



**South Africa and regional stability: Lessons from Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)
in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2013**

By

Boitshoko Grace Matlhakoane

1244937

Supervisor: Dr Mopeli Moshoeshoe

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of

MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

31 March 2021

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	i
Declaration.....	ii
List of Abbreviations	iii
Abstract.....	v
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Background	1
Research Problem	3
Research question	3
Objective	4
Aim and rationale.....	4
Literature Review.....	5
Methodology	15
Research method.....	16
Data collection	16
Study limitations	17
Structure of the thesis.....	17
Chapter TWO- Explaining Peace Enforcement- A tool used by South Africa in 2013.....	18
Introduction.....	18
The emergence of Peace enforcement in the United Nations	18
Origin, Definition and role of Peace enforcement	20
Characteristics of Peace Enforcement.....	25
Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC	27
Conclusion	32
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF THE DRC CONFLICT	34
Introduction.....	34
Brief historical background of the DRC	35
Years of peace-making and peace-keeping.....	41
The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement.....	41
The Sun City Accord	43
MONUC.....	45

MONUSCO.....	48
Conclusion	52
CHAPTER FOUR-FIB IN THE DRC AND SOUTH AFRICA’S INVOLVEMENT	54
Introduction.....	54
South Africa and Peace Enforcement	54
South Africa’s FIB decision towards the DRC	55
The Mandela Era.....	56
Mbeki’s presidency	60
Zuma’s administration	65
Economic relations with the DRC	68
Conclusion	73
CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE IN 2013.....	75
Introduction.....	75
The reason for the FIB in 2013	75
Conclusion and Recommendations.....	78
Bibliography	81

LIST OF GRAPHICS

Figure 1.....31

Figure 2.....69

Acknowledgements

I would like to firstly thank God Almighty for the strength he gave me during my master's degree journey. All glory goes to you God!

My sincere gratitude goes to my supervisor Dr Mopeli Moshoeshoe for his valuable support and constructive criticism during the process of completing my master's thesis.

I would like to thank my parents for their unwavering support from the beginning to the end, because my mother-Sophy Lebogang Matlhakoane is no more to witness the end of my MA journey, I dedicate this paper to her.

Declaration

I, Boitshoko Grace Matlhakoane, hereby declare that this thesis is my original work. I have acknowledged and duly referenced all my sources throughout the paper by means of footnoting reference style and a completed bibliography at the end of the last chapter. “South Africa and Regional stability: Lessons from Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2013” has not been submitted for any purpose elsewhere. It is now being submitted to the Humanities faculty of the University of the Witwatersrand for the Master of Arts degree in International Relations.

List of Abbreviations

ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
ANC	African National Congress
ASI	African Solidarity Initiative
AU	African Union
APCLS	Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CODESA	Convention for Democratic South Africa
COGTA	Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Department
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DFS	Department of Field Support-UN
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations-UN
DPSA	Department of Public Service and Administration
EU	European Union
FAZ	Forces Armées Zairoises
FDLR	le Force Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
GEAR	Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
GNU	Government of National Unity
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICGLR	International Conference of the Great Lakes Region
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence

LRA	Uganda Lord's Resistance Army
M23	March 23 Movement
MLC	Movement for Liberation of the Congo
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUB	United Nations Operations in Burundi
PCRD	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PNC	Police Nationale Congolaise
PSCF	Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RDP	Reconstruction Development Programme
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
R2P	Right to Protect
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC-OPDS	SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UAS	Unmanned Aerial Systems
UN	United Nations
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Abstract

This paper examines South Africa's foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2013, focusing on the decision to use peace-enforcement as opposed to traditional peacekeeping. The study will examine the phenomenon of peace-enforcement as an underutilized peacekeeping operation. The goal is to evaluate the force intervention brigade as a primary conflict resolution mandate. The report seeks to understand South Africa's involvement in the peace-enforcement operation and further assess possible lessons that can be derived from this operation and may be applied to other countries that are prone to conflict.

South Africa and Regional stability: Lessons from Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2013

Chapter One: Introduction

Background

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and South Sudan, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic and Burundi, to name a few, have all benefited from South Africa's peacekeeping, peace-building and mediation efforts¹. In 1998, South Africa intervened in Lesotho under the auspices of Southern African Development Community (SADC). Instead of a smooth intervention, Pretoria sent soldiers to Lesotho to avoid a coup, which resulted in "unintended consequences" such as deaths and mass destruction of property and public infrastructure². In Burundi, South Africa deployed troops under African Mission in Burundi which would later on be called United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) and also been involved in the post-conflict reconstruction of the country³. South Africa also had an unsuccessful intervention in Central African Republic prior to the intervention brigade in the DRC and this led to the unforeseen death of 13 soldiers.

There has been a couple of success and failures in South Africa's quest to peace operations and this has been questioned by scholars in terms of the South African foreign policy being inconsistent⁴. The case study in question is a great example of change in foreign policy by South Africa, in that, looking at the 1998-2003 war in the DRC and South Africa's role compared to the 2013 intervention brigade, a clear shift is apparent in South Africa's role.

¹ Tjemolane, T et al. South Africa's foreign policy and Africa: continental partner or hegemon?. 2012, 87-106

² Makoa, F. The challenges of the South African military intervention in Lesotho after 1998 election. 1999. 82-88

³ Ajulu, C. Burundi peace building and reconstruction. 2006, 107

⁴ Dudley, A. South Africa's foreign policy: striving towards Mandela's ideals. Africa Institute of South Africa. Briefing no. 89. 2013

The Democratic Republic of Congo has had a complex relationship with South Africa in regards to peacekeeping, for example, Pretoria did not militarily intervene in the DRC's conflict in the 90s but intervened through the force intervention brigade in 2013. In the late 90s when the DRC had its second war, South Africa took a firm decision not to intervene by means of military force but rather through diplomatic channels. Using diplomacy through mediation peace processes led to an end to the war in 2003 through an agreement between the government and the rebel groups. However, even with the agreement in place, one could not declare the country completely stable and peaceful. According to Sylvester⁵ "there is no bigger challenge facing humanity than how to build lasting peace in the eastern DRC". After the capture of City of Goma by the rebel group M23 (March 23) in 2012 the United Nations (UN) felt that an alternative method to ensuring the end of rebellion needed to be used in order to curb the on-going violence in eastern DRC⁶. As a result on February 2013 it was decided under the United Nations (UN) Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) that a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) should be enforced towards the M23. The FIB is a special African peacekeeping unit that operates under the African Union, however, it gets mandate from the United Nations through Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which stipulates giving right of way to offensive missions aimed at fighting rebel groups⁷. South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania were part of the countries that contributed troops to the offensive mission to counter the threat of violence⁸.

With that been said, South Africa has been involved or taken part in many of the conflicts the continent has seen and as such the engagements have led the country to be considered not only by fellow African countries but also the international community as a reputable actor in peace and security in the continent⁹.

⁵ Sylvester, C. War as experience: Contributions from international relations and feminist analysis. Routledge, 2013.

⁶ Le Roux, H. "A Web-based Collaboration tool for Information Management." CSIR, Smart Systems CSIR Defence, Peace, Safety & Security (2013).

⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098, 2013

⁸ Besharati, Neissan Alessandro, and Carmel Rawhani. "South Africa and the DRC: Evaluating a South-South partnership for peace, governance and development." (2016); 13 and Whittle, D. "The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action." European Journal of International Law 26, no. 3 (2015): 671-698.

⁹ Kotch, N. SA soldiers getting more involved in Congo. 2013

This paper will focus on South Africa's involvement in the FIB in 2013 and unpack the country's foreign policy towards the DRC, especially taking note of the fact that South Africa has its head of Diplomatic Corps situated in the DRC and also that the two countries have signed over 35 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) over the past years¹⁰. However, what is of interest is the shift by South Africa from *soft peacekeeping* to *offensive peacekeeping*. Since 1996 the DRC has received more international attention than any other country in the world, with the UN having its largest peace building mission there and no sufficient success until 2013.

Research Problem

In reference to the discussion above, the study will look at peace enforcement as a tool to curb recurring conflicts in the African continent. Furthermore, deliberating the new phenomena of international peace and security called peace enforcement, as a possible solution to conflict resolution. This study will use the case of the South Africa-DRC intervention in 2013, because South Africa along-side the United Nations has been at times involved in interventions that did not entirely defeat rebels groups, for example the UN Mission in Burundi, Darfur and Cote d'Ivoire. As a result, the interest with this case study is how MONUSCO (United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC) with the heavy support of South Africa managed to fulfil the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2098 and what criteria did the peace enforcement mission-FIB undertake in 2013 that has never been applied before in other conflict environments? This study will identify gaps or complexities in the scholarship and research of the peace enforcement as a growing concept in the field of international peace and security.

Research question

- What are the lessons to be drawn from South Africa's involvement in the force intervention brigade?
- Can the lessons drawn from the FIB be applied in other conflict cases?
- Should the field of international peace and security look more into peace enforcement as a primary conflict resolution mandate?

¹⁰ Carlsnaes & Nel, In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy. 2006;18

Objective

This study will aim to firstly assess FIB as a single mission in the DRC and lastly examine South Africa's foreign policy decision towards the DRC in 2013, especially after the unprepared and unsuccessful clashes in Central African Republic (CAR) prior to the FIB in the DRC, that led to over ten soldiers having been killed in CAR by a rebel militia group called Seleka.

Aim and rationale

This research aims to unpack reasons why South Africa only decided in 2013 to shift (non-intervention in the late 90s to intervention in 2013) from traditional peacekeeping operations to force intervention after many years of war in the DRC. Existing literature on South Africa's foreign policy asserts that there are inconsistencies with the foreign policy¹¹, with that, the study shall contribute to the debate about the fluctuation in the foreign policy decision making of South Africa. The intention is to contribute to the dialogue on South Africa's decision making and assert if there are any discrepancies like motivation or lack of motivation rather, that leads to the decisions taken on foreign policy by South Africa.

South Africa is considered to be an economic power house in the continent with credible experience in peacekeeping engagements not only in the DRC but also in countries like Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire and Burundi. As a result, this study is justified because it seeks to understand and uncover South Africa's foreign policy decision towards the DRC in 2013, a decision that South Africa has not used in the countries mentioned above.

Furthermore investigate the impact of the peace enforcement- force intervention brigade in the eastern DRC, to evaluate whether the intervention had a positive impact and should therefore be replicated in other conflicts in the continent. An alternative would be that perhaps the UN and Southern African Development Community should

¹¹ Landsberg, C. and Van Wyk, J.A. eds. South African Foreign Policy Review: Volume 1 (Vol. 1). African Books Collective. 2012

reconsider peace enforcement as not being a solution to conflict resolution. The effect of the FIB will be measured through the reduction of violence in the eastern region of the country, the protection of civilians and the overall achievement of the mandate.

The findings of the impact of the force intervention brigade will also contribute to policy and can be used by policy makers in the field of peace, security and international order.

Literature Review

This section aims to explore existing literature on the study of Peace enforcement, reviewing the leading debates and themes in order to form a greater understanding, decisions and objectives that inform Peace enforcement missions and South Africa's decision to be part of the intervention brigade. Furthermore, the section will look into gaps or complexities in the scholarship and research of the peace enforcement as a growing concept in the field of international peace and security.

Peace Operations

Peace operations are comprised of a range of four peace missions namely; traditional peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping (enforcement), peace-building and peace observation, these missions are said to be performed by troops in operations organised by international organisations, regional organisations or multinational groupings¹². South Africa is known to use diplomatic measures and methods during mediation of conflict, to avoid intra-state or inter-state tensions and conflicts from escalating into violent conflict. This is called conflict prevention which will be thoroughly discussed in chapter two¹³. Peace-making is one of the tools Pretoria uses as a peace operation, this is to assist by bringing the warring parties to table to negotiate an agreement that will suit all parties.

“The world is changing and UN peace operations must change with it if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security”¹⁴.

¹² Ibid. Vol 1

¹³ UN Peacekeeping Operations-principles and guidelines. 2008

¹⁴ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/reforming-peacekeeping> accessed 26 July 2020

Peacekeeping is a tool used to assist countries affected by war to regain peace and stability. Berdal¹⁵ notes that UN peacekeeping has “unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates”¹⁶. Peacekeeping is mainly about the shift from instability to stability, this is done through political support, ensuring safety and security of civilians and bring about sustainable peace to the country at conflict¹⁷. Sorenson & Wood¹⁸ believe that peacekeeping is more than just about the maintenance of security and peace but that it entails various aspects that help in the broader spectrum of attaining peace. For example, disarmament of weapons, ensuring that the rule of law is restored and upheld and finally the protection of citizens in the country¹⁹.

According to Bures Oldrich (2006, 83) “the United Nations defines it as an operation involving military personnel, but without power of enforcement, established by an appropriate international body to help maintain peace in an area of conflict”. Taking into consideration that this definition came about when the UN was the only organisation that could send troops for the purpose of peacekeeping. The UN can now rely on regional organisations and sub-regional organisations to deploy troops to conflict countries²⁰. Peacekeeper’s role is to ensure through observation and monitoring that processes and methods of peace-building are adhered to, this includes the signing of peace agreements by all warring parties. Peacekeepers provide the necessary political, social and economic and legal support to bring about confidence to state-building in the post-conflict stages. The use of force by peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations is not part of regular peacekeeping activities, according to our understanding of what peace-keeping entails²¹. Cammaert, Hunt ,Karlsrud and Bowet²² defines peace-keeping operations as military or non-military activities undertaken by the UN to ensure the organisation’s preservation of peace and stability in a conflict zone, normally at the request or with the consent of a host country and

¹⁵ Berdal,M. The state of peacekeeping. Lessons of Congo, 2017

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Berdal, The state of peacekeeping. Lessons of Congo, 2017

¹⁸ Sorenson, D. and Wood, D. eds. The politics of peacekeeping in the post-cold war era. Routledge, 2004.

¹⁹ ibid

²⁰ ibid

²¹ Tull, D. The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. 2017,5

²² Cammaert, P. 2013; Hunt, C. 2017; Karlsrud, J. 2015 and Bowet, D. 2008

other parties involved in the conflict²³. This is not to say that a peacekeeping force will always be welcomed with open arms by conflicting parties. In reality, peacekeeping forces are often attacked by warring sides. This occurs when one of the factions assumes that the peacekeeping force is not impartial in the conflict and is siding with the adversaries²⁴.

Peacekeeping differs from peace enforcement in that options, including coercion, are used to bring opposing parties to a negotiating table. However, the idea has sparked a lot of debate²⁵. Although it is an approach to preserving an on-going peace that can only be carried out by an outside party regarded as “neutral”, in this case the UN, it varies from peacekeeping in terms of the level of force that the outside entity is able to use in response to breaches of the established peace²⁶.

Many scholars argue against the notion of the UN being a neutral party in regards to the peace enforcement. The debate is that the force intervention makes the UN part of conflict, which taints the aspect of the international organisation being neutral. In fact robust peacekeeping can lead to ‘unintended consequences’ as it is seen as though the UN is taking sides in the conflict which goes against the “Holy Trinity” of peacekeeping that entails the following; the consent of the host nation (s), impartiality and the non-use of force by the UN troops. Denis²⁷ continues the debate on impartiality and contends that it does not imply that the UN should be neutral but that in order for the UN to achieve its mandates on peace missions, it needs to use force to be able to defend its mandate²⁸.

The post-Cold War era has seen the rise of the principle of peace enforcement, this is because traditional peace-keeping methods have proven to be of no use in several conflict environments, exacerbating the conflict in some instances. According to Akindele²⁹ peace enforcement is the “actual use of force under the auspices of the UN

²³ *ibid*

²⁴ Hunt, C. All Necessary Means to What Ends? The Unintended Consequences of the Robust Turn in UN Peace Operations. 2017, 108-131

²⁵ McDonald, G. "Peace enforcement: mapping the "middle ground" in peace operations." PhD diss., Université de Genève, 2001.

²⁶ *Ibid*.

²⁷ Tull, D. The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. 2017, 5

²⁸ Rudulph, P. 2017; Tull, D. 2017; Karlsrud, J. 2015 and Bellamy et al, 2010

²⁹ Tull, D. The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. 2017, 5

to deal with a proven case of armed aggression”. The UN Charter in Chapter VII states that the Security Council can use enforcement measures where considered necessary to maintain international peace³⁰. Furthermore, a peacekeeping mission’s troops may be used to enforce the peace, but the mandate must be amended or expanded to include enforcement action.

Although peacekeeping has largely avoided in the past, the degree of violence faced by peacekeeping operations in many countries, such as the 1994 events in Rwanda, where Belgian soldiers were forced to watch the on-going massacre and were finally killed without being permitted to interfere, has changed³¹. This astounded the international community, resulting in crises where nations’ willingness to join peacekeeping missions without the opportunity to use force is contrasted with their inability to enter potentially heated wars in which they would not otherwise be involved³². The United Nations may either cause such a force to be formed or offer its recognition and sub-regional organisations, just as it can with peacekeeping. According to Article 52 of the U.N Charter:

“The Security Council shall appropriately utilize such regional arrangements and agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under the regional arrangements or by agencies without authorization of the Security Council”³³.

The *Brahimi Report*- a 2000 report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations introduced the rationale for use of force in defence of a mission mandate as well. Following that, in 2009 a *New Horizon’s Doctrine* came to the fore advocating for the concept of robust peacekeeping, this doctrine concurs like the Brahimi report deterring threats to on-going peace processes. However, Tardy³⁴ critiques robust peacekeeping missions by asserting that the missions entail financial and military capability in terms of weaponry and the increased number of troops. The financial implications of this are that the UN or the regional organisations involved may

³⁰ Kai Kenkel, Academic Experts and the policy making process: the case of the 1996 South African defence white paper. Paper presented at the 19th international political science association world congress. 2013; 1 & 2

³¹ George, Oliver. The other side of peacekeeping: peace enforcement and who should do it. 2002, p9

³² Ibid. p. 9

³³ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2003;105

³⁴ Tardy, T. "A critique of robust peacekeeping in contemporary peace operations." International Peacekeeping 18, no. 2. 2011: 152-167.

decrease if not entirely end funding on some of the on-going projects in that specific country, to focus more on the peace operation³⁵.

The Force Intervention Brigade in eastern DRC in 2013 is one of the enforcement actions that was authorised under the Security Council in Resolution 2098. The Intervention Brigade's mission was to neutralize the M23 by conducting targeted offensive operations in a strong, highly mobile and flexible manner³⁶. One of the nation's obligations under the DRC's peace, security and cooperation framework was to "neither harbour nor provide protection of any kind to persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or crimes of aggression, or person falling under the United Nations sanctions regime"³⁷.

There seems to be multiple voices in the scholarship of the success or failure of the force intervention brigade in the DRC. Looking back from the first UN peacekeeping mission in the Republic of Congo during the 60s, some scholars believe that this is the most successful intervention of the UN by far in the DRC. Denis Tull³⁸ (2017; 13) shares a different sentiment, and this is because the DRC is said to have more than 30 rebel groups and out of that large number only one was defeated. Maphosa (2013) also agrees with this in the article "We need to do better, and we can", that "One group surrendering is hardly a return to peace and prosperity"³⁹. The debate is that despite the military defeat of the M23 the DRC is still under siege by many other rebel groups and thus remains fragile. According to Tull⁴⁰ the intervention brigade fostered two opinions, "from the point of view of Kinshasa and its SADC allies, one can conclude that FIB was extremely successful. From a UN perspective, FIB has been largely a failure since its accomplishment remains limited to the M23 defeat"⁴¹. The FIB was deemed a success because it managed to fulfil its mandate, which was to disarm the M23 and have the rebel group surrender its arms to the UN.

³⁵ Karlsrud, John. "UN peace operations and counter-terrorism—A bridge too far?." 2016.

³⁶ Labuda, P. UN peace operations: tracking the shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and state-building. 2015

³⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098, 2013; 13.

