

**NON - ALIGNMENT AS A
CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLICY
DEVELOPMENT**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that since February 1970, I have been engaged in research study for the purpose of writing this dissertation. Apart from regular contact, for guidance, with my supervisors from the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, I declare that this study represents my own work.

I declare that neither the substance nor any part of this study has been submitted in the past, nor is being nor is to be submitted for a degree in any university.

The information used in this dissertation has been obtained by me while I was a full-time student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

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October, 1975.

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to trace the development of nonalignment as a contemporary approach to foreign policy. I define nonalignment as a logical policy development among weak non-Western nations and may form the basis for a Third World perception of international relations.

For analytical purposes, this study is divided into three parts:

(a) Part One, Chapter One is a discussion of the theories on nonalignment, an explanation of the different forms of nonalignment and a comparative study of neutrality.

(b) Part Two is an historical overview of the development of nonalignment in the Afro-Asian Movement. The further development of nonalignment as a policy of consensus is then examined. An exposition of selected economic issues of the nonaligned nations is also emphasized.

(c) Part Three consists of an analysis of the pitfalls or success of nonalignment as an approach to foreign policy.

Research findings indicate that the strategy of nonalignment was first expressed by Jawaharlal Nehru in pre-independence India. When India gained independence, nonalignment as an approach to foreign policy was re-affirmed and elaborated by Nehru at various Asian conferences.

In April 1955, at Bandung, the African and Asian states re-affirmed their support for peaceful co-existence, pledged their support for anti-colonial movements and dedicated themselves to promote world peace and international cooperation. Bandung led to further consultations among African and Asian leaders and to an awareness that they had common problems.

Leaders like Nehru, Nasser, Tito and Nkrumah view the ideological conflict of the East and the West from a different perspective. Their attitudes are influenced by their nation's historical experiences.

They put their nation's independence, modernization and development, their quest for national identity and cohesion and their search for peace above all other priorities. Since the West reminds them of their past colonial domination, they feel they must not join the West against the East.

Nonalignment is a recent phenomenon distinct from isolationism, neutrality and neutralization. Nonalignment is a global phenomenon with adherents in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The nonaligned nations comprise a majority of states in the United Nations and other international organizations. Since each state has one vote in the United Nations General Assembly, the nonaligned nations tend to dominate it by their majority votes. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is an example of an economic institution dominated by the policies of the developing countries.

Since 1961 four major conferences of nonaligned nations have been held. These conferences have highlighted the problems of the Third World, expressed anti-colonial, anti-imperial and anti-Western sentiments. Seldom have these conferences condemned the Communist countries for their violation of human rights, the rule of law, interference in the internal affairs of other countries and their aggressive intent.

The double standards of the nonaligned nations has angered even the most sympathetic Western observers. Nonalignment as a policy of consensus is relative, partisan in a passionate way about colonialism neo-colonialism and the novel North-South problem. Nonalignment has become the poor, weak and non-Western nation's approach to international relations.

PREFACE

The study of nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy development is primarily a study of the Third World and their numerous gatherings in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

For analytical purposes this study will be divided into three parts. Part One will consist of the Theoretical Framework, Part Two will consist of the Historical Development of Nonalignment and Part Three will be an analysis of the failure or success of the policy of nonalignment in international relations.

I begin this study with the post Second World War period in the conviction that most of the important elements of nonalignment have evolved since then. I have confined myself to a treatment of Asia, Africa and Latin America because these areas have played a dominant role in recent years and it was there that a great many of the significant developments occurred.

Even when restricted thus, the subject matter is so vast and so complex that it must be artificially divided both in matter and in form. It will be necessary in some chapters to separate the analysis from the contents.

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PART ONE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I begin this study of nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy development with the difficult problem of semantics. International relations has been plagued by the improper use of its key terms. The concept of nonalignment and neutrality are at the core of international relations, yet, despite their key roles, both of these concepts are shrouded in ambiguity because of the careless use of these terms.

I will consider first the concept of neutrality and the manner in which it is commonly treated as synonymous with the vastly different concept of nonalignment. Many scholars and statesmen are prone to indiscriminately integrate and use interchangeably the two concepts. Why this confusion in terminology has been perpetuated is difficult to explain, for authorities are certainly well aware of the distinctions between neutrality and nonalignment.

I will emphasize that the confusion wrought by the misuse of these terms has complicated the study of many aspects of international relations, but it has especially impeded the understanding of nonalignment. I will maintain that nonalignment is a logical policy development among weak non-Western nations and may form the basis for a Third World perception of international relations.

PART TWOTHE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NONALIGNMENT

In Chapter 2, I propose to survey the general and historical trend of interest in nonalignment and the Afro-Asian Movement. In order to accomplish this I will have to be selective. I will review the general direction of Asian thought on the subject, I will examine the main elements of Jawaharlal Nehru's contribution and then proceed to deal with the most important stages of the Afro-Asian Movement. I will comment on the significance of the Bandung Conference and analyse the achievements of the various Afro-Asian Conferences.

At Bandung, Jawaharlal Nehru tried to dispel doubts and impress that nonalignment was not neutrality. Bandung was not a gathering of "yes-men". The new leaders were representatives of independent nations. They could not and would not remain neutral when freedom was threatened and justice was denied in many areas of the world. These new leaders wished to establish their independence beyond question; to keep their states together; to reduce poverty, illiteracy and disease and other post-colonial burdens within their countries; to make their weak countries safe from aggression; and finally, to show the East and the West that the new states desired peace and friendship with all nations.

In Chapter 3, I will critically examine the origin and development of nonalignment as a policy of consensus. While the United States was creating new alliances and "containing" Communism; India and other states were promoting peace through friendship and cooperation. Nehru sincerely believed in peace and thought other Asian leaders also had faith in peace and peaceful co-existence.

At various meetings of developing countries and at the United Nations

Nehru, Tito, Nkrumah and Nasser promoted nonalignment as an alternative approach to international relations. The first meeting of the nonaligned nations was held in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia - a Communist country. A total of twenty-eight (28) nations took part, three (3) of them as observers.

The Cairo Conference of Developing Countries of 1962 was attended by thirty-six countries, five of them as observers. Pakistan was the only aligned country attending the conference. The nonaligned nations as developing nations agreed to act in concert on economic matters and to promote trade, aid and mutual cooperation among nonaligned and developing countries. This economic conference was an important political event.

At Cairo in 1964 more than fifty-five (55) nations gathered and the participants condemned the West but not the East. At Lusaka in 1970 fifty-five (55) nations agreed that trade and development were urgent problems. The nonaligned nations, instead of condemning terrorism and hijacking, urged greater support for the terrorists. At Algiers in 1973, seventy-six (76) nations gathered to condemn Israel and other Western nations. Many resolutions were passed but little has so far been accomplished. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Lima, Peru in the first week of September, 1975 the eighty-one (81) nations concentrated on the economic problems of the developing countries and admitted North Korea and North Vietnam as full members of the nonaligned conference. The delegates refused to comment when their host, Juan Velasco Alvarado of Peru, was overthrown in a bloodless coup; because it was an internal matter of Peru.

The developing countries hope to pressurise the developed countries through organizations like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to alleviate the plight of the poor nations. The

prime purpose of this chapter is to discuss and analyse these organizations and an attempt will be made to illustrate how trade and development will be of critical importance over the next few decades.

PART THREEANALYSIS

In Chapter 5, I will attempt to recapitulate and critically examine non-alignment as a contemporary foreign policy development. It will consist of an analysis of the reasons for the success or failure of nonalignment as a policy of consensus. This analysis will consist of a comparison of neutrality and nonalignment and the nature of the multipolar and bipolar world. An attempt will also be made to predict the possible future and collective role of the nonaligned nations in international relations.

INTRODUCTION

1. WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

International relations is one of the new fields of specialization to develop in the social sciences, and its progress, especially during the post Second World War years, has been phenomenal. Norman Hill emphasizes that what we call international relations 'is in fact a complex of the foreign policies pursued by the nations of the world community, it is the action and interaction of the policies of a hundred and more states'.¹

It is essential to emphasize that all groups are unavoidable and omnipresent. Quincy Wright defines international relations as 'the relations between groups of major importance in the life of the world at any period of history, in particular those of territorially organized nation-states'.²

Broadly conceived then, international relations includes all types of transactions between governments and between peoples, from the sending of letters to a recipient in another country to the exchange of gunfire between the armed forces of two countries. Foreign policy can be defined as the activities of a nation arising from its dealings with other nations. Kulski maintains 'A policy is an external action undertaken to achieve a particular objective. Foreign policy is the total of all those actions, all of them aiming at a general objective, i.e. the desirable international situation'.³

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1. Norman Hill, International Politics. (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp.73-74
 2. Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations. (New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, 1955), p.13
 3. W.W. Kulski, International Politics in a Revolutionary Age. (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp.37-38

For Karl W. Deutsch: 'The study of international relations in our time is the art and science of the survival of mankind. If civilization is killed within the next thirty years, it will not be killed by famine or plague, but by foreign policy and international relations'.⁴

The concept "diplomacy" is often used as the equivalent of foreign policy, although this usage is not widely accepted. Norman Hill emphasizes:

'Actually, foreign policy is the content or substance of a nation's effort to promote its interests vis-a-vis other nations, whereas diplomacy is the vehicle by which policy is transported abroad and made effective; foreign policy is by nature substantive, whereas diplomacy is procedural. Popularly the word diplomacy is often applied, outside the realm of government, to the capacity which a person may have of influencing others skilfully, perhaps even maliciously, at its worst in this connection, it is according to Sir Harold Nicolson, "the more guileful aspects of tact".'⁵

Hans J. Morgenthau maintains that international relations have undergone four drastic changes in recent times. Firstly, 'the formerly separate systems of international relations have merged into one worldwide system'. Secondly, 'the predominance of the European system has disappeared'. Before 1914, the international system was essentially Europe-based containing several great powers. The great powers were those countries which were parties to a general settlement of international relations, small powers not only had no claim to such participation, but more often great powers, were the object of revisions in the international status quo. Thirdly, 'the possibility and actuality of total war dominate the international scene'. Since the Second World War, there has been intense diplomatic hostility and tension between the

4. Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1950), Preface, p.v

5. Norman Hill, International Politics. (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p.22

Soviet Union and the United States. After the Second World War the Soviet Union occupied Eastern Europe and brought it under its control. The Soviet Union forbade the Eastern European countries under its domination to participate in the Marshall Plan - an American programme to rebuild the war-ravaged economies of all willing European countries. Thus, a clear line was drawn between the East and the West in Europe. Later in 1947 the final traces of non-Communist organizations were wiped out in all the Soviet-dominated East European countries except Czechoslovakia. In 1948 a Communist coup removed the coalition government of Czechoslovakia and made it subservient to the Soviet Union. The United States and the Western European democracies, determined to prevent a Communist seizure of Western Europe, responded in 1949 with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, the Western European countries became partners of the United States in its policy of containment of the Communist expansion and Communist territorial expansion in Europe came to a halt.

Finally, 'the feasibility of universal destruction with nuclear weapons has radically altered the function of force as a means to the ends of foreign policy. The first three changes do not effect the dynamics and structure of international relations, but the last change constitutes a veritable revolution, the only one in recorded history in the structure of international relations.'⁶

2. WHAT IS THE "NONALIGNMENT"?

Since I intend to confine myself to the study of nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy development, it is essential that I give a definition of what I mean by the concept nonalignment. Nonalignment is a

6. Hans J. Morgenthau, "International Relations" in Stephen K. Bailey (ed.), American Politics and Government. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Information Agency, 1968), pp.251-252

logical policy development among weak non-Western nations and may form the basis for a Third World perception of international relations.

When India became independent in 1947, it decided to carry the demand for decolonization throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. By the mid fifties (1950's), it was clear that many colonies would become independent and an important bond and group consciousness began to develop between peoples of the world with experience under colonialism. The newly independent nations began to regard themselves as a group and consciously identified themselves with each other through regular interaction at meetings and conferences.

The newly independent group of nations had many common characteristics: they were weak, non-Western, non-White, newly independent, militarily impotent, and economically and politically underdeveloped.

In view of their weakness these new nations felt that they could not join the East or the West without running the risk of becoming "colonies" again of the West or "satellites" of the East. They shared a mutual distrust of the West as non-Western and non-White nations. They identified colonialism with the West and thus in their anti-colonial campaigns they condemned the West. As newly independent nations they cherished their independence and wished to assert their independence at home and abroad. As militarily impotent nations they realized that peace and the promotion of peaceful co-existence through the United Nations was their best safeguard against aggression. As economically and politically underdeveloped nations they needed much foreign aid with no strings attached from the East and the West.

There is not a general category of nonaligned states, for each country must in foreign policy, reflect the realities of its particular history, its geography and its position of power. The tendency to think in general terms about nonalignment has led both the critics and the ex-

ponents back to compile their separate categories of the vices and virtues of the nonaligned states, and thus each side has been able to present highly biased and exaggerated judgements.

Since nonalignment has no legal framework and there are no legal rights and obligations, the new nations felt safe in declaring their support for nonalignment as an approach to foreign policy. The nations can pursue nonalignment in their own interests and nonalignment may change with changes of government in a country. The outstanding characteristic of nonalignment is its flexibility and each nation can evolve its own brand of nonalignment.

Jawaharlal Nehru regarded nonalignment as the attempt by India to pursue an independent foreign policy by avoiding permanent political, military or diplomatic affiliation with either the East or the West in the Cold War. He emphasized that the essence of nonalignment is independent judgement - judging each issue on its merit. It is a flexible approach which cuts across the rigidities of alignments. India did not wish to surrender its options to a group dominated by a super power. Nehru's philosophy of nonalignment and of peaceful co-existence was born out of the Indian tradition of peace and peaceful change as expressed in the teachings of the Buddha and Gandhi. Nehru felt that the consequences of the rivalry between the two power blocs could be dangerous and destructive and that blocs were not necessary. India did not favour one bloc over the other; it tried to judge issues in accordance with its policy objectives.

But the United States turned to Pakistan as the centre of American interest in South Asia. The American policy-makers assumed that Pakistan would be responsive to their needs and its Islamic connections could be advantageous. The Moslem Middle East from Turkey to Pakistan was vital for the security of the Western alliance and thus, the Truman Doctrine

was extended to Iran in 1947 and later to Pakistan. India was dubbed pro-Soviet Union and nonalignment was branded as "immoral" by John Foster Dulles.

Indeed, the United States failed to take note of India's policies - that the Indian government had taken firm action against Communist insurgency in India in 1948; that initially the Soviet Union's attitude to India was not very friendly; that Stalin branded Nehru an "imperialist stooge"; or that if India was nonaligned, she was by definition not in the Soviet camp; and that India was also a member of the Commonwealth.

The Soviet Union's attitude to Yugoslavia was similar to the American attitude to India. Both the East and the West believed that those countries not with them were against them. Since Yugoslavia had not fought on Hitler's side, but had been occupied by the Germans, it was in a different position from that of Eastern Europe and the Balkan states. The Yugoslav partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, had captured and liberated Belgrade from German control and not the Soviet Union. When the Communists led by Tito came into power in Yugoslavia, they nationalized all industries, outlawed all opposition and condemned attempts made by Stalin to overthrow the Tito regime by overt and covert means.

Tito declared that Yugoslavia would pursue an independent foreign policy in its own interests and would not be aligned to the East or the West. Yugoslavia would pursue a policy of peace and develop peaceful relations with all states. When Tito condemned interference in the internal affairs of other states, he was referring to Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. Tito feared the Soviet Union more than the West. Tito survived because he was a genuine national leader, unlike other leaders who had spent more time in the Soviet Union than in their countries. Yugoslavia had no common frontier with the Soviet Union and

Tito accepted Western aid. This promoted Yugoslavia's relations with its non-Communist neighbours. Yugoslavia shattered the myth that a communist government, not subservient to the Soviet Union, was a contradiction in terms of international relations. Yugoslavia's "secession" led to a series of attempts by other Eastern European countries, like East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to break away from Soviet control. The Soviet Union brutally crushed these uprisings and the world accepted Eastern Europe as part of the Soviet sphere of influence. Yugoslavia became the first European nation to declare itself nonaligned and part of the Afro-Asian group of nations.⁷

3. CONCLUSION

The global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union clearly played a major part in determining the pattern of the post Second World War world. It is the aim of this study to show that these two nations failed in their attempts to align the countries of the Third World into their conflict. Communism and democracy were not the only forces shaping the post-war world, nor was alignment with the East or the West the only alternative for the weak non-Western nations. Nonalignment and nationalism were evolving in the Third World. This study will trace the evolution of nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy development and its significance in international relations.

7. Stephen Cissold (ed.), A Short History of Yugoslavia. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966)

For Yugoslavia's role in nonaligned affairs see:

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973)

PART ONE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL THEORIES ON NONALIGNMENT

I. THE PLACE OF NONALIGNMENT IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. THE STUDY OF NONALIGNMENT

Since the Second World War, the literature of nonalignment has swollen enormously in both the Afro-Asian States and in the West; in Britain and the United States, as well as other countries.

Serious study of the subject has been widely and vigorously extended, with the result that in almost every aspect there has grown a numerous and comprehensive bibliography.

The Western contributions far outweigh all others, even all others combined; this is an easy situation to explain, in so far as the United States and Britain have so many long established schools and University Departments where studies of the developing countries figure as major items, and thus there exists substantial numbers of teaching and research staffs devoted to these countries. The resulting literature is too considerable and extensive to permit any sort of survey in short compass as can be seen from the bibliography.

The development of nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy of India can be traced through the struggle for Indian independence. Nehru's sympathy with other struggling nationalities found expression in Pan-Asian ideas and the promotion of international peace and harmony among nations. India under Nehru was bound to be nonaligned if only because of the opinion in the country was too divided for the country to take sides in the Cold War. Nonalignment was the answer and by it Nehru gradually achieved until the end of his life, the rank of world statesman for himself, and for India, that of a country whose opinion counted even though not backed by great military strength.

From a handful of newly independent Asian States, led by India, by the end of the 1960's the nonaligned community had grown to encompass nearly half of the independent countries of the world. Indeed, the sheer number of nations subscribing to the philosophy of nonalignment imparts importance to the movement. The nonaligned movement was responsible for shattering the bipolarized pattern of global power and for creating a multi-polar system.

B. THE PROBLEM OF NONALIGNED TYPOLOGIES

The fundamental characteristic of the nonaligned movement is its ideological and semantic diversity. Concepts like "neutralist", "neutral", "nonaligned", "non-identified" and "non-engaged" are common to the movement.

The advocates of the nonaligned movement are themselves not clear and certain about the meaning of the concepts they use and about the elements in their diplomatic philosophy.

It seems that all varieties of nonalignment are not the same. In recent years, India's outlook and behaviour in regional and international affairs, for example, differs from that of Ceylon. Egypt and Tunisia, both Arab adherents of nonalignment, take very different positions on the many issues confronting the Arab world.

The political processes, ideologies and institutional patterns of these nonaligned countries are still in a formative stage and thus are fluid and changeable. The foreign policies of the nonaligned nations are multidimensional. Nonalignment is not a foreign policy, it is a way of approaching foreign policy in a multi-polar world.

Why do nations choose to undertake or shun external commitments? There is little agreement among political scientists. Many place emphasis on the external environment, stressing such factors as the structure of the international system or the level of conflict and threat

among its member nations. Others are more inclined to look also at the attributes of the nation, some types of nations are regarded as "alliance prone", whereas others are seen as more likely to remain free from military ties, i.e. nonaligned.

Why do nations elect to join a particular coalition in preference to others? One position is that nations with important characteristics in common are more likely to align than dissimilar nations. A different view is held by a substantial group of theorists who regard nonalignment as the pragmatic expression of transient, albeit urgent, interests, rather than as the international manifestation of sentimental ties arising from common ethnic, cultural, historical, ideological or other attributes.

The lack of an accepted definition of nonalignment is perhaps the first indication that the literature on nonalignment is characterized by a marked absence of agreement on many issues. Some authors use the terms "neutralism", "non-alliance" and "positive neutrality" interchangeably, whereas others distinguish among them on various criteria. Nor is there agreement on classifying types of nonalignment. But the differences are not merely semantic, as authors differ in their fundamental conception of nonalignment.

C. THEORY OF NONALIGNMENT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

Nonalignment originated in India, says D.N. Mallick who quotes a speech made by Nehru on September 7, 1946. Nehru relied on India's nonalignment to prevent Indian self-respect, national integrity, sovereignty and freedom from foreign domination. India was to pursue a policy of "live-and-let-live".

After independence, the national leaders dedicated themselves to achieving goals that they considered vital for their developing societies. Self-government and independence was supposed to open great possibilities for economic and social development. But with independence came the

first period of disillusionment; the first period of dependence on external aid for internal development, the first encounter with Cold War rivalries and great power intrigues.

The new nations believed in peaceful co-existence because only through peace is progress and stability possible. The Cold War does not promote stability, the arms race creates international insecurity, international insecurity crises, and interventions by great powers promote tension. Thus, the national interests of all nations should be peace and the safeguarding of peace through the United Nations.

For Ernest W. Lefever the policy of nonalignment is the policy of enlightened self-interest. According to Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah, nonalignment yields six interrelated benefits to the militarily uncommitted nations:

1. Nonalignment insures political freedom and independence and contributes to the national self-respect and moral integrity.
2. In contrast to alliance membership, which serves as a restraint, nonalignment permits freedom of expression and action.
3. Nonalignment keeps a small nation from getting involved in large conflicts of no concern to it.
4. Alignment would make local problems more difficult to solve. Nehru, in particular, is convinced that almost any problem can be solved if it is not permitted to become a part of the Cold War.
5. Alliances involve military obligations that divert scarce resources from the urgent necessities of economic development.
6. Nonaligned nations are in a position to accept and indeed to bid for economic aid from both sides in the Cold War.¹

Among the most widely known theories of nonalignment are those derived from balance of power theories, in which the emphasis is almost exclusively on the international system. The motives for nonalignment and

1. Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism, in Laurence W. Martin, Ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs, (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p.95.

for the particular coalition of Third World states derive largely from the structure, distribution of power, and the state of the international system. Nations join forces to aggregate sufficient capabilities to achieve certain foreign policy goals. The following opinions are a representative example:

Rothstein maintains that a policy of nonalignment can only be successful in a particular type of bipolar power configuration.²

Dinerstein maintains that in a balance of power system, only nations with no territorial ambitions or against whom others did not have territorial claims, can remain unaligned.³

Hans J. Morgenthau maintains:

'Were the United States not committed to containing the Communist bloc, neutralism could not exist as a policy and would at best survive as an impotent desire and a vain hope. For neutralism in the cold war, like neutrality in a shooting war, depends upon the balance of power. It is a luxury which certain nations can afford because the power of one antagonist cancels out the power of the other.'⁴

For Ernest W. Lefever, nonalignment is primarily a response to the Cold War, and only partly a product of rising nationalism. Since it takes three to make a neutral, Afro-Asian neutralism is a function of bipolarity.⁵

Some authors emphasize one or more national attributes, other than power and capabilities, as important considerations in nonaligned policies. Several theorists have emphasized the importance of historical experience.

2. Robert C. Rothstein, "Alignment, Non-Alignment and Small Powers 1945-1965". International Organization, Vol. 20, 1966, p.398

3. Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems". American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, 1965, p.592-3

4. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Critical Look at the New Neutralism", in Crisis and Continuity in World Politics, ed. George A. Lanyi and Wilson C. McWilliams, (New York: Praeger, 1972), p.616

5. Ernest W. Lefever, *Ibid.*, p.110

Rothstein maintains that new states tend to pursue a policy of avoiding alliances.⁶

In the contemporary international system, virtually all states which have achieved independence since the Second World War, have chosen policies of nonalignment; although not necessarily neutrality, with respect to Cold War conflicts.

In American history there are further examples. For a century and a half after gaining independence from Great Britain, the warnings of Presidents Washington and Jefferson against so-called "entangling alliances" represented the core of conventional wisdom on matters of foreign policy. Ironically, John Foster Dulles failed to appreciate that the often moralistic rhetoric of nonaligned statesmen which he found offensive was also important for reasons of domestic politics in India and elsewhere, as a symbolic expression of national independence by ex-colonial nations.

Many theorists argue that nonalignment tends to have significant consequences for domestic politics, not all of which are beneficial.

Robert C. Good says that leaders of newly independent nations will use a policy of nonalignment to maintain power at home.⁷

George Liska agrees that, nonalignment and neutralism are policies that arise from domestic concerns especially economic needs and interests.⁸

George Liska says elsewhere that the greater the internal difficulties within a nonaligned state, the greater the temptation to go beyond nonalignment to militant neutralism.⁹

6. Robert C. Rothstein, *Ibid.*, p.403

7. Robert C. Good, "State Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States", in Neutrality and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs, ed. Laurence W. Martin (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p.9

8. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.217

9. *Ibid.*, p.214

To say, for example, that India conducts its foreign policy on the basis of national interests is in itself to say nothing very clear and certainly to say something too simple, unless the precise content of the interests are specified. There is no reason, in logic or experience to believe that one factor will be consistently self-evident or will always be paramount - India, or for any other country's foreign policy, assertive simplifications take on clear meaning, if at all, only in context. National interest, like nonalignment, has proved to be a loose and adaptable garment for Third World foreign-policy-makers.

One conclusion that emerges from this survey is that the literature on nonalignment is marked by different explanations, none of which appears sufficient for a general theory.

This is not to say that all areas of nonalignment theory are equally marked by disagreement. We appear to know more about the "unity" of the nonaligned nations, for instance, than about the international consequences of nonalignment. Nor is the lack of complete agreement among writers necessarily a sign of theoretical chaos. The existence of the "Flat Earth Society" does not lead us to conclude that the disciplines of astronomy and geography are inadequate. Yet even where contradictions about nonalignment are most apparent, it is not easy to identify explanations that are the equivalent of the flat earth theory: thus even a generous appraiser must conclude that the literature on nonalignment taken as a whole falls short of being satisfactory.

Given the extensive increase in adherents to nonalignment since the Second World War, why should this state of affairs exist? Certainly it cannot be attributed to an absence of interest. The number of books, monographs, essays and articles on the subject is enormous, especially if we include those that deal with one specific nation's nonalignment. It becomes even larger if we add general texts on international politics and foreign policy, virtually all of which include some discussion of the Third

World. The problem, then, is not the lack of attention.

The obvious difficulty presented by the large number of nonaligned nations needs to be acknowledged but it is not a wholly satisfactory explanation for the state of the literature on nonalignment. A comparative study of only a few nonaligned nations can yield some theoretical returns if it is designed with this aim in mind. Indeed study of a single case need not be barren of general implications. A critical examination of the literature on nonalignment reveals a distinct shortage of research that is designed to shed light on central issues of nonalignment theory and is also documented with data derived by explicit and systematic method. Instead a vast majority of the studies fall into one of two categories. In the first we find essays of a general nature, usually sustaining a broadbased theory of nonalignment with selected historical examples. The most incisive of these are indispensable reading for any serious student of nonalignment, but the unscientific nature of the supporting evidence usually renders it difficult to assess either the proposed theory, or its strength relative to competing explanations of the same events. On the other hand there are large numbers of studies that tell us a great deal about nation's nonalignment, but usually with a degree of specificity that underscores the unique aspects of that nation's nonalignment. Thus, they make a limited contribution to a more general understanding of nonalignment.

D. THE LACK OF UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED GENERAL THEORY IN THE STUDY OF NONALIGNMENT

The concept of nonalignment is of recent origin and has given rise to many problems and much confusion. Nonalignment means different things to different people. The ambiguity of the roles of nonaligned nations has generated lively debates in the study of international relations. This controversy continues.

It is not possible, in this study, to present a comprehensive listing of definitions of nonalignment. Rather a sample of definitions representing the various approaches to conceptualization will be given. These approaches are not necessarily unique. On the contrary, there is much overlapping and it is evident that different people are simply looking at different aspects of the phenomenon.

Numerous leaders have put forward definitions of nonalignment, but oddly enough hardly any have adopted the customary practice of the scientific world, of starting from what predecessors have written or laid down. The inevitable consequence is a multiplicity of definitions scattered through the literature of nonalignment and the absence of any measure of agreement as to the real content of the subject.

Confusion in the minds of the leaders has obviously resulted and may have contributed to the impatience with which so many leading policy-makers, both in the East and the West, regard the proclamations, writings and declarations of their contemporaries in the nonaligned world. Moreover, confusion is even worse compounded by disagreements over terminology.

Nazif Choucri agrees that a certain ambiguity surrounds the position of Afro-Asian states in international politics. The terms "neutralism" and "nonalignment" have been used most frequently to describe their orientation.

This study will therefore outline some of the popular terms and definitions in this subject, and justify the term "nonalignment" which is used in this study.

