitted in 2004; 65,140 (in 2005); 75,491 (in 2006); 80,134 (in 2007) and 73,071 (in 2008). All these figures which have not significantly changed up till 2017 as reported by the NBS Report (2018), indicated that large numbers of youths are involved in anti-social and criminal activities largely because of unemployment. This has the potential to destabilize and truncate the democratic process in Nigeria.

Akwara, Azalahu, Akwara; Enwuchola; Adekunle and Udah (2013) observed that unemployment induces poverty which in the same vein causes insecurity. Substantiating this, they referenced Awake's (2012) submission that about 990% of all deaths due to violence had manifested in poor countries and seems applicable to Nigeria in view of the country's Bureau of statistics Report (2012), which showed that approximately 42% of Nigerians within the age range of 15 - 24 years and 17% of those between the ages of 25-44 were unemployed then. This implies that approximately 59% percent of Nigerians within the age range of 15- 44 years were unemployed then.

Awoyemi (2012) explained that youths live in a world of myths and that the activity of the brain-washing given to them provides a quasi-equivalent employment which makes feel engaged in acting out the subject of their brainwashing. This implies that youth unemployment is perhaps the most challenging in this respect and as such, requires special attention as a prerequisite for any security sector governance intervention to deal with the problem.

The present situation appears hopeless, and the reality could be better appreciated if put in the context of Doreo partners (2013) revelation. Her study revealed that unemployment rate in Nigeria was growing at a rate of 16% annually with the youths as the most hit and accounting for three times the general unemployment rate. She concluded that Nigeria's spiralling youth unemployment could have significantly contributed to the dramatic rise in social unrest and crime including the criminal activities of Niger Delta militants and that of the Boko Haram.

Udama (2013) related the problem to bad governance. The ineffectiveness of the country's governance in terms of service delivery according to him, induce the youths into crimes including terrorism. According to him, most of these youths do not possess the skills required for any employment which had resulted in cheap price placed on their labour and on their lives such that participating in drug production and trafficking becomes attractive.

Salami (2013) made a salient prediction that unemployment in Nigeria is a time bomb waiting to explode if effective interventions were not put in place to mitigate its unsavoury impact. The need for the creation of enabling socio-economic and political environment that will galvanize a culture where the youths think of job creation away from the mind set of job seekers as therefore very necessary. This can be achieved through a vigorous re-orientation to embrace a tested culture of honesty, creativity, hard work as well as nobility of character and for the youths to shun the easy way out of life.

Adebiyi (2013) also hinged the crime situation in Nigeria on youth unemployment. According to him, available data show that youth unemployment is very rampant in Nigeria and has contributed immensely to their involvement in criminal activities. He argued that criminal activities such as armed robbery, kidnapping, political thuggery, militancy and other social vices among the unemployed and jobless youths contribute greatly to the slow pace of development in Nigeria. He therefore proffered that addressing youths' unemployment will stem the tide of crime and foster rapid development in Nigeria. Ajufo (2013) corroborated this view. Drawing from her research on the challenges of youth unemployment in Nigeria, she concluded that unemployment had become a major problem bedevilling the lives of Nigerian youths and causing increased militancy, violent crimes, kidnappings restiveness and socially delinquent behaviours.

Adebayo (2013) linked the prevalence of crime in Nigeria to the slow pace of development in the country which consequently puts pressure on the youths to be involved in crime due to lack of opportunities for

their engagement in livelihood vocation. He opined that addressing youths' unemployment will stem the tide of crime and foster rapid development in Nigeria. Ajufo (2013) supported this position and concluded that unemployment had become a major security problem in Nigeria. In the same vein, Sule (2015) stated that there were not less than forty million Nigerians without jobs then and that an average of 14.60% was unemployed from 2006 – 2010 and later increased to 23.90%. He further stated that there were lots of unemployed youths in Nigeria who do not belong to any fundamentalist or radical group but could become easy tools in the hands of the rich or terrorist organisations.

More discouraging is the World Employment and Social Outlook Report (2015) which predicted the likelihood of a rise from the present 74 million rate of Youth unemployment in Nigeria. This has continued to witness astronomical growth in its population which in less than ten years, rose from 143 million in 2006, to over 178 million in 2014 and estimated to have risen to over 184 million in 2015. Notable in this case is the significance of youth unemployment. Noko (2017) observed that the rate of unemployment in Nigeria grew from 24% to 33% within a period of one and half years between January 2015 and July 2016 and that the rate of youth unemployment in the country in 2017 was 58% during the same period. It is vital at this point to note that Nigeria's unemployment situation tends to a dangerous trend because most of the unemployed are youths.

Furthermore, NBS (2017) stated that the country's economic growth has a proportional correlation with its employment situation. It noted that one of the notable economic conditions that confronted Nigeria and on which consequently induced unemployment in the country was the recession of its economy. It gave example with the economic recession the country witnessed in 2016 due to the constant economic slowdown in the country which commenced in 2014 and involved the consecutive negative growth of the country's Gross Domestic Product at least for two quarters.

According to the FSDH Merchant Bank Report (2019), the consequences of the unemployment situation in the country are enormous and cover such socio-economic adversity to the country including poverty, illiteracy and parasitic challenges all of which can translate into high level criminality. Worse still, the situation decreased the capacity of the country's citizens to purchase such necessities of livelihood because of high inflationary trends.

The report noted that the foregoing is attributable to the continued limitation of the country's economic sector including the education, construction and manufacturing sectors. Seriously indicted in this case by the report is the educational sector which it noted, has not been able to prepare potential applicants especially the youths with the required technical and information technological skills required for contemporary employment requirement.

From all the above indications, it can be observed that the consequence of unemployment, especially youth unemployment constitutes a serious security threat to the country and could be linked to governance

failure. This also requires urgent remedial interventions which should revolve around governance responsibility of job creation. Apart from population growth, other reasons have contributed to unemployment in Nigeria. Adekola, et al (2016) in their review of several studies on unemployment, identified the following "causes; namely: lack of serious attention to the agricultural sector rural urban migration, speedy population growth, distorted perception of the real implication of vocational education, poor economic growth with attendant reduction in domestic investments, bad governance and worsened by poor leadership and managerial lack of political will. Others are discordant and unrealistic school curriculum with attendant consequences on the quality of graduates that are not employable, inadequate youth development programmes, graduating of more persons in excess of available job opportunities as well as the gross depreciation in the manufacturing sector.

From all the above indications, it is clear that various requirements for the boosting of Nigeria's Security Sector Governance as reviewed in the literature review section are based on the various concepts advocated in the theoretical paradigms of this study. Provision of employment as a means of poverty eradication that can help to reduce involvement in terrorism was also analysed. These theoretical paradigms are the traditional Security Sector Reform paradigm and the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform which was complemented with the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform. Nigeria's security sector reform relative to its ability to effectively counter terrorism should therefore be based on the improvement of the relevant concepts advocated in these paradigms. The following reviews justify this need.

Thus, the imperatives of SSR, especially with due consideration of the existing security sector challenges facing Nigeria, cannot be overemphasised. As a starting point, Cheema and Maguire (2002) noted that the level of development of a country is relative to the quality of its governance. They advise that any country undertaking the reform of its security sector should strive to achieve required security and development relative to its security needs. This objective, according to them, requires proper scrutiny of the conditions that external actors, especially developed countries and organizations, use as a basis for their assistance to any country's security sector. With reference to Safty (2000), they cited Nigeria as one of the countries where citizens crave democracy as a means of deriving freedom and dignity of life, free from ethnic and cultural diversity and underscored the need for SSR in the country.

On this note, Fayemi and Olonisaken (2008) observed that Nigeria have not been able to completely contain its post military domestic security challenges because of the regimented counter measures including serious human rights abuses and more concentration on state security than human security imperatives.

Accordingly, they observed that security sector governance constitutes a vital consideration to ensure and sustain human security, especially given the various challenges confronting the country's law enforcement

system, which tend to derail its development. This situation, according to them, requires the reform of the country's security, but its achievement is problematic. They also noted that this challenge is consequent upon the weakness of the institutional framework for security sector governance, including the democratic control of security institutions as well as due to the many years of military dictatorship in Nigeria which militarized the country and bestowed so much reverence for the military.

They further contended that Nigeria's security sector governance was corrupted by the many years of military involvement in the administration of the country, including several military coups which took place twice in 1966; a civil war which spanned from 1967 to 1970, as well as other coups and counter-coups in 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985 and 1993. Despite the foregoing, Nigeria had hardly adopted a long-term security sector reform to address the above challenges.

The existing paradigm shift in the post-Cold War era equally provides the need for Nigeria to accordingly respond to its requirement. This is because this shift has inevitably provided a more enlarged scope of security covering the achievement of national interest through integration of physical and human security considerations (Cawthra 2014). This requirement according to the Project Report on Democratic Governance and National Security in Nigeria (2014) should include the environment, the citizenry, economy, human development and governance, natural disasters, mature and efficient governance, among others, are now critical components of national security.

The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform Report (2013) also rationalized the need for Nigeria to undertake SSR. This report hinged this need on the various security challenges confronting Nigeria. These include high incidence of political, criminal, religious resource and communal conflicts, poor detection of early warning signs, inefficient conflict management, inefficient policing with a flawed system of accountability and poor democratic oversight system. In addition to the above reasons, Atelhe et al. (2016) based their reason on corruption in the country's security and law enforcement agencies, coupled with the incompetence of the operatives lead to gaps in the country's security sector. This leads to the involvement and consolidation of non-state actors in the provision of public security. Other reasons they proffered include Nigeria's complicated judicial system due to its federal structure. Consequent upon this, they concluded that SSR has more than ever become desirable in Nigeria because of the inadequacy of traditional approaches in resolving the ever-increasing security threats in the country.

Furthermore, Nigeria's Department of State Security document titled "New Responses to Evolving Challenges" (2015 p.1) emphasised the need for more aggressive SSR by the country. It noted that this is urgent because the country's present security challenge is so precarious due to such devastating real and existential security challenges confronting the country. These challenges include issues of terrorism and "a constellation of schisms which collectively make Nigeria very volatile" (p.1). It attributed the foregoing to the escalation in the trend of transnational crimes with the perpetrators becoming more sophisticated in

their capacity to acquire and traffic narcotics and illicit arms. All these according to the document, are significantly consequent upon governance deficits.

More so, Page (2019) notes the serious security threats that persist in the country, including the criminal activities in North-East Nigeria by Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) which the country have not been able to control due to poor security governance approach. Others according to him are the insignificant attention by the government to resolve widespread rural banditry, the increased communal conflicts especially that of herders and farmers and the yet to be resolved grievances in the country's oil rich Nigeria Delta region. He noted that for these reasons, SSR is more than ever imperative because Nigeria's security sector is complicated by strategic as well as operational mistakes, human rights abuses, and endemic corruption.

The above situation according to Wilson (2019) is worse because the country has instead of pursuing sustainable security sector governance initiatives, has been concerned with ad-hoc reforms to check its security sector governance challenges. All the foregoing therefore not only require a proper security sector reform of the country's security sector but should also be based on the extant provisions in the applicable security sector reform paradigms as contained in the following theoretical framework.

2.13. Theoretical Framework

2.13 (a) Security Sector Reform (SSR) Paradigm

From the previous analysis in this study, it is understood that the menace of terrorism as supported by terrorism financing is indeed very challenging to Nigeria and underscores the need for improved Security Sector governance as a potential remedy. The remedial intervention therefore recognizes the need for proper integration of both human and state security requirements as given impetus in both the traditional Security Sector Reform model and the African Union Policy Framework on security sector reform (2015). These constitute the theoretical framework. They provide the requirements which when properly applied can boost Nigeria's security sector governance.

SSR is constructed around the provision and improvement of human and state security. It is therefore key to the transformation of security systems, with due consideration of the imperatives of good governance. The OECD-DAC (2007) authenticated the SSR concept as characterised by a governance approach that is holistic and cognisant of such relevant considerations as security and development as well security and oversight institutions. According to Wulf (2004), SSR propagates the efficient use of scarce resources to achieve effective security, and civilian democratic control of the security apparatus is crucial for the provision of security for the benefit of the larger society.

The USAID Report on SSR (2009) advanced that there is no single generally accepted definition of SSR but that it is commonly conceived as the process of reforming or rebuilding the Security sector of a state to

achieve efficient Security Sector Governance (SSG). In the same vein, the Report avers that an effective SSG implies the various conceived principles and good practices of an efficient security sector through good governance, including its dividends such as education and public health.

It also covers capacity development and reformation of security institutions involving realistic and efficient provision and appropriation of the requisite resources. It recognizes the proper subordination of all security institutions and actors including the military as well as diplomatic and development actors under civil democratic control within the context of a democratically guided decision-making process characterized by transparent and accountable system. Others include efficient human rights and complemented with an efficient anti-corruption drive including transparency and accountability and good governance.

However, apart from systems and policy reform, an efficient security sector reform programme should be considerate of those for whom security is intended, and this involves the provision of good governance with capacity to cater for their needs and secondly, strengthening the institutions that will protect the state to be able to provide for and take care of the same citizens. It is from this perspective that a Security Sector Reform Paradigm is advocated to help mitigate security challenges in Nigeria including those arising from terrorism and its illicit financial supports and corruption.

The preamble of the United States National Peace Essay Context Handbook on Security Sector Reform, Political Transition and Sustainable Peace (2014) is very affirmative on the relevance of SSR. It notes that SSR is necessary for the improvement of the security system in countries with a history of many years of conflict and authoritarianism. This, according to the document, is achievable through the transformation of the military and law enforcement institutions of these countries to conform to a civilized approach in their statutory roles, especially in their responsibility to provide human services. This new role instils in them, the need to eschew impunity. The document also affirms that necessary reform components such as good governance, maintenance of human rights, accountability and transparency and a civil democratic ethos are critical for efficient security administration. These reforms, which cover the defence and justice sectors, equally require the participation of non-state actors, including CSOs.

This paradigm might have been a vital consideration in security planning and implementation but, it was not until the early 1990s that it became articulated as critical for security sector governance. It was formally brought to the fore by development donors and congruent on such requirements for human security. These include governance, transparency, accountability, human rights, healthy and peaceful societal transformation, poverty reduction, anti-corruption, democratic civil oversight as well as Disarmament and Reintegration programmes.

Security Sector Reform, according to a release by the Department of International Development (2004), implies the transformation of the security system including all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions managed and operated in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles

of good governance and thus, contributes to a well-functioning security framework. The same release outlined the following accruable benefits due to Security Sector Reform. Annan (1999), in his presentation tothe United Nations, on Good Governance, cited Security Sector Reform, including transparency efficiency of security actors, equity and accountability, as vital for the containment of insecurity.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2001) developed six broad categories of recommendations for the effective policy direction of the Security Sector. These submissions were based on the organisation's objective of ensuring a holistic and integrated approach to security matters, emphasising effective governance. Implicit in this is the following vital considerations:(i) Recognition of the eventual achievement of development as the basis of security, (ii) Conceptualisation of the Security Sector as a comprehensive scheme with an appropriate definition of the roles of the actors, (iii) Identification of institutional capacity and reform requirements in donor countries; (iv) Development and efficient appropriation of the required roles amongst all the relevant actors in the reform project; (v) Proper integration of the various security facets and concerns relative to overall economic and foreign policy considerations; (vi) Provision of assistance to enhance domestic ownership and commitment to reform process and human security within a framework of democratic governance.

Ola (2013) noted that SSR emerged in the 1990s as a significant concept among security experts and advocates of democracy. It is a relative concept designed to provide state and human security within the precinct of a sovereign state and government. The antecedent of this concept, according to him, is based on the concerns raised since the end of the Cold War that states have not been able to fulfil their obligations in the provision of security to their citizens despite the complexity of security challenges. For this reason, it became imperative to enlarge the security agenda to include the wellbeing of the citizens, including their fundamental human rights.

Based on the historical perspective on Security Sector Reform, Bendix and Stanley (2008) stated that the emergence of the concept was consequent upon the policy of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to cater for countries that were initially not supported to adapt with the conditions of the Cold War. The need for these countries to cope with the new challenges due to the need for an effective support for the prevention of conflict, post conflict reconstruction and organized crime control such as anti-terrorism. These were all purposed to promote human security needs that would ensure poverty alleviation and protection of individual rights. These scholars justified the need for security sector reform in African countries because of the continuous excruciating consequences of violent conflicts and other security threats in the country, which they attributed to the colonial antecedent of the African state and its institutions. Thus, according to them, such reform will help the security sector of African states to ensure the enhancement of democratic control, boost the people's security, including that of the poor, and minimize the consequences of violent conflicts.

The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance Report (2020) clearly states that the primary purpose of SSR is to strengthen the Security Sector by providing efficient security within the context of democratic oversight and control. The concept provides the framework to conceptualize the actors and the enabling factors that are required to provide security relative to the conditions and the best method to maximally utilize state resources for the achievement of the intended purpose. The Report conceptualized SSR as the term used to describe the constituent structures, institutions and the personnel with the responsibility to manage and provide oversight of the security sector. It involves the means of transforming the Security Sector in order to consequently enhance accountability, effectiveness and respect for human rights and the rule of law in the governance of the Security Sector.

Maccolman (2016) described SSR as a unique conceptual framework that links the various aspects of human and state security, democratic governance and development with deep insights into the causes of security threats in countries emerging from mass violence and political instability. Atelhe, Anyabe and Abumnimye (2016) describe SSR as the process required for the transformation of the security sector, which includes all institutions whose role it is to protect the country and its citizens from security threats, as well as to provide security to the state and its people effectively. This initiative is guided by accountability and democratic governance. The aim of SSR according to them is intended to develop a security scheme that is based on development and encompassing rule of law, good governance sector and local ownership of security actors. This is intended positively reverse the inability of a dysfunctional security to provide security to the state and its people.

2.13 (ai) Components of Security Sector Reform

Because of the need to effectively implement SSR to check security challenges, it is important to identify its vital components. Brzoska and Wulf (2000) identify four broad areas vital to any Security Sector structure: political, economic, social and institutional. The political component entails civil democratic oversight, supervision of security institutions and good governance. They point out that this component aims to facilitate rubbing of minds on security priorities and encourage civilian oversight supervision of these institutions.

The second component is the economic dimension, and it involves the allocation of resources. This component underscores the need for rational allocation of human, financial and material resources to the security sector, which is essential for the sector's effectiveness. Under this component is the need for transparency and accountability to ensure judicious and ethical use of resources as a criterion for the capacity enhancement of the sector. They caution against excessive security apparatus that attracts unbearable budgetary burdens to the detriment of other sectors vital for sustainable and effective security administration.

They, therefore, aver that SSR should involve determination and scrutiny of what is affordable, prioritizing resource allocation and ensuring efficient application of these resources, which relies on proper budgeting and fiscal responsibility.

The third component is the social dimension. This component is represented as the actual guarantee of the security of the citizens, including the security of the population from all forms of attack on their life, property and health. It is under this component that the provision of the basic needs of the citizens is included. Thus, provisions such as education and employment opportunities as indices of good governance are taken care of in this dimension.

The fourth component is the institutional dimension which revolves around the structure of the security sector and the institutional separation of the various forces and institutions in the mix. The following considerations are relevant for the efficiency and accountability of the different forces in the security arrangement. These are proper definition of institutional roles necessary for checking overlap of the roles between domestic public security and that of the military for external defence. This is important because such unchecked overlap could attract military involvement in domestic policing. More so, these scholars warned that the concept of security sector should not suffice as an excuse for militarized police forces or a major internal role for the armed forces. Apart from the proper subordination of the armed forces and security institutions under civil control, vital in this dimension are the proper entrenchment of virile interagency and international cooperation schemes.

Further to the above, Hanggi (2004) notes that the security sector encompasses all those state institutions that have a formal mandate to ensure the state's safety and that of its citizens against all forms of crimes. These institutions, according to him, include the police, gendarmerie and para-military forces, the intelligence and secret services, border and customs operatives as well as judicial and penal institutions. He further recommends including private security companies because of the prevalence of private and other non–statutory security actors in many states. He listed the following elements as very necessary in any security sector consideration, especially from a governance perspective: the elected and duly appointed civil officials responsible for management and control of the security forces such as the executive, the relevant ministries including the Ministries of Defence and Interior, the legislature and relevant committees.

In line with the principle and application of good governance as they apply to other public service sectors, the importance of accountability, transparency and democratic participation, and the vital role of justice and law enforcement institutions for effective security sector governance are also critical features. The institutions listed and recommended to be considered components include the judiciary, ministries of justice, criminal investigation and prosecution services, correctional services, ombudspersons and human rights commissions. The role of civil society groups in any effective security sector program is also included.

Such groups, according to him, include non-statutory civil society groups such as the media, research institutions, and NGOs. Therefore, any sustainable and effective SSR Programme should incorporate statutory and non-statutory actors with proper alignment of their specialised roles.

Atelhe, Anyabe and Abunimye (2016) (p.5) state that since the country's independence in 1960, it has been facing internal and external security challenges including constitutional and election crises, census crises, civil war, inter-state boundary disputes, military coups and counter coups and recently, insurgencies by terrorist groups. They observed these crises most times, escalated to such dangerous proportion because of lack of the required capacity and professionalism of the country's security sector required to counter their threats. They noted that the country's present security architecture is very deficient to the extent that security institutions are not functional, instability in the country, violation of rule of law and human rights. All these according to them underscore the need to reform the country's security sector.

2.13 (aii) Relevance of SSR

Brzoska (2005) acknowledges the novelty of SSR and firmly posits that the most crucial underlying factor for effective Security Sector governance is a strong democratic foundation aimed at sustaining all such vital requirements as promotion of human rights and implementation of the principles of good governance including accountability and transparency. He avers that this involves integrating all previous and partial sectoral reforms, including defence, police, and intelligence and justice, into a unified scheme that is applied holistically.

Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin (2006) observe that SSR is critical for the democratic governance of the security sector and that it is suitable for the correction of a flawed security system primarily through ensuring that security and democratic deficits, including lack of civil democratic oversight in the security sector, are mitigated. The conception of SSR by Nieuwkerk (2019) is equally apt in this case. In his reference to the AU-SSRF, he noted that SSR is the means adopted by countries for the formulation and reorientation of policies, structures and institutional capacities and the groups involved in the security sector. This according to him ensures their effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness to civil democratic control and appropriate dispensation of justice to the citizens.

The appeal of SSR appears quite instructive, but its application should be relative to the specific, identifiable backgrounds and characteristics peculiar to the country that intends to apply the reform. Reasons for applying reform, according to Wulf (2014), may include, inter alia, post-conflict rebuilding, the transition from a military or one-party regime to democratic governance, recent independence, lack of transparency and accountability in public matters. Others are disregard for the rule of law, complex and inefficient conflict resolution mechanism, inimical challenges in the management of public resources and the limited capacity of civilians to regulate and supervise security institutions.

In essence, SSR varies substantially according to the specific reform contexts because no standard model of reform exists. However, in principle, each country should apply the reform relative to the prevailing circumstance in its domain. Thus, reform context differs from one country to another given several influential factors, including historical conditions, economic conditions, economic development, the nature of the political system, and the security environment**.** Like many other African countries, Nigeria is confronted with unique challenges beyond the ones mentioned above. Nathan (2001) noted that these challenges include authoritarian governance, weak states, socio-economic decadence, inequity and the exclusion of minorities.

This perhaps informed Handickson and Karkoszka's (2002) position that the emerging SSR paradigm should be based on broad principles such as democratic control and accountability, public participation and transparency, good governance and public expenditure management. They made a case for an integrated multi-disciplinary holistic approach rather than isolated donor-driven reforms with conditions such as good governance and democratization.

Despite the merits mentioned above, this research is not unmindful of the numerous shortcomings associated with traditional SSR. Wulf's (2004) insights are instructive in this regard. According to him, traditional SSR takes for granted the will to reform the security system and that governments are willing to welcome external intervention, which is essentially a pre-condition advocated in traditional SSR. He also took exception to the non-harmonization of international donor policies, which are inequitable. An example in this case, involves the UN, whose programmes are influenced by non-democratic member countries and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thus, the operations of these institutions are dictated by their shareholders from the developed countries, which subject recipient countries to unfavourable conditions, including the imposition of structural reform programmes as conditions for democracy and good governance prerequisite for any assistance to them.

Another example cited is the US counter-terrorism campaign which he noted, has impacted negatively on the entrenchment of transparency and accountability at the expense of good governance. Thus, the emphasis of the US, in this case, revolves around the enhancement of the capacity of uniformed security agencies and a narrow scope neither on proficient intelligence procurement and application nor for human security considerations. Furthermore, he observed that there is an inequitable prioritization of goals of international and national actors. This, according to him, underscores the need to give due consideration to the unique circumstances of the country undertaking the reform of its security sector in order to ensure its effectiveness while at the same time, taking adequate consideration of the entire goal of the reform programme.

Rupiya (2004) observes that because of the misgivings against SSR, especially by developing countries, any envisaged alternative needs to take cognizance of the peculiar circumstances of the countries applying the

reform. He hinged this requirement on the understanding that the subsisting contents of SSR as constructed by developed countries do not considerably address the security needs of the developing ones.

The challenge, therefore, according to him, is the need for developing countries to identify and pursue such SSR process with the potential to enhance their national and human security capacity without challenging these developed countries. Such caution is necessary because many African countries are economically unhealthy and require the assistance of the developed ones especially through the IMF and World Bank to redress their situation. Unfortunately, it is through these institutions that developed countries use to arm twist the developing ones into accepting such initiatives in the traditional SSR that are hardly in conformity with their domestic security realities. A specific example, in this case, is the US adoption of a legislative resolution mandating the IMF and World Bank to request from any developing nation applying for assistance from either of these institutions, to submit its defence appropriations as a condition for any consideration.

All the above demerits prompted the need for a domesticated security sector reform model. Thus, in order to ensure that the coverage of SSR is not limited to suit any partial interest, Bryden et al (2006), presented an all-encompassing perspective of SSR, which accommodates a wide range of activities that regulate the administration of the Security Sector. This covers a holistic strategy that unifies the reforms which according to them, should show more concern for strategic measures meant for the enhancement of the efficiency of democratic governance in the jurisdiction where the reforms are carried out. This is to create the desired atmosphere for the mobilization and participation of the executive, judiciary and the legislature, as well as non-state actors in the transformation of the sector.

Within this context, Ball et al (2004) had earlier identified the political will as a prerequisite to drive the transformation agenda. They observe that this requirement is crucial for these actors to ensure that security obligations and responsibilities are undertaken within the tenets of existing democratic principles. According to them, all these will ensure that security issues are appropriately subjected to proper civil democratic scrutiny, including the needed support to the legislature and all relevant statutory bodies.

Also, while recommending the involvement of the larger society in the entire security program, Wulf (2004) was quick to point out that democratization alone cannot guarantee improved security. This is in sync with the earlier observation by Luckhan (2003) that democratisation has the potential to even exacerbate political violence because of its propensity to distort established privileges and deterrence of political expectations.

Fayemi, Olonisakin and Williams (2004) counselled that this should involve a more profound intent on behalf of elected governments to ensure that the activities of security institutions are consistent with the democracies that they serve. They observed that countries with serious governance deficits might require

a fundamental transformation of relations between the civil authorities and civil society on the one hand and security organizations on the other. Such transformation, they stated, should occur within a framework of democratic oversight and control.

The transformation proponents mostly of African origin in this case used as example, the excruciating socio-political complexities that bedevilled African countries including the apartheid regime in South Africa and the various military dictatorial conditions that adversely influenced these countries. They aver that these were substantially based on drastic and sustainable re-orientation as a major plank of the reform process. According to Bryden et al. (2006), the reform or transformation model is unique and not ready-made because its formulation passed through three painstaking phases. These include less emphasis on state security through drastic induction in defence budgets and pegging its maximum at 4% of the entire national budget connected to the need to minimize governance deficits by ensuring transparency and accountability.

This is the reason for the wide acceptability of Security Sector Transformation agenda in African countries, including those of the West African sub-region. This trend is notably significant in the latest Security Sector Governance policies of the continental body, the African Union (AU) and that of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It underscores the adoption of the AU-PFSSR as a complementary SSR paradigm in this study.

2.14 AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (AU-PFSSR)

The application of SSR in this research is for its security needs of Nigeria. Kahuni's (2017) position on the need for SSR to be domesticated and for its application to be nationally sensitive and not based on the prescription of the West is quite acceptable. The specifications in the 2013 African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (AU-PFSSR) are relied on to achieve this purpose and predicated on resolving the contending issues in the country's security sector.

The AU-PFSSR followed the 2008 resolution of the AU, which called for the development of a comprehensive AU Policy Framework on SSR, similar to the Policy Framework on post-conflict reconstruction and development earlier endorsed by the Commission's Executive Council in 2006. It was also conceived and motivated by the 2007 United Nations Statement that emphasised the relevance of SSR as vital for the consolidation of peace as well as by the United Nations Secretary General's Report (2008), the United Nations Secretary General's Report (2009) and the United Nations Security Council Statement (2010) all of which recognized Security Sector Reform as very expedient for post conflict management. It was spurred by the need to institute an African continental framework for democratic governance of the Security Sector. The intention was to guarantee its effectiveness through the provision of the needed direction targeted at enhancing institutional capacities to be able to mobilize requisite resources to facilitate security reform processes that will accordingly alleviate the observed constraints of the Sector.

It envisions the following: (i) Provision of policy framework to assist member countries of the AU to, efficiently conceptualize, design, implement, monitor and evaluate their Security Sector programmes, (ii) Provision of an African instrument for SSR advocacy and an appropriate platform for Security Sector orientation, (iii) training and capacity development that will help relevant persons, groups and institutions to be effectively involved in the necessary SSR processes,(iv) Provision of appropriate international collaborative guidance to encourage relevant AU Partners and maximize their cooperation benefits and finally to serve as the wholesome African continental contribution to the UN global SSR framework.

The AU-PFSSR is also intended to act as a guide for the achievement of post-conflict reconstruction and development, which is aimed at reinvigorating the capacity of security institutions. This based on the following: (i) the need to transform the various state apparatus, especially those relevant for justice and security administration,(ii) the restoration and strengthening of the institutions that are crucial for the maintenance of law and order, including the police and correctional institutions,(iii) establishment of mechanisms for democratic governance and accountability of the security sector for the restoration of public confidence,(iv) Facilitation of SSR including civil-military relations, relevant human resources requirements and professionalism in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) schemes as well as (v) Creation of appropriate and effective oversight bodies for the security sector including the legislative arm and public complaints institutions.

Member countries were advised to conceptualise and design their SSR programmes relative to their peculiar circumstances and security needs and to incorporate relevant components which should include but not be limited to the following: proper Security Sector review and assessment; Conceptualisation and implementation of appropriate security strategies; Ensuring the existence and instrumentality of necessary institutional, legal and security policy frameworks; Embarking on comprehensive capacity development and professionalization programmes of security institutions; Setting up and implementation of robust partnership and coordination programmes; well strengthening utilitarian civil democratic oversight schemes; conscious, adequate and transparent resource allocations, appropriation and complemented with effective accountability practices as well as; effective monitoring and evaluation programme and strategic supports. This Framework is also elastic and accommodates other equally necessary considerations relative to the security needs and circumstance of particular countries (African Union Security Framework 2003 p.)

2.14 (a) Critical components of the framework

The framework contains several components relevant for the improvement of the above processes and requirements, and that can enhance the security sector in African countries, especially when applied relative to the right discretion. A proper analysis of these components shows that they revolve around the need to institute and effectively implement the following, (a) conceptualization and implementation of a

robust security strategy, (b) Strategic and institutional enhancement, (c) entrenching efficient democratic oversight, the rule of law and human rights standards, (d) Transparency and accountability standards and (e) ensuring proficient and sustainable monitoring and evaluation systems.

In conceptualising and implementing robust security strategy, the framework requires member states to produce a properly defined National Security Strategy. This has been iterated by many experts in security sector administration who also emphasize the need for relevant policies and for the engagement of qualified persons to undertake this responsibility (Ikelegbe, Mohammad Wali and Karim 2014). This strategy should be sustainable and is expected to guide the mitigation of existing security threats. It also envisages the need for efficient utilization of resources to achieve peace and security.

In strategic and institutional enhancement, the framework emphasizes the need for SSR programmes to be anchored on the achievement of sustainable peace, post-conflict reconstruction and relevant socio-economic programmes. Further to the above, is the need for professional capacity building programmes and professionalization of the sector. These underscore the need to ensure the provision of requisite institutional resources involving efficiency of relevant personnel in the sector through capacity development programmes. Appropriate and transparent employment procedures, training and equipment supports are noted to be necessary in this case.

It also stressed the need for member countries to create appropriate monitoring systems to achieve checks and balances through regular review and audit of these systems to establish guides for the oversight supervision of the institutions.

Another vital component recognised in the framework is the need for adequate democratic oversight of the security sector. Member countries of the AU are advised to be committed to enhancing all the relevant organs responsible for the performance of this role. Embedded in the objectives is the need to achieve good governance, promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The framework categorized such controls under the following: executive control, legislative oversight, judicial control and oversight as well as independent oversight by designated civil institutions.

For executive control, the executive branch of government is expected to provide the needed political and policy supports to the constituent institutions in the sector. In the case of legislative oversight, the framework affirmed that this is intended to ensure that member countries provide the necessary support to their legislative arm of government to supervise the security sector by making it mandatory for the executive to be accountable for the performance of the sector within stipulated rules of engagement. Included in this responsibility is the constitutional role of the legislature to make appropriate laws and regulations for security sector administration. The legislature is equally expected to exercise oversight to ensure that security institutions conform to these laws and other necessary provisions for the sector's effectiveness.

In the case of judicial control and oversight, the framework emphasized the need to check abuse in the sector and ensure that its various constituents perform their security roles within the ambit of constitutional and legislative provisions and ensure that citizens' rights are not negatively affected. It also obligates law enforcement institutions to conduct their operations per the rule of law and civilised tenets. This requires that constituent institutions in the sector respect national and international human rights and humanitarian laws. Those who contravene these laws should be investigated and accordingly sanctioned. For transparency and accountability, the framework recognizes the need for the promotion of transparency, accountability and public accessibility through an appropriate oversight regime by relevant institutions.

It is also expected that appropriated funds to all the stakeholders in the security sector should be utilized transparently and professionally. Before such budgetary allocations, each of the security institutions should submit their budgetary proposals. Following this is the need for realistic budgetary allocations from annual financial reports by concerned institutions, which will be subjected to annual audit verifications and the resultant reports to be submitted to the legislature accordingly. It should be noted that Nigeria has budgeted several billions of dollars for her security programme, yet this has not improved the situation due to cases of misappropriation and embezzlement and the politicisation of security budgeting. Thus, while acknowledging the importance of ensuring accountability and transparency within the sector, this research also investigated corruption in Nigeria, including the observed grafts in Nigeria's security institutions and how these can be mitigated.

The next requirement of this framework is the monitoring and evaluation component. Any African country embarking on SSR is expected to develop appropriate instruments for evaluating the programme and should explore, where necessary, support assistance from the AU. In this case, member countries of the AU are expected to entrench relevant schemes that should evaluate and monitor their SSR programmes. This is to ensure the required tracking and assessment of programmes to determine the extent to which objectives and milestones are realised.

2.14 (b) Justification for AU-PFSSR

The AU-PFSSR provides a comprehensive framework and detailed guidance for improving the security sector of African countries, including Nigeria. Its application should be based on a proper evaluation of the peculiar security situation of the country. The requirement for such evaluation was the basis for this study's detailed assessment of Nigeria's security situation, with specific focus on the existing and terrorism threats and its underlying causes.

Most of the recurring security threats facing African countries are symptoms of more profound political and socio-economic challenges. The links between these challenges and poor governance have also been well established. As such, the framework proposes several governance-related remedies that must be

addressed to reinforce SSR mechanisms. This study focused on the governance-related issues that are relevant for this purpose. These include the need to improve the country's civil democratic oversight mechanism; improvement of its human rights standards complemented by a robust justice administration and on the improvement of the quality of Nigeria's educational and employment programmes. The framework also emphasised the entrenchment of important accountability and transparency standards, which requires the elevation of the country's anti-corruption standards to ensure efficient Security Sector Governance.

More so, this framework thoroughly took cognisance of African countries' unique security challenges, including Nigeria's, which were arrived at through the contributions of relevant and critical stakeholders. Following this is the need for countries, including Nigeria, to heal their security sector due to the series of undemocratic practices and bad governance that are consequent upon their successive military dictatorships and for improvement in the relations between their military and civil populace. Achievement of these objectives involved dialogue among relevant stakeholders, including legislators and security experts. This resulted in the first book on Security Sector Governance based on African circumstances.

At this point, it is important to note that the effectiveness of the reform of Nigeria's security sector requires the cooperation of all the stakeholders in the sector and indeed that of the citizenry and their communities. This is because the yearnings and aspirations of these citizens should be a most vital consideration in the reform process. Such consideration is necessary to attract cooperation with security actors, which can also be elusive if these citizens are not treated fairly. Examples in Nigeria abound: citizens denied security operatives the necessary information to help them in their counter-terrorism operations due to the high handedness of the former and lack of trust for them. It is therefore important for security sector reform processes to appropriately put all these in context for a successful security sector reform. These underscore the need for the incorporation of local ownership in the reform.

Thus, the importance of local ownership of SSR programmes is important. It can also be counter-productive if not appropriately considered in the reform process. This was echoed by Nathan (2007) and Mobekk (2010), who warned that the lack of local ownership of SSR programmes could make security sector institutions and related processes and policies deficient in their capacity to satisfy the people's yearnings, leading to a lack of public trust and confidence. With reference to Edomwoyi (2003), they aver that domestic actor need to participate in SSR processes to ensure that the relevant security sector institutions respond to the local needs with due consideration for their cultures and value systems. According to them, this is necessary to avoid the possibility of rejection of such processes. They further advocated that local ownership should have such national and inclusive content that incorporates national and local institutions, the legislature and civil society components including traditional authorities and women associations.

According to Bastic and Valasek (2008), non-consideration of local ownership of SSR programmes can lead to non-accountability and non-responsiveness by the constituent institutions in the sector to the yearnings of the citizens. This according to them can vitiate the needed confidence in the SSR programmes which consequently limits the success of the programmes in achieving the required peace.

Donais (2009) also emphasized the relevance better inclusiveness of non-state actors for the efficiency of the security sector. Such inclusiveness is so critical for the success of the intended reform of the sector and can obviate same if not adequately considered. Accordingly, Gordon Forbes and Cave (2011) iterated that the absence of the required inclusiveness of local ownership of the security sector reform process can result in the component institutions not being able to satisfy the security needs of the common citizens. This can consequently make these institutions not to enjoy the needed acceptability and with the consequence of their suffering from lack of trust and acceptability which can truncate the expected peace.

For the above reasons, Gordon, Welch and Roos (2015) counselled on the need for local ownership of SSR to be inclusive as a means of eliciting the required responsiveness to the needs of the generality of the people rather than for a select priviledged few. They equally adduced the need for SSR to be gender sensitive and to ensure that women are actively engaged in this case.

These are very laudable expectations but are yet to be appropriately adopted in Nigeria's security sector governance which is also the case with most African countries. Cawthra (2015) links this to the inability of African security institutions to live up to their obligation, due mainly to poor governance of the state in general and specifically of the security sector to provide the required security, including a safe and secure environment for socio-economic and political development. He avers that Security Sector Governance should encompass the democratic governance of the security sector with due cognizance of the imperatives of human and state security involving a legitimate and trusted state that should be accountable to the citizenry.

Furthermore, he noted that since the end of the Cold War, the need to emphasize less on state and elite focused conception of security to a more citizen-centred one had been gaining much recognition globally. According to him, this includes such vital features of national security, economic development and basic human rights and with the objective of protecting the citizens from violence. He also observed that though the protection of the state and its citizens from external aggression is essential, the most threatening challenge facing African countries at the inception of this century is of multiple dimensions. Specific to Nigeria, its 21st-century security challenge has assumed such a threatening dimension mainly due to the escalation of terrorism in the country. The various law enforcement and security agencies in the country are also almost helpless due to their human resources and professional deficiencies.

The foregoing can be resolved through profound security sector reform through re-orientation of the sector and the citizens on security matters as well as organization of well equipped, well trained and well-

resourced security institutions that can protect the government, the relevant institutions and the citizens at large as well as create the enabling environment that will attract both domestic and foreign investments, create a secured society through a system that will be alert to its responsibilities in such a proactive manner that will capacitate it to nip imminent security challenges in the bud (Olaleye 2012, p.12).

This, therefore, underscores the need for Nigeria to strengthen its security sector by embarking on appropriate security sector reform, especially through improvement of the relevant requirements as propagated in the security sector reform (SSR) paradigm and in the African Security Sector Reform Framework (2015).

There are several such requirements, but this research concentrates on the need to improve institutional capacity and complemented by interagency cooperation and international cooperation. Others include the need to improve civil democratic oversight, human rights as well as the need to complement the foregoing with good governance and its derivation such as improved anti-corruption initiatives, access to quality education and employment opportunities.

Security Sector Reform is a systematic process of reforming and strengthening the security system to be better equipped to achieve peace by providing conditions necessary for human and state security. However, apart from systems and policy reform, an efficient security programme should be considerate of those for whom security is intended, and this involves the provision of good governance with capacity to cater for their needs and secondly strengthening the institutions that will protect the state to be able to provide for and take care of the same citizens. From this perspective, the Security Sector Reform Paradigm is advocated to help mitigate security challenges in Nigeria, including those arising from terrorism.

2.15 Complementary Theoretical Frames

In view of the foregoing and further to the need for consideration of Nigeria's peculiar circumstance and security need, ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance (EPFSSR/G) is also used in this research as complementary to the AU-PFSSR. This framework was developed in 2016 by member states of ECOWAS and was contingent on the core African principles for SSR as contained in the AU-PFSSR adopted by the African States in 2013. It should be noted that this framework constitutes policy and strategic guidance to deal with security threats in West Africa, especially the emerging security threats in the region including terrorism, armed conflicts, drug trafficking, arms proliferation, human trafficking, militarization of politics, etc.

The framework was therefore predicated on the challenges faced by the security sector in West African countries to deal with the above threats because of an absence of the required governance culture, insufficient physical and institutional capacity of the sector, lack of and limited professionalism of security

institutions and actors, lack of relevant training, inadequate equipment, funding and other resources as well as ineffective democratic supervision of the sector.

Other reasons for the framework are the recognition of the need for peace building and prevention of conflicts in the region and mitigation of the dangerous consequences of arms proliferation, especially Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and the inducement of conflicts due to illegal exploitation of Light Weapon. Furthermore, the framework was considerate of democratic governance and human security is basically relevant in the community strategy to ensure that security remains a vital human service and as a necessary requirement for sustainable development.

To achieve the foregoing objectives, the framework recognizes the need to institute changes in the security sectors of the various ECOWAS members including a combination of state and human security requirements in these sectors in order to ensure the needed democratic governance at national and regional levels. The framework is also cognizant of the peculiarities and specific requirements of security sector reform in the region and therefore endorsed the need for national and regional ownership of the reform processes and for the consequent initiatives to be based on the region's cultural and value system.

From the above indications, it would have been clear that this framework synchronizes with the AUPFSSR and can indeed complement it as part of the theoretical framework of this research. Thus, the relevant governance and security sector requirements; namely: the institutional and strategic capacity of Nigeria's security sector governance and SSR requirement; namely: good governance, anti-corruption drive, human rights, interagency and international collaborative initiatives all advocated in this framework.

Thus, in the ECOWAS - PFSSR (2016) (P.9) set objectives set out in the following expectations are clearly stated; namely:

(a) To eliminate threats to individual and group rights, safety, life, livelihoods and property as well as to protect institutions and values of democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law as part of human security needs.
(b) To provide the required direction of the capacities and focus of the actors and groups involved in the security sector in order to ensure their efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness to democratic control as well as adherence to fundamental human rights and rule of law.
(c) To ensure the emergence and consolidation of accountable, transparent and participatory security systems in ECOWAS member states (p.9)

The outlined features of the framework and which can help in the realization of the above objectives are equally relevant for the enhancement of the security sector of Nigeria to be able to mitigate the threats of terrorism. These are: development of a national security policy, periodic security sector review and needs assessment, comprehensive professionalization of security sector; involvement of local customary

authorities and community based security and justice providers, effective involvement of civil society, organizations and the media; instituting effective and accountable democratic oversight institutions including effective judicial systems; effective resourcing and mobilization strategy for the governance of the security sector, an effective national framework for proficient partnerships and cooperation initiatives as effective communications strategy as well as a monitoring and evaluation system (p.13).

2.16 Conclusion

This chapter commenced with the analysis of Nigeria's security challenges which was demonstrated as obvious in the country and which possibly influenced the development of its security sector. The consequences of Nigeria's colonisation, its independence and post-colonial challenges were also analysed. This revealed that the independence of the country was poorly nurtured and consequently confronted the country with post-colonial challenges that were rooted in the poor security sector structure that it inherited from its colonists.

The Nigerian civil war was also analysed as a notable factor in the development of the country's security sector and how it decimated the wealth and assets of its citizens and consequently spurred them into crimes including terrorism. It was also noted that this same war emboldened the country's military operatives to such an extent that they took over governance of the country after the war and governed the country for over thirty years. This resulted in the destruction of the country's democratic institutions and consequently, concerned the country's security sector with State Security provision more than human security. This was followed with analysis of terrorism financing as a major support. In this case, the sources and means of distribution of all such illicit funds that were used to support terrorism activities in the country were analysed.

The foregoing consequently underscored the need to improve the country's security sector governance using a suitable theoretical framework and its components as the source of the required areas that need be addressed in order to improve Nigeria's security sector governance. The required theoretical framework upon which the research is based was therefore analysed. The various paradigms which accordingly constituted the framework were discussed. These are the traditional Security Sector Reform (SSR) developed in the early 1990s by the OECD and the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform developed in 2013 and complemented with the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform developed in 2016. The main purpose of these paradigms was explained as congruent upon the reformation of the security sector in line with state and human security imperatives in order to achieve sustainable peace.

The objectives of these theoretical constructs were also analysed. These include: the need to strengthen the capacity of security and law enforcement institutions, the need to establish effective democratic supervision of the security sector; the need for the protection of human rights, the imperatives of good

governance especially the institution of mechanisms for transparency and accountability of the sector through effective anti-corruption initiatives as well as access to quality employment opportunities as a means of poverty eradication in order to limit involvement in terrorism.

The institutional capacity of the sector was analysed, and it includes review of relevant supports to the security and law enforcement agencies responsible terrorism control. These supports included budgetary, logistics, human resources and judicial supports. All these were analysed as insufficient and underscored the need for cooperation among the stakeholders in the country's security sector and for which the status of interagency cooperation in the sector was also analysed and found to be insufficient. This further underscored the need for international cooperation to complement the above cooperation. This was accordingly analysed relative to the various collaboration between Nigeria's security institutions with their foreign counterparts.

The literature further provided various perspectives on the critical security Sector Reform components that are most crucial in the country's security sector governance. These components are many, but it concentrated on democratic civil oversight and human rights which were analysed relative to their subsisting status in the country. The review revealed that the quality of civil democratic oversight over the security institutions responsible for terrorism in Nigeria is fraught with several challenges including the country's military administrative antecedent, corruption and absence of required political will. For the quality of human rights, administration, the various human rights violations by the country's security institutions were analysed and underscored the need for improvement.

Furthermore, the imperative of good governance as a vital requirement of proficient security sector governance were analysed but with emphasis on the country's anti-corruption profile as well as provision of employment as a dividend of good governance that can help eradicate poverty and limit involvement in terrorism.

The revelations from the literatures showed that Nigeria's corruption profile is very poor and that most of those who engaged in crimes especially the youths were unemployed, possibly due to the poor state of the country's employment programmes. All the foregoing underscored the need for the improvement of the vital security sector reform and good governance requirements that are most critical to Nigeria all for the purpose of boosting its Security Sector Governance capacity to effectively check terrorism.

The required theoretical requirement upon which the research is based was also analysed. The various paradigms which constitute the theoretical framework of the research were discussed. These are the traditional Security Sector Reform (SSR) developed in the early 1990s by the OECD, developed in 2013 by the African Union. The African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform developed in 2016 by ECOWAS. The use of these paradigms was justified and with explanation of their purpose. The main purpose of these paradigms was explained as

congruent upon the reformation of the security sector in line with state and human security imperatives in order to achieve sustainable peace.

CHAPTER 3:

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapters explained the necessity of the research study as well as the body of literature and the theoretical framework that is necessary for the required process. Following this is the need to appropriately conceive and analyse the relevant component of the foregoing through a proper research process. All these revolve around the conceptual framework and research methodology.

3.2. Conceptual Framework

This section identifies and analyses common and central features and relationships within the key theories and proceeds to synthesise these within an integrated conceptual framework.

The relevant blocks of this project include the need to appraise and recommend the means of improving Nigeria's security sector governance to be able to effectively control terrorism in Nigeria and terrorism financing as a major inducing factor. It also includes appropriate conception of the necessary security sector and governance requirements. These are: institutional supports of sector which underscored the need for interagency collaboration and international cooperation. Others are the quality and improvement of the country's civil oversight supervision scheme, its human rights standard as well as anti-corruption profile and complementary good governance initiatives; specifically, the country's employment programme. All the above are critical security requirements that when improved, can help to enhance the country's security sector governance to control the incidence and threats of terrorism in the country.

From the preceding analyses, it is evident that the threats of terrorism as supported by terrorism financing is a serious challenge to Nigeria and underscores the need to check it through the strengthening of the country's fiscal administrative within the context of its Security Sector governance. The required intervention involves a proper integration of both human and state security requirements as given impetus in the Security Sector Reform Paradigm and further credence in the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (2013). The benefits of applying this model are obvious because it can help to check the menace of this crime and engender peace in the country and with a higher propensity to attract desired development that can positively rub off on the security sector.

All these can be realisable through proficient security sector governance based on a proper variation of security sector reform imperatives in alignment with the applicable provisions in the above Policy Framework for the purpose of concurrently achieving human and state security. This covers the following; namely: (a) entrenchment of necessary human security conditions; strategic and capacity development; (b) reformation of security institutions including efficient provision and appropriation of the requisite resources to ensure their efficiency; (c) proper subordination of all security institutions and their actors

including the military as well as diplomatic and development actors under civil control within the context of a democratically guided decision making process and characterized by a transparent and accountable system as well as (d) observance of rule of law and respect for human rights.

Good governance also constitutes a significant portion of the conceptual framework of this research. Its relevance is legion. However, the incidence of corruption and the needed counter measures as well as provision of employment opportunities appear the most crucial in this case. In the case of corruption, its incidence, the country's anti-corruption crusade, the militating factors against its mitigation will be assessed. The overall objective is to entrench an effective anti-corruption programme which should as a matter of priority, entrench openness and ethical standards in Nigeria's security sector governance (Agwu 2011; Olutoyin 2014; Transparency International Reports 2014 and 2015).

Provision of employment opportunities is also a critical governance requirement. The extent of this provision as well as the utilisation of these opportunities by potential beneficiaries is contextualised. Notable constraints that militate against Nigeria's employment programme which pose consequence on its security sector governance capacity revolve around socio-economic and political factors including governance and policy deficiencies.

The reason for lack of education and unemployment may not necessarily be due to the non-provision of these opportunities but possibly as a result of such reprehensions and stereotypes held by would-be beneficiaries. These are compounded further by the failure of government to complement this with positive encouragement of potential beneficiaries to avail themselves of these opportunities (Adeyemi 2012 p.6).

Nigeria's security sector has over the years been derided as not impressive on the above requirements. For this reason, this research explored means of improving the above concepts all of which revolves around the provision of good governance to consequently boost the sector's capacity to control the threats of terrorism. There is therefore need to extend any counter measure against this crime to cut across national boundaries but with Nigeria's domestic security challenge as a primary consideration.

All the foregoing analyses bothers on the need for an efficient security sector governance and can meaningfully take care of the menace of terrorism with clear focus on the following; namely: Proper understanding of this crime, and its inducement by illicit financial supports; Proper resourcing of the concerned security and law enforcement agencies; the need for their collaboration and synergy in order to integrate their respective capacity for better aggregate performance. This research also projected the need for Nigeria's security agencies to cooperate with that of other countries based on an equitable mutual collaborative scheme that includes exchange of intelligence, joint operations, exchange of technical and human resources; etc.

Others are the need to improve the critical security sector reform requirements including a more effective civil democratic supervision of the sector and satisfactory human rights protection. Following this is the conceptualisation of the imperatives of good governance and to derive its benefits through an efficient anti-corruption programme and provision of employment opportunities as means of poverty alleviation and possible deference from involvement in terrorism activities.

At this point, it would have been understood that the conceptual framework provided the plan and direction of the research and guided by the relevant concepts advocated in the theoretical framework. It is therefore necessary to follow it up with the required process of actualising the research through adoption of appropriate steps, hence the research methodology.

3.3. Research Methodology

This section starts with a qualitative research design, based on the Interpretivism paradigm. The Interpretivism paradigm, predicated on social constructionism, was chosen as the basis for this qualitative study because the research involves interpretation of data and the derivation of relevant meanings through appropriate interaction with the social world, including the actions of constituent individuals. These meanings are consequently decoded through appropriate contextualisation relative to the research objectives. The content and the relevance of the above paradigm, design and approach are further elaborated in the section that follows.

3.3 (i) The Interpretivist Paradigm

This research is based on the philosophy of Interpretivism. This paradigm owes its origin to two philosophical orientations namely, phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. According to Collins (2010), while the former implies the manner in which human beings make meaning of the world around them, the later affirms that human beings continually interpret the social world around them relative to the action of others which are then utilized for the derivation of the accrued meaning. He stated that Interpretivism comprises multiple approaches such as social constructionism, phenomenology and hermeneutics, all of which obviates the position that the derivation of meaning was domiciled within the world and independent of consciousness.

Myers (2008) strengthened this position and corroborated the view by interpretive researchers that access to reality, whether standard or socially constructed, is only realizable through social constructions including language, shared meanings, consciousness and instruments. Interpretivists adopt several means to achieve meaning and to reflect different aspects of phenomena.

Interpretivism has a rich historical and research content. According to Madison (1998), this phenomenon was consequent upon the challenge that arose due to the use of natural scientific methods in the study of human affairs. Angen (2000) used several scholarly contributions to amplify this assertion. This includes

the argument that the requirement for simplification and reducibility, prerequisite for scientific experimentation and consequent explanation used in the physical sciences, is not sufficient for the interpretation and understanding of human experience. She observed that such position is in the precinct of the natural science and not suitable in human discipline which requires understanding and interpretation of human experience.

Interpretivism emerged from the frustration of scholars who felt that the social world was too dynamic and vast to conform only to the dictates of specific theorising as is in the physical sciences. This is because the physical sciences cannot sufficiently do justice to the huge benefits due to the understanding and interpretation of the world and consequently created the basis for the emergence of Interpretivism. Several scholarly contributions on the research merits of Interpretivism attempt to neutralize the criticisms of quantitative theorists. These include Smith (1984). He strongly advocated the need to reject the orthodox ideology of objectivity and truth but to focus our research periscope beyond mere methodology and to extend to constructive analysis and application. This is therefore the basis for the choice of this paradigm.

The interaction between the researcher, would-be researcher and the phenomenon of research must be consistent with the ontological dimension and based on the assumption that findings emanate as the research progresses (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Orlinowski & Baroudi, 1991). They further noted that this should take due recognition of social phenomena as understood through knowledge of how meanings are created and fashioned by the language and working culture of those involved in the process of achieving a mutual research objective.

The call by Angen (2000) is equally very strident on this note and perhaps one of the most honest positions on the heuristic value and relevance of qualitative interpretive research relative to such researches anchored on the quantitative approach. She tacitly subscribed to Interpretivism as highly reliable and with the potential to actually expand and deepen our understanding of the actual meaning of being human in this realm that is more than human. She furthered that though this task may involve risking certainty that this loss could be compensated for, through accrued moral and practical benefits due to meanings that will be eventually derived.

On the same but with an extended viewpoint as regards the conception of human understanding as socio-historically inclusive and based on the vehicle of language, she relied on the position of Kvale (1996) to extend the point that all interpretations are dynamic and evolutionary and subject to reviews and that the critical context of any interpretation, (i.e. the truth) should in order to sustain its veracity, be subjected to "continuous conversation and dialogue". Jardine (1990) and Sendelowski (1993) observed that research criteria that are based on methods, cannot guarantee the quality of objectivity envisioned by positivists.

An example of relevant research work was based on the Interpretivism paradigm was that of Klein and Myers (1999). They outlined seven basic principles on which its use is based. These are: Hermeneutic circle, contextualization, interaction between the researcher and the subjects of research, abstraction and generalisation, dialogical reasoning, multiple interpretations and suspicion.

The relevance of this philosophical paradigm is indeed astute in this research because the phenomenon of terrorism is subject to multiple social events which can only be adequately interpreted with due cognisance of these events and indeed, their intermingling circumstances. Thus, the various contents of this research, including the development of this crime, interconnectivity especially the major supportive factor e.g. terrorism financing and fast emerging are relevant in this case. These are due to the trends that need to be properly understood and integrated into the strategic plan envisioned in this research. The various external influences that aid the perpetuation of this crime as well as the efforts to counter it isnot static. They are subject to social events that cannot be absolutely measuredand can only be understood based on relative interpretations. Similarly, the operations of the security agencies responsible for checking these crimes is dynamic and based on the evolving trends of this crime. All these can be understood and interpreted through relevant social constructions that are congruent on relevant philosophical principles.

This research therefore appreciates the multiple dimensions on which this crime can be understood and therefore concentrated on the factors which caused its development especially governance related ones. Others are the security challenges of these crimes and what instigated and aggravated them (which are basically the symptoms) as well as the appropriate interventions that are based on security sector governance imperatives. All these require appropriate understanding of the contingent social constructs and their meanings or implications that could have been crucial for the above developments.

3.3 (ii) Research Approach

The approach of this research is mainly qualitative. This research approach is fast gaining more attention with relevance especially in the social science and humanities. Much as the choice of qualitative approach is the most appropriate in this case and without prejudice to the minimal basic statistical analysis availed to augment this, the need to provide the basis for this choice cannot be overemphasised.

The overall objective of this research is to support the improvement of Nigeria's security sector so that it can more effectively in counter terrorism and its illicit supports especially due to terrorism financing. Thus, this research has multiple dimensions that can only be understood and meaningfully explored through qualitative construction. All these are amenable to and conceivable within the context of qualitative research. Qualitative research comprises several techniques concerned with attempts to describe, decode, or translate to achieve meaning, rather than the measurement of units or frequency of phenomena in the social world Schwandt (2001). Rowlands (2005) explained that this deals with text rather than numbers.

Yilmaz (2013) observed that this was consequent upon the inspirations from previous studies, encompassing such supportive features and reliance on inductive, interpretive, and naturalistic principles to study people, cases, phenomena and social situations in their natural settings. All these according to him, is for the purpose of revealing through appropriate description, the meanings that might have been conceived by people and attached to events and phenomena. It is congruent on post-positivist, post structural, constructionist and critical imperatives with much ontological and epistemological relevance.

Having understood the meaning of qualitative research approach, the need to equally appreciate its relevance especially relative to the qualitative approach is hereby presented. Eisner (1979) cautioned against too much dependence on the quantitative approach. He observed that qualitative research is based on processes rather than consequences, with organic wholeness rather than independent variables and with meanings rather than behavioural statistics. He then adduced that qualitative research is based on recognition of the importance of the subjective experiential life world of human beings. Such reflection according to him is the province of phenomenology.

Osuala (2013) espoused that despite the contributions derivable from the use of scientific methods in research that it is still characterised by lack of trust in its application. According to him, while traditional scientific beliefs may have continued unquestioned for a substantial period, the human element is increasingly being recognised as a determinant factor in the definition of true knowledge. He further observed that since human judgement is so profoundly a part of every human act, that the supposed objectivity of science may be delusional. He further noted that the nature of quantitative research inherently places much burden on the validity of multiple meanings**,** structures and holistic analysis. All these are relatively easier with qualitative approach and are imbued with reliability and statistical compartmentalisation.

Qualitative research approach is congruent on the socialization of individuals and is essentially tied to the dialectics of phenomenology which is characterized by personal meanings derivable from life world experience. However, it is not immune to limitations. These include (a) Inadequacy in terms of validity and reliability in view of participants' and contextual subjectivity as well as lack of replication and limitation of generalization; (b) It is time and resources - consuming due to the need to significantly study relevant interactions and the responses of the subjects of investigation. This consequently leads to the third disadvantage; (c) Bias and influence on both the subjects of investigation and the researchers' assessments.

Both Parlet (1975) and Rist (1975) corroborated the above shortcomings. While the former concentrated on the problem of reliability, replication and its excessive time requirement, the later based his argument on the point that because of the intimacy of the participant-observer relationship within the research setting that the researcher's mere presence will inevitably have a significant reactive effect on the

participants. In the same vein, they noted that the promise of anonymity places more burdens on the researcher relative to the preparation and presentation of results.

Qualitative and quantitative methods may appear to be opposites derived from different philosophies, yet both are legitimate tools of research and can supplement each other in providing alternative insights into human behaviour. Osuala (2013) noted that no one method is better or poorer than the other. Mir and Watson (2000) on this note counselled that a researcher who is anchored on constructionist methodology (i.e. affinity to qualitative method as in this present study), may employ a variety of methods including statistical analysis just as a researcher employing a realist methodology (i.e. affinity to quantitative approach) may use qualitative contents to support or complement his research.

This research is not unmindful of the above resolutions and equally the relative merits of the quantitative approach. However, the preferred qualitative approach is predicated on the strong belief that the subject matter of terrorism is a social phenomenon that requires proper contextual application in order to understand its meaning relative to what prompts it, the consequences and means of resolving the attendant challenges. These constructs are not in isolation of certain social dynamics which provides the requisite illumination for their appropriate understanding.

In a study of political violence in one of Nigeria's Northern states Haliru (2013) adopted a qualitative approach using the interview data technique and achieved significant success. He utilized same to discover the adverse consequences of little or lack of education as a significant factor for involvement in political violence. Qualitative approval can also be for the purpose of enhancing or supporting findings obtained from quantitative data. These social constructs are also some of the social variables that this present study investigated.

One of the crucial tasks of this research is to trace and analyse the development of terrorism and to factor in relevant governance related variables that are crucial in this case. The required revelation for the understanding of all these are achievable through a proper qualitative approach based on interpretations by experts whose contributions rely on their experience and qualitative constructions. All the foregoing informed the choice of research design and methodology including the data collection techniques and means of analysing the accruing data.

3.3 (iii) Research design

This research adopted the Interpretive Design. This design is an offshoot of Interpretivism. Interpretive research is qualitative in context and application. The Institute of Public and International Affairs (2015), described interpretive research as a qualitative research design that is conducted from the perspective of a near experience in which the researcher does not commence with preconceived ideas but explores concepts from experience in the research field, namely; traditional in-country fieldwork, and textual

archival research. This type of research occupies a unique position in research process. Merram (2002) conceived interpretive qualitative design as characterized by the process of intuition that translates into appropriate research description. According to her, this involves the process of seeking to discover and unravel a phenomenon relative to the perspectives of those concerned. The most amenable data collection technique in this case includes interviews and document sourcing conscious inductive analysis. Accordingly, this type of design involves the recognition of actors as central in apportioning meanings to research findings. This research design relied on Document Analysis and Interviews as techniques for data collection upon which the consequent analysis was based.

