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Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-Natal, 1987-1993

Deborah Rosemary Bonnin

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Sociology)

Johannesburg, 15 January 2007

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before, for any other degree or examination at any other university.

Deborah Rosemary Bonnin

…... th day of ……., 20…..

DEDICATION

**This thesis is dedicated to my daughter Nonkululeko Aimee Bonnin Mncube
Born into freedom, may you never know the horror the children of
Mpumalanga lived with.**

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates political violence between the United Democratic Front and Inkatha in Mpumalanga township, Natal. In the early 1980s and early 1990s Mpumalanga was one of Natal's townships most gravely affected by political violence.

I ask and answer four questions:

1. Why and how did the conflict between political organisations in Natal become violent?
2. What forms did the violence take?
3. Why, as a result of the violence did ordinary people with little prior history of political activity come to identify with either the UDF or Inkatha?
4. How were these political identities produced?

In order to answer these questions the thesis explores three primary arguments. The first argument is that 1987 represents a severe rupture in the politics of Natal. This rupture is captured in the violent form of political conflict that gripped the province. To understand this rupture the thesis looks back at a complex set of processes that interlocked over space and time.

A second major argument of the thesis is that an aspect of the distinctiveness of the violence was its profoundly spatialised form in combination with gendered and generational forms. There were two major shifts in the spatialised form of the violence. The first shift occurred when instead of only attacking individuals, the household and its members also became targets. And then the second shift was when the purpose of the violence was about the pursuit of territory. Boundaries between territories identified who was 'in' and who was 'out' and all aspects of everyday life became politicised.

The third major argument of the thesis is that there was a strong relationship between space/place and political identity. The re-territorialisation of space

during the violence was central to the production of these new identities. Political violence created new spatialities, with space itself acquiring political meaning and identity. The political meanings of these spaces were intense markers of their identity and overrode all other meanings and identities. As the spatial form of the violence shifted it forced people to question their political identities. The lived experience of the politicisation of everyday life by the violence shaped the production of political identities.

Keywords: Mpumalanga township, Natal, South Africa, gender, political violence, space, place, political identity, generation, United Democratic Front, Inkatha.

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Acronyms and Glossary

amabutho	Age-set regiments, often used to refer to groups of men used by Inkatha-linked warlords to attack UDF aligned residents.
*amagwala (*sg *igwala)*	Cowards (coward).
amakesi	Group of KwaZulu policemen who assisted Inkatha-linked gangs with weapons, ammunition and covered-up investigations.
*amakhosi (*sg *Inkosi)*	Chiefs (chief).
amaquabane (sg *iquabane)*	Comrades (comrade).
amathakathi (sg *ithakathi*)	Witches (witch).
ANC	African National Congress.
Azapo	Azanian People's Organisation.
Azasm	Azanian Student's Movement.
BAD	Department of Bantu Administration and Development.
bantustan	Refers to South Africa's homelands.
BC	Black consciousness.
BIC	Bantu Investment Corporation.
Biko, Steve	Leader and founder of Black Consciousness philosophy in South Africa. He was killed in police detention on 12 September 1977.
blackjacks	Name given to 'police' whose job it was to check passes and ensure that those residing in the townships were legally entitled to be in urban areas.
blackspots	Privately owned land that was not released.
BOSS	Bureau of State Security.
CA	Central Archives.
Caprivi Trainees	Men recruited by Inkatha, sent to the Caprivi strip to receive training in covert military activities by the SADF, later infiltrated back into communities to undertake covert activities that added to the political violence in the province. (See chapter 1, footnote 12).

CBC	Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner.
charterists	Referring to the Freedom Charter, the term indicates an organisation or individuals who are broadly supportive of the African National Congress.
CNC	Chief Native Commissioner.
com-tsotsis	Criminals posing as comrades, or comrades who are engaging in criminal activities.
Cosas	Congress of South African Students.
Cosatu	Congress of South African Trade Unions.
Fosatu	Federation of South African Trade Unions.
gogo(s)	*uGogo* is the isiZulu word for granny, gogos would be used to indicate plural when mixed with English.
Hayco	Hammarsdale Youth Congress.
hloniphia	Respect (literally); physical and linguistic deference (that a married woman must give to her husband, or a junior (male or female) must give to a senior). (see chapter 1, footnote 4).
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party.
impi	Historically the word refers to a regiment of the Zulu army. In the context of political violence, it refers to a group of men, usually affiliated to Inkatha, who were moving *en-masse* in order to intimidate or attack political opponents.
*impimpi (*pl *izimpimp*i)	Informer (informers).
*induna (*pl *izinduna)*	Headman, foreman (headmen, foremen).
*inkosi (*pl *amakhosi)*	Chief (chiefs).
intelezi	A particular kind of *umuthi* associated with war, it is usually used to strengthen and protect fighters prior to going to battle. Different types of *intelez*i could be used to protect against different aspects of war eg bullets, or to hide you from your enemy. Some people believed that if you used the body parts of your enemy the *intelezi* would be more powerful.
*inyanga (*pl *izinyanga)*	Herbalist (herbalists).
isiZulu	The Zulu language.
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission.

IYB	Inkatha Youth Brigade.
JMC	Joint Management Centre.
Jorac	Joint Rent Action Committee.
KFC	KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation.
*kholwa (*pl *amakholwa)*	Christian(s); believer(s). (see Chapter three, footnote 1).
kitskonstabels	Name given to the special constables - direct translation is instant constables - on account of the two-week training they received.
KLA	KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.
KZP	KwaZulu Police.
LRC	Legal Resources Centre.
manyano(s)	Literally unions. A Xhosa term for Methodist women's (mothers') church groups.
mbotiba	A particular style of black and white *takkies* (tennis shoes) associated with UDF membership.
MCCG	Mpumalanga Concerned Citizens Group.
MPURA	Mpumalanga Residents' Association.
NOW	Natal Organisation of Women.
NJMC	National Joint Management Centre.
NSMS	National security management system.
NUTW	National Union of Textile Workers.
oblom	Local name given to the special constables on account of their blue uniforms.
Operation Marion	Code name given to the training and deployment of the Caprivi trainees.
OSP	Office of the State President.
otheleweni	Insulting name referring to those supporting Inkatha.
PAC	Pan African Congress.
PAR	Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository.
*qonda (*pl – *oqonda)*	Groups of older men who played a role between that of cultural enforcer of tradition and *hloniphia* and vigilante cleaning up township areas of petty criminals. (see Chapter four, footnote 2).

released land	Land legally opened up for African occupation either through the South African Native Trust or through individual or group purchase.
SABT	South African Bantu Trust (previously known as South African Native Trust (SANT)).
SACP	South African Communist Party.
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions
SADF	South African Defence Force.
SANT	South African Native Trust (later South African Bantu Trust (SABT)).
SAP	South African Police.
SPP	Surplus People's Project.
SPUs	Self Protection Units. Inkatha-linked groups trained to 'defend' an area.
SSC	State Security Council.
stokvels	Privately organised group saving schemes, individuals would contribute on a monthly basis and the pool would be given to one of the members on a rotational basis. While many are cash-based, others are organised around funeral savings, school uniforms or food coupons, to mention a few examples.
TAWU	Textile and Allied Workers' Union.
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
toyi-toying	March/dance usually accompanied by singing or chanting, associated with UDF-aligned youth; often a sign of political protest.
tsotsi(s)	Criminals.
UDF	United Democratic Front.
ubuntu-botho	'Inkatha syllabus', introduced into KwaZulu schools in 1979. See Mdluli (1987).
uMkhonto Wesizwe	The armed wing of the African National Congress.
umnumzane	Homestead head (always male).
*umuthi (*pl. *imithi)*	Medicine (medicines).
umuzi	Homestead.

verkramptes	reactionary (Afrikaner nationalist) (O'Merea, 1996:xxvi).
verligtes	enlightened (Afrikaner nationalist) (O'Merea, 1996:xxvi).
WHAM	Win-hearts-and-minds.
UWUSA	United Workers' Union of South Africa.

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Chapter One: Introduction

In the late 1980s everyday life for many African people in Natal, South Africa was marked by the need to cope with a situation of profound and traumatic change. For people in many communities daily life had been turned upside down. What they knew was no more; communities and families were divided; and social customs and ways of doing things had been transformed. This situation was the result of the region being wracked by violent political struggles between supporters of, on the one hand, the United Democratic Front (UDF),[1] and on the other, Inkatha.[2]

As Beinart (1992) suggests, violence was a normalised feature of life in apartheid South Africa. Historically South African society has been structured around violence. Structural violence, repression and coercion were the central features of the apartheid state. Violence embedded itself into every facet of our society (see Cock, 1991; Marks & Andersson, 1990; Campbell, 1992) and in turn shaped the nature of state power. Not only did this violence reflect race and class power, apartheid also sought to entrench gender power. Just as gendered norms and practices shaped the apartheid state, so the state acted to transform gender relations in society.[3] Gender regimes in South Africa did not exist outside of this framework of violence.

While violence (and here I refer to political violence – instigated and structured by political conflict – including violence against women) was not a new phenomenon, what happened in 1987 was different from anything that had preceded it.

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[1] The United Democratic Front was launched in August 1983. It was part of the broader congress movement and was seen to be broadly aligned to the exiled African National Congress (ANC).

[2] Inkatha, (Inkatha Yesizwe) was launched in March 1975 as a cultural organisation of the Zulu people. However, from the beginning it had strong links with the KwaZulu Homeland Government and many have argued (see for example Maré and Hamilton, 1987) that its identity, structures and functions were inseparable from that of the KwaZulu Government.

[3] See Robinson (1998) for a theoretical discussion of this point.

There are five signifiers of this distinctiveness.

Firstly, there was an unprecedented intensity to the violence. Political violence in Natal was about killing, rather than intimidating or silencing political opponents. The 'beginning' of political violence was marked by a dramatic increase in the number of deaths (see Aitchinson, 1989b). For example in January 1987 the Unrest Monitoring Group recorded one person killed as a result of political violence. By July 1987 this had increased to fifteen, and in January 1988 162 deaths were recorded (Aitchison, 1989b:7). In total about 21 000 people (primarily Africans) were killed in the course of this war with even more becoming internal refugees (Independent Projects Trust, cited in Krämer 2002:1). The intensity of the violence also manifested itself in the pace at which it escalated. Very quickly it shifted from being between known political activists to encompassing the entire community. All residents became involved and implicated and nobody could escape the violence or its consequences.

The second marker of its singularity was the modality of the violence. Political violence had a profoundly spatialised form (in combination with gendered and generational forms). There were differences within the province with some areas being more acutely affected than others. Furthermore, there were differences in temporality, with different places being affected at different times. But most distinctive was the form the violence took within these places. This form shifted over time, initially being between individuals and finally being about the pursuit of territory. The spaces of everyday life became reterritorialised. Borders were established marking clear boundaries between territories or areas controlled by one or other political group. The meaning of these spaces changed. They became singular, the only meaning with any significance being who controlled that territory. This had profound implications for residents and even for visitors.

Thirdly, there is the question of who the actors were in the political violence. An

initial reading suggests that the violence was between those who were supporters of, on the one hand, the UDF and, on the other, Inkatha. A second look reveals other, subtler, fault lines. An examination of the statistics of those killed and injured in the violence (see Aitchinson, 1989b) indicates that the majority were young and male. In effect, the political violence concealed a generational rupture. Township politics became the domain of youth organisations, and politics the sphere of young men. Older people, men in particular, were marginalised from local politics. When the young men brought their political stances into the domain of the household it unsettled the practice of *hlonipha*[4] and consequently patriarchal relations.

Fourthly, the technologies of the violence were distinctive. Violence involved killing (first by stabbing and then by shooting), arson and rape. Initial reports indicated that the bodies that were found scattered around Natal's townships had numerous stab wounds. Soon, however, the press were reporting more and more incidents of death as a result of gunshot wounds. With the exception of the few areas known for faction fighting (eg Msinga) and *uqhwasha* (home-made guns), guns had not been a feature of conflict in the province. Reports of killings were soon accompanied by those of arson. The houses of those believed to support the opposing political group were torched. The inhabitants were often killed as they fled the burning house. This contributed to the spatialised form of the violence as in the wake of arson areas were cleansed of political opponents. The sexualisation of the violence resulted in many women being raped. Rape was a standard practice during many of the attacks on political opponents. Those (whether UDF or Inkatha) who protected their area expected young women to be sexually available on demand. The old ways of

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[4] *Hlonipha,* which means 'respect' is a cultural practice central to Zulu identity/ies. *Ukuhlonipha* refers to the practice of granting respect either linguistically or performatively on the basis of age or status. Children are brought up with a strong emphasis on *ukuhlonipha abadala* (respect for adults), and on non-confrontational ways of disagreeing with adults. It should be noted that in *isiZulu* there is no distinction between the concept of 'elderliness' and that of 'adulthood', thus even somebody one-year older requires 'respect'. Furthermore, status does not only apply to social position but also to gender, all women were required to *hlonipha* all men. (See Dlamini, 1989:483-385.)

'proposing love' vanished with the violence.

Fifthly, all African inhabitants of the province were assumed to have a political identity. They were either UDF or Inkatha. It was not possible to be politically neutral. Political violence reterritorialised the geography of the province. In the process these spaces acquired political meaning. Political identities were read off the place of residence of that person or their family. The spatial nature of the political conflict was a crucial element in the formation of political identities, with individual residents, households and entire neighbourhoods firmly identifying 'the other' whom they did not simply oppose politically but hated.

Prior to 1987 conflict in the region was not unknown. However, it had never previously reached this order in terms of deaths, arson and rape. Neither was the geography of the countryside politicised in the way that violence reterritorialised the province, turning areas into no-go zones for supporters of one or the other political grouping. Furthermore, before political violence the authority of the patriarch was relatively intact. Young men were not the leading political actors of the day. After 1987 all this was to change. This thesis attempts to account for these changes.

I have identified four questions for investigation.

1. Why and how did the conflict between political organisations in Natal become violent?
2. What forms did the political violence take?
3. Why, as a result of the violence, did ordinary people with little prior history of political activity come to identify with either the UDF or Inkatha?
4. How were these political identities produced?

These questions will be answered through an investigation of political violence in

Mpumalanga township, (see Map 1) which was one of the townships in Natal most gravely affected by political violence in the 1980s and early 90s.

1.1 Argument of the thesis

This thesis presents three arguments, which, will allow me to answer the four questions posed above. The first argument addresses itself to the first question. The second argument concerning the spatialised, gendered and generational form of the violence answers the second question. And the third argument will allow me to answer questions three and four.

The primary argument presented in this thesis is that 1987 represents a severe rupture in the politics of Natal. This rupture is captured in the violent form of political conflict that gripped the province. In order to understand how this rupture occurred and its consequences for the province it is necessary to look back at a complex set of processes that interlocked over space and time.

MAP 1: LOCATIONAL MAP SHOWING MPUMALANGA TOWNSHIP (PRE-1994 POLITICAL CONFIGURATIONS)



I suggest that political violence is the outcome of the intersection of three spheres – political dynamics at the local, regional and national levels. Each of these spheres had its own independent dynamics, but as they intersected over time and space, they shifted larger processes and changed broader political configurations. In order to understand the full complexity of the dynamics that resulted in political violence each of these spheres has to be examined in detail. 'Violence', I shall argue, is embedded in the articulation between them. Central to my argument is that the result, in this case violence, is a process. At different points along the way these articulations coalesce and sediment to produce something new which again interacts with the other spheres. The dynamics within each sphere, as well as the way in which their articulation interacts to produce new dynamics, was crucial to answering the question 'why'. I am suggesting that none of these spheres are determining. They all feed into the violence with each having its part to play.

Firstly, there is the local sphere. I suggest that it is necessary to examine the local sphere in extensive historical detail. An historical examination of the local sphere allows me to demonstrate the severe rupture that occurred in the form of politics after 1987 and the singularity of political violence during the 1980s and early 1990s. Political violence was not simply a state of increased or intensified conflict. Rather it was a different order of conflict. Political violence is a particular form of conflict that was qualitatively and quantitatively different from any conflict that preceded it. Furthermore, an historical examination indicates how authority was established in the area. It traces shifts in the modality of governance in the area and the effect of these on political identity and the politics of generation.

Secondly, an examination of regional dynamics allows me to plot the increasing tensions between the KwaZulu Government, Inkatha, the ANC and the UDF from the late 1970s and into the 1980s. One of the results was increased violence on the ground between supporters of the UDF and Inkatha. Much of the violence was the

outcome of instructions from the regional level, and local level interpretations of the relationship between Inkatha and the UDF/ANC. These fed into and exacerbated local dynamics.

Thirdly, I suggest that the violence could only flourish within a certain sort of state. During this period, a faction that had assumed dominance within an increasingly militarised South African state was able to push the faultlines that were emerging at both the local and regional level, in order to further its agenda. I will demonstrate how this agenda articulated with the demands of the KwaZulu government and facilitated political violence on the ground.

My argument in examining these three spheres is that, political tensions between the organisations' leadership and some violent clashes between its supporters are not sufficient to explain why ordinary people who had been living together in neighbourly co-existence suddenly started killing one another. Similarly, the state's covert activities, while able to bring about violence,[5] are not on their own sufficient to explain the longevity and intensity of the violence as well as the extent of the involvement of ordinary people. Ordinary residents, who had not been politically active, quickly assumed a political identity and on the basis of that identity judged friends to be enemies. The state did not as Haysom (1990) suggests just 'manufacture' the violence; it was able to hook into local networks and exploit local conflicts.

Embedded within, and often giving voice to, this wider regional struggle was a challenge to patriarchal[6] order in the province. Within Zulu society this patriarchal order was premised upon age and gender. Amongst men authority rested upon age,

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[5] See for example Haysom (1990) on vigilante activities in the eastern Cape.

[6] I am using patriarchy to refer to a pattern of social organisation (within the family, household and wider society) whereby men achieve and maintain social, cultural and economic dominance over

while all men had authority over all women. Culturally this was inscribed in the practice of *hlonipha* (see above), and was further entrenched by a political system whereby authority was vested in male traditional authorities viz the *amakhosi*. Dlamini (1998) argues that Inkatha transcribed the practice of *ukuhlonipha* into political culture and thus not only were age and gender to be privileged and respected but so was political leadership. Many authors (Marks, 1989; Carton, 2000; McCLendon, 2002) have demonstrated that the struggle of youth against the authority of the elders in Natal and Zululand is deeply rooted in the history of the province. My historical examination of the local sphere will demonstrate how in Mpumalanga township the South African state and the KwaZulu government collaborated to return authority to older Zulu men – authority which had been undermined by the unregulated nature of the *kholwa* norms ordering life in the pre-township era. These attempts did not go unchallenged by the youth. I shall argue that these challenges to patriarchal relations articulated with the rise of 'new' political organisations (many of them with a predominantly youth membership) and underlies much of the tension at the local level. I shall show how, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, politics increasingly became the domain of young men. In the process organisations that had previously mediated conflict became marginalised, and the organisations of the youth took control of the township. In the early 1990s these youth (and their organisations) were excluded from the peace settlements, and political control once more passed to older men.

The thesis will also demonstrate the double edge of this patriarchal battle. While, on the one hand, the youth challenged the patriarchal control of older men, on the other, they reasserted patriarchal control over women, particularly young women. I shall show that this reassertion was violent and brutal. Masculine public cultures of earlier periods were reinforced by the emergence of the violent politics of the mid-1980s. Rape and sexual violence were part of the everyday repertoire of violence in the

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females and younger males (Jary & Jary (eds*) Collins Dictionary of Sociology* (2nd ed), p.478).

township. Young men, whether on the side of Inkatha or the UDF, exerted their gender power over women, and expected them to be sexually available on demand.

A second major argument of the thesis is that an aspect of the distinctiveness of the violence was its profoundly spatialised form in combination with gendered and generational forms. This can be seen at a number of levels. Firstly, there were differences within the province itself, with some areas being more acutely affected by political violence than others (see section 1.2 below). Not only was the violence unevenly spread across the province (both in intensity and in location) but places were affected at different times. Secondly, within the places that were affected by violence I shall identify distinct moments when the form of the violence shifted. The empirical material will show that at first the conflict was between individuals who were clearly identified as being active in either the UDF or Inkatha. The first shift in its spatialised form occurred when instead of only attacking individuals, the household as a physical entity and other members of the household also became targets. The second shift ensued when the violence was no longer about the pursuit of individuals or households but the pursuit of territory. A third characteristic of its distinctly spatial form was the marking of clear boundaries between territories aligned to one or other political group. Political violence reterritorialised the spaces of everyday life. The boundaries identified the political affiliations of those within and all aspects of everyday life became politicised. The boundaries between territories controlled by different political parties became impermeable. Those who crossed them risked accusations of betrayal and possibly death.

As well as a spatialised form, the violence also had a gendered and generational form. These were finely interlinked. A number of writers (see Kentridge, 1990; Sitas, 1992; Hemson, 1996; Waetjen, 2006) have characterised the violence as the *amaqabane* (UDF-supporting, young, modern and male) against *oTheleweni* (Inkatha-supporters, adult, traditionalist and male). The empirical material presented here will show a

more complex picture than these simple binaries suggest. Its spatial character drew the population into the violence according to their age and gender. When 'the war began' it was confined to the male youth. In effect, political violence marginalised adult men from local politics. Yet, as the spatial form of the violence shifted, so did its gendered and generational form. Once households and territories became the targets, women were more directly affected by the violence and gender and age were no longer protectors. The articulation of modality, gender and generation illustrates the importance of a spatial analysis of the violence.

The third major argument of this thesis is that there is a strong relationship between space/place[7] and political identity. Prior to the violence political identity was a non-issue. Many people were members of Inkatha, but their membership was linked to a cultural rather than a political identity. An important characteristic of these cultural identities was their heterogeneity. Political violence dislocated these cultural identities. As a result of the violence cultural identities acquired political meaning, and new identities premised upon political affiliation were produced. On the one hand, affiliation to Inkatha was no longer only a cultural positionality but became imbued with political meaning. On the other hand, there was the production of an entirely new political identity grouped around the signifier 'UDF'.

The re-territorialisation of space during the violence was central to the production of these new identities. Political violence created new spatialities, with space itself acquiring political meaning and identity. Territories were seen as aligned with and thus belonging to one or other political group. The political meanings of these spaces were intense markers of their identity and overrode all other meanings and identities.

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[7] In much of the literature there is a tendency to see space as abstract and place as about meaning. Following Massey (1994) I will not be making this distinction between place as concrete and space as abstract (see below). Rather, she argues that places, which could be anything from a street to a mega-city, are intense nodes in a broader spatial network. Spaces, I will be arguing, are a range of forms of social/material organisations eg territories, nodes, networks, boundaries, connections, places, settings,

Individuals were required to account for 'who they were', the answer being read off their residential location. As the spatial form of the violence shifted it forced people to question their political identities. Individuals associated with a particular space, either through residence or employment,[8] were also labelled with that identity. The lived experience of the politicisation of everyday life by the violence shaped the production of political identities.

In many respects these were political identities devoid of politics. The UDF was constituted as a broad front. It was loosely constituted, allowing a range of organisations, including those that were non-political, for example church organisations, to affiliate. Its affiliates were diverse with no common policy, other than adherence to the struggle for a non-racial, unitary state and non-collaborationism, to bind them (see Seekings, 2000:49-51). I suggest that what it meant to be UDF was place specific and closely bound to local politics. In Mpumalanga it was antagonism towards Inkatha that brought people together, and for most the political identity 'UDF' was constructed in the heat of war. Rather than representing a finely nuanced exposition of UDF policies, it was an oppositional identity, crafted in relation to what it was not and injected with local subjective meanings.

Finally, the thesis suggests that during this period political violence fixed/closed the meaning of both place and political identity. These political identities emerged in response to the violence. Their form is conjunctural and historically specific; they are not essential identities. However, paradoxically, this process of identity formation produced identities that were rigid in content. Political violence did not allow the content of these political identities to be plural and diverse. They were authoritarian and homogeneous in character and inserted into different relations of power.

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etc, they are not abstract ie prior to the social.

[8] Interestingly the relationship between place of employment and political identity only seemed to hold for schools.

1.2 Overview of Political Conflict and Violence in Natal

To allow the reader to situate the political violence in Mpumalanga township within a broader chronology of political violence in the province, I shall provide a brief overview of political violence in Natal. This discussion allows a substantiation of my earlier argument that 1987 was a key marker, signifying violence of a different order from that which had preceded it.

Despite the normalising character of violence in South African society (see Beinart, 1992), the early 1980s saw an increasing number of clashes between Inkatha and 'others'. Initially the opposition to Inkatha came from students, for example KwaMashu Township students during the 1980 schools boycott,[9] but in time opposition to Inkatha widened to include township residents ie adults, opposed to rent increases. With the formation of the UDF in August 1983, student groups and residents associations eg Jorac[10] affiliated, coalescing the nascent opposition to Inkatha under one organisational umbrella. Despite the increasing opposition Inkatha was still able, in the first half of the 1980s, to generate a groundswell of popular adult support as demonstrated in the events surrounding Victoria Mxenge's assassination.[11] Although many adults judged Inkatha's violent opposition to the youth excessive,

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[9] Students had joined a nation-wide school boycott against overcrowding, lack of school equipment and books, lack of student representation and poor teaching conditions. It started in coloured schools in the Cape, spreading to Natal where it moved from coloured and Indian schools to African students in KwaMashu, Durban. Inkatha expressed opposition to the boycotts and urged the students to return to school. When this advice was ignored, Inkatha used intimidation and violence to break the boycott (see Jeffreys, 1997:46-47). It should be noted that this was the first major student protest activity in the province. Natal and Zululand students had not participated in the 1976 student uprisings.

[10] The Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) was a committee of residents' associations from the Natal townships of Lamontville, Hambanathi, Chesterville and Clermont (close to Durban). Its initial purpose was to oppose rent increases, but with the proposed incorporation of these townships into the KwaZulu homeland its major purpose switched to opposing incorporation.

[11] Victoria Mxenge was a popular Durban lawyer, she was a member of the Natal regional executive of the UDF and a leader in the Natal Organisation of Women (affiliated to the UDF). She was assassinated outside her house in August 1985. In response the youth took to the streets protesting her murder. Political protest soon involved the burning of premises associated with the state - both the

they were not yet ready to swing their support behind the youth (see Sitas, 1986). The turning point came with the formation, in November 1985, of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). At its launch Cosatu openly condemned Inkatha. Inkatha responded by launching UWUSA (United Workers' Union of South Africa), in opposition to Cosatu. Inkatha's opposition to strikes and stayaways called by Cosatu-affiliated unions became the impetus for violent clashes with Cosatu members as the targets, for example the May 1986 stayaway resulted in attacks on Transport and General Workers' Union affiliated bus-drivers in Pietermaritzburg (Kentridge, 1990).

While these clashes resulted in death, injury and arson during 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, 1987 is the year that marks the beginning of 'the violence' in the region as something new and different. Firstly, there was a sustained escalation in the number of deaths and arson cases. In most African townships around Pietermaritzburg attacks resulting in deaths increased during 1987 until in September of that year sixty deaths were reported for the month (Aitchison, 1989). This was a dramatic increase from previous months when reported deaths were below twenty per month. Over the next three years, reported deaths from political violence were to drop below fifty per month only six times (Aitchison, 1990). Secondly, at the beginning of 1987 the Caprivi trainees[12] (see chapter six) were deployed in various areas across Natal. They brought a new intensity to the clashes as was illustrated by the January 1997 KwaMakhuta massacre[13] (see Jeffrey, 1997). Thirdly, Operation Marion, which the

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National Party and KwaZulu. In response Inkatha mobilised *impis* of men to restore order.

[12] The Caprivi trainees were a group of 200 Inkatha-aligned men who were selected for covert military training by the South African Defence Force. The training was conducted in the Caprivi strip, hence their name. They were redeployed back into many different areas of the province were they became involved in the violent elimination of opponents to Inkatha, principally those aligned to the UDF.

[13] KwaMakhuta is a township just south of Durban. Armed assailants (later identified as part of the covert military capacity created through the Caprivi trainees) burst into a house in KwaMakhuta in the early hours of the morning. Thirteen people, including seven children, were shot dead. The target of the attack was 21-year-old Victor Ntuli who was a founder member, treasurer and area organiser of the

Caprivi Trainees were part of, introduced firearms into the conflict. Before this the fighting between Inkatha and the UDF was with 'knives and stones' (Hlongwane, TRC amnesty hearing, 21 April 1998, p.59).

The violence began differently in each area and developed dynamics peculiar to the public life of that locale. Over the next six years (and beyond) it spread through the province, surfacing,

> like an underground fire ... horribly, and to the outsider unpredictably ... in new arenas where power was being contested (Freund 1996:181).

It hooked into local issues and melded with local dynamics. In some places it was primarily generational, in others it appeared to be about land and resources, in yet others it surfed on age-old historic tensions; like an opportunistic virus it appeared to grab what it could and embed itself within the community.

Despite the differences between places, the broad trends were similar. The protagonists were men loyal to Inkatha, and youth aligned to UDF-affiliated youth congresses. The majority of those killed were men, most of them young (Aitchison, 1988). Skirmishing that began amongst the youth soon involved other members of the household as the political affiliation of the male youth transferred to the entire household. Households that were not deemed to have the 'correct' political affiliation or who were seen to be harbouring the enemy were attacked. The occupants were killed or forced to flee. Areas became associated with either Inkatha or the UDF, and they became 'no-go' zones for those associated with the 'other'. The violence reorganised the geography of the Natal countryside and in the process branded political identities onto particular areas.

During most of 1987 Pietermaritzburg and its surrounding peri-urban areas (see Map

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UDF-affiliated KwaMakhutha Youth League. Mourners at the funeral of six of those murdered, were also attacked by a 'mob' armed with guns. They were forced to scatter, but no-one was injured.

2) were the centre of escalating violence. The Pietermaritzburg townships had always been a weak spot for Inkatha (Gwala, 1989) as demonstrated by the support provided, against Inkatha's wishes, to the BTR Sarmcol strikers.[14] The surge in violence was attributed to resistance to Inkatha's recruitment campaign (Gwala, 1989). The conflict appeared generational with youth affiliated to the UDF pitted against elders supporting the chiefs and the KwaZulu authority. By the end of 1987 Inkatha was losing the battle in the Pietermaritzburg area. The security forces stepped in on the side of Inkatha. According to Jac Buchner, head of the security branch in Pietermaritzburg, they had 'restored a certain sense of law and order by February [1988]' (Smith, 1992:244). The UDF-aligned youth soon regrouped and by the end of 1988 the 'war' in the Pietermaritzburg areas was as bloody as before. Just as one area quietened down so another would flare up. It continued this way until the early 1990s (see Aitchison, 1990).

[14] Workers at the BTR Sarmcol factory in Howick embarked on a strike on the 1 May 1985, demanding management recognise their union MAWU (Metal and Allied Workers Union). They were fired within three days and began a campaign for reinstatement. Part of the campaign involved the mass mobilisation of the Pietermaritzburg community, including a boycott of white shops and a stay-away. Inkatha soon expressed their opposition to the strikers and began to organise the scab workers under the Inkatha-affiliated union UWUSA (United Workers' of South Africa) (see Bonnin, 1988).

MAP 2: NATAL AND KWAZULU SHOWING SOME OF THE TOWNSHIPS AFFECTED BY POLITICAL VIOLENCE



SOURCE: Minnaar, 1992(a):26

Table 1: Deaths in Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Midlands, 1987-Oct 1989[15]

Year	Deaths
1987	397
1988	691
1989 (Oct)	531

Source: Aitchinson, 1989b:7

In the greater Durban area the cleavage seemed to be between those with access to land, housing and resources and those without ie between those living in formal townships and those in informal areas (Louw, 1989; Morris and Hindson, 1992). The 1985 riots following the murder of Victoria Mxenge had underscored the potential for conflict between informal settlements and residents of formal townships. This was exacerbated by the increasing power of shacklords like Thomas Shabalala of Lindelani (an informal settlement near KwaMashu, Durban). Inkatha increasingly used the *amabutho* (age-set regiments) controlled by Shabalala to bring dissident youth under control. They were deployed across the province in support of local Inkatha leaders in areas where the UDF was 'getting out of control'. Another significant source of conflict was dissatisfaction with the education system (Louw, 1989).

During 1988 key flash points in the Durban area were Umlazi and KwaMakhuta (south of Durban), Inanda and KwaMashu (north of Durban), and the Molweni/Ngcolosi area (near Hillcrest, west of the city) (see Map 2). By 1989 the areas affected had expanded to include Umbumbulu further to the south of the city, and Ntuzuma and Ndwedwe stretching north from Inanda (Minnaar, 1992a). In 1989 the Durban area accounted for sixty percent of incidents in the province, indicating a

[15] These are not official South African Police figures. Monitoring groups collected data under extreme duress. For this reason, and the fact that categories used by different monitoring groups frequently overlapped it is difficult to compare data bases.

shift in focus from Pietermaritzburg to Durban (Louw, 1992).[16] The number of incidents dropped in the early '90s but by 1992 the number of incidents in the informal settlements around Durban - Malukazi, Uganda and Ekuthuleni (all south of Durban on the outskirts of Umlazi) - were escalating (Louw, 1992).

Table 2: Frequency of Events and Fatalities by Year in Natal

Year	No. of Events	Fatalities
1989	751	559
1990	1 694	1 685
1991	1 201	1 094
1992 (April)	273	282

Source: Louw, 1992:35.

At first the violence was confined to the urban townships of Natal. But in mid-1989 there were reports of the violence having spread to the rural areas (Minnaar, 1992a), these included Swayimane (near Wartburg), Ehlanzeni (near Camperdown) Indaleni and Magoda (near Richmond) and Llalane (near Greytown) (see Map 2). Some of these were urban-style townships located outside small rural towns, others tribal areas under chiefs. This trend escalated in 1990 and into 1992. Just when the conflict seemed to be contained in the Pietermaritzburg and Durban areas, violence engulfed the lower south coast as far down as Gamalakhe near Port Shepstone, as well as the north of the province, eg the township of eSikhawini (near Richard's Bay), and spread inland to the west, for example Bruntville (Mooi River) in 1990 and Wembezi (Escort) by the end of 1991 (see map 2). All these small townships became caught up in their own version of this civil war.

[16] Mpumalanga township is variously recorded under both the Pietermaritzburg/Midlands area and the Durban area by different monitors. But what everyone agrees is that it was one of the worst affected areas during the late 1980s/ early 1990s. I have not included it in this overview discussion as I will be

In February 1990 the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) were unbanned. Instead of this reducing the violence, new dynamics emerged. Not only was there a greater influx of arms into communities but also the arms themselves were more sophisticated (Minnaar, 1992a). In an attempt to purge whole areas of UDF support Inkatha launched large-scale and well-organised attacks with good logistical support.[17] The largest and most publicised of these was the Seven-Days War in the Vulindlela and Edendale areas, (AHCC, 1990; Aitchison, 1991; Jeffery, 1997) but there were similar attacks in Mpumalanga. Once an area was 'won' by one political group, and by definition became a 'no-go' area for the other group the conflict settled. In some areas this scenario led to a new sort of conflict when 'comrades' threatened criminal elements in the community with organisational discipline (see Collins, 1992). Criminal gangs, often known as *com-tsotsis* emerged eg KwaNqetho (near Hillcrest) and KwaMashu, to provide new torment for residents.

The 1991-'92 period saw increased mobilisation of hostel dwellers in the townships around Durban (Louw, 1992). The launch of the South African Hostel Dwellers Association in Umlazi in May 1991 was linked to their mobilisation and politicisation. Inkatha leaders addressed the gathering urging hostel residents to resist the transformation of the hostels into family units. However, according to Minnaar (1992a:21) by 1992 many communities exhibited a 'general weariness' for violence. The targets shifted from communities to 'the selective elimination of leaders', for example Winnington Sabelo of the IFP in Umlazi, and S'Kumbuzo Ngwenya of the ANC in Imbali. In the run-up to the 1994 elections tensions escalated once again. The violence had ensured the province was divided into no-go areas according to political dominance. This meant little free political activity or campaigning for those

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discussing it in detail below.

[17] It was alleged that this support was provided by the South African security forces.

parties involved in the election.[18] For some time after the elections the incidents of violence remained high. But continuous political efforts at the regional level, coupled with investigations (frequently unsuccessful) into the apartheid state's involvement in the violence, managed to establish lasting peace in many areas. Nevertheless, even by 2000 the SJ Smith Hostel south of Durban and home to thousands of men remained a source of violence between supporters of the ANC and Inkatha. And there are still some areas, like Nongoma, where the situation is tense and open conflict threatens.

1.3 The Existing Literature on Political Violence in Natal

This thesis provides a substantially different contribution to the literature on political violence in Natal. This contribution is three-fold. Firstly, through my argument that political violence is the outcome of the articulation of multiple trajectories operating across different spatialities I move away from the structuralist interpretations that inform much of the existing literature (see below). Secondly, within the existing literature, there is little focus on, or analysis of, the form of the violence. Thirdly, no-one has attempted to understand why ordinary people with little prior history of political activity became identified with the UDF or Inkatha and how these political identities were produced.

Since the mid-1980s political violence in Natal has been fairly well documented. However, much of the existing literature was written with a political rather than an academic purpose. The documentation and descriptions were to alert the public to the horror of what was happening and to shame the state into an impartial intervention to end the violence.

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[18] Initially Inkatha boycotted the election, deciding to participate at the eleventh hour. The 1994 election results reflected the geographical divisions resulting from political violence. Those areas that had, during the violence, been dominated by the UDF returned results in favour of the ANC, while those areas that had been dominated by Inkatha reflected a majority vote in its favour. These patterns were still reflected in the 1999 elections.

The bulk of the Natal literature falls into four different types. Firstly there is what I call 'count the bodies'. A number of monitoring projects recorded the various attacks and incidents: initially John Aitchison (Unrest Monitoring Project, Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg) in the Natal Midlands, Black Sash, the Natal Monitor and the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) in the coastal region and the Christian Ministries in southern Natal. In the 1990s much of this work was taken over by the Human Rights Commission, though the Natal Monitor continued its work including the publication of reports. Indicator Project, based at the University of Natal, Durban, kept a database of incidents. This very necessary and vital monitoring work was concerned with recording events and keeping statistics of deaths and injuries. The records form invaluable raw data for researchers and other interested parties. Much of this work is not written up, and remains unpublished. The exceptions are the Black Sash, which produced and distributed a monthly bulletin of incidents as did the Natal Monitor. John Aitchison, utilising his project's data, wrote a number of papers (1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b, 1991), however, the majority are unpublished. The Indicator database provided the material for a number of foci published in Indicator SA (see Bekker, 1992; Bennett & Quinn, 1988).

Secondly, there are the 'description of events' (Aitchison, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990a, 1991; Booth, 1988; Hartley, 1988; Kentridge, 1990; Louw, 1992; Minnaar, 1992b) and within this the sub-group of 'community case-studies' (Minnaar, 1992a; Stavrou & Shongwe, 1989; Ziphakamise, 1991). The 'description of events' pieces provide the reader with an overview chronology of the violence. They try to order, make sense of, and in some cases periodise the violence. For example Aitchison's 'A Story of What Happened' (1990a) presents a detailed chronology of events in Pietermaritzburg. While serving the very necessary function of informing the general reader, these accounts rarely move beyond the descriptive. While I have slotted Kentridge's (1990) book into this category, it is not an easy fit. *An Unofficial War* is

a significant and substantial piece of work, but limited in a sociological context by its journalistic style. The best example of the 'community case-studies' is Anthony Minnaar's (1992a) book *Patterns of Violence*. This is an edited collection of case studies of communities caught up in the violence. Focussing on the 'hot spots', the various articles are descriptive accounts of events in one community. They concentrate on documenting the horror of an accumulation of events. Their strength lies in their focus on the local. For example, in Bruntville (outside Mooi River) conflict centred around existing tensions between hostel dwellers and township residents, while in Richmond the tensions between the youth on the one hand, and traditional leaders and agricultural workers on the other, mirrored historical tensions between areas occupied by formal sector workers and the informal areas that are home to agricultural workers. Yet the limitations are that the local dynamics are not analysed, only described. Connections between the history of the place and the contours of violence are never drawn. There are no attempts to ask questions about the genealogies of political violence in that place or the different trajectories that might have shaped the violence in that locality. However, this literature does draw attention to the spatially differentiated character of the violence between places and hints at its profoundly spatialised form. This suggests that spatiality is a necessary analytical tool if one wishes to understand the transition from political conflict to violence.

Thirdly, there is a literature that looks at the impact of this violence on different sectors, what I call the 'sectorial studies'. For example: Paulus Zulu (1993) focused on hostels, Doug Hindson, Mark Byerley, and Mike Morris (1994), and Cross et al (1988) examined the effect of violence on development, Ari Sitas (1992) and David Hemson (1996) have looked at the youth, Vaughan John (1990) and Wendy Leeb's (1988) work is on refugees (also see Smith & Khumalo (1992)), Gultig & Hart (1990) and Nzimande & Thusi (1991) have investigated children and schooling. These studies illustrate the enormous social ruptures that have resulted from the violence. In

the main they demonstrate the negative effects of violence; the breakdown of community and family life, violence's contribution to increasing poverty, the complete disruption of the education system, and the psychological damage. Nevertheless, Sitas (1992) does suggest that in all of this the youth are not just victims. He takes issue with Woods (1989, 1992) and argues that the comrades are not disaffected youth damaged by poor socio-economic conditions. Rather they formed themselves into a distinct social movement with their own political language, vision and cultural codes. This movement represents itself as in opposition to the existing order signifying legitimate authority.

Fourthly, there are a series of articles (Aitchison 1990b; Booth & Biyela, 1988; Gwala, 1989; Hindson & Morris, 1990; Louw & Bekker, 1992; Minnaar, 1992b; Morris & Hindson, 1992; Taylor & Shaw, 1992; Woods, 1989, 1992) and two books (Jeffery, 1997 and Kentridge, 1990) which try to examine the causes of political violence, the reasons behind the escalation of brutal incidents and counter-incidents. This literature can be further divided into two main subsections; that which sees political factors as the source of the violence (Aitchison (1990b) and Gwala (1989)), and that which provides some variant of a socio-economic explanation for the violence (Booth & Biyela (1988), Hindson & Morris (1990, 1992), Taylor & Shaw (1992) and Woods (1989, 1992)). The political explanations range from the crude eg 'tribal' or 'black-on-black' violence, to the more sophisticated argument of Gwala. He shows how Inkatha's reliance on homeland structures for 'bureaucratic entry points to gain control of areas' put it into automatic opposition with any group that opposed collaboration with the state.

The difficulty with much of this work is the assumption that sufficient political rivalry will produce violence. I take issue with this literature on two accounts. Firstly, implicit in this writing is the idea that political violence is an intensified version of political conflict. And secondly, their failure to recognise that the 'outcome' violence

is the result of a process; there are multiple trajectories that feed into the violence with each having its part to play.[19] The socio-economic explanations also cover diverse views; Hindson & Morris (1990, 1992) centre their argument around the socio-economic conditions arising from the weakening of apartheid, while Taylor & Shaw (1992) suggest that it is the socio-economic conditions arising from apartheid itself which are responsible for the violence. They argue that Hindson & Morris's argument marginalises the political and does not 'probe the linkages between material and political factors' (Taylor & Shaw, 1992:15). Despite their proposal that it's necessary to investigate 'how political consciousness is actively constituted and reconstituted within a changing dynamic' they don't actually do this work or offer any concrete proposals on how it could be done. Woods (1989, 1992) adopts a different approach and argues that there are a number of causal factors and that it is these causal factors that have a socio-economic base. All these explanations operate at the macro-level with the analysis pivoting on structural contradictions. Similarly to the 'political explanations' school the analyses seem to assume that violence is an inevitable outcome of conflict. By ignoring the dynamics and tensions of particular places and localities and the role of local politics and grassroots organisations they also remain silent about the multiple trajectories that produce the violence and its different forms in different places.

One study that deserves special mention is Mhlongo's (2004) unpublished study of political violence in Mandeni. In this masters' dissertation Mhlongo is interested in understanding the 'causes' of the political violence, but unlike some of the other literature in this category, he pays keen attention to the dynamics of place. He provides a very detailed and interesting study of political violence in the Mandeni/Isithebe/Sundumbili area. Unfortunately, the study tends towards the

[19] However, these criticisms are not entirely fair to Gwala's work. He does provide a more sophisticated account, examining local and provincial dynamics in detail. I find his work very suggestive and it has enabled me to develop my thinking in this arena.

descriptive and ultimately the conclusions tend to be self-evidential rather than analytical.

The major (and only) debate in the literature has been around the causes of the political violence. The 'political causes' position, pointing to police partiality in supporting Inkatha, suggested that the violence was a deliberate destabilisation strategy linked to strengthening the KwaZulu homeland. The 'socio-economic' position argued that the violence had a material base in communities' differential access to resources. Subsequent evidence showing the direct and deliberate complicity of the state in stoking the violence shows these arguments to be fatally flawed (see chapter six). While some of the literature advocating a 'political causes' position does refer to police involvement (Aitchison, 1990b), this work with the exception of Gwala (1989), is limited by its failure to move beyond the descriptive and never fully engages with the role of the state. As my study will demonstrate, the militarised apartheid state was able to hook into local networks and exploit local conflicts. By ignoring the articulation of covert state interventions with local politics their analyses are only able to provide a partial explanation.

A further difficulty with all these explanations is that they skirt too closely the trap outlined by Beinart (1992) whereby African political conflict is explained as a response to conquest, dispossession and the authoritarian nature of colonial rule. Beinart suggests that adopting a contextual approach to understanding violence is not sufficient to explain the forms of violence within African communities. While it is necessary to locate violence in its 'colonial historical context' (Beinart, 1992:469) and so avoid the colonial and racist discourse that sees African societies as intrinsically violent (eg the 'black-on-black' analysis), it is also imperative to 'avoid the ahistorical assumption that African violence was born in the colonial era' (Beinart, 1992:469). Freund (1996:186) recognises this conundrum and argues that it is important to

> establish deeper historical and cultural connections ... because these reveal continuities in form in the history of conflict in the region.

Clegg's research (cited in Freund, 1996) on rural faction fighting and Sithole's (1997) research on land disputes in the Umlazi location demonstrate some of these continuities. Nevertheless, none of the literature on contemporary political violence has attempted to probe for historical continuities. While such continuities might be difficult to find in newly constructed urban townships (many of which were the scene of intense conflict) I suggest that it's necessary to locate the political violence of the 1980s in a place where space had already acquired particular meanings.

One study that does require mention is the work of Krämer (2003, 2004).[20] Through an in-depth exploration of one locality, the Inchanga / Fredville area, he investigates the dynamics of political violence in that community. With his desire to establish that political violence is a 'different type of conflict altogether' (Krämer, 2003:4) and to argue that one needs to establish the 'specific local factors' that 'played a crucial role in the onset of violence … [and] even more in its subsequent course' (Krämer, 2003:4) there are striking similarities in our approach.

A serious weakness of the literature on political violence is the absence of gender as an analytical tool. Furthermore, it is completely silent about women - the effect on them, their participation and roles. It assumes that political violence is about men. Most of the literature, to cite Cockburn (1998:12/13) assumes a 'curious 'present absence' of gender'. It presents a sex-differentiated picture with 'men and women acting out their age-old trans-historic roles' (Cockburn, 1998:12/3). The exceptions are a few short popular pieces, in the feminist journal *Agenda* commissioned by the Editorial Collective (see Annecke, 1990; and Irish, 1993), and in the grassroots women's magazine *SPEAK*, and one chapter in Kentridge (1990) which looks at the

[20] Krämer's research work was towards a Phd thesis titled 'Violence as Routine. Transformations of Local-level Politics in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa'.

effect of political violence on women. These short articles are concerned with describing how women are affected by the violence. An article by Campbell (1992) links a crisis in African men's masculinity to the wider political violence. She suggests that it is within the family that men learn to be violent. However, while Campbell raises these issues, her article is only tangentially concerned with political violence. By focussing on the lives of women in areas affected by political violence, this study adds to the literature by exploring the ways in which political violence affected men and women differently both in its time-frame and in its modality, and how this articulates with the production of political identities.

Furthermore, this study raises questions of gender and generation; a theme that is also missing from the current literature. Much of the literature (see for example Kentridge, 1990; Sitas, 1992; Hemson, 1996) suggests that the violence is between elder men on the Inkatha side and younger men on the side of the UDF. This study shows that this is not the case. This thesis illustrates the ways in which the violence represents a generational rupture, fundamentally challenging and reforming generational power within the province. Additionally it adds to the literature by illustrating that embedded within the violence was a challenge to patriarchal order. The generational rupture represented a challenge to the patriarchal power of older men, but the gender violence (a theme not discussed in any of the existing work) encapsulated in the political violence sought to realigned gender relations between young men and young women. Thus, political violence asserted the patriarchal power of young men in relation to both older men and women.

In many respects I am also seeking to understand the 'causes' of the violence. What distinguishes my approach from the rest of the literature is my emphasis on process. I go beyond simple arguments of causality to explore how multiple forces are implicated in the political violence. While the participants in the debate around the 'causes' of the violence might ultimately be seeking to answer the same question

'why' their approach and starting point are very different. Thus a fundamental critique of the existing literature on violence in Natal is implicit in the analytical framework of the thesis.

1.4 The Meaning of 'Zuluness' and Zulu Ethnicity in KwaZulu-Natal[21]

This question is a central sub-text of the thesis. While not directly posed for investigation, it nevertheless lurks beneath many of the explanations for political violence. Inkatha, with its project of politicising Zulu ethnicity, firmly defined what it meant to be Zulu (see Bonnin et al, 1996). However, as the literature demonstrates there was a heterogeneity of meanings attached to 'Zuluness' which as Sitas (1988) argues meant many African residents of the province remained unavailable for ethnic mobilisation.

What constitutes Zulu ethnicity and the meaning of that identity has been widely written about (see Maré & Hamilton, 1987; Sitas, 1988; Marks, 1989; Maré, 1992; de Haas & Zulu, 1994; Campbell et al, 1995; Morrell, 1996; Wright and Hamilton, 1996; Dlamini, 1998; Muthien & Khosa, 1998). Much of the discussion on Zulu ethnicity has centred on the 'fashioning and mobilisation of this experience by political brokers for political ends' (Campbell et al, 1995:288). It suggests that it is imperative to distinguish between ethnicity as the 'lived experience of ordinary people as the perceived members of an ethnic group' and its mobilisation for political ends. While these two elements of ethnicity often interconnect they are discrete concepts and need, as the authors remind us, to be kept analytically separate.

Both concepts are relevant to my argument in this thesis. As I have suggested earlier an important characteristic of cultural identities in Natal was their heterogeneity. For

[21] The reference here to KwaZulu-Natal should be read as meaning the place occupied by this

some people, an aspect of their lived experience as Zulus was the politicisation of their ethnic identities, which made them available for political mobilisation. But for others their lived experiences ensured that their ethnic identities remained cultural and they were not available for ethnic mobilisation.

Furthermore, ethnicities are historically specific and their meanings shift over time. The broader post-modern literature on identity (see for example Hall, 1992) suggests that ethnicity, along with other social identities, is a contingent rather than essential feature of human nature and organisation. Wright and Hamilton's (1996) work illustrates that ethnicity is not an inherent feature of African, and in this case Zulu, society. Their work demonstrates the political, social and economic changes that constructed ethnic differentiations in the early Zulu kingdom. They show that a broader Zulu identity within the Zulu kingdom did not develop until the late nineteenth century; furthermore, it was not until the twentieth century that this identity was appropriated by Africans south of the Thukela River (ie living in Natal).

The historical specificity of the construction of Zulu ethnicity is further developed in the work of Marks (1989). In her examination of African politics in early twentieth century Natal and Zululand she argues that by

> Using the building blocks of past history, language, and 'custom' twentieth century ethnic consciousness has been the product of intense ideological labour by the black intelligentsia of Natal and the white ideologues of South Africa (Marks, 1989:217).

Concerned with the degenerative consequences of urbanisation and modernity, the African Christian community of Natal (the *amakholwa)* together with the pre-colonial ruling class forged a 'pan-Zulu identity' (Marks, 1989:233). Key organising elements in the construction of this identity were: symbols of the Zulu monarchy and its history; the need to preserve Zulu tradition and custom (most important the adherence to practices of *hlonipha*); the need to reassert moral control over women

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province historically as well as in the current period.

and youth; and an ethnic chauvinism towards non-Zulus.

Other work has also indicated the ways in which Zulu ethnic identity has been crafted both from above and below (see Sitas, 1988; de Haas & Zulu, 1994). De Haas & Zulu (1994:437) refer to apartheid's race classification policy, mother-tongue education and the homeland policy whereby a ''Zulu nationality' was imposed on all those who were assigned identity as citizens of the 'national state' of KwaZulu'. Maré (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987; Maré, 1992) has demonstrated the ways in which Inkatha and its leader Chief Buthelezi have shaped Zulu ethnic identity and consciousness through the honouring of traditional authorities, particularly the institution of the monarchy; the establishment of a common origin in Shaka as the 'founding father' of the Zulu nation; their glorification of a proud Zulu warrior past; and arguments of cultural distinctiveness. Sitas' (1988) paper suggests that while these 'projects from above' have had some measure of success, in that by the late twentieth century African people residing on both sides of the Thukela River in Natal subjectively identified with the ethnic group Zulu, the meaning ascribed to this identity was not uniform. He argues that

> There is no 'Zulu-ness' held in common by all black workers in Natal, despite the fact that most of them identify themselves as 'Zulu'. The appropriation of this ethnicity by black workers is related to their varied forms of historical experience.' (Sitas, 1988:19)

He identifies the varied experiences of their relationship to land, dispossession, proletarianisation and chieftainship as responsible for 'heterogeneous clusters of meanings and traditions of resistance'. These varied and different experiences are closely tied to 'place' of residence.

Campbell et al (1995) and Dlamini (1998) have explored more closely the subjective meaning of 'Zuluness' for some residents of KwaZulu-Natal. Dlamini (1998:475) suggests that Zulu identity in KwaZulu-Natal has four criteria of identification – birthplace, descent, language and history. To this should be added 'familiar and

understood ways of behaviour' – with the practice of *hlonipha* being most important. She argues that political groups have used these criteria of identification (ie birthplace, descent, language and history) differently in order to construct and formalise certain practices as 'Zulu'. Similarly, cultural practices like *hlonipha* have been reinterpreted and redefined by some political groups. Yet despite attempts by political groups to homogenise Zulu identity many groups, particularly the youth remained outside these attempts. Campbell et al's (1995) study further demonstrates the diversity of meaning attached to 'Zuluness'. This study identifies language, customs and cultural practices as important in establishing ethnic identity and in the informants' identification of themselves as Zulu. But an elaboration of any of these reference points by informants showed that their location was domestic and local ie family, home, clan and community. Customs that are understood as culturally specific are located within a particular family or clan, with a sense of 'this is how things are done by our family', rather than 'this is how things are done by Zulus'. Similarly, a discussion of history did not make reference to a common origin in Shaka and the history of the Zulu nation but to personal and family histories. Respect or *hlonipha* was an important cultural value that served as a lynchpin of harmonious relationships both within families and communities.

This literature shows that the politicisation and construction of Zulu ethnicity has been a project undertaken by various political elites at different periods in the region's history. As such these projects and the meanings they construct are always historically specific with particular political goals. However, this politicised ethnic identity is only one of many meanings that ordinary people might ascribe to 'Zuluness'. As the more subjective studies show, many inhabitants of Natal lacked a self-conscious ethnic Zulu identity. While language is an important indicator of ethnic identity, what it means to be Zulu relates to family customs and kinship beliefs ensuing an heterogeneity of cultural identities. Nevertheless, amongst this heterogeneity there are common values – *hlonipha* being an important one.

A question which is not overtly explored in the literature is the resonances of age and gender with meanings of Zuluness. Campbell et al's (1995) study hints at some of the crises plaguing age and gender identities but doesn't explore how these are knitted into ethnic or cultural identities. However, Dlamini's (1998) discussion of how the practice of *ukuhlonipha* is impregnated with patriarchal meanings allows some unravelling of these linkages. *Ukuhlonipha* was practiced in terms of both age and gender. Reworkings and renegotiations of gendered and inter-generational relationships disrupt the practice of *ukuhlonipha* and thus forces a renegotiation of cultural identities as well. Furthermore, Dlamini (1998:483) argues that the politicisation of Zulu culture, with the extension of *ukuhlonipha* to those who held political power, meant that the challenging of age or gender hierarchies implied a challenging of the established political order and vice versa.

1.5 Gender, Generation and Masculinity

A recently emerging literature (Campbell, 1992; Carton, 2000; Xaba, 2001; Waetjen & Maré, 2001; McClendon, 2002; Waetjen, 2006) attempts to explore the relationship between Zuluness, generation and gender/masculinity. The discussion of these three concepts is not equally balanced, with some of the literature emphasising one aspect more than the other. The first theme, generation, is explored in much of this work. Historical studies (Carton, 2000 and McClendon, 2002) demonstrate that the issue of generational revolt or disobedience has been of concern to the Zulu patriarch over many decades and, to cite Campbell (1992:618), 'as several historians have pointed out the erosion of African patriarchy has been a long-established social process'. Carton (2000) specifically explores generational conflict in late eighteenth century colonial Natal and Zululand (specifically the Thukela Basin region). He examines complicities between African and colonial patriarchal systems and their impact on homestead power relations. McClendon (2002) looks more closely at the relationship between customary law, labour tenancy and 'hierarchies of gender and generation'.

While similarly focussing on 'relationships within African communities' (McClendon, 2002:3), he also points to the alliances between patriarchs. His work is important to this study in two respects. Firstly, his discussion of gender and generational conflict allowed me to explore more fully the broader generational struggles that impinged on the Georgedale area in the period prior to the construction of Mpumalanga township. And, secondly, he sheds light on the multiplicity of Zulu identities that 'competed and coexisted' (McClendon, 2003:11) in early twentieth century Natal. He suggests that these identities draw on status, generation, gender, religion, tradition, migrancy and land in their construction.

In the work by Waetjen & Maré (2001) and Waetjen (2006), the discussion of generation is far more implicit and tangential. Drawing on other literature Waetjen, in her study of Inkatha and Zulu masculinity assumes that the generational struggle evident in the political violence of the 1980s was between young, urban and ANC/UDF supporting men and older, rural and Inkatha supporting men. This is an argument that this thesis takes issue with (see below). However, it should be noted that the major emphasis of Waetjen's study is the exploration of Zuluness and masculinity as constructed by Inkatha. She demonstrates how Inkatha constructed a particular kind of masculinity drawing on their specific construction of Zulu identity. Key to the construction of Zulu identity was the subordinate position of women as ordered by 'ethnic custom and traditional practice' (Waetjen, 2006:73). Other key resources in the construction of Zulu masculinity by Inkatha are the institution of the *amakhosi* (Waetjen, 2006:72-74), the industrial cultures of the modern workplace and customary practices of the rural homestead (Waetjen, 2006:79). Waetjen (2006:93-94) argues that the efficacy of the masculinity constructed by Inkatha lay not necessarily in uniting Zulu men against a feminine other, but rather in capitalising on differences between men. This she argues was a key strategy in politicising Zulu masculinity and mobilising it in the political battles of the 1980s.

Political battles were fought within climates of 'mobilised masculinity,'

> where manhood was called upon by competing organisations and where political actions were prescribed and interpreted in the language of manhood. (Waetjen, 2006:95)

Undoubtedly Waetjen makes pertinent points with regard to the issue of masculinity and political violence. However, I would suggest that her discussion is limited by the sources from which she draws. Her analysis is primarily constructed from the discourses of Inkatha leadership; and, what is thus missing is a sense of how these discourses were received by ordinary men. Just as the work of Sitas (1988) and Campbell et al (1995) has demonstrated that there was a diversity of meanings associated with Zuluness, so there would have been a diversity of masculinities.

Campbell (1992) and Xaba (2001) examine constructions of masculinity from the side of the UDF youth. Campbell's (1992) study is interesting in that she locates her discussion of masculinity within a discussion of generation. She argues that the crisis besetting African patriarchy and masculinity in the 1980s was a crisis underscored by generation, with younger and older men experiencing that crisis differently (Campbell, 1992:618). She suggests that the status of older men has been severely undermined.

> Social change has effected a radical contradiction in the experience of fathers. Older men are struggling to reconcile what they would call the traditional view of men as potent, powerful, proud beings, as well as repositories of community wisdom and experience, with a set of social relations where as black workers they fall low in the current social hierarchy and have little power within the family. The result of this is that men feel alienated and displaced in their families as well as their township communities. (Campbell, 1992:621)

Younger men also faced disappointments associated with economic and employment hardships. Yet, they were able to reassert their masculinities through 'the macho culture of resistance' (Campbell, 1992:624). For young men, participation in political violence becomes an integral part of the reassertion of their masculinity. Another aspect of the relationship between violence and masculinity was gender relations

(Campbell, 1992:625-626). Violence was a common theme in the way in which young men discussed their sexual relationships. Many young men referred to the 'use of violence in what they called the 'common practice of forced sex' amongst young people' (Campbell, 1992:626). Young men also spoke about the need to control, and if need be, discipline, their girlfriends. Xaba (2001) in his study of the 'young lions' alludes to similar traits in what he terms 'struggle masculinity'. He also discusses the generational tensions between younger and older men with younger men being impatient of older men who had tolerated or accommodated apartheid (Xaba, 2001:110).

These discussions are relevant to the questions explored in this thesis. They provide a broader context in which to locate the violent masculinities that exhibited themselves in the context of political violence. What the current discussions do illustrate is that 'what it means to be a Zulu man' is contingent upon time, generation and location.

1.6 Space, Place and Spatiality

The empirical picture of the political violence in Natal with its differential impact across the province shows that space does matter. Central features of the political violence were its uneven spread and spatial concentrations. As I have suggested above a purely structural analysis like that proposed by Booth & Biyela (1988), Hindson & Morris (1990, 1992), Taylor & Shaw (1992) and Woods (1989, 1992) is unable to provide an explanation for this unevenness. It is not that such explanations ignore space; rather they rest on a passive conception of space with time being the dynamic and changing force. This according to Massey (1994:251) is a fairly common view of space, one that views space as stasis and in opposition to time. Over the last three decades this view of space has been the subject of much discussion within the literature, particularly within Marxist geography. I shall examine some of the key developments in these debates before outlining the way in which I shall be utilising the concept in this thesis.

Geography had always been the most spatial of the social sciences. However, the tendency to treat 'social relations as purely spatial relations' (Gregory, cited in Johnson et al, 2000:768) made many human geographers increasingly uneasy. David Harvey in his development of a Marxist geography[22] played a key role in repositioning human geography. Asking 'what is space?' he argued for the need to reconceptualise and interpret 'space' as well as the relationship between space, time and social being. This 'historico-geographical materialism' project, as Harvey termed it, resulted in Marxist geography developing a number of different directions in its reconceptualisation of space. However, according to Gregory (cited in Johnston et al, 2000:769) there was

> … a general convergence on the *socialisation of spatial analysis* and, hard on its heels, the *spatialisation of social analysis*: like simultaneous equations, each was seen to require the other.

There were other important works within Marxist geography during the 1980s. A key work within this school was Neil Smith's (1984) book *Uneven Development*. Trying to understand the uneven development of capitalism, he argued that capitalism was a continuous but uneven process of expansion into absolute space. Space is not an empty container. He maintained that 'by living, acting and working we produce space' (Smith, 1984:85). Capitalism, he said, 'produces certain absolute spaces of its own as part of the larger production of relative space' (Smith, 1984:85). These productions were expanded upon at the ideological level

> Thereby forging a powerful connection between the 'material' and 'metaphorical' spaces (Johnston et al, 2000:769).

The work of Henri Lefebvre was critical to the development of this literature. Both

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[22] His groundbreaking book was *Social Justice and the City* (1973), followed by *Limits of Capital* (1982). According to Soja (1989:59) there were very few 'original and synthesizing books' in the period between these two.

Smith and Harvey in their development of Marxist geography drew on his work and he has also been significant in the repositioning of space in critical social theory more generally eg Soja, Giddens, Massey. In his influential book *The Production of Space* ([1974], 1991) Lefebvre put forward an argument for the social production of space – spatiality.

According to Shields (1999:154) Lefebvre asserts the importance

> of a dialectic in which space and the geographical is integrated into the understanding of the social just as time and history are.

Lefebvre suggests that space is something that is both produced and productive. It evolves historically rather than being created separately from society. Implicit here is a critic of the separation of space and time. Thus he argues there is a need for an approach 'that seeks to understand the dialectical interaction between spatial arrangements and social organisation itself' (Shields, 1999:157). His key concept is his 'threefold dialectic within spatialisation' (Shields, 1999:160-170). The first level is that of spatial practice which includes the 'contradictions of everyday life'. Through the practice of everyday life space is dialectically produced as human space. The second level is the representation of space. This is the discursive regimes of analysis, the expert knowledges that conceive space. And, the third level is the spaces of representation or the discourse of space. This is space as it might be. It is reflexive and allows for the imaginings that allow us to think about what kind of space is possible. This aspect is at the centre of any fully lived space. Each aspect of the dialectic is connected to the other two and altogether they make up space.

Key to Lefebvre's work are his criticisms of social theorists, for example Althusser, Foucault, and Derrida, who use spatial metaphors 'in abstraction from social practice' (Hart, 2002:34; see also Gregory in Johnston et al, 2000). Lefebvre sees spatiality as being produced through the practices of everyday life, which are <u>simultaneously</u> material and metaphorical. Furthermore, as is shown above, he argues that space and

time are inseparable (see Hart, 2002:34). The problem with spatial metaphors, according to Smith and Katz (cited in Hart, 2002:34) is not with the metaphor itself but rather with the conception of space (absolute) upon which they rest.

Drawing on this work these formative Marxist geographers were amongst the first to challenge the dualities of time and space; absolute and relative space; and real/material space and imaginary/symbolic space. During the 1980s and 1990s these concepts were widely debated within critical social theory. According to Johnston et al (2000:771/2) three propositions have emerged from these debates. Both space and time (or space-time) (see Massey 1994b) are seen as being produced through action and interaction. Neither space nor time are seen as neutral and neither exists outside the practices of everyday life. Secondly, both space and time cannot be seen as 'held fast in fixed compartments'. Rather than the previous emphasis on order, pattern and symmetry it's important to recognise the multiple ways in which 'life on earth evades and exceeds those orders'. Space is produced and transformed through multiple 'productions, practices and performances'. Thirdly, following Neil Smith's (1984) proposition it is agreed that 'productions of space are inseparable from productions of nature'. Through practices these productions are constituted together.