<https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm> accessed 6 May 2020

³⁸ Tull, D. The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. 2017, 13

³⁹ Maphosa, S. 2013 www.africaportal.org accessed 7 June 2020

⁴⁰ Tull, D. The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. 2017, 13

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 13

Mat Berdal⁴² supports the views of both scholars mentioned above however, not from a perspective of just one military defeat but on how the intervention brigade failed to address the root causes of the conflict (political and economic issues) and instead ‘established pattern of band-aid protection’. Peter Mateja⁴³ argues that peace enforcement missions are not meant to be a solution to a conflict, they are ‘stabilization missions’ meaning that they sought to bring stability and security to an environment in order to create an atmosphere that can lead to political solutions or settlements.

Conflict has been a chronic issue on the African continent for many years. As a result, various attempts have been made to resolve these conflicts, including the use of both peacekeeping and peace-enforcing approaches⁴⁴. Unfortunately, due to the slow pace of foreign intervention in some cases, some African states have established their own regional forces, as permitted by UN⁴⁵. However, in the face of peacekeeping force’s embarrassment and on-going human suffering, it has often been necessary to move the forces’ mandate to one of complaint⁴⁶. The strategy’s implementation, on the other hand, created a climate conducive to peace talks, despite the fact that this trend of rotating between peacekeeping and compliance activities had not been seen before in other peacekeeping operations.⁴⁷

Drivers of South Africa’s Foreign Policy

In the years leading to the 1994 elections Former President Nelson Mandela was advocating for human rights and made human rights a core driver of the South African foreign policy. Nelson Mandela said that human rights would be ‘the light that guides our foreign policy’⁴⁸ and by this also including the promotion of democracy in the African continent. In 1996 Nelson Mandela called for sanctions against the oppressive and dictatorial regime in Nigeria⁴⁹.. However, South Africa got criticized for its silence towards the human rights issues panning out in neighbouring

⁴² Berdal, M. The state of peacekeeping. Lessons of Congo, 2017

⁴³ Mateja, P. United Nations Peace Operations. 2015

⁴⁴ Berdal, M. The state of peacekeeping. Lessons of Congo, 2017

⁴⁵ ibid

⁴⁶ ibid

⁴⁷ ibid

⁴⁸ Dudley, A. South Africa’s foreign policy: striving towards Mandela’s Ideals. 2013, 3

⁴⁹ Baregu, M, and Landsberg, C. eds. From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's evolving security challenges. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.

country, the Mbeki policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe. Could it be that Mbeki did not want a repetition of 1996, whereby South Africa was isolated and not supported by fellow African heads of states in regards to the sanctions against Nigeria and hence the quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe?⁵⁰ Jacob Zuma’s approach to the foreign policy has also been under enormous scrutiny, with cases of the hosting of the AU meeting that led to the President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir travelling to South Africa and not being arrested. The International Criminal Court (ICC) then rebukes South Africa for not arresting the Sudanese president on grounds that he is wanted by the international court and South Africa as a member to the court needed to make an arrest. Moreover, the case of South Africa rejecting Dalai Lama a visa for Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s 80th birthday celebrations in the year 2011. These are but the few controversies the South African foreign policy has had to face about whether the country is for ‘Africa first’ or under pressure to act as ‘Western backer’ for the continent. The Sudanese president’s visit is a great example of foreign policy inconsistency by South Africa, in that, looking at the 1998-2003 war in the DRC and South Africa’s role compared to the 2013 intervention brigade, one can clearly note the differences in the decisions took by South Africa and this would also be the case of different leadership over the years (Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma foreign policy)⁵¹.

With that been said the following segment will discuss the drivers of the South African foreign policy using the *White paper on South Africa’s foreign policy: Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu* (2011). After the 1994 elections leading to South Africa being a democratic state, the country’s foreign policy changed from being militaristic and only promoting the rights of the white minority to its commitment the promotion of human rights which was one of former President Nelson Mandela’s ideal principles. The concept of human rights was then linked to *Ubuntu* which led many in the international community to conclude that South Africa would be the promoter of democracy and human rights throughout the continent⁵². As such the international community has “looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of

⁵⁰ Adebajo, A. West Africa’s tragic twin: Building peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 2006 and Barber, J. "The new South Africa's foreign policy: principles and practice." *International Affairs* 81, no. 5 (2005): 1079-1096.

⁵¹ Monyae, 2014; 6. Hengari, 2016; 3. White paper on South Africa’s foreign policy, 2011, p 11

⁵² Dudley, A. South Africa’s foreign policy: striving towards Mandela’s Ideals. 2013, 3

poverty and underdevelopment”⁵³. Post the apartheid regime the foreign policy was guided by principles of values, ideals, intentions and normative aspirations, these are said to be the inspiration of the years of the struggle for freedom, also rooted in the Freedom Charter.

In 2014, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane-the minister of DIRCO had a public lecture at the University of Witwatersrand on the topic of South African foreign policy. The minister outlined pillars that influence the country’s foreign policy as the following⁵⁴:

- Human rights
- The promotion of democracy globally
- The rule of international law
- International peace
- South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa
- The development of regional and international economic cooperation
- A consolidation of democracy

The South African foreign policy is deeply entrenched in Africa’s stability, unity and prosperity⁵⁵, Landsberg⁵⁶ contends that the interest of the foreign policy is to promote and support the positive development of others. The reason for this is that South Africa does not want to seem as though it’s a hegemon in the continent or in the words of Landsberg⁵⁷, an “island of prosperity in a sea of poverty” because this would not only lead to high migration into the country by refugees seeking political or economic freedom but also confirm the notions about South Africa being a backer for the Western world/powers⁵⁸.

⁵³ Building a better world: The diplomacy of Ubuntu. White paper on South Africa’s foreign policy, 2011

⁵⁴ Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 2014. Lecture on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, University of the Witwatersrand, April 10. <http://oldgov.gcis.gov.za/speeches/view.php?sid=45083>

⁵⁵ Kingah, S and degli Uberti, S. Has South Africa the Spine for Global Leadership? United Nations University Series on Regionalism. 2016, vol 11. 209-224

⁵⁶ Landsberg, C, and Kondlo, K. "South Africa and the'African agenda'." 2007

⁵⁷ ibid

⁵⁸ Alex Dudley, South Africa’s foreign policy: striving towards Mandela’s Ideals, 2013

Nicholas Kitchen⁵⁹ points out two perspectives or ideas to foreign policy which fits in with the body of knowledge this study will undertake. “The first *idea* is called *intentional ideas* which refer to the normative suggestions seeking to establish goals for foreign policy, an example of being the general western backing of the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’ strongly promoted by the African Union”⁶⁰. South Africa holds in terms of supporting the ‘African agenda’, the white paper on South Africa’s foreign policy (2011) emphasises the continuation of support by the country to the African Union and United Nations to initiatives that will steer just and lasting solutions to outstanding issues of sovereignty (self-determination) and independence (decolonisation) of the African continent. The second idea talks to the involvement of the African Union and United Nations, *operational ideas*, this idea is about the suggestions regarding how those objectives should be followed or should be pursued. For example, the question of what kind of assistance should be provided by non-African actors to attract African troops like the force intervention brigade to be deployed in violent conflicts. South Africa seems to be in the predicament of implementing either intentional or operational ideas, which leads to the scrutiny of the foreign policy by its African neighbours.

South African foreign policy towards Africa

*Africa is at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy*⁶¹, South Africa has played and is still playing a leading role in many of the continents’ and region’s endeavours. The support is seen through conflict management, regional integration, intra-African trade, promotion of sustainable development and the utilisation of exploring opportunities to help the continent become more empowered. However, the most prominent role the country plays in the continent is that of peace, stability and security through conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction⁶².

⁵⁹ Kitchen, N. Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation. 2010. P 117-143

⁶⁰ Olsen, Gorm. ‘Great power’ intervention in African armed conflicts. Cambridge review of international affairs. 2015, p 229-245

⁶¹ Building a better world: The diplomacy of Ubuntu. White paper on South Africa’s foreign policy, 2011

⁶² <https://moam.info/hegemonic-order-and-regional-stability-in-sub-59fd4a851723dd709a42e5e0.html> accessed 19 October 2020

In *South Africa as an emerging middle power*, Shoeman⁶³ applauds the peacemaker position South Africa has taken up in the continent and globally. However, other scholars, do not sing much praise to the peacemaker role of South Africa, these scholars believe that the country should be doing more in terms of its leadership in Africa and not just playing a role⁶⁴. Maphosa, Hendricks & Lucey⁶⁵ acquiesce that South Africa is not doing enough, in fact the scholars contend to the country acting more like a donor or just offering technical assistance to the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI). South Africa is seen through this peacemaker role taking a step back to lead the continent and rather using multilateral organisations to its engagements within the continent, in the case of the DRC, the UN's mandate through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and in some instances through the African Union (AU), the Commonwealth or the Non-Aligned Movement.

Conversely, there is a debate that South Africa does not 'hide behind' multilateralism to getting involved in a crisis, for example the Lesotho intervention by South Africa in 1998⁶⁶. South Africa played a significant leadership role to ending the political crisis in Lesotho, but one can argue that countries like Lesotho and Swaziland might, if not always receive a more hegemonic intervention from South Africa as these countries form part of main South Africa⁶⁷. This debate then goes back to the notion of South Africa's inconsistent foreign policy, because at times it pursues intervention under the hegemonic umbrella and other times under the multilateral umbrella, clearly indicating that South Africa is not ready to take a firm stance to its position in the continent even though it has been labelled as the regional hegemony. However, this leads to the unpredictability of South Africa's foreign policy in terms of it using the hard power or soft power approach, for example, from the beginning of the DRC war in the 1990s South Africa was non-confrontational and in fact South Africa believes in 'collaboration over confrontation'. Interestingly a transitional approach occurred in 2013 when the country decided to use hard power in the DRC, which entails the

⁶³ Schoeman, P M. "South Africa as an emerging middle power." *African Security Review* 9, no. 3 (2000): 47-58.

⁶⁴ Sakhile, H. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Towards Southern Africa, 1994-2017: Partner or Hegemon?* 2015

⁶⁵ Hendricks, C, and Lucey, A. "South Africa and South Sudan Lessons for post-conflict development and peacebuilding partnerships." (2013).

⁶⁶ Habib & Selinyane. *South Africa's Foreign policy and a realistic Vision of an African century.* 2004

⁶⁷ *ibid*

following; economic sanctions, military interventions and coercive diplomacy⁶⁸. In conclusion, Lalbahadur ⁶⁹states that foreign policy cannot be rooted only on values but that there is an application of decisions that are often complex in terms of national and international requirements, also whether interests are short term or long term goals.

Methodology

The FIB will be measured through the following criteria:

- Was the mandate fulfilled as per UNSC Resolution 2098?
- Did the operation result in the resolution of the conflicts' underlying disputes⁷⁰?
- Did the operation's presence help to maintain international peace and security by reducing or eliminating conflict in the operation's area⁷¹?

The definition of success or failure of peace operations is one concept many scholars avoid researching. There is no agreed definition of success in academic literature, Thomas Weiss⁷² makes a claim that the reason behind difficulty in measuring success is because of the "the ambiguity of success and failure, as well as the time frame used to measure the durability of results"⁷³.

Virginia Page⁷⁴ evaluates peace operation through the presence of peace operations, in that does peace last longer when peacekeepers are deployed and thus reducing the risk of another conflict erupting? Policy scholars Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis believe that the only way to deem peace operation successful is through 'absence of significant residual violence, form of an end to the war, a minimum level of political openness and undivided sovereignty'. However, Robert Johansen⁷⁵ argues

⁶⁸ *ibid*

⁶⁹ Lalbahadur, A. "South Africa's Economic Statecraft in Southern Africa: Non-existent or Nascent? An Examination of Relations with Zimbabwe and Swaziland." 2014.

⁷⁰ Bratt, Duane. Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations, International peacekeeping. 1996, p 64-81

⁷¹ *Ibid*. p. 64-81

⁷² Weiss, T. "Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome-Operation Rekindle Hope." Global Governance 1. 1995

⁷³ Bratt, Duane. Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations, International peacekeeping. 1996, p 64-81

⁷⁴ Fortna, V. "Where have all the victories gone? War outcomes in historical perspective." In annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, 2005.

⁷⁵ Johansen, R. "UN peacekeeping: How should we measure success?." (1994): 307-310.

against measured used for success, in “that success should not be measured against ‘an ideal state of peace (for example, no armed conflict after deployment or against an ideal form of conflict resolution (for example, settlement of long-standing animosity)’”⁷⁶. With that been said, it is clear that success of a peace operation is the eye of the beholder, what is success to one scholar can be considered a failure to the other scholar. However, this study will be undertaken through the indicators mentioned above and those will determine whether the invention brigade was a success or not.

If the lessons to be drawn from South Africa’s involvement in the force intervention brigade are positive, can these be replicated in other conflicts in the continent? If the lessons are negative then what are the causes behind the negative results. Similarly there is anticipation of variance in the dependent variable-lessons to be drawn, in regards to the outcome of the force intervention brigade in the eastern DRC.

Research method

This study will be conducted through qualitative research methods and use some numeric data. This will not only assist my study with revealing the multiple facets of the phenomenon but also assist in collecting and analysing information on the concept of the peacekeeping operation⁷⁷.

Inductive research design according to Van Evera⁷⁸ is the creation of theory that looks at the interaction between variables and also causality in the interactions or relationships. The study will undertake a bottom-up approach and assess the situation in the DRC prior the force intervention brigade and after the peace enforcement by the South African government and through observation explain the change in eastern DRC due to a shift in South Africa’s foreign policy toward the country.

Data collection

The data collection of this paper will be derived from desktop research, using both primary and secondary literature including books, academic journals, online resources, newspaper articles, media reports, memoirs and reports from organisations

⁷⁶ *ibid*

⁷⁷ Baxter & Jack, *Qualitative case study methodology: study design and implementation*(2008: 4)

⁷⁸ Van Evera, S. "Offense, defense, and the causes of war." *International Security* 22, no. 4. 1998: 5-43.

like the United Nations, African Union, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Armed Conflict and Event Data (ACLED) and Armed Conflict Data-base (ACB) these are world leading resource centres for data on conflict. This study will be limited by the lack of access to documentation and resources, also the lack of information and literature in regards to the period 2012-2013 in the eastern DRC.

Study limitations

Furthermore, the study will not delve into much of the narrative features of the beginning of the DRC war but will undertake a brief explanation of the historical developments that led to instability in the DRC in order to show the shift between the non-intervention and intervention of South Africa. Moreover, the paper will only examine South Africa's involvement as one of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in the intervention brigade and not go into detail with the other members of SADC especially Malawi and Tanzania

Structure of the thesis

- Chapter One: Introduction- methodology, rationale and literature review
- Chapter Two: The unpacking the concept of peace enforcement

This chapter will look at the transition from soft power to hard power and explain the origins or the genesis of peace enforcement. As a fairly new phenomenon in the field of international peace and security, the chapter aims to explain what peace enforcement is about and how different it is from other peace operations.

- Chapter Three: History of the DRC conflict

Rich scholarship on the war in the DRC exists tracing back to the 1960s where it all began. This chapter have a brief discussion on how the war began, however focus mostly on the third war dating from 2003-2013.

- Chapter Four: The Force Intervention Brigade and South Africa's role in the intervention brigade

This chapter will explain the Force Intervention Brigade mission, what it entails and what impact, challenges or consequences it brought in the eastern DRC, with a focus on South Africa's contribution to the mission. The contribution will be measured through the deployment of troops and military weaponry or any technical assistance South Africa employed to this intervention brigade

- Chapter Five: Lessons to be learnt: was it a success or not

Chapter TWO- Explaining Peace Enforcement- A tool used by South Africa in 2013

Introduction

The post-cold war era brought about increment not just in number but in the size of missions deployed by the UN peacekeeping operations across the globe. There was a shift in the practice of traditional peacekeeping in terms of the principles of non-use of force, consent and impartiality. The shift was brought about due to the conflict environments that required more than just the monotonous traditional peace-keeping principles that have been practiced by the UN over the years. The need for a turn-around in operations led to a debate in the UN Security Council, among international relations scholars and the national defence forces as to what extent they should uphold traditional peacekeeping principles especially in the case of lack of cooperation by parties and the means to use force in problematic conflict environments. Furthermore, other national defence establishments argued about the relaxation of traditional principles in regards to self-defence, that is to say that, extremely violent environments would require robust action in order to achieve the mission's objectives. The purpose of this study is to analyse the use of force (peace enforcement) in the UN, and also understand both in theory and practice how it alters traditional peacekeeping and ultimately brings about international peace and security. The following chapter will be based around the theory of peace enforcement by describing and explaining its features, chapter four of this study on the other hand will then give a practical picture of enforcement in the case of the DRC's conflict and illustrate the operation of the mandate to use force as per Security Council instructions.

The emergence of Peace enforcement in the United Nations

The concept of peace enforcement was developed through a series of reports and doctrines, the UN as an international organisation experiences conflict in diverse ways. There is no conflict or threat to international peace and security that comes in the same form, as a result the Security Council has had to critically analyse a conflict and formulate resolutions that best fit the circumstances of each individual conflict. The UN cannot apply a blanket solution to all conflicts. The genesis of UN

peacekeeping operations begins with; classical peacekeeping that embraces consent by all parties, impartiality and the zero-use of force with the exception of self-defence, then the Agenda for Peace in 1992, the Brahimi Report in 2000, in 2008 the Capstone doctrine is developed in an attempt to understand and accept the concept of conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building are pieces that make part of the bigger picture of peace processes in peacekeeping operations⁷⁹. The doctrine's aim was to "contribute to creating a common understanding of UN peacekeeping"⁸⁰ and additionally, the UN established new concepts like responsibility to protect-R2P, sovereignty as responsibility and humanitarian intervention. Although peace enforcement is the centre of this paper, it is imperative to understand how it differs from other concepts and how it also relates to them in the same breath. The following are definitions of the concepts mentioned above according to the Capstone doctrine, these help draw distinctions between different missions and the purpose of those missions⁸¹:

Conflict prevention- the use of diplomatic measures and methods to avoid intra-state or inter-state tensions and conflicts from escalating into violent conflict⁸².

Peace-making- generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.

Peace-keeping- it is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by peace-makers.

Peace-building- involves a set of measures aimed at reducing the risk of conflict escalating or re-escalating by improving national conflict management capabilities at all levels and laying the groundwork for long-term peace and development. Peace-building is a long-term, complex process of establishing the conditions for long-term peace.

These UN operations are quite straightforward to comprehend and understand in theory, however the UN faces many challenges in terms of application in the battle

⁷⁹ Coning, C. Detzel, J. and Hojem, P. UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine-Report of the Tfp Oslo Doctrine Seminar. Norway. 2008

⁸⁰ ibid

⁸¹ UN Peacekeeping Operations-principles and guidelines. 2008

⁸² ibid

field. This is to say that there are many grey areas and implementation is not as black and white as the clear definitions appear. The grey areas are also accompanied by interlinks because the operations cannot exist in isolation of each other and at times cannot take place in chronological order of conflict prevention first, peace-making second, peace-keeping third and lastly peace enforcement. As a result the United Nations ought to strive for a response in the case of a threat to international peace and security to ensure that the business of peacekeeping operations continues even amidst grey areas and interjections.

Origin, Definition and role of Peace enforcement

A relatively new term in the field of peace studies, without a clearly outlined definition and a result of uncertainty and confusion in the United Nations and amongst scholars of international peace and security. Peace enforcement also called “wider peacekeeping, third generation peacekeeping, enlarged peacekeeping, peacekeeping with muscles and the most common name *robust peacekeeping*” has led to a new perspective to dealing with ending conflict through the UN⁸³.

The concept of peace enforcement was founded in 1992 by the United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali on a report titled *An Agenda for Peace*⁸⁴. After the Gulf War and Cold War there was a shift in the environment of international affairs. According to Douglas Brisson⁸⁵, the end of the Cold War gave the United Nations a new light into international peace and security, there was a sense of collectivism and less of individualism by states. It was during this time that the introduction of the New World Order came to the fore, and as such multilateralism was focal point of foreign policies in the global community, especially the United States⁸⁶. With the success of the UN in the Persian Gulf War, there was a shift from the traditional way of peacekeeping to a more robust system of peacekeeping.