Klein and Myers (1999) posited that the fundamental assumption of interpretive research is anchored on the belief that knowledge is gained through social constructions including language and conscious exchange of meanings. They also observed that interpretive research strongly recognizes the intimacy between the researcher and the object, concept or the issue being investigated or researched, as well as the situational variables that structures the process. Rowlands (2005) conceived interpretive research from an epistemological stand point with due acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is being researched. Hay (2011) re-affirmed the above but pointed out that interpretive design is centrally motivated by a concern to understand and explain actions, practices and to an extent, institutions. A vital example in this case is my experience in security administration which is applicable in this case through appropriate recollection interpretation and extrapolation of these experiences to suit and answer the research questions.

This research design is predicated on the belief that there are multiple dimensions to social phenomena including the subject matter of this research; (Shwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). According to them, this research design involves making choices and justifying these choices through properly formulated plan; namely documentary analysis and interviews. It is suitable for this research because the phenomenon of terrorism and how it can be effectively checked through strengthening Nigeria's security sector governance capacity.

Several scholars among whom are Guba and Lincoln (1994); Orliowski and Baroundi (1991) and Neuman (1997) also provided relevant ontological and epistemological savour of Interpretivism. Their common position was that the ontology of Interpretivism is anchored on the belief that social reality is constructed. They noted that human beings make meanings of their world specifically through their action and interaction and based on their subjective interpretation. It was for the above reasons that Diaz (2009) surmised that the existence of an objective world cannot be defended by researchers.

In the same vein, Bevir and Kedar (2008) posited that interpretive research conceived human action as meaningful and relies on a strong historical platform. Based on this, Rowlands (2005), with reference to Washman (1995), clarified that relative to qualitative methodology, interpretive research neither directly

puts in perspective nor outline dependent and independent variables. It also does not embark on testing hypotheses but rather provides understanding of the social context of what is being researched and that the processes are inextricably tied in such a way that both the phenomenon and the process influence each other.

The choice for this design is therefore congruent on the need to sufficiently convey the meanings associated with the research phenomena and through relevant interaction and extraction of the experience of those conversant with the subject matter including the ones represented in documents and those from interviewees. This requires purposive selection of the documents and individuals to be interviewed. After extracting the information required for this research, it will be put in the proper context through content and contextual analyses to derive the required meaning in line with the research objectives.

The stage of data collection, through documentary and interview sources in this study involved my interaction with these sources which helped in the logical extraction of the data for analytical relevance. After the collection of these data, they were accordingly synthesized relative to the research questions. This is a prerequisite to subjecting the deposits of these meanings to appropriate qualitative analysis involving the standard steps of data analysis. I was central in the achievement of these objectives and brought my experience in law enforcement to bear especially in the control of serious crimes with a cautious check on any emanating bias. This was done with due adherence to the interpretive research guidelines and in accordance with the overall qualitative framework.

A good example of a study which utilized this design is the one by Shun-Ling (2005). She adopted this design in her study of the assessment and relevance of nursing. She thoroughly acknowledged this research design as having been extensively applied to interdisciplinary studies in recent decades. Accordingly, she averred that the objective of this design was congruent on the need to acquire understanding of human experience in order to achieve and ascribe meanings involving objective interpretations.

Another study that relied on the principles and application of interpretive research design was that of Rowlands (2001). This was consequent upon his involvement in a pretesting management program for trusteeship training of employees in Information Technology. The training was a prerequisite for the introduction of an Australian qualification framework due to the participation of this scholar in this programme. He was therefore able to understand the peculiar circumstances of the trainees based on his interaction with them. This also revealed that lack of participation on the part of the employers was a constraining factor in the achievement of training results for employees. This understanding was elicited through appropriate derivation of the meaning within the context of the research. In addition to this, he emphasised that interpretive research relies heavily on the intimate relationship between the researcher, the object or phenomenon of research and the situational variables that dictate this process.

He noted that the interpretive research design tallies with the epistemological and ontological assumption that the world and reality are contextually interpreted by people relative to historical and social factors implying the subjectivity of the experience of the world which according to him, is best dictated by individual's subjective understanding, rather than by the researcher's objective criteria. Being the desired research design, it was used in this research to locate and provide meaning to the contingent factors and understanding of the various concepts relative to the phenomena of study.

3.3 (iv) Data collection techniques

In line with the paradigm of Interpretivism, qualitative research approach and the interpretive research design, this study relied on relevant documents and interviews as data sources. In addition, my many years of involvement in organized crime control and my participation in over sixty national and international crime conferences provided me with the relevant experience and information which were appropriately matched with the data from the above sources.

(a) Document Analysis

Document Analysis is one of the social research methods that critically analyses relevant documents and materials in order to extract the required research ingredient required to provide answers and complement an academic enquiry. This type of data collection method can be very vital in either quantitative or qualitative research or in the mixture of both.

Document analysis involves the procedure of systematic and articulate evaluation of necessary documents by extracting relevant information and meanings from same for the purpose of providing needed answers to research questions within the context of the research paradigm, design and approach. These documents may either be in print or electronic format. The analytic procedure in document analysis involves locating, selecting, appraising (i.e. appropriate contextualization to provide meaning) and proper synthesis of the data included in the documents, which would then be classified into themes, categories and case examples through both content and context analysis (Labuschagne 2003 p.).

Document analysis is anchored on the expectation of substantial and vital data guarantee. It is for this reason that Bowen (2009) advanced the requirement of qualitative research to include robust data collection techniques and analysis. Though it is not the intention of this research to use only document analysis, its unitary relevance is given desired acknowledgement in the same manner that it can also be used to complement other techniques. An example of a study that was based on this singular technique was Gagel's (1997) in-depth analysis of documentary data on illiteracy and technology in which he itemised documents that are of research value. These are as follows: advertisements; agendas; attendance registers and minutes of meetings; manuals; background papers, books, and brochures, diaries and journals, event programmes, letters and memoranda; maps and charts, newspaper clippings and articles; press releases, programme proposals, application forms and summaries, radio and television program reports, survey

data, and various public records. These materials were sought first based on their relevance to the direction of the research and accordingly subjected to critical analysis involving systematic appraisals and situating same to the research context and purpose.

Apart from its singular research appeal, document analysis is very amenable and provides a very strong support to other data collection techniques. According to Bowen (2009), this can help to achieve corroboration and congruence through the use of different data sources. Document analysis is considered as most suitable for use in combination with other sources and methods. These symbiotic sources include interviews and ethnographic studies. Document analysis for this research supports with the data collected from interviews. The information derived from the documentary sources for this research was also utilised to formulate part of the interview questions administered to the experts who participated in this study.

According to Eisner (1991), such support provides congruence of evidence and credibility. This essentially promotes the reliability of the research. Paton (1990) submitted that this provides the required reliability of a research finding as it could save it from such criticism that it relied on just one method, one source and only one investigator. Other advantages of triangulation include the potential to provide the following benefits: Provision of a menu of opportunities to the researcher including instilling confidence in the researcher; stimulation and provision of novel options of tackling the research problem in consonance with acceptable means of collecting data and the heuristic capacity to unravel deficiencies in old models and theories. It also propagates improvement on same for better research results.

An exemplary study that utilised the document analysis technique is the study on environmental degradation in Nigeria's Niger Delta conducted by Ayuba (2014). This study significantly relied on the document analysis technique, which was also used to appropriately present the research findings in sequence. It included the fact that oil exploration had benefited the Nigerian Nation but had also caused adverse environmental dislocation with severe consequences on the livelihood of the citizens. Kadefa (2012) corroborated this view and reiterated that data gotten from the documentation process can successfully help in the sequential presentation of the facts in a research field.

The documents utilised in this research were systematically categorized according to relevant themes upon which the required contents were extracted and analysed relative to the research objectives. The derived data from these documents also significantly constituted some of the information used to construct the interview questions, which were responded to by the sampled experts. This question interrogates the propriety of strengthening Nigeria's security sector governance because of the threats of terrorism as facilitated by terrorism financing. The documents utilized in this research are: relevant reports from Nigeria's security and law enforcement institutions; from Nigeria's ministries and agencies; from international organisations; evaluation reports of domestic and international Civil Society Organisations;

relevant legislative reports as well as academic journals and reports by professional bodies on security, politics, finance, strategic studies and on conflict management.

(b) Interview Technique

The second data collection technique adopted in this research is the interview technique. It is also very suitable in qualitative research as in this study which required the extraction of the knowledge and experience of experts in security matters especially as pertains to terrorism. Apart from its use to derive expert recommendations for the improvement of Nigeria's security sector governance capacity, this technique is also used to complement the data derived from documentary sources. This is congruent on the view that interview as a method is very reliable as a supportive tool to cover the limitations of other qualitative data sources.

There are several studies on similar social phenomena as in this research which adopted the Interview Technique. One of such exemplary studies was that by Okunola, Lawal, Ganiyu and Adeleke (2014). They adopted the interview technique using purposive sampling, in their study of interagency cooperation in crime management and its implication on the workability of community policing project in Nigeria. From this, they concluded that community policing is very necessary in Nigeria. They also explained that the use of in-depth interviews and the application of purposive sampling technique help to elicit information from appropriate respondents who are versatile and knowledgeable by virtue of their experience and positions.

Interviewing, as a research technique is a two-way method involving the exchange of information through direct verbal interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. It is meant to gather information that is valid and reliable relative to the research questions. It is either structured or unstructured. The structured format is based on prepared schedules aimed at deriving precise information and clarification on specific issues and with an on-the-spot adaptability on the part of the interviewer. The unstructured format is characterized by such flexibility aimed at deriving varied and sundry responses on one or more issues.

While the structured technique is guided based on ready understanding of the phenomenon by the interviewer, the unstructured one is not guided and gives the interviewee the opportunity to provide a wide range of responses. This format is more advantageous to the researcher who is not versed in the research problem and if it is the main tool of data collection for the research. Conversely, the structured format is more appealing for a professional and or technical area in which the researcher is interested in furthering or improving knowledge on the research phenomena as in this present research.

The several variations of this type of interview include face to face, telephonic, through e-mail or other IT methods. The structured type of qualitative interview, according to Kvale (1993), is designed to acquire descriptions of the life world of those interviewed. This research adopted more of the face-to-face interview technique. This technique is preferred because of its strength in the elicitation of quality

information from respondents and its vitality in the cross-fertilization of ideas between the researcher and the respondents. “Face to face interviews are characterized by synchronous communication in time and place and take advantage of social cues such as voice, intonation, body language, etc. According to Opdenakker (2006) this synchronous communication of time and space, affords the interviewer the social opportunities to achieve a veritable interview ambience including proper structuring of the interview situation to suit the research objective.

Sindhu (2013) observed that a good interview is more than a series of casual questions and generalized replies. It is a dynamic interpersonal experience that is carefully planned to accomplish a particular purpose. It also creates a friendly permissive atmosphere, directing the conversation in the desired channels, encouraging the respondents to reveal information and motivating them to keep presenting useful information requires a high degree of technical skill and competence.

This research therefore adopted an effective interview that was systematically conducted to maximize the validity and reliability of the information derived and the attendant research results. In view of this, the interview process of this research is based on the following: (a) The phenomenon of research (i.e. terrorism is specialised requiring only relevant and professional information with high intelligence content not given to frivolities; (b) As a validation tool for the data derived from Documentary sources; (c) For the elicitation of information that were used to complement whatever information that have been derived from documentary sources; (d) To derive specific and professional information regarding the improvement of the subsisting strategic security sector governance programs by Nigeria in the prevention and control of terrorism; (e) For the fact that there is a limited number of specialists in international crimes control especially in counter-terrorism programs.

Due to the above considerations, the sampled groups interviewed were asked questions that were carefully chosen and covering the relevant areas of research concern. Apart from its use for data collection, this technique is used as a validation tool. This involves proper content analysis of the interview questions, which are structured to eliminate the “halo effect” from the respondents (predetermined disposition to consistently answer in the affirmative or in the negative).

3.4 Sampling Technique

The main objective of this research is to arrive at valid and reliable answers to the research questions. It is not feasible for any study to cover every member of a population under study hence the need to make selections that can satisfy the objective of the research. This can only be achieved through the most appropriate sampling of the target population.

This research is specialist in nature because the phenomena under study, i.e. Security Sector Governance for the purpose of controlling the security threats posed by terrorism is complex social constructs that can

be investigated properly through the involvement of persons that are conversant with their intricate principles and application. The process ensured that those chosen for the study are very much abreast of the implications of these phenomena. Thus, the essential purpose of this research is two pronged: to understand the evolution and trends of these crimes and their perpetrators as well as suggest improvements for existing intervention mechanisms. For this reason, this research integrated both the purposive and judgmental sampling techniques as enunciated by (Neuman, 2011).

Judgemental sampling is the type of sampling that is not subjected to chance outcome because it is characteristically not prone to probability. It is concerned with the conscious selection of the researcher's target group from the population based on the chosen criteria of the researcher and the necessary information considered as representative of the population. Neuman (2011) equated this to purposive sampling because it is also appropriate for the selection of unique cases that are especially informative. Sindhu (2013) conceived this as the selection of a group by intuition on the basis of such criteria considered to be self-evident. He noted that based on the researcher's judgement, if a specific sub-group or stratum is significantly representative of the population under study, then such a group can be selected.

Purposive sampling is characterized by the stratification of the population governed by specific criteria that are consciously determined and act as a secondary control in which case, the sample is purposely selected based on the purpose it is expected to achieve. This sampling technique is used to complement the main sampling technique adopted in this study, the non-probability judgmental technique. This technique involves the utilization of available information in the population and the envisaged objective and plan of the researcher as the basis of selection of the required sample. The main advantages of this type of sampling include cost and time effectiveness in the preparation of the sample.

These benefits in a nutshell are numerous and include the following: (a) It ensures that only samples conversant with the subject matter are chosen with high possibility of extracting the needed expert content for the resolution of the research problem; (b) It substantially eliminates all such extraneous variables including undesirable guesses that usually accompanies samples chosen by chance; (c) It reduces the cost of choosing samples from a larger population because it is more direct without dealing with unnecessary factors except those that are relevant for the resolution of the research problem; (d) Due to the foregoing, unnecessary time wasting is drastically reduced; (e) It also affords the opportunity to develop the required criteria and or stratification on which the choice of the sample would be based; (f) It provides a better guide for analysis of data in view of the novel opportunity for the development of interview schedules and to also avail the sampling criteria as data analytical guide.

In spite of the foregoing, judgemental sampling is not without disadvantages. Sindhu, (2013) listed these as follows: (a) Elimination and use of inferential parametric-statistical tools for purposes of generalization, associated risk due to reliance on intuitive guess, as well as (b) Its tendency for uncontrolled variability and

bias in the determination and choice of criteria upon which the sampling is based. It is however possible that these disadvantages can be checked with the constructive processes that are characteristic of qualitative research methodology.

The respondents for this study include experts who are conversant with the phenomenon of terrorism in Nigeria, especially with regards to how the critical issues of the country's security sector governance and initiatives can be improved and utilized to control this crime.

The purposive sampling of the respondents who participated in this study was based on their experience expertise and the institutions they are affiliated with. The thematic areas and the relevant institutions that guided the selection of the experts of this study are as follows:

- Manifestation and threats of terrorism with terrorism financing as a major facilitator as well as the required strategic institutional counter measures
- Improvement of interagency cooperation among Nigerian Security and Law Enforcement Agencies and complementing same with international cooperation supports
- Assessment and improvements of the standard of civil democratic oversight of security institutions
- Assessment and improvement of human rights standard in the country
- Imperatives of good governance including improvement of Nigeria's anti-corruption profile and dividends of good governance especially provision of employment opportunities as a poverty alleviation strategy and possible deference from involvement in terrorism

Further to the above, the institutions that these respondents were previously or presently affiliated to also constituted the yardstick for their selection. These institutions include; namely: relevant Nigeria's Security and Law Enforcement Agencies, relevant Nigerian Ministries, Extra Ministerial Departments and Agencies, relevant International Agencies and Embassies in Nigeria, International Organizations, relevant Legislative bodies as well as important Civil Society Organisations.

Consequent upon the foregoing, the following respondents who possess the requisite experience and expertise on the above areas and affiliated to the above institutions were purposefully sampled and interviewed. They are indicated as Experts (E) with numbers 1 - 60. They include: top academics, former National Intelligence Agency (NIA) Director, former Inspector General of Police, former Chairmen and Director General of Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, former Directors of the Department of State Security Service, EFCC and ICPC, former Military Generals, Director Nigeria's Financial Intelligence Unit, Academics with specialization in related Security Studies, top officers of the Central Bank of Nigeria and Commercial Bank in Nigeria, Civil Society and Media Practitioners, anti-corruption watchers, Members

of related Security Committees of both Nigeria's Senate and House of Representatives, Retired US and UK Security Operatives who worked in Nigeria, Official of UNODC in Nigeria, etc.

3.5 Reliability and Validity

The essence of research is to arrive at valid answers to research questions which can be consistently relied upon in future. This is achievable if the process of the research is reliable and the results valid relative to the objective(s) of the research. Thus, the reliability of research answers or discoveries cannot be guaranteed if the processes of the research are faulty and incongruent with the research results and expectations. These include the right research methodology, approach and design as well as appropriate data collection and analysis (Bowen, 2009; Merriam, 1998).

Shun-Ling (2005) also outlined the following steps as very crucial and effective in dealing with the issue of validity. These are: truthfulness by researchers in describing the origin, processes and outcome of the research. This is done through the use of peer review and discussions for the clarification and strengthening of the real content of the derived meaning; proper and careful utilisation of the research guide of the hermeneutic cycle method for data analysis as a means of verification of the truth of interpretation. Others are provision of sufficient multiple constructions and appropriately complementing same with relevant contextual explanations and through appropriate utilization of the pre-knowledge of the phenomenon under study.

This research investigated social constructs that are amenable to qualitative analysis. In qualitative research, validity and reliability are two sides of the same coin and are treated unitarily and not separately (Golafshani 2003). Both are in the same spectrum because reliability is consequent upon validity (Lincoln & Guba 1985). This is in consonance with the point that reliability consideration of research in anchored on two principles and these involve replication of the research as a whole and that a significant percentage of other researchers can produce similar conclusions or research findings using the same process (Paton 2001).

This is a difficult task because qualitative research is especially vulnerable to the constraints of replication as a result of the onerous challenge to researchers in the bid to obtain research results that are similar or the same, due to the characteristic subjective influence in the respective research settings including the sources of the data which is extremely difficult to be universally acceptable.

This research adopted some of the steps outlined by Shenton (2003) to achieve the required reliability and validity. These include the following: Right choice of the research methods and its application; achievement of the appropriate context of the research through relevant background data. This background data was derived from accredited sources including government, international and reputable non-governmental organisations as well as internationally and academically acclaimed experts. Systematic articulation of the

research process was adhered to including proper highlighting of possible biases as well as potential short-comings of the research.

The positions of Rist (1975) and Parlet (1975) are equally in agreement with this position especially on the need to ensure correct content and replicability of data. Same with Sindhu's (2013) position on the need for proper planning and adherence to the standard rules of data collection as well as that of Asika (2004) on the need to adhere to the research process and to adequately synchronize the various stages of the research process including; namely: Identification of the problem, proper definition of the problem, delimitation of the problem, analysis of the problem, conclusion and deductions from the analysis, recommendations based on the deductions and consequent implementation.

This research is concerned with results that are trusted and have appreciable heuristic value. It therefore complied with the four requirements recommended by Meriam (1998) to achieve this purpose. This includes the following; namely: appropriate and relevant statement of the problem; proper identification and utilization of the right research methods, proper communication of the research results as well as constructive discussions of these findings.

In the case of the research problem, this study ensured that the problem can be appropriately subjected to qualitative investigation with proper determination of the content of the question in terms of meaning and understanding. The relevance of literature for proper decoding and synthesis of the problem was also quite utilized. In order to satisfy these conditions, the above processes were followed with proper reflection of the three vital ingredients of the research; namely: Research statement, question and purpose. The process for the achievement of these objectives relied on proper adherence to the research guidelines in data collection and data analysis including the sampling and the data analysis steps as has earlier been clearly enumerated.

Apart from the above steps, this research adopted a meticulous sequence of corroboration to achieve required triangulation in the data collection steps from documentary and interview sources. This significantly helped to check accruing biases, which Mathison (1988) cautioned against in his counsel on the need to achieve congruence in the thrust of various data sources relied on.

Furthermore, the various security institutions in Nigeria keep and maintain separate data sets. For the purpose of this research, the various data collected from each of these agencies were cross checked and then compared with those collected from Nigeria's Central Data Agency, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to ensure their consistency. Also, since the data collection technique of this research relied on documentary and interview sources, the information collected from documentary sources were triangulated with the ones collected from interview sources. Thus, the experts who participated in this study were confronted with the content of information derived from documentary sources and therefore elicited their clarifications.

In this case, the interpretive design was not only identified but its relevance to the research objectives, appropriately described. The purposive sampling method was equally described with justifications for its use relative to the special content and sensitivity of terrorism which is such a phenomenon that can be justifiably analysed by specialists. The document analysis and interview methods utilized for data collection were not only explained, but its process and application were discussed. In doing this, the required ethical requirements were respected. The derived data were strictly used for the purpose of the research and analysed relative to the research questions and expectations. The results of the study were also systematically presented in consonance with the research objectives. The use of different experts and stakeholders in Nigeria's security administration was also informed by the need to achieve validity and reliability.

The above steps are in line with that of Golfshani (2003) that constructionism extracts multiple realities from different data sources. These include appropriate Content Analysis of the various constructs and issues that constituted the questions. (i) Synthesis and sifting of the content of the interview questions through cross fertilization of ideas with other experts in the field. (ii) Systematic collection and analyses of the previous and subsisting documented policies and programs on the prevention and control of the crimes in question. All these were used to appropriate the necessary information that were eventually included in the final round of the interviews. After this, a pilot study was undertaken. The purpose of this is for the validation of the sufficiency of the contents and for the achievement of preliminary standardization and reliability. To achieve this, ten accredited participants at two international security conferences (i.e. a total of twenty respondents were interviewed). These respondents were requested to do a critique and proffer advice on the quality and the purpose of the interview questions relative to the intention of the research.

Consequently, the questions that were included in the interview schedule for this research were prepared based on all the above considerations and consequently applied relative to the following steps. This is to ensure its utility and achievement of the purpose of this study. These includes the following namely: (a) Appropriate definition of the statement of research problem, purpose and questions; (b) Systematic arrangement of the questions to provide for appropriate response flow; (c) Proper determination of the content of the interview questions capable of eliciting the required data for the research; (d) Proper classification of the derived data based on relevant conceptual and thematic considerations.

From the above indications, the relevance of reliability and validity considerations and the steps that were followed to achieve these in this research have been presented. These steps include; namely: (a) strict adherence to process covering proper articulation and statement of the problem of the research including proper and meaningful definition of the problem; (b) Appropriate methodology which includes the right approach and design covering the qualitative approach and relied on right identification of the constructs of research; namely: the social construct of terrorism and that of the intervention strategies. The design meticulously adopted the right data collection techniques which in this case, involved document analysis

and interviews; (c) the selection of the documents was systematically sourced based on the research objectives and questions. Same for interviews which relied on contributions from tested experts and professionals. Both the information derived from documentary and interview sources were also triangulated; (d) the utilization of my experience in security administration and attendance of over sixty relevant international and domestic security conferences was meticulously and cautiously applied.

3.6 Ethical considerations

The phenomenon of terrorism is a very serious issue with such complexity that requires sound investigative dexterity for effective remedial intervention programs. Most of the information required for this purpose is highly classified with exclusive content. Those who provide such information are also under strict oath and professional obligation, which must be adhered to. Therefore, this study not only procured appropriate authorizations from the institutions from where respondents are chosen it ensured the protection of the identity of the accredited respondents.

The procured responses are also used exclusively for the purpose of the research. Acknowledgment of the respondents and the institutions they represent were equally consented to, prior to publication. These responses were also not shared with any other unauthorised persons or institutions. Though some of the information procured did not rhyme with my views due to more recent revelations which I am not privy to, such information is accurately reported and supported with required acknowledgements.

Furthermore, in view of the peculiarity of this research, some of the information sourced to answer the research questions inevitably contains highly sensitive intelligence materials. This information was therefore properly protected in this research and only utilised for the academic purpose of answering the relevant research questions and with absolute confidentiality considerations.

The purpose of this research is to proffer academic recommendations to improve the strategic intervention programs that can help to strengthen Nigeria's security sector governance capacity. This is based on the required academic guidelines to promote scholarship and institutional enhancement. Accordingly, appropriate steps were taken to prevent the use of this project to indict or berate persons and institutions that are vital actors in these intervention programs.

It is also not strange that research results can be utilised for pecuniary political purposes. The results of this research were therefore protected from such unethical use and not made available as a reference for political vilifications. Further to this, this research took cognisance of the prevailing international politicisation of the phenomenon of terrorism. Thus, certain countries especially developing countries had come under political sanctions by others notably, the developed ones due to the categorisation of the former as not doing enough in the control of this crime. The results of this research were therefore adequately protected from any such undue utilisation.

It is important to point out that some very vital information for this research was derived from international regulatory and accredited information exchange institutions. These institutions' international collaborative schemes, including their exchange of information, are guided by established procedures, standard protocols and ethical standards. Such standards include the principles of exclusivity, confidentiality, purposefulness, non-politicisation, guided interpretations and applications, intellectual property protection; etc. This research accordingly adhered strictly to all the above requirements.

Finally, this research also leveraged on the authorisation, assurances and academic reference of the School of Governance of the University. It accordingly respected all the accruable guarantees through strictly abiding by the institution's academic research ethics as a highly esteemed citadel of learning and scholarship.

3.7 Data Analysis

Data generated using the document analysis and interview techniques were organized and analysed in accordance with the objectives of the research. This task was achieved through appropriate conceptualization of the constructs of the research involving proficient data arrangement, according to appropriate categorisation upon which relevant themes and patterns were arrived at with the goal of organizing specific details into a coherent picture, model or set of highly interlocked concepts, (Neuman 2011).

In the first instance, a proper and neat arrangement of the data collected from documentary and interview sources was carried out and involved sifting the irrelevant ones from the needful and storing same based on indicators that are guided by each of the research objectives. It is important to stress that the nature of this research makes it implicit for the data collection from documentary and interview sources to be concurrently undertaken based on such conceptual guides that helped to either originate new concepts or review existing ones as the data collection process progressed. Accordingly, analysis of the data from documentary sources as well as the data collected from interviews, involved conceptual categorization of these data relative to the derivable themes, concepts and established characteristics. In the process of doing this, new revelations emerged and were equally put in proper context relative to the research objectives. These are adequately covered in the research findings.

The most vital initial step in the analysis of the data for this research is that they were well sorted, arranged, labelled and properly stored according to the thrust of the interview questions. These were constructed based on the information derived from documentary sources and my experience relative to the expected ethical requirements. Therefore, this analytical approach to a reasonable extent relied on the procedures outlined by Elliot and Timulak (2005). These include: proper connection of various data that were procured and utilized to provide answers to the research questions. The following steps were therefore followed to achieve this purpose:

(a) Data Preparation**:** This commenced with proper auditing and arrangement of the data in a suitable manner to remove irrelevant information and appropriately situate them to the overall context and objectives of the research. Reading and proper understanding of the derived data was taken. This made it possible for the background information of the phenomena under study to be understood. This consequently instigated new insights regarding the phenomena being researched.

(b) Delineating and processing meaning units: The data were categorized according to relevant indicators of the trends of the phenomena under study. These indicators were utilised to provide necessary information that was used to determine their contextual relevance or otherwise.

The foregoing meaning which has been derived at this point, were used to illuminate these data. This involved the delineation of these meaning units through a conscious elimination of such ingredients without any value within the context of the research. This was carefully done to ensure that their removal did not obliterate any aspect of the derived data. Accordingly, the vital meaning units were appropriately coded.

(c) Determination of the organizing structure of the data: This stage was consequent upon a proper delineation of the data into distinctive meaning units based on the meanings they respectively portrayed. Their utility was based on their contextual relevance to the phenomena of research. Based on this and relative to the research conception, they were organized into conceptual patterns. These are constituted as formal structures and their interrelationships were determined. These indicative relationships were based on their connectivity based on common criteria including data collection techniques and other novel features that emerged.

Thus, data analysis is organized into categories based on themes, concepts or similar features which can lead to the development of new concepts and determination of the relationship between these concepts (Neuman, 2011). The relationship between or among these concepts is indicative of their sequence either inversely or as interwoven and mutually consistent constructs.

(d) Categorisation: Having prepared, delineated and processed the data to extract relevant meanings as well as organised same into appropriate structures, these data were then categorised. These categorisations are reflective of the meanings which they portray and based on common features and mainly on their consistency. The process adopted to achieve these categories relied on constructive data interpretation requiring profound research dexterity and knowledge especially of the phenomena under investigation. Further categorisation was achieved based on emergent variables in the data analysis.

(e) Interpretation of data**:** Categorisation of research data is a vital aspect of qualitative data analysis as has so far been achieved, but this becomes useless if the derived meanings in established categories are not suitably abstracted. To achieve this purpose, descriptive taxonomies were therefore apportioned to each of these categories to describe the phenomena of research. This was carefully undertaken in view of the need for proper communication of the data analysis.

The appropriate categorisation of data was utilized to achieve meaningful abstractions. All these were appropriately situated based on the specific objectives involving explanation of the categorised data relative to the thrust and expectation of the research objectives.

Analyses of the various data derived from documentary and interview sources were therefore based on the above steps. The documentary sources include the documents that were purposely sourced from the following; namely: relevant security and law enforcement organisations, Nigeria's federal ministries and agencies; international organisations; domestic and international civil society organisations; Nigeria's legislative bodies as well as from relevant academic journals.

The data from the above sources significantly influenced the interview questions that were administered to the experts who were also purposefully sampled. These experts include: serving retired officials of Nigeria's security and law enforcement agencies; federal ministries and agencies; legislators from relevant oversight committees; academics with cognate experience in the various thematic areas relied upon to resolve the research questions; officials of relevant international organisations; diplomats especially those in-charge of related security issues in their respective embassies, government and private regulatory entities on the subject matter of concern as well as civil society organisations.

These sampled experts are alphabetically coded and identified as EI – E60 and were selected based on the following thematic areas and the relevance of the activities of their agencies on same; namely:

(a) Manifestation and threats of terrorism and evaluation of the country's security sector governance to effectively counter same as well as measures to also counter terrorism financing as a major facilitator

(b) Analysis and means of improving the strategic and institutional capacity of the sector

(c) Assessment and improvement of interagency cooperation among agencies and stakeholders involved in terrorism control as well as reliance on international cooperation to complement this.

(d) Assessment and improvement of the standard of civil democratic control of security and law enforcement institutions involved in terrorism control

(e) Assessment of the quality and improvement of human rights administration in Nigeria

(f) Assessment of Good Governance and its various requirements such as anti-corruption as well as Nigeria's educational and employment programmes and utilizing same to complement Nigeria's security sector to effectively control terrorism.

(g) Nigeria's Security Sector Governance to be able to effectively control terrorism threats in Nigeria.

The interview sessions lasted from October to December 2018 and from February to April, 2019.
The categorisation of all the documentary data sources, the expert interviewees as well as the questions based on the above themes, are respectively noted as appendixes (I) and (II). The above thematic areas constitute the main points on which the conceptual framework is based.

3.8 Conclusion

This section analysed the conceptual framework and methodology. While the former was concerned with conceiving the scope and content of the research based on the applicable concepts in the theoretical framework, the latter was concerned on the means of achieving this objective to improve the country's security sector governance.

Regarding the conceptual framework, the various content of the research with due consideration of the relevant theoretical concepts were conceptualized relative to their ontological and epistemological relevance. These contents include the various concepts advocated in the traditional security sector reform, AUPFSS and complemented by the ECOWAS PFSS. They include: Institutional Capacity, Democratic Oversight, Human Rights as well as Good Governance including anti-corruption, access to quality employment. These concepts were therefore analysed relative to their relevance for the mitigation of terrorism by Nigeria's security sector.

The methodology section covered the paradigm, approach, design and data collection techniques of the research. Interpretivist paradigm is used as the preferred design for this research and is cognizant of its philosophical orientation that bothers on phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. The meaning of these two concepts were accordingly put in the right perspective including how human beings arrive at meanings of the world and consequently interprets same based on their continuous interaction with the world and through social constructions.

Its relevance to this present study was therefore hinged on the point that the phenomenon of study is not static and can only be properly explained based on experience and contextualization of its various ramifications that constitutes the components of this study. The demerit of this design which bothers mainly on the question of validity and reliability was also noted. Following this is the research approach which is mainly qualitative. It is congruent on the need for a proper decoding and explanation of the various segments of the research concern and essentially provided the required contextualization of the subject of

enquiry. Its advantages including the capacity to provide expanded judgemental scope and wholeness of interpretation were explained as its demerits regarding issues of validity and reliability were also explained.

Also, the research relied on Interpretive design and is in tandem with its interpretivist philosophical imperative. It involves exploration of meanings without any preconception to arrive at answers through the process of intuition. It was further analysed as a means of acquiring knowledge through social constructions and exchange of knowledge using such mediums as language. Two previous studies which adopted this approach were used as examples in line with the qualitative approach of this research. The data collection method adopted included Document Analysis and Interview techniques. The complementary advantage of this technique especially its use to derive relevant interview points was also explained. The various documents used for this purpose were based on their importance to the phenomenon of study and are listed in the appendix section.

The interview as the second data collection technique adopted by this research was also explained including its varieties. Specifically, the face-to-face type used in this research was explained. The interviewees in this research were purposefully sampled and based on their experience and expertise and as well as the relevance of their institutions to the phenomena of study. The preferred sampling method to achieve this was therefore explained. This involved the integration of both the purposive and judgmental sampling methods which basically does not rely on chance outcome or probability but based on conscious selection relative to the above criteria. This informed the selection of sixty experts for this study.

Furthermore, the reliability and validity considerations of the study were explained. These are congruent on the need to ensure that answers to the research questions could be trusted and relied upon. The various steps to achieve this objective were analysed including the right choice and application of the research methods and the dexterity in adhering to the research process.

Consequent upon all the foregoing, this section also discussed the various steps adopted to analyse the procured data. These included arrangement of the data, categorization of the data based on appropriate themes, organization of the structure of the data into distinctive units, further categorization based on the common features of the themes and then systematic analyses and abstractions.

CHAPTER 4:

ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S SECURITY SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

4.1 Introduction

Having understood from the literature review section the threats of terrorism in Nigeria, the need for the country to undertake appropriate measures to mitigate these threats becomes very necessary. Several of these measures can therefore be explored and includes strengthening the capacity of relevant institutions as well as improving the enabling conditions including security sector reform and good governance requirements. The purpose of this chapter therefore, is to put in context, the various security challenges due to terrorism in Nigeria and to analyse the country's security sector's institutional capacity, to be able to effectively counter terrorism and it financing.

4.2 Threats of terrorism in Nigeria

As already stated in the literature review, the threats of terrorism in Nigeria appear very obvious and need to be analysed in order to appropriately gauge the consequent challenge to the country. This is to fully underscore the urgent need to improve on it within the context of an effective security sector governance paradigm. Accordingly, the data from documentary and interview sources were utilized to achieve this objective.

The responses of experts as well as academics and security professionals who were sampled from the security agencies responsible for Nigeria's counter terrorism programme confirmed that the threats of terrorism to Nigeria are enormous. All the respondents captioned E1 – E60 indicated that the challenges posed by terrorism especially in contemporary world and specific to Nigeria are serious. The expertise of these respondents and the reason for their choice are explained in Appendix II. They were all in consensus that terrorism results in violence with such frightening consequences intended at achieving negative political, religious and ideological objectives.

They averred that the threats of terrorism to Nigeria are indeed mind rending and have ceaselessly been sky rocketing since the Niger Delta insurgencies which climaxed around 2009 as well as the explosive terrorist activities of Boko-Haram which took a very dangerous turn the same year. The other challenges that they listed due to terrorism includes; namely: forceful displacements and migration of citizens resulting in their becoming refugees and living under inhuman conditions; disruption of economic activities including agricultural activities as well as discouragement of investments and tourism all of which result in famine and hunger. Others include infrastructural destructions; subversion of rule of law and public safety and the propensity to further induce other crimes such as drug trafficking and money laundering; vitiation of national development plans and the diversion of scarce resources from critical areas of need as well as inducement of such negative atmosphere that encourages human rights abuses, corruption as well as arms

proliferation on which other forms of violent extremism thrives (Nigeria's National Security Strategy 2014 P. 9).

The above respondents further observed that terrorism in Nigeria, especially the emergence of Boko-Haram is not a spontaneous occurrence but a consequence of sustained decadence in the country's development due to several factors which includes but not limited to; namely: religious fundamentalism, adverse socio-economic and political factors.

Respondents E1 – E13 singled out Boko Haram as the dangerous terrorist group that has posed the most serious security threat to Nigeria. They traced the growth of this group to several human security deficiencies. They noted that the increase in the terrorist attack by the group as a result of its increased capacity is sustained by the training of its members in countries such as Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia, etc. The capacity of the group they averred is also evident in its continuous ability to withstand Nigeria's security agencies which has caused the latter, several casualties. Many Nigerian soldiers had also in many cases, taken to their heels during the onslaught of the group. The country's Army Chief in a recent statement confirmed this point (Nigeria's Army Report 2019, p.2). These respondents revealed that over 5000 soldiers have been dismissed because of alleged lack of commitment and for absconding.

They were also affirmative that organizations involved in terrorist acts require funding which indisputably, point to finance as the life wire of terrorism. Consequent upon this, they posited that any meaningful strategy to counter terrorism must target at a systematic obstruction of the flow of funds to criminal organizations as well as provide the enabling supports to relevant security institutions to be able to defect and cut off these illicit funds (Central Bank of Nigeria Report on the Role of the Financial Sector in curbing Funding of Global Terrorism 2016 p.1).

Furthermore, on the extent of threats of terrorism in Nigeria, Data from NBS (2019) shows that the estimated number of deaths due to terrorism in Nigeria is put at between 30,000 and 50,000. The Nigerian Watch Group Report (2016) put the figure at 32,842 within a span of ten years. This includes the civilian population killed due to Boko Haram invasions, isolated suicide bombings in motor parks, market places, churches, schools, mosques, police stations, army barracks and other public institutions. The figure also includes the massacred Boko Haram foot soldiers and military casualties (Ohanyere 2018). The following tabular presentation of casualty rate of terrorism provides a good picture of this level of threats.

4.2.1. Terrorism Casualties from 2009 - 2020.

Year	Incidents	Fatalities
2010	34	75
2011	115	593
2012	340	1607
2013	278	2974
2014	404	7509
2015	445	8848
2016	306	2806
2017	1637	4946
2018	2036	6243
2019	2216	5415
Total	**7,811**	**41,016**

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (www.acleddata.com 2019)

From the above tabulation, acts of terrorism in Nigeria have consistently been on the rise. Respondents E1 – E18further traced this to the adverse consequences of rapid socio-economic development; political and civil disorder as well as the long span of military administration in Nigeria, attendant human rights abuses, growing rate of other related crimes and worsened by the deficient capacity of security and judicial institutions.

The summation of the presentation of Respondents E1, E7, E8, E14, E18, E20, E27, E33, E45, E46, E56 and E60also indicated that the problem of terrorism is linked to failure in governance due to the government's poor performance in the provision of basic means of livelihood for the citizens such as education, employment, security of lives and property, infrastructural, healthcare facilities, etc. The situation is worsened by lack of sincerity on the part of the government.

This worsening situation especially in Northern Nigeria, are also blamed on the lack of a proper understanding of the social environment of the region which predisposes its people to such extremist ideology that make them vulnerable to imbibe terror. It is regrettable that the warning signs on the imminent manifestation of terrorism in Nigeria were ignored in spite of the early series conflicts in the region which resulted in wanton destruction of lives and property due to religious extremism (Onuoha 2010).

The study by a United Kingdom Risk Consultancy Group, Maplescroft (2014) stated that the casualty rate due to terrorism related attacks in Nigeria was the highest in the world for which it topped the list of terrorism ridden countries including Somalia the main abode of Al Shabab and Iraq, the prominent base of

ISIS. The report noted that the terrorist activities in Nigeria mainly carried out by the Boko-Haram sect averaged twenty-four deaths per attack and 146 attacks in the first half of 2014. The study also noted that the level of sophistication of Boko-Haram led to loss of investor confidence in Nigeria especially with the increase in the attacks which recorded up to 3477 deaths in 2014 as against 1735 during the same period in 2013. Furthermore, the study ranked Nigeria as fifth in the list of global extreme risk countries due to terrorism and surpassing countries as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia. Apart from the severe terrorist onslaughts by the Boko-Haram Group, the study observed that the security risk in Nigeria was compounded by attacks on the country's oil and gas installations due to the gradual resurgence of the Niger Delta militants.

The United States Bureau of Counter Terrorism Report (2014) also reeled out several casualties caused by Boko-Haram. These include the following international casualties; namely: (a) Kidnap of seven French tourists in Northern Cameroon in February, 2013; (b) Kidnap of a French Priest in December, 2013. Attack of Civilians in several Cameroonian communities; (c) Kidnap of eight French nationals in Northern Cameroon; (d) Abduction of ten Chinese workers in Northern Cameroon in May 2014; attack of the village of Cameroonian Vice President and kidnap of his wife. Kidnap of the Sultan of Kalifate and his family as well as the killing of several persons including military and police personnel. (e) Others include the capture of Gwoza a border town between Nigeria and Cameroon and displacement of the over eight thousand Nigerians in the area during the same period.

Apart from the huge loss of lives and property due to terrorist activities in Nigeria, the country also witnessed capital flights both in terms of investments and human resources. The country's educational sector was also adversely affected because many educational institutions in terrorist prone areas were forced to close down due to terrorist onslaughts. Thousands of pupils, students and teachers have been killed and displaced by terrorists. Many industries are also forced to fold up leading to the retrenchment of many citizens thereby contributing to the adverse unemployment situation in the country.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Report (2014), noted that the Nigerian economy was growing annually at 7%, and had the potential of being Africa's economic haven. It however expressed regret that though Nigeria's economic comparative advantage has been endowed with several resources, that these are being translated into harvest of doom due to socio-political ethno-religious and economic mismanagement. The report noted that since the Boko - Haram insurgency became so serious, that it has translated into loss of properties with huge commercial value and erased local and foreign investments. This was to the extent of completely crippling the country's domestic economy with investment losses of N1.33 trillion Naira or (equivalent of $6.6 Billion). It concluded with the views of many Analysts, which conceived Nigeria's situation as "a paradox: so peaceful but yet at war, so wealthy but ridden with poverty, so endowed yet so deprived" (UNCTAD Report 2014 p.1).

The tourism industry also had its share of economic loss due to terrorism. Nigerian Tourism Development Corporation (NTDC) Reports (2014; 2015) stated that the country's tourism industry, which generates an estimated N80 billion ($404.1 million) was grounded due to the disruption of activities in the tourism value chain by terrorists. The Reports estimated that the country lost over N1.5 billion Naira ($7.6m) daily in the aviation industry alone due to terrorism.

More so, Respondents E7, E8, E20, E27, E33, E45, E46, E53, E54 and E55 observed that because of the series of terrorist attacks against innocent persons including foreign nationals in Nigeria, several countries consistently warned their citizens against travelling to Nigeria. This constitutes adverse effect on the country's tourism industry leading to the loss of accruable foreign exchange revenue. The same adverse consequence has also led to the limitation of the capacity of International Organizations; namely: DFID, USAID, UNICEF from providing essential service supports in the area of health, education, etc. to the country because of the risky environment where those who require this assistance are found.

The institute for Economics and Peace Report (2015) stated that the terrorist onslaughts of Boko Haram insurgents led to the death of not less than three thousand one hundred and twenty persons in 2015 and that this figure excludes soldiers and all the various terrorists killed during the period. The same report revealed that about two hundred and fifty-five persons were killed monthly in the same year, the worst being January when two thousand one hundred and seven persons were killed including the massacre of two thousand persons in one swoop in Baga, (a town in North Eastern part of Nigeria). It also noted that terrorist activities in Nigeria had at 2015, led to the destruction of many towns and villages with the displacement of thousands of persons.

The UNICEF West and Central Africa Regional Report (2017) recounted the various atrocities by the Boko-Haram insurgents especially against children. The document noted that out of the estimated 2.3 million displaced persons as a result of the terrorist activities of Boko-Haram since May 2013 that the number of displaced children increased to 1.3million from the initial record of 800,000. This situation is further complicated by the alarming rate at which children are killed, maimed, abducted and recruited for terrorist activities in addition to being abused sexually and forced into marriage with the terrorists. Worse still, schools and other infrastructural facilities are attacked thereby preventing the provision of essential services to the people who are consequently displaced and housed in very poor communities without access to basic means of survival.

To worsen the above adverse situation, the abducted children are so negatively sensitized to attack their families as proof of their loyalty to the group due to the toxic extremist indoctrination they receive. This perhaps accounted for the increased frequency of suicide attacks undertaken by children in North East Nigeria especially since 2014. It is also observed that in spite of the several successes recorded by the Nigerian military in freeing many Boko-Haram abductees including women and girls that those freed still

live under fear because they are mistrusted, discriminated against and persecuted. Some of them already had children for the terrorists and are suspected to be loyal to them and as potential instruments for the perpetration of terrorist acts.

UNICEF Report (2017) also stated the viral consequence of terrorism to the educational sector in Northern Nigeria. It stated that more than one thousand eight hundred schools have been closed, destroyed or looted and that this situation has instilled fear in the teachers who consequently have abandoned their jobs as well as the parents who withdraw their children from schools and are not in any hurry to return them. This situation has kept over 670,000 pupils out of school in the region.

The UNESCO - Global Education Monitoring - Report (2018) revealed that Boko-Haram killed 2300 teachers, destroyed 1000 schools and displaced 19000 teachers as at 2017. The report noted that many schools have been destroyed and worsened by the shortage of qualified teachers in North East Nigeria. It also observed that the epidemics due to the terrorist activities in North East Nigeria have caused severe malnutrition among children in the region which increased from 149,000 to 195,000 children within two years from 2014 to 2016. This trend was possible due to the disruption of farming and fishing in the region leading to the loss of their means of livelihood for the farmers, fishermen and herdsmen and worsened by lack of access to hygienic water.

On the adverse international consequence of terrorism to the country, Nigeria's CVE (2017) raised the point that Nigeria became a terrorist target because of its close economic ties with the United States of America. The document noted that Nigeria's prominence in the Gulf of Guinea from where Western countries and mainly the US source their petroleum needs, inevitably elicits reprehension against the former as an ally of the later based on such adverse Salafist sensitization by Moslem extremists that Western civilisation is evil. This reprehension according to the document, was echoed by Osama Bin Laden and for which reason, Nigeria was included as one of the countries that was ripe for Jihad and as a potent ground for recruitment by Islamic terrorists.

Nigeria also witnessed serious capital flight due to several reasons including the reduction in the willingness of many foreign countries to invest in or increase their investments in the country. This situation has also dealt a heavy strike on the psyche of Nigerians including several psychological stresses on the citizens leading to the drastic reduction in their productivity level and consequent derailment of the country's economic development this observation was corroborated in.

Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce Report (2016). The report indicated that the threats of terrorism portend adverse implication to the thriving of business activities in the country especially to both existing business activities and for potential investments. It evidenced this with such vital indicators which revealed a significant correlation between high cost of business development and progress due to insecurity in Nigeria. This revelation is also in sync with the World bank Report (2015) on the investment

situation in nine (9) African countries in which it was discovered that while 29% of prospective investors viewed insecurity as reason for the slow rate of investment drive in Africa generally, 36% conceived same specifically for Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria has been witnessing a steady decline in foreign direct investments including reduction in the building of new industries that would have created jobs for the citizens. Rather than investing in real production activities that could have helped the country's economy, foreign investors resort more to acquiring equities from already existing companies. The Central Bank of Nigeria Report (2010) in this case, showed that while foreign investments in Nigeria decreased by 78.1%, investments in already existing companies in Nigeria rose to 87.2%.

The above threats are feared to possibly escalate especially with the expanding connectivity of the Boko-Haram sect with other international terror groups due to illicit financial supports. The intelligence report by African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security (2017) indicated that the illicit relationship between Nigeria's Boko - Haram group and ISIS further complicates the security threat of the group to Nigeria. It was accordingly reported that this illicit relationship was sealed in 2015 when the Boko – Haram sect pledged allegiance to ISIS. This was evident in the arrest in 2015, of two Nigerian youths by Indian security agencies alleged to be en-route Iraq for possible enlistment in ISIS. This report revealed that more than six thousand African terrorist fighters recruited by ISIS out of its estimated thirty thousand manpower strength, were meant to return to the continent soon and could pose potential threat to Nigeria in view of the possibility of their enlistment by the Boko-Haram sect. The document further alerted that these returning terrorists could sneak into the country in different disguises including adorning farming attires. Nevertheless, it should be noted once more that all the above threats are sustained through illicit supports in the form of terrorism financing. It is therefore necessary to fully understand terrorism financing as a driver of terrorism and its manifestation in Nigeria as well as the country's review effort in curtailing its growth.

4.3. Terrorism financing

As earlier stated, terrorism financing is a strong support for the thriving of terrorism in Nigeria. The NFIU Report (2013) on the Trends and typologies of terrorism financing stated that the success of any terrorist activity is significantly a function of the funding acquired either from legitimate or illegitimate sources which are transmitted through financial or designated non-financial institutions. These are thereafter utilised to support the perpetration of terrorism. It therefore emphasised the imperatives of understanding the processes of raising, transmitting and the utilization of funds by terrorists and their organizations as the foundation of any effort to either counter terrorism or combat its financing. It also noted that these vices are induced in Nigeria by several factors including pervasive corruption, high level poverty, unemployment, etc.

The Mutual Evaluation of Terrorism Financing Report on Nigeria (2015) emphasised the need to criminalise terrorism financing. The report noted that it was for this reason that the United Nations came up with its 1999 Convention against illicit Financing of Terrorism which became effective in April 2002. Within the context of this convention, the special committee set up by the United Nations committee on counter terrorism (UNCTITF), specified the constituents of Terrorism Financing to include; fund raising, storage and concealment of funds, utilisation of funds to sustain terrorist organizations and groups including their equipment and intelligence as well as utilisation of same to undertake terrorist operations. In this case, money laundering was noted as one of the most viable instruments for the thriving of terrorism financing and invariably terrorism.

Using Boko Haram as an example, it is submitted that terrorist financing is obvious in Nigeria. It noted that In Nigeria, the capability and coordination of Boko Haram as well as the increasing tactical sophistication of its operations lay credence to the belief, or reasonable suspicion, that the group receives support from several sources. These include unscrupulous politicians or individuals and sympathizers within the country and have ties with other international terrorist organisations; (NFIU, 2013 p.2). Respondents E1 – E19noted that in spite of the several onslaughts by the country's security agencies that the main terrorist group in Nigeria appears to be getting stronger because of the huge availability of illicit funds to it which it gets from local and international sources. Examples of such sources include supports from the Al-Qaida Headquarters from where Boko Haram in 2011, got cash support of approximately 1.8 million British pounds from Osama Bin Laden. This was also followed with several of such supports from other terrorist groups such as Al-shabab.

Respondents E3, E4, E6, E7, E8, E9, E10, E13, E16, E17 and E18 also pointed out that the banking sector has been complicit in the facilitation of illicit financing of Boko-Haram through the connivance of fraudulent bank employees to use multiple criminal identities and forged documents to open and operate bank accounts and facilitate fictitious bank loans. More so, there is a preponderance of flow of illicit funds through illegal conduits. This was supported with the startling statistics of the illicit flow of over thirty-three billion dollars from Nigeria within a period of ten years and included almost $7.5 billion proceeds of corruption. The consequence of these portends serious threat to the country's governance including increase in poverty and insecurity all of which have adverse implications on the country's security sector governance (Annual Conference Report on Financial Fraud, Cyber Crime and Cross Border Crimes in Nigeria 2016).

The synopsis of the above presentations are as follows; namely: Significant increase in both terrorism and its financing in Nigeria; Observed relationship between terrorists in West African countries and other international terrorist groups; adoption of both legitimate and illegitimate means of sourcing of funds by terrorists to cater for their activities including their upkeep, recruitments, funding of their operations,

logistics and equipment supports. Others are that these terrorists adopt both formal and informal means to transmit their funds including the use of non-governmental and charity organizations as instruments.

4.3 (i) Sources of Terrorism Financing

Having examined the implication of terrorism financing and the increasing availability of illicit funding to terrorists in Nigeria, it is important that the sources of these funding are elaborately explained and put in the right perspective to provide the basis and direction for appropriate counter-measures. This analysis therefore concentrates on the two main terrorists groups that have constituted the most vicious security threats to Nigeria. The two groups in this case whose activities indicate that they are obviously supported with illicit funding and which exemplifies the above narratives, are the Niger Delta militants and the Boko-Haram sect.

This research utilised the presentations of the FATF Report (2013) and the NFIU Report (2013) to provide evidence of financing to these major Nigerian terrorist groups. These two studies provided analyses of the various typologies of terrorism financing applicable to Nigeria's terrorist groups. These typologies centred on such illicit funding through trade and other lucrative activities; through Non-Governmental Organizations and charities; through arms smuggling assets and currency couriers and through Drug trafficking.

FATF Report (2013) specifically noted that the main terrorist groups in Nigeria - finance their activities through trade and other lucrative businesses as well as through NGOs, charity organizations and levies, through financing from arms smuggling, assets and currencies by cash couriers, drug trafficking as well as through politically exposed persons. The study evidenced all the above funding sources through the confessions of terrorist culprits arrested in Nigeria which it classified into typologies; namely: **The first typology identified the following activities through trade and other lucrative activities to include** (a) sale of goods and other lucrative activities; (b) through business profits, logistic supports; (c) through Real Estate business identities and (d) through the importation of used vehicles.

These sources were reported in the study as legitimate business ventures that are exploited by terrorists to not only fund their activities, but also utilized to transmit the accruing funds. The above examples according to the study are indicative of the exploitation of legal business for terrorism financing whereby terrorists and their financiers are involved in various kinds of business activities in disguise, only to utilize proceeds of same, to finance terrorist activities. Such disguise includes engaging in different types of businesses in multiple countries in order to conceal the source of the monetary remittance to terrorist groups. The above examples confirm the use of not only illegally acquired funds but also from legitimate business ventures to finance terrorism and pointing to the lapse in the processes involved in the registration of companies for business transactions which enables terrorists to float fictitious companies that are used for nefarious activities.

The NFIU Report (2013) used the confessions of arrested culprits to support this typology. These culprits, who were confirmed to be members of Boko Haram, were involved in the purchase and sale of used vehicles and other legitimate wares in different locations and even across borders. These confessional statements indicated that they also extorted monies from their victims, through intimidation and from voluntary donations by members and those sympathetic to them. They thereafter use the proceeds to procure Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and for the renting of apartments for members and factories for the manufacture of IEDs, as well as for the upkeep of members.

The Second typology identified in the FATF Report (2013) covered terrorist financing through non-governmental organizations, charities and Levies. The various sources identified under this typology include the following; namely: Financing through the financial system; from contributions and collections from members of the terrorist group; through alms solicitation from vulnerable persons; through extortion from civilians by intimidation and execution of works for legitimate NGOs. The study noted that the activities of Boko Haram, exemplified all the above sources. It observed that this group utilizes unsuspecting persons and those sympathetic to them including street beggars to source for funds. It revealed that NGOs and charities are also susceptible in this case in view of the infiltration of these entities by terrorists who end up using them for criminal ventures including being used as avenues for the transmission of funds for terrorist activities while at the same time, concealing the trail of such funds. The study also exposed how the same Boko Haram group intimidated government functionaries including governors in North East Nigeria whom they coerced to donate to it or to be faced with its onslaughts.

The NFIU Report (2013) corroborated the foregoing and provided example of this type of financing with the investigative report which indicted the International Islamic Charity Organization with its headquarters in a foreign jurisdiction and other individual culprits as having provided funding supports to the Nigerian terrorist group as well as for groups earlier indicted by the US government as terrorist organizations. These supports according to the report were usually sourced from grants and transmitted through wire transfers. The report used the confessions of an arrested Boko – Haram culprit to buttress the use of child beggars known as Almijiris, the physically challenged and the elderly to solicit for funds which were then ploughed to fund terrorist activities. Another example of sponsorship of terrorism through supports disguised as charitable gestures was equally provided by the report. It gave example with a principal suspect, a Nigerian jailed in South Africa where he resided and planned terrorist attacks in Nigeria in conjunction with his cohorts in the country. Investigation of these culprits as included in the report, showed that the principal donated vehicles for the attack at Nigeria's capital city, Abuja.

The third typology is concerned with terrorist financing through arms smuggling, assets and currency couriers. This typology covers the following; namely: Smuggling of arms through Nigeria's borders; Use of women as cash couriers and arms smugglers; trafficking of cash between Nigeria and some identified West African countries such as Burkina Faso, Niger as well as simultaneous trafficking of cash and arms and

hostage taking. The use of different material and financial resources for hostage activities including the means of funding kidnappers identified as receiving assistance from security operatives, were equally classified under this typology.

As in the first two typologies, the confessions from culprits arrested by relevant Nigerian Security Agencies were used as examples in the NFIU Report (2013). The culprits, who confirmed their involvement in the terrorist activities of Boko Haram, narrated how they illegally bought and sold arms and thereafter used the proceeds to support their terrorist campaigns. These arms according to them were usually smuggled across borders using women who were hardly screened by security agencies as well as commercial vehicles that transported legitimate goods. The Nigerian who resided in South Africa as noted in the second typology was also complicit for arms smuggling. He was reported to be involved in illicit arms smuggling into Nigeria from overseas countries and supplied quantities of arms to his terrorist associates in Nigeria who also sourced funds through kidnapping and hostage taking.

The fourth typology involves terrorism financing through drug trafficking. This study utilized the observations raised in the FATF Terrorist Financing Report (2008) to explain this typology. The report observed that drug trafficking organizations have tremendously utilized countries within and along the West African coastal region as transit points for the trafficking of substantial quantities of narcotics especially cocaine from South America, to European countries. It noted that these trafficking organizations which are mainly based in Colombia and Venezuela use a combination of privately owned aircraft and maritime vessels to transport hundreds of tons of cocaine valued at billions of dollars to West African countries.

This trend according to the study is evident of the lucrativity of narcotic proceeds as a significant source of terrorist financing. The study used the following scenarios to substantiate this point; namely: Drug trafficking by Al-Qaida in the Maghreb, (AQIM); by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionaries de Colombia (FARC); Triangular trafficking involving Latin America, Africa and Europe. Fund raising in four West African countries including Nigeria as well as West African based Money laundering activities facilitated by Lebanese currency Exchange Houses.

The foregoing scenarios were further exemplified with the confessions of drug trafficking actors apprehended by both domestic and international law enforcement agencies and who owned up that substantial part of their funds were derived from drug trafficking and utilized to support terrorism. The conspiracies of Nigerians in this criminal activity were equally highlighted. The US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2017), used the UNODC estimate that terrorists in 2016 made almost one hundred and fifty million dollars from the Afghan opiate drug trade alone and could have been more if other drugs were considered.

In the case of Nigeria, it reported the facilitation of drug trafficking by Boko – Haram through aiding drug traffickers to transport heroin and cocaine within and across West African drug trafficking routes. This was exemplified with the record of court proceedings during the prosecution of Boko-Haram members in Chad which revealed the recovery of huge quantities of psychotropic substances from members of this sect suggesting their heavy involvement in the trafficking and consumption of these drugs. The same applies to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which is known to maintain a serious link with Boko-Haram and has ostensibly been involved in cannabis and cocaine trafficking.

The World Drug Report (2017) in corroborating the foregoing, revealed that transnational organized crimes groups including terrorists derived 25 -33 percent of their funding through drug trafficking with serious money laundering implications. This according to the report, portends long term negative consequences because when a significant quantity of illicitly acquired monies permeate a country's economy, it inevitably cause inflation increase, property prices, jeopardize export procedures including export figures, cause unequal competitive practices especially in the manner in which income and wealth are distributed in the country and with inducement of corruption.

All these can potentially kill legitimate businesses which cannot access illicit capital outlays and same for new and prospective businesses. Worse still, this illicit funding instigates a vicious cycle that sterilizes rule of law, complements corruption and in turn, further supports the drug business. The Report relied on previous studies to aver that laundering of illicit drug proceeds has the tendency to reduce a country's economic development.

From all the indications, the following points as corroborated by respondents E14 – E19 would have been established and can also guide the formulation of the required interventions:

- That the sources of funds to Nigerian terrorists include the following: Membership contributions, donations by unsuspecting Nigerians, bank robberies in towns and cities, kidnapping and human trafficking for ransoms, drug trafficking, cross border arms and ammunition smuggling, sea piracy, extortion blackmail, trade financing exploitation and protection fees.

- That the acquired financial proceeds by these terrorists are used for the following; namely: for the funding of the upkeep of members; for the purchase of required materials and logistics by the sect including bombs and other attack weapons; for the financing of operations including surveillance and intelligence gathering, recruitment of new members, settlement of families of suicide bombers, procurement of accommodation for members and for logistics and weapons storage.

- That the movement of these funds includes; namely: regular Automated Teller Machine (ATM) withdrawals, cash deposits to and from high-risk terrorism prone areas, depositing cash in different branches of the same bank by different persons and instant withdrawals of same from

these branches by different persons. Frequent temporary deposits in foreign currencies in personal accounts, physical movement of cash by currency couriers, regularity in wire transfers from foreign donors, extensive cross-border cash transmissions and trading, use of credit and debit cards to access funds domiciled in foreign banks.

4.3 (ii) Further inducing factors of terrorism financing in Nigeria

At this point, it is also necessary to examine some other factors which aid terrorism financing in Nigeria.

One of such factors as reported by Respondents E8, E16, E17, E18, E20, E27, E36, E45, E46, E56 and E57 is the lack of strict financial regulations with relatively non stringent monitoring of cash movements. They noted that this is responsible for easy flow of illicit funds in Nigeria. The country before now was one of the most notable cash-based economies with not too effective money laundering control strategies due to fiscal governance deficiencies. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, the Financial Action Task Force and the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West - Africa (GIABA) have all raised disturbing concerns on Nigeria's weak financial regime and practices. (FATF Reports 2013 and 2014). They also observed that the weak capacity of Nigeria's security institutions is a contributory factor. The Financial Action Task Force Report (2013) on Nigeria equally outlined the following reasons in this case; namely:

- That the institutions responsible for the tracking and reporting of suspicious transactions with terrorism connotation, do not possess the requisite capacity to effectively undertake this function;

- That the intelligence capacity especially the surveillance systems deployed at the susceptible borders are weak and ineffective and worsened by the multiplicity of several illegitimate pathways which are utilized by these terrorists to not only gain access but to also move their illicit arms and ammunition;

- That law enforcement and security institutions in Nigeria are not sufficiently knowledgeable about relevant laws on counter-terrorism and as such, limit their capacity to apply these laws.

- Poor state of interagency cooperation among Nigerian security agencies was also provided by the respondents as a responsible factor. One of the consequences of this situation is transmission and flow of illicit funds and arms without proper screening. More so, because of interagency distrust, these agencies hardly invite the NDLEA to be involved in the debriefing and profiling of arrested terrorists including those found with suspicious illicit substances. Rather than do this, these security operatives either destroy or consume these substances which would have ordinarily been handed over to the NDLEA for the required narco - forensic analysis; (US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2018).