Despite these theoretical developments the concepts of space and spatiality remain marginalised in much of mainstream sociological theorising. For example the second edition of the Collins *Dictionary of Sociology* (Jary & Jary), published in 1995 contains no entry on space, place or spatiality. An exception was the work of Anthony Giddens. In his 1981 book *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* he calls for

> The injection of temporality and spatiality into the core of social theory, and binds and brackets the theory of structuration in time-space relations. 'All social interaction', Giddens writes (1981:19), 'consists of social practices, situated in time-space, and organised in a skilled and knowledgeable fashion by human agents'. … Social systems are thus conceived as <u>situated practices</u>, patterned

> (structurated) relationships socially reproduced across time and space, as history and geography. (Soja, 1989:142)

Soja's (1989:143) conclusions, in a critical yet sympathetic review of this book, is that despite these intentions the spatial still plays second fiddle to the primacy of time and history. These criticisms still seem to hold for Gidden's later work *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990) with its discussion of time-space distanciation. Here he argues that

> The 'emptying of time' is in large part the precondition for the 'emptying of space' and thus has causal priority over it. For, as I shall argue below, coordination across time is the basis of the control of space. The development of 'empty space' may be understood in terms of the separation of *space* from *place*. It is important to stress the distinction between these two notions, because they are often used as more or less synonymous with one another. 'Place' is best conceptualised by means of the idea of locale, which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically. … The advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between 'absent' others, … (Giddens, 1990:18)

This analysis I suggest is problematic. As much of the literature (see above) has suggested, space is not an 'empty container'. In insisting that space is actively produced through everyday practices, Lefebvre (1991) was making an argument for the inseparability of space and time. Furthermore, as Hart (2002:34, emphasis added) argues

> the production of space also implies the production of meanings, concepts and consciousness about space (or space-time) that are <u>inseparably linked</u> to its physical production <u>through situated practices</u>.

While not disputing Gidden's argument that the meaning of space and place changes from pre-modernity to modernity, Massey (1994:6) suggests that the challenge is to 'rethink the unity of space and place in different terms'.

As has been demonstrated Lefebvre's arguments have been central in the development of the more recent literature on space. His ideas have been used, albeit

critically, by a number of authors who have taken them in different directions. Amongst these is Doreen Massey (see [1984] 1995, 1994) whose work has been critical in shaping my conceptualisation of space and the way in which I have operationalised it in my analysis.

Massey (1994) was particularly concerned with the dichotomous portrayal of the relationship between space and time and in particular the view that space is a 3-D slice that moves through time. She argued that space needs to be conceptualised as

> 'constructed out of interrelations, as the simultaneous coexistence of social interrelations and interactions at all spatial scales, from the most local level to the most global.' (Massey, 1994:264)

Central to her argument is that space must be theorised integrally with time, the objective being to think in terms of space-time (Massey 1994:3). Space-time is conceptualised as a configuration of social relations imbued with power relations. Space-time is produced through both action and interaction, simultaneously in a number of different spatial locations. The spatial organisation of society is implicated in the production of the social; it is not merely the end product. Key to Massey's (1994) argument is that the lived world consists of 'a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces' in constant interaction with each other. Space, in Massey's view, is both active and dynamic. Furthermore, the 'social relations of space' are viewed and interpreted differently depending upon the social location of those who are part of it.

As stated above the differential nature of political violence illustrates that a spatial analysis is crucial in understanding the trajectories of the political violence. There was nothing in the social histories of either Natal or the places that were consumed by violence to indicate that political violence would be the primary social problem by the late 1980s. In effect the violence was the outcome of a multiplicity of social forces operating in different spatialities. The coming together of these social forces sedimented power relations and then reworked and reconfigured them over time. At any point along the way a different configuration of forces or spatialities could have

produced a different outcome ie political violence was not inevitable. It was the result of a series of spatial reconfigurations over time. In effect I am making an argument for a 'processual'[23] analysis of the violence. It is necessary to trace and understand these different social forces, to understand how they come together and articulate with other spatialities, how at the point of articulation new spatialities are constructed and created along with new meanings of place and identity.

Understanding space-time as a configuration of social relations brings us to the question of power. The production of space itself is imbued with power relations. Here I would suggest Foucault's discussion of spatiality is useful. Despite Lefebvre's critical view of Foucault, as Robinson (1996:19) points out, he 'explains spatial distributions and the division and arrangement of space in more than a purely metaphorical sense'. His empirical studies of prisons, asylums and hospitals illustrated that spatial strategies are key mechanisms for the operation of power in modern society. In all of these institutions, and by inference in wider society, the ordering of space allows for the disciplining of the inhabitants. In the chapters that follow I will show how the ordering of space during political violence allowed for the disciplining of residents and ultimately the constitution of particular subject-positions and the production of political identities.

Furthermore the production of space itself is not gender neutral. As Massey (1994:2) argues space is actively constructed out of social relations. It is produced through multi-layed, situated practices that are simultaneously material, symbolic, and mediated through power relations. Not only do all these spatial practices inscribe gender but gender inscribes itself into the production of space. The way in which spaces are gendered changes as spaces are produced and reproduced. Just as spatiality is 'constructed out of the multiplicity of social relations across all social scales'

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[23] Lefebvre (Shields, 1999:155) discusses the 'processual nature of l'espace' to suggest that space is 'always undergoing change from within through the actions and innovations of social agents'.

(Massey, 1994:3), so there are multiple ways in which gender relations are constructed and maintained (see McDowell, 1999:18). Gender relations are 'relations of power, hierarchy and inequality' (de Almeida, cited in McDowell, 1999:21). Thus as Hart (2002:37) reminds us, meanings of masculinity and femininity are invoked and contested as part of the exercise of power in multiple arenas.

The conceptualisation of the spatial as space-time formed out of a multiplicity of social interrelations has implications for how one views place. Within the literature there is a fierce debate over the conceptualisation of place (see Massey, 1994:4-11; Rose, 1995). These debates have relevance in both the academic and political spheres. One conception, linked to the idea of space as stasis, views place as bounded in various ways. Place is seen as the site of authenticity, it is singular, fixed and unproblematic in its identity. The political consequences are exclusivist claims to place. The results have been seen in various parts of the world from Bosnia to Northern Ireland, from apartheid South Africa to Israel where contesting parties have attempted to fix the meaning of particular spaces, bestow them with fixed identities and claim them for themselves. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters a similar process was seen in Natal.

Thinking about space as active and dynamic allows one to recognise that places are similarly produced. Thus an alternative conceptualisation is to view place as a particular articulation of social relations and situated practices at all scales. To cite Massey (1995:5) place becomes 'a particular moment in those networks of social relations and understandings'. This view of place disputes the notion that the meaning of place can be based on internal histories (only) or ahistorical (timeless) identities. Therefore 'the identities of places are always unfixed, contested and multiple'. The distinctiveness of any place is therefore constructed not by placing boundaries around it and defining its identity in relation to the other but through the particular articulation of linkages with and connections to that outside. In this

analysis places are seen as open and porous. As Massey (1995:5, original emphasis) points out attempts to establish boundaries can therefore be seen as

> attempts to stabilise the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time. … For such attempts at the stabilisation of meaning are constantly the site of social contest, battles over the power to label space-time, to impose the meaning to be attributed to a space, for however long or short a span of time.

Massey (1993) argues for a progressive sense of place that recognises the open and porous boundaries between places as well as the numerous interlinkages and interdependencies among places. Places are not bounded entities but are socially created through their spatial connections with other places. According to Johnston et al (2000:583) the progressive concept of place is normative as well as descriptive.

> It assumes social and cultural heterogeneity within places rather than assimilation to a national or local norm. Any given place is materially and imaginatively constructed by many different types of people.

The spatial form of political violence and the way in which it reterritorialised the spaces of everyday life throws the spotlight on the conception of place as open, shifting, multiple and porous (see Massey, 1994:7). Boundaries between places are always constituted and maintained by social relations of power and exclusion. In a situation of political violence boundaries both within and between places are constructed. It is important to understand how such boundaries are produced and to probe the consequences for the meaning of place. In the process the meaning of place becomes singular, furthermore there is little tolerance for alternative conceptions, boundaries become set and the meaning of those places become fixed. Moreover, the way in which men and women are able to access places and contribute to the construction of their meanings is gendered and differential.

1.7 Space, Place and Identity

A question that this thesis seeks to understand is how the production of space and place articulate with the co-production of political identity. Just as the identities and meanings of places are conceptualised as 'multiple, shifting and unbounded' so too are subjectivities and personal identities. Yet as chapter six will demonstrate as political violence reterritorialised the spaces of everyday life so it fixed the meanings and (political) identities of places.

Most theorists agree that the meanings ascribed to places are socially constructed. The identity of place, similar to other identities is always and continuously being produced. As Massey (1994:168) points out attempts to fix the meanings of place generally rest on singular, fixed and static identities for places. Such understandings of identities of places compel them to be enclosed, to have boundaries and most importantly to establish their identity through negative opposition with 'the other' beyond the boundary.

Massey (1994:168) suggests that this is not the only way in which place can be conceptualised. Moving from the premise that space is conceptualised in terms of four-dimensional space-time as the simultaneous coexistence of social interrelations at all scales, then it's possible to reconceptualise place too. Social relations, she says, always have a spatial form and a spatial content. They exist both <u>in</u> space (ie locationally) and <u>across</u> space. However, I would suggest that this 'progressive' understanding of place doesn't preclude the formation of a fixed and static identity for place. My argument here is that just as political violence was the outcome of multiple trajectories, so the articulation of these trajectories resulted in the construction of a fixed and static identity for place.

The identity of place is also constructed by the underlying structures of power (see Rose 1995:98-102). A sense of place marks differences between groups of people.

One way of marking that difference is claiming that 'my group' belongs to a particular place and other groups do not belong. These differences are further marked by boundaries that establish insiders and outsiders. The construction of boundaries is a means of organising space. The drawing of boundaries at all levels and in all circumstances is an exercise of power. They are an expression of the power structures of society, and are one among the many kinds of social relations that construct space and place (Massey, 1995b:69). The process of claiming place can take the form of elaborate rituals eg graffiti as in the case of many gangs or as in Natal the shouting of insults across the 'borders'. Most importantly, territoriality is the 'geographical expression of social power' (Sack cited in Rose 1995:100).

Writing which only emphasises power in the construction of place tends to offer a structural analysis of the meaning of place. However, it is also important to take into account the feelings and emotions that play a part in creating places. The creations of boundaries are usually involved when there are intense emotional constructions of senses of place. Boundaries define identity by marking 'not only what/where it is, but also what/where it is not' (Rose 1995:103). The identity of the place is established through a contrast by defining something in opposition to what it is not (see Said, cited in Rutherford 1990)

> … the Other, in its very alienness, simply mirrors and represents what is deeply familiar to the centre, but projected outside of itself. It is in these processes and representations of marginality that the violence, antagonisms and aversions which are at the core of dominant discourses and identities become manifest – racism, homophobia, misogyny and class contempt are the products of this frontier. (Rutherford, 1990:22)

Ideas about difference are articulated through the construction of 'the other'. Rose (1995) suggests that exclusionary ideas about who belongs in a place and who doesn't are made through the construction of Others.

> The notion of the Other allows us to connect senses of place, power and identity in an analytical manner which does not neglect the emotional dynamics of place.

Communities actively make places both in imagination and through material practice (Massey, 1995b:48). There are many possible outcomes to the way in which places are made or produced. One possibility, grounded in the view of space as stasis, is to keep out things and people whom we argue do not belong. Each group draws lines of demarcation between itself and other groups, purifying the identity of place. This, according to Keith and Pile (1993a:20), provokes a reactionary vocabulary of both the identity politics of place and a spatialised politics of identity.

These views of the construction of the identity of place are useful in understanding the form the violence took in Natal. As will be shown in chapters six and seven political violence marked and divided up the township between two political groups. The reterritorialisation of the space of the township marked some areas as UDF and others as Inkatha. The boundaries signified the borders between areas supporting the different political groups. In the process both groups constructed an Other. Identities were expressed more in terms of what they were not than what they were.

Citing Walter Benjamin, Keith and Pile (1993b:26) suggest that identity and location are inseparable. 'Knowing oneself was an exercise in mapping where one stands'. They suggest that spatialities have always produced landscapes that are loaded with ethical, epistemological and aestheticised meanings. And these meanings are perpetually contested. However, what I am interested in here is a situation where that contestation takes a violent form. As will be shown in chapters six and seven, violence has more severe consequences for the construction of identities of place and subjectivities.

The construction of coherent places and identities are intertwined social processes. In the political violence in Natal the spatial politics involved moments of closure and boundary making. There were attempts by both parties to stabilise the identities of

places with those groups then claiming a right to that space. Residents within those places saw themselves as affiliated to that political group. Bodily survival depended upon a changed sense of self, and in the process a redefinition of one's political identity.[24] Therefore, I propose there is a strong correlation between individual subjectivity and the political identity of place.

Sitas (1988) in a paper examining the relationship between class, nation and ethnicity in Natal suggests a strong relationship between place and 'identity'. He rejects structuralist theories that 'collapse subject-formation to being no more than the result or the outcome of ideological interpellations' (Sitas, 1988:15). He argues that 'Zulu-ness' is by no means 'a common univocal or unilateral experience in Natal'. He distinguishes four main 'traditions of resistance' in Natal, mapping each of these traditions onto experiences grounded strongly in time and space.

> The argument, stated so broadly suffices as a simple demonstration: that 'Zulu-ness' as an ethnic self-identification among black workers in Natal, although common, registers different experiences and comradeships from area to area. (Sitas, 1988:25)

In a similar vein, but a different time and place, Radcliffe (1993) looks at the way 'place and politics became intertwined' in the *Madras* movement of Argentina. She suggests that in the creation of the *Madras* as a political movement 'an elision between place and maternal identity was founded and maintained' (Radcliffe, 1993:110). Radcliffe argues that it is necessary to examine the linkages between the mechanisms of transformation of identities and the spaces of operation for politics.

A third study is by Watts (1992), where he looks at a number of Islamic insurrections that took place in several cities of northern Nigeria during the 1980s. He is interested to show how difference and identity are produced within constellations of power that

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[24] This point is made somewhat crudely here. See chapter seven for a more nuanced discussion of this process.

are located in interconnected spaces.

The importance of these studies is their stress on the relationship between place and subjectivity. They construct their arguments through detailed empirical material. I therefore turn to some of the more abstract writing on identity formation in order to identify some theoretical markers to assist in constructing my arguments.

Identities, Hall (1996) argues, are produced in specific historical and institutional sites ie to use Massey's terms in space-time. Most contemporary thinking on identity (see Appiah & Gates, 1995; Calhoun, 1994a; Castells, 1997; Hall, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Hall & du Gay, 1996; Laclau, 1990; Rose, 1995, Rutherford, 1990; Somer, 1994) disrupts the essentialist conception of identity. It disputes the idea of a stable core of self that unfolds from beginning to end; that there is some part of the self that remains 'the same', 'identical to itself across time [and space]' (Hall, 1996:3). Instead the arguments suggest that identity is understood as that which is never unified but always fragmented and fractured, that it is never singular but multiple, that it is constructed across difference, that it is never completed but is always in the process of change and transformation (see Hall, 1996:4). Within these ideas I am trying to find a way to understand how ordinary people with little prior history of political activity came to identify with either Inkatha or the UDF and furthermore, how these political identities were produced.

Identities cannot be read off a subject position. For example, it does not follow that a working class identity will arise as a result of the positioning of a class in a particular relation to socio-economic relations. Identities must be actively constructed. This construction is itself a process - a process that involves articulations with boundaries, power, difference, otherness and situated practices. Moreover, as Laclau argues any articulation of identity is only briefly complete.

> In such a fragile world of identity formation and object formation, political subjects are articulated through moments of closure that

> create subjects as surfaces of inscription, mythical and metaphoric, invariably incomplete. (Keith and Pile, 1993b:27)

Politics, as Keith and Pile (1993c:222) suggest, is habitually about closure. It is the moment when boundaries become impermeable – the Berlin Wall. Politics seals the boundaries creating spaces of enclosure. 'We' are on one side and 'you' on the other. Boundaries fix the subject. They create moments of closure for the identities of the subjects within those spaces. The moment of closure creates and gives meaning to the 'community' defined by that identity. Thus the creation of boundaries has a double role; firstly, they produce the oppositional 'us' and 'them', and secondly, they produce the internal community. Central to understanding this moment of closure is locating it on, and then understanding the ground on which it takes place. In certain situations, like in Natal, these spatial boundaries are real. They are not just spatial metaphors indicating social oppositions and contrasts. The boundaries signify difference and distance, location and separation (Kirby, cited in Pile and Thrift, 1995b:374) both between places and between the subjects that inhabit those places.

Identities are formed in relation to each other. They emerge through difference. It is only in relation to the Other, to what it is not, that an identity can be constructed. Laclau (1990:21) draws on Lacan to flesh out this concept of identity formation. Identity formation is set within fields of (negative) differences, articulated through what it is not. Accordingly they are never complete since 'relations do not form a closed system'. Identity and the conditions of their existence are inseparable. There is no identity outside of its context. Keith and Pile (1993b:30) raise a difficulty with a politics of identity that stresses the irreconcilable nature of differences. It can, they suggest, advance a notion of a politics of location that privileges each and every place.

> The advantage of Laclau's theorisation is that these spaces can be unpacked, they become equivalent to surfaces of inscription.

Through the process of boundary-making and othering identities construct an internal unity. However, this is not an inherent unity, it rests on the moment of closure, or opposition to the other. Thus, identities are always relations of power. As Laclau (1990:31) argues 'the construction of social identity is an act of power and that identity as such *is* power'. To study the conditions of existence of a given social identity, then, is to study the power mechanisms making it possible. However as Rose (1995b:207) reminds us the subject is constituted through multiple power relations – whether they are supportive or antagonistic. This connects with the concept of the articulation of multiple trajectories that constitute place, reminding us that the power relations that are part of constituting identity are located at a number of spatial scales.

Finally just as communities make places through material practices, so identity is also constructed through practice. Pile and Thrift (1995a) in their introduction to the edited collection *Mapping the Subject* outline a variety of approaches to 'the subject'. Amongst these they cluster a number of authors under 'practices' (see Pile & Thrift, 1995a:26-38).

> … what these authors have in common is that they see the subject as primarily derived in *practice*. … understanding of the subject in practice is fundamental in two ways. First, this kind of subjectivity is always present. Sometimes we frame representations. Sometimes we do not. But the practical intelligence is always there. More to the point, and second, the kind of representations we make are only comprehensible against the background provided by this inarticulate understanding. (Pile and Thrift, 1995:27)

They identify four main characteristics of this kind of thinking about the subjects' understanding of the world. First, the subjects' understanding comes from 'a ceaseless flow of conduct, conduct which is always future-orientated'. Second, the subject's understanding of the world is 'intrinsically corporeal'. The socialised body is not an object, rather it is a storeroom of creative and generative abilities to understand. The third characteristic is that the subject's understanding is worked out

in joint action. Actions are created through shared understandings that the subject both takes from and contributes to.

> Dialogical action is a fundamental determinant of the intelligibility of social life, understanding comes from 'we', not 'I'. (Pile and Thrift, 1995a:28).

The fourth characteristic of the subjects' understanding of the world is its situatedness. The subject can only know from their location in a particular place.

> Therefore abstracting subjectivity from time and space becomes an impossibility because practices are always open and uncertain, dependent to some degree upon the immediate resources available at the moment they show up in time and space. (Pile and Thrift, 1995a:29)

Finally, as Pile and Thrift assert, there is a major emphasis in theories of practice on the particularities of place. Specific contexts are crucial elements in the construction of subjectivity. 'In other words place is constitutive of the subject's understanding of the world.' (Pile and Thrift, 1995a:29)

Allan Pred (2000) in his book *Even in Sweden* utilises the concept of locally situated practices in his discussion of racisms and racialised spaces in Sweden. He (2000:17) argues that collective or individual identity can't be reduced to stories people tell about themselves. Furthermore, it's not just the boundaries that are drawn between 'them' and 'us'. He suggests that at the core of any dimension of identity is a set of taken-for-granted yet flexible meanings. These, he says, are attained and reinforced via involvement in a particular sphere of situated practice. Thus in the wake of new or transformed practices and discourses that accompany social or economic crises, collective identity crises are liable to develop as central taken-for-granted meanings become unhinged and problematic.

In chapter seven I demonstrate how these elements articulated to produce political identities. The reconstruction of both place and identity happened alongside the formation of boundaries, the enforcement of the 'new rules' of living, the othering of

political opponents and their spaces and through the lived experiences and situated practices of political violence.

1.8 Scope of the Thesis

This introduction has outlined the argument of the thesis and reviewed some of the essential literature that the thesis engages with.

Chapter two charts the methodology used in the research process. The chapter begins by reviewing some of the philosophical concerns, making an argument for qualitative research, more specifically ethnography. It then details the reasons behind the choice of research topic before providing an account of the fieldwork process.

The purpose of chapter three 'From Freehold to Model Township: The Making of Mpumalanga – Space, Control and a 'New' Zulu Identity' is to sketch the historical narrative of place, space and identity with regard to the Hammarsdale area. It covers the period from the establishment of Georgedale as a *kholwa* mission in 1862, to the forced removal of residents into Mpumalanga township in the 1970s, and, the establishment of new structures of township governance and the conflicts associated with these in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Chapter four – 'Local Politics: Resisting an Ethnic Politics of Identity' focuses on the period of the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. It examines the organisational politics of Mpumalanga illustrating that public communal life in Mpumalanga during this period was characterised by a variety of organisations and associations.

Chapter five – 'National and Regional Politics: The Role of the State in Political Violence in Natal' argues that if we wish to understand what was politically distinctive about this period, and why this order of violence didn't happen previously, then it is necessary to confront the role and nature of the central state. The chapter

discusses the South African state in the 1970s and 1980s. Secondly, it looks at the specific politics of Natal and KwaZulu. Finally, it outlines the implementation of covert strategies to sow conflict and violently destroy political opposition to both the South African state/government and the KwaZulu government/Inkatha.

In chapter six 'Mapping Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township' the events in the years 1987 (from when political violence starts) to 1991 (when peace is established) are described. The focus of the chapter is place-specific and intensely local; discussing the form and character of political violence in Mpumalanga township. It shows the extent to which the violence transformed and disrupted the spatiality of the township and clearly illustrates what was new and singular about this mode of conflict. The chapter is concerned to demonstrate the ways in which political violence reshaped the space of the township. It explores the different spatialities – the body, the household and the neighbourhood – through which violence was produced through the simultaneous interaction of forces at different levels.

Chapter seven – 'Ethnographies of Violence: The Making of Political Identities' attempts to answer similar questions (how and why) but from the local perspective. This chapter provides a textured and ethnographic account of how political identities were made.

Chapter eight concludes the thesis by restating the contributions of the thesis and looking to the legacies of the political violence.

Chapter Two: Methodology

This thesis attempts to account for the severe rupture that occurred in the politics of Natal in the mid 1980s. This was represented by the violent political conflict that gripped the province. As discussed in chapter one this thesis investigates four questions:

1. How and why did conflict between political organisations in Natal become violent?
2. What forms did the political violence take?
3. Why, as a result of the violence, did ordinary people with little prior history of political activity come to identify with either the United Democratic Front (UDF) or Inkatha?
4. How were these political identities produced?

These questions are explored through an empirical investigation of the political violence between supporters of the UDF and Inkatha in Natal.

Sociology offers researchers many different ways of gathering data. However, the researcher needs to consider her/his choice with care. Firstly, the method needs to be able to provide the data that will answer the specific research problem. Secondly, the research process is not divorced from the philosophical, ethical and political debates of the time. These are of particular concern to feminist researchers. This chapter will first consider the philosophical concerns that underlie the choice of research method and then outline the research procedure used to generate the data for this thesis.

2.1 Questions of methodology

The major divide in social science research is between quantitative and qualitative methods. Survey and experimental methods are associated with quantitative methods and are often theoretically located in the positivist world view. Positivism equates the social sciences and the natural sciences and sees little relevant difference for the purpose of science between the social world and the

natural world. The objective of sociology is to formulate laws to explain social events and then to test and verify these laws through observation and measurement (see Wilson, 1983). On the other hand, qualitative methods include in-depth interviewing, oral history, documentary sources and observation amongst others. Rejecting the assumption that sociological data must be testable and generalisable qualitative researchers are principally interested in understanding social experiences from the point of view of their participants so as to illustrate how social actors ascribe meaning to these experiences (see Burawoy, 1991). Given the nature of the questions this thesis is interested in - the relationship between political violence and the making and remaking of political identities as perceived by African women in Natal - qualitative methods are a more appropriate route for enquiry. The stories and narrations these women tell and the meanings they give to those stories are critical in answering this question.

Advocates of qualitative methods argue that the strengths of this approach are in fact the exact weaknesses pointed to by positivists. Instead of seeing the interaction between researcher and subject as a source of bias, it is suggested that this is a positive interaction, which in itself generates data and understanding. Qualitative methods enable the researcher to understand not only how people act but also "how they understand and experience those acts" (Burawoy, 1991:2, emphasis added).

Western feminist researchers have developed their own critiques of traditional quantitative research methods, arguing that these methods in effect silence women's own voices (Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991:85). They were looking for a method which would not only redress the sexist imbalances in academic knowledge but would, in reflecting the experiences and voices of ordinary women, also address the power imbalances between researcher and subject (see various articles in Bowles & Klein, 1983; Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991). As such they developed strong critiques of positivism and advocated research 'for' women as opposed to research 'on' women (Klein, 1983:90). Research 'for' women

engaged with a participatory method, was political in focus and in line with feminism's political goals concentrated on changing women's lives. Twenty years later we/I are/am acutely aware that despite these ambitions much of this work was based on the

> assumption of women as an already constituted, coherent group with identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic or racial location, or contradictions ... (Mohanty, 1991a:55).

and very often entrenched the notion of the subject as disempowered other.

Feminist researchers, particularly in South Africa, have raised the questions of representation and authenticity (Hassim & Walker, 1992; Letlaka-Rennert, 1991; Lewis, 1992a, 1992b; Lund, 1991; Robinson, 1994 etc). This has challenged the researcher to think through not only the form of data-gathering but also their relationship to the subject in the production of knowledge. In South Africa, much of the literature from the debate, arising from the 1991 'Women and Gender in Southern Africa' Conference at the University of Natal, Durban, focused around 'who can do research on who' (see Lund, 1991; Letlake-Rennert, 1991; Hassim & Walker, 1992; Kemp, 1993; Fouché, 1993; Funani, 1993; Gouws, 1993). White women researchers were challenged both for their choice of research subject and their ability to (re)present the experiences of black women.

The debates were charged with emotion and intensity. Black women felt they were being denied the right to be heard (see Lewis, 1992a) and many white women academics found the challenges silencing. There are no easy answers to this question. As Robinson (1994) points out <u>all</u> researchers have to face the dilemma of being the 'outsider within'. Kemp (1993:26/7) argues that "you don't have to be one of those nouns to teach, study, or 'understand' ..." however it is important to recognise that one is crossing boundaries and position oneself accordingly: "authenticity is a sham. Every time you quote someone, you are re-presenting that person." The answer, if there is one, points in the direction of positionality, and honesty. It is necessary to locate oneself as researcher both in

the research process and in the writing, to acknowledge and to own up to the "interpretive authorial self" (Stacey, 1991:115).

Ethnographic research foregrounds the question of the production and construction of knowledge by forcing the researcher as ethnographer to

> confront participants in their corporeal reality, in their concrete existence, in their time and space... [they are] ...forced to forsake the authority of science and enter into dialogue with their subjects (Burawoy, 1991:291).

Ely (1991:3) makes the point that "there are conflicting claims for what can be properly labelled ethnography". There also seem to be different approaches within ethnography - critical, post-structural, feminist ethnography (Stacey, 1991) and a fairly traditional approach that sees ethnography as "the work of describing a culture" (Spradley, 1979:3). Without wishing to find myself in a label debate I feel it is necessary to put forward my perspective. I see contemporary ethnographic practice as critical and self-reflexive. It is sensitive to the power relations inherent in all research. It does not see its job as describing a culture but it is aware of the place of the researcher in this process. It draws on ethnographic literature from these different perspectives.

The interactions between researcher and subject foreground the question of power. Traditional positivist research situations are characterised by an asymmetry in power between the researcher and the respondents. While one can be sensitive to such dynamics, ultimately what the researcher writes is outside of the control of the subjects. Nevertheless, ethnography is a self-reflexive method that attempts to confront the power relations inherent in all research. Once again, this is done through acknowledging the location and positionality of the researcher. It is necessary to identify the points of difference and commonality and to incorporate these into the writing. It is possible to utilise

> dialogic forms of ethnographic representation that place more of the voices and perspectives of the researched into the narrative and that

> more authentically reflect the dissonance and particularity of the ethnographic research process (Stacey 1991:115).

As I discuss below my choice of research topic is intimately connected with my personal academic and political history. My positionality as researcher was central to the way in which the research was conducted; who I contacted, how I entered the field, the way I introduced myself and ultimately my acceptance by the respondents. I was not the neutral academic coming to discover the truth. Neutrality had no part in my choice of topic or in my acceptance in the field.

The employment of an ethnographic method is not an instant solution to the problems raised above. What it does allow is for one to anticipate some of the problems and to provide ways of negotiating them. The stories and meanings presented in this thesis are only partial accounts partly because this is the only window the research subjects open and partly because of my location on the 'outside'. Nevertheless, ethnography allows one space to explore these partial meanings and the role both the researcher and the research subject play in their construction.

2.2 Selecting a research topic

Political violence was not something any South African could escape. It marked us from the moment we entered the world as conscious engaged human beings. It shaped and patterned our being; all of us, black or white, male or female. Growing up in the South Africa of the late 1970s and 1980s, political violence impacted directly on me. First it entered my consciousness through the newspapers and the television as something that happened to other people - Steve Biko's death in detention, the police baton-charging protesters; then, as I became politically active, it moved closer to me, becoming a potential threat - the unmarked car following me, the line of police at a protest, guns and dogs ready, the childhood friend now a member of the South African Police (SAP), the person shot and killed at the place I'd just left; finally it touched those close to me - a friend whose relative was killed in a South African Defence Force (SADF) raid on

a neighbouring state, comrades from Mpophomeni abducted and killed by vigilantes, friends in hiding fearful for their lives. It engulfed Natal and it engulfed many of the people I was close to, friends, comrades and colleagues. Most of all it ensured that many of my family and childhood friends became other.

Being white and living in a racially exclusive white suburb meant that most of my knowledge of political violence was at a distance, through a third party. However while the violence happened to other people I was not unaffected. It was shaping who I was, my concerns, feelings, consciousness and identity.

I had come of political age in Natal in the early 1980s. My political involvement had thrown me up against incidents that clearly marked Inkatha in the category of collaborator. Thinking back on those times, Inkatha's violent and brutal opposition to 'progressive' forces seemed a natural progression. Long before I heard the stories of forced recruitment campaigns and brutal slayings during the floods of September 1987, Inkatha was already marked 'treat with caution' and identified as the enemy to be feared. The incidents that marked them as such were numerous but that which had the most impact on me was the attack on Mpophomeni Township. Since 1985 I had been working with members of the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) who had been dismissed for going on strike at the BTR Sarmcol factory in Howick. The majority lived in Mpophomeni, which had become a site of struggle and resistance. I was part of a support group that was assisting with campaigns for reinstatement and had also begun academic research into the issue. The phone call came early on the morning of 6 December 1986. It was Bobby Marie, organiser for the Metal and Allied Workers Union. 'An Inkatha *impi* invaded Mpophomeni last night; they abducted and killed Simon and Phineus.[1] The community's been attacked.' We were uncomprehending. Numb. Angry. Surprised? If I remember back, surprised at

[1] Simon Ngubane was a Sarmcol shop steward and leading figure in the Sarmcol Workers' Co-operative Cultural Group. I had been involved in the workshopping of the plays and had got to know him well. Phineus Sibiya was the chairperson of the shop stewards council and the co-operative.

the boldness of the attack, but not at Inkatha's declaration of Mpophomeni as the enemy, not at Inkatha's violence, and certainly not at the ineffectiveness of the police, either to protect the community or to halt the attack.

This attack was the first of many similar incidents that were to follow. During 1987 deaths from political violence steadily increased until in September of that year sixty deaths were reported (Aitchison, 1989b). In the next three years, reported deaths from political violence only dropped below fifty per month six times (Aitchison, 1990b). Despite South Africa's history of political conflict the intensity and scale of the political violence was unprecedented. In a very short space of time people who had lived happily, side-by-side for years began killing one another. From Pietermaritzburg it spread to most of Natal's African townships. Thousands of people were displaced as internal refugees and thousands more killed their political affiliation or perceived affiliation to one or other political group determining whether they would live or die.

I felt the need to say something about what was happening. Initially I responded by painting. I did three paintings in the late 1980s / early 1990s that reflected different aspects of my thoughts on political violence and in particular the way it impacted on women. The first painting (*Violence in South Africa*) (see Fig 1) explored the relationship between state violence and sexual violence; it saw all women as universal subjects. Political and state violence impacted on them by increasing sexual violence.

Fig 1: Violence in South Africa



The second painting focused on political violence in Natal. Called *Food for Guns* (see Fig 2), it portrayed women as victims of violence, the mourners of sons, male lovers and husbands. Its analysis presented women as passive; they had no agency in a war controlled and fought by men. Nevertheless, this painting

Fig 2: Food for Guns



reflected my growing concern with the silence in the written analysis of the violence that ignored the way in which women were affected by the violence and participated in it.[2] This concern led me to motivate that *Agenda*[3] organise a workshop, inviting women living in areas affected by political violence, monitors of violence and others working in communities affected by political violence. The purpose of the workshop was to share information on the way in which women were being affected by political violence. The workshop held in Durban on 5 May 1990, resulted in an article published in *Agenda* (see Annecke, 1990) but neither the workshop nor the article had much effect on the broader gender analysis of the political violence.

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[2] See chapter one for a critique of this literature.

[3] *Agenda* is a journal publishing material on women and gender issues. At the time I was a member of the editorial collective of *Agenda*.

In 1991, I began a small research project attempting to reanalyse data collected by the Unrest Monitoring Project based at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. They had an extensive database of incidents of violence in the Natal Midlands. My purpose in reanalysing the data was to look for incidents where women were affected and to categorise them in order to understand the ways in which women were participating in the violence. My own theoretical framework suggested that women could not just be passive victims, however, it was necessary to explore this empirically. The paper (see Bonnin, 1991) resulting from this research was pivotal in my decision to pursue this topic by registering for a doctoral thesis. The problem of gender silence was not just one of the analyses of existing data, but of its collection. Questions about gender and political violence were not being asked. Furthermore, the existing data did not allow these questions to be answered.

I decided that I needed to explore questions of gender and political violence more seriously and that the only way to do this was to conduct field research myself. My early attempts to conceptualise the topic focused on women's experiences of political violence. On the few occasions when the press had focused on women's role in the violence they portrayed their activities as that of peacekeeper. Initially I wished to deconstruct this portrayal and understand in more detail how women were being affected and the roles they were playing in the violence. In essence, I hoped to question the essentialist construction of gender identity that automatically aligned women with peace. However, upon further investigation I found myself intrigued by questions of political identity.

A feature of the violence was a seemingly firm affiliation with a particular political group. In this situation it was impossible not to have a political identity (see Kentridge, 1990). However, it was also a period in which political identities underwent dramatic changes. People who were previously apolitical or loosely identified with one or other political group became virulent supporters of either the UDF or Inkatha. This situation of political violence provided an excellent

empirical example to develop our understanding of the ways in which political identities are made and remade.

Well into my fieldwork I began the third painting. *Self Portrait of a Researcher* (see Fig 3) problematises my positionality as researcher. The painting comprises four panels. Along the bottom of the canvas are the hills of Durban's Berea – my hometown, a place that I love and my refuge from global citizenship. The central panel depicts the looming Memorial Tower Building at the University of Natal's Durban campus – not only the location of my office but it also seems to represent the phallic authority of scientific knowledge, the authorial voice of the researcher. On the right the brutal world of my research informants – sourced from a press photograph, police collect distended corpses, loading them onto the back of an open truck. The left-hand panel shows the interior of my lounge, my home – quiet, safe and peaceful, filled with objects I had carefully chosen. This is where I could retreat, safe in the white suburbs, when my intellectual labours became too fraught. But the question that troubled me is: to where do my informants escape? The contrast between my world and the world of my research informants haunted me throughout the research.

Fig 3: Self-Portrait of a Researcher



2.3 Choosing the research site: Mpumalanga township

Fighting between supporters of the UDF and Inkatha engulfed much of Natal (see chapter one). With the emphasis in this thesis being on locale and place it was necessary to find a suitable location for in-depth ethnographic fieldwork.

As a result of its history and particular circumstances Mpumalanga Township (see Map 3) provided an ideal location to investigate political violence and identities. It was built in the late 1960s as a model township to accommodate the increasing squatter problem in the Hammarsdale area – an industrial decentralisation point (see chapter three). It also provided a labour force for the Hammarsdale textile factories. Political violence began in late 1986, intensified during 1987 and continued until 1991. Since then there have been some sporadic attacks. As the records of the Unrest Monitoring Project (see below) indicated, it was one of the

worst affected areas in Natal. A peace pact signed in late 1989 had little effect and large scale attacks on certain sections of the township continued well into 1990. Large areas of the township were emptied and many residents were refugees for over a year. However, by 1992 the peace pact began to have some influence, residents returned and today many outsiders regard Mpumalanga Township as a model of peace. Furthermore, Mpumalanga is an area where women have been particularly active. Newspaper reports described six protest marches/demonstrations organised by women between 1988 and 1990.

MAP 3: LOCATIONAL MAP OF NATAL SHOWING MPUMALANGA TOWNSHIP (pre-1994 political configurations)



2.4 The fieldwork process: collecting primary material

There were two main field strategies. Data was collected from a number of different archives and in-depth oral interviews were conducted.

A central purpose in collecting data from as many sources as possible was the recognition that any one piece or source of data was incomplete. In order to convince the reader (and myself) of the credibility of my research findings it was essential to look for verification and validation between different sources. Silverman (2001:233) notes that there are two possible ways in which to validate qualitative research. The first involves comparing different kinds of data and different methods to see whether they corroborate each other. The second method involves taking one's findings back to informants. As indicated in the discussion below I utilised both these methods. I found strong coherence between sources of data. Furthermore, different chapters were given to some of my informants for comment and discussion.

2.4.1 Documentary material

The political violence in Natal has been very well documented (as discussed in chapter one). Such sources proved invaluable for the range of information they provided. Furthermore, much of this data was generated at the time and so provides a counter to the problems of memory (see below). Bailey (1987:291/2) in his discussion of the advantages of documentary sources lists a number that had resonance for this study. He mentioned a problem faced by many researchers of inaccessible subjects - that documentary sources can provide access to those who are long dead. While this is particularly pertinent for historical studies, it is doubly useful in this context where many potential research subjects have been killed in the violence. Documentary evidence allowed some, but limited, access to their stories. Secondly, by its very nature ethnography focuses on a small sample size, the additional usage of documentary material widened the scope of the research. Thirdly, documentary sources allows for the gathering of data over time. While the period of study in this research is not particularly lengthy, the use of

data collected at different times again counters some of the problems associated with memory - romanticisation, forgetfulness and the reworking of the past to fit with the current political situation.

I drew on a number of different sources of documentary evidence, some more complete then others.

(i) The database of the Unrest Monitoring Project, Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg contains all reported incidents of political violence in the Natal Midlands, which includes Hammarsdale and Mpumalanga. The sources of these records are police unrest reports, witnesses, newspapers, SAPA reports, and well-placed individuals eg lawyers, trade unionists, community-based workers/activists. This database runs into thousands of reported incidents. Some reports are based only on police unrest reports and are very sketchy, while others incorporate detailed statements from victims and witnesses (some who subsequently were killed) and run into many pages. These records detail incidents involving both women and men, though frequently the witnesses/survivors who make the statements are women. Using key words I categorised all reports according to area in which the incident occurred. Within these data-sets I then isolated all reports containing incidents involving women. The analysis of these data-sets provided me with an overview of the violence in Natal, and contributed to the selection of the research site and the discussion in chapter five.

(ii) Newspaper clippings housed in the Natal Room Archive, University of Natal, Durban.[4] These files were sourced from a wide range of national newspapers and include all the Natal newspapers. The clippings relate to incidents of political violence and the wider political situation, and they cover the period from 1980 to 1992. I went through the clippings covering the period 1985 to 1991. I made

[4] This collection has since been moved to the Alan Paton Centre, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg.

copies of all articles relating to incidents in Mpumalanga/Hammarsdale. These were then ordered chronologically and I summarised each article. The material from the newspapers was used extensively in chapter five and also in chapter four. Newspaper material was key in enabling me to identify organisations active in Mpumalanga prior to the violence and I was able to follow this up through key informant interviews (see below). I also found that there was corroboration between incidents mentioned in newspaper articles and narratives from the oral interviews.

(iii) Affidavits and statements. A large number of affidavits from both men and women were collected at the time of the incidents by the Black Sash and lawyers from the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), Durban. Some of these were stored, others formed part of court records when lawyers applied for restraining orders and others were quoted extensively by journalists. Unfortunately the affidavits lodged with the LRC in Durban had been destroyed as the LRC shredded their files after five years. The Black Sash lodged all their Advice Office records at the Killie Campbell Museum, and there were a few affidavits in the collection. These affidavits provided useful background material and they corroborated interview data and newspaper reports. I cited some extracts in chapter six and seven, but they were primarily used to corroborate and validate other material, .

(iv) The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings were an essential source of information. The TRC held a number of hearings into political violence in Natal. I consulted the transcripts of the victim hearings held in Pietermaritzburg and Durban as well as the amnesty hearings of the Caprivi Trainees and the Special Hearings into the Caprivi Trainees. The hearings corroborated material from the oral interviews and the newspaper clippings. They were particularly useful in shedding light on covert state activities that had been alluded to in the other sources. This material was used in chapter five and six.

The TRC research process and the final report has been critically discussed (see Wilson, 2001; Posel & Simpson, 2002). While the material I consulted can not be isolated from the context within which it was produced, I used certain primary texts generated through the TRC process very particularly. Many of the incidents, as well as the details of these incidents (what happened and who was involved) had already been the subject of much discussion during the oral in-depth interviews. The TRC affidavits submitted to the victim and amnesty hearings provided further corroboration and more in-depth details of these same events. Mpumalanga residents already knew who had gone for training under Operation Marion, and what they had been involved in upon their return to Mpumlanaga. The TRC affidavits and special hearings allowed me to verify the in-depth oral interview discussions.

(v) Archival material was located in the National Archives in Pretoria and the Regional Archives in Pietermaritzburg. In the National Archives I consulted the Department of Bantu Affairs Records for Mpumalanga and Hammarsdale. These pertained to government plans around the construction of Mpumalanga Township and the decision to relocate the residents of Hammarsdale and Georgedale. Camperdown Magistrates Records were found in the Regional Archives. This material was useful in constructing the history of the area and in tracing the genealogy of violence; it was used in the writing of chapter three and chapter four.

2.4.2 In-depth oral interviews

In-depth oral interviews, sometimes called semi-structured interviews, were used in a variety of contexts. I made two main excursions into the field – the first in 1993/4 when focus group discussions were held with older women in Mpumalanga Township and the second in 1999 when individual interviews were held with young women. In addition, a number of key informant interviews were conducted.

Oral interviews do raise the methodological problem of memory and the reconstruction of the past. One view is that provided by Thompson (1978:98):

> The information provided by interview evidence of relatively recent events, or current situations, can be assumed to lie somewhere between the actual social behaviour and the social expectations or norms of the time.

According to such arguments the interview transcripts offer material accounts of events. However an opposing view sees such material as only text or discourse, according to Clifford Geertz (cited in Burawoy, 1991:3) "our business is limited to the 'understanding of understanding'". My approach was that interview transcripts are material accounts of actual behaviour, but that they cannot escape the reconstructions of the present. Accounts that people give of events are not 'passive memories' but "'scripts' through which people actively structure and manipulate conceptual elements …" (Finnegan, 1992:115). Passerini, (cited in Marks, 2001:15), further cautions that 'oral sources [should be] considered as forms of culture and testimonies of the changes of these forms over time". The process of remembering does not lie outside the context within which they are gathered. The material gathered in interviews and the meanings generated are moulded by the context of the interview the place where the interview takes place; the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee; and, in a focus group discussion the way the person wishes to present themselves to the groups. Furthermore, the memories are selective. As Marks (2001:13) reminds us, everyone has their own point of view and they will narrate the story from their perspective. As discussed below, some of these issues did have a bearing on the in-depth interviews. Thus, it was imperative to compare this data against that elicited from the documentary sources and to "look for congruence in the different accounts" (Schrager, cited in Marks, 2001:15). In many cases the material gathered from both these sources corroborated each other.

An issue that the research literature does not seem to discuss is the impact of the event itself on recall and recollection. Given that the topics under discussion had to potential to be particularly traumatic for those recounting the narrative; I

needed to consider the possibility that the reconstruction of traumatic events could be particularly problematic. As discussed below, the principal emotion invoked during the interviews was anger. Rather than resulting in memory loss, it seemed as if anger had honed remembering to the finest detail.

The material gathered from oral interviews was primarily used in writing chapter seven, however it was also used in chapters three, four and five.

(i) Focus Group Interviews

Focus groups have become increasingly popular as a tool of qualitative research (Macun & Posel, 1998). They involve small, relatively homogeneous groups discussing a series of defined topics, where "the interaction plays an important role in generating information and data" (Macun & Posel, 1998:119). Topics and hypotheses for discussion are selected in advance, but the actual questions are not selected (Bailey, 1987:190/1). This allows a series of probes that can investigate subjective issues deeply.

This method was appropriate for a number of reasons. Firstly, the technique is more sensitive to power relations and the group dynamics often dislocate the "questioning researcher and the questioned research subject" (Robinson, 1994:12) and so allow the displacement of subject positions. Secondly, as Burawoy (1991:284) argues new meanings are produced in social arenas. These new meanings

> arise from communicative labours whose comprehension requires actual or virtual participation. To gain access ... scientists have to enter into dialogue with participants.

Given the theoretical questions this thesis is interested in, a method that generates meanings seemed to be most productive. Thirdly, the lack of trust and suspicion that existed as a result of the violence suggested that group interviews were more acceptable than individual interviews. While negotiating access (see below) members of the community decided that the interviews would be group affairs.

While this was a non-negotiable it is telling in itself and informative of community dynamics at the time.

My first task was to negotiate access for the research and acceptance of the project amongst residents of Mpumalanga. The peace pact was barely two years old, many houses still stood empty and the air was thick with distrust. Nobody would talk to a stranger who did not come with the right credentials. I approached Mary de Haas, a well-known violence monitor, explained my project and asked if she would introduce me to some community leaders. She agreed to speak to activists from the area about my project. I was then put in touch with Zweli, a prominent comrade from unit three, Mpumalanga Township. He was doing a course in Community Development at the University of Natal and I met him for the first time after one of his lectures. He listened to my story. My affiliation with the University of Natal, given its history of individuals who had played a role in supporting the mass democratic movement during the days of the anti-apartheid struggle, as well as, my own personal history of involvement with the trade union movement and the BTR Sarmcol strike, were deciding factors in his decision to introduce me to key gate-keepers in Mpumalanga.

The first visit to Mpumalanga Township took place on 4 September 1993. I was introduced to local community leaders, Connie Myeni in unit one south and Sydwell Ngwana and Mr Duma in unit three (both UDF areas), in order to get sanction for the research and permission to be in the area.[5] On this first visit to Mpumalanga we avoided areas that were known to be Inkatha and my field-notes reflect that Zweli specifically advised that we avoid Woody Glen (an Inkatha stronghold) 'as he did not know what might happen to us'. At each house I was questioned. They wanted to know who I was and what my history was. With

[5] Even though a peace pact had been signed, there was still a lot of tension. Strangers were viewed with suspicion. It was just prior to the 1994 elections and Inkatha had not yet agreed to participate in those elections. Rumours abounded in the township that Inkatha was still recruiting clandestinely in order to disrupt the elections violently. Interviews I did in 1999 bore this out when a young woman from unit one north confirmed that during this period Inkatha had sent her for paramilitary training. Once trained they formed Self-Protection Units.

Zweli's support all agreed to endorse the research and ask women in their neighbourhood to talk to me. There was one condition - the interviews were to be done in groups.

Over the next year a total of twelve focus group discussions were held in various UDF-supporting units of the township (see table three). Some groups met more than once, and on each occasion the discussion lasted between two and three hours. Mrs Myeni and Mr Duma arranged the first two groups; thereafter a snowball sampling technique was used. At the end of the discussion I asked the group if anybody was prepared to arrange a new group at their house or to ask one of their friends to arrange a group. My requests were met with positive responses and a number of women indicated they would assist. With the exception of the church group[6] all the groups consisted of close neighbours. Macun & Posel (1998:119) argue that as the purpose of a focus group is to encourage group discussion, it is desirable for the participants to "feel as comfortable and uninhibited with each other as possible". Nevertheless, it was important to recognise that in a group situation there is added pressure to conform to the dominant viewpoint of the group. This was particularly so in the context of political violence and the atmosphere of fear and intimidation that had resulted. I attempted to counter this by focusing the discussions around the experiences of the women involved. As the violence had forged intimate relations between neighbours, and information had great currency in the attempts to stay alive there was little they didn't know about one another.

Table 3: Focus Groups Interviewed

Date	Name of Group	Introduced by	Unit	Who was there[7]
07/09/93	Mrs Ncgobo	Zweli	Four	One women
11/09/93	Edith's Group	Sydwell	Three	Four women and one man

[6] This was a group of Roman Catholic women who met twice a week for prayer.

[7] I've excluded the contact/organising person who with the exception of Edith's group usually attended as well.

Date	Name of Group	Introduced by	Unit	Who was there[7]
18/09/93		Ngwana		Two women
24/09/93	Connie's Group	Connie	One south	Three women and one man
05/10/93 16/10/93	Mthembu's Group	Edith	Three	Five women Five women (only three were from the previous discussion) and one man.
26/10/93	Roman Catholic Church Group	Edith	Four	Twenty women
28/10/93	Mrs Mkize's	Church Group	Four	Eight women
09/11/93 17/11/93	Mrs Semelane's Group[8]	Edith	Three	Four women Six women (only three from the previous discussion)
13/11/93 04/12/93	Mrs Tusi's Group	Mrs Mkhize	Four	Ten women Five women (only three from the previous discussion)
03/02/94	Connie's Group (2)	Connie	One south	One woman and one man
05/02/94 26/02/94	Mrs Tusi's Group (2)	Mrs Tusi	Four	
15/03/94	Teacher	Mrs Tusi	Four	One woman
05/09/94 7/09/94	Connie's Friend	Connie	One south and Two	Two women Two women

The size and membership of the groups varied. There was one very large group and two consisted of just one woman.[9] Not everyone who had been at the first discussion returned for the second meeting and often new women arrived to

[8] A third meeting had been planned with this group. However, when we arrived for the appointment the house was locked and Mrs Smelane was not there. We waited an hour but nobody arrived. I later received a phone call from the woman who introduced me to Mrs Smelane saying that Mrs Smelane had had visitors asking who I was and what I wanted. She had been frightened and intimidated and asked me not to come back to her house.

participate. I also found that participation varied. Some participants spoke frequently and seemed to dominate the discussion. While this was more of a problem in large groups, it also happened in the smaller groups. Some women arrived late and others left early. On some occasions, men joined the groups. It seemed that the men in the house were curious to hear what was being discussed. In the instance of Mthembu's Group, Mr Mthembu was an important local leader and he felt that 'he knew more than ten people'. When this happened I did not object to their participation and upon reflection it was interesting to contrast their stories with those of the women. Often these dynamics shifted the power balance and marginalised me as the researcher. I was not able to control the research process. My fieldnotes of 5 October 1993 reflected the following observation

> The way things are happening are outside of my control. … Groups are interesting as it definitely shifts power away from the interviewer.

It was necessary to keep in mind the point made by Stacey (1991) that research is a process in which the researcher is never in full control. At times, all research and particularly ethnographic research is unpredictable. Yet its very unpredictability often provides the insights and analytical clues. Ethnography enables the researcher to observe and get to know the community, how it functions and works. It enables the researcher to learn from the informants and all situations become learning situations.

With the assistance of an interpreter the interviewer, using a discussion guide initiated a discussion among the group. These conversations were primarily conducted in *isiZulu*. This discussion was recorded using an audio-tape for later transcription and translation. Each audio-tape was transcribed and translated in full. This allowed me to see the full context of how the discourse developed during the interaction and enabled the translation process to become transparent. Translations raised a number of problems in both the interview and in the

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[9] One of these interviews was not used. The woman's son sat with us throughout the discussion clearly monitoring what was being said and how his mother answered the questions. In addition, she would not allow the interview to be taped.

transcription process. As most of the discussion took place in *isiZulu,* I was effectively excluded from steering the discussion and had to rely on the translator to do so. A number of different translators were used, and I found that age was an important factor in the ability of the translators to both gain respect from the group and understand the objectives of the focus group discussion. Student translators were not the most successful and the two older women, with their additional life experience and political knowledge, were better placed to facilitate the group. However, the student translators were more likely to defer to me and translate frequently, while the older women steered their own course and allowed the discussion to take its own direction. However, upon reviewing the transcripts it became apparent that each approach had its own advantages and disadvantages. Transcription and translation of tapes gave rise to more technical problems. It was impossible to locate any professional transcription services that were able to handle recordings in *isiZulu* and therefore I was forced to use students. Upon checking the tapes I found numerous problems with the transcriptions and each tape had to be checked and re-transcribed as well as the translations checked. However, despite these problems the focus group research could not have been completed without the assistance of the many women (and one man) that assisted by translating and transcribing focus group interviews – for this I thank them and acknowledge their contribution.

After each visit, field notes were written and the transcribed tape formed part of the field observations (see Burawoy, 1991). I used the field notes to record information about the participants in the group, my observations about the group and its dynamics as well as additional information I was given about events/dynamics in the township at that time.

As there was still great fear of Inkatha amongst the participants full confidentiality of those participating in the focus groups was agreed to. To ensure this, with the exception of the person organising the group nobody was introduced to me by name.

My intention was also to hold focus group interviews in Inkatha-supporting areas of the township. Mrs Myeni had agreed, through her work in the reconstruction committee, to introduce me to a contact person who might facilitate a group. However, it became clear in the discussions with informants that this was not really desirable. While no-one raised outright objections, and when asked many said that it would be a good idea to get the perspective of Inkatha-supporting women, the undercurrents led me to believe that it would seriously compromise the relationship I was developing with my informants. Who I was, my views on Inkatha and the violence were central to their willingness to participate.

Informants frequently saw me as a resource person. I was asked to assist with numerous activities, from bringing University of Natal application forms, to providing a list of potential funders for the community advice centre to taking someone to see a lawyer. While I was willing to assist where possible this perception did lead to one problem. It had become clear to me that there were a number of undercurrents – their exact nature or purpose I was not sure of - in one of the neighbourhoods. I began to get suspicious that one of my informants, a woman who had organised a number of focus groups, was using her relationship with me (and the possibility that she would be able to access resources this way) to leverage her position amongst her neighbours. Deciding to be cautious, once the discussion was over I withdrew and did not pursue other contacts through her.

(ii) Individual in-depth oral interviews

Given the emphasis on generation it had always been my intention to conduct interviews with younger women.[10] Reflections on the focus group interviews made me decide to conduct individual interviews with the younger women. By avoiding inter-group interactions and dynamics I wished to see if the conversations covered similar ground.

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[10] While a few young women did attend the focus group interviews, they were not in the majority and furthermore did not participate much.

One-on-one in-depth interviews were conducted in English with eleven young women in 1999. The women were between twenty and thirty-five years of age ie they were the peer group of the male youth who had been so intensively involved in the violence between the years 1987 and 1991. A similar set of open-ended questions was put to each woman. This allowed the conversation to develop its own direction but ensured similar ground was covered in each interview. The interviews were conducted in English in order to avoid the earlier problems encountered regarding translations and transcriptions. There was some self-selection as informants needed to have good English fluency. However, given the prevalence of English fluency amongst younger African people I regarded this problem as having a minimal effect on the sample.

Table 4: Young Women Interviewed

Date of Interview	Name	Birth Date	Unit
18/03/99	Thoko (TN2)	1972	One north
27/03/99	Thembi (TN1)	1971	Four (moved to Georgedale during violence)
30/03/99	Nomvula (NK)		One north (moved to unit six during violence)
06/04/99	Dudu (DM)	1973	Georgedale
07/04/99	Thando (TM)		Georgedale
07/04/99	Nonku (NL2)		Georgedale
09/04/99	Mandisa (MN)	1972	One north (moved from one south at the beginning of the violence)
09/04/99	Nonto (NL1)		One south
11/04/99	Mbali (MM)	1975	Six (stayed in unit three to attend school)
11/04/99	Phumzile (PM1)	1974	Three
12/04/99	Pumla (PM2)	1975	Three (moved to unit four but returned to unit three during the violence)

Contact with the informants was made through Muzwi Mkhulisi, an Mpumalanga Township resident and University of Natal Geography masters student. Muzwi was researching waste management systems and recycling in Mpumalanga

Township. He had come to see me previously to ask my advice about certain aspects of his research proposal. I asked him to assist in finding young women who were willing to be interviewed. The sample was a non-probability sample, selected through a combination of random selection (Muzwi approached women from his neighbourhood and others at the bus and taxi ranks) and snowball sampling (when a woman who had already been interviewed asked a friend to get in touch with me). The interviews were conducted at the University of Natal and each woman was reimbursed for her transport and subsistence costs. The reason for conducting the interviews at the University was to ensure a quiet venue where we would be undisturbed and get a good quality recording. Each interview lasted approximately two hours.

Permission was obtained from all the informants for the interviews to be recorded using an audio-tape recorder. They were transcribed in full by a professional agency and checked by myself. Full confidentiality of all the informants was assured.

By 1999 fear of Inkatha and the resumption of political violence had subsided significantly. Informants were curious about my interest in the topic and whether I had any direct experience of violence, but I no longer had to prove my political credibility. Their questions to me were around my education, career path, personal life and economic status. There was an expectation that I would be interviewing young women from all units of the township. There was no sanction, even from strong ANC supporters, about my interviewing young women from Inkatha-aligned areas.

(iii) Key informant interviews

In addition to the focus group interviews with older women and the individual interviews with young women, I also conducted ten key informant interviews with community and organisational leaders (see table five). These were used to elicit

information about specific events. These individuals were selected using purposive sampling:

> ... the researcher uses his or her judgement about which respondents to choose, and picks only those who best meet the purposes of the study. The advantages of purposive sampling are that the researcher can use his or her research skill and prior knowledge to choose respondents (Bailey, 1987:94).

The data generated from the documentary material as well as from the focus groups was used to identify these individuals.

Table 5: Key Informant Interviews

Date	Name	Organisation / Position
23/10/98	Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge	Former chairperson of Natal Organisation of Women, NOW had a branch in Mpumalanga.
25/03/99	Phozo Zondo	Branch organiser for NOW.
25/04/99	Reverend	Lives in unit one north Mpumalanga, former tenant in Georgedale/Hammarsdale prior to removals to Mpumalanga Township.
26/04/99	Rodger Sishi	Lived in unit two Mpumalanga, former mayor of Mpumalanga, founding member and chairman of Mpura.
29/04/99	Mr M	Member of old Georgedale family, landowner whose land was expropriated to build Mpumalanga Township.
24/07/00	Strini Moodley	Member of Azapo, key contact person for Mpumalanga Branch.
28/07/00	James Ngubane	Lived in unit two Mpumalanga. Member of Azapo (Mpumalanga Branch), Mpura, NUTW and vice-president of TAWU.
01/08/00	Richard Mqadi (Cele)	Lived in unit four Mpumalanga, member of Azapo, chairperson of Mpumalanga Branch.
03/08/00	Mandla Mthembu	Lived in unit one south Mpumalanga. Member of Azapo (Mpumalanga Branch).
09/12/00	Sbu Mbhele	Lived in unit three Mpumalanga, Member of Azapo (Mpumalanga Branch).
07/11/03	Bruce Buthelezi	Lived in unit one south Mpumalanga, Member of Azapo (Mpumalanga Branch), and key activist in Hayco.

The in-depth interviews with key informants were very unstructured. I prepared for the interview and made notes regarding the ground that I needed to cover,

however, each interview took its own course depending on the area of expertise of the individual.

Permission was received from all the key informants, with the exception of Mr M, to record the interview using a tape record. Interviews were fully transcribed by a professional agency and checked by myself. None of the key informants, with the exception of Mr M, requested their identity be kept confidential.

2.5 Research lacunae

I have identified two lacunae in this research.

Firstly, as discussed above the project was originally conceptualised to focus on women's experiences of political violence. While later I developed an interest in the construction of political identity, the focus was still women. Thus my research strategy highlighted women as the primarily informants. However, as the research progressed, it developed its own dynamics. It became more focused on the political violence itself and in trying to understand the rupture that occurred in KwaZulu and Natal's politics in the mid-1980s. Gender and generation became more pivotal to my analysis. In analysing and writing up the research it has become apparent that in-depth interviews with a cohort of male respondents of mixed age would have added to the richness of the data and contributed meaningfully to my analysis. Given the overwhelming male membership of the youth organisations, this data would have allowed me to develop a richer picture of their organisational history and development, particularly that of the Hammarsdale Youth Congresss. Nevertheless, the key informant interviews do, to some degree, mitigate this lacuna. Within this cluster there are a significant number of male activists. They were able to speak to the development of youth organisations in the area and outline their experience of political violence. While not satisfactorily closing this lacuna, these interviews do add significantly to the richness of the research data.

The second weakness relates to the problems of inaccuracies contained within newspaper reports. When attempting to corroborate newspaper reports with other documentary sources and/or in-depth interviews it became apparent that there were inaccuracies. Frequently names and sometimes even incidents were mixed up. The killing of Mashu Mbatha/Bongani Mbatha/Masha Shandu referred to in chapter six is an example of this problem. In its report of the killing of a student leader The Natal Mercury refers to the victim as Bongani Mbatha, The Weekly Mail and two oral interviews (see Interview Thembi, TN1#1-2:2; focus group Connie's group, Con1#1-2:3) gives his name as Mashu Mbatha, and Israel Hlongwane in his TRC affidavit refers to the killing of Mashu Shandu (TRC affidavit S20).[11] Many reasons lie behind these inaccuracies. Firstly, for a range of reasons, from state of emergency regulations to laziness, reporters often relied on official police reports. The information contained in these reports was notoriously scanty and frequently inaccurate (Aitchison, 1988:4-6). Secondly, the difficulty and danger in accessing areas where there was a war meant that many reporters did not carefully check and substantiate their information, often relying on second-hand accounts that were unverified. Thirdly, the lack of *isiZulu* language proficiency amongst mostly white English-speaking reporters could have also resulted in accuracies. In the example cited above, Shandu is the clan name for Mbatha, and the two are used interchangeable. Despite these problems, the inaccuracies contained in the newspaper reports seem to be mostly in the detail, rather than in the broad brush-strikes of events. I did find strong corroborations between the in-depth oral interviews and newspaper accounts.

2.6 Research Ethics

There were numerous ethical considerations associated with this research. Some are related to any research activity but others were specifically related to the subject matter of this project.

[11] There are other discrepancies between the various reports regarding the method used to kill him and the location of the body.

(i) *Informed consent, privacy and confidentiality.* All research participants were fully informed of the intentions of the research and that participation was voluntary. They were told that if there were any questions they did not wish to discuss, they were under no obligation to answer them and they did not need to provide any reasons. Furthermore, their identities would not be revealed without their express permission and in fact would be protected. Any information that personally identified a research participant would not be released without their permission.

(ii) *Expectations of the research informants.* It was important that I did not raise the expectations of those participating in the research, or make unrealistic promises in order to encourage participation. Research participants often have expectations that many of their problems will be addressed through the research. This was particularly so in the context of political violence when people lost so much and were facing traumas that made it difficult for them to piece their lives back together. I tried to make it very clear that while I could assist in my individual capacity where possible, my research was not of a policy nature nor was I coming from any organisation that could provide them with assistance. Some of the issues around expectations were discussed above.

(iii) *Evoking trauma.* The subject matter of this research was the source of great personal trauma for all the research participants. I needed to ensure that I was not the cause of secondary victimisation. Many participants, particularly in the 1993 focus group discussions, did find talking about these events very distressing and they evoked a lot of anger. I attempted to act responsibly in such situations; being empathetic and where necessary referring people to counselling. Fortunately, it never became necessary to refer anyone to counselling.

Chapter Three: From Freehold to Model Township: The Making of Mpumalanga - Space, Control and a 'New' Zulu Identity

3.1 Introduction

This chapter foregrounds the argument that 1987 represents a primary rupture in the politics of Natal. Its purpose is to sketch a historical narrative of the Hammarsdale area in order to understand the way in which the space, Mpumalanga, has been constructed. This historical narrative, exploring the intertwining themes of identity, place, patriarchy (embodying both gender and generation), power, authority, and modalities of governance will demonstrate the totality of this rupture. Furthermore, a history of the locale, detailing the changing configurations of economic and political interests, modalities of governance, ethnic identities, and the politics of gender and generation, establishes a vantage point from which to look forward to the post-1987 period. As this chapter will demonstrate Mpumalanga Township and the surrounding area had been the site of other conflicts and struggles prior to the political violence of the 1980s. Unlike the post-'87 period, these earlier struggles were kept in check, with the state acting as a force of order and containment. Thus my argument is that political violence needs to be located in a place where space had already acquired particular meanings. These spaces have a history; they were not just empty spaces to be inscribed with meaning in the current period.

The chapter will show that while the strong *amakholwa*[1] identity of the founding community dissipated with the influx of new residents into Georgedale, this legacy enabled the formation of the elite in the new township and the existence of (a)

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[1] *Kholwa* means 'believers', most Christian converts lived in communities on mission reserves land know as *kholwa* areas. In many of these areas residents formed themselves into tribes, *amakholwa*, and elected chiefs to govern them. *Kholwa* areas as well as the *amakholwa* themselves fell outside of customary law as inscribed in the Natal Native Code. Many have argued (see Meintjes, 1990:126) that

different version(s) of Zulu identity. If the states' project of herding the African population into urban townships was to be successful then these legacies needed to be disciplined. Transferring these townships to KwaZulu was a key factor in this process. However, the establishment of new forms of governance answerable to KwaZulu was not just about the enforcement of grand apartheid with its racially segregated spaces, it was also about re-shaping the communities' subjectivities as KwaZulu subjects and citizens. Key to this was the establishment of the Inkatha branch in the new township, and its hegemonic project of redefining what it meant to be Zulu and a loyal KwaZulu subject. As the chapter will show this was not without conflict. Yet the conflict in this period is markedly different in both form and intensity from the political violence of the 1980s. Thus, the discussion in this chapter provides weight to the thesis' argument that political violence was an unprecedented form of conflict, that reterritorialised and politicised the spaces of everyday life as well as remaking political identities.

The chapter attempts to periodise this historical narrative. A major project of the South African apartheid state was to organise and racially demarcate both the countryside and the urban areas. State interventions in ordering the ownership of land and living spaces have had, I would suggest, the most marked effect on the lives of ordinary people. These interventions imposed new spatialities on their lives, changed their social relationships, and forced them to accede to new bureaucratic powers and forms of local government. It was in the reordering of these spatialities that new identities were formed.

The chapter begins by providing a brief background to, and history of, the area prior to the 1950s. Government attempts to control access to land and enact systems of local government predate the Nationalist Party government. The first two sections discuss the establishment of Georgedale as a mission area with its attendant form of

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the *amakholwa* culture was a hybrid of Christian modernity and African traditionalism. This was one

kholwa governance and identity. I shall give some indication of the socio-economic conditions, class formations, the local political dynamics and power blocs in this period. The later period sees state attempts to bring the *amakholwa* community under control by changing the form of local government.