It is difficult to compile a list of nonaligned nations that will command universal acceptance. The only European nation considered non-aligned by the Afro-Asian states is Yugoslavia. Israel's policy of non-identification is in most respects equivalent to nonalignment; yet Israel is not accepted as a nonaligned nation by hostile Arab states. Similarly,

Malaysia regards itself as nonaligned, yet is not considered to be non-aligned by most Afro-Asian states, and certainly in recent years not by its neighbour, Indonesia. Cuba, on the other hand, participated in all the nonaligned conferences.

At the beginning of the nonaligned movement in the post Second World War years, its opponents and some of its lukewarm friends predicted that, like so many other policy trends in international relations, nonalignment was destined to be short-lived. They were poor prophets. The falsity of their prognosis can be seen in the fact that the political terminology of the movement can be found in standard dictionaries of contemporary politics. Words like neutralism, peaceful co-existence, non-alliance, nonalignment, neo-colonialism, and uncommitted, which its exponents introduced as Afro-Asian concepts, have been adopted and are used to give new meanings, new values to our knowledge of Afro-Asian nations and international relations.

E. "NEUTRALITY" - "NONALIGNMENT"

The historic policy of isolationism followed by the United States of America towards Europe until the Second World War, stemmed from the conviction that the American society and American way of life were intrinsically different from Europe. The United States, as a new young nation, had embarked on a new course and was experimenting with novel concepts of government and political tolerance, democracy, prosperity and peace for her peoples. Isolationism was a natural outgrowth of America's predominant concern with her domestic affairs, for example, national unity, Indian uprisings, and border incidents. The isolationism of the United States then meant: non-involvement in European military alliances; neutrality in purely European wars and conflicts; non-entanglement in the political quarrels of Europe; the maintenance of reasonably sound and cordial relations with all European nations; and insistence that European nations

refrain from projecting and injecting their ambitions and rivalries into the Western Hemisphere. American intervention in the First and Second World Wars ended the traditional policy of isolationism, led the nation into numerous entangling alliances, and led the nation into the quagmire of Indo-China.

Neutrality is a term of International Law referring to the rules that states are obliged to follow during a legal state of war in which they are not belligerents. Their neutral status implies strict impartiality and abstention from any assistance to either belligerent and the enjoyment of rights of maritime trade with all belligerents subject to certain hazards and provisions.

The term neutrality has been variously defined by different writers, though all the definitions emphasize the same central point. According to Starke:

'Neutrality denotes the attitude of a State which is not at war with belligerents, and does not participate in hostilities. In its technical sense, however, it is more than an attitude and denotes a legal status of a special nature, involving a complex of rights, duties and privileges at International Law which must be respected by belligerents and neutrals alike.'¹⁰

According to L. Oppenheim:

'Neutrality may be defined as the attitude of impartiality adopted by third states towards belligerents and recognised by belligerents, such attitudes creating rights and duties between the impartial States and the belligerents.'¹¹

The adoption of the attitude of impartiality by any State towards belligerents fall outside the scope of International Law; it comes within the field of international politics.

According to Pitt Cobbet: 'Those States which on the outbreak of war remain at peace with the countries at war are described as neutrals'¹²

10. F.G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law. (London: Butterworths, 1972), p.433

11. L. Oppenheim, (ed.) L. Lauterpacht, International Law. (New York: Logmans Green), Vol. II, p.653

12. Pitt Cobbet, Leading Cases of International Law. (London: Butterworths), Vol. II, p.339

According to George Schwarzenberger:

'The essence of neutrality is, that States not involved in war take an attitude of impartial abstention towards belligerents and, in their turn, the latter respect the territorial integrity of neutral states.'¹³

Neutrality is a concept of limited applicability. It seems potentially attractive only for relatively small states like Switzerland. Neutrality is a formal status of permanent neutrality, it signifies that it is valid in times of peace as well as in war. Austria is an example of self-neutralization. The Austrian State Treaty signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and Austria in May 1955 gave Austria her sovereign independence in July 1955. Thus ended ten years of foreign occupation of Austrian territory. In return, Austria promised to maintain permanent neutrality; to renounce the use of major offensive weapons, including nuclear ones; promised never to enter into a political or economic union with Germany; and the Four Powers gave up their claims to reparations.

Nonalignment must be carefully distinguished from the closely related but essentially different concept of neutrality and neutralization. Several criteria were agreed upon for determining which countries were nonaligned and which were not. In essence, these were that countries attending the Belgrade Conference pursue an independent foreign policy; that they accept the principles of peaceful co-existence; and that they support the so-called national liberation of the dependent peoples. Ideally, nonaligned countries were not supposed to have military ties with either of the great powers. However, if military agreements did exist, these should have been concluded outside the context of the Cold War disputes. Significant omissions from the Belgrade list of nonaligned

13. Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law. (London: London Institute of World Affairs), Vol. I, p.206

states were: Israel (still confronted with implacable opposition), Malaya (believed to be too pro-Western), Nigeria (which did not conceal its ideological links with the West and its opposition to the views of militant African states like Ghana), and the states of French West Africa (which continued to maintain close ties with France). Yugoslavia was the only European state deemed nonaligned as distinct from being neutral (as in the case of Finland and Sweden) or from being a de facto member of a Cold War power bloc.

Implicit in the nonaligned conception of foreign affairs is the idea of diplomatic "freedom of choice". Permanent identification with the East or the West (or, as each bloc has tended to lose its monolithic character, with powerful countries within them) is prohibited by a policy of nonalignment. Temporary cooperation or association with great powers in military, economic, diplomatic or other affairs is permissible without departing from a "nonaligned" diplomatic status. Thus, for India and other states espousing this principle, several alternatives are available:

- (1) to formulate policies of their own toward major global issues;
- (2) to agree on some issues with the West;
- (3) to agree with the Communist bloc on other issues; and
- (4) to agree in part with the West and in part with the East on some issues, such as disarmament.

Nazli Choucri maintains that at Belgrade the term "nonalignment" was used more frequently in speeches, while the word "neutralist" was barely mentioned and "neutrality" appeared only now and then. This may indicate that the nonaligned nations perceive a distinction between their own brand of nonalignment and that of other states in the international system.¹⁴

14. Nazli Choucri, "The Nonalignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception and Behavior", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. II No. 1, pp.1-2.

F. THE TERMS USED IN THIS DISSERTATION

In this study I use the term "nonalignment" which has become a generally accepted term. Through the wider professional interest in the subject over recent years, there is however, gradually evolving a pattern of wording in regard to the day-to-day activities of the nonaligned states, for instance, within such organizations as the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations.

With the generic terms "Neutrality", "Positive Neutrality" and "Non-alignment", some shred of controversy persists, but they are no longer the battleground which they represented some years ago. "Nonalignment" is gaining ground over the three terms as the general descriptive label, undoubtedly because throughout the Afro-Asian world and the Third World the title "nonaligned" is widely accepted. In 1961, at the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Nations, nonalignment became established.

I maintain that nonalignment is a logical policy development among weak non-Western nations and may form the basis for a Third World perception of international relations.

In this study when I refer to the Third World, I speak of those nations that are poorer and less developed economically than nations such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the Third World countries are located in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Indeed, with very few exceptions (such as Japan, Israel and South Africa), Third World countries comprise most of the nations of these areas. The Third World tends to be politically independent of both the East and the West. The majority of the Third World gained independence from the modern colonial powers only after the Second World War. The Third World nations deem themselves as a distinct group of countries in competition with the more economically advanced nations. The Third World comprises most of the nations and people of the world. Thus, the Third World is non-

Western, ex-colonial, non-industrialized, amorphous and an expanding entity.

The Third World is not hostile to the East or the West and it is a self-defined association of independent states. The Third World has defined its position at numerous gatherings, such as Bandung, Belgrade, Cairo, Lusaka and Algiers among others. At these numerous international and regional conferences the Third World countries have formed conferences and associations to deal with common problems. Most Third World countries however, have not yet developed effective, proven institutions and some face seemingly intractable problems.

Nonalignment has become a cornerstone of Third World policy. For the Third World nations, nonalignment does not imply a passive position but rather the active pursuit of international peace through mediation and the United Nations.

The First World has several geographical parts: Europe, North America, Japan and Australia. The First World nations are economically advanced, technologically sophisticated and are modern capitalist democracies. Since the Second World War, the United States has been the kingpin of the West - the latter is here taken to include Northern and Western Europe and Italy, the United States and Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

The Second World consists of the Soviet Union and all those countries included in the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact is an important multi-lateral treaty between the communist states under Soviet leadership both militarily and politically, but little is known about its institutional structure. The Communist states have centrally planned economies, strong military ties with the Soviet Union and limited independence.

G. CONCLUSION

It is evident that interest in the Third World is increasing among Western

writers. Different writers use different terms to denote nonalignment. In this chapter it has been proved that nonalignment is not neutrality. The latter is a legal concept, nonalignment is a political notion.

PART TWO

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NONALIGNMENT

CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NONALIGNMENT
THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCES

I. INTRODUCTION

It is said that the goddess Athena sprang forth full-grown and in full armour from the brow of Zeus. That is not quite the way nonalignment made its debut on the contemporary scene, although there is a passing resemblance. Some of the subject's central ideas trace as far back as the ancient Asian religious doctrines; but at that time the prospects seemed dim that they would ever become practical tools for decision makers. Other important principles were expounded early in this century. The body of knowledge that is summarized in this chapter, however, only and large emerged during and since the Second World War.

Synonyms for the term nonalignment are about as numerous and tenaciously adhered to as dialects of Africa. A frequent American substitute is "neutralism" and many American authors use the two names interchangeably. The Third World prefers "nonalignment". The concept and hence, the problem of nonalignment is historically, a very recent one, and it is not at all native to the developing areas, but is strictly an Afro-Asian notion, with one exception Yugoslavia.

It may be taken for granted that it is useful to understand the past in order to manage the present and to prepare intelligently for the future. It is relevant to be familiar with certain landmarks of historical development and analysis, including the principal stages in the history of Afro-Asian organizations and gatherings.

The history of the Afro-Asian movement is a fascinating story. It involves the evolutionary development of the concept of nonalignment into

the institutions for economic, social and political cooperation among the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and Yugoslavia.

II. BACKGROUND

Since 1945, warfare has never ceased in one or more regions of Asia. Internal civil wars, conflicts between the new nations of Asia, the Great Power involvement in the Cold War - all of these, often interrelated and occurring simultaneously have made Asia an area of intense conflict in world diplomacy.

South and South-Eastern Asia, with the exception of the Philippines (United States) once formed part of the European empires principally of Britain (India, Ceylon, Burma, the Malay States and Straits Settlement), of the Netherlands East Indies), and of France (Indo-China). Thailand was the only sizable independent Asian state in this part of the world.

During the years from 1946 to 1957 European control ceased and was replaced by Asian national states. The Philippines gained independence in July 1946, India and Pakistan in August 1947, Burma in January 1948, Ceylon in February 1948, and Indonesia in December 1949. Indo-China, which the French left in the period 1954-56, has been the scene of continued conflict. Malaya gained independence in August 1957.

The zone of eastern and north-eastern Asia comprises mainland China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and the Soviet Union. Finally, the great landmass of central Asia is dominated by China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Tibet and the Soviet Union.

The Communist victory in China in 1949, the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty in February 1950, the American awareness that the Soviet Union also had exploded an atomic bomb in September 1949 - all these events led to changes in United States policy in Asia and the Pacific.

During the period from 1950 to 1954 the United States concluded that the threat to stability and peace arising from the possibility of commu-

nist direct attack or subversion was increasing and could only be met by throwing the military weight of the United States behind European and Asian allies willing to resist aggression. The objective was deterrence. The cohesion of the European (NATO) alliance was accordingly strengthened with substantial military contributions. In Asia a search for new allies was intensified in 1950. But in Asia there was no continuous ring of developed nations that could be formed among China's neighbours. Running from north to south Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines formed an unbroken flank, but in the South China Sea, Malaysia and Indonesia kept aloof; south of Indonesia and far removed from China were Australia and New Zealand; these two joined the United States alliance groupings. On the mainland of Asia, Thailand and South Vietnam, were associated in alliances; Cambodia and Laos were never securely brought in; Burma, India and Ceylon refused to join in anti-communist alliance, but Pakistan in 1954 did so; the American arc of defensive alliances against the Soviet Union continued unbroken thereafter through Iran to Turkey and Greece.

III. THE AFRO-ASIAN MOVEMENT

Peter H. Lyon observes that another remarkable feature of the post-war period has been the re-appearance of the formerly ill-fated Pan-Asian and Pan-African movements; and the emergence of a new and uniquely grandiose Pan-bi-Continentalism-- the Afro-Asian Movement.

The Asian phase of the movements was inaugurated by the Asian Relations Conference of March-April 1947, which convened in New Delhi, India. The Conference, under the chairmanship of Nehru, expressed Asian attitudes on international affairs, promoted closer ties among Asian nations and formed a platform for Asian opinion.

A second conference was convened at New Delhi, India in January 1949, to consider the Indonesian question. The rumored formation of an Asian

bloc failed to materialize. However, the termination of the Dutch police action in Indonesia and the settlement of the same year, can partly be attributed to the holding of the Conference and the growing influence of the Asian community.¹

The Asian Relations Conference paved the way for the Bandung Conference of African and Asian states. Like its predecessor, the Asian Relations Conference created a permanent organization which proved to be ineffective, partly because a number of Asian states were wary of India's predominance and did not wish to see it institutionalized. The Indonesian question gave the Conference a distinct anti-colonial note, but it was divided between the friends of the West and the non-aligned nations. This division was accentuated in the following months when different Asian leaders took up different attitudes towards the two outstanding Asian events of the year - the victory of Mao Tse-tung and communism in China and the war in Korea. Asian solidarity promoted by Nehru, was proving difficult to achieve, even on an anti-colonialist programme. The British and French campaigns in Malaya and Indo-China did not evoke the same reaction as the Dutch proceedings in Indonesia, partly because of the strong communist flavour in the Malayan and Vietnamese anti-colonialist movements.

In the fifties, Asian nonalignment and solidarity waxed and waned. Some Asian states, putting their economic and strategic needs before their nonalignment, signed not only economic but even defence treaties with the United States or the Soviet Union. In 1954, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines concluded military agreements with the United States. Furthermore, Afghanistan became the first non-communist country to receive

1. Peter H. Lyon, "Strains in the Pan-Continental Movements of Africa and Asia, 1947-1958", Australian Outlook, June 1959. pp.100-103 passim.

Soviet aid. The Soviet Union already had a trade agreement with India, was about to conclude another with Burma, intensified the diplomatic and economic wooing of Indonesia which led to Sukarno's visit to Moscow in 1956. Indeed, the great powers were taking a keen interest in Asian affairs but one consequence of this interest was to make it more difficult for Asian nations to maintain a common attitude towards the great powers or to keep their distance as pure nonalignment required.²

Bluma S. Steinberg maintains that the Korean War transformed Indian nonalignment from a verbal assertion into a global posture. The necessity for the United States to obtain United Nations sanction for its Far Eastern containment policy gave India, as leader of the so-called Arab-Asian Group, a new importance to the West. India's policy in the Korean Crisis was rooted in the careful assessment of its national interests: to remain uninvolved, which became especially compelling after the intervention of Communist China, and to bring about a peace settlement. India's policy produced an additional benefit - the recognition by the Great Powers, of the significance of nonalignment. As a result of the Korean Crisis diplomacy, the essentially negative and passive character of nonalignment was altered. India assumed the role of mediator and impartial arbitrator, and no further demonstrations of its unique posture were needed to establish in fact what Nehru had been proclaiming in theory.³

A number of important events occurred in 1950, the major one was the North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel into South Korea (June 25, 1950). The other events were the establishment within the United Nations

2. John Spanier, Games Nations Play: Analysing International Politics (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1972), pp.230-234, passim.

3. Bluma S. Steinberg, "The Korean War: A Case Study of Indian Neutrality", Orbis, Vol. 8 (4), Winter 1965, p.753.

framework of the bloc-like Arab-Asian consultative group and the Baguio Conference in the Philippines, where frequent consultations between Asian nations was emphasized.

On July 7, 1950 the United Nations Security Council by seven votes to none, with three abstentions (Egypt, India and Yugoslavia - all nonaligned) and one member absent (the Soviet Union), requested all member states providing military forces in pursuance of the council's resolution to make them available to a unified command under the United States.

India was one of the first nations to recommend cease-fire arrangements in Korea. Later India chaired the United Nations Repatriation Commission with the neutral states, Sweden and Switzerland, and the Communist States, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Afro-Asian consultations culminated in two important conferences in 1954; the first in Colombo, Ceylon, and the second in Bogor, Indonesia.

IV. THE COLOMBO CONFERENCE

The Colombo Conference opened on April 28, 1954, two days after the beginning of the Geneva Conference, 26 April - 21 July 1950, on Korea and Indo-China. Neither India, nor any major Asian country apart from the participants in the wars, including China, was invited to attend the Geneva Conference. This major international conference, devoted to purely Asian issues, was non-representative of Asia, and the Asian leaders considered it an insult to their newly won independence.

The Asian leaders attending the Colombo Conference were Nehru of India, U Nu of Burma, Muhammad Ali of Indonesia, and the host Sir John Kotelawala. Indeed, of all the pre-Bandung Conferences this one was the most controversial. The participants refused to heed Nehru's plea that they should devote themselves to one issue only - Indo-China - and ranged over a wide number of subjects. Not surprisingly, the Pakistani premier

hastened to raise the question of Kashmir: so long as that problem remained unsolved it was a little presumptuous for the Asian nations represented to teach peace to others.

Nehru insisted that a resolution condemning Communism was tantamount to taking sides in favour of the West in the Cold War, and was therefore incompatible with India's policy of nonalignment. He flatly refused to accept the draft resolution put forward by Ceylon, which declared, *inter alia*, that international Communism was the biggest potential danger in South and South East Asia. This argument was to be repeated no less fiercely, at Bandung, but there, as at Colombo, a compromise formula was eventually found.

When the cease-fire in Indo-China came into operation, India accepted the chairmanship of the Armistice Supervisory Commission for Indo-China.⁴

At this same Conference, the Prime Minister of Indonesia proposed that the five ministers sponsor an Asian-African Conference on a broad geographical basis. The proposal received tentative agreement at Colombo and was confirmed at the Bogor Conference in December 1954.

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, disapproved of the Geneva settlement; the United States would not sign it but in a declaration promised not to upset these arrangements. Dulles continued to strengthen opposition to the spread of communism in Southern Asia in the face of the French military defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam. He conducted negotiations for an alliance of collective defence among the major Powers interested in this region, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand, together with such Asian states as would join the grouping. The new treaty would thus extend and complement the security treaty the United States concluded with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS).

4. F.C. Jones, Survey of International Affairs, 1954, p.288.

The outcome of the negotiations was the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEATO), in Manila on 8 September 1954, together with a Pacific Charter of principles. The eight signatories were the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and the three Asian states, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.

V. THE BOGOR CONFERENCE

The Bogor Conference met in December 1954, to discuss plans for, and to agree on who was to be invited to the Afro-Asian Conference. The so-called guest list was the subject of considerable debate. The inclusion of Communist China was agreed upon in exchange for the addition of Japan and the exclusion of Israel. No invitations were to be extended to North or South Korea, nor to the Chinese Government of Formosa. The presence of Communist China was urged by many countries.

The question of China's participation in the proposed conference at Bandung loomed large from the very beginning with Burma, Indonesia and India insisting on her inclusion. The Colombo talks had taken place at the time of the final assault on Dien Bien Phu. As the talks ended, the French posts were being overrun by the Communist forces. The Communist victory had an enormous psychological impact on the peoples of Asia, comparable perhaps to the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. It placed the Chinese presence in Asia in a completely new perspective. Nehru, in particular, had rightly reached the conclusion that peace in Asia was bound very largely to the degree that China was accepted into the Asian community. He was determined that India and China, as the two largest nations of Asia, should live in peace and harmony with each other. This determination is reflected in the Panchsila or Five Principles.

The tone and general orientation of the Bogor final communique was interesting. It focussed primarily on cooperation among the Asian and

African states and the organization of the forthcoming conference.

The document was remarkably void of any reference to the Great Powers, although opposition to the Cold War in general was asserted. Almost all issues covered in this communique, such as colonialism and economic development, had a direct bearing on regional affairs.

There is general agreement among many scholars that the foreign policy of China since 1949, like that of all nations but especially those which aspire to be great powers, is concerned, with the task of advancing national interests. But Communist China aspires also to be a great revolutionary power, and her foreign policy therefore reflects this additional preoccupation. To some degree the two reinforce one another since a victory in foreign policy may enhance the prestige not only of the Chinese nation but also of China as the protagonist of world revolution.

The major power in Asia other than China is India, led by Jawaharlal Nehru. Although a very strong Communist party exists in India, Nehru maintained very cordial relations with China, which he regarded as a strong fellow-Asian power, worthy of respect and friendship.

Nehru made no serious effort to prevent China from overrunning Tibet in 1950, although the boundary between Tibet and India was not properly defined. Indeed, the frontier had been delineated by Sir Henry McMahon in 1914. China was anxious to push this frontier back to the Himalayas, which formed the natural boundary of the state. Nehru, a north Indian from Kashmir, disagreed vehemently, but the Chinese insisted.

VI. THE FIVE PRINCIPLES

On June 28, 1954 India and Communist China agreed to perpetuate the "Five Principles" (PANCHSHILA) designed to promote more cordial relations between the two countries. The Five Principles were:

- (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and

sovereignty;

- (2) a non-aggression pledge;
- (3) Non-interference in each others internal affairs;
- (4) Relations based on equality and mutual benefit; and
- (5) Peaceful co-existence.

A great deal has been written and has been made of the Panchshila, not least by Indians themselves. It is, therefore enlightening to read the remarks of one of the major architects of India's foreign policy, Krishna Menon, on this subject.

'When we were discussing the Tibetan Treaty the way we should conduct ourselves came up willy-nilly. After all, what is the Tibetan Treaty? Tibet, including the various trade agreements involved, was the only problem we had with China which called for regularization ... The five points as you can see, are not very well drafted. It was not as though it was prepared formula. It emerged out of the conversations - that is all there was to it.

Krishna Menon continued in a later passage:

'When I saw the drafting of the Five Principles I thought it had been rather badly written. I said so to the Prime Minister and he said, "what does it matter; it isn't a treaty or anything, its a preface to this Tibetan business". Quite frankly it was only afterwards that the Five Principles emerged as a mantra (dictum), a slogan, a sop.'⁵

Krishna Menon further pointed out that 'the five points really contained nothing new' that they were 'merely a restatement of those principles which we call nonalignment - what else!'⁶ Thus, at that time, not too great importance was attached by the Indians to the Five Principles. Indeed, it was the Chinese premier Chou En-lai who suggested in an exchange of letters after the Tibetan Agreement that the Five Principles could be made the basis of a reasonable settlement of any outstanding

5. Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.142-3.

6. Ibid., p.143.

questions.⁷

The points were elevated to a rank of outstanding importance when Chou En-lai visited New Delhi on June 25, 1954 on his way home from Geneva and the two leaders affirmed their agreement with the Five Principles as the basis of their intentional conduct.

For India these Principles now became the foundation stone of her foreign policy. India sought adherents to the Panchshila zealously; it was almost as if she considered it the universal panacea to all evils in international relations. Above all, India saw it as a basis for friendly relations with China, to which Nehru attached supreme importance.

Thus, India based her Asian and foreign policy on friendship and cooperation with China. On the evidence of Krishna Menon the first storm clouds that were already gathering in 1954 in relations between India and China were considered of no significance by the Indian leaders. They accepted unequivocally Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.⁸

They considered Chinese probings on the frontiers at Barahoti and at the North East Frontier Agency to be 'smaller territorial disputes, not the prelude to aggression'.⁹

Evidently they sincerely believed that the Panchshila Agreement with the Chinese committed China to espousing the same foreign policy objectives as those of India, above all, non-intervention in the affairs of other countries, peaceful co-existence, and broadening the area of peace.

The orientation towards China was all the greater because of the

7. F. Jones, *Ibid.*, p.245

8. Brecher, *Ibid.*, p.130

9. *Ibid.*, p.144

vehemence with which India opposed the efforts of the Western great powers to set up a military alliance which, in Indian eyes was directed overtly against China. This can be seen from India's reaction to the invitation sent to the so-called Colombo Powers to attend the talks at Baguio, Philippines, which led to the establishment of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

Another very interesting point in these discussions was that none of the so-called Colombo Powers raised the question of Soviet participation. The question whether the Soviet Union was part of Asia or not, which was to bedevil the Afro-Asian states in future, was not even raised at the Bogor Conference. Nobody was to defend the thesis that the Soviet Union was an Asian power more vigorously than India in the future, but Nehru's silence on this subject at Bogor was to have far-reaching effects on the Afro-Asian Movement.

Since many countries had not granted diplomatic recognition to China, it was agreed that any country's acceptance of the invitation to attend the Bandung Conference would in no way invoke or even imply any change in its view of the status of any other country.

VII. THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

The inception of the policy of nonalignment was accompanied by the beginning of the great anti-colonial campaign of the African and Asian peoples, manifested through the activity - legal and illegal - of governments and liberation movements. A series of meetings between the representatives of these countries and the liberation movements were held in this period. (viz. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, the Conference of Independent African States, The All-African Conference, among others). The Afro-Asian Conference of April 1955, held at Bandung in Indonesia, is regarded as a watershed in the history of the Afro-Asian Movement.

A leading theme of the Conference was the struggle against Western

imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. The conveners expressed that the Conference would not be exclusive in respect of the membership, nevertheless they showed great selectivity. For example, they invited all the Arab States but not Israel; the Central African Federation but not South Africa; Communist China, but not the Soviet Union, the Gold Coast, but not Nigeria.

The Conference was advertised as an Afro-Asian gathering but its African voice was mainly Arab. Ethiopia represented Black Africa and the Gold Coast had not yet become independent Ghana thus its delegation had observer status.¹⁰

The Bandung Communique covered a whole range of issues and nature, but was remarkably void of any direct reference to the major powers, although opposition to the Cold War was asserted. Almost all issues covered in this Communique, such as colonialism and economic development, had a direct bearing on regional affairs.¹¹

VIII. THE RESULTS OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

Most writers on the Third World agree that the Bandung Conference was an historic event. Even if the Conference only met, the meeting itself would have been a great achievement. Bandung proclaimed the political emergence in international affairs of nations representing over half the world's population.

It was largely in response to the demands made at Bandung that in the wake of the Conference, Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Libya, and Nepal were admitted to the United Nations. This was followed, in later years, by many more African and Asian States, adding greatly to the power and prestige in numbers of the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations.

10. Lyon, *Ibid.*, pp.100-111, *passim*.

11. The Bandung Conference, Appendix A.

At Bandung, the world became aware of the differences between the Soviet Union and China, for during the next few years the two countries gradually drifted apart, largely as a result of their differences on foreign policy, although these were not made public at the time. At Bandung, the Chinese seized the opportunity to impress Asians and Africans with their reasonableness and to stress the points of interest between the Communists and the non-Communists in the two continents. Chou En-lai reassured the South East Asian countries that China had no aggressive designs on her neighbours, expressed willingness to settle outstanding problems concerning the nationality of overseas Chinese and to discuss the Formosan question with the United States.

The Chinese Communists, who had taken a conciliatory line towards the nonaligned states, were not so concerned about the growth of non-alignment as Nehru was; in fact, they applauded it as a means of breaking down the positions and interests of the Western powers. Their line was Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism and colonialism.¹¹

After Bandung, Sukarno regarded Indonesia as the born leader of what he later conceptualized as the "New Emerging Forces" (NEFOS). Although his efforts engendered little discernible evidence of enthusiasm among other members of the Afro-Asian community, Sukarno repeatedly pressed for a Second Bandung Conference. China supported Sukarno enthusiastically and systematically, and looked forward to exclude the Soviet Union from yet another exclusive Afro-Asian gathering. What happened to the Communists in Indonesia in October 1965, and to Sukarno is now history.¹²

11. Mary Knatchbull Keynes, "The Bandung Conference", International Relations, October 1957, pp.362-376 passim.

12. Cecil V. Crabb (Jr.), Nations in a Multipolar World. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp.438-445 passim.

John Foster Dulles appraised the results of the Conference as exercising some restraint on the Chinese Communists. He felt it would be salutary if the Chinese Communists were confronted with the opinion of free Asian nations. These Nations promoted peace and peaceful co-existence and were against direct and indirect aggression.¹³

The Bandung Conference was significant in that it brought together, for the first time, the new and developing countries including six African nations. The Conference enabled these developing nations to formulate their attitudes toward economic and cultural cooperation, human rights and self-determination problems of dependent peoples, and the promotion of world peace and cooperation. Moreover, the Conference laid the basis for future Afro-Asian cooperation. The influence of Bandung was subsequently seen in the United Nations where what previously had been known as the informal ad hoc Asian caucusing group, became formally organized as the Afro-Asian caucusing group.