As regards countering narcotics in order to ensure that their proceeds are not diverted for terrorist activities, Respondents E1, E2, E7, E8, E14 to E19noted that there has not been any significant success in this case because of poor or obsolete drug surveillance equipment. They observed that the Nigerian military or operatives of Nigeria's Department of State Security Services who are involved in counter terrorism operations, do not possess the knowledge of drug intelligence and interdiction as the operatives of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and as such, could hardly detect narcotics which constitutes a major source of funding to the terrorists. Respondents E1, E2, E7, E12, E18, E22, E33, E52, E53, E54 and E55, averred that the assistance of the NDLEA is hardly sought under this circumstance. They also adduced: Lack of capacity to identify cannabis farms most of which are located in thick forests and or mixed up in farms for healthy crops. These farms are not easy to identify except through proper aerial surveillance using helicopters and sophisticated surveillance equipment which Nigeria's security agencies especially the NDLEA do not possess.

Other complementary reasons include the underestimation of Nigerian terrorists especially in their capacity for wider contacts and better understanding of the geography of possible routes by terrorists including the various sea routes and land borders. These Respondents gave example with the complex geographical features of the creeks in the Niger Delta region and the multiple land borders in the North which are better understood and mastered by the Niger Delta militants and the Boko-Haram insurgents in the Niger Delta and Northern regions respectively. They also noted that the complex means of drug concealment by drug traffickers are better understood by these criminals than the security operatives. For example – there have been instances of injection of drugs in camels which were used for cross border drug trafficking in the historical trans-Sharan trade routes and require sophisticated intelligence gathering dexterity to unravel.

Respondents E1, E2, E4, E7, E10 – E13 and E14 – E19 reported that faulty posting and deployment practice adopted by these security agencies have also not helped matters. They stated that while it is expected that posting of operatives should be based on the understanding of their operational terrain, postings by these agencies are influenced by pecuniary factors. This is such that postings to terrorist prone areas are used as punishment for unfavoured ones while the loyalists and ethnic relations of bosses are shielded in spite of having better understanding of these areas. Some of the operatives posted to these areas do not even understand nor speak the native language of the people in the areas they are posted to with the implication that their intelligence acquisition capacity remains limited as far as their duties in these areas are concerned.

The foregoing was corroborated by the above Respondents with additional reasons; namely: (a) the inability of the Nigerian security agencies to properly police all the potential drug trafficking routes due to insufficient resources, Poor understanding of the drug trafficking terrains and inland drug transportation

routes; (b) Ineffective drugs interdiction strategies and lack of understanding of the drug transit terrains. All these are complicated more by the porosity and multiplicity of Nigeria's International land borders.

The manifestation and threats of terrorism in Nigeria with terrorism financing as a major support would have been understood at this point. The need to explore the means through which they can be mitigated is therefore necessary at this point.

4.4 Nigeria's strategic interventions

Nigeria's efforts at ensuring the security of lives and property as enshrined in its constitution have not easily been realisable and therefore require relevant interventions within the context of security sector governance including enhancement of its strategic and institutional capacity.

Data extracted from relevant Nigeria's policy document revealed that the country has embarked on several policy and strategic measures to curtail the threats of terrorism. At policy level, the country enacted the Terrorism Prevention Act (2011), which was expanded and amended in 2013. This law is complemented with various institutional measures; namely: constitution of an Amnesty Committee for terrorists to explore the grievances and underlying causes of terrorism; institution and encouragement of inter-religious cooperation through the establishment of Nigeria's Inter-Religious Council which had as one of its prime objectives, encouragement of dialogue between Christians and Moslems in order to neutralize such religious frictions with the potential to stoke militant extremism.

Other measures included the establishment of an improved Islamic Almajiri schools system in Northern Nigeria to provide educational opportunities to discontented Northern children and youths; exclusion of religion as one of the indices in population enumeration; establishment of the Federal Character Commission to ensure equitable inclusion of the various ethnic nationalities in the Nigerian project including public institutions; statutory denial of registration and non-recognition of political parties, financial institutions and groups with religious colouration.

Furthermore, the presentation of Nigeria's Security Adviser (2014), indicated that the country devised an inclusive national security model based on the provision of peace, security and development involving all facets of society. This includes blocking all avenues for terrorism financing, establishment of a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, which in collaboration with key stakeholders developed a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy with ample opportunities for multi-sectoral participation by many Federal government ministries, departments and agencies. He noted that this strategy presented a promising future for the country's anti-terrorism efforts and was constructed around the following imperatives: respect for human rights and the rule of law, successful prosecution of violent extremist offenders; capacity building of relevant institutions as well as the country's criminal justice system.

Nigeria's counter terrorism campaign has been a diverse mix of hope and trepidation. This includes bad governance as the centre of all the problems. There is a common consensus by the Nigerian public that the government's response to terrorism is reactionary rather than proactive. This observation is based on the view that the government usually waited for insurgents to launch attacks on churches, schools, police stations and other public institutions before reacting (Akpan, Olotu and Adeoye 2014).

Nigeria's strategies against terrorist activities can be argued to revolve around soft initiatives such as the amnesty programme as well as military and law enforcement approaches. These are anchored on three documents. These are Nigeria's Policy Document on the Amnesty for Niger Delta Militants (2009), National Security Strategy (2014) and the National Framework and Action Plan for preventing and countering Violent Extremism (2016) which was also improved upon in 2019.

4.4.1(i) Amnesty Strategy

One of the strategies adopted by the Nigerian government to check the incidence of terrorism and which fairly helped to control the Niger Delta militancy and still being experimented to check the onslaught of Boko Haram and armed herdsmen in the country is the amnesty programme. According to Nwozor 2013, Amnesty as a counter-terrorism strategy is associated with the preparedness of the state to suspend its powers to prosecute and punish individuals and groups who had breached the laws of the state and involves the invocation of the powers of the state to cleanse from its official records, the indictment and culpability of the beneficiaries of the amnesty.

This conceptualization is also in sync with the observation on same that amnesty as a security intervention strategy is used to contain antagonistic forces and maintain the corporate unity of the state in the face of seemingly intractable threats (Olatoke & Olokooba 2012). The effectiveness of amnesty relies on putting on hold, the undisputable demonstration of the superiority of the fire power of the state as well as the willingness of the intended beneficiaries to denounce their criminality for which the amnesty concession was contemplated in the first place. This is essentially predicated on the expediency of a conducive atmosphere rather than prosecution for the promotion of public welfare.

The presentations of E1, E2, E3, E7, E8, E21, E22, E23, E24, E27, E30 and E33 indicated that before exploring the amnesty option to contain the Niger Delta insurgency that Nigeria had attempted same for the Biafran separatists but it was sparsely implemented. The amnesty programme designed for these separatists in 1970, was conceived as empty rhetoric peddled to contain the security threat that open marginalization could have elicited. Though, this amnesty programme was intended for the purpose of procuring a peaceful polity, it was noted to be one sided and that rather than integrating the secessionists, it fostered their alienation and relegation from the mainstream of Nigeria's governance. The Federal Government further worsened this situation through the confiscation of the assets of the separatists which were disposed of based on the adverse policy of "abandoned property" of the Federal Government (Ukaogo 2010).

Also, the economic policy introduced by the Government whereby individuals from the secessionist region who had money in the bank, were given a paltry sum of twenty Nigerian pounds in 1970 (then equivalent of forty dollars) regardless of the amount they owned before then, economically incapacitated them. Most of them including those who had off-spring and dependents were rendered hopeless, downtrodden and predisposed to criminal activities especially, the various forms of militant extremism. The army of disgruntled youths that emanated from this quagmire were those who were quickly recruited as couriers by established drug barons especially in the South West Nigeria.

More so, after the 1970 version of the amnesty programme that the Federal Government adopted the amnesty programme to assuage the violent Niger Delta militants. This Programme represented a milestone in initiative as it showed that the Nigerian Government was listening and willing to engage in peaceful resolution of the people's grievances. This marked a shift in the security hard stance of the Nigerian government in view of the less emphasis on its superior fire power which it had used to cow the people but rather embraced dialogue anchored on voluntary renunciation of violence by the militants (Nwozor, 2013).

Though this amnesty programme was well intended and achieved some appreciable success, it was not without some deficiencies. The programme was riddled with irregularities and massive corruption. According to him, one hundred and twenty-seven billion Naira (about 528 Million Dollars) was budgeted initially for the programme from 2009 – 2011 and another seventy four billion Naira in 2012. In spite of this huge amount of money, oil theft and illegal bunkering persisted in the Niger Delta region with many of the region's youths always threatening to go back to the trenches if they were not paid their entitlements as agreed in the amnesty contract (Ibitoye 2014).

Thus, the immediate effect of the programme was the reduction in armed confrontation in the region and resumption of oil exploration which was not without occasional outbreak of violence between the state and some intransigent militants. This raised serious concern about the peace achieved by the programme and the need to complement this with initiatives that were equally capable of resolving the root causes of conflict in the region. The Programme was also faced with the delay in the payment of the agreed forty dollars subsistence allowance approved for each of the militants which caused them to engage in post amnesty criminal activities and disrupted post conflict peace building in the region.

The reason for this was that the programme from its conception, diminished the security challenge in the region to only militant activities without due cognizance of the fact that these militants were products of neglect and deprivations. The programme was therefore assumed to be mainly a response of the Nigerian government to the external pressure from the multinationals with economic interest in the Gulf of Guinea. It was an interim measure bearing in mind that genuine development should have been undertaken concurrently with the declaration of the programme. This should have involved the simultaneous

development of the communities and complemented with review of existent repressive and obnoxious laws at the same time that the militants were being disarmed, demobilised and rehabilitated. The narrow focus of the programme denied Nigeria the much needed opportunity to ensure a lasting post-conflict peace in the Niger Delta region (Udegbunam, 2013).

Another aspect of the amnesty programme is its arms confiscation content which instigated a strategic disarmament process. The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALTW) induced by various armed struggles in the Niger Delta region propelled the need for disarmament in some communities and the disbandment of their vigilante groups (Davidheiser & Nyiayaana 2010). During the first phase of the amnesty programme, twenty thousand ex-militants surrendered their arms. This number rose to 30,000 by December 2012 (Oluduro 2012) and included outright pardon to all the insurgents who were directly or indirectly responsible for the restiveness in the Niger Delta. The process witnessed the surrendering of about two thousand seven hundred sophisticated arms and three hundred thousand rounds of ammunition by the first fifteen thousand of these militants. While the disarmament process could be described as successful given the initial attendant scepticism and the de-escalation of armed conflict in the area, the process hinged on the militants alone and should have also covered the communities which harboured them for the purpose of sweeping them to clear hidden dangerous weapons, (Udegbunam 2013).

In spite of the foregoing, respondents E7, E8, E9, E10, E11, E12, E15, E20, E21 and E58 were all affirmative that the positive results derivable from the programme cannot be wished. They noted that this perhaps encouraged Nigeria's government to consistently express desire to use the same programme to check the Boko – Haram menace. However, the logic for the replication of the Niger Delta amnesty model for the Boko-Haram was farfetched because the conditions of both scenarios are not the same. Thus, the Niger Delta grievances and demands were properly articulated as represented in the region's various articles of demand, e.g. the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990) and Kaiama Declaration (1998). These documents articulated such grievances to include; namely: review of the country's discrepant federalism, the impunity of the multinational oil companies causing environmental degradation in the region which limited the means of livelihood of the people and the intimidating tactics of the federal government.

Apart from the amnesty programmes as part of Nigeria's strategic intervention against terrorism, it has also embarked on several other policy measures. Nigeria's National Security Strategy (2014) enumerated these strategies. They include the establishment of a Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) in the Office of the Country's National Security Adviser with the responsibility to coordinate the country's counter terrorism programme. The role of this office includes the formulation and implementation of the country's National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) involving the collection and analysis of procured intelligence from relevant agencies by the Joint Intelligence Analysis Bureau (JIAB) as well as effective oversight supervision of these agencies and their collaboration with foreign institutions and persons to build appropriate capacity.

Both the National Security Strategy (2014) and NACTEST (2016) also recognized that the thriving of terrorism in Nigeria depends on supportive resources including human and financial resources; namely: Clandestine funding, bank robberies, kidnapping, drugs and human trafficking, car hijacks, and even fronting of legitimate business entities; etc. The proceeds of the above activities are usually transmitted through the financial system. For this reason, the country's Central Bank, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) embark on appropriate control measures to check the transmission of such financial resources with terrorism connection. PCVE (2016) corroborated the foregoing but recommended the need to identify terrorists and their sponsors, proper sensitization of the populace on not only the prevention of terrorism in the country but also on the possible control of its effects including an aggressive de-radicalization programme to be complemented with the protection of lives and property including public and private infrastructure and Nigeria's interest globally.

This strategy is complemented with confiscation of terrorist related assets in line with relevant United Nations Conventions which Nigeria is signatory to and the provisions of the country's Terrorism Prevention Law (2011) as amended in 2013 which empowers the freezing of terrorist assets for the purpose of neutralizing their capacity to raise funds. As support to the foregoing, Nigeria's National Security Strategy (2014) stated that the Nigerian government instituted and implemented a robust foreign policy framework with capacity to stimulate proficient military cooperation with such countries that are more technologically advanced and supported with an effective intelligence programme as well as the tracing and freezing of all illicit supports for terrorism using appropriate diplomatic platforms.

The Strategy also emphasized that the country complies with the following international instruments; namely: (i) the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199 of 2015, Resolution 2250 of 2015 and Resolution 2349 of 2017; (ii) United Nations Secretary General's Report on the Plan of Action for the prevention of Violent Extremism (2015); (iii) the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy Review; (iv) United Nations Resolution 68 (127) on Global Counter Terrorism Strategy; and (v) the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.

As already noted, terrorism financing is a major support for terrorism in Nigeria. Thus, it is important to note that any effective counter – terrorism programme should equally consider means of cutting off the various means through which terrorists which terrorists source for and transmit their funds. Nigeria is quite conscious of this need and has embarked on several efforts to achieve this objective.

4.4.1 (ii) Nigeria's counter terrorism financing measures

It would have been understood that terrorism financing seems to be the most potent factor in the sustenance of terrorism. It is therefore very vital that any effort to check the threats of this crime should evolve effective means of countering this factor. For this reason, the FATF (2013) averred that the need to

defect and cut-off illicit funding through effective interdiction, investigation and prosecution of the financiers of these terrorists in order to deter others cannot be overemphasised.

The study on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing in Nigeria by Shehu (2016) which derived from his experience as an Head of GIABA, acknowledged the (FATF) forty recommendations as the required standard for the evaluation of countries' efforts against money laundering and terrorism financing. The study observed that these standards are very crucial for the mitigation of transnational organised crimes and indeed, constitute the required policy direction and enforcement by various countries in the control of these crimes. It endorsed these standards as having successfully contributed to the sustenance of the required best practices and protection of the international financial system through adherence and commitment to the extant international regulatory controls against money laundering and terrorism financing. The study praised Nigeria for its pioneering efforts in the formulation and implementation of relevant measures to deal with money laundering and terrorism financing.

The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) Mutual Evaluation Report on Nigeria (2015) appraised Nigeria's efforts in tackling money laundering and terrorism financing. It specifically concentrated on the extent to which Nigeria has been able to adhere to the relevant FATF recommendations as included in GIABA's strategic policies to counter money laundering and terrorism financing. This appraisal of Nigeria on the various critical compliance requirements appeared very satisfactory but with counsels on further improvements and sustainability.

Nigeria is quite conscious of the need to achieve the above objective and has instituted several measures to achieve this. Accordingly, Nigeria's efforts in curtailing terrorism financing are classifiable under the following: Formulation and implementation of relevant legislations and policies as well as strategic and process improvements covering efficient information, intelligence, surveillance and realistic international collaborative schemes. These classifications were adopted to analyse the data derived from documentary and interview sources.

4.4.2 (i) Legislative measures

Nigeria has embarked on several efforts in this direction especially in the area of promulgating necessary assets recovery legislations. The country has almost finalized the required processes for a comprehensive regulation on assets recovery in addition to the conclusion of work on the process of promulgating the civil forfeiture bill (GIABA Mutual Evaluation Report on Nigeria 2015). Other areas on which the country was evaluated and on which it is striving to achieve successfully include; namely: the need to develop guiding procedures for all the relevant institutions involved in assets recovery schedule and on the need for the institution of prerequisite processes for transparent and efficient management of assets recovery including compilation of correct statistics and accurate repatriation of recovered funds. Specifically, it has almost completed the general AML/CFT Regulation that will guide the concerned agencies to institute internal

systems for the compilation of relevant statistics and the required scheme for the repatriation, preservation and establishment of assets recovery funds.

On the need to urgently conclude the prerequisite legislation for the operational autonomy of Nigeria's Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), the report stated that this has reached advanced stage and that the requisite bill had already been passed by the country's legislature and will soon become an enabling law that will legally qualify the NFIU as an autonomous and independent entity. (It should be noted that the above expectation has been met as this bill has been successfully passed and implemented).

On the need for Nigeria to accelerate efforts towards passing the Mutual Legal Assistance and the Assets Recovery and Tracing bills into law, the document noted that the drafts of these bills and passing same by the country's legislature into law were almost completed. (This has also been passed). Connected to the above, Nigeria in response to the need to effectively implement necessary international cooperation schemes to deal with the challenge of money laundering and terrorism financing, presently has Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties with several countries.

Furthermore, the Central Bank of Nigeria Report (2017) also acknowledged the several efforts made by the Nigerian government to control terrorism financing have also been acknowledged. These include; namely: the enactment of relevant legislations including amendments and consequent improvements in the 2002 and the 1995 Money Laundering Law (this legislation was further amended in 2011) to cover the proceeds of all crimes including drug trafficking and terrorism; the 1991 Banking and other Financial Institutions Law which extended the scope of the law to stock brokers and foreign exchange instruments and further empowered Nigeria's Central Bank to denote and freeze suspicious accounts and possibly confiscate the licences of culpable banks (CBN Report 2017).

4.4.2 (ii) Process Improvement:

Nigeria has also undertaken several measures to improve the required process that can facilitate and expedite requisite actions in its anti-terrorism financing programmes. GIABA (2015) provided insights on the extent to which the country has achieved this objective.

On the requirement for the provision of relevant information for efficient counter measures against money laundering and terrorism financing, it reported that Nigeria undertook inspections on the extent of compliance with the provisions of the AML/CFT by several capital market operators including Stockbrokers, Trustees, Registrars, Rating Agencies, Investment Advisers and Issuing Houses. These are in addition to the enforcement measures carried out by Nigeria's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to ensure that these operators fulfilled their rendition obligations. Relevant government regulating agencies such as NAICOM, CBN, etc. equally braced up with their regulatory obligations including institutional review and evaluation of critical compliance requirements.

On the expectation for the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) to assess and report on the extent to which reporting entities are conversant with their reporting obligations, it stated that the NFIU lived up to this obligation and indeed collaborated with financial sector regulators to provide necessary training programmes on effective identification of Suspicious Transactions (STR) to each of the reporting entities from the different facets of the financial sector. Much more, the NFIU dealt with many terrorism financing cases and shared the intelligence that emanated from this with relevant security institutions in Nigeria.

On the requirement from Nigeria to adequately report on the extent of its implementation of the terrorism prevention agreements, especially the 2013 International Regulations on the freezing of international terrorism funds and other related resources, it noted that Nigeria including its relevant authorities, have promulgated the anti-terrorism Act including issuance of the necessary guidelines prerequisite for compliance with these regulations and for the implementation of relevant UN Conventions on same.

Further to these, the establishment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) through an enabling law which criminalized involvement in the provision of illicit financial supports for terrorist acts, gave further bite to these counter measures. In the same vein, financial institutions in Nigeria are mandated by the country's law to render reports of suspicious transactions to the NFIU. This includes such transactions with money laundering and terrorism financing implications as well as local currency and foreign currency transactions reports that are above the legally stipulated limits. This consequently requires conducting due diligence on all their customers as well as corporate entities including their owners who should be properly screened to ensure that they are not conduits for the illicit financing of terrorism activities.

In line with the foregoing, such vital strategic measures that are compliant with the FATF recommendations have also been instituted in the sector to counter terrorism financing. In this case, financial institutions in Nigeria are required to ensure appropriate identification and assessment of the potential money laundering and terrorism financing activities by their customers including their products and services, operating environment and channels of delivery of these goods and services.

The necessity of installing a reliable Information Technological Software for proper screening and prescription of appropriate remedy to check illicit financial activities is also underscored. In addition to the foregoing, the following measures were identified as having been undertaken by the Central Bank of Nigeria to check illicit financial activities through the country's Banking sector; namely: (a) Strengthening the processes for granting of the required licenses to financial institutions in Nigeria. (b) Establishment of specialized units with the requisite professionals to strictly pursue policy formulation and regulations and proper supervision of financial institutions under the overall regulation of the country's Central Bank for the purpose of safeguarding the financial system in Nigeria. This is further complemented with the issuance of appropriate operational guidelines by Nigeria's Apex bank in compliance with FATF recommendations

and the country's relevant anti-terrorism and other applicable laws as well as provision of regular update to the country's financial institutions on the United Nations list of persons and organizations involved in terrorism related activities (CBN Report 2017).

Other sundry measures undertaken by the CBN in line with the foregoing are as follows: Development and implementation of proper Bank-Customer Identification regime aimed at ensuring and enhancing required financial inclusion through proper risk assessment and controls. This is supported with the uniform Bank Account Number (NUBAN) system introduced by the bank based on a unified Standard Account Opening form; Introduction of the cash-lite system aimed at limiting the quantity of cash in circulation and thereby controlling the challenges that are associated with a cash based economy; Alternative payment system which included Mobile Payments, Point Of Sale Terminals, ATMs, Automated Direct Debits. Others include provision of special Identification Numbers which incorporates the customers biometric features known as Biometric Verification Number (BVN); Strengthening the CBN's collaborative schemes with relevant stakeholders involving sharing of information, joint inspections and joint training programmes. All these culminated in the establishment of the AML/CFT Stakeholders Consultative Forum that is constituted with appropriate stakeholders including representatives of relevant law enforcement and regulatory agencies.

The foregoing representations were corroborated with the views of experts at the Annual Conference on Financial Fraud, Cybercrime and Cross Border crimes in Nigeria, NACFFCBC (2016). These concentrated on relevant thematic issues bordering on Nigeria's executive, legislative and judicial as well as international cooperation efforts in tackling organised crimes including illicit financial supports to these crimes. In the same vein, the US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2017) acknowledged that Nigeria's government embarked on the implementation and enforcement of the Treasury Single Account (TSA) for all government institutions in Nigeria to check diversion of public funds as well as the Government Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) both of which are meant to ensure transparency and uniform standard in the management of government's revenues and expenditures.

More so, for efficient management of relevant statistics to adequately support the country's anti-money laundering and terrorism financing efforts, it stated that Nigeria has been living up to this expectation especially as relates to the investigation of these illicit activities with successes by its relevant law enforcement agencies including the EFCC and NFIU. More so, Nigeria relied on the provisions of its Terrorism Prevention Act of (2011) as amended in 2013, to prosecute and jail over forty terrorists in the country.

More so, the Steers Business Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in Nigeria (2017) concentrated more on the efforts and successes recorded by Nigeria in countering Terrorism Financing. These include; namely: penalizing financial institutions which are in breach of the Central Bank's Financial Regulations including withdrawal of the licenses of the indicted ones. All these efforts according to the

document culminated in the reprieve granted Nigeria by the FATF which freed the country from the former's harmer leading to the country's delisting from the FATF's Non-Cooperating list.

On the country's international collaborative efforts, the report also averred that in response to the need to share information that can lead to the apprehension of terrorist suspects and as credence to relevant international cooperation initiatives to counter terrorism financing, Nigeria has been cooperating with countries of the Lake Chad Basin including Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali to achieve this purpose. Apart from spearheading and participating in several meetings with these countries to exchange ideas on the threat of terrorism and on strategies to counter same including their financiers, the country's NFIU entered into bilateral agreements with the financial intelligence units of Chad, Cameroon, Columbia and Angola and further reached out to other countries for the same purpose.

In conclusion, the Financial Action Task Force Report (2013) acknowledged the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States to address the above challenges. Nigeria equally keyed into these laudable efforts. These include the enactment of Anti-Terrorism and Combating Terrorist Financing laws, establishment of necessary institutional mechanisms, enhancement of appropriate capacities for terrorism investigations and prosecutions, improvement of national interagency collaboration and international cooperation on counter-terrorism including the development of a West African regional counter-terrorism, strategic plan; adoption by the ECOWAS Heads of Government, of a model Counter-Terrorism Strategy and implementation which was further complemented with a political declaration on a common position on counter-terrorism.

In response, member countries of ECOWAS including Nigeria also undertook the following initiatives: (i) enactment of anti-terrorism and combating terrorism financing laws, (ii) establishment of institutional frameworks, (iii) strengthening investigative and prosecutorial mechanisms, and (iv) enhancement of interagency and international cooperation (Shehu 2016). Despite Nigeria being part of these initiatives, the level of its adherence and application of its content is yet to translate into any appreciable success.

4.4.2 (iii) Challenges in Nigeria's Counter Terrorism Financing Intervention

The benefits of the foregoing efforts by Nigeria to control terrorism financing would have ordinarily contributed to a drastic reduction in terrorism financing opportunities to Nigeria's terrorist groups, but the reverse seem to be the case. This is because the realization of these efforts is faced with several challenges identified in relevant documentary and interview sources which need to be addressed.

In its conceptualization of the constraints of checking terrorism financing and its consequent thriving due to the benefits of cooperation with other criminal groups, FATF (2013) reported that poor political and economic realities within West Africa, including Nigeria, contribute to this trend. This includes "weak post-conflict states with ineffective laws and institutions; states with porous and poorly policed borders, states experiencing widespread systemic corruption and offering lucrative criminal opportunities (FATF, 2013, p.

15). Clarke (2015) and Lee (2018), noted that implementing effective counter terrorism financing (CTF) measures in Nigeria are fraught the challenges attributable to the multiplicity of sources of terrorism financing. Nevertheless, Nigeria has embarked on several policy reforms and institutional measures within the ambit of security sector reform.

It is also iterated that institutional and technological challenges, poor coordination of counter-terrorism strategies and structural deficiencies, are contributory factors. In some instances, counter-terrorism policies can, in effect, aid terrorist groups such as Boko-Haram with illicit funding due to the absence of political will on the part of the actors responsible for countering terrorism financing in Nigeria (Koldas and Askit, 2020).

Another challenge is the existence of informal money transfer services. GIABA (2015) in its survey noted that the above constitutes a militating factor against efforts to counter terrorism financing. For example, Nigeria's financial environment was infested with the preponderance of the Mavrodi Mundial Money Scheme (MMM) in 2016. This system was so viral and caused the CBN to step in with some regulatory warning to the country's banks to neither subscribe to the system nor provide any support to the operators (CBN Report 2017).

The US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2017) also listed the following constraining against successful anti-money laundering efforts by Nigeria. These include pervasive corruption, lack of efficient investigative mechanism, dearth of legislative supports, interagency frictions; etc. The report noted that the country's revenue profile, out of which 70% is sourced from oil, has over the years, been a subject of embezzlement and misappropriation and provides the basis for diversion and possible illicit use. The document stated that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission especially its investigative capacity is limited in this case because it conducts its investigations with minimal involvement of relevant prosecutors and with excessive reliance on confessional statements. This and several noticeable gaps in the country's judicial system hamper effective prosecution of terrorism financiers.

Relying on his experience as the former Boss of Nigeria's EFCC, Ribadu's presentation (2017) centred on the susceptibility of the Nigerian banking system to frauds and corruption especially the inimical challenges of the proceeds of crime with the potential to facilitate terrorism. This problem according to him is hinged on the foundation and structure of the Nigerian Banking System which provides the enablement for abuse by corrupt individuals with the complicity of banks and bankers.

Several means through which these atrocities are committed includes; namely: the opportunities offered by special private banking service rendered by commercial banks in Nigeria. This service is noted as prone to abuse and with the potential to aid money laundering. This includes adverse use of the confidentiality requirement that is intrinsic in electronic banking service, to cover-up illegal transactions with the possibility of using customers who are involved in legal business but operate intense cash as conduits for

money laundering. The presentation noted that the thriving of the above trends is also traceable to inadequate protection of banks especially those located in remote areas.

Furthermore, the responses of E1 – E7, and E14, E15, E16, E17, E18 and E19 indicated that financial institutions submit their financial transactions to appropriate law enforcement agencies in Nigeria. However, the voluminous nature of these reports coupled with the country's cash-based economy; make it cumbersome and difficult to detect illicit transactions. They also listed the following as constraining factors: religious fundamentalism, lack of supervision of the activities of charity organizations, easy registration requirements for NGOs which tend to complicate the monitoring of not only the source of their funding but on how these funds are utilised.

Other constraining factors they listed include: lack of scrutiny of donations to faith-based NGOs in the country which obscures proper identification of their sources, porosity of Nigerian borders which provides easy access for cash movements and without adequate security infrastructure including insufficient human and materials resources.

Furthermore, Respondents E1 toE6, E7 and E14 to E18submitted that Nigeria has not been able to effectively check terrorism financing because of the prevalence of corruption and money laundering in the country and the involvement of its nationals in these vices. This is worsened by the country's laxity in exploring appropriate international cooperation initiatives to engage the FATF and accounted for the blacklisting of the country and inclusion in the list of non-cooperating countries and territories. The consequence of this classification for Nigeria included the negative perception of the country as a risky zone for business and financial transactions and attendant evaluation of its financial institutions including banks as lacking integrity. Nigeria suffered this negative classification till 2006 after series of engagements with FATF.

Another adverse factor extracted from the presentation of these Respondents is the complexity of Nigeria's borders making it a major transit point for drugs and financial instruments. Thus, because of the country's location, porous borders, ineffective laws, chronic corruption, inefficient enforcement mechanism and poor economic and social standard, criminals easily launder their illicit proceeds mostly derived from drug trafficking among other numerous criminal activities. Incidentally, these borders are uncontrolled even at peace time and provide unhindered access for terrorists especially in Nigeria's Northern neighbours. It is alleged that most of Boko-Haram weapons and military materials come from Libya, through Mali and Chad. In the same token, Boko-Haram receives money mainly in physical cash through these unprotected borders. Thus, the biggest advantage for Boko-Haram is that it occupies a very strategic location in the Zambisa forest which is a vast piece of forest, stretching into hundreds of kilometres and strategically located and bounded by many countries.

At this point, the threats of terrorism and terrorism financing in Nigeria and the country's efforts at countering these would have been explained. Nevertheless, it is important to explore means of improving Nigeria's security sector governance to achieve a more effective result in countering this crime. Accordingly, the relevant requirements as advocated in security sector governance paradigm relative to Nigeria's situation will be analysed upon which improvements would be based. The selected areas based on this paradigm are: institutional capacity, civil democratic oversight, human rights as well as good governance requirements including anti-corruption profile and provision of employment.

4.4.3 Institutional Capacity

Nigeria's strategic efforts to counter the threats of terrorism and terrorism financing are tied to the capacity of the various institutions charged with this role. For the country to achieve any meaningful result in this case, the capacity of these institutions needs to be enhanced. Indications from relevant documentary sources on the capacity of these institutions show that this is deficient. Respondents E1, E2, E1 - E13 and E14, E15, E16, E17, E18, E19, E56, E59 and E60 conceded that this is due to lack of relevant governance and policy supports as well as misappropriation of resources. They observed that manifestation of security threats in Nigeria is linked to institutional failure. They also assessed the foundation of Nigeria's security architecture as weak. This situation tends to impose serious constraints on the country's governance institutions that are consequent upon poor security sector governance considerations.

To worsen this, most of these respondents, E20 to E26 stated that provisions for the country's security sector concentrated more on state security and less on human security. They listed the many years of military dictatorship in Nigeria's governance to the above which led to over concentration of Nigeria's security priority on physical security concerns which over the years, had gulped more funds than that for human security provision. According to Nigeria's Budget Office Report (2018), Nigeria budgeted N58.001 Trillion Naira (approximately USD387 billion) from 2008 to 2018 for defence. This represents an average of over 11% of the country's total budget during this period, the highest allocation reaching 21.16% in 2013. These figures were budgeted only for defence and did not include other appropriations for physical security procurements by other security agencies and security votes. All these consumed more than 50% of the country's total budget during these years and far more than the budgets for other human security needs, etc.

Another factor that hinders the intelligence and operational standard of these security agencies is the recurring practice of setting up and using ad hoc operational teams to tackle supposedly special assignments at the whim and caprice of the leadership of these institutions and with the propensity of being diverted for pecuniary use. These respondents observed that this practice distorts the consistency and ripeness of the already existent operational structure of these institutions and does not help in the

maximization of the meagre manpower and logistic resources available to them for the larger counter terrorism obligations.

Further to the above, Nigeria's anti-narcotics agency which also plays an important role in Nigeria's programme against money laundering and terrorism financing was exemplified as a manifestation of unethical practices such that prior to 1994, it was enmeshed in a series of problems for which the country's anti-drug efforts were not accredited internationally with consequent sanctions against the country. The above conditions were aggravated by professional irresponsibility of judicial officials. A UNODC (2016) in-depth assessment of the country's justice sector integrity corroborated this observation. The report observed a significant level of corruption due to lack of transparency in Nigeria's judiciary, which contributed to inefficient justice administration. It observed that on the average, more than 70% of lawyers in the country paid bribes in order to expedite court proceedings. The foregoing was corroborated by respondents E56 to E60.

Data extracted from the World Drug Report (2017) further identified several gaps militating against the capacity of Nigeria's security institutions. These include their meagre level of logistics and technical capacity. This is worsened by inefficient intelligence acquisition. National Intelligence Data Base that can service relevant collaborating agencies in the country's national security obligation. It also revealed systemic failures covering lack of interagency cooperation and professional misconducts among security operatives. Further to this, the quality and extent of cooperation at regional and international levels were evaluated as unsatisfactory. The study assessed the logistic and budgetary supports to these institutions, their intelligence acquisition and application capacity, their human resources and professional responsibility standard as well as legal judicial supports.

Apart from the data sourced from relevant documents on this subject matter, top officials including serving and retired bosses of the various security and law enforcement agencies specifically responsible for terrorism control and those with complementary supports including foreign collaborators were interviewed. They include respondents E1 to E13 and E45 to E55 and were all of the view that the operational and logistic resources of Nigeria's security agencies have implications for their performance level. Thus, for the country's security agencies, including the military, to effectively confront terrorists presently causing havoc in the country, the institution needs to have sophisticated equipment including superior arms and ammunitions, surveillance gadgets, etc. In spite of this, these agencies over the years, can only boast of obsolete arms as well as unserviceable security hard ware (Presentation of security chiefs to Nigeria's senate, 2018). For example, operatives of these security agencies frequently suffer serious casualties from drug merchants and from the landmines laid for them by the terrorists because of lack of the required state of the art explosive detection equipment. It is for the same reason that these terrorists have succeeded in many of their suicide bombing operations.

Similar reasons were also adduced by them for the continuous successful illicit monetary trafficking through and from Nigerian airports and land borders. The reason they presented for this is that the law enforcement agencies responsible for interdiction in these posts, lack the required state of the art narcotics surveillance and detection equipment as well as other supporting logistics such as Special Purpose Vehicles and drug screening equipment. The Nigerian National Drug Control Master plan (2015), though acknowledged that, the NDLEA has been doing a lot in Nigeria's anti-money laundering programme especially in the area of monetary interdictions, stated that the agency is hampered by several factors which includes the following; namely: Logistics constraints such as lack of operational vehicles, surveillance equipment and suitable armaments, as well as insufficient intelligence sourcing and application capacity and unavailability of needed intelligence data base.

Another related finding is that Nigerian security agencies are evidently stressed out with relatively insufficient and poor-quality equipment for the prosecution of their security mandates. The data in this case as extracted from Global Firepower Ranking Report (2018), indicated that Nigeria's human and logistic capacity especially of the military for this purpose are relatively insufficient. This document listed the following as what Nigeria could boast of in terms of equipment by its military. These include the following; namely: 181,000 military personnel, 124 aircraft including nine fighter aircraft, 21 attack aircraft, 52 transport aircraft, 47 trainer aircraft, 42 helicopters and 11 attack helicopter, 148 Armoured tanks, 1420 attack vehicles, 25 self-propellant artillery and 30 rocket projectors as well as 75 naval assets including four naval frigates and 93 patrol crafts. Respondents E1 – E13 submitted that ordinarily, these resources appear substantial but relative to the serious security challenges presently confronting Nigeria, that these are insufficient especially when compared with such countries with similar or same terrorism threat level.

4.4.3 (a) Budgetary Supports and Accountability Standard

The main reasons attributed to the insufficient logistic supports to Nigeria's security agencies are poor budgetary and accountability standards. The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2017) in this case, an unimpressive support level to the country's counter narcotics agency (NDLEA) especially in the area of funding by the Government of Nigeria (GON). It noted that the budgetary allocation to the NDLEA declined from approximately $46.6 million in 2015 to 25.6 million dollars in 2016 with only 41.764 dollars earmarked for training. The above respondents were also not impressed with the level of resources support for the country's anti-drug crusade.

The US International Narcotics Control Strategy (2019) reported that the annual operating budget of the NDLEA as at 2017 was about $25.5million out of which salaries for the 5,100 employees of the service gulped $24,000,000 with only a balance of $1,450,000 annually as operational expenses. This means that each of the agency's 42 command formations received $2,800 monthly. This poor budgetary allocation to the agency has seriously been diminishing its counter-narcotics efforts especially in 2018, when it was reported that none of these commands received any funds for operations. This situation according to the

report prompted operatives of the agency into soliciting and receiving bribes to make up for their poor wages and operational expenses.

Respondents E1 – E13 and E14 – E19in this study specifically listed the following constraints in this case; namely: budgetary constraints including meagre budgetary allocations, poor budgetary prioritisation due to lack of proper knowledge of the agency's security challenges and inefficient threat analysis, model pecuniary considerations on the part of those preparing the budget, budgetary misappropriations, outright embezzlements, etc.

They also reported that in spite of the claim of huge budgetary allocations to the country's security agencies, the issue of funding has been recurring and accounts for the inability of these agencies to effectively carry out their responsibilities especially in their anti-drug and counter terrorism mandates. They therefore expressed surprise that in spite of the budgetary allocations to the country's security sector, that it still operates below expectation. However, in order to improve on the budgetary allocation to its security sector, Nigerian government allocated more money to the sector. In spite of this, the sector still performs poorly. NBS, (2017) indicated that Nigeria's Federal Government allocated N4.62 trillion Naira (then about $15.1 billion) to the country's security sector within a period of five years. However, proper accountability and transparency of this funding remains opaque.

On this note, Respondents E1, E8, E18, E20, E27, E28, E33, E39, E60also took a swipe at the country's Office of the National Security Adviser and the Ministry of Defence which are expected to provide guidance to the country's security agencies on the practice of accountability, but have rather been turned into bad examples. These Offices have over the years, refused to disclose their security spending thus making the country's security sector susceptible to corruption. The country's legislators contribute to the problem because of being fond of coercing these agencies to submit budget proposals for contracts that will benefit them rather than for more critical operational needs.

Furthermore, the Nigerian government recently made towards funding counter terrorism was a request to the country's senate for approval to spend $2 billion to prosecute the war. Since then, much more money has been spent particularly since 2015 which enabled the Air-force to acquire fighter planes. The Army also got logistics and trained many soldiers as well as technical assistance procured to enhance the capacity of the Military. All these were estimated at $10 billion. Nigeria also had to support its neighbours financially for the equipment of their military to ensure effective collaboration against the menace of terrorism. This assistance was instigated by the realization that it was difficult to defeat the group alone because of its base on the fringes of Nigeria's borders with Cameroun, Chad and Niger where they retreated to, any time they were put under pressure. Nigeria therefore, had to initiate a joint military arrangement with these countries not only to jointly confront Boko Haram, but to police their various borders.

In spite of the above budgetary supports, there have been reported cases of the misappropriation and stealing of monies meant for this purpose and is symptomatic of the country's corruption status which inevitably stalls the security sector. Example of such misappropriation is the case of Nigeria's former head of state accused of embezzling over $1.1 billion under the guise of multiple security votes. Another example was that of the country's former National Security Adviser who also misappropriated over $2. billion budgeted for the capacity enhancement of security institutions engaged in counter-terrorism operations.

4.4.3 (b) Intelligence Management Capacity

The submission of respondents E3, E4, E5, E6, E8 and E9 averred the need for proficient intelligence support for the containment of terrorism in Nigeria. They observed that the trends of terrorism is ever becoming complex with the introduction of new strategies, expanding inter-connectivity of terrorist groups which are also exploring new frontiers and alliances including multiple sources of illicit supports as well as improvements in their assault strategies.

The intelligence mechanisms of most of the security agencies in Nigeria were also evaluated as distorted by security specialists and the country's international collaborators. Respondents E1, E8, E9, E14, E16, E20, E33, E45, E46, E60 corroborated this position and submitted the following reasons as responsible; namely: sabotage and conspiracy of their operatives who are easily compromised as well as poor intelligence sourcing strategy. Thus, the practice of using informants to procure information on the activities of drug traffickers and terrorists in Nigeria remained a regular feature in the intelligence acquisition strategy of these security agencies without exploring other modern options to counter the double standard characteristic of these informants.

These respondents further reported that these agencies usually fail to apply the required standard for this purpose because sometimes, their operatives connive with potential informants some of whom are their relations. They do this to extort money in the disguise that the money will be used for information sourcing on planned terrorist operations. Even in cases where potentially fruitful information are secured, they end up being misused due to either the same sabotage or lack of required dexterity to process the information into actionable intelligence. Worse still, some of the informants recruited by these security agencies works for criminal organizations and are used by them for disinformation purposes. Some of them that are not engaged by these criminal organizations sell out due to ethnic and filial reasons such that these security institutions continue to be trapped in their mischievous and vicious intelligence cycle.

In view of the above revelation, it is highly suspicious that most successful onslaughts by organized gangs against the country's anti-drug operatives and the ambush and killing of security operatives by drug traffickers and terrorists operating in the country could have been due to poor informants' recruitment strategy. This situation has been noted to be further fuelled by insider conspiracies by operatives of Nigeria's security institutions. (This view was earlier highlighted by Nigeria's President in 2014). Following

the consequence of the lapse in intelligence sourcing, is the wrongful application of these intelligence. The above respondents also ascribed poor operational planning and execution of counter terrorism operations to lack of systematic and painstaking threat analysis and inappropriate deployment of human and material resources.

4.4.3 (c) Quality of Human Resources Support

On human resources and professional responsibility standards, analysis of relevant documentary and interview sources showed that this is not encouraging. One of the vital security institutions involved in terrorism intervention in Nigeria is the Nigerian Police whose capacity and level of performance have implication for the country's security sector. The World Security Index Report (2019) ranked the Nigerian Police as the worst in the world in terms of its capacity to deal with issues of internal security in Nigeria. It noted that in Nigeria, that there were only two hundred and nineteen (219) Police personnel for every 100,000 persons in the country. This situation was explicit in the presentation of Respondents E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E7, E8, E9, E18, E20, E24, E25, E26, E27, E33, E39, E42, E60 which they noted as very worrisome and is further complicated by the improper deployment of the same insufficient workforce. Apart from the insufficiency of these resources, the limited ones are not properly maximized to achieve results.

Thus, instances abound when these security agencies have most of their operatives embarking on odd and less important assignments. This includes providing special security to wealthy persons who pay for these services and for the family members of their bosses rather than being used for more expedient operations that will help mitigate the threats of these crimes. They gave example with the observed priority in the deployment of security operatives to provide security to government officials and other wealthy citizens. Nigeria's Police Service Commission Statement (2018) in the same vein revealed that one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) policemen at the time were performing guard duties for privileged individuals in the country. This document took exception to this development and wondered why this number of policemen was used for such assignments rather than for guarding schools in North East Nigeria where the Boko-Haram sect has been abducting many innocent students.

These respondents frowned at the above situation because according to them, the Nigerian police is deficient in terms of its human resources capacity. According to top bosses including two retired and serving ones who are part of the respondents, the ratio of security personnel relative to the civilian population in Nigeria is far below the recommended standard by the United Nations which ranked Nigeria 152 out of the 190 countries so measured. Related to the foregoing is the welfare provision to the personnel of these agencies which is very vital for the maximisation of their productivity. In spite of these, they are not well catered for. Such welfare provisions that can help in this case include improved salaries and emoluments, insurance provisions, housing facilities, leave and vacation entitlements, etc. The poor provisions of these facilities are also linked to insufficient budgetary allocations, mismanagement of these

allocations and misplacement of welfare priorities. More worrisome is the trend of delay in the payment of salaries of these personnel in spite of the sensitivity and associated risks of their security assignments.

The ethical standard including the quality of integrity and professional responsibility of the security personnel of these agencies is also very important. However, these agencies seem to lack this requirement and are enmeshed in cases of alleged bribery and corruption involving extortion of money from drug and terrorist culprits to help them avoid being prosecuted and at times, aiding their escape from prison custody. In addition to the above, operatives of Nigeria's counter – narcotics agency were involved in wide range infractions including pilfering of seized drugs, receiving of bribes from drug barons and couriers, misuse and unaccounted loss of equipment donated by the agency's international collaborators. Others included inter-agency friction, loss of case files, low morale among operatives due to poor conditions of service and an increasing number of assassinations of operatives by drug merchants (Obot 2004 p.3). The submissions of respondents E1, E8, E14, E20, E56, E59 and E60 supported the above presentations.

The report of Nigeria's Presidential Committee on the Reformation of the NDLEA (2007) corroborated the above revelations. The goriest examples in this case includes series of allegations of insider conspiracies against drug law enforcement officers who shield drug couriers to circumvent the required screening at the country's major gateways and tampering with drug exhibits which they sell to the drug traffickers they had earlier established relationships with. Counter-terrorism operatives have also been accused of complicity ranging from revelations of operational plans to terrorists before their operations are undertaken, divulging of sensitive intelligence to aid the terrorists in their assaults, selling of arms and ammunition to them, aiding the escape of arrested terrorists, etc. (Nigerian Army Report, 2014 p.1).

The several reported cases of corruption and ethical misconduct on the part of counter terrorism operatives are sundry. While not rationalizing the corrupt activities of these operatives, the blame can be based on the institutional decay in these agencies including poor welfare standard provisions, lack of a sustainable integrity development programme, ineffective deterrence standard and the interference of political office holders in the affairs of these agencies including undeserved protections for erring and unproductive operatives.

Respondents E1, E7, E8, E14, E27, E33, E39, E45, E46, and E60 drew attention to certain practices that tend to undermine the human resources administration of the various security agencies in-charge of terrorism control in the country. These include the tendency of successive leaderships in the country to be influenced by pecuniary and nepotic considerations in their management of security institutions also constitutes serious human resources challenge to these agencies. Examples include the various appointments made by the present Nigerian leadership into security institutions in the country. Another instance is the case of lopsided leadership composition of the various law enforcement and security agencies in the country especially their administrative/command and control composition. It is estimated that more than 80% of

these leadership compositions are from the Northern part of the country. Also, out of the ten heads of the country's anti-drug agency since inception in 1990, eight had come from the Northern part of the country. Such inequitable compositions cannot be totally ruled out as the reason for the observed levity on the part of these security institutions to comprehensively confront the country's security threats. The ethnic affinity of traffickers and terrorists with the heads and senior field commanders of these security institutions is also adduced as a reason.

Apart from these appointments being politicized and not based on merit and professionalism, those appointed seem to be more committed to the fulfilment of political mandates and the satisfaction of selfish desires of their benefactors rather than for patriotic and national interest. For this reason, they slack in their commitment towards curtailing the country's security challenges. Also, because most of Nigeria's presidents have been more of serving and retired military personnel, they tended to appoint their military colleagues and cronies to key security positions in the country. To this extent, these institutions continued to be infused with military regimentation and consequently made it difficult for them to embrace the required civilized professional standards in line with the expectation of contemporary security sector governance imperatives.

The process of recruitment into these security agencies is another example. The subsisting recruitment standard of these agencies appear unimpressive in spite of the expectation from them to constantly recruit the best hands to be able to effectively counter security threats in the country. The two main areas mentioned as having adverse consequences on the recruitment standard of these agencies are: (a) The use of recruitment for political patronage and favours and (b) inappropriate application of quota system policy. In the case of the former, rather than rely on a proficient talent acquisition strategy to search for and recruit the best hands into these law enforcement and security agencies, they use same to satisfy selfish desires and for political patronage. This is because the leadership of these agencies either reach out to, or are coerced by influential politicians and top government functionaries to recruit their relations and benefactors without being subjected to the required standard screening process. There have also been instances of blackmail against the leadership of these agencies by legislators and high-ranking officials in the executive arm with threats of unreasonable sanctions to ensure that their nominees were recruited.

The case of inappropriate application of quota system policy by these agencies is another inequitable policy. In the bid to ensure equitable representation of all the various states in Nigeria in the workforce of these agencies, the quality standard requirement for recruitment is sometimes differed or waived for some states categorized as disadvantaged. Much as this policy may be advantageous in some instances, it has the potential to obviate the required professional standard in the country's security agencies especially for highly technical positions. Worse still, the leadership of these agencies allegedly apply this policy when it suits their purpose and also regularly breach it to ensure the recruitment of their relations, friends and

people from the same ethnic extraction in contravention of the standard recruitment and promotion requirement of these agencies.

The posting of operatives for crucial assignments has also been politicized such that the loyal ones and those related to the bosses are deployed to less risky or supposedly for lucrative assignments, while those not in the good books of the bosses are deployed to risky operational domains. All these, diminish the required morale of the operatives with negative implication on their commitment and above all, their patriotic zeal to undertake complex responsibilities. Recently, some military personnel engaged in counter terrorism operations in Northern part of Nigeria were accused of lack of commitment (Buratai 2019). However, security commentators in the country adduced such dereliction to the above selective practice which inevitably over stretched these security institutions without any immediate respite. Another vital concern that could have helped the situation is conscious capacity development programme which unfortunately is neither professionally nor adequately practised.

Therefore, for these security institutions to achieve meaningful results, their operatives need to also constantly receive training on every possible innovation adopted or to be adopted by these criminal groups. Such training programmes are to be sponsored locally and can be supported by international collaborators. It is however regrettable that the training needs for these agencies and their operatives are not being realized for several reasons: (a) Insufficient budgetary allocation, (b) misappropriation of the meagre funding for training, (c) inability of the leadership to identify and implement realistic training needs because of limited knowledge and capacity of the leadership of these agencies having passed through the same system that did not afford them the required training, (d) inability to gauge and analyse current terrorism challenges which are different from the ones known by these leaders which lead to the drawing up of unrealistic training programmes, (e) politicisation and preferential treatment in the nomination for training programmes in which case, the wrong operatives are nominated for such training that are not related to their functional and operational schedule because of the relationship of the nominees with those in charge of the nomination. Such unqualified nominees at times, are not able to comprehend the training only to return without adding any value to their institutions. The unrealistic and disappointing performance of these nominees has often drawn the ire of the country's collaborators especially international partners who for this reason withdrew training assistance to the concerned security agencies.

4.4.3 (d) Legal and Judicial Supports

The data utilised for the explanation of this subject matter were derived from relevant national and international strategic documents as well as interviewees including lawyers, judicial officers, senators, members of the House of Representatives as well as senior law lecturers. Another capacity requirement of Nigeria's Security Sector that is relevant for its terrorism obligation is the quality of policy and judicial supports to the sector. The trends of terrorism are ever changing with attendant complexities requiring enabling and dynamic legislations that are based on sincere political will and proactive disposition on the

part of the legislature which should constantly review the laws to spur improved performance of concerned law enforcement and security agencies. The country's legislature has not been living up to this expectation. Worse still, Nigeria has not ratified many relevant international conventions nor varied same to suit its unique security challenges. This situation is also not helped by the country's notoriety in breaching the rule of law which is a vital area that needs to be redressed prerequisite for the improvement in the country's security sector governance.

Nigeria was recently ranked 97 out of 113 countries in its 2017/2018 assessment of the level of adherence by countries to Rule of Law (Rule of Law Report 2018). The report stated that Nigeria's score in this case is unimpressive because of the country's abysmal performance on vital security indicators. It observed that the reason for this situation is attributable to the increase in the terrorist and insurgent activities by Boko-Haram as well as the massacres that are masterminded by herdsmen and the extrajudicial killings and detention without trial by the country's security agencies. The document also took serious exception to the government's indifference or at best, very minimal response to these incidents and for failing to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators. Several cases of disobedience of court orders by the Nigerian government were also cited. All these in addition to the need to resolve the contending issues in Nigeria's security administration as earlier discussed should be taken serious by the country.

Also, the laws that established the various security and law enforcement and security institutions in-charge of terrorism hardly incorporated the country's current security realities. For example, the operative laws of the country's Military and Police are products of its country's past security circumstances. The situation is made worse because most of the subsisting laws and policies for the management of these agencies are obsolete and hardly updated yet the executive branch of government insists that these agencies operate within the ambit of these policies. Most of these policies were developed without proper forecast of the present drugs and terrorism challenges to the country. They were formulated when there were few security and law enforcement agencies charged with the control of these crimes. During this period, only the Nigerian Police was with internal security in the country.

These orientations were carried over even after the enactment of the law which established the NDLEA as arrow head of Nigeria's integrated drug control programme without any sustained policy to deal with the accruing transition challenges of the new agency. Thus, the required orientation to the operatives who are expected to utilize previous lessons and improve on same relative to the country's subsisting drug challenges was not provided. Worse still, the military government which established the agency transfused an anti-civil but regimented orientation into the agency and its operatives and this has subsisted till date without any conscious reorientation programme by the executive to redress the situation.

Also, the country's counter-terrorism programmes are faced with discrepant executive policies. This includes lack of clear criteria on the mandate of the Police regarding terrorism interventions coupled with

the deployment of the military for minor terrorism threats that should ordinarily involve Police action and the deployment of the Police for serious insurgencies that should require military solution. At times, these two institutions are deployed for less serious threats while the serious ones are either ignored sometimes, or treated with levity.

The alarming security threats posed by terrorism in Nigeria attained a turning point in 2009 and have been spreading rapidly. This perhaps informed the need for the country to formulate a National Security Strategy in 2014 to counter its threats. This strategy was well intended but sparsely considered the role of the judiciary and prosecution in this effort in spite of its critical role of prosecution in terrorism interventions. This obvious gap in this strategy accounted for the country's poor prosecution of terrorist offenders and perhaps, instigated the consideration of this need in the 2016 version of the strategy.

This strategy appeared like an improvement on the 2014 version relative to the prosecution of terrorists and strongly gave impetus for prosecution to be appropriately considered in the strategic process in the country's counter terrorism efforts. This includes the involvement of the Federal Ministry Justice in terrorism matters. The Ministry is expected to provide leadership in the smooth and proper coordinated approach in criminal investigations and prosecutions involving all the country's law enforcement agencies. Ensuring the speedy trial of terrorist suspects in accordance with the rule of law and complemented with an integrated criminal data base that will be utilized for the prosecution of drug trafficking and terrorism crimes is vital in this case.

However, the strategy did not properly articulate the three critical prerequisites for successful criminal prosecutions which complement each other. Successful prosecution involves proper investigation to derive the relevant evidence and requires that the prosecutor is diligent and knowledgeable in law. This is very necessary but is not in isolation of the courts which constitutes the third segment in the cycle. Thus, the speedy prosecution and fairness in criminal cases depends on the courts which is the final and perhaps, the most vital in the prosecution chain but is also unfortunately not considered in the strategy. It was consequent upon the foregoing that Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Justice set up a National prosecution Committee aimed at ensuring swift prosecution of criminal cases. Accordingly, this committee was charged with the responsibility of effective coordination of investigations and prosecution of high-profile cases, ensuring prompt contacts and synergy between investigators and prosecutors and the management of required information as well as ensuring strict compliance with the extant requirements of the country's Administration of Criminal Justice Act (2015).

It is also notable that the country's prosecutorial efforts against terrorism have been championed more by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Thus, the UNODC through its Terrorism Prevention Branch has organised a number of capacity building programmes involving prosecutors in the Federal Ministry of Justice. Through these programmes, a number of vital guiding principles have been formulated

for effective counter terrorism campaign including appreciation of the Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counter terrorism Practice in Criminal Justice Sector known as good practice 6 of the (GCTF). This memorandum encourages states to enact appropriate rule of law procedures aimed at protecting the sources and collection methods of information in terrorism cases and resolve procedural challenges in prosecuting terrorism matters. Though these are noble initiatives, the maximization of their benefits cannot be guaranteed because the Nigerian content in all these is diffused.

In spite of this capacity development programme, the trained prosecutors drawn from Federal Ministry of Justice are not adequately involved in the prosecution of terrorists in the country. It is also unfortunate that Nigeria is yet to put in place such rule of law measures and legal safeguards that will allow investigators and prosecutors to use intelligence and sensitive law enforcement information as evidence while also protecting the sources and collection methods as well as respect for the accused person's right to fair trial as recognized under national and international laws.

Further to the above, Respondent E1, E2, E3, E7, E8, E14, E18, E20, E27, E33, E36, E56, E59 and E60 took a swipe at the country's judiciary. Cases cited in this case, include the overly long process and delay in the prosecution of terrorism and money launderers offenders leading to the congestion of prisons with awaiting-trial drug and terrorism inmates. This according to them, accounts for the recurring jail breaks; sentencing disparity for same drug and terrorism offences due to wrong exercise of discretionary powers by judges which most times, dilute the required deference standard. They noted that this situation often caused misunderstanding between the arresting security agencies for these crimes and the judiciary. Another point which they raised is the ridiculously low sentences pronounced by the courts for drug and terrorism offences which should normally be higher as prescribed in the country's criminal law (NDLEA Report 1998; 2004; 2014).

Several allegations of improprieties have also been levelled against judges and judicial support officials on this note. A very important point which was used to highlight the questionable integrity of the country's judiciary and with adverse consequence on the country's counter-terrorism efforts, are instances of connivance of prison officials with convicted offenders to assist them to evade serving their jail terms. The country's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency cried foul on how over sixty convicts were once let off the hook with the collusion of Prison Officials half way to the prison house from the court where they were sentenced. (NDLEA Report 2014 – 2015, Nigeria' Presidential Report on the Reformation of the NDLEA, 2007). All the foregoing events have the potential to depreciate the prosecutorial capacity of Nigeria's security sector and could be due to the following reasons:

(a) lack of sufficient training for the judges which would have enabled them to properly appreciate the provisions of the country's extant laws relating to the administration of justice and the prescription of the standard sanctions for these crimes;

(b) Questionable integrity of some judges which is compounded by the laxity of the country's National Judicial Council to effectively enforce the required discipline and professional responsibility standard for judicial officers. This situation has trickled down to the support personnel in the judiciary including court clerks, secretarial staff, supporting security personnel, etc. These staff have consequently become so compromised that they give preference to the facilitation of the adjudication of cases that they would have possibly been settled for (UNDCP Report, 2004; UNODC Report, 2018).

Consequent upon the above presentations, the following revelations are obvious; namely:

- That Terrorism is a special crime that sometimes traverses several countries and requires a good understanding of its nature not just by the prosecuting counsel but by the judge. This therefore requires the government to regularly engage Judges in such educative programmes on terrorism given its complex nature. UNODC should be encouraged to involve Judges in their programmes on terrorism to help them understand the complex issues involved therein and to also take cognizance and cross-fertilize ideas on Nigeria's unique peculiarities in this case.

- That the complexity of the manifestation of terrorism requires an adaptation of the laws (procedurally) to rule of law-based standard that will protect the sources and collection methods of evidence and information in terrorism cases. For a chief Judge to invoke those procedural rules, he or she must first comprehend the object of the rules before subscribing to its enactment. The trial of terrorism cases based on Nigeria's rules may be the reason why prosecution of terrorism cases have not been succeeding and should therefore be reviewed and standardised to conform to contemporary requirements.

- That the Nigerian Judiciary is ill equipped to handle the myriad of terrorism cases leading to delay in trial of some criminal cases lasting sometimes more than ten years. This situation was recently reiterated by Nigeria's Chief Judge during the induction of new Senior Advocates in Nigeria's Bar (Mohammed, 2019).

The latest onslaught on the Nigerian judiciary by Nigeria's Department of State Security Services (DSS) further exposed the disjuncture in the country's judiciary and by extension its security sector governance. Though this operation led to the arrest of many senior judges and the recovery of huge sums of money, it was conducted in a draconian manner (SERAP 2016) and also exposed a mixed grill of corruption and lack of transparency in the country's judiciary (Sagay 2016); poor intelligence application, abuse of human rights and judicial process as well as functional usurpation and lack of interagency cooperation, (NBA 2016).

Essentially these limitations inevitably affect the performance of Nigeria's security sector and underscore the need for redress especially in the resourcing of these security institutions. In the case of inadequate resources including insufficient intelligence and operational resources as well as inadequate human

resources requirements, the consensus of Respondents E1 - E10 is that not one of these agencies is sufficiently resourced and therefore underscores the need for their cooperation. Therefore, the need to evaluate the interagency cooperation as a critical component of Nigeria's security sector becomes necessary.

In line with the foregoing, the verdict of the US State Department Country Report (2017) appears very instructive in this case. This report took serious exception to the capacity, professionalism and ethical standards of the Nigeria's security agencies involved in counter terrorism. It raised concerns about the ineffective civil control over these agencies, including the Nigerian Police Force, the Department of State Security and the military. These agencies expectedly report to civilian authorities but periodically act outside of civilian control. The report also noted that the government lacked effective mechanisms to investigate corruption cases and mete out necessary punishment. The Nigerian Police, the report noted, remain susceptible to corruption, perpetrate human rights abuses and generally operate with impunity in the apprehension, illegal detention and sometimes execution of criminal suspects. The report equally indicted Nigeria's State Security Service for human rights abuses, particularly in restricting freedom of speech and press. In most cases, private citizens brought charges against perpetrators of human rights abuses in these units, but these cases lingered in court and remained unresolved.

At this juncture, it would have become clear that the institutional capacity of Nigeria's security institutions is relatively below the standard required to effectively control the menace of terrorism in the country. Several reasons were offered as responsible for this assessment. These are poor budgetary and logistic supports, poor intelligence management especially in its acquisition and application, unimpressive human resources capacity and a relative absence of professional responsibility etiquette amongst the security operatives as well as inappropriate and insufficient legal supports. This therefore prompts the need for the relevant institutions and stakeholders involved in this task to explore and undertake cooperation initiatives to complement this.

4.4.4 Interagency Collaboration among Nigeria's Security Institutions

Interagency cooperation among security agencies provides a complementary advantage because it affords the participating agencies the opportunity to reinforce each other's capacity. Though this advantage is worthwhile, it has not been maximized in Nigeria because of lack of a unified legal backing in the country's laws which cannot be sufficiently addressed only by joint agreements by collaborating agencies.

The US Bureau of Counter Terrorism Country Report (2013) concluded that the level of inter-agency cooperation and information sharing amongst Nigeria's security agencies is limited. The various security agencies in Nigeria do not, at their respective levels, possess the wide-ranging resources required to effectively undertake their crime control mandates. As such, the need for interagency collaboration is paramount. This covers a proper exploration of the subsisting status of this collaboration upon which the

requisite insights for possible improvement measures are articulated. This research therefore relied on appropriate documentary sources and interview of experts to achieve this objective.

Nigeria's Security Summit Report (2014) stressed the need for cooperation among Nigeria's security agencies as a means of curbing security challenges in the country including the threats of terrorism. It contended that it will amount to a useless venture if security agencies pursue their security programmes independently and that they should establish meeting points upon which to leverage on each other's resources and operate on clear cut jurisdictions but with shared responsibilities. This is given due consideration in the composition of the country's National Security Council as provided for in the third schedule, section 25 a-i of Nigeria's 1999 constitution.