The early 1960s marks a period of transition. The residents of the Georgedale-Hammarsdale complex were to experience the first of a series of major upheavals in their lives when the area was marked for expropriation. Prior to this residents had some autonomy over their lives and some control of their environment. With the coming to power of the Nationalist Party Government in 1948, this autonomy was slowly brought under legislative control. 1961 marks the beginning of a period of dramatic change and uncertainty. The next decade saw major changes and violent upheavals in their lives as they were removed and relocated into the newly built Mpumalanga Township.

The third periodisation begins in the late 1960s / early 1970s with life in Mpumalanga Township. This section demonstrates that as new political structures, forms of governance and administrative procedures were established it became necessary for residents to adjust to new life-styles and urban cultures. In the process residents acquired (a) new urban identities(y). While the strong *amakholwa* identity of previous decades had dissipated, this history had provided Georgedale residents with a certain independence from both the state and KwaZulu. Now residents found themselves incorporated into KwaZulu with the resulting pressures to become loyal Zulu subjects. These pressures were central in the creation of new political and economic elites. Local traders marginalised by this group formed a new organisation to advance their interests. The chapter concludes by examining emerging conflicts between this group and Inkatha. While these conflicts never assumed the intensity of the political violence that consumed the township from the mid-1980s, they were

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version of Zulu identity available to Natal Africans (see McClendon, 2002:11).

important in challenging Inkatha's hegemonic project and offering a counter-identity to Inkatha.

This narrative emphasises three, more abstract, points. Firstly, it shows that identity emerged in relationship to a range of complexities. Factors that were important in identity formation during this period included land, organisational membership, histories of association, religion, gender and age. Secondly, it demonstrates the interconnections of time and space; the changing forms of governance, power and authority are closely connected to changes in place and space, yet central to the analysis is the need to periodise these shifts. Thirdly, it demonstrates the historical heterogeneity and co-existence of different forms of (Zulu-)identity.

3.2 Establishing a Mission: The Roots of Power, Governance and Identity

The Mpumalanga township was built in 1968 on freehold mission land. These mission roots shaped the character of the area and determined the key features that configured its future. Primary amongst these was the *amakholwa* character of the area. This determined the forms of governance, ethnic identities and the politics of gender and generation that were found in the area. Secondly, the patterns of land-ownership, established at this time, were to shape the economic and political elites of the area.

In 1843 the British authorities in the Cape Colony issued a proclamation annexing Natal. Within a few years Theophilus Shepstone, Natal's Secretary for Native Affairs, began to map out the sections of the colony that would be available for settler occupation and those parts where the indigenous people would live in 'reserves'. In addition to the 'native' reserves owned by the crown, Africans could also occupy land in the mission reserves.

The 'Shepstone system' was a model of 'indirect' rule that allowed the colonial

government to rule African people through the agency of African chiefs. Some of the chiefs (*amakhosi*) had a hereditary claim and others were appointed, nevertheless, they all relied on the continual approval of the colonial government for their positions. African 'customary law' was devised utilising a mixture of indigenous custom and British legal procedure. This ensured that the hierarchical and patriarchal systems of the pre-colonial period were codified in a system enforced by colonial magistrates and the *amakhosi*. Guy (1997) called the Shepstone system an 'accommodation of the patriarchs'; it entrenched patriarchal and gerontocratic power within African societies. However, as McClendon (2002:12) observes African societies were fluid and there were opportunities for women and juniors to challenge and limit the power of senior males.

Throughout the late nineteenth century the colonial authorities continued to codify customary law. According to Berry, (cited in McClendon, 2002:17) both customary law and indirect rule were 'built on a foundation of conflict and change'. Challenges to patriarchal authority were central to these conflicts and changes.

> At a time when young men pursued wage labour, homestead women produced grain for the market, fathers demanded inflated and sometimes monetised bridewealth, and young women sought refuge in mission enclaves from polygynous elderly husbands, the ideology of customary law cast the chiefdom and the homestead as timeless, well-ordered bastions of respect, hierarchy and contentment. (McClendon, 2002:17)

In 1891 the Natal Code of Native Law was fully codified by the Natal Legislative Council. Women were subjugated to men and children to their father. By placing women as perpetual minors and requiring all residents of the *umuzi* to 'render obedience, respect, and wages to the *umnumzane*, and through him to the *inkosi*' (McClendon, 2002:18) patriarchal and gerontocratic power was legally entrenched.

In implementing these measures, Shepstone did not always have the support of the Natal settlers. Instead of protecting and reinforcing African patriarchy, the settlers would have preferred a weakening of the system that kept young men tied to the African household. The settlers argued that

> The reserve system bolstered the homestead economy and encouraged homestead heads to ignore colonial labour needs. … Colonial farmers advocated laws designed to undermine homestead heads' control over youths and to compel African sons and daughters to work on the settlers farms. (Carton, 2000:32)

In 1864 the African reserves were placed under the administration of the Natal Native Trust, a government body that safeguarded African rights to hold communal title to their land. The Shepstone system had allowed few instances where Africans could hold individual title to land. However, one opportunity for individual tenure was provided by the mission societies (see Surplus People's Project, 1983b:24). Colonial Natal was the site of intense missionary activity (see Surplus People's Project, 1983b:19). The missionaries were strongly supportive of individual land tenure amongst Africans. Within this they encouraged the development of

> self-sufficient, petty commodity-producing units based on the nuclear household and on family labour. The nature of the productive process in these households made them resemble those of settler society, though they also shared aspects of indigenous, kinship-based households in the reserves. (Meintjes, 1990: 132)

The first mission reserves were demarcated in 1856 and by 1864 there were twenty-one mission reserves (later adjusted to nineteen). A prosperous *amakholwa* group emerged within these areas (see Etherington, cited in Surplus People's Project, 1983b:20).

In 1862 the Reverend John Allsopp of the Methodist Church bought the farms Woody Glen and Georgedale in the Shongweni/Hammarsdale area (see Map 4). He wished to acquire land for African Christians from the Verulum area in order to establish a mission[2] (Laredo, 1968:70). The Mission Society bought the land with the intention that the *amakholwa* who settled there should purchase their land from the Missionary Society. They would acquire freehold rights along with the title deeds to

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[2] Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (PAR), Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1B, Letter to magistrate 30 June 1951.

MAP 4: LOCATION OF GEORGEDALE AND WOODY GLEN FARMS IN THE CAMPERDOWN MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT (c1957)



the land. Besides being seen as a way to finance the establishment of the mission (Laredo, 1968:71), it also fitted with the Christian-mission ideology to improve the conditions of the *amakholwa* (Brookes & Hurwitz, cited in Laredo, 1968). Christian Luthayi was elected leader of the group of people who made the move from Verulum to Georgedale. A section of the Natal Code, promulgated in 1871, stipulated that the leader of the *amakholwa* community would become the chief (Laredo, 1968:71). However, it wasn't until 1880 that a *amakholwa* tribe was formed at Georgedale

under the chieftainship of Christian Luthayi.[3] Membership of the community could only be obtained by conversion or baptism.

As stated earlier this history resulted in a number of distinguishing features. I shall briefly outline them below. It should be noted that these themes will reoccur throughout this chapter. Most significantly, this community owned land. Throughout the twentieth century the right of Africans to own land was contested by the state. The various measures enacted by government (see below) to restrict African ownership of land shaped the community. Furthermore, account needs to be taken of its *kholwa* beliefs and associated values (see Marks, 1989) and privileges not least of which was exemption from the Natal Code. Finally, the membership criteria resulted in a small distinct group of original families. These families formed the basis of the elite in the area. They were to remain amongst the elite until the forced removals of the 1960s.

The Christian-mission ideology of individual land tenure for Africans was not widely accepted in colonial Natal. Soon after achieving responsible government in 1883, the settlers implemented measures to restrict African access to land tenure (Surplus People's Project, 1983b:25). In the 1890s mission reserves were closed to individual ownership and in 1903, the Land Department was instructed to refuse all African bids on the sale of crown land.

The 1913 Land Act, which scheduled land as Native Reserves, continued a process of exclusion that had already begun prior to Union.[4] Much of the scheduled land was based on existing reserves and locations established in the colonial period. According to the Surplus People's Project (SPP) report (1983) most existing African freehold land was not included in the schedule. Africans were no longer able to

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[3] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1B, 15 September 1949.

[4] In 1910 the Union of South Africa was formed. The former Natal Colony was incorporated into the Union.

acquire land outside that which had been scheduled. The state acknowledged that the 1913 Act had not set aside sufficient land and the Natives Land Commission (known as the Beaumont Commission) was set up to make recommendations for additional land to be included in the schedule. The Commission's proposals were unacceptable to many. After a torturous process watered down recommendations were accepted, in 1921, by the Smuts Government.

Governance proceeded as if these proposals were formally in place; however, the legislation confirming these proposals was only enacted in 1936. According to the Surplus People's Project (1983b:30) the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act was a far more significant and wide reaching piece of legislation than its predecessor. This Act drew on colonial Natal's trust tenure system to create a legal body, the South African Native Trust[5] (SANT), to which ownership of the reserves was ceded. The various trusts already in place in Natal were incorporated into this new body. More significantly for owners of freehold land, the Act created a new category of reserve land, released land - 'land legally opened up for African occupation either through the trust or through individual or group purchase' (Surplus People's Project, 1983b:31). The Act formally legalised 'new' land that had been bought by Africans in recommended areas since 1921 and recognised other areas owned or occupied by Africans for inclusion in the reserves. Most of the land released in 1936 was land that had already been bought but not scheduled in 1913. While much existing freehold land was incorporated into the reserves in 1936 a substantial amount was excluded. These areas were to be known as blackspots - 'privately owned land that was not released' (Surplus People's Project, 1983b:35).

In common with most of Natal's freehold land, Georgedale did not make the list of scheduled land outlined in the 1913 Land Act. However, it was declared a released area (Released Area No 51) by the 1936 Land Act.

Despite these legal uncertainties, Georgedale had become a desirable residential location for many Africans – both landowners and tenants.[6] Besides being a freehold area with legislative protection, Georgedale had other features to recommend it to prospective residents. There were good transport systems and relatively easy access to the city of Durban (see Map 4). Furthermore, it was one of the few available options for those who wished to purchase land. Many moved into the area with this purpose in mind (Laredo, 1968:238). According to Laredo,[7] (1968:74) there was an influx of people purchasing land after 1913 and 1936. Camperdown Magistrate's records show a flurry of sales activity in the early 1930s.[8] Much of the documentation related to these sales and transfers refers to Woody Glen and Georgedale Mission Station as being 'in the midst of a locality almost exclusively owned by natives'.[9] During the early 1930s there were numerous applications and attempts by Africans to purchase land beyond the Woody Glen farm and Georgedale Mission[10] ie outside of the areas indicated by the Beaumont Commission as available for African occupation. The magistrate's correspondence of the time shows that even though many individual white farmers wished to sell their land to African buyers (white-owned land bordering on African-owned land having little appeal to white buyers) few were, in the face of an organised campaign by the Hammarsdale

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5 This was later known as the South African Bantu Trust and then the South African Development Trust.

6 By the early twentieth century a landlord/tenant relationship (Surplus People's Project, 1983b:27) was developing on freehold land with African landowners taking on rent-paying tenants rather than cultivating the land for the agricultural market. Two pressures were responsible; firstly, difficulties associated with competing in the market, and secondly; land pressures forcing landless people to look for alternatives. African-owned freehold land being unmediated by government officials was such an alternative. Figures for 1916 show that two-thirds of the population on freehold farms were tenants (Surplus People's Project, 1983b:27).

7 Laredo, an anthropologist at the University of Natal, did extensive field work in the Shongweni area in the late 1950s and early 1960s. His methodology involved living in a number of areas including Georgedale. I have relied extensively on his 1968 study *Patterns of Socio-Economic Transition. A Study in a BantuReserve in the "Three Rivers District" of Natal* for an account of the early period.

8 PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/1/1

9 PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/1/1, 2/3/2

10 PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/1/2, 2/3/92

Farmers' Association, prepared to break ranks and agree to such sales. For example, of the eight applications made in 1931, only one was approved by the white farmers.[11] The chief native commissioner was only prepared to give permission for a cross-race-sale if the majority of farmers agreed.

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s the availability of land for either purchase or rent, in what was a restricted property market, attracted both potential landowners as well as tenants to the area. As no 'new' land was available for purchase, the sub-division of the existing land into smaller and smaller plots, a feature of many freehold areas, was increasingly evident.

The *amakholwa* status of the area also influenced these patterns. There were a number of ramifications. Firstly the *amakholwa* were exempt from the restrictive terms of the Natal Code.[12] For women this exception allowed them to escape the status of perpetual minor, it also gave them the right to own property independently (Marks, 1989:226). Secondly, influenced by the church the household structure tended to resemble the nuclear family structure of western society rather than the traditional *umuzi* of the extended polygamous family. Thirdly, the chief was elected by the men of the community instead of being selected by the past chief. And fourthly, there is evidence that throughout the first half of the twentieth century *amakholwa* areas became refuges for those escaping patriarchal authority (see Carton, 2000; McClendon, 2002).

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[11] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/1/2, 2/3/92, Letter from Acting CNC to Native Commissioner Camperdown, 24th July 1931. Also an article printed in a local newspaper; 'Sale of Land to Natives: Result of Hammarsdale Discussion' *The Farmer*, 26th June 1931.

[12] Legislation was introduced in 1865, which allowed individuals to apply for exemption from customary law. The *amakholwa* viewed these provisions with suspicion as they wished to be exempted as a group. However, changes to customary law which undermined Christian marriages and removed the right of women to property ownership encouraged the *amakholwa* to seek exemption in the 1870s. (see Meintjes, 1990:128)

3.3 Georgedale in the 1940s and 1950s

By the 1940s and 1950s Georgedale had changed substantially from its early days as an *amakholwa* enclave. There had been an influx of new residents which had changed the patterns of land-usage; diversified land ownership; and, expanded the elite of the area.

There were two sources of power in the area; that vested in the traditional authority and that held by the economic elite – the landowners. As the period unfolded so the power held by the *Inkosi* declined. At a formal level the state attempted to replace the *amakholwa* leadership with other forms of local government and the landowners (many who were not descended from the founding community) garnered more authority in the area. This period was not without conflict but unlike in the 1980s the conflict was resolved through the accepted traditional authority structures of the area.

3.3.1 The Socio-Economic Conditions

Laredo (1968) in his study *'Patterns of Socio-Economic Transition. A Study in a Bantu Reserve in the "Three Rivers District" of Natal'* provides a rich and detailed account of the socio-economic status of the Shongweni area, and its African residents in the late 1950s (see Map 4).[13] The area of 14530 acres comprised the farms Georgedale, Hammarsdale and Woody Glen and by 1957 had a population of 7457 (Laredo, 1968:35). The power of the economic elite was based on land ownership. In this section I will sketch the socio-economic character of the area indicating patterns of land-usage, changes in land ownership and the foundations of the economic elites. The discussion will also give some indication of the cultural identity

[13] This section draws closely on the work of Laredo. As explained above he spent some time living in the district during the 1950s while conducting anthropological field-work utilising unstructured interviews and observation (Laredo, 1968:38-39), he also drew upon a socio-economic survey covering ninety percent of the African population in the area conducted by the Department of Economics at the University of Natal (Laredo, 1968:42). This work was to form part of an inter-disciplinary project for the Natal Regional Survey (see Laredo, 1968:2). Furthermore, this work is cited by many other studies where Mpumalanga is the object of investigation (see Hofmeyr, 1986;

of the area and the heterogeneous nature of 'Zuluness'.

By the 1950s the Georgedale community was divided into three distinct groups (Laredo, 1968:74). Firstly, there was the small group of original settlers and descendents (these were landowners); secondly, there were other landowners who had bought land since Woody Glen was declared a released area; and thirdly, tenants who rented land from the landowners. Amongst the original landowners there were strong kinship connections, despite them being scattered (depending upon where they bought their land) around the area. The newer landowners and tenants had no kinship connections within the area, and many of them, particularly amongst the tenants, were strongly connected to a 'home' area (Laredo, 1968:163). The tenants constituted the largest group of people (Laredo, 1968:169). These three groups were differentially connected to and embedded in the local power networks (see below). Based on their ownership of land, the landowners formed the economic elite of the area, with those who were both landowners and members of the founding *amakholwa* community forming an elite within an elite.

By 1957 there were 1217 households, of which thirty-six percent were landowners (438 households) and fifty-two percent were tenants (633 households) (Economic Survey, cited in Laredo, 1968:239).[14] Many were newly resident in the area with only nine percent of household heads (116 households) having been born there (Laredo, 1968:72). Prior to moving to Georgedale eleven percent came from urban locations (often smaller midland towns), fifty-eight percent from white farms and twelve percent from the reserves. The majority of tenants were labourers who had left white farms. In the late 1950s labour tenants, unhappy with attempts to tie them

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Motala, 1988; Ramduny, 1996). I felt I was fortunate to come across such detailed data for a specific location and historical period; in the absence of this work such data would not have been available.

[14] The remaining twelve percent were classified as 'others'.

to particular farms,[15] were leaving white-owned farms in large numbers (SPP, 1983, vol 4:45). Furthermore, areas like Georgedale (where land was available to rent from black landlords) became a haven for young men and women fleeing the patriarchal control of fathers who wished to control their labour in order to fulfil labour tenant obligations (see McClendon, 2002). The medium period of residency for landowners was twelve years and for tenants four.

It was not easy for the area of black-owned land to expand. Given the legislative restrictions (primary amongst them the various land acts) the chief native commissioner (CNC) was reluctant to grant permission for the sale of white-owned land to black farmers. Yet, he was happy to allow the subdivision and re-sale of existing black-owned land. Camperdown magistrate's correspondence in the early 1950s[16] shows that with the coming to power of the Nationalist Government applications were scrutinised more carefully. The applicant had to confirm that the subdivision was at least five acres in size. Despite this benchmark many applications were turned down, with the Minister claiming that 'five acres was too small to provide a family with full subsistence'.[17]

Notwithstanding the restrictions on land transfers of under five acres, thirty-six percent of landowners in Georgedale owned less than five acres and twenty-five percent between six and eleven acres of land. Only a couple of the 438 landowners owned sizable amounts of land (Economic Survey, cited in Laredo, 1968:242). In contrast sixty-seven percent of tenants had less than two acres of land (Economic Survey, cited in Laredo, 1968:242).

Land ownership was fraught with difficulties and there were numerous conflicts and

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[15] In 1956 the government amended the 1936 Land Act in order to tighten controls on labour tenants. New legislation provided for the registration of all labour tenant contracts and prohibited farmers from taking on more purely rent-paying tenants after 31 August 1956 (SPP, 1983, vol 4:45).
[16] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/29/3/69.

disputes over land. While land was being bought and sold until the late 1950s, it was not always easy to acquire. Firstly, according to Laredo, people disliked parting with land and secondly, the chief native commission refused to grant permission for the transfer of land that he considered unviable for subsistence agriculture. More commonly land was inherited. And here a whole plethora of problems arose. If a will had been made it was easier to resolve the inheritance issues. But if there was no will then the situation was more complex. The first issue to resolve was if the deceased was an 'exempted Native'. The *amakholwa* were exempt from Native Law, this allowed wives and daughters to inherit property in their own right. If this was the case then the property was divided according to Roman Dutch Law. But if they were not exempted it would be divided according to Native Law and Custom which often meant the senior son would inherit. Frequently these inheritances were not legally transferred, meaning the current owner did not have official title deeds making it difficult to prove ownership if a dispute arose. One of the reasons given was the costs involved. Land had to be surveyed and transferred, with the cost often higher than the original purchase price. According to Laredo (1968:244)

> Many people are not unduly worried that they have not got title deeds. They claim that everyone can see they are living on the land, and therefore people know to whom the land belongs. Disputes between landowners are taken directly to the Commissioners Court.

Yet this messy situation was to result in numerous problems for landowners when land was expropriated in the 1960s (see below).

Tenants rented a residential plot from individual landlords. They were expected to build their own homes and could if they wished cultivate a section of the land. Rent varied from landlord to landlord, but each landlord charged the same for his plots even if the size varied. The relationship between landlords and tenants was purely business and there was limited social interaction. There were no communal land rights except for access to water. The area had a number of rivers and springs and

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[17] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/29/3/60-64.

access to them was unrestricted. The land occupied by tenants was criss-crossed by paths and public roads gave right of way over land. However, landowners were entitled to, and did put up fences and stop access to paths.

Agricultural activity in the area was limited, much of it being undertaken by landowners. Only thirty-nine percent of homesteads, primarily landowners, had livestock. Women, organised into groups, engaged in basket-making which they sold in urban areas. The close proximity to transport and urban areas, the good schooling, and the *kholwa* values meant a higher proportion of women were in waged employment compared to reserve areas (Laredo, 1968:306). Most men were employed outside of the area (the majority in Durban) and the homestead was left in the care of the women. Though the majority of men returned home on at least a weekly basis.

The mission background meant that education was given high priority. At least fifty-five percent of the inhabitants had some formal schooling. Samson Mcoyi (landowner, teacher and the chief from 1948-1952) had been very influential in the establishment of schools in the area (pers comm with his son, 29/04/99). There were a total of ten schools (one lower primary school, seven higher primary schools and two high schools), with approximately two and half thousand pupils.

Social networks were limited and gender specific with women having much narrower networks than men. Visiting between tenants was usually restricted to neighbours. Generally men were at work during the week, returning home at weekends. Women were mainly occupied with household tasks. Religion was an important part of community life. Methodism was the official religion of the area. Laredo (1968) found that forty percent of people were church members including most of the old settlers and the chief. There was also a woman's manyano. Other orthodox churches had established themselves in the area, but only the Catholic Church had a church building as well as a primary and high school. Many separatist sects were active and

their services provided a source of social interaction. The tenants were more likely to be members of these small sects. In all these churches women made up the majority of the congregations.

Already by the late 1950s this was an area that was very heterogeneous in character. The tenants and landowners formed two distinct groups with very little social interaction between them. The landowners who were part of the *amakholwa* group formed the economic elite of the area, they owned bigger land-holdings and were more likely to engage in agricultural activity and owned livestock. The *amakholwa* group had kinship networks in the area and were likely to belong to the Methodist church. They also had higher levels of formal education. The landowners who were not part of the *amakholwa* group had smaller land-holdings and it is likely that formal title had not passed to them. Most of them were newly resident and they had few kinship connections within the area. The tenants were economically (and politically – see below) marginal in the area. Many of them were fleeing harsh labour tenancy conditions on white farms. They were likely to have the lowest levels of education and to belong to separatist religious sects. While the founding *amakholwa* group structured the public cultural foundations of the area, for example the emphasis on education; the dominance of orthodox Christian churches; women's involvement in economic activities including the ownership of land; and, the predominance of smaller nuclear family structures, this was being dissipated by the influx of new residents with different cultural backgrounds. I am suggesting that even though many of the new residents were *IsiZulu*-speaking they operated with different cultural codes to those of the founding families. Thus, what we find in this earlier period is a heterogeneous interpretation of Zuluness that was acceptable to the larger community.

3.3.2 Power and Authority - Administration and Local Government

This section examines political power in the 1940s and 1950s. As will be shown the *amakholwa* history determined the form of political power and authority in the area.

More broadly, the economic elite (see above) ie the landowners, were those with access to political power. This period is characterised by two dynamics; firstly during the 1940s there was a chieftainship dispute and secondly, as the period was drawing to a close it was becoming evident that the authority of the *Inkosi* was on the wane. This was as a result of the influx of tenants who did not fall under the authority of the *Inkosi* and attempts by provincial authorities to introduce new forms of local government in the area. These dynamics had the potential to lead to violent conflict and yet they did not. This discussion allows me to map sites of difference in the earlier period, as well as examine other techniques of politics and alternative, non-violent ways of dealing with difference.

The immediate administration of Georgedale fell under the *amakholwa* chief (see above) whose land was about two miles away from Georgedale in Hammarsdale (see Map 4) (Laredo, 1968). The *kholwa* chief, Luthayi and his successors, had limited civil and criminal jurisdiction in terms of Native law and custom (Brookes & Hurwitz, 1957; Laredo, 1968). Georgedale was located in the Camperdown Magisterial District. Administered by the magistrate, Camperdown fell under the Department of Justice with the magistrate also acting as native commissioner (Brookes & Hurwitz, 1957:27).

However, there were major differences in the authority of the Georgedale *Inkosi* and *amakosi* located on reserve land. These differences allow for the particularity of this area. The reasons were twofold; firstly this was an *amakholwa* community and secondly, the land was freehold. What were these differences? Firstly, the chief was elected by the voting male members of the community, rather then a situation of agnatic descent. The election being subject to the approval of the chief native commissioner. Secondly, being a *kholwa* chief meant that there were no *indunas* to assist the chief, instead councillors were appointed by the chief to assist and advise him. Unlike *indunas* these councillors were not attached to a particular area, and did not have any specific duties except to attend the chief's court. Thirdly, as the land

was freehold, the chief had no jurisdiction in the allocation, sale or re-sale of land, unlike in the reserves where the chief was responsible for allocating land held in trust by the SANT. Fourthly, the chief only had authority over those who were part of the *amakholwa* community. Newer arrivals, whether landowners or tenants, did not need to pay homage to him. The market had brought them to Georgedale and it was the market, not the grace of the chief, that allowed them to stay. The *amakholwa* chiefs had encountered this difficulty as soon as the community began selling its land to 'outsiders'. As far back as 1921 Chief Christian Luthayi had petitioned the native commissioner requesting that the 'natives from around the area [be brought] under his control'.[18] But as the size of the community increased so a larger percentage of the population fell outside of the chief's control, dissipating both his authority and the strong *amakholwa* identity of the area. According to Laredo (1968:432) by the late 1950s

> there is thus nothing, either derived from a common history, or in the method of allocating land, which gives unity to the Shongweni *kholwa*.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s a chieftainship dispute upset the unity of the *amakholwa*. These divisions had long-lasting effects on the landowners and impacted on their attempts to resist removals (see below). In 1924 Leonard succeeded Christian Luthayi, the first chief of the Georgedale *amakholwa* (see Figure 4). He was the eldest son of Christian's second wife,[19] the son of his first wife having left the area. Leonard was killed in 1945 in a level-crossing accident, leaving a principal heir (Braveman) who was still a minor. *Induna* Ben Dela was appointed in the interim to act as regent.[20] Despite this being an *amakholwa* community the traditional three-month mourning period was observed.

Male clan members disagreed over who should succeed Leonard. Some members

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[18] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1A. Letter from Camperdown Native Commissioner to CNC, 29 November 1921.
[19] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1A.

favoured a regent until Braveman was old enough to take on the position. But others favoured Clifford Luthayi (Christian's grandson, and son of his eldest son who had left the area some years previously). One of the councillors, Samson Mcoyi, preferred Braveman but the majority of the clan supported Clifford and he was appointed[21] acting-chief and held this position between 1945 and 1949. The councillors soon became unhappy with the way in which Clifford conducted his duties and in particular his overriding interest in the Zionist Church. Furthermore, there were allegations of the misuse of trust funds and criminal proceedings were instituted against him. Samson Mcoyi resigned in protest.[22] Another of the councillors Samson Nkehli (a long-standing councillor who had served a number of chiefs) was also implicated in the fraud. As a result of these irregularities, as well as, petitioning from the councillors, the chief native commissioner, upon the recommendation of the magistrate, decided to remove Clifford from office.[23] A new chief had to be elected.

At first it seemed as if the only candidates for the position were two of the councillors Samson Nkehli and Khanyile. However, the native commissioner favoured Samson Mcoyi who he said 'was respected by all the natives'.[24] In September 1951, the magistrate called a meeting to elect a new chief. The chieftainship election was between Samson Nkehli and Samson Mcoyi – both councillors. Mcoyi was not descended from the original settlers but had lived in the area since a young man and had large landholdings. He was elected by a majority of six votes at a meeting

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[20] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1A.

[21] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/1/2, 2/1/2/5/1A, 22/11/48. Minutes of Meeting of the Kuzwayo Tribe, 13 October 1945. Usually *amakholwa* chiefs are elected, it is interesting that in this case that was not followed.

[22] PAR, Campterdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1A. Statement made by Samson Mcoyi to W.A. Burdon, 10 October 1940.

[23] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1A. Letter from Magistrate to CNC, 30 December 1948. The issue that the magistrate raised with the CNC was related to the fact that Acting Chief Luthayi was not registered as a taxpayer, this necessitated his removal from office.

[24] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, Letter to CNC 27 April 1951. 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1B

FIG 4: Succession to the chieftainship in the Georgedale amaKholwa community



SOURCE: Laredo, 1968: 434

attended by 103 men.[25] Nkehli did not accept this decision and began to organise against it. He challenged the native commissioner's acceptance of the meeting's vote and his support for Mcoyi as there were 1000 voting males in the tribe.[26] However, the native commissioner was unconvinced by Nkehli's argument, citing in a motivation to the CNC the respect with which Mcoyi was held in the area as well as his war-record in the Great War of 1914. Mcoyi's appointment was confirmed and he was inaugurated as chief on the 6 March 1952.[27] This dispute became the source of bad feelings between Nkehli and Mcoyi. Mcoyi died unexpectedly in 1954 (Laredo, 1068: 434), according to his son bewitched by his enemies (pers comm, 29/04/99). As will be seen below this antagonism would have repercussions in the future. There were no immediate moves to elect a new chief, and as an interim measure the Administration appointed his brother as acting chief.

There are stark differences between the way in which the conflict was dealt with in this period and in the later period. The dispute was channelled through legitimate channels. The community were prepared to use these channels and accepted the decision. However, it is interesting to note that when Mcoyi died unexpectedly within two years his family attributed his death to this dispute. However, a similarity with the later period is the marginalisation of women from politics. While exemption from the Natal Code allowed women to become property or business owners they were not granted political rights. Voting rights were confined to male members of the tribe.

The second dynamic of this period was the waning authority of the chief. In terms of the regulations Georgedale fell under the authority of the chief. But in reality the chief had little authority in the area. As discussed above the Georgedale population

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[25] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, Letter to CNC, 20 September 1951. 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1B

[26] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/3/2, 2/1/2/5/1B. Letter from Magistrate to CNC, 20th September 1951.

had increased substantially, bringing 'outsiders' into the community and fewer families now paid him homage. While the chief still conducted his court, by the late 1950s the number of cases were few and attendance was low (Laredo, 1968:433). A potentially more powerful force in the area were the local landowners. These landowners were not necessarily members of the *amakholwa* tribe.

The Bantu Land Owners' Union, was founded in 1948 (Laredo, 1968:437). Landowners were concerned about the limited land available for freehold purchase, and the threat to freehold land posed by the South African Native Trust (SANT), which had already bought 366 acres of land in the area. The SANT had bought land to the south of the old Georgedale mission (see Map 4). Samson Nkehli was the acting chairperson of the Bantu Land Owners' Union. Of the nine executive members, elected at the AGM, only two were descendants of the original settlers.[28] The Association represented the interests of its members and attempted to improve conditions within the area, for example it built a well in a section of Zig-Zag Farm (Laredo, 1968:438). It also protected its members from any perceived threat to their tenure.

By the early 1950s government authorities were becoming aware of changes in the character of the area. In the eyes of the authorities, it was in the process of transforming from a rural area to a densified peri-urban village as this extract from a letter from the native commissioner at Camperdown to the chief native commissioner[29] illustrates:

> The farm Woody Glen is so subdivided that there are four groups of plots forming villages, but without any local authority. I am not aware of any move at present towards urbanisation. Water is drawn from nearby springs and streams as required by the residents on these subdivisions. There is no laid on water supply. The various occupiers or owners of

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[27] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/5/1B

[28] Tenants were not members - though they were not specifically barred from membership.

[29] PAR, Camperdown Magistrates Records, Letter from the Camperdown Native Commissioner to the CNC, 1/CPD, 3/2/2/13, 2/29/3/69.

> these subdivisions mostly work in the nearby cities and their families tend small gardens which can't be classified as farming.

In 1954 the Provincial Authorities claimed that conditions in the area were such that it would be necessary to put in place some form of local government to safeguard the health of what was becoming a heavily populated area. The intention was to establish a local Health Board.[30] Local Health Committees were either elected or appointed, and functioned as local government bodies in rural areas. They were enacted by the Natal Provincial Administration (Ordinance No 20 of 1941).[31] Their primary purpose being to establish

> a form of local government control over peri-urban and rural areas in which undesirable living conditions existed as the result of unauthorised or unregulated native settlement. ... Section 4 of the ordinance defined a public health area as 'any area not being or forming part of any local authority area' which in the opinion of the Administrator is such 'that by reason of the density of the population, or its class or character or the sanitary conditions prevailing, it is necessary that special provision should be made for the proper management, regulation and control of matters affecting the public health in such area'. (Department of Economics, 1951:17)

Despite their name Health Committees did not solely concern themselves with questions of health and sanitation. They were given fairly wide-ranging powers of local government. They controlled roads and other public works, health, the acquisition and sale of land, the situating of houses and were entitled to levy rates. As both landowners and landlords these were all issues of concern to the Landowners Association. Given these wide-ranging powers and functions as well as the manner of its appointment the Ordinance encouraged that the co-operation of the residents was sought (Department of Economics, 1951:18).

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[30] This intention was gazetted in the Natal Provincial Gazette, 15 July 1954, Ordinance No 20/41.

[31] The ordinance was amended the following year (Ordinance No 12 of 1942) to enable the Administrator of Natal to constitute the Commission as a Health Committee.

Many landowners saw this development as a real threat to their land. The Landowners' Association, which had sunk into inertia and become ineffective, was reinvigorated by the crisis over the Health Committee. The Health Committee issue brought in some new leaders (Samsom D. Nkehli became the acting chairman) and forced the landowners to make proposals about the 'organisation of local authorities'. Furthermore, a new local authority structure also threatened the remaining authority of the chief. Supporting the Landowners' Association, Mcoyi (himself the owner of large land holdings) came out against the Health Committee. He and Nkehli put aside their differences and the first meeting of protest was held at the chief's house.

Opposition focussed around this being the 'wrong kind of government for the Bantu' with the 'landholders privately fearing that once 'they move in, our title deeds will be worthless'.' (Laredo, 1968:438/9). It soon became clear that mere opposition to the Health Committee would not lead to success. The Association drew up a petition to the governor-general asking for the establishment of a local council as laid out in the Native Administrative Act of 1927.[32] They motivated their appeal by pointing out that these were the same rights as enjoyed by local councils in the Transkei and Ciskei. Furthermore as an area that was almost exclusively African 'it was well suited to having the 'opportunity to develop on its own lines'.'(Laredo, 1968:439). This was followed by a meeting with the governor-general. He agreed not to initiate the Health Committee until a decision had been made about the landowners' request.

In 1955 it was announced that the landowners' request had been denied. The councils constituted under the Act had not been a success and the government was in favour of

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[32] The Governor-General was empowered to govern by proclamation in all African areas (previously this was in certain areas only). The Act made provision for special courts for Africans, and for the recognition of customary law in civil cases in these courts … Power was given to the Governor-General to issue orders without prior notice requiring any tribe, section of a tribe, or African to move from one place to another, and not to leave any stated area for a specified period. The Act dealt, further, with tribal organisation, land tenure and marriage and succession. It gave the Government wide power to make regulations dealing, inter alia, with the control of meetings and of African villages and settlements. Provision was made for exemptions from the pass laws (Horrell, 1978:4).

implementing the recently passed Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.[33] The Association asked the department to reconsider the decision based on the unique local conditions. They argued that they were an *amakholwa* community and as such it was difficult to institute Bantu Authorities. Furthermore, many people held the land under freehold tenure (Laredo, 1968).

The Landowners' Association was split. A group led by Nkehli and supported by the regent through his son, wished to co-operate with the Administration. They argued that 'unless the people met the government half-way they would be working for a dead horse' (Laredo, 1968:440). Many of the new landowners opposed this move. A break-away association which included a number of the original settlers was formed under Nkehli.

Opposition to the regent coagulated around his tacit support of the Nkehli faction. The Landowners' Association sent individual members to plead with the magistrate to regularise the position of the chief by holding new elections. Braveman, who had now reached adulthood, was elected chief. This seemed to mark a return of the chieftainship to the family of the original chief. Yet it disguised the struggle over land and control of the area. The Landowners' Association's support for the candidacy of the son of the former chief was not only a move against the regent, but also an attempt by them to win the support of the original settlers (Laredo, 1968). The Landowners' Association did not enjoy a close relationship with the chief. He was not a member of the Association and the state did not recognise them. Thus to get the ear of the magistrate the Association had to channel its views either through the chief or through individuals who might be able to interview the Commissioner.

By the late 1950s the Bantu Land Owners' Association had a paid-up membership of 400. According to Laredo (1968:253) 'leadership vests in those organisations which

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[33] This Act began the process of establishing separate political institutions for Africans. It made

are concerned with rights to land'. By this stage the chief's influence had waned considerably (Laredo, 1968). Leadership in the area reflected the basic need for land and the need to protect the land. The chief was never approached by the tenants as they did not recognise him, and those who wanted technical advice about their land often by-passed him in favour of the Land Owners' Association. Many properties were the subject of ownership disputes, adding to the disharmony in the area.[34]

These two disputes – the first within the *amakholwa* community and the second between the landowners and the provincial administration which then divided the community – allow one to understand some of the earlier sites of difference within the Georgedale community. Points of difference were between elites in the community with women and tenants playing no part in these discussions. The chieftainship dispute revealed differences within the *amakholwa* group, and the conflict over the imposition of a Health Committee showed differences between the new landowners and founding members of the community. In this earlier period the community used existing authority structures to resolve disputes. They petitioned and made representations to the magistrate and chief native commissioner. There were no indications of violence and no attempts to resort to violence. But as these various disputes play themselves out over the decade, it becomes clear that the authority of the *Inkosi* was on the wane. This was due to both internal dynamics in the area, as well as, the actions of provincial authorities. As these conflicts and organisational alliances illustrate at this point identity was emerging in relationship to range of complexities; amongst them were land; organisational allegiance and association; and, family history.

In 1958 the first industry, Hammarsdale Clothing, was established in the area (Motala, 1988:52). In order to take advantage of lower wage rates, the owners had

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provision for tribal, regional and territorial authorities (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:28-29).

[34] Central Archives (CA), Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD), Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, p.61

shut down their factories in Fordsburg (Johannesburg) and Durban and transferred operations to Hammarsdale. This was the beginning of industrialisation in the area.

With the establishment of industry, Hammarsdale soon became a centre of trade union activity under the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) (Luckhardt & Wall, 1980). Workers became members of the African Clothing Workers Union (Hammarsdale), which had 500 members by 1960. There were strikes in February 1959 (over wages) and again in February 1960 (over union recognition and the interference of the Garment Workers Union, Natal). This served to militise the workforce and to politically activate the local residents who rallied support behind the strikers in the face of dismissal, arrests and threats to close the factory. The union successfully won its demands in both strikes (see Luckhardt & Wall, 1980:289-291). Unionisation and the strikes impacted upon the area in two ways. Firstly, whereas two years previously Laredo (1968) had commented on the lack of networks amongst tenants and between tenants and landowners unionisation facilitated the development of new networks amongst these groups. Secondly, it opened up spaces for a 'new' politics and identity that was unconnected to land.

To recap on the significant features of this period. The nature of the area changed considerably with the influx of new residents into the area. The original inhabitants became outnumbered both by tenants and other landowners. This paved the way for the emergence of a new power elite. The new elite was still linked to land ownership but was not confined to the original *amakholwa* community and the authority of the chief was diminished. The provincial authorities were also alert to these dynamics, which led them to propose a new form of local government. Linked to these changes was the emergence of a number of conflicts. The resulting cleavages facilitated the emergence of new power elites. The first conflict was between the original *amakholwa* inhabitants involving a dispute over the chieftanship. Two factions, supporting different candidates, emerged. The second conflict occurred between landowners over the Health Committee proposal. The Bantu Land Owners'

Association emerged, with the support of the losing faction in the chieftanship dispute, as one of the most powerful groups within the area. This further diminished the authority of the chief. A third set of conflicts related to ownership disputes over land. The end of the decade sees the development of industry in the area. This allows for the development of new organisations that serve to unite the community against 'outsider' class forces and for the first time linked landowners and tenants in common cause.

3.4 The 1960s - Relocation

At a national level the 1960s are significant for the banning of the ANC, the consolidation of apartheid policy and unparalleled economic growth. For those living in the Georgedale-Hammarsdale complex these developments had major local ramifications. During the 1960s they experienced the first of a series of major upheavals in their lives. The banning of the ANC and the suppression of its trade union wing the South African Congress of Trade Unions meant that worker organisation in the Hammarsdale Clothing factory was similarly suppressed. However, a far greater threat to the autonomy of the area, land ownership and the way of life in Georgedale was to come from the Industrial Development Corporation and the border industry policy. In 1961 the area was declared a decentralisation point. This had enormous consequences for the African inhabitants. Soon after followed an expropriation order to establish a township for the African employees of these industries.

Two concerns motivated the state's behaviour in this period. Firstly, the need to provide accommodation for the workers and their families in the Hammarsdale border industry. And secondly, their horror at the large influx of people into the area (squatters), and the development of 'another Cato Manor'[35] with the attendant 'social

[35] Cato Manor was an informal settlement on the outskirts of Durban. It was a mixed race area where Indian landowners had rented sites to African tenants. It was known for its political militancy and

and political repercussions'.[36] The dominant discourse was that of public health. It suggested the state was acting in everyone's best interests. Those landowners opposing its plans were exploiting the unsatisfactory situation for their own personal gain.

These policies resulted in the destruction of the existing elite and the creation of new elites. The means by which residents had acquired power and resources - land ownership - was destroyed. State policy ensured that the community, which a few years previously had united in support of the African textile workers strike, became divided amongst itself. Initially landowners united in opposition to the government proposals. They were concerned the development meant not only the erection of factories but that the SANT would buy up land to create a 'rural village' to house the workers.[37] By the middle of the decade there were divisions amongst them with some landowners advocating cooperation with the state (pers comm, Mr Mcoyi). Tenants had different interests. Those who qualified, in terms of influx control policy, were assured of rental accommodation in the newly-built township (albeit at a price), while those who didn't faced eviction with no alternatives in sight. Many women, either landowners in their own right or tenants, were denied access to township housing as a result of the state's policy that formal township housing only be provided to male household heads (Todes & Walker, 1992:117).[38] The creation of

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vibrant cultural life. In the late 1950s it was marked for relocation with those residents who qualified being moved to the newly constructed Indian and African townships around Durban.

[36] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File G52/2/1106/2, part I, p. 16-24

[37] Natal Provincial Gazette, 14 July 1961.

[38] Natal Provincial Notice NO. 383 of 1960 stipulated that rental housing, and thirty year leases should be allocated to the head of household, defined as a male in a recognised marriage, or as a man who was widowed, divorced or deserted. Furthermore, women were constrained by the Natal Code, in terms of which they were defined as minors, with no contractual powers (Todes & Walker, 1992:117). Citing Eagle (1987), Todes and Walker argue that consequently many women were forced into convenience marriages, or to become domestic workers in order to gain access to housing. In the late sixties national regulations governing urban areas were developed. These changed the rules of allocation. The new regulations (R1036 of 1968) incorporated many of the existing rules, but the definition of the family able to occupy public housing was changed from a nuclear to an extended

the township and the new political structures that were put into place ultimately provided the basis for the support which Inkatha was to generate and then fight to maintain two decades later.

3.4.1 Establishment of Border Industries

Border industry policies encouraged, through the use of incentives, industries to locate close to the homeland borders in specified areas within white South Africa. These incentives were of a temporary nature and usually had a lifespan of ten years. Hammarsdale was classified as a decentralisation point under this scheme. Industries were encouraged to apply for incentives and relocate there. Services (ie power, water and waste removal) were made available by the state. The availability of transport and the proximity of labour were important in the selection of Hammarsdale as a border industry. With the national road passing close by and the main Johannesburg-Durban railway line running through the area, transport linkages were already established (see Map 5).

In 1961, Elangeni Estates in Hammarsdale was established by the state-controlled Industrial Development Corporation (Motala, 1988; Ramduny, 1996) (see Map 5). The government decided not to implement any restrictions on the recruitment of 'bantu' labour provided that industries confined themselves to the employment of Zulus.[39] By 1965 four textile firms and five knitwear and clothing manufacturers had established themselves. Nearly 7000 jobs were created (Rumduny, 1996). It was estimated that these factories employed 5600 Africans.[40] By the end of 1971, this had risen to sixteen firms, employing 8500 workers (Motala, 1988:53).

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family structure, while additional limitations were placed on women's independent access to housing (Todes and Walker, 1992:117-118).

[39] CA, Memo to Progress Knitting Mills, 4 March 1963. BAD, Box 5024, File G52/2/1106/2, part 1, p.210

[40] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File G52/2/1106/2, part 1, p.271/2

At the end of 1969 Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) confirmed rumours that in the opinion of the Department of Planning Elangeni was fully developed and it was unlikely that it would be extended.[41] In 1970 Hammarsdale was removed from the border incentive scheme. The department believed that development in the estate had reached a point where it was possible for the area to be self-sufficient. It could now attract development on its own merits. The Development and Services Board of the Natal Provincial Administration took over the management and administration of the estate in 1973.

3.4.2 The Need for a Township - Relocation and Construction

At a meeting held on 14 July 1961, the BAD urged that the development of housing for the workers be given the speediest attention.[42] On the 31 August 1961 a letter[43] was sent to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner[44] (CBC) informing him that a decision had now been taken with regard to the establishment of a township (see Map 5) to house the workers.

> It will be observed from the plan that the land required for township and buffer purposes consists of a number of properties some of which fall within and others outside the released area. It is not clear who the owners of the various properties are. In view of the impending large scale industrial development at Hammarsdale as explained in paragraph six of the memorandum it is essential that the Bantu township be developed as a matter of urgency.

A Bantu Affairs Committee was appointed to enquire into and establish the ownership of the various subdivisions of land in the area.[45] A proclamation was gazetted on 13 November 1961 to determine the rights of land ownership.[46]

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[41] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Letter from BAD to CBC (PN), 05/12/69. Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, part II, p.125

[42] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, p.8

[43] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, p.19

[44] Previously the Chief Native Affairs Commissioner.

[45] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File, G52/2/1106/2, part 1, p.49

[46] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, part 1, p.76/8

MAP 5: HAMMARSDALE AREA IN THE MID-1960S SHOWING PROPOSED LOCATION OF MPUMALANGA TOWNSHIP



The Bantu Affairs Commissioner from Nqutu was sent to investigate the situation and to gain the co-operation of the various owners with regard to the sale of their properties to the South African Bantu Trust.[47] The initial report claimed there were a total of forty-six owners. The office of the CBC was instructed to ascertain from the Deeds Office

[47] Formally known as the South African Native Trust.

> who the registered owners are of the various properties comprising the area required for township and buffer purposes and whether they are Bantu, Indian or European.

An initial foray into the Deeds Office found there were approximately 302 registered owners; eight were white, three Indian and 291 African. One hundred and fifty-two of the Africans owned their land in released areas while 138 owned land outside the released area. Nineteen (eleven in the released area and eight outside) owned over twenty morgen, entitling them to similar land as compensation for expropriation. It was also apparent that some of the land was still registered in the names of the original owners (acquired back in 1881).[48] However, the position on the ground showed the ownership issue was even more legally complex.

> Not one of those questioned claimed to have title deeds for the property they occupied. Some said they had purchased the property, some as many as 20 years ago but for some reason had not effected transfer. Several claimed to have come by the property by inheritance also having no transfer to their names. It seems very certain that many of the registered owners had sold out and disappeared or had died.[49]

The CNC was advised that the question of tenure was one of much greater chaos then originally thought. Pieces of unsurveyed land had passed *de facto* ownership many times without title being transferred. These *de facto* owners had occupied their land for varying periods, some for up to forty years. Furthermore, those owners who did wish to sell were able to get prices well above 'fair' market values. As it would take many years to establish true ownership, instead of trying to persuade the owners to sell to the Trust the government should 'expropriate immediately if we want quick results'.[50] Furthermore, 'special legislation to deal with this problem would be required'.[51]

The tangle of legal ownership was to haunt the BAD throughout the development and

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[48] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, p.31
[49] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, p.31
[50] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, p.30

construction of the township. From the first it was recommended that the Minister should be done with it and issue an order to expropriate the land. Acquisition of land seriously hindered the development of the township. By December 1965 the situation according to the developers had not improved. In a memo to the chair of the Bantu Township Committee,[52] the Committee was urged to recommend to the Minister that

> expropriation should be resorted to throughout ie whether an owner can be traced or not as such a step would expedite the acquisition of land.

Nevertheless, the department continued with their strategy of getting the SANT to purchase land from the legal owners alongside expropriation where legal ownership could not be established. The consulting engineers and developers were continually working around pockets of unacquired properties. The following letter from the consulting engineers indicates some of the problems they encountered;

> work on the sewer, stormwater drainage and road works have started in unit three but they are hampered because of an occupied house. ... It seems as if an expropriation notice was served on Mr Mncwabe in 1966 but that it contained an error therefore he ignored it. Please arrange the service of an expropriation notice on Mr Mncwabe.[53]

The rapid development of industry attracted people from as far away as Harrismith and Ladysmith to the area in the hope of finding employment. As other squatter areas were cleared eg Cato Manor, those who were not eligible for formal township housing made their way to Hammarsdale. As a result released area 51 and released area 36 mushroomed. By late 1966 a police survey estimated that there were 32000 squatters in the area with new shacks being constructed at a rate of ten per week.[54] According to the report

> the seriousness of the situation required immediate action before it got

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[51] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, p.60

[52] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/2206/2, p.271/2

[53] CA, Letter from Horne & Glasson to BAD, 20/02/70. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5114, File 58/2/1106/2, Part 8

[54] CA, Report from senior engineer, 1 September 1966. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, part II, p.10.

> out of hand. Funds simply must be made available to ensure the overall economy and avoid the social and political repercussions from without.[55]

Officials saw the 'squatter problem' as posing a serious threat to public health. This fear underlay a moral panic 'to provide for effective control'. Eager to avoid the occurrence of unnecessary costs, the state decided not to upgrade the area by providing water and sanitation, instead they appointed squatter inspectors. But the increased policing of influx control exacerbated the problem, as squatters evicted from one area moved into another until in turn they were evicted from there. In a series of articles in April 1969 a Durban newspaper the Natal Mercury blamed the slow progress in housing development on the mushrooming number of squatters, estimating that in the province as a whole there were now 500 000 squatters (Natal Mercury, 3 April 1969).

The provision of new towns did not necessarily solve the issue. Housing in the new Mpumalanga township was only available to those men employed in Hammarsdale. Of 7000 squatters, only 2000 were eligible for township houses. The remainder, once evicted found their way to Fredville[56] where they again constructed shacks (Natal Mercury, 10 April 1969) only to be removed some years later to Mpumalanga (SPP, 1983, vol 4:109).

A temporary township, Malengeni (see Map 5), had been established in late 1963 to house the workers employed in Hammarsdale. This township comprised ninety-seven wooden houses with communal ablution facilities.[57] In an ironic twist this land was rented from Wakefield Mcoyi (the son of Samson Mcoyi) one of the largest African landowners in the area. Within a couple of years these amenities had fallen

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[55] CA, Report, 5 September 1966, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, part II, p. 16-24.

[56] A nearby black spot.

[57] Report from Senior Engineer to BAD, 1 September 1966. BAD, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, Part II, p.10

into a state of complete disrepair and living conditions in this temporary township were no better than in the squatter areas.

The 'rapidly deteriorating squatting position on the land where the Woody Glen Township was to be established'[58] was the CBC's constant refrain. They urged the BAD to make haste in resolving the land acquisition problems and move ahead with construction of the permanent township. Durban-base consulting engineers Horne & Glasson had won the tender to construct and develop the township which was to be located partly on released area no 23 and partly on released area no 51. In February 1967 the district of Camperdown was excised from the area of the CBC, Natal and included in the area of the CBC, Port Natal.[59] This was as a result of a change in government policy and the decision to move the control of 'bantu' areas from the Department of Justice to the BAD.[60]

At the beginning of the decade the BAD had 'gigantic planning and development schemes of the Bantu areas in Natal'.[61] The Hammarsdale township was only one of a number planned in the area (others were envisaged in Cato Ridge).

> The Township in question is intended to accommodate not only the Bantu which will be employed in the Hammarsdale industrial area but also all Bantu squatters in the whole vicinity ...[62]

However, a shift in industrial development policy as well as financial constraints forced a modification of these ambitions. Plans for the other townships were dropped

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[58] CA, Letter from CBC (PN) to Sec for BAD, 12 September 1966. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, Part II, p.2. At first the township was referred to as the Woody Glen Township, Woody Glen being the name of the farm on which it was to be constructed. Later after a search to decide upon a name it was officially decided to call the township Mpumalanga. The name being suggested by Chief Luthayi.

[59] Government Gazette No 201, 17 February 1967.

[60] CA, See various correspondence between the CBC (Natal) and the secretary for BAD from 1962-1964. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File G52/2/1106/2, Part I, p.243/4, 252, 253, 257, 258

[61] CA, Letter from Sec for BAD to CBC (Pmb), 23 March 1962. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, Part I, p.135

and the Hammarsdale township was designed to accommodate only those working in Hammarsdale. It was estimated that the factories would ultimately employ 12000.[63] The master plan for 10400 houses was completed in December 1966 and construction began in April 1967. They wanted to complete 4000 houses as soon as possible in order to relieve some of the immediate health problems in the 'squatter' areas.[64] Unit one was the first area of the township to be complete. By 16 August 1968 the survey of unit one was finalised.[65] Within a month over four hundred dwellings were occupied.[66] By the end of August 1968 the BAD reported that the expropriation of land for unit two would soon be complete.[67] Plans for units two and three were submitted in February 1969.[68] A month later in March the Department decided to abandon the planning of units seven, eight, nine and ten.[69] This was connected to the decision to halt the development of Hammarsdale as an industrial growth point.[70] By February 1970 unit one was complete, unit two was in an advanced stage[71] and work on unit three had started but was being hampered by occupied houses.[72] About 900

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[62] CA, Letter from Sec for BAD to CBC (Pmb), 23 March 1962. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, Part I, p.135

[63] CA, Memo to chair of Bantu Township Committee, 8 December 1965. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File G52/2/1106/2, Part I, p.271/2

[64] Ibid.

[65] CA, 16 August 1968. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5099, File G57/6/1106/2

[66] CA, 23 September 1968. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5099, File G57/6/1106/2

[67] CA, 29 August 1968. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5099, File G57/6/1106/2

[68] CA, Letter from Horne & Glasson to BAD, 26 February 1969. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, Part II, p.111

[69] CA, Letter from BAD to CBC (PN), 6 March 1969. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, Part II, p.106

[70] CA, Letter from CBC (PN) to BAD, 14 November 1969. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5024, File 52/2/1106/2, Part II, p.121

[71] CA, Memo from CBC (PN) to Deputy Secretary Housing, 19 February 1970, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 2/1853, File 60/4/1106/2, p.12

[72] CA, Letter from Horne & Glasson to BAD, 20 February 1970. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5114, File 58/2/1106/2, Part 8

houses were now occupied.[73] Unit four was planned in March 1970.[74] By June 1972 the population of Mpumalanga Township was 30000 (see Map 6 and Fig 5).[75]

Construction did not mean that the ownership issues had been resolved. The problems with tracing individual owners and settling ownership in very complex estates had finally led the Minister to approve wholesale expropriation. Yet in a memo written in February 1970, when unit one was complete and unit two was nearing completion, the CBC (PN) claimed that

> the various sections in Head Office and the district offices concerned cannot at this stage say with any certainty that only SABT property has been developed at Mpumalanga.[76]

Garden allotments covering about twenty acres were located on the undeveloped boundary stripes.[77] These were allocated to township residents, mainly widows who sold the vegetables grown. The Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) constructed market stalls in unit one, there was also a beerhall. By 1970 trading had begun.[78] Shopping centres were planned in most units. However, many of the facilities initially planned for the township were never constructed eg a swimming pool in unit two, a hospital and a brewery. The first township manager - Mr R.K. Francis - was appointed in January 1969. In January 1970 the township was transferred to the district of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Pinetown.[79]

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[73] CA, Memo from CBC (PN) to Dep Secretary of Housing 19 February 1970. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 2/1853, file T60/4/1106/2, p.11&12

[74] CA, Letter from Horne & Glasson to BAD, 25 March 1970. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 5051, File G57/4/1106, p.165-7

[75] CA, Letter from township manager to Camperdown magistrate, 7 June 1972. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 2/1853, File T60/4/1106/2, p.56

[76] CA, Memo from CBC (PN) to Deputy secretary, housing, 19 February 1970. Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 2/1853, File 60/4/1106/2, p.11 & 12

[77] CA, Memo,14 April 1970. Box 5051, File G57/4/1106

[78] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 2/1919, File T60/8/1106/2, p.30

MAP 6: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF MPUMALANGA TOWNSHIP 1960S – 1980S

MAP 6(a): PROPOSED TOWNSHIP EARLY 1960S



[79] CA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Box 2/1853, File T60/4/1106/2, p.29

MAP 6(b): COMPLETED TOWNSHIP, c1978



MAP 6(c): FURTHER GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT, c1989



Fig 5: Photograph of Construction of Mpumalanga Township – Site Prior to Construction, c1967



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Chapter Four: Local Politics: Resisting an Ethnic Politics of Identity

4.1 Introduction

Following from chapter three, this chapter continues to explore the space of the local and the form of political struggles within Mpumalanga. In so doing, it contributes to many of the broader arguments of the thesis that have been broached in the previous chapter. Firstly, there is the argument that political violence is the outcome of the articulation of multiple trajectories that intersect at the local level. Understanding place is a key component in being able to answer the question, 'why did conflict become violent?'. At an empirical level, the chapter develops the detail of the social and political relations within Mpumalanga Township in the period immediately prior to the violence. Theoretically it underscores the argument that place is a particular articulation of social relations and situated practices at all scales.

Secondly, through its discussion of the organisational conflicts in the early 1980s this chapter addresses itself to the argument that political violence is a particular form of conflict that is qualitatively and quantitatively different from any conflict that preceded it. During earlier periods the propensity to violence lay just below the surface, but as this chapter will show, what changes in the 1980s is that ways of resolving conflict and dealing with these tendencies become increasingly under siege. By amplifying the nature of local politics and the conflict that existed in the pre-'87 period the chapter emphasises the singularity of the political violence in the post-'87 period.

Thirdly, it elaborates upon the argument that stresses the connection between space, place and identity. It continues to demonstrate the ways in which the local space was produced and reproduced, and the meaning that was inscribed in these spaces. An understanding of these meanings will allow me to illustrate the ways in which the violence re-territorialised space as well as the spatialised form of the

political violence (see chapter six).

The chapter also introduces new arguments. Through its focus on cultural and organisational life it begins to demonstrate the argument regarding the articulation of the political violence with generation, age and gender. It shows how in this period the youth began to disrupt one aspect of patriarchal authority and how it was thus possible for politics in the 1980s to become the preserve of the male youth. Hand in glove with this disruption was a refashioning of patriarchal authority in relation to women. This lays the foundation for the discussion in chapters six and seven on the gendered and generational form of the violence.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore these themes and arguments through a focus on the organisational politics and cultural life of Mpumalanga in the 1980s. Its intention is to elaborate further the discussion, begun in chapter three, of the way in which the place - Mpumalanga - has been constructed and the various versions of Zuluness that were formed alongside this construction. An Inkatha branch had been established in Mpumalanga Township soon after Inkatha's relaunch in 1975. Chapter three outlined how Inkatha's attempt to establish political hegemony in the late 1970s was challenged by the Mpumalanga Resident's Association (MPURA). By the early 1980s there were a number of other organisations and youth sub-cultures in the township, all with different identity politics and locations in national politics. These national linkages conferred upon them a differential ability to construct the space of the township.

The chapter begins by examining public communal life in Mpumalanga in the early 1980s. At this time Mpumalanga had a vibrant public communal life. A diverse range of political and community organisations operated in the township. Consequently a variety of prominent local leaders, including some women, contributed to shaping the public life of the community. A diversity of class interests were represented by these organisations. As will be elaborated upon they offered different and competing versions of the meaning of 'Zuluness' and Zulu

identity. While they might have represented different interest groups, and as shown in the previous chapter there was contestation of this diversity, in the eyes of all members of the community this diversity of politics and identity was legitimate and normative.

It then goes on to examine the way in which this space is constructed through the rivalries and intimacies of local organisational politics. The last three sections of the chapter track the ways in which local organisational dynamics and power relations bring the township closer to the unprecedented levels of violence described in chapter one. Through a variety of interventions this picture of public communal life began to change. In the process, a number of fault lines and contestations emerged. Firstly, there was a contestation over the meaning of 'Zuluness'. In essence it was about who had the right to give it definition. In the process cultural concepts acquired new political interpretations and meanings. Secondly, there was the fault line of age. Youth were the main protagonists; on both sides the violence was between male youth. In the process there was a politicisation of age and ethnicity. Youth, age and generation all become contested issues. This contestation cannot be divorced from the issue of 'Zuluness' as cultural beliefs provided meaning to discourses of age. Thirdly, the boundary between conflict and violence was challenged, crossed and contested. Mpumalanga was a violent place. As Fred Khumalo (2006) narrates in his autobiography, violent crime thrived, gender violence was a technique used to discipline women, and most men carried knives. Nevertheless, this violence had not extended to politics. The tacit understanding about ways of conducing oneself politically did not include violence. Previous decades had established ways of doing politics that rested upon a framework of respect for patriarchal authority and appropriate ways of challenging that authority. Yet, as this chapter will demonstrate, at some point in the mid-1980s this boundary was crossed and these tacit understandings were disrupted. The chapter explains how organisational life came to be dominated by young men, the consequence of which was to exclude women and older men from public communal life.

4.2 Public Communal Life (Local Politics) in the early 1980s

As stated above, public communal life in Mpumalanga in the early 1980s was characterised by a variety of organisations and associations. Some of these, like Inkatha and the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo), had a clearly political agenda. They were often local branches of national political organisations. Others like MPURA were interested in local 'civic' issues. Residents were also members of churches, trade unions, choirs, cultural groups, student organisations and other informal associations (see below). All these organisations were differentially located spatially. Their spatial location meant they brought to Mpumalanga a different set of relations to place, relations infused by national agendas and power relations. At the local level, these national linkages located power differently amongst organisations and their leadership, conferring upon them a differential ability to construct the space of Mpumalanga.

As with other townships (see Campbell, 1992; Bozzoli, 2004), Mpumalanga township public culture was masculine. Community and political organisations had a majority male membership; and, with few exceptions the leadership was also dominated by men. Criminality flourished and with it a masculine-*tsotsi* sub-culture. Other dominant youth sub-cultures like the Mapantsula's[1] and the American Dudes[2] (see Khumalo, 2006:110-112) were also male. Boys hung out on street corners, smoking and talking; and, in the process creating neighbourhood and peer networks that excluded young women. Gender violence against women was common; a technique used to discipline women and ensure one aspect of the patriarchal order was not disturbed. Wife-beating existed in many families (see Khumalo, 2006) and young women were publicly disciplined

[1] The Mapantsula's "wore trousers with stovepipe legs", they were known for stealing money from individuals. (Khumalo, 2006:110).

[2] The American Dudes wore "tight-fitting Bang-bang jeans, tight-fitting muscle tops and high-heeled Watson or Barker shoes. Our hair would either be done in long bushy Afros or in gleaming curls. Our clothes were always bright – pink, orange, yellow … Their raison d'être was fun, fun

by their boy-friends through the practice of streamlining.[3]

As argued in the previous chapter there existed in Mpumalanga a heterogeneous interpretation of what it meant to be Zulu. With the formation of Inkatha, there were attempts to establish a singular meaning. Yet, the existence of different organisations in the early 1980s indicated just how contested Inkatha's project was. Each of these organisations offered residents a different version of 'Zulu-ness', allowing residents to develop different ethnic self-identifications. These did not necessarily correspond with the 'official' version promulgated by Inkatha and the KwaZulu government.

In the early 1980s there were four important organisations in Mpumalanga Township. As discussed in chapter three the most prominent was Inkatha, which at that time was the main political organisation in the township. Many residents claimed they joined Inkatha because they saw it as part of the liberation movement aligned to the ANC.

> ... some exiles like Tambo, some like Mandela in prison for so many years, we knew, we heard that (unclear) ... but we were supporting Mr Buthelezi because we thought he was also on them on that line, whereas he was, we found later, that no this one is playing, some other cards he is not playing this way. (Focus group, Connie's Group, Con2#1-2:3)

Inkatha's membership was comprised of older people, but it also had a vibrant and strong youth component.

As discussed in the previous chapter the other prominent local organisation was MPURA (see chapter three). To recap, MPURA was not affiliated with any political party. Its leadership was older and based in the Mpumalanga business community. Many of these leaders served as role models for the youth (see Bruce

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and more fun." (Khumalo, 2006:110).

[3] According to Khumalo (2006:108) "Streamlining was a common practice, a form of 'punishment'. It wasn't considered rape. Rape was associated with physical violence and force. Streamlining was about control. A man must control his woman. Girls could be streamlined for drinking, simply to teach them a lesson. And the girls never reported it. I suspect they felt no one would believe them, because being streamlined stigmatised you. 'Why did they do it to you, out of all the girls in the township? What wrong did you do? You must have asked for it!'"

Buthelezi's story below) and MPURA had support from a wide range of residents irrespective of their gender, age or class backgrounds. MPURA's focus was on the local area, and the issues faced by residents.

As outlined in chapter three relations between these two organisations were frequently hostile. Any association with another political group was interpreted as an anti-Inkatha position and by extension disloyalty to the KwaZulu government. According to MPURA member James Ngubane, after the MPURA leadership had been successful in their attempt to win control of the Mpumalanga Township council in 1982 the 'organisation collapsed'.

A third important organisation in Mpumalanga in the late 1970s was *oQonda* (straighten-up).[4] Formed in response to the domination of criminal gangs in the township, *oqonda* were a community-based group active in enforcing law and order.

> Before that violence there was a lot of killing ... ja, so we formed eh the security, a community security in society, so we used to go around the whole of Mpumalanga at night watching this eh crime people. It came quiet after that, without no benefit, we wasn't getting paid. No, we was just helping people. (Focus group, Con2#1-2:2]

> ... when I came here in Mpumalanga [1971] the place was hell, ... place for criminals ... Friday, Saturday, you must find a dead body at the bus stops, at the shop. Then after that we had formed this community security. So it [the crime] came down ... (Focus group, Con2#1-2:5)

In his autobiography, in which he describes his youth in Mpumalanga, Fred Khumalo (2006:82) concurs. He says that Mpumalanga was dominated by two gangs (amongst others) the *Amakwaitos* and the *uMsingizane*.