Mohamed Osman⁸⁷ argues that peace enforcement is a ‘system of collective security’ and as such the unexpected success of this collective security led to the Secretary-

⁸³ Mohamed Awad Osman, The United Nations and peace enforcement with special reference to Kuwait 1990-91: 1999, pg 15-45.

⁸⁴ Jane Boulden, Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia (Westport, conn; Praeger, 2001. Pg 15

⁸⁵ Brisson, D . 1995

⁸⁶ Major Robert. Allen, Lesson Form Somali: The DILEMMA of Peace Enforcement. 1997; pg 2

⁸⁷ Osman, M. The United Nations and peace enforcement with special reference to Kuwait, 1990-91. 1999.

General of the UN to think of ways to strengthen the peacekeeping mandate of the United Nations. The above mentioned author further makes an assertion that the concept of collective security meant the *internationalisation of defence*, by this meaning this was different from the traditional way of an alliance by a group of states against one state. Peace enforcement meant that all states join as a single unit to coerce the party in refusal to comply with the mandate by the Security Council to bring out peace.

The optimism of Post-Cold War propelled the writing of *An Agenda for Peace*, however, it has been said that Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali did not present a comprehensive definition of what peace enforcement was and as a result there is no real definition of peace enforcement. Scholars in the field of international peace and security identified the report talks to the concept of peace enforcement in contrast to peacekeeping and peace-making. For example, if peace-making means “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations”⁸⁸ and peace-keeping as defined in the UN 1990 report called *The Blue Helmets* means⁸⁹:

An operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the ‘enforcement action’ of the United Nations under Article 42.

Peace enforcement is thus about the use of force beyond the concept of self-defence, it involves the application of economic and diplomatic sanctions and necessary punishment to parties that refuse to comply with the mandate of cease-fire⁹⁰. The objective of enforcement is to compel both parties to abandon violence and restore peace, this is takes place usually when the belligerent parties do not agree to the interventions brought forth by the United Nations Security Council.

⁸⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for peace* (New York: United Nations, 1995, 278-294)

⁸⁹ *The Blue Helmets- A review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*. New York, UNDPI, 2nd ed., 1990; pg 7-8

⁹⁰ Osman, M. *The United Nations and peace enforcement with special reference to Kuwait 1990-91: 1999*, pg 15-45.

In *An Agenda for Peace*, “peace enforcement is the creation of peace through the military support of one side in a conflict in order to force a victory or stalemate that makes it rational for the opposing side to cease fighting militarily and begin negotiating diplomatically. Successful peace enforcement creates the conditions for peacekeeping. Peacekeepers, on the other hand, are a neutral force sent in to maintain a peace that has already been established, tentative though it may be, so that the theatre of conflict between warring parties can switch from the battlefield to the boardroom. Successful peacekeeping holds the balance of power on the ground constant so that a negotiated political solution can be reached and institutionalized, based on that balance”⁹¹.

According to George Oliver⁹² it was only in 1994 that a clear definition of peace enforcement was developed by the British and American military doctrines. Both armies came up with definitions of what the term meant in regards to their military forces. In the US Army field manual of 1994 peace enforcement meant “the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorisation, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions”⁹³. The British Army field manual, the term meant “operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to interventions and who may be engaged in combat activities”⁹⁴.

According McDonald⁹⁵ peace enforcement is the middle ground between peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement. There was never an agreed definition of what this peace operation meant, neither by the Security Council or the United Nations. However, focus was put more on the notion of ‘enforcement’, what is to enforce and what is it that the Security Council will be enforcing that cannot be applied in a normal peacekeeping operation.

In the United Nations Charter Chapter VII, Article 39-51 explain what the Security Council expect member states to adhere to in regards to *Action with respect to threats*

⁹¹ Leslie Hough, A study of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and private military companies in Sierra Leone: Features, *African Security Review*, 16:4, 7-21 (2007): p14

⁹² Oliver, G. "The other side of peacekeeping: peace enforcement and who should do it." *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations* 8 (2002): 99-117.

⁹³ *ibid*

⁹⁴ *ibid*

⁹⁵ McDonald, G. "Peace enforcement: mapping the" middle ground" in peace operations." PhD diss., Université de Genève, 2001.

to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Scholars makes reference to Article 39, 40, 41 and 43 when explaining the Security Council's role and responsibilities are when dealing with maintaining international peace and security. The following Articles are the legal basis for peace enforcement by the UN⁹⁶:

Article 39- the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threats to the peace, breach of the peace, or act aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security⁹⁷.

Article 40- In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures⁹⁸.

Article 41- The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 43⁹⁹

1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html> accessed 15/01/2018

⁹⁷ www.un.org accessed 15/01/2018

⁹⁸ www.eprints.nottingham.ac.uk accessed 24 October 2019

⁹⁹ www.dtic.mil accessed 24 October 2019

¹⁰⁰ www.un.org accessed 15/01/2018

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of force, their degree of readiness and general location and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided¹⁰¹
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible of the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Member or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes¹⁰²

The basic role of enforcement as mandated by the United Nations Security Council is to maintain or restore peace and order in instances of instability and conflict. Peace is enforced through cease-fire and disarmament of parties in conflict, the mandate this is done through is that of using force beyond that of self-defence. However, enforcement is not the first solution to bringing about peace or attempting to resolve conflict. It is rather the last recourse.

According to the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* paragraph 44¹⁰³

“The mission of forces under Article 43 would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual. Such forces are not likely to be available for some time to come. Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorisation of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General. I consider such-peace enforcement units to be

¹⁰¹ www.un.org accessed 15/01/2018

¹⁰² www.un.org accessed 15/01/2018

¹⁰³ Mcdonald, G. Mapping the “Middle ground” in peace operations. 2001

warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter. Such peace enforcement units should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression or with the military personnel which governments may agree to keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations”,¹⁰⁴

Characteristics of Peace Enforcement

Enforcement

Force is mandated for use beyond the usual notion of self-defence. However, this force can only be exercised as a last recourse because of its limitations, one of them being to avoid weaponry confrontation with rebel groups wherever possible. Enforcement is only to be used if there is a high chance of minimal collateral damage. This means that force must be applied with zoomed in specifications, that is, it must ensure intense civilian protection in the process and that property is not damaged. These however are challenging to uphold and sustain especially in instances where the belligerent factions live in close proximity with civilians and occupy properties like school buildings or any other building that is important to the development of a country.

Impartiality

Peace enforcement is also compelled to maintaining strict impartiality, peacekeepers cannot be seen as taking any sides. The practicality of being neutral however is complex, the role of the UN or UN peacekeeping operations is to display a parental position between children who cannot live together in harmony. As a result in the case of impartiality being problematic it leads to the loss of trust by factions towards UN peacekeepers. Similarly making the latter an entity to the conflict and becoming part of the conflict instead of solving it as the operation is mandated to¹⁰⁵. McDonald¹⁰⁶ explains impartiality as an ‘even-handed implementation’ asserting that it is not about

¹⁰⁴ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. International relations 11, no 3. 1992, 201-218

¹⁰⁵ Allen, 1997

¹⁰⁶ McDonald, G. "Peace enforcement: mapping the" middle ground" in peace operations." PhD diss., Université de Genève, 2001.

targeting a particular group but a general means of the application of force towards compliance or non-compliance of a group with the mandate. The requirement of this even-handed implementation is that all factions comply with the terms of the mandate and that the operation acts in no favour of any group against the other. Practicality is complex as mentioned above because negating neutrality is difficult to sustain. For example, the United Nations Operation in Somalia-UNOSOM II case in 1993 whereby peacekeeping forces were seen as having failed to be impartial by trying to capture Somalia faction leader General Mohamed Farah also known as ‘Aideed’. The manhunt for General Farah led to a disastrous violent attack between warring factions and UNOSOM II peacekeepers, this immediately changed the role of peacekeepers in the eyes of the factions and ultimately undermined the integrity of the UN and caused the UN partnership to dismally fail¹⁰⁷.

Non-consent or imperfect consent

Peacekeeping is traditionally embedded on the principle of consent. However, peace enforcement operations have altered this principle in that where the UN feels the need to intervene in the absence of a full functioning of a government or state institutions it can do so without consent of any faction to protect the ‘threat to international peace and security’¹⁰⁸. Classical peacekeeping by the UN states that ‘UN troops must be deployed with the consent of all parties involved and only after a political settlement has been reached between warring factions’¹⁰⁹. The UN argues that the protection of civilians is their first priority and if a conflict persists with violent attacks involving gruesome human rights violations it shall intervene by the use of force and requires no consent as an international body, whether a country is a member or not a member of the international organisation. Consent cannot be relied upon in enforcement operations, and conversely, is somewhat indispensable. Military doctrine and practice emphasize the significance of maintaining and reinforcing already established consent in the realm of operations. It is as a result important for warring factions to cooperate in achieving the objectives set out by the mission, this cooperation is realised through peace talks between concerned parties, ensuring that the mandate is understood by all and find resolutions to issues that come up in regards to how the mandate

¹⁰⁷ Allen, 1997

¹⁰⁸ www.un.org

¹⁰⁹ www.un.org

implemented. “Consent of the local parties is the *critical difference* between peacekeeping and peace enforcement”-Andre Roux¹¹⁰.

Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC

The FIB is one of the best missions the UN has ever undertaken in the DRC to date, many scholars, however, argue that the peace enforcement mission in 2013 was in actuality not successful as it did not completely end the hostilities in the DRC. What made it a great achievement is the defeat of the predominant eastern DRC rebel group the M23. The following chapter will discuss the military intelligence behind the defeat of M23, the stakeholders behind orchestrating the FIB and assess its effectiveness.

The United Nations has had to improve its peacekeeping capabilities in the 21st century, this being the result of persistent violent conflicts globally and more specifically in the African continent. The improvements of capabilities are now seen through a shift from traditional peacekeeping to more robust mandates from the UNSC like the FIB in the DRC. The FIB was mandated to use *force* and as such this came about through three main objectives namely; create stability in the eastern DRC more specifically the Kivus and the Orientale province, neutralise armed groups M23, FDLR, ADF and APCLS and lastly work together with the DRC FARDC in cooperation for mission operations of the FIB. However, these mandates require not only manpower in terms of troop contributions by other countries but it is said that the main ingredient to what is now regarded as a successfully planned mission like the FIB is military intelligence support¹¹¹. According to Norhein-Martinsen & Ravndal (2011):

“Intelligence activity in the context of peacekeeping can be defined as the specialized informational component, which supports decision-making processes and implementation of policies at all levels of command and control chain of an organisation”.

This crucial support consists of various structures and divisions within the UN-Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UN-Department of Field

¹¹⁰ Allen, 1997 and McDonald, G. "Peace enforcement: mapping the" middle ground" in peace operations 2001

¹¹¹ Kuele, G and Cepik, M. Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs. VOL 19, NO.1. 2017, p 44-68

Support (DFS)¹¹². One structure that needs to display effective capability is the command and control structure which gives authority and direction to ensure that missions like MONUSCO are properly constructed and objectives are adhered to and achieved¹¹³. Kuel and Cepik¹¹⁴ argue that Intelligence in peacekeeping operations comprises of three practical levels, which are namely: Tactical level, Operational level and Strategic level. Further emphasising how the FIB operation was mainly tactical than it was operational and strategic. The scholars define tactical level as a level that involves the protection of civilians and undertaking all measures to neutralise illegal armed groups, which was achieved UN. Moreover operational and strategic levels have more to do with structures in the UN that assert power and give commands to the field commanders and other departments dealing with the mission's mandate¹¹⁵.

In an interview with one of MONUSCO's Force Commanders Lt Gal Santos Cruz, he explains how crucial it is for robust operations like the FIB to be led by intelligence so that the operation can be successful¹¹⁶. The importance of intelligence is so that field commanders are always kept on the loop about the -who, what, when and how's of the armed groups. For example, who the force is dealing with in terms of a leader of an armed group, what the armed groups are planning, what the strength and weaknesses of the armed groups are, when are they planning to attack and how?¹¹⁷. All of this information helps the mission forces to be on alert and better position themselves for a counterattack. Intelligence is more than just about patrolling for presence but requires the attainment of information that could prove to be significantly helpful to the mandate of the mission¹¹⁸.

The main operational centres for the FIB were Beni and Dungu in the North Kivu province of the DRC. These two bases were helpful in terms of the tactical aspect of intelligence products that were called 'targeting documents'. According to MONUSCO (2010) these documents comprised of information like collateral damage risk, area of operation, approval authority, target name, actions on objective and

¹¹² Ibid. p. 44-68

¹¹³ Kuele, G and Cepik, M. Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs. VOL 19, NO.1. 2017, p 44-68

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 44-68

¹¹⁵ Kuele, G and Cepik, M. Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs. VOL 19, NO.1. 2017, p 44-68

¹¹⁶ Ibid.p 44-68

¹¹⁷ Ibid.p. 44-68

¹¹⁸ Ibid.p. 44-68

special instructions just to name a few. Targeting documents played an important role with regards to defeating the M23, this is because unlike all the other armed groups, the M23 was equipped with weaponry and was also run like an orthodox armed force as compared to the other groups which made it a real threat to the mission forces. It was for this reason that MONUSCO had to work in conjunction with the FARDC as many of the armed groups were formed by leaders who were previously in the national army, and as such had the know-how of running an armed group. Intelligence came in the form of human, imagery and open-source intelligence:

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) was one of the main sources of intelligence at MONUSCO, it comprised of military observers and patrols who headed the process of collecting of information that came from FARDC, the *Police Nationale Congolaise* (PNC), local population, individuals, UN agencies, regional organisations and Non-governmental organisations (NGO)¹¹⁹. However, even as the main source of intelligence, HUMINT has its own challenges that hinder information gathering. For example, some informants insist on being paid to give out any information they may have. This has raised issues in the UN because the international organisation's financial procedure allows not that individuals be paid¹²⁰. Similarly, there are traditional intelligence methods that individual countries use that the UN as an international organisation is prohibited to do. In broad terms, HUMINT challenges UN's principles and practices, as a result limiting the organisation in peacekeeping missions. Walter Dorn (1999, 420) asserts that "the limitations on intelligence gathering are legal as well as moral, political, and practical".

Furthermore, the UN has to abide by the legal parameters it has created in regards to field missions, so as to not have its legitimacy questioned. On the contrary, the UN Charter in Article 2(7) gives right of way to navigating the legal parameters in field missions by stating that: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...(except for the) enforcement measures under Chapter VII".

This implies that UN in peacekeeping missions that are mandated to be enforcement missions can be pardoned for not abiding to traditional information-gathering

¹¹⁹ Walter, Dorn. The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on intelligence in UN Peacekeeping. *International journal of intelligence and counterintelligence*, 12(4). 1999, 414-447

¹²⁰ Ibid.p. 414-447

methods. Furthermore, it can be pointed out that the FIB mandate or peace enforcement mandates are already outside the traditional scope of peacekeeping, as a result, the UN should have free reign to by all means achieve the objectives of a robust mission like the FIB because according to the Charter enforcement missions can intervene within a domestic jurisdiction of any state.

According to Kuele and Cepik¹²¹, the first UN mission to have drones was MONUSCO and these drones were used as part of Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) which was second to HUMINT in terms of importance in information gathering. Imagery through drones, surveillance and "unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAS)" played a pivotal role in the FIB. The availability of great technology in field missions has assisted in the attainment of real-time imagery irrespective of the time of the day especially in regards to aerial operations. For example, if there is an order of operation to bomb an armed group, IMINT through its methods ensures that there are no civilians in close proximity that will be harmed as a result of the bombing¹²². IMINT can also assist to confirm people's identities through aerial surveillance, this was also useful during the FIB as it was found that many of the illegal rebel groups wore the same uniform as the national army which made it difficult at times to execute bombings due to the need to confirm if the individuals are from FARDC or the armed groups¹²³. According to Tim Murithi¹²⁴, the defeat of the M23 in 2013 was mainly due to the effectiveness of IMINT, further pointing out how the "FIB had superiority in terms of the array of tactical operations it could deploy including artillery, aerial attacks and snipers." These tactical operations were also used in the engagements with the ADF, whereby the ADF attacked the national army battalion stationed in Kamango and through aerial support the ADF was defeated.

Figure 1 below shows where the FIB operations took place


Figure: 1-Force Brigade Intervention Operations

¹²¹ Kuele, G. and Cepik, M. Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs. VOL 19, NO.1. 2017, p 44-68

¹²² Kuele, G. and Cepik, M. Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs. VOL 19, NO.1. 2017, p 44-68

¹²³ Ibid.p.44-68

¹²⁴ Murithi, Tim. "11 The Eastern DRC Conflict and the UN-Mandated Force Intervention Brigade: Insights for Africa's Framework for Responding to Crisis." *African Conflicts and Regional Interventions* (2016): 155.



Source: <https://www.africandefence.net/analysis-how-m23-was-rolled-back/> Accessed:

08/02/2020

Moreover, Operational level was more about sharing information between all stakeholders and ensuring that all are on the same page in terms of understanding what is at hand. According to a Joint Operation Cell Chief, the operational level had a political focus to it and thus heavily involving the government of the DRC. However, there were many constraints to this platform due to mistrust between the DRC government and the UN.

The government was wary of other state's interests in their mineral-rich great lakes region and that caused a barrier in the exchange of information, as a result, this had an undesirable impact to the intelligence of the FIB. Despite the discomfort by the government of the DRC on sharing information, the DPKO/DFS Handbook states that "in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the Military Component interacts with all other Mission Components, such as Civilian and Police Components to maximize

the sharing of information and integration for wider collective impact of UN's response"¹²⁵.

Strategical level, on the other hand, is more about improving the mandate as it should be in peacekeeping missions. If a peacekeeping mission is not leading to great results then it should be improved even if it requires opting for a more robust resolution. All UN peacekeeping missions are formed in New York at the United Nations Headquarters (UN HQ). The UN bodies responsible for these missions are the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the General Assembly Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Kuele and Cepik's discussion on intelligence support to MONUSCO states that the MONUSCO mandate was established by resolutions from the Security Council: Resolutions 1925 (2010), 2053 (2012), 2098-FIB (2013), 2147 (2014), 2211 (2015) and 2277 (2016).

This level is about ensuring that intelligence generated on MONUSCO informs the mission and the headquarters on challenges and achievements, all these feeding on to the question of how to improve the decisions made about the mandate and the processes of implementation. A 2015 UNSC report on the DRC explains that intelligence provides ways of assessment and analysis to the decision-making process to the UN and does not exactly make decisions but informs decisions to be taken on findings it produces. However, even though intelligence does not make any final decisions it has assisted in reducing the gap between these three levels; tactical, operational and strategical level, and these levels have steered field research in MONUSCO to inform UN structures in the headquarters.

Conclusion

The discussions above clearly show the distinctions between the types of peace operations in the UN. Furthermore, explaining the difference of these principles (consent, use of force and impartiality) in terms of the operation mandated by the UN. For traditional peacekeeping the use of force is restricted to self-defence, on the contrary, peace enforcement is driven by the use of force. The latter requires no consent by either party involved in the conflict, whereas the former relies on full agreement and approval by all the parties in the conflict. However, both operations

¹²⁵ UN DPKO and UN DFS (2014, P.21)

aim to be impartial in mission objectives. Peace enforcement can be used in the implementation of a peace settlement for the purpose of either ‘preserving the status quo or peacefully changing it’¹²⁶. What makes the mandate for peace enforcement necessary is conflict environments that fail to fulfil the principles of traditional peacekeeping, thus compelling the need for use of force, enforcement as a result acts as a means to an end-the end to continuous violent conflict. Overall, unlike other UN peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement is distinguished by ‘its characteristics and not its functions’.