In spite of the foregoing, quality of cooperation among Nigeria's security agencies has not been impressive. Nigeria's Department of State Security Report (2015) traced this situation to the repositioning of security agencies to meet desired national security objectives. This, according to this Report, predates the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates to form Nigeria in 1914. Such reform efforts led to the creation of security outfits from existing ones or the formation of entirely new agencies with statutory responsibilities. The report further stated that over time, some of the country's security agencies started feeling that those excised from them must remain subservient consequent upon which the required synergy to attain collective national security goals started to wane.

This situation according to respondents E1, E7, E8, E10, E11, E12 and E13 observed that the above development was further complicated by the difference in the scope and content of operations of the different security institutions especially between the military and law enforcement institutions. Thus, while the military is charged with fighting an enemy based on general war principles and laws on which its Rules of Engagement are derived, law enforcement agencies are obligated to maintain law and order in the society where the citizens enjoy constitutional rights and liberties. These law enforcement agencies are guided by extant legal provisions that must be in consonance with contemporary security sector reform objectives including good governance, civil oversight and the rule of law as well as such human security requirements that can boost democratic governance including accountability and transparency.

Combating money laundering and terrorism financing include Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), the Central Bank of Nigeria, the National Drug Enforcement Agency, (NDLEA) the Nigerian Police, the National Intelligence Agency and the Nigerian Customs. Also, the Security institutions charged with counter terrorism obligation in the country include the Nigerian military, Department of State Security Services, the Nigerian Police, etc.

According to Respondents E1to E13 and E16, E17, E18, these agencies are expected to be mutually involved in checking these crimes and should be partners in progress and assist in watching each other's back and helping to close their tracks. They also need to take advantage of the opportunities that are abound for

better result-oriented counter measures on such mutual areas as exchange of intelligence, joint monitoring/screening and operations; joint training, exchange of expertise and mutual Human Resource and logistic supports. They noted that these are worthwhile measures but it appears that they are yet to be realisable in the country because of several recorded frictions among these agencies. The above respondents decried situations whereby these same institutions are desirous of carrying out and creating enclosures in their operational jurisdictions and pointed out that this is the major challenge of effective interagency cooperation in the country.

4.4.4 (a) Instances of Interagency Conflicts

There have been several cases of interagency frictions among Nigeria's security agencies because their operatives hardly see their colleagues from other sister agencies as partners in progress but as contestants to their statutory authority. This is worsened by the absence of patriotic zeal in these operatives whose interest is dictated more by pecuniary motivation including bribes that they get from criminal culprits. For this reason, the interdiction of criminals and their resources are influenced more by selfish gains and hardly by any professional responsibility obligation. All these inevitably truncate the achievement of any meaningful success in aggressively pursuing their assignments.

In the case of drug control, Nigeria's Presidential Committee Report on drug control (2019) observed that though Nigeria has a brilliant drug control policy, (the NDCMP), that it lacks the required coordinated response because of absence of cooperation among the stake holders charged with the implementation of this policy and even worse, that none of them could be held accountable for the country's lack of required implementation of the country's drug control programme

The above observation is evident in the reported cases of interagency frictions derived from the presentation of respondents E1 toE7, E13, E14, E16, E17, E18, E33, E36, E45 and E46. These include when the Nigerian Customs prevented operatives of the NDLEA from screening cargoes and luggage on the excuse that such cargoes had been Customs-certified. These frictions are also prevalent in Nigeria's land borders and constitutes serious impediment against successful counter terrorism operations in these borders. Such disagreements had led to the gaining of grounds by terrorists possibly because of lack of harmonization of the operational and professional expertise of the respective agencies responsible for terrorism control in the country. Further to the above, the country recently witnessed an unprecedented conflict between the Nigerian military and the police operatives. The former was alleged to have been bribed by a notorious terrorist not only rescued him from the police intelligence team that arrested him, but also killed the police operatives and granted the criminal the opportunity to escape (Presidential Committee Report on the Assassination of Police Intelligence Operatives and rescue of a Kidnap Kingpin by Nigerian Soldiers, 2019).

Government institutions in Nigeria also have their share of conflicts. A striking example is the recurring frictions among the various arms of government made worse by their respective hard-line stance. This situation has characterized the country's criminal justice administration since its return to democratic government in 1999. The associated frictions have been more, between the executive arm of government and the legislature as well as the executive and the judiciary. It took a new twist at the beginning of 2016 when the country's law enforcement agencies especially the Department of State Security Service was used by the executive to unleash a reign of terror against the judiciary through the raid of the houses of several high-ranking judges and arresting them on trumped up allegations of corruption. This was notwithstanding the fact that the judiciary as an independent arm of government in Nigeria has its exclusive disciplinary system to deal with any of its erring official as clearly stipulated in the country's National Judicial Council Provisions; (1999).

This action provoked serious conflict between these two arms of government and sowed such seed of discord which till date, has been affecting the smooth prosecution of drug and terrorism offenders in the country. The above respondents left the impression that the executive's anti-corruption campaign is used as a tool for the settlement of political scores and has given the country's security institutions the impetus to act beyond their mandate rather than concentrating on the core security challenges facing the country.

Instances of conflicts between government departments and the specialized agencies responsible for the country's anti-corruption mandate were also reported. These include: the Office of the Attorney General of Nigeria and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Department of State Security Service and the Police. Such conflicts were consequent upon the limits of the powers of these agencies as well as on their investigative and prosecutorial procedures in the handling of such serious crimes confronting the country. These conflicts often resulted in the withdrawal of cases by the Office of the Attorney General from these agencies. An example was when the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation stopped the prosecution of a onetime Federal Minister by the ICPC and which eventually cost the job of the Head of this agency.

The consistent misunderstanding between the executive and the legislature is also another sore point in the quality of interagency cooperation in Nigeria. This situation remains a recurring decimal with adverse consequence on the country's security sector governance. The same respondents frowned at this situation and cited as an example, the legislature's refusal to confirm the boss of one of the country's law enforcement agencies based on negative security report on him. The executive refused to comply with the recommendations of the legislature on this and retained the affected officer in spite of the statutory provision that appointment to the affected office requires legislative endorsement. The executive remained adamant in this case and put to question the country's sincerity in its anti-corruption crusade. This situation made the legislature to defer all legislative endorsements for subsequent executive appointees including those that are very crucial for the country's anti-narcotic and counter terrorism

programme; (Nigerian Senate Resolutions, 2017). This executive/legislative and executive/judicial face offs have also grossly limited the necessary legislative and judicial supports to the security institutions that require such supports for success in their terrorism intervention roles.

4.4.4 (b) Factors responsible for the present status of interagency cooperation in Nigeria

The main research finding in this case is that interagency cooperation is a vital requirement for the effectiveness of Nigeria's security sector governance especially in its capacity to control the threats of terrorism. In spite of this necessity, the quality of cooperation among Nigeria's security agencies is assessed based on the same presentations as unsatisfactory. Several reasons for this situation are classifiable under four thematic categories; namely: Jurisdictional challenges and manifestation of power consciousness; poor ethical standard including corrupt tendencies by security operatives; poor Human Resources provisions including poor welfare programmes for the operatives of these agencies and poor communication and information exchange among them.

Ukpoghome and Nwano (2017) noted that these are congruent on namely: (a) multifaceted nature of the crimes prevalent in the country with political, cultural and socio-economic ramifications which cannot be effectively handled by any one security agency without the cooperation of the others and (b) challenges of jurisdiction due to the fact that the enabling laws of these agencies duplicated their functions without clear cut guides to avoid infringing on the functions of the agencies that hitherto performed these functions before the subsequent agencies were created.

4.4.2 (c) Jurisdictional challenges and power consciousness

These challenges do not only induce but orchestrates the persistent lack of cooperation between and among Nigeria's security institutions responsible for drug trafficking and terrorism intervention. The consciousness amongst these agencies regarding the powers and authority bestowed on them arising from their statutory responsibilities, appear to be the main reason for the rampant conflicts amongst them. This trend is further made more complex due to the consequential panic instilled in the citizenry any time these conflicts manifest into clashes which often lead the government to institute investigative panels on which to base required interventions.

Odoma (2014) corroborated the above position based on the point that the incompatibility of the goals and aspirations of different groups or persons as well as divergent interests can precipitate conflicts. The theoretical postulation of Metcalf and Metcalf (1993) is relevant in this case. According to them, individuals and groups will be more predisposed to cooperate to achieve peace if the stake is mutually beneficial but if otherwise, can instigate conflict among them. They also observed that group conflict can be consequent upon the way in which one group perceives the other and that the way a group understands social life could be a function of its cognitive orientation.

Thus, before the creation of Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to take charge of money laundering and related crimes, in Nigeria including drug interdiction and prevention, the Nigerian Police and the Nigerian Customs were responsible for this role. In the same manner, before the creation of the Department of State Security Services which is now heavily involved in counter insurgency operations, both the Nigerian Military and the Police were responsible for state security and counter insurgency operations. More so, before the creation of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (and recently the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit) which in collaboration with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) takes responsibility for terrorism financing control, the role was previously under the purview of the Nigerian Police and the Central Bank of Nigeria. These respondents noted that the legislation upon which the new agencies were created did not adequately extricate their functions from the older ones which hitherto performed their functions with the consequence of conflicting or overlapping of their respective functions. All these resulted in such complications that have subsisted till date in the operations of these agencies and with consequent limitation of their performance.

4.4.4 (d) Corruption and Poor Ethical Standard

The incidences of interagency rivalry have also been linked to the widespread corruption in Nigeria. This includes irresponsible and unprofessional acts especially by Police personnel who are fingered as being in the habit of extorting money from the public and arousing the jealousy of the military personnel to the extent of being tempted to assume police functions in order to also partake in this unwholesome act. The UNODC Report on corruption in Nigeria (2017) highlighted the level of professional irresponsibility of the Nigerian police with vital insights on the reasons for the motivation of its personnel to engage in unwholesome acts and deterring the required disposition for cooperation.

Envy between and among the agencies is another potential cause. This is aggravated by the availability of illegal opportunities in some of these agencies which the others do not have. For example, the functions of the Nigerian Police expose them more to the public and provide its operatives with the dubious chance to extort money from the same public unlike the military operatives who are not exposed to the same opportunities and for which reason, they envy their police counterparts and react aggressively against them especially when their parts cross.

The presentation of Respondents E1 - E13, and E56 – E60 elucidated these challenges. This includes the situation whereby instead of cooperating to deal with a challenging security threat, these agencies waste their time to insist on exercising undue operational monopoly for the control of particular crimes. At times, they restrict other concerned agencies from getting involved in operations that would have been better executed through mutual cooperation and resulting in instances where different security agencies arrest culprits for the same offence because of lack of operational harmonisation among them.

The above situation appears surprising because all the security agencies in the country have their respective enabling laws on which their operations are based. They cited the historical overlap of the functions of the Nigerian Army and the Police as a contributory factor which was conceived as a status transformation in favour of the Army due to the adventure of the Military into the political administration of the country and consequently prompted superiority squabbles between them. The following factors have also not helped matters; namely: the tendency of Nigerian security agencies to perceive each other with trepidation thereby limiting their aggregate efforts to counter the numerous security challenges facing the country; Pursuit of individual and selfish goals rather than synergising their operations in order to maximize their crime intervention efficiency (Odoma 2014).

Further to the above, poor ethical standards of these agencies and the corrupt tendencies of their operatives is also identifiable as a causal factor in the persistent lack of cooperation between and among them. This constituted one of the salient revelations in Nigeria's Army Board of Inquiry Report (2014) on the clashes between the Nigerian Army and Police Personnel. The report identified poverty and gross indiscipline as the reason the personnel of the Police and Army engaged in illegal duties and functional excesses especially in uniform which they feel, could shield them from any reprimand or sanction.

Respondents E1, E7, E8, E14, E16, E20 and E56 to E60 were in agreement that most operatives who usurp the functions of operatives of other institutions and without involving or sharing the necessary information with operatives of the institution statutorily empowered to perform such duties do so for selfish and pecuniary benefits. Their intentions of performing such functions are normally induced by the need to benefit from the culprits of these crimes and not to bring them to book. The example cited by these experts include instances when the Nigerian Customs, the Police and even the Military confiscated narcotic cargoes without handing over these cargoes and the owners to the NDLEA for the required prosecution or in some cases handing over the cargoes without the owners. An example in this case is the incidence of tramadol seizures in one of Nigeria's seaports by the Nigerian customs that were not handed over to the NDLEA the statutory agency empowered by law to deal with cases of illicit drugs. There have also been instances of arms seizures by other security agencies and narcotic seizures but were not completely handed over to the military and the NDLEA respectively for their necessary action; (US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2018).

Another finding has to do with insider conspiracies in security agencies charged with terrorism control. The respondents recounted that this is induced by filial and fraternal reasons or fraudulent intention to connive with culprits to get them off the hook. Examples cited by the above respondents include instances when anti-narcotic operatives were blamed for colluding with drug traffickers by aiding them to traffic narcotic substances through Nigeria's land borders and airports. Many of these operatives are sanctioned for this but yet, without any sustained monitoring on them to ensure that they do not eventually devote their special skills to support drug barons who are ever willing to entice them with huge sums of money beyond

their legitimate earnings while in active service. Similar examples regarding counter terrorism operatives were also reported. These include cases of insider conspiracies including selling of intelligence and arms to terrorists as well as engaging in dubious tactical withdrawals to give insurgents undue advantage to perpetrate their dastardly acts. Many of these security operatives have also been indicted for these criminal conspiracies while many are still undergoing disciplinary trials and many dismissed yet without any searchlight on them to ensure that they do not continue their sinister romance with terrorists.

4.4.4 (e) Poor Human Resources Provisions

It is equally important to observe that the above cases of professional irresponsibility and corrupt practices are further induced by poor human resources system including poor welfare provisions. This situation arises from inadequate funding which instigates competition among the operatives of the different agencies that may resort to pursuit of assignments for pecuniary, rather than for service purpose. The consequence of this is that the agencies that are expected to cooperate with each other will not have the required resources to sponsor their operatives for relevant training and joint sessions that will help their personnel understand and appreciate each other's relevance. The reason for the poor state of interagency cooperation between and among Nigerian security agencies is also linked to the systematic failure in their administration such as the poor conditions of service in these agencies including fraudulent recruitment processes, poor training facilities and lack of provision of essential working tools, poor welfare provisions including poor remunerations, etc. The above conditions can de-motivate security operatives which can result in the inducement of alienation among the work force if not properly managed (Odoma 2014).

In addition to the deficient human resources systems as a contributory factor to the lack of interagency cooperation among Nigeria's security agencies is the poor state of communication between and among them. This is made more complicated by the extreme confidentiality and protective culture of most government agencies especially those charged with sensitive security mandates make it very compelling for them to exercise excessive caution in the exchange of crime intelligence.

Respondents E1 – E8, E14, E18, E20, E27, E33, E39, E53 and E55 were affirmative on the above revelations as possible catalysts for misunderstanding of the operational process of each of the agencies that should be engaged in joint cooperation. They affirmed that lack of sufficient information on the activities of each of these agencies especially on their respective standards and objectives, does not help the situation. Accordingly, they averred the need for each of these agencies to understand the complementary of their roles and erase misconceptions among themselves. This according to them includes proper understanding of their respective objectives and operational mechanism to diffuse any misinformation or stereotypes that could have been held against each other. The Military, Police and Paramilitary, Public Relations; (MILPOPPROF) Report (2010) was explicit that the absence of the above condition is responsible for the

several violent exchanges between the various Nigerian security agencies, especially among the junior cadres.

So far, the prevailing status of cooperation between and among the relevant security agencies responsible for terrorism intervention in Nigeria including the factors responsible for this situation have been presented. Most striking in this case is that an improved interagency cooperation mechanism is highly critical for boosting the capacity of Nigeria's security sector governance to effectively counter the threats of terrorism. This is because no single Nigerian security agency can surmount the threat of terrorism without the helping hands of the others. This is the reason Nigeria's anti-narcotics and counter terrorism programme should properly and adequately give interagency cooperation a prime place.

In conclusion, it would have been noted that in the strategic institutional and operational standard of Nigeria's security system especially in its budgetary, logistics, intelligence acquisition and applications as well in its human resources, appear deficient. It has also been observed that this standard can be improved if all these areas are systematically complemented through healthy collaboration among the stakeholders and agencies with relevant roles in the country's security system. This study therefore identified the various case examples of notable frictions among these stakeholders and the reasons for these based on jurisdictional challenges and exhibition of power consciousness, adverse ethical and corrupt manifestations by concerned security operatives; substandard human resources provision and unsatisfactory communication standard.

However, the analysis of this critical requirement for a more improved performance of these agencies revealed that the expected cooperation to achieve this objective is not satisfactory and is evidenced with case examples of frictions. These occurred among the security agencies themselves, between government ministries and these agencies, between the executive arm of government and with the legislature and with the judiciary. Factors responsible for these frictions were also identified and include: challenges due to conflicting areas of jurisdiction among these agencies, the relevant arms of government and government departments. This was mainly attributable to the enabling laws of these bodies which were identified as lacking clear cut prescriptions on their respective areas of jurisdictions and mandates.

Also noted in this case is the manifestation of superiority complex among the concerned agencies with such delusion that tend to insulate them from the required harmony and mutual respect for each other. Other militating factors for the required collaboration include corrupt tendencies of these agencies due to indulgence and poor professional responsibility standard of their operatives. These anomalies are also discovered to be complemented with low quality human resources supports including poor welfare provisions as well as insufficient and non-standardized communication exchange among these agencies on the one hand and among their operatives on the other.

The foregoing indications show that while institutional capacity of Nigeria's security sector seem unsatisfactory that the cooperation of the respective institutions in the sector to bridge this gap is equally unimpressive and for which reasons, the need for international cooperation is explored to augment the sector's capacity.

4.4.5 Nigeria's International Cooperation Efforts

This is consequent upon the observed poor status of Nigeria's institutional and strategic capacity to contain the scourge of terrorism in the country and reliance on the need for collaboration among the constituent security agencies in the country's security sector which is also unsatisfactory. For this reason, Nigeria has been relying on international supports to complement the capacity of its security sector. There are several of such foreign supports but the most prominent have been the supports from the US Government and from the United Nations.

According to the US-Bureau of Political Affairs Report (2020) Nigeria's cooperation with the US, has spanned for more than half a century and is one of the most vital in sub-Saharan Africa in view of Nigeria being the largest economy and most populous in Africa and as a leading producer of oil in the continent. The US according to the report cooperates closely with Nigeria both at bilateral and multilateral levels through regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the Multinational Joint Task Force to counter terrorism. This involves increased cooperation in maritime and border security as well as in military professionalism, counter terrorism efforts against terrorist groups in the country and the enhancement of Nigeria's security sector governance.

In view of the foregoing, the report observed that the US has rendered several security sector assistances to Nigeria. These are; namely: provision of $7.1 million to Nigeria for international military education and training from 2016 – 2020 as well as another $1.1 million to the country from 2016 – 2017 as support for the development of appropriate training curriculum development and instructors in its military schools. More so, the report stated that Nigeria received from the US Government, a total of $1.3 million in foreign military financing to strengthen its maritime security, professionalization and counter terrorism operations. In addition, the country received as a member of the trans-Sahara counter terrorism partnership, a sum of $9.3 worth of relevant equipment and training for its terrorism fight. Others include provision of $2.14 million since 1993 in terms of conventional weapons as well as for the destruction of mines. This includes demining and explosive detection equipment and provision of training on same to the country's military.

Furthermore, as part of Nigeria's international cooperation scheme with the US, the latter agreed to sell twelve A-29 Super Tucano Aircraft worth $497 million to Nigeria for the purpose of enhancing the latter's military operations against terrorists. This also includes special training of Nigeria's military personnel and

the required military infrastructure to ensure the effectiveness of these military aircraft and consequently mitigating civilian casualty.

Nigeria's international cooperation in counter terrorism also includes the support of the United Nations through the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes. According to the UNODC Report (2020) as part of the organization's fight against terrorism, it has been providing Nigeria with capacity building supports targeted at strengthening the country's criminal justice capacity to be able to effectively investigate, prosecute and adjudicate terrorist case in accordance with rule of law. It also promotes interagency cooperation amongst the various agencies engaged in counter terrorism responsibilities; strengthening of international cooperation mechanisms and ensuring respect for human rights. All these supports according to the report are within the expectations of the required security sector reform by Nigeria and to be properly adapted to Nigeria's peculiar security needs to be able to efficiently counter terrorism.

It would have been substantially established that the incidence and consequences of terrorism have significant transnational implication and as such cannot be successfully mitigated only through domestic efforts and the need for appropriate international cooperation programme. On this note, Nigeria's National Drug Control Master Plan (2015 – 2019), averred that International Cooperation in organized crime control has become so inevitable in view of the globalisation of the drug problem and related organized crimes.

Furthermore, Nigeria's National Security Strategy (2014) accordingly stated that the country's international cooperation scheme against the threats of terrorism is anchored on the development and promotion of healthy foreign cooperation programmes with its contiguous neighbours based on respect and non-interference in the domestic affairs of cooperating countries including its neighbours. It also involves the application of the principles of reciprocity with due cognizance of the need to partner with other countries to counter such threats due to globalization. Others include contribution to international peace initiatives. It was therefore consequent upon the above guides that the country pursues military alliances and defence cooperation agreements with foreign countries. Others include expansion of the capacity of the country's embassies to be equipped to proficiently procure foreign intelligence for effective counter-terrorism operations.

A prior international initiative between Nigeria and the US that reflected the foregoing was the West African Joint Operation initiative (WAJO) project. This as a regional enforcement initiative aimed at galvanizing efforts for the decimation of notorious crime syndicates and networks within the West African sub-region and their international networks including terrorism financiers. A major facet of this regional cooperation programme is the exchange of drug intelligence among the various West African anti-crime agencies.

This initiative was taken up by Nigeria to the ECOWAS Heads of State Forum and has as one of its prime objectives, the continuous launching of joint operations by the various national anti-crime enforcement

outfits within the West African region in collaboration with the USDEA, as well as the various US Regional Security Offices in the West African sub-region. The country also embarked on several bilateral and multilateral initiatives which yielded some results including notable exchange of intelligence on illicit funding that led to many successful 'controlled delivery' operations with other countries' drug enforcement outfits such as United Kingdom Customs, USDEA, the South African Police and the German BKA and BND, etc.

Before the creation of EFCC, the country's anti-drug agency, NDLEA executed several Memoranda of Understanding with the embassies of source and notorious drug producing and transit countries like Brazil, Thailand, etc. in what is termed, the visa screening scheme. The essence of this practice is to ensure that Nigerian travellers to such countries where drug could be sourced and trans-shipped and sold in developed countries to derive illicit funds were properly screened before visa issuance to them. This strategy has helped in the drastic reduction of the number of Nigerians arrested in these countries for drug trafficking and illicit money transfers. Similarly, Nigeria signed various Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with many countries. This includes the MOU which Nigeria entered with the US and led to the creation of a Joint Task Force with the latter's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Vetted Enforcement Team constituted with the aim of promoting effective intelligence and operational cooperation.

Nigeria has also undertaken international cooperation programmes to tackle terrorism. These include regional collaboration. Several experts were interviewed for their contributions in this case which included senior officials of Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Ministry, Senators and House of Representative members, Senior Officers of the NDLEA, UNODC Official in Nigeria, Senior Lectures with specialisation in International Relations and Strategic Studies, former General Inspector of Nigeria's Police, former USDEA chief in Nigeria, former Director General of NFIU, etc. Respondents E9, E52, E54, E55, E56 and E57 justified as very vital.

Another international initiative of the Nigerian Government to tackle terrorism especially by the Boko Haram sect was the re-enactment of the instrument of the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. This was one of the decisions of the Commission's extra ordinary summit in 2014 and equally endorsed by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council. This Task Force was conceived as a framework for the international coordination of national counter terrorism efforts for the purpose of maximizing the respective national efforts to achieve required multiplier gains (William, Abacan & Sowadogo 2016).

However, the mandate of this force was aimed at creating a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the terrorist activities of Boko Haram and other insurgent groups as well as the facilitation and implementation of the entire stabilization programmes by the commission's member countries and the Republic of Benin. This includes the complete restoration of state authority, ensuring the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and complementing same with the needed humanitarian operations to

ensure the provision of necessary assistance to them. These objectives are predicated on the force's mandate to conduct military operations for the purpose of mitigating the spread of terrorist groups through exchange of intelligence, proper surveillance and operational patrols aimed at checkmating the distribution of weapons and other supporting logistics to the group and to search for and rescue all those kidnapped by the group.

Respondents E1 toE13 and E45 to E55 affirmed Nigeria's leading role in this case and was conceived based on the transnational feature of this crime including its consequences which transcends national borders especially the Lake Chad Basin. The Lake Chad region is standing on a precipice due to complex security challenges notably the terrorist threats by Boko – Haram who are leveraging on the vast porous borders in the region to facilitate their links with other terrorist groups like ISIS.

Much as these are laudable intentions, it should be noted that the required cooperation among the participating countries is not being maximised due to national inclinations. These respondents acquiesced to the view that while the intention of the Nigerian military Force was to stop further territorial acquisition by the terrorists especially recapturing territories, that the other countries in the Force; namely: Cameroon, Niger and Chad were more interested in terminating the expansionist adventures of these terrorists. These varied intentions doubtlessly did not promote the required loyalty and solidarity for the effectiveness of the Force and suggested that the different military forces in the joint military arrangement were committed more to the interests of their respective countries and their allies in developed countries.

The following observations are therefore derivable from the above narratives; namely: contradictions in the objectives of the force regarding the geopolitical realities of the Lake Chad regional system, Lack of trust and discontent among member countries of the force; differential perception of the threats, differential priorities and levels of responsibility among these countries. Others are the historical animosities and linguistic differences between the English and French speaking countries in the commission as well as the geopolitics of oil which tended to instigate power tussle between Chad and Nigeria over the oil reserve in the region (Mustapha 2017). In the same vein, Nigeria and Cameroon had long been embroiled in territorial dispute over the Bakassi Peninsular. Added to this, the approach adopted by the African Union was not sufficiently supportive and is further complicated by the pursuit of selfish interests against the general interest for which the force was established, (Zanfir 2015).

Nigeria's commitment to this regional military cooperation was highly essential because of being more affected by the activities of the terrorist group whose location was more in the country. This was not helped by the country's penchant for lack of consultation with other member countries before undertaking any action on behalf of the joint force as well as the absence of the country's military in towns recaptured from the terrorists and its inability to consolidate on the victories already achieved. More so, in spite of Nigeria's favourable disposition towards its international collaborators, these collaborators exercised some level of

misgiving when it came to directly collaborating with its military. (This situation was evident in the withdrawal of military cooperation with the Nigerian military by the US military based on allegations by the later that the former abused the intelligence shared with it 2014 for the rescue of the Nigerian school girls abducted by terrorists).

For the above reasons, the expected military cooperation in the region has not been realizable due to regional geopolitics. This is worsened by Nigeria's status as a military, political and socio-economic regional and continental power and for which it is perceived as domineering in the region and in the continent, (Roux Benoni, 2015). This domineering posture could be linked to what Alli (2012) viewed as the role conception for Nigeria by its leaders in international relations upon which its foreign policy engagement is predicated and for which reason, the country sees itself as the natural leader of Africa and ties its security to that of the entire Africa.

However, the conception of Nigeria either as a leader in the West African sub-region or in the continent is challenged. Thus, Nigeria's underperforming credential in domestic affairs with unimpressive representations in international fora coupled with its lack of proper coordination on many issues is adduced in this case. More so, the country exhibits clumsiness due to the lackadaisical and casual attitude of its officials. The position of Adedeji (2005) corroborates this assessment based on his assertion that no country that is confronted with a long period of political instability, stagnation and regression and is reputed to be one of the most corrupt in the world, has the moral basis to lead others. If such a country tries this, it will be resisted (Zabadi, 2011). The foregoing evaluation of Nigeria account for the inability of the country to muster the needed political will in its anti-terrorism efforts which further exacerbates the attendant security challenge due to this crime.

Another important observation in Nigeria's international cooperation programme is that the various foreign supports to its counter – terrorism efforts by its foreign collaborators are also based on the interest of the latter. The above observation is corroborated in the submission by E1, E2, E8, E45, E46, E47 and E52. They reiterated that it was because of the possibility that terrorists could infiltrate oil producing countries like Nigeria and destroy US investments in the country that motivated the US to start showing concern for terrorist threats in the country. For this reason, the US Navy established a presence in the Gulf of Guinea, largely to protect international sea-lanes for transporting oil and gas, and to keep a watchful eye on oil interests along the coast, particularly in Nigeria's Niger Delta where ethnic minority militants periodically bombed oil company installations, kidnapped oil workers and disrupted oil production.

These Respondents also stated that another important consideration in the US strategic involvement in counter terrorism in West Africa especially Nigeria, was for the protection of its offshore oil installations from the activities of international criminals and terrorists. This is perhaps the reason why most of the support assistance by the US to African countries especially Nigeria, concentrates more on the provision of

security equipment and rarely on human security provisions. Thus, the United States of America is disposed to providing support assistance to cooperating African countries (including Nigeria) for the protection of its interest in the latter's domain (Kahuni 2017).

Further to the above, attention has been drawn to the numerous security challenges especially terrorism to Nigeria which appear overbearing for the country's security sector and the need for peace to help in the protection of the United States' multi-billion dollar economic and unquantifiable diplomatic interests in the country. The US is aware that insecurity in Nigeria will not only adversely affect the same interests but disrupt Nigeria's status as US strategic partner in the West African sub-region (Mustapha 2014).

The above Respondents also gave credence to the view that it was consequent upon the evaluation of Nigeria's security sector as lacking the required capacity to deal with these security challenges that motivated the US Government to embark on several cooperation initiatives aimed at supporting Nigeria's security institutions. These include: The provision of training especially in the area of intelligence management and in other critical areas aimed at enhancing their capacity all within its Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme. This initiative incorporates counter terrorism partnership as one of its vital objectives as well as the US maritime awareness system which was installed in Nigeria for the monitoring of its international waters and other resources in the Gulf of Guinea.

Further justification provided by these respondents includes the following: that the support provided by these countries to the Nigerian Government to counter the insurgencies in the Niger Delta was targeted at the protection of the former's oil interests in the Gulf of Guinea. These foreign countries also geared up their supports for counter terrorism in Northern Nigeria, after the bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja by Boko-Haram which was considered a threat to the interest of developed countries. Another instance they cited on the overbearing foreign influence on Nigeria's security sector is the suspension of assistance to Nigeria's security agencies three years ago by the US Government during the Obama regime based on allegations of human rights breaches and misuse of intelligence by the operatives of Nigerian Security agencies; (USG Counter Terrorism Report 2014; 2015).

Also confusing as denoted by these Respondents, is the constant vilification of Nigeria by these developed countries who trump up allegations of human rights abuses against Nigeria's security agencies while condoning same when it is meant to protect their interest. They gave example with Exxon Mobil a foreign multinational entity, which provided helicopters to Nigerian security agencies for the bombing of Niger Delta communities. This was based on the suspicion that militants who were in the habit of attacking oil facilities belonging to multinational oil corporations, were hiding in these communities. Nevertheless, it should be clarified that even if such an action was not meant to satisfy a foreign interest that it should be condemned and that Nigerian security agencies should comply with such ethical requirements for the respect of human rights and not to sacrifice same for diplomatic benefits.

Respondents E1, E7, E8, E45, E46, E47, E48 and E58 also took exception to the Leahy Law by the US. They noted that this Law can be misplaced especially when not applied with discretion. The architect of this law was Senator Patrick Leahy and it disallows the provision of security assistance to countries with verifiable records of human rights violations by its security agencies. These Respondents pointed out that the application of this policy should not be in isolation of the serious security challenge faced by the country that breached it. This is because the consequent sanction can be counterproductive as in the case of Nigeria when the US not only refused to sell arms to it but also blocked others who wanted to assist. Thus, this action led to the escalation of terrorism in Nigeria and caused the Nigerian security agencies to become ill-equipped and unable to effectively confront these terrorists.

Because of the same law, Israel was dissuaded from selling the American made aerial surveillance Chinook helicopters to Nigeria at the time this equipment was much needed for the country's counter terrorism programme. This action prompted further scepticism about the sincerity of the US pursuant to its AFRICOM policy in Africa. This policy was conceived as a platform of US military adventurism in Africa and formulated without consultation with the host African countries including Nigeria (Mustapha 2014).

The US AFRICOM project is also assumed to be part of the US counter terrorism initiative to protect its oil and gas interest in Africa (especially in the Gulf of Guinea). This was possibly conceived on the need to checkmate China through provision of supports to African countries that are cooperating with the US. On the same premise, AFRICOM entraps the militaries of African countries to the whim and caprice of the US military high command to the extent of subjugating the sovereignty of these countries (including Nigeria). "AFRICOM mission is to lock the continent in a cage of steel to imprison it in the imperial orbit and to patrol the continent with dependent African armies" (Ford 2014 p.11)

The above indications discussed Nigeria's international cooperation efforts including the country's foreign policy initiatives to its institutional efforts to counter terrorism as well as supports by its international collaborators. Nevertheless, the attached interest of these collaborators was also discussed.

From the above indications, it can be concluded that Nigeria's international cooperation as presently constituted cannot complement Nigeria's institutional capacity as a critical component of its security sector governance to effectively control the threats of terrorism in the country and therefore requires improvement.

4.5 Conclusion

Based on the presentation of relevant data from documentary and interview sources and the analysis of same relative to the conceptual framework of this study, the following findings were made:

(a) That terrorism constitutes serious security threats to Nigeria including heavy involvement in this crime by vulnerable persons who are deceitfully recruited. These threats include economic

adversities, international credibility challenges, loss of millions lives and unquantifiable property, displacement of millions of persons, etc.

(b) That terrorism financing is the most notable supportive factor of terrorism in the country. Other complementary reasons for the growth of this illicit support includes lack of proper conception of this growing trend due to inappropriate risk assessments; poor policy formulation and implementation to guide the needed counter measures; absence of and improper intelligence supports; lack of effective and strict financial control. Others are: poor human resources provisions and the ignoble actions of security operatives who criminally indulge the perpetrators of this crime and their limited capacity in understanding the tactics of these criminals and their operational areas.

(c) Further to the foregoing, the sustainability of terrorism financing is linked to such several sources of illicit financing. These includes the following; namely: through protection fees to the terrorists, through legitimate trades, charities, NGOs, ransoms, robberies, illegal oil bunkering, human trafficking, arms and narcotics trafficking. Others are religious sources, through external supports including those from other international terror groups and from politicians who share in the vision of the terrorist groups.

The above revelations are indeed challenging and are further aggravated by the following factors; namely: existence of multiple means of money transfer in the country, voluminous quantum of financial reports dished out by financial institutions which are not easy to analyse to identify criminal financial transactions; corrupt tendencies and insider conspiracies compounded by weak banking supervision in the country's financial institutions, lack of efficient financial investigative and prosecutorial schemes, poor and discrepant legislative and policy supports and the complexity and multiplicity of Nigerian borders which make it difficult to check financial inflows and outflows into and out of the country.

The foregoing therefore underscored the need for the country to develop and implement effective intervention programmes against this crime. It accordingly embarked on several strategic interventions against terrorism. This includes amnesty programme for Niger Delta militants and involved arms confiscation and reintegration of the militants. This strategy was assessed as having achieved minimal success as it failed to comprehensively address restiveness in the region because it concentrated only on the militants without any comprehensive developmental plans to develop the region and mitigate those issues that in the first instance induced insurgencies.

The institutional and operational capacities of the agencies responsible for the mitigation of terrorism were also generally assessed. These assessments covered the sufficiency and quality of the various resources that affect their performance in the control of this crime. These include the quantity and quality of logistics supports, budgetary and accountability standard, intelligence procurement and application capability,

quality of human resources supports as well as the quality of legal and judicial supports. Much as all the above requirements are provided to these agencies, these provisions were assessed as insufficient.

Because it was also understood from the foregoing revelations that none of the agencies involved in the country's terrorism intervention programme can boast of sufficient provision of the above supports, the need for their collaboration becomes highly expedient. Accordingly, the quality of such subsisting collaboration in the country's security sector was analysed and found to be deficient. This deficiency was traced several to factors including frictions among the constituent institutions. Examples of these frictions between and among these constituent stakeholders were not only analysed, the causes of such frictions were also identified. These are jurisdictional challenges and manifestation of superiority complexes, poor professional responsibility standard as induced by corruption, poor human resources provision as well as distorted communication between and among concerned agencies.

In view of the above observed poor interagency cooperation standard, the need for international cooperation to complement this was also explored. This is congruent on the understanding that it is very difficult if not impossible for any country to effectively control the threats of terrorism without cooperating with others. This is because this crime is characteristically transnational. Thus, Nigeria in its bid to achieve this as part of its strategic programme to boost the capacity of its security sector, inevitably partners with foreign countries especially the developed ones for their support. Consequent upon this, it has received several supports from these foreign countries like the US and international organisations especially the United Nations. The country also embarked on counter – terrorism operations with other countries in the Lake Chad region in a special Multinational Joint Task Force project which concentrated on appropriate intelligence sharing and strategic Joint Operational Initiative to decimate terrorists operating in the region. In spite of all the foregoing, the country's international cooperation scheme has not sufficiently satisfied the requirement that can complement the institutional capacity of its security sector and essentially underscores the need for improvements. It can therefore be concluded from all the above points that the institutional capacity, specifically that of the security and law enforcement institutions in its security sector does not meet the required expectation that can help the country's security sector governance to effectively counter terrorism.

CHAPTER 5:

NIGERIA'S SECURITY SECTOR REFORM INTERVENTIONS

5.1 Overview

The institutional capacity of Nigeria's security sector governance has already been analysed as a necessary requirement to effectively counter the threats of terrorism in the country. The need to therefore analyse other requirements which are also critical for the same purpose, is equally important. This section is therefore devoted to achieving this objective by first determining their quality on the basis of which relevant improvement measures will be advocated.

These requirements are predicated on security sector reform and governance imperatives. There are several of these but this research concentrated on such security sector governance requirements as: democratic oversight and human rights. These are complemented with good governance and exemplified with governance requirements such as the country's anti-corruption profile and such dividends of good governance, specifically access to employment opportunities.

Relevant documents were not only analysed for this purpose but also provided some vital information that were utilized to frame the interview questions. The respondents in this case were chosen based on their experience on the subject matter and on the institutions, they represent and the relevance of their role to the subject of inquiry. (See appendix I and II for a comprehensive categorisation of the utilized documents and the experts who were interviewed and the basis of their selection)

5.2 Civil Democratic Oversight

The first security sector governance requirement that is articulated for this purpose as earlier stated is the quality of civil democratic oversight of Nigeria's security sector governance. The imperative of democratic oversight was given credence in the AU Framework on Security Sector Reform (2012). This obligated member countries of the African Union to be committed to the enhancement of all the relevant organs responsible for the performance of this role over all the institutions that constitutes their security sector. The framework categorized such controls under the following; namely: executive oversight, legislative oversight, judicial oversight and independent oversight by designated civil institutions.

Further to the above, the Institute of African Studies Report (2015) acknowledged the relevance of democratic oversight over Nigeria's security institutions in such a manner that they will be appropriately subordinated to civil control. The Report averred that the country's democratic development can be complemented with a security sector that is under an effective oversight supervision of the legislature.

However, it berated the country's legislature for lacking the required capacity to undertake this vital function and for which reason, its security institutions exercise excessive power including human rights

abuses in the country. The above narrative actually underscores the basis for the recognition of democratic oversight in Nigeria's constitution and meant to be utilised by the civil institutions as provided in the same constitution to ensure proper checks and supervision of security agencies.

Democratic principles and application are critical for the efficiency of security sector governance and with potential to help Nigeria's situation if entrenched and proficiently applied. For this purpose, the structure of Nigeria's security sector, its subsisting democratic oversight scheme with emphasis on its performance are analysed upon which improvement measures are explored and recommended.

The Nigerian security sector is made up of security institutions playing different but inter-connected roles for the achievement of both human and state security for the country. The African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (2013) indicated that the sector constitutes relevant individuals, groups and institutions with responsibility for the provision of both human and state security. The notable security institutions playing this role in Nigeria includes the military (made up of the Army, Navy; Air-force; Military Intelligence), the Police; the Customs and Excise, Immigration Service, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, the Department of State Security Services, Civil Defence Corps, the Judiciary, Ministry of Justice, Prison Service as well as private security groups not directly under the control of the government.

5.2.1 Actors and Institutions in Nigeria's Civil Democratic Oversight

The subsisting structure of Nigeria's Security Sector oversight scheme is classified under the following categories including institutions and actors; namely: The Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial and Independent Oversight bodies. The role of the above bodies especially the first three are explicitly provided for in the country's 1999 constitution and is congruent on democratic tenets. Other relevant oversight supervisory duties in this case include those performed by the Executive through special executive and monitoring bodies; namely: ministries as well as special monitoring and administrative commissions, justice authorities including the Judiciary and the Courts; Civil Society organisations including the media and non-governmental organisations. There are also other independent oversight supervisory bodies with complementary oversight roles among which is the Public Complaints Commission. This commission is expected to act as the country's ombudsman. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this body is constrained by its restriction to complaints against the conduct and operations of the country's security and law enforcement agencies. The most relevant amongst the above are hereby further explained.

5.2.1 (a) The Legislature

Nigeria's legislature is bi-cameral in nature and includes two chambers; namely: The Senate and the House of Representatives. While the Senate is the Upper Chamber, the House of Representatives is the Lower Chamber. The need for these legislative chambers is provided for in section 47 of Nigeria's 1999 constitution. The senate is made up of one hundred and nine (109) members with three representatives

from each of the thirty – six states of the country and one from the federal capital territory (Staddon 2018 p.1), while the House of Representatives is made up three hundred and sixty members. These legislators are elected from delineated constituents in the country as provided for in section 49 of the country's constituent. The main responsibility of these chambers is to make laws for the good and smooth governance of the country. Law making in any of these chambers originates from a proposal known as a bill (Anyebe 2016)

Both chambers are administered by relevant officers. While the senate is headed by a President, the House of Representatives is headed by the Speaker. These officers and their deputies are elected by members during plenary. Their roles include: presiding over meetings especially at plenary sittings, preserving order and ensuring civilized and democratic conduct of members, interpretation of standing orders, organizing votes and breaking of vote ties and the constitution and appointment of the leadership of committees. In addition to this, the senate president presides over the joint meetings of both chambers. Other principal officers include: the Deputy President and Deputy speaker, Majority Leader and Deputy; Minority leader and Deputy; Chief Whip and Deputy. Senators and House of Representatives members are elected on a four years term and could be re-elected severally.

The role of the country's legislature in the country's security sector is very crucial and this is further given impetus by its constitutional empowerment to undertake the following: Approval of key and strategic government appointments as contained in section 147(2) of the constitution. In addition, the senate enjoys the prerogative derived from section 147(2) of the country's 1999 constitution to approve judicial appointments and federal ministers, regulation of the powers of the president, appointment, promotion and discipline of members of the armed forces including the army, Air-force and Navy. This is the reason Nigeria's president forwards the name of the country's Army Chiefs to be screened and confirmed by the National Assembly. Others include the power derived from section 5(4) to approve the declaration of war and troops deployment; powers over finance and appropriation especially decision on military procurements. The country's National Assembly supervises the country's budgetary implementation through its committee on public accounts (Jimoh 2016). Furthermore, the legislature undertakes the following roles:

(a) Amendment of existing laws and legislations in line with contemporary realities as included in section 88(2) of the country's 1999 constitution;
(b) Control of public funds through relevant appropriations prerequisite for any withdrawal of money from the country's consolidated Revenue Fund as provided for in section 80(3) and 80(4) of the 1999 constitution;
(c) Power of investigation. This role is backed up by the provisions of section 88 of the country's 1999 constitution which gives the National Assembly the power to direct the investigation of any matter relevant to the country's governance including the affairs of any person, authority, ministry or

government department charged or intended to be charged for notable infractions. This is purposed for exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste and to consequently ensure good governance. This therefore underscores the need for undertaking relevant oversight responsibilities (Azuni and Nwosu 2016).

The country's legislature through the powers granted it in section 4 of the country's 1999 constitution is also empowered to promulgate legislations related to the country's defence and security as well as its agencies including the armed forces, police, prisons, etc. it is also empowered to make laws that regulate arms and ammunition including small and light weapons.

One of the most critical statutory roles of Nigeria's Legislature which makes its oversight function very important is its power of investigation and mostly handled by relevant committee(s). This power is derived from the provisions of section 88 of Nigeria's 1999 constitution which provides that both the Senate and House of Representatives are vested with the power by resolution and published in the National Assembly's Journal and in the Gazette of the Federal Government, to initiate investigation into the following; namely: Execution and Administration of the laws made by the country's legislature; the conduct of the affairs of any person, institution, ministry or government departments responsible for the executing and administering the above laws as well as disbursement of money's that had been appropriated or yet to be appropriated by the legislature (Fashagba 2019 p.40).

According to Agbedi et al (2020), the role of the legislature in the governance of countries should not be measured relative to its capacity to promulgate laws but in its ability to effectively conduct oversight functions which in essence, provides the opportunity to scrutinize and vet the activities of the executive branch of government. This responsibility according to them is more effectively achieved through committees. These committees accordingly comprehend issues in detail and assess every data that is required to arrive at correct decision. They therefore noted that these committees should be characterised by diligence efficiency and effective data analysis.

The importance of committees in the performance of the oversight duties of Nigeria's legislature cannot therefore be overemphasized. PLAC (2016) stated that legislative standing committee's takes responsibility for the evaluation of the functions of ministries, departments and agencies of government. DCAF (2020) specifically justified the relevance of these special committees to oversight security and law enforcement agencies especially as relates to the technical and sensitive nature of their roles. It is noted that while the senate has fifty-two standing committees, the House of Representatives has sixty – five.

The committees which are directly responsible for supervising security agencies in the country include committees on Drugs and Financial Crimes, Army, Air-force and Navy. Others are committees on Defence, National Security and Intelligence, Police Affairs and Prisons. The Committees whose oversight role are not directly targeted at the security and law enforcement agencies in the country but whose activities can

influence the activities of these agencies include International Affairs; Appropriations; Intergovernmental Affairs; Public Accounts and Procurements; Finance; Federal Character; Justice and Human Rights, Establishment and Public Service. In addition to this constitutional enablement, the country's legislature including the Senate and House of Representatives can create standing and adhoc parliamentary committees to take charge of the legislative oversight of the country's security sector.

For the oversight function of the legislature to be successful, certain procedures or processes are highly imperative but are dependent on the type or nature of the oversight assignment. Nevertheless, these processes take place, prior to, during or after the oversight assignments. The first instance involves development and approval of the agenda and scope of the assignment. Consequent upon this, the Ministries, Departments and Agencies MDA(s) to be over-sighted will be informed including request for relevant documents that will be needed during the exercise. This exercise is essentially meant among other purposes, to expose corruption inefficiency or wasteful expenditures in the process of executing the laws enacted by the legislature. Achievement of this objective normally follows collection of relevant data and evidence prerequisite for the summoning of any person to provide evidence. To ensure that this is realizable, the Assembly is further empowered by Section 89(1) of the constitution, to issue a warrant to compel any invitee to honour its invitation.

The most critical requirement during the oversight sessions includes proper introduction of committee members and relevant personnel of the MDA(s) being over sighted, inspection visits, scrutinization of documents and other records. After the foregoing, the committee will prepare its report which will then be subjected to committee meetings to consider and review the report with accruing recommendations. These recommendations will then be presented and laid on the table. The general house will then deliberate on the report and come up with resolutions depending on the nature and content of the resolution(s) which may be further subjected to investigative hearing including public hearing. However, it needs to be pointed out that the above actions are consequent upon the extant legislative rules and regulations. Anyebe (2016) stated that the legislature's parliamentary procedure first and foremost, originates from the relevant constitutional provisions on the powers of the legislature and its limitations and upon which its standing rules equally rely on.

These standing rules as supported by the constitution, guide the business of both chambers of the country's legislature and for which reason, it must be strictly adhered to, otherwise, the actions of the legislature including law making and indeed the outcome of its oversight responsibilities will be illegal and of no effect if these rules are not followed. These standing orders according to him, are descriptions of the procedures to be adopted by the legislature in carrying out its constitutional obligations. They are amendable and could be temporarily suspended depending on the situation or issue in parliament because they are not fool proof and may not satisfy the requirements in all situations and all subject matter.

As provided in its Guide to Legislative Oversight in the National Assembly by PLAC (2016), stated the power of exercising oversight functions over security and law enforcement institutions are provided for in the rules of both chambers of Nigeria's legislature. This responsibility requires these legislative arms to oversee the executive arm of government in terms of implementing projects for which funds have been appropriated. This role obligates the legislature through its relevant committees, to conduct investigations into related governance matters as well as monitoring of the performance of Ministries Departments and Agencies. In spite of the above provisions, the required quality of democratic oversight supervision of Nigeria's security institutions seems far-fetched because of the country's history of military administration.

Transparency International (TI) Report (2019) provided some reasons for the above assessment and noted that in spite of the statutory empowerment of Nigeria's legislature to undertake oversight supervisory role over relevant security agencies in the country, the members of the relevant committees that will execute this role especially the defence committee lack the required expertise. This problem according to the report hinges on the following deficiencies; namely: (a) Inability of members to comprehend basic defence issues and due to the revolving character of the members; (b) reliance on the expertise of the military members who consequently find it difficult to properly interrogate issues concerning their military constituency because of such emotional attachment (Otusanya, Lauwo, Ige and Adelaja 2015).

Further to this is the poor legislative control coupled with lack of transparency which allows for huge military spending without proper scrutinization. The TI report further noted that the legislators in the country's National Assembly assessed the country's legislature's capacity to provide oversight of Nigeria's security agencies as weak. Dearth of required information to carry required oversight functions was also cited. The report noted that Nigerian legislators depend on non-legislative personnel to undertake research on their behalf which often led to inadequate information for proficient oversight duties (Staddon 2019).

The above reasons seem to hinder the oversight role of the country's legislature on its security agencies because of lack of relevant documents to undertake this role. This lapse has been attributed to two main legal provisions; namely: the provision in the FOA section 11 (1). Based on this, disclosures to a public institution could be denied if such will be detrimental to the conduct of the country's defence and Foreign Affairs. The other one is the National Security Agencies Act contained in section (315) (5) (c) of the country's constitution which recognised only three security agencies that are responsible for country's security intelligence requirement for the state security; namely: The State Security Services; National Intelligence Agency and the Defence Intelligence Agency which is bestowed with the responsibility to protect and preserve all classified matters relating to the military. All the foregoing were highlighted by (Staddon 2018).

Following the legislature as an important oversight institution in Nigeria are such executive functionaries that equally play relevant oversight role in the country's security sector. These include mainly the Attorney General and Minister of Justice and Auditor General of the Federation.

5.2.1 (b) Office of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice

Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Justice is headed by a cabinet minister known as the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federation. His or her office is one of the most important government departments with supervisory oversight powers over the country's security and law enforcement agencies. The Minister in-charge of this office is appointed by the President with a permanent Secretary who acts as Deputy and Solicitor General of the Federation. The appointment of Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federation is provided for in sections 150 and 195 of Nigeria's 1999 constitution. The appointee is the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and is constitutionally empowered to take responsibility to institute criminal charges on any person or institution in any court of competent jurisdiction in Nigeria.

The Ministry is presently constituted of eleven main departments; namely: public prosecution; law reporting; citizens' rights; Human resources; Finance and Administration; Legal Drafting, International and Comparative Law, Planning Research and Statistic, Civil Litigation, Solicitors and procurement. The Attorney General is the Chief Law Officer of the federation. One of his most important roles as the Chief Legal Adviser of the country is to advise on the constitutionally and veracity of policies and actions of government. This is done through provision of required justifications as well as ensuring that such laws and policies are properly enforced. This Office is accordingly bestowed with the power of oversight of security institutions in the country. This is a statutory responsibility for the proper enforcement of federal laws, preservation of order and prevention of public wrongs. Apart from acting as a legal beacon and guiding the various government institutions on their legal obligations, this office also provides policy direction and supervision of several law enforcement agencies and parastals in the country. Examples among others are the NDLEA, EFCC, ICPC, NFIU, National Agency for the prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP).

Apart from providing guidance and ensuring that the rule of law is respected in the country, the Attorney General makes sure that security agencies do not exceed the powers granted them under the law to adhere to rule of law and avoid infringing on the right of citizens. The Office is also vital in the government's anti-corruption crusade. In the execution of this role, this office has investigated several persons including top government officials for corruption. These include judges and top officials of anti-graft agencies. Mores so, Section 174 (1) of the same constitution empowers the Minister of Justice to take over and continue or discontinue criminal trial in any case that had initially been commenced by any person or institution in the country.

5.2.1 (c) Office of the Auditor General of the Federation

The Office of the Auditor General is another strategic entity that plays a very vital oversight role over many institutions in the country including security and law enforcement agencies. The office is headed by the Auditor General of the Federation who is appointed by the President. The responsibilities of this office are well prescribed in section 85 of Nigeria's 1999 constitution. Section 85(2) of this constitution specifically

provides that this office has the responsibility to audit the public accounts of Nigeria's federation including that of every office and courts in the country. In the same vein and by virtue of the provisions contained in section 85(4), the Auditor General is empowered to undertake periodic checks on all government corporations, commissions, authorities and agencies and all statutory organizations and all persons whose existence are consequent upon the legislation of the National Assembly. The various security and law enforcement agencies in the country are by virtue of the constitutional enablement, subject to this check.

Because of the sensitivity of this role and its checking component, the Auditor General or any person he or she delegates, has unencumbered access to every document related to the accounts to be audited. Because of the sensitivity and importance of this responsibility, the Auditor General is constitutionally exempted from the direction or control of any other authority and will accordingly not be subject to supervision by same. Furthermore, the Auditor General in view of the provisions of section 85(5) of the 1999 constitution, will upon receipt of the Accountant General's Financial Statement is expected to submit within ninety days, his or her report to the National Assembly.

After this, the report of the audit is expected to be submitted to the legislature including the Senate and House of Representatives. Upon receipt of this report, the Public Accounts Committees in both the Senate and House of Representatives will consider the report in order to ensure that appropriated funds to the various government institutions including security agencies are spent in accordance with the Law. This should be in consonance with probity, accountability, efficiency, judicious and economic imperatives. It is for this reason that these committees hold public sittings to critically examine the audit reports and with the Auditor General with other principal government functionaries in attendance are expected, to provide needed defence as far as the report is concerned.

An important observation at this point by respondents E20, E21, E22, E23, E24, E25, E26, E27, E28, E30, E56 and E60 is that the oversight role of both the legislature and the executive as exemplified in the roles of the Minister of Justice and the Auditor General of the Federation depend on judicial functions. To this extent, Omotosho (2019) espoused that the role of the executive is to provide meaning to the laws and policies made by the legislature for the governance of the country in order to ensure that the citizens are provided with good governance. For this to be achieved through the required compliance, the legislature also follows up to ensure that the laws are operationalised in accordance with the purpose for which they were made.

5.2.1 (d) The Judiciary

The third segment in the arms of government, the judiciary takes responsibility for the interpretation of these laws and policies. Its function also includes arbitration of any disputes as a result of the execution of the laws due to the processes of government actions and the implementation of government policies. These roles are consequent upon the unique function of protecting the citizens from the excesses of the

other arms of government including security agencies through appropriate interpretation of the law to ensure peace in the country. The oversight functions of the judiciary are performed by judges which includes the chief judge as the most senior in the court which is also made – up of many other judges.

The Nigerian judiciary at the federal level is made up of the Supreme Court, the Appeal Court, the federal High Court, the High Court of Nigeria's Federal territory (FCT) the Customary, Court of Appeal of the FCT, the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT. At the State level, the courts include the State High Courts, Magistrate Courts, the Sharia Courts as well as the Customary Courts of Appeal and Sharia Courts of Appeal. The Supreme Court is the country's Apex Court in the country and is chaired by the Chief Justice of the Federation and other judges but not more than twenty-one of them, the Appeal Court by the President while both the Federal High Courts and State Courts are headed by Chief Judges. These courts at both Federal and State levels are supported by the National Judicial Council which serves to sustain the independence of the judiciary by insulating it from the other arms of government. The oversight role of the judiciary according to Okonyodo (2018) (p.4) is a very vital requirement in the administration of justice in Nigeria.

The judges are expected to conduct the affairs of these courts with the required professional responsibility. According to Udombana (2017), is congruent on the need to sustain the moral values as the foundation of society.

5.2.1 (e) Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Another important constituent of the country's security sector oversight are Civil Society Organizations and the media including prints, electronic and social media. Much as these outfits are not absolutely and formally empowered constitutionally to undertake oversight functions in the country's security sector, they rely on the constitutional provisions to communicate any information that may be relevant for good governance in the country. Thus, section 39(1) chapter 4 of the country's constitution supports press freedom including freedom of expression and freedom to hold opinions without restriction. Another strong support to this is the country's Freedom of Information Act (2011). It is the intention of this law to ensure that government should not classify its information as secret.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are vital instruments of Security Sector Oversight in Nigeria and can take part in oversight roles at National and International levels. There are several of these organizations that represent and protect the interest of the citizenry in Nigeria. These among others include: Civil Liberties Organisations, Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA), etc. Transparency International and Amnesty International

According to Caparini (2004), Civil Society Organisations represent the interest of the constituent communities in the country. They also help through provision of guidance and expert advice to the

government and its institutions in the provision of good governance to the population. They do this through gauging the yearnings of the people and communicating same to government. He affirmed that these help to put security and law enforcement agencies and indeed all security actors to check by ensuring that they are accountable to the people in the performance of the duties that they are statutorily assigned.

These organizations are also involved in monitoring security trends and advising the constituent security agencies in the sector based on the aspirations of the citizenry especially at the grassroots. Apart from relying on domestic parameters, they utilize international democratic standards on transparency and accountability to guide their watch over Nigeria's Security Agencies. They also help to provide relevant resources to the security sector including intellectuals and professionals who could be used as consultants or recommended for recruitment into relevant government parastatals including security agencies as well providing relevant capacity development programmes for operatives of security agencies.

Accordingly, Nigeria News (2019) (P.1) these organisations constitute the foundation of every democratic society which provides relevant governance related supports and contributes to the growth and development of the country. These organizations are many in Nigeria and they advocate for the interest of the citizens.

The publication noted that these organizations consist of conscious citizens that are intelligent and very conversant with the current socio-economic political and cultural trends globally and in their country of origin. In a nutshell, the document listed the following as the functions of CSOs: (a) Monitoring of government activities, political processes and pressure government and its agencies to respect and act in accordance with constitutional provisions, (b) Intermediation role between the citizens and the government through protection of peoples' interest and protection of democratic values, (c) Advocates and follows-up on the required positive socio-economic, political and changes in the lives of the citizens, (d) Communicating with the citizens and providing relevant enlightenment on governance issues to the citizens.

Mohammed and Yalwa (2018) emphasized that Civil Society Organisations especially Non-Governmental organizations are very vital in security sector governance. Specific to Nigeria, they noted that lack of proper engagement of CSOs on the part of the Federal Government of Nigeria could be a factor that has not helped to properly manage the consequences due to terrorism in North East Nigeria. Thus, some of these NGOs can not only put the government and the relevant security agencies to task but can also provide humanitarian services in the terrorism affected areas. Having understood the actors and institutions in Nigeria's oversight scheme, the need for further insights on the above are quite necessary.

There are some strategic institutions with either constitutional or extant legislative and legal backing with responsibility to advise the presidency on security matters under the executive arm of government. They are expected to provide the needed support for efficient security in the country and includes; namely:

National Security Council, National Defence Council, Nigerian Police Council, Office of the National Security Adviser which is complemented with the Joint Intelligence Board.

Constitutional provisions are also made for the creation of oversight schemes that will ensure the protection of citizens' interest and to not only check the excesses of government but ensure adherence to the rule of law. In addition, Nigeria's constitution provided for specialized committees to undertake special oversight supervision of the Nigerian Army, Air-force, Navy, Police, NDLEA, Customs, DSSS, Immigration Services, National Civil Defence Corps, etc. These institutions are additionally supervised by their respective Ministries such as the Ministries of Defence, Justice, Finance, Interior, etc. with the support of their respective governing Board of Directors in terms of policy guidance and specification of levels of administrative authority. Furthermore, there exists the Office of the Auditor General of The Federation, Budget Office and Due Diligence Office which supervises and scrutinizes the financial appropriations of these security institutions to ensure that they conform to the constitutionally stipulated fiscal guidelines on financial appropriations and expenditures. In the same vein, the National Human Rights Commission specifically checks the extent of human rights compliance by these security institutions.

According to Respondents E1, E2, E3 and E4, E23, E24, all the above democratic supervisory roles are applied to the various security and law enforcement agencies in the country. Specific to the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) especially on its role to curtail illicit funding of terrorism through drug proceeds, its administration relies on a Board made up of representatives of all the major security agencies in the country including the Military with the Minister of Justice and Attorney General as the supervising minister. The chairman of this Board is also the Chief Executive of the agency.

Respondents E1, E3, E20, E21, E22, E23, E24, E25, and E26 on the civil oversight administration of the Nigerian Police, stated that three agencies apart from the legislature and the law courts which adjudicates its cases, are charged with this responsibility; namely: The Police Service Commission, the Police Ministry and the Police Council. Out of these three agencies, the Police Service Commission plays a major role in the civil oversight supervision of the Nigerian Police including appointments, promotions and disciplinary schedules. Notwithstanding these vital functions, the commission's programmes are hampered by political interference, paucity of funds and the absence of an investigative unit. These factors limit its capacity to effectively enforce discipline in the service and for which reason, it still refers serious cases of misconducts to the management of the service (African security Brief, 2016).

These respondents explained that following the Police Service Commission is the Police Ministry (which has now transformed into the interior ministry) under the headship of a cabinet Minster from whom the Head of the Police Service is expected to take instructions. This Ministry provides policy and administrative direction as well as logistics, financial and management supports to the service. In spite of all these, the quality of oversight supervision of the service by the ministry has remained unsatisfactory because of lack

of defined vision, scope of responsibility, innovation and the required skill for the effective performance of this role.

The next institution that plays some level of oversight supervision over the service according to them is the Police Council which is the apex executive body responsible for this role and is constituted of the country's President, all the State Governors, and the Chairman of the Police Service Commission. This council is responsible for the confirmation of the appointment of the Head of the country's Police as well as approval of top-level policies for the service. However, it was observed that the functions of this council overlap with that of the Police Ministry and that the non-inclusion of the country's Justice and Interior ministers in this Council hampers the proper harmonization of the roles of the various institutions charged with oversight supervisory mandate over the Police.

The legislature is not only expected to invigorate the above executive responsibilities, but to appropriately moderate and supervise the performance of these functions. This includes the power to direct or cause to be directed investigations into the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government departments charged or intended to be charged with the responsibility of executing or administering all the laws enacted by the National Assembly and disbursing or administering monies appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly".

The country's legislature is constitutionally empowered through section 5(A) and (B) of the country's constitution to endorse the deployment of troops to deal with security threats to the country. Other constitutional provisions which provide legal backing to the legislature to regulate the country's security sector includes section 147(2) which empowers it to approve sensitive security appointments and section (81) which empowers it to approve the budgets of the country's security institutions as well as section (88) and (89) which empowers it to summon and question executive functionaries including those of security agencies (Nigeria's constitution 1999).

According to Respondents E1, E8, E20, E21, E22, E23, E24, E25, E26 and E27, E28, E33 and E60, the crucial role of the judiciary in the exercise of oversight responsibilities over the country's security sector is equally recognised. This includes ensuring proper interpretation and application of legislations and policies relative to the required democratic principles in the security sector including the effectiveness of the legal norms that guide the sector. Further to this, the country's judiciary especially the courts are constitutionally empowered to interpret the various laws and pronouncements on security institutions in the country. Thus, the law courts determine the prosecution of civil or criminal cases involving these agencies as well as the constitutionality and legality of their actions.