Another significant result of the Conference was a realization of the potential role that Afro-Asian states would play in the arena of international politics. Bandung demonstrated a new and important unity among the African and Asian nations in a common attitude towards the Cold War and a common goal concerning economic development and political independence.

The Bandung Conference gave the first indication that Africa was on the way to becoming a force in international politics. It remained a question of time until a sufficient number of independent nations could give a new identity to African attitudes in the United Nations.¹⁴

13. Cecil V. Crabb (Jr.), The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp.103-109 passim.

14. Colin Legum, Bandung, Cairo and Africa (London: The Africa Bureau, 1958). pp.1-10 passim.

For Nasser of Egypt, Bandung was an asset. En route, he conferred with Nehru and at Bandung he shared the spotlight with leaders of the Afro-Asian world, such as Nehru, Chou En-lai and Sukarno. Indeed, for the first time, since the emergence of the modern Arab states, an Arab leader received a place of honour among leading world statesmen; he was consulted as an equal; his problems were heard and treated sympathetically by nations prominent on the international scene. Bandung added lustre to Nasser's reputation as an Arab nationalist leader, not only in Egypt but also among nationalists in Hashemite Iraq. The Conference further stimulated earlier thoughts Nasser had given to Arab nationalism in his autobiography - Arab unity and African emancipation.¹⁵

IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Conferences featured in this Chapter were gatherings not of nonaligned nations but of Afro-Asian states. These states were regionally defined and included Asian members of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). The Communist States, China and North Vietnam were also present.

For the Communist states, participation in the gathering, meant an opportunity to identify their Communist slogan of peaceful co-existence and anti-imperialism with the anti-colonialism of the new states. Ceylon and other members of Western alliances, some of whose governments were soon to fall, launched an attack on Communism and warned of the dangers of Communist infiltration.

Nehru and U Nu of Burma had ideas of wooing China away from the Soviet Union in an effort to insulate Asia from the Cold War. Nehru hoped to lay the foundation for an improvement in the diplomatic atmosphere, and

15. Morton A. Kaplan, ed., The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley and Company, 1962), pp. 178-179.

he persuaded the Conference to re-affirm the principles of co-existence to which Nehru and Chou En-tai had subscribed to in April 29, 1954.

Declarations of mutual goodwill will not reduce international tension. The ineffectiveness of former declarations of this type should be a sufficient warning. Since the early fifties, however, both the Soviet Union and China had waged a vigorous campaign for bilateral treaties in which the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence would be proclaimed. These Five Principles were for the first time enshrined in a Sino-Indian Treaty signed in 1954. They have since been reproduced in several declarations adopted by the Soviet Union, China and various nonaligned states like India and Yugoslavia.

Declarations add nothing to the customary duties of states. Moreover, the Communist record is not very encouraging in this respect. India learned the useful lesson from China that international tensions cannot be reduced by solemn promises.

Nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy development suffers from the weakness of any policy which seeks to build its structure around the conference table, in the comfortable, if not always elegant hide-away where the conferees are carefully protected from the distractions of normal day-to-day existence.

When so many leaders gather together there is an abundance of sound logic, many examples of skilled debate, some heat and as usual some fatuous nonsense. Too often, however, ideas carefully phrased and logically developed are left to wither from lack of nourishment as the subject abruptly shifts to a new centre of attention.

If the nonaligned conference hoped to find an answer, it did not take long for disillusionment to set in. The problems of the nonaligned world are so complicated it defies analysis in one short conference. There is reason to suppose that there is no answer, only a continuing

series of accommodations and compromises.

Most Western scholars dealing with international relations expressed great doubt about the future of nonalignment and the nonaligned states themselves. They cited the great diversities in Asia, Africa and Latin America as divisive factors which would make trans-continental co-operation impossible. Among the most frequently mentioned factors were the nations' dissimilar British and French colonial experience; artificial and ill-defined boundaries; weak military machine; and diverse ethnic and linguistic groups. In addition, it was noted that nonalignment was being promoted by only a few leaders, especially Nehru, Tito, Nasser, Nkrumah and Sukarno among others. It was generally believed that the nonaligned movement could not survive the elimination of these men from their positions of leadership.

History has proven the fallacy of these doubts. The Afro-Asian states, despite their dissimilar colonial experience, have a great deal in common - mostly the tremendous problems confronting them. However, because common problems require a common coordinated solution, this has become perhaps one of the greatest unifying factors in the Third World today.

Much of the early history of the Afro-Asian nations consists of attempts to establish pressure groups. Only when these relationships had coalesced and a well-defined number of organizations had been established, could the group settle down to work. Gradually the members of the group developed friendships and teamwork, and the aggregation of developing nations grew into a formidable group.

The success of the conferences depended greatly on the needs and interests of the participating nations. Indeed, some of the problems on the conference table were really not as difficult to deal with as some of the leaders around the conference table. Many leaders have departed

from the international scene, but the basic problems of the developing nations remain.

As human history moves toward the year 2000, with its awe-inspiring problems and opportunities, the subject of nonalignment is attracting increasing attention from scholars, institutions and nations where it was formerly unknown. Whether its recent discoverers view it as an unsystematic approach to international relations, or as an international philosophy for serving human needs, or as a problem-solving state of mind, there is no doubt that it is spreading beyond its traditional abode in the great halls of capitals such as Lusaka, Cairo, Belgrade and Algiers and becoming a fashionable subject.

Not only are a variety of nations and leaders showing an unprecedented interest in nonalignment but it is rapidly spreading as an idea of importance to nation-building. Leaders of developing countries are turning out in large numbers to attend meetings of the nonaligned to see how this concept can increase their effectiveness in domestic and in international politics.

At the United Nations, the nonaligned nations have dominated the scene since 1960. It was the year which witnessed the beginning of the end of colonialism. The revolutionary ferment which was sweeping the African continent and the struggle of the peoples for liberation resulted in the admission of many newly independent African states to the United Nations thus making the Afro-Asian group the dominant force in the world organization. The nonaligned nations were at the height of their strength. The wind of change was so strong that the administering countries, with the exception of a few intransigent ones, like Portugal and South Africa, became more cooperative and more willing to decolonize.

The mood of compromise which existed in the United Nations prior to 1960 vis-a-vis the administering countries disappeared. Instead, the

anti-colonial nonaligned bloc with a majority of more than two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly became militant and intensified its pressure on the administering countries. In many instances the General Assembly was led to adopt extreme and unrealistic resolutions.

How successful have these meetings and conferences been in the general sphere of decolonization?

The answer is that the role of these early Afro-Asian meetings in the general process of decolonization has been a major one. The independence of the new states of Africa and Asia came as an end-product of a panoply of diverse internal and external forces and pressures which the Afro-Asian group created and conjured up. Among these various contributing factors were the following: a vigorous spirit of nationalism within the dependent territory itself, generally operating through a national political-action party or parties; the clash and rivalry emanating from the Cold War with the Soviet Union on the one hand (conveniently overlooking its own imperialism and colonialism) constantly prodding and challenging the Western European powers over their domination of alien peoples, and with the United States, on the other hand, quietly pressing its allies to adopt a more enlightened position on the question of self-determination so as to forestall the violence and revolution which the Soviet Union sought eagerly to exploit; a recognition by the colonial power of the heavy cost entailed in sustaining colonial authority, in the face of increasing hostility, in an area far removed from its own metropolitan area renewed scepticism as to the economic benefits of colonialism generally; realization by the colonial power that the colony might be dispensed with, without in any way seriously affecting the metropolitan state's existence, vital interests, or basic pattern of life; and increasing domestic pressure arising from liberal humanitarian groups to relinquish control of the territories. The nonaligned nations gather-

ings served primarily to channel the diplomatic pressures that were ex-
tant and to provide the world community with appropriate forums for
focussing these pressures.

CHAPTER THREE
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF NONALIGNMENT
AS A POLICY OF CONSENSUS

The policy of nonalignment traces its development and origin from the actions of a few countries not belonging to any bloc or military alliance. These nations felt that such groupings were not commensurate or conducive to the interest of peace. Initially, these countries included Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, later Indonesia and Yugoslavia. Between 1954 and 1956, the Heads of State of these countries made contacts and exchanged visits with each other, and from these talks grew the idea of cooperation and the promotion of international peace. The basic doctrine was embodied in the principles of active peaceful co-existence.

During this initial period, nonaligned policy was directed towards alleviating bloc tension and countering policy pursued from strength; towards establishing peaceful cooperation between nations irrespective of social and political systems. Active peaceful co-existence grew from the rules of peaceful relations among nations, which were formulated in a number of documents dating from 1954-1956. The major ones are:

- The Communique on the visit of China's Premier Chou En-lai to India, of 29th April, 1954.
- The Joint Communique of President Tito and Prime Minister Nehru of 22nd December, 1954.
- The Joint Communique of President Tito and the President of the Union of Burma, U Nu, of 17th January, 1955.
- The Joint Communique of President Tito and Prime Minister Nehru, of 7th July, 1955.
- The address of President Tito in the Indian Parliament and at the University of Rangoon, Burma, on the occasion of Tito's visit to these countries.
- The address by Prime Minister Nehru in the Federal Assembly in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on 2nd July, 1955.

- The Joint Communiqué by the governments of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, of 2nd June, 1955.¹

I. THE SINO-INDIAN AGREEMENT

The Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet of 29th April, 1954 was based on the following principles:

- Mutual respect for each others' territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- Mutual non-aggression;
- Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- Equality and mutual benefit;
- Peaceful co-existence.

The Indian President Rajendra Prasad on February 21st, 1955 said:

'This agreement confirmed the friendship between these two great countries which is so important for the peace of Asia and the world. In this agreement certain principles were laid down which are of even wider application and which have been recognized as such by other countries.'²

The Chinese Premier Chou En-lai said on November 28th, 1956:

'The friendship and cooperation between India and China, which were the first to initiate the five principles of peaceful co-existence, are of special significance to the promotion of world peace and international cooperation.'³

II. THE NEHRU-TITO COMMUNIQUE

On a state visit to India in December 1954, President Tito of Yugoslavia reaffirmed his faith in the five principles of peaceful co-existence.

On this occasion, Nehru and Tito proclaimed that the policy of non-alignment pursued by their respective governments is not "neutrality" or

1. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Documentation, Special Supplement dedicated to the Consultative Meeting of the Non-aligned Countries, to begin on July 2, 1969, in Belgrade. p.2, S.V.
2. Lok Sabha Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India, Texts of Documents, 1947-59, p.101
3. Ibid., p.110

"neutrality" and therefore, passivity, as alleged in certain quarters. Nonalignment is a positive, active and constructive policy seeking to lead to collective peace, on which collective security can rest.⁴

A new stage in the development of nonaligned policy was launched when the leaders of Egypt, India and Yugoslavia met on Brioni Island in July 1956. Here the leaders re-affirmed their dedication to non-aligned policy and agreement was reached on their position on the most crucial problems of peace and security; and the problems facing the developing areas of the world. Thus, an international dimension was added to the policy of nonalignment. The Twelve Points of the Brioni resolutions served as a platform for coordinating the policies of the non-aligned nations in their approaches to international problems and international affairs.

At Brioni it was decided to hold regular meetings for purposes of mutual consultations about international affairs and seeking greater contacts with other developing nations. The idea of conferences of nonaligned countries emerged from these inter-nation consultations.

III. THE INITIATIVE OF THE FIVE

The Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly figured significantly in the annals of nonaligned policy. A large number of countries from the newly independent African continent took part for the first time in U.N. activities.

The President of Yugoslavia, was one of the heads of the nonaligned countries to take the floor in the General debate. In his address, he outlined the positions and demands of nonaligned policy, primarily from the standpoint of the problems of peace. At the same session, the Heads of State of Ghana, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic and the Prime Minister of India, having consulted the other delegations

4. Ibid., p.145

of nonaligned countries, submitted a joint draft resolution. Owing to the rapid deterioration in the international situation, the draft called upon the leading powers, the United States and the Soviet Union to renew their interrupted contacts and to seek a peaceful solution to their problems by way of negotiation. The Initiative of the Five of September 30, 1960, marked the first collective stand by the nonaligned countries at the level of general international policy.⁵

IV. THE CAIRO PREPARATORY CONFERENCE, JUNE 5-13, 1961

The international context in which this meeting was held must be borne in mind. First, it was the admission of 23 new states, especially from Africa, to the United Nations membership in 1960 that gave increased urgency to calling a meeting of the nonaligned nations per se. Iraq's Western-aligned government had fallen, and General Kassim had declared his nation nonaligned. Cuba had fallen to Fidel Castro's revolutionaries and had been declared nonaligned by its new leaders. Tito, Nasser, Sukarno, and the somewhat reluctant Nehru, agreed to the convening of a nonaligned conference in the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade.⁶

The list of invitess was, however, limited to 25 states. When the committee which issued invitations to the Belgrade Conference came to decide who should be invited, they refused to invite Communist China (who had been a leading participant in the Bandung Conference of 1955), because she was no longer in their view a nonaligned country, but a potential belligerent. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was regarded as truly nonaligned, because she was no longer tied to the Soviet bloc but neither had she allied herself with the North Atlantic Treaty powers;

5. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Documentation, n.3, s.v.

6. Theodore L. Shay, *Ibid.*, p.240

she maintained a nonaligned stance between the two blocs.

Few of the French former colonies qualified because they were too closely allied to France, whereas nations like Nigeria were too close to Britain. All those nations which belonged to Western-oriented alliances such as CENTO (The Central Treaty Organization) and SEATO (The South East Asia Treaty Organization) were automatically disqualified, as were Japan and Taiwan since they were allied directly with the United States by treaty.

At Cairo, the following criteria were formulated by the meeting in camera on the eve of the first conference of nonaligned nations:

- The invited country should have adopted an independent policy based on the co-existence of states with different political and social systems and on nonalignment; or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy;
- The invited country concerned should consistently support movements for national independence;
- The invited country should not be a member of multilateral military alliances concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;
- If an invited country had a bi-lateral military agreement with a Great Power or was a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;
- If it had conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.

V. BACKGROUND

The Belgrade Conference had an atmosphere of crisis about it. The background to it included the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests, the French nuclear tests in the Sahara, the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Berlin Wall crisis, the Franco-Tunisian clash over Bizerte naval facilities and the crisis in the Congo.

The Sino-Indian border dispute was simmering. The Soviet Union was

7. R.V.R. Chandrasekhara Rao, "India and Nonalign-Summitry", The World Today, September 1970, p.394

preparing for a clash with China over the borders in the Far East.

VI. THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

The first gathering of nonaligned nations was organized and held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia between September 1-6, 1961. . total of 28 nations took part, three of them as observers. The Belgrade Conference set itself two tasks:

- to define positions and sum up demands of the nonaligned countries in terms of the most pressing problems of peace, peaceful relations among states, and international cooperation;
- to intervene, by a special and direct action, for the purpose of preserving peace which stood threatened by the deterioration and aggravation in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union over Cuba.

The Declaration of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries issued at the end of the Conference, and the so-called "Initiative of the Five"; contributed to the extension and further evolution of the concept of nonalignment. It defined the position of this policy toward the major problems and outstanding problem areas of international relations. On many questions, it manifested the so-called identity of national interests and solidarity of a large section of the international community. At most, broad support for the nonaligned nations was promoted at the Conference.

The Declaration laid particular stress on the elimination of all forms of colonialism, encouraged the struggle against imperialism, expressed support for the so-called national liberation movements; advocated disarmament; reviewed the problems of development in the poorer areas and their trade problems; advocated active and peaceful co-existence; promoted the entry of Communist China into the United Nations among several others.⁸

8. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 17-24, 1962, pp.18601-18605 A-B, s.v.
See The Belgrade Conference, Appendix B.

At Belgrade there was a greater degree of sophistication than at Bandung, for this time, the Afro-Asian nations met as exponents of a distinctive approach to the Cold War pressure between the other continents. Here there was a more selective membership. India was correct in emphasizing the importance of giving attention to urgent world problems rather than protesting against colonialism. At Belgrade it became apparent that similarity in foreign policy did not necessarily mean friendship.

The Belgrade Conference brought to a spectacular climax Tito's efforts to assert Yugoslav leadership among the nonaligned nations, and indeed, in the councils of the world. The constant Yugoslav refrains were the common struggle for peace and co-existence, repudiation of blocs, identity of views on international problems and cooperation in the United Nations. Yugoslavia, after Belgrade, extended loans and embarked on modest technical aid programmes in some of the nonaligned countries.

According to Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. the American reaction to the Belgrade Conference was one of anger. Most of the American blame was placed on Nehru, who played a prominent role. The Americans considered the Belgrade Conference a psychological victory for the Communist bloc. The Americans maintained that the nonaligned nations failed to condemn Soviet colonialism and hegemony in Eastern Europe, and the resumption of Soviet nuclear testing.⁹

9. Cecil V. Crabb (Jr.), "The Testing of Nonalignment", Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVII, September 1964, p.520

Press Comment Comment in the British and American press suggested that the Final Declaration reflected the moderating influence of Nehru, who was supported by U Nu (Burma), Mrs. Bandaranaike (Ceylon), President Makarios (Cyprus), and on certain issues by President Nasser (United Arab Republic), President Bourguiba (Tunisia), and King Hassan (Morocco). Thus, the twenty-seven point declaration put forward no concrete proposals for the solution of the German Question, and con-

The Belgrade communique focussed directly on international affairs and issues. The Cold War, the recognition of Communist China, peaceful co-existence, the use of nuclear weapons, all featured prominently. For the first time, the Third World was expressing its own views on various international issues. A distinct shift had taken place from a regional to a broader orientation.

At Belgrade, the nonaligned nations defined their own identity. The nonaligned nations defined their international role as one of mediation between states in conflict in world politics. The nonaligned nations defined their international function as one of reducing systematic tensions and stabilizing interaction processes at the global level. These notions were formulated initially within the larger Afro-Asian context and restated in Belgrade specifically within a nonaligned framework.

VII. THE CAIRO CONFERENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Between July 8-12, 1962, a Conference of developing countries was held in Cairo. Thirty-six countries attended with five of them as observers. With the exception of Pakistan, the participating countries were nonaligned. India, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab Republic were the conveners of this Conference.

The original initiative for convening a similar economic conference of nonaligned countries was taken during the meeting between Tito, Nehru, and Nasser; held in Cairo between November 17-20 and after a later meeting between the three leaders, also in Cairo; broad consultations were

tained no reference to the recognition of Eastern Germany, or to Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea. Le Monde expressed the opinion that "the only real gainer from this meeting was the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (i.e. G.P.R.A.)", which had been recognized by Afghanistan, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Ghana, and had received promises of future recognition from Burma, Ceylon, Congo and Cyprus.

undertaken with other nonaligned countries, and this led to the decision to convene the Cairo Conference.

The Conference passed the Declaration of Developing Countries which set out the positions of the nonaligned countries on all economic problems raised by the requirements of their development, and their relations with the developed countries. Within the framework of the ideas set out in this Declaration and the conclusions adopted, the so-called Group of Seventy members continued the initiative in the United Nations, which led, at the 17th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, to convene the first World Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, in 1964.

At the Cairo Conference the concept of "economic nonalignment" evolved. Whereas political nonalignment has meant nonalignment even amongst nonaligned nations, economic nonalignment means the alignment of the non-aligned nations to the developed countries of the First and Second World.

VIII. THE SINO-INDIAN WAR

The year 1962 was a bad year for India. On October 20, 1962, after almost five years of mounting border tensions between Communist China and India, Communist forces invaded and penetrated far into India's northern provinces.

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. has made an interesting study of the effects of the Chinese invasion of India. He maintains that China in its attack on India, was assailing nonalignment itself. Most commentators agree that China had seized upon the border dispute with India as a suitable pretext for the achievement of diplomatic objectives at India's expense. China also wished to consolidate its position in Asia. China hoped to teach Nehru and nonaligned India a lesson that they will not forget; that China was the leading nation in Asia and communism will emerge

triumphant over democracy.¹⁰

We can conclude that the doctrine of nonalignment emerged basically intact from the Sino-Indian conflict. India had learnt that "there is no nonalignment vis-a-vis China". India would henceforth base its diplomatic nonalignment upon a position of military strength, comparable to the armed neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland. Nonalignment should not signify military impotence and the nonaligned nations should not depend upon slogans like "the spirit of Bandung", to preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity. India revealed its determination to resist Communist aggression by relying chiefly upon its own efforts and resources, in contrast to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The supply of military equipment to India did not compromise India's nonalignment; in fact it preserved it. India re-affirmed its faith in nonalignment and democracy. No foreign troops or bases were permitted on Indian soil.¹¹

IX. THE CAIRO CONFERENCE

By 1964, the strength of the pro-Communist Chinese nonaligned nations had increased. Presidents Sukarno and Nkrumah had attained the full measure of their pro-Communist sympathies in foreign policy. Tanzania-Zanzibar, and Mali were openly sympathetic to Communist China; and Algeria was buzzing with revolutionary fervour.

The convening of the Second Conference of Nonaligned Countries, held between October 5-10, 1964, in Cairo, was preceded by broad consultations among the nonaligned countries. The idea of the new conference was discussed at the Tito-Nasser meeting on Droni Island in May 1963, and at

10. Cecil V. Crabb, (Jr.), "The Testing of Nonalignment", Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVII, September, 1964, p.523

11. Cecil V. Crabb, (Jr.), Ibid., pp.540-1

the meeting between President Nasser and the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sri Sirimavo Bandaranaike, in Cairo on October 13, 1963. On this basis, other nonaligned countries were consulted and a preparatory committee at ambassadorial level was set up. It met in Colombo, Ceylon, to organize the conference and send invitations.

The composition of the Cairo Conference, with more than twice the number of participants as the first nonaligned conference, demonstrated the increase in the number of countries which have decided to take an active part in the policy of nonalignment, and also illustrated how successful this policy had been in winning adherents in the developing countries.

The conclusions and positions assumed at the Belgrade Conference and the first Cairo Conference, were re-affirmed at the Second Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Cairo.

The Cairo Conference warned that the next international problem could be the danger of limited and local wars, and other pressures; and coercion, which stop short of war, but nevertheless, undermine the freedom of smaller countries.

The participants noted that imperialism still constitutes "a basic source of international tension and conflict", that "military and other assistance", is being given to "certain countries to enable them to perpetuate by force colonialist attempts to maintain unequal relationships, particularly in the economic field, are continuing".

The participants claimed that the United States is seeking "to impose changes in the political, economic, and social system" chosen by the people of Cuba and that "foreign interference in the internal affairs of countries of Indo-China continues".¹²

12. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Documentation, No. 48A-9. August 5-20 1970, pp.23-25

The Cairo Conference produced the most comprehensive statement ever made till then about the urgent need of, and for, economic cooperation among the member countries, and between them and the industrially advanced countries of Europe and America.

The Cairo Declaration tried to cover some ground by evolving the principles upon which the nonaligned countries may try to resolve, by their own efforts, their own local or regional problems. By the praise conferred upon the Organization of African Unity, in the Cairo Declaration, for its efforts to resolve mutual tensions among its members, the nonaligned nations have indicated their preliminary preference for such efforts in other regions as well.¹³

The Cairo Declaration notes with satisfaction that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development came into being, and within that body the nonaligned nations, in their capacity as developing countries, formed a strong and assertive group, which had come to be known as the Group of Seventy-Seven.

There has been frequent and close interaction between the nonaligned countries and the Group of Seventy-Seven, which has helped to heighten the awareness of the world, of the economic agencies of the United Nations, and not least of the nonaligned nations themselves, of the dimensions of this problem, and of the urgent need for cooperation between them. The Cairo Declaration (until the Lusaka Declaration), contained a far more elaborate statement of the nonaligned view of this aspect of international relations than an earlier document of its kind.¹⁴

At the Cairo Conference, Guinea, Indonesia, and Mali appeared bent upon upsetting some of the basic principles of nonalignment, such as,

13. Ibid., p.23

14. Ibid., pp.28-29

nonaligned criteria as formulated in Cairo in 1961 and peaceful co-existence. Strong efforts were made by Indonesia to repudiate competitive co-existence and the United Nations. The Cairo Conference unanimously rejected these primarily Communist Chinese doctrinal ideas.

At Cairo, the spirit of conciliation prevailed over the forces of confrontation. The Cairo Declaration was an exercise in generalities. The Conference failed to condemn Communist Chinese intentions of developing and testing atomic and nuclear weapons.

The Cairo Conference clearly indicated that an overwhelming number of nonaligned nations did not have any scepticism about India's nonalignment, in the wake of the Sino-Indian War. However, the Conference showed that though India was one of the leading nonaligned nations, she no longer retained her former eminence and weight.

Thus, the policy of nonalignment not only remains the policy of the nonaligned countries, but even more broadly, is becoming the policy of all those countries that accept the principles of active co-existence - the peaceful solution of international problems, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and several others.

Theodore L. Shay notes that:

'A second Afro-Asian Conference was scheduled for Ben Bella's capital of Algiers in 1965. After various construction delays, a coup d'etat against the host government, Soviet Russia's insistence that it be included as an Afro-Asian state. Indonesian insistence that Malaysia not be invited, mutual Indian and Communist Chinese animosity, and finally Peking's sabotage of the meeting, the conference was cancelled. Observers felt there would be no further efforts to convene either an Afro-Asian Conference or a new, large-scale non-aligned meeting.'¹⁸

X. THE BELGRADE CONSULTATIVE MEETING

A Consultative Meeting of special government representatives of nonaligned countries was held in Belgrade from July 8-11, 1969. The participants

18. Theodore L. Shay, *Ibid.*, p.241

in the meeting:

- condemned power politics;
- condemned intervention and interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states;
- urged implementation of the United Nations Declaration on Independence for the Colonial Peoples;
- emphasized the widening gap between the rich and poor nations;
- re-affirmed their faith in the United Nations Charter;
- advocated the admission of Communist China to the United Nations;
- recommended comprehensive forms of consultations between nonaligned countries;
- discussed the desirability of holding a conference of nonaligned nations.¹⁶

In conformity with the Communiqué of the Belgrade Consultative Meeting of nonaligned countries, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or Heads of Delegations of the nonaligned countries, met at the United Nations in New York, on September 27, 1969.

The participants discussed:

- the activities and cooperation of the nonaligned nations during the Twenty Fourth Session of the General Assembly;
- the preparations for the Twenty Fifth anniversary of the United Nations;
- and the forthcoming meeting of the nonaligned nations.¹⁷

XI. THE DAR-ES-SALAAM PREPARATORY MEETING

The Preparatory Meeting of Nonaligned States was convened in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania on April 13-17, 1970.¹⁸

16. For the integral text of the Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting see:
Yugoslav Survey, No. 3, 1969, pp.133-6
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Nov. 8-15, 1969, pp.23663-23664
Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Documentation, No. 488-9. August 5-20 1970, pp.30-31

17. *Ibid.*, p.31

18. *Ibid.*, pp.31-33. For full text of Final Communiqué.

The participants discussed:

- the prevailing world situation;
- the role of the nonaligned nations;
- the desirability of economic independence and self-reliance;
- the proposed summit conference of nonaligned nations.

President Nyerere said to the Preparatory Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the nonaligned countries:

'Inside the power blocs there is obviously a restless movement of peoples struggling for peace and freedom - and indeed for a little bit of nonalignment our nonalignment exists. It has already had, and it still has, a tremendous importance in the world. It has been a factor in the restlessness of people in satellite states; it has been a factor in reducing the imminence of violent confrontation between the great powers; and it has prevented the division of the whole world into two- or even three powerful and bitterly hostile groups.'¹⁹

The participants noted "with profound disappointment" that "progress towards the formulation of a strategy for the Second Development Decade has commanded universal international support only at the level of generalities".

A special joint communique issued at Dar-es-Salaam described "the continuance of out-dated and iniquitous pattern of economic relationships with the economically advanced countries" as "the real threat" to the independence of the nonaligned countries. What is more serious, they added, "in this situation, developing countries are at the mercy of forces often beyond their control".

President Nyerere, in his address, agreed with the participants, about the seriousness of the economic threat and denoted the political use which is sometimes made of economic aid. "Many of the nations at this conference can give examples of aid being withdrawn as a result of their political decisions", he said, and he had to make the admission

19. Ibid., pp.32-33

that "everyone of us agree to little compromises here and there when we are conducting supposedly economic negotiations. We have no alternative." Some of the developing countries responded in kind and were not averse to using political levers for increasing the quantity of aid made available to them.

The participants recommended measures which suggest that political sensitivities will be discouraged from coming in the way of economic, and in the ultimate sense, political; good sense. They endorsed the idea of "sub-regional, regional and inter-regional cooperation between the nonaligned countries". Furthermore, they promoted the idea of "negotiating wide-ranging arrangements of tariff concessions, extended to all developing countries, and clearing arrangements for trade among developing countries on a global scale". A novel programme was their recommendation that "mutual agreements" should be made "on the location of large-scale multi-national and multi-regional industries" which obviously require concepts of cooperation between new, and therefore, jealously independent states which have been tried out only rarely, if at all, as yet.²⁰

XII. THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE

The Third Conference of Nonaligned States was held in Lusaka, Zambia from September 8-10, 1970. About half of the Fifty-Five participating states were represented by their Heads of State. Several Latin American countries sent observers, almost all of the known so-called national liberation movements attended, as observers; and a novel situation arose: there were two rival Cambodian delegations, one representing the legitimate government of General Lon Nol, and the other representing the deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in exile in Peking, Communist China.