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[4] From the late 1970s *oqonda* appeared in many townships in Natal. Composed of older men, they played a role between that of cultural enforcer of tradition and *hloniphia* and vigilante cleaning up the areas of petty criminals. Their almost simultaneous appearance in many townships throughout the province, and their links to township councillors led many to speculate that they had been organised by Inkatha. They were key in breaking the school boycotts of 1980 by forcing the children back to school. Their emergence indicates an anxiety about the politicisation of the youth and an attempt to restore order amongst them. I would suggest that struggles over different versions of Zuluness contain at their heart struggles over generational authority. In 1986 members of the Durban Workers' Cultural Local workshopped and performed a play called *Qonda*, written by Mi Hlatshwayo, about the problems associated with *oqonda* (see Von Kotze, 1988).

> The threat of gangs loomed largest on Fridays, payday. People were mugged and stabbed and killed. Cries for help mingled with the merrymaking in the shebeens. Soon the gangs were a law unto themselves, terrorising the community. They demanded 'protection fees' from businessmen, and those who refused were burgled repeatedly. They even charged a toll at night at a bridge that linked two sections of the township. To this day, the bridge is called kwa-Five Rand. On Monday mornings bodies floating in the stream underneath the bridge were a common sight for children crossing to school. Nor were the police, stationed in white Hammarsdale, interested in the gang violence. They only came into the township to collect the corpses. (Khumalo, 2006:82)

According to Khumalo (2006:82) the *oQonda* patrolled the streets at night armed with knobkerries, sjamboks and occasionally spears. A curfew was imposed, and anyone out after eight-thirty was beaten up unless they had good reason.

Another resident, Sbu Mbhele, gave his reasons for the flourishing of criminal activity.

> [Crime was] very high, you would understand that people were coming from different areas and do you know an area when it is going *skomplaas*, … and quite a number of people were coming from those areas, like Cato Manor, squatter camp. You find that people are living a higher life [there], a good life, but in squatters, so a *skomplaas* would be something like that. There'll be crime, there'll be overnight gigs, it's funky, ja, so there are killings there, they are part of that settlement. So many people came from such areas so they brought that thinking, that mentality with them. At one stage there was a need for this whole thing to be eradicated, so this *oqonda* thing came up. I don't know it was an Inkatha or MPURA idea I don't know, but it did work. (Interview Mbhele, SMb1#2-2:5-6)

At the heart of the concerns outlined by Mbhele is the need for moral and generational policing. Georgedale had represented ordered living. Everyone whether tenant or landlord, old or young, male or female 'knew their place'. The practice of *hloniphia* is fundamental to Zulu culture and to the observation of generational order. With the relocation to Mpumalanga this order was disrupted. And as described by Mbhele, it was disrupted even further when people from outside of Georgedale were allocated houses in Mpumalanga unit three. For the former Georgedale residents restoring that order and enforcing *hloniphia* amongst the male youth was a priority. *oQonda* were primarily composed of older men, their job to patrol the streets and ensure that there was no crime in Mpumalanga. Male youth and young men were seen as harbingers of crime and disorder. In an

attempt to restore generational order they were targeted by *oQondo*.

> They used to go in groups, when they met the young boys they search them, when they find the knives they will let them step down and beat them. So the crime was eliminated in that way. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:10)

Another reason for getting the youth back under control was that they often had 'bad things to say about Inkatha' (Khumalo 2006:82), and for this youth were flogged in public.

Besides controlling for crime *oqonda* had another function. They were the enforcers of Zulu culture and tradition as understood and interpreted by the community elders.

> ... at that time if a girl wore pants she would be beaten. If they found a male and woman together they will be beaten. They would also guard the streets. That was my father's duty. (Hlongwane, TRC amnesty hearing, Richard's Bay, 21 April 1998, p.59)

Despite initial support for *oqonda* there were increasing tensions around their activities.

> The only thing with that group was they started to interfere with family matters, so the community started not to like them because of that. Otherwise they were doing a very good job. ... The only problem started when the wife and husband were quarrelling and then the wife would go to *oqonda* and the *oqonda* would call, these *oqonda* would call a man and let the man step down, I mean and hit that man, that's when they started to be bad. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:10)

Khumalo (2006) also informs us that the presence of *oqonda* was used as a threat to keep unruly neighbours in check.

Many residents saw *oqonda* as aligned with Inkatha.

> The thing is, if I am not making a mistake, they were controlled by Inkatha [at] that early stage, because they came immediately after the inauguration of Inkatha. So I was already at Ladysmith, when I came back I was told about Inkatha and *oqonda* at the same time, so and many people like this person I've told you about was shot [by] Sishi, was a member of *oqondo* and a member of the Inkatha. A very strong member of *oqondo* and a very strong member of Inkatha, so I would say it was Inkatha's idea. Because in 1977 the Mpumalanga Residents' Association was very strong, so the *oqondo* who belonged to Inkatha sort of moved back and in came those who supported MPURA. So it was just like that, ja, they did achieve a lot. (Interview Mbhele, SMb1#2-2:6)

According to Ngubane,

> they were recruited ja, at a later stage this *qonda* people were recruited by Inkatha woman who was from, Mrs Xulu from Woody Glen. So they were used to fight these business people. There was a conflict at some stage I remember that. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:10)

Members of one of the focus groups recalled the conflict between them and

MPURA, though no-one could clearly recall the exact cause.

> There was a lot of fighting there, do you remember? Between security and MPURA. Do you remember one chap was shot but eh he was shot here on the leg. (Focus group, Con2#1-2:3)

The formation of *oqonda* alerts us to a number of interesting dynamics in Mpumalanga society at this time. Firstly, conflict, crime and ineffective policing were not unknown before the political violence, a variety of sources attest to a problem so serious (both the crime and the policing) that the community was forced to take matters into their own hands and create a community / vigilante group in response. Secondly, a certain level of violence was a normative part of everyday life - both the violence signified by crime, but more importantly it was acceptable to use violence in response. What will become clearer is that it is not the use of violence *per se* that crosses the boundary of the normative, but rather, the type of violence that is used. Thirdly, in the early 1980s older men were visible and prominent in the 'ordering' of the society. The notion of patriarchal order was an essential feature of Zulu society and the role of maintaining this order fell to older men (see Mduli, 1987). Thus, they were the ones who formulated and enforced the community's response to the problem of crime. However, it should be noted that in doing so 'the other' was identified as male and younger. Fourthly, these narratives provide a further signifer of the normative. It was permissible to interfere in private relations that transgressed public codes of respectability (*hloniphia*) but it was not acceptable to intervene in the domain of the household. At a later stage, (see chapter six) the political redefines *hloniphia* and the domain of the household is no longer seen as out-of-bounds.

Yet, the formation of *oQondo* was not just about a community's response to crime. It was also about the policing of a generation and defending a moral order that was seen to be under threat. The youth with their criminal gangs, their carrying of knives and their cheekiness about Inkatha was perceived as a problem. A problem that needed to be put in its place. And in the late 1970s *oQondo* succeeded in doing that. To cite Khumalo (2006:82) "The community sighed with relief. … peace and order had returned to our streets."

The fourth organisation was Azapo. Azapo was a national political organisation, falling within the black consciousness tradition. It was founded in April 1978, the first organisation formed since the bannings of 'Black October' the previous year. However, within two weeks most of its national leadership had been detained and Azapo was silent for over a year (Lodge, 1983:344). In September 1979, after the last of the detainees had been released, the organisation was relaunched and a new executive was elected (Seekings, 2000:36). According to Lodge (1983:345), Azapo differed from its black consciousness predecessors by presenting a sophisticated class analysis. They proclaimed their intention to focus on the black working class and saw trade unions as an instrument to 'redistribute power' (Mosele, cited in Lodge 1983:345). Secondly, they recognised that some blacks would find it within their class interests to collaborate with the authorities (Azapo policy paper, cited in Lodge 1983:345). Much of Azapo's organisational strength was to be found in the Transvaal, as were most of its branches. It was only in 1983 that Azapo developed a presence in Natal with the launch of a large number of branches, for example Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Ladysmith and Hammarsdale. This can partially be attributed to the release of Natal-based black consciousness leadership from Robben Island in the early 1980s (Interview Moodley, SM1).

The beginnings of a local branch in Mpumalanga was initiated in late 1982. The organisation of the branch illustrates both the effect of local agency as well as the spatial reach of the local activists. Azapo introduced a different sort of politics and new spatial linkages into Mpumalanga Township. Richard Mqadi (then known as Cele) was the key figure. Educated by both black and white teachers at the nearby Catholic mission school of Marianhill, he was sheltered from the harshest realities of apartheid South Africa. The experience of work in a local Hammarsdale factory made him aware of the gross inequalities that existed in South Africa.

> ... the conditions at work were just appalling. And what was happening at work was that if you were employed as an Indian you were going to be a supervisor, and if you were employed as an African you were going to be an operator, and if you were going to be employed as a white person you were going to be in the laboratory and not in the factory.

> So that's how things were. And I began to question these things within myself. And it so happened that I was the youngster at that time, and I had that energy to read things. I still remember it was a *Pace* magazine, if I'm not mistaken, which was carrying a lot of political articles. And that's when I learnt a lot about ANC, that ANC has actually attacked whatever. One day I read about Azapo, and Azapo to me reminded me during my school days because Steve Biko was actually a student at Marianhill and I remember 1977 when he was killed, the teachers were mourning ... So when the question of Azapo came through the newspapers and I was reading a lot about them. Because that was the main political organisation. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:1)

His politicisation was heightened when he was dismissed for introducing the Chemical Workers Union to his workplace. In September 1982 Mqadi attended a Steve Biko commemoration meeting at the Umlazi Cinema. After this meeting he decided to join Azapo. Their positive response to his written application encouraged him to begin organising a local branch. He organised a number of meetings at the house in unit four where he was staying. Contact was made with Strini Moodley, a well-known black consciousness figure, in Durban for assistance in setting up the branch. In early 1983, with the requisite twenty members, the Azapo branch in Mpumalanga was officially launched.

Azapo's membership was primarily male and youthful. It was drawn from all sections of Mpumalanga and frequently school-based networks drew in the youngsters. The branch grew quickly, estimates of active paid-up members were around four hundred plus a support-base of over a thousand. It was suggested that in time their support eclipsed that of Inkatha. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#2-3:11)

Fred Khumalo's (2006:113-116) autobiography provides an account of his politicisation that indicates the many ways in which young people became politically aware and the importance of the school-based networks. This process was far removed form the influence of their parents and Inkatha. As a teenager, in the late 1970s, Khumalo began to frequent a neighbour's house whose son was a dagga merchant. Here a mixture of people (amongst them known criminals) would sit around listening to music, talking and smoking dagga. It was here that he met Step-by-Step, a young man already politicised who introduced political

discussions into the laid-back dopers' conversations, introduced him to Radio Freedom and lent him copies of Frank Talk[5] and Pace (Khumalo, 2006:93-95). At Phezulu High School Khumalo was put to sit next to a hardened criminal Nhlanhla who was notorious for the large knife he routinely carried, the disrespect with which he treated the teachers and his pick-pocketing activities. Khumalo's own nascent criminal networks ensured they soon became friends. In turn Khumalo lent him the books that came from Step-by-Step and they spent long hours in deep political discussion (Khumalo, 2006:100-101). Some time later, having disassociated himself from those criminal activities, Khumalo became part of another sub-culture The American Dudes. Here he met Bongani Gasa who was politically astute and anxious to conscientise his friends. Gasa took him to his first Azapo meeting and encouraged him to recruit others. Amongst others, he tried to interest his old friend Nhlanhla, but despite his beliefs he like many others was afraid of falling foul of the security establishment and didn't join the organisation. By now Khumalo was in standard nine and was looking for other ways to 'spread the political message' (Khumalo 2006:114). With the backing of his class teacher he approached the school principal with the idea of starting a newspaper. The idea was that after morning prayers, he would read a few self-generated news stories about the school and township as well as some general news. He was given permission and soon pupils were bringing him news of youth meetings, music competitions, community meetings etc. Into this agenda he began to insert news about the Azanian Students Movement (Azasm) and Azapo. This development attracted the attention of students who were members of Inkatha and he was then forced to accept an Inkatha supporter into his news team, whose stories had a strong Inkatha bias. Shortly thereafter Bongani Gasa went missing, a year later they found out that he had left the country to join *uMkhonto weSizwe*[6] and had been killed in an ambush while returning to South Africa (Khumalo 2006:114-116). He also mentions that a teacher advised him to go and see Mafika

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[5] Frank Talk was the black consciousness magazine.

Gwala, black consciousness activist, writer and poet, who upon accepting his credentials provided him with more political literature to read and introduced him to other cultural networks (Khumalo, 2006:130-131).

Bruce Buthelezi, who became a key UDF / Hammarsdale Youth Congress activist describes a similar, but slightly different, process of politicisation. He explains that he grew up under the influence of Reverend Ngidi[7] a church minister who was also a close neighbour. He also got to know Majoy Mcoyi, a member of the UDF-affiliated Natal Organisation of Women (NOW) and MPURA. She printed political t-shirts (with Biko's face) in her backyard and Buthelezi sold them at school. Buthelezi's account that he managed to sell on average twelve t-shirts per day is an indicator of the large support that Azapo had amongst the students. Buthelezi himself joined Azapo, being elected the secretary, and then becoming a prominent Hayco member.

These stories give some account of the politicisation of the youth. The networks they engaged in were different from that of their parents; spatially more extensive they stretched beyond the township, Natal and Inkatha politics. Reading was important and books were circulated freely, despite the fears that many experienced. In essence, the modalities of politics were changing. No longer was politics the domain of the older generation. Azapo's politics did not rest on patriarchy. The youth were finding their own role models and making political linkages that extended beyond the narrow confines of the province and Zulu ethnicity.

Many of Azapo's activities focussed on 'education'.

> What we were doing at that stage, it was education. We were educating our members because they didn't know anything about politics. We were busy educating. So we managed to educate them such that when you meet an Azapo member they will tell you

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[6] The armed wing of the African National Congress.

[7] Reverend Ngidi organised a memorial service for the students killed by Inkatha at the Ngoyi campus of University of Zululand (see below for a fuller account of this event).

the same thing as other people. ... every weekend we used to have meetings. Specially it was education, education, because we felt we cannot move without education. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:5&6)

Azapo's very existence challenged the ethnic Zulu identity tendered by Inkatha. In principal Azapo was opposed to participation in the homeland government. Azapo viewed Indians, Coloureds and Africans as part of the oppressed black group. They sought to present an identity based on race (defined by oppression) and class, which excluded those who collaborated. Integral to their organisational culture was an emphasis on political education. They had no time for what was viewed as ethnic tribal identities or an uninformed populism.

Other organisations, while not as prominent, also contributed to the political life of Mpumalanga. The Congress of South African Students (Cosas), a national scholars organisation aligned to the Congress movement developed a presence at secondary schools in the township. Cosas was formed in 1979, and according to Lodge (1983:341) 'stood in conscious opposition to organisations which claim to be inspired by the precepts of Black Consciousness'. This was not necessarily the case in Mpumalanga and many students were both Cosas and Azapo members (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:7). Azapo did not have a student wing until July 1983 when the Azanian Student's Movement (Azasm) was 'revived to compete with Cosas' (Seekings, 2000:68). Cosas played an important role in filtering Congress-ideas into Mpumalanga and offered an alternative political identity to that of Inkatha.

Many Mpumalanga residents worked in the Hammarsdale industrial area and were trade union members. Given the predominance of textile mills, most were members of the National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) an affiliate of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu). Other large employers were the Rainbow Chicken factories at Cato Ridge, these were organised by another Fosatu affiliate the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union. Baskin (1991:103) characterised Fosatu politics as

> independent worker ... their politics envisaged an alternative working-class organisation in both the factory and the community, ...

> their practice, particularly in the case of NUTW, often amounted to political abstentionism.

Fosatu was careful not to interject on the terrain of the political and members of all political persuasions found a comfortable home within its structures.

At the beginning of the 1980s the public space appeared to be the preserve of older people, primarily male - men had initiated and participated in *oQonda*, the Inkatha leadership and that of the Mpumalanga Residents' Association was older. Within a few years this was to change. The Mpumalanga Residents' Association became defunct as many amongst its leadership took up new positions within the Township Council and new organisations emerged. The role of the *oQonda* had been questioned and successfully challenged. While there were overtly political dimensions to the challenge, this concealed patriarchal concerns. Within Inkatha itself the older leadership was in the process of being displaced by younger men. A few prominent women had been active in MPURA, and, despite its demise, these women retained the profile of community leader. The group most marginalised by this organisational activity were young women. The few who participated in Azapo meetings were usually the sisters or girlfriends of male members (Interview, Mqadi). This situation was common to youth politics countrywide (see Seekings, 1993). In many of the organisations those who were most active were male and young - students in the schools and those like Mqadi, Nkehli and Ngubane who had recently left school.

4.3 Friendship and Intimacy

As has been shown in the previous section in the early 1980s there was an active and vibrant political life in Mpumalanga township characterised by the presence of a number of different political organisations. The relationships between these organisations were complex. They co-existed yet they barely tolerated one another - they presented different ideologies (described above) and they clashed, sometimes violently. Yet, this was all within the boundaries of acceptable violence and conflict. Despite these clashes, there was also an atmosphere of tolerance and debate at the local level. Not only did friendships cut across

political affiliation but they were also accepted. Mqadi taught at a local night school with the well-known Inkatha leader Zakhele Nkehli (a distant relation, as their mothers were both from the Cele clan). Given their common interest in politics, they discussed the political issues of the day, with Mqadi a frequent visitor at Nkehli's house. Nkehli, well aware that he had little interest in joining Inkatha, invited him to attend Inkatha meetings and rallies.

There were other intimacies and friendships that cut across political affiliation. James Ngubane, who was to become prominent in the local Azapo leadership, was a close school-friend of Nkehli. They had both attended Isibukosezwe High School in unit three (Nkehli living in unit four and Ngubane in unit two south).

> He used to be my friend and class-mate. We were sitting on one desk, we were four friends, four, and we were called the *viermanskap*. There was a book that we were reading, it was an Afrikaans book *Viermanskap*. And we were four, it was myself, Zakhele Nkehli, another guy Patrick Hlongwane and the fourth one was Petrus. We were four, we were friends, ja. And then, this thing of politics separated us. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:7)

Nkehli joined Inkatha while he was still at school. He respected his friend's church orientation,

> I was not interested in politics because at that time I was a church-goer, (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:8)

and did not try to persuade him to join Inkatha. It was only once he left school and began working at South African Nylon Spinners in Hammarsdale that Ngubane became politically active. He joined the NUTW, became involved in the Mpumalanga Residents' Association and through that joined Inkatha, and finally Azapo.

> The reason I joined Inkatha is not that I like Inkatha. It's because I was involved in the community organisation called the Mpumalanga Residents' Association. ... I moved out of Inkatha because I like this idea of Black Consciousness ideology. I like this. So that is why I joined Azapo. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:4)

Sbu Mbele an active member of Azapo and Azasm was best friends with the son of a local councillor and prominent Inkatha member, Simon Cele.

> We used to talk about issues; I used buy magazines and specifically looking into the political side of things. (Interview Mbhele, SMb1#1-2:2)

These stories alert us to the situation that existed prior to political violence. Youth who were interested in politics were drawn to each other. They exchanged literature and enjoyed the cut and thrust of debate. As in many other parts of the country the youth, during the 1980s, were becoming political actors (Marks, 2001; Carter, 1991; Naidoo, 1991; Seekings, 1993; Bozzoli, 2004). Like their counterparts elsewhere they joined organisations, read and debated amongst themselves.

In Mpumalanga conflict and tolerance coexisted. Debate was free-flowing, friendships and even membership cut across political boundaries. Other studies of youth and organisational politics suggest this atmosphere was uncommon for the time (see Carter, 1991; Naidoo, 1991; Seekings, 1993). While Carter's (1991) study of youth congress activists in Alexandra charts a similar diversity of organisations, with church youth membership frequently being the organisational route into political activity, there close friendships brought people into the same organisation. Thus, tensions between organisations were not mediated by friendships.

4.4 Tensions rise between political organisations

Relations that exist in one place are never untouched by relationships between and across spaces. Mpumalanga Township could not remain isolated from the political tensions in the rest of the country. The coexistence of conflict and tolerance, always a volatile balance, was stretched tighter and tighter as the 1980s progressed. Shifts in local politics articulated with national political dynamics, to raise the stakes at the local level.

Firstly, Inkatha was losing its youth membership; initially to Azapo and then to the Hammarsdale Youth Congress (Hayco). Inkatha tolerated the co-existence of other organisations as long as they dominated. Losing the Township Council elections in 1981 to MPURA-backed candidates (see chapter three) demonstrated they did not have overwhelming support amongst the adults, now it appeared they

were now losing support amongst the youth. Much of the jockeying for membership happened amongst the youth. Secondly, all parties were facing the pressures 'from outside'. Regional Inkatha leadership was not comfortable with Azapo's presence and growing support in Mpumalanga. They were even less happy with personal friendships across parties. Azapo's national policy was against collaboration with homeland leaders. Both the charterists and Azapo national leadership were publicly attacking each other's positions (Seekings, 2000). Local leaders would have been under pressure to demonstrate that their branches were not out of line with organisational policies.

> ... and also the word went to Ulundi that they were allowing Azapo to operate there, and I think he [Nkehli] was facing some difficulties. ... I use[d] to visit him at home, at his home, ... but as time went on I also got increasing pressure from my colleagues who were saying that this guy is actually urging their people to attack them ... (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:4)

The increasing tensions and the potential for violence was publicly signalled at a series of public meetings organised by both Inkatha and Azapo. The result of each of these meetings was a shift in membership away from Inkatha towards Azapo (and later from Azapo to the UDF), frequently accompanied by either threats of or actual violence.

Azapo's first public event in Mpumalanga was a Sharpville Commemoration Meeting (21 March) in 1983. The commemoration was attended by Azapo members from other branches, as well as, the national leadership including the president. It was also attended by a large number of Inkatha members who, according to Mqadi, intended to disrupt the meeting. However, this backfired and Inkatha began to lose membership to Azapo. Mqadi recalled this meeting as a turning point in terms of the popularity of both organisations.

> We outnumbered them and most of the people they had organised, it was mainly kids, you know, I mean very young compared to us. So in terms of force, they could not use force in terms of disrupting the meeting. ... they confronted us with a number of questions ... the more question they were putting forward the more it was easy for us to clarify our position. And I guess what actually happened, they made a mistake by attending that meeting because after that meeting a number of people who had come to disrupt the meeting actually got interested because thereafter there was a number of people who were making calls trying to find out exactly what was happening. Some of them wanted to join the organisation. And I think that is where the mistake was because a number of people [who] actually later on joined Azapo were from that meeting. And in fact it just opened gates from Inkatha of people who flocking from Inkatha to Azapo. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:3)

This meeting also illustrated the generational revolt that was taking place in Inkatha politics. Previously Inkatha had always been seen as an organisation of the parents (see chapter three), but now the Inkatha Youth Brigade dominated Inkatha politics (Interview, Buthelezi) and became the public face of Inkatha. Given that Azapo also had a predominately youthful membership, more generally politics in Mpumalanga now became the domain of the youth. These internal shifts in generational power were reinforced by the national campaigns linked to the United Nations International Youth Year (1985). While these campaigns might not have been successful (see Seekings, 2000), they did emphasis youth leadership and political agency.

As Azapo's Mpumalanga membership increased, so strategies employed elsewhere in the province were used to exert pressure. Throughout the province, all employees of the KwaZulu Government - teachers, civil servants and officials - were expected to express their loyalty through membership of Inkatha. Failure to comply led to censure, unemployment and even physical injury (see Gwala, 1989). These threats had personal significance for Richard Mqadi.

> We had started the branch around March, in June 1983 I was employed by the KwaZulu Government, the Department of the Interior, when I was employed of course people who employed me didn't know about my political affiliation. I was the chairman of Azapo when I was employed. I was employed as a clerk. And immediately when I had been employed the news broke because of the activities of Azapo that I was actually a member of Azapo. Apparently there was a pressure to the township management who had employed me. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:5)

Later that year, he, together with Ngubane, accepted an invitation from Nkehli to attend an Inkatha youth meeting at the Mpumalanga College of Education. Despite having invited them, Nkehli used the meeting as a platform to attack Azapo and in particularly Mqadi's employment by the KwaZulu Government.

> ... while we were still inside that meeting, [he] stood up and said 'I'm glad that Azapo members are here I want to introduce them to you, ... Mr Richard Cele, he's working for our government but he's opposed to our government. We are feeding him.' And they people started shouting they wanted to attack him, ... (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:9)

1984 and 1985 saw a jostling for membership and increasing hostility between

Azapo and Inkatha. Some like James Ngubane left Inkatha to join Azapo without problems, others were subjected to violence.

> Romeo Khumalo, he was among those people who attended the [Sharpville] commemoration, and after that commemoration he approached me, he wanted to join. He ... went to attend an Inkatha meeting, and at that Inkatha meeting they felt that Romeo didn't speak well at that commemoration, he was being in support of Azapo instead of being supporting of Inkatha. So he was beaten at that meeting, so he ran away from that meeting, and we had a meeting at the same time at Kulugkle creche ... at unit three, ... so Romeo ran away from that meeting where he was beaten and came straight to our meeting ... So we received Romeo. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:9)

In August 1983 the UDF was launched nationally. At first there were no formal structures in Mpumalanga township, though Cosas provided a congress presence. Political tensions increased after the Ngoya massacre[8] of 23 October 1983. According to Ngubane (Interview, JN1#1-2:2), Inkatha people from Mpumalanga were involved – 'there were people bussed from Mpumalanga to Ngoya. ... Inkatha people they were bussed to Ngoya'. A commemoration service for those who had died in the massacre was organised by Reverend Ben Ngidi from the Apolistic Church in unit one. The meeting was addressed by Archie Gumede, regional chairperson of the UDF in Natal.[9] This meeting introduced the UDF into the township in a very public way. There was debate amongst the younger Azapo members over whether they should or could attend the meeting. Richard Mqadi outlined his views,

> ... I said people should attend whatever meeting as long as they know what they are there for. I mean we didn't believe that people should not attend a particular meeting, like we went to an Inkatha meeting. So apparently when they went to attend that meeting, some of our members were moved, they wanted to cross over. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:8)

While there was open hostility between Azapo and the UDF at a national level (Seekings, 2000:52) this was not the case in Mpumalanga. Many of the youth thought they could be members of both the UDF and Azapo.

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[8] Inkatha supporters killed five students and injured over a hundred at the University of Zululand at Ngoye (Seekings, 2000:65).

[9] Archie Gumede was an ex-Robben islander. He lived in Clermont Township, a staunchly UDF-supporting area, near Pinetown. Gumede was to establish close contact with the UDF-youth from Mpumalanga Township.

So when I came back (after my accident) to start work in Mpumalanga I found that there was a lot of confusion and people thought they could be members of UDF, ... and Azapo was so-called purist. In fact we didn't want to associate ourselves with the charterists. But we could speak to them, but we could not share membership. That was inconceivable as far as we were concerned. ... So when I came back we had to intensify our campaign to clarify things ... (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:8)

4.5 The First Attacks

In August 1985 the normative values of acceptable violence were transgressed for the first time - groups of Inkatha youth attacked the houses and persons of Azapo leadership. In response some of the leadership fled the township.

Victoria Mxenge was murdered on 5 August 1985 outside her home in Umlazi township, south of Durban.[10] The response to her death was almost immediate; youths took to the street protesting and attacking government buildings (see Sitas, 1986). Within a few days the street protests, burning and looting had spread to most townships around Durban. Inkatha marshalled its *amabutho* in order to restore law and order. In Mpumalanga Nkehli managed to convince the council and business people (the same MPURA members) that the violence and the looting being experienced in Durban's townships could reach Mpumalanga.

He managed to get funds from them, some, one of the men Mr Mkhize, he=s got a lot of butcheries there. He used to offer meat for youth, because what they did they put up a tent in the road, in the road that enters Mpumalanga. So they put up a tent searching all the cars that were coming to Mpumalanga. So they were backed by those business people. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:9)

Azapo members from outside of Mpumalanga, Strini Moodley and Selby Baqwa were caught in the road block. They were held and questioned by Nkehli for seven hours before being released on instruction from the Pietermaritzburg security branch (Interview Moodley, SM1).

Eight days later Mandla Mthembu, a member of the Azapo executive in Mpumalanga was attacked. An attempt was made to abduct him from his home in

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[10] This has been marked as a significant event in the politics of Natal. It is seen as a turning point in the periodisation of violent conflict in the province (see Minnaar, 1992a) and in the relationship between the UDF and Inkatha.

unit one south and he was stabbed in the back with an assagai (Interview Mthembu, MM1#1-2:10). As there had been open conflict between the UDF and Azapo in other areas of Natal,[11] at first they thought the UDF was responsible for the attack.

> ... Mandla said no I think it was Inkatha. There were people, in fact they were singing around the house, you know the same guy, Nkehli guy, came there was speaking all sort of things. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#2-3:1)

The following night Richard Mqadi's house was attacked.

> ...I said Mandla can't you leave this spear with me because they are coming for me and I don't have anything. So Mandla left the spear so that if they come to me I would actually try and defend myself. So early hours of Sunday they actually came. And they busted the roof and we had to try and mop the place because it was burning. They threw petrol bombs and the sofas inside were burning. ... (Interview Mqadi, RM1#2-3:2)

In response Mqadi left Mpumalanga briefly, returning within two weeks. In mid-September Inkatha attacked again, they assaulted and stabbed James Ngubane outside the shops at KwaMcoyi.[12]

Azapo claimed that the names of their members appeared on a hit-list and they were being targeted by vigilantes (The Natal Witness, 11 and 13 September 1985). Rumour had it that Nkehli was behind the attacks. James Ngubane who had a close friendship with Nkehli explained why he was targeted, these attacks changed their relationship causing him to hate his former friend.

> ... he [Nkehli] organised people to go and kill me when I was going to work. ... I heard that the meeting was at his place, it was organised that I should be killed because I=m too dangerous because I used to be Inkatha member, though at that time Inkatha was not violent, because they said no people are going to listen to this person because he used to be Inkatha member. Ja. So I started to hate him. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:12)

This attack threw the organisation into crisis. By attacking James Ngubane Inkatha had irrevocably stepped closer to the boundaries of 'acceptable conflict' - but had they crossed it? The issue facing Azapo was how they should respond.

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[11] In 1985 conflict broke out between UDF and black consciousness youth in Imbali (a black township outside Pietermaritzburg). This was resolved through negotiations (Aitchison, 1989a).

Even though Azapo was an organisation of young people, age still stratified the debate. The students within Azapo, members of Azasm, wanted to attack back. Mqadi (Interview, RM1#2-3:2-3) explained that it took all the leadership's powers to hold them back. As leadership they felt that it would be suicidal to shift the terrain unless they had access to weapons. Finally, the debate marked death as the border.

> And then, we finally took a resolution, that if anyone of us got killed by Inkatha then that would be a strong reason for us to go all out and kill Inkatha with whatever we had in our hands. ... We had a meeting the whole night at James' place and that was the resolution. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#2-3:3)

They also decided to retreat from the public life of the community.

> The other resolution we took was that we had to go underground. We must be seen as an organisation that is no longer operating. So, our meetings were not going to be in the open. But we had to meet at all hours. Because it would seem that Inkatha just wanted to see Azapo not all in operation. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#2-3:3)

According to Mqadi (Interview, RM1#1-3:8) relations between Inkatha and Azapo continued to deteriorate. Inkatha members threatened and intimidated Azapo members at every opportunity, beating Azapo members if they found them walking through the streets of Mpumalanga. Mqadi would phone his comrades to escort him home from work.

> ... they came to the office where I was working at unit two, they used to come there and show assagai through the windows where I was working, that they were going to get me. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:10)

In an attempt to stop the attacks and ease the tension Azapo initiated, in late 1985, the formation of a common organisation the Black Unity Youth Association (BUYA). Inkatha, through Nkehli, agreed to participate. To ensure a charterist presence, in the absence of a formal structure, Azapo co-opted the sons of a well-known Robben Islander (Interview Mqadi, RM1#3-3:2). However, an organisation and a constitution could not guarantee unity and in the face of continued attacks BUYA disintegrated.

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[12] Mcoyi is a prominent Mpumalanga family (see chapter three). Some of them like Rejoice Mcoyi were business people, others are in education. KwaMcoyi is the name by which a cluster of shops and a transport nub, in unit two, is known.

So he was so happy when the whole thing was started. But when the attacks happened, we felt that, I mean he was actually saying that this BUYA thing should be done away with. So he was regretting to be involved in the whole thing. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#3-3:2)

Against the background of this rising tension, Mpumalanga residents working in the Hammarsdale textile factories challenged their union NUTW to respond to the issue of Inkatha. At Provincial level accusations of being anti-Cosatu were levelled at the NUTW leadership. A split resulted (see Baskin, 1991:113-3), the splinter union, Textile and Allied Workers Union (TAWU), had a strong support base in the Hammarsdale and Pinetown factories. James Ngubane, a shop steward at South African Nylon Spinners in Hammarsdale took the whole of his factory over to TAWU,[13] consequently, TAWU attracted support from both Azapo and Azasm in Mpumalanga (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:8). In early 1986 Inkatha attacked a joint TAWU / Azasm[14] meeting in Mpumalanga, those attending were badly beaten. Azapo leadership interpreted this to signify that Inkatha was now openly attacking them.

Early 1986 was a time of ferment for Azapo as it attempted to strategise and find solutions. The debate centred on whether they should retaliate. It was felt that without access to weapons Azapo was very vulnerable and would not be able to take on Inkatha. One response was an attempt to form alliances with charterists in the township.

... Now UDF was there but they didn't have a structure. Now we had some meetings behind closed doors, trying to find out what we can do. ... So we made a deal with these guys, so look guys is there anything that you could help us. So they said no they were going to go to Archie Gumede and to Lamontville and to Chesterville to try and get some [weapons]. It went on and on ... So what actually happened was that we realised we were not in a position to get anything out of these guys. We realised they were willing to help us but their leadership knew that they cannot give any arms to Azapo. But at least there was no hostility between us and them. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#1-3:10)

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[13] James Ngubane was elected vice-president of Textile and Allied Workers Union.

[14] Azasm had organised this meeting without consulting or informing the Azapo leadership. Perhaps an indication of their unhappiness with the previous decisions not to openly confront Inkatha.

In March 1986 a mob attacked the M Glazier Hall in Mpumalanga, after the staging of the play *Asinamali* (The Natal Witness, 22 March 1986). The play's promoter was killed. *Asinamali* provided a critical account of the township rent system and was workshopped in the wake of the rent boycott in Lamontville township, Durban.[15] It had been suggested that this play was responsible for 'fermenting discontent among Durban audiences and was not needed by the people of KwaZulu' (The Natal Witness, 22 March 1986). Those associated with the play claimed that Inkatha was behind the attack.

The formation of a branch of the Natal Organisation of Women (NOW) in 1986 (Interview Zondo, Zon1#1-1:1) was a further indication of the growing congress presence in the township. Significantly this was a presence that drew an adult membership. NOW, a regional affiliate of the UDF, had branches in most of the Durban townships. NOW was frequently perceived as an organisation for the *gogos* - older women. Not only did the formation of the branch in Mpumalanga provide a platform for women to become involved in community life and politics, it also counter-balanced the dominance of public life by the youth and their organisations.

In the following months there was a second attack on Azapo. Approximately six houses were attacked with petrol-bombs (Interview Mqadi, RM1#2-3:4). The Azapo leadership met, but were still not prepared to authorise revenge attacks on Inkatha. They had not been able to access weapons and it was clear that Inkatha was not prepared to co-exist with them. Instead Mqadi decided to leave Mpumalanga, hoping this would satisfy Inkatha. He explained the mood.

> ... we were very much confused, and we were beginning to lose confidence in ourselves because it was at a stage when there was no help all together. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#2-3:3)

The leadership's decision alienated many of the student-members, and they began

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[15] Lamontville was also associated with the Joint Rent Association (an UDF affiliate) which, along with Clermont, Hambanati and Chesterville, was opposing incorporation into KwaZulu.

to look for an alternative organisation. Mqadi applied for a transfer to Umlazi. He left Mpumalanga in May 1986, commuting into work from Umlazi until the transfer came through.

By early 1986 Inkatha was beginning to dominate public space in Mpumalanga. Azapo had decided not to confront their increasingly violent tactics and had withdrawn from the organisational terrain. The ex-MPURA dominated Township Council had acquiesced to Inkatha controlling the streets in the aftermath of Mxenge's assassination. All these happenings signified the beginning of the reconstruction and redefinition of space in Mpumalanga. Furthermore, this reconstruction was being driven by male youth. Both the Inkatha-of-Nkehli, in effect the Inkatha Youth Brigade, and Azapo were organisations of male youth. The formation of the UDF-aligned Hammarsdale Youth Congress was a response to this situation.

4.6 The Formation of the Hammarsdale Youth Congress

Other youth activists associated with Congress politics had also fled Mpumalanga. Many were living in Umlazi Township but travelling daily, by train, to school in Mpumalanga. These train trips became the site of heated political debate where the launch of a new youth organisation was discussed.

> It was more UDF youth, myself, and some of BC guys who had left there in the township. So we discussed about the formation of Hayco. And they were actually asking advice from me. And I was saying that look guys, we have decided as Azapo to go underground. But if you guys think you can actually take on Inkatha then you can, but in as far as we are concerned we think it would be dangerous for anyone to come and challenge Inkatha at this stage. ... We just don=t think you are going to make it. (Interview Mqadi, RM1#2-3:4)

Deciding that they would not let Inkatha go unchallenged, the youth formed the Hammarsdale Youth Congress (Hayco) in mid-1986. The decision of the Azapo leadership not to fight back had angered and alienated many of the younger student members. They looked towards the UDF and many went across to Hayco,

including the articulate and ambitious Azasm secretary Vusi Maduna,[16] who went on to become Hayco president. Tensions between youth aligned to the UDF and those belonging to Inkatha were increasing. This was exacerbated by the rapid growth of Hayco, which drew not only disaffected Azapo members but also Inkatha Youth Brigade members (The Weekly Mail, 27 February - 5 March 1987). One of Hayco's first activities were to organise a school boycott demanding free stationery and books. The boycott lasted three months and at least one school was petrol-bombed (Pace, November 1988:63).

Hayco had been formed by young militant youth who unlike Azapo leadership were not prepared to strategise a third-way with Inkatha. It's uncertain if their *raison d'etre* was to fly the UDF flag or to take on Inkatha. Tensions escalated and positions hardened on both sides. Israel Hlongwane described how he was accosted by prominent Hayco members Sthembiso Ndlovu (his neighbour) and Sgangi Hlongwane. They wished to know why Zakhele Langa an Inkatha member was frequenting his home. He responded that Langa was a relative (his cousin) and that 'my home was my parents' property and I have no powers to restrict people from coming to my home' (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S6). According to Hlongwane, houses had already been attacked and in the light of Ndlovu's response, 'I would see what he would do to me', he feared his home would be next. His cousin Zakhele Langa confirmed this by alerting him to a rumour that his home was to be attacked. Langa introduced Hlongwane to Zakhele Nkehli, and he joined Inkatha to obtain protection.

> From that day on I associated myself with the youths who supported Inkatha. I started attending Inkatha meetings and rallies. I also took part in the fighting between the UDF and Inkatha. This fighting included assaulting and stabbing anybody who was a UDF supporter, the burning down of their homes and stopping the UDF youths from going to schools that were predominantly Inkatha schools. At that time there was intense fighting between the youth of the different political parties but very little between the adults. (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S8)

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[16] Newspaper reports at the time of his death suggest that Vusi Maduna was the Inkatha Youth Brigade treasurer. I have not been able to confirm his membership of Inkatha, but all my oral sources indicate that he was a well-known Azapo member and the personal friend of many of the Azapo leadership in the period immediately prior to his membership of Hayco.

These incidents provide indicators of how both parties were beginning to construct political identity. Male youth were perceived as the carriers and transmitters of political identity and their political affiliation was transferred to that of the household. In the process cultural norms of *hlonipha* which would have accepted these 'rights' as belonging to the father were challenged and redefined, with this being accepted by both sides. Dlamini (1998:483-485) has argued that Inkatha transcribed the practice of *ukuhlonipha* into political culture - not only were age and gender to be privileged and respected but so was political leadership. I would suggest that alongside this process the domain of the household was also redefined. No longer was it seen as a space under the authority of the senior male, but an undisciplined household, one that did not *hlonipha* the Inkatha leadership, could also be disciplined by them. This is in contrast to the situation a few years earlier when the *oQonda* were sanctioned for interfering in household affairs. Inkatha was making it clear that it was unacceptable not to belong to Inkatha.

4.7 Conclusion

In the late 1970s Mpumalanga Township had a busy and energetic political and cultural life. Many different kinds of organisations flourished. But the early to mid-1980s were a turning point in a number of respects.

Firstly, while at the beginning of the period there was still a heterogeneous interpretation of Zuluness, this was less possible by the mid-1980s. Inkatha had politicised what it meant to be Zulu, and the only definition 'allowed' was their official version. As in the earlier period this version was contested, but the challenges to this contestation were increasingly violent. By 1987 other political organisations were under threat from Inkatha. Azapo members had been attacked and Azapo had taken the decision to 'go underground'. Many of the youth, dissatisfied with the ethnic identity offered by Inkatha and impatient with Azapo's timidity, had formed Hayco and were intent on challenging Inkatha's attempts to control the politics of the township. Inherent to this conflict over 'what it means

to be Zulu' is a conflict of gender and generation.

Secondly, it is during this period that the youth become politicised and develop as political actors. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the influential organisations in Mpumalanga - MPURA and Inkatha - were controlled by older people (mostly men but some women). The councillors elected onto the Mpumalanga Township Council were also older men. But by the mid-'80s a generational shift had occurred. The significant organisations were those of young people - Azapo and then Hayco, while Inkatha was increasingly under the leadership of Nkehli and his lieutenants. The township council still played a role in the governance of the township, however, in the coming years their role was to become negligible.

These politicised youth were overwhelmingly male. Young women were not in the leadership positions of the newly dominant political organisations; very few were even members in their own right. The masculine public cultures of the previous period were reinforced by the emergence of violent politics in this period.

By the mid-'80s Inkatha (under Nkehli) was also demonstrating that it had little tolerance for the existence of other organisations in the township. Again this was very different to the situation that had existed in the early 1980s. While this intolerance was not unique to Mpumalanga (as was demonstrated by other events in the province (see Abel 1995; Jeffery, 1997; Naidoo, 1991) it shattered friendships that had existed across political organisations. As a result of these friendships, the violence acquired a distinctive intimacy, which I suggest was partially responsible for its intensity and brutality.

Thirdly, the period of the early to mid-1980s demonstrates the transition to a different form of politics. The tacit understandings of the ways of doing politics that were so obvious in the earlier period (ie non-violent, using legitimate channels of governance, respect for patriarchal authority) were implicitly

challenged by the events in this half-decade.

Finally, to explicate the continuities and discontinuities. In the previous periods there was a certain acceptable level of violence. A criminal element in the township, marked as male and youthful, were perceived as problematic. Given inadequate policing it had become acceptable for community groups to use violence in disciplining these problematic elements. However, by the end of this period 'violence' in the community developed new characteristics that would contribute towards its singularity. These include a shift from targeting problematic individuals to targeting the household, as demonstrated by the burning of Richard Mqadi's house. The lack of tolerance for the membership of other political organisations and the right to express this disapproval violently. The shift from older men disciplining community members to this role being assumed by younger men, and in the process the exclusion of older men from public communal life. And finally, as public communal life became characterised by violence so it also excluded women. Fundamental to these shifts was the desire by Inkatha to define the ethnic identities of all the residents of Mpumalanga township and their resistance to this project.

Chapter Five: National and Regional Politics: The Role of the State in Political Violence in Natal

5.1 Introduction

One of the arguments of this thesis is that political violence is the outcome of the articulation of multiple trajectories, which means that the violence needs to be thought of as a process – rather than a series of events. At different points along the way these articulations coalesce and sediment to produce something new which again interacts with the other spheres. Thus in order to understand why the conflict between the UDF and Inkatha turned violent, to the extent that the province was engulfed in what amounted to civil war, it is necessary to examine both local and national dynamics. 'Violence', it is argued, is embedded in the articulation between them. By this I am suggesting that each 'sphere' ie the local community of Mpumalanga, the regional polity of the KwaZulu homeland government and the central South African state, had its own issues and dynamics. Yet, as this chapter will demonstrate, these were not unconnected to each other.

Previous chapters have given insight into the local dynamics of Mpumalanga township. In the early 1980s local politics was spirited and diverse (see chapter four). Residents belonged to a wide range of different political and community organisations. Debate and organisational competition was located in an atmosphere largely tolerant of diversity. This is not to deny either the occurrence of incidents of violent conflict between organisations, or that the township was a violent place where a particular level of violence was accepted and tolerated by the residents. Yet despite these conflicts violence in Mpumalanga did not 'have to happen' but rather a series of encounters sedimented the conflict, gave it new shape and moved communities along the path towards violence. Nevertheless, as will be argued in chapter six, what we see after 1987 is political intolerance and violence of a distinctly different order.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a further set of answers to the question 'how did we get from a situation of competing political organisations and political tensions to a situation of political violence?' If one wishes to understand what was politically distinctive about this period, and why this order of violence didn't happen before, then the role and the nature of the central apartheid state has to be confronted. The chapter argues that the violence was (at one level) the outcome of a confluence of dynamics between the militarised South African state and the clientelist KwaZulu government. Both were concerned, for somewhat different reasons, to stamp out political opposition and allow the government reform programme to hold sway.

At another level the chapter contributes to the theoretical argument of the thesis by illustrating that the foregrounding of locality, context and spatiality are essential to developing an analysis of political violence in Natal. Political tensions between the organisations' leadership and some violent clashes between supporters are not sufficient to explain why ordinary people who had been living together in neighbourly co-existence suddenly started killing one another . Similarly, the state's covert activities while able to bring about violence (see Haysom, 1990) are not on their own sufficient to explain the longevity and intensity of the violence as well as the extent of the involvement of ordinary people. Ordinary residents, who had not been politically active, quickly assumed a political identity and on the basis of that identity, judged friends to be enemies. The state did not as Haysom (1990) suggests just 'manufacture' the violence rather they were able, as will be explored below, to hook into local networks and exploit local conflicts.

The chapter discusses the reform policies of the South African state in the 1970s and 1980s. It outlines the way in which the so-called securocrats managed to gain the upper hand within the ruling bloc itself, enabling them to implement the 'Total Strategy' policy. Thus from the mid-1980s the security establishment came to play an increasingly central role within state structures. This allowed for the implementation of covert strategies intended to sow conflict and violently destroy

political opposition to both the South African state/government and the KwaZulu government/Inkatha.

The second area that needs to be considered is the specific politics of Natal and KwaZulu. The regional political dynamics set in place a distinct trajectory that was to bring Inkatha into conflict with the UDF and facilitated Buthelezi's collaboration with state initiatives to destabilise the region and wipe out support for the UDF. Since his installation as chief, Buthelezi had embarked on a mission to utilise the institutional structures provided by the homeland legislation in order to become a regional political force. The chapter will show how any opposition to these structures was seen as opposition to both Inkatha and the Zulu nation. By 1985 Inkatha had begun to take the view that its attempts to become a regional political force were being increasingly undermined by the UDF and thwarted by the support urban township dwellers were showing for what was interpreted as anti-Inkatha forces.

The chapter then goes on to discuss the approach made by the KwaZulu government to the South African state for military assistance. This request resonated with sections within the state and found support amongst the proponents of the 'counter-revolutionary warfare' position. Therefore they were prepared to assist in giving Inkatha covert military capacity in order to 'restore law and order' in the province. Of interest to the broader argument of this thesis is the way in which the implementation and execution of these plans and strategies relied on local Inkatha networks and structures. Inkatha branches, under the 'command' of loyal subjects, who had already shown they were not adverse to violence conflict, were used in the recruitment of operatives. The same networks were then used to infiltrate the covert agents back into communities. In many cases operatives were utilised in the very areas from which they came. This further disguised the role the state played in fermenting the conflict as to all intents and purposes the violence was between those within the same community.

As will be discussed in chapter six, once the Caprivi trainees were back in Mpumalanga, they used trickery and subterfuge to convince those Inkatha members opposed to violent conflict of its necessity. They also fed fire-power into the community and sabotaged peace and cease-fire attempts. Thus they assisted in shaping the form the violence took. The township quickly divided up into territories under control of one or the other political group. As will be argued in chapter seven, the spatial form was essential to the formation of the political identities that rapidly accompanied the violence.

5.2 Thinking about the South African State

As both O'Meara (1996) and Glaser (2001), amongst many others,[1] have noted in their extensive reviews of the literature on the apartheid state, there has been a tendency for much of this literature to provide a reductionist and instrumental view of the state. This was particularly so of the revisionist writings of the 1970s (some of the key examples of this literature are discussed and cited in Glaser, 2001:76-78). While there were significant differences amongst them, they were primarily concerned to understand the relationship between apartheid and capitalist growth and accumulation in South Africa (O'Meara, 1996).

O'Meara (1996:425-426) captures some of the major critiques of this approach. Firstly, they offer a 'functionalist conception of apartheid'. For many of these theorists apartheid was a set of policies that 'directly served the economic interests of capital' and enabled swift capital accumulation. This made it difficult for them to realise the impacts of the changes in the structure of South African capitalism in the 1970s. Secondly, closely linked to the first critique, is the instrumental conceptualisation of the state which sees the state as 'both monolithic and a simple instrument' of one or other faction of capital. As the statists (see Glaser, 2001:78-80) pointed out, this conception was weak on a number of fronts. It failed to explore the 'concrete organisational forms of the state', and, it didn't take into account the way in which bureaucrats and state managers pursued their own

interests. Thirdly, the analysis provided by most of this work tended to be reductionist, whereby the actions of these groups were seen to represent a class or class faction. The implication of this was that the relative autonomy of politics was lost and they were unable to 'explain the process of real politics within the state' except as a result of clashes between different class interests (O'Meara, 1996:425).

Much of the later work on the state, particularly that produced during the 1980s, attempted to address some of these shortcomings. The 'statists' as termed by Glaser (2001: 78-80) stressed the autonomy of the state and the need to examine its internal structures and workings. Amongst this literature, has been an interest in explaining power balances and conflicts within the apartheid state, as well as attempting to connect these internal conflicts to external processes.[2] Of significance to this dissertation is the work looking at the 'security state' of the 1980s. Those who examined the rise of the 'security state' included the radical writers, (see Cock, 1989; Swilling and Phillips, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c) as well as, those whom Glaser (2001:80) calls the liberal institutionalists (see Alden, 1996).

Glaser (2001:80) argues that the statist literature, while casting a useful light on areas that the earlier radicals had not paid much attention to, 'nevertheless, produced a mixed yield'. Empirical knowledge was usually expanded, but the work often remained decidedly descriptive. Hyslop (1989) in his 'introduction' to the 'State and Politics section' of *South African Review 5* makes similar allusions. He suggests that while the contributions to that volume are rich in empirical detail, showing amongst other things the 'detailed and precise accounts of the structures and policies of the state' (Hyslop, 1989:3), as well as, how 'the security

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[1] See also Hyslop (1989), Posel (1991) and Robinson (1996).

[2] Glaser (2001:80) cites the following as examples: S Dubow *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid*, Macmillan, 1989; D Posel *The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise*, Clarendon Press, 1991; J Lazar 'Verwoerd versus the "Visionaries": The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (Sabra) and Apartheid, 1948-1961', in P Bonner, P Delius, & D Posel (eds) *Apartheid's Genesis 1935-1962*, Ravan Press, 1993; and, D Duncan *The Mills of God: The State and African Labour in South Africa, 1918-1948*, Witwatersrand University Press, 1995.

establishment became the dominant force in policy-making' (Hyslop, 1989:5), social scientists have not 'fulfilled their obligation to theorise anew' (Hyslop, 1989:3).

Most influential in writing on the security state has been the work of Swilling and Phillips (1989a; 1989b; 1989c), their work appears in key texts of the time (see Cock & Nathan, 1989) and is favourably cited in many of the later analyses of the period (see Price 1991; Marais, 2001). Yet, the militarised, security state thesis has attracted substantial criticism (see Hyslop, 1989; O'Meara, 1996; Glaser, 2001). Much of the criticism stems from the view that they remained entrapped in an implicit instrumentalism. O'Meara's criticism (1996:427) is the most damning, the central thrust being that 'it tended to oversimplify and exaggerate the military's role in internal state politics coming close to explanations based on military conspiracies'. The writings on the militarisation of the state have tended to ignore the theoretical debates of the time (see Glaser, 2001:79-80 for a broader exposition of the issues) and thus are inclined to present a view that the state of that period had one overriding purpose and it was able to bulldoze ahead in achieving that purpose. However, a central objective of the statist literature was to demonstrate, theoretically and empirically, that the state has its own institutional cleavages and conflicts and that these 'play a major role within policy-making and administrative processes' (Posel, 1993:21).

Mindful of these issues and debates, my intention is to look at the last decade of the apartheid state. This is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of the state; instead the focus is on the internal power struggles within the state during this period and the broader impact of these power struggles on the political violence. Clearly, these power struggles did not happen in isolation and as Posel (1993:22) has reminded us the internal workings of the state need to be analysed in relation to the boarder economic and political forces impinging upon it. State building is simultaneously a productive and reactive process. Furthermore, place-

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He also includes those writing on the security state.

specific conflicts shape the relations between the central and regional power blocs (in this case the KwaZulu government). All this impacts on both the processes of fragmentation within the state as well as the state's attempts to build a coherent state project (see Robinson, 1996).

5.3 The Militarisation of the South African State

O'Meara (1996:170) suggests that as South Africa entered the decade of the 1970s there was little to suggest the economic, social and political crisis that was to be facing the state by the mid-'70s. However, lurking below this deceptive picture was a rising inflation rate, and rapidly increasing black unemployment (Marias, 2001:39). The economic boom of the 1960s was coming to an end, severely impacting on the creation of new jobs and reinforcing capital's resistance to demands from labour to increase wages. A response to this - the 1973 Durban strikes - caught both state and capital unaware.

By the mid-'70s, some of the crisis points for the state had begun to emerge. On the political front, internally, there had been the 1973 Durban strikes followed by the emergence of the independent trade union movement, as well as, the 1976 Soweto uprising followed by student uprisings in other parts of the country. Externally, the military coup in Portugal had resulted in Portugal's withdrawal from its African colonies, providing the African National Congress with bases in neighbouring states and exposing South Africa's borders. Furthermore, the regimes that replaced the colonial powers were Marxist-Leninist, strongly supported by the Soviet Union (Glaser, 2001:101). On the economic front, the 'apartheid growth model had begun to decay' (Marais, 2001:40) and by 1976 there was a full-scale recession (O'Meara, 1996:176)

These structural contradictions (what Saul & Gelb, cited in Marais (2001:40) termed an 'organic crisis') pushed the state to consider a series of reforms. Certain sections of the state and business began to agree that there was a need to 'stabilise labour' (Posel, 1987:424). The Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions were

tasked with making recommendations in the areas of labour reform, and, influx control and housing of black workers, respectively. These were initiated under Vorster[3] but only came to fruition in the Botha era.

Already at this point there were cracks emerging within state institutions, and more widely within the National Party between the hard-line *verkramptes* and more pragmatic *verligtes*. Vorster had previously engaged in battle with the *verkramptes*, 'successfully marginalising them', and winning over the Broederbond (Glaser, 2001:101). But the strategies of reform that were now being proposed went against the fundamentals of Verwoerdian apartheid. The state needed to find a 'new language of legitimacy' (Posel, 1987:425) if the reform programme was to find credibility amongst all sectors.

In 1978 the Muldergate scandal saw Vorster ejected from power. The revelations of corruption in the Department of Information allowed Minister of Defence, PW Botha to play his hand and take control, in the process discrediting verkrampte elements in the state (Posel, 1987; O'Meara, 1996).[4]

Botha moved rapidly to reorganise the state, as well as, to embark on a more definite programme of political and economic reform (Posel, 1987; O'Meara, 1996; Glaser, 2001). Botha called this programme 'total strategy'. As Minister of Defence, in his 1975 and 1977 White Papers he introduced the concept of 'total strategy' (see Swilling and Phillips, 1989a; Price, 1991). Botha pointed to the regional changes brought about as the result of the end of colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola; their potential impact on domestic black politics; and, increased organisation and resistance in the domestic sphere, and, argued for the

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[3] John Vorster, Prime Minister from 1966-1978, and State President from 1978-1979. In the wake of the information scandal he resigned the premiership in 1978 in ill-health (O'Meara, 1996:xxxviii).

[4] O'Meara (1996:210-219) provides a fascinating account of the internal wranglings between different sections of the state, demonstrating the broader point of the need to analyse the internal workings of the state.

need for an overarching strategic plan (Price, 1991). In the 1977 Defence White Paper

> 'Total strategy' was defined as involving the coordination 'with all the means available to the state' of the military, economic, psychological, political, sociological, diplomatic, cultural and ideological fields of state activity. (Swilling & Phillips, 1989a:135)

It also argued that South Africa was facing a 'total onslaught' from communist forces and thus needed a 'total strategy' that would combine security measures with reform.

In implementing this strategy, Botha looked for allies in business and the military. Business had already expressed their concerns about the direction of government and was pleased with the new 'reform' direction (Posel, 1987:425; O'Meara, 1996:294-5; Glaser, 2001:105). As Minister of Defence Botha had been involved in a long-running battle against the police and the Bureau of State Security (Boss) (O'Meara, 1996:210-219), he moved to isolate those elements of the state and to incorporate the military into his reorganisation (see below).

Once in government he instituted what Spence (1989:242) termed a 'managerial revolution in the structure and process of government'. The rational for much of this was outlined in a 1980 White Paper on Rationalisation (Swilling & Phillips, 1989c). The state was reorganised through a three-phrase rationalisation programme (Swilling & Phillips, 1989a:136). Overtly, the logic lay in the need to deal with the bloated, inefficient civil service (Posel, 1999:110). However, as Posel (1999:110) suggests there was likely to be another motive; 'the need to marginalise the right-wing opposition within the civil service' and avoid the possibility of either an intransigent civil service that refused to cooperate or the loss of electoral support amongst civil servants. In effect, the circuits of power were re-routed to bypass resistant bureaucrats. The state's rational for reform was bound up in a technical discourse – 'reform was presented as rationally incontestable' (Posel, 1987:421).

The first phrase of rationalisation involved 'the dramatic reorganisation of the pinnacle of state power'. Four 'planning branches' to deal with security, economic policy, and social and constitutional affairs were established in the Prime Minister's Office. Cabinet meetings and affairs were to be coordinated by the newly established cabinet secretariat. And, four permanent cabinet committees dealing with constitutional, economic, social and security issues replaced the twenty *ad hoc* cabinet committees that existed under the Vorster administration. A long dormant committee, first established in 1972, the State Security Council (SSC) became the key decision-making body in the state (Spence, 1989:243).

The second phase reduced the number of state departments from thirty-nine to twenty-two. This involved the creation of a new department, Constitutional Development and Planning under Minister Chris Heunis. This department was a central leg in the total strategy framework. Its role, to manage the planning and implementation of the reform policies.

The third phase involved the continuous process of 'rationalising areas of authority'. The newly formed Department of Constitutional Development and Planning emerged as the central authority in managing 'black affairs'.

A key feature of the reorganisation was that the security establishment[5] became central in state policy-making. The State Security Council became a policy-making body involved in both domestic and foreign matters. It was chaired by the State President[6] and met twice a week to recommend policy to Cabinet (Price, 1991:86). As well as the 'security establishment', membership also included key

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[5] The security establishment consisted of the Department of Defence, the South African Defence Force, the intelligence services, intellectuals based in key think-tanks, Armscor and the South African Police.

[6] In terms of the 1983 constitution the office of Prime Minister was abolished and replaced by that of State President. In 1984, PW Botha became the first state president and remained so until September 1989 (Price, 1991:86).

government ministries.[7] In effect, the State Security Council subverted Cabinet's place at the state decision-making body (Cock, 1989:8). Security as seen by the SSC was defined to include economic, political, constitutional, ideological and welfare issues.

This process demonstrated the shifts in the balance of power within the state. Glaser (2001:103) comments that

> Botha elevated two kinds of reforming technocrat: the constitutional engineer and the counterinsurgency strategist.

The former was responsible for the 'constitutional reorganisation' and the later for crushing opposition while at the same time 'winning hearts and minds' through service delivery to black areas.

These realignments allowed for 'significant changes in the form of state control' (Posel, 1987:426-427). Power became higher centralised, and the executive had greater independence from both parliament and the party. The military penetrated into civil spheres of governance with many senior military officials being incorporated into the new committees in their capacity as 'experts'. Similarly, leading business people were also incorporated onto cabinet committees.

Political reform was key to the total strategy doctrine (Swilling & Phillips, 1989b; Price, 1991). The Wiehahn Commission reporting in 1979 resulted in wide reaching reforms to the industrial relations system. Under amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act black workers were recognised as workers for the first time and black trade unions were able to register and legally allowed to participate in the industrial relations system. The Riekert Commission was tasked with investigating influx control and the housing of black workers. A second set of legislative reforms resulted from its recommendations that conferred urban rights (economic and social) on Africans residing in white South Africa (see Greenberg, 1987; Murray, 1987; Cobbett et al, 1988; Swilling and Phillips, 1989a; Price,

[7] Price (1991:86) lists these as foreign affairs, defence, law and order, constitutional development

1991; Alden, 1996; Marais, 2001). The Botha government also moved to amend the constitution through the introduction of the Tri-Cameral system and establish a new regional development policy.

In the early 1980s charterists[8] within South Africa had made strategic decisions to become involved in a wide-range of political and civic organisations (Seekings, 2000:31/2), a thinking which mirrored the ANC's emphasis on organising a 'domestic political base' (Seekings, 2000:34). These strategic decisions lay behind the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in August 1983. The UDF was a broad front to which like-minded organisations affiliated. The *raison d'être* behind its formation was opposition to the Koornhof Bills and the Tri-Cameral Parliament – key elements of Botha's reform policy. Thus, most of the opposition to the state's reform programme was organised through affiliates of the UDF.

The mid-'80s was a period of intense opposition to the State. The tri-cameral elections were boycotted, as were Black Local Authority elections. There were rent boycotts, school boycotts and consumer boycotts of white shops. Government responded by declaring a partial state of emergency (O'Meara, 1996:325-328) and thousands were detained. Business was uneasy about the ineffectiveness of the government's response to the 1984-86 township uprising. They opted out of their alliance with Botha and began to explore new alliances (Glaser, 2001:105).

The failure of the total strategy doctrine resulted in intense struggles within the state over what was to replace the failed policies (Swilling & Phillips, 1989a) and opened the way for the security establishment to increase its power within the state.

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and planning and finance.

[8] Charterists is a generic term for organisations claiming broad allegiance to the Freedom Charter.

Key to the struggle was the debate between the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning and the security establishment over the way forward. The 'reformers' argued for the need to extend and widen the reform programme while the securocrats maintained that opposition needed to be crushed before reforms could be implemented. In particular, according to Swilling and Phillips (1989a:143), they disagreed with the 'soft repression' strategies pushed by the police commissioner, which emphasised 'limited coercion and espionage to control low-intensity conflict'.

By 1986 the Office of the State President (OSP) was showing its support for the security establishment's proposals 'that the state defend itself by means of 'counter-revolutionary warfare' methods' (Swilling and Phillips 1989b:74, O'Meara, 1996:343). At the heart of the new strategy was a plan for a more coordinated programme that would crush the opposition, 'counter-organise' the communities and improve socio-economic conditions (Swilling and Phillips 1989b:75).

O'Meara (1996:343) warns that while in the post-'86 period the securocrats were clearly on the rise, they should not be seen as a 'monolithic force'.

> Inter-service rivalries and territorial disputes continued to set Military Intelligence against the National Intelligence Service (formerly BOSS) and the Security Police, both jealous of the military pre-eminence. With the SADF General Staff conventional counter-insurgency proponents did battle with the advocates of 'WHAM' (Winning Hearts and Minds) approach.

Nevertheless, despite these differences, the security apparatus agreed on the need for a new strategy.

The national security management system (NSMS) was at the heart of the new organisational infrastructure. According to Price (1991:86), its purpose was to provide a policy-implementing capacity to go along with the SSC's policy planning functions. The NSMS was a separate arm of government falling under the direct control of the Office of the State President. It was tasked with the

responsibility for formulating and implementing all the strategies needed to win the war.[9] The turning point for government came in May 1986 when they rejected the Eminent Persons' Group's proposals (see Swilling and Phillips 1989b:76; O'Meara, 1996:340-341) and declared a national state of emergency activating the NSMS at all levels. O'Meara (1996:340-341) argues that the deliberate 'sabotage' of the Eminent Persons' Group's mission by the 'securocrats' through the attacks on three neighbouring states, was a clear signal that the State Security Council consensus was over.

According to Swilling and Phillips (1989b:80) the implementation of 'counter-revolutionary' warfare involved three significant changes. Firstly, there was the implementation of a new structure of centralised power and authority – the National Joint Management Centre (NJMC). After the declaration of the state of emergency, the NJMC was directly responsible for co-ordinating both the welfare and security functions within the Office of the State President.[10] Secondly, there was a dramatic increase in the number of key security personal drawn into the joint management centres at all levels. They occupied key positions within these structures. And thirdly, a new 'theory of state action' – counter-revolutionary warfare in order to 'win-hearts-and-minds' (WHAM) replaced the 'counter-insurgency' position of earlier years. Citing Frankel, Cock (1989:8) suggests that the militarisation of the South African state was 'reflected in the penetration of top government institutions by Defence Force personnel, on either a formal or informal basis'. The armed forces did not exercise a coup d'état in an explicit and dramatic way instead they exerted 'tight control over the formal holders of power' (Lowy & Stader, 1985, cited in Cock, 1989:8)

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[9] According to Swilling and Phillips (1989a:143) the securocrats circulated a document entitled *The art of counter-revolutionary warfare* in which they suggested that in order to defeat a revolutionary movement the governing power must adopt a revolutionary strategy but apply it in reverse.

[10] These having been taken away from the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (O'Meara, 1996:343).

Three assumptions underlay the new strategy (see Swilling and Phillips 1989b:81). Firstly, there was the imperative to restore law and order before reforms could be introduced. Secondly, socio-economic development needed to happen before political reform could be implemented. And thirdly, constitutional change and development needed to begin at the local level and then proceed to higher levels.

> The fundamental difference between 'total strategy' and the WHAM programme is that the latter is no longer concerned primarily with restructuring the access points to political society. Instead, the emphasis falls on recasting the foundations of civil society so that political access points can at some future date be restructured in a way that does not threaten the system as a whole. Realising that it was resistance from below that limited the effectiveness of 'total strategy', the state has now turned to strategies aimed at radically reshaping the moral, cultural, religious, political and material underpinnings of civil society in the black townships. This shift from grand visions of reform from above to building up new foundations from below is the single most significant feature of current strategic thinking in the state. Although the objective of dividing, neutralizing and containing black opposition still stands, the means to achieving it have changed. (Swilling and Phillips 1989a:144)

Cock (1989:9) emphases the need to realize the degree to which township upgrading and development represented a military strategy. She refers to the announcements by the chief of the SADF General Magnus Malan that he had taken 'personal responsibility' for upgrading projects in certain townships.