5.2.2 The Content of Nigeria's Civil Oversight Scheme

On the assessment of the subsisting quality of Nigeria's civil oversight scheme, the above respondents averred that Nigeria is quite aware of the need to revamp its security sector oversight system and therefore undertook some reforms. These reforms according to them, were meant to improve the country's Security Sector, are yet to be properly entrenched and needs to be backed up with the required political will to ensure that they are proficiently administered. The most appreciable strides in this direction were undertaken by the country to strengthen its civil democratic control over the country's security institutions especially the military includes the following:

- Election of a civilian president and constitutionally conferring him with the powers as Commander-In-Chief of the country's armed forces as well as promotion of the supremacy of elected government officials at every level of governance. This also includes ensuring that a civilian is the boss and in-charge of the country's Defence Ministry and other strategic security institutions;

- Establishment by civil authority, the guidelines, objectives and conduct of military operations to serve political and strategic purposes and the application of democratic principles formulated by the civilian establishment to guide all military investigations and trials;

- Constitutional empowerment of the country's apex court to review decisions taken by the military courts as well as constitutional provisions on the oversight roles of civil institutions including the legislature over security institutions including the military;

- Legislative oversight of security budgets through subjecting them to prerequisite legislative scrutiny and oversight supervision of such budget appropriations. Other measures undertaken to give further impetus to civil democratic control of Nigeria's security institutions include the following: Exercising civil democratic authority to appoint and sack chiefs of security institutions; constituting the Defence Ministry mainly as a civil entity and constitution of the Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission.

- Reformation of the military justice system is equally part of the efforts that the country adopted to promote and sustain the subordination of the military to the required civil democratic control. This policy emphasized the primacy of political leaders, elected government functionaries and those they appointed in the establishment of relevant policies in the defence sector. This is however with due consideration of the professional inputs of military personnel especially as regards military capabilities, constraints and projections. Furthermore, this policy made it imperative for military bosses to respect public opinion through provision of authentic information to the citizenry regarding their operations (Ayede 2015 p.104 – 105).

The above initiatives and the constituents of Nigeria's democratic oversight system seem very comprehensive and expectedly should live up to expectation in the administration of the system. However, it is surprising that the country is yet to achieve an impressive score in this direction as affirmed by Respondents E1, E2, E3, E8, E20, E22, E25, E26, E27, E45, E46 and E60. This can be linked to the general consensus that a veritable security sector governance standard is yet to be effectively entrenched in several countries especially in developing countries with nascent democratic governance. Nigeria's case appear worrisome and is due to several reasons; namely: (a) Over three decades of military and dictatorial governance; (b) the crafting of the country's supposedly democratic constitution by the military based on military decrees and military fiat without the contribution of the citizenry; (c) the transmutation of retired military officers into politics and their attainment of political position including headship of security institutions without prerequisite civil orientation and hardly compliant to proper subordination to civil democratic control; (d) carryover of lack of accountability and transparency which is characteristic of military dictatorships and consequent infiltration of the country's political landscape with corrupt and predatory practices.

Several observations point to the damage the military inflicted on Nigeria which will take a very long healing period. Compounding this is the infiltration of the country's body polity by hitherto military actors who retired and ventured into politics as their means of reintegration and resettlement due to the absence of a more attractive resettlement programme by the government. For example, the present Nigerian President is a former military Head of State. There was also another ex-military Head of State who ruled the country for eight years as a democratically elected President during the country's third republic.

Other reasons for the subsisting poor quality of democratic oversight of Nigeria's security institutions have been attributed to the country's military antecedent. Omoruyi (2011) notes in this case, that the needed restructuring of the Nigerian armed forces, which could have saved the situation, was farfetched because of lack of political will by successive presidents of the country to undertake this vital action. These narratives can be better appreciated within the context of the extracts from the US Library of Congress studies (2011). The studies noted that whether the restoration of civil rule in Nigeria existed or not, the proliferation of retired senior military personnel in the Nigeria's political landscape has not helped the situation, especially due to the large number of these retired officers who has continued to play vital political and economic roles in the country. These studies observed that Nigeria ranks among the countries that has frequently promoted and retired its generals. It revealed that over 200 generals were retired in Nigeria between 1985 and 1989 and also noted that the Nigerian military had produced more millionaires than any other profession in Nigeria since the 1970s and who eventually are top functionaries in government institutions, including the legislature.

It was also the military that crafted and foisted the constitutions upon which the country's third and present republics were governed. Military and security personnel had over the years occupied sensitive

strategic positions especially of important government agencies and consequently infiltrated these agencies with military traditions and idiosyncrasies. Military personnel have also been appointed as senior ministers especially of Defence and Police Affairs and have inadvertently introduced policies and practices that vitiated efforts that could have ensured that military and security institutions conformed to civil and democratic ethos.

It needs to be reiterated that all the country's previous constitutions, made ample provisions for checks and balances which could have normally ensured the proper subordination of the military and security institutions to civil democratic control but all these remained almost impracticable mainly because those who framed most of these constitutions were military personnel who metamorphosed into politicians and assumed important executive roles. These military personnel in the garb of civilian functionaries have continued to directly and indirectly indulge military and security institutions to exhibit unprofessional excesses which have constituted an Achilles heel in the enhancement of the country's security sector governance.

Furthermore, retired military and top security personnel found their way into the legislative arm of government as parliamentarians and still exhibit such military traits that counter the entrenchment of sound democratic principles and practices. In addition, the improprieties in the Nigerian legislature contribute to the situation. The Peace Conflict Studies Programme Report (2015) noted in this case that the formulation of the country's 1999 constitution is a contributory factor because this constitution was not based on the democratic expression of the citizenry but on the dictates of the military regime that handed it over to the country.

The above respondents pointed out that the provisions in this constitution were not sufficiently reflective of the required democratic governance requirements of security institutions. Their responses were in consensus that these provisions concentrated more on state security with very strict centralized control system for the convenience of whoever is the Head of state. These provisions granted extensive powers to the country's presidency and with very minimal inclusion of legislative role that will provide the legislature with the powers to effectively check the country's security agencies and their operatives. They took exception to the selection and appointment of most of the top operatives of these agencies without recourse to the legislature except for their confirmation which the constitution did not explicitly provide as a compulsory requirement.

Furthermore, these respondents stated that all the security institutions responsible for the control of drug trafficking especially as a huge source of terrorism financing in Nigeria, mainly the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), was the creation of the military and was under the control of a military administrator and till date, the military has been playing a significant role in the Agency's Administrative Board. The same situation is applicable to the Nigerian customs (as a critical stakeholder in the country's

border and contraband enforcement) which has had many serving military and retired military personnel as its boss. The Nigerian Police is also not free from military infiltrations because the Police Affairs Ministry which could have prevented this undue infiltration and ensured the subordination of the Police operatives to civil control has severally been manned by retired military personnel. The case of the Department of State Security Service is even worse because of rampant military involvement in its affairs including its much military leadership.

Another major factor that had made the military and the security institutions not to have been sufficiently subjected to proper civilian control is that the country's Office of the National Security Adviser have all these years been manned by either serving or retired military personnel whose allegiance have been more to their military constituency rather than to civilian authorities which consequently impacted the various security agencies they controlled with lack of respect for constituted civil institutions.

All these have been worsened by the increasing threat level of terrorism to Nigeria such that intervention against this crime is now equated to war situation requires military approach. This was the reason a military Sole Administrator was appointed to take charge of the NDLEA. He accordingly, prosecuted the country's anti – money laundering campaign as it related to illicit funding due to drug trafficking as a military challenge. He bluntly refused to conform to any form of civil control and this took a heavy toll on the professional development of the agency. Now that the most serious security challenge to the country is terrorism with the military drafted to take on the terrorists, it has also given the military effrontery to be further insulated them from the required civil control because of their feeling in time of war, that they are superior to the civilians.

These respondents also stated that the frequent flouting of policy instructions especially by the high-ranking operatives of the country's security institutions constitute a cog in the wheel of progress of the country's security sector's capacity to deal with the persistent terrorism challenge. These instructions include extant executive directives, legislative resolutions, judicial pronouncements and even those from the presidency. The above respondents noted that the laws which established these agencies provides for a periodic presentation of their activities to the special sessions of the country's legislature in order to provide it with the opportunity to appraise them and set future guidelines and milestones, yet, this important requirement is hardly adhered to.

The above impropriety was traced to the manner in which the leadership of these agencies are appointed at the discretion of the president. Thus, the heads of all the military institutions in Nigeria; namely: the Army, the Navy and the Air-force as well as the Police are not only appointed by the President but can be relieved of their appointment any time the president so wishes and without reference to the country's legislature. This situation therefore directs their loyalty to the president. Related to this, is the prevailing

trend whereby political party affiliations influence legislative actions and dictated by the objective of political parties even when contrary to the yearnings and aspirations of the majority.

More so, the country's security institutions as corroborated by these respondents are often under the control of incumbent executives who are used as tools for regime protection rather than for the citizens good and promotion of human security. This is traceable to the protectionist indoctrination of the country's security sector inherited from its colonists and whose orientation was for the protection of the ruling class rather than the citizens. This was worsened by the country's long history of military administration and characterized by the brutality of its security agencies with attendant abuse of the citizens' fundamental human rights. This portends adverse consequences on the development of the required democratic principles and practices in the country and equally negatively rubbed off on its security sector. Thus, the successive military regimes in the country discouraged the required respect and adherence to the imperatives of good governance including respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights, (Aning & Lartey, 2009) and almost rubbished the country's security sector governance because of such factors as listed by Aluko (2015); namely: massive human rights violations, destruction of *esprit de corps* in the country's security institutions, truncation of democratic agendas all of which sowed the culture of violence and arbitrariness in the nation.

For the legislature and judiciary, it is observed that they have not been able to achieve the desired democratic oversight standard for the country's security sector. The above respondents traced this to lack of discipline and the autocratic tendencies of the country's presidency which is in the habit of indulging and providing undue supports to the leadership of several security institutions and for which reason they also disobey executive, legislative and court orders. The capacity of the judiciary to play its role is therefore challenged due to disobedience of court orders, intimidation of the bench by the executive, insufficient funding, etc. (Aluko 2015). This situation is worsened by the complicity of some members of the judiciary who mortgage their conscience after being gratified by the same agencies they are expected to check.

The overbearing influence of the executive arm of government especially in its control over the country's security institutions and to a reasonable extent, over the judicial arm which adversely affects the quality of rule of law in the country is a contributory factor. Examples include instances when the courts granted bail to accused persons but were denied by the executive. This situation is so frustrating to the judiciary and is further worsened by the judiciary's dependence on the executive for its funding and for which the country's Chief Judge recently lamented thus: "If you say that I am independent but, in a way, whether I like it or not, I have to go cap in hand asking for funds to run my office, then I have completely lost my independence. It is like saying a cow is free to graze about in the meadows but at the same time, tying it firmly to a tree. Where is the freedom?" (Mohammad 2019 P.6). This is in spite of the provision of Section 81 (3) of the 1999 Constitution which requires that funding for the judiciary should be directly credited to it but which has unfortunately not been obeyed by the executive.

Disobedience of judicial orders is also frowned at and for which reason it is strongly counselled that "Justice must be served without fear or favour; for every law of the land to be obeyed because the consequences of disobeying lawful court orders are too grave to bear. We all should gird our loins to do our constitutionally assigned duties with due diligence so that Nigeria can be the pride of everyone" (Mohammed 2019, P.6).

In a nutshell, the above developments can be linked to the following; namely: the origin and provisions of Nigeria's 1999 constitution which is the subsisting instrument upon which all aspects of the country's security administration is based; the absolute powers of the presidency over the country's defence and security sector; the promotion of party supremacy over the will of the citizens; the timidity and lack of integrity of Nigerian legislators; lack of security expertise on the part of the legislators including the requisite knowledge for effective oversight functions; lack of dialogue between the legislators and civil society groups as well as lack of security knowledge by members of civil society groups.

In the case of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency as the arrow head of Nigeria's counter narcotic programme especially in the mitigation of illicit funding through narcotic proceeds, the presentation of Respondents E1, E7, E8, E9, E18, E20, E25, E26, E27, E29, E33, E45, E46 and E60indicated that the quality of the required civil democratic oversight supervision of this agency is not satisfactory. They noted that there has been overbearing military influence on its activities due to obvious reasons. For example, the agency relied heavily on the military and other security institutions for logistic and manpower supports when it was created which warranted the absorption of both serving and retired military personnel into its initial workforce in addition to arms supports from the military and police. A striking example was the creation of the agency's Intelligence Unit based on military framework and was incubated and operated by retired military personnel.

Furthermore, they observed that the enabling law that set up the agency concentrated so much power on the Chief Executive who is also the Chairman of the Governing Board that could have been regulating the Agency and its boss. Successive heads of this agency abused this provision through exhibition of autocratic tendencies and without respecting the extant provisions in the agency's laws that required their accountability to the supervising ministry and the legislature. Such undemocratic tendencies climaxed when a military sole administrator was appointed as the overall boss of agency. This administrator introduced strict regimented military programmes and orientations in the agency including creating command formations in military tradition as well as purchases of military type logistics most of which are still being used by the agency till date.

The situation was worsened by the personal relationship between this sole administrator and the then Military Head of state such that the Ministry of Justice (which is the statutorily empowered civil authority to supervise the agency). The ministry neither exercised the required oversight supervisory control over

him nor the agency. This tendency became instituted in the agency and has been sustained by subsequent Chief Executives all of whom were either serving or retired Military or Police personnel including the incumbent who is retired military personnel. They were emboldened by not only the absolute powers conferred on them by the agency's enabling law, but because of having been nominated and appointed by the president whom they felt they owed their loyalty more than anybody else. The above trend is also not helped because the Head of the agency possessed the power to appoint senior executive personnel of the agency without legislative approval.

Also, the required quality of oversight supervision of such security agencies charged with counter terrorism roles has not been satisfactorily achieved. The institutions singled out in this case include the Military, the Police and the Department of State Security Service. The submission of the above respondents indicated that in spite of ample provisions in the country's constitution and in the various extant executive policies and legislative resolutions that are expected to provide the needed platforms for effective civil oversight of the institutions, that their applications have been fraught with irregularities. The main reason adduced for this situation is the lack of effective deterrence standard for the leadership of these agencies who breach the prescribed oversight guidelines as provided for in the country's laws as well as their indulgence by the country's presidency.

The instances they cited regarding the above include: situations when the leadership of these agencies fragrantly disobeyed legislative and special executive summons because of the protection they enjoy from the presidency. This is because most of the Heads of State and Presidents who were serving or retired military personnel used these security institutions more for selfish purposes. This includes exacting autocratic control over the citizenry or for re-election which consequently, gives the leadership of these agencies the effrontery to call the bluff of any other constituted authority including the legislature. Notable cases of outright disobedience of legislative orders by the operatives of these security agencies due to the indulgence of the executive especially the presidency also tend to bring to naught the constitutional requirement of legislative oversight over them. This is possibly a strong reason why these agencies are now enmeshed in several cases of professional misconducts including human rights violations, insider conspiracies, corrupt practices including connivance with the same drug traffickers and terrorists that they are meant to counter.

There have also been occasions when these security institutions including the Nigerian Police, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Department of State Security Services acted contrary to specific legislative instructions due to the unwarranted tacit supports from the Executive. Cases cited in this case by respondents E1, E2, E7, E20, E21, E22, E23 and E26 include that of the parliamentary non-confirmation of the appointment of the Head of the EFCC based on an alleged indicting security report.In spite of this, the executive refused to comply with this legislative resolution. Others involved the Head of the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) who is a retired military officer but appointed as the

Administrator of the NCS contrary to the enabling legislation governing the service and that by the Head of Nigeria's Police Service who severally disobeyed legislative instructions. This police boss disobeyed several legislative summon to appear before the country's parliament in spite of pleas by other well-meaning Nigerians outside the government but he rather approached the court to endorse his action to delegate such legislative attendance to his subordinates. He lost the case as the court ruled in favour of the legislature; (Pronouncement of Nigeria's Federal High Court, Abuja, 2018).

The over indulgence of these security agencies has also adversely affected the quality of the presidency to effectively control them. The Nation was stunned when the president confessed that the country's Police boss disobeyed his directive to relocate to a particular state in Nigeria to supervise counter terrorism operations to check the reported rising killings of many innocent citizens there. Most surprising was that the president knew about this disobedience three months after his directive was flouted yet no action was taken against the erring officer; (Nigeria's Presidential presentation at the meeting with stakeholders in Benue State, Nigeria 2018).

In addition to the foregoing, Respondents E1 – E8 and E20, E21, E22, E23, E27, E28, E45, E46 and E51 indicated that embarked on many reforms of its security sector but none of these reforms have been comprehensive. The above situation was further not helped because these reforms were undertaken by persons with military antecedent and based on the country's 1999 constitution that was bequeathed to it by its previous military administrations. These attempts as corroborated by most of the respondents especially E1 – E8 as well as E14, E15, E16, E17, E20, E21, E39, E47 and E60 were in splinters and isolated without sufficient coordination, sustainability and harmonization. They also noted that Nigeria had previously set – up adhoc committees, commissions and Institutions to administer issues related to its security sector governance but apart from not completely implementing their recommendations, they were hardly harmonized and integrated to formulate a unified framework for a proficient governance of the sector.

They cited instances when the country reformed its military and police institutions at different times and averred that these reforms were not integrated into a unified framework. They did not also incorporate such other critical security sector conditions e.g., on the need for these security agencies to sufficiently defer to civil' democratic institutions for the required supervision and on the need for them to operate with civility and respect for fundamental human rights. In addition, the government hardly demonstrated the political will for a sincere anti-corruption drive as well as provision of good governance that could have complemented these efforts. Further to the above, the recommendations of these previous efforts were sparingly utilized in administering the country's security sector.

5.2.2 (a) Legislative Improprieties

Improprieties by the legislature have also been identified as a militating factor against effective parliamentary oversight. The submissions of the above respondents were congruent on the following reasons. These include the alleged questionable integrity of the legislators and that of top operatives of these agencies who autocratically breach the enabling laws setting up these agencies, sometimes with the tacit endorsement of the legislators who would have mortgaged their legislative supervisory authority (Institute of African Studies Report 2015). Another area of concern cited by respondents E1, E7, E20 – E28 is the tendency of the legislators to usurp the operational functions of these agencies in the disguise of performing their oversight mandate including instances of frequent instructions on their day to day running. These include the influence and pressure to appoint their cronies to head very sensitive positions in these agencies. They also influence the employment of their relations and cronies into these agencies and sometimes, insisting on preferred postings for them without consideration of their qualification and capacity.

They also noted that the reason why the legislators are not trusted to sincerely provide the needed legislative supports to the country's law enforcement agencies is the alleged complicity of some of them in criminal activities some of whom had previously been prosecuted. Based on these indications, the above respondents noted that it is very disappointing that some of these legislators occupy sensitive legislative committee positions responsible for oversight supervision of the same agencies that questioned them in the past. (These views were corroborated by the chairman of Nigeria's Senate Committee on Security in 2001).

The above observation brings to the fore, the inappropriate appointment of legislators into these committees without recourse to their integrity, qualification, cognate experience. Consequently, relevant civil oversight committees are populated with persons of allegedly questionable character and grey horns without the knowledge of quality oversight principles. These respondents also noted that most of the legislators are lazy to undertake proper field visits and assessment of the law enforcement and security agencies charged with terrorism control in the country.

Further, submissions by these respondents also indicated the following constraints which militate against the required effective legislative oversight in the country namely: complicity and corrupt tendencies of the legislators who allegedly receive money and other gratifications from these agencies and end up selling their conscience and integrity to the former. Examples they cited in this case, include instances whereby some of the agencies sponsor the legislators for international trips during which they are paid huge sums of estacode. Some of them fly on first class tickets at the expense of these agencies contrary to the legally authorized class for them. During oversight supervisory tours of the operational locations of these agencies, these legislators are accommodated in expensive hotels and suites and paid huge allowances and at times, lavishly entertained with expensive beverages and erotic gratifications. Thus, because of the exposure of

the misconducts of some legislators in their handling of previous investigative hearing on critical security matters, their integrity end up being rubbished with loss of respect not only from the agencies they exercise oversight roles, but that of the citizenry, (Aluko 2015).

Terrorism and its support by terrorism financing is a transnational crime with complex trends because of the ingenuity and innovations of the perpetrators involving complicated tactical operational strategies, illicit connectivity, etc. This therefore requires commensurate or superior intellectual capacity to deal with. In spite of this, the selection of persons into special oversight committees to check counter terrorism agencies as expressed by the above respondents are sometimes based on non-standardized criteria that are tainted with favouritism including ethnic considerations.

Thus, most of the legislators nominated into the special legislative committees for such security oversight functions are not conversant with the latest security trends on which to base their guidance of these security agencies. These respondents accordingly stated that majority of the country's legislators do not possess the required capacity to regulate the activities of these agencies. They equally noted that the legislators appointed into security committees are mostly retired police and military operatives with minimal democratic credential. This situation is worsened by the insufficient information available to the legislators for efficient oversight duties and is further complicated by their reliance on the executive arm of government for the required data. The snag in this case is that such data may be adulterated to suit the interest of the executive thereby defeating the purpose of unbiased checks expected of a virile oversight scheme (Omotosho and Oladeji 2019).

Another constraint against effective democratic oversight as noted by respondents E1, E7, E8, E20, E27, E33, E56, E59, and E60is the example whereby appointments into the operational and decision making cadres of security institutions are used for party patronages. This is such that these appointees enjoy the backing of legislators with affinity to the same political parties even when they are not living up to expectation.

The high turnover rate of Nigerian legislators was also cited by them. Most of them are hardly re-elected with the consequence of lack of continuity for efficient legislative oversight by the legislature. The statistics of retention in the country's present legislature shows that only 25% of the legislators who served in the 2011 – 2015, legislative tenure, were re-elected while less than 31% made it among the present legislators (NBS 2018) implying that the 75% and 69% who could not make it in these instances, left with their experience and for the new ones to start afresh to garner the required experience. The same trend was replicated in the present 9legislature in the Country (INEC Report, 2019).

There is also a noticeable dearth of needed cooperation between the country's legislature and civil society organizations which limits the required rubbing of minds between them. Apart from not having the sufficient opportunity to interface with the legislature on behalf of the electorate, members of most civil

society organisations in Nigeria do not possess the requisite knowledge on such critical security issues that they can utilise in their dialogue with the legislature. This situation is not helped by the absence of a sustainable platform of dialogue between the legislators and their electorates which equally deny the legislators the required knowledge of the feelings and yearnings of these electorates.

In a nutshell, the synthesis of the foregoing includes the following; namely: That the quality of oversight by the various institutions responsible for this role in the country's security sector is below standard and underscores the need for improvement.

- That the Nigerian security sector does not operate within the required framework of accountability due to the culture of impunity, opacity and poor management as well as absence of clearly outlined guidelines, objectives and principles for the security sector. All these are due to the absence of national strategic plan. The following reasons account for this situation; namely:

- Lack of integrity among members of the various oversight bodies in the country including legislators and those of such special executive and extra parliamentary oversight agencies. This has caused them to compromise their conscience and principle as a result of desire for pecuniary gains and perquisites;

- The highly secretive content of the country's security sector which causes a serious dearth of information regarding the sector thereby shielding its activities and make it not to be properly scrutinised;

- Difficulty in actually subordinating the country's security institutions including military institutions to civil democratic control due to the country's history of absence of democratic culture as a result of the several years of military dictatorship.

  The other reasons are as follows: That the executive arm of Nigeria's government seem to have an exclusive control and exercises so much grip on the country's security sector to such an extent that the oversight responsibility and capacity of the legislative arm is depreciated;

- Weak technical capacity of some of the relevant oversight institutions in the country including that of the legislature and civil society organizations;

- Lack of trust between civil society organisations and security institutions especially in the manner in which the later secretly guards its operations without taking the former into confidence and deters it from effectively performing their oversight role.

In addition to the foregoing, Garba - Shehu provided some complementary reasons. He linked the present lack of appreciable success in combating security threats in Nigeria to terrorism to its poor security sector

governance especially lack of effective civil democratic oversight over Nigeria's security institutions especially the military. He noted that the Nigerian military is overstretched and under resourced in terms of proper direction and supervision, human resources, capacity development and equipment supports. This is worsened by the present rivalries among the army, navy and air-force which the chief of defence staff and the defence minister whom he respectively described as lame duck and powerless is unable to resolve (Garba – Shehu 2019).

The reason for this situation is because the service chiefs regularly by-pass them to report direct to the president and therefore making them redundant. The service chiefs separately engage in operations instead of jointly such that critical security and defence projects are undertaken without due cognisance to the existent operational capacity of the various agencies tasked with counter terrorism in the country. Furthermore, the Nigerian military is enmeshed in several allegations of human rights abuses which are yet to be resolved as promised by the country's president (Garba – Shehu 2019).

From the above indications, it can be noted that democratic oversight supervision of Nigeria's security agencies has not been impressive in spite of several efforts by Nigeria to improve on the situation. This has been linked to several prevailing conditions including the country's military antecedent corruption and legislature improprieties and lack of the required qualification by legislators and their high turnover rate, etc. All these require appropriate remedial intervention which can also be complemented with the need for security and law enforcement institutions to operate within the ambits of civilized doctrines including respect for human rights. This accordingly justifies the need for the country's human rights standard to be improved. In order to achieve this objective, it is therefore important to evaluate the subsisting quality of this need prerequisite for such improvement.

5.3.1 Status and Improvement of Nigeria's Human Rights Standard

No doubt the requirement for the respect of human rights by Nigeria's security and law enforcement agencies is necessary for efficient security sector governance. This requirement equally constitutes one of the benefits of a proficient civil democratic oversight of security and law enforcement agencies because when they are effectively supervised within democratic requirements, they can be made to appreciate and respect the rights of citizens in order to attract their cooperation.

The administration of the security sector of any country including Nigeria's is therefore expected to strive to efficiently maintain an appreciable human rights standard as this can enhance the capacity of the sector to deal with the threats of crime. In other words, containment of crimes can hardly be successful in an atmosphere of human rights violations by security operatives and worse still, when such infringements are not checked by the government and the responsible institutions.

In view of the foregoing, the need to explore means of improving the standard of this vital Security Sector Reform (SSR) requirement cannot be overemphasized. This should commence in this study with an appropriate conceptualisation of human rights relative to its relevance to Nigeria's security sector as well as its administration in order to contribute to the boosting of the country's security sector governance. Achievement of this purpose will involve a proper understanding of the concept with examples of human rights violations that have been trending in Nigeria, Nigeria's response to this challenge and the constraining factors that have been militating against these efforts.

5.3.2 Conceptualisation of Human Rights

The need to ensure and protect the rights of the citizens and practice of rule of law are integral components of good governance. These rights are fundamental and elaborately provided for in chapter four of Nigeria's 1999 constitution. It espoused that these rights be predicated on the rule of law. Nigeria's human rights obligation to its citizens is not merely a domestic affair but an international obligation in view of the country's commitment to the various international human rights instruments that it entered into. This informed the reason for the establishment of the country's National Human Rights Commission to undertake the administration of human rights issues with the objective of mitigating its abuse.

Nigeria's National Security Agency Act, 2004, 51 Cap N74, Laws of the Federal Republic averred that it is incumbent on security agencies in Nigeria as part of their obligation to ensure the preservation of law and order as well as the maintenance and respect for human rights. This document noted that Nigerian's security agencies are obliged under the law, to ensure respect for these rights in the provision of security to the citizens. Though the need for the maintenance of human rights is a vital feature of security sector governance, the country's record in this case over the years has not been impressive. There are several reasons for this poor standard but the country's colonial heritage and its successive military administrations appear the most notable.

Respondents E1 – E13, E20, E27, E28, E29, E30, E31, E32, E39, E53, E54, E56 and E60confirmed that this situation continued because the Nigeria's first republic was not able to reform the security system for the purpose of improving its human rights record. This is because it was short lived having lasted barely six years before the adventure of the military into the country's governance and consequent abolition of democratic system of government. Following this were the second and third republics which were also short lived and without any significant positive impact on the system. The opportunity for this improvement came during the fourth republic but was vitiated by the military background of the major functionaries.

These respondents noted that the requirements for the respect for individual's fundamental human rights was subsequently restored and entrenched in the country's 1999 Constitution and given effect through the replacement of military tribunals. Much as this marked an improvement in the country's justice system,

they observed that law enforcement agencies and their operatives did not adhere to civil and constitutional operational procedures.

5.3.3 Analyses of Human Rights Violations in Nigeria

The preceding narratives provides a preliminary understanding of the need for the maintenance of appreciable human rights standard in Nigeria's security sector and some of the underlying factors that could have contributed to the present status of the country's human rights administration. Further understanding can be achieved if the incidents of the various violations of these rights by Nigeria's security institutions are analysed.

PLAC (2018) provided insights on the series of human rights violations perpetrated by the Nigerian security agencies and noted that the conflict between Nigerian security agencies and the main terrorist group in Nigeria; the Boko-Haram is one of the reasons for these violations. It stated that this conflict is yet to abate and consequently cause such humanitarian crisis that has affected millions of people; (Dakas, 2015). The document used the Global Terrorism Index (2017) and the Amnesty international Reports (2016/2017) to substantiate this position. While the former rated Nigeria as the third (for the third time) most terrorism-prone country globally, and only better than Iraq and Afghanistan, the later indicted the Nigerian military for extra-judicial killings and the forced disappearance of persons due to the presence of Nigeria's military in 30 out of the country's 36 states. Also, notable in this case, are the series of human rights violations including tortures and inhuman treatment of fellow human beings, harsh military detention facilities and forceful eviction of people from their homes.

Amnesty International Reports (2014 – 2018) highlighted that Nigeria witnessed the commission of crimes under international law with serious human rights violations. The reports stated the continued armed conflicts between the Boko-Haram group and the Nigerian security forces has caused the death of thousands of civilians and displaced over two million citizens. It listed the incidence of torture and the brutal actions of Nigeria's security operatives as well as extra-judicial killings, forced disappearances, forced eviction of thousands of persons and the imposition of death sentences and resultant humanitarian crisis which affected over fourteen million persons. The human rights abuses which are contained in all the above reports also included arbitrary arrests and mishandling of citizens and subjecting them to trump up allegation that they belong to the terrorist groups and thereafter detained. These detainees are incarcerated under lock and key without access to their families or any legal assistance nor notified of the reason for their arrest whilst still being tortured resulting in the death of many of them.

Worse still, the reports noted that the Nigerian military has severally been involved in extra judicial murder of recaptured escapees from prison custody. An example was the execution of 640 Boko-Haram suspects who escaped from a military detention in a major North Eastern Nigerian town. Furthermore, cases of mass arrests of citizens by the military caused the overcrowding of military detention facilities which led

to dehydration, starvation and consequent deaths of many detainees. Another case of abuse was the arrest and detention of members of a separatist group in Nigeria, the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) and the refusal of the government to honour the court order for the release of the leader of this group. This leader was later released on bail but escaped as a result of the alleged onslaught at his residence by the Nigerian military.

The reports further highlighted that Nigeria's Federal government deployed military operatives to almost all the states of the country and they usurped police duties and most times, descended on peaceful demonstrators leading to several extra judicial killings including several members of IPOB as well as enforced disappearance of many of them. This situation according to the reports was even made worse as the country's Department of States Security Services and the police followed suit in the execution of several members of the group. The same fate was meted to members of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria which led to the massacre of many of its members while their leader was incarcerated in spite of a subsisting court order for his release. The country also continued with the military prosecution of military personnel and sentencing many of them to death. This implies that the country has continued to practice death penalty as enshrined in its related legislation in spite of promise to explore means of abolishing it from its legal instrument system as also requested by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, since 2014.

Furthermore, a special Amnesty International Report (2015) on the war crimes committed by Nigeria's military, corroborated most of the above revelations. This report was based on in-depth interviews with victims, relatives, human rights activists, military personnel, legal practitioners and the content analyses of over 800 official documents. The document however noted that the above statistics were those collected between 2013 and 2014 and were not easily verifiable because of dearth of records, cover-ups by the country's security institutions and lack of accessibility to witnesses in the location where these crimes were committed.

It narrated that Nigerian security agencies executed over 1200 persons extra judicially and have arrested over 20,000 since they commenced their confrontation of Boko-Haram terrorists in North East Nigeria in 2009. Those arrested who are mostly young men and boys were subjected to series of torture while thousands of others were not only victimized but forcefully taken. Worse still, an estimated 7000 persons were recorded to have lost their lives between 2011 and 2014 in military confinement due to starvation, unbearable overcrowding and denial of medical attention. It also observed that those who were extra judicially murdered were either shot dead or had their throats chopped off in detention facilities in clear contravention of International humanitarian law since they posed no further security threat having been captured by security forces.

The report also noted that in spite of having been thoroughly briefed with documentary evidence on the above incidents that the leadership of the concerned military formations that perpetrated these acts took

no action to redress the situation. To substantiate this revelation, the report noted that the Nigerian Government including military and civilian authorities continued to shy away from taking any effective action to stop these violations and accordingly bring the culprits to book. More so, the report pointed out that the Nigerian government has severally attempted to understate these acts through consistent denials of these allegations which they consistently tagged as exaggerated.

5.3.4 Nigeria's Human Rights Standard

It may not be doubtful that the administration of human rights in Nigeria has not been satisfactory and with such attendant age long challenges that inevitably require the country to seek means of redressing the situation. One of such steps undertaken by Nigeria to check this trend is the country's National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (2006). This Plan was consequent upon the recommendation contained in the United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights promotion and protection which was adopted at the World conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria in 1993. The conference requested countries including Nigeria to draw up a national action plan which would identify and formulate measures for the improvement, protection and promotion of human rights.

Nigeria responded to the above request and came up with the above plan but varied it to suit the country's circumstance. This National Action Plan contains an integrated and systematic national strategy intended for the realization of the advancement of human rights in the country. This plan encapsulated an audit of the human rights situation in the country and identified areas of need for human rights protection and improvement. It also represented the country's commitment and concrete steps for the entrenchment of a virile human rights culture as well as provided the guide for a well sustained and coordinated means of protecting human rights in subsequent years.

It acts as a guide for the monitoring and evaluation of the country's human rights standard practice by both government and civil society organisations. The document observed that the respect for and protection of human rights in Nigeria had been consistent in Nigeria's various constitutions starting with the 1960 constitution and the subsequent ones namely: the 1963, the 1979 and the 1999 constitutions which in addition, provided for a bill of rights intended to protect the citizens' political, economic, social freedom and wellbeing.

It however expressed regret that in spite of the above good intentions, especially the prescription of fundamental human rights in these constitutions, that the intermittent forays of the military in Nigeria's governance, adversely affected the realization of a virile human rights culture in Nigeria. Thus, the successive military governments in the country engaged in series of human rights abuses which has subsisted till date.

The Respondents E7, E27, E28, E29, E30, E31, E32, E33 and E36 made submissions on the quality of implementation and effectiveness of the plan in helping to improve the country's human rights profile and noted that this has not be impressive. They cited the continuous poor score of the country's respect for human rights by Amnesty International to buttress their point. They also observed that the country's human rights standard has nosed-dived to the same situation as it was during the country's military regimes. They attributed more of this to the handling of the country's security challenge due to terrorist activities which tend to give security operatives the impetus to be engaged in human rights abuses.

On the country's sincerity in adhering to relevant international human rights statutes, these respondents expressed reservation on the rational implementation of these instruments. PLAC (2018) observed that though Nigeria has ratified several international instruments on human rights including the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) which it endorsed in 1983 that its adherence to the provisions of these international instruments has not been satisfactory.

Furthermore, the United States Human Rights Practice Report (2017) indicted the present Nigerian government for its laxity in the investigation and prosecution of alleged human rights violations by the country's security operatives that are complicit. The report pointed out the prevalent widespread impunity by the government which was also worsened by the government's failure to check its security agencies' personnel responsible for using excessive and extremely brutal force on persons in custody and which resulted in their deaths. It acknowledged the Presidential Investigation Panel set up by the Federal Government to appraise the extent of compliance of the country's armed forces to human rights obligations and to civilised rules of engagement. However, it noted that this panel was yet to release its report and that several other investigative panels set up by the Federal and State Governments did not disclose their findings; (The panel subsequently released this report but it is yet to be implemented fully.

The several cases of human rights infringement by the country's security agencies which were not granted deserving attention by the government as cited in the report were as follows:

(a) The government's failure to adequately investigate or indict culpable police and military operatives responsible for the (2016) extra judicial killings of supporters of the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) – (the group in Nigeria clamouring for a separate independent country for the people of South-Eastern Region). This is in spite of the Amnesty International reported killing of not less than one hundred and fifty members and arbitrary arrest and forceful disappearance of several of them by the country's security agencies.

(b) Lack of reports from Nigeria's Federal government in terms of either conducting further investigation or indictment of persons who were culpable for the 2015 execution and mass burial of 348 members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria. Dissatisfaction is also hinged on lack of diligent prosecution of human rights violators. This is mainly due to the failure of the authority to

not only take security operatives who violate citizens' human rights to court but to ensure that they are conclusively prosecuted. Worse still is that even when such cases are conclusively prosecuted with resultant court pronouncements, these sentences are flouted by the security agencies and without effective reprimand by the government (Nzarga 2014);

(c) Wide spread torture as well as unwarranted use of evidence extracted from suspects under torture to prosecute them in clear breach of the constitutional abhorrence of this practice. Accordingly, the report observed that in addition to the prohibition of torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment by the country's constitution that the country's Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) enacted in 2015 also clearly prohibits torture and cruel inhuman or degrading treatment of arrested persons. This Act also disallows the acceptance of any evidence or confessions procured through torture or coercion. In spite of all these, the report noted that the country's security agencies continue to torture suspects as a means of forcefully inducing their confessions.

The foregoing are further supported with practical instances of the abuse of rule of law and resultant infringements on the rights of citizens. These are: The Money Laundering Decree enacted by the military which has subsisted till date and used by the military leadership of security agencies to swoop on suspected bank officials, businessmen and women and any person presumed to be living beyond his or her means of livelihood. This resulted in the invasion of car shops to arrest their owners and confiscate their assets and was also followed with the freezing of the bank accounts of persons suspected in this case. Even parents and relatives of suspects were not spared as many of them were arrested and coerced to answer for missing suspects, (Obot, 2004 P.4).

Other instances were when the country's security operatives in the disguise of tracking money launderers broke into peoples' homes without the required court authorization as well as shot at vehicles in motion. Operatives of sister law enforcement were also arrested and detained on suspicion of colluding with these launderers. To complement this level of high handedness, the military leadership of the NDLEA advocated the reintroduction of capital punishment for drug related money launderers. To worsen the situation, civil society organizations were intimidated to the extent that they became cowed and refrained from challenging these abuses. Nevertheless, some of them who were bold accused the Nigerian government especially the leadership of these agencies of serious human rights violations. (A onetime UNODC Technical Adviser took exception to this and petitioned Nigeria's Head of State then).

Another challenge observed in Nigeria's human right administration is that the citizens, whose rights were violated in Nigeria were reluctant to seek redress in courts due to the complexities and constraints in the country's justice system. The listed constraints in this case by the above respondents includes the high cost of legal services and the lengthy time required to obtain court judgments as well as the insufficient involvement of civil society organizations in pursuing human rights cases in courts.

Also, the present Nigerian democratically elected government also seem not to be adhering to the principles of rule of law. This is due to the frequency of arbitrariness in the use of state power and with the consequence of instilling fear, uncertainty and apprehension in the citizenry which portends such negative perception of the government and its security agencies as no longer trustworthy. Several cases of unlawful arrests and detentions and disobedience of court orders especially by the country's security agencies exemplify the situation.

An important observation in the country human efforts is its tendency to justify human rights violations using security as excuse. It has however been advised that the boundaries of the rule of law should not be exceeded regardless of the purpose of the action otherwise democracy will appear to be under siege if the provision of security is used as an opportunity to deal with dissenting voices" (Ubani 2017). It was for this reason that Dakas (2015) cautioned that the fight against terrorism should not be used as justification for rights abuses by the country's security institutions.

Same was echoed in the Resolution 60/288 of the United Nations General Assembly which noted emphatically that effective intervention and maintenance of human rights should complement and not contradict each other and should be in consonance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003). This resolution stridently emphasized the need for countries to prosecute their anti-terrorism campaigns in compliance with their obligations to the relevant extant international laws. Respondents E1, E7, E8, E18, E20, E27, E28, E29, E30 and E31 corroborated this position and also took exception to the subsisting practice of non-standardised and lack of uniformity in the application of rules of governance for different individuals and situations and therefore asserted that available laws in Nigeria, are sufficient to tackle any of its security challenge within the limits of these laws.

All the foregoing obviously underscores the point that Nigeria's security agencies especially those charged with counter terrorism are yet to properly embrace civility in their operations and for which reason, their score card in terms of respect for human rights has not been satisfactory.

5.3.5 Constraining factors in Nigeria's Human Rights Administration

The foregoing analyses indicate that though Nigeria has embarked on some initiatives to improve its human rights standard that these efforts have not yielded the desired result. For this reason, it has continuously been indicted locally and internationally (AI Reports 2000 – 2019). The reasons for this are traceable to such constraining factors that require a conscious programme of action to redress.

Amnesty International Report (2015) identified the following challenges as responsible for the country's, security institutions' failure to meet up with the required human rights standard in their counter terrorism campaigns; namely: (a) Ignorance and insufficient knowledge of the phenomenon of human rights and its demands; (b) Lack of, or insufficient training on the part of the operatives especially on the intricacies and

application of this subject matter; (c) Complexity of the country's judicial process with attendant lack of expertise in handling related cases; (d) Incidence of corruption in the country's justice system which has not only made law enforcement operatives to be corrupt but has also corrupted the judicial process; (e) Lack of and inadequate provision of resources to both law enforcement and judicial institutions. Thus, the unavailability of these resources can push law enforcement institutions and their operatives to cut corners at the expense of the rule of law. (f) Other factors include undue bureaucratic practices in the process of governance; psychological fixation to specific operational procedures and lack of dynamism on the part of law enforcement operatives as well as societal ignorance induced by illiteracy and primitive cultures.

The foregoing are elaborated with additional factors; namely:

(a) Lack of political will on the part of the government as exemplified by the inefficiency of the government's institutions in charge of human rights administration in the country due to lack of legal and financial supports (Nzarga 2014).

(b) Lack of understanding of not only the implications, but the required training for the maintenance of these rights. Thus, most Nigerian citizens are not educated and as such, do not even understand where their rights begin and end nor when such rights are violated and when and how to seek legal redress. This situation is further compounded by the lack of training of Nigerian security operatives on their obligations and application of human rights requirements in their security functions. The Nigerian Police is an example in this case because its personnel including their political and organizational leadership have been assessed as corrupt, as corrupt with attendant absence of ethical conduct expected in a civilized society (SERAP Report, 2017, UNODC Report 2019);

(c) To worsen the situation, civil society organizations are intimidated to the extent that they are cowed and refrained from challenging these abuses. Cost implications of seeking redress compounds this situation especially in the absence of free and effective legal aid to assist victims who cannot afford the legal cost of pursuing their cases.

The above reports were in consensus and were corroborated by the respondents that lack of commitment in the handling of the several human rights abuses perpetrated by Nigeria's security agencies are impediments in Nigeria's human rights administration. This is exemplified in the manner in which the cases of human rights abuses by security operatives are treated with levity and undeserving protection of the accused by their superiors instead of being appropriately sanctioned. This situation is further worsened by the lack of the needed sanction which will make it compulsory for operatives of security agencies to account for all their operational tools especially arms and ammunition that are used against the citizens; (Nzarga 2014). The foregoing analyses are pointers to poor administration of security agencies which inevitably discourages the citizens from cooperating with them including denying them with necessary

information that they can use to track and apprehend terrorists. Thus, the violation of rights of citizens is also a consequence of bad governance. Therefore, good governance can help to ameliorate the situation and underscores the need to appraise its relevance in helping the country's security sector.

5.4.1 Imperative of Good Governance

The quality of institutional capacity, democratic oversight and human rights standard of the country's security sector have been analysed and understood not to be impressive and requires improvement. It is the proposition of this research that such improvement can be attained through good governance. This involves the proper management and appropriation of resources which can help in the reduction of the threat level of terrorism. Provision of the dividends of good governance can also help to not only reduce the number of potential recruits into this crime but equally reduce the level of involvement. Accordingly, the need for good governance is highly justifiable.

Thus, good governance is a relevant requirement for the development of any country's security sector and Nigeria is not an exception. The Austrian Development Report (2011) averred that good governance involves upholding human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law as well as the transparent and accountable administration of the relevant natural and man-made resources to achieve equitable and sustainable development.

The World Bank Institute (2012) conceptualized good governance as the means of exercising power in the administration of a country's socio-economic resources for the purpose of its development. This is characterized by rule of law, popular participation, transparency and responsiveness (Adesola 2012). Its relevance is anchored on the need to ensure peace and development of the state with attendant security of lives and property that will consequently enable sustainable development (George – Genyi 2013). The concept of leadership is a vital requirement of governance.

According to Mo Ibrahim Foundation Report (2020), governance is the provision of political, socio – economic, public goods and services which the government as a matter of responsibility is obligated to achieve and which, every citizen is entitled to and has the right to expect from their government.

In his interrogation of the quality of governance in Nigeria, Omotosho (2012) averred that the qualities of democratic governance should include capacity to bring socio-economic development, citizen's participation in government, quality accountability and transparency of public officials. However, he took exception to the quality of governance since the country's return to democratic governance in 1999.

Johnson (2020) observed that attainment of good governance requires the cooperation of the government with its citizens and is constituted of Rule of Law, Accountability and Transparency. These variables according to him must interact to achieve desired results through effective leadership. They are very critical

for the socio-economic and political development of any country and for the attainment of peace. Inversely, any country that is lacking on the above is more prone to social unrest and insecurity.

Several features have been adduced as constituents of good governance. According to Odok (2009 p.4), the relevance of leadership in the governance of a country cannot be over emphasized because it is only through good leadership that a state or group of citizens can achieve their political and socio-economic objectives. In his contestation on the leadership question in Nigeria, Chigbu (2007) averred that the Nigerian problem is basically tied to its leadership which has not been able to live up to its responsibilities.

In addition, USAID Report (2018) noted that the practice and adherence to the rule of law is another critical characteristic of good governance and requires free and fair political and justice systems; protection of human rights, vibrant civil society, public confidence in the various security and law enforcement agencies, the courts as well as security sector reform. It affirmed that re-establishing rule of law should be the first step in the rebuilding process of any post conflict situation. This is because it is relevant for the development of the pre-requisite conditions for reconciliation, public confidence and eventual economic development.

The absence of the attributes of good governance results in bad governance. This implies the inability of public institutions including their functionaries to efficiently manage or administer public affairs and resources. This comprises governments and institutions that are inefficient, non – transparent, non-responsive, non – accountable, inequitable and more favourable to the elites. It is also non – participatory, does not adhere to the rule of law and riddled with unpopular policies (Owoye and Bissessar 2009). It is important to therefore state that good governance and bad governance have implications for the security of lives and property. All the respondents E1 – E60 were of the consensus that while good governance can engender peace that bad governance can cause insecurity.

On the relationship between governance and security, Coker and George – Genyi (2014) in their reference to Mijah (2007) noted that security does not only entail the presence of security agencies. They equated security with development which they noted, implies qualitative improvements in the standard of living of citizens in such a manner that the levels of inequality, unemployment and poverty are drastically curtailed. Further to the above, Maman (2012) affirmed that security is not only constituted by the absence of war (or the absence of terrorism related threats) but such requirements that are necessary for lasting peace including education, democracy, health, human rights, etc.

The above indications have obvious implication for Nigeria's security sector because the country's poor human and physical development can undermine its national security (World Bank Report 2019). In the same vein, the thriving of democratic governance can significantly help its national security because it tends to provide the requisite peace, stability upon which democratic governance can achieve the expected national development. This underscores the need for democratic governance to ensure the provision of

dividends of good governance. These include: health and welfare facilities, education, gainful employment poverty alleviation and food security, social services, infrastructure, economic growth and stability efficient conflict and grievance management schemes and the protection of citizens lives and properties. Nevertheless, the attainment of such provisions can hardly be achieved without judicious management of resources in such a transparent manner that is devoid of grafts by the managers of these resources and which constitutes a vital requirement of good governance (Enofe, Aigboduwa, Audu and Idemudia 2015).

The various security challenges presently facing Nigeria especially the onslaughts of Boko Haram and even the previous ones, notably the Niger Delta militant activities have been so excruciating to Nigeria such that the country and its foreign friends have been exploring various strategies of resolving the situation but which are yet to produce the desired result. To this extent, it has been averred that none of these strategies will be appreciably successful unless they recognize the consequence of bad governance as the root cause of the above security challenges (Onabogu 2019 p.1). The same view was earlier echoed by Okonyedo (2016) who iterated that tackling modern security threat should be predicated on improvement of governance and oversight of the security sector.

The inference from the submissions of respondents E1, E7, E8, E20, E27, E28, E29, E30, E45, E46, E56, E57, E58, E59 and E60 indicated that these lacks are symptomatic of bad governance and are compounded by the brazen corruption of political elites which is equally a symptom of governance failure and can elicit insecurity. This situation especially in Northern Nigeria where the rate of corruption is highest, has stoked crisis in the region (Omede 2011 p.93). Ojo and Aghedo 2013 stated that the citizens especially the youths are pushed into violent activities due to being deprived of the dividends of good governance as a means of eliciting government attention.

From the above indications, terrorism in Nigeria can be linked to governance because of the growing rate of poverty which elicits, discontent and frustration among the population especially the youths who consequently resort to violence (Okoro 2014 p.1). It is further noted that this is a situation where most Nigerians hardly satisfy their basic human needs including the youths who can neither afford to feed nor access to quality education, health care and employment provisions.

The above narratives therefore point to the need for good governance in Nigeria as an important requirement for the control of terrorism in the country which can also escalate if the government continues to treat issues of good governance with levity. This can consequently give birth and breed more insurgent groups that will hold the country hostage.

The non – satisfactory quality of governance in Nigeria, as observed from the foregoing can be supported with relevant evaluations by the Mo – Ibrahim foundation especially as indicated in its 2018 and 2019 Reports. This foundation included several indicators under its governance framework and formulated under four main categories; namely: Security and Rule of Law; Participation, Rights and Inclusion;

Foundations and Economic Development. There are several components of these indicators which cannot be exhaustible in single research of this nature. However, such issues as maintenance of human rights, anti-corruption, access to qualify employment as a means of poverty alleviation, public administration (under which the issue of security sector governance and specifically democratic governance is subsumed, were chosen for more comprehensive analyses within the context of improving Nigeria's security sector's capacity to counter terrorism.

The 11AG framework provides the indices for the assessment of the delivery of public goods and services as well as the quality of good governance results due to government policies. These indicators have clear implication for Nigeria's security sector and the need for the country to improve on them cannot be overemphasized. Unfortunately, it is regrettable that Nigeria has over the years not fared well on these indicators. According to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) evaluation of governance in Nigeria, the country's scores from 2007 to 2019, were not impressive. On the aggregate scores for the four indices, Nigeria's scores are as follows: 43.2% in 2007, 43% in 2008, 43.2% in 2009, 43.9% in 2010, 43.2% in 2011, 43.4% in 2012, 43.4% in 2013, 45.3% in 2014, 44.9% in 2015, 48.1% in 2016, 47.9% in 2017, 47% in 2018, and 45.5% in 2019. All these indicated an overall average score of 44.7% which is obviously below average and underscores the need for improvement. The country was ranked 34 out of the 54 countries assessed with a score of 45.5% and was also included in the list of thirteen other countries classified as increasingly deteriorating within the past ten years in its governance indices. According to the report, this signifies that the governance in Africa including Nigeria has not progressed since 2015.

The IIAG Report (2020) classified Nigeria's governance as increasingly deteriorating. The report also observed that Nigeria has been declining over the past ten years with more depreciation within the past five years. Regarding its anti-corruption profile, Nigeria was scored 26% in terms of the corruption profile in its institutions and 25% in its public procurement operations. Regarding the relevant indications on security sector governance, the country scored 21% in its criminal justice system and classified in the fourth category in the non - performing nations in this respect. Other scores include 35% for law enforcement and30% for disclosure of financial information. These evaluations are very worrisome and with possible adverse implication for the country's security sector governance Popoola (2020) (p.g.1) in this regard, noted that the reason for this poor governance performance could be attributable to two transparency - related indicators; namely: accessibility to information and dearth of disclosure of financial and judicial information. In his analysis of Ibrahim Index of African Governance, (IIAG) Awojobi (2014) (p.1), observed that the annual results of these evaluations showed that Nigeria's performance on all the four categories as represented in IIAG indices was very unsatisfactory. These evaluations were based on the country's performance on safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. The evaluation according to him showed that in spite of the country's democratic

governance, that it is yet to progress and instead, been challenged with insecurity, poverty and unemployment.

Also, the widening gap of inequality has been identified as another component of bad governance and with the propensity to not only stoke but increase the level of participation of the citizens especially the poor ones, in insurgencies. This was manifested in Nigeria's Niger Delta region, mainly due to how the country's resources are held by a very minority few wealthy elites at the detriment of majority of ordinary citizens (Crossdel Oghaotor and Abam 2015). Such inequality has been noted as a source of discontent by majority of the citizens and indeed has caused food crises and attendant insecurity in Northern Nigeria. Respondents E1, E7, E8, E14, E20, E27, E28, E33, E36, E37, E38, E56, E57, E58, E59 and E40 corroborated all the above points. They observed that Nigeria's democratic governance has been disappointing especially due to the absence of good governance which is made more adverse by the incidence of corruption in the country.

According to Oxtam Report (2017), the level of economic inequality is very high in Nigeria especially in Northern Nigeria where terrorism is at highest in the country and with a continuous resistance by majority of the citizens who live in extreme poverty at an average of below two dollars daily. The report which is indicative of bad governance in Nigeria, noted that in spite of Nigeria's growing economy, that the country remains one of the few countries where the number of its citizens who are very poor, have been increasing. The report further noted that resource management in Nigeria is not encouraging and is bedevilled by elite capture and corruption which dwindles the required opportunities for inclusive growth. It gave example with the revelations by the country's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission that about $20 trillion was stolen from the country's coffers within a period of forty – five years. To compound the situation, the country's resources are not transparently appropriated and consequently disable the government from providing the dividends of good governance. The report exemplified this situation with the meagre allocation of funds for the provision of education, health and security services.

A warning signal to this dangerous trend can be deciphered from the NDIC Report (2016) (p.1) which indicated that only 2% of Nigerians own more than 90% of the total N17.2 trillion (equivalent of $114.7 billion) bank deposits as at December 2015 in Nigeria which according to the report, is indicative of the wide gap between the rich and the poor in Nigeria and with serious negative socio-economic challenges to the country.

Another adverse consequence of the poor management of the country's resources is the high level of unemployment especially youth empowerment. This according to the report is due to inability of capacity of the country's economy to create job opportunities because of insufficient allocation of resources that would have translated to job opportunities. All the foregoing according to the report stalls the government's poverty eradication obligation. A very vital observation in the various analyses of quality of

governance in Nigeria is the incidence and adverse consequence of governance especially in the country's security sector.

The (Nigerian News 2014 p.6) averred that Corruption has been both a cliché and a mantra in Nigeria (P.1). The publication wondered why Nigerian security operatives who were sent to other countries for international peace assignments always come back with medals, but performs poorly in Nigeria. It magazine linked this to lack of sufficient resources to perform well and "that the criminals operating in Nigeria possessed better and sophisticated weapons because the funds budgeted for security agencies in Nigeria were embezzled. The brazen grafts in the Accounts and payroll section of the Nigerian police command between 2009 and 2011 where officials were fingered to have stolen about two billion Naira (then equivalent of 13million dollars) was used as example.

This trend according to the report has the propensity to stall human development. This view was equally reiterated in USAID Report (2019) in which it stated that countries that are ranked high in corruption and without effective rule of law and accountability in their government are more prone to conflicts and security threats. It also stated that citizens do not trust any government that cannot provide good governance and its dividends. This according to the report affects the ability of the government to sustain democratic reforms and improvement of the lots of its citizens.

The report further advanced that if a country is riddled with corruption, it will hinder it from the provision of the dividends of good governance such as health, education and other social benefits which consequently breeds poverty and inequalities. The report averred for the process of governing to achieve desired governance benefits that it should incorporate democratic principles including transparency, citizens' involvement in decision making, accountability as well as recognition of the role of civil Society Organizations.

Most of the expert interviewees especially E1, E7, E8, E55, E56, E57, E58, E59 and E60 were affirmative that corruption constitutes a major reason why good governance seems far-fetched in Nigeria. According to them, the country over the years treated this menace with kid gloves and that it is very imperative for it to sit-up and be more proactive in its desire and efforts to eradicate this quagmire. It is therefore important for this research to help contribute means of achieving this objective. The need to therefore seek means of controlling the menace of corruption in Nigeria's security sector is therefore very crucial. Accordingly, Nigeria's corruption profile needs to be adequately understood to provide the diagnostic guidance upon which necessary resolutions will be based.

5.4.2 Nigeria's Corruption Profile

For the above reasons, a proficient anti-corruption drive which can minimize the stealing of resources that can be used to support Nigeria's security sector will be analysed. A proper understanding of the incidence

of corruption in the country and the various interventions that the country has so far embarked upon to check this menace will therefore be analysed.

Apart from having a negative effect on good governance in Nigeria, the manifestation of corruption portends adverse implication on all the various segments of the country's security sector governance including the institutional capacity of the sector as well as on other critical requirements such as the quality of civil democratic oversight and human rights standard.

It is also noted to be significantly responsible for the decrease in Nigeria's (HCD) Human Capital Development. According to the World Bank's Human Capital Index (HCI) (2020), Nigeria ranked 150 out of the 157 of countries evaluated. The report noted that Nigeria has for this reason continued to be confronted with serious developmental challenges including poor infrastructure, governance challenges, inefficient and poor institutional capacity and worsened by graft-ridden financial management systems. Other consequences identified in the report include high income inequality, high poverty levels, insecurity and high inflation.

PriceWater House Coopers Report (2016) had earlier indicated that by 2030, that the menace could depreciate Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by up to 37% if prompt interventions were not taken. This observation according to the report, was based on the adverse consequences of corruption in the country's critical governance segments including reduction in the provision of the dividends of good governance.

Available statistics of the extent of corruption in Nigeria due to the country's corruption perception and the country's efforts to ameliorate the situation over the past five years from 2016 – 2020 have been poor. The country's ranking in the Perception Corruption Index (PCI) since 2016 were: 136 out of 176 in 2016; 148 out of 180 in 2017; 144 out of 180 in 2018; 146 out of 180 in 2019 and 149 out of 180 in 2020. All these surpassed the African and global averages in these years. These are respectively, 67.9% and 56.8% in 2000; 67.6% and 56.8% in 2019; 67.5% and 56.9% in 2018; 67.9% and 56.9% in 2017 and 68.5% and 57.1% in 2016.

During these years, Nigeria's anti-corruption records were 25%, 26%, 27%, 27% and 28% respectively. The foregoing statistics also reflected the country's level of corruption during the same period. Its scores during these years were: 75% in 2020; 74% in 2019; 73% in 2018; 73% in 2017; 72% in 2016.

In spite of the foregoing, the UNODC Report (2019) and specific to bribery in the country, noted that 30.2 percent Nigerians who had at least a contact with a public official in 2019 paid bribe or were solicited to do so. The report acknowledged that though this figure was still high that it was a slight improvement over previous years especially in 2016 when the figure was 32.3 percent. The report further noted that 93 percent of the total amount of bribes in Nigeria in 2019 were moderately lower than the figure in 2016. A

total of N675 billion was paid in cash as bribe to public officials in 2019 and corresponded with 0.52 percent of the entire country's GDP. This implies that bribery in Nigeria during the year under review, approximated to 6 percent of the average yearly income of Nigerians. The analyses show that the incidence of corruption has remained unabated in Nigeria. Accordingly, the report averred that corruption is significantly noted to constitute a serious impediment to Nigeria's hope to realize its 2030 Agenda for sustainable development through which it intends to lift 100 million Nigerians with the next decade.

The Nigeria – South Africa Chamber of Commerce Report (2016) in the same vein, while acknowledging that Nigeria is blessed with resources, but identified corruption as a militating factor against the judicious and transparent utilization of these resources. It observed that the country earns a lot of revenue from its natural resources but is incapable of properly appropriating the accrued earnings to take care of its people and utilize same to provide support to its security sector. Respondents E1, E7, E8, E14, E20, E27, E28, E33, E56, E57, E58, E59 and E60 took exception to how the poor budgetary allocations to security agencies are frequently misappropriated with the consequence of gross limitation of their performance including poor productivity occasioned by lack of commitment of their operatives. The reason for this according to them, includes poor welfare provisions; e.g., poor salary, non or unbefitting accommodation (most of the houses which accommodate these operatives are so dilapidated and present very disgusting and gory sight). They reiterated that the poor welfare standard which security operatives are subjected to, is consequent upon the misappropriation of funds meant for their welfare. This can induce them into criminal conspiracies with organized criminals because of the juicy allures from the latter. (US International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 2015, 2016 and 2018).

The World Drug Report (2017) averred that corruption reached its climax during Nigeria's military administrations because the leaders facilitated it through patronage of acolytes and by virtually privatizing the state and appropriated the public treasury for their individual gains. This was exemplified with the alleged stealing of N12.8 billion dollars oil revenue windfall to Nigeria during one of its previous military administrations (EFCC Report 2016).

The above respondents also observed that the country's international cooperation scheme has equally been affected by corruption is because of the presumed lack of trust for the country's security operatives by its international collaborators (Wroughton and Stewart 2014). They noted that these international collaborators consequently become sceptical in providing or exchanging resources with the country's security agencies and their operatives due to their belief that such resource will be misappropriated or out rightly stolen. These observations were corroborated by respondents E45, E46, E53, E54 and E55. The same reason could have also informed the tendency of these foreign collaborators to dictate the conditions for their cooperation with Nigeria and almost at expense of the country's sovereignty.

The presentations of the above respondents were emphatic that the menace of corruption constitutes impediment to the development of Nigeria including vitiation of good governance, threat to the protection of lives and property disruption in the provision of human security needs of the citizenry due to poor infrastructural facilities, poor health care and social services, etc. All these according to them can be linked to many years of mismanagement of the country's oil wealth, due to inept and unaccountable leadership. Furthermore, corruption contaminates the judiciary and leads to the truncation of rule of law as well as threat to good governance including democratic institutions due to subversion of public good for selfish individual interest.

SERAP (2018) observed that the anti-corruption drive of the government was unsatisfactory. It stated that an average Nigerian would at 63% probability be requested to pay bribe on any occasion he had dealings with the police. In its corruption Assessment Performance Survey, SERAP (2018) stated that the Nigerian Police was the most corrupt institution in the country relative to bribe taking among five institutions that were assessed. It evidenced this with the interview results regarding citizens interactions with the police in which it was reported that out of every 100 interactions with the police that bribes were paid in 54 interactions.

Other institutions where corruption was prevalent included the power sector with 37%, education sector with 18%, the judiciary with 17.7% and 14% in the health sector. The share of national bribe collected by each of the above sectors showed that the judiciary's share was the largest with both having received 33% and 31% respectively. Nevertheless, the report stated that the judiciary got the largest share of money paid for corruption. The survey further reported that 51% of the interviewees who paid bribe to the police and 35% of those who paid bribe to the power sector stated that it was not possible to procure the services of government agencies without paying bribe.