20. Ibid., pp.31-33, passim.

The participants re-affirmed and attached special importance to the following principles:

- the rights of people who are not yet free, to freedom, self-determination, and independence;
- respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states;
- the right of all states to equality and participation in international affairs;
- the right of all sovereign nations to determine in full freedom the paths of their internal political, economic, social, and cultural development;
- the right of all peoples to the benefits of economic development and the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution;
- refraining from the threat or use of force;
- and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.

At the Lusaka Conference, the number of conference participants far exceeded the number of countries represented at the Belgrade and Cairo Conferences respectively. An outstanding characteristic of the delegations from the Arab countries was their representatives, who apparently

Commenting on the Lusaka Conference, the New York Times said:

The first question a disinterested observer might raise about the summit conference of "nonaligned" nations just concluded in Zambia is: What do they mean by nonalignment? In their performance at Lusaka it is clearer than ever (before) that they do not mean to signify a neutral or evenhanded stand on some of the world's most complicated problems. As expected the "nonaligned" leaders lined up decisively with the Arab side in the Middle East conflict. Their resolutions contained no censure of Palestinian guerrillas for hijacking aircraft and holding innocent humans as hostages; but they demanded the removal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territory and United Nations actions against Israel for obstructing Middle East peace negotiations. Their approach to the South African problem was equally one-sided. They condemned Britain for its intention to resume arms sales to South Africa but deleted a specific censure of France for selling arms to Pretoria for years in violation of United Nations resolutions. This represented a successful lobbying effort by France's "independent" African colonies. Evidently it did no violence to the Conference's "nonaligned" principles to give the floor and its greatest ovation to the Foreign Minister of the Vietcong regime in South Vietnam. Though calling for a withdrawal of "all foreign forces" from South Vietnam, one resolution blamed the American armed forces exclusively for the suffering and deaths in the country. There was no resolution condemning the Soviet

did not have the same extensive representation as those who attended the Belgrade and Cairo Conferences. Perhaps, they were too pre-occupied with their own domestic and strategic problems vis-a-vis Israel. Another characteristic of the Conference was the unanimity on all the matters under review. To a certain extent, the African states dominated and influenced the course of events and discussions. It was not surprising then that much of the discussion centered on the so-called problems of the struggle against racial discrimination and apartheid and the decolonization of Africa.

The Lusaka Declaration has drawn up some detailed proposals for the expansion of trade between the developing countries and the integration of their economies to the maximum mutual advantage. But action on these proposals, so far, has been very meagre. The nonaligned nations must recognize the inescapable fact that the primary responsibility for their development rests upon themselves. Their record of development is dismal, and their record of cooperation is even less satisfactory.

XIII. THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS - SEPTEMBER 1-4, 1973

Prior to the fourth conference of nonaligned nations, the foreign ministers met from September 1-4 to agree on a definite agenda for the forthcoming nonaligned conference. The meeting agreed on 3rd September 1973

Army's occupation of Czechoslovakia. President Kaunda, the conference host, implored the departing "soldiers of nonalignment" to fight for freedom and justice, but his government had done violence to both, by arresting sixteen reporters for Western news organizations, because some of them were based in South Africa and Rhodesia. When the first of these conferences and meeting was held in Yugoslavia in 1961, it seemed to make sense to bring nonaligned leaders together for common objectives, including efforts to ease relations between the power blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. Today it is no longer clear what nonalignment means, if anything, or what shared goals the self-styled "nonaligned" can best pursue collectively. (New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970.)

to the admission to full membership of the nonaligned group the following states: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Oman, Peru and Qatar. Malta was also admitted as a full member of the nonaligned group.

Indeed, this decision overrode one of the five original criteria for membership of the nonaligned group - that member countries should not offer military bases to other countries. Presumably, the government of Malta could have argued that the current military agreement expires only in 1979. The Belgrade Conference of nonaligned nations declared in 1961:

- '11. The participating countries consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support to countries which are endeavouring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously their abolition as a contribution to world peace.
12. They also acknowledge that the North American military base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to the permanence of which the Government and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country.²¹

At the Cairo Conference of nonaligned countries, in 1964, the participants re-affirmed the basic principles of the Declaration of Belgrade of 1961.

Cuba participated as a full member at Belgrade, Cairo, Lusaka and Algiers despite the vast American presence at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba cannot evict the United States from Guantanamo by force of arms; and the United States is unwilling to depart until its lease on the naval facility expires. (By the now famous Platt amendment, the United States was given the right to lease or buy Guantanamo Bay as a naval base at the beginning of this century.)

Malta can similarly claim that it can do little to sever the military

21. See: The Belgrade Conference, Appendix B.

agreement until 1979. But since it otherwise adheres to, abides by and dedicates itself to the principles and policy of nonalignment as expressed at Belgrade, Cairo, and Lusaka, Malta should be allowed to participate at the Algiers Conference.

XIV. THE ALGIERS CONFERENCE

The fourth conference of Heads of State and Government of the nonaligned countries was held in Algiers, Algeria from September 5th to 9th, 1973. The Conference took place during the tenth international trade fair held in Algiers from August 31st to September 16th, 1973. According to the official list, 76 full members attended. Nine countries sent observers, the three neutrals - Austria, Finland and Sweden - came as guests. The following international organizations were also represented at the Conference: the United Nations (by Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary General), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League and the African, Asian and Latin American Solidarity Organization.

Representatives of 14 liberation movements recognized by the OAU were also present at the Conference, as well as Mr. Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Mr. Juan Maria Bras, of the Socialist Party of Puerto Rico. Cambodia was represented by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The Prince appealed to all the nonaligned countries to recognize his government and, if they had not yet done so, to break off diplomatic relations with Israel. While denouncing continued American involvement in Cambodia, he claimed that there were no North Vietnamese or Viet Cong troops operating in Cambodia.

President Sadat of Egypt entreated the nonaligned nations to proceed from "mere denunciation" to "action" to achieve a settlement of the East conflict, and suggested that sanctions should be imposed to end Israeli "aggression". He declared that "any aggression" against a non-aligned country" should be regarded as a challenge to all such countries

which should take collective measures to support the victims of aggression.

The Political Declaration of the Conference dealt with the detente between the Great Powers, the Middle East, Latin America, the liberation movements, Indo-China and other matters such as disarmament.

The Economic Declaration contained a number of proposals for a common approach of the nonaligned and other developing countries to be adopted in future multilateral trade negotiations. Among these proposals were preferential treatment for the developing countries, an extension of the general system of preferences, a code of conduct for the activities of multi-national and trans-national companies and the right to nationalize the assets of foreign firms by any state. The nonaligned nations demanded an urgent convening of a joint conference of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and UNCTAD to examine the world's food shortages.

The Conference adopted a resolution calling for a boycott of Israel, a resolution recognized the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia, and urged material support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

The Algiers Declaration stressed that detente, dialogue and peaceful co-existence between the East and the West promotes peace in the First and Second World. The Third World areas remain centres of war, tension and economic under-development. Peace is confined to the prosperous areas of the world and the gulf between the rich and poor nations is widening. International security cannot be achieved in a world where there is economic insecurity. Thus, the nonaligned countries pledge themselves to promote the principles of economic security in international relations.

The nonaligned nations blamed colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, racial discrimination among others for the failure of eco-

conomic progress in the developing nonaligned world. The developed countries lack the political will to take action to improve the plight of the poor developing countries. The necessary international cooperation has been lacking or was unsatisfactory.

The Algiers Declaration accused the multi-national corporations of plundering the developing countries. Inflation and the international monetary crisis were causing havoc to the economies of the developing countries. Large sums of money were spent on the arms race and the conquest of space, but little was done to aid the growing needs of the developing countries. The brain drain from the developing countries to the developed countries continues unchecked.

The Algiers Declaration stressed that the share of the developing countries in world trade declined from 21.3 per cent in 1960 to 17.6 per cent in 1970. There has been no improvement in the terms of development financing.

The Algiers Declaration contained a number of proposals for a common posture of nonaligned and other developing countries to be adopted in future multilateral trade negotiations. These proposals included: acceptance of the principles of non-discrimination and preferential treatment for developing countries, an expansion of the generalized system of preferences, and the inclusion of preferential treatment for developing countries in any reform of international trade.

At Algiers, the nonaligned countries agreed on the following measures:

(a) The creation of an economic and social development fund open to participation by all non-aligned countries for the purpose of promoting investment and financing development projects and technical assistance.

(b) Prior authorization and government control of foreign investments, the securing of assurances that authorized foreign investments would not be prejudicial to national development plans and would generate new employment, and the limitation of foreign investments to non-strategic sectors of national economies.

(c) Reinvested profits from foreign investments to be considered as

new investments subject to prior control.

(d) A "Code of conduct" for the activities of "transnational and multinational companies".

(e) Reaffirmation of the right of any State to nationalize the assets of foreign companies in order to recover its natural resources.

(f) Co-ordination of the action of member-States in order to achieve a reform of the world's economic and financial system.

(g) A demand for the urgent convening of a joint conference of FAO and UNCTAD to examine the world's food shortages.²²

The Algiers Conference also recommends that the nonaligned countries should act as a catalytic force in the Group of Seventy-Seven in order to increase the effectiveness and solidarity of the developing countries.

The Conference urged the Secretary General of the United Nations to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to the problems of development.

XV. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LIMA, PERU, SEPTEMBER 1-7, 1975

The Foreign Ministers Meeting of the nonaligned countries met in Lima, Peru for six days and was attended by 81 nonaligned countries including 55 foreign ministers. The main item on the agenda was the world economy and the economic situation of the developing world. However, the conference dealt with the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Delegates rejected a proposal for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations and adopted a resolution urging Israel to evacuate and withdraw unconditionally from all occupied Arab territories. Other subjects included were the intensification of the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and apartheid and support for the liberation movements.

The Lima Conference reiterated arguments and proposals made at Algiers and other Third World gatherings. The nonaligned countries blamed the

22. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 1-7, 1973,
pp.26117-26121, A-B.

West for all their problems, accused the industrialized countries, the multinational and transnational corporations of plundering the developing world. The Lima Conference urged increased cooperation at all levels between the developed and developing countries. The Lima Conference made a review of the development of economic and social conditions in the developing countries in the context of the prevailing world situation. The participants also noted that more than half of the member states of the international community representing the majority of mankind were present at the Conference.

At Lima, Peru the Communist countries, North Vietnam and North Korea were welcomed as full members of the nonaligned conference. These countries had not attended the Algiers Conference of nonaligned countries even as observers. Panama had attended and thus was accepted as a full member of the nonaligned conference. At Algiers, the nonaligned nations had endorsed Panama's claim to sovereignty over the Canal Zone under United States control. The Palestine Liberation Organization had observer status at Algiers, but at Lima it was also given full membership of the conference.

The Philippines and South Korea were apparently excluded from participating because both governments voluntarily permitted American bases and troops on their soil.²³

XVI. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFERENCES

The sessions of the Nonaligned Conferences last only a few days. Since many resolutions are passed, it is evident that there is not enough time available for a thorough discussion of all the resolutions on the Agenda.

In spite of this fact, the nonaligned nations do consider all the resolutions on the agenda and take decisions. These decisions are then

23. Time, September 8, 1975, pp.19-21.

taken on to the United Nations General Assembly for further consideration.

Should the duration of the sessions of the Conferences be extended, the many distinguished delegates would not be able to attend because of more pressing commitments at home. Some leaders dare not stay away from their capitals for some length of time. When Milton Obote was away at a conference Idi Amin seized power in Uganda. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was overthrown while attending a conference.

A brief analysis of resolutions dealt with at sessions of the non-aligned conferences reveal that the problems of colonialism, racial discrimination and imperialism have received attention at all sessions.

Modern imperialism, colonialism and racism, are usually associated with the West by the nonaligned nations. Today, especially, in view of rapid decolonization in Asia and Africa, imperialism and colonialism cannot be identified exclusively with the Western countries. The non-aligned nations seldom speak of Soviet control over a large per cent of the Soviet population who are of non-Russian descent and of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. Was it not China that carried out the most recent annexation by force of an alien nation - Tibet? There are many nonaligned Asian states that have large national minorities which are often discriminated against.

Since the Second World War the West has embarked on a policy of emancipation and decolonization; while the Soviet Union has embarked on a policy of annexation, domination and subjection in Eastern Europe. The nonaligned nations adopt double standards to the West and their familiarity with Western colonialism only, breeds contempt for the West.

Laurence W. Martin, a scholar of Afro-Asian affairs notes that the Bandung Conference was a gathering of both aligned and nonaligned nations. He maintains that the Communist states were there to show their opposi-

tion to imperialism and colonialism; and also show solidarity with the non-Western nations. Nehru and Chou En-lai had their Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence reaffirmed and expanded to ten. The aligned countries launched attacks on Communism, but Chou-en-Lai adopted a diplomatic peace posture and avoided confrontations.²⁴

A. THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE

A close study of the United Nations Charter will reveal that it is based on the principle of peaceful co-existence although it does not use this very concept. In its preamble, the United Nations Charter, for example, states that the member countries undertake "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours", and to unite their "strength to maintain international peace and security". By that, the United Nations Charter in fact provides for the practice of what the nonaligned nations call peaceful co-existence. Some other articles of the United Nations Charter are also based on the tacit recognition of this principle and also on the recognition of such principles as:

- the sovereign equality of states (Article 2 (1));
- non-intervention (Article 2 (7));
- the equality and self-determination of peoples (Article 1 (2));
- territorial integrity (Article 2 (4)).

The most ardent supporters of the slogan of peaceful co-existence have been the Communist countries. The Five Principles of Co-existence are noble, if not quite clear; if they were more clear they might not sound so noble.

In the Bandung Conference the list of principles had swollen to ten.

24. Laurence W. Martin, ed., Neutrality and Nonalignment, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp.14-15

The first four principles in the Sino-Indian Treaty survive in altered or lengthened form. Several new ones include among others:

- respect for fundamental human rights;
- respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;
- abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the Great Powers;
- abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries;
- and respect for justice and international obligations.

Peaceful co-existence was thus, elevated from the list of enumerated principles to the caption of the list - The Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

We may note certain striking features of these and other lists of declarations. Foremost is their ambiguity and the fluidity of their contents. Most of the items stressed and most of the reasons advanced for them or in their support have been conspicuous for their failure to specify a secondary content - a content that is sufficiently arguable to have some meaning. Where the content is arguable, it is designed to advance a cause. An example is the proclamation of the inalienable right of peoples to their natural resources is loudly silent upon the form and extent of compensation or other redress in the event of expropriation.

One of the Bandung Principles was the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as, negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, the phrase - "other peaceful means of the parties' own choice", can be interpreted also as to require consent of the parties in each case before resort to arbitration or judicial settlement, or indeed, any other

specified peaceful means. Still, the reference to arbitration and judicial settlement, is there.

Peaceful means were not exhausted when the Indian take-over of Goa, Diu and Daman took place; and the Indian action was praised as the righting of historic wrongs. The colonial power, Portugal was at fault and not the nonaligned India. The Sino-Indian border clashes are regarded as mere aberrations of the Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, and not as part of the pattern of Communist Chinese imperialism in South East Asia. It is an internal affair of the Soviet Union that the massive Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Czechoslovak debacle is treated in many nonaligned quarters. Arab aggression against a solidly nonaligned Israel is condoned, while Israeli re-tention of the Sinai and other captured areas is not regarded as preventive counter-action. Indeed, the principles of peaceful co-existence are completely ignored by states in their international relations.

B. THE SUMMIT CONFERENCES OF THE NONALIGNED NATIONS

Since the Belgrade Conference in 1961, numerous meetings of the nonaligned countries have been held. Thus far, no attempt has been made to create a more or less institutionally built up international organization. There is no Organization of Nonaligned Nations such as there is an Organization of American States (OAS) and an Organization of African Unity. (OAU).

The Organization of American States has a Charter that comprises 112 articles. It places the inter-American system on a permanent treaty basis within the United Nations framework. Articles 32 and 101 define the structure and functions of the organization. The supreme organ of the organization is the Inter-American Conference which in ordinary session meets every five years, although at the request of two-thirds of the members a special conference may be convened. The Charter sets out

the purpose, principles, duties and rights of the O.A.S., the purpose of the organization is to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes, to strengthen inter-American solidarity and to raise economic, social and cultural standards. Provision is made for collective security and enforcement action.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is an organization within the definition of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ of the OAU and meets at least once a year. Each member state has one vote, procedural questions are decided by simple majority and resolutions are approved by a two-thirds majority. A Council of Ministers, frequently Foreign Ministers, meets for consultative purposes, and is required to do so at least twice a year. It is responsible to the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. There is no provision for any enforcement action against a member State. The emphasis is on peaceful conciliation. The resolutions of the organization are only advisory. The OAU affirms of a policy of nonalignment with regard to all blocs.

It must be noted that the governments of the nonaligned nations are developing habits of consultation and concerted action on a range of issues. We have noted that there have been several carefully staged meetings, with much fan-fare and public addresses, quiet backstage diplomacy, and formal resolutions. There is increasing inter-capital visits and conferring by heads of state. There is caucusing before voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations. There is a regular Asian-African Caucusing Group, and also smaller caucusing groups of Arab states and African states.

However, all these patterns are still fluid, but certain features emerge. The Lusaka Conference (1970) demonstrated that a shared sense of weakness could bring together such left-wing regimes as Tito's in Yugoslavia with such right-wing governments as those of Ethiopia, Nepal,

and Morocco. The Lusaka Conference also revealed unanimity on the desire to mitigate the rigours of economic development and social change.

The leaders of nonaligned countries have faith in the effectiveness of international conferences. This is their belief that as African, Asian and other leaders get to know each other and are able to understand the goals and aspirations of other nations, the prospects for peace and security will be enhanced.

The domestic political motivations involved in summit meetings must be emphasized. Nonaligned nations' political leaders have reaped benefit from the many Afro-Asian summit meetings by showing the people at home that they were genuinely concerned and earnestly seeking to alleviate world tensions and by showing that they were leaders of stature, who were able to enhance the nation's prestige abroad. Indeed, sheer curiosity also sometimes plays a part in leading nonaligned statesmen to the Afro-Asian summit conferences. This motivation is especially important when there have been revolutionary changes within the Afro-Asian nations, creating a necessity for the new and often temporary leaders to become acquainted with their opposite numbers abroad.

However, Afro-Asian summit meetings, with other techniques of open-door and face-to-face diplomacy, have become a permanent feature of international relations. From time to time, circumstances may demand that they be held, especially as regimes change and as new leaders as well as new problems emerge.

Indeed, with all their deficiencies, Afro-Asian summit conferences must be held regularly, if for no other reason than to demonstrate to politically conscious masses throughout the Third World that every device and avenue is being utilized to assure global peace.

It can be said that the nonaligned nations treat foreign affairs as an arena of national and ideological effort. They make moves on the

diplomatic chessboard for their propaganda impact: to rally their friends in the outside world, to win other particular elements in their own country, and to embarrass their opponents at home.

The nonaligned nations make proposals, demands and circulate official documents that are carefully calculated to show up the "motives" of the West but none of the East; and to mobilize world opinion against colonialism and racialism.

Seldom have the nonaligned nations made protests against Communist violations of treaties and agreements, against Communist crimes in the area of human rights as defined by the United Nations Charter.

Hidden beneath the veneer of decisions are a whole range of urgent problems that are quietly dropped or pigeonholed for future discussion, like boundary problems, human rights and legal issues among the non-aligned nations themselves.

It is obviously clear that nonaligned nations are still poles apart on several key issues, and stubborn adherence to partisan nationalistic viewpoints prevents the unity of nonaligned nations.

The numerous conferences aptly display the divergent opinions of the nonaligned nations on both big and small issues. National interest still reigns supreme and the habit of nationalism still runs strong below the surface appearance of an international posture. Despite verbal professions of lofty goals of unity the nonaligned nations remain non-united.

Indeed, a nonaligned conference would have meaning only to the extent that it poses the necessary questions, proceeds to the required analysis, stimulates real discussions and above all asks:

Does nonalignment as a policy exist? And if it does, what are its criteria? What benefits can the participating nations expect from it? What is the best philosophical and practical approach to the problem?

What are the obstacles along their way? What kind of organization is required for the pursuit of this policy if it is justified?

Posing and attempting to answer these questions, will mean advancing towards a realistic conception of nonalignment, and at the same time, put an end to the verbalizing that forms a carapace around the problem befogging the issues and making it difficult to arrive at a clear comprehension of its implication.

Is it opportune and appropriate for men who are responsible for the fate of their nations to come together in some part of the world, with all that this involves in terms of the expenditure of time, money and energy, simply to make another inventory of the problems confronting and pre-occupying the developing nations on the international scene, since sufficiently well-known tribunes already exist for oratorical tournaments.

Indeed it is impossible to say precisely which states are nonaligned. I think that perhaps the membership of a future conference should be defined along the lines of what the nonaligned states should be. I feel that it would be important at future conferences of nonaligned states - if they are to be effective that the participating nations should not be too emotionally involved in trying to be judges in matters to which they are parties. Participating nations should avoid entering into any emotional accusations against other states with which they are aggrieved because the proper platform for such accusations is at the United Nations.

Theodore L. Shay conducted an analysis of the nonaligned states attending the Bandung, Belgrade, and Cairo Conferences and found that Soviet-oriented states successfully dominated the membership. Western-oriented states either were not invited to participate or, in the case of the "universal" Cairo Conference many declined to attend a breakdown of confer-

ence membership shows the following disproportionate representation;²⁵

TABLE NINE

BANDUNG CONFERENCE ATTENDANCE

Western-oriented states	1
Soviet-oriented states	13
Equidistant states	5

BELGRADE CONFERENCE ATTENDANCE

Western-oriented states	1
Soviet-oriented states	15
Equidistant states	6

CAIRO CONFERENCE ATTENDANCE

Western-oriented states	6
Soviet-oriented states	19
Equidistant states	12

XVII. CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have traced the origin and development of the policy of nonalignment as a policy of consensus. The nonaligned nations have undertaken a variety of approaches towards political and economic development. Nonalignment is essentially a post Second World War phenomenon. Nonalignment, as an anti-colonial response, is a logical policy development among weak, non-Western nations. Nonalignment is now a global phenomenon. The doctrine of nonalignment has adherents in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. More than one third of mankind live in countries that pursue a policy of nonalignment. The nonaligned nations comprise a majority of states in the United Nations General Assembly. Since each state has a vote in the General Assembly, the non-aligned nations have an international forum in which they exert a voting strength far out of proportion to their real power in international affairs. Since the General Assembly is dominated by their votes, the

25. Theodore L. Shay, *Ibid.*, pp.241-242

nonaligned nations promote their causes and interests at the United Nations. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development is an example of united action by the nonaligned nations and it will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD AND UNCTAD

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the Second World War, the traditional colonial empires have been dismantled and a large number of new states have emerged. Many of these states claim to be nonaligned and poor. Another contemporary phenomenon is the growing polarization of the poorer nations vis-a-vis the rich ones and the growing political cohesion of the developing nations. Despite the vast differences and hostilities which characterize many developing regions (such as India versus Pakistan; Iran versus Iraq; Indonesia versus Malaysia; Ethiopia versus Somalia) they act fairly effectively and at times in a monolithic bloc in international economic negotiations.

The post Second World War period has also been characterized by the growth and spread of capitalism throughout the developing world. International trade and foreign investment has increased rapidly in the world. In response to foreign aid, capitalist forms of production and organization have grown in scope and significance within most of the poorer developing countries. Indeed, capitalism has also penetrated the countries behind the Iron Curtain - such as the availability of Pepsi-Cola in Moscow.

Trade has become the most vital arena in the field of development. Many of the Afro-Asian states lived largely on the sale of their primary products and raw materials to the more developed countries, from which they import finished goods.

An authoritative analysis concluded that although the trade of the developing countries was increasing, it was not keeping pace with expan-

sion elsewhere. Their share in total world trade was thus falling, and in addition, most of the trade was with the advanced countries rather than with the rest of the Third World. What was worse, the prices the developing countries received for their goods was decreasing relatively to what they paid for industrial and other goods from abroad. This degradation of the terms of trade threatened their very existence.¹

Since independence, the Afro-Asian and developing countries had received much aid from the East and the West to promote their economic development. This was at the height of the Cold War when the East and the West competed with each other for the loyalties of the developing countries. Since this aid was given for political purposes, the non-aligned nations condemned both the East and the West. They maintained that the burden of interest payments and capital repayments became a considerable drain on export earnings. Since aid was frequently tied so that the recipient, instead of using aid to buy what he wanted where it was available most cheaply, was obliged to accept schemes not on his list of priorities or buy goods from the donor instead of more cheaply elsewhere. Many nations maintained that aid perpetuated an economic pattern created in colonial times, when the colonies were producers of raw materials for their colonial masters. For many nations, aid impeded the diversification of developing economies and retarded the industrialization of the recipient nations. Aid was a poor substitute for what the international economy and particularly guaranteed prices for their products and access to the markets of the developed and affluent world. Indeed, the developing nations wished to promote the establishment of a

1. Bronislav Gosovic, "UNCTAD: North-South Encounter", International Conciliation, No. 568 (May 1968), pp.5-80.

new international economic order, based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and cooperation among all states irrespective of their economic and social systems.

At Belgrade in 1961, and at Cairo in 1962, the nonaligned nations expressed concern over the dangers of the continued and increasing economic disparity between the developing and developed countries. At Belgrade they demanded steps to close "the ever-widening gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced countries and the many economically less developed countries". They invited "all countries in the course of development to cooperate effectively in the economic and commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the economic sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created by the economic blocs of industrial countries".²

The Cairo Conference of Nonaligned Countries of 1964 produced the most comprehensive statement ever made till then about the urgent need for economic cooperation among the member countries and between them and the industrially advanced countries. An entire chapter of the eleven chapter Cairo Declaration is devoted to economic cooperation.

When the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) came into being, nonaligned countries, in their capacity as the developing countries, formed a strong and assertive group which has come to be known as the Group of Seventy Seven (77). There has been frequent and close interaction between the nonaligned nations and the Group of Seventy Seven (77). This interaction has helped to heighten the awareness of the world, of the economic agencies of the United Nations and not least of the nonaligned nations themselves of the dimensions of this problem and of the urgent need for cooperation between them.

2. For more details see: The Belgrade Conference, Appendix B

There are increasing signs on the plane of international diplomacy, that the world is emerging from the ideological framework that has since the early 1950's often clouded the underlying realities of the bipolar cold war. New poles of power are appearing and new checks and balances between these will have to be worked out.

When the Third Conference of Nonaligned Countries met in Lusaka from September 8th to the 10th 1970, the participants conferred on the problems of peace, independence, development, cooperation and the democratization of international relations. The Lusaka Declaration asserts that the balance of terror has not brought peace and security to the rest of the world. The lofty principles of the United Nations, the Lusaka Declaration maintains, could be brought to closer realization if the role of the nonaligned countries would be strengthened within and outside the United Nations. Moreover, the nonaligned and militarily weak nations desire, more ardently than any others, "the dissolution of great power military alliances" and genuine disarmament, particularly of the atomic powers.³

II. BACKGROUND TO UNCTAD I

The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was preceded by almost two years of intensive discussions and preparation. Indeed, this pre-conference activity actually determined the outcome of the conference.

In 1961 the Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted an amendment to Assembly Resolution 1707 (XVII) debated on December 19, 1961. The resolution was titled "International trade as the primary instrument for economic development". The amendment called on

3. See: The Lusaka Conference, Appendix E

the Secretary General to find out if member countries were of the opinion that a conference devoted to international trade problems should be organized by the United Nations. The forty-five (45) nations in favour of the amendment were mainly African and Asian countries plus the Communist bloc. The thirty-six votes against were cast by the Western developed countries and the Latin American states. There were ten (10) abstentions. At the very outset, the so-called North-South split was in evidence.

In 1962 an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution convening an international trade conference and establishing a Preparatory Committee was to consider the agenda and prepare the necessary documents for the conference.

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1785 (XVII) of December 8, 1962, decided to hold a World Conference on Trade and Development. It was hoped that some of the problems could be resolved and a new deal obtained for the developing countries. The points under discussion would include the need for increasing the trade of the developing countries - both among themselves and with the developed countries - in primary commodities as well as manufactured goods; measures for ensuring stable, equitable and remunerative prices for their exports; and measures for gradually removing tariffs and other barriers which had an adverse effect on their trade. Finally, the conference would seek to establish any methods and machinery deemed necessary.⁴

In 1963 the United Nations General Assembly welcomed a "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Five (75) Developing countries". This declaration proposed a novel and dynamic international trade policy, which would enable the developing countries to expand and diversify their trade. This

4. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 1963, p.19370 A-B.

would involve the removal of trade barriers, fair and stable export prices, more aid on better terms and the creation of new machinery to implement the policy.