Alongside this, the restoration of law and order also involved the detention of individuals, the banning of organisations and the support of vigilantism (see O'Meara, 1996:344-346). The declaration of what came to be an almost permanent state of emergency in 1986 provided the enabling environment for much of this – the exception being vigilantism. It was the tight control of state policy, through the office of the state president, and, the hegemony of the security establishment that allowed for state involvement in covert activities (see below).

Clearly the empirical story of the South African state during the 1980s is, as O'Meara (1996) illustrates, much more complex than what has been outlined above. My primary concern has been to show how it might have been possible for the state to support the covert activities discussed below. The time at which Inkatha approached the SADF for assistance coincided with the point at which the securocrats were in ascendance, and the request fell on fertile soil.

Does this mean that South Africa became a security state? O'Meara (1996:427-428) presents a strong argument to suggest this was not so. Ultimately, he suggests those who argue the case for a security state

> … made the same mistake as many generals – to confuse the internal logic and precision of a strategy drawn up on paper with both the murky and contested processes of elaborating and implementing policy as well as with the subsequent struggles to adjust policy to deal with its own unintended consequences. (O'Meara, 1996:427)

Bearing in mind the problems of an instrumentalist view of the state, and wishing to exercise caution in pursuing such analysis, the tenacity of 'third force' activities even after the end of the Botha presidency does need to be noted.

5.4 Regional Politics in Natal and KwaZulu

In accordance with the apartheid state's homeland policy the Zulu Territorial Authority was established in 1970. Its purpose was to co-ordinate the 196 tribal authorities in KwaZulu and to provide a higher tier of government (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987).

In 1972, in terms of the 1971 Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, KwaZulu was granted its own legislative assembly with its own constitution. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) was composed of members of the former Zulu Territorial Authority – the *amakhosi* and their representatives. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi headed the KLA. Buthelezi immediately went about constructing a discourse that closely knitted together the Zulu nation, Inkatha and the KwaZulu homeland (Maré and Hamilton, 1987).

While there was provision for elected posts within the KLA, Buthelezi opposed the holding of the elections (see Bonnin et al, 1996). This left the KLA in the hands of traditional authorities. The new power bloc of the KwaZulu homeland embodied a new petty bourgeoisie, consisting of traders who had managed to take advantage of tripcos[11] and Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) support and the traditional authorities (see Bonnin et al, 1996). The *amakhosi* played an important role in the bureaucratic bantustan machinery, operating as the administrative, judicial and policing agents of the new homeland. The government's policy of forced removals in Natal (primarily implemented against labour tenants and black spots) 'transferred' large numbers of African people to KwaZulu and brought them under the administrative control of the homeland government (see Bonnin et al, 1996:150).

Inkatha was formed in March 1975 with what many claim was the tacit approval of the ANC (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:77-78). It was formed as an exclusively Zulu organisation with Buthelezi claiming that

> all members of the Zulu nation are automatically members of Inaktha if they are Zulus. There may be people who are inactive members as no one escapes being a member as long as he or she is a member of the Zulu nation. (KLAD, cited in Maré and Hamilton, 1987:57)

From the beginning Inkatha's structures were intricately bound to those of the KLA (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:61-64). By the late 1970s, it was difficult to distinguish the political authority of Inkatha from that of the KwaZulu government KLA (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:83-88). The close and overlapping relationship between Inkatha and the KLA was to define Natal and KwaZulu politics in more ways than one. On the one hand, it provided numerous opportunities to increase the number of 'pressure points'. The homeland bureaucracy was to offer job prospects to those who would repay the emerging

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[11] Tripcos were tripartite companies – three-way business deals between white capital, the bantustan authority and the Bantu Investment Corporation.

power elite with loyalty, respect and obedience. Membership of Inkatha was viewed as proof of this loyalty. It's suggested that 'the KLA and Inkatha withheld or provided services, jobs and tenders according to political loyalty' (Bonnin et al, 1996:168). However, on the other hand the embeddedness of Inkatha in apartheid created institutions meant that any opposition to those institutions was interpreted as opposition to Inkatha, KwaZulu (defined as the Zulu nation) and Buthelezi.

In 1978 the first elections for the KLA were held (see Maré and Hamilton, 1987:85). The Inkatha central committee controlled the selection of candidates for both the parliamentary and the local government elections. In a thirty-eight percent poll they won all fifty-five elected seats in the KLA. Their control of the elected seats gave them greater institutional control in urban areas. Always able to control political access points in rural areas – the seventy-five non-elected seats were allocated to traditional authorities and their representatives - they were now able to extend this to urban areas. Inkatha had also participated in community councils in townships both within Natal as well as in KwaZulu (Maré and Hamilton, 1987:155). Providing them with access to the same range of 'pressure points' as they had enjoyed in areas under traditional authorities, their control also had the potential to bring Inkatha into conflict with township residents. Given the precarious fiscal base of many African townships, community councils were unable to provide the services residents had been promised. Councils provoked the ire of residents when they were forced to increase rents (as in KwaMashu) or did not keep their promises (as in Umlazi). Given the close relationship between Inkatha and these institutions of local government Buthelezi was particularly sensitive to such consequences.

Initially Inkatha was considered part of the anti-apartheid fold. At first, for the ANC, non-participation in state-created structures was a questions of strategy not principal (Maylam, 1991; Seekings, 2000). Their response to Buthelezi's involvement in homeland structures was ambivalent. Censure and condonement co-existed. Albert Luthuli absented himself from Buthelezi's installation as chief

(Maré and Hamilton, 1987:35) yet Buthelezi was accepted on the public platforms of black oppositional politics (Maré and Hamilton, 1987:39).

However, in the late 1970s this position changed. Firstly, within the black consciousness movement[12] there was criticism of Inkatha's participation in homeland structures and the resulting collaboration with the State. For the black consciousness movement non-collaboration was a non-negotiable principle. Secondly, Inkatha's ambiguous relationship with the ANC came to an end in 1979 at the infamous 'London meeting'. Furthermore, with the influx, in the late '70s / early '80s, of activists with a black consciousness background into the congress movement the non-collaborationist position, and hence the condemnation of Buthelezi, became more influential within the mass democratic movement.

According to Bonnin et al (1996:165) Inkatha's response was to deepen its power in three ways. Firstly, via the KLA; secondly, through alliances with white politicians and business interests; and, third through attempts to control and mobilise the people of KwaZulu and the Zulus in Natal. While it managed through the Buthelezi Commission[13] and the *Indaba*[14] to woo business and white political support, it was not as successful in its attempts with the African residents of Natal. The UDF and its affiliates boycotted the *Indaba* and Inkatha's

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[12] The black consciousness (BC) movement encompasses a number of different political organisations. While activists might have been influenced by the exiled Pan-African Congress, it has its roots in the philosophy of Steve Biko. The slogan 'black man you are on your own' captures much of their philosophy. The Black People's Convention (BPC) was formed in the early 1970s. The banning of the BPC and other similar organisations in 1977 saw many of their activists in prison or exile. While the BC movement re-formed into other organisations (Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) was launched in April 1978, and subsequently re-launched in September 1979) many activists subsequently joined organisations aligned to the congress movement (see Seekings, 2000:29-37).

[13] The Buthelezi Commission was established through an Inkatha central committee decision in March 1980. Its brief was 'deliberate on the region' of Natal and KwaZulu. A third of its members were from business. The ANC refused to participate. (see Maré & Hamilton, 1987:163-167)

[14] In 1986 a regional summit called the *Indaba* was convened by the Natal Provincial Council and the KwaZulu government in Durban. Its purpose was to negotiate a new legislative dispensation for KwaZulu and Natal as a single geographic, economic and administrative region. (Bonnin et al, 1996:167).

participation in local government structures was to result in conflict between it and urban Africans.

Given the close proximity of KwaZulu to many white urban areas, many of Natal's urban townships were administered by KwaZulu. The exceptions were the older townships around Durban and Pietermaritzburg. The Durban townships were administered by the Port Natal Administration Board. In the early 1980s residents embarked on a series of campaigns firstly, against increased bus fares and secondly, against rent increases. Neither of these involved confrontation with the homeland authorities or the community councils and initially Buthelezi lent his support. What did occur though was the formation of civic organisations and the mobilisation of many residents. In 1983 the state decided that in order to further the consolidation of KwaZulu the urban townships surrounding Durban should be incorporated into KwaZulu. This won the immediate support of Inkatha and the KLA. Concerned with losing their urban rights[15] residents opposed incorporation. Non-Inkatha councillors and those against incorporation withdrew from the community councils and aligned themselves with organisations affiliated to the Joint Rent Action Committee,[16] which was in turn affiliated to the UDF. Inkatha interpreted the anti-incorporation stance as being anti-KwaZulu and Inkatha. The state soon withdrew its support for incorporation but the clashes between anti and pro incorporation factions became clashes between Inkatha and the UDF. Lamontville was threatened with 'invasion' by Inkatha *impis*, and members of the Hambanathi Residents Association had to flee their homes (see Bonnin et al, 1996).

The dynamics in Pietermaritzburg were a little different. In a finely textured article Gwala (1989) outlines the politicisation of communities around Pietermaritzburg. He argues that before 1985 there was scant evidence of political

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[15] Section 10 rights guaranteed access to jobs in white South Africa.

[16] The Joint Rent Action Committee (Jorac) was originally set up to co-ordinate opposition to the rent boycotts. It had affiliates in Chesterville, Clermont, Hambanathi and Lamontville – the townships threatened with incorporation.

or community organisation in Pietermaritzburg's townships. National campaigns, without local connections, he suggests, have little resonance for communities. This changed with the 1985 stayaway demanding the reinstatement of the Sarmcol workers. The stayaway was swiftly followed by a consumer boycott on the same issue and in 1986 the first major rally in the Pietermaritzburg area since the 1950s. Compounding the threat associated with the mobilisation of Pietermaritzburg's residences under the broad umbrella of UDF-aligned youth organisations and the trade union movement was the specific institutional arrangement governing Pietermaritzburg's townships. Falling outside of Inkatha's control Sobantu, Imbali and Ashdowne were administered by the Pietermaritzburg local authority while Edendale, formerly a mission area, was privately owned by African landowners. Only Vulindlela, a traditional authority under the *amakhosi* provided Inkatha its normal bureaucratic entry points. Support for Inkatha had always been weak and now it was being weakened further.

Ironically, given Inkatha's concerns, the UDF[17] in Natal was weak. Outside of the older Durban townships there was little history of charterist organsiation. The majority of the UDF affiliates were from the Durban area (Seekings, 2000:77). According to Bonnin et al (1996:163) the UDF was controlled by relatively few activists most of whom were based in the Natal Indian Congress. Youth organisations that had emerged in the wake of the UDF's formation were active amongst the African urban youth. Their membership 'gave [the UDF] a political presence and the illusion of vibrancy' (Bonnin et al, 1996:163). But there was little relationship between organisations based in Indian and African areas (Bonnin et al, 1996; Seekings, 2000). The Natal UDF organised a few high profile campaigns but most of its organisational energy was utilised in national campaigns and agendas and it did not develop a coherent grassroots approach to consolidate a base in Natal or KwaZulu. Nevertheless, Inkatha began to perceive the UDF as an increasing threat to its hegemony in the province.

This threat was starkly illustrated in the events surrounding Victoria Mxenge's assassination. Victoria Mxenge was a popular Durban lawyer, a member of the Natal regional executive of the United Democratic Front and a leader in the Natal Organisation of Women (affiliated to the UDF). In August 1985 she was assassinated outside her house in Umlazi. In response the youth of Durban took to the streets protesting her murder. Political protest soon involved the burning of premises associated with both the apartheid state and the KwaZulu government. In response Inkatha marshalled its *amabutho* to restore law and order. Many of Durban's residents regarded Inkatha's interventions timely, if a little excessive (see Sitas, 1986), as shown in the previous chapter in Mpumalanga residents tightened access to the township in order to stop these influences reaching them and the protests has little effect in Pietermaritzburg.

5.5 State Involvement in Fomenting Political Violence[18]

In November 1985 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Homeland and President of Inkatha, approached the state for military support that would include an offensive or attacking capacity. Earlier that year, in the light of increasing support for the UDF Inkatha had taken a decision 'to turn the whole of KwaZulu and Natal into a 'no-go area' for the UDF' (Varney, 1997:8).

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[17] The Natal UDF was formally launched in May 1983.

[18] This section is primarily compiled from the transcripts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission special hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, held in Durban 4-8 August, 11 August and 14 & 15 August 1987. I also rely on Howard Varney's (previously attached to the Investigation Task Unit (ITU)) submission to that hearing. These activities were also the subject of a number of other legal proceedings - various commissions of enquiry into hit-squad activities, The Goldstone Commission and the Harms Commission; criminal trials - S v Mbambo (NECLD Case No CC123/94), S v Msane and nineteen others (unofficially known as the 'Malan trail'); and, TRC amnesty hearings (see various amnesty hearings, TRC, 1998). The evidence is lengthy, frequently technical and repeatedly contradictory. The controversy surrounding the Malan trial judgement is well known (see Amnesty International, 1998, 2003; Helen Suzman Foundation, n.d.), as much, I would suggest, the result of the political forces surrounding it, as was the trial itself. The judgement makes my task a little more difficult, but I don't think is sufficient to suggest that I should not explore the arguments I shall be making in this chapter. The TRC affidavits are used in the same way as one might use any interview transcript. I concede that issues of 'interviewer bias' might be more pronounced, but I have sufficient verification of events through other interviews and newspaper reports to be confident that these are useful and accurate sources.

Buthelezi's request was promptly processed through military structures to what had become in the light of the state's reorganisation the key government decision-making body - The State Security Council (SSC). Major-General T Groenewald, the director of Military Intelligence was tasked with developing a plan for government consideration. The plan was first outlined in a memo of the 19 December 1985. From the start it was recognised that the actions would be unlawful and a structure to act as a cover for offensive operations was formulated.

An extra-ordinary meeting of the State Security Council considered the memo on 20 December 1985. By 10 February 1986, in less than two months, approval 'at the highest level' (Varney, 1997:12) was granted. Responsibility for establishing this security force was given to the ministers of defence (Magnus Malan), constitutional development and planning (Chris Heunis) and law and order (Louis Le Grange) – locating the project firmly within the state's total strategy thinking. From the beginning a close working relationship was established with Ulundi. The state security council delegated the practical investigations around implementation, to a sub-committee that met in Ulundi. Constant consultation ensured this close working relationship was maintained throughout the operation.

Reflecting the debates within the state there were tensions over both the kind (clandestine) and form (military) support to be given to Inkatha. The sub-committee's report (of 15 January 1986) outlined seven elements (i) personal protection for Buthelezi, (ii) protection for other selected VIPS, (iii) offensive para-military elements, (iv) the enlargement of the existing KwaZulu Police Force, (v) a conventional /ceremonial force, (vi) an intelligence service, and (vii) the authority to issue firearms licenses. A distinction was drawn between protective and offensive capacities. It was proposed that the South African Police and National Intelligence would supply the protective measures while the SADF would build the para-military element and the conventional / ceremonial force. The decision-making process around the exact nature of the support to be offered

to Inkatha dovetailed with the debate within the state over the future of the total strategy thinking and what, if anything should replace it. These recommendations were the subject of fierce debate in the inter-departmental committee. Both National Intelligence and the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning objected to the provision of an offensive para-military element. However, those in favour (Commissioner of the SAP and the KwaZulu representative) argued that Inkatha was already taking para-military steps, which were being conducted unprofessionally and thus carried high risks. Without para-military capacity Buthelezi's requirements would not be met.

The sub-committee's final decision was to recommend that the SSC investigate 'the creation of a para-military element ... at the highest political level and clarify it with the Chief Minister' (Varney, 1987:12). The SSCs approved the recommendation (at their meeting on 3 February) referring the final decision to the 'highest level' and tasking Malan and Heunis with contacting Buthelezi. Once final approval was granted, with responsibility for working out the final details assigned to the military, it became clear that the securocrats had the upper hand.

The SADF was instructed by Malan to draw up a detailed implementation plan. A task-group was appointed under the Chief of the Army, General Liebenberg. Their report (The Liebenberg Report) of 27 February 1986, set out the details. Central to the implementation plan was the inclusion of contra-mobilisation, defensive, offensive, the protection of Inkatha leaders, intelligence and the future establishment of a military force under a para-military unit. The offensive element was 'described as a small full-time offensive element that could be used covertly against the UDF (about thirty)' (Varney, 1997:14). Also included was the extension of the KwaZulu Police which included the training of an additional five hundred police. Support to the KwaZulu Police was delineated from support to Inkatha. MZ Khumalo, Inkatha secretary-general and Buthelezi's right-hand man, was placed as commander of Inkatha's para-military and offensive groups.

The establishment of this force served the interests of both Inkatha and the South African government. For Inkatha it would enable them to 'wipe out the UDF' and reassert their hegemony in KwaZulu-Natal, for the South African state it fitted neatly with the emphasis on 'restoring law and order' as laid out in the newly adopted 'counter-revolutionary' warfare position.

Inkatha's intention was not just to insert a military capacity into communities. This capacity was to be integrated into its existing political networks to bolster and strengthen them. From the first stage, recruitment, the existing networks of patronage were strengthened. The task of recruiting Inkatha-supporting men fell to MZ Khumalo. He, in turn, relied on militant Inkatha members, in many respects embryonic warlords, to select men on the ground. Bhekisisa Khumalo, a Caprivi trainee, from Gezubuso (in the Pietermaritzburg area) explained that he heard that

> KwaZulu police members were being recruited and I went to Mr Ntombela's[19] house and I found a group of people there. Mr Ntombela transported us to Ulundi to the Hlongwane [or Nhlungwane][20] Camp. (TRC amnesty hearing, 11 August 1998, p.2)

Brian Gcina Mkhize (20 years-old at the time), another Caprivi trainee, was from Mpumalanga Township. Unlike Khumalo who had not been politically active, he had joined Inkatha while still at school. He was directly recruited by Zakhele Nkehli.[21]

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[19] David Ntombela, from the Vulindlela area near Pietermaritzburg was a notorious Inkatha warlord. It was alleged that he was a central force behind the 'Seven Day war' in 1990. He is now a member of the provincial legislature for the IFP.

[20] In some places in the transcripts it's called Nhlungwane Camp. The spelling of *isizulu* names in all the TRC transcripts is so appallingly bad that it is difficult to rely on either of these being correct or determine the correct place name.

[21] Zakhele Nkehli was a Mpumalanga Township councillor, chairman of the Mpumalanga Inkatha Branch and a member of the central committee of Inkatha. An Inkatha warlord he was feared and dreaded by UDF-supporting residents of Mpumalanga. His appearance was synonymous with death and residents believed that even whispering his name was to tempt fate. Many failed attempts to kill him led credence to the belief that he was invincible and protected by very strong *umuthi*. An ambush on his car on the 19 December 1989, which killed his sister, injured his wife and left him paralysed and fighting for his life in Edendale Hospital, resulted in street parties as residents initially believed him to have been killed (The Natal Witness, 21 December 1988). He died from pneumonia, without leaving hospital, on Wednesday, 3 May 1989 (The Natal Witness, 13 May 2000).

One of my cousins [Nkehli], who was a member of Mkwamanda (the Central Committee) in Inkatha asked me what am I preparing myself to do, since I have already completed my standard 10. ... he had been asked by the leader of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi to go and find out or recruit young members - trusted members of the IFP, who wish to be members of the Police Force in KwaZulu-Natal. ... I accepted the offer from my cousin to become a policeman. Even if it wasn't the kind of work that I aimed to continue with, it was better to join the police than to sit down and not do any work, ... Zakhele Nkehli talked to one of his brothers who was supposed to take me to Ulundi. (Special hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 4 August 1997, pp.24-25)

Zwele Dlamini (17 at the time) also from Mpumalanga Township was a member of Inkatha and active in the Inkatha Youth Brigade. He was also approached by Zakhele Nkehli.

He is the person who approached us and he was recruiting for people who were coming to join the police, the KwaZulu Police. ... He told us that he needed people to be trained to become KwaZulu Police. He wrote down my name and told us that he's going to come back and we'll be taken for training to become KwaZulu Police. ... A kombi from Ulundi came. They took us to Ulundi. ... We went to a place called Nhlungwane. (Special hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 6 August 1997, p.6)

At the Camp, they found themselves in the company of approximately four hundred other men all in their late teens / early twenties. Further selection took place on the basis of their physical health and political affiliation.

There are certain types of questions which we used to be asked, to determine our success. Questions like, 'what is the Mgwamanda of Inkatha?' by Mgwamanda means the central committee of Inkatha. We would be asked, 'what is a pathfinder?' and also,'what are the policies of Inkatha?', and other things which - kind of questions which will show about how trustworthy you are within the Inkatha organisation. (Brian Gcina Mkhize, Special Hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 4 August 1997, p.26)

In June 1986, the two hundred selected men were secretly transported to Durban and flown to the Caprivi Strip in Namibia. They received training at the Hippo Camp by the Special Operations component of Military Intelligence and the Special Forces. Here they were introduced to Dulaxolo Luthuli[22] initially their

[22] Daluxolo Luthuli, often known by his clan name Madlanduna, was born in the mission area of Georgedale, Mpumalanga. His family, related to the late Chief Albert Luthuli was well-known for its ANC sympathies. His father, Reverend Jafta a travelling preacher, owned land in Georgedale and was a respected figure in the community. Luthuli was a member of the ANC and later its military wing Umkonto weSizwe. He was trained in the Soviet Union, fought as part of the MK contingent in the Wanki Campaign, was later captured and sent to Robben Island. On his release from prison in the late 1970s he returned home, found his father had become a member of Inkatha and joined as well. In the early 1980s he considered himself to be both a member of the ANC and Inkatha. He claimed that discussions on Robben Island had not identified Inkatha as an enemy organisation to the ANC. (This view is in contradiction to that of Harry Gwala, who in the early 1970s, was warning workers to be suspicious of Inkatha and Zulu nationalist politics.) He travelled, with his father, to Lesotho to make contact with the late Chris Hani and discuss the recruitment of members for MK.

political commissar, but later to become their military commander as well. All trainees received basic training; they were then divided into four operational groups - offensive, contra-mobilisation, defence and VIP protection - and received specialised training. In addition to these military skills they also received 'educational' training

> Yes, that's correct [they explained the purpose of this teaching] ... there is only one purpose, it was that as soon as we came out of the training to go back and fight and eliminate the ANC ... (Mkhize, Special hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 4 August 1997, p.34-35).

They were indoctrinated using visual material showing poor conditions in communist countries with the suggestion that this was the fate that would befall South Africa if the ANC were to 'take over'. It was emphasised that the UDF was an underground structure of the ANC and the UDF had only one aim, to eliminate Inkatha supporters through inhuman and violent means. This was reinforced through visual material showing people being necklaced, elderly people being stripped and made to drink cooking oil, councillors being killed and schools being burnt (Mkhize, Special Hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 4 August 1997, p.36). The training lasted six months, until December 1986. The groups then returned to South Africa where some of them were given further specialised training.

Using networks similar to those through which they had been recruited the trainees were infiltrated back into different communities throughout the province. For example Gcina Mkhize, who was assigned to the contra-mobilisation group, after additional training in Venda, was deployed on the south coast of Natal.

> We arrived in the office of Chief Khawula. We were using his old offices. There was an old office for Inkatha in that area and we were using it as a base. We always go out to have rallies and also come back to the place and we used to visit many chiefs' areas, asking them to give us permission to go to the people and talk to them and we managed to address people mobilising for Inkatha. We also went to high schools, warning children that they shouldn't be influenced by the UDF spirit and that's how we tried to build our organisation. We visited many places at South Coast and we stayed there for about three months. (Mkhize, Special hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 5 August 1997, p.5)

In 1985 he became an active member of Inkatha when he was approached to become political commissar of the para-military wing of Inkatha. He accompanied the two hundred recruits to Caprivi where they underwent six months military training (including unconventional warfare). On their return he was asked to take on the position of commander as well as that of political commissar. (Luthuli, Amnesty Hearing, Durban, 7 April 1998.)

Zweli Dlamini who was allocated to the offensive group was sent back to his home in Mpumalanga and told to report to the Mpumalanga Police Station daily. He was provided with a KwaZulu Police appointment certificate at the rank of detective sergeant and posted to the Pietermaritzburg area to guard chiefs in the area. He claimed that trainees were allocated to different chiefs.

> We were given firearms and we went to Pietermaritzburg. That's the place where we were supposed to work. We stayed there, because there was a fights, people were fighting. At night if there was a chance, we will go out to hit or attack the UDF people. ... We entered houses and shooting people inside those houses and then you have to run and go back to your place after doing that. (Dlamini, Special hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 6 August 1997, p.10-11)

One of the first offensive operations undertaken by the Caprivi Trainees on their return was the KwaMakhutha massacre in January 1987. As argued above this signified a new measure to the violence. MZ Khumalo played a central role in launching offensive actions including identifing the targets for elimination. He instructed Dulaxolo Luthuli to lead the fight against the UDF in Mpumalanga township (see chapter six) and supplied the trainees with arms and ammunition.

Despite these interventions Inkatha was still under pressure from the UDF. At the beginning of 1988 there was another meeting between Buthelezi and Operation Marion staff. Buthelezi asked for additional clandestine training. Furthermore, there were problems with the existing trainees in terms of discipline, command and control. According to military documents (cited in Varney, 1997:19) Buthelezi argued that it was necessary for more Inkatha members to be trained in order to swing the conflict in the townships in his favour. On 21 March 1988 Buthelezi and Khumalo met with General Malan in Durban. Once again the urgency of the situation and the need for more members to be trained was stressed. Bases for the Caprivi trainees were set up at Port Durnford (for the offensive group) and Mkhuze (for the others), it was hoped that this would redress the discipline problem by providing a place where they could 'plan and take action' (Varney, 1997:19).

Responding to this pressure and Inkatha's complaints that the South African Police were biased in favour of the UDF, special constables were recruited into the SAP.

> ... in Pietermaritzburg most members of Inkatha were getting killed and they were conquered by the ANC and other structures of the ANC like UDF. ... It was the structures of the ANC which were helped by the SAP to fight against Inkatha. Khumalo told us ... Buthelezi has met with the seniors of the SAP about the assaults and killing of Inkatha people in Pietermaritzburg and senior people in the South African Police told him that he should bring his own people, if he doesn't trust the South African Police personnel working in Maritzburg. (Mkhize, Special hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 5 August 1997, p.8).

The recruitment and training of special constables took place in January 1988. As with the Caprivi Trainees only loyal Inkatha men were considered. The special constables came from two sources - new recruits and the Caprivi trainees. Some, like Israel Hlongwane[23] from Mpumalanga were amongst the new recruits. Once again, Inkatha used its networks to source suitable candidates:

> I got a message at home that Nkehli wanted to see me at his house. I went there to find most of the Inkatha youth already at Nkehli's house. Upon my arrival Zakhele started to address us. He told us that there was a job opportunity. He insisted that only brave and reliable Inkatha people were needed. Nkehli told us that educational qualifications were not important. He told us that the required people would be trained as policeman who upon passing out would come and protect the community from the UDF. ... I think the following day we were taken by Inkatha vehicles to Pietermaritzburg Riot Unit. ... On the same day we were all loaded into privately hired busses and conveyed to Koeberg for Special Constable training. (Hlongwane, TRC amnesty application affidavit, S26)

Others like Gcina Mkhize and Zweli Mkhize were Caprivi trainees. The intention was for the Caprivi Trainees to infiltrate the special constables.

> It was during January 1988 ... they came to fetch us saying that we are wanted at Ulundi. ... Four of us left the South Coast to Ulundi. When we arrived at Ulundi it was explained to us by MZ Khumalo that we will be taken to Cape Town where we were to be trained as special constables. That did surprise us, because we knew that we were very advanced with the knowledge, the military knowledge and we didn't understand why do we have to be taken back to be trained as constables and we asked Khumalo ... Khumalo explained that they were not degrading us or giving us a lower position, however, it wasn't a demotion. However, they wanted us to help in the police service. ... Mr Khumalo told us

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[23] Israel Hlongwane was born in Mpumalanga Township, Unit Two, in 1968. He was to complete his schooling to standard six level before leaving school and getting employment at Glacier Bearings in the Pinetown industrial area of Westmead. After his recruitment by Inkatha he was to become one of the notorious boys associated with Inkatha central committee member and warlord Zakhele Nkehli. In 1988 he was recruited as a special constable and sent for training at Koeberg. He was then stationed in Pietermaritzburg before being whisked into hiding by Inkatha. He was then drawn into the activities of the Caprivi Trainees and operated in Northern Natal and Ermelo. He was sentenced to prison for the rape, murder and attempted murder of two Mpumalanga schoolgirls. He applied for amnesty from the TRC, he was successful on all accounts except for those pertaining to the rape and murder of these two young women (TRC AC/99/0332, November 1999).

that our task is to infiltrate the special constables; ... we will be able to further our aims to hit directly at the ANC. At the very same time we will be able to protect our people. ... We were also warned that we're getting training and also to hide that we know anything about military. (Mkhize, Special hearing into the Caprivi Trainees, 5 August 1997, p.8)

No checks were done to ensure that the recruits had a clear criminal record with no criminal charges pending. Only those whose loyalty to Inkatha was assured were accepted. The special constables or kitskonstables as they were sometimes known, received six weeks training at Koeberg in the Cape. The training involved the use of a shot-gun and 9mm pistols. As in the Caprivi training there was a large measure of indoctrination. Upon completion of their training they were integrated into the South African Police, the majority of them initially deployed in the Pietermaritzburg area, though some, like Zweli Dlamini, were sent to Mpumalanga township.

Towards the end of 1988 tensions surfaced between the SADF and Inkatha over the future of Operation Marion. Already they had deflected Buthelezi's demands for the military training of additional men. Due to an increasing number of covert activities, Inkatha was faced with the serious problem of concealing trainees who had been arrested and were facing court action. The security establishment had assisted in 'hiding' trainees, mostly at the Mkuze base, who were being sought by the South African Police. This situation was discussed at a serious of meetings between Inkatha and SADF representatives towards the end of 1988. Inkatha complained of insufficient support in concealing the operatives, while the SADF regarded continued support 'as an unacceptably high security risk' (Varney, 1997:21). The South African Police were not prepared to assist in covering-up the crimes beyond arranging bail and then assisting in concealing the members from detection. In an attempt to find a solution, all Caprivi trainees, including those sent for special constable training and who had been accepted as part of the South African Police, were demobilised into the KwaZulu Police. Despite Inkatha's opposition to the withdrawal of military support for the offensive unit, by June 1989 most trainees had been placed within the KwaZulu Police.

Notwithstanding the relocation of the trainees to the KZP the military continued to be involved and it was another two years (July 1991) before the operation was completely terminated. During this period there were dramatic changes at the political level, from FW de Klerk replacing PW Botha as prime minister, to secret negotiations with the ANC, to the unbanning of the ANC, SACP and PAC, the release of Nelson Mandela and the multi-party talks and negotiations. The official yet slow disengagement of the military from these clandestine operations needs to be understood against this background. Officially the government moved away from 'Total Strategy' yet it was only in December 1992 (eighteen months after the final Operation Marion meeting) that President de Klerk took action against twenty-three senior SADF officers who 'may have been involved in activities that stretched beyond the call of duty' (Jeffery, 1997:451) and ordered all clandestine projects to be closed down.

In the interim Inkatha continued to pressurise the SADF for further support. On 31 October 1989 at a meeting with Brigadier Van Niekerk (a member of the interdepartmental sub-committee) and Colonel Van den Berg (a senior staff member for Operation Marion), Buthelezi expressed concern over the situation in Mpumalanga township and claimed that he was losing the armed struggle. He said that at the very least he continued to require 'cells which could take out undesirable members' (Varney 1997:22). Nevertheless, despite these requests the SADF felt that the 'security risks' of the 'violent option ... were too high' (Varney, 1997:23). Buthelezi was informed of these opinions at a meeting on 9 May 1990 (the ANC and other exiled organisations had been unbanned three months earlier on 2 February 1990). By the end of the year the SADF had decided to terminate Operation Marion, and Khumalo was informed on 4 December 1990. Van den Berg's last meeting with Khumalo was on 23 January 1991, with Major-General von Tonder's (chief director intelligence operations) final meeting with Buthelezi taking place on 16 July 1991.

Operation Marion had supplied Inkatha with a capacity for self-sufficiency. The transfer of the Caprivi trainees to the KwaZulu Police meant that the offensive actions of the Caprivi trainees continued under the cover of the KwaZulu Police in the early 1990s, with the activities of the eSikhaweni hit squad[24] being but one such example. As shall be seen in the next section these clandestine interventions were largely responsible for the transgression of the normative boundaries of everyday life.

5.6 Conclusion

The primary purpose of this chapter was to provide a further set of answers to the question 'how in Mpumalanga township did we get from a situation of competing political organisations and political tensions to a situation of political violence'. What is argued in the thesis more generally as well as specifically demonstrated in this chapter is that political violence is the outcome of the articulation of multiple trajectories that operated at national, regional and local levels. This chapter traces two of these trajectories and demonstrates how they articulate.

Firstly, it examined the South African state in the late 1970s and 1980s. It argued that a key characteristic of the state in this period was the dominant presence of the military. The State itself was reorganised substantially, in the process marginalising the *verkramptes* and setting up new institutions of state power. Central to this process was the general acceptance of most within the inner circles of state power of the need 'to defeat revolutionaries with their own weapons on their own battlefield' (unsourced government document cited in Swilling and Phillips 1989a:143). These developments meant that the approach made by Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi in late 1985 for military support that would include an offensive or attacking capacity fell on fertile soil. Buthelezi's request was seen to neatly dovetail with the state's counter-revolutionary warfare position.

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[24] It was the arrest and subsequent trial (S v Mbambo) of the members of the eSikhaweni hit squad Gcina Mkhize, Romeo Mbambo and Israel Hlongwane which brought the activities of the Caprivi Trainees to light.

Secondly, the chapter examined the regional politics of KwaZulu and Natal. From the time of his installation as chief Buthelezi occupied an ambiguous position taking full advantage of what Maré and Hamilton (1987) have terms 'the politics of loyal resistance'. He attempted to utilise the institutional structures provided by the apartheid state in order to become a regional political force. At the same time he claimed he was part of the anti-apartheid forces and represented the 'ANC at home'. However, as this section argues the embeddedness of Inkatha in apartheid-created institutions resulted in increasing contradictions from which there was little escape. Inkatha and the KwaZulu homeland could not avoid becoming the target of opposition. This opposition was interpreted as opposition to Inkatha, KwaZulu (defined as the Zulu nation) and Buthelezi. The section demonstrates how local township struggles in some of the older Durban townships hitched themselves to the flag of the UDF. Thus undermining Inkatha and Buthelezi's wider project of being the regional political force. This led to Inkatha's decision to 'wipe out the UDF' in the province and their approach to the state for assistance in this regard.

The consequences of the interception of these two trajectories was examined in the third section of the chapter. This section outlined the approach made by the KwaZulu government to the South African state for military support. It showed how Inkatha's concerns resonated with those of the state. Therefore they were prepared to assist in providing Inkatha with the covert military capacity needed to 'restore law and order' in the province. The key point demonstrated here was the way in which these two trajectories articulated with local Inkatha networks. It is the coming together of these three trajectories – state policy under the militarised apartheid state, the regional politics of KwaZulu and Natal and the specifics of the local political dynamics (as discussed in chapter four) that allowed the conflict to become violent. Moreover, it indicates an argument that is amplified in the following chapter, that as important as each of these stories is in understanding why conflict became violent none of them are determining. They are all part of

the multiple trajectories that fed the process and transformed conflict into violence.

Chapter Six: Mapping Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township

6.1 Introduction

Previous chapters have focussed on answering the first question posed by the thesis 'why and how did the conflict become violent?' (see chapter one). As discussed in chapter four, the answers lie partly in the dynamics of local politics; but also in the fundamentally violent nature of everyday township life. While violence was always there, lurking below the surface of daily life, there were ways to contain and deal with those dynamics. As against the background of increased national political mobilisation and confrontation political tensions increased, these tacit understandings began to unravel. Furthermore, as chapter five demonstrates those ways of doing politics were deliberately undermined, and, the ensuing distrust exploited by the State.

This chapter continues to assemble the layers that need to be explored to fully answer that question. Chronologically this chapter continues the narration developed in chapter four. It demonstrates that despite its conflict-ridden history the violence that was seen from the mid-1980s was singular; and, 1987 did represent a severe rupture in the politics of Natal and KwaZulu. As such, it demonstrates the increased intensity of incidents and the changing technologies of violence.

The chapter provides a detailed discussion of the trajectory and modality of political violence in Mpumalanga township. Its focus is firmly on the local. It illuminates further the relationship between political violence and the tensions between political organisations in Mpumalanga (see chapter four). Nevertheless, this detailed examination clearly demonstrates the argument that political violence is deeply embedded in the articulation between local, provincial and national dynamics. I illustrate how, in the post-1987 period, these trajectories intersect at

the point of place. As will be seen none of these spheres was determining, each fed into the violence, with each having their part to play.

The chapter also begins to answer the second question asked by the thesis 'What forms did the political violence take?' (see chapter one). It investigates the form and character of political violence in Mpumalanga township, focusing on the five-year period from 1987 to 1991. It will demonstrate the argument that the year 1987 marks the beginning of a major shift in both the form and character of violence that previously existed in the area. It concludes the narration in 1991, which is marked by the eventual success of attempts to negotiate peace, a cease-fire having been originally signed in November 1989.

It shows the extent to which the violence transformed and disrupted the spatiality of the township, clearly illustrating what was new and singular about this mode of conflict. The chapter also provides the first layer of evidence for the argument about the distinctly spatialised form of the violence. It identifies the three spatialities of the violence - the body, the household and the neighbourhood. It describes the first 'expansion' in the spatialised form of the violence from an attack on individuals to attacks on households, followed by the second 'expansion' when the focus became the pursuit of territory. Moreover, it indicates how the meaning of place was recast by the violence - an argument amplified in the subsequent chapter.

Furthermore, the chapter examines the gendered and generational form of the violence. Its spatial character drew the population into the violence according to their age and gender. Through a detailed narration of the progression of the violence it firmly establishes that initially the political violence was primarily a conflict between male youth. They determined the sites of conflict and the meaning of those spaces. In the process, generationally-based patriarchal authority was challenged and older men were marginalised from public life by younger men. The chapter illustrates that as, over time, the violence shifted its

spatial form so did its gendered and generational form. It incorporated the entire community of Mpumalanga. Once households and territories became the targets, women were more directly affected by the violence, and gender and age were no longer protectors. Women, reclaiming their right to occupy the streets worked differently from men in their efforts to ensure the safety of their areas. In the process they challenged the reconstruction of the street as a site of masculine power relations. Nevertheless, while no-one could exist outside the violence, the power to determine its form and direction still lay with the youth.

The chapter begins by examining the first attacks on Hammarsdale Youth Congress (Hayco) members and the debates within Inkatha that these attacks provoked. These attacks, confined to known UDF and Inkatha activists, constituted the first spatiality of the violence – that of the body. In the second section I look at the second spatiality of the violence – attacks on the household. For the first time residents not directly affiliated to any political organisation become targets. The household, I argue begins to acquire the political identity of the youth who reside there. In the third section, the focus shifts to the third spatiality of political violence – the capturing of territory. It examines how the violence re-territorialised the space of the township, establishing firm borders between Inkatha and UDF areas. The meaning of space was similarly re-made and purified. The chapter then shifts to examine the way in which women used their gender-specific networks to challenge the redefinition of these spaces as spaces of masculine power, violence and sexual assault. In the final section I look at the 'invasions' of territory, primarily but not only by Inkatha supporters. Constant themes throughout these discussions are attempts to negotiate peace and the role played by the security forces. The devious role played by the security forces illustrates the way in which the different trajectories articulated with each other, to produce through their specific interactions new conflicts and sedimentations.

6.2 Violence and the Spatiality of the Body

The first spatiality entered by the political violence was that of the body. Attacks

on the body did not in and of themselves represent a new modality of violence or demonstrate the singularity of the violence. They were not necessarily new - witness the earlier attacks on Azapo members, and the alacrity with which *oqondo* beat any male youth suspected of criminal activity (see chapter four). What did, over time, indicate 'something new', was the increased intensity of the attacks (see fig 7), in both number and severity; the introduction of new technologies (in particular guns); and, the intensified violation of women's bodies through rape and coercive sex. In the post-'87 period the repertoires of violence against the body changed fundamentally.

6.2.1 Attacks on Hayco members

As outlined in chapter four, a new organisation Hayco[1] had been formed in mid-1986. Its membership was intent on challenging Inkatha's presumption of controlling the politics of the township. Implicit was a challenge of gender and generation. Hayco's membership was primarily male youth. On Inkatha's side, the youth were also the major protagonists, with Nkehli and 'his boys' the main perpetrators of the violence (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, Section 8-37, 6 July 1995). Political violence signified a new politics. Unlike the pre-'87 period where there were institutional ways of dealing with conflict, a diversity of political organisations and an involvement (if not dominance) of older men in public politics, this was a violent politics, dominated by male youth with no room for political diversity. It was also to become a politics devoid of politics where territory rather than ideology signalled political identity (see below).

In early 1987, a few months after the formation of Hayco, its membership came under physical attack from Inkatha-aligned youth controlled by Zakhele Nkeli. In February 1987 Hayco member Sthembiso Mngadi was killed, ostensibly in a case

[1] It appears as if at first Hayco consisted of township youth opposed to Inkatha. It was not the political philosophy of the UDF that brought them together but their opposition to Inkatha's increasingly violent control of all aspects of township life (see the account of the school boycott in chapter four). The broader conflict between UDF and Inkatha resulted in them seeing themselves aligned to the UDF.

Fig 7: Graph Showing Incidents of Political Violence, Deaths, Injuries and Arson, September 1987 – December 1989

of mistaken identity.

> … one day they [Hayco youth] held a meeting in one church down there. And as they came out of that meeting, the Inkatha people and Zakhele Nkehli, whom we heard was there, approached. They shot Mngadi's boy. That was when it began, actually we could realise what was going on. (Focus group interview, Connie's Group, Con1#1-2:3)

The target was apparently Hayco president Vusi Maduna (The Natal Mercury, 17 February 1987). The five killers including a 'political figure' from Woody Glen, being driven by a local councillor[2] in a yellow Cortina, said they were looking 'for a man in a brown hat'. They then shot and killed Mngadi who was wearing Maduna's brown hat at the time. Within a week another three members of Hayco, Vusumuzi Mdletshe, Bongani Mbatha[3] and Sandile Xaba,[4] had been killed in two separate incidents (The Natal Mercury, 24 February 1987). A day later Arnold Ngubane was found dead (The Natal Mercury, 25 February 1987). According to Hayco he was not one of their members. In the wake of these killings Hayco leadership fled Mpumalanga and many students stayed away from school (The Weekly Mail, 27 February-5 March 1987). In early March the South African Police arrested a 16-year old youth in connection with Mngadi's killing (City Press, 1 March 1987). Two weeks later four more arrests followed (The Natal Mercury, 17 March 1987). The UDF-aligned youth responded by attacking two Inkatha officials as they emerged from church in Clermont,[5] (City Press, 15 March

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[2] One of the focus group interviews claims the local councillor involved in this killing was Zakhele Nkehli (see focus group interview, Connie's Group, Con1#1-2:3).

[3] This report illustrates of some of the difficulties with using newspaper sources. The Natal Mercury refers to him as Bongani Mbatha, The Weekly Mail and two oral interviews (see Interview TN, TN1#1-2:2; focus group Connie's group, Con1#1-2:3) give his name as Mashu Mbatha, and Israel Hlongwane in his TRC affidavit refers to the killing of Mashu Shandu (TRC affidavit, S20). According to The Weekly Mail, his body was found in a culvert, and Hlongwane says they left it in a water pit opposite his house. However, there is a discrepancy in the method of killing, Mbatha was shot but Hlongwane says they stabbed Shandu. Nevertheless, Mashu was a well-known student leader at PheZulu High School. His murder impacted dramatically on the community's perception of Inkatha and relations between Hayco and Inkatha.

[4] Israel Hlongwane applied for amnesty for this killing (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S11). He claimed this was the first killing in which he was involved (see S11.7).

[5] Clermont is an African freehold township on the northern side of Pinetown. Politically associated with the congress movement and resisting incorporation into KwaZulu, it became a refuge for the youth fleeing Mpumalanga from Inkatha. Mpumalanga Inkatha-based officials were also convinced that comrades from Clermont were infiltrating Mpumalanga to assist with UDF activities there.

1987), the previous week the chairman of the Woody Glen[6] Inkatha branch, Mcoleni Nicholas Shange, had been shot and killed while visiting a fellow Inkatha member in unit four (The Natal Mercury, 17 March 1987). Other IYB members were killed, and by the end of March eight more members of Hayco were dead, including the president Vusi Maduna (The Weekly Mail, 20-26 March 1987). Maduna had been negotiating a cease-fire with Nkehli, who was acting on behalf of the Inkatha youth, at meetings convened by Mpumalanga mayor Rodger Sishi. His comrades accused him of being a spy. He was shot and burnt by those of them who had taken refuge in Clermont, when he went to discuss the negotiations with them (City Press, 22 March 1987).[7] In these first few months, many of Hayco's original leadership were killed.

The annual inter-school athletics meeting between Hammarsdale, Wartburg, Camperdown and Inchanga in April 1987 exposed many of the Mpumalanga schools and their scholars to the violence for the first time.

> I think I was doing standard six, and we were going to meet with other schools, it was the athletic day. We gathered at the stadium at the township near to my home. ... at half-past two see a yellow car, running around the ground, the sports-field ... . And to see what has happened. 'Oh', they said, 'those are the Inkatha members'. 'Oh, what are they doing?' 'They are looking for the pupils who their families joined UDF or their brothers, or their sisters, or their parents.' Ok. It seems as though we are in danger, we did evacuate at the ground, at the sports-field and go to home. While I was on the way to my home, I see this car. I saw this car. Haw! Two guys in front, and two guys in the back-seat. [Mmm]. The other guy I can mention was Mashuga, who was (was who?) Mashu Mbatha.[8] Who was the first one who was killed at the violence at Mpumalanga. And the other guy I can't remember well his name. And he was killed because they said he was the UDF member .... So they are not allowed to practice UDF things at our township. Ok. They killed that guy. The members of UDF want to avenge for him. That start the violence. (Interview TN, TN1#1-2:2)

> I was there running, ja. I didn't see anything, but I saw the bus burnt, and the young boys running there. And they fight everyone. And they run. And in that day, I lost my shoes, my school shoes! I lost my school shoes. And when we came home and told my mother, ... 'I haven't got the shoes now'. They say, 'I have no money to buy for you another shoe. You must go with your feets'. And I must every day. It's too far from [unit] one north to unit four [where I schooled]. (Interview MN, MN1#1-2:3)

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[6] Woody Glen, sometimes referred to as *Inkandla*, is one of the sections of Mpumalanga township, it was to become an Inkatha stronghold.

[7] These allegations are confirmed in Israel Hlongwane's affidavit to the TRC, (see S11.8 and 11.9). Furthermore my oral sources indicate that suspicions about Maduna were widespread.

[8] See Hlongwane's affidavit and footnote 2 in this chapter.

By all accounts it was the events of these three months that demonstrated to the ordinary resident that their community had changed. To cite a woman from unit two who had just finished recounted the killings of UDF-aligned youth, including attacks on her sons, during this period 'so the war just started like that' (Focus group, Fri1#1-2:12).

Many amongst the older generation were confused by the situation. They didn't understand the new politics of violence and attempted to resolve the situation utilising the methods that had always worked in the past. The parents of UDF-supporting youth called community meetings. Showing their respect for, and faith in, legitimate channels of governance they wrote letters of complaint to the KwaZulu Government requesting an end to forced recruitment[9] and asking that particular Inkatha officials, like Nkehli, be restrained from violating their rights (Focus group interview, Mrs Mthembu's Group, Mth2#1-3:23). The situation was discussed at council meetings,

> … We also talked about it at the Council Chamber and a memorandum was signed. What Inkatha had to say about that was that they had nothing to do with that, meaning they denied that. They claimed self-defence up until the fight took place. What happened then was that the youth could no longer tolerate watching Inkatha raping their mothers, attacking their homes and doing everything silly just because it said that it wanted to destroy the UDF. They then started defending themselves and their parents as well as their property. It was then that violence took place. (Focus group interview, Mrs Mthembu's Group, Mth2#1-3:24)

But this more gentle way of doing politics was terminated by the violence. Neither the youth of Mpumalanga nor the higher authorities responded to their pleas. The escalation in political violence to a war-situation saw the end of public governance in Mpumalanga Township, and a generational about-turn in determining the politics of the community. The men and women who had been in the MPURA leadership, and were then elected to the Mpumalanga Township Council, were excised from shaping the public life of the community. The youth shaped the politics of the community and politics dominated every aspect of

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[9] This is discussed more fully in chapter seven.

community life - public and private. As the violence increased in intensity township management disappeared along with the rule of law. The township council no longer met and administrative responsibility was assumed by township superintendents who, as the spatiality of the violence shifted, invariably followed the politics of the unit in which they lived (Interview Sishi, Sis1#2-2:1-3).

Nevertheless, some of these 'public' individuals did find ways, outside of the violence, of participating in communal life. Rodger Sishi continued to use his role as 'mayor' of Mpumalanga to try and steer the community back to peace. Rejoice Mcoyi, a prominent business woman and MPURA member became well-known as a member of the Natal Organisation of Women and prominent in the women's protests.

6.2.2 Inkatha and the *oTheleweni* - Conflicts within Inkatha

Many of the older Inkatha members were also not happy with the violent direction Inkatha seemed to be taking. After all, they were also part of a certain tradition of 'doing politics'. Residents of Unit One North, an Inkatha stronghold, had all been relocated from Georgedale, and as discussed in chapter three, had brought with them a certain orderliness of how things should happen. Violent politics controlled by the youth did not have a place in that world-view.

One section of Inkatha under Zakhele Nkehli was propagating the violence, while another group under Mrs Xolo did not support these actions (Luthuli, Amnesty Hearing, Durban, 7 April 1998). Many ordinary Inkatha members agreed with that viewpoint. Mrs Ziqubu from unit one south (see Map 7), giving evidence to the TRC explained that her husband was a staunch Inkatha member and a respected figure in his neighbourhood. At a local community meeting he spoke out, arguing that

> ... if it is Inkatha who is doing all this [killing people] it means we have to resign from the organisation. (Mrs Ziqubu, TRC Victim Hearing, Pietermaritzburg, 21 November 1996).

Yet, ordinary Inkatha members resident in Mpumalanga were not able to debate

the issue amongst themselves. As part of a wider provincial strategy (see chapter five) in late 1986 / early 1987 covert militarily-trained operatives, later known as the Caprivi trainees, were infiltrated into Mpumalanga. These men, many of them from Mpumalanga, were under the command of Dulaxolo Luthuli[10] who had been instructed by Inkatha General Secretary MZ Khumalo to lead the fight against the UDF. Luthuli's contact in Mpumalanga was Zakhele Nkehli. The Caprivians were further instructed to make contact with the local KwaZulu Police officers and await instructions.

Luthuli was sent to stay in the area under Mrs Xolo with the task of uniting the two factions (Luthuli, Caprivi Hearings, Durban, 4 August 1997, p.27). He felt that the indiscriminate violence was losing Inkatha support (Luthuli, Amnesty Hearing, Durban, 7 April 1998). Nkehli didn't trust Luthuli because of his ANC background and was not prepared to accept his guidance (Luthuli, Caprivi Hearings, Durban 4 August 1997, p.27). After Nkehli complained, they were all summoned by Buthelezi to Ulundi. According to Luthuli the disagreement was not that Inkatha was killing people, but rather the way in which Nkehli was organising it.

> ... there is a boy in one house, who is a member of the UDF, then people thought that they should go and destroy the entire house. In the evenings people would be forced to go to camps, going to places like Ngoze, if the elders of that house refused to let their children go out at night, that house would have to be attacked, or if maybe that house is

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[10] Daluxolo Luthuli, often known by his clan name Madlanduna, was born in the mission area of Georgedale, Mpumalanga. His family, related to the late Chief Albert Luthuli was well-known for its ANC sympathies. His father, Reverend Jafta a travelling preacher, owned land in Georgedale and was a respected figure in the community. Luthuli was a member of the ANC and later its military wing *uMkhonto Wesizwe*. He was trained in the Soviet Union, fought as part of the MK contingent in the Wanki Campaign, was later captured and sent to Robben Island. On his release from prison in the late 1970s he returned home, found his father had become a member of Inkatha and joined as well. In the early 1980s he considered himself to be both a member of the ANC and Inkatha. He claimed that discussions on Robben Island had not identified Inkatha as an enemy organisation to the ANC. (This view is in contradiction to that of Harry Gwala, who in the early 1970s, was warning workers to be suspicious of Inkatha and Zulu nationalist politics.) He travelled, with his father, to Lesotho to make contact with the late Chris Hani and discuss the recruitment of members for MK. In 1985 he became an active member of Inkatha when he was approached to become political commissar of the para-military wing of Inkatha. He accompanied the two hundred recruits to Caprivi where they underwent six months military training (including training in unconventional warfare). On their return he was asked to take on the position of commander as well as that of political commissar. (Luthuli, Amnesty Hearing, Durban, 7 April 1998.)

suspected that maybe the members are likely to be UDF members, then they would be attacked. Sometimes they would be attacked because they are economically well off, maybe people just want to steal from the house. I was just trying to fix such things. ... when I arrived there, Inkatha youth members used to act like they were entitled to killing people. There were cars that were known to the community that if you happen to see that car, you would be killed. Or if there was an attack, they would act that they had the legitimate right to do so. To such an extent that people would be able to identify the people who say killed or burnt down their houses. I then decided that it would be better to do this operation or to carry out this operations in a covert manner. ... They thought that they could do anything and everything in public and in broad daylight. I ... advised them to do things in more appropriate ways. ... I went to the Cabinet meeting because Nkehli had complained that I do not allow for people to be killed. But I did not agree with the manner in which it was being done. (Luthuli, Amnesty Hearing, Durban, 7 April 1998, p.12-13)

These accounts of this early period give a clear indication of the generational struggle that threaded through the political violence. The youth were the new political actors demanding that other youth participate in this new politics. This demand for participation was paramount, surpassing generational authority.[11] Even if the elders refused, their authority was not, as is demanded by cultural norms respected. In fact, such refusal was constructed as a reason to discipline a household that did not *hlonipha* the Inkatha leadership (see chapter four) and thus could be legitimately attacked. Waetjen (2006:111-113) citing Campbell suggests that this generational struggle relates to the breakdown of masculine authority within the family and the different way in which men of different generations responded to the 'crisis of masculinity'.

Other aspects illuminated by this quotation are the modalities of the violence. Luthuli speaks to the intensity of the violence. He doesn't dispute the aim was to kill opponents; the question was that this should happen in a way that did not easily identify the perpetrators. He also indicates the technologies used in the early period of the violence (killing individuals and burning houses) and makes it

[11] Israel Hlongwane's affidavit to the TRC clearly spells this out these dynamics. He describes how he was accosted by UDF-supporting youth wanting to know why Inkatha supporters were frequenting his home, if as he claimed he was not a member of any political party. His response refers to the house being the domain of his parents and therefore under their control; but this explanation is not accepted (S6, 6 July 1995). Similarly a woman in the focus group (Connie's Friend's, describes how she was informed by Inkatha youth that her children should attend a meeting, when she referred them to her husband she was told that they were not interested in talking to her husband (Fri1#1-2:13). Both these incidents are fundamentally against the norms of *hlonipha*.

clear that the youth, on both sides, were the actors in this new form of politics.

While the Ulundi meeting might have cleared the air between Nkehli and Luthuli, it did not persuade all within Inkatha. People were confused and uncertain as to what was happening. Mrs Ziqubu explained how her husband was expected to assist Inkatha. However, his unease at Inkatha's direction led him to eventually distance himself from the organisation.

> Things started to happen. I had children, male children. We were now all afraid because of the violence in the place. You could see the children walking around were not safe. They started pointing out families which were supposed to be burned. We were all afraid because of all this. Meetings continued to be held in the place where we were. There was Mr Mlaba[12] at that time. He was the leader during the meetings. As I said before people were all afraid, they didn't know what was happening, but it happened that they elected my husband to be the leader at the area in which we were staying. Men used to go out patrolling the place, especially at night. My husband used to join them in the patrolling process. He decided to stop patrolling because he was afraid that he could be killed at night. ... People used to talk about exactly what was happening, asking, 'Why do we have to leave other people?' And it happened that they stopped patrolling the place. ... [TRC: After that are you trying to tell us that your husband disassociated himself with the watch operations? Did he also disassociate himself from the IFP activities?] --- I don't remember well, but what I know is that he was no longer following the IFP views and policies, but you couldn't say that he was no longer working for them. But he could see that everything was bad, and he could see exactly what was the cause of that. (Mrs Ziqubu, TRC Victim Hearing, Pietermaritzburg, 21 November 1996).

In order to sway this faction, of which 65-year-old Mr Ziqubu was representative, Luthuli embarked on a covert strategy to demonstrate the danger posed by the UDF group. He hoped to convince the 'Inkatha group' of the need to fight UDF.

> ... I divided the Caprivians that they should infiltrate them in order to recruit the youth, especially in those Inkatha group who didn't see the need to fight or didn't want to fight and also to ensure that if the *Theleweni* people, there is some burning of houses and fighting, they should run to the area of the people who didn't want to be involved in violence action, to create an impression to the UDF people that even the other group, the Inkatha group is also fighting, so when they are attacked they could attack all of them. Therefore because of that arrangement, the peaceful arrangement which was Inkatha, find itself getting involved in the fight. That was used as a strategy to get them involved in the fight and we used the Caprivians to achieve that. (Luthuli, Caprivi Hearings, Durban, 5 August 1997, p.28)

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[12] Sipho Mlaba was the Inkatha chairperson from unit one north, Mpumalanga Township. He was to gain a reputation as a fearsome warlord and his car became associated with drive-by shootings. A few months after Nkehli's death he became involved in negotiating a cease-fire and today is credited, together with ANC-leader Meshack Radebe, as responsible for the peace in Mpumalanga. He passed away in mid-2006.

Three organised groups of Inkatha youth operated in Mpumalanga. The first group was organised by Zakhele Nkehli (resident in unit four). Israel Hlongwane (living in unit two south) assisted by Mashonisa Jabulani Hadebe, Mxolisi Bhoxabhoxa Ndlovu, Bhani Khambule and Zakhele 'Sqothu' Langa carried out most of the attacks. They had eleven youth under their control,[13] most of whom came from unit two and unit one north (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S10). The second group fell under Mrs Xulu from Woody Glen. There were five boys in this group, also from Woody Glen[14] (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S16.2). The third group were linked to the Caprivi trainees. They fell under the ultimate control of Luthuli[15] (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S15.1). Not all the Caprivi trainees were used to attack UDF areas, some of the group eg Bongo Msomi, were infiltrated into UDF areas to act as spies (Khumalo, Amnesty Hearing, 11 August 1998, p.44). In these early days the group associated with Zakhele Nkehli was responsible for most of the killings (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S19.1).

Through a combination of subterfuge and intimidation the 'violent' *otheleweni* were able to win the day and convince other Inkatha members of the need to eliminate the UDF from Mpumalanga. However, in the process a number of the older Inkatha members withdrew their active support from the organisation. The *otheleweni* led by warlords like Nkehli were youthful both in leadership and membership.

6.3 The Second Spatiality of Political Violence - Targeting the Household

By August 1987 new modalities indicated that the political violence had moved into a new spatiality. The second spatiality incorporated all aspects of the first

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[13] Their names were Bheki Tsanibe, Pang 'Qabani' Wanda, Siphiwe @ 'Guitar', Zitoto Dlamini, Themba Magubane, Mfanozi Zwane, 'Silwane', 'Ngqovela', Sifiso Shampanza @ 'Tsotsi', Mandla Moshe and Mali Kunene.

[14] They were Nathi Zondi, Bheki Makhatini, Musa Nxumalo, Khehlo Ngubane and Du Ndwalane.

[15] They included Vela Mchunu, Bhabha Khunene, Walter Mthalane, Nathi Sibisi, Thulani Vilakazi, Bongo Msomi, Sosha Khumalo, Zweli Dlamini, Sicelo Ndlovu and Musa Xulu.

spatiality but added new dimensions. The targets of the violence were no longer only the UDF youth. Hlongwane's gang[16] also attacked the family members of these youth and burnt their houses. Furthermore, the political affiliation of other family members was not a protector - it had become irrelevant. Politics had become the firm preserve of male youth and their affiliation determined the affiliation of their families, thus if the son was a Hayco member the whole family became targets.

In this context, women were subject to rape and sexual violence. As chapter four indicated sexual violence was a long-standing strategy in disciplining women. In this spatiality, it now emerged as one amongst the repertoires of violence. These acts were strongly patriarchal in every sense of the concept. Not in the traditional Zulu sense of authority vested with older men – here, it was younger men who were wresting the power to rape women and irrespective of their age – ie again in breach of the generational principle. The rape of women was meant to establish the patriarchal and gender authority of the male youth. Not only did they challenge older men's authority to protect their household, they also violated women as independent beings. Strong taboos in Zulu custom about the killing of women and children in legitimate warfare were disregarded as well as modes of respect that older women could previously have expected from younger men. The traditional ceremony that was held after the KwaMakhuta massacre, where women and children were killed, in order to cleanse those who had participated, illustrates these taboos.

> When we arrived there was a goat. Mashubane then said ' Men, I slaughtered this goat so that I can wash you because there the children died and the females, so I actually wash you by slaughtering this goat'. He actually slaughtered this goat and took some medicine and it was like *intelezi* and we're actually supposed to vomit and then we ate this goat. Thereafter we actually went to Matekulu and that was the end of it. (Khumalo, TRC Amnesty hearing, 11 August 1998:10).

The first wave of attacks in early 1987 had resulted in many of the active Hayco

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[16] I mention Hlongwane, because he later accepted responsibility for most of the attacks reported in the press during this period (see TRC affidavit, S19.1), furthermore the press reports do indicate that they were the work of the same group.

leadership fleeing Mpumalanga and subsequently the number of incidents decreased. In mid-July Hayco youth began to return home and once again the attacks started (The Natal Witness, 1 August 1987). In late July five youth were attacked, four killed and two homes were destroyed by arson.[17] The Inkatha-linked youth arrived at the homes of these youth, knocked on the door and asked for them, stabbing them to death when they came to the door. If the youth was not there, the family bore the consequences. When Inkatha youth arrived at the home of Mrs Paulina Shabanga they were looking for her son Leonard, as he was not there they abducted her ten-year-old son Jeremiah and set her house alight (The Natal Mercury, 21 July 1987).

On occasion the motive in killing family members was more cynical. As Israel Hlongwane explained in his TRC affidavit the killing of the Hlongwane brothers, Nkosinathi and Thulani (no relation), was to set a trap so that their older brother Sqanqi Hlongwane[18] could be eliminated.

> In fact, we[19] had been looking for Sqangi for a long time and each time we got to his home he was not there. We often found Thulani Hlongwane who was Sqangi's brother at Sqangi's home. We reported this to Zakhele Nkehli. Zakhele Nkehli told me that the only way to get Sqangi is to do something that would force Sqangi to come home. Zakhele Nkehli then suggested that Thulani should be killed in order to get Sqangi home. We went to Sqangi's house one night on two occasions at about 20.00 and 22.00 and again he was not home. [...] We found Thulani and other family members including his mother, a young boy of about 12 years of age and an infant carried on the mother's back present there. We surrounded the house and I knocked on the front door. When there was no response my friends started demolishing the windows using stones and bush knives. Thulani came out waving a bush knife in a drunken manner. Bhani grabbed him and pinned his arms from behind. Sphiwe asked him where Sqangi was and he only replied by swearing at us. Sphiwe then stabbed him once in the throat area and he fell down. [...] We failed to kill Sqangi because he did not come home to mourn the death of his brother Thulani. [... We] met Thulani's brother when he was coming from Sishi's shop in unit one. It was about lunch time on a clear day, [...] it was about three weeks after we had killed Thulani. We discussed among ourselves that we should kill this brother also in the hope that this may bring Sqangi to the wake [vigil]. We called to him to come to us but he refused. He started running and we chased him. We chased him for approximately 100

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[17] Mandla Xaba (18) , Welcome Zulu, Nkosinathi Hlongwane and Thulani Hlongwane were killed and Daniel Selepe (20) was seriously injured. The Shabanga and Hlongwane homes were torched.

[18] Sqangi Hlongwane was a well-known Hayco leader. He was one of the youth who had originally approached Israel Hlongwane asking why Inkatha supporters were visiting his home.

[19] Mdu Zuma, Bheki Dzanibe, Qabane Peng, Wanda Zakhele Langa (his cousin), Bhani Khambule, Silwane, Nkosiyamandaba Mkhwanisi, Ngqovela, Mfanozi Zwane, Sphiwe @ "Ghita", Mali 'Nyuka' Nene and Zitoto 'Hwanqa' Dlamini.

metres finally catching him in the road. He had been screaming for help as he ran. People in the neighbourhood just closed their doors. [...] stabbed him a number of times. (Hlongwane, TRC affidavit, S13 & S14).

These and other similar incidents begin to establish more explicitly the repertoires of violence associated with the second spatiality. Groups of armed youth went looking for activists at their house, killing family members in their place if they were not there. Attacks on the homes, families and persons of youth suspected of being Hayco members or even sympathetic to the UDF became more frequent (see Table 6). In many cases these attacks included the rape of the girls and women found in the house.[20] For the first time press reports suggested that the 'gang was heavily armed', undoubtedly the result of the Operation Marion (see also Hlongwane TRC affidavit, S18). Against this background the cycles of revenge that were to characterise the violence began to emerge.

One of the incidents that shocked the Mpumalanga community (see Focus group Edi1#2-2:2, Mth1#1-2:17), the attack on the Dladla family home in unit one, illustrated these new dynamics. The front door of the house was broken down by Hlongwane's group, searching for the 15-year-old son. That he had left the family home the previous year because of political differences with his mother, an Inkatha member, did not deter them. They proceeded to gang-rape the mother and her three teenage daughters. Before leaving they demanded money from the 102-year-old grandmother then set her alight, preventing the other family members from rescuing her and thus burning her alive (The Natal Mercury, 21 August 1988).[21]

This incident was recounted by most of the focus groups. Despite everything they

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[20] The rape that accompanied these attacks is one of the most unreported aspects of the violence. Even the TRC hearings were not able to uncover the full picture. Yet the oral interviews I have done indicate that rape was endemic during the early days of the violence (see chapter seven). It should be noted that this invisibility is not unique, and it is in fact the widespread reporting of the rape of women as in the former Yugoslavia that is unique (see Copelone, 1998).