Relative to corruption records in Nigeria's Security Sector, Page (2018) noted that Nigeria's Defense and Security Sectors are among the most corrupt globally. He cited the use of security votes by top government officials as instrument to siphon public funds which Transparency international estimated at over $670 million in its report. The situation according to the report is worsened because these votes are not only unaudited in cash but are not subjected to standard procurement regulations. Worse still, many government officials without security schedules are noted to be beneficiaries of these votes.

A good case in point, is the high-level corruption in the administration of Nigeria's police. Specifically, he noted that more than 80,000 ghost operatives in the payroll of the service which constituted over 20% of the entire personnel of the service were identified in 2018. Apart from staffing the capacity of the service to effectively control the internal security challenges of the country, it hampers the country's economic development. He further noted that corruption remained the single most constraining incident against the

realization of Nigeria's enormous potential by draining billions of dollars from the country's economy annually.

Sanders (2014) in the same vein, had also affirmed that Nigeria's Armed Forces and Police are mistrusted because of corruption. Quoting the 2013 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, she stated that nine out of every ten persons interviewed rated the Nigerian Police and military as very corrupt. She also revealed that there were scandals on "Security Votes" which allowed politicians to misappropriate millions of dollars in the disguise that these monies were utilized for security purposes. She gave example with Nigeria's former military president who was alleged to have siphoned over $1.1 Billion using the facade of security votes while leaving the security agencies were extremely underfunded and unable to effectively perform their security obligations.

Throwing more light on the foregoing, Ojelu (2019) in a nutshell, reiterated that the Nigerian police was rated highest in terms of frequency of incorrupt practice while the judiciary made more money out of corruption. With reference to the SERAP Report (2018) he observed that majority of Nigerians that were interviewed assessed the government's anti-corruption intervention as poor and were pessimistic that corruption will subsequently reduce in the country because according to them, the efforts of government were not adequate. Further reference to the report indicated that the country's anti-corruption, legal and institutional framework was not efficient due to namely: lack of political will to effectively enforce anti-corruption legislations, poor funding of the various anti-corruption institutions, weak public support and ownership of anti-corruption initiatives, lack of and or poor clarity of the roles of the various anti-corruption agencies as well as politicization of corruption by the government.

Another trend which has not helped Nigeria's corruption profile is the complicity of the country's elites. This manifests in elites' predation that cause such frustration and deprivation of the citizens who may be pushed into criminality. This type of situation contributed to militant activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria as an offshoot of the predatory tendencies of its elites (Crosdel et al 2015 p.5).

In order to gain political power as a means of sustaining their vantage position, these elites also manipulate the electoral process involving the enlistment and arming of intransigent youths who after being used by them and dumped, resort to further criminal activities. It is notable that Niger Delta militancy is a consequence of the above situation. Nigeria's Federal Government Kayode Eso Panel Report (2009) (p.1) on this note, indicated that the Niger Delta militants were originally equipped and funded by political elites for selfish political escapades but these militants later resorted to serious terrorist activities after being discarded. "These elites sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind" (Ohanyere, 2016 p. 6). Same scenario was replicated in the North which created the Boko – Haram monster. As corroborated by the experts who participated in this study, this situation, was worsened by the selfish misuse of the country's oil resources

by the competing elites to foster and sustain their dominance rather than for the dividends of good governance and thereby created a big gap between them and the other citizens.

The presentation of the last mentioned respondents was critical of Nigeria's elites for their tendency to use and discard the less privileged without considering how to not only give them food, but on how to empower them to be able to fend for themselves. These elites are expected to provide for the under privileged by giving intentionally and strategically in such a manner that will not only expand opportunities but equally create wealth and eschew the type of giving that will always make those receiving continuously to be dependent on them. It is further noted that some countries are more developed than the others because their elites utilize their wealth and resources for developmental purposes including support to the educational sector and supporting businesses and encouraging entrepreneurship (Adusei 2015) (p.1).

The adverse effect of corruption is not only due to the stealing of the country's resources by political elites who use foreign accounts to hide the proceeds of their corrupt activities from the country's common wealth. It is also because these resources are expatriated to foreign countries and used to develop their institutions at Nigeria's expense (Omojuwa 2017) and further emboldening their domineering capacity. This is like double jeopardy to Nigeria because the country's elites not only steal from the country's common wealth, but repatriate the stolen money to other countries. The money is now made more useful for the receiving country while denying the opportunity of using it for the development of Nigeria's institutions especially its security sector. A good example is the case of an ex-Nigerian minister who lost over one hundred and fifty-three thousand dollars out of the total amount allegedly embezzled while her community and kinsmen presently wallow in abject poverty (Omojuwa 2017 p.6).

Another example is the stolen funds by a former Nigerian dictator within a span of five years estimated at between 12 to 16 billion dollars and domiciled in over 130 offshore accounts mostly in European countries (Adusei 2015). The above revelations are significantly in line with the APPG Report (2006) which stated that between 700 – 800 billion dollars belonging to corrupt African elites including Nigerians were domiciled in foreign bank accounts.

Further to the above infractions, a recent Swiss Report captioned 'Swiss Traders' Opaque' deals in Nigeria contained in the Berne Declaration Report (2013) described how Nigerians connive with foreign companies to defraud the country of its oil resources. This was executed through creation of offshore companies as conduits for the siphoning of country's oil revenue amounting to almost seven billion dollars over a period of three years from 2009 to 2011 using bogus overseas companies in connivance with Nigerian elites described as politically exposed persons. The report indicted seven oil marketing companies as complicit in this conspiracy and who perpetrated this scam using these fake companies in Switzerland and illicit offshore tax haven in Bermuda to reap Nigeria of billions of tax earnings that would have been ploughed for the development of the country.

The report also implicated Nigeria's National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) as also involved in conniving with foreign companies to defraud Nigeria. The report noted that though earnings from oil account for almost 60% of Nigeria's total revenue that it has not significantly impacted on the country's developmental growth and for which the country's citizens still groan in poverty and inequalities. It attributed this situation to the stealing of the country's oil resources with NNPC as a conduit involving Nigerian oil players in connivance with foreign companies. The report exemplified this with the criminal collaboration between NNPC and two Swiss companies that were also registered in Bermuda; namely: Vitol and Trafigura both the biggest and third biggest oil trading oil companies respectively in Switzerland and also respectively exported 13.44% and about 13.50% of Nigeria's crude oil amounting to a total value of 6.7 billion dollars in 2011.

Similarly, Nigeria's Ministry of Information presentation (2016) reported how fifty-five Nigerians during a span of eight years, (2008 – 2015) stole a whopping sum of over 1.34 trillion Naira (average equivalent of $8.66 Billion then) which would have appreciably developed the country including its security sector. Relying on World Bank indices, the report explained that only one third fraction of these stolen funds, would have provided substantial human security facilities including construction of 653.18 kilometres of roads, 36 ultra-modern hospitals in each of Nigeria's states; 20,062 units of two-bedroom houses; 183 schools as well as the education of 3,974 children from primary to tertiary level. Further to this, a recent revelation on the mismanagement of the country's resources tagged "democracy rogues" indicated high level misappropriation of the country's resources which resulted in the stealing of thirty-eight trillion Naira (average equivalent of $253.333 billion) within a period of seventeen years, (Sunday Punch, 2016).

Also provided are examples of the perpetuation of poverty in the country through corrupt enrichment of few government functionaries whose yearly earning surpasses the life earning of over one hundred and twelve million Nigerians living below the poverty line. The consequence of this trend is the underfunding of such critical governance sectors especially the security sector. Nigeria's Ministry of Information Brief (2017p.1) used twenty-four high ranking politicians in Nigeria to buttress this point and noted that they take home a total of about ten billion Naira approximated at ($66 million) as allowances and privileges for merely serving in public offices in spite of the country's astonishing poverty rate. It also reported how security votes are misappropriated by serving political office holders.

The level of corruption in Nigeria is such that the country's citizens have given up hope on any imminent resolution of this quagmire and now perceive such statements by successive administrations to deal with the menace as mere semantics especially the present administration's election promise "to kill corruption before it kills Nigeria" (Buhari's Inaugural Speech 2015 p.5)

The aforementioned corrupt practices are existent in Nigeria and with negative effect on its security sector. It therefore behoves on the country to improve its anti-corruption mechanism as this is very critical for the thriving of its security sector governance.

5.4.3 Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Efforts

The above reported incidents of corruption in Nigeria indeed deserve to be checked. Nigeria has therefore embarked on several measures to counter this problem. These measures are sundry but this research concentrated on policy formulation and implementation, education and psychological strategies. Chattam House Report on African Programme (2017), acknowledged that Nigeria's anti-corruption strategies includes traditional, legal and governance counter measures including reformation of public procurement procedures and public financial management, anti-corruption legislations and the creation of several anti-corruption institutions that are meant to prevent, prosecute and punish offenders.

The World Drug Report (2017) noted that since 1966, that successive government in Nigeria had adopted measures to counter corruption in the country. It noted however that most of these governments were insincere and lackadaisical in proactively dealing with the problem which consequently prompted the continuous manifestation of this menace. It specifically observed that since 1976 that the commitment of the various regimes to resolve the problem has been pretentious and hypocritical.

Alegeh (2015) recalled that in the past, all matters of corruption in Nigeria were within the exclusive purview of the Nigerian Police Force and that this was a major challenge because the Police was evidently underfunded and lacked the required resources and technical capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute corruption and related offences. The country had in order to correct this situation instituted several laws on the basis of which relevant anti-graft agencies were established.

These agencies are the EFCC, the Nigerian Police, the ICPC, the Code of Conduct Bureau and the Central Bank of Nigeria. The EFCC's main responsibility is the investigation and prosecution of financial and economic infractions including terrorism financing. It also undertakes the investigation of incidents of stealing of proceeds of criminal activities, seizure and forfeiture of assets including domestic and foreign related assets. The Nigerian Police is also empowered to arrest and investigate persons for corruption and can prosecute through the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation. This relies on the powers granted to this office in the country's constitution or based on the derivative powers from the provisions of the Police Act, specifically section 23 of the Police Act, Cap P.19, LFN, 2004. The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission has the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting of corrupt activities in the country's public institutions especially government Ministries and Agencies and with the aim of protecting the country's public service from corruption. This role is similar to that of the Code of Conduct Bureau with the function to prevent corruption among public officials during the performance of their statutory schedules.

Though the establishment of these agencies were well intended, they have over the years, been faced with political interference resulting in the non-achievement of the noble objectives for which they are statutorily expected to perform. This is coupled with the culture of impunity by public officials involved in haemorrhaging the country's resources which would have been appropriated for the provision of essential services for the citizens and strengthening institutions of government including security agencies responsible for the mitigation of terrorism (Ijide 2020).

Olutoyin (2014) noted that these agencies lack sufficient capacity, independence and resources to effectively perform their statutory responsibilities and had themselves been embroiled in corrupt practices. He elaborated that it was ironical that despite the magnitude of anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria that corruption and abuse of power had been on the increase in the country. For these reasons, the agencies are constantly being reinvigorated to effectively confront corruption and deal with culprits regardless of their status and political leaning. The essence of checking the incidence of corruption within the ambit of the rule of law and respect for human rights also constitutes part of this effort. Nevertheless, Nigeria's president in one of his presentations sought for more time for the country to fully adhere to this need. He stated that this was because Nigeria came out of many years of military rule and that it will take time to reform the mentality of its security and law enforcement operatives (Nigeria's Presidential Presentation 2016).

In addition to the above, Nigeria has also been relying on vital international and domestic legislations as part of its anti-corruption programme. These include international initiatives such as the ratification of both the United Nations Convention against corruption and the African Union Convention on the prevention and combating of corruption (2004) and (2006) respectively. Consequent upon the above, Nigeria has also been collaborating with relevant international organizations in its anti-corruption drive. Some of such strident supports to Nigeria in this case are the UNODC research on corruption in Nigeria (2018) and the European Union (EU) which funded the corruption project that spanned from 2012 to 2017.

These projects emphasized the need to properly understand the concept of corruption and its various manifestations prerequisite for instituting appropriate counter measures. This understanding includes the various specimen of corruption covering daily administrative bribery cases involving public officials and such covert machinations aimed at tampering with public resources. They also include the enhancement of the various facets of Nigeria's anti-corruption process covering policy making, legislation, coordination, research and monitoring in accordance with the stipulated guidelines in UNCAC. Others are improvement of the institutional and operational capacity of anti-corruption institutions for the prevention, investigation and adjudication of corruption cases and reinvigorating necessary cooperation amongst them as well as supports to Civil Society Organizations (CSOS).

Furthermore, the United Kingdom has not only been supporting Nigeria on anti-corruption programmes but has continued to justify the need to put appropriate systems in place and ensuring proper attitude for effective investigation, prosecution and punishment of culprits. The above supports involved institutional reformation of relevant institutions for which Nigeria was assisted with seven million pounds over a period of five years for the strengthening of its anti-corruption agencies. This support positively rubbed off on the country's capacity to implement relevant laws that complemented its anti-corruption programme. This involved capacity building for the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, elicitation of appreciable accountability through appropriate civil society involvement as well as the operational supports by the UK National Crime Agency to several Nigerian law enforcement institutions.

The Report of Presidential Advisory Committee against Corruption (2016) also enumerated some of Nigeria's anti-corruption efforts which are grouped into two strategic frameworks. The first involves the development of a strategic framework for the effective coordination of all the relevant components of the country's anti-corruption and criminal justice reform mechanism. This objective involves: identification of the constraining factors against virile interagency collaboration; improvement in the subsisting strategies for assets recovery and management; provision of required guidelines and the necessary agreements prerequisite for productive collaborative schemes among the cooperating agencies. Specific to this objective, is the identification of areas of cooperation, encouragement of joint capacity development programmes as well as constant review of their challenges for the required corrective measures. The second is concerned with fostering collaboration between the government, private sector and Non-Governmental Organizations through consultation and engagement with stakeholders including anti-corruption agencies, private companies, professionals, youths and women associations. Due to this activity, the public is not only positively sensitized on the country's anti-corruption agenda, required commitment are elicited from relevant stakeholders on this agenda.

From the above indications, the meaning and implication of corruption have been analysed with examples of its incidents in Nigeria and consequences on its security sector. In view of the foregoing, the need for appropriate intervention was espoused and upon which several efforts by the government to improve on the situation were analysed. Nevertheless, these efforts hardly achieved its objectives because of several constraining factors.

5.4.4 Constraints against Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Programme

The consequences of corruption in Nigeria have been affecting the capacity of its security sector to effectively counter security threats as confirmed by the experts interviewed (i.e., E1 – E60) for this study. This underscores the need to mitigate these challenges. However, it has not been easy to achieve this because of such militating constraints that need to be resolved prerequisite for the formulation of the

required programme to check the menace. These constraints are sundry but the most crucial ones are classifiable as follows: lack of reliable data and inaccessibility of relevant information, legal and political constraints as well as conflict of interests among anti-corruption agencies.

In the case of lack of reliable data and inaccessibility of relevant information, the world drug report – (2017), provided a vital narrative which is equally applicable to Nigeria. It observed that paucity of reliable data on corruption is a serious challenge in any anti-corruption effort. It stated that while most studies in this area concentrate attention on specific events and geographical areas, some others rely on subjective conception. The foregoing is further complicated by the inability of the citizens to have access to government information that may be relevant for the revelation of corrupt activities in government cycles and public institutions. The Freedom of Information Act in Nigeria has been passed by the country's legislature and is a welcome development and with the promise to complement the country's anti-corruption campaign. However, its implementation has remained a mirage because of Nigeria's government misapplication of the exclusivity doctrine in governance.

In the case of legal and political constraints, it is observed that those charged with the responsibility of enforcing anti-corruption laws in Nigeria are not adequately encouraged due to lack of political will. This includes situations whereby the same laws are not uniformly applied and most times, abused by the operators to favour certain persons while disproportionately used to witch-hunt others. It is revealed that this type of abuse diffuses the efforts of the country's anti-corruption agencies and creates the wrong impression in the eyes of the citizens and the international community that the country's anti-corruption institutions are lame ducks and incapable of deterring the country's public servants and politicians from getting involved in corrupt activities; (Osunde 2013).

Another identifiable constraint is the conflict of interest among the country's anti-corruption agencies, and consequent lack of collaboration among them. A striking example as noted by respondents E1, E7, E56, E59 and E60 is the constant interference by the Office of the country's Attorney General in the functions of these agencies. The Office has been fingered on several instances whereby the latter nullified or withdrew cases brought up by the former against certain persons or institutions. Such conflicts have also been observed among the various courts including jurisdictional conflicts and disputes between Federal and State courts within the judiciary as well as between and among law enforcement and security institutions. Finally, it is stated that the country's judiciary appear weak and overstretched and is compounded more by lack of sufficient resources required for effective adjudication of graft cases.

Another challenge is the legal insulation of certain classes of public office holders especially the executive office holders who are shielded from civil and criminal prosecution due to the constitutional immunity granted them by the country's law (Report of Nigeria's Presidential Advisory Committee, 2016). Such

persons according to the country's laws include the President, his Vice, as well as State Governors and their deputies.

Akinseye (2015) corroborated most of the above challenges. He observed that anti-corruption crusade is not a recent adventure in Nigeria and that those challenges previously encountered in this campaign could have instigated some lessons upon which subsequent efforts could have been based. This can be attributed to such constraining factors as lack of the required political will including lack of sincerity on the political class and their complicity in the abuse of court processes. All these are worsened by insufficient budgetary allocations to the judiciary which cause delay in the prosecution of corruption cases including congestion of cases in the courts; abuse of judicial processes, conspiracy between the bar and the bench; etc.

From the preceding analysis of this phenomenon, it would have been clear that corruption is a serious challenge to the country's security sector governance including its viral effect on the various components of the sector. Thus, this menace has over the years been adversely affecting the institutional and operational capacity of the sector. It has not only been a constraining factor in the interagency collaboration among the country's various security institutions, but also encourage human rights abuses, derails provision of the dividends of good governance as well as very contagious to the effectiveness of civil democratic oversight of the sector.

It would have been substantially explained up to this point that the Nigeria's security sector governance is not yet strong enough to satisfactorily control the threats of terrorism in Nigeria. Thus, the various requirements that could have helped the situation were found to be deficient. These include a robust institutional capacity, proficient democratic oversight, satisfactory human rights standard, good governance including appreciable anti-corruption profile and provision of employment opportunities were all found lacking. Lack of required political will that can help the sector to thrive and effectively counter terrorism did not equally help matters.

Other reasons are the menace of corruption which was further induced by the country's many years of military administration and permeated all the country's security sector governance apparatus. The situation was further complicated because the country's security sector governance is based on a 1999 constitution which is equally a creation of military dictatorship and a derivative of military decrees.

Apart from the above, several underlying factors were noted to have contributed to the situation. These include: the country's poor socio-economic conditions, inequity, conflicting interests and lack of unity among the various sections of the country, ethnicity, recurring challenges of Nigeria's civil war. Others are: the country's many years of military dictatorship and its inheritance of regimented type of government and militarized psych of military personnel who were products of military dictatorship but launched themselves into the country's democratic governance. This included top executive and legislative functionaries without sufficient democratic indoctrination and credential.

5.5.1 Nigeria's Employment Programme

As earlier stated, improvement of Nigeria's employment programme is a critical requirement of good governance that may not only help in the country's poverty alleviation programme but can enhance its security sector governance capacity to control terrorism. Achievement of this objective requires a proper assessment of the present status of this programme in the country as a vital governance obligation. Consideration will also be given to the factors which tend to militate against its realisation and consequently cause unemployment and with the potential to induce security challenges.

Thus, unemployment has within the last decade, emerged as one of the most salient causes of insecurity globally especially restiveness which is linked to idle youths who constitute ready tools for societal insecurity. Nigeria's National Employment Policy (2016) relied on the definition of the International Labour Organization Report (2003) to provide meaning to the concept of unemployment. It stated that unemployment is the condition whereby the percentage of any country's Labour Force that is unengaged including persons above a certain age bracket during the period under reference, are neither engaged in paid or self-employment.

Another variation of unemployment in Nigeria which has the potential of adding to the country's security challenge is underemployment. This situation occurs in the informal sector and involves a situation whereby unemployed Nigerians are forced into unbefitting and unfulfilling jobs such as hawking and casual labour with meagre income below their cost of living. This category of workers though measured as employed in the country's employment calculation, remain poor and can hardly meet up with their need. It is also noted that Nigeria's economic development has not reflected in its employment capacity. This is a significant constraint against the country's socio-economic development and therefore underscores the urgent need for realistic and efficient policy direction to stimulate employment generation (Nigeria's National Employment Policy 2016).

Provision of Employment as a vital necessity in the prevention of organised crimes has been a vital policy of the United Nations due to the recognition that millions of people across the globe depend on drug production and trafficking as not only a means of employment but to utilize the proceeds to support insurgencies. It is for this reason that the UN vigorously pursues healthy employment programmes as alternative involving skills transfer provision of land, credit, infrastructural and market supports as well as community ownership. These are aptly captured in the UN General Assembly Session Report, (1998) the UNODC Drug Report (2015) and recently corroborated by UNODC Report (2017).

Nigeria is a major producer of cannabis and a percentage of local farmers especially in Southern Nigeria depend on cannabis farming as a means of livelihood and are patronised by criminals including insurgents. It is for this reason that the country previously embarked on not only interdiction of these farmers and their products, but also in encouraging them to substitute cannabis seeds with healthy and more beneficial

crops in order not to render them unemployed (NDLEA Report 2014). The Niger Delta indigenes, whose land is exploited and polluted due to oil exploration, are denied of their means of livelihood. Most of them are peasant illiterate farmers and fishermen and cannot be employed because they lack required education and the requisite vocational skills for employment by the multinational companies that presently exploit their land for oil. All these can consequently lure them into alternative means of survival including militant activities such as hostage taking for ransoms.

In Northern Nigeria, most of the protests against constituted authorities which transformed into full-fledged terror attacks can be linked to unemployment due to desertification and deforestation as well as drying up of Lake Chad on which Northern peasant farmers depend on for fishing, herding, etc. Boko-Haram and Herdsmen conflicts were also prompted by poverty and inability of the citizens to make a living (Rizzo 2015). This was worsened by lack of requisite formal education and vocational skills needed for employment which were lacking in the type of Arabic and Almajiri educational system predominantly practiced in Northern Nigeria.

Respondents E1, E7, E8, E14, E20, E39, E40, E41, E42, E56, and E60 also reported that lack of employment opportunities contributes to most of the post-election violence in Nigeria in which disgruntled youths were easy recruits for political brigandage (Rasak and Garuba 2017). Thus, these youths who are armed by politicians for selfish political pursuits end up as terrorists because they remain jobless after being used and dumped by these selfish politicians. Most of them do not have any vocational livelihood but depend on the crumbs and mass feeding program by their elites. Thus, extremists and criminals take advantage of unemployed youths to lure them into their criminal enterprise. More so, the country's labour force presently lacks the capacity to reduce the number of readily available persons that can be lured into criminal activities. It is therefore worrisome that Nigeria's state of insecurity may not abate because of the escalating level of unemployment in the country (Osakwe, 2013).

It cannot therefore be overemphasized that the rate of unemployment in Nigeria is troubling. However, much as such obvious reasons which can cause unemployment as in other climes, rear their ugly heads in Nigeria, some other uncommon reasons also orchestrate the situation in the country. The World Bank Report (2013), stated that there were not less than forty million Nigerians without jobs then and that on the average, that 14.60% were unemployed from 2006 – 2010 and increased to 23.90% in subsequent years. The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) (2013) also placed Nigeria at 153 position out of 186 countries in the global unemployment Index and further stated that in Nigeria, there were lots of unemployed youths who do not belong to any fundamentalist or radical group but are easy tools in the hand of the rich or terrorist organizations and who with little financial inducement, will carry out any criminal act. The under listed tabular representation of Nigeria's ten-year unemployment statistics provides the picture of the situation.


5.5.2 Unemployment rate in Nigeria (2010 -2018)


Year	Unemployment		
	Number (millions)	Percentage	Growth Rate (%)
2010	3,000.0	5.0	
2011	4,000.0	6.0	33.3
2012	3,000.0	8.0	-25.0
2013	7,000.0	10.0	133.3
2014	5,000.0	6.0	-28.6
2015	8,000.0	10.0	60.0
2016	12,000.0	14.0	50.0
2017	18,000.0	20.0	50.0
2018[1]	21,000.0	23.0	16.7
Average	**9,000.0**	**11.3**	**36.2**

Source: Nigeria Bureau of Statistics NBS (2019)



Note that these statistics are based on ILO description of unemployed persons as those who are able to work but are not presently employed. In Nigeria, 90.5 million persons are able to work but 23.1% out of this number are not employed as at September 2018.





A further analysis of the above statistics shows that during the first, second and third quarters of 2018, that Nigeria's unemployment status stood at 23.1% as at September 2018 or 20.9 million unemployed persons relative to the 85.08 million of the country's total active labour force. According to the FSDH Merchant Bank of Nigeria Economic Analysis Report (2019) the level of unemployment in Nigeria has been on the rise since the past ten years, having risen up to 21.1% of the country's total workforce as at the third quarter of 2018 with the possibility of increasing to 24million persons in 2022. The report noted that the unemployment situation in the country is so frightening and calls for urgent intervention. This is

corroborated with the unemployment statistics of Nigeria's Bureau of Statistics (2018) which put the figure of unemployed Nigerian's at almost twenty-one million persons as at the third quarter of 2018 out of the country's almost 90.5 million workforce representing persons in the country aged between 15 – 64 years out of which about 13.2 million are youths and representing 63% of this number who can and are willing to be employed but do not have the opportunity.

During the same period, 14.8%, 16.0% and 18.6% of these numbers in Nigeria in the first, second and third quarters respectively are illiterates and never attended any school with 23%, 24% and 24.5% of the same group during the same period being under-employed, while 18.9%, 20% and 23.2% of the unemployed persons during the same quarters, had below primary school education. During the same quarters respectively, 10.3%, 11.4% and 13.5% had primary school education while 15.4%, 13.9% and 16.2% during the same period respectively possessed secondary school education. Most surprising was that during the same period respectively, 16.7%, 28.0% and 31.8% were educated up to tertiary educational level.

Another vital observation relevant in this study were those who were underemployed. This included those who though were employed, were not engaged up to the minimum forty hours full time hours per week as specified by the ILO minimum standard of at least twenty hours of engagement per week. It also implies a situation where someone works full time minimum hours but is not fully utilized relative to his qualification and skill. In this case, the NBS Analysis (2017) indicated that during the first, second and third quarters of 2017, that 23%, 24% and 24.5% respectively, were illiterates and never attended any school, while 9.3%, 9.5% and 9'6% during the same period, had minimal education below primary school. Also, 15.3%, 15.5% and 15.8% during the same period respectively, had primary education and 21.5%, 22.7% and 22.9% respectively for the same period had secondary school education. More so, 19.6%, 18.6% and 18.3% respectively for the same quarters had tertiary education.

From the above indications, it appears that the illiterates, those with minimal education and those with tertiary education constituted the highest number of unemployed persons. This is because while the two categories lack the skill or minimum educational level sought for by employers, the availability of employment opportunities for those with tertiary education are so minimal in the country. This is because Nigeria produces graduates on average of 120,000 persons yearly while a total of 500,000 persons leave school each year (Okafor 2011; Adekola et al 2016). This Statistics which was extracted from NAPEP (2003) is indicative of the educational growth in the country which is traceable to the desperation of the youths to gain tertiary education regardless of the content of the education that hardly provided the prerequisite skills for employment but with poor quality graduates (Ojeifo, 2016).

5.5.3 Factors that Induce Unemployment in Nigeria

Having understood the subsisting employment situation in Nigeria, the need to understand the precipitating factors is expedient. There are several of these factors but this study categorized them under uncommon and common factors.

5.5.3(a) Uncommon Factors

Respondents E1, E7, E33, E35, E36, E39, E40, E41, E42, E43 and E57 stated that the uncommon reasons for the unemployment situation in Nigeria are hinged on cultural and religious inhibitions as well as environmental factors and negative role of politicians.

The toxic indoctrination of susceptible children and youths by mischievous elements in the country especially in the South East and South – South Nigeria that wage employment is time wasting and a long and complex journey to wealth acquisition is a viral factor in this case. Potential employees are also negatively sensitized that accepting wage employment from government establishments and their cronies as well as from foreign companies amounts to tacitly endorsing the same government and foreign entities that they conceive as anti- citizens and foreign exploitative agents. This erroneous belief subsisted especially for citizens of these regions who were denied education because of the civil war and were forced into criminal activities which they found lucrative and were deceitfully celebrated more than those who went to school thereby leaving a wrong signal to the upcoming generations that acquisition of education is a long process of acquiring wealth position.

These respondents also reported that environmental factors contribute to the high rate of employment in parts of the country whose indigenes are involved in drug trafficking and terrorism. For example, South East Nigeria where the indigenes engage in drug trafficking and hostage taking is ravaged by erosion which to a reasonable extent, is unfavourable for the location of productive industries that would have created employment opportunities for the citizens. Similarly, the South - South part of the country is seriously confronted with environmental pollution due to the oil exploratory activities of major oil and gas multinational corporations. This adversely affects the region's ecosystem including its aquatic resources which consequently had destroyed the indigene's fish farming, resources thereby rendering a whole lot of them jobless.

The Northern part of Nigeria is faced with desertification and deforestation which adversely affect their herding vocations to the extent that most of them are rendered jobless while the remaining few wanders to other parts of the country to fend for their cattle which severally result into conflicts with their host communities whose farmlands are eaten up by these cattle. Governance failure is also identified in this case because the government has not embarked on any conscious effort to correct the situation.

The observations of respondents E1, E7, E8, E33, E37, E39, E40, E41 and E42 stated were affirmative that youth unemployment is perhaps the most challenging Nigeria's unemployment situation. They attributed

this adverse condition to the negative role of politicians who rather than create opportunities for human development and healthy employment opportunities, recruit youths for selfish political duties. These youths are further retained for unwholesome political activities which most times, manifest into political conflicts. They become so hardened that training them for other more useful and healthy employment become almost impossible. The reason for this is the lack of adequate attention to the youths. Thus, Nigerian youths are hardly given attention in the Nigerian project and became unemployed, underemployed, lack food, lack good and affordable education, lack access to affordable health care, denied involvement in decision making on account of invested values in democratic governance and consequently constitute part of the country's security challenge (Akpan 2015). Also, these youths are insecure and easily become susceptible to mischievous use by politicians especially during elections (Lawyers chronicle 2015; Haliru 2013).

The above situation is further worsened especially in Northern Nigeria by the fact that the elites in the region are not attracted to invest in the region and prefer to locate most of their industries elsewhere in the country or even outside the country. In essence, they end up creating employment opportunities elsewhere rather than in their homelands. The region is therefore left with only the few employment opportunities provided by the grossly few investments by these elites. This situation is not encouraging because there are over eighty Northerners in the list of the one hundred richest Nigerians and three in the list of the one hundred richest in Africa (Forbes 2015). Yet, their region and people are very impoverished and orchestrated by lack of education and employment opportunities. The situation is worsened by the outbreak and sustenance of insurgency which has equally forced other Nigerians and these Northern elites to relocate their investments to other more secure regions.

5.5.3(b) Common Factors

These factors are those that are easily discernible and due to either lack of action or wrong action and founded on poor policy formulation and application. Nigeria's National Employment Policy (2016) classified these factors into two broad categories; namely: Supply and Demand factors. Listed under the supply factors include population structure and growth which implies that increase in the population of youths portends a higher supply of those that need to be employed. The stampede witnessed in Abuja during the recruitment exercise by the Nigerian Immigration Service in 2013 when millions of youths turned up is a classic example of this situation.

Immigration of persons especially from neighbouring countries into Nigeria also adds pressure to the Nigeria's labour market. Other factors listed as potential causes of unemployment as outlined in this document includes the country's education and skills development programme which produces graduates without the requisite skills and qualification for employment, its security situation which deter investments that would have provided employment opportunities as well as the poor state of physical infrastructure

such as power and water supply, roads, bridges etc., which hampers the production and distribution capacities especially of the manufacturing sector thereby minimizing their employment capability.

Under the demand factors, the document listed the following as potential inducers of unemployment namely: the country's poor economic growth and industrial development, lack of available credit facilities and entrepreneurship supports, low productivity level with attendant high cost of production, technological innovations which are used to undertake jobs that were hitherto performed manually thereby causing redundancy as well as non-adherence to corporate values and practices by employers of labour on the need to comply with employment regulations. In addition, the following factors also contribute to Nigeria's unemployment situation; namely: the country's poor educational standard, corrupt activities, neglect of the agricultural sector, poor power supply and the country's tax regime, (Noko 2017)

(a) In the case of the country's educational system, it is noted that this system hardly imparts adequate knowledge of the course of study, and neither the required skills for the available jobs nor the creative and analytical skills to create jobs.

(b) The presentations of the above respondents indicated non approval of the curricular used Nigerian educational sector and corruption in the sector. They observed that these curricular are terse in skills acquisition and most often theory-based without adequately equipping beneficiaries with requisite employment skills. The insufficiency in entrepreneurial content of these curricular is also emphasized.

(c) The adverse consequence of corruption is also notable in this case. This according to them covers a wide range of unwholesome activities such as: the diversion of budgetary allocations meant for the educational sector into private purpose; using ghost worker enumeration to divert employment openings and misappropriating the accruing remunerations without actually performing the job; complete absence or minimal infrastructural supports due to stealing and diversion of funds meant for these supports as well as insincerity on the implementation of employment programmes.

(d) Neglect of the Agricultural sector which has been made unattractive to the youths especially due to lack of modernization of the sector is equally a contributory factor. Nigeria's economic mainstay was Agriculture before the discovery of oil in the country but has now been abandoned with the consequence of stretching the employment capacity of the oil industry because all those that would have been accommodated in the agricultural sector have disengaged from their agricultural vocations and shifted attention to the oil sector.

(e) Poor power supply has also led to exorbitant cost of operating businesses in Nigeria thereby leading to cut in jobs due to the extra cost of sourcing alternative power supply which

consequently led to the closing down of several industries and attendant retrenchment as well as discouragement of foreign investments that would have led to job creation;

(f) The consequence of the country's tax regime as another factor that was listed and explained by these respondents. They iterated that exorbitant taxation of industries can be so burdensome to such an extent of leading to their closing shops and with attendant discouragement of new investments that would have created new jobs. This consequently reduces economic activities including reduction in the aggregate distribution of money in the economy. The foregoing is also tied to the reduction in the employment capacity of the manufacturing sector because many industries in the country are folding up and retrenching several of their workers as a consequence of poor economic and regulatory environment. The statistics released by the Manufactures Association of Nigeria which corroborated this position revealed that within a period of eight years from 2000 – 2008, that more than 820 manufacturing companies in Nigeria closed shop and laid off thousands of their employees.

5.6 Conclusion

This section analysed the quality of the relevant Security Sector Reform (SSR) and governance requirements that can complement Nigeria's Security Sector Governance to effectively control the scourge of terrorism. The specific requirements that were analysed; include: the country's civil democratic oversight scheme and its human rights standard as well as the imperatives of good governance including access to employment opportunities as a means of poverty alleviation. These analyses were preceded with an understanding of the country's security sector and its constituents including the various security and law enforcement agencies, non- state actors and stakeholders especially civil society organisations whose roles have relevance to the sector.

Further to this, the conception of democratic oversight as the supervision of the country's security sector by civil democratic institutions including the executive, legislative and judicial arms of the country's government was provided. The various reforms which the country had undertaken along this line including its institutionalisation of civil rule, setting out supervisory guidelines for the supervision of security agencies were outlined. These include: legislative oversight of security budgets and the reformation of the military

justice system. In spite of the foregoing, the country's attempt at implementing an efficient democratic oversight was evaluated as unimpressive due to the following reasons; namely: overbearing influence of the executive arm of government especially over the other arms of government as a result of the autocratic tendency of the country's presidency; the country's many years of military administration, its constitution as a product of military dictatorship; legislative improprieties including corrupt practices of legislators and lack of experience as well as high turnover rate among them and lack of cooperation with civil society organisations.

The country's human rights standard was also analysed. This requirement was conceptualised as respect for the rights of citizens in line with the expectation of rule of law. The implication of respect for human rights was noted as very crucial in Nigeria's security sector governance. This is because it has the propensity to elicit support from the citizenry to security agencies and their operatives if the latter conduct their affairs with respect and decorum. It was therefore averred that without this, the citizens may perceive these operatives as enemies and deny them of valuable supports including necessary information that could be useful to successfully confront terrorists. However, the standard of respect for human rights was evaluated as very poor. This was supported with the several human rights violations by the country's security institutions as well as the government's lack of commitment to redress the situation especially for lack of investigation and prosecution of culprits.

The country was also assessed as not complying with the various international laws on human rights. Several constraining factors were also identified as not helping Nigeria's human rights standard; namely: lack of political will to investigate and prosecute certain human rights violators, lack of required knowledge and experience for proficient human rights administration, lack of required training and capacity development resources for this purpose, incidence of corruption in the judiciary including grafts by court employees, lack of accountability in the judicial system, lack of the required resources to enforce and prosecute human rights cases. These constraints were noted to have constituted serious snags in the country's human rights administration and consequent impediment against the efficient security sector governance in the country.

This chapter also analysed the imperative of good governance. This was indicated as the efficient management of resources which can have positive impact on the country's security sector governance and consequently boost its capacity to more effectively, control the threats of terrorism.

It was also revealed that the country has not fared well in providing good governance as indicated in several evaluation of its performance in this case and in the provision of derivatives of good governance especially in its anti-corruption profile and in the provision of access to education and employment opportunities. The following were pointed out; namely: In the case of corruption, it was observed that Nigeria's security

institutions and stakeholders in the country's security sector including the constituent security agencies, the judiciary and legislature, etc are all embroiled in corruption.

The complicity of the elites in the perpetration of corrupt activities was also brought to bear. Consequently, the various efforts embarked upon by Nigeria to curtail this trend were analysed. These included: establishment of anti-corruption authorities, reliance on and application of relevant anti-corruption as well as fostering cooperation between the government, private sector and Non-Governmental Organisations on sensitization programmes against corruption. Noticeable constraints against Nigeria's anti-corruption efforts were also identified and analysed. This includes: lack of reliable data and accessibility of Nigeria's corruption data, certain categories of persons from being prosecuted, lack of political will to enforce anti-corruption laws, interagency conflicts among the country's and corruption agencies.

Access to quality employment opportunities was equally analysed as a governance dividend that can help to minimize involvement in terrorism in view of the observation that gainfully employed persons could possibly have a more reduced urge and tendency to be involved in crime. Nigeria's performance in the provision of this dividend was evaluated as unsatisfactory.

Nigeria's employment status was assessed as not encouraging. The two main areas which this study confirmed as responsible for the country's poor state of employment, revolves around the capacity of the unemployed because of their non-possession of requisite qualification and skill for employment as well as the paucity of developmental programmes. The above situations are classified under uncommon and common factors. The uncommon factors in this case include cultural and religious inhibitions including negative stereotypes against wage employment, environmental factors and the negative role of politicians. The common ones include immigration due to population explosion, poor infrastructure, lack of credit and entrepreneurial supports, high production cost, technological automations, poor educational standard. Others are corruption, neglect of the agricultural sector, poor power supply and the country's tax regime.

Consequent upon all the above analyses in this chapter, it is deciphered that the quality of the various critical security sector reform and good governance requirements for the effectiveness of Nigeria's security sector are below the required standard. These requirements, namely: civil oversight supervision, human rights standard as well as the imperatives of good governance including the country's anti-corruption profile, access to and provision of employment opportunities therefore require improvement.

CHAPTER 6:

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER INSIGHTS

This section covers the following; namely; (1) Overview of the research objectives and attendant research questions; (2) conclusions and research findings and (3) recommendations and further insights.

6.1 Overview of Research Objectives and Questions

This study was prompted by the rising security threats due to terrorism in Nigeria which is mainly spurred by terrorism financing and the need to check this through efficient security sector governance. These measures are anchored on strengthening the country's security sector governance. The main objective in this case from which other purposes are derived, revolves around the assessment of the country's security sector governance relative to its capacity to control the threats of this crime. Subsumed under this main objective are the following: gauging the extent of threats of this crime and how this is enabled mainly by terrorism financing and it can be mitigated by improving Nigeria's security sector governance.

The means of improving such security sector governance requirements that are most critical for the reform of Nigeria's security sector also constituted part of the objectives. There are several of these but this study concentrated on the enhancement of the institutional capacity of the sector under which the various strategies adopted by country to counter this menace and the resourcing of the security agencies in the sector and the need for them to cooperate and the exploration of relevant international cooperation supports were analysed. Others are: improvement of the civil democratic supervision of the country's security sector and human rights standard of the sector: the imperatives of good governance including the country's anti-corruption profile and provision of employment as a critical requirement for poverty alleviation in the country.

Consequent upon the foregoing objectives, the following interrogations were undertaken; namely: Whether this crime is really threatening including its enablement by terrorism financing to warrant the enhancement of Nigeria's security sector governance capacity; If the improvement of relevant security sector governance requirements such as democratic oversight, human right and good governance including its derivatives; namely: efficient anti-corruption profile and provision of education and can help to counter the threats of these crimes; If improvement in good governance initiatives such as qualitative education and employment programme can complement the country's security sector governance capacity to control these crimes and finally; If the international cooperation programme of the country can be improved to support its efforts in controlling these crimes especially by mitigating such counteractive foreign influence including the role of Multinational Corporations and the complicity of Nigerians leveraging on the country's corrupt status to aid this trend.

6.2. Conclusion and Findings

The conclusion and findings of this study as well as the recommendations are based on the following thematic areas. These are:

- The threats of terrorism and supported by terrorism financing as a major facilitator;
- The institutional capacity of Nigeria's security sector as well as the collaboration of the institutions responsible for the mitigation of terrorism as well as efficient international collaboration;
- The quality of security sector reform requirements for the improvement of the sector including civil democratic oversight and human rights standard;
- Complementary good governance initiatives including anti – corruption and access to quality employment opportunities as a means of poverty alleviation;

Consequent upon the revelations from the analyses of data, it was confirmed that Nigeria's security sector governance is deficient in its capacity to effectively manage the threats of terrorism. Several reasons were identified to be responsible for this situation.

- That though Nigeria had previously embarked on some security sector reform initiatives that these efforts were not comprehensive but in splits and lacked the required integration to constitute a unified framework that is sustainable. More so, the country did not adequately implement the recommendations of these isolated reforms due to lack of political will. It was also discovered that these reforms gave more consideration for the improvement of the capacity of security and law enforcement agencies in terms of doctrines, logistics intelligence and investigative operational capacity of these agencies with sparse attention to human security needs.

- Improper resolution of the country's civil war which also spurred the military into the country's governance and militated against the development of all such security sector governance requirements in accordance with contemporary democratic requirements. The vestiges of military administration in Nigeria were sustained because of the dependence of successive democratic governments on sundry military policies and human resources left by previous military administrations which were incorporated in the country's 1990 constitution upon which the country's present governance is based. This was worsened by the corrupt practices which characterized these past military regimes which the succeeding civilian administrations imbibed.

- That the above trends subsisted and influenced other critical security sector reform components. These include the institutional capacity, of the various security and law enforcement agencies, their synergy and cooperation including relevant international cooperation initiatives, the country's civil democratic oversight and human rights standard. It also rubbed off on such

complementary good governance initiatives including the country's anti-corruption drive and the provision of employment opportunities.

This study therefore posits that unless the country's democratic governance is completely purged of the vestiges of military policies and intrusions, that its security sector governance may not be improved and developed to effectively counter the threats of terrorism.

In addition to the foregoing, the following conclusions and findings were arrived at; namely:

1. That the threats of terrorism is so challenging with terrorism financing as a major facilitating factor and is orchestrated by the various sources and means of terrorism funding and further helped by the country's poor fiscal administration.

2. That the threats of terrorism and supported by terrorism financing are multifaceted with the propensity to not only reduce the country's population and critical assets, but also destroy such essential resources upon which the survival of the country depends. In spite of this revelation, previous efforts to deal with this situation have been not sufficient because the country's counter measures separately concentrated on terrorism and terrorism financing instead of an integrated approach that will simultaneously mitigate them in one connection. The country's counter measures were also observed to deal more with the symptoms of this crime than the root causes.

   That a relationship exists between Security Sector Governance and the incidence and threats of terrorism. Thus, an enhanced security sector governance capacity including a proper integration of physical and human security related strategies can effectively counter the threats of this crime in the same manner that a weak security sector governance capacity can provide a fertile ground for these threats.

   Consequently, the effectiveness of Nigeria's security sector to check the manifestation and threats of terrorism cannot be guaranteed. It confirmed that the poor institutional capacity of Nigeria's security sector including poor budgetary, intelligence, logistics, human resources and judicial supports, etc, have not helped this situation.

   That one of the solutions that can complement the capacity of the country's security sector is for the constituent agencies to engage in healthy collaboration. However, the quality of interagency cooperation among these agencies especially those responsible for the control of terrorism was assessed to be unsatisfactory. The quality of international cooperation that is expected to complement the foregoing was also assessed as requiring substantial improvement.

3. That the quality of the necessary security sector requirements that can provide the required pedestal for the thriving of the sector are equally deficient and point to the necessity to improve

them. There are several requirements in this case but the notable ones in this study are the standard of civil democratic oversight supervision of Nigeria's security institutions as well as the quality of human right administration. (i) That these requirements can help to boost the country's security sector governance capacity if proficiently applied but are unfortunately unsatisfactory. However, it is notable that the deficiency of these requirements is due to the misplacement of the country's security priorities as well as the inefficiency and malfeasance of security operatives.

(ii). That democratic oversight is a relevant Security Sector Reform requirement with the potential to complement the effectiveness of Nigeria's security sector governance but the subsisting status of this requirement in Nigeria has been deficient.

(iii). That the subsisting human rights standard in the country is not encouraging because of the excesses and abuse of citizens by the country's security operatives consequent upon which these citizens refuse to cooperate and support concerned security agencies.

4. That good governance is lacking in Nigeria with several adverse consequences with potential to spur its citizens into terrorism. Thus, in spite of Nigeria's resources, the country has not been able to achieve required development due to the following constraining factors; namely: poor leadership, conflicting political interests, inconsistent and unattainable policies, weak national innovative system, lack of technological advancement and infrastructural deficiencies. Other drawbacks are the country's inability to harness its human resources potential which consequently cause unemployment and contribute to security challenges.

   Further to the above, the provision of employment opportunities as a good governance requirement to alleviate poverty in the country was also assessed as unsatisfactory. This is more threatening because of the high rate of unemployment among the country's youth population who are more prone to terrorism.

Apart from non – provision or insufficiency of this vital good governance initiative, other reasons attributable to the inability of the country's employment programme to complement its security sector governance includes: the apathy of some citizens towards taking advantage of employment opportunities and their lack of educational or vocational qualification.

6.3 General Recommendations:

In addition to the recommendations for the improvement of the specific components of Nigeria's security sector as advocated in the theoretical framework, this study deemed it fit to consider some relevant recommendations based on the overall scope of the country's security sector governance.

The need to give consideration for appropriate improvement of both physical and human security considerations and to efficiently integrate both for effective security sector governance cannot be overemphasized. This requirement is explicitly recognized in Nigeria's National Security Strategy 2014 and the 2017 revised version. The various provisions in these documents are laudable but require a more improved and practicable will to implement. Relevant stakeholders including government and non-governmental functionaries as well as traditional institutions were identified as very critical for the success of Nigeria's security sector.

These stakeholders should therefore be encouraged to dispense with the needed patriotism, their duties in this case with attendant motivation. This should be followed up with a systematic coordination of their roles which will cover such supports as intelligence gathering and exchange sensitization against terrorist acts at not only the federal level but at state and local government levels. To complement this, the Institute of Security Report (2015) proposed the setting up of a multi-purpose intelligence unit in Nigeria's presidency to coordinate and disseminate intelligence on potential terrorism activities including intended plots in order to notify the public of same as well as provide possible mitigation tips.

Nigeria's National security strategy (2014) advanced the need to enhance the capacity of key institutions of government especially the ones responsible for security interventions and administration of criminal justice; improvement of the well-being of citizens through the provision of their means of livelihood including gainful employment, qualitative education, positive reinvigoration of the country's foreign policy direction and a sincere commitment towards the mitigation of the numerous security challenges confronting the country.

More so, PLAC (2017) also recommended that the sector should be subject to proper professionalization and reorientation of its main stakeholders. It noted the need to de-militarize public order and give more impetus and support to civil policing as well as for change of attitude in government quarters especially the tendency of the executive to shield security institutions from legislative checks and supervision. The report further advanced the need for better recognition and encouragement of non-state actors in security sector governance. For this purpose, it recommended the need for the Nigerian government to develop an appropriate institutional framework in order to provide the required legal backing for the activities of these actors relative to their operations especially in providing supports in community policing and on counter terrorism.

In the case of legislative support to Nigeria's security sector, the document further recommended the need to build capacity in the country's legislature through provision of relevant training programmes on critical legislative requirements that can improve its oversight functions including enhanced budget. Other requirements advocated include entrenching required transparency and accountability as well as professional responsibility standards. Related to this is the need to balance the confidentiality content of

the sector with the larger national security and interest and to equally elicit the confidence of the citizenry in this practice.

Omotosho and Oladeji (2019) in this vein recommended that in order to improve legislative oversight in the country, the need to strictly comply with Nigeria's constitutional provision of separation of power cannot be overemphasized and for the legislature to be guided by global best practices including the required professionalism and ethical standard. In this case, they counselled that legislative oversight assignments should not be used as a means of exploitation of the agencies being over-sighted. Accordingly, they noted that legislators should be patriotic and to consider their legislative roles as national obligation with commitment and dedication of service to the people. Furthermore, they recommended that legislative oversight should not merely entail enhancement of their capacity to pursue transparency in the sector. The country's legislature is also to be encouraged to solicit inputs of civil society organizations in their oversight duties.

Nwogwugwu and Ishola (2019) in addition, recommended the need for Nigerian legislators to be more focused on the identification of the problems facing the citizenry consequent upon which they will seek for the inputs of the citizenry and relevant civil society organizations in order to appropriately resolve such issues. They also emphasized the need for the enhancement of the capacity of these legislators to be able to pursue and ensure transparency through effective oversight of Nigeria's security sector.

Ijide (2020) also observed that to strengthen Nigeria's security sector, the country's federal government should entrench such security sector reform programme that can improve the capacity and professionalism of the various security and law enforcement agencies in the sector as well as the states and legislative oversight capabilities. He emphasized the need for cohesiveness in the sector and the possibility of merging the agencies whose roles are duplicated. He also recommended the setting-up of a Security Trust Fund through a special tax or donor support as a means of alleviating the subsisting poor funding of the security sector. To cut off frivolous and unnecessary expenditures in the sector, he also recommended that security votes should be abolished and should be supported with necessary constitutional and legal support to the extent that observed infractions in the sector should be appropriately punished to act as deference.

DECAF (2020) also provided some salient recommendations that can ensure the effectiveness of Nigeria's security sector governance and which Nigeria can also leverage on. These are:

- Effective and civilian supervision of the security forces including proper and clear direction as well as appropriate definition of the country's security objectives in its national security policy and in the complementary documents;
- The roles of the various stakeholders in the sector should be adequately defined in these documents; Efficient and accountable oversight of security institutions by democratically

constituted civilian authorities and to ensure professional delivery of security services by security forces with cost effectiveness and guided by the rule of law and subject to efficient judicial checks;

- Involvement of civil society and non-governmental actors in monitoring the governance of the sector in an active and independent manner as well as for domestic security sector actors to ensure proper and smooth interaction and synergy among each other and to be adequately integrated into regional and international security initiatives;
- Conducting the affairs of the various constituent security agencies of the sector and their operatives in a transparent manner and not shielding of required information from the public;
- Inclusiveness of the various segments of the population including adequate gender and community representation.

Furthermore, Nigeria had previously embarked on several reforms at different times which were not comprehensive enough and hardly incorporated all the relevant requirements that could improve its security sector. For this reason, it is necessary to collate the recommendations of these reforms in order to integrate them into a unified strategic framework. This should include all the vital items that were omitted and followed up with the desired implementation. A committee of experts could be constituted to undertake this important responsibility including ensuring that accredited professionals are regularly consulted to advise and provide necessary inputs.

There is also need to ensure that any counter – measure that is developed to counter terrorism in Nigeria should not treat terrorism financing in isolation of the other drivers of terrorism but should be integrated in the larger strategic plan. An example in this case was the advice of an ex-director in one of Nigeria‘s security agencies who is also one of the experts interviewed in this study. He opined that prosecution of terrorist culprits for terror acts should be done concurrently with the prosecution of the same culprits for terrorism financing. According to him, such culprits are also complicit in either sourcing for and utilization of resources for their terrorism acts. This underscores the need for improved synergy and cooperation between the country’s security and law enforcement agencies involved in counter terrorism and the institutions involved in financial investigations and those involved in the prosecution as well as the CBN, commercial banks, insurance and mortgage, institutions, etc. Apart from synergizing their operations, a sustainable collaboration among them is also very imperative. In this case, Nigeria’s Financial Intelligence Unit should strengthen its co-ordination capacity to more effectively undertake this responsibility.

It is equally important to state that the improvement of the various critical areas of Nigeria’s security sector should explore means of resolving the contending conditions with potential to militate against the smooth functioning of the sector.

As far back as 2014, the country’s Army chief warned about this challenge and stressed the need to seek urgent solution that will be cognisant of the country’s socio – economic and political challenges. It is

important to postulate at this point based on the preceding analyses in this study that that much as it is important to improve on all the security sector governance requirements which were specifically focused on this study that it is equally important to note that the realization of the objective is predicated on the country's subsisting socio-economic and political conditions.

In line with this, Nigeria's National Security Strategy (2014) counselled that the country should consciously work to eliminate from its body polity, the politics of exclusion which has been identified as militating against fruitful political interaction in Nigeria since its independence. It is expected that when this situation is addressed, that it will curtail the marginalization of the minority groups in the country and possibly, check resentments that can breed insurgencies.

The document also recommended the need for the country to be involved in mitigating such conditions that create opportunities for incitement and recruitment of potential terrorists in places of religious worship and sermons through legislations that will seriously criminalize such unwholesome activities. A proper review of the almajiri system in Northern Nigeria in view of its potential to provide source of recruitment to terrorist groups should be given due consideration. It therefore emphasized that the country's security should aggregate and unify the national aspirations of all the federating units through equitable distribution of power and resources. In order to achieve the vision of political security, it noted that this will require the utilization of the opportunities presented by the country's endowments in size, numeric strength and diversities as well as mutual interdependence of its people (p.30).

On the need to resolve the consequences of the various crises that befell the country it can be deduced that their aftermath was not properly managed especially due to the poor integration of the combatants and the victims of the crises. To improve the situation, there is need to leverage on the counsel of Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka to the Nigerian government bothering on dialogue with agitators and to request from them, what they feel can induce their feeling of belongingness in the Nigerian state. A constitutional amendment is therefore recommended for this purpose. This should include sincere provisions that will guarantee this need as well as consideration for equitable appropriation of socio-economic and political resources. The proclamation of Osinbajo (2017) at the colloquium on Biafra 50 years could be explored in this case. This harped on the need for today's Nigerian leaders, to give a pathway to unity in adversity and for these leaders to build bridges, close cleavages and to achieve a more cohesive country (Obasi 2017).

Onuoha (2018) provided the requisite foundation on which the above recommendation can rest. He stated that the lessons from these crises suggest that reconciliation is imperative. However, he took exception to the process undertaken by the Nigerian government towards achieving this objective. He noted that this was anchored on a distorted understanding of nationhood for the resolution of the country's post war nation-building project.

Consequent upon this, he advised on the need for a paradigm shift involving not only stabilizing the system but of healing and assuaging frayed nerves. In this case, an improved political will for a result-oriented implementation of the government's conflict resolution policies and mechanism cannot be over emphasized. This should include a sincere and sustained peace and reconciliation programme by Nigeria's Federal Government and should redress the obvious subsisting discrimination and incapacitation of the human and material resources of the sections of the country.

The foregoing can be complemented with the peace and restitution initiatives earlier embarked upon by Nigeria's Federal Government which were not sincerely and proficiently pursued. This should involve a sincere and aggressive national re-orientation that will systematically target and diffuse negative suspicions in the country. It should encompass a sustained mental and cognitive positive sensitization and complemented with equitable socio-economic and political appropriation to all the sections of the country.

To concretise the foregoing, it is advisable for the Nigerian Government to constitute and empower a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and to utilize the recommendations of the Oputa Panel Report (1999). This commission should take a census of every citizen of the country who had suffered losses as a result of the Nigerian civil war and all the crises that had befallen the country in order to assuage their hurts by compensating them. Such persons should be invited for interviews for stocktaking of their losses on the basis of which a sincere and practicable indemnity programme would be applied.

On the politicization of security issues in the country, the need to be guided by professional doctrines in the country's security sector governance cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, a systematic and sustained threat analysis of the country's security challenges and to refrain from being guided by personal and group sentiments should be pursued. Onifade, Imhonopi and Urim (2013) had while warning on the dangers of politicizing and treating security issues with kid gloves by the government, especially sustaining personal and regime security, advised that security sector governance must be predicated on moral values and virtues.

They averred that Nigerian citizens should be governed by such leadership with moral qualification and capable of securing their patriotism. According to them, this will entrench the needed peace and tranquillity for the socio-economic and political development of the country. Further to this, Dambazau (2014) affirmed the need to identify the right leadership with capacity to undertake the following actions; namely: ensuring transparency and accountability in governance; recognition as well as implementation of such inclusive and participatory governance that will be cognizant of the country's ethnic and religious heterogeneity.

Furthermore, PLAC (2017) advised that the Nigerian government should strive to institute appropriate security sector reform measures to eschew the politisation of security sector and ensure proper subordination of the sector to civil democratic institutions including the legislature. It also recommended

that the governance of the sector should strictly be based on the country's constitutional provisions and upon which the scope of the sector should not only emanate from but clearly spelt out.

Nigeria's National Security Strategy (2014) hinged the required intervention on political security that revolves around good governance and pursuit of National unity and integration. Accordingly, the strategy recommended the following: (a) pursuit of equitable devolution of power in accordance with democratic requirements including national dialogue and political stability involving grassroots political participation; (b) effective national orientation including purposeful de-radicalisation and education programmes that will ensure citizens' commitment to national security aspirations (c) strategic enhancement of the country's security institutions including mitigation of political impunity and undue interferences in these institutions.

Having provided recommendation for the improvement of Nigeria's security sector governance as an entity, it is therefore necessary to provide recommendations based on the specific areas of the sector as examined in this study.

6.4 Improvement in Institutional Capacity

On the improvement of the country's institutional capacity, NNDCMP (2015) advocated the need for drastic improvements in the security and law enforcement institutions especially their human resources capacity building and in their threat analysis procedures. This underscores the need for improved equipment provision and training for their operatives. It also proffered the need for the setting up of special dedicated investigative teams to deal with complex investigative obligations which can in turn, help these operatives to acquire specialised skills in on-line investigation and electronic evidence procedures. Further to the above, the NDCMP (2015) and NDCMP (2019) recommended the following strategic initiatives:

- Proper review and adoption of a dynamic and strategic plan including capacity improvement of the notable agencies in-charge of organised crime control; improved legal and policy framework; intelligence - driven interdiction mechanism, targeting of illicit proceeds including illicit finances of criminal perpetrators as well as improved professionalization and operational capacity of these agencies; Provision of regular training for concerned law enforcement institutions in contemporary crime control.

These documents equally recommended the need for the strengthening of the forensic capacity of the country's security and law enforcement. This according to the document can be achieved through provision and support for appropriate Human Resources and modern facilities as well as contemporary data collection procedures. The need for excellent coordination of the aforementioned programmes handled at the various levels by each of the participating stakeholders at the different levels of government, are also emphasized. This accordingly places much emphasis on policy supports, inspections and systematic appraisals. Nigeria's National Strategy (2014) also recommended the following strategic initiatives:

(a) Provision of required supports to the various security agencies involved in counter-terrorism operations. In this case the country's Office of the National Security Adviser acts as the coordinating Office for intelligence supports to other agencies including the Department of State Security Services which should anchor the process of intelligence acquisition and exchange and updating the country's terrorism data base to support the country's information sharing scheme. The country's Ministry of Information is also expected to play a pivotal role in the information management of this scheme.

(b) Enhancement of border security, protection of critical national assets, strengthening the capacity of institutions and minimization of potential risks in crowded places and in every other facility in the country's transportation system. These can be achievable through the following; namely: proficient and timely detection and investigation of threats; improvement in the country's human and technological capacities including improved surveillance; monitoring, tracking, media and public enlightenment as well as re-orientation and reintegration programmes; nipping of terrorist plans in the bud before their manifestation and the apprehension and prosecution of culprits. The country's Interior Ministry is also expected to strengthen the country's border administration to check criminals and their activities while simultaneously supporting legal cross border movement of persons and goods. This involves proper documentation of persons passing through these borders. The same measure is also expected to be applied in the country's sea and airports;

6.5 Developing a Robust Research and Development Scheme

One of the observations which have been adding to the threats of terrorism with the potential of further increase is the poor utilization of lessons from the strategies adopted by drug traffickers and terrorists in their previous successful operations. Such derived lessons can be applied to check all subsequent operations that are executed using the same or similar methodology by them.

It is surprising that terrorists in Nigeria have severally succeeded in their onslaughts using the same strategy which if proactively decoded by Nigeria's security agencies could have successfully countered subsequent onslaughts. For example, if the mode of operation adopted by the terrorists to successfully kidnap school children in Chibok, North East Nigeria, was properly studied and utilized in the counter strategic programme by Nigerian security agencies, the second kidnap incident in Dapchi in the same region and the several kidnap sprees by the same terrorists could all have been nipped in the bud.

Also, if the security agencies were proactive, several suicide bombings in public places using minors, girls, disabled persons, cleaners, hawkers, etc. could have also been prevented. All these are attributable to the carelessness in the utilization of vital lessons and failure to deploy state of the art explosive detection and sweeping equipment. Such unpardonable dereliction to appropriately mitigate subsequent attacks cost Nigeria a lot of lives, including military personnel.

Proper information management on drug trafficking and terrorism should also substantially constitute the basis of planning and implementation of subsequent intervention programmes. Nevertheless, this should be congruent on a continuous monitoring and evaluation of the manifestation of this crime to identify its vital trends. Other considerations include frequency of occurrence based on time frames as well as paying attention to such indicators as the perpetrators including their characteristics, their observed strategies, logistics, internal and external supports. The tracking of these indicators should be used to determine and improve the required counter measures that will be integrated in the envisaged improved security sector governance in the country.

6.6 Logistic Improvements

To achieve this objective, there is need to explore the option of statutory percentage of improved budgetary allocation and dedicated funding policy for each of the concerned security agencies. The judiciary should also be considered in this dedicated funding specifically for terrorism cases and should be backed up with necessary legislations. More so, drastic reduction in the security votes of top government officials and heads of security agencies and using same to argument the budgetary provision of these agencies, should be undertaken.

The process of procurement of essential materials for the operation of these agencies has also been attributed as the reason for their poor logistic capacity and which is equally infested with corruption. Instances abound of inflation of costs of security equipment by those who award the contracts and those who make the purchases. Apart from this, they deliberately connive with suppliers to purchase inferior equipment at a much reduced cost and then pocket the extra due to this reduction. Specific examples include the purchase of poor quality and unserviceable arms and ammunition that have severally been reported by Nigerian troops as disappointing in their operations against terrorists and by anti-narcotic operatives against vicious and armed cannabis farmers and distributors.