¹²⁶ Mcdonald ,G. "Peace enforcement: mapping the" middle ground" in peace operations. 2001

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF THE DRC CONFLICT

Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo previously known as Zaire is the second largest country in the African continent after Algeria. The DRC as commonly known has a population of approximately 78 million with a complex social fabric due to its history with Uganda and Rwanda¹²⁷. The country has the longest transboundary river basin in Africa after the Nile river and it is the fifth longest river in the world with hydroelectric power. This chapter will explain the roots and complexities of the conflicts in the DRC, with a brief synopsis of the second war of the DRC famously known as Africa's 'World War' from 1998 to 2003¹²⁸.

The DRC has an immense fortune in natural resources, the country is blessed with a multitude of mineral resources. However, according to scholars, what was meant to be blessing for the country's economy turned out to be a "resource curse"¹²⁹. Daniele¹³⁰ explains that mineral-rich countries are prone to dependency on the minerals which leads to negative outcomes in human welfare indicators, for example, education, human development levels and child mortality just to name a few. Additionally, it has been said that countries with high and spread-out corruption, with weak institutions and rich-mineral resources are likely to depress growth¹³¹. One of the reasons the DRC has been in conflict for so many years is that it bears fruits that are considered to be of strategic importance to the production of resources that are required for a twenty-first century country¹³². Mineral resources in the DRC range from diamonds, gold, petroleum, silver, cobalt, copper, coal, hydropower and zinc just to name a few, these making the country a target for prey not just in the African continent but also for

¹²⁷ <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/> accessed 23 October 2019

¹²⁸ Williams, C. Explaining the Great Ear in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Crisis. *Fletcher F. World Aff.*, 37. 2013, p.81.

¹²⁹ Daniele, V. Natural resources and the 'quality' of economic development. *the Journal of Development studies*, 47(4). 2011, p.545-573.

¹³⁰ Ibid.p. 545-573

¹³¹ Ibid.p.545-573

¹³² Omeje, K. "Understanding the diversity and complexity of conflict in the African Great Lakes Region," in *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region*, eds. Kenneth Omeje and Tricia RedekerHepner. Indiana University Press. 2013, 6-7

other countries looking to economically benefit from the natural resources¹³³. This chapter will not only assess the 10 years of conflict in the country but also elucidate the UN missions (MONUC and MONUSCO) which have been the biggest missions the UN has ever undertaken in the history of peacekeeping missions as an international organisation. The DRC should be one of the richest countries in the African continent with a strong economy and strong institutions.

Brief historical background of the DRC

In 1885 at the Berlin Conference the DRC formally known as the *Congo Free State* was endorsed to King Leopold II¹³⁴. The Congo Free State was initially a fiefdom of King Leopold's monarch from 1885-1908 and only in the 1900s was it established as a colony under the Belgium imperial government¹³⁵. During his reign, King Leopold II took autonomy over the Congo River, a transboundary river in the centre of Africa. The decision to take full control over the Congo basin was entirely an economically strategic move as it meant control not only of territory but of the trade routes by other countries from the Central and West Africa alongside the Congo basin¹³⁶. King Leopold II handed over land ownership to his trust company called the *Association Internationale du Congo* (AIC). However, with all the power the King had over such an enormous country, he still could not pay off the debt he owed to the Belgium Government and as a result, in 1907 King Leopold bequeathed the Congo Free State to Belgium authority and the country was renamed the Belgian Congo¹³⁷.

With the rich pool of mineral resources in the Great Lakes the Belgian colonisers began by firstly expropriating land from the Congolese population, mostly the indigenous pupils of the country¹³⁸. Land expropriation was mainly focused on agriculture and mining, the colonisers needed a large labour force to work the agricultural plantations and the mines, as a result they promoted labour migration and

¹³³ Ibid.p.6-7

¹³⁴ Omeje, K. "Understanding the diversity and complexity of conflict in the African Great Lakes Region," in *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region*, eds. Kenneth Omeje and Tricia RedekerHepner. Indiana University Press. 2013, 6-7

¹³⁵ Tshiyoyo, D. *Democratice Republic of Congo: Road to Political Transition*. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) paper. 2006, page 1

¹³⁶ Ibid.p.1

¹³⁷ Ibid.p.1

¹³⁸ Omeje, K. "Understanding the diversity and complexity of conflict in the African Great Lakes Region," in *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region*, eds. Kenneth Omeje and Tricia RedekerHepner. Indiana University Press. 2013, page 25-46

allowed people from neighbouring countries into the Belgian Congo for work¹³⁹. Majority of the migrant workers came from Rwanda, a group called the Banyarwanda populated the North Kivu region which was along the Rwandan border and was already concentrated by Kinyarwanda speaking people¹⁴⁰. The Banyarwanda community eventually occupied the Kivus (the eastern Kivu provinces to be specific) taking Congolese ancestral or customary land and this is one of the reasons that caused a rift that still exists between the Congolese and the Rwandans to date¹⁴¹. The tension between local and immigrant labour during the Belgian government tenure is often overlooked when discussing the historical context of the conflict in the DRC. However, an analysis of the DRC conflict indicates a dynamic that has shaped instability in the country- competition for natural resources. According to Vlassenroot and Huggins¹⁴² “Despite a relative lack of analytical attention, competition for land has played a dominant role in local disputes and can be pointed at as one of the root causes of violence and conflict in Ituri and the Kivu-provinces. Even more, since the start of the Congolese war, local disputes over land have become linked to the regional struggle for economic control and politico-military power”.

Vlassenroot and Huggins¹⁴³ build an interesting debate around the competition for land in the DRC, however adding to this land were the natural resources which made the dynamics of the warfare in the country complex. Across the African continent many conflicts have taken place due to land, scarce resources, political power and economic control, the case of the DRC is a case in point whereby the country is rich in mineral or natural resources and that attracts attention not only from locals but regionally and internationally, in this instance everyone wants a piece of the pie of natural resources even at the cost of violent conflict that is prolonged for over 10 years.

It is for the reasons above that Belgium tussled with handing over political and economic power to the Congolese. The colonisers had to ensure that they would still assume some form control or power before granting the country independence. This

¹³⁹ Ibid.p.24-46

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.p.25-46

¹⁴¹ Ibid.p.25-46

¹⁴² Vlassenroot, K, and Huggins, C. "Land, migration and conflict in Eastern DR Congo." *Eco-Conflicts* 3, no. 4. 2004

¹⁴³ Ibid

was done through creating and deepening local political division that would assure and warrant neo-colonial benefits¹⁴⁴.

“Africa is bedevilled by terms of identity that have caused wars”-however these terms of identity were strategically implanted by Governments of the colonial period in Africa to divide and conquer Africans through ethnicity. For instance, towards the 1950s before granting independence to the Congolese, the Belgian regime only gave approval to movements in the country according or based on their ethnic identity and any political party or organisation that transcended ethnicity was banned¹⁴⁵.

In 1959 the Belgian government announced that it was granting independence to the colony, this came as a pleasant but unprepared surprise to the Congolese as the Belgians were aware that the Congolese were not ready to take on political and economic control of the state¹⁴⁶. The government of Belgium used the unpreparedness of the Congolese as a tool to ‘assist’ in the transition to independence, assisting through ensuring that there was ethnic political factions in the country that would benefit the Belgians post-independence¹⁴⁷.

In June of 1960 Belgium handed over full control of the Belgium Congo to the Congolese, and just as designed or orchestrated the politics of the Congo were driven by ethnic terms and this became a way of running the political environment in the Congo. For example, many political parties were derived from ethnical terms or geographic identity: Movement for Liberation of the Congo (MLC) with most of its presence in the North of the country was supported by the Ugandan Government and the contending party, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) had majority of its supporters from Rwanda¹⁴⁸.

¹⁴⁴ Omeje, K, ed. *Extractive economies and conflicts in the global south: multi-regional perspectives on rentier politics*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013.

¹⁴⁵ Kabemba, Claude. “South Africa and the DRC: Is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo?” in *South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa: Conference Proceedings*, ed. Roger Southall. Pretoria: HSRC Press. 2006, 6-7

¹⁴⁶ Omeje, K. “Understanding the diversity and complexity of conflict in the African Great Lakes Region,” in *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region*, eds. Kenneth Omeje and Tricia RedekerHepner. Indiana University Press. 2013, p 25-46

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.p.25-46

¹⁴⁸ Kabemba, Claude. “South Africa and the DRC: Is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo?” in *South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa: Conference Proceedings*, ed. Roger Southall. Pretoria: HSRC Press. 2006, 6-7

Post-independence Zaire as it was called under the administration of President Mobutu Sese Seko was constrained by various refugee calamities by Rwanda and Burundi. There were three migration influxes that destabilised the human security, political climate and the economy of Zaire. Between 1959 and 1963 Rwanda experienced ethnic conflicts by the Hutus and the Tutsis, the famous Hutu revolution led to approximately 200 000 Tutsis fleeing and seeking refuge in the eastern DRC and other neighbouring countries, Burundi and Uganda.

In 1972 Burundi encountered the same ethnic violence which was regarded as genocide of the Hutus by Tutsis, although it did not directly affect Zaire as the Rwandan Hutu revolution, the Hutus who fled from Burundi to Rwanda and Tanzania occupying the refugee camps that already had presence in those countries would later flee from Rwanda to the eastern DRC in one of the most well-known genocides in the history of genocides in Africa¹⁴⁹.

In 1994 the biggest genocide took place in Rwanda between the Hutu-led government and the Tutsis-genocide against the Tutsis by the Hutus. It is said that over 2 million Tutsi refugees escaped the massacres into the eastern DRC and also Tanzania. The Tutsis inhabited the North and South Kivu and most of them being members of the former army of Rwanda and the Rwandan Hutu militia called the *Interahamwe*¹⁵⁰. On the contrary, whilst Zaire would have to bear the influx of refugees, the country was also deteriorating under the leadership of President Mobutu. Mobutu was a dictator and ruled Zaire for thirty-two years through kleptocracy, corruption, lack of democracy, ethnic violence, economic inactivity-illegal economic activity, foreign actors present in the running of the country and environmental dilapidation¹⁵¹.

With the knowledge of some of the Hutus who had fled into Zaire being members of former Rwandan army and *Interahamwe*, Mobutu recruited these members in attempt to destabilise Uganda and Rwanda, Rwanda being of most interest with the aim of unseating the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government and as a result in 1996 and

¹⁴⁹ Lemarchand, R. Exclusion, marginalization and political mobilization: The road to hell in the Great Lakes, Concordia University, Montreal, undated paper, p 6.

¹⁵⁰ International Crisis Group (ICG). Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an ugly war, Report 26, ICG, Brussels. 2000, 13.
Omeje, 2013; 25-46.

¹⁵¹ Hussein, S. "From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Insight*, 27(1). 1997, 91

1998 war resumed in the country between the Banyarwandan and the Tutsis in the Kivu provinces leading to internal conflict in Zaire.

It was towards the second war known as *Africa's World War* that Mobutu's tactics to destabilise Rwanda began to dismally fail and lead to alliances being formed with the aim of overthrowing him. The reason for this is that it became evident to President Paul Kagame that Mobutu was in support of and backed the rebel groups and the genocide movement in Rwanda. These rebel groups and the genocide movement were exempted to operate, train and receive military assistance from one of Mobutu's armed forces called the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ)¹⁵². Consequently, the Rwandan President and the President of Uganda Museveni both long-time allies came together in support of a revolution that would oust the Zaire President. At this stage Mobutu had long lost his Western allies-Belgium and the United States who had supported his governance of oppression that eventually led to corruption and state collapse¹⁵³. In 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) led by rebel leader and opposition against Mobutu, Laurent Kabila, came to the fore and united with Rwanda and Uganda-Banyamulenge who had considered themselves Congolese until Mobutu called upon an attack against them asserting that they were from Rwanda and not originally Congolese. With the dictator out of the picture and no longer the President of the country, Laurent Kabila-newly appointed president promptly renamed the country to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The new dawn of the DRC did not really bring about change in the country, change in terms of good governance and a wholly democratic state. According to Tshiyoyo¹⁵⁴ "Kabila signed a decree which annulled the Transitional Act and bestowed on himself monopoly of executive, military and legislative powers until the adoptions by a Constituent Assembly of a new constitution". Under the said decree, all political parties were banned". Similarly perpetuating Mobutu's leadership style instead of correcting the injustices of corruption, nepotism, inequality and ethnic divide the DRC faced during Mobutu's regime. Adding to the already burning fire was Kabila's decision to cut off and alienate his allies-Uganda and Rwanda in his

¹⁵² Ibid.p.91

¹⁵³ Ibid.p.91

¹⁵⁴ Tshiyoyo, D. "The constitutional referendum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." conflict trends 2006, no. 2. 2006

tenure, which would spark off the second war of the DRC in 1998¹⁵⁵. In a failed attempt to overthrow Laurent Kabila, Kabila then ordered that non-Congolese troops to leave the country and this provoked even worse the revolt against him¹⁵⁶. Rwanda and Uganda formed new rebel movements (Force Armees Congolaises-FAC and Congolese Rally for Democracy-RCD) that were anti-Kabila because as known these three parties were once a team fighting against one enemy-Mobutu but Kabila proved to have only used his allies to get the DRC and strategically cut them off once in power¹⁵⁷. The failed attempt to remove Kabila from office did not discourage Rwanda and Uganda, in fact with the RCD, the two countries had gained control over the eastern DRC making it a military 'camp' and a homeland to rebellion groups (Davis & Hayner, 2009).

In a short time of space Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola and Sudan were involved in the war supporting Laurent Kabila and Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi as opposition in backing the rebel groups. In 1999 four ministers of defence from the SADC (Southern African Development Community) countries (DRC, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) signed a treaty in Luanda called the Defence Protocol. According to Cilliers & Malan¹⁵⁸ article 4 of the treaty asserted that if an armed attack took place against any of the members then it would imply an attack to *all* members in the treaty and all necessary means to maintain peace and security would be used to deter any violence and instability. As a result all attacks by the rebels proved unsuccessful due to the military power the Kabila camp had and as such, in 1999 Uganda formed a rebel group called the Movement for the Liberation of Congo-MLC. The government of Uganda was strategic and tactical in creating the MLC, the movement was formed under the umbrella of keeping the memory of President Mobutu alive and 'fighting' for justice against the way he was overthrown. As a result most of the soldiers who took part in the movement were and had been loyal to Mobutu over the years, and these soldiers had a great presence in the Equator province which then gained them control over the northern part of the DRC. At this stage the country was geographically divided into three bodies of governance namely the MLC in the

¹⁵⁵ Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A people's History. New York: Zed Books. 2002

¹⁵⁶ *ibid*

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*

¹⁵⁸ Malan, Mark, and Cilliers, J. "SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future development." Institute for Security Studies Papers 1997, no. 19 (1997).

Equator province as mentioned above, the RCD based in the eastern DRC and the government of Kinshasa in the capital of the country¹⁵⁹.

Years of peace-making and peace-keeping

Although Kabila's time in office brought about even more complex issues to the war in the DRC, the bright side is that it introduced peace-keeping and peace-making into an unstable environment and that could be argued to be a step in the right direction. With the escalation of the civil war between three warring parties, the international community-United Nations, regional community-the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and sub-regional community (SADC) and the European Union (EU) called for peace talks to bring an end to the war and have peace in the country through diplomatic efforts. The following discussions will dwell into the diplomatic peace-keeping and peace-making efforts that brought about some form peace through mediation, negotiation and the deployment of troops with the UN missions that were to be developed during this phase of the DRC.

The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement

The Lusaka agreement emanated from a difficult kick start, the idea to actually begin the peace-making processes started in August 1998 at an emergency summit in Pretoria by SADC leaders. The mandate of the emergency summit was to decide upon the actions to be taken to assist the government of the DRC in ending the war through an immediate ceasefire and political dialogue. Following that, would be the Franco-African Summit in Paris where African heads of State raised their concerns about Uganda and Rwanda's involvement in the DRC war. This resulted in a premature decision and announcement by the President of France-Jacques Chirac that a ceasefire agreement would be put in place and signed by all concerned. However, Kabila and the rebels did not take a liking to this decision made without their consent and participation and as such the ceasefire did not happen. The third attempt to ceasefire agreement was in December of 1998, whereby the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi intervened as a mediator and had individual engagements with the DRC's president and Uganda's president. The engagements led to a call for the countries directly involved in the war, including Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola to have a meeting and

¹⁵⁹ Tshiyoyo, D. "The constitutional referendum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." conflict trends 2006, no. 2. 2006

agree upon a ceasefire agreement and once again the agreement produced no fruit because the main actors to the war were not present¹⁶⁰.

Cilliers and Malan¹⁶¹ argue that the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was lengthy and a tedious process, it took months of mediation and negotiation by various leaders in the African continent and the international community to convince all who were party to the conflict to sign the agreement. In April of 1999 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1234 demanding “an immediate halt to the hostilities” and adding to that was also a laundry list of what the mandate of the resolution entailed¹⁶²:

- The immediate signing of a ceasefire agreement allowing the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces¹⁶³.
- The re-establishment of the authority of Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo throughout its territory¹⁶⁴.
- The disarmament of non-governmental armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo¹⁶⁵.
- The need for the engagement of all Congolese in an all-inclusive process of political dialogue with a view to achieving national reconciliation and to the holding on an early date of democratic, free and fair elections¹⁶⁶.
- The provision of arrangements for security along the relevant international borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo¹⁶⁷.

The process to end the conflict in the DRC was often interrupted or delayed by different incidents. For example, the year of May 1999 saw the split within the RCD movement with the leadership in logger heads over agreeing to ceasefire or the continuation of hostilities, this resulted in prolonging the peace-making process as mediators now had three rebel groups to negotiate a peace settlement with; the RCD

¹⁶⁰ Cilliers, J. and Malan, M. Peacekeeping in the DRC-MONUC and the road to peace. 2001

¹⁶¹ *ibid*

¹⁶² United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1234 (1999)- Adopted by the Security Council at its 3993rd meeting on 9 April 1991

¹⁶³ www.humanrights.law.monach.edu.au accessed 20 June 2020

¹⁶⁴ *ibid*

¹⁶⁵ *ibid*

¹⁶⁶ *ibid*

¹⁶⁷ *ibid*

in Goma, RCD in Kisangani and the MLC¹⁶⁸. Similarly, long-time allies Uganda and Rwanda would also be in a verge of collapse when the troops of both countries collide in a bloody fight leading to a break up in the long-time alliance¹⁶⁹.

The Lusaka ceasefire agreement was finally signed in July 1999 after a tedious process of getting parties to the conflict to sign and equally agree to the terms of the agreement. The heads of states involved in the conflict signed the agreement first and later on in August the leader of the MLC and RCD also signed the ceasefire agreement. The terms of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement clearly stemmed from the mandate of the UNSC Resolution 1234, the agreement stated major terms like the withdrawal of all foreign troops, reconciliation, protection of borders, re-establishment of Government authority and all items from the 'laundry list' of resolution 1234¹⁷⁰.

The Sun City Accord

Following the assassination of Laurent Kabila, the implementation of MONUC and the succession of Joseph Kabila as the new head of state, the DRC was in need of post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building. According to (Paul Collier, 2004), the actual costs of war are only visible after the guns have been silenced, this is because it is only then that the warring parties and government can see the extent of the damage caused by the war. With that being said, it is important to have a transition from conflict to peace through the rebuilding of a socio-economic framework of the country- this according to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) policy framework (2005) includes "security, political transition, socio-economic development, human rights and resource mobilisation" and these are the issues that the Sun City Accord was aimed at addressing going into a post-war phase in the DRC.

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue took place in 2002 in South Africa and its core mandate was the political transition and governance of the country going forward as a nation. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue ensured equal participation by all the signatories of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and most importantly the civil society

¹⁶⁸ Tshiyoyo, D. Democratic Republic of Congo: Road to Political Transition. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) paper. 2006, p 6

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.p.6

¹⁷⁰ Cilliers and Malan, Peacekeeping in the DRC-MONUC and the road to peace. 2001

for the purpose of representation and involvement of all by all in the new democratic government to come¹⁷¹.