In 1964, the main ideas of the Joint Declaration were embodied in the Prebisch Report to UNCTAD entitled "Towards a New Trade Policy for Development". This lengthy document, known as "The Prebisch Report", became the basic policy document of the conference. Both the diagnosis and reforms advocated by Prebisch develop ideas originally presented in the Joint Declaration.

On December 30th, 1964, the nineteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 1995 (XIX) established UNCTAD as an organ of the General Assembly. The existence of groups was partly recognized by this resolution. For the purpose of elections to posts the membership of UNCTAD is divided into four lists of states:

- A. Africa, Asia (excluding Japan) and Yugoslavia.
- B. Western Europe (including Turkey, Cyprus and Malta), the United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Australia.
- C. Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean.
- D. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.⁵

From the outset, nations in UNCTAD took sides and three basic groups crystallized.

- A. the Group of Seventy-Seven (77) African, Asian and Latin American countries;
- B. the Market economies of Western Europe;
- C. and the centrally planned economies of the Eastern bloc.

A. THE GROUP OF SEVENTY-SEVEN (77)

The three groups defined along lines of relative wealth and socio-economic systems were to be a continuing feature of future conferences. The Group

5. Branislav Gosovic, *Ibid.*, pp.1-16, *passim*.

of Seventy Seven (77) has become the main entity for the expression of the demands of the developing countries.

Initially, the Group consisted of Seventy Five (75) countries, but by the end of the first Conference, the developing countries numbered Seventy Seven (77). At the present time the Group consists of about 98 countries, but for political and psychological reasons the name Group of Seventy Seven (77) has been maintained.⁶

6. The Group of Seventy Seven (77) was constituted during the first UNCTAD Conference in Geneva, 1964, comprising the following countries:

Afghanistan	Gabon
Algeria	Ghana
Argentina	Guatemala
Bolivia	Guinea
Brazil	Haiti
Burma	Honduras
Burundi	India
Cambodia	Indonesia
Cameroon	Iran
Central African Republic	Iraq
Ceylon	Jamaica
Chad	Jordan
Chile	Kenya
Colombia	Korea (South)
Congo	Kuwait
Costa Rica	Laos
Cyprus	Lebanon
Dahomey	Liberia
Dominican Republic	Libya
Ecuador	Madagascar
Egypt	Malaysia
El Salvador	Mali
Ethiopia	Mauritania
Mexico	Syria
Morocco	Sudan
Nepal	Tanzania
Nicaragua	Thailand
Niger	Togo
Nigeria	Trinidad and Tobago
Pakistan	Tunisia
Panama	Uganda
Paraguay	Upper Volta
Peru	Uruguay
Philippines	Venezuela
Rwanda	Vietnam (South)
Saudi Arabia	Yemen (People's Democratic Republic)
Senegal	Yugoslavia
Sierra Leone	Zaire
Somalia	

Alfred S. Friedeberg has studied the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development of 1964. He stresses the fact that UNCTAD was a political event rather than an economic conference. The existence of the Group of Seventy Seven (77) has given UNCTAD its political importance but it has also created many of its problems. The Group comprises states of diverse political regimes from three continents, ranging from the very poor to the modestly rich and the coalition of developing countries has common interests only at a high level of generality.

In reality, the Group of Seventy Seven is a weak coalition of three regional groups - African, Asian (the Arabs are divided by continent, and in addition, Yugoslavia meets with the Asian group) and Latin American (including the English speaking Caribbean). Decisions on issues are made in the three regional groups and added together rather than debated and sorted out at meetings of the Group of Seventy Seven (77).

By 1972 the following 19 countries had also joined the Group, to bring the total to 96.

Bahrain	Lesotho
Barbados	Malawi
Bhutan	Maldives
Botswana	Mauritius
Cuba	Qatar
Equatorial Guinea	Singapore
Fiji	Swaziland
Gambia	Yemen Arab Republic
Guyana	Zambia
Ivory Coast	

The following countries are expected to join the ranks of the Group:

Bangladesh
Mozambique.

For example, at Algiers, the signs of a potential alliance of least developed Latin American and African states were eliminated by imposing the principle of regional group discipline. Thus, to many Western observers, the Charter of Algiers was a collection of demands rather than a realistic negotiating programme. The Group of Seventy Seven (77) is held together primarily by the belief that rigid discipline vis-a-vis the rich states is the best weapon the poor states have. The result however, is a long and inflexible set of maximum demands with unclear priorities presented by group representatives of the developing countries with the little authority to compromise.⁷

The developing countries are highly differentiated from the point of view of cultural traditions and socio-economic conditions. They have scanty intra-trade relations and links, and there is little solidarity in advancing common interests, social and economic development. All socio-economic disparities occur in their most extreme form in these developing countries.

Indeed, these countries are increasingly becoming aware of their backwardness and are developing counter-measures. Inadequate living conditions, widespread hunger, malnutrition and man's inhumanity to man create and foster unrest and civil disturbances. These forces can not only jeopardize internal order and national equilibrium, but also threaten international equilibrium and order.

Many developing countries are feverishly searching for ways of solving their present difficulties. This process takes place under constantly increasing internal pressure. However, this pressure is not necessarily the strongest in countries at the lowest economic level

7. Alfred S. Friedeberg, The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development of 1964: The Theory of the Peripheral Economy at the Center of International Political Discussion, (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1969), passim.

(such as Mali, Chad and Somalia) quite often the opposite is true (examples are Zambia, Botswana and the Congo). At the same time, the overwhelming majority of the developing countries have not, as yet, chosen a strategy for overcoming their present difficulties. Indeed, in cases where it has been made, the choice is not necessarily wise and stable.

Indeed, it is an over-simplification, but it is basically true to claim that in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the near East, economic existence has not materially improved for the average inhabitant for generations. Indeed, for many of them it has worsened - the poor get poorer.⁸

B. THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The countries of the Western developed market economy also pursue similar interests. They have organized their position through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. But since the wealthy states also form a very diverse coalition (such as the divergencies of French, American, German and Japanese trade interests), they tend to agree primarily not to embarrass each other's weak points - which means a position of minimal concessions confronting the Group of Seventy Seven's (77's) maximal demands.

8. For a further discussion of the Third World see:

Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (Eds), The Politics of the Developing Areas. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960)

Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States. (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1962)

Paul E. Sigmund (Ed), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967)

Peter Worsley, The Third World. (London: Weidenfeld Paperbacks, 1964)

This group of countries, with homogeneous patterns of civilization, linked by a solidarity of economic interests, has the highest economic standard of living and has at its disposal both political and military resources to maintain its advanced position. Their greatest advantage lies in their advanced research in science and technology. These developments have enabled them to maintain self-sustained progress and an extensive rate of growth.

However, the development of these countries, at the present rate, could not be sustained without access to the large raw material resources of the major part of the world. Indeed, control over these resources and their direct exploitation, not only ensures high rates of growth, but also provides many advantages such as profits, control over prices, and a lever for political bargaining and negotiation for the developed countries. This is the greatest bone of contention between the developed and developing countries.⁹

C. THE EASTERN BLOC

The third major group in UNCTAD, the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, are equally organized. They have even less to offer because they plead that their planned economies, intermediate level of

9. More about this section on Developed Countries in:

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technocratic Era. (New York: Viking Press, 1970)

Morton A. Kaplan (Ed), The Revolution in World Politics. (New York: John Wiley and Company, 1962)

Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966)

Adam Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1971)

development, and their absence of a colonial past "excuses" them from responding to most of the demands of the developing world.

In reality they account for only some 15 per cent of world trade compared with nearly 70 per cent for the developed market economies. This fact helps to explain why the Soviet Union and its satellites play only a minor role in UNCTAD and their unyielding position to the developing world.¹⁰

'In the post Stalin period, the Soviet Union advocated "peaceful co-existence" between Communist and non-Communist systems. This implied a willingness on both sides to renounce or sharply limit the pursuit of their goals by reliance on military force; it implied no diminution in ideological rivalry and hostility or in competition between the West and the Communist bloc in economic affairs. In the ideological and economic realms, the Soviet Union in effect advocated "competitive co-existence" or "peaceful competition", the boast of Communist officials that they would "bury" capitalism sprang from the conviction that Marxism would ultimately win this competition. Except for a tacit agreement not to rely upon massive military force, the Marxist conception of peaceful co-existence has little in common with the nonaligned nations' conception of the same idea.'¹¹

The Soviet Union has often claimed to be the most reliable friend of the nonaligned and developing nations. According to the Soviet Union, the world of today is not divided into the "big" and the "small", the "rich" and the "poor", but between the forces of socialism, progress and peace, and those of imperialism, colonialism and reaction facing them.

The Soviet Union thus rejects the Communist Chinese thesis that the world is divided into rich and poor countries, and also the views of those who believe that for the Third World, there was no fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both of these states sought to defend the interests of their states rather than

10. For an interesting study see:
Adam Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II
 (New York: Viking Press, 1971)

11. Cecil V. Crabb (Jr.), Nations in a Multipolar World. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p.420

those of their ideologies.¹²

III. UNCTAD I

The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I) was held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1964. It began on 23rd March and continued until June 16th 1964. It was the largest conference ever held and over 2,000 delegates from 118 countries attended. The main outcome was a new form of international machinery. This is UNCTAD and it is technically described as a periodic conference. Membership of UNCTAD is open to all countries who are members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. As a result, countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and South Korea, non-members of the United Nations, are members of UNCTAD. Yet UNCTAD has a permanent secretariat within the United Nations secretariat and it is a special body of the United Nations General Assembly. Each member would have one vote. Decisions on matters of substance would require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, but procedural matters would be decided by a simple majority vote.¹³

At Geneva, all the countries present pledged themselves to pursue internal and external economic policies designed to accelerate economic growth throughout the world, reduce the gap between the respective standards of living in developed and developing countries and render assistance to developing countries. All the countries should cooperate in creating conditions of international trade conducive in particular to the achievement of a rapid increase in export earnings of the developing countries.

At Geneva, the developing countries demanded that new preferential

12. Adam Ulam, *Ibid.*

13. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 13-20, 1965, pp.20581-20583 A-B.

concessions, both tariff and non-tariff, should be made to the developing countries as a whole and such preferences should not be extended to developing countries.

International institutions and developed countries should provide more material, technical, financial and economic assistance to the developing countries. There should be no strings attached to such aid. Instead of spending vast sums of money on arms, the developed countries should use such funds to the promotion of economic development in the developing countries. Special attention should be paid to the least developed countries of the world.¹⁴

At UNCTAD I in Geneva, the developing countries pressed a demand for a scheme of temporary preferences on industrial products for their exports of manufactured goods. This demand was strongly opposed by the United States, primarily on the principle of non-discrimination in international trade; but subsequently the United States reversed its stand under pressure from the Latin American countries.

The developing countries are aware of the damage done to their export potential by the agricultural protectionism of the developed countries. Through UNCTAD they have sought higher and more stable prices for their agricultural products. Experience has shown that international commodity agreements are extremely difficult to negotiate and operate, and they do not promise an effective solution to the income problems they are supposed to solve.

During the Conference a number of "walk-outs" took place at the attendance of South African delegates and the delegation from Portugal. Protests were made when the Portuguese delegates came forward to speak on April 7th, 1964, and again on the following day - April 8th, when the

14. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 13-20, 1965, pp.20507-20583 A-B, *passim*.

South African Minister of Finance, Dr. N. Diederichs, addressed the Conference. On both occasions, the Conference President and delegates of the Afro-Asian countries, the Communist countries, and some Latin American countries left the Conference chamber.

The delegates from the Communist countries also left the Conference chamber on April 1st, 1964 during the speech of the delegate from Nationalist China (Taiwan). On April 8th 1964, the Algerian delegate criticized the absence of delegates from the Chinese People's Republic, East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam.¹⁵

IV. THE GROUP OF SEVENTY SEVEN (77) IN ALGIERS, ALGERIA

It has become customary, both before and during sessions of UNCTAD, for the three geographical groups to meet to co-ordinate views and positions. This has led to a polarization of views prior to contact between the groups.

Prior to UNCTAD II in New Delhi the three geographical groups undertook extensive consultations among themselves. The Group of Seventy Seven (77) developing countries held a ministerial meeting as their main preparation for the second conference.

This meeting, in Algiers, Algeria in October 1967, was preceded by the work of a co-ordinating committee and by meetings within each developing region. On the basis of these regional submissions the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of Seventy Seven (77) formulated the Charter of Algiers.

A. THE CHARTER OF ALGIERS

The Charter of Algiers points out that "the share of developing countries in the total world export declined from 27% in 1963 to only 15.3% in

15. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 13-20, 1965, p.20581 A

1966 ..." The purchasing power of exports from developing countries has been steadily declining the loss in purchasing power amounted annually to approximately 2½ billion dollars, which represents nearly half of the flow of external public financial resources to developing countries. This has aggravated the problem of the increasing indebtedness of the developing countries. The external public debt alone has increased from 10 billion dollars in 1955 to 40 billion dollars in 1966. While the debt service demands averaged half a billion dollars annually in the mid 1950's, they have already increased to 4 billion dollars and may offset the entire transfer of resources before the end of this decade if the present trends continue. They already equal the entire amount of grants and grant-like contributions While in 1961 the flow of development financing to developing countries amounted to 0.87% of the gross national product of developed countries, it came down to 0.62% in 1966 - or only a little more than half the target of 1% of national income which was unanimously accepted as the target of financial aid to be provided by the developed to the developing countries.¹⁶

Thus, the Algiers Charter was actually an inventory of the short-range and long-range demands of the developing countries.

The Charter of Algiers adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of Seventy Seven (77) in October 1967, records a further worsening of the plight of the developing countries. In spite of all that was said at UNCTAD I no new commodity agreement of primary products exported from the developing countries have decreased by 7% since 1950, those for primary products exported from the developed countries have increased by

16. United Nations Document, TD/38, 3 November, 1967, pp.5-10, passim
Leo Mates, *Ibid.*, pp.456-475, passim.

10% in the same period; as a result of the proliferation and promotion of synthetic substitutes in the developed countries, the market for competing natural products of the developing countries has shrunk and their prices have fallen; no progress has been made by the developed countries in the recommended transferability of credit balances held with them by the developing countries; with a few notable exceptions, the terms and conditions of development finance are becoming more and more onerous, the proportion of grants is declining, interest rates are increasing repayment periods are being shortened and development loans are becoming increasingly tied.¹⁷

The Algiers Conference was convened to prepare the Group of Seventy Seven (77) with a negotiating stand for the New Delhi Conference. One of the principal pre-occupations at Algiers turned out to be the discussion of problems within the Group of Seventy Seven.

At the Algiers meeting, the move from the general declaration of demands to their concretization made it necessary to face more seriously some of the main cleavages in the Group. In general, the principal lines of division within the Group of Seventy Seven are those caused by the special ties that some developing countries and those between group members who are at different levels of economic development. These conflicts were manifested in Algiers on the question of the relationship between general and vertical preferences; and the question of special measures for the least advanced developing countries. At present, for example, eighteen African countries received preferential treatment in the EEC, on the basis of the Yaoundé Convention. Developing countries that are members of the Commonwealth enjoy preferences in the United Kingdom and some other Commonwealth countries.

17. Leo Mates, *Ibid.*, pp.456-475, *passim*.

A special relationship also exists between the Latin American countries and the United States through association in the Organization of American States and the Alliance for Progress.

At Algiers, the Latin American countries continued their pressure on the 18 African states to give up special preferences that they enjoy in the EEC in favour of a generalized system of preferences for all developing countries.

On the second issue, the least advanced countries were striving to have their special status recognized by the Group of Seventy Seven. No substantive progress was made on either question, and consideration of both was postponed.

The Algiers Conference demonstrated that the members of the Group of Seventy Seven, despite very serious differences and obvious clashes of interest were motivated by the need to maintain their unity prior to the New Delhi Conference - UNCTAD II. The Group is exposed to outside pressure through bilateral channels and is politically weak.

The Charter of Algiers embodied a general statement of the current, unfavourable, situation for sustained economic development. The programme of action called upon the developed countries, to support the developing countries' efforts regarding commodity problems and policies; expansion of exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures; development financing; invisibles including shipping; general trade policy issues; trade expansion and economic integration among developing countries; and special measures to be taken in favour of the least developed among the developing countries.

The Charter of Algiers accepted a great deal of flexibility in the formulation of the preferential system and also provided for specific commitments for technical and financial assistance for the least advanced countries.

V. UNCTAD II

The second session of UNCTAD, was held in New Delhi from February 1st to March 29th, 1968. The Conference was attended by delegates from 119 of the 132 member countries of UNCTAD. Seven United Nations specialized agencies, 21 inter-governmental organizations and 11 non-governmental organizations were also represented.

The Conference adopted the following 11-point agenda:

- (a) trends and problems in world trade and development;
- (b) commodity problems and policies;
- (c) expansion and diversification of exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures of developing countries;
- (d) growth, development finance, and aid (synchronization of international and national policies);
- (e) problems of developing countries in regard to invisibles, including shipping;
- (f) trade expansion and economic integration among developing countries, and measures to be taken by developing and developed countries - including regional, sub-regional, and inter-regional arrangements;
- (g) special measures to be taken in favour of the least developed among the developing countries, aimed at expanding their trade and improving their economic and social development;
- (h) general review of the work of UNCTAD;
- (i) the world food problem - its relationship to international trade and to the export earnings and economic development of developing countries; measures to assist these countries to increase their food production and to improve the conditions for its distribution and marketing;
- (j) special problems of the land-locked countries;
- (k) transfer of technology including know-how and patents.¹⁸

During the Conference a number of "walk-outs" took place in protest at the attendance of South African delegates and on March 28th, 1968 a resolution was adopted by 49 votes to 18, with seven abstentions, recom-

18. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 31- September 7 1968.
pp.22893 A-B

mending the United Nations General Assembly to amend its resolution governing the membership of UNCTAD in order to suspend South Africa "until it shall have terminated its policy of racial discrimination and until that fact has been duly confirmed by the General Assembly".¹⁹

According to UNCTAD membership and voting rights, the membership of the Conference would be open to all members of the United Nations and the United Nations specialized agencies. Each member would have one vote. Decisions on matters of substance would require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, but procedural matters would be decided by a simple majority vote.

The timing of the New Delhi Conference could not have been less fortunate - it coincided with the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the world monetary crises. The rich states were not only absorbed in these crises, but also were affected by the changed climate of international politics since the early 1960's when UNCTAD was conceived.

Politically there was a lessening of the ideological sharpness of the East-West cleavage between the Soviet Union and the United States; and a growing disillusion in both camps with the short-term political importance and development prospects of the Third World. This change was reflected in diminished domestic support in the rich countries for aid development abroad - including UNCTAD's use of trade measures for aid. Thus, the problem of UNCTAD is not one of obstructive leaders and national officials, but that there is currently little domestic support in most rich countries (for UNCTAD measures).

Economically, the developing countries' proportion of world trade has continued to decline, and although their exports increased at a rate of 50 per cent higher than that projected by UNCTAD, an increased burden of

19. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 31-September 7, 1968, p.22894 A.

debt service, higher cost of invisibles, and declining aid meant that the crucial rate of imports increased at only the same 4 per cent rate as in the late fifties. Although the economic situation remained serious, political responsiveness of the rich states had declined.²⁰

At New Delhi, the aspirations of the developing countries, were shattered by the compromises finally agreed upon by the developed countries. The developed countries came to the Conference with a major contribution in the field of tariff preferences, but in other areas, many of them were hampered by such problems as balance of payments difficulties, the conflicting requirements of domestic budgetary demands, and a lack of any adequate official and public support and understanding for the changes in developed and developing areas which must follow meaningful contributions to the development of poor nations.

At New Delhi, it became apparent that the positions of the developing countries and both the centrally planned and the market economies were as far apart as ever. The Group of Seventy Seven tried to impose the points it had proclaimed in the Algiers Charter such as, the failure of the advanced countries to aid the poorer nations, agreements to stabilize commodity markets and prices, among others. Soon a deadlock was reached and the rest of the Conference was spent covering up differences.

At New Delhi, no commitments for preferences on primary and manufactured goods had been attained. Indeed, the time had not even come for the actual negotiations. The only apparent accomplishment was to insert in the new list of aims a series of targets that had no more chance of being attained than the previous ones. For example, despite the unmistakable indication of the advanced nations that they would not be able to increase their aid to development for many years to come, the Final Act

20. Isaiah Frank, "New Perspectives on Trade and Development", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, April 1967, p.525

raised the level of aid requested to one per cent of gross national product. The only point on which the nonaligned nations received satisfaction was somewhat extraneous to the debates - South Africa was suspended from UNCTAD for its policy of racial discrimination.

According to Raul Prebisch, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the primary causes of disappointments at New Delhi were the opposition in the developing countries to the introduction of reforms in their economic and social structures, to a modification of attitudes and policies, and to the discipline of sound economic planning, and the view of developed countries that the development problem is a residual one, which, in the absence of political requirements to do otherwise, can be dealt with haphazardly.²¹

Raul Prebisch summarized the results of the New Delhi Conference as follows:

Limited and incomplete results concerning the fundamental problems of preferences and finance;

Some positive results in the spheres of trade expansion among developing countries, trade with socialist countries, shipping the food problem and policy in relation to least developed and land-locked countries;

Virtually no results in the access to markets; and

No contribution to the formulation of a global strategy for development.²²

VI. THE GROUP OF SEVENTY SEVEN (77) MEETING IN LIMA, PERU

The Group of Seventy Seven (now numbering 96 members from Asia, Africa and Latin America) met in Lima, Peru from October 28th to November 8th, 1971. For the first time Cuba attended a session of the Group of Seventy

21. "UNCTAD, The significance of the Second Session of UNCTAD", Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, TD/96, 7 May 1968, pp.2-3 and 9.

22. Ibid., p.3

Seven and this was as a result of the initiatives taken by Peru. As is customary, initial positions had already been taken up in a series of three meetings among the countries of Asia in Bangkok, of Africa in Addis Ababa, and of Latin America and the Caribbean in Lima, Peru. Financial and monetary problems were the main topics of discussion and the plight of the least developed countries, trade in raw materials and commodities also featured in the discussions. At Lima, a list of demands to be made of the industrialized countries was drawn up.²³

VII. UNCTAD III

The third session of UNCTAD was held in Santiago, Chile on April 13th 1972. The session was attended by about 3,000 delegates from 141 countries. The People's Republic of China attended - its first major conference as a member of the United Nations. During the meeting it was decided to admit Bangladesh as a member of UNCTAD.

It was pointed out at the Conference that the developing countries' share of international trade had been reduced between 1960 and 1969 from 21.3 per cent to 17.6 per cent and the developing nations accounted for 60 per cent of the world's population, but had only 12 per cent of the gross product at their disposal.²⁴

The timing of UNCTAD III held in Santiago, Chile in 1972, could not have been less fortunate - both the developed and developing countries were caught up in the devastating effects of the international monetary crisis. The primary effect was that the developed countries, beset by their own economic problems, were even less disposed than before to make major concessions to the developing countries.

23. Ker. Ing's Contemporary Archives, July 22-29, 1972, pp.25376-25377 A-B

24. Ibid., pp.25377-25378 A-B.

The still outstanding issues of preferential tariff treatment were deferred until the opening of the world trade conference scheduled to begin sometime in 1974 and to continue into 1975. Action on the losses in the developing countries foreign exchange reserves, caused by devaluations and revaluations of developed world currencies, was likewise postponed until the world monetary conference, also tentatively scheduled for 1974.²⁵

The developing countries require a major and sustained input of capital. If the developed nations cannot meet the needs of the developing countries for capital, technology and markets, the two will be driven still further apart. This too was repeatedly emphasized at Santiago.

The developing countries dislike the role they are being assigned - as agricultural and raw materials areas - for the developed nations. Most of the developing countries are exporting relatively inexpensive agricultural and mineral raw materials and importing expensive finished consumer goods from the developed nations.²⁶

The Conference expressed recognition of the fact that the developing countries were primarily responsible for their own economic development. The industrialised countries were asked not to interfere with the efficient mobilization of the developing countries' own resources. With reference to multinational and trans-national corporations and the recent spate of expropriations by the developing countries, a resolution was passed:

- (a) affirming the sovereign right of those nations to ensure that foreign capital was used in accordance with national development needs;
- (b) expressing concern at the financial outflow brought about by private foreign investment, and

25. Ibid., p.25378 A-B

26. Ibid., p.25380 A

- (c) urging developed countries to take steps to reverse the tendency for an outflow of capital from developing countries.²⁷

It is important to now consider a revolutionary development in international economics, based not on exchange, but on the international production of goods and services. The most important agency for international production is the multinational corporation.

A. THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

UNCTAD III drew up a list of least developed countries on the basis of a number of factors including:

- (1) a per capita gross domestic product of \$100 or less;
- (2) a share of manufacturing in the gross domestic product of 10 per cent or less; and
- (3) a literacy rate among persons over 15 years of age of 20 per cent or less.

The list included 16 African countries, they are: Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Upper Volta. There are eight in Asia and Oceania, they are: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos, Maldives, Nepal, Sikkim, Western Samoa, and the Yemen Arab Republic. There is one in Latin America - Haiti. Thus, there are 25 least developed countries.

The developing countries maintained that these 25 least developed countries should be granted special treatment. A unanimous resolution adopted included recommendations in the fields of commodities, diversification of economies, access to markets and other commercial policy measures, restrictive business practices, development finance, transfer of technology shipping and trade promotion. The resolution further included suggestions for actions by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe international organizations and regional economic groupings. With reference to the establishment of the special fund, the conference suggested

27. Ibid. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

that the United Nations Economic and Social Council should study the desirability and feasibility of the proposal and report its findings to the General Assembly.²⁸

VIII. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF UNCTAD

UNCTAD has had some effects. The pressures exerted by UNCTAD have affected other organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and made them more sensitive to the demands of the developing countries. UNCTAD is also partly responsible for the change in the American position on preferences, although the final economic benefits of the scheme remain to be seen. UNCTAD has also brought international attention and pressure on shipping practices. UNCTAD has helped set up an international sugar agreement.

On the issue of preferences, the developed capitalist countries had made a major departure from traditional commercial policies based on "most-favoured-nation" treatment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). At UNCTAD I in 1964, most developed countries, and particularly the United States, opposed any preference scheme as a violation of the "most-favoured-nation" clause in GATT.

However, by 1967, as a result of UNCTAD and Latin American pressures, the United States reversed its position and supported a system of worldwide preferences for manufactured products from the developing countries.

The impact of UNCTAD on international relations is evident. The rich countries have been made aware of the problems of the poor countries. It has stimulated other organizations to intensify their efforts but its main contribution to economic progress is that by bringing trade, aid and finance problems into one orbit it shows a concern for coordination in the sphere of development.

28. Ibid., p. 2577 f.

IX. ANALYSIS

Most authorities on organizations agree that UNCTAD is an unwieldy and frustrating organization and the larger the meeting, the more unwieldy it is. Since any member of the United Nations or its specialized agencies is eligible for UNCTAD membership - there are over 140 member states - the attendance at UNCTAD is very high. For example at UNCTAD II in New Delhi, in 1968, about 1,500 delegates spent eight weeks accomplishing very little.

Aware of these limiting factors, the Trade and Development Board suggested at its 7th session in 1968 that in future the World Trade Conference should limit itself to deal with matters of principle only. It should indicate objectives and the general way in which this global strategy for aid and trade is to be approached. It should refrain from discussing the long and varied shopping list of demands emanating from the developing countries. The task of working out practical and acceptable detailed solutions should be left to the board.

UNCTAD's pressure group role seems to be running into diminishing returns, at least until there are changes in the domestic political attitudes in the rich countries or changes in the international political structure which could return the Third World countries to the temporary and illusory position of importance that they held in the early 1960's.

UNCTAD cannot escape its rigid group system or its past reputation of partiality and double standards. These have doubled the determination of the most important rich states to negotiate only in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and restrict UNCTAD to general rhetoric.

A major function of UNCTAD has been to change the general philosophy of international trade to favour developing countries. Indeed, such changes rarely appear in the short run. Political negotiations at UNCTAD meetings result in vaguely worded resolutions designed to bridge the gap

in a society that separates the rich and poor nations.²⁹

While the resolutions of UNCTAD have considerable moral force, the organization had no means of implementing its recommendations and decisions. The executive power lay elsewhere - in the developed world. The developed states today dominate an international economic system which they created to meet their own needs and national interests. These states are most reluctant to relinquish the control they have over international economic relations and thus to give in to the demands made in UNCTAD resolutions would amount to economic suicide. The developed states will make minor concessions, but on the whole they will not move in the direction that UNCTAD wants them to move. Indeed, this is particularly relevant, since the mid-sixties when the Cold War no longer compelled the East and West to woo the developing nations. By the mid-sixties cleavages within the West and the East, the emergence of a limited detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and over a decade of experience with not too successful efforts to bring the developing countries into the Cold War alignments all combined to decrease Soviet and American attention to the problems of the Third World.