Therefore, the need to strengthen the due process requirements for such purchases including proper price and quality verification should not be treated with levity. These verifications should not be left at the discretion of the purchasing agency but should be done in conjunction with an appropriate centralized due process and monitoring unit made up of persons from the country's Office of National Security Adviser and the Ministries of Justice, Finance and Budget. These purchases and the equipment in question should be subjected to end-user certification that will require physical verification as well as integrity and quality tests.

Also, these procurement processes should take due consideration of the inputs from field commanders on the priority of essential and most needed equipment. Research on the latest state of the art equipment for counter-terrorism operations should be regular and the results utilized for the determination of the most effective security equipment specie to be purchased. Direct dealing and payment to manufacturers should

be instituted as a policy. This should be supported with complete circumvention of middlemen and contractors as well as avoidance of undue administrative tendering that gives room for fraudulent and inferior purchases. The procedure adopted by the Nigerian government in its latest purchase of Tucano aircraft and ancillary security equipment is a good example and should be applied for subsequent security purchases.

6.7 Improvements of Intelligence Management

Improvement of the Intelligence mechanism of the security and law enforcement agencies can considerably help and should involve more proficient collection and application techniques. Though risky and rigorous, the need for a sustained undercover infiltration into the ranks of criminal gangs is required to understand their operational plans, attributes and expansionist programmes. The façade they put up to distract security operatives; their historical, filial and structural configurations and common motives and interests need to be continuously and systematically interrogated. This can be achieved through dexterous infiltration of their nerve centres using such ploys involving implanting of molls in the different strata of their command and control structures. Subterranean training of security operatives who will act as these molls should be explored. They should thereafter made available for recruitment by these criminal gangs so that as insiders, they will be used to sniff on and act as tools of disinformation in these gangs. Recruitment of indigenes where these gangs operate can help in this case.

The above strategy can be complemented with undercover methods. In this case, operatives of concerned security agencies will disguise as artisans, hawkers, taxi drivers, truck pushers, cattle herders, hotel attendants, commercial tricycle and motorcycle operators, local hunters, etc. Under these cloaks, they will be used to continuously sniff for viable information that can be processed into actionable intelligence. Discrete surveillance techniques should be instituted at the various formal and informal border points of the country as well as at airports. Covert screening should be adopted at the airports using sophisticated contraband and explosive detection equipment. Concealment of detection equipment and disguising the identities of operatives can also be undertaken.

Another group of persons who seem to have been ignored and should be watched are physically challenged persons and beggars especially in Northern Nigeria. These individuals can either consciously, or through inducement, work for terrorists as informants and suicide bombers with unimaginable success because of their unsuspecting status. It is also possible that able bodied persons can feign the same status in disguise to equally sniff and monitor security agencies on behalf of terrorist gangs. Security operatives should therefore not rest on their oars and should not take such persons or even ordinary situations for granted.

The informant recruitment programme of concerned agencies should be reviewed and improved to include proper vetting of potential informants involving background checks on them as well as serious cautionary warnings to them and their recruiters. More so, information by informants should be properly processed

before being applied for any counter – terrorism operation. Compensation to informants should be based on proper authentication and utility of the information provided.

Furthermore, arrested terrorists should not only be prosecuted or granted amnesty. They should be subjected to thorough debriefing and psychologically sensitized. Thereafter they should help security institutions with information that will be useful for understanding the mode of operations, networking, connectivity and stimulating factors of the terrorist group they belong. All these can be derived from a proper and strategic extraction of their confessions and supported with sustained forensic analyses of the confiscated assets of these criminals including their arms and ammunitions in order to trace the manufacturers and supply sources.

Because of the strong allegation that most of the arms used by terrorists are supplied to them by unscrupulous security operatives, the registration and indexing of the arms and even other equipment legitimately owned by security institutions should be made more security-proof. This should also include inscriptions based on the command formations of these agencies and possibly personalised to the particular operatives at the point of their being allocated these arms.

Another important consideration that can augment the improvement of the intelligence acquisition capacity of Nigeria's security agencies and assist with the monitoring and tracking of potential terrorists is the need for improvement in the country's international passport administration. For example, one of the vital observations regarding the terrorists that have been attacking Nigeria's citizens and assets is that many of them are non-Nigerians. This is possible because they take advantage of not only the porosity of Nigerian borders with neighbouring countries to get into the country but also Nigeria's simplistic passport issuance process. The need for a more improved immigration screening and for this to be extended to the non-formal entry and exit points in the country is very necessary. Persons with Nigerian passports coming in or going out through these land borders should not be exempt and those suspected through profiling should be subjected to consistent monitoring. This is because some of such persons may not really be Nigerians but could have illegitimately procured these passports.

More so, those that are legitimate Nigerians and pretend to be trans-border traders may have links with terrorists. To check this trend, a more stringent strategic measure for the processing and issuance of Nigeria's passports should be embarked on. The need to request for a verifiable guarantor from the applicants' home in Nigeria should be instituted. These guarantors must be interviewed and their physical residence and relationship with the applicants confirmed. The passport approval process should also be area-specific and with serious sanctions for abuse or circumvention.

Finally, the country's Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) should be enhanced to ensure a more efficient intelligence networking and application. The present ad hoc nature of the board should be reviewed and constituted as a permanent and substantive structure. Its representative scope should be expanded to

comprise nominees from the intelligence units of all the security and law enforcement agencies and possibly representatives of accredited civil society organizations. This board should also be supported with required budgetary provisions to be able to guide the various security agencies in the sourcing, analyses and conversion of information into actionable intelligence as well as means of sharing these. More so, it should consistently appraise and advise these agencies on the extent and quality of exchanged intelligence as well as on ways of improvements. A sanction scheme for agencies who for pecuniary reason, or due to incompetence, fail to transmit useful intelligence that can help the operation of their sister agencies should be instituted. This board should regularly organize purposeful interactive fora for the promotion of intra-agency cohesion and interagency synergy as well as encouragement and monitoring of joint operational platforms for these agencies.

6.8 Countering Terrorism Financing

The indications as presented by respondents the E1, E2, E7, E14 – E19, E45, E46, E47, E53 and E54 point to the fast emergence of the nexus of drug trafficking with terrorism financing is a major facilitator of terrorism. They stated that to check this trend requires a more conscious focus on the identifiable factors responsible for this and should involve formulation of an intelligence-based operational framework. They recommended that this should incorporate proper surveillance of the Niger Delta creeks and the cannabis farms spread around the country especially in the South-South and South-West regions in the country. This should involve monitoring the exchange of resources between cannabis distributors, militants and illegal oil bunkers who buy these substances or exchange same with arms.

Also, the trans-Saharan trade routes in the Sahel which terrorists in the region control to facilitate drug trafficking in order to acquire its proceeds should be subjected to better monitoring using state of the art surveillance equipment.

Furthermore, it is noticeable that the reason for the thriving of terrorism in the country is the insufficient attention to the various identifiable sources of illicit funding of terrorism. Accordingly, the above respondents recommended the following; namely: better monitoring of the activities of NGOs and faith-based organizations, Islamic foundations including their donations, trans-border traders, assets and currency couriers. Registration of these businesses should not only be thoroughly scrutinized; their activities should regularly be scrutinized including thorough background checks of their owners. Other recommendations include the need for Nigeria to explore practical international collaborative initiatives including foreign intelligence exchange and reliance on relevant international instruments.

Other strategies which can achieve the same purpose were derived from the larger improvement framework advocated in the GIABA Mutual Evaluation Report (2015). This report recommended the following measures to check Terrorism Financing; namely: - Proper and sustained training of relevant entities in terrorism financing, interdiction, investigation and prosecution and overall, on the effective

strategies for the decimation of terrorists and neutralization of their sources of funding; enhancement of institutional and human resources capacities of relevant security agencies responsible for crime prevention and control and mainly, those charged with counter-terrorism and drug interventions especially in their capacity to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist financing culprits.

All these are to be complemented with the formulation and implementation of measures to promote integrity and professional responsibility among the operatives. More so, the need to institute early warning systems within these agencies to act as vigilance instruments for them to proactively detect and neutralize potential terrorist financing sources is very necessary. Institution of such systems that will encourage reliance on electronic banking payment systems for the purpose of limiting cash transactions is equally relevant.

Others are the proficient performance of reporting entities in the control of terrorism financing; improvement in customer identification process which should involve more thorough screening procedures with capacity to track dubious bank customers as well as enhance interagency cooperation among relevant law enforcement agencies in the country especially in the area of intelligence exchange. The foregoing should be supported with the establishment of a national criminal data base on domestic terrorists to serve as a veritable information sharing source among Nigeria's financial institutions, law enforcement agencies and with relevant international agencies.

The Presentation at the Annual Conference on Financial Fraud Cyber Crime and Cross Border Crimes in Nigeria, (2016) supported the foregoing with complementary recommendations. Embedded in these, are means of addressing the subsisting security challenges in Nigeria and the world at large covering transnational organized crimes such as terrorism, money laundering, etc. Another recommended strategy involves the strengthening of the human resources capacity of financial institutions. This is advocated as a viable remedy to equip personnel of financial institutions with the required capacity to identify all such lapses that terrorist financiers exploit to perpetrate their acts. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria Report (2018), this is achievable through the following: (a) Capacity building initiatives including special training programmes on reporting requirements and suspicious transactions by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and (b) By collaborating with professional associations such as the Committee of Chief Compliance Officers of Banks in Nigeria and that of Bank Inspectors of Nigeria.

Furthermore, Maza, Koldas and Askit (2020) provided some valuable recommendations on the improvement of Nigeria's strategic plan against terrorism financing. These include: Integrating the various initiatives presently being undertaken by the respective stakeholders in the country to reduce the funding of Boko Haram group. To realize this objective, they recommended the enhancement of the operational capacity including sufficient provision of state-of-the-art equipment to the relevant agencies responsible for countering terrorism financing in the country. They also recommended the promotion of more effective

interagency cooperation as well as multiagency synergy and cooperation among these stakeholders in the exchange of financial intelligence. This is in order to a proficiently monitor and track the transmission of funds that are meant for the facilitation of terrorism in the Lake Chad and African continental areas.

They also recommended a more dedicated commitment with the needed political will to identify, expose shame and prosecute terrorism financiers including seizing their assets. They also recommended a more conscious effort to resolve the socio-economic, political, ideological environmental and structural conditions in the country with the potential to lure citizens and be recruited by terrorist organizations; a more vigorous bombardment of such areas where terrorists collect illegal taxes. This should be complemented with efficient border monitoring and immigration screening of all the border areas that terrorists utilize for cross border transmission of funds.

Furthermore, the country's cash-based economy is identified as one of the most potent factors that provides enablement for illicit financing and therefore requires a comprehensive review and improvements. This should not only involve encouraging persons and business outfits to bank their monies, but to utilize electronic mediums and cautiously too. This is to reduce the amount of cash they take to banks for safe keeping to limit the amount of cash in their custody and the quantity that can be stolen from these banks in the event of their being looted by robbers or terrorists.

Banking services should be improved to suit the need of the customers especially the illiterates. Due to the cumbersome requirement of banking services, they resort to self-safe-keeping of their money with the risk of being stolen by robbers who may equally be involved in terror activities. Also, such policies that tend to subject the citizens' bank deposits to taxation should be reviewed. The need for education to elicit trust from citizens regarding non-cash transactions should be vigorously pursued. Thus, ensuring that cheques and electronic transfers are promptly actualized as against the present trend of long delays will help to elicit and sustain the need attraction and trust.

A more effective surveillance of financial inflows and outflows from bank accounts should be undertaken. The quantum and consistency of turnovers in accounts should be continuously subjected to a sustainable discreet monitoring. The use of biometric features such as the finger prints of bank customers as the index of identification should be made compulsory and improved. It should include matching of different accounts holders, sources of deposits and beneficiaries of monetary transfers. This will help to establish appropriate trails that can help in the identification of suspicious transactions and create such web that can be used to track the relationship between different account holders. The frequency and similarity of transactions and possible link to illicit purposes can also be denoted through this. Monitoring of Bureau-de-change operators and making it compulsory for them to regularly render account of their transactions is equally important.

6.9 Improving Interagency Cooperation

The presentation in Nigeria's Army Report (2014) outlined the following measures which can help to check observed constraints against efficient interagency collaboration. Most vital ones in this case includes: the initiation of novel policies and practices with attendant minimization of service duplications, judicious appropriation of resources, reduction in the anxiety and stress of operatives, maximization of the capacity of the collaborating agencies with attendant improvements in their service delivery. The report expressed optimism that this situation can be improved through regular discussions and harmonization of differences and essentially requires timely identification of the common goals and objectives. Proactive disposition in dealing with security challenges to be complemented with a comprehensive approach by government in the provision of required supports to the various security institutions is equally important.

The submissions of respondents E1, E2, E3, E7, E8 – E13 in this case revolve around the following improvement measures. These include realistic legislative and legal reforms to cater for such conflicting areas of convergence and backed up with the following strategic supports; (a) conscious programme of action with potential to positively sensitize operatives of the concerned agencies on the need for team spirit among themselves and to see each other as partners in progress. Also, it is notable that interagency conflicts can be resolved if the different parties understand and appreciate each other's interests and preferences which can be harmonized to achieve a common goal. This is possible if they are provided with the opportunity of healthy interactive platforms for rubbing of minds. These initiatives can be further sustained through interaction among the various stakeholders in the country's security system during which their operatives will be exposed to the principles and application of interagency cooperation (Odoma 2014).

In addition to the foregoing, a thorough reorientation programme is recommended. This should be organized regularly to ensure that these operatives imbibe the required democratic disposition and to be desensitised against all such brutish and regimented approach in crime control. They should also be inculcated with the discipline to submit themselves to civil democratic oversight supervision for necessary checks and evaluations to include proper understanding of the structures, roles and areas of strength of each of their agencies and how these can be harnessed for mutual and collaborative advantage. All these can be complemented with proper sensitisation of these operatives to understand that the claim of superiority between or among themselves is unconstitutional and very irrelevant for functional successes.

The need for improved communication between and among the stakeholders in Nigeria's security system can also help. The report on the capacity building and training workshop on effective gateways for interagency and business cooperation in Africa by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (2016), emphasized on this requirement. To achieve this purpose, the document underscored the need to

determine the most relevant agencies that can investigate the crimes as well as the type of information and the accessibility of the relevant information to achieve this purpose.

The above requirements can be supported by improvements in the professional responsibility standards and the entrenchment of an effective anti-corruption culture. This should involve: Promotion of discipline by the leadership of the security agencies. This is to ensure that their operatives imbibe the required professional responsibility etiquette e.g. appreciating that other agencies are equally involved like them, in a common course. They should therefore on this note, accord operatives of other security agencies their deserved respect and to freely explore means of cooperation to achieve this common course.

Equally important is the enforcement of professional responsibility standards among these operatives with responsibility on the leadership of these agencies to ensure that their personnel especially the junior ones, are instilled with appropriate disciplinary traits. This should be supported by ensuring that persons in other professions apart from security and law enforcement are accorded their deserving respect in line with democratic ethos.

Another area of concern which can also help to achieve the above objectives is the mitigation of negative power consciousness and jurisdictional challenges. Respondents E1, E2, E3, E7, E11, E12 and E13 recommended the streamlining of the operations of concerned agencies to ensure that they are not only easily supervised, but equally improve their effectiveness.

They further recommended for a conscious effort should be made to identify common functions among the agency's responsible for terrorism intervention in the country and to accordingly cede such functions to the agency considered most suitable to effectively perform same. The option of merging security and law enforcement institutions with significant commonality in their roles should be explored. A technical committee should therefore be constituted to undertake the process of such mergers with due consideration for the country's security situation and international obligations.

In order to give impetus to the above recommendation, it is required that an interim measure prior to such mergers, can be explored through the creation of a Central Administrative System that will be responsible for the coordination of a uniform administration of these agencies. This central system should be responsible for the implementation of common and uniform recruitments, promotions and welfare appropriations for these agencies as well as appointments and periodic deployments of their heads and senior commanders based on the country's security exigencies. The system should also be responsible for regular organization of conferences and seminars for the different strata of these agencies with emphasis on the appreciation of the relevance and complementary of their various roles for the achievement of common objectives.

Accordingly, a study team should be constituted to take a critical look at all the laws and policies guiding the establishment and operations of all the security agencies in Nigeria in order to identify all such provisions that are not only replicated but overlapping. These provisions should be evaluated in order to determine the ones that can be properly separated and exclusively maintained and the ones whose replication should subsist and with proper clarification relative to the purpose they serve.

6.10 Improving Nigeria's International Cooperation

The documentary sources that provided valuable guides for the achievement of this objective is the United Nations International Cooperation tool (2006) and its (2018) improvement.

This document counselled that the international cooperation initiative to be embarked by any country should be anchored and evaluated relative to the country's peculiar circumstance covering the need for improved internal security, political stability and above all, improved standard of living. It also emphasized that it should be used as a means of strengthening the sovereignty of countries and through utilization of the provisions of this tool on mutual Legal Assistance, Assets Confiscation, etc. It also stipulated that countries can utilise these provisions to also direct informal and formal cooperation between law enforcement institutions in the exchange of intelligence, including criminal and financial intelligence.

It advocated the development and promotion of international collaborative schemes that are relevant to a country's security goals and aspirations especially with its contiguous neighbours. This is to the extent that they will benefit the concerned country's national and international commitments and in consonance with the country's non-interference in their internal affairs based on reciprocity, bilateral and multilateral practices. Consequent upon the foregoing, the document recommended: the need of national legislations to conform to rule of law and respect for human rights.

The document equally underscored the need for concerned countries to: (a) To facilitate convergence and compatibility of their legislations; (b) To introduce procedural reforms; (c) To develop a more efficient investigative and prosecutorial capacity at national levels to effectively complement international cooperation initiatives. Nevertheless, the commitment of countries to international cooperation requirements should not be at the expense of the maintenance of its rule of law or the protection of citizens' human rights (Dakas 2015). PLAC (2018) provided support to the foregoing and recommended that Nigeria should improve on the domestication of its international cooperation Instruments.

To support the above recommendations, Nigeria needs to undertake a critical review of all such international agreements that are related to its control of the incidence and threats of terrorism. The country should therefore constitute a Technical Study and Review Committee to undertake this responsibility. This committee should critically study and review these agreements including the ones bequeathed to the country by its colonial rulers and the undemocratic ones by its military administrators. This is in order to identify the ones that are of less important to Nigeria's domestic interests and to

recommend how such provisions in these agreements can be updated and improved to achieve equitable benefits to Nigeria. The accruing recommendations by this committee should be taken to the relevant bilateral or multilateral fora by the country using a more proficient diplomatic negotiation tool for the required endorsement of these reviews.

The risk assessment models being utilized by the country's law enforcement and security agencies should be reviewed. This should pay more emphasis on the protection of the country's sovereignty. The country should also constitute a Diplomatic Monitoring Team charged with the task of raising red flag at the country's international collaborators and equally putting them to task, to redress in the event of breaches and also to bring same to limelight at relevant multinational fora. It should be mandatory for training supports to the country to be adapted to suit the country's peculiar security challenges. Joint operational programmes with these foreign countries should be reviewed to ensure that surveillance and operational standards are dictated by Nigerian commanders and not from the high commands of these foreign collaborators through which they infiltrate Nigeria's critical intelligence nerve centres and security secrets.

In view of the negative perception harboured against Nigeria's international collaborators which elicit hatred against them and consequent terrorist attacks against them. Nigeria needs to evolve an effective and sustained positive image laundering programme for these Western countries including adequate propagation of the positive basis of its cooperation with them. These should include consistent highlights of the benefits of the relationship to the country; provision of dividends of good governance to the communities harbouring these antagonistic persons. The use of local media in native language and the involvement of friendly religious and community leaders for the image laundering of these countries can help.

Furthermore, Nigeria should institute where they do not exist, or review existent foreign economic agreements that will be very explicit and make it mandatory for the repatriation to Nigeria, all verifiable funds that are proceeds of corruption. Such provisions should also constitute part of its domestication of relevant international conventions and protocols that it is signatory to. It should also embark on a comprehensive review of its various Joint Venture agreements with these multinational corporations to unambiguously include strict anti-corruption compliance and obligations and with clearly spelt out penalties for breaches. These agreements should be appropriately communicated and registered in the concerned embassies of these foreign countries.

6.11 Improving Democratic Oversight

The improvement of this requirement is congruent on the following thematic guides; namely: entrenchment of an efficient constitutional and legislative framework; Improvement of the civil capacity oversight structures and their functionaries as well as Improvement in the participation of civil society and non-state actors.

On the need to institute an effective constitutional framework, the Institute of African Studies Report (2015), emphasised the relevance of strengthening the capacity of the country's legislature for the realisation of this objective, a comprehensive constitutional amendment that will limit the powers of Nigeria's presidency over the country's security institutions is advocated.

PLAC (2017) in this case, advocated a holistic remedial intervention which encompasses the need for government to commence appropriate reform in the country's security sector to counter the challenges posed by the prevalent secret culture in the country's security institutions. This should be backed with appropriate constitutional and legislative supports that will cover the following areas:

(i) Proper de-politicisation and subordination of the security sector to civil democratic control by elected legislators and executives through provision of constitutional support and the re-definition of the role and scope of the security sector;

(ii) Re-orientation and professionalization of the core-security institutions and their operatives on the imperatives of contemporary security sector responsibilities and obligations.

(iii) Designing of a legislative framework by the Federal Government that will be used to coordinate and harmonize the activities of non-state security actors and to ensure that their activities and operations conform to the legal requirements of the country's security sector.

(iv) The need to strengthen subsisting oversight mechanisms and encouraging public accountability. This should involve provision of sufficient resources and skills that will sustain their autonomy and complement their oversight supervisory role.

It is also advocated that the level of knowledge of legislators on security matters should be improved and also for the country's legislature to establish its own independent means of sourcing information regarding the activities of government security institutions on which it is expected to perform oversight supervision (Ball and Fayemi 2008).

The need to ensure a properly organized structural and functional harmonisation and cognizant of the above improvements are also advocated. Thus, all segments of the security sector should be systematically organised and mutually inter connected for the purpose of providing better understanding of the system with potential to elicit required support (Toomstra 2013).

Because of the observation that some legislators responsible for the oversight supervision of Nigeria's security agencies are not adequately experienced and with corrupt background, the following recommendations should be heeded. Thus, as part of the qualification for any elective or executive position, and as a compulsory requirement, prospective applicants should pass through a certification process of civil democratic indoctrination including a complementary internship programme. This

underscores the need for a comprehensive background and competence checks on them first before their election and secondly during consideration for selection into legislative committees. More so, they should be engaged in regular interactive fora with the operatives of the agencies they supervise in order to actually understand and appreciate their shortcomings and needs.

A whistle blowing policy should also be established in these agencies to expose the legislators who surreptitiously engage in influencing the internal administration of the agencies they exercise oversight role. This should cover alerts on any kind of patronage including contracts, sponsorship for tours or employment and posting of operatives. Nigeria's Department of State Security Services should create a special unit for these checks as well as undercover surveillance of the performance of the oversight duties of these legislators to identify culpable ones in order to subject them to appropriate sanctions. Continuous integrity tests on these legislators should equally be embarked upon. Accordingly, there is need for a proper constitutional review or in the interim, for a legislative Bill to grant financial autonomy to the judiciary and the legislature and for these arms to independently source for and recruit all their employees without reliance on the executive. This constitutional and or legislative Bill should provide for a joint executive, legislative and judicial committee to be constituted and be responsible for the selection of the heads and senior personnel of these agencies as well as the approval of their needs.

Subjecting vital security requirements to civil democratic approvals and statutory sanctions for breaches should be instituted. Such requirements as appointments, promotions and ratification of disciplinary decisions should not only be subject to executive but to legislative approvals. Pronouncements by the law courts regarding the activities of security agencies should be strictly obeyed with clearly spelt out sanctions for breaches.

On the need to strengthen the oversight capacity of the judiciary the following recommendations which were further corroborated by respondents E1, E7, E20 – E26 recommended the following: Other initiatives that can also help includes: Proper funding of judicial institutions especially the courts which should be provided with sufficient human and material resources to enable them cope with not only the incessant demand for expeditious prosecution of cases, but the increasing rate of prosecution of drugs and terrorism suspects. The above respondents also recommended that the government should urgently address the problem of dearth of not only judges, but that of courts and their required resources.

6.12 Improving Human Rights Standard

The recommendations made by E1, E2, E3, E7, E8 and E27 – E32 centre on the following; namely: appropriate justice reform initiatives; improved political will and government action; appropriate capacity and ethical improvements; efficient and diligent investigations and prosecutions; education and training programmes; adherence to international best practices and efficient foreign collaborative scheme.

On the need for judicial reform and capacity improvements, journal of law, policy and globalization (2014) recommended the following measures:

(a) Regular sensitization programmes to enlighten the citizens on their rights and means of seeking appropriate restitutions. Community leaders and relevant organizations in the country should be involved in the education of the citizens in this respect.

(b) Further to the above, all the persons statutorily or informally engaged in human rights protection, should be engaged in consistent educational and training programmes on the principles and application of human rights doctrines.

The following measures are also vital namely: implementation of justice sector reform agenda that will involve among others, the provision of legal supports that are accessible to everyone that needs it; responding to the special needs of the vulnerable including providing legal aids to poor victims; developing a policy framework that guarantees improved accessibility to justice especially in civil matters. Other measures include establishment of accessible and affordable Alternative Dispute Resolution Schemes; implementation of human rights training programmes for security personnel and service providers on their human rights obligations. (Nigeria's National Action Plan for the promotion and protection of Human Rights in Nigeria 2006).

The above respondents as well as E59 and E60 recommended a comprehensive review of the various legislations on criminal justice administration in the country including all the inherited colonial laws which gave impetus to the protection of state institutions and state functionaries. While the provisions of these laws which appear discordant and obsolete should be completely expunged from the country's laws, the others should be re-framed to elicit positive disposition and obedience to the laws of the land and discourage reprehensible attitudes against the government.

(a) Sustained training programmes on the principles and application of rule of law for law enforcement operatives including re-orientation programmes to diffuse the negative stereotypes against the practice of rule of law harboured by these operatives;

(b) Effective public enlightenment programmes on the constituents of rule of law including aggressive civic education on citizens' rights that will enable them understand not only when their rights are violated but when and how to assert these rights and accordingly seek justice; Realistic review of the constitutional requirements on such rights e.g. on the maximum acceptable detention period of suspects before they are charged to court as the present forty eight (48) hours maximum time seems unrealistic.

(c) Diligent prosecution of violators and the strengthening of the country's Human Rights Commission to ensure its effectiveness in the administration of human rights in the country. This should include legal, logistic and manpower supports among others.

On the need for improved demonstration of political will on the part of government, amnesty International Report on the war crimes committed by Nigeria's military tagged "Stars on their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands" (2015) made the following recommendations; namely:

(a) For the government to publicly accept responsibility for the various human rights abuses in the country by its security agencies and strive to promptly stop these incidents that breach international law and to urgently commence the required investigations that will involve prosecutions with the exclusion of the imposition of death sentences on them. The purpose of this action is not only intended to placate or provide compensation to victims of human rights abuse, but as a deterrence measure for future violations;

(b) Instituting appropriate mechanisms that will stop all human rights abuses such as unlawful arrests, detentions, torture, maltreatments enforced disappearances, extra judicial executions, etc.

(c) Publication of all previous investigative findings on human rights violations and to determine the reasons for the failure to implement these findings by the country's former regimes as well as the need for the country to integrate the provisions of international human rights laws in its legislations and to complement same with realistic international involvement of the country's National Human Rights Commission.

On the need to adhere to international best practices, amnesty international report (2015) emphasized the need for the relevant organs of the African Union especially the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the African Commission on Human and People's Rights to make political declarations condemning the series of allegation of human rights violations by Nigeria's military and for the government of Nigeria to investigate these allegations and institute measures that will deter subsequent occurrence.

The report further recommended that the United Nations Human Rights Council should follow suit on the above measures including the need for the High Commissioner for Human Rights to equally express concern regarding the frequent human rights violations committed by the Nigerian Security Institutions. More so, the required benchmarks of adherence to human rights should be set for Nigeria by its international collaborators as pre-condition for security support assistance. Such conditions should include vetting the country's security operatives recommended for international training on their human rights credential. The above recommendations can be further supported with the following:

A more stringent sanction against rights abuses, to be statutorily backed up should be instituted in the country. This initiative should be complemented with an award scheme for human rights compliance by

security agencies involved in drug trafficking and terrorism control in the country. Civil society organizations should be involved in the scheme to evaluate these agencies in order to extol the compliant ones and equally blacklist the indicted ones including their operatives who are involved in human rights violations.

Also, the present policy of accommodating security and law enforcement operatives in exclusive quarters or barracks distant from where the other citizens reside should be reviewed to make them live in communities with other members of the public. This will bring them close to the citizenry and provide increased interactive opportunities that can prompt better understanding of their peculiarities which will eventually achieve the required bonding. It will also help them in their intelligence sourcing coverage and deter the human rights abuse tendencies of these operatives because they can easily be exposed unlike when they live in distant barracks where they hibernate and seek refuge after abusing innocent citizens. It will also help the citizens to appreciate that these operatives are as human as they are which can consequently elicit their cooperation and supports.

More so, Nigeria appears to have been conformed to obey the definition of what constitutes human rights by developed countries. The country needs to therefore, standardize its human rights administration based on domestic considerations and with respect for international requirements. The practice of waiving same due to foreign cooperation or the need to elicit accreditation, should be avoided and if need be, should be sufficiently justified in order not to send a wrong signal to Nigeria's security operatives that human rights abuse can be tolerated in some instances and not in others.

Nigeria's Human Rights Commission should be strengthened with sufficient human resources and financial supports to be able to effectively monitor human rights compliance and violations. This commission should also develop schemes to professionally liaise with international human rights monitoring groups for further improvements and correct reportage of human rights situation in Nigeria. The commission should be statutorily empowered to prosecute human rights abuses in the country and should accordingly, be restructured to have an effective prosecutorial unit that will consistently liaise with the country's Federal Ministry of Justice for effective prosecution of offenders.

6.13 Improvement of Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Programme

Though Nigeria has made efforts to check the menace of corruption though national initiatives and in collaboration with international partners, these have not achieved the desired objective. The need for improvements in this case is therefore very essential. Olutokun (2014) had accordingly echoed the need for Nigeria to consciously brace up with its anti-corruption crusade including the need for the country to redraw its security architecture and national integrity system. This should involve a frontal attack on the alarmingly skewed distribution of national resources. He acknowledged that this might be an arduous task but that the current circumstance of the country's declining economic fortunes made it a compulsion for

the country to take those long deferred hard decisions. He further advised that "Nigeria did not have to reinvent the wheel and only need to learn the example of such countries which had excelled in this case". He gave example with Hong Kong which progressed from being one of the world's most corrupt countries to one better rated on the Corruption Perception Index than such countries as the United States of America and Britain.

Furthermore, the following recommendations are necessary and based on legislative and institutional supports, education, sensitization programmes, strategic and behaviour modification strategies as well as interagency cooperation. The Presidential Advisory Committee against Corruption Report (2016) stressed the need for the identification of the legislative, organizational and attitudinal factors that constitute impediments against effective prevention, detection, investigations and prosecution of corruption cases in the country. The committee therefore pursues the actualization of this objective through: Promotion of the reform agenda of Nigeria's anti-corruption programme with proper coordination of the implementation of subsisting anti-corruption legislations. This involves appropriate consultations with relevant anti-corruption agencies, the judiciary, public institutions including law enforcement institutions, professional and civil society organizations. To complement the above initiative, it is imperative for existent legislations to be improved relative to the country's corruption status including incorporating legislative counter measures against such eliciting factors and system laxities against fraudulent practices. Proper identification of all the obsolete legislations inherited from colonial statutes and military decrees for consequent review are also very necessary.

The promulgation of relevant bills by the country's legislature should also form part of the strategies. These legislations should be aimed at harmonizing the country's legal framework and ensuring that it is supportive to the implementing institutions. This will enable them to effectively execute their anti-corruption mandates such as sentencing, assets declaration, ethical adherence, procurements, etc. It should also involve development of appropriate frameworks for the sensitization of the public on the extent and consequences of the menace of corruption.

To give a further effect to the foregoing, the committee underscored the need for the facilitation of collaboration and partnership building among stakeholders to elicit public support. It therefore recommended that the following measures should be undertaken; namely: designing of a strategy document to improve synergy and unfettered communication between the government and the citizens on the country's anti-corruption initiatives; identification of areas of cooperation among relevant stakeholders including the public especially in the area of exchange of information as well as recommendation of means of improving government's information strategy through effective utilization of new media opportunities. To sustain the benefits of all the foregoing, periodic reviews of the performance of the various anti-corruption agencies in order to ascertain their status and performances prerequisite for appropriate improvements are equally underscored.

The Chattam House Report on Corruption in Nigeria (2016) emphasized the need for the inclusion of anti-corruption education in school curricular as a vital consideration for positive youth development as well as prioritization of the conceptualization of integrity issues in the public service at early stage. This is complemented with anti-corruption awareness campaigns with the young ones as specific target. The same report recognizes the relevance of behavioural disposition as a significant factor for involvement in corrupt practices. In this case, it strongly advocated the need for law enforcement agencies with anti-corruption mandate in Nigeria to appropriately consider this factor in their strategies. This can be achieved through the creation of a covert unit that will cut across these agencies. Provision of systematic counsels on the means of applying behavioural indicators in anti-corruption policy formulation and application are equally critical. It is expected that this unit should be strengthened through training and guidance and should equally adopt same in the required psychological procedures.

Furthermore, the above efforts can be complemented through proper sensitization and behavioural modification programme. The UNDOC survey on corruption in Nigeria (2018) in this case recommended the following: massive sensitization against corruption in the mass-media targeting up to forty million listeners; capacity development programmes involving training of more than 1400 stakeholders from the government and civil society organizations in relevant anti-corruption processes. It averred also that the achievement of any meaningful result in the country's anti-corruption crusade should involve decisive public attitudinal change and apathy against corruption. For this purpose, the document placed high premium on proper reinforcement through; namely: appropriate understanding of the underlying motivating factors for refrain or restraint from crime commission; proper consideration of societal factors that aids the rationalization of crime commission and its attendant consequences.

The document therefore counselled that Nigeria should utilize the foregoing to strengthen its capacity to apply behaviour and social norms as part of strategies to curb corruption. The UNODC Project Report on Corruption in Nigeria (2018) while supporting the relevance of the above strategies averred the need to inculcate public officials with the trait of not falling for bribe inducements. The report further recommended the application of the research findings on anti-corruption strategies for Nigeria as proffered in the Chatham House, London, African Programme Report (2017). The research revealed that behavioural traits that can induce individuals to be predisposed to pay or take bribe and accordingly recommended reward system for those who refrain. Above all, it recommended that the government should be sincere in the prosecution of its anti-corruption crusade by being purposeful and committed as well as creating the enabling environment for the entrenchment of the independence of the country's anti-graft agencies. This should be complemented with the provision of necessary resources to enable them effectively perform their roles including adequate budgetary provisions, human resources capacity supports covering provision of sufficient personnel strength, training and development as well as provision of requisite operational tool.

In a nutshell, the document observed that "a careful understanding of the factors that drive relevant behaviours should be a critical component of government actions to reduce corruption". (P.33).It anchored the foregoing on the position of Hallsworth (2016) which affirmed that every aspect of the government's efforts to check corruption, could be bolstered through the application of observed proof of how citizens will respond to existent measures.

Furthermore, the need to create an international anti-corruption mechanism is very critical. This should be dedicated to the monitoring, tracing and facilitation of unconditional return of such stolen assets to the countries they were stolen from. It is also advisable for the country to demonstrate willingness to forge strategic partnership with foreign governments, civil society and international organizations in this regard. Other complementary strategies that can help to mitigate the menace are as follows:

(a) Instituting an effective system that can motivate and protect persons who report the incidence of corruption to relevant authorities and complemented with necessary encouragement of citizens to report to appropriate authorities; (b) development and application of strict enforcement measures that can minimize the feeling of impunity among perpetrators and complemented with more measures that will not only inculcate, but also enhance responsible etiquette among public officials. Others are:

(c) Exploring measures that will drastically minimize direct contact of citizens with public servants including reliance on digital technological solutions for service delivery. Also, the use of cashless electronic payment systems especially for the payment of public goods and services should be continuously encouraged. In this case, it is recommended that the Corruption Risk Assessment Report on e-government platforms conducted by the UNODC and ICPC in 2017 should equally be utilized to ensure improved expeditious process for the provision of public service as a means of ensuring that public officials do not exploit existent slow procedures for pecuniary gains.

(d) Entrenchment of higher level transparency and accountability in recruitment process. This can be achieved through proper and regular review of selection procedures as well as ensuring compulsory rotation and provision of integrity training of officials involved in the process.

The various means of checking the menace of this corruption as represented above are indeed worthwhile and it is intended to reform not only the system at the domestic level but also relative to the interaction with foreign interests. This is expected to insulate such transnational opportunities that aid both domestic and international actors to connive with unpatriotic elements in the country to steal Nigeria's resources.

6.14 De-radicalisation as a Good Governance Requirement

Another critical requirement to check the expansion of terrorism in Nigeria is the need for de-radicalisation through positive education. Nigeria's National Security Strategy (2014) noted that this can be

complemented with the establishment of de-radicalization centres for the reintegration of convicted terrorism culprits. Media enlightenment of the citizenry to obliterate the negative campaigns against the uncertainties of terrorist activities in the country is also part of the strategy. This includes incorporation of effective civic education in the curricular of the various educational institutions in the country for the promotion of security awareness nationwide. The media as well as relevant stakeholders are expected to complement this initiative through such programmes that will ensure attitudinal changes and help the populace to be able to take necessary preventive actions against terrorist attacks

The document also advocated involvement and participation of civil society organizations and the private sector as well as the need for a well-designed rehabilitation programme that will ensure a systematic de-radicalization of those terrorist convicts that were prosecuted and jailed based on the country's terrorism Prevention Act as amended in 2011 and those that were arrested and awaiting trial for the same offence. This programme is also meant to cater for offenders who might benefit from the country's dialogue and possible amnesty programme. The essence of this initiative according to the document is to properly reintegrate such convicts and offenders into society as responsible citizens. For this purpose, the families of the victims and communities of these offenders are given the needed orientation to forgive, provide and support repentant offenders.

Other relevant actions outlined that complements the above initiatives are; namely: piloting a counter - terrorism radicalization programme which incorporates strategic community engagement and resilience building, covering peace initiatives, community outreach, engagement of religious youth groups, conflicts resolution and early warning systems and the empowerment of relevant stakeholders all for the purpose of sensitizing the citizens against the menace of terrorism.

According to CVE (2016), the instrumentality of educational instruction for the behaviour modification of individuals that are susceptible to negative sensitization should revolve around mental and psychological engagement of those that are vulnerable to extremist indoctrination. Those that have already been transformed into responsible and peaceful citizens are also to be monitored to ensure that they do not become recidivist. Improvement in the content of educational curriculum should be complemented with the provision of safe and constructive environment achievable through dialogue for peaceful co-existence between educational institutions and their communities.

Furthermore, CVE (2016) advised on the following solutions; namely: piloting of a positively oriented curriculum development with capacity to inculcate critical and logical reasoning, identification and the training of Islamic religious leaders to imbibe and transmit moderate religious views, professional supports by psychologists, therapists and religious leaders including vocational training and provision of sustainable means of livelihood to affected groups as well as the reintegration of reformed extremists into the society especially within their families and communities.

For the objective of developing children into responsible youths that will eschew criminality, it is advisable that education should commence at the family level which is equated as not only the foundation, but the pivotal basic cell of the society from where every human person emerged from to the society (Josephite Mareillan Catholic Report 2018 p.3). In essence, parents should take the responsibility to inculcate in their wards, basic and authentic, socio-cultural, religious and educational standards and etiquettes for their exploration of the larger society. A similar responsibility is equally placed on religious institutions in the formation of the mind of the youths to be effectively equipped to cope with the challenges of life and society. Religious and community leaders as well as institutions are challenged in this case to ensure that they impart positive religious doctrines and ensure that the youths eschew extremism or fundamentalism as well as to tolerate and respect persons of different religious faith or creed.

Nigeria's National Framework and Action Plan for Preventing and countering violent extremism (2016) also made some salient recommendations. This framework was designed with due consideration for both the victims and drivers of violent extremism. It covers the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (PCVE). These involves enhancement of the capacity of relevant institutions and proper coordination of all the required processes in the PCVE Programmes, enhancement of rule of law through improvements in the access to justice and respect for human rights, adherence to the rule of law, engagement of communities, resilience building and integration of strategic communications.

The Global Education Monitoring Report (2016) also recommended the following steps to complement the above requirement; namely: adequate preparation of the child for smooth transition from home to school; preparing the child for primary education and provision of adequate care and supervision of the child. These objectives according to Nwuche (2018) can be achieved through the provision of quality teachers.

6.15 Improving Employment Programme

Nigeria's Employment Policy (2006) recommended the following improvements namely:

(a) Creation of a realistic educational system including necessary skills and development programme relevant to the demands of the country's labour market. These are to be complemented with virile technical education facilities for the development of middle level personnel who are mostly needed in the country's labour market;

(b) Provision of supports to the private sector in order to enhance their employment generation capacity. Such supports should include the improvement of market accessibility and patronage of locally made goods and services, infrastructural supports such as provision of electricity to minimize the cost of production of goods and services;

(c) Further to the above, the document emphasised on the need for increased investment in public infrastructure and improvement in public service delivery, mitigating of factors that engender child labour as well as maintenance of public safety.

Furthermore, Nigeria's National counter Terrorism Strategy (2014) emphasised the need for labour security through enhancement of labour productivity and recommended the following: Formulation and implementation of required governance framework that will spur skill development programmes and attendant productivity; implementation and application of safe and promising social security scheme; making provision for occupational health and safety of employees; improvement of information dissemination about possible employment openings; supporting the creation and sustenance of small and medium enterprises including improvements in the required institutional framework; facilitation of the informal sector; supporting the promulgation and implementation of legislations and policies that encourage positive labour relations through enhancement of resourceful labour advisory services that will elicit confidence and reliability of employers in respecting and implementing collective labour agreements.

The foregoing goals according to the document, equally rely on the following implementation plans; namely: establishment of job centres in all the states in Nigeria with the cooperation of state governments for the purpose of disseminating information on employment vacancies to potential applicants; reduction of administrative procedures and bottlenecks for the establishment of new business and the sustenance of old ones; Initiation; improvement and sustenance of local content programmes in every of the country's economic sector in order to provide the needed advantage and preference for potential Nigerian job seekers.

The Nigerian Content Initiative is also a step in the right direction for the realization of this objective. However, they advised that this should be administered to be immune to foreign manipulation. On this note, Respondents E56, E57, E58, E59 and E60 advocated a review of the process of expatriate quota concessions to avoid usurpation of the opportunities available for qualified Nigerians. All these according to them, should be complemented with the enhancement of the various statutory institutions with mandate for employment creation as well as provision of credit facilities for new business ventures including joint and cooperative schemes; provision of incentives to SME's including tax reliefs and micro-finance supports. Development and promotion of value chain in agriculture and the productive sector is equally recommended.

The relevance of entrepreneurship education as a strategic measure to control the problem of youth unemployment in Nigeria supports the above recommendations. This programme should include appropriate development of skills, infrastructure and rich school curriculum to be complemented with training the trainers programme and removal of all such possible impediments against the entrepreneurial development of youths. It also includes means of creating and propelling the growth of small enterprises

in communities through training and consultancy programmes as well as the facilitation of access to requisite funding and necessary supports for new businesses (Oyelola, Igwe, Ajibosin& Peluola 2014).

In addition to the foregoing, FSDH Merchants Bank Report (2019), recommended that the following measures can be explored; namely: (a) Immediate restructuring of the educational sector so that it can readily provide such skills acquisition programme relative to contemporary realities especially as required in the present digital age; (b) Creation of adequate funding of technical and skills acquisition institutes spread all over the country; (c) Adequate investment in the educational sector to attract and cater for qualified teachers and administrators; (d) Agricultural Interventions involving private sector participation to boost agriculture including partnership with agricultural research institutes that will support the sector with such necessary materials that can improve productivity.

Furthermore, for a proper evaluation of the unemployment situation in Nigeria, there is need to undertake a comprehensive census of all the unemployed persons in the country with proper classification based on such vital indices as age, location, level of education, vocational skills, marital status, etc. These indicators should be used for the administration of such social security programmes that will involve payment of monthly stipends, vocational training, scholarship programmes for the brilliant ones and provision of soft loans for trading, farming, etc.

The present social investment programme of Nigeria's is an important initiative but seems to be more as a political tool to elicit citizens' electoral support rather than for poverty alleviation. The programme therefore needs to be depoliticized and made all encompassing and spread not only to urban but rural communities. The soft loan scheme in the programme should not only cover petty traders but also peasant farmers and artisans. The process of acquiring these loans should be simplified and accompanied with guides on how best to utilize same to improve beneficiaries' trades and vocations. In addition, peasant farmers should not only be supported with fertilizers but with crop seedlings for crop cultivation and fingerlings for fish production as well as provision of training on modern farming and fish production.

Continuous employee verification should be embarked upon to check the problem of ghost workers that has been responsible for the closing up of employment openings and denying opportunities to potential applicants. When such openings are freed up due to such verification exercise, the engagement of more unemployed persons becomes possible. Also, employment processes should be standardized with appropriate sanctions against favouritism. Government should demonstrate a more sincere and dedicated commitment in the provision of enabling environment for the setting up of industries including security, power and fiscal supports. Corporate institutions should be tasked to take up some of these initiatives as part of their social responsibility obligations.

It is recommended that recruitment of persons by politicians without proper authorisation should be sanctioned with stiff penalties for not only the culpable politicians, but to the youths who make themselves

available for such unscrupulous role. However, it should be legislated and made mandatory for whoever is employing any youth for political support assignments to register them with guarantee that they will not be used for negative purpose but to be employed based on contemporary labour regulations and to be discharged only on such standard regulations especially on disciplinary or health grounds. Nigeria's government should accordingly at the state and federal levels, statutorily regulate all apprenticeship programmes including conditions for recruitments, rights and obligations of both the parties (i.e. the apprentices and the recruiters) welfare issues, duration and settlement entitlements.

In view of the foregoing, a special unit to undertake the responsibility of sanitizing the system with clearly spelt out sanctions against breaches and adjudication of complaints, if need be, should be constituted. The country's Human Rights Commission should also take this matter seriously and in the interim, assume the role of regulating this practice. This initiative should be supported with a sustained enlightenment programme to sensitize citizens especially the naïve ones on their obligations and rights. Persons who are already victims should be encouraged to report their plights for possible indemnity and support by the government.

Another important observation in the country's employment programme is the tendency of multinational corporations to shy away from this obligation. This is such that they hardly use their host communities as catchment areas for their employment needs on the excuse that most of the indigenes do not possess the required qualification for employment. These corporations should therefore be made not to hide under this guise. It should also be made mandatory for them to not only pay compensation to those whose farms and fishing resources are destroyed due to their exploratory activities, but should train them and their wards in relevant vocations and to provide scholarship opportunities to the brilliant ones and thereafter employ them.

In view of the increasing manifestation of terrorism by herdsmen, and in order to sustain healthy vocation among them, a special team should be constituted by government to understudy how countries confronted with similar challenge are able to resolve same. The option of ranching should be explored including recommending the required human and material resources but cognizance of Nigeria's peculiar circumstance including proper education of herders to first of all, appreciate this system and the means of successful implementation and maximization of its benefits.

Further theoretical insights and suggested areas for future studies

This study was concerned with how to improve Nigeria's Security Sector Governance to be able to more effectively control the threats of terrorism. It accordingly leveraged on a viable theoretical framework which provided the anchor upon which the various requirements for the achievement of this objective was based. The theoretical paradigms in this case are: the traditional Security Sector Reform and the African

Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (AUPFSSR) and complemented with the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform.

This study benefited from the epistemological content of these paradigms and accordingly situated same to the Nigerian situation. These paradigms provided very helpful projections on how critical security sector governance requirements can help countries emerging from conflict situations, to deal with their consequences. Nevertheless, the synthesis and application of these requirements as included in these paradigms appear more corrective than preventive and might not have been deep enough to CONTAIN Nigeria's peculiarities.

The requirements as contemplated in SSR are sundry but this research concentrated on the institutional capacity, civil democratic oversight, human rights standard and complemented with the imperatives of good governance, specifically the country's anti-corruption profile and provision of employment opportunities.

Nigeria is made up of over two hundred and fifty component ethnic nationalities with such cultural diversities and interests including different traditional leadership and kinship systems; followership; language; religion; etc. These nationalities also nurse such stereotypes that cannot only be explained within global or national contexts. There are also issues of intra-national and ethnic competitions among these groups which can potentially stoke insecurity. The antecedent of the countries in which SSR/G are to be applied should, in addition to considering their post conflict, situations, equally take cognizance of their unique historical factors as well as natural and man-made environmental disasters that affect them.

For example, Northern Nigeria is faced with natural environmental hazards such as deforestation and drying up of its aquatic resources. Specifically, the drying up of Lake Chad and its adverse consequences on the fishing occupation of the indigenes results in the obstruction of their means of livelihood which can consequently push them into crime. All these therefore underscore the need for deeper contestations that should focus on the local ownership of the envisaged security sector governance model that could be used to resolve such peculiar security challenges.

Future studies should also adequately put in context, the personality traits and the unique stereotypes harboured by the citizens of the countries where SSR/G is to be applied. Thus, it is vital to identify such traits among the citizens that can either complement or pose constraint to the envisaged reform.

Also, a close observation of the various ethnic nationalities and religious sects in Nigeria reveal that they harbour certain stereotypes that influence their resentment against certain good governance provisions. For example, it was assumed that the reason for poor educational and employment standards as dividends of good governance in Nigeria is as a result of the insufficient provision of these opportunities. While this may be the case, certain underlying reasons should equally be considered.

For example, in the case of good governance such as the provision of employment opportunities, it has been observed that some Nigerian citizens in terrorism prone areas of the country refuse to take advantage of these opportunities because of having been negatively sensitized as products of western civilization which they were made to abhor. In this case, it can be argued that the level of unemployment in this region may not necessarily be due to only insufficient provision of such opportunities but because of negative stereotype against them.

More so, SSR provided very good explanation on the possible consequences of corruption which includes the depletion of resources that can be used to provide the dividends of good governance and for proper resourcing of security and law enforcement agencies. It is notable that these consequences can lure citizens into crimes because of having been denied access to these dividends. However, the perpetration of corruption especially among those entrusted with public wealth could also be used by those who engage in crimes to rationalize their action as a means of retrieving their share of such public wealth that had been stolen. However, it is possible that future in-depth surveys can reveal these uncommon reasons that are peculiar to the people of the regions affected more by terrorism.

Furthermore, SSR identified some of the most vital requirements that are crucial for successful security sector governance e.g. the need for efficient civil democratic oversight, human rights, transparency and accountability, etc. Thus, efficient civil democratic oversight of security institutions and excellent human rights standard in Nigeria can benefit the country's security sector and consequently enhance its capacity to tackle the scourge of terrorism. Nevertheless, the SSR model is not very clear on the administration of these requirements and the possible factors that can obstruct the realization of its benefits. These factors may differ from one jurisdiction to the other. Such factors in the case of Nigeria may be due to corruption, the country's colonial and military antecedent, lack of democratic credentials of political actors. Proper contextualization of these areas in any future study can therefore help to properly understand and situate these factors for more proficient SSR/G.

Efficient performance of the expected roles by the stakeholders in the SSR/G programme, can also promote the effectiveness of the sector. Proper assignment of these roles, their synergy and the required performance guides should therefore be made more explicit. Thus, the effectiveness of SSR can be boosted if this lapse is corrected including determination of the areas of conflict and convergence of these roles.

It is notable that the functionaries who administer these roles are vital. Their effective performance is critical for the successful implementation of these requirements. This should therefore be given adequate consideration. For example, for the success of the required civil democratic oversight function, it is important that the functionaries possess requisite intellectual capacity and experience as well as the needed democratic credential and integrity. Thus, the reasons for the poor quality of civil democratic oversight over Nigeria's security institutions is because most of the executive and legislative functionaries

especially those with military background do not possess this vital qualification. It is therefore necessary for these requirements to be based on the development of proper criteria for the choice of the functionaries that will play this role and should be relative to the peculiarities in the country where this reform is being undertaken.

The process of the actualization of these objectives requires more explanation. The following should therefore be properly considered namely: the required guidelines, monitoring and evaluation standards, the choice and qualification of those to drive and implement these requirements. Further exploratory studies can be conducted to reveal such policy stimulants that can successfully drive the administration of these conditions. It is for this reason that the security sector transformation advocates recommended an all-encompassing review of SSR to include a radical alteration of the status-quo of power configuration regarding security management and complementary oversight functions which also, involves a mental re-orientation of security actors.

Appreciable Human Rights Standards as a critical requirement as advocated in the SSR model is also a vital necessity. This can create an enabling condition for the efficient security sector governance especially with its potential to elicit the support of the citizenry if their rights are respected and protected. The reverse can also be the case if these rights are not protected, for which security operatives are mostly complicit. The SSR model is more concerned with the policies and administration of these rights including the need to ensure that they are protected but with less emphasis on the factors that can induce and sustain this. Security and law enforcement operatives are responsible for most of the human rights violations and need to also be reformed in addition to reforming the system. This can also constitute a veritable area for future studies.

It is also notable that poor condition of service and the corrupt tendencies of these operatives can equally contribute to this situation. It is not impossible that there could be other reasons based on peculiar socio-economic and political exigencies in Nigeria and therefore require further exploratory studies to identify and recommend how they can be mitigated within the contemplation of an efficient SSR/G paradigm.

In Nigeria, instances of resurgence of militant activities in the country in spite of control measures require further investigation to identify the militating factors that hinder effective implementation and sustenance of countermeasures. For example, after the amnesty programme by Nigeria as part of its reform programme to contain the insurgencies in the country, the militants returned to trenches. The need for further investigation to unravel the factors responsible for this deficiency with the aim of mitigating them is therefore very vital.

Also, the continuous sophistication of terrorists in Northern Nigeria especially the herdsmen who appear more like the hybrid of Boko-Haram insurgents in spite of the peace initiatives embarked upon by the government underscore the need for strategic reviews. The increasing rate at which terrorist offenders,

become recidivist, in spite of Nigeria's government palliatives and supports to repentant terrorists, is an important area of concern. The need for reviews involving systematic evaluation of these programmes based on well-coordinated research projects is imperative. This can include means of improving deterrent measures and how to mitigate such internalized resentments of the culprits, apart from governance deficits that induce citizens to indulge in terrorist activities.

In addition to the foregoing, there are some issues that are trending in Nigeria with implication for its security sector governance. These issues require resolution which further research can help to achieve.

(1) The recent revelation by Nigeria's Minister of Justice that over four hundred Nigerians have been identified as being involved in the funding of terrorism in Nigeria. In the same vein, the government of United Arab Emirates disclosed that it arrested six Nigerians for involvement in the funding of terrorism globally. The reasons for their involvement could be because of religious fundamentalism or other extremist affiliations. In spite of any reason, the above revelations show that more Nigerians are getting involved in the funding of terrorism which are driven by other several factors apart from the ones already examined in this research. This in essence, underscores the need for further research to unravel such other reasons.

(2) Related to the foregoing, the head of Nigeria's counter narcotics agency recently announced the seizure of narcotics worth over N8b (equivalent of almost $198 million) which he revealed, were meant for ISIS and to be sold and ploughed into terrorism. He noted that this trend indicated the possibility of the expansion of the relationship between terrorists and drug traffickers in Nigeria with the consequence of increase in terrorism financing in the country. This trend is a possible evolution of narco-terrorism in Nigeria that requires more attention and a good tip for future studies.

(3) Another area of concern is the several allegations of grafts against government functionaries including legislators some of whom had not only been indicted in Nigeria, but in foreign countries, yet they were allowed to contest election and even came out victorious. Some of these functionaries end up presiding or assuming important oversight roles over sensitive security institutions charged with counter terrorism operations and anti-corruption responsibilities. Such situation pre-supposes that they either did not undergo the prerequisite screening or were not properly screened. There are also several notable instances of insider conspiracies by security operatives with sympathy for terrorists and contributed to successful terrorist onslaughts. Even some top government functionaries have been alleged to sabotage government's counter – terrorism efforts as revealed by Nigeria's former president. All these underscores the need for the institution of a more effective and comprehensive background check programme in Nigeria's security sector. This should act as a prerequisite, to qualify any one to stand for election or to be appointed into sensitive position or for recruitment into any security and law enforcement agency.

This can contribute to better success of Nigeria's security sector governance and therefore requires further investigation on how this can be successfully appropriated to help the sector.

From all the above indications, it is clear that future studies on SSR/G model can be made more academically beneficial to provide a better theoretical foundation if the deficient areas in these models as have been explained, are improved. These areas cover their scope, context and application which can be relied upon by future researchers in contemporary security studies.

APPENDIX I

DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

The documents which were selected and analysed for this research were purposefully sourced from relevant Nigeria's Security and Law Enforcement institutions; Nigeria's Federal Ministries and Agencies International Organizations; Domestic and International Civil Society Organisations; Nigeria's legislative bodies and from relevant journals.

(1) Relevant Reports from Nigeria's Security and Law Enforcement Institutions; namely:

a. National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA);
b. Nigeria's Customs Service (NCS);
c. Nigerian Police Force (NPF);
d. National Intelligence Agency (NIA);
e. Nigeria's Prison Service (NPS);
f. Department of State Security Service (DSS);
g. Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS);
h. Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC);
i. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).

(2) Relevant Reports from Nigeria's Federal Ministries and Agencies; namely:

a. National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS);
b. National Bureau of Statistics (NBS);
c. National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA);
d. National Directorate of Employment (NDE);
e. National Amnesty Office in Nigeria's Presidency;
f. Federal Ministry of Defence;
g. Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA);
h. Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU);
i. Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN);
j. Federal Ministry of Budget and Planning;
k. Federal Ministry of Education;
l. Federal Ministry of Justice;
m. Due Process Office in the Presidency;
n. Federal Ministry of the Interior;
o. Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity

(3) Relevant Reports from International Organisations; namely:

a. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC);
b. International Narcotic Control Strategy Reports of selected Countries;
c. Financial Action Task Force (FATF);
d. United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF);
e. Inter - Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA);
f. World Bank;
g. United Nations Education and Scientific Commission (UNESCO);
h. Lake Chad Basin Development Commission
i. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

(4) Evaluation Reports by domestic and international civil society organizations; namely:

(a) Transparency International (TI);
(b) Amnesty International (AI);
(c) African Union (AU);
(d) Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO);
(e) Committee for the Defence of Human Rights;
(f) National Human Rights Commission;
(g) Coalition Against Corrupt Leaders (CACOL);
(h) Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP)
(i) Nigeria's National Employers Consultative Association (NECA);

(5) Relevant Nigeria's Legislative Bodies

Special Oversight and Supervisory Reports on related research area by relevant Committees of Nigeria's Senate and House of Representatives

(6) Relevant Journals from Academic Institutions and Professional bodies on Security Management, Education, Politics, Finance, Human Resources, Strategic studies, conflict Management, etc.

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND SAMPLED RESPONDENTS

A total of sixty sampled experts coded as Experts (E1 – E60) took part in the interview sessions and covered the following thematic areas. Threats of terrorism and countering terrorism financing, improving institutional counter measures, improvement of interagency cooperation and international cooperation, civil democratic supervision, improvement of human right standard; imperatives of good governance and employment as a critical dividend of governance.

These experts were sampled based on their expertise on the under-listed thematic areas. However, those with inter-disciplinary expertise also made contributions on the other thematic areas outside the ones for which they were chosen.

The basis of their choice also included the various institutions they previously worked for, or presently working in. These include Nigeria's security and law enforcement agencies; Nigeria's Federal Ministries, Agencies and Extra Ministerial Departments, foreign missions and international organisations, as well as Domestic and International Civil Society Organisations, Nigeria's Legislature bodies, relevant academic institutions including universities.

1. Threats of terrorism and institutional counter measures

Interview questions concentrated on the following**:**

- The threats of terrorism to Nigeria and viable strategies to counter these threats
- Operational strategies of terrorism institutions in Nigeria. How their strategic and institutional capacity can be improved.
- Assessment and improvement of the various supports received by these institutions from the government in terms of funding, equipment, personnel, legislative and policy supports
- Assessment and improvement of their intelligence gathering and application strategies.
- Policy and Legislative Supports

RESPONDENTS	CODE
- Professor of Strategic and Security Studies	E1
- Director General - Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency	E2
- Ex- Inspector General of Nigeria's Police (A)	E3
- Ex – Director, Nigeria's Department of State Security Service	E4
- Ex - Director Nigeria's National Intelligence Agency	E5
- A senior Army Personnel who was engaged in counter terrorism	E6
- A practicing Private Security Consultant	E7

They have been appropriately unveiled to answer the question

2. Improvement of interagency cooperation

Interview questions concentrated on the following:

- Quality of interagency cooperation among relevant security institutions especially as regards human resources, operational strategies, exchange of intelligence, training and logistics cooperation
- Extent of inter-agency frictions among security agencies charged with terrorism control and how this can be resolved
- Means of engaging the concerned security institutions in joint training and in simulated operational programmes for the purpose of instilling and improving cooperation among them
- Subsisting status of exchange of tactical and proactive intelligence among these institutions and possible improvement measures
- Extent of legislative supports in terms of law making and oversight supervision for the promotion of healthy interagency cooperation and improvement guides

RESPONDENTS	CODE
- Academic specialist in security and strategic studies	E8
- Military Commanders of anti-terrorism operations	E9
- A Senior Officer - Office of the National Security Adviser	E10
- Director of Law Enforcement Training	E11
- Former Comptroller General of Nigeria's Customs	E12
- Inspector General of Nigeria's Police (B)	E13

3. Terrorism Financing (TF):

Interview questions concentrated on the following:

- Factors that facilitate terrorism financing in Nigeria
- Sources of illicit funds in Nigeria
- Assessment of the various efforts of Nigeria's government and its relevant institutions in the control of terrorism financing
- Complicity of financial institutions in the facilitation of flow of illicit funds/mitigation strategies/ and how this can be checked
- The role of Central Bank of Nigeria in this case and how its regulatory system and other relevant regulatory institutions can be improved.
- Strategies against laundering of illicit funds especially in the area of law making and oversight supports
- Recommendations on appropriate policy and legislative supports

RESPONDENTS	CODE
- Frontline consultant in Financial Investigations	E14
- President Chief Inspectors of Banks in Nigeria	E15
- Ex - Director - Nigeria's Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU)	E16
- Ex - Top Functionary of GIABA	E17
- UNODC Project co-ordinator in Nigeria	E18
- Ex – Deputy Governor - Central Bank of Nigeria	E19

4. Improving Civil Democratic Control of security institutions

Interview questions concentrated on the following:

- Extent of compliance to democratic norms and practices including obedience to legislative and executive instructions by concerned Nigeria's security institutions/strategies for improvement
- Sufficiency of constitutional and policy provisions for the oversight of relevant security agencies/ improvement measures
- How the various democratic institutions namely: the legislature, executive and judiciary can be strengthened to effectively supervise these institutions
- How the various authoritarian policies presently practiced by Nigerian security institutions can be refined in line with contemporary democratic norms.
- Re-orientation programmes and strategies that can be embarked upon to complement all the above.