Similar to the ceasefire agreement, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue also came across its own hurdles one of them being the introduction of a new ‘International Criminal Court’ by the United Nations through the Truth and Reconciliation. The aim of the court was to criminalise all who waged the war against humanity. This however was not successful and instead many were granted with impunity for the grave violations they had performed during the war¹⁷².

Furthermore, Tshiyoyo¹⁷³ argues that it was because of ‘impunity’ that the Sun City Accord had hopes and potential of being a success. The Accord led to the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement paving the way for a peaceful post-conflict reconstruction in the country. The agreement stated that there would be a two-year transition period through Government of National Unity (GNU)/ Transitional Government, as a result political, social, economic and military power would be shared by all warring factions until a set date for elections would be agreed upon. Finally in April 2003 the ICD came to a successful end whereby the war came to a standstill in the DRC and the transitional two-year period well on its way.

According to Claude Kabemba¹⁷⁴ the core directive of the Transitional Government was to ensure that the DRC would acquire democratic dispensation through contested free and fair elections. Kabemba further explains the 1+4 political system that was established in the DRC, having President Joseph Kabila still as Head of State alongside four Vice-Presidents with other signatories as Ministers and Vice-Ministers. The Vice Presidents were as follows as per portfolio¹⁷⁵:

- Jean-Pierre Bemba Ngombo (MLC)- Economic and Finance¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ Tshiyoyo, D. Democratic Republic of Congo: Road to Political Transition. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) paper. 2006, page 12

¹⁷² Davis and Hayner, 2009

¹⁷³ Tshiyoyo, D. Democratic Republic of Congo: Road to Political Transition. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) paper. 2006, page 12

¹⁷⁴ Kabemba, C. Perspectives on the Role of Key Stakeholders in the DRC’s Political Transition, EISA Occasional Paper No. 26. 2004

¹⁷⁵ Kabemba, C. Perspectives on the Role of Key Stakeholders in the DRC’s Political Transition, EISA Occasional Paper No. 26. 2004

¹⁷⁶ www.eisa.org.za accessed 27 May 2019

- Azarias Ruberwa Maniwa (RCD-Goma)- Politics, Defence and Security¹⁷⁷
- Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (ex-Government)¹⁷⁸ - Development and Reconstruction
- Arthur Zahidi Ngoma (non-armed opposition)- Social and Cultural¹⁷⁹

The Transitional period ended in 2006 due to a plea for an extension as per Article 196 of the transitional Constitution which states that an extension can be granted with the approval of the Independent Electoral Commission and a mutual agreement by the transitional Parliament and after more than 40 years the Congolese went to the polls and chose their democratic government¹⁸⁰.

MONUC

The relationship between the DRC and the UN dates back to the 1960s when the government of the DRC requested that the UN assists militarily in terms of protection of sovereignty against external forces in the country causing violence¹⁸¹. Accordingly the UN has been involved in DRC from the beginning of independence, it was after the Lusaka Agreement in 1999 that the *Mission de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Congo* (MONUC) was established. MONUC in turn became a driving force of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement, the agreement was consent between several African states (Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda), the government of the DRC and eventually the belligerent groups in the country and even those from neighbouring countries-FDLR, Mai-Mai militia, Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Republic of Congo (FARDC) just to name but a few¹⁸². As a result in November 1999 a small UN 'watchdog' mission was deployed in the DRC which came to be known as MONUC.

¹⁷⁷ ibid

¹⁷⁸ ibid

¹⁷⁹ ibid

¹⁸⁰ Tshiyoyo, D. Democratic Republic of Congo: Road to Political Transition. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) paper 9. 2006

¹⁸¹ Ingrid van Osch and Joseph, Fragile Support: MONUC's reputation and legitimacy in the DRC. School of policy studies; Canada.2010, Pg 78

¹⁸² Ibid.p.78

The mandate for MONUC was to ensure the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement takes place and this involved focus on the following key areas to make certain that the objectives of the Agreement are met¹⁸³. Overall the role of MONUC was to protect civilians, humanitarian workforces and UN personnel and amenities in the country. It was pivotal that MONUC ensures across the board the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) of all armed groups and the withdrawal of all foreign parties involved in the conflict is adhered to¹⁸⁴. DDRRR is an incentive of political will and commitment and failure to necessary political will through corruption can lead to unsuccessful implementation of the DDRRR and this has been seen throughout the continent. It is paramount that commitments to disarmament outweigh one's desire of control or ownership, using Angola as an example, UNITA was more concerned with having control over diamond fields than the gains that will come with the implementation of the DDRR¹⁸⁵. Taking into account that MONUC is one of the most expensive peacekeeping missions in the history of the UN, with estimated operational costs that amount to \$1.4 billion a year from the year 2009/2010 which equals to one-sixth of the global budget, an unsuccessful of any of the objectives of the mandate would result in the loss of millions of dollars¹⁸⁶. According to Major General Patrick Cammaert¹⁸⁷ MONUC had to operate under hostile and volatile conditions, with a conflict stemmed from three narratives and that is interstate, intrastate and ethnic conflict. The DRC conflict involves external forces from neighbouring countries fighting in the country itself, the Congolese rebel groups opposing the Kinshasa government and also fighting amongst themselves and then last but not least the ethnic narrative that has been said to stem from the 1994 Rwanda genocide that led to Hutus fleeing from Rwanda to the DRC due to the fear of being killed causing a stir of the Tutsis and Hutu rivalry in the DRC¹⁸⁸.

¹⁸³ Jakkie, Cillers. & Mark, Malan. MONUC AND THE ROAD TO PEACE. 2001

¹⁸⁴ Ingrid van Osch and Joseph, Fragile Support: MONUC's reputation and legitimacy in the DRC. School of policy studies; Canada. 2010, Pg 79

¹⁸⁵ Gwinyayi, Dzinesa. "Postconflict Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Southern Africa", International Studies Perspectives. 2007, p.77.

¹⁸⁶ Gwinyayi, Dzinesa & Joyce Laker. Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the DRC. Policy advisory group seminar report. Capetown. 2010, Pg 16

¹⁸⁷ Major General Patrick Cammaert, 2007

¹⁸⁸ Clifford Bernath and Anne Edgerton. MONUC: flawed mandate limits successs. May 2003, pg 2

As such one of the challenges MONUC has had to encounter has been a three-fold conflict with a mandate under Chapter VII, focused only on one fold and that is interstate conflict and one could argue that the Security Council should reconsider exploring mechanisms that could resolve all layers of the conflict instead of one¹⁸⁹. Another limitation of MONUC being the implementation of the DDRRR, for example, the DDRRR process cannot take place in an unstable environment and the UN has not been successful regards to ensuring the totality of this process. It has been estimated that in the Eastern DRC there are approximately 15 000-20 000 foreign armed groups, MONUC's approach to disarming these groups is such that the process will unfold in a voluntary manner. This is because MONUC believed that using force to disarm groups is too risky, will cost the UN immensely and furthermore not realistic given the current climate of the lack of troop contribution for the mission¹⁹⁰.

MONUC's voluntary approach is not a solution even considering the variables mentioned above on why the UN has chosen not to forcefully undertake DDRRR. Observers are concerned by this as it means these foreign belligerent groups can stay in the country and not be challenged to leave, and as such will not have any incentive to leave. However, MONUC does not experience the same hurdle with disarming Congolese combatants except of course in the Eastern DRC. It was in 2003 that UN Security Council approved Resolution 1493 and because the DDRRR was at its early stages MONUC had to overcome several hindrances. For example, the fact that Eastern DRC lacked government institutions or structures which combatants could be handed over to, MONUC had not deployed troops to the Mai-Mai area and finally the non-conducive socio-economic atmosphere in the Maniema and Kivus for reintegration of previous combatants¹⁹¹.

Cliff Bernath and Anne Edgerton¹⁹² argue about the lack of clarity in terms of mandate of MONUC in the DRC, by this asserting that the UN might have lost in translation their role in the DRC. MONUC was formed to observe the unstable climate in the DRC but instead what is seen is the actual involvement of MONUC in

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.p.2

¹⁹⁰ Emeric, R. "The Inter-Congolese dialogue: a critical overview." *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria (2004).

¹⁹¹ Ibid

¹⁹² Bernath, C, and Edgerton, A. "MONUC: flawed mandate limits success." Washington, DC: Refugees International. 2003

the conflict and probably exacerbating the conflict even further especially with the foreign armed groups. However, many scholars argue otherwise, it is believed that using force creates a tone of authority and peace can be achieved through such channels. For example, a statement was made by the Major General Patrick Cammaert, a MONUC Divisional commander that “in order for the UN to keep peace it has to enforce it sometimes”¹⁹³. Conversely, other schools of thought believe that the use of minimal force can result to the loss of power and domination of a conflict situation and the inability to protect civilians and uphold humanitarian attributes. Notwithstanding that the use of excessive force can also lead to retaliation of militias directed to either civilians or the government¹⁹⁴.

MONUSCO

MONUSCO came about in the wake of the birth of the rebel group M23 that had captured the eastern DRC and thus making this mission the second largest peacekeeping operation the UN had ever done¹⁹⁵. With the capturing of the eastern DRC by the rebel group and the fall of Goma, the government of the DRC came under immense pressure to seek for a more proactive approach from the international community to gain control of its eastern provinces- North and South Kivu¹⁹⁶. Perhaps the school of thought arguing for the peace enforcement approach to take its rightful place in the peacekeeping field is correct, that is to say, without the cry for help by the Government of the DRC for a more ‘proactive’ approach as stated above, MONUSCO would have not come into play. It is because of the realisation that the UN mission MONUC was not yielding any positive results and more needed to be done that MONUSCO was formed. MONUC was a mission with a mandate to observe the unstable climate of the country, observation without any force to curb the on-going conflict. As a result in the discussion above about MONUC, it can be debated that there is some truth to the statement made by the MONUC division commander about how enforcement sometimes needs to be applied by the UN when observatory

¹⁹³ Jim Terrie. The use of UN peacekeeping: the experience of MONUC. African security review 18.1. Institute for security studies. MONUC 2005-2007.

¹⁹⁴ Ingrid van Osch and Joseph. Fragile Support: MONUC’s reputation and legitimacy in the DRC. School of policy studies. Queen’s university at Kingston, Canada .2010, Pg 84

¹⁹⁵ Denis Tull, The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. 2017,13

¹⁹⁶ Stimson Centre and Better World Campaign, Challenges and the path forward for MONUSCO. 2016, 3

missions like MONUC are not effective¹⁹⁷. In 2005 during the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) the same sentiments were shared by Jean-Marie Guehenno, Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations after being criticized for the direct attack called ‘Operation Iron Fist’ saying that:

“it was necessary to stand up to armed groups that threaten to undermine peacekeeping missions. But he said UN commanders had to strike a balance between engaging in all-out warfare and resorting to the passive military posture that characterized UN operations in Srebrenica, where Dutch peacekeepers stood down as Bosnia Serb troops killed thousands of unarmed civilians¹⁹⁸,”

What is interesting to note is the comparable statements that Commanders or Heads of these missions keep reiterating, which creates a debate about or around what exactly is the role of the UN is during or post-conflict. The realism theory asserts that the UN should take up a more proactive approach in peacekeeping operations, on the hand, the liberalist approach which one could argue to be the traditional peacekeeping principles that have been adopted by the UN, suggests that these peacekeeping missions should be passive and less aggressive. What these schools of thought fail to recognise is that whether a mission is passive or proactive in war there is always casualty. Therefore, the UN should employ a strategy that ensures reduction in the mortality rate or the rate of sexual offences or the number of internally displaced persons.

In 2010, the UNSC with a new mandate (resolution 1925) on the conflict in the DRC renamed MONUC to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC-MONUSCO. Take note of the word ‘stabilization’ in this new mission, reflecting the ineffective efforts of MONUC to help the country tackle economic, political and social issues and take control of its institutions which that led to the rise of rebel groups like M23, FDLR and Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)¹⁹⁹. According to John Karlsrud (2015, 42) the term ‘stabilisation’ dates back to 1995 when NATO created a force called the NATO Stabilisation Force. The Stabilisation Force was established during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of

¹⁹⁷ Jim Terrie. The use of UN peacekeeping: the experience of MONUC. African security review 18.1. Institute for security studies. MONUC 2005-2007.

¹⁹⁸ John Karlsrud, The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. 2015, 43

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.p.43

using military efforts to tranquilise the situations in both countries for the purpose of peace and stability and more over with the idea of building institutions that are sustainable. In the context of the UN, the term stabilisation was used in 2004 during the Haiti debacle, naming the mission the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. Over the years this term would gain content and be defined by the UN as a ‘period when the UN peacekeeping mission is deployed’. The Brahimi Report explains in detail how the peacekeeping operations of the UN ought to be deployed where there is “peace to keep”²⁰⁰. However, looking at the history of the UN and its involvement in conflict or post-conflict countries, the UN has deployed missions where there was no peace or stability as outlined in the Brahimi report, for example, the case of Darfur, DRC, Rwanda and Somalia²⁰¹.

“Political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of the UN peace operations”²⁰², however, this was not the case with the mandate of MONUSCO. The mission had a focus on military peacekeeping and in the process did not address the politics of the conflict, the political process and/or framework that needed to be dealt with the new shift to stabilizing the state and its institutions, especially the armed force of the DRC (FARDC)²⁰³. Two years after the establishment of the MONUSCO, the mission was proving to be of no relief to the state. According to the Resolution 1925 (2010) adopted by the Security Council two main priorities of the mandate of MONUSCO were strictly the *Protection of Civilians* (PoC) and *stabilization and peace consolidation*. However in 2012, violence boiled over the eastern Congo with the Congolese soldiers now part of the newly formed M23 movement, the occupation of the capital city of Goma, violation of human rights against civilians, death rate increasing and hundred thousands of people displaced, approximately 140,000 people, the mission to ‘stabilize’ the DRC came into tatters and MONUSCO was now having a different effect to what it was originally mandated to be. The goal of peace, security and stability came to ruins as tensions fuelled up and the mission could not be able to defend the city and its civilians from the atrocious acts of the rebel group, which involved sexual harassment and rape to women making the country to be known as

²⁰⁰ John Karlsrud, *The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali*. 2015, 42

²⁰¹ Ibid.p.42

²⁰² Congo Research Group, *The art of the possible-MONUSCO’s new mandate*. 2018, 10

²⁰³ Ibid.p.10

the ‘rape capital city’ of the world²⁰⁴. MONUSCO had lost all its legitimacy and credibility in the year 2012, reasons being the failure to act swiftly to the attacks against civilians and largely the protection of civilians as an entity of peacekeeping itself²⁰⁵.

The relationship between the Government of DRC and the UN Mission also proved to be a constraint in the success of the mission. Scholars argue that the lack of a close relationship by these two parties led to the Government undermining the mission especially because of the impartially approach the UN was employing²⁰⁶. In the first instance the UN failed to clearly explain to the Government what the mandate of this mission was, mostly importantly taking into account that peace enforcement involves impartially and non-consent of the key players part of the conflict, which clearly led to resistance or reluctance by the Government to fully support the mission.²⁰⁷ On the contrary the 1925 resolution reflects a different approach by the Security Council, stating that under the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council agreed on “emphasizes that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo bears primary responsibility for security, peacebuilding and development in the country, and *encourages* the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to remain fully committed to protecting the population through the establishment of professional and sustainable security forces, to promote non-military solutions as an integral part of the overall solution for reducing the threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups and to restore full state authority in the areas freed from armed groups”²⁰⁸.

MONUSCO under resolution 1925 (2010) was adopted during a critical phase in the DRC’s democratic reform. The second general elections of the country were about to take place in 2011, and many argue that the run-up to elections were part of the reason why the Government was not so welcoming of the peacekeeping mission that required ‘non-consent’ of parties by the UN. It is believed that the Kabila government was on a

²⁰⁴ Denis Tull, *The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo*. 2017,13

²⁰⁵ Alexandra Novosseloff et al, *Assessing the effectiveness of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC-MONUSCO)*. 2019, 17

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.* p.17

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* p.17

²⁰⁸ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1925 (2010) - Adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on 28 May 2010. 2010, 3

venture to limit the mission's presence during the elections, so as to be able to report the elections free and free even in the midst of instability and uncertainty in the country²⁰⁹. The presence of the mission running up to the elections had a couple of concerns for the Government, mainly that the mission personnel would pronounce the elections null and void looking at the environment under which they would be taking place. By this meaning that with the political authoritarianism, election rigging and malpractices known to occur during elections and moreover election violence leading to the violation of human rights, letting elections take place in an unstable atmosphere would only lead to pouring fuel into an already burning fire and as such not be able to control it. Secondly, Kabila's government was also in fear of being toppled or overthrown in the name of removing the current central power from office and have no government leading to the elections, so that the country can have free and fair elections²¹⁰. Consequently the government asked that the number of troops be reduced as a strategic approach to not have elections postponed or regarded as null and void after their first successful elections that took place five years ago, as a result these were the most pivotal elections the county would undertake²¹¹. However, rightfully so the Security Council did not agree looking at how Kabila's interests were at the forefront of this due to the fact that elections were fast approaching, which of course made the relationship between the host country and the Security Council to be more strained than it already was²¹².

With the challenges and constraints discussed, the UN mission MONUSCO still continued and with the United Nations Security Council of course seen as having failed the DRC by being unable protect the country, there was a need to redeem itself and this when the MONUSCO shifted from roundtables discussions to military action on the grounds enforce the rule of law and have the rebel groups abide by it-this would be named the Force Intervention Brigade.

Conclusion

This chapter has shed some light on the historical background of the DRC showing how the country attained its independence and the political struggle thereafter. The

²⁰⁹ Stimson Centre and Better World Campaign: 2016,7-8

²¹⁰ Ibidp.p.7-8

²¹¹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2277 (2016)- Adopted by the Security Council at its 7659th meeting on 30 March 2016, 5/15

²¹² Stimson Centre and Better World Campaign, Challenges and the path forward for MONUSCO. 2016, 7

DRC as the above discussion indicates has never had absolute peace and stability since its independence. Of course there is no country with full and absolute peace, however, the DRC's independence was founded under a dictatorship by the first president, Mobutu Sese Seko and one could say that this leadership style is one of, if not the major reason why the country found itself under so much political and economic turmoil after the administration of Mobutu ended. The country since then was bedevilled by power politics, 'resource curse' and ethnic violence. Moreover, the chapter elucidates the battle of control over the minerals as one other major contributing factor to the conflict in the DRC. *Blood diamonds* were used for personal enrichment not just internally but also by external parties in the war. The external parties would later include nine African states taking sides in the war and hence the second war of the DRC became known as Africa's world war. The chapter has shown the intervention by member states of SADC and UN which led to the ending of the war through the agreement of a transitional government and ultimately the first democratic elections held in the country to bring about a peaceful and stable atmosphere in the country. The next chapter will focus on the 2013 FIB and how it was orchestrated by UN, South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC from 1998 to 2013 and intervention by regional communities like SADC.

CHAPTER FOUR-FIB IN THE DRC AND SOUTH AFRICA'S INVOLVEMENT

Introduction

The following discussion will look at South Africa's role in the mission and an overall look into South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC, more so focusing on the shift between hard and soft power by the South Africa since the breaking out of the war in 1998 to the FIB in 2013. This chapter will unpack the different presidential offices of South Africa towards the DRC as stated in chapter one. Additionally exploring the different sectors South Africa is involved in, in the Great Lakes region.

South Africa and Peace Enforcement

The discussion in chapter two is about the establishment and technicalities of the FIB, a result of South Africa and SADC's support through the UNSC²¹³. Pretoria's approach over the years prior the FIB was mainly to resolve conflict through peace-building initiatives, however when the M23 shutdown Goma in eastern Congo in 2012 there was a need for a shift in South Africa's conflict resolution methods in the DRC. The rebel group-M23 was born of frustrations by the DRC government's failure to uphold a peace agreement signed in 2009 between the government and the CNDP. The departure of soldiers from the Congolese army stirred up fear in the North Kivu province and conversely led to the strengthening of the M23. The M23 movement gained momentum and within a couple of months had taken captivity of a town called Bunagana near Goma and threatened to attack the capital of the North Kivu. According to Musoni²¹⁴ the rising threats to attack Goma resulted in about 600 Congolese troops fleeing across the border and taking refuge in neighbouring Uganda.