UNCTAD constitutes the best expression of modern economic thinking and of new concepts of international cooperation. The problem, therefore, is no longer of an institutional nature. The question is whether the institutions are being adequately utilized. For in the final analysis institutions are meaningless if Governments are not truly determined to achieve the objective that they have set themselves through such mechanisms. Accordingly it is essential that institutions should undergo such adjustments as are necessary to meet new problems and changed circum-

29. J. Nye, "UNCTAD: Poor Nations' Pressure Group" in R. Cox and H. Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 334-370, passim.

stances.

Since 1964 UNCTAD has become the major forum for what is often acrimonious and bitter debate concerning the economic status and relationship of the rich and poor countries. At UNCTAD I no one debated the fact that between 1950 and 1960 the developing world's share in the money volume of world trade; dropped from 30 per cent to 20 per cent. In the same period the Western developed countries increased their share from 60 per cent to 66 per cent, and the share of the Soviet Union and the East European Communist countries rose from 8 per cent to 12 per cent.³⁰

UNCTAD I illustrated well the gap which exists between the rich and poor nations of the world. The recommendations of the conference covered the major economic problems of the developing countries. The recommendations took the form of requests to developed nations to undertake new policies and make adjustments in their own economies to foster the economic development of the Third World.

However, it must be emphasized that the lack of progress within UNCTAD was a reflection of the inability of the international community to reach agreed solutions to problems which cut at the heart of national interests and existing international arrangements and practices.

The recommendations that emerged from the New Delhi conference represented a compromise between the positions of the developed industrialized and developing countries.

The activities of UNCTAD are predominantly research-orientated, although actual negotiations in the form of the commodity conferences sponsored by UNCTAD have received more publicity. It is difficult to assess

30. Escott Reid, The Future of the World Bank. (Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965), pp.36-37.

the activities of UNCTAD. What UNCTAD has done, is to impress upon the industrialized rich countries not only the problems of the poor countries but also their potential power.

Raw materials are unevenly distributed and dispersed over the earth's surface. The capacity to extract and process these raw materials into finished form is even more unequally distributed and is overwhelmingly in the hands of the technically skilled minority of the world population. The rate of raw materials exploitation threatens to exhaust or drastically restrict the availability of a whole series of major minerals within one generation.

Just as the developed world struggled for access to raw materials in the building of its economy, so the goal of development for the rest of the world necessarily implies a comparable struggle. It will be a struggle for their re-allocation, for a repossession of their ownership and management, for a re-channeling of their output into domestic industrial production, and for a repatterning of world trade away from raw material export by the developing countries and manufactured exports by the developed countries. The objective of the developing countries is a world trade pattern in which they produce, consume, and export their own manufactures, thus building their own internal wealth, raising the level of their internal consumption, and putting an end to the situation of chronic international price disadvantage that has characterized the economy of raw material export.

The world is confronted with the dreadful prospect of a widening gap of per capita income and productivity between the rich and poor nations. At present, the low income areas of the world contain about 70 per cent of the world's population but less than 15 per cent of the world's total output of goods and services. The population of these areas is expected to grow more rapidly than production, resulting in further expansion of

grim Malthusian spectre of malnutrition, poverty and disease.³¹

The United Nations system was developed at a time in history when information on the problems of economic and social development was relatively scarce and the coordinate nature of the strategy of development was not widely recognized. The result has been that some of the institutions in the United Nations system have developed an exceedingly specialized orientation. They tend to base their entire approach to the question of development on the assumption that the problems pertaining to their own special field of competence can be isolated and dealt with separately from the general issue of promoting overall social and economic progress. Contemporary research indicates that it is extremely naive to assume that the problems of agriculture and food production can be isolated from the general problem of economic development in the developing areas of the world. Indeed, the problem of agriculture is actually the basis of the problem of economic development per se in most of the developing countries. Furthermore, the problems of education, science technology and industry in the developing areas cannot be isolated and considered separately from the general problem of economic and social development. The difficulties inherent in all aspects of economic and social development are so interrelated and interwoven that they constitute an integrated whole. Thus, the strategy by which to overcome these problems and promote effective development must also, of necessity, be a unified and coordinate one.³²

A large number of the developing nonaligned countries do not have

31. For more on this aspect see:
Barbara Ward and René Duros, Only one Earth. (New York: Norton, 1972)

32. A. Segal, "The Integration of Developing Countries", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. V, March 1967, pp. 252-282, passim

at their disposal sufficient qualified manpower to follow complex UNCTAD matters, their political and specialist level is low, and their presence often is now felt at international meetings. Furthermore, there is a high "turnover" of personnel in many delegations, which is a great disadvantage in an organization where issues are extremely complex and require continuity of attention. The unfamiliarity of some delegates with the issues on hand, coupled with the lack of precise instructions from the home ministries often leads to improvisation and excessive attention being paid to marginal issues.

The future of UNCTAD will, to a great extent, depend on:

- (1) when the policy organs of the organization become aware of the various problems, difficulties and deficiencies confronting them;
- (2) what corrective measures are devised to resolve these inadequacies;
- (3) when these proposed solutions are actually implemented;
- (4) how and by who this implementation is undertaken;
- (5) the effectiveness of the corrective measures in adequately resolving the difficulties confronting UNCTAD.

Some of the attitudes of the developing countries, particularly those related to the real or fancied vestiges of colonialism, will continue to trouble the West in the future. The relatively low level of economic development of most of the developing countries, and the continued dependence of these nations on the developed nations for capital and technical assistance, will tend to prolong feelings of inferiority and to breed suspicion that the advanced and developed nations are using their superior position to dominate the poorer nations.

Indeed, internal crises have only escalated into international crises when there has been intervention from outside, in the form of communist and imperialist actions, and organized guerrilla terrorism.

All these problems are interwoven with the global crisis of the population explosion, which is itself linked with modern technology. Without

modern medicine and drugs, millions would not be alive. The rising population in the developing countries is something which arouses dutiful cries of alarm at regular intervals, but without actually getting something done about it. About a century ago, the earth's population was approximately 1,000 million, having taken about 200,000 years or so to reach this level. In the following 50 years, the population doubled, and will have doubled again by 1975. By the end of this century - barring global disasters - today's children will be sharing the globe with 6,000 million or 7,000 million others. They will see, before they die, a world population of about 12,000 million. By then, the population crisis will be truly global. Predicting from current trends, the real horrors of urban life will be centred in the developing regions, where there is an urban explosion with none of the capital and technology which barely allow the cities of advanced countries to cope. The current situation in Calcutta, India is indicative of the shape of things to come.³³

X. CONCLUSION

One way of progress toward the kind of international community that the nonaligned nations and many others desire may be found in the United Nations addressing itself to novel and timely concerns that have arisen in both the most developed and developing countries, the solution of which cannot depend merely on arms control and generally accepted political power balances. Anxieties over the population explosion are growing again, although they vary in intensity and are approached in different countries, by different groups of experts in widely differing ways.

33. George F. Kennan, "To Prevent a World Wasteland", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48 (April 1970), pp.401-413, *passim*.

UNCTAD could not have accomplished much had the nonaligned nations not switched their emphasis from political matters to economic development. The nonaligned nations as a group pressured the United Nations for the creation of UNCTAD. Many nonaligned nations realize that independence is meaningless if there is no economic growth and development. The priority task of a poor country is the attempt to feed its people. Slogans do not fill and nourish the people. The poor country cannot cease being poor unless there is a joint effort by the poor and rich countries to make sufficient food available to meet the needs of the poor country. Nonalignment then is a tool used by the weak and developing nations to assist them in the task of nation-building and at the same time to provide a certain degree of security for themselves by remaining aloof from the Cold War.

PART THREE
ANALYSIS

CHAPTER FOURANALYSIS

No fully adequate and up-to-date assessment of India's nonalignment exists, but one could not be made without careful analysis of the many apparent ambiguities and/or inconsistencies of argument and action - such as the avowals of independent uncommitted judgement and yet the examples of strong partialities at particular times, the disavowal of military force and yet its employment in Goa and in Kashmir.

The concept of nonalignment raises more questions than it answers. In specific situations, adherence to the concept tells us a great deal about what Afro-Asian spokesmen are saying; but it tells us little or nothing about what they are doing. Nonalignment has almost become an incantation, which repeated sufficiently, gives nonaligned officials sufficient insight into dealing with the West, the Communist nations, or with the Republic of South Africa.

It is idle to talk, if talk is all. The proposals of the nonaligned leaders bear no convincing relation to the problems they discuss, describe and face. Consider, for instance, their advocacy of the use of force for overthrowing the so-called minority regimes in Southern Africa. They grossly underestimate the military might of these "minority regimes"; furthermore they grossly underestimate Western revulsion against such so-called wars of national liberation against White-ruled nations.

The diplomatic goals of the nonaligned nations are expressed in resounding declarations of idealistic principles, typified by such documents as the Panchshila, the Addis Ababa Charter, the Lusaka Manifesto and the United Nations Charter; which also expressed goals towards which, it was believed, the international community was moving. The current demand for

an arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa is one of the glaring examples of foreign policy being shaped in response to emotional-moralistic pressures, without any regard for the long-range politico-strategic interests of the African continent. For the West, an embargo of arms against South Africa is antithetical to the balance of power principle because, the Cape sea route is vital to Western strategy and defence. Western interests cannot be defended by an unarmed South Africa, nor can it be defended by a nonaligned Africa. This view is shared by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

Raymond Aron, Hans J. Morgenthau and many others note that in comparison to the Nineteenth Century, irrational and unpredictable factors have come to the forefront in international relations, whereas the concept Rule of Law has lost ground and occupies the back-seat. The emergence of Communist China as a major power undoubtedly poses an unpredictable, and thereby a dangerous problem in present international relations. A resurgent and powerful Communist China, even in the United Nations, provides a new dimension to the problem of peace and security in the world.¹

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., emphasises that there are certain obvious limitations in identifying the basic nonaligned motivations and goals. Firstly, it is easier to do so in respect of a country whose objectives are clearly related to its actual capacity than in respect of one whose so-called power is still in the process of development. Nonaligned objectives and goals are likely to vary over the years in accordance with the development of their diverse capacities.

Secondly, both as African and or Asian nationalists the nonaligned leaders' view of the world largely reflect an Asian-centric bias.

1. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday, 1966)

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966)

Thirdly, there is usually a gap between the highly polemical non-aligned declarations and their policies in action.

Fourthly, the external international environment is not likely to remain static. The problem is therefore one of identifying basic nonaligned objectives in the changing context of a changing frame of reference. It is possible, thus, to identify them only by relating historical precedents with contemporary trends and accents in the nonaligned foreign policy.²

A possible explanation of nonaligned foreign policy responses rests on the assumption that the nonaligned nations do not regard the struggle between the East and the West as being of primary importance to their future. Their responses to the problems of international concern are quite often determined by their divisions of the world into pro-colonial and anti-colonial blocs.

Their emergence from dependence to independence, meant an increase in the number of states belonging to the anti-colonial group in the United Nations. Since then these nations as a group were able to control the voting on all colonial issues. But of primary importance was the creation of a state of mind in the United Nations which considered that colonialism - in all its forms and manifestations - would be no longer accepted and tolerated.

Their consistent espousal of anti-colonialist doctrines at the United Nations and in other world forums and their verbose statements about non-alignment, are central to the rhetoric of most of the nonaligned states. However, in their often desperate efforts to win support, they have made claims that are simply unrealistic.

2. Cecil V. Crabb (Jr.), Nations in a Multipolar World. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp.413-450

Furthermore, since each of the nonaligned nations has a vote in the United Nations General Assembly they have an international forum in which, particularly in recent times, they exert a voting strength far out of proportion to their power in international affairs. They are encouraged, if not compelled, to positions on a wide range of problems and issues, and to pursue an active international policy. Since the General Assembly is dominated by their votes, the representatives of the nonaligned states view it as an instrument to defend the small and weak nations against the large and powerful nations. Conscious of their weakness in physical power, they have resisted attempts to dilute the effectiveness of the United Nations; since it remains the best forum for the exercise of moral pressure by them upon the Great Powers.

For example, with the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, the developing countries had an international organization with a permanent secretariat embracing, indeed in some ways defining, a common Third World view on reforms needed at the systemic level. Since its creation UNCTAD has become an important intervener on behalf of the developing countries in their relations with the advanced industrial states.

For example, two historic resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The first resolution was adopted at the twenty fifth (XXV) session on 16th December 1971, and the second at the twenty sixth session (XXVI) on 15th December 1972. Both were adopted by an overwhelming majority without any opposition, although the two super powers and some other nations had abstained from voting. The groundwork for these resolutions had been laid down at the Lusaka Conference of Nonaligned Countries in 1970 and the Singapore Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1971. The principle was reaffirmed at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Nonaligned

Countries held at Georgetown Guyana in August 1972 and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference held at Blantyre in October 1972.

The first resolution was actuated by the need to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a nuclear free zone and zone of peace from which the Cold War rivalries were excluded. It was thought desirable to ensure peace in the area by nonaligned means rather than by military alliances. The General Assembly declared the Indian Ocean a zone of peace for all times.

The second resolution after recalling the first resolution noted that the consultations envisaged therein did not take place and agreed that further steps should be taken towards the implementation of the first resolution. It therefore appointed an ad hoc Committee to study the implications of the resolution and to report on it. The later deliberations of the Committee were mostly exploratory.

Although the United States and the United Kingdom did not oppose the resolutions by the General Assembly declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the United States has begun to build and enlarge a naval base on the island of Diego Garcia in agreement with the United Kingdom to whom the island belongs. Since the resolutions of the General Assembly are not mandatory like the decisions of the Security Council, the United States has chosen to pursue its national interests and ignore the two resolutions on the Indian Ocean.

The United States realizes that while thermonuclear power is awesome and represents virtually unlimited potential destructiveness, it has proven to be a limited diplomatic instrument. Its uniqueness lies in that it is both an all powerful weapon and also a very inadequate weapon.

The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States can mutually destroy one another - regardless of who strikes first - narrows the range of Soviet aggression which American nuclear forces can effectively

deter. Despite American nuclear monopoly in the early postwar period, the United States was unable to deter the Soviet Union's pressures against Berlin, or Soviet support of aggression in Korea. Current American nuclear superiority does not deter all forms of Soviet support of Communist insurgency in South East Asia and prevent defeat in Indochina.

The lesson of Indochina is that the United States and her allies require substantial non-nuclear forces to cope with levels of aggression that massive strategic forces do not in fact deter. This has been a difficult lesson for both the United States and the West to accept, since there is a strong psychological tendency to regard superior nuclear forces as a simple and final solution to security, and an assurance of victory under any set of circumstances. Indeed, American nuclear strategic forces do play a vital and absolutely necessary role in Western security, but it is an intrinsically limited role.

Thus, the United States and her allies must maintain substantial conventional forces, fully capable of dealing with a wide spectrum of lesser forms of political and military aggression - a level of aggression against which the use of strategic nuclear forces would not be to American advantage, and thus a level of aggression which these strategic nuclear forces alone cannot effectively deter.

For Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch, Jr., the emergence of an Asian-African alignment within the United Nations, which, when united, musters formidable strength, is an event of exceptional significance. The alignment has already demonstrated its ability to influence the course of events; it is conceivable that under favorable conditions the bloc might press the General Assembly still further in the direction of becoming a quasi-legislative body. The implications of this are already troubling the Foreign Ministries of the West - and possibly the East. The bloc stands as a challenge to the Great Powers, whose position has been under-

mined. A case in point is the considerably altered position of the United States, which in conjunction with the friendly Latin American votes, once controlled one-third of the General Assembly's vote. Under the Charter this meant a virtual American veto in the General Assembly. At present, this vote represents only one-fourth of the Assembly's membership. On the other hand, the Asian-African alignment with a few friendly votes, often available and preferred - has acquired the position formerly held by the United States.

The problems posed by the existence of this novel regional voting bloc has great significance in determining the future of the United Nations.

The coalition of Asian and African states is a phenomenon of the last decade, but a sense of common interest and even identity had long been shared by many colonial peoples. The evolution from the recognition by isolated national movements of the need for mutual support (if only moral) to an alignment for political action is in large measure the history of the international relations of Asia and Africa since the First World War.³

Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch Jr., observe that events in Pakistan, Burma, Iraq, Thailand, Sudan, and to some extent, Indonesia, suggest that for the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, democracy may be a luxury they cannot afford, a contradiction in terms, an illusion. Each has attempted to make its way within the framework of parliamentary democracy, only to abandon the experiment in favor of a less but more efficient military dictatorship or some other form of authoritarian regime.

3. Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch (Jr.), "Asian-African Coalition and International Organization: Third Force or Collective Impotence?", The Review of Politics, April 1959, pp. 410-419

A fear has been gaining ground in Asia that the party system of the western constitutional democracies, while excellent in some environments, cannot provide the controls necessary for a progressive national life. This concern has been reinforced in many countries by the spectacle of parliamentary instability, and irresponsibility against a background of severe social and economic disorder. And, in the process, socialism in its various forms, within the framework of a more controlled political environment, is becoming the universally acknowledged "means" rather than a free economy subject only to the moderate controls of democratic society. Throughout much of Asia and Africa, it would be difficult to find an intellectual who did not consider himself a socialist or a party which did not espouse socialist economic doctrine regardless of its place on the political spectrum.

Apart from what socialist doctrine offers in an economic sense, it has a very definite appeal in that it represents a break with the so-called capitalist exploitation of the past. Thus, Asian and African nationalism has come to have an economic appendage.

Indeed these factors tend to establish a sense of identity among those countries in which they are present. To nearly all of the countries in the Asian-African community they have been a stimulus to unity that has compensated considerably for the many political and cultural elements of discord. In some, those common factors have encouraged the policy of nonalignment, a policy which has been supported by still other influences: the desire to trade and develop economic relations with all possible partners; exhaustion from past conflicts and the fear of war; an opportunism which seeks advantages normally unattainable - all of these receive further support from the acts, both of omission and commission, of the former colonial powers, and close proximity to a strong and overtly close friendly Soviet Union and Communist China. These two states present themselves sympathetically as societies, which also have

undergone revolutions in an effort to emerge from social stagnation and to catch up with the modern world.⁴

John Spanier observes that, the nonaligned nation, like the many developing nations, is undergoing a process of social, economic, and political development. In this process the nonaligned nations face fundamental intra-societal strains: political, economical, social and psychological as well as extra-societal pressures from other international systems; namely the United States and the West, the Soviet Union and the East; and Communist China. In their quest for technological development and progress the nonaligned nation's decision-makers rely heavily on the United States and the Soviet Union for the necessary aid to achieve their objectives. In the meantime technological and financial aid becomes a major factor in the power struggle not only between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also between the latter and Communist China.

The pattern of development is complex and the effect upon it of foreign aid is still undetermined, but it is clear that the relationship usually assumed to exist between aid and growth is too simple. In general, foreign aid has neither accelerated growth nor helped to foster democratic political regimes. If anything, aid may have retarded development by leading to lower domestic savings by distorting the composition of investment and thereby raising the capital output ratio, by frustrating the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class, and by inhibiting institutional reforms. Precisely how widespread and strong are these negative influences still remains to be determined, but the limited evidence available suggests that aid programmes, as currently administered,

4. Triska and Koch, *Ibid.*, pp.428-429.

and in so far as they are concerned with the economic development of a country, frequently are counter-productive.⁵

It is in the interest of the world community that the developing non-aligned nations raise their living standards as rapidly as possible. If the increases are fairly substantial, they will increase the likelihood that development will be peaceful, they will advance the time when these countries might be substantial trading partners, and they might even work to enlarge immediate investment opportunities there.

George Liska contends that, after the Second World War the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant and competing poles of power in international politics. Each side constructed a series of alliances seeking to define its area of major security interest. The United States entered into agreements which did not irrevocably bind it to fight for its allies, but which indicated that American decision-makers, nevertheless, viewed it as a distinct possibility. In 1947, on the basis of an historical tradition of involvement in Latin America for over a century, the United States signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), undertaking to "assist in meeting an attack" against one of the other American states. In 1949, it participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato). In 1951, the United States was a party to the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS); the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEATO) in 1954; and bilateral agreements with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey in 1959, which brought it into relationship with the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

During this period, the Soviet Union acted similarly. In 1950 it concluded a treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with

5. John Spanier, *Ibid.*, pp.364-411, *passim*.

Communist China, and in 1955, it joined with other seven Eastern European states in establishing the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The nations of the Third World also established international organizations with alliance aspects. While security activities tend to be only one facet of these multi-purpose institutions and while the nations which composed them could not begin to match the sophistication in weapons and technology of either of the superpowers, such groups remained significant as expressions of solidarity. They included the League of Arab States, which incorporated security tasks through the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty of 1950, and the Organization of African Unity, established in 1963.

In the 1950's several nations of South East Asia declined joining alliances with the West and adopted a nonaligned posture. This was to demonstrate to Communist China that it was not being encircled by hostile pro-Western powers. As the strength and influence of Communist China grew in international relations, many nations in South East Asia adopted pro-Chinese attitudes. The small and weak nations believed that through a policy of friendly relations and acquiescence to Communist China they could avoid internal subversion or external attack, and a situation in which they might become a battlefield for the great powers.

Over the years many of these bodies began to show signs of deterioration. Military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Communist China began to decline during the late 1950's and during the 1960's the bitter polemics were punctuated by periodic border clashes between the two communist countries. The Albanian government, by 1961, had ceased to fully participate in the Warsaw Pact. During 1959, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which was subsequently redesignated as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In 1965, France began a military "withdrawal" from the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and in 1966 did the

same from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1967 Pakistan began a progressive disengagement from the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Indeed, this disintegration of unity within the great alliances which emerged after the Second World War is another spectacular development in recent international relations.

However, the post-war alliances may endure in some form for some years, but it seems unlikely that political relations within them can ever again take the form that they had during the 1950's. Indeed, the discordant personalities and political styles among American, French, Soviet and Chinese leaders have contributed to the disintegration of alliance unity.

Frederick L. Schuman maintains that

'.... in a State System of competing Powers, the primary objective of foreign policy in peace and in war is neither war nor peace but something common to both: the enhancement of the power of your State to resist the will of others and impose your will upon them and the diminution of the power of others to resist your will and impose their will upon you. In "war" this goal is pursued by overt violence, and in "peace" by bargaining supported by threats of force. Arms and allies are the tools of power. The task of diplomacy is to keep the powder dry and to win friends and influence people.'⁶

The foreign policy of each state is based on factors which are more or less stable. They have to be taken into account if foreign policy is to be successful and realistic. The current political trend is characterized by the conflict between Western civilization and the Communist pseudo-religion, as embodied in two super powers with their allies and satellite, a conflict which has the nature of a civil war because its front lines goes through all nations.⁷

6. Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: The Western State System in Mid-Century. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1953) Fifth Edition, p.253

7. Cecil Y. Crabb, (Jr.), Nations in a Multipolar World. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp.413-450, passim.

7. Cecil Y. Crabb, (Jr.), Nations in a Multipolar World. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp.413-450, passim.

We can pose the question: In what sense, if at all, are nonaligned states "neutral"?⁸

Traditionally, there has been much confusion over the differences among such concepts as neutrality and nonalignment. In one sense both signify the same type of foreign policy orientation, where a state will not commit its military capabilities, and sometimes its diplomatic support to the purposes of another state. Non-willingness to commit military capabilities to the purposes of others is the hall-mark of nonalignment as a foreign policy strategy, but there are some variations in the circumstances by which a state adopts a nonaligned policy; it is here that neutrality and nonalignment have distinct meanings.

Richard Ogley observes that as a legal institution neutrality is a product of the classical period of the community of states (1648-1914) in which the balance of power, in different forms, was the organizational principle. In the League of Nations, the first attempt to base international relations on collective security instead of balance of power was made, yet it broke down in the 1930's. After the Second World War, however, this endeavour was renewed in the United Nations Organization.

The new system of collective security which forbade the use of force in international relations and made any disturbance of international peace and security a breach of the United Nations Charter to be met eventually by the collective force of all peace-loving states, has, in pure theory, no place for neutrality; whether casual or permanent. Its effectiveness depends on the active participation of all member states.

The League of Nations had made an exception of Switzerland in permitting this neutral state to become a member while maintaining its perma-

8. J.G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1959), pp.433-467, *passim*.

nantly neutral status. However, in the Charter, the status of permanent neutrality is incompatible with the principles declared in Chapter 2 paragraphs 5 and 6, in that, no state can avail itself of the status of permanent neutrality to be freed from the obligations of the Charter.⁹

Cyril E. Black and his associates note that Austria's position is different. Although it is not aligned to any military alliance, it is committed to the principles of Western democracy and is part of the cultural pattern of the Western world. But if it is to guard its independence among the political and military blocs, it must determine alone its attitude toward each issue.¹⁰

It is impossible for a nonaligned state to be objectively neutral in a world of East-West competition and conflict. No nonaligned state can be compared with the neutrality of Switzerland. Swiss neutrality is a product of tradition, a favourable combination of geographic, economic, military and political factors. In the present multi-polar system, Swiss neutrality is a variable posture only when it is not threatened directly by either side. There is no doubt that the West would never threaten Swiss-neutrality, in fact it would safeguard it from violation by the Communist bloc.

J.W. Burton emphasizes that neutrality is not nonalignment and the two concepts are poles apart. Take for example the general question of the recognition of a government involved in Cold War diplomacy. The position of a neutral would be that recognition is accorded it, and only

9. Richard Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the 20th Century. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. V.

10. Cyril E. Black, and others, Neutrality and World Politics, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. XIV.

provided that this number included at least the main contestants or their allies in any power conflict which might be current. If there were two rival claimants for recognition, supported by two rival blocs, then the neutral government would refrain from the recognition of either.

The nonaligned nations, on the other hand, accord recognition wherever in their view the government is in undeniable control of the political institutions of the country concerned. They have been prepared to act, regardless of the views of any great power, and entirely on their own judgement as to the status of the new government. An example is the recognition of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's regime in exile in Peking, China.

'Most policy decisions that nonaligned governments must take impinge upon the Cold War, and many may be even more unneutral. Recognition of a new government can be accorded on the formal ground of effective control. Most other decisions of necessity reflect in some degree an assessment, an evaluation; touching upon the nature of the conflict, and the merits of the issues being debated. Policy decisions in relation to nuclear testing, disarmament fighting in Korea, disputes over Formosa, the future of Laos, the war in Indo-China; all reveal political attitudes, and even sympathies. The traditional neutral government would endeavour to remain strictly neutral in a dispute touching upon the Cold War, and if necessary even to refrain from casting a vote in the United Nations. But the nonaligned nations claim the right not to be indifferent, in respect of any issue. Far from being indifferent the nonaligned nations feel strongly about the issues at stake and in the right to express themselves to intervene with propriety in the settlement of disputes.'¹¹

There are factions within the nonaligned nations who are postulating a world that does not exist yet; and it seems that they are assuming that the Cold War was deliberately started by the West, and thus could be called off by the West at will instead of being a product of the policies nursed by the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc.

Their rejection of power politics is considerable. The Indo-China war and the Middle East Crisis has enhanced their rejection and coloured

11. J.W. Burton, "Rights and Obligations of Nonalignment", Australian Outlook, V.16(3), December 1962, pp.293-294

their outlook on foreign policy. Their opinions are based on a negative foundation - namely, a total repudiation of and dislike for the West, especially the United States.

Most of the nonaligned nations would deny that they are pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese simply because they are anti-American or anti-Western. Indeed, many of their attitudes and slogans are parallel to those of the Communist countries - such as their intense hostility, for instance, to the Republic of South Africa, Israel, Portugal, Spain and Rhodesia.

'The nonaligned nations both suffer and profit from the existence of the Cold War; but they probably profit more, at least in the short-run, than they suffer. By playing one side against the other, consciously or unconsciously, they have received economic aid from both. If there were no Cold War the nonaligned nations would be getting less outside help. They enjoy an additional advantage because of their military non-involvement in either camp; by remaining nonaligned their defence budget may be smaller than it otherwise would be. As a result, they can devote a larger portion of their national resources to economic development.