[21] There was another attack in unit one the same night. Also looking for a Hayco member, Hlongwane's group petrol-bombed the house (the Dlamini family), taking up positions outside, they shot at the family members as they fled the burning building.

had seen and heard during the four years of political violence, this incident had stood out and remained in their minds. The act of young men raping older women is enormously significant in understanding the political violence as also including a gender and generational conflict. It can be seen as one of the most subversive attacks on the system of values that underpinned 'Zuluness' – respect for age, otherwise known as *ukuhlonipha*. As discussed in chapter four, while gender violence had long been a technique of disciplining women, these acts of raping older women extended beyond gender discipline. It was a patriarchal technique of violence used to its ultimate effect in a generational battle located in a strongly patriarchal society (see Cockburn, 1998:42-45).

A few days later Hlongwane's gang took revenge on the home of Mr Dlamini in unit three. His neighbour's son, Toto Dlamini (no relative) himself an Inkatha member and compatriot of Hlongwane, had been killed by a member of Hlongwane's gang in a quarrel over a girl (Hlongwane TRC affidavit, S24). Toto Dlamini's mother, after consulting a *sangoma*, had informed Nkehli that her son's death was the result of her neighbour, a 'fortune-teller' and a member of the UDF (Hlongwane TRC affidavit, S25). Nkehli instructed Hlongwane to kill the man. The attack was carried out on the night of Dlamini's vigil. Not only did they execute Mr Dlamini but when the youth entered the house they deliberately threw a petrol bomb in a room where two young children were sleeping (The Natal Mercury, 21 August 1988).

These attacks illustrate two other elements that coasted on the tailcoats of the violence. Accompanying the 'political' violence was theft. Many attacks, as in that on the Dladla household were accompanied by demands for money. Furthermore, there were opportunities for personal grudges to be settled. It was easy to deal with a 'problem' neighbour by labelling them UDF or Inkatha.

Youth who had fled Mpumalanga returned once they realised that their absence did not deter Inkatha from attacking their families (for example see focus group

interview, Mrs Mthembu, Mth1#1-2; interview, MN1#1-2). Upon their return they attempted to protect their neighbourhoods from attack and exacted revenge for the Inkatha attacks.

> … at the time when Inkatha raped, our children had ran away to Pinetown.[22] That is why they came back from Pinetown to defend. Because they heard that their mothers were being raped, houses burnt, and their fathers killed. … All that led to their coming back from Pinetown to die now, 'let us fight and die once', they said. (Focus group interview, Mrs Mthembu, Mth2#1-3:27)

These patterns of violence continued for the rest of 1987. Schooling was intermittent as many schools closed or male youth fled. Come end-of-year and many scholars were unprepared or unable to write exams, including matric.

Table 6: Violent Incidents in Mpumalanga Township - Late 1987 [23]

Month	No of Incidents	Deaths	Injury	Arson
September	4	4	1	1
October	3	5	2	1
November	20	17	7	4
December	21	7	12	5

As the months passed the number of incidents increased, as did the deaths (see Table 6). A closer look at the reported attacks enlightens us about the nature of the violence at this stage. During November and December, of the fifteen incidents where the age of the victim was mentioned, all were under thirty, the average age being twenty-one; the sex of the victim was mentioned in twenty-nine of thirty-two incidents, twenty-six of these were male. In nineteen of twenty-seven incidents the incident involved an attack on the victims' house. To recap: the violence involved the male youth and in the majority of cases included an

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[22] Pinetown was the white municipality next to the black township of Clermont.

[23] These figures are gleaned from newspaper reports. They are limited in that it is likely that not every incident was reported in the press, secondly, while I have tried to eliminate the same incident reported in more than one newspaper, there may be some duplication. Nevertheless, their purpose which they serve well, is to illustrate the increase in the number of incidents.

attack on the victim's house.[24]

There was very little active policing in response to these incidents. From the beginning of the violence the South African Police and KwaZulu Police were complicit in aiding and abetting Inkatha.

> At that time [1987] we had started working in co-operation with a gang of KwaZulu policeman known as *Amakesi*. They drove a light blue Nissan E-20 combi with a Melmoth NO registration ...consisted of Jabulani Makhathini ...., Khuluse who was also stationed at Mpumalanga ..., I do not know the details of the other policemen but there were enough of them to take up all the seat space in the combi. (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S13.6)

A few arrests were reported in the press, yet when they involved Inkatha members the intention behind them was only to placate the residents.

> Van Vuuren [from the SAP] assured them [Hlongwane's compatriots] that they had only arrested me to calm the people down who had seen me at the scene. He said that he would only detain me for a few days and there after I would be released. (Hlongwane, TRC affidavit, S17.6-17.7)

As indicated the technologies of violence changed. Initially those killed were stabbed with knives or spears but very soon guns became the weapons of choice. Responsibility rested with the Caprivi trainees who introduced firearms into the township. Hlongwane's group was supplied with a number of 7.65mm pistols that they shared amongst themselves. They obtained ammunition, as needed, from either Luthuli or the *Amakesi* (Hlongwane, TRC affidavit, S18).

6.3.1 The First Peace Talks

When the Hayco-affiliated youth fled Mpumalanga they found refugee with Archie Gumede (Natal UDF President) in Clermont. Gumede now entered the fray and attempted to mediate peace in Mpumalanga township (The Natal Witness, 11 September 1987). Towards the end of September 1987 discussions were held between Hayco members and Inkatha. Despite their earlier enthusiasm for taking on Inkatha Hayco was eager to end the violence. In contrast to the UDF delegation, which was from Mpumalanga Township, the Inkatha delegates were

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[24] The increase in incidents from November is likely to coincide with the 'return' of UDF-aligned youth to the township. It should be noted that the discussion in Jeffery (1997:62-67) suggests that there were in fact more incidents than recorded here in the previous months.

based in Ulundi - the national organiser of the youth brigade and representatives from the Department of Communications. None of them were associated with Operation Marion, and thus the talks had little impact.

The peace meetings broadened to include representatives from KwaMakhutha and Pietermaritzburg townships, also engulfed in violence. Finally on 6 October Gumede (on behalf of the UDF) and Musa Zondi (from the Inkatha Youth Brigade) signed a statement agreeing to end the killings (The Weekly Mail, 9-15 October 1987). Yet the ink was hardly dry on the agreement when newly returned Hayco members were chased out of the township by Inkatha members and the attacks and killings continued, with increased intensity in the following months (see Table 6).

Gumede followed up the truce with public statements calling for restraint. Buthelezi's response was to accuse the UDF and its affiliate the Natal Indian Congress of 'keeping black strife alive'. His statements included a personal attack on Archie Gumede (The Natal Mercury, 12 October 1987). Gumede continued his efforts, and delegates from Mpumalanga, KwaNdengesi and KwaMakhutha met with senior Inkatha leaders and KwaZulu MPs (City Press, 18 October 1987).

In early November, the 'peace delegates' met again to discuss progress on the 'cease-fire'. They proposed the formation of a body to monitor the cease-fire (The Natal Mercury, 5 November 1987). The delegates were to meet once more at the end of November. However, in the wake of the mounting body count all attempts at monitoring a cease-fire or talking peace faded away.

6.4 The Third Spatiality of Political Violence - Capturing Territory

During 1988 the spatiality of the political violence shifted once again. By this time the technologies and intensity of the political violence were firmly established. But in this third spatiality the political violence acquired its distinctive

spatial form whereby the spaces of everyday life became re-territorialised. The targeting of households had begun the process of ordering and remaking space. The cleansing and purifying of space by both Inkatha and the UDF resulted in those households that were perceived to have the 'wrong' politics being ordered to vacate the area. Through intimidation and killings, rigid boundaries between UDF and Inkatha areas - of a sort that would have been unthinkable previously - were constructed. Place acquired new meanings and a new identity - they became singular with the only meaning of any importance being who controlled the area. Groups of male youths located themselves in abandoned houses or moved into households near the borders. Their job was to secure these boundaries, to watch out for and repulse attacks.

Instead of focusing on particular households, the objective turned to the capturing of territory. In the process the violence intensified and a wider range of political actors were drawn in. Despite, or perhaps because of, the use of the Caprivi trainees and *kitskonstabels* the UDF were winning the sympathies of the residents. Large areas of the township became known as UDF areas; as Inkatha saw it, they were 'losing the war'. The township became divided into separate geographic zones that were no-go areas for residents who lived in areas known to support the other party (see Map 7). The meaning of these spaces was remade according to political affiliation (see chapter seven where this point is discussed in detail). In the process political affiliation became fixed according to residential area. This had numerous implications for residents' lives (see chapter seven).

In order to boost Inkatha's chances of winning territory special constables attached to the South African police were deployed (see chapter five). This had the immediate effect of strengthening Inkatha's firepower and intensifying the political violence. Women became involved through protesting at the actions of these special constables (see below). Much of the public activity during 1988 concentrated on removing the special constables from Mpumalanga and replacing them with an impartial security force.

Map 7: Mpumalanga Township Showing Different Sections as Controlled by Different Political Groups

Table 7: Incidents Associated with Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, 1988 [25]

Month	No of Incidents	Deaths	Injury	Arson
January	21	13	11	12
February	5	3	2	1
March	10	4	2	0
April	8	4	7	0
May	6	7	2	0
June	19	8	8	9
July	12	6	10	3
August	22	16	12	3
September[26]	23	9	22	3
October[27]	48	22	38	27
November	45	47	55	10
December	22	26	15	10

The killings and attacks continued into 1988. An analysis of the reported incidents suggests that the distinctive repertoires and forms of the violence remain unchanged. The victims and perpetrators were still primarily young and male. Most of the attacks took place under cover of darkness, a cover frequently deepened by the deliberate switching off of the electricity supply between 5.00pm and 8.00pm (Sunday Tribune, 28 August 1988). However, the shifting spatialities did mean that the number of women attacked slowly increased over the year - by September slightly more women were reported injured than before. While the victims were still overwhelming male, the number of female victims increased four hundred percent from the previous year. After a drop in the second quarter the figures rose steadily from June, with an enormous increase from October through to November (see Table7). By September the press reported that Mpumalanga was the worst-hit township in the Province (Sunday Tribune, 18

[25] These figures are gleaned from newspaper reports. The same reservations apply.
[26] Official figures released by police unrest reports (The Natal Witness, 5 October 1988).
[27] With the exception of injuries these are official figures released by police unrest reports (City Press, 13 November 1988).

September 1988), which seemed to coincide with the redeployment of the *kitskonstabels*, and an attempt on the part of Inkatha to flush out the comrades and 'regain' the territory lost to them. An incident on 12 November illustrates: a large group of about twenty-five men scoured unit two (a UDF-area) knocking on doors and shouting to the comrades to come out, when they did leave the houses they were blasted with shotguns. In this incident about twenty-five people were shot including five who were killed (The Natal Witness, 15 November 1988).

The Caprivi trainees were still playing an active role in the violence. Bhekisisa Khumalo described the role of the Caprivi trainees in late 1987 and 1988:

> ... I received an instruction from Madlanduna that now we will actually be deployed at Mpumalanga Police ... we did get those police certificates ... When we were here the work that we were doing was night duties and [indistinct] duties. However at times Madlanduna would actually come and take us to do some other jobs because he told us that we mustn't forget that we are still with him even if we are working with the police. ... At times we used to patrol at night but then we did not patrol the IFP areas, the areas which were filled with the comrades, strongholds of the comrades. At times we would jump off and sjambok them and get them with whatever weapon we had. At times we used to shoot. ... when you arrive and people are in a group where you actually scatter and run away and then you just shoot everywhere and you don't even see who you're shooting, ... there were plenty [of these incidents] ... My aim was to [?], that in these areas, because the areas that were filled with the comrades, is that the comrades mustn't just sit freely and think that because they are on their stronghold they must just sit freely and just do as they please because their freedom means that it was easy for them to plan attacking us but when we actually tamper with them they wouldn't have enough time, they would actually think and be pre-occupied, think about defending instead of attacking. ... (Khumalo, TRC Amnesty Hearing, 11 August 1998:12).

Despite their interventions Inkatha was still under pressure from the UDF, both in Mpumalanga and elsewhere. To combat this, Buthelezi urged that more men were trained (see chapter five). The recruitment of Inkatha-supporting men as special constables, *kitskonstabels* or *oblom* (as they were known in the townships) in early 1988 was in response to these pressures. Amongst those recruited from Mpumalanga were Hlongwane, a group brought by Mrs Xulu from Woody Glen and a number of the Caprivi trainees (Hlongwane, TRC Affidavit, S26). The intensification of violence from June 1988 (see Table 7) was a direct result of the redeployment of the special constables in Mpumalanga.

In February, when the schools reopened the impact of the violence could be seen

in the decreased school enrolment of male pupils. Instead of a fifty-fifty ratio, in most Mpumalanga schools boys were reduced to twenty-five percent of the pupils (Sunday Tribune, 14 February 1988). Furthermore, schools were no longer free of violence. Children were arming themselves, and there was the first reported killing of a pupil at school. At Ukuza High School in unit three men dragged nineteen year-old Vusi Gqaza, of unit two, out of the classroom and shot him dead in the playground.[28] The unstable situation in the schools affected all pupils, not only Hayco members (see chapter seven). As a result of the fighting many pupils had not been able, during the past year, to attend school continuously. In the new year they faced difficulties registering at schools in Mpumalanga. Some principals refused to register pupils without an Inkatha membership card. Many of these pupils fled Mpumalanga, hoping to escape the violence and enrol in a school outside the township. There they too faced a number of problems - schools in other areas were already full and were reluctant to admit pupils fleeing from violence-torn areas concerned that they would bring the violence with them.

The distinctive spatialised form of the violence ensured that routes around or across spaces were particularly vulnerable. As both parties demarcated areas as belonging to particular groups so transport routes became contested. In February there were a number of incidents where passengers were dragged from taxis and killed, and taxis ferrying passengers were shot at. The Mpumalanga Taxi Association arranged to meet with Inkatha to discuss an alleged hit-list of 'bad elements who should be eliminated' (City Press, 21 February 1988). By August there were more frequent attacks on bus passengers and vehicles (The Natal Mercury, 8 August 1988; The Daily News, 12 August 1988). In many cases roads served as boundaries between UDF and Inkatha areas. It had also become impossible to travel across an area perceived to be affiliated to the party that wasn't the same as in your own area. Unit one north, unit four and Woody Glen (see Map 7) were perceived as Inkatha areas; unit one south and unit three were

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[28] This incident is referred to in an interview with Nonto (Nond1#1-2;4). It is cited in chapter seven.

UDF areas; and unit two was keenly contested with small pockets of Inkatha and UDF supporters scattered throughout. Taxi-drivers were forced to find ways to negotiate these boundaries

> Taxis from Pinetown were not yet divided at that time. ... If you are from unit three and the taxi goes to unit one first, you must tell the driver that, ... 'let me get out, you will pick me up when you come back'. The drivers already knew that. If you were near Mcoyi they would ask 'Is there no one from unit three who is a comrade?' 'I am here.' 'Get out we will pick you up when we come back'. (Focus group, Mth1#1-2:30-31)

This trend had intensified by October. Mpumalanga's urban design (see chapter three) worked in favour of the UDF and against Inkatha. The UDF controlled those areas of the township through which the main access routes passed and thus were able to control access to the Inkatha areas of unit one north and unit four which lay beyond the UDF areas (see Map 7). Nkehli complained that they were not able to get to work as the through-roads were blocked by UDF areas. The violence, he said, had increased absenteeism 'people were losing their jobs as they were scared to move around freely in and outside of their areas' (Echo, 4 October 1988). In response Inkatha was having to ferry workers to work everyday.

As Table 7 indicates the violence in Mpumalanga intensified dramatically from August/September 1988. In the main UDF youth 'fighting back' were responsible. However, there was also the infamous 'cemetery massacre' where five people were killed and numerous others injured after an Inkatha group of one hundred armed men ambushed a UDF funeral (The Weekly Mail, 12 August 1988, focus group interview, Mrs Mthembu, Mth2#2-3:18). The 'success' of the UDF can be seen both in Nkehli's need to organise a peace rally at Mpumalanga Training College on 9 October and in the UDF's ability to stop and delay the buses bringing Inkatha members from outlying areas to the rally (The Natal Witness, 10 October 1988). By the end of October Nkehli was complaining that the UDF was trying to drive Inkatha out of Mpumalanga. To support his assertion he provided a list of ten Inkatha members who had been killed recently (The Natal Witness, 20 October 1988). In October more *kitskonstabels* were deployed in Mpumalanga to bolster the firepower of Inkatha and ensure that UDF supporters

were driven out.

6.5 Women, *kitskonstabels* and protests

In this situation of escalating violence, where political affiliations and identities were being determined according to residential areas and public life was controlled and defined by young men (see chapters four and seven), women used their gender-specific networks to intervene in an attempt to redefine the terrain.

Women were just as interested as men in the safety of their area, and they undertook whatever action was necessary to ensure this. But they worked differently from men and, in the process, challenged the reconstruction of the street as a site of masculine power relations. Men were interested in protecting the boundaries of 'their area' and if possible expanding them. Women supported men in these activities by providing food, resources for weapons and the like, but their primary activities were aimed at ensuring that the space within these boundaries was safe.

> That time we were always alert, you find that whatever is happening women were always outside watching what was happening … when they're coming to attack us they always shout, 'you must watch out, there they comes', and we run out and we lock our houses and we're in the street. Everything happens, we were outside, and see what's going on … (Focus group interview, Edith's group, Edi2#2-2:2)

As argued in chapter one, the production of space is imbued with power relations. The territories controlled by either Inkatha or UDF (or the police who moved across these spaces) were also reconstructed as sites of masculine power. Boys – whether Inkatha or UDF – patrolled and guarded the street, challenged strangers to declare their politics, and asserted their gender power by proposing or abducting young women and raping them (see above, also chapter seven). As the masculine protectors of this space they protected the houses from attack, and guarded the integrity of women – albeit selectively. Through their protests, women challenged this construction of space.

There are numerous examples of women using a strategy of surveillance and, through both their presence and their role as observers, trying to limit the violence

around them. They would gather, singly or in small groups, outside their houses to watch what was happening in the street, or at a high point to observe what was happening across the valley in other areas. In these places women often confronted the police over their actions.

In these short moments women challenged the use of the street as a physical place of killing. As Westwood and Radcliffe (1993:22) have pointed out, drawing on the Latin American context, the presence of women's bodies in sites from which they are excluded can in itself become a political act. Women's presence in the street subverted the dominant construction of the space. They provided an oppositional discourse to the power relations within that site, partly by using a discourse grounded in their identity as mother. This was powerful at a number of levels. First, all parties recognised it as an authentic identity. Mothers have a legitimate concern over the safety of their children and so their presence, while subversive, was legitimate and hence unthreatening. Second, it did not overtly challenge gender power relations and present a feminist challenge to the UDF comrades.

Other elements like religion[29] and cultural practices were also drawn into the construction of this alternative discourse. To illustrate I present two stories:

> Mrs M: I remember one day when we were exposing ourselves[30] to the police in the street.
>
> Mrs N: After having arrested a child just because he had come to the comrades' area. … Then we took off our clothes and we protruded our buttocks at them and we insulted them on the streets. We had turned to be like those people in Saylom. We were like mad people. (Focus group interview, Mrs Mthembu's group, Mth1#2-2:15-16)

> Mrs S: I remember one day three white policemen came. … [T]here was a boy who

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[29] With its mission background Hammarsdale has always been a strong Christian area, women have always constituted the majority of church members (see Laredo, 1968).

[30] She uses the word *sidunusela* which means dropping their panties and protruding their buttocks. Historically this action is associated with Zulu women, they use it to indicate disrespect towards someone or to show that an action is wrong. The historical and cultural context in which this is used is when men are stick-fighting and they continue to beat a man who is down. Women will *sidunusela* to stop this action that is wrong (pers comm., Professor Sihawu Ngubane).

was running away. … He got inside, closed the door and sat inside. They [the police] ran there running and shouting saying that he got in there, inside that house. … I asked [in *isiZulu*] the girl who was outside 'did he get here?' and she said 'yes'.[31] And then one of the policemen who was asking took a gun. … He took out bullets and loaded it. Then the other one … when he came he said, 'open here', he told them to open here, he kicked the door saying 'open the door'. I then said that he is asleep because he works at night. He said, 'is he asleep, why doesn't he wake up? Knock hard so that he can get up'. I said [in *isiZulu*] 'you are asleep inside there, keep on sleeping'. He said, 'alright, he does not want to open'. I said, 'he is asleep'. Then he said, 'alright I'll shoot'. 'Wait! Wait! I'm telling Jesus first.' He said, 'alright', he went up near the wall there, he said, 'alright, tell Jesus'. Then I quickly said, 'Oh Jesus come because this man is shooting us! Jesus come now! Jesus come now! Now! Now! I look upon you.' Then I said, 'come and shoot'. And he said 'no'. He came down … and called the other one who was guarding the window that side. He said, 'come back'. They came back. He said, 'don't shoot'. I said, 'come on work. I'm hot to Jesus. I'm hot to Jesus now, now, now, now. I see Jesus's face face. Come on work. Shoot.' They kicked the door. The boy got up [from the bed] and rubbed his eyes] and they said 'alright, mother move out of the way'. They got out and left. I said, 'thank you lord, oh I'm seeing you now'. (Focus group interview, Mrs Mkhize's group, Mkh1#2-2:14-17)

More directly challenging to these constructions of space and their accompanying gender power relations were women's protests. These were not always part of an organised political movement, but what distinguishes them from the examples described above is, firstly, that they involved a sizable and concerted group of women rather than a single woman or a small cluster acting on its own, and secondly, that the women were taking a grievance beyond their immediate neighbourhood. Through these protests women attempted to both regain control over, and to extend the activity spaces of, their everyday life (see Massey, 1995b:45-85). In the process they created new social relationships and redefined existing ones.

The first intervention in March 1988 was a regional one, involving women from different townships and coordinated by the Natal Organisation of Women (NOW). The regional UDF/Cosatu leadership, who were about to embark on peace talks with Inkatha, had been detained. The peace talks being held in Pietermaritzburg were initiated by Cosatu, the UDF, and the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce. A delegation of approximately fifty women from the townships of

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[31] Here the story-teller shifts between *IsiZulu* and English. When she talks to the girl she uses *IsiZulu*, but when she talks to the police or wants to be understood by them, as when she prays, she uses English

Mpumalanga, KwaNdengezi, KwaMakhuta and Pietermaritzburg presented a memorandum expressing their concerns to the Natal Judge President John Didcott at the Pietermaritzburg supreme court (The Daily News, 2 March 1988). This and other similar interventions organised by NOW impacted upon and fragmented dominant white discourses on the violence, and illustrated that the violence was not only a male issue. While the protest projected women's voices into public discourses about the violence it had little impact on the local spaces of everyday life.

It was the activities of the *kitskonstabels* that pushed the women of Mpumalanga into the public domain, in the first of their ongoing attempts to redefine the terrain of public life in Mpumalanga township. Their actions were governed by local realities and aimed at resolving the situation in Mpumalanga township rather than, as in the earlier protest, 'violence in the Province'. Despite the shifting political terrain and locations of power in the township the women still operated within the 'old frameworks' and directed their petitioning to the township mayor. Their actions continued to provide legitimacy for the township council and the pre-violence structures and networks in a situation where governance no longer had any meaning. To cite the Mayor:

> There is nothing my council can do to resolve the conflict. It's impossible. The fighting is taking place under cover of darkness. On the surface everything is quiet and fine, but the next day you hear that so many people have been killed and so many houses have been burnt. In that kind of situation where would you start? (RD Sishi, cited in Pace, November 1988, p.65)

It wasn't long after the arrival of the *kitskonstabels* that a group of women went to see the township mayor Rodger Sishi to demand their withdrawal. They claimed that the *kitskonstabels* were responsible for much of the violence (The Natal Mercury, 22 October 1988). When the promised meeting to discuss the violence in the township failed to materialise, they staged another protest over the *kitskonstabels*. In early November, in an attempt to get the issue addressed, they camped at the petrol garage owned by the mayor, asking him to make an

appointment on their behalf to see the police district commandant. When the police refused the request they decided to seek legal advice (The Natal Witness, 3 November 1988). Within three days five hundred residents had signed a petition for the *kitskonstabels* to be removed and replaced by the South African Defence Force (The Natal Witness, 5 November 1988). According to residents the *kitskonstabels*, described as 'gangs armed with shotguns', were conducting a reign of terror against them (City Press, 6 November 1988). The contents of affidavits made to Legal Resource Centre lawyers correlates closely with the description given by Khumalo in his evidence to the TRC (above) (The Natal Witness, 5 November 1988).[32] At first the police refused to respond. But after a meeting between the police and the Mpumalanga Township Council on the 8 November, they agreed that twelve of the *kitskonstabels* who had been recruited from the Mpumalanga area itself would be withdrawn. The others, the police said, would stay until Inkatha and the UDF discussed peace (The Natal Witness, 9 November 1988). Despite being a councillor Nkehli did not attend the meeting. Inkatha did not oppose the deployment of the *kitskonstabels*, arguing that there had been a reduction in the violence since their deployment. In response Nkehli held a rally in support of the *kitskonstabels* (The Natal Witness, 10 November 1988). A further irony was that the police were represented at the rally by Major Deon Terreblanche from the Pietermaritzburg riot squad. He was in collusion with the *kitskonstabels* and often supplied them with guns and ammunition.

In spite of the removal of these twelve the intensity of violence in Mpumalanga did not abate, with the press describing it as the 'bloodiest in the province (The Natal Witness, 7 December 1988). The number of internal refugees leaving Mpumalanga increased. On 15 November a delegation of women from UDF-areas again went to the mayor requesting that *oblom* should be removed and replaced by the SADF. Sishi planned a community meeting at the Mpumalanga Stadium to discuss the issue; it was postponed once and rescheduled for the 4

[32] Amongst the official duties of the special constables was guarding the houses of officials, always affiliated to Inkatha, from attack by the UDF-aligned youth.

December, finally never taking place (The Natal Mercury, 23 November 1988). The last week of November was much quieter, with the number of killings and attacks decreasing.

To counter this, Nkehli called a meeting for 11 December at which a petition requesting that the special constables remain in Mpumalanga would be handed over. In defiance of the geographical division of the township and the UDF no-go zones he arranged bus collection points, to pick-up residents for the rally, throughout the township (Echo, 8 December 1988). According to the press the rally was attended by five hundred Inkatha supporters, Nkehli claimed that 13000 had signed the petition (The Natal Witness, 12 December 1988).

The relationship between Nkehli and the *kitskonstabels* was well-known. Many residents living in UDF-areas felt that if Nkehli could be removed the UDF would be able to subdue Inkatha and the violence would end. He invoked dread in the UDF sections of the township, both his powers and *umuthi* were feared and respected which had created an aura of invincibility around him. There had been numerous plans to assassinate him, all failing in the face of his powerful *muthi* (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:12). On 19 December Nkehli was seriously injured after his car came under fire and smashed into an embankment. His sister was killed and his wife seriously injured (The Natal Witness, 21 December 1988). Shot in the neck, Nkehli was paralysed from the neck down. Residents in UDF-areas held street parties believing that he had been killed. In retaliation the UDF-area of unit three was attacked by a large group of Inkatha-supporting youths. A caller to *The Natal Witness* described the situation

> Crowds of youths have just run past my front door. The house next door to me is burning. I am not sure if there are people inside. I can hear shooting, plenty of shooting. I am too frightened to go outside. (The Natal Witness, 21 December 1988)

In the aftermath of the attack on Nkehli violence continued unabated. Perhaps emboldened by the success of the attack on Nkehli UDF-youth attacked a number of houses guarded by special constables. But Inkatha also took its revenge. Over

the Christmas weekend six men were killed and another ten people injured in the fighting according to official figures (the mayor of Mpumalanga claimed that the figures were much higher) (The Daily News, 28 December 1988). In an attack similar to the one on unit three, armed men moved through Georgedale (also a UDF-area) shooting and killing seven men. Residents fled taking refuge in a nearby forest (The Natal Witness, 29 December 1988).

Once again women from UDF-areas intervened. About fifty women went to Rodger Sishi, again foregrounding the removal of the *kitskonstabels* and asking him to intercede to achieve this and end the violence (The Natal Mercury, 29 December 1988). Sishi responded by promising that the township council would attempt to bring together Inkatha and UDF, reviving the earlier peace initiative that had been put on hold after Nkehli was shot. He publicly joined the call to remove the *kitskonstabels* and replace them with members of the SADF as a first step towards peace (The Daily News, 29 December 1988). The meeting was cancelled after Mrs Xulu, the newly elected KLA member for Mpumalanga (replacing Nkehli), announced that she had not agreed to participate and that officials from Ulundi were not supportive of the meeting (The Natal Witness, 3 January 1989). Nevertheless, the campaign bore fruit when in early January 1989 it was agreed to remove the *kitskonstabels* from the township (The Natal Witness, 3 January 1989).[33]

In these and other protests women were not acting in such a way as to renegotiate gender power relations. In many of these incidents (and others that were to come, see below) women acted through men. It was strategic for them to do these things, it was felt that they would have more chance of success. Outsiders (like senior police officials, attorneys) were seen as more likely to respond to women requesting assistance. Local men were occupied with defence, or else they inhabited the drunken 'don't care' world and would have been useless anyway.

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[33] This should be read against the broader discussions between the security forces and Inkatha over the future of Operation Marion (see chapter five).

Mr Z: They [women] had a role, very important role, because they went to places like Durban, Pietermaritzburg. They were mostly worried about policing in the area … I think they played a very important role. In some cases they won …

Mrs N: [Mr] Khanyile lived here inside and he could see the situation, but in this area it was not going to be clearly understood if men came with complaints about this area here. He then spoke to the women saying 'women there is this department which can help you when you report that things are like this … I can go with you and leave you there'. (Focus group interview, Mrs Mthembu's group, Mth2#2-3:9-11)

New social relations of power and exclusion maintained the boundaries of both the Inkatha and the UDF areas. While their construction had challenged patriarchal relations grounded in cultural practices like *hlonipha* (see chapter four) they were still essentially spaces of male power. Women challenged these constructions as well as what happened in those sites, verbally and through their physical presence. Furthermore, through their association with NOW (see below as well) they entered new spatial locations. While in UDF areas older men had become marginalised, the extension of women's role as mother (see above) allowed them to redefine their relationship with the youth.[34]

6.6 From Defending the Borders to Invading Territory

Mpumalanga township entered 1989 with the reputation as the most unstable area in the province. As in the later half of 1988 much of the public activity of the year focussed on the activities of the security forces, particularly the *kitskonstabels* and later in the year the riot squad attached to the South African Police. Policing of the township shifted from the SAP to the KwaZulu Police, frequently assisted by Major Deon Terreblanche's notorious unit eight of the SAP's riot squad. Women were active in organising and participating in these protests.

Towards the end of the year the modality of the violence changed again. It shifted from being about attacks on individuals and households within a territory identified as belonging to either Inkatha or the UDF to being characterised by battles over territory fought by large numbers of male youth. The availability of

[34] The relationship of women, particularly older women to the youth is discussed further in chapter seven.

sophisticated weapons and security force assistance to Inkatha made these battles bloodier. These large battles turned into invasions of the 'others' territory. In some instances women and children were evacuated in advance, and in others, they fled in the wake of the battle. Much of the fighting, particularly towards the end of the year was concentrated in unit three and unit four, as first the UDF 'won over' unit four and then Inkatha fiercely contested this 'defeat'. Georgedale was also the site of continuous violence and unit one south was subject to a fierce invasion (see Map 7).

Alongside these attacks were the efforts to negotiate peace, both at the regional level and local level. By the end of the year, in the wake of these battles, a cease-fire agreement was signed in Mpumalanga.

Table 8: Incidents Associated with Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, 1989 [35]

Month	No of Incidents	Deaths	Injury	Arson	Battles
January	25	6	7	28	
February		26[36]			
March	7	7		1	
April		6+			
May	18	24	7	11	
June[37]	19	16	10	7	
July	11	36	3	3	1 - unit two and unit four
August	10	14	3	3	
September	12	13	9	6	
October	20+	46 [38]	10	6 [39]	2 - unit four & Georgedale, and unit three and four
November	19	24	4	19+	2 - unit three and unit one, and unit three/four
December	5	4	2		1 - unit three

Throughout 1989 the larger hand of the state, through covert activities, machinated behind the scenes in an attempt to ensure the success of the Inkatha-linked forces. In terms of policing support, Inkatha suffered a defeat when the *kitskonstabels* were withdrawn in early January. Initially there was a decrease in the number of deaths, but this also gave the UDF-youth opportunities to attack Inkatha-supporting households (see Table 8). The issue was a political hot-potato

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[35] These figures are gleaned from newspaper reports. The same reservations about omissions and duplications apply.

[36] Official figures (The Daily News, 9 March 1989).

[37] Official figures of deaths are 8 and injuries are 13 (The Natal Mercury, 19 July 1989).

[38] Official figures of deaths are 30, (The Natal Witness, 21 November 1989).

[39] It is impossible to know how many houses were damaged in October and November, some newspapers report that one hundred houses were gutted in the attack on 22 November (The Natal Witness, 23 November 1989), others that 1000 houses had been damaged during 1989 (The Natal Witness, 30 November 1989).

between the two sides. Nqobizizwe Nkehli (Zakhele Nkehli's brother) claimed that since the withdrawal of the *kitskonstabels* fifteen houses had been attacked by the UDF and called for their return. Sishi responded that the number of deaths had decreased, and if the December peace meeting had gone ahead there would have been the opportunity to discuss these problems (The Natal Witness, 5 January 1989).

Once again attempts to 'talk peace' were thwarted. The UDF youth leader Bruce Buthelezi was detained on his way to a peace meeting with Inkatha (Interview, BB1#1-1). The 11 January meeting was cancelled. However, as the situation worsened, both Nkehli and Sishi decided to continue with the talks despite the detentions.

Despite the violence residents' efforts to bring about peace continued. A youth leader from the Pentecostal Holiness Church 'Thy Kingdom Come' organised a twenty-four hour prayer vigil at the Mpumalanga Training College. He distributed pamphlets door-to-door, and said that he

> ... was shocked at the number of houses that have been burnt down or vacated. Hundreds of people have fled from the area. Houses have no roofs, windows are smashed, doors are gone. It's unbelievable. You see hardly anyone outside. The shops are empty. You used to see Zionists going from house to house, but not any more. (The Daily News, 10 January 1989)

The prayer vigil was attended by only fifteen people. People expressed the view that if they attended they would be attacked. Public meetings were easy pickings. Press reports indicated that since the special constables were withdrawn on 30 December, thirty-five houses had been attacked (for the period 30 December - 9 January) (The Natal Witness, 12 January 1989).

On the 1 February the policing of Mpumalanga was handed over to the KwaZulu Police from the South African Police (The Natal Witness, 24 January 1989). The special constables who were attached to the SAP were to be removed. These

transfers of responsibilities need to be read against the national security discussions. By the end of 1988 serious tensions had emerged between the SADF and Inkatha over Operation Marion (see chapter five). Inkatha was complaining of insufficient support in concealing operatives who were facing legal action, while the South African Police were not prepared to assist beyond arranging bail and then helping to conceal bail-hopping members. As part of the way forward all Caprivi trainees, including those sent for special constable training were demobilised into the KwaZulu Police.

At first, the change in policing had little effect on the violence, with ten people killed in first ten days of February (The Natal Witness, 10 February 1989). However, by the end of the month community leaders were praising the KwaZulu Police, reporting that the violence had greatly subsided and that 'peace is now prevailing in the area' (Echo, 2 March 1989). Strangely enough, Lieutenant Sipho Makhatini, implicated by the Caprivi trainees in assisting them with their covert activities, was the station commander.

The drop in the number of incidents continued into March. However, two incidents towards the end of the month targeted community leaders involved in the peace talks. Firstly, the mayor's son was shot and killed and secondly, Rejoice Mcoyi's house was attacked and burnt down. Themba Sishi had no history of political involvement, and popular opinion suggested that his death was a way to 'get at' the mayor. Mcoyi was a prominent UDF and MPURA member, also involved in the peace talks (Echo, 30 March 1989). Many had thought that the relative quiet was evidence that the violence was over, these incidents showed otherwise.

The state's role in the violence is also demonstrated by the piggy-in-the-middle role played by regular South African Defence Force troops. South African Defence Force troops were used in many parts of the country as part of the state's armoury to quell 'unrest' and they were a key piece of the state's WHAM strategy

including the NSMS and JMC networks. Their role in Mpumalanga also demonstrates the tensions between different groups within the security forces, as well as, between the South African state and KwaZulu government.

At various times SADF troops were deployed to Mpumalanga as one strategy to subdue the political violence. But their power was limited, the SADF troops were obliged to work under the authority of the police. Furthermore, their deployment, was always contested by the KwaZulu government who demanded that they alone should be responsible for security in the area. Moreover, ordinary residents were also active agents, demanding that professional and neutral security forces be deployed. They intervened in their own local way when this didn't happen; organising protests and drawing in other outside groups (eg Legal Resources Centre, Black Sash, other UDF affiliates) to support them and publicise the events.

The events described below evoke the theoretical points discussed in chapter five. Particularly pertinent is the role that the 'struggle from below' plays in state policies and processes, and furthermore, that the contestation of state power, both organised and unorganised, disrupts 'the state's capacity to control its own destiny' (Posel, 1991:21). The power play and dynamics between these different groups 'within' the state security system (ie SADF, SAP, KZP, and more covert forces like military intelligence) enabled those on the ground (both UDF-linked and Inkatha) to find and exploit the spaces in between to their own advantage in this bloody battle.

In early April 1989 following the removal of African SADF soldiers from the township at the request of Buthelezi, there were further attacks (The New African, 9-11 April 1989).

> At one stage we were guarded by soldiers who took no risks. Mischief-makers from both sides were punished. It was rumoured that the chief minister [Buthelezi] said they must go because they were not doing their work. ... Women approached soldiers, I was also there, and asked them not to ... At 9 pm we were there trying to prevent them from leaving. We obstructed their way. ... Just a day after they had left, we were attacked, or was it two days later? We were attacked, beaten up. (Focus group, Semelane Group,

Sme2#2-3:30).

Subsequent to their departure, houses were looted and burnt by Inkatha. The Cape Coloured Corps who were deployed in their place were not allowed to intervene without the permission of the South African Police. Furthermore, KwaZulu Police station commander Lt Makhathini, well-liked by the community, was replaced by Lt Ncube. By the end of April the *kitskonstabels* were back in Mpumalanga, in the interim they had been transferred to the KwaZulu Police (The Natal Witness, 26 April 1989). Their return brought more than one hundred women to the Mpumalanga police station in protest.

> We women were there. We were complaining about the special constables *oblom*. Because they were killing in broad daylight, shooting people. … Women were full in the police station that day, we went to the station commander complaining, still complaining, asking the station commander to tell the [unclear] that we don't want special constables. … Me and Mrs Mvelase were take in and the police said we were ring-leaders. 'How can all these women come to be here?' Because the other women are from unit one, and other from two, the others, some from three and four. 'How could all the location know about the meeting here'? And I went up and said 'me!' [Laughter] I phoned Mrs Mvelase and said tell unit three and four should come to the police station, and I phone Mrs Nene and said tell the women to come to the police station. That's how we all came together here … (Second focus group interview, Connie's group, Con2#2-2:6-7).

According to the police the *kitskonstabels* had been brought to the township because a big prayer meeting was planned. They were to remain until 'things are back to normal'.

The women were not prepared to leave it at that. They went back to the police station in larger numbers on Thursday, 4 May after a youth in unit four had been killed by the *kitskonstabels*. As with their previous protests, they directed their complaints through legitimate channels of governance consulting with the mayor, Rodger Sishi (The Natal Witness, 6 May 1989). Their complaint was that since the *kitskonstabels* arrived in mid-April violence in the township had once again increased. The following weekend (6/7 May) the women once again marched to the police station. Then they held a press conference, also attended by Black Sash and Legal Resources Centre, where they outlined a series of incidents involving the *kitskonstabels*. Their strategy was successful and the following week it was announced that the *kitskonstabels* had been withdrawn (The Natal Witness, 13 May 1989).

On 6 May Zakhele Nkehli died of pneumonia in Edendale Hospital, he was thirty-two years old. Nkehli's death heightened tensions in Mpumalanga. Inkatha youth patrolled sections of the township, threatening comrades that they were coming later to avenge his death (The Natal Witness, 12 May 1989). Those residents who refused to contribute towards Nkehli's funeral were singled out for attack. His funeral, which in contrast to UDF-funerals had no restrictions imposed, was attended by eight to ten thousand mourners.

Despite regional and national peace talks between Cosatu/UDF and Inkatha in May and June the violence continued in Mpumalanga. Nqobizizwe Nkehli had stepped into his late brother shoes and was now a member of Inkatha's Central Committee and a member of the Inkatha negotiating team.

The *kitskonstabels* might have been withdrawn but within days they were replaced by the South African Police riot squad. Again they were accused of being partisan. On 22 June about fifty women went to the Mpumalanga police station to complain that they were siding with Inkatha members and involved in petrol-bombing houses. Two of the delegates met with the station commander Lt SJ Ndlovu but when senior members of the SAP riot unit arrived they ordered the women into the police station and told the journalists to leave the area. According to the South African Police the allegations were 'so far-fetched it doesn't deserve comment' (The Natal Witness, 23 June 1989).

By July 1989 the township's units, with the exception of two and four were neatly aligned to either Inkatha or the UDF. However in unit two and four there were

> small sections of UDF and Inkatha supporters - sometimes just five or six houses at a time, or different streets ... neither side had been able to oust the other as the numbers were fairly equally balanced ... (Roy Ainslie, cited in The Natal Witness, 19 July 1989).

The sudden surge in violence in mid-July when twenty-five people were killed over the weekend of 16 and 17 July was attributed to this situation (see Table 7).

Amongst those killed was the brother of Rejoice Mcoyi, he was driving her car at the time (The Natal Witness, 18 July 1989). Residents barricaded the streets with car wrecks, fighting took place in the remaining 'mixed' areas of units two and four. This was the first of the battles that was to characterise the second half of 1989. The police, in response, sent reinforcements and established strong-points at strategic places. Women went to the police station threatening to blockade areas of Mpumalanga in order to protect them from attack (Unrest Monitoring Project records). According to Rejoice Mcoyi after the KZP took over the township in February everything was quiet, then they brought in a special unit and the South African Police began to monitor the township, the situation then deteriorated rapidly which was why the women marched on the police station (The New African, 24 July 1989).

Mpumalanga was not the only township to experience renewed violence in July. Reports of a resurgence in violence from most areas neatly coincided with national-level peace talks (The Weekly Mail, 15 September 1989). This led many to question the coincidence. In response senior members of the KwaZulu Police toured the township to review the situation. They launched a crime prevention exercise in Mpumalanga, arresting people on charges of public violence, erecting illegal roadblocks etc. In total eight were arrested (The Natal Witness, 25 July 1989). Incidents of violence decreased in August and September, with the number of deaths back to the three per week average. A review of newspaper reports shows that by late 1989 a broader group of actors were involved; more women were amongst the victims and most of the men were in their thirties. While the youth were still the main activists, no resident could avoid the violence.

In late 1989 Duloxolo Luthuli was once again deployed to Mpumalanga.[40]

> The situation was quite bad because Zakhele Nkehli had been killed. There was a vacuum that was left open. MZ Khumalo said I should go and assist there, because the IFP was being wiped out in the area. [My objectives] was to rebuild the IFP by trying to control the attacks, to regain the places or the area that had been taken by the UDF.

[40] By this stage the Caprivi trainees had been demobilised into the KwaZulu Police (see chapter five).

(Luthuli, TRC Amnesty Hearing, 7 April 1998, p.20)

From early October the death toll began to rise again. The hot-spots were unit four and Georgedale - Georgedale a strong UDF area and unit four still closely mixed. This round of tensions had their roots in a series of incidents in late September. A taxi taking people from unit two to work in Mophela[41] was attacked as it passed through the Inkatha area of unit one north. In response Mophela residents launched an attack on unit one, this was followed by a counter-attack against Zondi's shebeen allegedly by the KwaZulu Police. Community organisations and residents attempted to renew peace talks (The Natal Witness, 22 September 1989) with little effect. Fighting started in earnest in response to the attack on a wedding party at the home of a comrade. The following day (Sunday, 1 October) the comrades retaliated.

> ... we planned for the whole night to attack unit four, we wanted to do away with Inkatha once and for all. Ja. And that day there was other group that we were waiting for that was supposed to come from a place called Mophela that was going to assist us. And that group never came, it was around eleven in the morning, we said, 'no if they don't come let's go and attack Inkatha'. By the time we came to Inkatha, Inkatha was ready for us. They whistled, they had whistles and then they started shooting. And most of people died in that fighting. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#1-2:14).

On Monday there were pitched battles when 'opposing armies totalling about 800 armed men squared up to resolve the situation (The Weekly Mail, 6 October 1989). Tents were pitched in unit four to house the Inkatha supporters bussed in from other areas to act as reinforcements (The Cape Times, 4 October 1989). Eight people were killed. Groups of armed men patrolled the streets and sporadic gunfire was heard (The Natal Witness, 6 October 1989). By Thursday the situation had quietened, residents began to return to work and some public transport was running. There were allegations of police involvement on the side of Inkatha and residents asked for the army to intervene.

The battle continued the following weekend. Streets were barricaded with burning tyres and running street skirmishes were fought between the comrades in

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[41] Mophela, a UDF-aligned area, is an informal/semi-rural area, next to Mpumalanga township, near unit one north.

unit three and Inkatha in unit four. Six more people were killed (The Natal Witness, 9 October 1989). These battles involved all residents, though in gender-specific ways. Women explained their role in these battles.

> … on one day, it was a Sunday, we never went to church, we were forced, because the fight had taken two days. It took place on Friday, Saturday up until Sunday morning. We became forced to get up, all of us, girls, mothers and grannies, we were full on the streets and we looked like insane people so that our children can get to sleep and were hidden where they [police] wouldn't even know where the children had been hidden. We were fighting and chasing away the police, making noise, and we blocked the streets, chasing them away. (Focus group interview, Mrs Thusi's group, Thu2#2-3:26)

In response there were three interventions to broker a ceasefire. The first was a meeting between the senior police officers and a group of about fifteen 'prominent' people (including politicians, diplomats, business and church leaders). This was followed by a tour of the battle-zones, hosted by the mayor Rodger Sishi and the township manager. They then met with representatives of both Inkatha and the UDF/Cosatu (The Daily News, 9 October 1989; The Natal Witness, 10 October 1989).

The second was the organisation of a march to the local police station to hand over a petition demanding that the *kitskonstabels* and riot police were removed and replaced with the SADF (The Daily News, 9 October 1989). Thousands of people[42] participated in the march, organised by local UDF leader Noel Ntseli on the 10 October. After a rally at the stadium, they delivered a petition asking for the policing of the township to be returned to the KwaZulu Police. UDF residents claimed that KwaZulu Police stood by helplessly while the South African Police assisted Inkatha (The Daily News, 11 October 1989). The march led by Sishi was also attended by other UDF affiliates, including the Natal Indian Congress and the Black Sash.

A third intervention, far more tentative and low-key than the others was an attempt to arrange peace-talks at ward level. A local peace committee - the Mpumalanga Joint Committee of Inkatha and UDF - had been set up the previous

month (Sunday Tribune, 15 October). Headed on the UDF side by Noel Ntsele, a personnel officer with a Pinetown firm, and by Nqobizizwe Nkehli on the Inkatha side they were not able to defuse tensions. While the battles might have ended, the incidents of violence and murder continued to be high.

In late November war broke out again.

> On Saturday 18 November 1989, after the large Inkatha meeting at Kings Park, a large number of Inkatha supporters came into the township, and began a violent campaign against people in unit four. A number of people were killed over the weekend, in unit four. On Monday (20 November) the Inkatha people moved their attention to ward nine of Mpumalanga. (Affidavit, Richard Ndlovu 24 November 1989)

This was preceded by a security force operation in ward nine (unit three) where about sixty young men were detained (The Natal Witness, 23 November 1989). The operation was followed by the attack on ward nine where a large number of houses were damaged (The Natal Witness, 23 November 1989). Five days later unit one and unit three, UDF areas, were the site of more attacks (The Natal Witness, 28 November 1989). A group of people from Woody Glen, together with some of the special constables moved into the lower part of unit four (now aligned to the UDF) and began to attack people in the streets. Many of the residents fled towards unit three. When police arrived the attacking group split into four, with one section advancing into unit three. Houses were attacked and hundreds of people, particularly women and children fled leaving the streets deserted. In a now all-to familiar pattern there were allegations of South African police involvement on the side of Inkatha. And accusations of looting by all parties. Lawyers from the Legal Resources Centre were asked to assist in obtaining interdicts against the police (The Natal Mercury, 29 November 1989).

> On Monday 23rd November 1989, a group of Inkatha supporters in a white kombi and a red car were driving around ward nine, carrying guns and shooting at people in this ward. I saw two vehicles and saw the occupants carrying pump action shot guns and others carrying hand guns. A number of people have been killed by these men since Monday 20th November. ... While this shooting and killing was taking place on 23rd November, the South African Police were standing by in two hippos and two yellow four-wheel drive vehicles. The vehicles were parked on a football field in ward nine. I saw the police standing next to their vehicles watching the Inkatha people, armed with guns, chasing people past the police vehicles down the road. The police took no steps to intervene ... (Affidavit, Richard Ndlovu 24th November 1989)

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[42] Estimates in the press vary from five or six thousand to twenty-five thousand.

According to Inkatha the attacks were a result of the UDF setting up roadblocks to stop them passing through UDF areas on their way to work (The Daily News, 29 November 1989). Sipho Mlaba, Inkatha branch chairman from unit one north, claimed that a group of about sixty UDF youth attacked his area. According to him, UDF-youth had set up roadblocks and were taxing people R2 or R5 to pass through (The Natal Witness, 29 November 1989). These incidents provide some insight into the balance of power in the township. Despite the assistance of the *kitskonstabels* and the South African Police, the UDF-youth controlled most of the township. Two small areas, unit one north and a small section of unit four, around Nkehli's house, and Woody Glen were still aligned to Inkatha. However, access into and out of these areas was controlled by the UDF, and they were slowly tightening the noose making it difficult for those living in the Inkatha-areas to get to work, obtain food and even bury their dead (see Map 7).

Much of the fighting on Monday 27 November happened in unit three. It started in the early morning when a crowd tried to stop commuters catching buses for work. A group from unit four then invaded unit three setting houses alight and attacking people in the street (The Natal Witness, 29 November 1989). Some houses in unit one south were also attacked. The next few days were chaotic as houses were looted and burnt, large groups of Inkatha *impis*, supported by the South African Police, moved through the streets shooting randomly, and people fled or milled about at vantage points watching the township for renewed outbreaks of fighting.

> I was in my house [in unit four] at about 1.30pm on 27th November 1989, when a large group of black men armed with bush-knives, sticks and spears came to my house. They broke the windows with sticks and smashed the kitchen door. They entered the house and began removing my goods. (Affidavit Constance Mkhize, 28 November 1989)

> I was walking back from work to my home [in unit three on 27th November] and I saw a group of white policemen on foot with some special constables walking the streets of ward seven. They numbered about thirty - forty altogether, perhaps more. They were carrying long pump action shot guns. They were shooting randomly at any young people on the streets, …after they shot the people, they left them lying in the street. (Affidavit Monica Ntanzi, 28 November 1989)

At 8.30pm on the 27th November I was inside my house [in unit one south], when a petrol bomb was thrown through the window of my house. Part of the kitchen was burnt. I ran out of my house and I saw a group of white policemen and special constables dressed in blue uniforms standing in the yard of my house. They were watching as the house was burning. Once they saw that the house was burning, they moved to the next house ... that night nine houses in my road were burnt. (Affidavit Hamilton Molefe, 28 November 1989)

I was in my house this morning between 8 and 9am today - 28th November 1989. The Inkatha members dressed in blue came to my house. There were many, all men. It started yesterday. They took a sideboard, a TV, six dining-room chairs, a big radio. This was at about 12, 12.30pm. They took all my washing off the line ... They smashed the big windows. They left at about 1.30 having been in and out several times. They carried all my belongings away. The house was surrounded by white policemen. One stood in the doorway with a gun. ... They came back today ... (Affidavit Ida Ngubane, 28 November 1989)

No buses and taxis operated and residents did not go to work. Nine of the fifteen thousand strong Hammarsdale workforce did not report for work during this period (The Daily News, 30 November 1989). The violence was still continuing on Wednesday (29 November) - telephones were out of order, businesses were closed, there were power cuts, transport was still not running and residents were loading what they could onto private vehicles and leaving the affected areas (The Natal Witness, 30 November 1989).

> A crowd of about 200 gathered on the top of a hill outside Mpumalanga KwaZulu Police Station and watched as a horrific scene of violence unfolded in unit three and unit four in the valley below. At 11.30am a group of about 100 people were seen running down into the valley. They swarmed into streets where SAP vehicles were seen patrolling. The sound of gunshots could be heard sporadically for about twenty minutes. ... (The Natal Mercury, 29 November 1989)

The attacks continued until Friday (1 December) with large groups from unit one and four fighting in unit three.

As a result of the residents' affidavits (see above) the Supreme Court granted two interim orders restraining the South African Police from assaulting, threatening, harassing, intimidating or conducting themselves in any unlawful manner towards four Mpumalanga residents and their families and property (The Natal Mercury, 2 December 1989). On the 29 January 1990 these interim orders were confirmed (The Natal Witness, 30 January 1990).

Workers began to return to work on the 1 December. The South African Police were withdrawn and replaced by the SADF (The Natal Witness, 2 December 1989).

6.6.1 A Cease-fire is Signed

On 30 November 1989 Inkatha and UDF leaders in Mpumalanga signed a cease-fire agreement (The Natal Mercury, 2 December 1989). The agreement included the appointment of a monitoring committee to investigate any violation of the agreement, and they committed themselves to further peace-talks to rebuild the community.

James Ngubane, vice-chairman of the Textile and Allied Workers Union was a key figure in initiating the cease-fire. The initiative was in response to increased tensions on the factory floor and the real possibility of violence in the workplace (The Daily News, 18 December 1989). The first meeting had been in early October.

> We invited all union shop stewards to come to the meeting. It was my first step. In that meeting with the shop steward we decided to invite two leaderships, leader from the UDF and the Inkatha. We struggled to get leadership, as I said from the UDF. But at a later stage Boy Majola and Majoyce Mcoyi and that Reverend Ngcibi came forward as leaders of UDF. We signed a cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire agreement was communicated to people in the township and they were happy, there was a *toyi-toying*, becoming very happy about the peace process. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#2-2:1)

Industrialists from the Hammarsdale area, particularly the South African Nylon Spinning factory where Ngubane worked were also involved in the initiative. Connie Myeni, a community leader from unit one south described how she was drawn into the peace meetings.

> … on that day Johnson Dladla, who is manager for Hammarsdale taxis, he just came to me and said 'Samson is called you, he said I must come and fetch you.' I said, 'why?' And he said, 'no, come with me, you will know when we get there'. I just changed my clothes and got into a combi and we left. When we came there, Inkatha members were full there. There was a white man called Steve Simpson, from the IFP, he is the one who brought us together. He brought us together in a neutral venue so that we could talk peace. … At Spinlon we revealed our secrets and what we used to do to each other. (Focus group interview, Connie's group, Con1#1-2:10)

Attempts to bring about peace signal the intergenerational tensions that existed in

the UDF-aligned areas. It is notable that youth leadership were not amongst those drawn into this process. On the one hand, it needs to be acknowledged that many amongst the youth leadership were in detention, Bruce Buthelezi being but one example (Interview, BB1#1-1). But on the other hand, many amongst the youth now had vested interests in the political violence. They were not prepared to give up until Inkatha was totally defeated – they had dropped out of school, and dedicated the past four years to fighting Inkatha. In the process, they had acquired power and status in the community. Political violence affirmed a particular type of masculinity that had flourished during the last four years. To cite, Xaba (2001:110)

> Being a 'comrade' endowed a young man with social respect and status within his community. Being referred to as a 'young lion' and a 'liberator' was an intoxicating and psychologically satiating accolade.

Furthermore, amongst the comrades were the criminals who used the anarchy to further their acquisitive aims. Those who initially came forward to discuss peace were the 'old guard', older men and women who had been at the forefront of the community prior to the violence or those whose class and/or economic position was threatened by the violence.

On Monday 4 December workers in Hammarsdale, Pinetown, New Germany and Kloof stayed away from work to mourn the deaths of people in Mpumalanga and to protest at the presence of the South African Police (The Natal Witness, 5 December 1989). The stay-away organised by the union had one hundred percent compliance.

The Peace Committee held its first meeting held on Monday 4 December. At first those involved did not want to be named, the Inkatha team included Victor Dladla (chair Inkatha youth brigade), Frans Bamba, Sipho Mlaba, branch chairman and notorious warlord from unit one north and his brother Eugene Mlaba. They set up a committee to investigate the rebuilding of houses (The Natal Mercury, 6 December 1989). The Reconstruction Committee met again on 18 December. Hammarsdale industrialists had pledged financial assistance to reconstruction and

they had also enlisted the aid of the Urban Foundation. It was decided to do a quick socio-economic survey to ascertain the reconstruction needs.

Residents, concerned that the different sides would still want revenge, were sceptical that peace would last. However, by the end of January 1990 the agreement was still holding and no incidents had been reported (The Natal Mercury, 23 January 1990). The maintenance of peace was assisted by the SADF who had established strong-points on the dividing lines separating the territories (The Natal Witness, 23 December 1989).

6.6.2 Violence Erupts Again

The first few months of 1990 were taken up with attempts to contain the violence and maintain peace. Newspaper accounts suggested that the local leadership, perhaps with the exception of Nqobizizwe Nkehli, worked hard at this. In April the township once again imploded with invasions of the UDF-areas of unit four and three. Thereafter with much of the township deserted violence declined. The recognition, by the local role-players, of the part played by covert security force activity allowed the peace process to regenerate itself. This time peace was firmly on track and by early 1991 the situation had normalised sufficiently to allow refugees to return.

Many of the themes of the previous year's violence were present in this period. The major issue was 'battles' over the policing of the violence - the partisan role of the South African Police and *kitskonstabels*, calls for the deployment of the SADF, and women's protests. As in the latter part of 1989 the form the violence took were the large-scale attacks on UDF areas. There were a number of groups that actively worked against the establishment of peace, some have labelled these *com-tsotsies*, however, in the light of Luthuli's evidence to the TRC they could have been third-force military intelligence agents.

There were no reported incidents of violence in Mpumalanga until the end of

January 1990, when police found the bodies of a man and a woman (The Natal Mercury, 30 January 1990). The outbreak of violence followed in the wake of the withdrawal of the SADF. On Sunday, 3 February only hours after the SADF were withdrawn about thirty armed vigilantes from Woody Glen attacked houses in ward eleven of unit four (now an UDF area). Most were vandalised and looted, and three were gutted by fire. Allegations were that the vigilantes were supported by the SAP (The Natal Witness, 6 February 1990).

In response the peace committee condemned the violence and committed themselves to resolving the situation. It was agreed that the leaders, Nkehli of Inkatha and Willis Mchunu a Cosatu leader from outside Mpumalanga, 'would be seen in public together in a bid to show residents the accord is working' (The Daily News, 7 February 1990). On Wednesday, 7 February defence force troops were brought back to Mpumalanga.

Still it was not possible to contain the violence. On Saturday 10 February four people were stabbed to death when a group attacked their vehicle (The Natal Witness, 12 February 1989).

> The only problem started when this car was attacked by a few guys from the UDF who were opposed to peace. ... They started the violence again. ... They didn't want peace, they wanted violence to go on, I think they were getting something out of it. And then after that fight. The fighting was now concentrated in unit three. The rest of the township was peaceful. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#2-2:1)

In the wake of Mandela's release on 10 February 1990, renewed fighting broke out in the province and Mpumalanga was not spared. At least ten men were killed in various incidents over that weekend (The Natal Mercury, 13 February 1990). While most of the UDF-youth were at the funeral of one of their comrades Qina Nzimande attacks were launched on unit three and four by Inkatha members from Woody Glen (The Natal Witness, 13 February 1990; The New African, 19 February 1990). The fighting continued over Sunday and Monday with residents staying away from work. Both parties blamed each other for the resumption of violence, according to Inkatha it resulted from the Saturday attack on the car

belonging to their supporters, while the UDF claimed that Inkatha started the trouble by attacking their territory on Sunday killing nine people (Sunday Times, 18 February 1990).

This time the SADF could not to be relied upon, they were only allowed to support the South African Police and hence were required to take a SAP member with them on patrol. Their involvement had to be at the specific request of the police (The Natal Mercury, 15 February 1990). Residents were also concerned that, unlike previous deployments, all the troops were white (The Daily News, 13 February 1990).

Nqobisizwe Nkehli organised an Inkatha rally on an empty piece of ground between Woody Glen and Ward 10 (unit four). The choice of venue illustrated the limitations of Inkatha's spatial control of Mpumalanga township. Controlling small sections of the township, they were no longer able to command the stadium for their meetings. Newspapers estimated the meeting was attended by between five and eight thousand people (The Natal Mercury, 14 February 1990, The Daily News, 14 February 1990). The outcome was a decision to suspend their involvement in the peace talks with the UDF. The UDF delegation had been replaced at least twice, this they felt was an indication that they was not honouring the peace agreement. A few days later in an announcement suggesting divisions within Inkatha, Sipho Mlaba from unit one north proclaimed that the peace talks were back on track. According to Mlaba the

> decision to suspend was taken hastily and emotionally. He slammed Nkehli's suspension of the talks, saying that 'people who run away to Ulundi the moment the fighting intensifies are not acceptable to the community'. (The Natal Mercury, 19 February 1990).

Despite the violence, at some point in 1990, the 'old Inkatha' began to reassert itself against the '*otheleweni*'. Mlaba, originally associated with the 'Inkatha faction' and then aligned with Nkehli to become a feared warlord, began to organise to end the violence. Some claimed he was a realist, who recognised that

Inkatha areas were cut-off and marginalised with even personal survival threatened (Interview Thoko, Tsh1#1-2). Luthuli claimed it was his influence.

> When we were at Mlaba's house, I then said to him that it is clear that the war is not just between the IFP and the ANC. I told him that from what the Major [Paul Berry] had been saying, it is clear that the Military Intelligence was behind the attacks. They were responsible for killing the members of the ANC or the IFP or the UDF. In the process they were using us, to kill each other. I then advised him that we should go speak to the UDF leadership, because we had heard that we are being destroyed by the Military Intelligence. We then did so. By then we embarked on a peace initiative. (Luthuli, TRC Amnesty Hearing, 7 April 1998, p.21)

The UDF held a rally in Mpumalanga on 20 February, which was addressed by senior Natal UDF and Cosatu leaders. The message for the youth was that violence was not part of the UDF agenda. The Inkatha and UDF/Cosatu peace talks continued the next day (The Natal Witness, 21 February 1990). This was followed by a visit from Walter Sisulu on Friday 23 February. As with the other high-profile visitors, it went through the official channels of local government. Mayor Rodger Sishi hosted the visit (The Daily News, 24 February 1990). However, in his speech Sishi acknowledged the powerlessness of his position and the council

> ... the township was now ruled by youths: 'They have taken over. You know, children are very powerful, they can direct their parents and that is what has happened. They are now ruling this township and I think this is the trend all over.' Parents are scared, he said: 'Because these little things are violent. You know, when they say they're going to burn you down, they burn you down; when they say they'll kill you, they kill you. They have their own committees and the parents submit to their discipline.' (Sunday Tribune, 25 February 1990).

Despite the power of the youth some of the older people who had played a role in shaping public life in Mpumalanga prior to the violence continued to contribute. The peace process bolstered their legitimacy. One such person was the mayor Rodger Sishi. He used the mantle of his office, empty as it might be, to mediate between the residents (predominantly women) and the authorities. In a sense he provided a conduit for non-violent methods of containing the violence. A second person was Rejoice Mcoyi. She played an active role in the peace process, acting

as spokesperson and making public statements on a number of occasions.

In March Mandela paid his first visit to Durban and addressed a large rally at Kings Park Stadium. Despite his call for 'weapons to be thrown into the sea' sporadic killings continued in Mpumalanga. The fighting intensified in the second week of March with attacks on Inkatha homes in unit one north, including that of the Inkatha chair Sipho Mlaba (The Natal Witness, 8 March 1990). There was also fighting between the squatter area of Mophelo (a UDF-area) and the more rural area of Mjobokazi. Residents from unit one north were not allowing people travelling from Mophelo to pass through their area. Other sections of the township were quiet. The local peace committee were concerned that the continued fighting would jeopardise the peace talks (The Natal Witness, 8 March 1990).

The Mpumalanga Branch of the Natal Organisation of Women, organised, in conjunction with the NOW central office, an all-night peace vigil on Saturday 10 March at the Roman Catholic Church in Mpumalanga. Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, chairperson of NOW recalled,

> I remember being so aware of the pain of living under that situation of violence. … We felt we had to do something. And we weren't very brave about it. (Interview Madlala-Routledge, NM1#1-2:3&4)

Many, including women and children had been killed during the large-scale attacks in February, and thousands others had fled as refugees. While at one level the vigil was about solidarity with the women of Mpumalanga, it was also about reclaiming the space from which they had been ejected.

> … most of the women were not staying in their homes, they were staying in … Pinetown, its Anglican church. We wanted women to go back to their homes. And we wanted children to go back to school. … And some of the women could not bury their own kids because they could not go back to Mpumalanga, we wanted to be able to bury their kids, to be able to go back home and rebuild their houses, and also the children to go back to school. (Interview Phozo Zondo, Pzondo1#1-1:5)

An additional objective was to bring women together across political parties for peace. Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge referred to Mandela's call for women 'to begin the work of bringing peace to Natal' (The Daily News, 9 March 1990).

> Among the women we had in NOW, a lot of them were church-going and the concept of prayer for peace had been part ... of the organisation. One of the organisation's strategies ... in fact the initial idea was that church is where women met from across the political divide. (Interview Madlala-Routledge, NM1#1-2:3&4)

This discourse, familiar to members of NOW, was somewhat different from that which characterised the other protests that had been organised by women in Mpumalanga.[43] Three hundred women attended the vigil; with other NOW branches also participating. Rodger Sishi, the mayor, welcomed them. During the evening women recounted their experiences of violence, it ended with an interdenominational service on Sunday morning (The Daily News, 9 March 1990).

The situation in Mpumalanga was still very tense. On the same weekend four people were shot and killed. Buses were shot at and four drivers had their vehicles hijacked resulting in KwaZulu Transport suspending its services. Attacks into unit three from Woody Glen continued. A number of unit three residents, amongst them local UDF-leader Noel Ntsele, received threatening phone calls ordering them to leave their houses (New African, 12 March 1990). Unexpectedly the SADF which had been acting as a buffer between unit three and four and Woody Glen was ordered to withdraw from Mpumalanga. Residents, predominantly women, gathered at their camp to plead with them not to withdraw. While negotiations were underway they were shot at by a busload of Inkatha supporters.

> While we were still meeting at the grounds a car came. This car was a lookout car. After that it was followed by the bus, and people inside the bus opened fire seeing that there were women. Fortunately when they were shooting the police sergeant was there and he told us to lie down. The Captain instructed others to shoot at those people who were shooting us. The bus was destroyed by the shots, Inkatha people who were there were injured and others who were lucky enough managed to escape (Focus group, Edi1#2-2:8).