The M23 further claimed that all they asked from the government is the adhering of resolutions of the 2009 peace agreement. Seeing as the M23 was not backing down with violence and attacks in the east, the South African Defence Force deployed 1 345

²¹³ John Karlsrud. The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1). 2015, 40-54

²¹⁴ Musoni, F. "Understanding M23 and the current conflict in the DR Congo." November 29 (2012): 2012.

troops, had three military observers and staff officers. Karlsrud²¹⁵ states that Tanzania and Malawi were also part of the troop-contributing countries for the FIB and helped to ensure a defeat by the M23. Furthermore, stating SADC's role in the brigade which was done through an agreement on a Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the Congo and establish a Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) along-side 11 more African countries, the UN, AU and finally the ICGLR. To date making this military intervention the largest international effort to curbing the unending conflict in the east. South Africa, however, did not just deploy troops, one of the most significant and can be argued to be one of the reasons why the M23 eventually surrendered, is the South African Rooivalk gunship helicopters which helped immensely in fighting against the M23 and also the ADF in the early months of 2014²¹⁶. South Africa is still highly involved in peace-making in the DRC, making peace and stability a high priority not only in the DRC but Africa as a whole. In 2015 South Africa was appointed as the head of MONUSCO and also formed a tripartite alliance with Angola and the DRC to fight violence and instability by promoting peace and stability for the Congolese²¹⁷.

South Africa's FIB decision towards the DRC

Foreign policy is a complex concept in the field of International Relations. The complexities of this concept are seen through the inability of scholars to agreeing to a standard definition that covers all aspects of the term. Hence Russet and Star²¹⁸ argue that the numerous interpretations, arguments and statements on foreign policy add up to the lack of consensus on what the term foreign policy means. However, according to Hermann²¹⁹ there are two kinds of foreign policy studies, he describes them as an *idiographic manner* and *nomothetic orientation*, the former being the study of issues that confront particular state authorities/ regimes or confront other actors of foreign policy. The latter focuses more on the growth of general contentions about foreign policy and how those contentions are likely to take place. In essence, the term involves descriptions, explanations, evaluation, and interpretation of current issues

²¹⁵ Karlsrud, J. "The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali." *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2015): 40-54.

²¹⁶ *ibid*

²¹⁷ Lalbahadur, A, and Rawhani, C. "South Africa's peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 24, no. 4 (2017): 523-545.

²¹⁸ Russet and Star, 1996

²¹⁹ Hermann, C. *Foreign policy behaviour: that which is to be explained*. 1978

that are occurring or will occur. Hermann²²⁰ further explains foreign policy as a concept that involves "the plans, goals, and actions of national governments directed at entities outside the nation". However, he challenges this traditional definition of foreign policy through a set of the following questions which can be used to assess the case of South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC:

- What plans and actions in foreign policy are taken in instances of the use of quiet diplomacy in an international crisis? ²²¹ South Africa's non-intervention in the DRC-1998
- How do the extemporaneous remarks of a visiting head of state constitute foreign policy if they are inconsistent with previous declarations of his government and if they are later "reinterpreted" by a press secretary?²²²
- Is it foreign policy when non-governmental entities get involved in a conflict situation through mediation to resolve the conflict?²²³

The first chapter of this study delves into debates about the South African Foreign policy expanding on issues related to the drivers of foreign policy, the principles that drive the South African Foreign policy and the country emerging as a middle man in African conflicts. It further touches on the differences from Mandela's foreign policy up until Zuma's tenure and the different agendas that all those heads of state had for the foreign policy of the country. The following discussion will look more deeply into South Africa's role in the DRC conflict from 1998 to 2013 through three presidential lenses.

The Mandela Era

Countries like the US, South Africa and France are examples of states whereby the president is both the leader of government and also head of state, and with this, the president takes full control of the foreign policy²²⁴. With that being said, the president does not only overlook the formulation of foreign policy but is involved in the process

²²⁰ Hermann, C. Foreign policy behaviour: that which is to explained. 1978

²²¹ *ibid*

²²² *ibid*

²²³ *ibid*

²²⁴ Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. New York.: Palgrave. 2003, p 53

and implementation of foreign policy²²⁵. This is why foreign policies are differentiated per head of state because each president that is elected every five years in South Africa designs and customises foreign policy to their own inclination. The Mandela era was a crucial point in time for the newly democratic country post-apartheid. It was a time for redress, transition and transformation and this was seen through various policy developments like the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) aimed at addressing the socio-economic needs of the non-white majority and the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR)²²⁶. Mandela's administration was confronted by constraints inherited from the apartheid regime and thus the first order of business post-1994 was the reconstruction of the foreign policy²²⁷.

The administration was faced by international sanctions, weak state capacity and socio-economic issues just to name a few. According to Mandela²²⁸ the future of South Africa relied solely on the African continent. It was imperative for the country to have support from the Southern African region because under the apartheid regime South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa was antagonistic in nature. As a result, there was a need to repair under a new government the relationships the country had formed with the region during the apartheid era²²⁹. Pre-1994 Mandela advocated for human rights issues to be addressed going into a new government and for an absolute democratic transition to take place in South Africa²³⁰. As a result, assuming the presidency of the country he ensured that South Africa's foreign policy would be founded on human rights and democracy. Leading towards the 1994 elections the country was seen as the 'darling' of the international community, this was because of the peaceful transition it had from the apartheid regime to a democratic state. However, it was not long before Mandela's foreign policy principles would be tested on the continent and have many criticize South Africa's role, stance and image in the international arena.

²²⁵ Ibid.p.53

²²⁶ Van Nieuwkerk, Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors and process. p 40

²²⁷ Ibid.p.40

²²⁸ Mandela, 1993

²²⁹ Sakhile, H. "South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards Southern Africa, 1994-2014: partner or hegemon?." PhD diss., 2015.

²³⁰ ibid

A number of scholars like Landsberg²³¹, Lالبahadur and Rawhani²³² Kebemba²³³, Gbaya²³⁴ agree that South Africa's foreign policy during the Mandela's administration was inconsistent, had double-standards, lacked cohesiveness and was overall clouded by ambiguity. However, other scholars like Sakile²³⁵ argue that the lack of direction in Mandela's foreign policy was derived from "the staff of the old regime which did not share the view if the new government". This goes back to the debate on whether or not the internal institutions were ready to be ruled under the new administration. Furthermore, Lالبahadur and Rawhani assert that "internal obstacles prevented a significant response from the South African government. Internally its institutions lacked a cohesive image of South Africa's foreign policy brand on which to act". Ultimately this meant that Mandela's administration was run by individuals with different ideas that led to confusion on the trajectory of the foreign policy.

Mandela's principles on human rights and democracy proved to be ambitious because most African heads of states were dictators and as a result violated human rights which would be challenging for South Africa to intervene because of its high moral standards. For example, in 1995 South Africa's foreign policy would face isolation when Pretoria decided on calling for sanctions against de facto Nigerian president Sani Abacha for the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other activists who were resisting Abacha's authoritarian rule²³⁶. Consequently, Mandela did not receive any support from fellow African leaders who felt that he was being "un-African" and this could probably be the reason why South Africa under Mbeki did not interfere in the Zimbabwean crisis because of the experience of isolation during its intervention in Nigeria²³⁷. Many scholars have attacked Pretoria for its quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe's crisis relating to human rights abuses forgetting that this is the same

²³¹ Landsberg, C. "The impossible neutrality? South Africa's policy in the Congo war," in *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, ed. J. Clark. Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2002

²³² Lالبahadur, A. and Rawhani, C. South Africa's peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model. *South African Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 24. 2017, 523-545

²³³ Kabemba, C. "South Africa and the DRC: Is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo?" in *South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa: Conference Proceedings*, ed. Roger Southall. Pretoria: HSRC Press. 2006, 6-7

²³⁴ Gbaya, D. 2015. *South Africa's Foreign Policy toward the DRC: From non-intervention to intervention 1998-2013*. University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. p 22

²³⁵ Sakile, H.. *South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards Southern Africa, 1994-2014: partner or hegemon?* 2015

²³⁶ ibiid

²³⁷ Barber, J. (2005). The New South Africa's foreign policy: principles and practice. *International Affairs*. 81,5, p 1079-1096

country that was walloped by African heads of states for being “un-African” during Abacha’s regime. Furthermore, just as the Zimbabwean case had the support of the global community so did the Nigerian case, the difference being the international sanctions that were placed on Zimbabwe and the support of the West in Nigeria’s economy through the export of oil even with the call for help by South Africa²³⁸. The Nigerian incident shaped South Africa’s foreign policy towards human rights and democratic issues in Africa. The cases of the application of quiet diplomacy by Pretoria in human rights crisis throughout the continent indicate that the country has taken a stance to not get involved. According to Sakile²³⁹ South Africa decided that all matters in relation to SADC or AU should be dealt with through structures of the two organisations and that it will undertake its foreign policy decisions relating to the continent through multilateralism instead of unilateral. For example, the former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir's case of being wanted by the international criminal court and not arrested by the South African government during a visit for an AU meeting in South Africa asserts Pretoria's foreign policy towards human rights issues in the continent.

Moreover, one of the major debates about South Africa's foreign policy during Mandela's tenure is the 1998 Lesotho military coup attempt that led to military intervention by South Africa and Botswana under SADC. However, in the same year, Pretoria opted for a peaceful resolution to the DRC conflict maintaining a neutral position that was later deemed as a 'double standard'. Chapter three explained the nature of the DRC conflict and all the actors involved, some of the actors being countries like Rwanda and Uganda. At that time South Africa had an arms deal with the government of Rwanda which was viewed as Pretoria supplying weaponry to “*genocidaires*” in Rwanda who were attacking civilians in eastern Zaire²⁴⁰. Therefore, South Africa's foreign policy principles were questioned because it had painted a picture of integrity and morality when on the contrary its engagements were the opposite of its principles. The decision South Africa took to remain neutral in the DRC crisis during the Mandela era had ripple effects on the regional organisation

²³⁸ Ibid.p.1079-1096

²³⁹ Sakhile,H. South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy towards Southern Africa, 1994-2014: partner or hegemon? 2015

²⁴⁰ Lalbahadur, A. and Rawhani, C. South Africa’s peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model. South African Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 24. 2017, No. 523-545

SADC. Firstly, SADC was divided into two, with members having two ideologies about how to intervene in the conflict at the DRC and thus affecting the SADC-Peace and Security pillar. Two groups existed, one under South Africa including Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique and Mauritius and the other group under Zimbabwe; the DRC, Namibia and Angola. Taking into account that the DRC had only joined SADC a year before the crisis through the influence of South Africa and Namibia, it was ironical as to why South Africa would decline to send troops in support of Kabila after lobbying for the country to be a member of the organisation. This only proves that South Africa was indeed supplying arms to Rwanda and Uganda, as such being in a position of conflict of interest in the crisis, thus leading placing Pretoria in a difficult position of choosing between its role as a member of SADC and its own national interests. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, played its part as a member of SADC and also as the chair of the SADC Organ of Politics and Defence Security (OPDS). Mugabe and the three others were well within their rights and obligation under international law to militarily intervene in the DRC crises. According to the UN Charter "if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations" states or a state can intervene for reasons of defending itself and also restoring international peace and security. Therefore, the decision by the Zimbabwean group to assist the DRC was significant because it legitimised the country as a member of SADC and a member of the UN, both these organisations believing in the maintenance of security by member states for any member state experiencing a threat to its peace and security. Mandela's administration was a trial and error, all criticism by scholars and analysts are justified because Pretoria was firstly a new-born of democracy in the regional and international scene and thus the inconsistency in the decision-making of policy issues. Advocating for the DRC to be a member of SADC surely has to be one of the highlights of Mandela's tenure²⁴¹.

Mbeki's presidency

Thabo Mbeki's term began in 1999 and ended in 2008, he had two terms of presidency and was undoubtedly able to have a footprint on South Africa's foreign policy. Many scholars agree that Mbeki is the *father* of the well-known term 'African Renaissance' dream in terms of implementation and driving the narrative of Africa

²⁴¹ Landsberg, 2005. Coning, 1999/2000. Nabudere, 2003. Lalbahadur and Rawhani, 2017 and Monyae, 2014.

first through a strong belief in 'African solutions to African problems'. He did not create nor was he the first to introduce the term to Africa, leaders like Muammar Kaddafi also wanted to unlock Africa's potential through the *United States of Africa* and have the continent unite as one under a federal state with one currency and free flow of trade²⁴². Furthermore, other African leaders like Pixely ke Izaka, Nelson Mandela, Julius Nyerere, Olusegun Obasanjo, Kwame Nkrumah and Robert Sobukwe had also stressed in their time that the 'future of Africa is in the hands of Africans themselves'²⁴³. President Thabo Mbeki is seen by scholars as the 'father' of African Renaissance because he resurfaced, popularised and put action to the term and hence when the term is brought up he is first to be thought of²⁴⁴.

In addition, the African Renaissance dream led to the creation of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) which was a programme developed in 2001 under the African Union through the initiative of Thabo Mbeki and Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade²⁴⁵. NEPAD's vision and objectives are to "recognise that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development"²⁴⁶. President Mbeki's foreign policy was as a result Africa centred, focusing more on issues relating to economics and conflict resolution in the continent because the two issues are interrelated, in that economic development cannot take place in a politically unstable environment²⁴⁷. In order for economies to grow, there needs to be an intervention in African states that are facing conflict to assist them in the culmination of the conflict. Being the economists that he is, Mbeki was concerned about the recurring pattern of conflicts in the continent that will eventually have a negative effect on the future of African states in terms of the globalisation of economies²⁴⁸. Furthermore, taking into

²⁴² Sakhile, H. South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards Southern Africa, 1994-2014: partner or hegemon? 2015

²⁴³ Ibid and Maloka, T. African Renaissance. Debate A Critique. 2001

²⁴⁴ Sakhile, H. South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards Southern Africa, 1994-2014: partner or hegemon? 2015 and Maloka, T. African Renaissance. Debate A Critique. 2001

²⁴⁵ Momoh, Zekeri. New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Development in Africa Vol 3 No. 3. University of Ilorin, Nigeria. 2015

²⁴⁶ NEPAD. African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, NEPAD Secretariat- Governance, Peace and Security Programme. 2005

²⁴⁷ Gbaya, D.M. South Africa's Foreign Policy toward the DRC: From non-intervention to intervention 1998-2013. University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. 2015. 22

²⁴⁸ Ajulu, R. Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a globalising economy: the struggle for the soul of the continent. 28/27 Review of the African Political Economy. 2001, 27-42

account that the continent is rich in mineral resources, however, remains to be at the bottom of the world economy²⁴⁹.

The trajectory of South Africa's foreign policy took a shift from Mandela's focus on human rights and democracy to more of economic development and peace in Africa under Mbeki. With that been said, in its first year the Mbeki administration dived straight into the DRC conflict and the on-going Lusaka Peace Accord that had difficulty to execute as discussed in chapter three was then signed after effective negotiation by all the actors in the conflict²⁵⁰. The signing of the ceasefire agreement led to the deployment of troops by the UN with the aim of monitoring peace and security within areas that were mostly affected by violence and instability²⁵¹. Deployment of troops by the UN is said to have been done through the assistance of the South African government indicating President Mbeki's mission and the country's position to bringing about peace in the DRC²⁵².

Despite the efforts of the ceasefire agreement, in 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated. This caused panic in terms of the country not having an elected leader but conversely led to all parties going back to the negotiation table under a new agenda called the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue opened doors for discussions on the drafting of the DRC's constitution and following that were the duly anticipated first democratic elections of the country in 2006. However, the process leading to the 2006 elections was not as simple and straightforward. There had to be numerous round table discussions and bargaining processes on the way the democratic transition was going to take place, and this is where South Africa played an experienced role in terms assisting as a mediator to negotiating for a settlement similar to the Convention for Democratic South Africa-CODESA. Mbeki's administration was successful in its overall leadership with this process which resulted in the DRC's very own 'CODESA' called the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition. The Global and Inclusive Agreement founded institutions like the truth and reconciliation commission, independent electoral commission and a human right

²⁴⁹ Ayittey, G.1999. Africa in Chaos.London. Macmillan

²⁵⁰ Lalbahadur, A. and Rawhani, C. South Africa's peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model. South African Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 24. 2017, 523-545

²⁵¹ Bellamy, A.J. and Williams, P.D. Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions. Oxford University Press. 2013, 385-6

²⁵² United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC Mandate, 2000. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mission/past/monuc/mandate.shtml> . Accessed 24 February 2020

commission to ensure that no human rights violations would continue in the new democratic compensation²⁵³. With some resemblance to CODESA, the Global and Inclusive Agreement also encouraged the presence of females in government and ensured that all parties are represented in the new DRC government²⁵⁴. Notably, South Africa's foreign policy under Mbeki was well underway to pursuing 'Africa first' through peacekeeping and peace-making. There was preparedness and confidence for the country to send troops into African conflict zones to do peacekeeping through multilateral diplomacy and as such created credibility for the South African foreign policy towards the continent especially the DRC²⁵⁵.

Thabo Mbeki's role in the DRC was immensely purposeful not only to obtain a peaceful resolution in the country but also to the post-conflict state of the country. Mbeki's foreign policy was concerned with state-building and institution-building. In 2004, the two countries had formed greater bilateral relations amongst them through a national commission that was established with the aim of rebuilding the state's institutions²⁵⁶. Furthermore, following the year of elections South Africa assisted DRC civil servants through sending 118 individuals as an observer mission, which was the largest deployment financed by the country, to ensure that there would be free and fair elections²⁵⁷.

Mbeki's administration also took part in the printing of all election ballots and made logistical efforts through helicopters and trucks to ensure that even those in the rural areas of the DRC would participate in the new democratic sphere of the country, this was done through the helping hand of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)²⁵⁸. Additionally, in anticipation of the 2006 elections about 200 members of the DRC police force were trained for crowd management by the South African Police Services (SAPS)²⁵⁹. Besharati and Rawhani²⁶⁰ further explain how the Mbeki

²⁵³ <http://peacemakers.un.org/drc-agreementontransition2002> Accessed 25 February 2020

²⁵⁴ <http://peacemakers.un.org/drc-agreementontransition2002> Accessed 25 February 2020

²⁵⁵ Monyae, D. "Learning to Lead: South Africa's Role in Africa-Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Case Studies (1994-2008)." 2014

²⁵⁶ <http://www.gov.za/about-government/international-relations-peace-security-cluster-1> Accessed 25 February 2020

²⁵⁷ <http://www.gov.za/pahad-briefing-notes-international-affairs-4> Accessed 25 February 2020

²⁵⁸ *ibid*

²⁵⁹ *ibid*

²⁶⁰ Besharati, N, and Rawhani, C. "South Africa and the DRC: Evaluating a South-South partnership for peace, governance and development." (2016).

government practically *build* the democratic Government of the DRC through Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). For example, numerous South African departments like The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), South African Management Development etc. were involved in strengthening important and yet weak institutions existing in the DRC at that time to ensure that those institutions would be capable to run the country after the elections had taken place. The Mbeki administration is said to have spent approximately R700 million in the DRC towards the 2006 elections²⁶¹ and moreover, according to Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD stats and Official Development Assistance (ODA) sources, South Africa was first in the top 10 donor list to the DRC as a development assistance donor as per Gross National Income (GNI) in 2008 with 0.07% in comparison to Belgium's 0.04%²⁶².

Mbeki's two-term presidency can be characterised as a pillar of regionalism through the African Renaissance advocacy and South Africa's launch into the international stage. During his term in office, South Africa is seen as the key driver of the African agenda with a stern focus on peace, economic development and good governance. South Africa's foreign policy had a clear trajectory of what it aimed to achieve outside its political jurisdiction in Mbeki's tenure.