Conversely, the relative balance of power between the chief Cold War antagonists has produced a degree of military stability in the world. Both the United States and the Soviet Union tend to deter each other from attacking independent states. This so-called extended deterrence provides a measure of security for the nonaligned and neutral states, security they would otherwise have to buy through membership in an alliance, through a bigger defence establishment or through both. Thus, the nonaligned nations among others, are protected as well as endangered by the Cold War. In the long run, the Cold War may, of course erupt into a hot nuclear war, in which the whole world, including the nonaligned and the neutrals, would suffer.'¹²

In this rationale, the contingency of war with Communist China was largely ignored by India. The tendency to view military matters in terms of war and peace naturally made Nehru, India's chief policy-maker, to opt in favour of peace, with results which require no further elaboration. In retrospect, the policy of friendship with Communist China was

12. Ernest W. Lefever, in Laurence W. Martin, (ed.), Neutrality and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp.117-118.

really based on India's military weakness, the desire to avoid provoking Communist China at all costs, the failure to understand the implications of a strong Communist China having expansionist tendencies, the absence of an Indian initiative in the Himalayan region, and finally, the fallacy of a peace posture based on a so-called toothless diplomacy.¹³

J.W. Burton stresses that:

'Nonalignment, then can be construed as a peacetime status. It relates to acts and attitudes of nations involved in a power conflict short of war. While neutrality laws control the behaviour of governments and citizens, nonalignment is a matter only for governments and there are no obligations on citizens or limitations on their freedom to express themselves or to negotiate commercial and other transactions. In the event of open warfare between the main power blocs, nonaligned countries may or may not declare themselves as neutral. Those that choose neutrality will immediately be subject to the restraints, and have the rights and duties associated with neutrality. These could over-ride rights claimed under nonalignment, for at that stage even the expression of judgements made on the merits of the dispute could be interpreted by one side as prejudicial to the conduct of war, and therefore an act of war.'¹⁴

The claim of nonaligned countries to represent the so-called unbiased conscience of humanity, is somewhat tarnished by what appears to Westerners to be a greater readiness to condemn Western misdeed than those of the Soviet Union as well as by the nonaligned nations support for the use of force, as in the case of Goa. Examples like India's attitude on Kashmir, on Morocco's claim to Mauritania, indicate that on questions affecting what are considered to be their vital national interests, the non-aligned nations are no more likely to defer to international morality and opinion than do the more powerful nations who they upbraid for their immoral behaviour. Yet, despite the fact that no nation is ready to abjure the use of threat of the use of force, the very military weakness of the

13. Michael Bracher, India in World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.310

14. J.W. Burton, Ibid., pp.294-29

new nations, which leads them to adopt a moralistic attitude, also makes armed conflict among them less likely, provided the great powers restrain themselves or are restrained from becoming deeply involved in their rivalries.

John Spanier explains why the new states exercise the degree of influence they do.

'The first is precisely that these nations are new, non-Western, non-White and ex-colonial. For an older, Western white nation with a legacy of colonial control to attempt to coerce or use force against one of the new states is politically nearly impossible in an age when national self-determination is universally recognized. A second reason is that these new, highly nationalistic states can, if need be, organize along revolutionary war of defense. Before the French Revolution and the birth of nationalism, the lack of popular participation and involvement with the state meant that military conquest need not be followed by the task of pacification. Today this task is so difficult that the cost of using force for this purpose tends to be very high, if not excessive. Third - and Vietnam again demonstrates this power - Western military doctrine and forces are orthodox not geared to fighting guerilla armies. Thus, the combination of balance between the super-powers, Western inhibitions against using their superior power in such a way as to appear to be acting as bullies, and the capacity of the nonaligned to resist allows at least some of them to exercise a degree of influence disproportionate to their actual power.'¹⁵

Nonalignment serves the national interests is a claim that is often made by Afro-Asian leaders.

'If a prudent regard for the national interests is the determining consideration, it follows that the nonaligned leaders pursue a strictly neutral course only when it serves their interest, and depart from it when it does not. Under the pressure of serving the national interests, their attachment to nonalignment is pragmatic rather than doctrinaire; instrumental rather than absolute; and transitory rather than permanent.'¹⁶

The nonaligned nations insist that they be left alone to regulate their internal and regional affairs among themselves. The examples of the Congo, the Arab-Israeli War, and the Nigerian Civil War, demonstrate that the major

15. John Spanier, *Ibid.*, p.230

16. Ernest Walter Lefever, in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), *Ibid.*, pp.116-117

powers may not be willing to comply to this demand, particularly when it is put forward by countries with ambitions of their own in the areas. Moreover, the belief of the nonaligned nations in the principle of non-intervention is not an absolute. The Afro-Asian states have pressed the Western countries and especially the United States, to take action against Western allies like Portugal, who still holds colonial territories. Non-intervention is a doctrine to be applied to legitimate regimes, but not to colonial or reactionary governments.

'The contribution of the nonaligned and neutral nations to the preservation of international peace and stability is severely limited. Their efforts to mediate great power disputes are effective only when the great powers are willing to compromise their differences. If that willingness is present, an agreement can probably be reached through normal diplomatic channels, without mediation. When the great powers do agree, the nonaligned nations can often make an instrumental contribution by providing personnel or armed forces for an impartial observation team or a United Nations police force.'

Theoretically, one nonaligned state, or a group of nonaligned states could play a role as balancer, but in the present situation of nuclear bi-polarity, with the great disparity between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, this role is not feasible. Furthermore, the non-aligned nations do not possess enough unity to form a coherent and viable bloc.¹⁷

Nonalignment, with its emphasis upon peace and peaceful co-existence, may thus be construed as a sort of strength through weakness philosophy, espoused by small, militarily vulnerable nations, unable to compete with the great powers in the making and acquiring of arms. If such countries are unable to acquire arms and powerful armed forces, then their diplomatic voices eventually will become influential to the degree that armed forces themselves are rendered less decisive in the conduct of international relations.

Theodore L. Shay found that:

'The number of nonaligned nations which are committed to a pro-Soviet orientation is small, but is not for that reason to be discarded as

17. Ernest W. Lefever, in Lawrence W. Martin (ed.), *Ibid.*, p.118

negligible. These states cannot be charged with subservience to the Soviet Union, nor are they the so-called camp-followers. However, the presence of large number of Soviet military and technical advisors and equipment, does make one ponder the possible fate for that country's independence and nonalignment. The case in point is the United Arab Republic. The Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty of June 1971 requires closer study and can be regarded as a form of alliance, however unholy.

The leaders of the nonaligned countries have indicated their opposition to revolutionary or subversive activities; by a major power of either bloc. Yet, here too, there is a difference between the attitudes of the moderates and the radicals. The Communist Chinese lost support throughout the nonaligned world when their Foreign Minister declared that the African continent was ripe for revolution. The Chinese attitude was denounced with particular vehemence by the moderate leader of the Ivory Coast. Western attempts at subversion would be the objects of attack by the radicals and it was as a Western ally that the overthrow of Milton Obote and Kwame Nkrumah was seen by the more radical African spokesmen. The distinction which has been made between the Western oriented and pro-Communist leaders may be subtle and exaggerated, but it may have some basis in fact, even though both groups may claim to be neutral.¹⁸

The right not to be indifferent is exercised furthermore, in relation to the fundamental assumptions of the power conflict. The nonaligned nations do not accept any rights to employ power, to threaten the use of force, or to exercise economic pressures, as legitimate instruments of national policy arising merely out of the possession of superior powers. They are not against the use of force by an international organization or even by a nation; but they do not agree that possession of power confers any special rights. They do not seem to devalue power. They claim a status that does not rest upon the existence of a power rivalry, as do neutrals. They claim that the policy of nonalignment should be the policy of all sovereign states, including great powers, and should be the basis of an international structure. They are, therefore, not merely attacking the day-by-day policies of the great powers according to the merits of each case as they see them; but they are also denying the rights which the great powers have always assumed to be theirs, as an integral part of

18. Theodore L. Shay, *Ibid.*, pp.223-245, *passim*.

their sovereignty, and national interests.

In addition to their role as the so-called moral conscience of humanity, the nonaligned nations also view themselves as a balance or intermediary between the power blocs. Nationalist nonaligned thinking has added the theory of the Third World countries to the older bi-polar view of international politics. Like the bi-polar view, this view of international politics overlooks the pluralistic elements in the West and, especially since the simmering Sino-Soviet ideological division, in the East as well; but it serves the purpose of establishing a separate identity and special role in international affairs for the new nations. Yet, the two roles - that of independent moral conscience exercising an unbiased judgement on each case, and that of the balance wheel located precisely midway between the position of East and West - need not lead to the same conclusions. The conception of themselves, as the mean between the extremes, typical of the thinking of nonaligned nationalists, leads to an almost automatic assumption of a middle ground on East-West questions, with different results from the attempt to make an independent assessment of the moral worth of the claims of the two antagonists.

J.D.B. Miller cautions that:

'We must constantly keep in mind the very heterogeneity of the nonaligned countries. It is polite and convenient to lump together with that phrase, or as the Afro-Asian states, or the Third World, but we should beware of assuming that this involves any unity of purpose or approach, except within certain fairly narrow limits. In attacking South African racialism at the United Nations, or in condemning the economic policies of the developed countries at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the nonaligned countries can stand together and sound united. But outside the range of issues of this sort, they are heterogeneous in the extreme. They have different religions, ethnic origins, languages, and colonial backgrounds. They encompass a wide range of economic circumstances, from countries in which the worst Malthusian forebodings seem to be coming true, to those that still have ample resources of land.'¹⁹

19. J.D.B. Miller, "Political and Ideological Trends of the Underdeveloped Trends of the Underdeveloped Nations", The American Scholar, p.592, s.v.

The nonaligned nation's endorsement of support for the so-called wars of national liberation - a departure from the Charter of the United Nation's conception of permissible use of force - provides a complex example of unintended consequences flowing from an original departure in doctrine and practice from legal expectations. Among the consequences of such a departure is that it weakens the impact of nonaligned objections to the more militant posture of the Soviet Union and Communist China and to the interventionary anti-Communist policies and practices of the United States. Likewise the unilateral scale of the United States role in support of the government of South Vietnam is generating precedents - with regard to outside participation in civil wars - that seem to impair existing precedents of neutrality and limited intervention that might have been strengthened had the United States government chosen an alternative course of action.

Most nonaligned nations prefer to talk in terms of ethics in their pronouncements on international affairs. They have been alert to point out - what they believe to be - the delinquencies of other nations, and especially those of Western nations. Their spokesmen refer to racial discrimination and colonialism in Southern Africa with a display of moral indignation. Fast as they are to make the most of the moral delinquencies - or what they may choose to call moral delinquencies - their leaders do not bother about their own. Indeed in point of theory, they are quite willing to discard all moral standards in their dealings with other nations, simply on the ground that the end justifies the means. Let it not be implied here that the nonaligned nations have a monopoly on unethical conduct in international affairs. Other nations are far from guiltless.

'India under Nehru set itself up as spiritually superior, as the shining example of the virtue of practicing nonviolence in international affairs, and offered the United States frequent lectures on power politics and the immoral use of force. As the United States had attributed Europe's wars to petty jealousies and rivalries so too did India see the causes of the Cold War. Meanwhile at home (where another form

of segregation, the caste system, has been part of India's traditional culture for centuries and, though legally abolished, still has great social force.). the new nation had some second thoughts about trying its own hand at power politics, even resorting to the use of force in Kashmir and Goa.²⁰

Indeed, there is nothing particularly moral about a policy of non-alignment. Nations which decide not to commit themselves to either side in the Cold War make the decision in their own national interests. Non-alignment is not a pious refusal to take part in power politics, nor is it based on a rejection of the use of force, and modern weapons of war. Too often, nonalignment is associated by its exponents with virtue in international affairs. Nonalignment has nothing to do with morality and nations which espouse it operate on the same principles of national self-interests as any nation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

J.W. Burton maintains that:

'Nonalignment is a policy which can be followed to its logical conclusion only by a deliberate attempt to be professional about international relations; and the technical aspects of those relations. It is in this respect that the nonaligned nations have failed. It is said, that at the Geneva discussions on disarmament in 1962, only two of the seven nonaligned and neutral nations appeared to have had specialized technical advisors. Surprisingly, they were discussing and making suggestions on some of the most highly technical questions.'²¹

However, the nonaligned nations have supported efforts for the elimination or reduction of nuclear weapons with humanitarian arguments: showing little concern for the merits of alternative proposals for dealing with the problem.

Hans J. Morgenthau and John Spanier point out that one of the most pronounced characteristic of the conduct of nonaligned foreign policy is its amateurishness. This is fostered by the lack of influence of the professional staffs - if any - of the Foreign Ministry - if any - and the departmental obstructionism of the Cabinet or the ruling clique. Nonaligned

20. John Spanier, *Ibid.*, p.393

21. J.W. Burton, *Ibid.*, p.296

diplomacy tends to be one of reaction. Often the search for an answer is one of a floundering nature.

Foreign policy is primarily a policy of "public relations" designed not as in the advanced countries, to sustain the security of the state or enhance its power among other states, but to improve the reputation of the nation, to make others heed its voice, to make them pay attention to it and to respect it. The "world", the "imperialist world", remains very much on the minds of the intellectuals of the new states. It remains the audience and the jury of the accomplishments of the nation which the intellectuals have done so much to create.

Prudent decision-making requires knowledge of the subject-matter to be handled. Such knowledge is more often difficult to obtain in political affairs. This is true, in particular, of international politics. The major powers have therefore developed large institutions for the collection and evaluation of information in the field of international affairs. The nonaligned nations must for obvious reasons try to get along with much more restricted means.

However, it is of particular importance for a small nonaligned nation to keep informed about the views and intentions of the interested great powers, with respect to itself and its region, and this is an almost impossible task. It can rarely obtain much current information beyond what appears in the press and what is stated by the representatives of the relevant great powers. Study of the available political literature and source material is, in this case, of particular importance.

The global character of international affairs creates needs to obtain information from almost every part of the world, but for the smaller non-aligned nations which have necessarily limited resources for diplomatic and intelligence activity it may be prudent to concentrate them primarily in those regions and states which are most relevant. Otherwise they may

lose unduly in efficiency.²²

Michael Brecher a student of Indian affairs, notes for example, that the conduct of Indian foreign policy was saved by the dominance of such forceful a personality as Nehru. Through private correspondence and personal contact, he could conduct a fairly effective foreign policy over the built-in inertia of the collective responsibility of the Indian Cabinet, which at many times was opposed to some of his private actions. Another factor of salvation was the length of time he remained in office. The foreign minister's office was one office that was not rotated among the Indian Cabinet.²³

For the developing nonaligned nation, a systematic approach to foreign policy formulation - with effective planning of strategy - is just as essential as for the advanced nations and the Great Powers. The basic question is not whether a nation can survive without sophisticated, corporate, long-range policy planning, but whether it can survive without clear knowledge of its purpose and its strategies. Political strategy serves the purpose of providing guidelines for developing new and wider international contacts and of determining the individual major factors necessary for the nation's achievement of its objectives.

Robert C. Good stresses that:

'It is very important, for the developing nonaligned nation to start thinking in terms of relatively simple national planning and building, in a number of key elements such as, a clear knowledge of the international environment, a clear statement of its objectives; the criteria by which future courses of action can be assessed. It must also tidy up the operations planning of the national economy, covering economic development, the provision of new markets, supply of foreign investment capital, and the productive utilization of manpower. Trade and industry must form part of the national affairs is commercial first, then political. Politics should not be an obsession and

22. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Ibid.*
John Spanier, *Ibid.*, Chapter 12, p.364-411

23. Michael Brecher, *Ibid.*

supercede the national interests.²⁴

Today, the nonaligned country is politically weaker because its central administration is in disarray. Centrifugal tendencies toward regionalism, which have repeatedly fragmented many a developing country, are at work and might produce tragic results. The country is also weaker than the smaller developed countries, in sophisticated weaponry and an industrial base for the production of modern weaponry.

Paradoxically, the nonaligned country's relatively backward economy, taken with its dispersed population, means that it is not as vulnerable militarily as advanced industrial societies. In terms of defence, then, the smaller nonaligned country is not a formidable force to be reckoned with. Thus, it has no offensive potential against neighbouring countries, and is not capable of doing significant damage. However, the international weaknesses of the state does provide a standing invitation for foreign powers to intervene.

Seymour Martin Lipset notes with reference to leadership in the non-aligned world, it is characteristic of the radical nonaligned leaders that in them the quest for popularity and power is great. In their discussions, the radicals are not exploring the great questions that are troubling the developing nonaligned world. They are not concerned with whether there is peace, freedom from hunger and want, economic development and social change, and progress. They do not care enough about their societies to burn the midnight oil over them. They are too indolent intellectually to do the tough work of exploring and solving the problems to which they pretend a concern. Theirs is the egoism, the personal chauvinism of the nationalist self. Theirs is the mindless, obsessive

24. Robert C. Good, "State-building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States", in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), Neutrality and Nonalignment. (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p. 11

quest for power.²⁵

Suffice it to say, that in recent years, their speeches at nonaligned gatherings and other international forums have reached new heights of absurdity. The use of such terms as genocide, racist, imperialist and others, is disturbing, for it betrays a lack of historical perspective, a provincialism and narrow-mindedness so monumental as to make rational discourse and even dialogue, impossible. It may be rooted partly in the post-colonial Afro-Asian hypochondria - the state of mind in which any economic, physical, or social affliction, real or imagined, turns into a fatal illness.²⁶

Perhaps, it has to do with the post-colonial Afro-Asian naivete and the surfeit of idealism - engaging qualities in themselves, but potentially dangerous. They reflect a predisposition to be taken in by demagogues like the late Kwame Nkrumah, the late Nasser, the late Sukarno, the late Nehru, and the very much alive Tito, and their slogans. How else can one explain the much publicised enthusiastic support given by so many well-meaning nations, like the Netherlands, Sweden and even the World Council of Churches, to causes and movements which, below a thin veneer of progressive, anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, anti-racist verbiage, are unmistakably proto-fascist or even proto-communist in character and which, if given success and power, would establish a reign of terror and oppression such as Africa and the world, has never known.

The world has known of many demagogues who have demanded freedom and power to the people, or have promised freedom, equality and power to the people, and have promised freedom, equality and justice to everyone.

25. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man. (London: Mercury Books, 1963), p.416

26. *Ibid.*, p.416

But, no leader wants to hear about history and the experience of the past of other countries, few leaders are not prone to blindness and confusion. The object lessons of the past are meaningless. It is this unflinching acceptance of slogans which is perhaps so frightening about the current trend in Afro-Asian politics; and even international politics.

Samuel P. Huntington, in a study of emerging nations notes that in the past century, through the instrumentalities of nationalism, numerous countries acquired politicization. Excluding the Soviet, Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban nationalist movements, nearly all of the nationalist movements in the post Second World War period, have been expropriated by the bourgeoisie elites. The reasons for this are that the bourgeoisie is more deft at perceiving the dynamics of power - its dialectical turns and twists - and at steering events and situations, symbolically and empirically, in directions favourable to, or at least not destructive of, bourgeois concerns. A case in point is the confrontation between President Kaunda and the radical Simon Kapapwa in which the latter lost.

This bourgeoisie has fostered a world of make-believe. It is precisely this neglect of reality which forces us to relegate to the category of propaganda all the wasteful claims of successful leadership. Most of the speeches are variations on the theme of speech - making as an exercise in nationalist fantasy, executed with all the usual revolutionary rhetoric and an occasional ranting. However, there are exceptions.

It seems that one function of the nonaligned nations' leaders' use of polemical excess is to facilitate ties with radicals in their countries and with the Communist world. The use of such excess is rooted in the articulating styles of the nationalist movements' political sub-culture, one of which is a tutored proclivity to give the impression of being that which you necessarily really are not, hoping thereby to derive a certain

quick and short-run advantage and leeway.

Furthermore, verbal excesses, along with other stylistic excesses, are basic to the nonaligned leadership style; one is, indeed, perceived by one's followers as deficient unless one indulges in these excesses. Without the daily evidence of anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist violent rhetoric and symbolism, which is amply and grotesquely provided by their controlled news media, the leadership would be without a major vicarious outlet for their revolutionary fantasies.

The leaders, reared and schooled in the internationalist movement's political sub-culture where pretense is in fact the main mode of providing the people with vicarious or spurious satisfactions, would be poor examples of leadership they failed to exploit this situation. The payoff provided by the raving proletariat and some radicals is simply enormous.²⁷

The leaders' polemical excesses perform an unintended and personal function for the leaders. The polemical excesses enable the leaders to exercise certain inner tensions, stresses and strains - indeed certain demonic feelings - which stem from the "unique" frustrations these persons experience in an international society which, through the Western imperialist instrumentalities, somehow restricts the development and modernization of their nations.

The arrogance of the leaders' views are matched by what I believe to be a serious and deliberate breach of objectivity with regard to the Communist world. Of its failure, deceipts, and belligerence, they have little to say. They dismiss as feeble and insufficient the West's assistance and efforts to reconstruct the economic and social fabric of their

27. Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics, Vol. XVII, 1965, pp. 396-430, passim.

nations. They applaud the Communist assistance in the form of expensive military hardware. Nowhere in their speeches do we find mention of the bloody Communist role in the post-war world, other than as promoters of freedom and self-determination - this in the face of Communist subversion in South East Asia, their incursions into India, their invasion of Czechoslovakia, their clandestine support of left-wing governments in Africa, and their massive and blatant intervention in Vietnam.

'Policies always take the form of rules of comparison. The common practice of stating "policies" in the form of simple injunctions to "seek peace" or "preserve the country's natural frontiers" is most unacceptable. First, it tends to ignore the costs of trade-offs related to each of the actor's choices in a situation. More importantly, it is very likely that even a small number of such injunctions (two or three) could be maintained for any period of time in the natural environment if they generated meaningful implications for specific situations. Thus the use of the injunctive form tends to re-inforce the tendency to use vague, general, slogans which are untestable and beyond criticism, hence cannot be improved or refined. The foreign policy of a national government, or any other agent, taken in the aggregate sense, will be a collection of particular policies, solutions to specific problem situations, not a set of formal derivatives from some set of general axioms or principles created a priori by policy-makers. The situation is prior to the principle. Internal consistency is essential, of course, but there will be overlapping and gaps in the structure cannot be avoided. Further, man's capacity to create new concepts, new standards, new ways of looking at the environment, must be respected if we are to avoid ossification.'²⁸

John Spanier emphasizes that the most important political aspect of the nonaligned state is the urge toward nationalism. This has both practical and ideological implications. It is the nationalism encouraged by the state machine to sustain itself. In most cases it develops out of that anti-colonial nationalism that flourished before the transfer of power, but it is different in a variety of ways, because its emphasis is on construction and legitimacy, not on destruction and defiance. It places great emphasis on national unity, and on state symbols, such as the

28. Eugene A. Pappas, *The Non-Aligned Movement: A Study in International Relations*, p. 10.

flag, the anthem, the armed forces, the head of state, and the national boundaries, even when these are the product of the most arbitrary and opportunistic actions of nineteenth century imperialism. It cultivates suspicion of the foreigners, and blames them for whatever goes wrong; if they are local residents like the unfortunate Chinese in Indonesia, or the less fortunate Indians in Burma and East Africa, they may be subjected to persecution in the name of the new nation. It is opposed to colonialism in its public statements, and gives primacy to the anti-colonial causes in its foreign policy; but it is amenable to suggestions from businessmen, and is anxious to secure arms from whoever will make them available promptly and most cheaply. It stresses economic growth, which is often linked to protectionism. It shows reluctance to enter large groupings of states, unless it will be able to dominate the group, or the organization is so weak as to make anyone else's domination impossible. Plus or minus an element or two, this form of nationalism is common to all emerging states, and is also to be found in the older ones like Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iraq; which are in similar economic and social circumstances. This sort of nationalism is supposed to be strong and self-supporting. A change is unlikely in the foreseeable future.²⁹

²⁹Since nonalignment is not rooted in an absolute principle, but rather in an outgrowth of circumstances, we may expect constant adaptation in the foreign policies of nonaligned states in response to changing conditions. Nonaligned leaders, like political leaders of other states, are responsive to the changing interpretation of the sources and nature of primary and secondary threats to the safety and security of their nation. Nonalignment as a position or a policy will be discarded when it no longer serves the national purpose.³⁰

The hidden crisis in the politics of nonaligned nations is their inability to reconcile the crisis in international relations, international trade,

29. John Spanier, *Ibid.*, pp.364-411, *passim*.

30. Ernest Walter Lefever, in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), *Ibid.*, pp.115-

and the arms race, and their national interests and priorities. The problems in the international arena will resolve themselves, but the problems of the nonaligned nations are capable of nation-rending explosions. The crises the nonaligned nations talk the most about are the degeneration of international relations and the threat of race prejudice to world peace. However, many nonaligned nations face graver problems in the inter-communal and inter-governmental relations area, than even before. Their points of view are elusive, and as they probe and meddle into other nations' affairs, they obscure and wish away their own. At international gatherings some of them adopt a belligerent stance and ask provocative questions; but none of them can supply the answers. This is part of the hidden crisis in the politics of the nonaligned nations.

Thus, it can be justifiably questioned, whether the contemporary foreign policy orientation of the nonaligned nations is part of the larger pattern of policies through which developing nations pass compulsorily in moving from one period in history to another.

CHAPTER FIVECONCLUSION

Foreign and domestic politics resemble the positive and negative components of an electric current - eliminate one and the other will not function - they produce power only when they are combined. Although issues of domestic interest may exist, rarely are there significant ones not affected by world conditions and a nation's position vis-a-vis other nations. There are good reasons why foreign and domestic politics have almost merged into one concept - technology and ideology have changed, perhaps even shifted the foundation upon which the nation-states were built.

Nonalignment is a new concept in international relations which is the direct result of the struggle between the non-Communist world and the Communist bloc, as it developed after the Second World War. It is confined mainly to the developing states of Asia and Africa. Latin America is nonaligned only in part; the Organization of American States cannot be called nonaligned, because its interests coincide with those of the Western world, a fact which was clearly demonstrated in the Cuban Crisis when the Organization clearly opposed Soviet penetration of Cuba and in virtual unanimity voted to take measures against Castro's alignment with the Soviet Union.

Although nonalignment implies a certain opportunism - because it does not preclude a nonaligned state's trading and maintaining relations with components of the opposing blocs - we can understand the nonaligned nation's desires not to jeopardize their newly won sovereignty. Also, as long as they remain nonaligned, they receive assistance from both sides, for the East and the West are eager to be in their good graces.

Foreign policy in the Sixties is characterized by the wooing of the nonaligned; the Communists do it to get them on their side; the West remains satisfied to keep them from joining the Communist camp.

A policy of nonalignment, however, is no guarantee of national security as India learned from its experience with Communist China. Indeed, India was a strong exponent of nonalignment, which became its national policy. Yet the Communist Chinese attack on the contested Sino-Indian border areas in 1962-63 compelled the Indian government to retreat to some extent, from its nonalignment by accepting Western military aid. India also received massive Soviet aid in its confrontation with aligned Pakistan and this contributed substantially to the defeat of Pakistan.

The Communists believe that the nonaligned areas hold the key to the defeat of the West. By liberating them from so-called neo-colonialism and converting them to the Socialist camp; they hope to end Western access to the Communist States; thereby isolating the West both politically and economically. In such circumstances, it can be said that nonalignment contributes to a country little more than a reprieve from actual involvement in the East-West conflict.

The nonaligned nations believe that the priorities of international relations are the population explosion, malnutrition, low agricultural output, the problems of urbanization, of adverse terms of trade, and human degradation.

Indeed, these are realities that are age-old and recurrent. The nonaligned nations believe that they have, by their numbers alone, become sufficiently influential to assume that their pleas would be heard and that some of their demands would be met.

However, the study of international relations will continue to be affected by the urgency of war, civil strife and peace problems. There

will be continual changes in the developing countries and these will change the pattern of international relations. The developing countries will swell the number, size and importance of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Since the problems of peace and war are so complicated, and have such a profound bearing on international relations, they will not be solved merely by slogans like "peaceful co-existence", "area of peace", and the numerous declarations of the African and Asian states at conferences of the nonaligned nations.

The paramount concern of the nonaligned nations is peace, especially international peace. There is no indication that this concern will not continue in the future.

The nonaligned nations attach great significance to moral-ethical values in their conduct of international relations. It seems they will continue to do so in the future in spite of the fact that the Great Powers do not care much for moral-ethical values.

The nonaligned nations' belief that nonalignment is a constructive force in the resolution of international tensions and in the maintenance of peace, will continue.

The bi-polar world of the post Second World War period has now been replaced by a multi-polar world. But, the majority of the nonaligned nations are militarily weak; and neither now nor in the future will they be in a position to threaten or challenge the Great Powers in the acquisition of military and economic strength as decisive instruments of foreign policy.

However, minor armed clashes among nonaligned nations themselves and with other nations in alliance, cannot always be ruled out. For, one of the things we have learnt from hard experience is that we cannot always expect rationality in international relations. In fact, we can forecast

irrationality as a logical instrument in some countries' promotion of their national interests.

Nation-building will continue to be a major pre-occupation of the nonaligned nations. Thus, they will attach special importance to the right of all sovereign nations to determine in full freedom, the paths of their political, economic, social and cultural development. They will also promote the right of all peoples to the benefits of economic development and the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution.