6.6.3 The Last War

In April 1990 Pietermaritzburg was engulfed in what was to become known as the 'Seven-Day War'. Thousands of Inkatha supporters were mobilised and in a well-

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[43] NOW had been involved in other similar activities eg the Chesterville women's vigils (see

organised operation they attempted to clear the Edendale valley of UDF-supporting residents (Aitchison, 1991). At the same time Mpumalanga was subjected to similar attacks.

On Wednesday 4 April 1990 two youths were shot dead at Chief Luthayi High School in unit four. The following day it was reported that South African Police patrols had come under fire. The situation became more serious when on 6 April 1990 unit three once more came under attack. While the attacks were spearheaded from Woody Glen, it was claimed that the *kitskonstabels* were also involved. The death-toll mounted rapidly according to the press, from five, to fourteen and then to at least eighteen in four days (The Sunday Tribune, 8 April 1990), and close to one hundred houses were gutted. The comrades decided that it was too dangerous for the women and children to remain and they were sent from the area (The New African, 9 April 1990). An estimated two thousand fled (The Daily News, 7 April 1990). Allegations were made of security force complicity in the attacks

> ... I peeped out of the window and saw KwaZulu Police patrolling the streets in their vans, flashing their guns brazenly. The South African Police were doing the same. ... About 15 minutes after I heard the gunfire calmness had returned. I walked out of the house to assess the damage. Children - milling around in the streets - were recovering from teargas smoke. Then all of a sudden, I saw the Inkatha impi - they must have numbered between 200 and 300 - running down the mountain from Woody Glen, an Inkatha stronghold, into unit three and unit four, which are known to be UDF strongholds. All the people, from the youth to the old, began fleeing. ... Together with activists, I rushed out of the area and we secured a vantage point for ourselves. ... The Inkatha impi moved in. The SAP, the ZP and the South African Defence Force stood by and watched. Some 45 minutes later, the impi withdrew ... I saw them looting furniture, television sets and other belongings. In a closer investigation, I found some of the homes had been petrol bombed. (The New African, 9 April 1990)

Beall et al) and had organised other women's activities for peace eg Umlazi Peace March.

On the Monday following these attacks (9 April 1990) Cosatu called a provincial-wide stay-away to protest police action, not only in Mpumalanga but Pietermaritzburg as well (The Natal Mercury, 10 April 1990). Two days later a mini-bus was attacked and five people killed. Thereafter press-reports cease. In the wake of the April attacks units three and four were deserted, the residents who had fled as refugees did not return. There were renewed attempts to put the peace-talks back on track.

> ... the fighting was now concentrated in unit three. The rest of the township was peaceful. Ja. That's where Dr Radebe came in. Ja. He came in and intervened and there was peace again. He started by prayer meetings which were organised by the Reverend Madlanduna, Luthuli from unit, he has got a shop in unit three. He started going with, some other churches, going right around, making prayer meetings. In the prayer meetings one would stand up and speak against the violence. That is how people felt in the area, that there was a need for peace. And when those Inkatha people were also for peace. So they make a deal to come together and fight the *com-tsotsies*. So when the *com-tsotsies* were fought then the peace came into existence. People who were against the peace were the *com-tsotsies*. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#2-2:1)

According to Luthuli, friendships which somehow had survived the violence reinforced these initiatives (Luthuli, TRC amnesty hearing, 7 April 1998, p.21).

> The people who were responsible for the initiative were Mr Mbambo from the IFP who had a funeral parlour in the area and his friend Boy Maqinga Majola, those are the people who started the peace initiative because they were friend. ... we told Mbabmo that he should keep Majola with him, because we were also wanting to talk to him. Whilst they were busy with discussions, we also arrived. Majola was surprised to see us here but he trusted me because he is actually an uncle of mine. He asked me if we were there to kill him and I told him that we were there to discuss or to add on to the discussions, and he complained that he was the only one from the ANC or the UDF camp, but we explained ourselves. He then said that he should go and consult his colleagues. He did try, although it was difficult because some of the people were not prepared to accept this initiative. But Sipho Mlaba and Meshack Radebe managed to carry this through, although it was difficult.

According to Radebe they sat down in six-a-side teams to try to bring about peace (Echo, 18 April 1991). Ngubane explained that the power of the 'peacemakers' had a positive effect on the process.

> Cause Majola and [?] was also estranged because other people wanted to go back and Majola was very brave. He was not scared of anything. And he had boys, who were very powerful, ja. Some of his boys were involved in this cash transits business, so he was a big man. (Interview Ngubane, JN1#2-2:2)

On 2 July a national stayaway over the violence in KwaZulu and Natal was called. Barricades were erected in Mpumalanga (Echo, 5 July 1990) but overall it was a

peaceful event. Both Inkatha and the ANC had endorsed the South African Council of Churches nine-point code of conduct. Three deaths were reported during July. All Caprivi trainees had been transferred to the KwaZulu Police by June 1989. In mid-July some of the special constables who had been recruited from Mpumalanga returned, this time in the uniform of the KwaZulu Police (Echo, 26 July 1990).

The Caprivi trainees, falling under the KwaZulu Police since June 1989, were removed from the township.

> After the peace initiative in Mpumalanga MZ removed me from there and said that because there had been peace, there are still areas that were under siege, therefore I had to go and try to fix things in those areas, like eSikhaweni, Inkatha was being wiped out there, therefore I should go there to assist. (Luthuli, TRC amnesty hearing, 7 April 1989, p.22)

The death toll in Mpumalanga township was dramatically reduced. Three deaths were reported during July, nothing in August and a few more in September. Attacks focused on the rural areas adjoining the township for example Njobokazi and Mopela where there were attacks in early August 1990. Again there were allegations of KwaZulu Police involvement (The Natal Witness, 3 August 1990).

The efforts to promote peace in Mpumalanga were bolstered by the visit of a joint delegation of Inkatha and ANC leaders in October (The Natal Witness, 26 October 1990). Prominent in the Inkatha delegation was Nqobizizwe Nkehli, now living in Ulundi. Yet there were still elements interested in sabotaging the peace efforts. First Reverend Walasi Ngcibi, a UDF-member of the Peace Committee, was assassinated in Clermont (The New African, 29 October 1990). Then on 12 December 1990 Rejoice Mcoyi was shot dead (The Natal Mercury, 13 December 1990). Mcoyi aligned to the UDF and a key community figure from the days of MPURA, was also a member of the peace committee. She had embarked on a campaign to weed out the *com-tsotsies* in the township and had been warned by youths that she was a target. Her death, attributed by the Black Sash to in-fighting amongst the ANC resulted in revenge attacks and a twelve more people were

killed (Black Sash Bulletin, no 16, p.2).

The peace continued to hold in 1991. Inkatha and the ANC embarked jointly on campaigns to build peace. On 9 February 1991, following a meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi, a joint peace rally was announced in Mpumalanga. The rally, attended by more than two thousand people, was held on Saturday 18 May (The Natal Witness, 20 May 1991). Appeals were made to refugees to return to the area and to begin to rebuild the community. Regular meetings were held between Inkatha chairman Sipho Mlaba and ANC chairman Meshack Radebe. Officially all no-go zones had disappeared and schools and community facilities were open to all (The Daily News, 9 February 1991). However, it took some years for residents to feel comfortable going into an area that had been controlled by the other side.[44]

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has a number of purposes. Firstly, it provides a detailed narrative of the political violence that engulfed Mpumalanga township from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s. In doing so, it maps and plots the details of the events that took place. As such, it provides a rich and textured backdrop against which the broader arguments can be understood and evaluated. In doing so it also demonstrates the importance of locality to an understanding of broader macro-political events. On the one hand, its dynamics were enmeshed in a web of local relationships; both organisational and personal. On the other hand, regional and national political interests as illustrated by the interventions of both the Caprivi trainees and *kitskonstabels* articulated with and attempted to contrive the direction of local politics. These trajectories intersected in Mpumalanga in early 1987 transforming previous conflicts into political violence.

The chapter shows quite conclusively that political violence was fundamentally

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[44] I first visited Mpumalanga township towards the end of 1993. Residents were still not going into areas controlled by opposing groups. Refugees were beginning to trickle back and many

different both in character and form from the conflict that existed in the earlier period. Significantly different was its intensity (even more so in the later period), its modality and its technologies. Furthermore, it transformed the politics of the township, signifying a historic rupture with the past way of doing politics. It shows how political violence became fundamental to the politics of the township. In the process, the youth (on both sides) became the primary political actors. Over the next four or five years they dominated the politics of the township. In a sense, the peace was only successful once the older generation managed to wrest back control.[45]

In establishing their political primacy the youth also engineered a generational revolt. Whether they were aligned to Inkatha or the UDF the youth challenged patriarchal authority and marginalised older men and women from public life. Older men were silenced by the political revolt of the youth and the violent politics that dominated. Their voices were not heard, and their presence in the conflict was limited. Towards the end of the period they began to reassert themselves and pushed forward attempts to negotiate peace, bring an end to the conflict and return politics to its previous modalities.

Women were also marginalised by the violence. As part of the older generation they were excluded from public spaces of politics. Their bodies, through rape and sexual assaults, became the ultimate terrain upon which the gender and generational conflicts were inscribed. These patriarchal techniques of violence were used to demonstrate the powerlessness of the other group to protect their communities. As the youth fought to protect their mothers and sisters, so women formed powerful alliances with them (this is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter). In their own right women also became political actors in the violence. They organised to rid the area of the security forces they felt were partisan in the violence. Nevertheless, their activities remained firmly within acceptable gender

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houses were still burnt out and unoccupied.

[45] This statement does need to be read against the involvement of covert political forces and the

roles.

Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that one of the distinctive dimensions of the political violence was its particular spatialised form. As the violence progressed so the spatialised form of the violence shifted – from targeting the body, to the household, to territory. The intensification of political violence was the result of a series of spatial reconfigurations over time, and similarly, spatial reconfigurations resulted in an intensification of the political violence. The consequence for residents was that political violence recast the spaces of everyday life. In the process the meaning and identity of space and place was remade. Through the creation of boundaries and the conquering of territory both parties attempted to stabilise the identity of places, and then claimed a right to that space. Thus space and place acquired the political identity of the party that controlled it. To accommodate the re-territorialisation of space the spatial practices (Lefebvre, 1991:16-18) of the township residents changed. As the objective of the violence became the pursuit of territory, so residents avoided certain areas of the township, transportation routes changed, and only pupils belonging to the associated political group could study at particular schools as they became associated with different political groups. This argument is elaborated upon in chapter seven.

The chapter has begun to demonstrate the way in which space was produced and reproduced during the violence. As argued in chapter one, the production of space is imbued with power relations. The territories controlled by either Inkatha or the UDF (or the police who moved across these spaces) were also reconstructed as sites of masculine power. Through their protests, women challenged this construction of space. Surveying the streets and confronting the police in a variety of locations they challenged the use of the street as a physical place of killing.

A broader argument of the thesis is that the construction of coherent places and identities are intertwined social processes. The re-production of the space of the

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broader agendas of the apartheid and KwaZulu state.

township and the resulting re-construction of the meanings of place had consequences for the political identities of residents. Bodily survival depended upon a changed sense of self, and in the process a redefinition of one's political identity. The way in which the production of space and place articulate with the co-production of human subjectivities is explored in the following chapter.

Chapter Seven: Ethnographies of Violence: The Making of Political Identities

7.1 Introduction

On my first visit to Mpumalanga township in September 1993, I was told 'we can't take that road, it's in the Inkatha area and only for Inkatha people. We don't know what would happen to us'. More than two years after the last major incidents of political violence, space was still deeply politicised. As a result, place was still being ascribed with a political identity and individual political identities were being read off one's residence of, or, even presence in, those places.

This chapter concerns itself with the last two questions this thesis intends to investigate. Why did ordinary people come to identify with either the UDF or Inkatha,[1] and, how were these political identities produced?

Through its discussion of the new meanings and identities attributed to Mpumalanga in the context of political violence, this chapter continues to demonstrate the ruptures the thesis seeks to establish. Political violence was the outcome of the articulation of multiple trajectories (local, provincial and national) that intersected at the point of place (ie the local). What resulted was a form of political conflict that was qualitatively and quantitatively different from the conflict that had preceded it. As chapter four demonstrated the Mpumalanga area has a long history of conflict which did include violence. What changed abruptly in the mid-'80s was the decisive overthrow of established methods of conflict resolution and ways to contain the excesses of violence. As in previous chapters, this chapter reveals the intensity of the political violence and the new forms of politics that emerged in the post-'87 period.

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[1] Given that most of my interviews and focus group discussions are with women who lived in UDF areas, the empirical material will concentrate on the experiences of those who supported the UDF.

In my discussion of the different spatialities of the violence and the marking of boundaries between territories aligned to one or other political group (see chapter six) I have begun to demonstrate the profoundly spatialised form of the violence. Here, I extend and elaborate upon this discussion. I do this from the perspective of the residents of Mpumalanga township. Everyday life became politicised. Spaces were politicised in ways that linked their meaning to the political identity of those found in that space. Thus, the spatialisation of the political violence resulted in the production of new political identities.

The masculine identities that pre-existed the violence were already edged with the propensity for violence (see chapter four). This propensity was exploited by the situation of political violence and became a central quality of these new political identities, which, while on the one hand, were political in that they were UDF or Inkatha, were also, on the other hand, deeply violent. Furthermore, embedded in their violence were fundamentally dehumanising attitudes towards women. These incredibly violent masculinities were at the heart of the production of the new intensities of violence.

Key to the production of these new identities was the creation of boundaries between places. Boundaries were created and maintained by social relations of power and exclusion. Some people were seen as belonging and others as not. And, some felt they belonged and others felt they did not. As I will demonstrate in this chapter the marker that indicated belonging was based on political affiliation and identity. For example, if unit three was UDF then those who lived within it were UDF. Yet, the chapter shows that these markers did not immediately affect all residents of the township. Residents were drawn into the web of political violence and identity, at different times, according to age and gender, rather than their political affiliation; ie initially a person's age or gender rather than their political affiliation was the cause of the question 'who are you?' being directed at them. Eventually it was directed at everyone. Furthermore, a

person's prior political affiliation had little bearing on them becoming UDF or Inkatha during the violence

The question left to answer is how does the production of space and place articulate with the co-production of political identities? For Mpumalanga residents' bodily survival depended upon a changed sense of self and in the process a redefinition of one's political identity. I suggest that the construction of coherent places and identities are intertwined processes. Just as places are actively made both in imagination and through material practice (Massey, 1995b:48) so are political identities. The politicisation of space became closely linked to the politicisation of identity. The issue of 'who you were' as a political actor was paramount and subsumed all other aspects of one's identity. As a result of the political violence, the meaning of place became overwhelmingly determinant of inhabitants' identity. It overrode all other identity markers. Attempts to stabilise the political identity of places went alongside attempts to stabilise the political identities of the inhabitants of those places. Identities, I argue in chapter one, must be actively constructed. The reconstruction of both place and identity happened alongside the formation of boundaries, the enforcement of 'new rules' of living, the 'othering' of political opponents and their spaces and through the lived experiences and situated practices of political violence.

Political violence was a lived experience for all residents of Mpumalanga Township. No one was allowed to be politically neutral, and no one, unless they left the township and cut all ties, could escape the violence. However, there was a range of responses to the common situation of the politicisation of space. Firstly, there was a choice of whether to stay or move and different people made that choice differently. Secondly, amongst those who stayed, it must also be acknowledged that for some this element of self was straightforwardly performative. For reasons of survival there was a need to perform a different sense of self. And thirdly, there were those whose political identities were fundamentally remade by the political violence. Nevertheless, no matter where an

individual fell on this spectrum, what the political violence did was to politicise the issue of 'who you were' in a new way. One couldn't be indifferent, neutral or uncertain.

The chapter begins by examining the way in which political organisation and violence began in the schools. At this point only the youth, in particular the male youth were implicated. This discussion corresponds with the first spatiality of the violence, as identified in chapter six, organised around the spatiality of the body. The second section re-looks at the second spatiality of the political violence – the household. Here I discuss the way in which the political identity of the youth was transferred to that of their household and family. The families of the youth were seen to share their political affiliations. In the process political violence crossed the age and gender boundary. As the violence reconstructed these spaces, they became differentially unsafe depending upon age and gender. Furthermore, males and females encountered different dangers associated with the violence, females had the additional hazard of sexual violence alongside the physical violence associated with war. In the third section, I focus on the way in which the space of the township became re-territorialised – the third spatiality of the violence. Borders were constructed, separating areas on the basis of their control by one or other political group. In the process place was purified and acquired new identities. All residents were called upon to declare their political affiliation. The final sections examine the lived experiences and situated practices of political violence and how these became implicated in the construction of political identities. These practices, discourses and power relations reinforced and thus internalised the political identities that had been thrust upon many residents. In this situation identities are not 'open, shifting and porous' as much of the literature suggests (see chapter one). But their meaning, like that of the spaces they occupy, became singular with little tolerance for alternatives.

7.2 Organisation / Violence Starts in the Schools

At the beginning, when it started … when it began, it was at the time when Ulundi said

that in schools teachers must teach Inkatha as a subject.[2] That was when the whole thing began. So the teachers went to Umlazi[3] for training. They were trained on what were they going to teach the pupils under Inkatha. And that was when we saw children going out on to the sports grounds chanting Inkatha slogans, then we realised that that was the beginning of this whole thing. After that we saw two boys, named Zakhele Nkheli and Nqobizezwe Nkheli, running around the township with these Inkatha people. At that time there were councils, there were elections for councils under KwaZulu government. So we respected all that was happening here because it was said that this was the KwaZulu government township, this township was meant for KwaZulu. As time went on, one day we saw school children *toyi toying* at schools. Especially those from Ukuza High School. Then they, the children … [conversation breaks as someone else arrives] … whilst the boys were *toyi toying* in the afternoon chanting Mandela slogans, we as parents could not understand what was going on because all we knew was this Inkatha. Even though we knew that there were some people who were arrested a long time ago whom we did not know when were they going to be released and come back to us. … What caused a division in this area was that the boys from this side [referring to unit one south] did not want to listen to Zakhele Nkheli and Nqobizizwe Nkheli on what they had to say about Inkatha. They were against that, they wanted to talk about Mandela. This went on and on. (Focus group discussion, Connie's group, Con1#1-2:2-3)

As the discussion in chapters four and six showed the schools were an important site in the development of a counter ideology to that of Inkatha. A large proportion of Azapo's membership were scholars and Cosas had a small but active presence in Mpumalanga schools. Furthermore, it was Azapo's scholar membership (Azasm) that challenged the Azapo leadership's response to Inkatha's increasingly violent attacks on their membership. They argued for a more confrontational approach to Inkatha where violence would be met with violence (see chapter four). In addition scholars were dissatisfied with the conditions at schools; the high failure rates, corporal punishment etc. It is not surprising therefore that the Hammarsdale Youth Congress (Hayco) was launched from the Mpumalanga high schools, the majority of its small membership male scholars.

The first members of Hayco were comrades in the sense which Marks (2001:51) uses the term to describe those youth with '… a deep concern for justice and a fairly high level of political insight into the workings of the apartheid state'.

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[2] In 1979 Inkatha introduced *Ubuntu-botho* as a compulsory non-examinable subject in all KwaZulu schools under the Department of Education and Culture. According to Mdluli (1987:61) a key factor in its introduction was student resistance in urban schools in the mid-to-late 1970s. *Ubuntu-botho* was part of Inkatha's ideological strategy to 'control youth who had rebelled against parental authority'.

Many of the founder members being former Azapo members had been schooled in the Azapo education programmes and had developed analyses of the racial nature of South African society. Other members coming from Cosas brought with them a non-racial politics and a rhetorical knowledge of the Freedom Charter. Despite the rhetoric the Freedom Charter 'provide[d] the youth with a clear set of ideals and an all-embracing philosophy' (Carter 1991:207).

Given the pre-existing political tensions in Mpumalanga and Hayco's intention to challenge Inkatha more robustly it was not unexpected that Hayco and Inkatha youth were immediately combatative (see chapter four). Nonto[4] had arrived in Mpumalanga in 1986. She was from Swayimane and had come to live with her aunt and uncle, as they were childless, and, to continue her high school education. She described the atmosphere that she found in Mpumalanga.

> … there was these small symptoms that there is something that is going to happen, or there is something that is going to take place. This unusual thing, even the atmosphere of the two politics, of the two political parties were not right. Because the main road has divided then. There was that small tension, north not going to south, south not going to north. When they meet [the] other they give the one the cold shoulder, not knowing what the hell's going on. Although they were not shooting each other, but there was that small tension. (Interview Nonto, Nond1#1-2:3)

As Nonto's comment illustrates the spatial differences were already evident prior to the severe ruptures of 1987. However, while there was a diffidence to places perceived 'to belong to' the other group, the firm boundaries of the post-'87 period, as well as, the politicisation of those spaces was not evident.

The conflict escalated rapidly in early 1987. In February and March a number of prominent Hayco members were killed. Many of them were well known in their schools. Hayco soon retaliated killing Inkatha members. As a result of these attacks, the Hayco leadership fled, taking refuge in Clermont. Around mid-July Hayco members returned to Mpumalanga in order to defend their families from attack (see below) and the violence resumed with even more ferocity (see chapter six for a more detailed account of this period).

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[3] Umlazi is a township in the south of Durban (see Map 1).

[4] Names have been changed to protect the true identities of participants. Nonto is the name given to interviewee NL1.

The elders were concerned about the escalating violence amongst the youth. As is recounted in chapter six Inkatha elders debated their response to the attacks by UDF-linked youth. Many were reluctant to endorse a violent response. The parents of UDF-supporting youth called community meetings. They wrote letters of complaint to the KwaZulu Government requesting an end to forced recruitment and asking that particular Inkatha officials, like Nkheli, be restrained from violating their rights (Focus group interview: Mrs Mthembu, Mth2#1-3:23). Other parents decided to seek help from UDF structures outside the township, and the help they received ensured they became aligned with the UDF.

> … we went to Archie Gumede, it was Thobile, and I, and the other boy who stays down there, Gobo's boy. … one night at about twelve midnight we went to Archie Gumede. We asked the owner of the combi to take us there to ask for help. We told Archie that we were dying and we are asking for help from the UDF because we do not know what to do. There is no UDF around here, nothing of that sort. Ever since we went to see Archie Gumede, he took away our children, some of the boys he took to Clermont, [and] he bought food for them and washed their clothes. After that, the other parents also took their children to him. In [court] cases and funerals he would help, in funerals he helped with the money for the burial. In cases he would help with the people like Mlaba, he took the cases to lawyers like Mlaba at Casanova[5] to handle them. That is how the UDF helped us a lot, and that is how we associated ourselves with the UDF in Durban. (Focus group interview, Connie's group, Con1#1-2:5)

As places where youth from all sides met the schools were the first battlefields. It was here that both sides tried to recruit members to their respective organisations. Later they served as conscription points for the armies of thugs that would carry out attacks, and they were easy picking grounds in the campaign to eliminate those of the opposing political group. Thembi[6] was living with her family in unit four at the time the violence started. She had just started high school (standard six) at Ukuza High School in unit one south (see Map 7). She explained her first encounters with political violence.

> … Usually wars start at school. Okay, the UDF and Inkatha sometimes schooling, because I can say it was [unit] one north and [unit] one south they used to meet at the point, the point was school. They used to fight, the other members who were around [the area] there if they were UDF or Inkatha they come to help their party. There war broke

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[5] Casanova is the name of a clothing shop in Grey Street, Durban. Grey Street being part of Durban's 'second CBD', and primarily consisting of Indian run shops and businesses. I suspect the inference here is that this was an 'Indian' law firm, which would suggest links with the Natal Indian Congress, an affiliate of the UDF.

[6] Thembi is the name given to interviewee TN1.

out and then the school was closed at the time. Teachers and others evacuate. Others were killed there at schools. Sometimes at school, I see cars parking outside the gate. Then guys coming with the guns, coming to the class without talking to the principal or the teacher, sometimes the teacher is busy on the board writing some notes or explaining something to peoples, they used to come to the class and say 'you guys, you come here'. No other way round for you. Must go to them. Either they killed you, or they take you and kidnap you. And sometimes they used to take you to the cabin, taking your private part alive, you alive making *intelezi*, the strong *umuthi* to make them to be brave, to be strong warriors. And then they leave you dead, then they take you to the forest and throw you away. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#1-2:12)

The stories of many of the young women I interviewed are similar. Central to their narratives are attempts by members of both Hayco and Inkatha to recruit the male youth to their organisations. Alongside these recruitment attempts were attacks at the school premises on members of the other political group and those seen to be supporting them. Dudu[7] lived in Georgedale and attended the high school in the area. She described the situation at her school.

It all started in 1987, it was 1987 I was doing standard seven at that time. At Amatshezulu High School. It all started there. I can say at Georgedale … the youth started as Inkatha. … they jump at ANC. So that is where the violence start. The youth of Inkatha usually came at school, maybe at this time [11.00ish] or early in the morning and search for the boys who were wearing t-shirts, maybe written by the ANC leader or what-you-call yes, and there's another thing. If they wear *takkies* there are *takkies* that were used by *amaquabane*, I can say that. … They were *mbotiba*, they call them *mbotiba*, they black and white. So, if you are wearing those *takkies* that mean you are an ANC. They came at school and they took them [the boys] by force. (Interview Dudu, Dud1#1-2:2)

Thoko[8] stayed in unit one north. She attended Sobozongezo High School.

… I was at school during that time where some guys they used to talk about the politic, I am IFP, I am ANC that's why really to me it happened at school … [unclear]. And guys stopped, tried to stop coming from one north, stop those coming from [unit] two, they say you are ANC this side we are IFP at one north. That's why the violence occurred at school and the principal had to close the school. (Interview Thoko, Tsh1#1-2:3)

Nonto attended Ukuza High School in unit one south. She recounted her experience.

… It was [al]right in 1986 but in 1987 yes things changed. Because it happened when we were in the classes, it was about nine to ten [o'clock], before break when we were still sitting in the classes. We see the crowd of people coming in at the gate, we do not know what they want, they were saying slogans, they get in the classroom, they took one of our

[7] Dudu is the name given to interviewee DM.

[8] Thoko is the name given to interviewee TN2.

students, they go out with him, they stab dozens of time, stabbing dozens of time [at the school?] inside the school. And we drop out of windows, screaming and crying, running away. And that boy died at school in front of our eyes. The way the blood goes like a river. And there after teachers close the office, lock themselves, others crying, that crowd comes out without saying anything. (Interview Nonto, Nond1#1-2:4)

Phumla[9] attended Chief Luthayi High School in unit four. She described an incident at her school.

… We were at school and we saw lots of people fighting, and guns, they were killing each other. So, the police just came that time. The teachers send us home. Everybody was like running, jumping, because the police now, they didn't know who's wrong, who's fighting, they were just shooting everybody that time. Even me, I got hit here because I was running and I fell down that time. (Interview: Phumla, PM2:4)

Thando[10] told of a Hayco meeting at her school early in 1987. They were trying to recruit students to their organisation when her uncle, Daluxolo Luthuli a well-known Inkatha member,[11] arrived.

… then my uncle came. Because they know, some of them they know him. So he came here, they started to be very noisy. They said they didn't want this person here, because they were also coming to campaign for the IFP to the same school. So now some people, they didn't want to - Some they want to join IFP. Some they don't know what is going on. So we want to go and join. It's my uncle, so I have to support him. I have to go and join to under his Party. Then that's where everything started. They started to throw stones on him. We are fighting just in one school, fighting to the school and burn the school. So, that's where it started to be worse and some people come and attack my house, … (Interview Thando, Tho1#1-2:16)

In telling these stories of their first encounters with the political violence, many of the young women recounted events quite matter-of-factly. They talked about these and other very brutal events with little emotion. This was in contrast to the older women who had expressed intense anger and sadness at how they had suffered at the hands of Inkatha.[12] But all of them (young and old) voiced confusion at what was happening. Most of them were politically unaware and they didn't understand what had led to this violent turn of events, which made it

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[9] Phumla is the name given to interviewee PM2.

[10] Thando is the name given to interviewee TM.

[11] See chapter five for a discussion about the role Daluxolo Luthuli played in the violence.

[12] I suspect the different responses had to do with the different times at which these groups were interviewed. At the time of the focus-group interviews with the older women the violence was still very fresh and the effects and impact still very close to their daily lives. The older women talked about those close to them who had been killed but they also mentioned the very real deprivation they were suffering as a result of having lost houses and material goods during the violence.

even more difficult for them to respond, at the time, in any coherent way. The young women described being terrified by the events they were witnessing. For most of them, their immediate response was to run away from the scene, screaming and crying. Many of them talked about being too frightened to return to school. Mbali[13] pleaded with her mother to stay home from school as she didn't know when she might be 'pointed out' (Mba1#1-3:3).

One group of parents suggested that Inkatha's tactics were directly responsible for youth joining Hayco and by implication aligning themselves with the UDF.

> This is because UDF did not exist here in Mpumalanga, it came into existence with the children who did not want to join Inkatha because they did not like its actions. Because after you have joined you were instructed to go and attack somebody's house, raped the old ladies, commit housebreaking and do all other funny things. And the children didn't like that. UDF came in when your child is schooling and runs away from them [Inkatha], they would be labelled UDF. (Focus group interview, Edith's group, Edi1#1-2:5)

Initially the assassinations and fighting were between known and self-acknowledged members of the UDF and Inkatha. Both organisations were determined to recruit members to their cause. In this atmosphere of intimidation, fear, and attempts to recruit the male youth, both sides exerted pressure on all male youth to declare a political allegiance. Failure to do so led to the conclusion that you were aligned to the other side and therefore needed to be eliminated.

Many boys did become involved, and most of the young women I interviewed spoke of older brothers or cousins who were known as comrades (or Inkatha as the case may be) (see interviews: Phumzile,[14] Dudu, Nomvula[15], Thando, Nonto, Thembi, Thoko, Mbali, Phumla). However, not all boys were eager to become involved. They were then coerced into becoming aligned with one or other faction, and often did so only to protect themselves or their families. Dudu explained how her older brother, who was later killed in the violence, became involved with the comrades.

> … He wasn't active that much, he was forced by the youth. Because they know him,

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[13] Mbali is the name given to interviewee MM.
[14] Phumzile is the name given to interviewee PM1.
[15] Nomvula is the name given to interviewee NK.

because he was a familiar boy. He was playing soccer so it was easier to take him. And my mother was so frustrated about that but nothing that we do was going to do, so he was forced to go there because if he doesn't we were going to be attacked at home, all of us. [Attacked] as Inkatha if he's not going there. Although he was an ANC. (Interview Dudu, 1#1-2:5)

Mbali gave a similar story about her two brothers involvement with the IFP.

.. fortunately they didn't burn my home because my brothers, they were scared of them, they just went with them and they said 'Ja, IFP too'. Because they just want to survive. (Interview Mbali, Mba1#1-3:5)

In order to avoid them becoming involved Thembi's mother used to send her sons out of the area if she sensed there was going to be trouble.[16]

… wars used to start in the afternoon, round about five, or at night. They (her brothers) used to visit my aunt who was staying at Georgedale. My mother said 'mmm, I can feel that something could happen today, …', they take their goods, their uniform with them. Okay their clothes to change after school, they packed it with their books, my mother give them money, okay, if you come from school you must go to Georgedale. School breaks at half-past two, round about three we can see or hear others insulting others, okay, my mother can say give me the money then go and visit your aunt at Georgedale so that you can be safe for this. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#1-2:11)

At first the violence only involved the male youth. They were expected to have a political allegiance. Neutrality, as the stories above show, was not tolerated. Female youth, children and adults were excluded from this struggle for political allegiance.

When the violence starts, they were dealing with boys, they just don't recognise girls. (Interview Mbali, Mba1#1-3:9)

… Children used to join organisations without the knowledge of parents. (Focus group interview, Mrs Mkhize's group, Mkh2#2-3:1)

Nonetheless, girls were not excluded for long. They were not expected to be involved in fighting but they were expected to declare and show their loyalty either to the comrades or Inkatha. Phumzile lived in unit three and attended school in unit four. She was a member of the school choir; they used to meet after school to practice. However, all choir members came under increasing pressure to attend UDF meetings instead. This pressure didn't only come from the comrades but also from male members of the choir.

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[16] However, this strategy was short-lived. The family was eventually forced to flee their home in unit four. They relocated to Georgedale where both boys became involved with UDF comrades.

… [they were saying that] they would prefer for us to go there [to the UDF meeting] like, I mean, boys. Boys they would like us to go because they too, they were like ANCs, I mean, members. So they used to say like, 'let's go there'. (Interview Phumla, PM2:5)

Nonto remembers being told by three boys that there were 'not happy' as they did not 'understand me what politically am I'. They then questioned her, asking her about the political affiliation of her family at home in Swayimane. She informed them that the need to either belong to different parties or to declare loyalty to one of them was unknown in rural areas and that her family did not belong to any party. They indicated that they would investigate the truth of her statement, and then turned their attention to her beliefs.

They ask me, 'do you like UDF? What do you say?' … There was going to be a meeting at community hall. So they told me that if you are a real, real UDF member we are going to be with you to that meeting. Then I say, 'ok I will be there. Fortunately I will try by all means to be there'. Then I think they were satisfied. Because from that [time] onwards they don't have any problems. We just talking, brothers and sisters. (Interview Nonto, Nond#1-2:10)

Initially the discussions about political allegiance and membership was restricted to the high schools. But it was not long (a matter of months) before the need to declare a political allegiance affected all children at school no matter their age. Mbali was in standard one (grade three) and ten years old in 1985[17] when she first remembers violence starting. She attended a lower primary school in unit three. She remembers youths of sixteen and seventeen coming into the school and raping young female teachers in front of the children (Interview Mbali, Mbal1#1-2:4).

It was this random uncertainty to the violence that caused Mbali to ask her mother if she could drop out of school for a while; ultimately she ended up missing two years of schooling. She explained that everyone was terrified of these youth (she is talking about the Inkatha-linked youth) who carried knobkerries, guns and knives. Their brutality silenced any opposition as scholars were too afraid to draw

[17] Recollection of dates and ages is a problem here. Working from the date of birth she was indeed ten in 1985, however there is little other evidence to support her claim that violence in the schools was evident at this time. She might though be remembering a school boycott, which was organised by Hayco soon after the organisation was formed (see chapter four) or she might be remembering the roadblocks and attack on Azapo members soon after Victoria Mxenge's assassination in 1985.

any attention to themselves. Their only response was to run away. They received help from no quarter. The police who were meant to protect them were complicit. Any attempts to report the actions of these youths were interpreted to mean that you were an UDF-supporter. Most parents were just as terrified and instructed them to be quiet.[18] This feeling of utter helplessness in the face of such terror, perhaps helps to explain the warm reception and support given to the 'UDF boys' when they 'returned from Pinetown' to fight Inkatha (see below).

Mbali explained that even though the violence started amongst older youth as younger children they were soon embroiled in the stories of allegiances.

> … other children were very clever then, because most of them were older than us. Like children who were doing standard one, standard two, they were older because most of them were fourteen years, fifteen years. They just see what is going on, and they just came to our classes, the lower classes, and they will ask us one-by-one, 'do you belong to ANC or IFP?' Maybe you just shut your mouth first. What are you going to say? And because our parents told us at home, we must say we are nothing. And you say, 'no, I don't know what's happening. I'm nothing. At home we are nothing'. And maybe one of them will say, 'no, you are just lying. I know you. I saw your brother in a group of ANC. You are an ANC'. Then you cry because you say, 'no, I don't know. My brother is not an ANC'. 'Oh, if he is not an ANC, he is an IFP'. And you say, 'no, he is not an IFP, he is nothing'. And they say, 'no, you are lying. We will come at your home today, tonight, and I will tell my brother to burn your house'. Then you go home crying. 'Why are you crying?' You just tell them why am I crying, and they'll say, 'oh'. Because you are not safe whether that child, that particular child will tell their brothers. So my parents start to pack things that we will need and just run away to hide because we don't know whether they will come or not. (Interview Mbali: Mbal1#1-3:6)

In the process of the organisation of schoolboys into political gangs, attacks on pupils at school, and the defence of those schools, the schools themselves began to acquire a political identity. On the one hand, this identity was synonymous with the political affiliation of the dominant group at that school. But soon the identity of the school and thus its pupils became aligned with that of the unit in which it was located. If a pupil lived in an area with a different political affiliation, they were forced to leave that school and find another place to study.

> … if the school is dominated by the ANC, everyone should be ANC because if you are not you being killed, even ladies. (Interview Dudu, Dud1#1-2:4)

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[18] Parents did have different strategies, particularly if they were politicised. One woman who was a NOW member visited a lawyer and got an interdict (not that it helped), others became more involved with assisting the comrades.

This situation was particularly difficult for scholars living in Inkatha areas. There were no high schools in unit one north, and it became impossible for those scholars to continue with their high school education.

The teachers were not excluded from this process of identity-making. They were drawn into these tangles of identity between the political identity of the school, the area in which the school was located and the emerging identity of the area in which they lived. A teacher explained how they were moved around to facilitate this process.

> … Every year I was still teaching at … at unit one there was nothing there either.[19] But later on when the violence started, I was supposed to come this side [to unit three] because we were not allowed there. … Yes we were all transferred because we couldn't stay there at their HP and stay in unit three and teaching in unit one. … (Focus Group Interview Mthembu's House, Mth2#1-3:4)

The process of identity-making was used by youth to dismiss the authority of teachers. School pupils disobeyed school rules and disregarded the voices of their teachers. If teachers did attempt to impose discipline on the pupils this was taken as a sign that they belonged to the other side, leaving the teachers open to physical assault, rape or death.

> … everyone was silenced. They were thinking of their lives. Ok it will be helping this boy who have stand up and leaving the class room it's an IFP member, ok, ok this means teacher is an ANC. When I stood up from the classroom and maybe he ask me nonsense, 'Where I'm going, I must sit down', ok which means this one's an IFP. Ok this boys which is running out is ANC, oh the teacher will ask, 'where are you going? Sit down, I'm still teaching'. Oh it seems that you are IFP. That's why you are asking me the silly questions, 'aye leave me alone IFP'. The teacher will not go to tolerate such things. So better they zip their mouths. For the sake of their lives. (Interview Nonto, Nond#1-2:10)

These stories illustrate a number of dynamics significant to the broader argument. As chapter four demonstrated there was a small group of highly politicised male youth in Mpumalanga. On the one side were members of Inkatha, and, on the other side were those sympathetic to the ANC and charterist politics. As the conflict, which included the killing of opponents escalated, these youth began demanding political support of other male youths. This involved significant

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[19] The name of the school is inaudible on the tape.

coercion and intimidation. These events sowed intense fear and confusion amongst many of the young women. With no protection or support from teachers or police, they adopted different survival strategies. Some attempted to evade involvement through 'ducking-and-diving'. The response of others was clearly performative, yet as time went on and the conflict intensified, their involvement with the youth and the violent politics of the day seemed to shift and deepen their political affiliation and identity.[20]

In these early days, this process was confined to male youth. But within a few months, young girls were also being asked to declare 'their politics'. Thus, the demands of political identity began to cross the gender boundary. Yet, as many of the young women indicated, their response was also performative – they attended the meetings in order to placate 'the boys' and protect themselves. As young men were being killed, parents began to be concerned. In order to obtain assistance they made contact with the UDF, both through this assistance and the behaviour of Inkatha youth, they began to align themselves with the UDF.

As a result of the worsening situation most schools in Mpumalanga closed for the rest of 1987 and education was disrupted. Perhaps, the authorities hoped that by closing the schools the violence would abate. Paradoxically it allowed the violence to escalate as it gave the youth the free time to continue to organise and fight each other.

> … no more school. Because we, the crowd for UDF by that time coming together and saying no we are going to pay, we are going to revenge, we are going to do what they do. So the tension was very, very, very strong because here in school, both parties were inside in the school. (Interview Nonto, Nond1#1-2:5)

7.3 Violence and political identity follow the boys home

In the wake of the attacks at schools and their closing the male youth began to organise outside of the schools.

> … The other started to camp, no longer sleeping in their homes, collecting boys, 'stay here boys, maybe these people are coming'. And the other side, 'stay here boys maybe

[20] In particular I am thinking of the stories of Mbali (whose brothers did initially become deeply involved with Inkatha), Thembi and Dudu.

today's coming to revenge'. … It started with the boys. Ok they come house by house, and take the boy, take the boy, they were not begging them, 'oh just now please my friend it's just going …', they just get in and grab 'Aye come here', you don't know what is happening, 'Let's go, let's go'. (Interview Nonto, Nond1#1-2:6)

By mid-'87 violence was no longer confined to 'boys' in the schools or on the streets. Many of the UDF-linked youth had fled the township and Inkatha-linked youth now went looking for those they wanted to kill at their homes and in the streets (see chapter six). At first, they only looked for the particular person, but when they did not find the boy they wanted, the other members of the household came under attack. In the process the entire household was tarred with the same political brush.

… when Duma's house was attacked they demanded the child of the house, the child ran away because he didn't want to join them, … They came again to Duma's place looking for his child, when they arrived the child had ran away again, they told him that he was to die in the place of the child because he hid his child. It continued like that. (Focus group interview, Edi1#1-2:1-2)

The families of these youth were seen to share their political affiliations and the household became the target.

… it's how we were divided, that it was known that here we were identified that when my child go out to help Inkatha that means I am in the Inkatha, and my child runs away that means that I am ANC member … (Focus group interview, Edith's group, Edi1#1-2:7)

Them [Inkatha], they told us because your children are on that other side and belong to that party so you are also part of them. And we automatically accepted that, and we said, 'yes we are'. (Focus group interview, Church group, Chu1#1-2:13)

For many older women their knowledge about the conflict came through their role as mothers. A young man brought home the political identity he had acquired in the schoolyard and/or street, and the entire household was judged to share it, making all its members vulnerable to attack. Mrs A from unit one south described her situation.

… my children were involved in the structure called UDF which I didn't even know what it meant … so then there was this mobilisation from … this person who wanted to go into the intersection where some other road comes to the location, so they went there to sort of block the UDF from coming into the area. My children did not go there and that is where the whole discrimination began. And then we were attacked. Saying that my children are comrades. In our being attacked. They will call us at home to say they are coming today. I remember that once they phoned and said they were coming. When I came back from work, they stopped the car and shot it. (Focus group interview: Connie's Friends, Fri1#1-2:1-2).

The intrusion of such political stances, brought by the youth into the domestic space of the household, also unsettled the practice of *hlonipha* and patriarchal gender relations. Many parents, in particular fathers, were indignant that youths should be defining the politics of the household. Thoko explained the situation in her family. All the family, except her elder brother, supported Inkatha. This caused divisions amongst her family. They were forced to flee their home as other Inkatha supporters labelled them UDF and their house was fire-bombed. While her mother was inclined to support her elder son, her father was angry with him.

> … father stick to the point that you are wrong, don't do that because you sell us. They are going to kill you on your side. (Interview Thoko, Tsh1#1-2:8)

In an attempt to escape the wrath of their fathers and/or protect the household many young men had fled the township, but as these attacks demonstrated this did not necessarily secure the safety of their families. Instead, when the house and its remaining residents were attacked, the women were often raped. In these cases, the attacks on women were a direct product of their relationship to men – as mothers, wives or sisters. For many women these attacks were their first knowledge of the violence.

The ways in which political violence affected men/boys and women/girls was different. These differences were seen not only in its timeframe but also in its modality. Sexual violence and rape against women became a feature of many of these attacks. Most of those interviewed described a situation where rape was commonplace.[21]

> … those Inkatha people, they attack us. … because they said they were looking for him,[22] 'you're going to give us the information'. So now, we had to run, in the middle of the night. They went there to rape us too and even by the time they hit my grandmother. And my grandmother did not want them to take us, because they want to rape us. So they hit her with a sjambok in the head, and my grandmother falled. By that time, the policemen flash light all over the area, then they ran away. (Interview:Thando, Tho1#1-

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[21] As many of the interviewers lived in UDF-areas, in their experience the rapes during this phase of the violence were committed primarily by Inkatha-linked men.

[22] This refers to her other grandfather who fled an IFP area; he had been staying with them.

2:17)

… first they come to grab boys and leave the women and the children as the time goes on they change their minds. What they are doing now, they get in the house and grab the girls, not the women, they grab the girls and stay with the girls. Who is going to disturb? Who is going to stop because once you open your mouth you be found six feet underground. Once you open your mouth, you close your eyes. They [Inkatha] take the girls and go with them to the camp. What's happening at the end of the day, most of the girls became pregnant, whenever that girls became pregnant, that guys told the girl if ever you say to your mother that I'm the cause of that rubbish you'll find yourself in hell. (Interview: Nonto, Nond1#1-2:6)

At the time when Inkatha raped, our children had run away to Pinetown. That is why they came back from Pinetown to defend. Because they heard that their mothers were being raped, houses burnt and their fathers killed. For example if they came for Zweli and did not find him, his father would be killed and they would say that he had hidden him and he would have to die in his place. All that led to their coming back from Pinetown to die now ' let us fight and die once', they said. (Focus group interview: Mrs Mthembu's group, Mth2#1-3:27)

Other stories give greater prominence to the site of the household and place the role of women more at centre-stage. They tell how women came to be making major decisions themselves, the consequences of which would put them and their households into conflict with Inkatha. In most cases these decisions involved their authority as mother: refusing to allow their daughters to be dragooned into becoming Inkatha camp-followers providing sexual services to their fighters, or questioning the activities of Inkatha and in the process being labelled UDF.

When violence began it started by the emergence of a group that called itself Inkatha Freedom. This group took young ones from as young as twelve years, both girls and boys at night. They organised meetings, which took up late at night. We, the people who had grown up in this area and knew the policy of our fathers, did not agree with this. Then our children were labelled as comrades. Inkatha also started making demands for donations. It was not clear what the donations would be used for. Because I was very sceptical about all these things, I would ask them what the demands are for. They started to victimise me. I was the first of all the others. I remember it was December 25. We were sitting in the house. We saw people attacking it. That was the very beginning. They continued and they used to harass my children when they passed near my house. I was by then locking them inside when I went to work. One day as I was coming from work I met one of my children at the bus stop. She said there was chaos back home, these people had come and smashed things and had nearly killed her father. … (Focus group interview: Mrs Mkhize's group, Mkh2#1-3:7-8)

Now our children were meant to have sex with them [Inkatha]. If you tried to refuse they asked you, 'how do you think the boys would enjoy themselves?' We, mothers, all of us refused this, [and] we hated it. They then started attacking houses. They would smash windows, and break everything up. They would beat everyone up and rape the girls and leave chaos in the house. (Focus group interview: Mrs Mkhize's group, Mkh2#1-3:14-15)

One day they came, a guy from KwaMajola and said that he is asking for boys. That guy is Inkatha. They said there was going to be a meeting at the school at night. Then I told this boy to talk with their father, I will not talk anything. This boy said he does not care about their father but he is telling me. This boy left running. My husband arrived he

tried to find out about this thing. He looked at this thing and he found that it was okay. This boy who has passed away used to school there.[23] Then they attended this meeting. After that they were always 'on the way'.[24] They will go to many places maybe they will be taken to iNkandla. Until I received a message saying that I must stop my children from taking these trips. It was said it is better for children to study at home than to be always travelling. Then I stopped my children. When I had stopped them, people started shouting at me again. Even when they go to the shop, they will point them with guns. (Focus group interview: Connie's friends group, Fri1#1-2:13-14)[25]

Paradoxically, the withdrawal by UDF-aligned youths from these spaces had made them more vulnerable to attack. It was the early period, before UDF-aligned youths returned to take control of their neighbourhoods, which many women describe as the time of greatest chaos and most frequent rape. It was in an attempt to protect their households from such attacks that the young men returned from 'exile'.

Many, many boys ran away [from] there. … So that's why they just phone their families, to know what is happening there. And their families tell them that, 'no, its worse now'. … after that those boys who ran away came back to help those, to help those boys who were fighting with the Inkatha. (Interview Mbali, Mba1#1-3:8)

Now because they are being killed they have [to] ran away. They started coming back. And they all came back. They were kept by Archie [Gumede] in Clermont. They came back hot as chillies, ready to fight. (Focus group interview: Connie's Friends, Fri2#1-2:32)

Many viewed these 'boys' as heroic rescuers. They returned from the relative safety of Clermont in order to protect their communities. This discourse of the 'boys' was particularly significant when older women discussed the events of that time. When reflecting upon the sense of confusion that existed amongst ordinary residents during this time, one can understand how and why many in the community welcomed them back, and ultimately, despite the excesses of the comrades, saw them as protectors (see below).

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[23] Mrs C had already lost her eldest son; he had been shot dead by a neighbour's son (linked to Inkatha), after the family ignored a warning to leave the area.

[24] Direct translation, it means 'travelling around'.

[25] Mrs C's story is one of intense harassment. After this incident, the family was subject to constant police visits; her remaining son was detained by the police on many occasions. Her husband was not able to attend work regularly as he was staying at home to guard the family. One morning while on his way to work, her husband was followed by a car containing Nkheli and some of his boys, he was shot dead a short distance from their house. She continued to be harassed by both police and 'Inkatha boys', until the UDF took control of her area. She broke down crying many times while telling this story, saying her heart is still sore at the lose of her husband and son. After a while, we terminated the interview, saying we would return another day.

Groups of male youths located themselves in abandoned houses or moved into households near the border. Their job was to secure these boundaries, to watch out for and repulse attacks from Inkatha, and to attack Inkatha in turn.

> It is not that our group was clean, honest and glorious. Because of their being abused. There are other parents who fail to control their children. Down here near my house there are burnt Inkatha houses. These children, it was them who were initially attacked by Inkatha, and they also lost their heads and they wanted to revenge now. (Focus group interview Connie's Friends group, Fri2#1-2:22-23)

Through these battles, the violence began to redefine the geography of the area. Mbali, who lived in unit three and six, both ultimately UDF-areas, described this process.

> … But people who were IFP, they saw that, 'no, here we have no chances. So we'd better move somewhere, because now they killed us'. … [Was there a big battle or was it just slowly that they moved out?] Just slowly. Their families just ran, they went. I would just see, we just saw trucks. Then they put their things there and just went. But not the same day, ... Some of them will go on Monday, some of them go on Tuesday, but it only took a month, just went within a month. (Interview Mbali, Mba1#2-3:1)

Certain areas became Inkatha areas and other areas UDF areas. This process created enclaves of safer space.

> There was still violence, but it was not the same, because ANC rules now. The ANC ruled there. So it was better because we were in school safely but we knew that we mustn't go [out] at half-past five or six o'clock, we must be at home at three or four o'clock. It was not safe because IFP came over our areas at night to find those people who are walking on the streets late and kill them. But it was safe during the day, like afternoon or morning or whatever. It was very safe. (Interview Mbali, Mba1#1-3:9)

The process of 'cleansing' an area was fluid and contested for some time. The streets also became dangerous and unsafe places. Walking along the streets meant being vulnerable to attack.

> Going to places was non-existent, because if you go you had to be careful that you are really protected because groups were in all the streets. (Focus group interview: Connie's friends, Fri2#1-2:1)

Well-known Inkatha warlords cruised the streets in their familiar cars, identified by nicknames. While their purpose might have been to kill specific 'comrades', they also abducted girls for sex. One of the more notorious stories, recounted by a number of informants (Interview: Thembi; focus group interview: Connie's

friends, Fri1#1-2:3; and focus group interview: Connie's group, Con1#1-2:20) involved two young girls from unit one north.[26]

> … they are travelling to school [in unit one south], they were confronted by three guys. They said you girls, you are the members of the UDF. They said no that is my family, it is my family who stay there. I can't live without my family. That's why I am staying there. Even though they were not UDF or ANC or whatever, these girls were taken by these three guys who take them to the bush near the township called Georgedale. They take them on Friday and take them to the cabin, the Inkatha cabin. They were raped there, were sjambokked, everything was done to them. Aye I can't mention everything that you can think of that was brutal or tyrannical. … They take these girls with a car to the bush. They raped them until they decided to kill them. Nozihlele was cutted his head out from her body and Stella was cutted until her head didn't come out. They think the throat was cut off but not. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#1-2:4)

Drive-by shootings were commonplace, some aimed at specific targets, others random.

Gender and age affected the way in which different groups managed their access to the unsafe space of the street. Groups of mostly male youth gathered on street corners, ready to accost and attack those suspected of supporting the other party. They challenged the right of others to refuse them access to the streets, observed and challenged passers-by, and called on girls for sex. Boys across the political divide expected girls to be sexually available on demand. Reluctantly many girls acquiesced, concerned about the effect of a refusal on the safety of the family at home.

> I was so scared to go outside … I was so scared, because once we were getting outside, you were having a problem with the guys. Maybe they come to you and talk about things to you. Maybe some of them touch you, you see. And some often rape you. (Interview: Phumzile, PM1:1).

The street became reconstructed as a site of masculine power, whether it was an area controlled by the UDF or Inkatha (or the police who also moved across these spaces). Boys – whether Inkatha or UDF – patrolled and guarded the street, challenged strangers to declare their politics, and asserted their gender power by

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[26] This incident was widely reported in the press and was the subject of testimony at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Special constable and Mpumalanga resident Israel Hlongwane later admitted to the abductions, rapes and murder. He implicated Zakhele Nkehli in his testimony claiming the two girls were UDF spies, and saying that he acted under Nkehli's orders in killing them. Nkehli, he said, wanted their blood for *umuthi* (see Hlongwane TRC affidavit).

proposing or abducting young women and raping them. As masculine protectors of this space they protected the houses from attack, and guarded the integrity of women – albeit selectively – by escorting them to and from potentially unsafe places as well as running errands.

> Our brothers went to our school to guard us, they were security. They just did look after us, … go with us to school. [Was this your brothers or just boys in general?]… Any boy but who belong in our area, ja. Who were in the group. Any boy. But they just quit school and just surrender them to guide us as their young sisters. They just left schools and just do that. (Interview Mbali, Mbal1#1-3:9&11)

Xaba (2001:109) suggests that 'struggle masculinity', characterised by its anti-authority stance (implicit here is opposition to patriarchal authority), opposition to apartheid and political militancy, coexisted with a street-gang *tsotsi* masculinity he calls 'street masculinity' which was 'disparaging towards women'. Thus, he argues struggle masculinity also incorporated these 'negative attitudes and behaviours towards women'. Yet, the discussion of pre-violence township life (see chapter four) illustrates that these 'negative attitudes and behaviours', which included coercive sex and rape (including gang-rape) were more deeply embedded in township masculine culture than the allusion to their roots in street masculinity suggests. Xaba's discussion of 'struggle masculinity' doesn't seem to take into account the excesses and extremities of the political violence itself on the construction of these masculinities. The effects of these excesses were acknowledged by the young women interviewed.

> It changed the boys in so many ways. They became wild animals. Even my brothers I was scared of them. The way they were. They became the wild animals and they just wanted to kill. If they are together, they were talking about 'who are we going to kill today?' And 'when are we going to burn that house?' 'Which unit are we going to kill people who are Inkatha?' Things like that, always they were just talking about killing, killing. So we were scared of them because we thought maybe they would kill even us. The way they were talking about killing. They were just wild animals. They didn't even bath their bodies; they were just dirty and stink, all things like that. They were just like wild animals. Always talking about killing, killing. So, we were just scared of them because they were just like wild animals. Ja. So I can say the violence changed them. Because if there were no violence, they would be not like wild animals. They will be maybe good boys going to school, educated, whatever. But the violence came over them. It changed them. Changed them to be wild animals because they will kill. Ja. Always there was just a smell of blood everywhere. (Interview, Mbali, Mba1#2-3:9)

> There was that animality both sides … (Interview, Nonto, Nond#1-2:9)

Generational differences undercut women's relationship to the comrades. Young women had to cope with the demands for sexual favours from the comrades, but this was not the case with older women. As argued, political violence turned generational relations upside-down. Regardless of their politics, many older women experienced the youth as 'disrespectful'.

> And people! And now this disturbance between the parents and the children during the time of violence, violence made the children aware of that the parent is nothing, he or she is not clever, the one who is clever is the child. (Focus group interview, Mrs Thusi's house, Thu1#1-3:21)

Another woman who was herself politically active through her participation in NOW and whose children were comrades said,

> In a way I always say that we were lucky because if we talk to these children [in my area] they listen, if we go to the rallies children smoke dagga, if you discipline them they get shocked because they are not used of being discipline[d] by old people. Old people are now afraid of children. (Focus group interview Connie's friends, Fri2#1-2:31)

Nevertheless, the comrades were not a homogenous group. On the one hand, there were the well-disciplined comrades with an unambiguous and developed ideological commitment to political change and social justice. But, as time went on, these young men became few and far between. It was more likely that these comrades were in the leadership, having been amongst the founders of youth movements. A year or more into the 'civil war', many of these young men were either dead, gone into exile or detained, depriving the comrades movement of its political and moral leadership. While the UDF-youth leadership did try to discipline youth who raped and abused women (Interview Buthelezi; interviews Thembi, Tha1#2-2:3, Mandisa, MN:7-8) this did not always happen. Due to the chaotic situation, there weren't tight organisational structures amongst the comrades and they operated as small independent and spatially dispersed groups, making such discipline both random and difficult to implement.[27] Mbali (see above) spoke about the effect of the excesses of violence on the psyche of those involved; and these excesses played themselves out in a number of ways, further distorting and exaggerating the already existing, frequently violent, patriarchal relationships between men and women. Others, amongst the comrades, were

[27] Sitas (1992:632) also alludes to the loose 'fragmented' organisational structure of the comrades movement. But he doesn't distinguish between the comrades and the *com-tstotsis*.

com-tsotsis. While the *com-tsotsis* fought Inkatha, they also used the generally chaotic situation as a cover for criminal activities. Many of the more politically disciplined comrades viewed those who raped women and stole goods as *com-tsotsis*. Other residents distinguished between the comrades and the *com-tsotsis* and attributed the excesses to the later.

> The *com-tsotsis* were came at home and asking impossible things. Unnecessary. Unnecessary things and you say no, its not the way now, they are abusing you now. Maybe sometimes they will came and ask money that you didn't know [about]. So, they came even at night, whereas the comrades they didn't do that, at night it was not safe to open for the people whom you don't know. So they came at night say we want this, we want this. Maybe they will, sometimes they will knock and say we are comrades, maybe they want your TV or your radio or your what they will take it. They were *tsotsis* ... (Interview Dudu, Dud1#2-2:1)

> When the leader of the ANC punished them, they leave that party and they form *com-tsotsis* … It was the *com-tsotsis* [who were raping]. Because they don't like discipline. If you discipline them they form that groups. They think you're not working with them. Now they form their groups, called the *amacom-tsotsis*. I don't think they [UDF comrades] are raping. I don't know so. Don't think so. Because they know discipline. (Interview Mandisa, MN:7-8)

Violence crossed the gender boundary before the generational boundary. Mbali explained why after they had slept away from their house, it was their granny who would go back to check if it was safe for the family to return.

> … they didn't recognise grannies or grandpas. They were dealing with youth, like my mother. My mother, I can say she was still young then because I think she was 25 or 26 then. But she was, she belonged to youth. So that's why we used to tell my Grandmother to go and check there what had happened, because they just don't recognise them, Ja. They were dealing with youth. Ja. (Interview Mbali: Mbal1#1-3:7)

But as political violence began to re-territorialise the space of the household and the street the number of attacks on older people increased.

7.4 Remaking place and political identity

In Mpumalanga Township, as in much of Natal space was re-territorialised by political violence. In this process the meaning of places was fixed, resting on a fixed and singular identity – the political affiliation and political identity of its inhabitants. The creation of such identities was about closure, about the marking, creating and finally the sealing of the boundaries that divided one political space from another. This involved a process of 'cleansing' the area of those who did not share the same politics (see above). Those who did not, or were not seen to, share and support the political beliefs of the area had to leave. As the violence entered

the third phase in which spatiality was reconfigured (see chapter six) so it became impossible to reside in an area that was seen as having a different political identity from your particular household.

Many families received threats informing them that unless they moved they would be attacked and killed. These threats were frequently, but not exclusively, linked to the active political involvement of a male member of the family. Phumla, who lived in unit three, explained that her elder brother's involvement in the UDF led to her family having to flee. He had become politically active and was known as a UDF comrade. Early one morning they found a letter under their front door warning them they should leave the area as Inkatha is looking for him. The letter said that if Inkatha came to the house and he was not there, then they would kill the rest of the family. Her mother immediately took the other children and fled to her sister in unit four. Her brother asked some of his comrades to stay with him in the house. Inkatha did not attack and after a few days the other youth left. But Inkatha youth saw her brother in the street and shot at him, badly injuring his hand. Once UDF youth had gained control of unit three, they approached her mother and told her that the family should return home. The UDF now controlled the area and they would be safe. She finished the story by saying that her brother

> … is the one caused the problem because he joined the ANC, he couldn't have a choice, he has to join one of them, you see. (Interview Phumla, PM2:5)

The belief that the male youth defined the political identity of the family was paramount. With the exception of this brother, the rest of Phumla's family believed they were politically neutral. This was not so in the case of Thoko's family. All of them except one son were Inkatha supporters but still they were forced to flee. Thoko lived in unit one north. Here Inkatha youth had the upper hand.

> People they came at home. Inkatha people they came at home and said you have got a UDF person. We are going to [petrol] bomb you with your son or with your brother. So that is why, when we are planning to wake up early in the morning and fled to [unit] four. They bomb our house but only was burning, the dining room was bombed. And the neighbours who was IFP, they didn't help. So by the way, by that time [we had] fled to [unit] four. (Interview: Thoko, Tsh1#1-2:4)

The family's troubles did not end once they sought refuge with her aunt in unit four. They still could not shake the political identity of UDF.[28]

> There was still the same thing at unit four where violence although we were not involved like at [unit] one. Cause we were born and bred at [unit] one and they all know us very very [well], and at [unit] four they knew us half-way. There some people … they don't want us, they say we must go back to where we belong. … People, the community at [unit] four they tried to take us to [unit] one north … 'what are you doing here?', 'you don't belong here', 'they not born here, go to your home'. We are threatened everyday. When we sleep they take the stones put it on top of our house. (Interview: Thoko, Tsh1#1-2:5-7)

As a result, the family approached the wife of unit one north Inkatha leader Sipho Mlaba. As she was related to them, they asked her to plead their case.

> We tried and convince them that we are not a UDF, members of the UDF, we said we are the IFP, we want to stay in our place. … And they saw and understand their mistake. (Interview: Thoko, Tsh1#1-2:7).

The family were allowed to return to their burnt-out house in unit one north. However, they were estranged from the elder son. Not only was he not welcome in unit one north but the family, in particular her father did not want anything to do with him. In their eyes he had betrayed them.[29]

Mrs X also fled her home as a result of her children's political activities.

> My children joined an organisation, maybe ANC, without my knowledge. So it was discovered in that Inkandla area,[30] then I had to send them away, before they were hacked, I had to send them away. I remained alone, but finally I realised that I was also in danger. I could not just be alone. I left the area. I left the area because I realised that my life was no longer enjoyable. I don't fit into that community. I had to follow my children. Further, I could no longer be able to go to work because I had to pass an area dominated by the comrades. I also realised that the life I was living there was not good anymore because even my children had already made a choice to live differently. I followed in their steps. I had to decide what to do, so finally I belonged to ANC. Now I am homeless. (Focus group interview: Mrs Mkhize's group Mkh2#2-3:1)

Some residents used the violence as a way of resolving neighbourhood disputes or petty jealousies. Mrs C (see Focus group interview: Connie's friends, Fri1#1-

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[28] At this time unit four contained pockets of both UDF and Inkatha areas. As Inkatha youth leader Zakhele Nkehli lived in unit four (see chapter four and six) much of unit four provided a strong support base for Inkatha.

[29] The family reconciled after the violence when the son returned and apologised to his father for the mistakes that he had made. (Interview: Thoko, Tsh1#1-2:5)

2:15) claimed that her family was labelled UDF because the neighbours were jealous of their success. While still young they had managed to build themselves a house much larger than the neighbours' and her children were always well dressed. It was easy to carry tales to the youth accusing a neighbour of being either UDF or Inkatha. Seldom were such tales verified.

> It happened like that, it happened like that. It happened a lot, if you could a person didn't like you he will say anything about you. He will say she's Inkatha, or she's involved with Inkatha person or I saw him or I saw her speaking with Inkatha. So the boy will come and attack you. Having no proof of that, because that person is an enemy to you, you don't like him, maybe he want to kill you. … There are some people who they trust, if that person say its true. They didn't do that much investigation, if they say you are Inkatha they will go there and attack the whole house because maybe you have bad people who are called *amathakathi*, witch, ja witches, you don't even have that proof that she's a witch and you tell the boys that she's a witch and they will go there. Ja you are a witch and they will kill her. (Interview: Dudu, Dud1#1-2:14)

The redefinition of places as either Inkatha or UDF areas meant that no family or person could avoid assuming the political identity of that place. It did not help households to remain aloof from the political divisions and affiliations that were happening around them. Some families thought that by avoiding contact with either political party they would be left alone, and their safety assured. However, neither group allowed such a situation. If one or the other group did not see that a member of the household was actively supporting them, it was presumed they supported the other party. Thembi's story illustrates this point. She stayed with her mother and three brothers (two older and one younger) in unit four.

> We had the members of Inkatha, by the time there was violence there was UDF. … So we didn't participate to any party, by not participating they [Inkatha] think[s] we are the members of the UDF, although we were not. So as if to them we are siding with the other parties because we don't like what happened to peoples and we did see what happened to peoples who joined the parties. And we decided with my family, my brother, my mother, to stay, not to join any party. … Unit four was not divided into south or north. It was divided by lines.[31] I can say this three lines here are for Inkatha, those two lines there are for UDF. They were separated like that. … Our lines were regarded, because we didn't participate, we didn't participate at the parties because of our non-participation they regarded us as UDF members. Ok, they bombed the two houses near my home. Our home, oh, our home was in the middle, the other house on the side was bombed, the other house on the side was bombed but they tried and run away. But the little girl of my neighbour died there. 'Ok', my mother says, 'we can't live here no more, we must try and go to our aunt at Georgedale'. We take our properties; we hire a van at night, the

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[30] Inkandla is another name for the informal settlement of Woody Glen, situated between unit three and four (see chapter three). This was a strong Inkatha area under the leadership of Mrs Xulu.

[31] By lines she is referring to rows of houses.

following night because we knew that they were coming for us now because they have solved our neighbours. We evacuate to Georgedale. While we at Georgedale, we said, 'ok, we were nearly bombed or nearly killed by Inkatha member, it is better for us to join the UDF party because at unit four we were nearly killed by the Inkatha members'. There we participated as UDF. (Interview: Thoko, Tha1#1-2:2-8)

In this situation where the residential areas were being divided up between the parties it was impossible to avoid being aligned with one or the other of the political groups. Mandisa[32] reiterated this point.