From 2007-2008 South Africa was a non-permanent member of the UNSC and thus became the 'African voice' in the Security Council along with two other African states, following that was its chairmanship in SADC from 2008-2009. At this point, South Africa had gained "credibility as a major geostrategic player in Africa"²⁶³ and the global community as compared to Mandela's term in office. This is because as explained above, in as much as Mandela was seen as a 'darling' by the international community for the role he played to attaining a peaceful resolution for a democratic South Africa, his decisions like calling upon sanctions to Nigeria in 1995 made South Africa unfavourable to many leaders in the continent. As a result, Mbeki's foreign policy theme of Africa first shifted the country's narrative in terms of where it stands

²⁶¹ Lalbahadur, A and Rawhani, C. "South Africa's peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model." South African Journal of International Affairs 24, no. 4 (2017)

²⁶² <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1> Accessed 25 February 2020

²⁶³ Gbaya, D. "South Africa's Foreign Policy Toward the DRC: From Non-intervention to Intervention 1998-2013." 2015.

with the rest of the continent and thus being voted as one of the three countries that represented Africa at the UNSC in 2007. When Mbeki left office in 2009 South Africa had established its own identity as a peacemaker, peace-builder and peacekeeper of the continent, it had made its footprints in the DRC, Central African Republic (CAR) and Burundi through the deployment of troops and other state-building resources and all this were done under the continuity of multilateral diplomacy under regional structures like SADC and the AU and global structures like the UN.

Zuma's administration

Jacob Zuma started the country's fourth administration in 2009 taking over from President Kgalema Motlante's short term in office after the 2008 recalling of Thabo Mbeki by the ANC. In comparison to the Mandela and Mbeki era, Zuma came into office 15 years into South Africa's democracy. At this point, the country had already established itself as a key player regionally, in the continent and internationally, therefore the fourth administration was not run from the ground up but found the ship already sailing, unlike Mandela who had to ensure that the ship leaves the port and Mbeki steering the ship to a regional and global arena.

Comparatively, Zuma did not deviate much from Mbeki's policies and this is because, in as much as they are different individuals with diverse ideas about how the trajectory of the country ought to be, the make-up of the South African foreign policy post-1994 has been derived from values of the African National Congress (ANC) from Mandela to Zuma's tenure²⁶⁴. The South African foreign policy under Zuma was guided by the international relations resolutions adopted in 2007 at the ANC 52nd National Conference in Polokwane and the resolutions developed at the 53rd National Conference in Mangaung²⁶⁵.

However, a major change that occurred during the Zuma administration was the change of name from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)²⁶⁶. Landsberg²⁶⁷ further explains that change of names was an indication of a new dawn in the government's foreign

²⁶⁴ ibid

²⁶⁵ ibid

²⁶⁶ Landsberg, C. "The concentric circles of South Africa's foreign policy under Jacob Zuma." *India Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (2014)

²⁶⁷ ibid

affairs giving more emphasis to ‘partnerships and cooperation for development’. One of the criticisms Mbeki received from his foreign policy was that of neglecting domestic responsibilities in his quest for Africa first. This meaning that the foreign policy under Mbeki did not align with national interests or help in the alleviation of domestic issues and as such partnerships and cooperation for development would entail states coming together for the greater good of advancing their own national interests. As a result, the core of Zuma’s South African foreign policy would be prioritising national interests and conducting international relations in line with national goals, which are the needs of the South African civil society.

The Minister of DIRCO at the Heads of Mission conference further elucidates this point saying “our government desires to give clarity and focus on the role of the Department in meeting our domestic priorities through international partnerships and cooperation”²⁶⁸ and thus establishing a link between the South African foreign policy and its national interest. Zuma began his tenure with a clear focus on domestic policies putting emphasis on rural development and the need to address challenges in the agricultural sector like farming and food security²⁶⁹. However, unlike Mbeki, President Zuma shifted from peace-building to economic ‘building’. Economic diplomacy became a theme for the South African foreign policy under Zuma, this diplomacy was done through the strengthening of South-South cooperation. Furthermore, in December 2009 South Africa joins the Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) organisation of emerging economies of the South to further deepen its economic and political ties²⁷⁰ and continues to cement its already existing South-South relations with other groups formed during the Mbeki era, for example, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, G77 plus China and the Non-aligned Movement (NAM)²⁷¹.

The increased economic engagements under Zuma are also seen in the DRC through a formation called the SA-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC) which is a commission

²⁶⁸ Maite Nkoana Mashabane. Speech by the Minister of DIRCO, Heads of Mission Conference. Sandton. 2009

²⁶⁹ Zuma, J. State of the Nation Address, Cape Town, June 2009

²⁷⁰ Landsberg, C. "The concentric circles of South Africa’s foreign policy under Jacob Zuma." *India Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (2014)

²⁷¹ *ibid*

that ensures bilateral engagements between the two countries on annual basis²⁷². On the contrary, Zuma's relationship with Kabila has been under scrutiny with allegations of kleptocracy through these economic engagements²⁷³. Lالبahadur and Rawhani²⁷⁴ call the relationship between Zuma and Kabila the "Kabila first, peace later" relationship and assert like many scholars that the relations between the two is mostly for private and personal gain and not necessarily the interest of their countries. For example, Zuma's nephew was found to have an R100 billion oil deal in the DRC a deal that has been controversial with hints of nepotism and corruption²⁷⁵ coming to the fore. All of these allegations feeding to the notion of the Zuma administration as 'captured' by business pursuits leading to the mismanagement of state funds for personal advancements²⁷⁶.

According to Qobo and Dube²⁷⁷ questionable economic relations under the Zuma presidency are also noticed with the Russia and China bilateral engagements, they argue that "Zuma's administration in choosing diplomatic friends is less to do with South Africa's collective interests, or even ideology and more to do with enhancing the welfare of the ruling party" and this welfare is evident in the increased party-to-party relations between the ANC, United Russia and the Chinese Communist Party. Le Pere²⁷⁸ further describes South Africa's foreign policy under Zuma as one masked by 'diplomatic ceremonialism' without any concrete gain to the country's welfare. Economic diplomacy strategy during Zuma's tenure is further reinforced in the 2013 National Development Plan 2030 as a central point of South Africa's international relations²⁷⁹. Additionally, South Africa through the BNC in collaboration with the Department of Trade and Industry gets involved in projects like the Bas Congo Corridor and the Grand Inga Dam to help foster post-conflict reconstruction,

²⁷² Lالبahadur, A, and Rawhani, C. "South Africa's peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 24, no. 4 (2017): 523-545.

²⁷³ <https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Khulubuse-Zumas-R100bn-oil-deal-20150430-2> Accessed 25 February 2020

²⁷⁴ Lالبahadur, A, and Rawhani, C. "South Africa's peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 24, no. 4 (2017): 523-545.

²⁷⁵ <https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Khulubuse-Zumas-R100bn-oil-deal-20150430-2> Accessed 25 February 2020

²⁷⁶ *ibid*

²⁷⁷ Qobo, M, and Dube, M. "South Africa's foreign economic strategies in a changing global system." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 22, no. 2 (2015)

²⁷⁸ Le Pere, G. "Ubuntu as foreign policy: The ambiguities of South Africa's brand image and identity." *The Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 39, no. 1 (2017).

²⁷⁹ <http://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030> Accessed 26 February 2020

development and private investment for the country reaching trade deals amounting to approximately \$13 million²⁸⁰.

The Zuma government may have slightly shifted its focus from peace-building but it still remained committed to supporting the culmination of deadly conflicts in the continent. In terms of the approach to conflict resolution in Africa Zuma followed the footsteps of his predecessors Mbeki and Mandela. His administration goes further into continuing to assist countries like Sudan which Mbeki was highly involved in, CAR, Burundi and the DRC. Not only does the Zuma tenure assist in post-conflict reconstruction and development in the countries mentioned above, but his government also restores strained relations with the neighbouring country Angola, ensures the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe runs 'smoothly' and once more helps the DRC with the 2011 elections that unfortunately lead the country back to civil war giving rise to groups like the M23 and finally resulting to the UN's FIB with South Africa's assistance²⁸¹.

Economic relations with the DRC

South Africa has for many years dating back to the Mobutu Sese Seko era had economic engagements with the DRC. Trade relations between South Africa and the DRC were mostly in connection to the mining sector, whereby South Africa would supply goods to DRC's southern mining towns²⁸². South Africa had a strained business relationship with the DRC during the Mobutu administration, however after he left office and the DRC making it into the SADC through the help of South Africa that is when trade flows began between the fellow SADC members²⁸³. Post-1994 Pretoria has always maintained relations with Kinshasa that were mainly driven by political unity and tireless means to bring about peace and stability in the Great Lakes region and this was mostly during the Mandela and Mbeki administration. The

²⁸⁰ <http://www.thedti.gov.za/editmedia.j.sp?id=3761> Accessed 26 February 2020
<http://www.southafrica.info/business/south-africa-drc-economy-projects-2015.htm> Accessed 26 February 2020

²⁸¹ Landsberg, C. The concentric circles of South Africa's foreign policy under Jacob Zuma 2014
Lalbahadur and Rawhani, J. South Africa's peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model. 2017

²⁸² Besharati, N, and Mthembu-Salter, G. "Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC." (2016).

²⁸³ *ibid*

Department of International Relations and Cooperation indicates in their quantitative findings of bilateral relations between South Africa and DRC that there is an evident imbalance of bilateral trade between Pretoria and Kinshasa. The figures show that South Africa in 2012 was exporting more than it was importing from the DRC, with about R12 billion worth of exports and imports of a fraction of the R12 billion, R67 million²⁸⁴.

Figure 2 below is a comparison between imports from South Africa to the DRC and exports from the DRC to South Africa from 2006-2012

YEAR	IMPORTS FROM KINSHASA	EXPORTS TO KINSHASA	BALANCE OF TOTAL TRADE
2006	47 768 011	2 479 644 104	2 431 876 093
2007	54 034 126	4 369 539 310	4 315 505 184
2008	43 239 861	9 203 936 291	9 160 696 430
2009	72 354 386	4 829 931 726	4 757 577 340
2010	100 511 011	6 318 722 965	6 218 211 954
2011	106 500 768	8 040 664 774	7 934 164 006
2012	67 436 251	12 141 678 103	12 074 241 853

Source: <http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/bilateral/drc.html> Accessed 1 March 2020

Between 2000 and 2013 South Africa has had great trade relations with the DRC. Due to political instability, the DRC has not been able to attract foreign investment as it should. Mineral resources in the country have however assisted in keeping the DRC as a potential competitor especially in the mining industry and that is why it cannot be

²⁸⁴ <http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/bilateral/drc.html> Accessed 1 March 2020

entirely written off as an unstable country. According to Sidiropoulos²⁸⁵ South Africa engages with African states based on three objectives, the first objective is to strengthen institutions like South African Customs Union (SACU), AU and SADC, secondly to support programmes like NEPAD and RISDP-SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and lastly South Africa engages to strengthen its bilateral relations with individual countries. In a lecture on South Africa's foreign policy, DIRCO's minister Nkoane-Mashabane highlights the importance of economic development in Africa and asserts that as a country "We believe that greater intra-regional trade will produce considerable economic gains for Africa, accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty, and enhance food and energy security". Accordingly, the following discussion will look at economic sectors in the DRC that South Africa invests in, considering that the two countries operate under 36 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs)²⁸⁶.

Energy and Infrastructure

To date, the utmost significant economic tie that has been undertaken by the two countries is the Grand Inga Treaty that was signed in October 2013. This collaboration is potentially the region's super-power project of the generation of electricity from the Inga Dam. The prognosis of the 'Grand Inga' hydropower project is that it will be able to produce 40,000 MW of clean renewable electricity, befitting to be the largest electricity scheme in the world and possibly assist in 40% of Africa's power needs²⁸⁷. However, the six phase's project has had difficulties in its developmental and implementation plans, in that there are issues politically, technically and bureaucratically that have caused delays in the project. It was due to these reasons that Pretoria decided to sign a joint agreement-Grand Inga Treaty with Kinshasa with the aim of off-taking about 2,500 MW of 4,800 MW that is to be initially produced in the first phase of the project²⁸⁸. Besharati and Mthembu-Salter further state that the overall cost of Grand Inga is estimated to be approximately \$120 billion making it difficult to finance with phase 1 alone being estimated to cost \$14

²⁸⁵ Sidiropoulos, E. "African Regional Powers: The Foreign Policy of South Africa." The South African Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper 33 (2007).

²⁸⁶ Besharati, N, and Rawhani, C. "South Africa and the DRC: Evaluating a South-South partnership for peace, governance and development." (2016).

²⁸⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/28/construction-of-worlds-largest-dam-in-dr-congo-couldbegin-within-months> accessed 1 March 2020

²⁸⁸ Besharati, N, and Mthembu-Salter, G. "Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC." (2016).

billion. Eskom through the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) submitted a funding proposal for the project because the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) do not have the capacity to fund the billion-dollar project. NDB is yet to fund the power plant project, however, with South Africa's interest and relationship with China, the Grand Inga project might eventually be accomplished²⁸⁹.

Mining and Construction

South African presence in the mining sector of the DRC has existed since the early 1990s, Pretoria has numerous mining groups in the Great Lakes region. Some of these mining groups are originally from South Africa and work independently from the South African government, others, on the contrary, entered the DRC mining industry through the South African government²⁹⁰. Mining companies like AngloGold Ashanti (AGA)-third largest gold mining company in the world and De Beers-world's leading diamond company and Anglo Vaal are amongst the many independently operating mining companies in DRC and other companies like Mintek and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) are examples of parastatals that are operating under the Government of South Africa in the DRC²⁹¹. Gold mining has been one of the success stories of bilateral relations between Pretoria and Kinshasa with South African companies like AGA and Randgold owning 45% respectively of a joint venture- Kibali Gold that is estimated to be worth \$2.7 billion²⁹². Kibali is swiftly growing to be one of Africa's biggest gold mines, Randgold reports that in 2014 the mine produced 526,627 ounces of gold and 642,720 ounces the following year²⁹³. Similarly, South Africa has also cemented its footprints in the construction sector of Kinshasa, with the reconstruction and infrastructure developments taking place in the Bas Congo corridor, the country has invested about \$280 million through cement companies PPC Cement Company and Barnet Group²⁹⁴. PPC has also contributed to the construction of clinics, schools, youth training centres and churches

²⁸⁹ Besharati and Mthembu-Salter, "Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC." (2016)

²⁹⁰ Gbaya, D. "South Africa's Foreign Policy Toward the DRC: From Non-intervention to Intervention 1998-2013." 2015.

²⁹¹ ibid

²⁹² Besharati and Mthembu-Salter, "Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC." (2016)

²⁹³

<http://reports.randgoldresources.com/sites/reports.randgoldresources.com/files/Annual%20Report%202014-0.pdf> Accessed 1 March 2020

²⁹⁴ Besharati and Mthembu-Salter, "Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC." (2016)

in most communities. This is part of state rebuilding which is aimed at developing countries through infrastructure that was either destroyed during the war or did not exist and needs to be introduced in the country. Pretoria also contributes to construction industries in other African countries like Angola, Congo Brazzaville and CAR.

Telecommunications

In the past 15 years, the DRC has seen growth in the telecommunications sector through mobile telephones as with the whole world. The year 2002 is said to be the year that the DRC saw a vast opening in the telecommunication sector and as such Vodacom introduced itself to the DRC. Vodacom-DRC was then established with South Africa owning 51% and the Congolese Wireless Network (CWN) 49%, the South African government enjoys its 14% shareholder profit through the Vodacom brand not just with the DRC but with the rest of the continent where the company has presence²⁹⁵. The DRC, on the other hand, is said to have 19% ownership in CWN through Jaynet Kabila-the president's twin sister²⁹⁶. High political involvement in the telecommunications sector by both countries has led to or played a significant role in the establishment of Vodacom-DRC²⁹⁷. Vodacom-DRC has about 11.2 million users, country's coverage of about 47% and a market share of 34, 7%²⁹⁸, with that being said the Vodacom brand is set to have a promising future in the DRC market despite the disputes over ownership and shareholders that have allegedly been costly to the brand. South African companies like Vodacom have done more than just open up communication services in the DRC. The company in question has changed Kinshasa both socially and economically, it is said to be able to reach every corner of the country from the remote rural areas of the DRC to the war-torn eastern parts of the country, thus playing a crucial part in the communication industry of the people of the DRC. As part of social responsibility, Vodacom has been able to provide refugee

²⁹⁵ Besharati and Mthembu-Salter, "Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC." (2016)

²⁹⁶ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-05/congo-president-s-twin-sister-has-indirect-stake-in-vodacom-unit> Accessed 1 March 2020

²⁹⁷ Besharati and Mthembu-Salter, "Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC." (2016)

²⁹⁸ <http://www.vodacom.co.za/cs/groups/public/documents/document/integrates-report-2016-lores.pdf>

Accessed 1 March 2020

camps and schools in the eastern region with goods and services to help them to be able to function even in the dreadful conditions²⁹⁹.

Agriculture

Following the *Zaireanisation* policy in the early 1970s agricultural output across the Great lakes, regions declined. This policy was introduced by President Mobutu Sese Seko and it required foreign-owned companies in Zaire to grant majority shares in their companies to citizens of Zaire chosen by the government³⁰⁰. Consequently, this led to increments in agricultural imports of the country and became beneficial to many countries including South Africa and has been since then. Companies in South Africa to date export large scale of food products to the DRC, this has led to the long-anticipated arrival of the Shoprite store in Kinshasa in 2012³⁰¹. Pretoria and Kinshasa further formed a partnership in the agricultural business through Africom Commodities, a business based in South Africa's North West province to develop and enhance the agro-industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Africom Company manages Bukanga Lonzo a state-owned enormous farm in the western DRC, and this is one of the many but similar partnerships South Africa has with the DRC. Besharati and Mthembu-Salter further assert that Africom plans to establish a fertiliser factory and market of the agricultural product near the capital of the DRC³⁰².

South Africa is also involved in other sectors like the transport and financial sectors in Kinshasa. There are a number of Standard Bank branches in the capital of the DRC, Lubumbashi, Goma, Kolwezi and Matadi. Adding to this is the transport sector which is seen in the presence of South African Airways in the country, it is said that South African Airways (SAA)-state-owned company is the only airline to fly the Johannesburg to Kinshasa and Lubumbashi route and this takes place seven times on a weekly basis³⁰³.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to show how involved South Africa has been in the DRC, from the Mandela era to Zuma's administration to the FIB in 2013. The chapter

²⁹⁹ Besharati and Mthembu-Salter, "Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC." (2016)

³⁰⁰ *ibid*

³⁰¹ *ibid*

³⁰² *ibid*

³⁰³ *ibid*

revealed the shift of South Africa from political solidarity engagements to economic diplomacy between the two countries. More importantly, is how peace and stability have always been at the forefront of attaining sustainable development in the DRC. Landsberg (2009) further explains this assertion by stating that "there can be no successful peace-building without socio-development and political and economic stability and, conversely there can be no sustainable development and political stability without a successful comprehensive peace-building initiative".

In South Africa's case from the early 2000s the objective was to achieve both peace-building and socio-development in the DRC especially because of the economic potential that Kinshasa possesses. However, the political instability and the mineral resource dynamic of the conflict have made South Africa's objective a tiresome one. Participation in the peace enforcement realm opened doors to conversations about probably shifting from traditional peace-keeping to a more robust peace-keeping especially in the African context with the knowledge that Africa is faced with deadly wars that have led to numerous ripple effects. This is why South Africa is involved in conflict resolution not only in the DRC but regionally because of the greater good of the African continent.

CHAPTER FIVE: LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE IN 2013

Introduction

There are about quite a few themes that took precedence in this paper, namely peace enforcement-FIB, foreign policy and intra/inter-state conflict. The UN has been involved in countless peacekeeping missions to date, these missions, however, have not all been successful in a sense that the mandate of the mission is fully achieved. Chapter one of this study argues on the definition of a successful mission and what criteria is used to deem a mission successful especially in cases where you find a conflict recurring. Therefore, this chapter will solely unpack the outcome of UNSC Resolution 2098 to give a judgement on whether or not the mandate was achieved. In addition to that will be a recommendation on the concept of peace enforcement as adopted by the UN and its purpose in the future of peacekeeping.