RESPONDENTS	CODE
- Professor of political science	E20
- Director General Nigeria's Governors Forum	E21
- Retired Nigerian Federal Judge	E22
- Ex – Director, Ministry of Justice	E23
- Senate Committee member on Defence and Security	E24
- House of Rep. Committee member on Defence and Security	E25
- Ex – Chairman Police Service Commission	E26

5. Improvement of human rights standard

Interview questions concentrated on the following:

- Human rights standard of Nigeria's security institutions and improvement efforts in line with best practices
- The various international condemnations against Nigeria for human rights violations and how these can be ameliorated.

- The handling of the welfare of terrorism suspects/culprits by Nigeria's security institutions. Possible recommendations for improvement
- Extent of adherence to international human rights treaties by Nigerian's security agencies as well as means of improvement
- Standard of the prosecution of human rights offences by these agencies and how this can be improved.
- The need for training of security operatives on human rights doctrines and application/How this can be improved and sustained.
- Extent and quality of legislative supports including relevant law making mandates to improve the country's human rights standard/improvement measures.

RESPONDENTS	CODE
- A frontline Human Rights Advocate in Nigeria	E27
- Senior official Nigeria's National Human Rights Commission	E28
- Nigeria's Amnesty International Country Office	E29
- Committee for the Defense of human rights	E30
- Senate Committee on Human Rights	E31
- House of Rep. Committee on Human Rights	E32

6. Imperatives of good governance

Interview questions concentrated on the following:

- The imperative of Good Governance and Improvements
- Efforts by the state and federal governments to ensure good governance

  Positive utilization of education doctrines for positive mental development
- Reasons for poor quality education and improvement of educational facilities
- Positive sensitisation programmes against negative perception of western education and how this can be instituted and sustained
- How Nigeria's National Orientation Agency can support the country's de-radicalisation programme

RESPONDENTS	CODE
- Permanent Secretary Ministry of Education	E33
- Education faculty member	E34
- Professor of cognitive psychology	E35
- A frontline Civil Society advocate of good governance	E36
- Nigeria's Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC)	E37
- Nigeria's National Orientation Agency	E38

Employment as a critical governance dividend

Interview questions concentrated on the following:

- Assessment of the unemployment situation in Nigeria
- Factors that militate against creation and provision of employment opportunities
- Employment creation and implementation strategies
- Relevant vocational skills acquisition programmes that can help to mitigate unemployment
- Measures to ensure sustained massive development of terrorism-prone areas.
- Assessment and improvement of legislative supports for employment creation in Nigeria

RESPONDENTS	CODE
- A professor of Human Resources Development	E39
- A senior official of Nigeria's National Orientation Agency	E40
- Senior official of Nigeria's National Directorate of Employment	E41
- Senior Representative, Nigerian Employment Consultative Association	E42
- Senate Committee member on Employment	E43
- House of Representative Committee on Employment	E44

7. Improvement of Nigeria's International cooperation

Interview questions concentrated on the following:

- Assessment of International cooperation programmes embarked upon by Nigeria
- Diplomatic fictions and resolutions between Nigeria and its foreign collaborators.
- Constraints encountered in the Implementation of international programmes by Nigeria in terrorism control/recommendations for improvements.
- Level of foreign support assistance – e.g. funding, intelligence, logistics assistance to Nigeria and how this can be further elicited.
- Effectiveness of the counter/terrorism joint operations between Nigeria and relevant international collaborators/improvement measures
- Assessment and improvement of the various international agreements entered into by Nigeria.

RESPONDENTS	CODE
- A doctorate Phd academic in International Relations	E45
- Senior faculty member in Nigeria's Institute of International Affairs	E46
- A doctorate academic in International Law and Diplomacy	E47
- Ex – Director Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Ministry	E48
- Ex – Director of National Intelligence Agency	E49
- Ex - Member - Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs	E50
- Ex –Member House of Rep. Committee on Foreign Affairs	E51
- Ex – Director Nigeria's Financial Intelligence Unit	E52
- Ex – Diplomatic Attache – US Embassy	E53
- EX – Diplomat Attache– British High Commission	E54
- Official ofUNODC Office in Nigeria	E55

8. Improvement of Nigeria's anti-corruption profile

RESPONDENTS	CODE
9. Director of Inspectorate Services	E56
- Member - Senate Committee on Anti-corruption	E57
- Senior official of Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (NEITI)	E58
- Transparency International (TI); Representative	E59
- Frontline Civil Society anti – corruption Crusader	E60

REFERENCES

Abdulwahab, A. L. (2020). Towards an accountable security sector in Nigeria. Civil Society Legislative Advocacy

Abegunde, O. (2013). Need for Security Sector Reform: Nigeria's Perspective. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. Vol. 3, No. 9, May 2013. Peace Studies & International Relations, North West University, Mafkeng, South Africa.

Abubakar, M.A. (2014). *United States-Nigeria Relations: Impact on Nigeria's security*. Calhoun, US: Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monetary California.

Adebayo, A. A. (2013). Youths Unemployment and Crime in Nigeria: A Nexus and Implications for National Development. *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology,* (Vol. 5 (8), pp. 350-357). Academic Journals, USA.

Adedire, S. A., Olowojolu O., Ake M. (2016): Combating Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria: An International Collaboration Against Boko Haram: Fountain Journal of Management and Social Science.

Adejumobi, S. (2004). Structural Adjustment and the Prospects of Democracy in Africa A Nigeria Case Study. In O. Omo, B. D. Dirk, A. Sambo, & A. Okimoshe (Eds.), *Democratization in African: Nigerian Perspective.* Vol. 2. Benin City: Hima and Hina.

Adelaja, T. (2014). How Nigeria's Leaky Borders Aid Insurgency. *National Mirror*. http://www.nationalmirroronline.net/how-nigerias-leaky-borders-aid-insurgency.html

Adeniyi, O. (2012). Terrorism and Inter-Agency Coordination in Nigeria. *Daily Post*, December 1, 2012.

Adeniyi, S. (2006). Nigeria has Lost $300 Billion to Corruption. *This Day,* November 3, 2006.

Aderinto, A. A. (2013). Power Consciousness of Security Operatives: The Bane of Interagency Feud in Nigeria.
International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 6, No. 3, June 2013, 1 – 14.

Adesoji, A. O. (2011): Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic fubdamentalism and the response of the Nigerian State.

Adetula, V. A. O. (2015). *Nigeria's Response to Transnational Organised Crime and Jihadist Activities in West Africa.* Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Adewale, D.Y and Adeoye, O.A (2019). Nigerian state and the crisis of governance: A critical exposition. Journals.sagepub.com/home/sgo

Aderonke, M. (2015). Terrorism and counter terrorism in contemporary Nigeria: understanding the emerging trends. Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Science, University of Lagos, Nigeria.

Adeyemi, B.O. (2010). *International Journal of Politics and good Governance*. Vol 1, No 1.1st Quarter.

Adeyemi, M. (2015). Kukah Canvasses Quality Education for Generational Change. *The Guardian Newspaper,* Thursday, 19 May, 2016.

Adusei, A. (2015). Between $148bn and $150b: Where They Stash Nigeria, Other African Nations Looted

Funds Abroad.http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/07/between-148bn-an-150b-where-t*hey-stash-nigeria-other-african-nations-looted-funds/*

African Union (2013). *African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform.* African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

African Security Brief. (2018). Africa Centre for Strategic Studies Retrieved 15 June, 2019 from htpps://africacenter.org/

Agbakor, E. Z. (2010). An Appraisal of Punishment in Combating Corruption in Nigeria - An Unpublished Master Thesis in the Faculty of Law, Benue State University, Makurdi for the award of Master of Law Degree (LLM).

Aghedo, I., & Oarhe, O. (2009). When the panacea becomes the problem: The Niger Delta question and the Federal Solution in Nigeria. *Nigerian Journal of Politics and Public Policy*, 5(1 & 2), 147–167.

Aghedo, I., & Osumah, O. (2014). Bread, Not Bullets: Boko Haram and Insecurity Management in Northern Nigeria. *African Study Monographs*, *35*(3 & 4), 205–229.

Ahire, P. (1990). Re-writing the Distorted History of Policing in Colonial Nigeria*. International Journal of The Sociology of Law,18*(1), 45-60.

Aiyede, E. R. (2015). Democratic Security Sector Governance and Military Reform in Nigeria. In: A. Bryden & F. Chappuis (Eds.), *Learning from West African Experiences in Security Sector Governance* (pp. 97–116). London: Ubiquity Press.

Ajani, J. (2015). Inside Nigeria's Dirty War on Terror. *Vanguard politics section,* Lagos, June, 28.

Ajayi, A. I. (2013). Subordinating the Military to Civilian Control in Nigeria since 1999: Enabling Factors, Strategies and Prospects of Sustainability*. European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 25, No 1.

Ajodo-Adebanjojo, A. (2017): Towards ending conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta region. Source by ACCORD. https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/towards-ending-conflict-and-insecurity-niger-delta-region

Ajufo, B. (2013). Challenges of Youth Unemployment in Nigeria: Effective Career Guidance as Panacea*. Afr.Res. Rev.* 7(1): 307-321 tabernacle

Akande, S.O., & Okuwa, O.B. (2009). Empowering Nigerian Youths for the 21st Century. *NISER Occasional Paper* No.3, NISER, Ibadan, Nigeria.

Akasike, C., & Adelekan, A. (2010). Back From the Kidnappers Den*. The Punch*, p. 3. Bloom, M. (2007).

Ake, C. (2001). *Democracy & Development in Africa*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Akpan, N. (2010). Kidnapping in Nigeria's Niger Delta: An Exploratory study. *Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 24 No. 1.

Akwara, A. F., Akwara, N. F., Enwuchola J., Adekunle, M., & Udah, J. E. (2013) Unemployment and Poverty: Implications for National Security and Good Governance in Nigeria*; International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research* (IJPAMR) Vol. 2, No 1, October 2013

Alade, S. (2015). Corruption and the Challenges of Economic Development. *AJSD,* Vol. *1, No.* 2.

Alan, B. (2003). Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal *Connection? The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4. (pp. 119 – 144).

Alao, D.O., Atere, C.O., & Alao, O. (2012). Boko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria: The Challenges and Lessons. *Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and Management Studies*, *1*(4), 1 – 15.

Albright, M. K. (1998). Fostering International Cooperation and the Rule of Law. *United States International Crime Control Strategy* – June 1998. http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/iccs/iccsix.html

Alessandro, P. (2009). *Social Reintegration.* Retrieved 25 February 2019 from: www.wikipedia.com.

Alex, E. (2019): Poor governance, corruption, poverty, insecurity and unbridled nepotism are increasingly becoming norms in Africa.

Alexander, Y. (2013). Terrorism in North Africa and The Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications. *Inter – University Center for terrorism Studies*, Arlington, VA, USA.

Ali, A. D. (2013): Security and Economic Development in Nigeria since 1960. Kuwait chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review Vol 2, No. 6

Allamin, H A (2016): The obligation on public authorities to use reasonable care in preventing and responding to acts of extremist terrorism: The Case of North Eastern Nigeria. Presentation to the UN Conference on the Human Rights of Victims of Terrorism, New York, 11 February.

Allen, M. (2020): Editorial: The importance of training in law enforcement. Graziadio Business Review

Alli, W.O. (2012). Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy. Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Aluko, B. A. (2015). Peace and Conflict Studies Programme Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan,Nigeria. *International Journal of Integrative Humanism*, Vol 8, No 1.

Amnesty International. (2015). Annual Report on Nigeria. https//www.amnesty.org/en/countries/Africa/nigeria/report-nigeria/.

Amnesty International. (2015). Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands. War Crimes Committed by The Nigerian Military, Amnesty International London, WCI United Kingdom

Angen, J. A. (2000). Evaluating Interpretive Inquiry: Reviewing the Validity Debate and Opening the Dialogue in Qualitative Health Research*. Sage Publications,* Vol. 10, No. 3, May 2000. pp 378-385.

Annan K. (2012). The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking on Governance, Development & Security in West Africa, Expert Meeting, Summary of Proceedings, Dakar, Senegal, 18 – 20 April 2012, Centre on International Cooperation.

Anyebe, P. A. (2016): Rules and Procedures Governing Legislative Process in Nigeria: Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization Vol. 48

APPG Report. (2006). The Other Side of The Coin: The UK and Corruption in Africa*.* A Report by the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group.

Aregbesola, R. (2012). Paper Presented at the National Symposium on 'Islam and Peaceful Co-Existence in Contemporary Multi-Religious State at the Shehu Musa Yar'Adua Centre, Abuja, May 15, 2012.

Ariyo O. (2017). *Nigeria And The Victory Over Terrorist Financing*. Steers Business Ltd, Finance 15 Mar 2017.

Assanvo W., Abatan J. & Sawadogo W. – Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) - Issue 19 September 2016, *West Africa Report*.

Assensoh, A. B. and Alex-Assensoh, Y. (2002): African Military History and Policies: Ideological Coups and Incursions 1900-Present. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Asika, N. (2004). *Research Methodology: A Process Approach*. Lagos: Mukugamu Publishers.

Atelhe, G.A, Adams, J. A, and Abunimye, S. B. (2016): "Overview of Security Sector reforms and the Transformation of the Nigerian's Security Agencies: American International Journal of Social Science Vol.5, No. 3; June 2016.

Attah, D. (2013). Mali Trained Terrorists in Nigeria – Punch Newspaper*, January 18, 2013*, pp 1,2,10.

Audu, B. J. (2014). Post Nigerian Civil War Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex. Combatants, *1970-1975.Department of History and International Studies*, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria.

Awojobi, O. (2014): Using Ibrahim index of African Governance in Evaluating Nigerian Democratic Governance: Research Gate Publication

Awotokun, K (2020): The Nigeria's Presidentialism and the Burden of Profligacy in an Inchoate Constitutional Democracy. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 11(5):40-40

Babatunde, A. (2012). Governance, Election Violence and Nigeria's National Security. In I.O. Albert, W.A Eselebor, & N.D. Danjibo (Eds.), *Peace, Security and Development in Nigeria* (pp. 117 – 128). Abuja: John Archer Publishers for Society for Peace Studies and Practice.

Baker, J. (2009). Illicit Money: Can it be Stopped? *Global Financial Integrity*. https://gfintegrity.org/press-release/illicit-money-can-it-be-stopped/

Baldwin, D. (1997). The Concept of Security. *Review of International Studies*, *23*(5), 5 – 26.

Ball, N. & Fayemi J. K. (2010). Security Sector Governance in Africa: A HandBook, A Project of the Centre for Democracy & Development (Lagos), Institute for Security Studies, (Pretoria) and the Centre for International Policy (Washington, D.C.) sponsored by the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada & the Department for International Development, UK.

Barak, G. (2001). Crime and Crime Control in An Age of Globalization*:* A Theoretical Dissection; Klower Academic Publishers. pp. 57-70.

Bartolotta, C. (2011). Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Harm. *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations,* 5(1), 9 – 23.

Bassey, C.O. (2007). Epidemiology of conflict and violence in Nigeria. In C. O. Bassey, & O. O. Oshita (Eds.) *Conflict resolution, identity crisis and development in Africa* (pp. 141 – 158). Lagos: Malthouse Press.

Bayart, J., Ellis, S. & Hibou, B. (1999). *The Criminalisation of the State in Africa.* Oxford: James Carrey.

BBC News. (2005). Nigeria Police Hunt Taleban, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr7-/2/hi/africa

Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 167–217.

Beckford, J. A. & Walliss, J. (2006). *Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debate*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing.

Bentick and Born (2013): Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. Principles, Mechanism & Practices. Handbook for Parliamentarians.

Berrebi, C. (2007). Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Peace Policy*, Volume 13, Issue 1 2007 Article 2. The Berkeley Electronic Press.

Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 27–40.

Bryden, A., Diaye, B. N., & Olonisakin, F. (2006). Understanding the Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa.

Bryden, A. and Hanggi, H. (2005): Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peace building. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). ISBN 978-3-8258-9019-3. Archived from the original on 2017-09-15

Bryden, A. & Olonisakin, F. (2010). Security Sector Transformation in Africa. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Brzoska, M. (2006). Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations. *International Peace Keeping,* Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 1-13.

Buhari, M. (2015). Nigeria Committed to Good Governance, Fighting Corruption. *The Guardian Newspaper, Tuesday, July 21, 2015*, p. 16.

Buhari, M. (2015). You Encourage Corruption by Providing Safe Haven for Stolen Funds, Buhari Tells WorldPowers. *Vanguard Newspaper, September 29. Lagos Nigeria*

Bureau of African Affairs (2021): U.S. Relations with Nigeria: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet. U. S. Department of State.

Burton, J. (1997). *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Butts, K. H., & Metz, S. (1996). Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa. US *Army War College Monograph Series,* 1996. Strategic Studies Institute

Buzan, B. (1991b). New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century. *International Affairs*, 67(3).

Byman, D. (2005). *Deadly connections*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Callister, K. O. (2015): Challenges of insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria: Implication for National Development. Ontario International Development Agency / International Journal of Sustainable Development.

Campbell, John (2013) Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.

Casey, C (2008) Marginal Muslims: politics and the Perceptual Bounds of Islamic Authenticity in Northern Nigeria. http://www.icermediation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Ethno-Religious-Conflict-in-Nigeria DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/AFT.2008.54.3.66

Cawthra, G. (2015). Security Sector Governance*: Lecture Series for Postgraduate Diploma in Management* In the Field of Security (PADM 5257). Wits School of Governance, University of The Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Center for International Cooperation Report (2012): The impact of organized crime and drug trafficking on governance, development and security in West Africa

Chattam House Report (2014). Collective Action on Corruption in Nigeria – A Social Norms Approach to Connecting Society and Institutions. Chattam House, *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, UK.

Cheema G.S. and Maguire L. (2002) -: Democracy, Governance and Development: A Conceptual Framework. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Democracy-%2C-Governance-and-Development-%3A-A-Cheema/be886db1afa5b8ce1ddb5e1b511929415c8d5f9c

Chergui, S. (2017). Integrating Behavioural Insights into Anti-corruption strategies. Behavioural Drivers Influence The Intelligence Report by African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Small.

Chikezie, O. (2014). The Real Cause of Boko – Haram*. The Guardianww.ngrguardiannews.com, Thursday May 22, 2014* P.17

Chigbu, U. (2007): Nigeria's world Feature Article - Viewing Nigeria's Bad Governance in the context of Bad Fellowship, retrieved from http://nigerworld.com.articles/2007/doc/031.html (Assessed on January 20 2010).

Chinwokwu, E.C. (2013): Terrorism and the Dilemmas of Combating the Menace in Nigeria. International *Journal of Humanities and Social Science* Vol. 3 N0. 4 [Special Issue – February 2013] 265

Christian Aid. (2003). "*Losing Ground: Israel, Poverty and the Palestinians*," *Christian Aid*, London, UK January

Clark, R. (2010). *Intelligence analysis: A target-centric approach* (3rd ed.). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Clarke D. (2010). Africa Trade Continent: The struggle for Africa's Oil Prize Bell and Bain, ltd Glasgow pp.83 – 101.

Coker, M. A. and George-Genyi (2014): Bad governance; The bane of peace, security and sustainable development of Nigeria: International Journal of Development and sustainability

Costa, A. M. (2008) Speech at the ECOWAS Summit, Praia, 2008.

Office of the National Security Adviser. (2016). Presentation on Countering Violent Extremism. Aso Rock Villa, Abuja, Nigeria.

Cresswell, J.W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method approaches (3rded.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Crosdel, O.E., Oghator H. and Abam M. (2015). Elites Predation and Insecurity: A Perspective on the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science*: F. Political Science Volume 15 Issue 5 Version 1.0. Year 2015

Dakas, C. J. (2015). National Security, Counter-terrorism and human Rights: The Imperative of Mainstreaming
Human Rights into Nigeria's Counter-terrorism Laws and Practices, AJSD Volume 1, Number 2, December 2015: 78-102

Dambazau, A. B. (2016). Buhari Calls for Inter-Agency Cooperation to Tackle Trans-Border Crimes http://www.interior.gov.ng/index.php/84-press-release/169-cooperation

Danjibo, N. D. (2013). Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The "Maitatsine" and "Boko Haram" Crises in Northern Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.

Department of State Security Service Report (2017) - Involvement of Security Agencies in Arms Sales, Abuja, Nigeria.

Diamond, L. (2014). Nigeria: Anatomy of a Feckless State.
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/164182-nigeria-anatomy-of-a-feckless-state-by-larry-diamond.html

Dogara,, Y. (2017):- Security Threats: Dogara Tasks Military on Reliable Intelligence
https://thepress.ng/2017/11/security-threats-dogara-tasks-military-on-reliable-intelligence/

Ebo, A (2004) Security Sector Reform as an Instrument of Sub-Regional Transformation in West Africa in A. Bryden, & H. Haggi (eds.) *Reform and Reconciliation of the Security Sector*. 68. Geneva; BCAF

Edet, J. T. & Amadu, J. A. (2014): The Legislature and National Development: The Nigerian Experience, 2(9) Global J. Arts Human & Soc. Sci. 63, 67

Efehi, R O (2014): Terrorism and governance crisis. The Boko Haram experience in Nigeria. Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria

Egwakhe, A. J. & Osabuohien, E. S. (2009). Educational Backgrounds and Youth Criminality in Nigeria. *International Forum*. Vol. 12, No. 1 April 2009, pp. 65-79.

Ejiofor, C. (2015). Australian Negotiator Says CBN Enables Boko Hara Funding.
www.naij.com/283043-revelations-cbn-helps-funding-boko-haram-australian-negotiator.html

Ejiofor, A. (2011). Solving Our Poverty and Unemployment Crises: A Malay-Israeli Approach.
An Article, Lagos - Nigeria

Ellis, Bayart JF and Hibou B. The Criminalisation of the State in Africa. (James Currey, Oxford, 1999) Chapter 2.

Eme, O. I, & Ugwu C. C. (2016) -: Terrorist Financing in Nigeria: A Case of Boko Haram, A Paper Presented at the Pan-African Anthropological Association Conference held at Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Akwa, Nigeria, between 2nd – 5th August, 2016.

Eme, O. I and Onyishi, T. O. (2014): Boko Haram and Security Challenges in Nigeria. Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review Vol. 3, No. 11

Emiefele, G. – Curbing funding of global terrorism: The role of the financial Sector. A Paper Presented at a 4-day International Seminar on "Asymmetry Security Challenges in the 21st Century", at the Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja, on October 16, 2017.

Enofe, O. A., Aigboduwa, O. R., Audu, G. O. & Idemudia, N. G. (2015): Integrity, Transparency and Accountability and the Nigerian Local Government. Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research ISSN 2504-883X Vol. 1 No. 8

Ewi, M. (2013). "Why Nigeria needs a criminal tribunal and not amnesty for Boko Haram". *Institute for Security Studies*, Abuja, Nigeria.

Elliot, R. & Timulak, L. (2005). Descriptive and Interpretive Approaches to Qualitative Research. (Eds.), *A handbook of research methods for clinical and health psychology* (p. 147–159). Oxford University Press.

Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D. and Loayza, N. (2002). What Causes Crimes*? European Economic Review* 46 (2002). 1323 – 1357

Faseke, M. M. (2021): Nigeria-United States of America (USA) bilateral ties in historical perspective; African Journal of History and Culture

FATF Report (2013) on Terrorist Financing in West Africa, FATF & GIABA: Paris, France

Folarin, S. (2020): Why terrorism continues in Nigeria and how to turn the tide. Covenant University, Nigeria

Freeman, R. B. (1991). *Crime and The Employment of Disadvantaged Youths.* NBER *Working Paper* 3875. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachussetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Fritsvold, E. (2021): A firsthand account on the importance of education for law enforcement.

Greenberg B. and Cain D. (2005) US-Africa Partnership are key to waging war on terrorism, US Department of State, International Information Programs, http://usinfo.state.gov/af/Archive/2005/Mar/15 (13 April 2005).

Garba, S. S. (2019): Making Military Reform and Civilian Oversight a Reality in Nigeria. Source by Council on Foreign Relations.

Gary, I.& Karl, T. (2003). Bottom of the Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom and The Poor*, Catholic Relief Services*, Maryland, p 12.

Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (2020): Security Sector Integrity

GIABA Report (2015). Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa. www.giaba.org

Glenn, C 2016 Timeline: Rise and Spread of the Islamic State. The Wilson Center, July. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-rise-and-spread-the-islamic-state.

Global Terrorism Index 2017 - Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism, *Institute for Economics & Peace*

Greenberg, D. (1977). Delinquency and Age Structure of Society: *contemporary crises*, 1 (2), 189-223. https://doi.org/10.1007/ ...

Greenberg, Maurice; Wechshler, Willaim F.; and Wolosky, Lee (2002), Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Taskforce Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations

Golafshani, N. (2003). Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research*. The Qualitative Report* Volume 8, Number 4, December 2003, 597-607, http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-4/golafshani.pdf

Griffin, E. and Pearsall, S. (2018): The Historical Journal. Cambridge Kistorical Journal (1923 – 1957)

Haliru, T. (2013). Political Violence and Youth Gangs in Bauchi State, Nigeria. www.ajol.info/journals/jorind

Hamermesh, Daniel S. and Neal M. Soss. (1974). An Economic Theory of Suicide. *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 82, No. 1, pp.83 – 98.

Hanggi, H., (2003). "Making Sense of Security Sector Governance." In: Hanggi, H. and. Winkler, Challenges of Security Sector Governance (Munster: LIT Verlag)

Hansen, W.W. (2013). The wretched and Boko Haram.*Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 48(3): 281 – 296.

Hay, C. (2011). Interpreting, Interpretivism, Interpreting Interpretations*: The New Hermeneutics of Public Administration.* Public Administration 89 (1): 167-182.

Henk D. Security: A New Africa Paradigm, Occasional Paper, Center for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe – p.5 (2001)

Hickey, C. (2007): Principles and priorities in training for Iraq. Military Review 87 (2)

Hinshaw, D. and Entous, A. (2013). *US-Nigeria Military Cooperation: On Terror's New Frontline, Mistrust Blunts U.S. Strategy.*https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2013/02/28/u-s-nigeria-military-cooperation-on-terrors-new-frontline-mistrust-blunts-u-s-strategy/

Humpries, D. & Greenberg, D. (1981). *The Dialectics of Crime Control.* In D. Greenberg (ed.) *Crime and Capitalism.* Palo Alto: Mayfield pp209-254

Huntington, S. (1967), "Political Development and The Decline of American System of World Order", Daedatus 96, 3 Summer, pp. 927 – 929

Igbuzor O. (2008). Strategies for Effective Oversight and Police Accountability in Nigeria. A Paper Presented at the 2008 Retreat of the Police Service Commission, Abuja Nigeria.

Ijide, W. O. (2020): Institutional Capacity and Capability of Nigeria's Security Sector. Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre

Ijide, W. O. (2016): Identifying Gaps and Challenges in Nigeria's Security Sector. Paper Delivered at Experts and Stakeholders Dialogue: Identifying Gaps and Challenges in the Security Sector in Nigeria. Institute for Peace and Conflict resolution, Abuja

Ikejiaku, B, (2009), The Relationship Between Poverty, Conflict and /Development. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol.2, No. 1 March, 2009.

Ikelegbe, A 2005, "The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta of Nigeria", *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 14(2): 208 – 234 (2005)

Ikelegbe, A. O. (2010). Crises of the State and Governance and Armed Non-State Groups in Africa, in W. Okumu and A. Ikelegbe (eds), Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies.

Ikepeze N, (2013) - Fusion of Anti-corruption Agencies in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal: *Journal of sustainable development law and policy* Vol. 1 (2013) PP. 148 – 167, Afe Babalola University

Imhonopi, D. and Urim, U. M. (2016): The spectre of Terrorism and Nigeria's industrial development: A multi-stakeholder imperative. Covenant University, Nigeria

Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering West Africa [GIABA] (2010), Threat Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa, May 2010, Dakar, Senegal.

International Monetary Fund (2013), Nigeria Financial Sector Stability Assessment, *Country Report* No. 13/140, International Monetary Fund.

Irwin, H.A. and Kenneth, B.S. (1995), Social Psychology Conflict and Conflict Resolution. Mayfield Publishing Company, California

Ioryue T. (2014): Threats of Terrorism and Intervention Measures General (TTMG) Terrorism and Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Discourse

Iroegbu, S (2019): Nigeria's Military Spending in 2018 increased by 18 percent, Gulps N7 Trillion-SIPRI. Global Sentinel. https://globalsentinelng.com/2019/04/30/nigerias-military-spending-in-2018-increased -by-18-percent-gulps-n-7trillion-sipri/

Isyaku, A. (2013), Terrorism: A New Challenge to Nigeria's Stability in the 21st Century. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*. Vol. 12, 2013

Jackson, R. (2017). CTS, counter terrorism and non violence: critical studies on terrorism.

Jatau E.M. (2017). National Security Policy in Nigeria. *Handbook of Political Science*, 1, No.3 (1975): 284

Johnson I. (2014). Inter-Security Agencies Conflict at Nigeria's Borders*:* A Challenge to Nigeria's National Security. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* Vol. 4. No. 7

Josephite Marellian Report(2019). A publication of the oblates of St. Joseph Vol. 7 2018 - 2019

Jubrin, I. (2014). Challenges of Enhancing National security in Nigeria, *AJSD.Volume* 1, No 1, Institute of Security Studies, Abuja, Nigeria.

Kadafa, A. A. (2012). Environmental Impacts of Oil Exploration and Exploitation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria*.Global Journal of Science Frontier Research Environment and Earth Sciences*. Volume 12, Issue 3, Version 2.0, Year 2012.

Kahunni P. (2017): The Security Sector Reform Debate in Post-Independent Africa South of the Sahara: A Critical Ethical Investigation Based on the Concepts of Sovereignty and Anarchy. A Research Work

Presented for the Award of Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Kaiama Declaration (1998)www.ijawcenter.com/kaiamadeclaration.html

Kangdim M, Umut K, Sait A (2020). Challenges of combating terrorist financing in the lake chad region: A case of boko Haram.D.

Kaplan, A. (1978). Psychodynamics of Terrorism: *Journal of Terrorism volume: 1 issue 3 and 4*

Karim A.A. (2015)-: Terrorism and the Quest for National Security in Nigeria. *African Journal for Security and Development* Volume 1, Number2, December 2015- Institute for Security Studies Reports, Abuja

Kemedi D. The changing predatory styles of International Oil Companies in Nigeria, *Review of International Political Economy,* 30(95), 134 - 139

Kirkpatrick, C. (2015). *Biafran War and British Involvement.* https://history105.libraries.wsu.edu/spring2015/2015/05/05/biafran--war-and-british-involvement/

Klare M., Bush – Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring The Rest of The World's Oil, Foreign Policy in Focus – Petro Politics, *Special Report*. See also M Klare & D Volman, Africa's Oil and American National Security, Current History, May 2004, p. 227

Klein, H. & Myers, M. (1999). A Set of Principals for Conducting and Evaluating Interpretive Field Studies in Information Systems*.MIS Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp 67-94.

Krueger, Alan B. and Maleckova, J. (2003). Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. Vol. 17, No.4.

Kusztal, A. (2017): Theoretical Foundations of Regional Security in International Relations - The Overview: Journal of Science of the Military Academy of Land Forces

Kwaja, C. (2014) Vigilantes, Public Safety, Crime and Violence Prevention in Nigeria. Centre for Conflict Mgt. &Peace Studies University of Jos, Nigeria

Kvale, S. (1983). The Qualitative Research Interview: A Phenomenological and a Hermeneutical mode of understanding*: Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 14, 171 – 1196

Kukah, M. (2016). Biafra: Government's Poor Strategies Inflamed Renewed Agitation*. Truth Magazine,* Dominican Christian Brothers, Ibadan.

Ladbury, S., Allamin. H., Nagarajan, C., Francis, P. and Ukiwo, U. (2016)-: Jihadi Groups and State – Building: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Stability: *International Journal of Security & Development*, 5(1): 16, pp. 1 – 19, DOI: http: //dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.427

Lawal, A. A. (2020): Towards an Accountable Security Sector: Civil Society Legislative Advocacy

Lee, M. (1969): African Armies and Civil Order. London: Chatto & Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies.

Lewis, D (2014). Cameroon Security Forces Kill 2 Boko Haram Militants after Raid Reuters, June 8, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/08/us-cameroon-boko-haram-idUSKBN0EJOE720140608.

Looney, R. (2014). The Boko Haram Economy. Foreign policy http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/15/the_boko_haram_economy.

Labuschagne, A. (2003). *Qualitative Research: Airy Fairy or Fundamental?* The Qualitative Report 8 (1)

LEDAP. (2015). Impunity in Nigeria: Report of Extra Judicial Executions in Nigeria, Lagos. The Legal Defence and Assistance Project (LEDAP) Report 2015. LEDAP Office, Lekki, Lagos, Nigeria.

Lincoln, Y. S. & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Lucas, A. (2017): Nigeria's 'completely shut down' from accessing financial intelligence from around the world due to sabotage by Magu of EFCC

Madison, G. (1988). The Hermeneutics of Post Modernity. Figure and Themes. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Mailafia, O 'Confict and Insurgency in Nigeria' PM News 26 September 2016.

Mali Watch Group. (2013). Enhancing the Primacy of Civil Authority in the Security Sector in Mali and Africa (2013). www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/ http://www.thebridgesinstitute.org

Marco, W. (2016): A Post-Imperial Cold War Paradox: The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement: The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.

Markovic, V. (2001): Fighting a losing battle? Countering terrorism financing in Nigeria and Somalia.

Markovic, V. (2019): Suicide squad: Boko Haram's use of female and women suicide bombers. Criminal justice 29, no. 4-5: Gender and Terrorism

Mathew, P. (2019): Nigeria Struggles with Security Sector Reform - Chatham House - International Affairs Think Tank.

Mathison, S. (1988). Why Triangulate? *Educational Researcher*, 17(2), 13-17.

Maurice, O. (2020): Has counter terrorism become a profitable business in Nigeria? Institute for Security Studies.

Maza, K. D., Koldas, U. and Aksit, S. (2020). Challenges of combating terrorist financing in the lake chad region: A case of boko Haram.D.

McGinnis, John O., (2003) "Expanding Trade: A Powerful Weapon Against Terrorism," *The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy*.

Meyer, J. W., Boli J., Thomas, G. M., & Ramirez, F. (1997). World Society and the National - State. *American Journal of Sociology* 103: 144 – 81.

Minimah K. T. J. (2014): Inter-Agency Collaboration: An Effective Instrument in Implementing Police Reform, A Paper Presented by then Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff at the Police Service Commission 2014 Biennial Retreat Thursday 30th January 2014.

Mohammed, W.A. &Karim A.A. (2014) - Democratic governance and national security in Nigeria: challenges and opportunities *Institute for security studies*, Abuja, 2014.

Mohammed, I. and Muhammad, Y. (2019): Inter-agency Cooperation: Imperatives for effective joint security operation in Nigeria

Moon, B. (2015). Bad Governance, Injustice Breed Terrorism. *Vanguard, Tuesday August 25, 2015*. P. 54.

Nadelmann, E. (1993) Cops Across Borders: The internationalization of US Criminal Law Enforcement. PA: *American* Journal of International *Law*

Nairaland (2015). *Revealed:* 'Actionable Intelligence' From US on Chibok Girls was Ignored by Military.http://www.nairaland.com/2072228/revealed-actionalbe-intelligence-us-chibok

Nakhleh E. 2014 - Nigerian Terrorism: Causes and Solutions. https://lobelog.com/nigerian-terrorism-causes-and-solutions/

Rupesinghe, N. (2018): The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism? ACCORD

National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Annual Report 2015, 2019, NDLEA Headquarters, Ikoyi, Lagos

NDIC Report (2016) 2% of Nigerians own 90% Bank Deposits, *Business Day* Capital Development Conference on the 2nd of July 2016, at Abuja, Nigeria

NDLEA. (2004). NDLEA Statements at The UN Third Committee Sessions. National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), 4, Shaw Road, Ikoyi, Lagos. www.ndlea.gov.ng

Neuman, L. & Berger, R. (1988). Competing Perspectives on Cross-National Crime: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence. *The Sociological Quarterly*,29, 281-313

News Agency of Nigeria Report (2016). Army Officer Sells Arms To Boko Haram. *News Agency of Nigeria* Report, Sept. 4. http//www.nan.ng///defence-and-security/army-officer-sells-arms-to-boko-haram/

Nigerian Army Report (2014). Inter Forces Harmony, being an address delivered by the Air Officer Commanding Logistics Command at the Meeting of Military, Police and Paramilitary Public Relations Officer's Forum [MILPPOPROF]. Lagos: 8 February

Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit Report (2013), Trends and Typologies Report on Terrorism Financing in Nigeria, NFIU, Headquarters FCT, Abuja, Nigeria. NFIU/PUB/SA/2014/VOL.I/001

Nigeria's Labor Force Statistics Vol. 1 (2017):- *Unemployment and Underemployment Report* for (Q1-Q3 2017), National Bureau of Statistics

Nigeria's Labor Force Statistics Vol. 1 (2018):- *Unemployment and Underemployment Report* for (Q4 2017 - Q3 2018), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

Nigeria's Money Laundering Act 2011, The Money Laundering Act 2011.https://lawpadi.com/8-things-the-average-nigerian-should-know-about-the-money-laundering-act-2011/

Nigeria's Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption Report, August 2015 – July 2016, Abuja, Nigeria

Nigeria's National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria, 2006, FCT, Abuja, Nigeria.

Nigeria's National Employment Policy of Nigeria (2006), Abuja, Nigeria.

Nigeria's National Framework and Action Plan For Preventing and Countering Violent Terrorism (2017) Peace Economics, *Peace Science and Public Policy*, Vol. 13 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 2

Noko, E.J. (2017) - Causes and Solution to Unemployment in Nigeria – https://educacinfo.com/causes-solution-unemployment-nigria/?v=...

Nwaja, C. Ogbonnaya, U.M, Ubon, U. (2018). Structural and institutional mechanisms for security sector oversight in Nigeria: Issues and challenges. Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre

Nwannennaya, C., & Abiodun, T.F. (2017). Illicit Drug Trafficking in Nigeria: Obstacle to National Development and Security. https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/illicit-drug-trafficking-in-nigeria-obstacle-to-national-development-andsecurity-2332-0761-1000230.php?aid=87373

Nwekeaku, C. (2014). The Rule of Law, Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration,* Vol 2, No. 1, pp. 26-35, March 2014.

Nwogwugwu, N. and Ishola, A. (2019): Legislators and their Oversight Functions in Policy Implementation in Nigeria: International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education

Nwolise, B.C. (2005), The Nigeria Police in International Peacekeeping under the United Nations, Spectrum Books Ibadan.

Nwolise, O.B.C, (2006). "National Security and Sustainable Democracy", in E.O. Ojo (ed), Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria, Ibadan: John Archers

Nwuche C.(2018): A Case for early childhood education in Nigeria, *Daily Sun,* Wednesday, March 14, 2018, p17

Nzarga, F. D (2014) - An Analysis of Human Rights Violations by the Nigerian Security Services - *Journal of law, Policy and Globalization,* Vol. 30

Obadan, M.I. & Odusola, A.F. (2001): Productivity and Unemployment in Nigeria. Ibadan: National Centre for Economic Management and Administration.

Obi C. (2009). Global, State and Local Intersections: Power, Authority and Conflict in the Niger Delta Oil Communities. Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558788.009 pp 173-194

Obi, C. (2010). Terrorism in West Africa: Real, emerging or imagined threats? *African Security Review*, Routledge: Mortimer House, London

Obikoya, O. J. (2002). The Foundation of Human Resources Management. *Vebric Publications Ijebu Ode, Nigeria*.

Odimegwu, O. (2015). Burden of the National Almajiri Education Initiative*; Daily Post Newsletter*, Feb 4, 2015.

Odinkalu, C. (2008). Criminal Force? Tortures, Abuse and Extra Judicial Killings by Police in Nigeria. Police Force, Lagos Nigeria Police Printing Press – p. 149

Obot I. S. (2004). Assessing Nigeria's Drug control Policy*, 1994 – 2000.International Journal of Drug Policy 15*, *17 – 26*

Obuah, E. (2010). Combating Corruption in Nigeria: The Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)*. African Studies Quarterly,* Volume 12, Issue 1.

Odekunle, K. & Okuwa, O.B. (2008): "Youth Empowerment Programme as Instrument for National Social Security in Nigeria". Paper Presented at HERPNET Third Regional Conference, held at IITA, Ibadan 18th – 21st August, 2008.

Odock, C. N. (2006): "Democracy and Good Governance". National Open University of Nigeria. Course Code PCR112 Monograph.

Odoma, S. (2014). Superiority Struggles and Inter Agency Feud in Nigeria*. Global Journal of Human Social Science: C Sociology & Culture*; Vol. 14, Issue 5, Version 1.0, Year 2014.

Ofodile U.E. 2015:- The 10 Biggest Foreign Policy Challenges Facing The Buhari Administration http://www.businessdayonline.com/the-10-biggest-foreign-policy-challenges-facing-the-buhari-administration/

Ofoegbu J.U. The Place of Human Rights in Nigeria's Democracy, *http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/og.v10i1.4*

Ogbonnaya, U. M., Ehigiamusoe, U. K. (2013): Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram Insurgency: National Security in Nigeria. Global Security Studies, Summer 2013, Volume 4, Issue 3

Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) (1990), Presented to the Government and People of Nigeria, 1990, <www.waado.org/Niger Delta/Rights/Declaration/Ogoni.html> (14 April 2005).

Oguejiofor, P. W. (2015). The Interrelationships Between Western Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Africa. *Arts and Social Sciences Journal*. Vol. 6, Issue 3

Ogundipe S. (2018). Nigerian Soldiers death toll rises in daring Boko Haram attack, *Premium Times* http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/282274-nigerian-soldiers-death-toll-rises-in-daring-boko-haram-attack.html

Ohanyere (2015). Presentation on Money Laundering in Nigeria. Shaw Road, Ikoyi, Lagos.

Ohanyere, A.A. (2016) Drug and illicit drugs in Nigeria, Anthill Publishers, Lagos

Ohanyere, A.A. (2018) Nigeria: The Anemia of a Bleeding Nation. Anthill Publishers, Lagos – Nigeria

Ohuabunwa, S. (2014). Winning The War Against Corruption: Let us Reform Not Deform our Institutions*. This Day Newspaper, April, 2014, Nigeria*, Pg 39.

Ojakorotu, V. (2010). Militants and Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Any Implication for Security in Nigeria? In V. Ojakorotu and I.D. Gilbert (Eds.), Checkmating the resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (pp 89-99). Retrieved from: http:/www.iags.org/Niger Delta book.pdf on April, 30 2011.

Ojeifo, E. (2015). Certificated illiterates and Unemployable Graduates: *This Day* November 2, 2015.

Ojeifo, E. (2015). The Chutzpad of an Incorruptible President *The Guardian.* www.ngrguardiannews.com Back page

Ojelu, H. (2019): Latest corruption report: Menace to increase in Nigeria. Source by Vanguard News

Okafor, E.E. (2011): "Youth Unemployment and Implications for Stability of Democracy in Nigeria", *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 13(1), 358 – 373.

Okenyodo, K. (2018) Judicial Oversight in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Okenyodo, O. (2016): Governance, Accountability, and Security in Nigeria: Africa Center for Strategic Studies: Africa Security Brief No 31

Okonjo – Iweala N. (2018): Fighting Corruption is Dangerous: The Story behind the headlines, The IMT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Okonjo – Iweala N. (2012) Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts

Okoro, E. R. (2014): Terrorism and governance crisis: Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria.

Okunnola, R.A., Lawal, M.O., Ganiyu, R.O., Adeleke, O.A (2014): Inter Agency Cooperation in Crime Management and its Implication on Workability of Community Policing Project in Nigeria. Public Policy and Administration Research, Vol. 4, No 7

Oladayo, A. (2014): Using Ibrahim index of Africa in evaluating Nigerian democratic Governance.

Oladele, P.O., Akeke, I. and Oladunjoye, O. (2011). Entrepreneurship Development: A Panacea for Unemployment Reduction in Nigeria. *Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences* (JETEMS) 2 (4): 251-256.

Olarinmoye, S. & Adedipe T. (2015) -: This is How Boko Haram Gets Funded. http://nairametrics.com/this-is-how-boko-haram-gets-funded/

Olise, A. (2016) - US explains presence in Gulf of Guinea, *Guardian*, 31 May 2006

Olufemi, J. (2015):- Nigeria spends N4.62 trillion on National Security in 5 years, yet widespread insecurity remains. *https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/185285-nigeria-spends-n4-62-trillion-on-national-security-in-5-years-yet-widespread-insecurity-remains.html*

Olutoyin, B.I. (2014). Stamping corruption out of our system: The impact of National and International Legislations on corruption control in Nigeria*. Journal of Law, Policy and Globalisation*. Vol. 23, 2014.Ekiti State University, Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria.

Omoh G. (2014) -: The Burden of Insecurity on the Nigerian Economy
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/05/burden-insecurity-nigerian-economy/

Omoigui, N. (2015) History of Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria.www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa9.htm

Omojuwa J. (2017) -: Corruption, Wealth Creation and the Nigerian Elite. http://punchng.com/corruption-wealth-creation-nigerian-elite/

Omonobi, K. 2004. We'll flush out these sea pirates from Niger Delta, vows Zamani Task Force Boss, *Vanguard*, 19 June, 2004. Lagos

Omoruyi, O. (2001). Fundamental Restructuring: The Answer to 'Military in Politics' in Nigeria. Nigeria world. www.nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/omoruyi.043001.html

Omotoso, F. and Oladeji, O. (2019): Legislative Oversight in the Nigeria Fourth Republic: Research Gate

Onapajo, H. (2013): Why Nigeria is not winning the anti-boko haram war. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/03/why-nigeria-is-not-winning-the-anti-boko-haram-war/

Onubogu, O.(2019): Peace in Nigeria will require Accountable Governance: United States Institute of Peace

Onuegbu, A. (2015). We Will Continue to Stand by The People, Workers.*The Guardian,* Tuesday, January 5*,2016*. www.ngr.guardiannews.com

Onuigbo, R. A. (2015): Corruption in Nigeria: An Examination of failed national assembly probes. Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and Management Studies Vol. 4, No. 4

Onuoha, F.C. (2010) Youth Unemployment and Poverty. Connection and Concerns for National Development in Nigeria. *African Centre for Strategic Research Studies*, National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria.

Onuoha, F.C. (2012). The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend. *Security Journal*, 25(2), 134 - 151. doi: 10 :1057/sj.2011.15

Onuoha, F. C. & Ezirim, G. E. (2014). Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa. http://www.tribune.com.ng/quicklinks/features/item/5069-terrorism-and-organised-crime-in-west-africa/5069-terrorism-and-transnational-organised-crime-in-west-africa

Onyewuchi, O. G. & Obumneke, E. (2013). Multinational Corporations and The Nigerian Economy. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*. April 2013, Vol. 3, No 4.

Orlinnowski, W. J. & Baroudi, T. J. (1991). Studying Information Technology in Organisations: Research Approaches and Assumptions. *Information Systems Research* 2(1), p 14.

Osahon, J. & Onyewuchi, I. (2016). Looming Cost of Resurgent Militancy. *The Guardian* Newspaper www.guardian.ng/Sunday -Magazine/looting-cost-of-resurgent-militancy/

Osiobe, E. U., Olushola, P. A. and Osiobe, S. A. (2019): The role of non-governmental organizations in community economic development: using a system dynamic approach. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development. ISSN 2222-1700

Osuala, E. C. (2013). Introduction to Research Methodology (3rd Edition). African – First Publishers Plc., Lagos.

Otoghile, A., Igbafe, A. A. & Agbontaen, E. S. (2014), The Quest For Good Governance In Nigeria: A Survey of People's Perception in Benin City. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*. Vol. 4, No. 28, 2014.

Otusanya, O. J., Lauwo, S. & Adeyeye, G.B. (2012). A Critical Examination of The Multinational Companies' Anti-Corruption Policy in Nigeria. Accountancy Business and The Public Interest. Department of Accounting, Faculty of Business Administration, University of Nigeria, Lagos.

Oraegbunam, I. "A Jurisprudential Critique of Human Right Situation in Nigeria", Nigerian Democracy And Global Democracy (ed) Ike Odimegwu, 2007 World Philosophy Day UNIZIK Vol. 3, Awka.

Osaghae, E.E. (2013). Coming to Grips with Terrorism in Nigeria, in V.A. Isumonah, M.O. Oyebode and A. Adams (eds), Nationalities, identities and Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience, Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Ltd.

Osayi, K. (2013). *Socio-Cultural Factors Affecting Reintegration of Discharged Prisoners in Anambra State, South East, Nigeria. Mediterranear Journal of Social Sciences*. Vol. 4, No 10.

Osinbajo, O. (2019): Corruption Responsible for Insurgency in N-East. A Presentation at a Meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD's Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum in Paris, France.

Osita Njoku, A and Chikere P, 2015 Consequences of Boko Haram Terrorism on Women in Northern Nigeria. *Applied Research Journal*, Vol. 1(3): 101 – 107, May.

Osuchukwu C. (2014), 1966 Crisis and the evolution of Nigerian Politics, Imo State University Press, Owerri

Osumah, O. (2013). Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Vicious Cycle of Internal Insecurity.*Journal of Small Wars and Insurgencies*. Volume 24, 2013 - Issue 3.

Othman N. (2016): Why Terrorism Thrives in West Africa, Gatestone Institute International Policy Council https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8020/terrorism-west-africa

OXFAM International Report (2017): Wealth of five richest men in Nigeria could end extreme poverty in country yet 5 million face hunger.

Owoye, O. and Bissessar, N. (2009): Bad Governance and Corruption in Africa: Symptoms of Leadership and Institutional Failures, Commission for Asia & pacific (UNESCAP).

Oyeniyi, A. B. (2010). Terrorism in Nigeria: Groups, Activities and Politics*; International Journal of Politics And Good Governance*. Vol 1 No 1.1, Quarter 1 2010.

Oyovbaire, S. E. (2007). *The Crisis of Governance in Nigeria.* A Paper Delivered on the 23rdOccasion Ceremony of the University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria. *Thursday* 15th March 2007.

Page M.T. (2018) Camouflaged Cash: *How Security Votes Fuel Corruption in Nigeria, Transparency International*

Phil O.M.D (2012):- Conflict and Insurgency in Nigeria: Impact on Development Prospects and Nationhood www.nigeriacalabash.com

Philip, C.A. (2021): "The dividend of democracy": analyzing U.S support for Nigerian democratization.

Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) Report (2017). Mapping Civil Society Interventions on Security Sector Reform in Nigeria.

PLAC Report (2017), Structural and Institutional Mechanisms for Security Sector Oversight in Nigeria:

PLAC Report (2019) on Civil Society Engagement with the Legislature for Rights-based Lawmaking, Nigeria 2019

Popoola, J. (2020). Mo Ibrahim index and the damning indictment on governance in Nigeria.

PriceWater House Coopers Presentation to Nigeria's Vice – President (2016): *Corruption to cost Nigeria up to 37% of GDP if it is not tamed completely and immediately.* Landmark Towers, Victoria – Island, Lagos

Purvis, C. (2012) Nigeria's Security Challenges. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* Vol. 3 No. 9; May 2013

Paden, J. (1986). *Politics and Sharia in Northern Nigeria* .in Soares, Benjamin and Rene Otayek, eds. Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa. New York: Palgrave.

Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods *(3rd ed.).* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Platt, T. & Takagi, P. (1981). Crime and Social Justice. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble.

Quinney, R. (1980). Class, State and Crime, 2nd edn. New York Longman

Reno, W. (1993). Foreign Firms and Financing of Charles Taylor's NPFL. *Liberian Studies Journal 18*(92).

UNODC Research (2017) on corruption in Nigeria: Bribery: Public experience and response by UNODC, Vienna, Austria.

UNODC Report (2018) Support to Anti-Corruption in Nigeria 2012 – 2017. UNODC Country Office, Abuja Nigeria

UNODC (2019): Corruption in Nigeria: *Patterns and Trends, Second Survey on Corruption as experienced by the population. UNODC, Vienna*

UNPO Reports (2020): Ogoni: The legacy of ken saro-wiwa 25 years later.

Rasak, B. and Garuba, R. O. (2017): Political thuggery, violence and women participation in politics in Nigeria. Department of Sociology, College of Business and Social Sciences, Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Kwara State

Rettig, M.D. (2016): West Africa's Terror Problem Needs A Regional Solution. Contributor – Africa center for strategic studies.

Ribadu N (2004), "Obstacles to Effective Prosecution of Corrupt Practices and Financial Crime Cases in Nigeria", Paper Presented at the First Stake holders Summit on Corrupt Practices and Financial Crimes in Nigeria Organised by the House of Representatives Committee on Anti-Corruption, National Ethics and Values, at the International Conference Centre, Trade Fair Complex, Kaduna, 23 – 25 November.

Ribadu N. (2017): Nigerian Banks Susceptible to Fraud, Corruption: Presentation at the Book Launch of Dr. Abdullahin Usman Bello titled improving Anti-Money Laundering Compliance: Self Protecting Theory and Money Laundering Reporting Officers

Rollinson, D. (2005). Organizational Behaviour and Analysis: An Integrated Approach, *Financial Times*/Prentice Hall, 661 – 691.

Rist, R. C. (1977). *On the Relations among educational research paradigms: From disdain to detente. Anthropology and Educational Quarterly*, 1977, 8, 42-49.

Rizzo, J. (2015): A shrinking lake and a Rising Insurgency. Sourced by http://labos.ulg.ac.be

Rowlands, B. (2005). Grounded in Practice: Using Interpretive Research to Build Theory. T*he Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods*. Volume 3, Issue 1.

Sahara Reporters. (2017). How Just 24 Privileged Former Nigerian Governors and their Deputies DrainNigeria of Scarce Funds, Perpetuate Poverty, New York.

Salawu, M. and Adeoti E.O. (2015): Terrorism and Nigerian Democracy: Implications for Sustainable Development - *European Journal of Globalization and Development Research*, Vol. 11, No.2, 2015

Sanyaolu, P. and Sanyaolu, C. (2019): Examining the rule and procedure of the National Assembly: Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria.

Sambo M.D. 2014:- Challenges of Governance In The Era of Insurgency by Mohammed Sambo Dasuki Presentation of Nigeria's Department of State Security Service, Abuja, Nigeria

Sanders, C. (2014). *Nigeria: Corruption and Insecurity.* Transparency International. http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/nigeria_corruption_and_insecurity

Schmid, A (1988), Political terrorism, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, p.28, cited in L Weinberg et al, The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), Winter 2004, p780.

Schmidt, A.P. (1996). "The Links Between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorist Crimes". *Transnational Organised Crime*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 40 – 82.

Schwandt (2001). Dictionary of Qualitative Enquiry, 2nd Ed. Sage Thousand Oaks, California.

Schwartz-Shea, P. & Yanov, D. (2012). *Interpretive Research Design. Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods*, New York and London.

Shehu A.Y. (2016). Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (ML/CFT) in Nigeria – A Call for Rescue, FCT, Abuja, Nigeria.

Shelley, L. (2008). The Globalization of Crime and Terrorism. Extract from the February 2006 Edition of eJournal USA.

Shenton, A. K. (2003). Strategies for Ensuring Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research Projects. Education forInformation 22 (2004) 63-75. IOS Press.

Sidhu, K. S. (2013). Methodology of Research in Education. Sterling Publishers Private Limited. New Delhi, India.

Smith, A.G. (2004). From Words to Action: Exploring the Relationship between a Group's Value
References and its likelihood of Engaging in Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 27(5), 409 – 437

Stapenhurst, R., Jacobs, K. & Olaore, O. (2016): 'Legislative oversight in Nigeria: and empirical review and assessment', The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 1-29

Stewart, P. & Wroughton, L. (2014). *How Boko Haram is Beating U.S. Efforts to Choke its Financing.* http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-bokoharam-insight-idUSKBN0F636920140701

Strategy Page. (2014). Nigeria.www.strategypage.com/qnd/nigeria/20140501.aspx P.1–10

Sule, A. K. (2002). The Almajirin Phenomenom Study of the Youth in Traditional Qur'anic Scholarship in Northern Nigeria. Seminar Presentation Notes for the Almajiri Initiatives, UDU Sokoto, Nigeria. *The Humanities Journal* 1(1), 27 – 47.

Usman A. and Mustapha M. (2017). The Emerging Architecture of a Regional Security Complex in the Lake Chad Basin *Africa Development*. Volume XLII, No 3, 2017, P.P-99-118

The Role of the Oil industry and the Nigerian state in defining the future of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria - African Research Review Vol 4 (2), April 2010

Tambuwal A. (2014). One Massacre Too Many. *Guardian Newspaper,* April 1, 2014, P. 69-70.

Tanimu, B. (2006). Convicts' View of The Criminal Justice System in Nigeria. In The National Question and Some Selected Topical Issues on Nigeria. pp 294-309.

US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, (2011). *International drug control policy*. In L.S. Wyler (Ed.). CRS Report RL34543, Washington, D.C.: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing.

Udama, R.A. (2013). Understanding Nigeria Terrorism, its Implications to National Peace, Security, Unity and Sustainable Development: A Discuss. IOSR *Journal of Humanities And Social Science.* 8(5): 100 – 115

Udegbunam, C.W.K. (2013). Repositioning Nigeria's Amnesty Programme for Conflict Transformation and Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Singaporean *Journal of Business Economics and Management Studies* Vol. 2, No.1, 2013.

Ugbodaga, K. (2016): Boko Haram crisis claims 32,842 deaths. https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2017/12/16/boko-haram-crisis-claims-32842-death/

Ugbomeh B.A., Atubi A.O. (2010) -: The Role of the Oil Industry and the Nigerian State in Defining the Future of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria (Pp 103 -112) – *African Research Review*, An International multi-Disciplinary Journal, Ethiopia Vol. 4 (2)

Ujah E. (2016) -: 2% of Nigerians own 90% Bank Deposits – NDIC, *Vanguard Newspaper*. 2016 pg 1-3

Ukpoghome T. U and Nwano, T. C (2017). The collaboration of investigative authorities in Nigeria - Current issues and challenges; *International Journal of Law* Vol 3; Issue 4; 2017. pp 99 - 48

Ukpong C. (2017):- Nigeria remains third most terrorized country as Boko Haram killings reduce 80%. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/249476-nigeria-remains-third-terrorised-country-boko-haram-killings-reduce-80.html

UNDP Report (1998) - Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and Alternative Development. United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem. New York, 8 – 10 June 1998. Fact SheetNo.6

UNICEF Report (2008). United Nation Children's Emergency Fund, Division of Communication, 3 United Nation Plaza, New York. NY 10017 USA.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006): Cross-cutting Issues: International Cooperation Criminal Justice Assessment Tool Kit 2006 reviewed in 2018

US Department of State (2012), Country Report on Terrorism - US Department of State, Washington DC, United States

United States Agency for International Development, USAID (2015), Nigeria Country Development Strategy

UNODC (2019): Corruption in Nigeria: *Patterns and Trends, Second Survey on Corruption as experienced by the population*

US Security and Exchange Commission Report (2010) Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), Department of State, Washington, US.

US House of Representatives (2017): Managing terrorism financing risk in remittances and money transfer, Hearing before the subcommittee on Terrorism and illicit finance. Serial No. 115-32

US Human Rights Practices Report on Nigeria, (2017), US State Department, Washington DC.

US Department of Justice (2020): Global disruption of three terror finance cyber-enabled campaigns. Press Release

US Department Of State Report (2012). 2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207787.htm

US Bureau of Counter Terrorism (2013). Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. US Bureau of Counter Terrorism.www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf

US Institute of Peace, National Peace Essay Contest (2014) on Security Sector Reform, Political Transition and Sustainable Peace. National Peace Essay Contest Guidebook 2014.United States Institute of Peace 2301, Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20037.

US security cooperation with Nigeria (2020). United state's department of state: Bureau of political military affairs.

Usifo V. (2017) -: 10 Ways to Reduce Unemployment in Nigeria, Info Guide Nigeria.com, Information Guide in Nigeria. https://infoguidenigeria.com/reduce-unemployment/

Usher, D. (1997). Education As Deterrent To Crime. Canadian *Journal of Economics*, 30, 367-384.

Usman, Y. (2020): Nigeria: insecurity system of corruption, bad governance.

Uzuegbu-Wilson, E. (2019): Security Sector Governance and its Impact on Development in Nigeria: A critical analysis. Department of International Law and Security Studies, Babcock University Ilishan-Remo, Ogun State, Nigeria.

Valle V. (2004) US Policy towards the Gulf of Guinea, in R Traub-Merz & D Yates (eds), Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth and Social Development, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 2004, p. 52

Venda T.I -Terrorism and Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Discourse. https://intellektualtourist.wordpress.com/about-intellectualtourist/

Walker, A 2012. What is Boko Haram? United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Special Report, Washington, 30 May. http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram.

Wallerstein, I. (2002), "Three hegemonies" in Patrick Karl O' Brien and Armand Clesse (eds), Two hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and United States 1941 – 2001, Aldershot/Burlington

Wallerstein, I. M. (1974). The Modern World System. New York Academic Press, pp. 1-30.

Wardlaw, G. (1982). Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter – Measures, London: Cambridge University Press.

Weiss, R. P. (2000). Introduction to "Criminal Justice and Globalization at the new Millennium" Social Justice.27(2), 1-15.

White House, US. (1998). International Crime Control Strategy (1998). White House, Washington DC, USA.

Williams, I. 2004. "Theorising Conflict and Violence: Contemporary Africa and the Imperative of Peaceful Co-existence", *African Conflict Profile,* Vol. 1 No. 1 p.6.

Williams, P. (2005), "Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation", *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, Issue 1.

Wilson, H. (2009). Curbing Recidivism in Our Society. Retrieved http://www.pioneerng.com/article.php?title=Curbing_Redidivism_In_Our_Societyandid=2765.

Wilson, J.Q., & Hernstein, R. (1985). *Crime and Human Nature.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Wilson, O.V. (2020): Institutional capacity and capability of Nigeria's security sector.

World Internal Security and Police Index (WISPI) (2016) Report on Assessment of Nigeria's Police. *International Science Association (IPSA*).

World Data. Info (2020) *Extent of Public Corruption in Nigeria*: africa/nigeria/corruption.php

Word Bank Report (2020) *Human Capital Index Update*: *World Bank Group*, N.W Washington DC USA. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/human-capital

Wulf, H. (2004) Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries. http://www.berghof-handbook.net

Yadav, Y. (2014). Boko haram Sinks its Narco Terror Fangs into India. The New Indian Express, The Sunday Standard.http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/Boko-Haram-Sinks-its-Narco-Terror-Fangs-into-India/2014/07/13/article2327584.ece

Yaya, J. F. and Entz, A. (2017): Boko Haram financial assessment, center of sanctions and illicit financing, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

Yesufu, T. M. (2000). The Human Factor in National Development in Nigeria. Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books Limited.

Yilmaz, K. (2013). Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Traditions: Epistemological Theoretical and Methodological Differences. *European Journal of Education,* Vol. 48, No 2. pp. 311-315. John Wiley and Sons Ltd.

Yin, R. K. (2002). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Yusha'u, M. A., Tsafe, A. K., Babangida, S. I. & Lawal, N. I. (2013). Problems and Prospects of Integrated Almajiri Education in Northern Nigeria. *Scientific Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences,* 2(3) pp. 125-134.

Zamfir, L. (2015). African-led counter-terrorism measures against Boko Haram, European Parliamentary Research Service Blog.

Zumve, S. Ingyoroko, M. & Akuva, I. (2013). Terrorism in Contemporary Nigeria: A Latent Function of Official Corruption and State Neglect. *European Scientific Journal*, 9(8): 122–140.