… you must have to join one of the parties. Not two of them. You must join the one [party] … the party of one north, the main party is Inkatha. Inkatha Freedom Party. At one north you must be joining Inkatha. If you … live at one north, you say 'I'm ANC', you must leave there. They're going to fight you and to burn your house and to kill your family persons. Yes. You must live there as you are Inkatha. You like it or you don't, you must live there as Inkatha. (Interview: Mandisa, MN:4)

… the bridge was the main road. When you are coming down, when you get in Mpumalanga there is a main road you go to the taxi rank from Mcoyi [shopping centre], then you walk down straight until when you get the taxi ring, when stop and go back to rank. So there was that bridge, knowing ok if you are living here you are this, if you living by this side you are this. It doesn't care that already you don't like this party. But if you living in that place you are forced to be that. … as I was staying in one south I was forced to be UDF. (Interview: Nonto, Nond#1-2:7&8)

Many people moved and/or lost their houses because of this. Mandisa (Interview Mandisa, MN:4) indicated that her family moved from unit one south (a UDF area) to unit one north (an Inkatha area) in 1987. Her mother was an Inkatha member and they moved to one north 'because I'm safe when I'm in there'. Dudu said that as the ANC became stronger in Georgedale so Inkatha supporters were forced to run away 'to the Inkatha place where the Inkatha is lives there' (Interview: Dudu, Dud1#1-2:6). Mrs T moved from an Inkatha area to a UDF area, 'I said to myself, 'no, it is not good for me to stay on that side', as I knew what organisation I was.' (Focus group interview Mthembu's group, Mth2#1-3:8)

In the process of the violence shifting to its third spatiality – that of capturing territory (see chapter six) the political identity of individuals and households was becoming synonymous with the area in which the household was located. Mpumalanga township divided up as follows unit one north, and sections of units four and six and Woody Glen were Inkatha areas. All those who lived there

acquired the political identity of Inkatha. Units one south, two south, three, sections of unit four and six and Georgedale were controlled by UDF (see Map 7). All those who lived there acquired the political identity of UDF. The geographical area in which the individual lived determined their political identity.

Mrs Mthembu: When this whole thing started those who stay across the river facilitated the division into two camps. They simply labelled us. When we heard it we accepted it peacefully and our youth had our full backing.

Mrs Radebe: She is talking the truth because we knew nothing about it. ... There is a neighbour of ours who ended up leaving after calling us comrades and we did not know what this meant. We would ask him to tell us what this meant because we were all in the home, myself, my husband and children were all around the house. He would simply say we are comrades. One day, as he was not well educated, he said, 'you are UDF'. Awu! UDF! What is UDF? I said I wanted to know. I went inside the house and asked the children because they are educated. I said, 'what is this thing called UDF?' They asked me who had said that. I told them it was the man they used to call uncle. They told me to ignore that because he was mad. I really did not know what it meant. I was so cross my daughter, because I did not know the meaning of a comrade. As the time went on we were told that if someone shouted there are the people from mud house[33] you must run away. If you heard that they were chasing the comrades you should also run away because you will die as you are also a comrade. We were simply running away not even knowing what a comrade looked like. (Focus group interview: church group, Chu1#1-2:14-15)

These stories illustrate the different responses to the politicisation of space that occurred alongside the violence shifting to its third spatiality. Yet, common to most of them is the element of coercion, often undercut with fear, involved in 'choosing' a political identity. As one or other side won the battle to control that space, so families and individuals had to decide whether to stay and accept that political identity or move somewhere else. Yet, despite this chaotic, terror-filled, and confusing situation people still made choices about where to stay. And in the making those choices, they made choices about where they wished to align their political identity. For example, once UDF controlled unit three, Phumla's family decided to return home; similarly, Thoko's family decided they did support Inkatha and were prepared to make a final break with their UDF-supporting son and brother in order to plead their case and return to unit one north; Thembi's family 'remained neutral' while living in unit four, realising they were being

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[32] Mandisa is the name given to interviewee MN.

[33] She is referring to the Woody Glen area. This was an informal settlement.

targeted as UDF and deciding they didn't want to get involved on the Inkatha side they moved to Georgedale where her brothers became comrades; and, Mandisa's family decided to move from a UDF area to an Inkatha area as they were supporting Inkatha.

7.4.1 Borders and boundaries

The construction of borders and boundaries between places was essential to their redefinition as either UDF or Inkatha places. Boundaries had two purposes. Firstly, they defined territory over which to wage battle. But secondly, they enabled the construction of an internal unity for both the meaning of place and the identities that were constructed alongside. Boundaries also enabled the creation of the oppositional 'other'. 'Us' and 'them' are key to the creation of identities. Identities, as discussed in chapter one, are formed in relation to one another. They emerge through difference. Discourses of the other as cruel and barbaric were important elements in the creation of these boundaries.

Power was another crucial component in the construction of these places and identities. The ability to enforce the observance of a boundary was an indicator of the power wielded by both Inkatha and the comrades. Observation and surveillance were key components, however, they were also enforced by violence. Both Inkatha and UDF enforced the 'rules of violence' equally against those within their territories and those outside these boundaries. Their gaze ensured residents obeyed the rules and contributed to the creation of docile subjects. Yet responsibility did not lie with the *amaqabane* or *otheleweni* alone, ordinary people participated in and were implicated in their creation.

Borders were clearly defined. According to Dudu

> … They write it. Maybe in the shop, or in the stop, the bus-stop or taxi stop. … You would see the youth that, you will see when you are going to that place, that street, they will shout at you, 'Hey, hey' there was a restriction on the roads, that Inkatha doesn't go here, ANC doesn't go here. It was like that. And they know each other, we know each other, that one is an IFP, that one is an ANC. (Interview Dudu, Dud1#1-2:6)

The borders between UDF and Inkatha areas were rigidly enforced. Gangs of young men who both watched for, and repelled attacks, patrolled them.

… like they're patrolling, the whole night they'll be sitting there, looking if there's nobody comes this side, in order to kill somebody or to go to somebody's house. Like I'm saying they [Inkatha] shoot my brother. If there was a chance for them to come again, they would have come. And even with the cars it wasn't easy, because, you know, Mpumalanga is not a big place, as you go one side and the other side. If they're standing there, you can't. You can't pass; no matter you want, with the car, you can't pass. They will see you and they will kill you. But it wasn't easy for them to get inside. So you are safe for that. (Interview Phumla, p.10)

Going into areas that had a different political identity from the one in which you stayed was under threat of death. Mandisa who stayed in the Inkatha area of unit one north explained what happened to her neighbour's grandmother.

One day the neighbour's grandmother went to church … When we want something there is no stores, there's no butcher. Stores they have. And that grandmother she say 'I want to buy meat'. When I come back from church, I will prepare for my family. … When we got there, she was dying, she was dying. Some small boys, they came. They said, they ask her, 'Where are you living?' and you know the adults they say, she say, 'I'm living at one north'. 'You know that we kill Inkatha when they come here'. She say, 'I didn't know that thing' and she was Inkatha. … And they throw stones and they, she died, with the church's uniform. … And the violence continued to go on , … You must stay there, when you're there you must stay. You're not going to buy meat. When you want meat you must stay. (Interview, Mandisa, MN:5-6).

… if you go to the IFP area if you are ANC. Definitely there you are going to be killed. And if you go to the ANC area, if you are IFP, definitely you are going to be killed. (Interview Thando, Tho1#1-2:2)

If shops, schools or churches were in the other area, then they were out of bounds, with the boundaries being enforced by both sides. A woman, who lived in what was first an Inkatha and then an UDF area, described her experience.

We were not allowed to go there [to the shop], one used to be stubborn by going there. One day when I was here at the corner carrying a checkers [plastic shopping bag] and I met MaHadebe. She said to me, ' where do you come from mother of Ntombi?' I said, 'I come from Msinga'. She said, ' don't you know that we are not allowed to go there'. I told her that I did not quarrel with Msinga'. She said, 'you see if you do like this I can tell the boys'. I told her, 'you can do whatever you like to do'. (Focus group interview, Edi1#1-2:15)

The situation was particularly difficult for those people living in unit one north as most of the shops were in UDF-controlled areas. As the war proceeded and UDF took control of larger areas it became more difficult for unit one north residents to leave their enclave. They were forced to approach Sipho Mlaba, the local Inkatha leader, for assistance.

Actually its so difficult … you must go to him [Mlaba] and talk, 'we want something to eat now.' And they have, he has more cars in his house. And they give them to the people to go out. But you must hide yourself until you go there and you move back. (Interview Mandisa, MN:6)

If the access road out of the township crossed another area, it was difficult to get to work or even to buy food. Many people were killed when the taxi they were travelling in passed through an area which had a different political identity from the one in which they lived.

> Taxis from Pinetown were not yet divided at that time. If you were coming here to unit one maybe your taxi would pass by Khanyile's place, an Inkatha place, it's near unit one. Sipho Mlaba's people some of them would come here, the others would go to the other side, if you were from unit one a person from Sipho Mlaba's group could see you. They would say, 'this one, who is he or she?' 'He or she is from a certain place. Get out.' You would get out and they would kill you there and then. If you are from unit three and the taxi goes to unit one first, you must tell the driver that, … 'let me get out, you will pick me up when you come back'. The drivers already knew that. If you were near Mcoyi they would ask, 'is there no one from unit three who is a comrade?' 'I am here'. 'Get out we will pick you up when we come back.' (Focus group interview, Mth1#1-2:30-31)

Eventually public transport, buses and taxis also stopped crossing the boundaries. After workers on the Rainbow Chicken Employees bus were attacked and four women killed (See interview Mandisa, MN:7), Rainbow Chicken arranged for the bus to travel under police escort and to collect and deliver workers door-to-door. People had to find another – usually longer – way around, run the risk of being killed by sneaking through, or else lose their jobs, as Mandisa commented 'many peoples they didn't work in that time.' (Interview Mandisa, MN:6).

One of the difficulties all young people faced was in attending school. As discussed above schools acquired the political identity of the area in which they were located. Those pupils who were resident in areas that had a different political identity were barred from attending. Thembi had the following to say:

> … it was difficult for us as ladies to go to school. If we go to school, we are checked. What unit are you going to because, the township is divided into units, … if you are going to south it means you are UDF, if you are going to north it means you are Inkatha. It was impossible for me from north to go to school at south. And if was impossible for the one who came from south to go to school at north. If you are found there, coming from south, you was killed or sexual harassment. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#1-2:3)

Furthermore, getting to school became difficult and dangerous. Many children walked to school and this involved walking across areas with different political identities. Mandisa attended the Chief Luthayi High School in unit four. She lived in unit one north, which was an Inkatha area, as was the section of unit four

where her school was located. However, the lack of transport made it difficult for her to attend school (Interview Mandisa, MN:5). As she was having to walk to school through a number of different units with contesting political identities, she decided that walking to school was too dangerous and so she went to other schools asking to be accepted there (Interview Mandisa, MN:9).[34]

It was not only the violence that resulted in school children being unable to attend schools. The violence affected schooling in other ways – primarily it broke down the discipline in the schools.

> … the school, the children were too few. Too few. The school days I think it's Monday to Friday. But maybe if you are at school on Monday, aye on Tuesday, aye no I'm not going to school today. Ok Wednesday, maybe you go to Friday and Monday. Ok, maybe on Tuesday and Wednesday. Others doesn't come until now. As I explained before there was that tension [at] school if you want to leave no-one is going to ask you where are you going. Ok, now its eleven o'clock, ok, I feel like going to home. Take your books, you take your bag, then you go outside the gate. Doesn't matter that the teacher in front [is] busy teaching. He knows when he or she is going to ask you [where you are going] what will follow him or her. Teachers [have] got no say, teachers [have] got no rights. Ok, maybe you are sitting here, oh here comes the crowd, ok it's mine, … going down or up the road, ok let me join them. Take your books, take your things, getting in, get into your bag, ok now I'm moving, here's my party, until the end of the year. (Interview Nonto, Nond1#1-2:9).

Male youth were required to participate in defending their area and attacking the opposing political group. Thembi explained her brother's involvement with the comrades after her family moved to Georgedale, fleeing from unit four.

> … they go to war at Georgedale because they were the group of people who they called the 'house-guards'. They were in groups, group one today we will be the night watchmen's, group two today there divided. So it was easy for them to join or to participate. Because they were divided into groups, because at Georgedale we have unity were one party. That was an ANC. And by that mean we are ANC. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#2-2:3)

For many of these youth their identity as comrades was bound up with their gender identity as masculine. Dudu (Dud1#1-2:14) revealed what it meant to her boyfriend[35] to be a comrade

> So I was furious now because I didn't know the reason why he came back, why? Because he was already at this school at Stanger. So he left the school … So he say,

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[34] She eventually found a place at a school outside of Mpumalanga.

[35] He was later killed in the violence. His house was petrol bombed and both he and his father died in the flames.

'what am I going to do? I'm supposed to do. I am a boy. I have to attend. I have to attack, I have to attack, if they attack us I have to protect myself'.

Implicit in Dudu's statement is the belief that being a man and a comrade means being ready to go to battle. Key to the construction of these identities as men and comrades was the notion of 'being brave' and thus not 'being a coward'. Tellingly, both men and women subscribed to this idea. Their peers of both genders called young men who refused to fight cowards.

There are … few of them [the boys] who would like to study hard, who didn't like it, to join politics; they're always in the class. … they were calling the boys who stayed in classrooms cowards. (Interview Phumla, PM2:14)

During battle, women used the insult of 'being a coward' to spur the men onwards to victory.

If we were talking to them at a meeting we say, 'hey you, you mustn't be defeated like this. Like yesterday, you were defeated. You must go braver now. You must attack these guys and kill them.' They said, 'ok, if we don't go there we will lost respect with these women. Ok, let us go and fight.' They used to go there and fight. … [In battle we used to insult them to get their bravery up.] Hey you, coward, *igwala*, go there. You used to recognise me that I am a coward, so I must fight to the last atom of my energy. Ok, they used to go there and fight. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#2-2:11)

Dudu, despite having suffered great personal lose in the violence, as both her older brother and boyfriend were killed, described her other brother who refused to fight as a 'coward'.

… that one, he's a very coward. So he also hides himself, … so he wasn't interested to go there. And mother was forced to take him to relatives in Cape Town to hide him there. (Interview Dudu, Dud1#1-2:4)

For many young men the calling upon this signifier of manhood, courage as opposed to cowardice, was critical to their involvement in the violence and thus their assumption of a political identity. Waetjen (2006:111), in citing an interview from Campbell, makes a similar point that fighting was seen as a 'rite of passage' from boyhood to manhood. This construction draws on both gender and generational identities in that boys or girls were allowed to be cowards, but not men.

Part of the process of claiming places was the shouting of insults across the borders.

One day we were sitting outside there, just after the death of Mr Mbatha, they were

cheering and shouting saying, 'where is your Mbatha', they had just killed him they were saying 'he-he where is Mbatha, we are coming in there and someone else will follow Mbatha'. (Focus group interview: Edith's group, Edi2#1-2:12

There were times when the youth maybe from this side would go there and shout to the other side 'hey come guys we are ready for you, how about a fight today'. … (Focus group interview: Mrs Mthembu's group, Mth2#2-3:2)

Women played an important role in supporting the boys who guarded these borders. They extended their role of mother to incorporate these boys: a role extension that had two implications. First, 'mother' became socially rather than biologically defined, since, in situation of conflict, any boy became the son of any woman. Secondly, mothering happened across different sites, the street as well as domestic space. Mothering would include feeding and caring for the youth, accosting police who might be harassing them in the street, hunting for them at police stations, supporting them in court appearances and finally, if the worst happened burying them.

So the fighting boys … I told them that they should come into the house. … You find that they are hungry those people. You know the sleeping of a hungry person, sleeping helplessly on the grass. So I would tell the children that use the big pot to cook, that we do not use when we are alone. … I dish stiff pap, I dish curry. We took out the curry pot, I said, 'here it is', they were satisfied. There is a child I have seen yesterday. He ran away and arrived here at home, and said he does not want to go back home. He asked to be my child. (Focus group interview: Mrs Thusi's group, Thu1#2-3:12-13)

As 'little sisters' young women were also drawn into caring for the youth.

If a guy comes with his washing and says 'I didn't sleep yesterday, I was a night watchman. I want to rest a little bit, may you please wash this washing for me'. 'With a please brother.' Washing it, drying it, ironing it. Afternoon, 'here is your washing'. 'Thank you sister.' That is how we participated as young ladies. (Interview TN, p.3)

Identities and meaning of places are also created through difference. Not only were 'they' UDF because 'they' lived in a UDF area but they were UDF because they <u>were not</u> Inkatha. According to Thembi (Interview Thembi, Tha1#2-2:10) Inkatha members were cruel; they initiated the tactics of the political violence ie rape and the burning of houses. Discourses of the 'other' as cruel, exceedingly violent, pitiless, and ruthless were an important element in the creation of these boundaries – both physical and metaphorical. Feelings about Inkatha amongst those living in UDF areas were extremely strong and very emotional

I hate Inkatha. I'm sorry because I'm telling you that, it doesn't matter. I don't want

Inkatha. They can kill me if they like, I won't be Inkatha member, they cruel people like Mlaba. (Focus group interview: Connie's group, Con2#1-2:12)

We didn't like Inkatha because the Inkatha people started killing us, so we were retaliating (Focus group interview: Connie's group, Con1#2-2:1)

Even now I work with them [Inkatha], I don't like to talk to them because sometimes they talk worse about these things [the violence]. … at that time I had a smell of those people. I was there [at work], then they said, 'oh, we will clean this place up, we are going to eat Kentucky'. Then I hate them more.[36] (Focus group interview: Mrs Mthembu's group, Mth2#2-3:24)

There were many derogatory names for Inkatha members.

… [they] used to be called *okloba*, they were dirty, don't like to wash themselves, don't like to change clothes. And UDF members, aye the guys are very smart, who are clean, who like themselves. But they give that name *okloba* putting you know that gall bladder its very bitter if you taste it. You call them *ufuthi oklobo* or *ufuthi* ..... the one who like a balloon, if you are inflating a balloon, the gall bladder inflates like a pig. … And what I can say I like UDF by that time because the guys they respecting themselves. Unlike *okloba*. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#2-2:10)

Another insulting name used for Inkatha members was *otheleweni*. This referred to the method of killing people by throwing them down a cliff.

Other community members suggested that Inkatha supporters had no self-respect unlike the UDF comrades.

Can you see that Zweli [pointing to a UDF comrade]? He liked himself that he wouldn't retaliate by doing something like that [rape]. What they [the comrades] did was that they pointed you and they shot you as they were shooting, but they would not rape because their intention was that they liked themselves and they knew that raping was a filthy thing, you know. Ja, it was something they wouldn't do, our side they never did that. (Focus Group Interview: Mthembu Group, Mth2#1-3:27)

7.5 Lived experiences of political violence

As discussed in chapter one Pred (2000) suggests that a consequence of social crises is that central taken-for-granted meanings become unhinged and problematic. This results in new or transformed practices and discourses. New identities are constructed and derived in practice. What I suggest here is that

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[36] The interviewee was talking in English and much of this is her direct translation. By saying she 'had a smell of these people', she means she knew them well because they worked together at the same school. 'We will clean this place up', means that they will get rid of UDF supporters. 'Eating Kentucky' - Kentucky is short-hand for fast-food Kentucky Fried Chicken, this is a reference to necklacing, burning the body. Its difficult to know how this allusion arose but it was quite widespread. Killing opponents was celebrated (often joyful songs would be sung over the

political violence was one such social crisis. Residents had to develop new 'rules' of living. For many of them this had profound consequences for their political identities. Political identity might have been conferred on residents according to how territory was divided up between the two parties and where they lived, but it was the experience of living with that identity that forced many residents to internalise it and to recognise themselves as that being.

Most of the older generation had unquestioningly joined Inkatha (see chapter three) when it had launched a branch in Mpumalanga. For example, the Church group, a focus group of more than twenty women, confirmed that most of them had been Inkatha members before the violence. They explained that it was the only organisation and they were initially confused when they first heard about the UDF (Focus group interview: church group, Chu1#1-2:13). Now they are, like many of the older women who participated in the focus groups, staunchly UDF/ANC. They explained the reasons behind the shift. Primarily, Inkatha's brutal behaviour caused them to question their loyalty and membership.

> That time they started shooting these Hayco boys. That is how we noticed that there is something wrong here. Ja. There is something. That is when I noticed that 'ah here is something going on'. (Focus group interview: Connie's group, Con2#1-2:4)

> I was once a member of Inkatha because it was the first organisation that was formed. It was said that we will unite, it was good. But when we were beaten and ordered to speak, there is a new Inkatha, then I was surprised about this. It was said that children would be taken to the training camps and stay there in the *veld* with boys, and it was said the mothers will be left alone at home. I was surprised as to what type of Inkatha is this. Because even people started complaining about this Inkatha. I stayed without knowing where I belong … I then join the new organisation … (Focus group interview: Edith's group, Edi1#1-2:20)

Their identity as mothers frequently gave them reason to question Inkatha's inappropriate sexual demands of their daughters and hence its overall ethos (see also focus group interview: Mrs Mkhize's group, Mkh2#1-3:7-8). However, their identity as mother also frequently meant that they chose the politics of their children rather than split up the family or abandon their child.

> If you've got a son or a daughter, if your child has gone to the other group, you have to support because you know that your child is supporting there – my daughter went to

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'boundaries' informing the other area of a killing), as was the chasing out of political opponents. Besides the obvious, the reference to Kentucky might also be a reference to a party.

UDF, they were know that when I'm living there[37] I am UDF because I can't throw away my child and go with Inkatha. (Focus group interview: Edith's group, Edi1#1-2:19)

Mothers it seemed were more likely to support their children's politics than were fathers (with examples above of fathers responding to their children's political activity and its implicit challenge to their patriarchal authority by forcing them to leave the family home).

The interviews suggest that political loyalty and identity did become paramount. In some situations, it superseded other relationships and identities. Some families evicted their children if they supported the opposing group (as in the case of Thoko), and there were stories of brothers killing brothers.

… [the] Mkhize boy was standing there, his brothers came this side, Philani and Nathi. They shot him. … when he told them 'no it's me, it's me, it's me', they shot him. They said, '*voetsak* you *qabane*'. Their brother. … That boy had run away from home because he didn't like this organisation, this Inkatha, so he was staying here at Xaba's house. So he went that side, they came shooting, shooting, shooting. And when he … because he was seeing his brothers, he said, 'oh my brother', then this one said 'oh *iqabane*', they shot him. It was so bad as like that, that you had no, there was no brothers, no sisters. (Focus group interview: Connie's group, Con1#1-2:22)

The rest of the group confirmed that the meaning attached to being a member of a political organisation was often more significant than family ties.

Relationships were clouded in an atmosphere of intense suspicion and distrust. This was to be a feature of the violence throughout and the roles played by the Caprivi Trainees and other third force activities encouraged it (see chapters five and six). Hayco leadership had already been divided by rumours alleging that its president was a spy (see chapter six),resulting in his own comrades killing him. Despite the 'cleansing of areas' there were still very real fears of spies living amongst you who would take information to the other side (Interview Nonto, Nond#1-2:11). There was a constant need to prove and continually reaffirm one's loyalty. If you were not seen to be with one side, the conclusion drawn was that you were with the other. This atmosphere fuelled the need to declare political allegiance and played a role in fixing identity. It was necessary to actively show

[37] This woman lived on the border of a UDF and Inkatha area. Initially her street was in an Inkatha area, her house was attacked when her daughter was accused of supporting the UDF. Her

one's loyalty by attending meetings and participating in the activities of the comrades or Inkatha youth. The need to demonstrate loyalty affected all residents regardless of age or gender; however, the ways in which this loyalty was demonstrated differed according to age and gender.

As outlined above male youth were expected to defend their area and participate in attacking the opposing political group.

All households were expected to have representation at the regular community meetings. Mandisa, from unit one north, explained the pressure on herself to be seen to be active in Inkatha youth. When nobody from their household attended Inkatha meetings her mother was questioned and their political loyalty queried.

> … when they finished meeting, they came to our home, ask why we don't see anybody in this house. Why? Who are you? Which group you fall into? (Interview: Mandisa, MN:14)

Initially the youth demanded that her younger, ten-year-old brother attend the meetings. When her mother protested that he was too young, they then demanded that her eldest daughter (ie Mandisa) should attend the meetings. Despite her reluctance to become involved, as 'I don't like any parties' she was forced to attend Inkatha meetings. Her sister and brother did become active with Inkatha youth; however, she was able to persuade her mother to let her leave the township in order to continue her schooling elsewhere.

Thando who lived in the UDF-controlled area of Georgedale alluded to similar dynamics. She explained that the comrades also required attendance and participation at community meetings.

> … we have to go to the meeting whether you want it or not. And if they uphold you to be something in the meeting, maybe to be a leader of that group, you have to do that. They didn't ask you. They want you to do it, whether you want it or not. They force the women to go to the meeting during the night. If you say you have a baby, you have a little girl baby, they say you must go with her. You must go with the baby or must leave the baby there and go to the meeting. And all of you must say your point. But if you just keep quiet and listen, they say, no, we just want to hear every views of them then can take it to the other member of the other Party. Then you have to participate in the meeting forcedly. You can't decide that, oh no, I'm not going to say anything and I can't

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daughter left home to join the comrades. Later, her street became controlled by the UDF and she played a very active role in supporting the comrades.

do anything. (Interview Thando, Tho1#1-2:7)

Amongst youth living in Inkatha-controlled areas one way of showing loyalty was to leave school and dedicate time to fighting. There were strong sanctions and even violence against those who escaped the disrupted education offered by Mpumalanga schools and were schooling outside the township. Mandisa explained that she stayed with a relative during the week and came home to Mpumalanga at the weekend. When she reached the industrial area of Hammarsdale (about 10km before Mpumalanga township) she would change from her school uniform into 'smart clothes' in the public toilet, as she didn't want the other youth to know that she was attending school.

> They want you to stay with them. And move, and *toyi-toyi*. You're doing *toyi-toyi*, and I don't like that thing. That's why went out at Hlangeza High School. Doing my standard seven. … One day I came and I take out [my uniform] at the toilets, at Hammarsdale, take out my uniform and wearing smart, so they don't see me that I came to school. When the taxi reach me there, then I saw the big group. They say, 'hey, you, come on. You're going to school. But us, we didn't go to school'. Aish! I'm afraid. I'm so scared! I came and walked slowly. They say, 'oh'. Some of other girls there, they say, 'you go heavy.[38] We want you to go to have the meeting with us. I saw you. You schooling. You are not sit with us here'. And someone say, 'you go heavy because your brother and your sister is here with us. If you didn't, you must walk'. Aish! The other girl, I didn't know, she know the situation there. They walk with the uniform and they take out the uniform and they move in the road. Nothing, wearing just the body. (Interview Mandisa, MN:10&11)

This punishment of forcing errant female scholars to walk naked through the streets - called 'modelling' - while being beaten was carried out by young girls.[39] If the culprit was a boy he would be punished by boys (Interview: Mandisa, MN:10).

In UDF-controlled areas there was greater tolerance for those who left the township in pursuit of education. Dudu explained that a topic of conversation amongst her friends was how they would manage to complete their education given the violence. They decided leaving Mpumalanga was the only solution.

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[38] I asked her what 'you going heavy meant'. She explained it meant she had a miracle, as her brother and sister were involved with Inkatha youth in the area she expected that they would save her from punishment.

[39] While this practice was common in many of Natal's townships at this time, it seems to have been confined to Inkatha areas (Mandisa was from unit one north). I remember first hearing about it, at the time, in the context of Pietermaritzburg's townships. There it was used specifically as a

When her mother agreed to send her away to boarding school her friends were supportive (Interview: Dudu, Dud1#1-2:9). However, friends were not the comrades and while those who left to continue their education were not physically threatened, those who remained behind treated them with derision and contempt. Boys were taunted that they were *amagwala*[40] and were expected to join the fighting when they were home on holiday. Another common insult was to call them (both boys and girls) 'supry' which meant a 'superior person'. The allegation was that because they were attending school, while their compatriots protected the area from Inkatha, they saw themselves as 'a better person'. (Interview: Thando, Tho1#1-2:11)

Young woman were expected to show their support for the comrades by attending the funerals of those comrades who had been killed by Inkatha or the police. Dudu explained that young women were expected to be *toyi-toying* in front of the crowd of mourners as it was hoped that this would deter the police from opening fire on the crowd. Attending funerals demonstrated loyalty and political identity.

> … because if there's a member of ANC, comrade has died surely you have to go there [to the funeral]. Everyone, everyone. They came even at home and take you. Because if you didn't attend that means you are another party, you belonging to other party. That they don't like. It was very difficult. (Interview: Dudu, Dud1#1-2:2)

However, Dudu admitted that, as time went on, what began as coercion turned into willing support.

> … when it started we were forced. When the time goes on and maybe it's your colleague or your friend he has died there we were willing to go there, in the funeral because it was your willingness. (Interview: Dudu, Dud1#1-2:5)

Young women were also expected to show support for the boys when they were in battle. As Mandisa explained they did by calling out sounds of support and cheering when one of the opposing force were killed.

> … [Girls] they make a noise, 'Kiri, kiri, kiri!' Yes to support the boys. Ja, they make the noise. When one of the other parties died, they shouted then, 'We are the heroes'. (Interview Mandisa, MN:19)

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punishment for girls who were behaving in a culturally inappropriate way. Thus it does seem to be a gender-specific punishment designed to humiliate and discipline women.

[40] Cowards.

Failure to follow the boys into battle resulted in one's political loyalty and identity being questioned.

> Because if you don't follow them when they're going to fight, you, you must say why you don't follow us, when they go in that. You must ask. If you don't like, you must go. You must go, to save your life. (Interview Mandisa, MN:19).

Following traditional gender roles women tended to those who had been injured in battle.

> … If somebody was shot, maybe he was not dead. You have to take, you have to learn to take the bullet out and wrap them so, and do anything, clean the […], take those who are dead with you. You keep them I somewhere else so that the IFP people don't saw him. Because they are going to burn the body. (Interview Thando, Tho1#1-2:14)

The comrades enforced their authority over the areas they controlled. This was done by controlling who could and could not enter an area (as discussed above) and by controlling the lives of those within the area. The comrades maintained community discipline by trying to remove criminality from the area. In the absence of policing they attempted to maintain tight control over their areas. As discussed above, this often put them in conflict with other youth and resulted in break-away groups of *com-tsotsis*. Partaking in the disciplining of community members who had 'done something wrong' was another way of showing that you identified with the community politics and were loyal to the comrades.

> … Maybe if somebody is found doing [criminal activities], maybe there is someone who is breaking the house up, …, the person was called, they have to discipline her or him. They tell maybe, … each of you must give her three strokes. Even if they don't want to, they said, 'You must do it, why you don't want to do it'. If your brother kill[ed] somebody, they said you must be the first one to kill him. If your brother, if your brother killed somebody else, there they caught him, then you are the one that's going to kill him. If you don't want to, they are going to kill you also. Then have to do it. … You can do that and everybody must do that. … (Interview: Thando, Tho1#1-2:7)

For most residents of Mpumalanga in UDF-controlled areas their relationship to the comrades was a double-edged sword. It was generally supportive as they were seen to be protecting them from something far worse – Inkatha, but it was undercut with fear. Dudu claims that most Georgedale residents supported the comrades as they were protecting them. The comrades went house-to-house asking for contributions, which residents complied with. But Thando explained that the compliance was always accompanied by the knowledge that if you didn't yield revenge would be extracted.

… Then those people want some money, they they have to go door-to-door to collect the money, official and the people in the area. So, we have to give them money. If there is some of them want some clothes to wear and they don't have some, because some of them don't have parents, some parents died, been killed by IFP members. So we have to look their, that group of that area has to look over those kids. So if they want clothes, they have to collect money to you and you have to give them money. … You must give them that money, even if there is nobody who's working in that house, you must try. Because if you don't give that money, which means you are IFP, they are going to attack you, they're going to maybe burn the house. So you have to try your best and do it. If they want to stay in the house, maybe you will have seven-room house, maybe you are four in the house, they can demand half of the rooms to be theirs. You can't say anything. You have to live with them, have to cook for them, wash clothes for them, do everything for them. (Interview: Thando, Tho1#1-2:10)

As described above a key factor in 'being UDF' was displaying unquestioning support and loyalty to the comrades. For women this loyalty and support was intrinsically bound up to their gender identities. The violence allowed the assertion of a particular kind of masculinity - one that had ultimate power over women, that ruled with an iron fist and that would be disobeyed on pain of death. Nonto said,

… by that time if you are being called by the boys, you always smiled although you don't say nothing but your smile. Because by that time they are taken as God. If the boy talk to you, you come attention, you talk to him friendly, because you are begging to be alive. Whatever he say, whatever he do doesn't matter, you accept what he say. (Interview: Nonto, Nond1#1-2:11)

In the interviews many young women spoke about the fear and reality of rape and sexual violence. Being with the comrades meant denying the boys nothing – if they wanted food you made it or stole it, if they needed a place to stay you organised it, and if they wanted sex you supplied it.

… And some of our ANC boys, they used to have the camping areas. If they come through the house, now the boys used to be rude, even into us, also the ANC. They can come in the house and ask for the girls. 'We want so-and-so. You can come and then stay with us. You can help us to, because we don't have the women to sleep with, we are going to sleep with you'. They ask you to your parents. … the parents say, 'I don't want my children'. They said, 'Why? Because she's a comrade, we are the comrades. She's supposed to help us'. … So, we have to fight for the life every time. And we have to hide, if you are a girl. If they wish, if you are going to the road, if they saw you, they said, 'I wish to sleep with you', then they're going to come in the middle of the night and ask for you. Even they didn't ask, they just take you and go with you. You can't say anything. Your parents can't say anything, because if they said anything they're going to be burning, they're going to be killed. So now you have to obey their thing, what they want from you. Do what they want so that your family can live there, can be safe. (Interview: Thando, Tho1#1-2:7)

Any questioning the comrades' right to sexual access was taken as disloyalty and tantamount to 'being Inkatha'. Phumla illustrated this through the experiences of herself and her friend.

> … we was young, they [UDF youth] can just take you as your girlfriend. You can't say no. If you go to the police and charge them, they will say you are against them, how can you go to the police to charge them? … We can't charge them, like one of my friends, they took her one day, they rape her. She went to charge them, they went to her house, they killed everybody, because they say, it means she's not, she's like Inkatha because she went and tell the police that thing. (Interview: Phumla, PM2:3)

Fear of a similar outcome following an encounter with the boys led her to leave Mpumalanga. She was walking home from school with a number of older girls.

> … nearby my school there was a place, they will call it *Ngotha* in Zulu, where the ANC boys staying there. So one day the guy called me, he said I must come, he wants to talk to me. Those, I mean, all the girls, they told me, 'You mustn't go there, because there it's only boys'. So that, the way they were, those girl were laughing because that guy was like keep on asking me to come there and I just told him, 'I've got toothache, I can't come there'. So they were laughing. He just came in hits me badly. Then I went home, I told my brother, because he was the member of ANC now. I told him, 'Your friends there, they hit me because he was […]', he wanted to know who was that person. Then I went with him, I show him. So they, there was a disciplining if you do something wrong to one of, you know, because they were calling me, I'm an ANC member because I'm, my brother is here. So they gave him [the boy who assaulted her] that punishment. From there, he was looking for me. He told me straight he will kill me, because the way they were hitting him with the sjambok, maybe twenty. So, he said he will caught me, so my mother decide[d], because I'm not walking with my brother all the time. Even those people who were discipline us sometimes they wanted even to kill them now. Because they want to do what they want to do. They're violent. They kill so much of people, so they got more hurt. So from there my brother told me, 'Please just go and stay to my auntie's house, then you look for a school there. Because I'm not walking with you every day. He can just come and rape you and do what he want[s] to do. You can't do anything because they're used to doing that things. (Interview: Phumla, PM2:16)

While Phumla's account does reiterate the distinction between comrades and *com-tsotsis*, it, nevertheless, still demonstrates the gender power that young men wielded. The anarchy resulting from the violence had substantially increased the gender power of young men in relation to young women.

The fear of sexual demands inhibited young women from participating in political structures in their areas. Phumzile belonged to the school choir. She explained that the male members of the choir were eager to attend local UDF meetings, however, she and her friends were not.

> … they used to say like, 'let's go there'. But we [the girls] didn't like it because even they, if we then in that meetings, the boys was like naughty, if maybe that guy loves me, he can't tell me nicely, propose me. It's like he can just take me to his house and do what he want to do to me. I can't go to the police because they will say I'm against them. You,

that's why we didn't like it. Once we finished school we have to go […], (Interview: Phumzile, PM1:5).

Thembi gave a very different account to the other young women. She indicated that young women played a supportive role to the boys guarding their areas

… other women's participated in things like organising *intelezi* for UDF members … we used to participate by cooking food for them, for those who evacuated from the location to stay here in cabins, cooking them food, if it was, um we acted as one big family. If a guy came at night, I knew he was staying at one north, his family were killed, sometimes their home was burnt, he came at night [makes knocking noise] 'Thembi can you give me some food'. 'okay with a pleasure'. Giving him food, drinks, if he likes to sleep organise a bed for him … That's how we participated. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#2-2:3)

She also indicated that girls would wash and iron for the boys who were defending the area. Thembi denied that UDF comrades sexually harassed girls.

They used to make sexual harassment to those of Inkatha. But aye, they were not always like that. Those who were found doing that were disciplined. There were disciplinary committees of UDF. Looking after those, if you find an Inkatha girl it's better to kill her rather than to harass her by sex. There were disciplinary committee of that. (Interview Thembi Tha1#2-2:3)

Upon further questioning, Thembi said the concern was that guys who 'sexually harassed'[41] Inkatha girls would get used to this behaviour and thus would be tempted to also 'sexually harass' UDF girls. For that reason it was better to kill the Inkatha girls, as there was little chance they would kill UDF girls. In a perverse way this explanation does recognise the gender power politics that became embedded in the political violence. Yet, for those young women who became intimately involved with the violence and the comrades (as Thembi was), it was difficult to acknowledge the gender violence that became integral to the construction of masculinities at the time.

This period was a time of terror and horror for most of those living in Mpumalanga township. Daily living was completely unpredictable; furthermore, they were forced to witness deeds of brutality on a regular basis. The trauma of the violence remains with them today. Nonto explained how the things she saw then still haunt her.

Whatever I see, even now I've not forgotten. Just, just, see if you are walking, when you are walking maybe one of you meet a corpse. When you look at the other side

[41] This seems to be a euphemism for demanding sex or rape.

'whoa, this one another corpse'. It's not a joke to see eighteen corpse a day. It's not a joke. Even now, till the end I won't forget. (Interview Nonto, Nond#1-1:6)

Thembi alluded to similar feelings,

… this thing disturbed us. Because if I am talking about this thing, I used to feel very unhappy. Because I see how my colleagues, my relatives were brutally killed. (Interview Thembi, (Tha1#1-2:11)

The constant harassment by both Inkatha and the police made the lives of many wretched. Mrs C's (see above, interview Connie's friends, Fri1#1-2, Fri1#2-2, Fri2#1-2) story is a typical example of what happened to those who were targeted as enemies by Inkatha. Frequently, as in her case, alongside attacks by Inkatha (see above) the police also harassed the families of known comrades. Mrs C was not even able to bury her husband in privacy, on the eve of the funeral she and her children were detained by the police – the accusation being that they were supplying guns to the comrades. These incidents still disturb her.

Most of those I interviewed had lost close family and relatives in the violence.[42] These events still cause them pain and suffering. Thembi shared her anguish at the death of her boyfriend;

He was killed by the younger brother of his father. Because he was a UDF member, his father's younger brother was Inkatha. … It was terrible. Very terrible. I was badly affected. … several times, months, some years, if I'm talking about this thing it makes me feel very unhappy. Because I miss him. Because of the violence. (Tha1#2-2:8)

Likewise Mr M talked about the lose of their son,

… this violence changed life. … maybe we are seated at the dining-room. If maybe it happens that a wife keeps quiet, you can see that she is thinking. The picture of her child who died comes back, then she keeps quiet. You realise that you have all been talking and everything was ok, they you will see her keeping quiet to herself and maybe that came to her mind and she would go to bed. If you try to figure out maybe you realise that you have been discussing about violence, then it will come to your mind that she lost her child in that violence … (Focus group interview: Mthembu's group, Mth2#1-3:21)

There was a sense that the experience of political violence had damaged all those who participated. Everyone mentioned the psychological side effects of those

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[42] Analysing the interviews with the eleven young women reveals a shocking picture: only three of them lost no close relative during the violence, four of them had brothers killed, two of them had their boyfriends killed, two lost close relatives and one's brother is now disabled after being shot. Its difficult to do similar calculations for the older women as the participants were many and not everyone spoke on all the topics.

times. Mrs C, an older woman from one of the focus groups, said that she lost so much weight she became a size 30 dress (Focus group: Connie's friends, Fri2#1-3:2). Thoko said her mother suffered from stress because of the difficulties of that time (Interview Thoko, Tsh1#1-2:5). Thembi says that her mother is still suffering from 'post-trauma' and won't return to the house they abandoned in unit four,

> She said she can't go back there. Because what she saw there, killing of people brutally, burning of houses, burning of people, seeing the person running with fire on his body. She's suffering from post-trauma. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#1-2:10)

Thembi explained how the violence changed her. She said that since she was a child she had attended church and was very well behaved, she didn't 'go to *toyi-toyi*'. But once they had been forced to flee, witnessing the horrors that they had, she became a changed person

> … when I left town [unit four] to Georgedale, when there was a *toyi-toyi* I used to go there. When there is an insult, I used to go there, behaving like barbarians. Talking insults, aye. Violence did change my life. But, I can say by education I do recover bit-by-bit to go back to where I was before violence. But, aye, I was by that time; I become angry as if I can kill another person because of my anger. Seeing how other people were killed. … Violence changed my life, but I am recovering now. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#2-2:2)

Dudu concurred

> … it changed the character because you became wild now. You know how to do things that you didn't know before, didn't do before. (Interview Dudu, Dud1#2-2:5)

Everyone agreed, that it was the 'boys', who were fighting, who changed the most. Nonto explained

> The children become tough, become cruel, become brave to do whatever is unexpected to do by the child. I think it affects [them] too much. … Being a fifteen old boy [who] is not afraid to stab anybody. When he sees a person knowing that this one is not my party, without asking help anyone, he just … shotting that police or stabbing that [person], is too young to do that. That is why that thinking is unexpected to do with the young. Because if a person is normally growing up, without a political disturbance that person knows, no this one is a person, this one is a human being, this one needs to be treated like that, no I can't do that to a human being. (Interview,Nonto, Nond#1-2:4)

Ultimately much of the township supported and identified with the UDF. Despite the superior fire-power of Inkatha and the support they received from state security forces, the comrades controlled most of the areas. The question that remains is why in this atmosphere of terror and uncertainty, where at times the

behaviour of the comrades invoked fear, and where it seemed as if they compelled support through intimidation, did these women identify with the UDF? I would suggest that there are three reasons for this.

Firstly, The terror that Inkatha unleashed needs to be acknowledged. For many the alternatives were unthinkable. The period when 'the boys were in Pinetown' was very difficult, upon their return they were welcomed as the heroes who were going to save them. Paradoxically, once the initial battles with Inkatha had been won, the areas became safer.

They blamed Inkatha for the violence and everything they lost. And as such, they could not support such an organisation.

> Women A: Gatsha started at first and trained the police force called *oblom*, he put the ZP [KwaZulu Police]. The ANC had no one when it was still called UDF. So in all that, in those tryings our children fought hard. They sweated; we were losing day by day. Day by day they died, we cried. God, but in one defeated cries. Today it is still him. ….
>
> Women B: What does the world say? What does the Zulu nation say? King! Oh! Country! Buthelezi. I do not know what I can say.
>
> Women C: Chief Buthelezi, Gatsha.
>
> Women B: No he is not the chief. He is a big *induna* of men.
>
> Women C: Oh he is in charge of men?
>
> Women D: Gatsha is not the king but he is a leader of Inkatha, of Inkatha members. It's not that he is the king of all the Zulus.
>
> Women B: The *induna* of men. Yes King Zwelithini, Gatsha is an *induna* of men.
>
> Women A: But he has killed no. We have no homes because of him. Mah he has finished the country. (Focus group interview: Mrs Thusi's group, Thu1#2-2:20-22)

Secondly, in the minds of many there were distinctions between the comrades and the *com-tsotsis*. Many of the excesses were blamed on the *com-tsotsis*. The comrades protected them from Inkatha when no-one else did. Furthermore, amongst the comrades were their brothers, sons and lovers. The lives of those they loved were being lost and endangered (see footnote 42) at the hands of Inkatha (or the police who were seen to support Inkatha).

And thirdly, it was the relationship between violence, place and identity that in turn cemented support for the comrades and thus confirmed political identities.

We knew as we know that we live in this place, this place belongs to UDF not Inkatha. There are no Inkatha people in this area. They are only UDF. So we knew that our children are UDF. (Focus group interview: Connie's group, Con1#1-2:23)

Thando explained that they supported the UDF because their homes and the place where they stayed were under attack. She said that they were not forced to support the UDF but

… we are fighting for the place to stay. So now we have to fall to other party because you have to stay within that area, because that's where you were born, you can't go anywhere.

She went on to say that,

… by that time I was so young, I believed in anything. . Because they told us that you have the ANC's fighting to the white people because you are being oppressed. By that time I didn't saw that thing that I am being oppressed. I am being or doing anything. I just know that if you are ANC are fighting the IFP people. If you are ANC party, you have to fight the IFP people. I didn't know that be there was conflict because all those people, ANC and IFP they are black. Why are they fighting? I can't answer. … I was so confused because I don't know what are you fighting for. I only know that I have to fight for the place to stay, I have to fight for my party. You have to fight, like it or not, because it is the place where you are staying. (Interview Thando, Tho1#1-2:9)

Other informants reinforced the relationship between the spatiality of the violence and their political identity as UDF (and then later ANC) supporters. But underlying this was the reference to what Inkatha had done to them.

... Yes, I was a UDF supporter. As I said before the main road was the bridge as I was staying in one south I was forced to be UDF. Although I don't say that I was, I was not like it. I was like to be UDF. I like the UDF so but by liking it there is no reward that I got at the end. I just like it because it was the majority by that time. I was too young. It was not clear in fact what is UDF, what is the main cause of the UDF, what is the purpose of that UDF. I was still young but I saw ok, this brother I know, this my aunt, this my uncle, oh they are UDF, please this is the right thing. That's why I became a UDF by that time. … now I'm a member of ANC, full member of ANC. Why becoming full member of ANC. I think because my relatives, the blood of my relatives that was split off, I can't leave, I can't leave it. So that's why I like UDF. The boys that were fighting by that time, stand the truth. Stand by us. They never leave us even times, times of trouble. There were times when the IFP comes and they were ready from line to line, line to line, line to line. Killing whatever is coming from. By that day they were killing even women. … So what I realised then is that they are no longer fighting as they political parties, now they are destroying the world we got. (Interview Nonto, Nond1#1-2:8-9)

While we at Georgedale we said ok we were nearly bombed or nearly killed by Inkatha members, it is better for us to join the UDF party because at unit four we were nearly killed by the Inkatha members. There we participated as UDF. (Interview Thembi, Tha1#1-2:8)

Yet, despite this support for the UDF, for many this was a politics without much ideological content. Support for the UDF was primarily based upon the need to protect one's home coupled with the need to defeat Inkatha.

It does need to be acknowledged that for some their identification as UDF was very shallow. It was an identification imposed upon them by the circumstances (the spatiality of the violence and fear). Phumla is a good example of this. She was fourteen years old at the time and didn't understand the politics,

> How can a ten-years girl or a thirteen-years girl know what is politics. I prefer maybe twenty-one years, but I don't know who teach them what is, when they know what it's all about. What is happening at all? Like even now, I don't know what is happening, so I don't think a girl of the age of thirteen can know what is happening. They just say, 'I'm running, I'm this', you can just see, if you ask them, then they're … she won't tell you. She don't know. Even though the boys do, there are boys who do know what it's all about. (Interview Phumla, PM2:27)

She blamed her brother, who was a comrade, for the situation the family found itself in; and, she feared the comrades. She persuaded her mother to let her leave to continue her schooling[43] and as a result was labelled Inkatha and couldn't return home for two years. Today she is politically uncommitted and feels the violence has destroyed trust between her and her brother as she 'doesn't know him'.

This discussion of the 'lived experience of political violence' demonstrates the spectrum of responses to the politicisation of space. Once space was claimed and identified as belonging to Inkatha or UDF those who resided in it were expected to adopt that political identity. For many this particular aspect of their identity did not become an all-consuming passion. They found ways to escape the violence, usually to pursue their education (with all the aspirations that contained). But for those that remained there was the constant need to show / perform their identity. This involved attending meetings and funerals, supporting the fighting youth (or

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[43] While this was her first account of why she left, later in the interview she said that a comrade harassed her, and then hit her when she refused his advances. When she reported this to her brother he took it up with his comrades and that particular youth was disciplined with twenty lashes. Thereafter that boy vowed he would 'catch her' (Interview Phumla PM2:16). Ultimately her story is full of contradictory emotions, going back and forth, blaming her brother, blaming Inkatha, saying that the comrades protected them, and then saying that she feared them and was frightened to ask anything.

fighting themselves), bowing to the authority of the comrades, and for young girls providing them with sex. Any divergence from this performance would result in accusations of being Inkatha with the resultant consequences. In the context of political violence the often abusive gender relations of the pre-violence years had intensified. Youth had taken over the patriarchal mantle of the father and demanded absolute obedience and respect. But the 'father' is often abuser and protector simultaneously, and this was the case with the comrades. Ultimately they protected their communities from Inkatha. And it was this protection and the fear of what Inkatha represented (the other) that solidified support for the UDF, later translated into the ANC, and confirmed their political identity as UDF.[44]

7.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an answer to the last two questions that this thesis intends to investigate. Why did ordinary people come to identify with either the UDF or Inkatha, and, how were these political identities produced? I argue that the construction of coherent places and identities are intertwined processes. I suggest that the re-territorialisation of space in Mpumalanga, and the new political meanings ascribed to these spaces, whereby during the period of political violence the political identity of place assumes overriding importance over all other meanings and identities are central in understanding this process. The construction of territories and boundaries secured a support base in a situation where the political affiliation of residents was not initially certain. It also enabled a clear identification of the other. Thus, I argue that the construction of identities is a process that involves articulations with boundaries, power, difference, otherness and situated practices.

The chapter shows how political violence began amongst youth in the schools. However, very quickly thereafter it was assumed that the families of those youth shared their politics. Once political violence left the space of the body, it crossed age and gender boundaries. No longer were male youth the only targets. Initially

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[44] While the commitment to that particular identity as opposed to other components of one's subjectivity might vary, Mpumalanga Township has remained a firm ANC stronghold throughout

many older residents had supported Inkatha. But the killings of youth and Inkatha's brutal tactics including the rape and sexual coercion of young women caused them to reconsider their support.

The re-territorialisation of space in Mpumalanga resulted in the meaning of places becoming fixed, resting on a singular identity – the political affiliation and identity of its inhabitants. The cleansing of areas was central to this process. This involved the intimidation and / or burning out of those who it was felt did not share the political beliefs of the dominant political group. Neutrality was not an option. No family or person who wished to stay in a place could avoid assuming the political identity of that place. As Mpumalanga divided into areas under the control of either the UDF or Inkatha, boundaries and borders between these areas were established. Both Inkatha youth and the comrades ruled through a reign of terror. Areas were demarcated as either belonging to one or the other. Those outside were not allowed to cross and those within were expected to visibly demonstrate their loyalty. Territory was constantly fought over, and the borders moved as the UDF expanded its control and influence. The establishment of borders allowed the creation of a 'them' and 'us' and aided in the creation of political identities. This was particularly relevant in this situation of political violence where the content of these political identities was more about what 'we' are not, rather than what 'we' are.

The politicisation of space meant that residents had to develop new 'rules' of living. Political identity might have been conferred on residents according to how territory was divided up between the two parties; but, as the movement of internal refugees within the township illustrated, many chose whether to support the party that was gaining power in their area. The experience of living with these identities eg demonstrating loyalty, attending funerals, defending areas from attack etc, forced residents to internalise them and to recognise themselves as that being. In many situations, political identity superseded all other identities.

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the various national and local government elections since 1994.

For many, particularly women, their relationship with the comrades was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the comrades defended their areas from attack and ensured some level of safety for residents. On the other hand, they demanded much from residents, particularly young women whose relationship to the comrades was always undercut by fear for their personal safety and rape. Yet they supported the comrades and by extension the UDF. Ultimately they were fighting for 'a place to stay'. The alternative if Inkatha won territory was further cleansing and the loss of their houses – 'a place to stay'. This relationship between place and identity is what cemented their political identities.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

In concluding this thesis I have two intentions. Firstly, I wish to restate the major contributions that the thesis makes. And, then secondly, I shall look forward to the period after the violence, to provide some indication of Mpumalanga's story after the peace pact. Despite 'the miracle' of the peace there could be no 'clean slate'; the political violence left behind overwhelming legacies that have shaped the community as we see it today.

8.1 Restating the arguments

Chapter one outlined the arguments of the thesis. Here, as stated above, I wish to draw attention to the major contributions of this thesis.

Firstly, it offers a substantially different explanation for the political violence of the 1980s. Rejecting the structuralist explanations of much of the current literature the thesis explores the articulations of local, regional and national dynamics. By closely examining each of these spheres, I demonstrate that while each has its own independent dynamics, ultimately it was the way that these spheres intersected over time, sedimenting a particular set of social interactions so that the 'new' configuration interacted with another set of social forces, that moved specific places (and ultimately the province) up the trajectory towards political violence. None of these spheres were determining. Furthermore, there was nothing inevitable about either the political rupture that occurred in 1987 or its form. The thesis shows that at each point in the interactions of these various spheres the processes could have shifted in a different direction. Thus, political violence was the outcome of a multiplicity of social forces operating in different spatialities.

As such my approach emphasises the importance of locality, both theoretically and empirically. It shows how place, in this case Mpumalanga township, is/was a particular articulation of social relations and situated practices at all scales. A key

theoretical point that has been empirically demonstrated is that understanding 'place' is a key component in being able to answer the question, 'why did conflict become violent?'.

Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that contained within this political rupture were gendered and generational challenges that contested patriarchal order within the province. The 1980s saw the rise of youth organisations that implicitly challenged patriarchal relations. Through my discussion of the period before 1987, I show how politics increasingly became the domain of younger men. As a result political organisations that had previously mediated conflict became marginalised. What is distinctive about this thesis is that it shows that at the local level conflict was between youth on both sides. Unlike much of the other work on political violence in Natal, which argues that the conflict was between young men on the UDF side and older men on the Inkatha side.

A third contribution is the argument that an aspect of the distinctiveness of the violence was its profoundly spatialised form in combination with its gendered and generational form. The empirical material showed how at particular moments the spatial form of the violence shifted. The first spatiality of the violence was organised around the spatiality of the body, the second spatiality was the household, and the third spatiality was the re-territorialisation of neighbourhoods. As a result everyday life became profoundly political. As well as a spatialised form the violence also had a gendered and generational form. These were closely interwoven. The spatial form of the violence was central in the creation of the political identities that accompanied the violence.

Fourthly, the thesis draws attention to the relationship between the spatialised form of the violence and the construction of political identities. The discussion of the modality of the conflict shows that the specifically territorialising strategies of the violence were essential to the identity formation that occurred. These strategies set in place borders between areas that were used to define insiders and outsiders. Such definitions, along with the denigration of 'the other' and the

situated practices of everyday life were crucial to those moments of closure that are essential in the formation of identities.

Fifthly, the thesis speaks to the theorisation of place. As the theoretical discussion in chapter one illustrates, there is a broadly agreed upon view that places are formed relationally, and locality is shaped by messy and diverse interconnections. But despite these theoretical advances, this thesis shows that it is still necessary to be able to analyse conflict-driven and closed forms of territory and identity. Places are not always open, shifting and porous. In particular conditions, boundaries are set and their meaning is singular with little tolerance for alternatives.

Finally, as a result of its particular methodological approach, specifically the use of detailed ethnographies, this thesis begins to reveal the profound horror and trauma of the period. Amongst the work on the political violence in Natal there is little other work that chronicles these narratives. Furthermore, it is one of the few pieces of research to focus on the violence and rape faced by women during the political violence. I hope it will contribute to telling the hidden story of that period.

8.2 Legacies of political violence

A question that remains is: after such a traumatic period, how do people reconstruct and live their lives? What is the legacy that is left by the political violence? By way of conclusion I shall highlight some aspects of that legacy.

Over the past decade or more, Mpumalanga has been touted as an example of 'how to' achieve peace. The two political leaders, Meshack Radebe from the African National Congress (ANC) and Sipho Mlaba from Inkatha (now the Inkatha Freedom Party), have been internationally lauded as peacemakers and have achieved numerous international and local awards for peace.[1] Peace was

[1] Amongst others, Radebe was awarded an honourary doctorate by the University of Cape Town in 1993. Mlaba chose not to accept a similar award 'saying it would be premature' (Weekend

carefully built through numerous meetings in the township, attended by the local leaders and residents.[2] Radebe has risen to prominence within the ANC, sitting as a member of the Provincial Parliament and later (2006) Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Social Welfare and Population Development in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Cabinet. Sipho Mlaba represented the IFP on the Durban Metro Council.

Peace posed many challenges for the Mpumalanga community. First was the need to reconstruct a physical environment that had been devastated by political violence. It was estimated that 1500 houses were burnt out (City Press, 2 August 1992), shopping centres and schools were also damaged and burnt, no maintenance had been carried out for over four years; and the township was empty with thousands of residents having fled as refugees. In response, the Peace and Reconstruction Committee set about raising funds to address these needs.

Secondly, there was also a need to re-establish governance in the township. By mid-'91 the township administration offices, which had been burnt down, had been re-opened. Of course, this process was facilitated by national political developments in the post-'94 period. Along with governance was also the need to encourage residents to begin paying rent and services, as payment of these had fallen by the wayside.[3]

A third challenge was getting the youth back to school. Schools needed to be re-opened and the discipline of learning re-established. This was not an easy task as

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Argus, 4 April 1993), and they were joint recipients of the first African Peace Award (Daily News, 21 June 1996). In May 1995 they both travelled to Burundi to 'share their vision of peace' (The Natal Witness, 27 May 1995).

[2] In February 1991 Radebe and Mlaba held meetings with local teachers (The Natal Mercury, 11 February 1991; in May 1991 a joint ANC/Inkatha rally was organised attended by over 2000 people (The Citizen, 20 May 1991); a joint ANC/IFP rally was attended by about five hundred people on 2 February 1992 (The Natal Mercury, 3 February 1992; on 21 March 1992 a joint Sharpville rally was held; and, a fourth joint peace rally was held on 8 November 1992.

[3] Residents stopped paying rent and electricity in 1986. Electricity bills had since accumulated and the supply was under threat. The ANC and IFP appealed to the KwaZulu government to waive the payment of outstanding bills. This appeal was successful and in October 1993 the KwaZulu Government wrote off more than R14 million in unpaid rent, service charges and water and electricity bills (The Citizen, 12 October 1993).

the violence had destroyed generational order and it now needed to be reinstated. This was a theme of many of the meetings and peace rallies. Young people were urged 'to stop terrorising teachers at school'; the message to parents was that they should 'stop encouraging their children to loot and steal because such actions undermine the current peace initiative'. Furthermore, the youth were told that

> not a single country in history had ever been ruled by young people. They were told it was crucial for them to educate themselves in order to prepare for their critical role as future leaders. (The Natal Mercury, 3 February 1992)

On the ground, the progress towards peace and stability was slow. There were organisational divisions within both the ANC and the IFP over the peace. Radebe was criticised by the Midlands ANC branches and Mlaba by Inkatha national leadership as well as a local grouping under Mrs Xulu from Woody Glen (City Press, 15 March 1992; Weekly Mail, 5 November 1992).[4] Tensions existed for many years after the official declaration of peace and despite the peace rallies[5] there were the occasional killings. In the interviews, ordinary people spoke about the difficulty of forgetting who had killed their loved ones.

As part of the national process towards reconciliation, the TRC set up a process to collect affidavits from members of the Mpumalanga Community[6] and in August 1998 the amnesty hearings of some the Caprivi Trainees[7] were held in the township. These were well attended by the community. The widespread rape of women during the violence was not brought to the attention of the TRC at these hearings, nor at the special women's hearings organised in Durban. This was no different from what happened nationally (see Goldblatt & Meintjes, 1997).

> … Of the nearly 8000 statements received on rights violations, only 300 deal with sexual assault and of these, only 80 relate to sexual assault on women. Only 17 of the 80 deal with rape and

[4] The role of Mrs Xulu is discussed in chapter six.
[5] For example, the numerous news reports on the rally of 3 February 1992 mention the tensions between individuals aligned to different political parties (see The Citizen, 3 February 1992).
[6] Unfortunately, despite my best efforts these affidavits were not available. First they were in boxes in the TRC Cape Town offices from where they were going to be transported to the Central Archives, and then they were awaiting cataloguing.
[7] They applied for amnesty for fifty-six incidents involving more than one hundred murders in the Empangeni, Eshowe, Clermont and Mpumalanga townships (The Citizen, 7 April 1998).

> these mostly occurred in KwaZulu-Natal (Barolsky, 1997) where the conflict followed the more typical contours of open warfare (Goldblatt and Meintjes, 1997:10).

Thus the sexual violence endured by women during the political violence remains one of the hidden stories of the war in Natal.

Despite fears,[8] especially in 1994, national and local government elections were successfully conducted in Mpumalanga. The ANC has won the majority of votes in all national, provincial and municipal elections. The relationship between place and political identity has survived the one-and-half decades since the official end of the violence. Areas that had been UDF during the time of political violence still show overwhelming support for the ANC. Similarly, the Inkatha areas voted overwhelming in favour of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

Most of the initial challenges the community faced in the immediate period after 'the peace' have been successfully met. While many initiatives were specific to Mpumalanga, these aspects of reconstruction were also part of constructing a new South Africa post-1994. The most difficult challenge to resolve has been the reconstruction of houses damaged during the violence and the rehabilitation of businesses. The story here is a mixture of ineptitude, corruption, incompetence and a lack of political will. Nevertheless, there are other legacies that are less about resources and the establishment of a new political system, and more about the profound social damage to a community that was wrought by the violence.

The history of political violence sits just under the surface of politics in KwaZulu-Natal. Whenever political disagreements between the ANC and IFP in KwaZulu-Natal become too heated, some member of the provincial parliament threatens us with the possibilities of returning to the violent politics of the 1980s. Similarly, in the lead-up to the various elections that have been held since 1994 members of the press, political commentators and politicians speculate about the political heat and the incidents of violence that will take place. Political parties sign codes of

[8] As some of the Focus Group interviews were conducted just prior to the 1994 elections, many women expressed fears that the elections would result in violence returning to the township once more.

conduct and berate each other over no-go zones. But the reality is that in each election since 1994 the levels of political violence in the province have been decreasing.

What then of the threats of a return to political violence? My analysis of the processes that gave rise to violent conflict in Mpumalanga township suggests that political violence was the outcome of a number of articulations – regional political dynamics, state and covert military support as well as local dynamics. While none of these are determining, I would suggest that covert military activities were crucial to increasing the intensity and longevity of the violence. Without such interventions it is unlikely that a civil war of such proportions (21 000 people, mostly Africans, killed in the course of the war with even more becoming internal refugees (Independent Projects Trust, cited in Krämer 2002:1) could engulf the province again.

Other legacies from the time have the potential to be more devastating. Political violence devastated household economies. When I did fieldwork in1993 and 1994 many households were in a precarious economic situation. Members were staying with relatives or in partially destroyed houses, there was no money to repair the houses and often the pensions of older members of the family were the sole form of income. As Freund (1996:187) has observed 'there is nothing exactly new in poverty in Natal'. Yet for many individual households, prior to the violence, vulnerability to poverty did not seem to be in their future. They had secured formal housing, even if it was a township matchbox; their houses were furnished and their children clothed; they had breadwinners, often male, in formal employment and other sources of income; they had sufficient resources to refurnish their houses after a first attack; and children were being educated or had just entered the labour market. Political violence changed all that. Residents emerged into the post-1994 period economically depleted and with their human assets in shreds.

Onto this grim legacy of the political violence needs to be mapped the impact of trade liberalisation and the resulting unemployment. Many of Mpumalanga's economically active residents worked in the nearby Hammarsdale industrial area. The majority of industries in this area are in the clothing and textile sectors; two sectors that have been hard hit by trade liberalisation and World Trade Organisation agreements. The 1990s was a period of factory closures and retrenchments in the Hammarsdale area. Fred Khumalo, on a visit to Mpumalanga in the late 1990s, observed,

> Ordinarily, kids finishing matric but with no money to go to a tertiary institution, would work at the factories, saving money to further their studies. Now that is all gone. In a row of ten houses, six of the supposed breadwinners are jobless (Sunday Times, 19 April 1998).

The desperate economic situation faced by many Mpumalanga households is in part the result of associated trade liberalisation. However, it is also linked to the history of political violence in the area.

By the late 1990s one of the major social problems facing Mpumalanga residents was crime. Residents complained of a lack of policing and on occasion, as in other places, took the matter into their own hands. This situation also needs to be seen as one of the legacies of the violence; the young men who abandoned their education to fight during the 1980s are now unemployed with little likelihood of finding employment in a restructuring economy looking for skilled labour. Writing in one of his newspaper columns Fred Khumalo tells us,

> Thousands of people died. Youngsters who'd grown up in good homes were sucked into the maelstrom, to emerge as bloodthirsty gunslingers – from both sides of the political divide. When the political violence died down, they had the guns and the weapons – but no targets, no future. So they found new targets – banks, shops, their fellow human beings. … Crime became their lifeblood. As a result, almost every third person I grew up with has got his own scam – hitting banks, doing housebreaking, stealing bank cards or doing the good old *ukubamba inkunzi* (mugging). (This Day, 26 January 2004)

Mpumalanga has been hard hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic (see Mosoetsa, 2005). The spiralling of this epidemic as well as the brutal gender relations of the post-

1994 period needs to be located within a modality of political violence that was sexualised. The incidence of rape of 'enemy' women as well as the demands for sexual availability by 'boys' on the same side, created the conditions for a rampant spread of the virus. Furthermore, in the post-1994 period the economic devastation wrought on local communities by political violence has created fertile conditions for transactional sex, a trend not helped by the economic challenges of the post-apartheid era.

The young women I interviewed in 1999 suggested that the emotional trauma of the political violence remained. They said that it was difficult to trust people and that a lack of respect on the part of the male youth was evidence of the years of war. The biggest personal challenge they faced had been completing their education. It seemed that this was what was determining their lives in the post-violence period. Those who had become very involved in the violence and dropped out of school, were unemployed and struggling to make ends meet. Many of them were engaged in survivalist economic activities. But the future seemed brighter for those who had managed to leave the township during the violence to pursue their education, or through their own fortitude and strength had gone back to school. They were currently studying at tertiary institutions and had dreams of a successful future. Nevertheless, they were still left with a question,

> … we are being very confused how it happened. For even now we used to ask ourselves, we wonder who did it?, how?, why? (Interview Thando, Tho1#1-2:17)

Fig 7: Graph Showing Incidents of Political Violence, Deaths, Injuries and Arson, September 1987 - December 1989



MAP 7: MPUMALANGA TOWNSHIP SHOWING DIFFERENT SECTIONS AS CONTROLLED BY DIFFERENT POLITICAL GROUPS