The reason for the FIB in 2013

In all the years of peacekeeping in the DRC, there was never authority to specifically target armed groups to neutralize or disarm them. The FIB was the first offensive mandate by the UN in the country and also a mandate with such great military capabilities. This mandate to enforce peace came about through the need to protect civilians in the eastern DRC and also defend the state against rebel groups challenging the government of the DRC. Over 3000 soldiers from the SADC region participated in the FIB-the soldiers were from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania³⁰⁴, furthermore, there were three infantry battalions, one Special Forces and Reconnaissance Company and one artillery company³⁰⁵. The difference between the traditional UN peacekeepers and the FIB is that the former only use light weaponry with the aim of self-defence and the latter operates on offensive mode. For example, the FIB used drones, snipers,

³⁰⁴ Berdal, Mats. The state if UN peacekeeping: lessons from Congo. Journal of strategic studies. 2018, p 721-750

³⁰⁵ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml> accessed 29 march 2020

and heavy artillery and attack helicopters to confront the M23 head-on which was the largest rebel group at that time in the eastern DRC³⁰⁶.

According to the Human Rights Watch (2015), because the M23 had tremendous control over the city of Goma, they were vicious in their war crimes. The M23 alongside rebel movement FDLR planned and executed "attacks on civilian, murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, rape, torture, destruction of property, pillage, and outrages against personal dignity". It was for those reasons that an intervention brigade was imperative to disarm the M23 and its threat to the civilians. In August of 2013, the FIB made its offensive attack against the M23 by shooting gunfire at positions the rebel group had made just outside of Goma propelling them to move³⁰⁷. Furthermore, security parameters were then extended for a variety of offensive attacks around Goma and attack the M23 stations. All these efforts to silence the M23 materialised later in November after persistence pressure on the rebel group to seek ceasefire³⁰⁸. Consequently, the M23 relinquished its rebellion and many of the members of the group fled to the neighbouring country, Uganda, and they disarmed and surrendered³⁰⁹. Through this robust unconventional peacekeeping model called the Force Intervention Brigade, the UN alongside FARDC was able to conquer and defeat goliath called the M23, who was seen as the strongest and powerful movement in the eastern region and thus obliterating eastern DRC's major threat to the civilians.

Chapter one discussed in detail the definition of success, one definition that took precedence is that of the measures against success, in that success should not be measured against "an ideal state of peace"-being no armed conflict after deployment or against an ideal form of conflict resolution and how the degree of success could mean from one's perspective to another. As a result, this section will assess the performance of the FIB in the DRC context and only emphasis the experience of the M23 defeat. The most significant and undeniable achievement of the intervention brigade is the neutralization of M23 a rebel group that posed as a dangerous threat to the civilians in eastern DRC, the city of Goma, especially in the year 2013. This incredible defeat or neutralisation led to positive numerous effects. A UNSC report in

³⁰⁶ <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/intervention-brigade-end-game-congo> accessed 29 march 2020

³⁰⁷ Katombe, K. "U.N Intervention Brigade Fires on Congo Rebel Positions", Reuters. 2013

³⁰⁸ *ibid*

³⁰⁹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24849817> accessed 4 April 2020

December of 2013 on MONUSCO-FIB outlined the effects in the following order. Firstly the FIB targeted to M23 resulted in the abandonment of thousands of members from their illegal armed groups to joining the FARDC as a way of surrendering. Furthermore, many of the armed groups that were not even targeted by the FIB also integrated into the national army and participated in demobilisation camps³¹⁰. This led to a reduction in illegal armed group activities in the eastern DRC.

It is imperative to note that the success of the intervention brigade was due to the use of technology³¹¹. The use of drones by the UN in conflict states has been argued by scholars as an invasion or the lack of respect to sovereignty. However, with the challenges encountered by the DPKO on the ground, technology has become a befitting tool to utilise to fulfil mandates. For example, one of the difficulties of troops was tracking rebels especially in a dense terrain like the eastern DRC³¹². According to the Better World Campaign (2013), machinery like drones played a vital role in solving the problem of tracking of rebels and attacking them aloft. O'Grady (2015) also emphasizes the importance of drones and explains that drones have become a powerful tool, this is because they can go "as low as needed, often seen or heard by the local population" and they convey a message to say "we know where you are, surrender"³¹³. This has helped with Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) efforts leading to the disarmament and surrendering of not only the M23 but other factions as well. MONUSCO Force Commander General Santos Cruz told the UN News Center in 2013 that he believes: *with this equipment we combine information gathered in flight with information gathered on the ground by people. One can observe the movements of armed groups, movements of populations and can even see the arms carried by people on the ground, and it is also possible to see people in forested areas*³¹⁴.

With that said, it is clear to see that the deployment of the FIB was not the only significant factor in defeat the M23 but through the technological advantages like the

³¹⁰ Katombe, K. "U.N Intervention Brigade Fires on Congo Rebel Positions", Reuters. 2013

³¹¹ Selex, E. Falco UAV system fact sheet. Ronchii Legionario Italy: Finmeccaniza. 2014

³¹² ibid

³¹³ Pilgrim, S. Are UN drones the future of peacekeeping? .2015

<http://www.france24.com/en/20150409-un-drones-future-peacekeeping-democratic-republic-congo-fdlr-humanitarian-drc> Accessed 10 April 2020

³¹⁴ www.globalresearch.ca accessed 10 April 2020

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) the UN was able to fulfil its mandate and execute to full success in terms of neutralising the Movement 23 faction.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Overall the lessons that can be drawn from the FIB is that the AU Peace and Security Architecture needs to invest more into technological machinery as conflict resolution tool, in order to make haste the DDR process and curb conflicts from prolonging, leading to the post-conflict issues that are brought about by unending wars. The notion of African solutions to African problems is possible when fellow African states join their resources and collectively assist in a crisis. Of course, it is easier said than done but the reality is that, with planning and resources and correct implementation-conflict can be resolved. Another lesson that came about in the writing of this paper is that SADC countries-the DRC in particular need not be heavily reliant on the UN. This is because the UN is a big organisation and this means that it deals with countless crises arising across the world, which can also deem the organisation to be slow in hastily reacting to each conflict situation around the world. The FIB was a good mission in that it was a timely mission with specific goals to achieve, unlike the open-ended peacekeeping missions that have existed in the DRC without much of a positive outcome. Time-frames are important in missions because resources are used to the utmost ability, resources are not wasted and the financial aspect of the mission is on a strict leash. Furthermore, the FIB was made possible by the political will that was able to sustain the mission, without political will the mission would have not reaped the results it was able to. Another highlight was that of the absence of the AU in the FIB. FIB was solely managed through SADC-a sub-regional community, under the AU as a regional organisation-specifically the AU Peace and Security Architecture. If a sub-regional community can orchestrate a mission of that nature like that of the FIB, it is a clear indication that there needs to be strengthening of the existing structures in the continent so as to effectively resolve conflicts in the SADC region. These are policy issues that should be discussed in the AU, to agree that conflict crisis is dealt firstly through sub-regional communities and then escalate to the AU in need of assistance and from the AU to the UN if crisis requires an international body like the UN. Another issue with the AU and it not being able to act as a regional body like expected is that the regional organisation lacks a coherent membership. By coherent membership- the AU exists but the member states do not

believe in the same values of democracy, good governance and human rights as a collective. Some member states are not fully democratic and some leaders do not uphold human rights values in their countries. As a result, the AU needs to adopt prerequisites or conditions of membership to say, a state needs to meet the following requirements to be a member, this way heads of states can be held accountable for bridging the values of the AU and consensus can be reached easily in terms of how to address issues like conflicts or violation of human rights. Being a member of the AU should not just be automatic because one is in the continent but because of shared values and principles of transparency, good governance, upholding human rights and the prosecution of those who do not adhere to those shared values. FIB indicated throughout this study that sub-regional agreements or bilateral engagements have a better effect than that of umbrella bodies like the AU or the UN.

This does not imply that there are no policy issues in sub-regional communities as shown in chapter three whereby South Africa did not want any involvement in the DRC conflict. However, conflict or any other crisis, for example, a virus outbreak like Ebola in West Africa, can be better managed through sub-regional bodies and if constraints like resources and human capacity are inadequate then other bodies can be called upon to assist, this will only happen through the government's political will. The same with the AU, SADC also needs to revise the policy of how states become members, not only to say by virtue of geographical location but also standards and principles. This is because some heads of states have been known to be part of violation of human rights, or run their countries in a manner that is not democratic in nature. These are the policy implications that need to be addressed in these communities or organisations to make them work effectively for the benefit of the people who live in those countries.

Security exists for the sole reason of protecting something or someone, in the case of the FIB, the protection of civilians was a priority, ending the attacks against the civilians by the rebel group- M23 was the whole operation itself. However, troop contribution comes at a cost of expected casualty and this is what countries willingly do for a state in crisis. The discussion in chapter four above explains that troop-contributing countries can be propelled by national interests to deploy troops in a battlefield and this is the reality of peacekeeping. States risk their personnel to help

other states in conflict or war and as a result, these risks taken need to be calculated and give a result of at least zero casualties if any.

The importance of time frames to a mission like the FIB is to encourage Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) from being hesitant when sending troops for Intervention Brigade mandates due to using force because a country is basically sending troops to a battlefield and not just mere peacekeeping through observation. FIB intended to disarm mainly the M23 rebel group that had seized power of the City of Goma, and posing a threat to civilians with the sole aim of getting the attention of the Government of Kinshasa. Resolution 2098, however, has come across its challenges as a mandate. The first challenge is the shift of the nature of peace operations, the FIB defies the principles of impartiality, consent and non-use of force, leading to the view that the UN is taking sides in conflict situations and thus rebel groups targeting UN troops. The FIB was a successful mission because it aimed at disarming the M23 and protecting the civilians of the City of Goma and as a result, it achieved its objectives. However, DPKO maintains that intervention brigades are not going to be the standard peacekeeping operations but will only be used in environments that require robust action and not just observation and this is how the future looks like for the peacekeeping operations³¹⁵.

³¹⁵ Major General Cammaert (Ret), 2013

Bibliography

Ajulu, R. Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a globalising economy: the struggle for the soul of the continent. 28/27 Review of the African Political Economy. 2001,27-42

Ayittey, G. Africa in Choas.London. Macmillan. 1999

Barber, J. (2005). The New South Africa's foreign policy: principles and practice. International Affairs. 81,5. 2005, 1079-1096

Berdal, M .“The State of UN Peacekeeping. Lessons from Congo.” Journal of Strategic Studies 52, no. 1. 2017, 1–30

Besharati, N and Mthembu-Salter, G. Eyes on the Prize: South African Business in the DRC. 2016

Besharati, N and Rawhani, C. South Africa and the DRC: Evaluating a South-South Partnership for Peace, Governance and Development. 2016

Bellamy, A.J. and Williams, P.D. Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions. Oxford University Press. 1999, 385-6

Boulden, J. Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia (Westport, conn; Praeger, 2001, 15

Boutros-Ghali, B. An Agenda for peace .New York: United Nations. 1995, 278-294

Coning, C. Detzel, J. Hojem, P. UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine-Report of the Tfp Oslo Doctrine Seminar. Norway. 2008

Cammaert, P. The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo. New York: International Peace Institute, 2013

Cilliers, J. and Malan, M. Peacekeeping in the DRC-MONUC and the road to peace. 2001

Clifford, B and Edgerton, A. MONUC: flawed mandate limits successs. May 2003, 2

Congo Research Group, The art of the possible-MONUSCO's new mandate. 2018, 10

- Dlamini-Zuma, N. Briefing to the South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document.2000
- Dzinesa, G. “Postconflict Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Southern Africa”, *International Studies Perspectives*. 2007, 77.
- Dzinesa, G. & Joyce, Laker. Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the DRC. Policy advisory group seminar report. Capetown. 2010, 16
- Field, S and Ebrahim, E. “Whither regional peace and security? The story of DRC after the war,” a paper presented to the Africa Institute, Pretoria, 24 February 2000, 10
- Fabrice, M. “Understanding M23 and the current conflict in the DR Congo,”.2012
- Gbaya, D. 2015. South Africa’s Foreign Policy toward the DRC: From non-intervention to intervention 1998-2013. University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. p 22
- Giovanna ,K and Marco ,C. Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security. *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs*. VOL 19, NO.1. 2017, 44-68
- Habib, A. and Selinyane, N. “South Africa’s foreign policy and realistic vision of an African century” in *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future South Africa’s Foreign Policy: 1994-2004*, ed. Sidiropoulos, E. Johannesburg, RSA: South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).2004
- Hunt, C. “All Necessary Means to What Ends? The Unintended Consequences of the Robust Turn in UN Peace Operations.” *International Peacekeeping* 24, no. 2. 2017, 108–131.
- Herbert, R. De facto partition in the Congo. *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*. 2000/2001, 277
- Hussein, S. “From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo,”*African Insight*.1997; 27(1) 91
- Hough, L. A study of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and private military companies in Sierra Leone: Features, *African Security Review*, 16:4 (2004): 14
- Hill, C. *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. New York.: Palgrave. 2003,53
- <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>

<https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/>

<http://www.un.org/drc-agreementontransition2002>

<http://www.gov.za/about-government/international-relations-peace-security-cluster-1>

<http://www.gov.za/pahad-briefing-notes-international-affairs-4>

<https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1>

<https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Khulubuse-Zumas-R100bn-oil-deal-20150430-2>

<http://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030>

<http://www.thedti.gov.za>

<http://www.southafrica.info/business/south-africa-drc-economy-projects-2015.htm>

International Crisis Group (ICG). Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an ugly war, Report 26, ICG, Brussels. 2000, 13.

Ingrid van Osch and Joseph, Fragile Support: MONUC's reputation and legitimacy in the DRC. school of policy studies; Canada. 2010; 78

Jakkie, C. & Mark, M. MONUC AND THE ROAD TO PEACE.2001

Karlsrud, J. "Towards UN Counter-terrorism Operations?" Third World Quarterly 38, no. 6. 2017, 1215–1231.

Karlsrud, J. "The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace Enforcement Mandates for the UN peace operations in CAR, the DRC and Mali." Third World Quarterly 36, no. 1. 2015, 40–54.

Kabemba, C. "South Africa and the DRC: Is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo?" in South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa: Conference Proceedings, ed. Roger Southall. Pretoria: HSRC Press. 2006, 6-7

Katombe, K. "U.N Intervention Brigade Fires on Congo Rebel Positions", Reuters. 2013

Lalbahadur, A. "Moving beyond trophy diplomacy: how to consolidate South Africa's position in the world. 2014

Landsberg, C. "The impossible neutrality? South Africa's policy in the Congo war," in *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, ed. J. Clark. Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2002

Le Pere, G. "Critical themes in South Africa's foreign policy: An overview", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 36.2, 2014, 33.

Le Pere, G. 'Ubuntu as foreign policy: The ambiguities of South Africa's brand image and identity', *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 39.1. 2017, 93–115

Lemarchand, R. Exclusion, marginalization and political mobilization: The road to hell in the Great Lakes, Concordia University, Montreal, undated paper, p 6.

Lalbahadur, A. and Rawhani, C. South Africa's peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and dissonance with the liberal model. *South African Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 24. 2017, 523-545

Landsberg, C. The concentric circles of South Africa's foreign policy under Jacob Zuma. *India Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (2014): 153-172.

Mohamed, A. The United Nations and peace enforcement with special reference to Kuwait 1990-91: 1999, 15-45.

Major Robert. A, Lesson From Somali: The DILEMMA of Peace Enforcement. 1997; 2

Menondji, M.H.A. "Problematic peacekeeping in the DRC: from MONUC to MONUSCO". 2013

Monyae, D. "Learning to lead: South Africa's role in Africa: Lesotho, Zimbabwe Burundi and the DRC." PhD case studies (1994-2008), University of the Witwatersrand. 2014

Momoh, Z. New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Development in Africa Vol 3 No. 3. University of Ilorin, Nigeria. 2015

Mashabane, M. Speech by the Minister of DIRCO, Heads of Mission Conference. Sandton. 2000

Naidoo, S. "Ending the war economy in the DRC", in *The War Economy in the DRC*, IGD Occasional Paper no. 37, September 2003.

Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite. Lecture at University of the Witwatersrand. 2014

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A people's History. New York: Zed Books. 2002

Norheim-Martinsen, M., & Ravndal, J. Towards intelligence-driven peace operations? The evolution of UN and EU intelligence structures. *International Peacekeeping*, 18(4). 2011, 454–467

NEPAD. African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, NEPAD Secretariat-Governance, Peace and Security Programme. 2005

Novosseloff, A. et al, Assessing the effectiveness of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC-MONUSCO). 2019, 17

Omeje, K. “Understanding the diversity and complexity of conflict in the African Great Lakes Region,” in *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region*, eds. Kenneth Omeje and Tricia RedekerHepner. Indiana University Press, 2013; 6-46

Pilgrim, S. Are UN drones the future of peacekeeping?. 2015

Rudolf, P . “UN Peace Operations and the Use of Military Force.” *Survival* 59, no. 3. 2017, 161–182.

Rupiya, M. SADC and DRC: Regional political and military implications? CPS workshop on conflicts in the DRC.1998

Schoeman, M. “South Africa as an emerging middle power”. 2000

Sidiropoulos, E. and Hugues, T. “Between democratic governance and sovereignty: the challenge of South Africa's Africa policy”.2004

Stimson Centre and Better World Campaign, Challenges and the path forward for MONUSCO. 2016, 3

Selex, E. Falco UAV system fact sheet. Ronchii Legionario Italy: Finmeccaniza.2014

The Blue Helmets- A review of United Nations Peace-Keeping. New York, UNDPI, 2nd ed., 1990; 7-8

Terrie, J. The use of UN peacekeeping: the experience of MONUC. African security review 18.1. Institute for security studies. MONUC 2005-2007

Tshiyoyo, D. Democratic Republic of Congo: Road to Political Transition. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) paper. 2006; 1

Tull, D. The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. 2017,13

UN Peacekeeping Operations-principles and guidelines. 2008

UN News Centre. “UN Mission chief applauds joint operations against armed groups in eastern DR Congo” <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49738>

UNPeacekeeping. “What is peacekeeping?”
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml> 82

UNPeacekeeping. “Peace and security” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace>

United Nations. *Report of Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC*. New York: United Nations, 8 October 2002

United Nations (UN) Security Council. Document S/2015/19 – Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2015 Retrieved from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_19.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1234- Adopted by the Security Council at its 3993rd meeting on 9 April 1991. 1999

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1925 (2010) - Adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on 28 May 2010. 2010, 3

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2277 (2016)- Adopted by the Security Council at its 7659th meeting on 30 March 2016, 5/15

United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC Mandate, 2000. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mission/past/monuc/mandate.shtml> . Accessed 24 February 2020

Vlassenroot, K and Huggins, C. Land, migration and conflict in eastern DRC. 2004, 119.

Van Evera, S. Guide to Methods for Student of Political Science, New York, USA: Cornell University Press. 1997

Van Nieuwkerk, A. "Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors, and process." in Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Aapartheid.eds. Carlsnaes, Walter and Nel, Philip. 38-49. Midrand, RSA: Institute for Global Dialogue aissance Future, ed. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. Johannesburg, RSA: SAIIA.2006

Wagner, C. "From hard power to soft power? Ideas, interaction, institutions and images in India's South Asia policy." Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, Working Paper 26. 2005

White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy. "Building a better world, the diplomacy of ubuntu." 2011 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf

Walter, D. The Cloak and the Blue Beret : Limitations on intelligence in UN Peacekeeping. International journal of intelligence and counterintelligence, 12(4).1999, 414-447

Van Nieuwkerk, Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors and process. p 40

Zuma, J. State of the Nation Address, Cape Town, June 2009