The questions of colonialism, racial discrimination, and the problems of underdevelopment in Asia, Africa and Latin America, will continue to dominate the attention of the nonaligned nations.

Nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy development is here to stay as part of the pattern of the post-war world.

APPENDIXESAPPENDIX ATHE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

The Asian-African Conference, convened by the Governments of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, met in Bandung from the 18th to 24th of April, 1955.

In addition to the sponsoring countries, the following twenty-four countries participated in the conference:

Afghanistan, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the State of Vietnam and Yemen.

The Asian-African Conference considered the position of Asia and Africa and discussed ways and means by which their peoples could achieve the fullest economic, cultural and political cooperation.

Free from distrust and fear and with confidence and goodwill toward each other, nations should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors and develop friendly cooperation on the basis of the following principles:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or

collectively in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

6. a. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. b. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.

7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

9. Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation.

10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

The Asian-African Conference declares its conviction that friendly cooperation in accordance with these principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural field would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of all.

The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five sponsoring countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference in consultation with the participating countries.¹

1. C. Romulo. The Meaning of Bandung, pp.92-102 passim.

APPENDIX BTHE BELGRADE CONFERENCEDECLARATION OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

The conference unanimously adopted on the 6th September a twenty-seven-point declaration setting forth the views of the participants on major international problems, as follows:

(1) The conference reaffirmed its support for the resolution on colonialism adopted by the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly and condemned all types of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialist domination.

(2) The conference demanded the immediate ending of all armed action and repressive measures directed against dependent peoples; freedom for all dependent peoples to exercise their right to complete independence; and respect for the integrity of their national territory. It condemned all aid given to a colonial power in such suppression as contrary to the United Nations Charter, and called for scrupulous respect for the territorial integrity of all States.

(3) The participating countries supported the Algerian people's struggle for independence and the integrity of their national territory, to which they would extend all possible aid. They were "particularly gratified that Algeria is represented at this conference by its rightful representative, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Algeria".

(4) The bloodshed and "intolerable measures of repression" in Angola should be ended immediately, and all peace-loving countries should assist the people of Angola to establish a free and independent State without delay.

(5) Where the territorial integrity of Asians, Africans and Latin American countries had been violated, all colonial occupation should be terminated immediately and all foreign forces withdrawn.

(6) The French armed forces should be evacuated immediately from the whole of Tunisian territory.

(7) The world community should do everything in its power to erase the consequences of the tragic events in the Congo, to prevent any further foreign intervention, and to respect the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Congo.

(8) The conference condemned South Africa's apartheid policy and all forms of racial discrimination as a grave violation of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

(9) The rights of ethnic or religious minorities must be respected,

and in particular such minorities must be protected against the crime of genocide.

(10) The conference condemned "the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East" and declared its support for the full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, in conformity with the Charter and United Nations resolutions.

(11) The conference condemned the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against the latter's express will, as a gross violation of their sovereignty; declared its full support for countries endeavouring to secure the vacating of such bases; and called upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously their abolition as a contribution to world peace.

(12) The conference recognized that the United States base at Guantanamo, in the permanence of which the Cuban Government had expressed its opposition, affected Cuba's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

(13) All nations had the right to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance. All peoples might "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit and international law". In no case might a people be deprived of its means of subsistence. The right of Cuba, as of any other nation, freely to choose its political and social system should be respected.

(14) "No intimidation, interference, or intervention should be brought to bear in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including their right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the attainment and preservation of their sovereignty."

(15) General, complete, and internationally-controlled disarmament was "the most urgent task of mankind".

(16) General and complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms, and institutions for military training, except for purposes of internal security, and the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear, thermo-nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons, as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the operational use of weapons of mass destruction.

(17) All States should undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. An international agency should be established to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

(18) The great powers should "sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament, in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments for the peaceful economic and social development of all mankind". The nonaligned countries should be represented at all future conferences on disarmament; all discussions on disarmament should be held under United Nations auspices; and general and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and

control, the terms of which should include representatives of nonaligned countries.

(19) An agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. Negotiations for this purpose should be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general disarmament, and the moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons should be observed by all countries.

(20) The U.N. General Assembly should adopt at its sixteenth (XVIth) session a decision on the convening of either a special Assembly session on disarmament or a world disarmament conference under U.N. auspices.

(21) Efforts should be made "to close, through accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever widening gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced countries and the many economically less developed countries". A U.N. capital development fund should be established for this purpose. The participating countries agreed to demand just terms of trade for the economically less developed countries; "constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and the restrictive measures and practices which adversely affect the trade and revenues of the newly developed countries"; and the application of the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution in all fields of economic development.

(22) All countries in the course of development should "co-operate effectively in the economic and commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the economic sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created by the economic blocs of the industrial countries". The countries concerned should convene as soon as possible an international conference to discuss their common problems and to reach agreement on the most effective measures to ensure the realization of their economic and social development.

(23) The recipient countries must be free to determine the use of economic and technical assistance which they might receive, and to draw up their own plans and assign priorities in accordance with their needs.

(24) The U.N. General Assembly should, through the revision of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in order to bring their composition and work into harmony with the needs and the extended membership of the United Nations.

(25) It was "absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the U.N. Secretariat, bearing in mind equitable regional distribution".

(26) Those countries participating in the conference which recognized Communist China recommended that "the General Assembly at its forthcoming session should accept the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of that country in the United Nations".

(27) The German problem was "not merely a regional problem but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in international relations". The conference therefore called

upon all parties concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin.

A draft resolution submitted by the Arab States condemning the creation of the State of Israel was strongly opposed by U Nu, Mrs. Bandaranaike and others, and was omitted from the declaration.²

2. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, v.18604 A-B, February 17-14, 1962

APPENDIX CECONOMIC CONFERENCE OF 1962 IN CAIROPARTICIPATING COUNTRIES

The Economic Conference of Developing Countries was held in July 8-19, 1962, in Cairo with the following countries attending:

- | | |
|----------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | 17. Lebanon |
| 2. Algeria | 18. Libya |
| 3. Bolivia | 19. Mali |
| 4. Brazil | 20. Malaya |
| 5. Burma | 21. Mexico |
| 6. Cambodia | 22. Morocco |
| 7. Ceylon | 23. Pakistan |
| 8. Congo | 24. Saudi Arabia |
| 9. Cuba | 25. Somalia |
| 10. Cyprus | 26. Sudan |
| 11. Ethiopia | 27. Tanganyika |
| 12. Ghana | 28. Tunisia |
| 13. Guinea | 29. United Arab Republic |
| 14. India | 30. Yemen |
| 15. Indonesia | 31. Yugoslavia |
| 16. Kuwait | |

OBSERVERS

Observers from the following organizations were also present at the Conference:

1. United Nations
2. Food and Agricultural Organization
3. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
4. International Monetary Fund
5. Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation
6. Arab League

APPENDIX DTHE CAIRO CONFERENCE 1964PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES

The Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, held in Cairo, from October 5-10th, 1964, was attended by forty-seven full member countries as follows:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | 25. Lebanon |
| 2. Algeria | 26. Liberia |
| 3. Angola | 27. Libya |
| 4. Burma | 28. Malawi |
| 5. Burundi | 29. Mali |
| 6. Cambodia | 30. Mauritania |
| 7. Cameroon | 31. Morocco |
| 8. Central African Republic | 32. Nepal |
| 9. Ceylon | 33. Nigeria |
| 10. Chad | 34. Saudi Arabia |
| 11. Congo (Brazzaville) | 35. Senegal |
| 12. Cuba | 36. Sierra Leone |
| 13. Cyprus | 37. Somalia |
| 14. Dahomey | 38. Sudan |
| 15. Ethiopia | 39. Syria |
| 16. Ghana | 40. Tanganyika |
| 17. Guinea | 41. Togo |
| 18. India | 42. Tunisia |
| 19. Indonesia | 43. Uganda |
| 20. Iraq | 44. United Arab Republic |
| 21. Jordan | 45. Yemen |
| 22. Kenya | 46. Yugoslavia |
| 23. Kuwait | 47. Zambia |
| 24. Laos | |

OBSERVER COUNTRIES

The Cairo Conference was attended by the following countries as observers:

- | | |
|--------------|------------------------|
| 1. Argentina | 6. Jamaica |
| 2. Bolivia | 7. Mexico |
| 3. Brazil | 8. Trinidad and Tobago |
| 4. Chile | 9. Uruguay |
| 5. Finland | 10. Venezuela |

OBSERVERS

The Conference was also attended by the Secretaries General of two regional organizations: the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League.

Moreover, Conference proceedings were followed by observers from many national liberation movements and political parties from all parts of the world, but mostly from the African countries which are still fighting for liberation and independence.

THE PROGRAMME FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

"... The Conference undertook an analysis of the international situation with a view to making an effective contribution to the solution of the major problems which are of concern to mankind in view of their effects on peace and security in the world.

To this end, and on the basis of the principles embodied in the Belgrade Declaration of September 1961, the Heads of State or Government of the above-mentioned countries proceeded, in an amicable, frank and fraternal atmosphere, to hold detailed discussion and an exchange of views on the present state of international relations and the predominant trends in the modern world. The Heads of State or Government of the participating countries note with satisfaction that nearly half of the independent countries of the world have participated in this Second non-aligned conference.

The Conference also notes with satisfaction the growing interest and confidence displayed by peoples still under foreign domination, and by those whose rights and sovereignty are being violated by imperialism and neo-colonialism, in the highly positive role which the nonaligned countries are called upon to play in the settlement of international problems or disputes.

The Conference expresses satisfaction at the favourable reaction throughout the world to this second meeting of nonaligned countries. This emphasises the rightness, efficacy and vigour of the policy of nonalignment, and its constructive role in the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security.

The principles of non-alignment, thanks to the confidence they inspire in the world, are becoming an increasingly dynamic and powerful force for the promotion of peace and the welfare of mankind.

The participating Heads of State or Government note with satisfaction that, thanks to the combined efforts of the forces of freedom, peace and progress, this second Non-aligned Conference is being held at a time when the international situation has improved as compared with that which existed between the two power blocs at the time of the historic Belgrade Conference. The Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries are well aware, however, that, despite the present improvement in international relations, and notwithstanding the conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Moscow, sources of tension still exist in many parts of the world.

This situation shows that the forces of imperialism are still powerful and that they do not hesitate to resort to the use of force to defend their interests and maintain their privileges.

This policy, if not firmly resisted by the forces of freedom and peace, is likely to jeopardise the improvement in the international situation and the lessening of tension which has occurred, and to con-

stitute a threat to world peace.

The policy of active peaceful co-existence, is an indivisible whole. It cannot be applied partially, in accordance with special interests and criteria.

Important changes have also taken place within the Eastern and Western blocs, and this new phenomenon should be taken into account in the objective assessment of the current international situation.

The Conference notes with satisfaction that the movements of national liberation are engaged, in different regions of the world, in a heroic struggle against neo-colonialism, and the practices of apartheid and racial discrimination. This struggle forms part of the common striving towards freedom, justice and peace.

The Conference reaffirms that interference by economically developed foreign States in the internal affairs of newly independent, developing countries and the existence of territories which are still dependent constitute a standing threat to peace and security.

The Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries, while appreciative of the efforts which resulted in the holding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and mindful of the results of that Conference, nevertheless note that much ground still remains to be covered to eliminate existing inequalities in the relationship between industrialized and developing countries.

The Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries, while declaring their determination to contribute towards the establishment of just and lasting peace in the world, affirm that the preservation of peace and the promotion of the well-being of peoples are a collective responsibility deriving from the natural aspirations of mankind to live in a better world.

The Heads of State or Government have arrived in their deliberations at a common understanding of the various problems with which the world is now faced, and a common approach to them. Reaffirming the basic principles of the Declaration of Belgrade, they express their agreement upon the following points:

I

CONCERTED ACTION FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE COUNTRIES STILL DEPENDENT; ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM, NEO-COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM

The Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries declare that lasting world peace cannot be realised so long as unjust conditions prevail and peoples under foreign domination continue to be deprived of their fundamental right to freedom, independence and self-determination.

Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism constitute a basic source of international tension and conflict because they endanger world peace and security. The participants in the Conference deplore that the Declaration of the United Nations on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples has not been implemented everywhere and call for the unconditional, complete and final abolition of colonialism

now.

At present a particular cause of concern is the military or other assistance extended to certain countries to enable them to perpetuate by force colonialist and neo-colonialist situations which are contrary to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

The exploitation by colonialist forces of the difficulties and problems of recently liberated or developing countries, interference in the internal affairs of these states, and colonialist attempts to maintain unequal relationships, particularly in the economic field, constitute serious dangers to these young countries. Colonialism and neo-colonialism have many forms and manifestations.

Imperialism uses many devices to impose its will on independent nations. Economic pressure and domination, interference, racial discrimination, subversion, intervention and the threat of force are neo-colonialist devices against which the newly independent nations have to defend themselves. The Conference condemns all colonialist, neo-colonialist and imperialist policies applied in various parts of the world

The newly independent countries have, like all other countries, the right of sovereign disposal in regard to their natural resources, and the right to utilize these resources as they deem appropriate in the interest of their peoples, without outside interference.

The process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible. Colonized peoples may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence if the colonial powers persist in opposing their natural aspirations.

The participants in the Conference undertake to work unremittingly to eradicate all vestiges of colonialism, and to combine all their efforts to render all necessary aid and support, whether moral, political or material, to the peoples struggling against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The participating countries recognize the nationalist movements of the peoples which are struggling to free themselves from colonial domination as being authentic representatives of the colonial peoples, and urgently call upon the colonial powers to negotiate with their leaders.

Portugal continues to hold in bondage by repression, persecution and force, in Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and the other Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia, millions of people who have been suffering far too long under the foreign yoke. The Conference declares its determination to ensure that the peoples of these territories accede immediately to independence without any conditions or reservations.

The Conference condemns the government of Portugal for its obstinate refusal to recognize the inalienable right of the peoples of those territories to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples ...

II

**RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
AND CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE EXERCISE
OF THIS RIGHT**

The Conference solemnly reaffirms the right of peoples to self-determination and to make their own destiny.

It stresses that this right constitutes one of the essential principles of the United Nations Charter, that it was laid down also in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and that the Conference of Bandung and Belgrade demanded that it should be respected, and in particular insisted that it should be effectively exercised.

The Conference notes that this right is still violated or its exercise denied in many regions of the world and results in a continued increase of tension and the extension of the areas of war.

The Conference denounces the attitude of those Powers which oppose the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.

It condemns the use of force, and all forms of intimidation, interference and intervention which are aimed at preventing the exercise of this right.

III

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE POLICY OF APARTHEID

The Heads of State or Government declare that racial discrimination - and particularly its most odious manifestation, apartheid - constitutes a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the principle of the equality of peoples. Accordingly, all governments still persisting in the practice of racial discrimination should be completely ostracized until they have abandoned their unjust and inhuman policies. In particular the governments and peoples represented at this conference have decided that they will not tolerate much longer the presence of the Republic of South Africa in the community of Nations. The inhuman racial policies of South Africa constitute a threat to international peace and security. All countries interested in peace must therefore do everything in their power to ensure that liberty and fundamental freedoms are secured to the people of South Africa.

The Heads of State or Government solemnly affirm their absolute respect for the right of ethnic or religious minorities to protect in particular against the crimes of genocide or any other violation of a fundamental human right

IV

**PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND THE CODIFICATION OF ITS PRINCIPLES
BY THE UNITED NATIONS**

Considering the principles proclaimed at Bandung in 1955, Resolution 1514 (XV) adopted by the United Nations in 1960, the Declaration of the Belgrade Conference, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and numerous joint declarations by Heads of State or Government

on peaceful co-existence;

Reaffirming their deep conviction that, in present circumstances, mankind must regard peaceful co-existence as the only way to strengthen world peace, which must be based on freedom, equality and justice between peoples within a new framework of peaceful and harmonious relations between the States and nations of the world;

Considering the fact that the principle of peaceful co-existence is based on the right of all peoples to be free and to choose their own political, economic and social systems according to their own national identity and their ideals, and is opposed to any form of foreign domination;

Convinced also that peaceful co-existence cannot be fully achieved throughout the world without the abolition of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism;

Deeply convinced that the absolute prohibition of the threat or use of force, direct or disguised, the renunciation of all forms of coercion in international relations, the abolition of relations of inequality and the promotion of international cooperation with a view to accelerating economic, social and cultural development, are necessary conditions for safeguarding peace and achieving the general advancement of mankind.

The Heads of State or Government solemnly proclaim the following fundamental principles of peaceful co-existence:

1. The right to complete independence, which is an inalienable right, must be recognized immediately and unconditionally as pertaining to all peoples, in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly; it is incumbent upon all states to respect this right and facilitate its exercise.
2. The right to self-determination, which is an inalienable right, must be recognized as pertaining to all peoples; accordingly, all nations and peoples have the right to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance.
3. Peaceful co-existence between States with differing social and political systems is both possible and necessary; it favours the creation of good-neighbourly relations between States with a view to the establishment of lasting peace and general well-being, free from domination and exploitation.
4. The sovereign equality of States must be recognized and respected. It includes the right of all peoples to the free exploitation of their natural resources.
5. States must abstain from all use of threat or force directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of other States; a situation brought about by the threat or use of force shall not be recognized, and in particular the established frontiers of States shall be inviolable. Accordingly, every State must abstain from interfering in the affairs of other States, whether openly, or insidiously, or by means of subversion

and the various forms of political, economic and military pressure.

6. Frontier disputes shall be settled by peaceful means. All States shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the human person and the equality of all nations and races.
7. All international conflicts must be settled by peaceful means, in a spirit of mutual understanding and on the basis of equality and sovereignty, in such a manner that justice and legitimate rights are not impaired; all States must apply themselves to promoting and strengthening measures designed to diminish international tension and achieve general and complete disarmament.
8. All States must co-operate with a view to accelerating economic development in the world, and particularly in the developing countries. This co-operation which must be aimed at narrowing the gap, at present widening, between the levels of living in the developing and developed countries respectively, is essential to the maintenance of a lasting peace.
9. States shall meet their international obligations in good faith in conformity with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

The Conference recommends to the General Assembly of the United Nations to adopt, on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary, a declaration on the principles of peaceful co-existence. This declaration will constitute an important step towards the codification of these principles.

V

RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY PROBLEMS OF DIVIDED NATIONS

(1) The Conference of Heads of State or Government proclaims its full adherence to the fundamental principles of international relations, in accordance with which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, great and small, are inviolable and must be respected.

(2) The countries participating in the Conference, having for the most part achieved their national independence after years of struggle, reaffirm their determination to oppose by every means in their power any attempt to compromise their sovereignty or violate their territorial integrity. They pledge themselves to respect frontiers as they existed when the States gained independence; nevertheless, parts of territories taken away by occupying powers or converted into autonomous bases for their own benefit at the time of independence must be given back to the country concerned.

(3) The Conference solemnly reaffirms the right of all peoples to adopt the form of government they consider best suited to their development.

(4) The Conference considers that one of the causes of international

tension lies in the problem of divided nations. It expresses its entire sympathy with the peoples of such countries and upholds their desire to achieve unity. It exhorts the countries concerned to seek a just and lasting solution in order to achieve the unification of their territories by peaceful methods without outside interference or pressure. It considers that the resort to threat or force can lead to no satisfactory settlement, cannot do otherwise than jeopardize international security ...

Taking into account the principles set forth above and with a view to restoring peace and stability in the Indo-China Peninsula, the Conference appeals to the Powers which participated in the Geneva Conference of 1954 and 1962:

- (1) to abstain from any action likely to aggravate the situation which is already tense in the Peninsula;
- (2) to terminate all foreign interference in the internal affairs of the countries of that region;
- (3) to convene urgently a new Geneva Conference on Indo-China with a view to seeking a satisfactory political situation solution for the peaceful settlement of the problems arising in that part of the world namely:
 - (a) ensuring the strict application of the 1962 agreements on Laos;
 - (b) recognising and guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia;
 - (c) ensuring the strict application of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, and finding a political solution to the problem in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people to freedom, peace and independence.

VI

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITHOUT THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

- (1) As the use of force may take a number of forms, military, political and economic, the participating countries deem it essential to reaffirm the principles that all States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
- (2) They consider that disputes between States should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter on the basis of sovereign equality and justice.
- (3) The participating countries are convinced of the necessity of exerting all international efforts to find solutions to all situations

which threaten international peace or impair friendly relations among nations.

- (4) The participating countries gave special attention to the problems of frontiers which may threaten international peace or disturb friendly relations among States, and are convinced that in order to settle such problems, all States should resort to negotiation, mediation or arbitration or other peaceful means set forth in the United Nations Charter in conformity with the legitimate rights of all peoples.
- (5) The Conference considers that disputes between neighbouring States must be settled peacefully in a spirit of mutual understanding, without foreign intervention or intervention or interference.

VII

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT; PEACEFUL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY, PROHIBITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS, ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, PREVENTION OF DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ABOLITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Conference emphasises the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world, and stresses the necessity of reaching immediate and practical solutions which would free mankind from the danger of war and from a sense of insecurity.

The Conference notes with concern that the continuing arms race and the tremendous advances that have been made in the production of weapons of mass destruction and their stockpiling threaten the world with armed conflict and annihilation. The Conference urges the great Powers to take now and urgent steps toward achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference regrets that despite the efforts of the members of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and in particular those of the non-aligned countries, the results have not been satisfactory. It urges the great Powers, in collaboration with other members of that Committee, to renew their efforts with determination with a view to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Conference calls upon all States to accede to the Moscow treaty partially banning the testing of nuclear weapons, and to abide by its provisions in the interests of peace and the welfare of humanity.

The Conference urges the extension of the Moscow Treaty so as to include underground tests, and the discontinuance of such tests pending the extension of the agreement.

The Conference urges the speedy conclusion of agreements on various other partial and collateral measures of disarmament proposed by the members of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The Conference appeals to the Great Powers to take the lead in giving effect to decisive and immediate measures which would make possible substantial reductions in their military budgets.

The Conference requests the Great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them. It underlines the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urges all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stock-piles of nuclear weapons.

As part of these efforts, the Heads of State or Government declare their own readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons, and call on all countries including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow Treaty to enter into a similar undertaking and to take the necessary steps to prevent their territories, ports and airfields from being used by nuclear powers for the development or disposition of nuclear weapons. This undertaking should be the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an international Conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations and open to accession by all States. The Conference further calls upon all nuclear Powers to observe the spirit of this declaration.

The Conference welcomes the commitment of the Great Powers not to orbit in outer space nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and expresses its conviction that it is necessary to conclude an international treaty prohibiting the utilisation of outer space for military purposes. The Conference urges full international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The Conference requests those States which have succeeded in exploring outer space, to exchange and disseminate information related to the research they have carried out in this field, so that scientific progress for the peaceful utilization of outer space be of common benefit to all. The Conference is of the view that for this purpose an international conference should be convened at an appropriate time.

The Conference considers that the declaration by African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa, the aspirations of the Latin American countries to denuclearize their continent and the various proposals, pertaining to the denuclearization of areas in Europe and Asia are steps in the right direction because they assist in consolidating international peace and security and lessening international tensions.

The Conference recommends the establishment of denuclearized zones covering these and other areas and the oceans of the world, particularly those which have been hitherto free from nuclear weapons, in accordance with the desires expressed by the States and peoples concerned.

The Conference also requests the nuclear Powers to respect these denuclearized zones.

The Conference is convinced that the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations to which all countries would be invited, would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process.

The Conference therefore urges the participating countries to take, at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations, all the neces-

essary steps for the holding of such a conference and of any other special conference for the conclusion of special agreements on certain measures of disarmament.

The Conference urges all nations to join in the co-operative development of the peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of all mankind; and in particular, to study the development of atomic power and other technical aspects in which international cooperation might be most effectively accomplished through the free flow of such scientific information.

VIII

MILITARY PACTS, FOREIGN TROOPS AND BASES

The Conference reiterates its conviction that the existence of military blocs, Great Power alliances and pacts arising therefrom has accentuated the cold war and heightened international tensions. The Non-Aligned Countries are therefore opposed to taking part in such pacts and alliances.

The Conference considers the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing of foreign troops on the territories of other countries, against the expressed will of those countries, as a gross violation of the sovereignty of States, and as a threat to freedom and international peace. It furthermore considers as particularly indefensible the existence or future establishment of bases in dependent territories which could be used for the maintenance of colonialism or for other purposes.

Noting with concern that foreign military bases are in practice a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development, based on their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideas, the Conference declares its full support to the countries which are seeking to secure the evacuation of foreign bases on their territory and calls upon all States maintaining troops and bases in other countries to remove them forthwith.

The Conference considers that the maintenance at Guantanamo (Cuba) of a military base of the United States of America, in defiance of the will of the Government and people of Cuba and in defiance of the provisions embodied in the Declaration of the Belgrade Conference, constitutes a violation of Cuba's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Noting that the Cuban Government expresses its readiness to settle its dispute over the base of Guantanamo with the United States on an equal footing, the Conference urges the United States Government to negotiate the evacuation of this base with the Cuban Government.

The Conference condemns the expressed intention of imperialist powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean, as a calculated attempt to intimidate the emerging countries of Africa and Asia and an unwarranted extension of the policy of neo-colonialism and imperialism.

The Conference also recommends the elimination of the foreign bases in Cyprus and the withdrawal of foreign troops from this country, except for those stationed there by virtue of United Nations resolutions.

IX

THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IMPLEMENTATION OF
ITS RESOLUTIONS AND AMENDMENT OF
ITS CHARTER

The participating countries declare:

The United Nations Organization was established to promote international peace and security, to develop international understanding and co-operation, to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedom and to achieve all the purposes of the Charter. In order to be an effective instrument, the United Nations Organization must be open to all the States of the world. It is particularly necessary to all that countries still under colonial domination should attain independence without delay and take their rightful place in the community of nations.

It is essential for the effective functioning of the United Nations that all nations should observe its fundamental principles of peaceful co-existence, co-operation, renunciation of the threat or the use of force, freedom and equality without discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language or religion.

The influence and effectiveness of the United Nations also depends upon equitable representation of different geographical regions in the various organs of the United Nations and in the service of the United Nations.

The Conference notes with satisfaction that with Resolution 1991 (XVIII), the General Assembly has taken the initial positive step towards transformation of the structure of the United Nations in keeping with its increased membership and the necessity to ensure a broader participation of States in the work of its Organs. It appeals to all Members of the United Nations to ratify as speedily as possible the amendments to the Charter adopted at the XVIIIth session of the General Assembly.

The Conference recognises the paramount importance of the United Nations and the necessity of enabling it to carry out the functions entrusted to it to preserve international cooperation among States.

To this end, the Non-Aligned Countries should consult one another at the Foreign Minister or Head of Delegation level at each session of the United Nations.

The Conference stresses the need to adapt the Charter to the dynamic changes and evolution of international conditions.

The Conference expresses the hope that the Heads of State or Government of the States Members of the United Nations will attend the regular Session of the General Assembly on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Organization.

Recalling the recommendation of the Belgrade Conference, the Conference asks the General Assembly of the United Nations to restore the rights of the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representa-

tives of China in the United Nations.

The Conference recommends to the States Members of the United Nations to respect the resolutions of the United Nations and to render all assistance necessary for the Organization to fulfil its role in maintaining international peace and security.

X

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND COOPERATION

The Heads of State or Government participating in this Conference,

Convinced that peace must rest on a sound and solid economic foundation,

that the persistence of poverty poses a threat to world peace and prosperity,

that economic emancipation is an essential element in the struggle for the elimination of political domination,

that respect for the right of peoples and nations to control and dispose freely of their national wealth and resources is vital for their economic development,

Conscious that participating States have a special responsibility to do their utmost to break through the barrier of underdevelopment;

Believing that economic development is an obligation of the whole international community,

that it is the duty of all countries to contribute to the rapid evolution of a new and just economic order under which all nations can live without fear or want or despair and rise to their full stature in the Family of Nations,

that the structure of world economy and the existing international institutions of international trade and development have failed either to reduce the disparity in the per capita income of the peoples in developing and developed countries or to promote international action to rectify serious and growing imbalances between developed and developing countries,

Emphasizing the imperative need to amplify and intensify international co-operation based on equality, and consistent with the needs of accelerated economic development,

Noting that as a result of the proposals adopted at Belgrade in 1961 and elaborated in Cairo in 1962, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development met in Geneva in 1964,

Considering that while the Geneva Conference marks the first step in the evolution of a new international economic policy for development and offers a sound basis for progress in the future, the results achieved were neither adequate for, nor commensurate with, the essential requirements of developing countries,

Support the Joint Declaration of the "Seventy-Seven" developing countries made at the conclusion of that Conference, and PLEDGE the co-operation of the participating States to the strengthening of their solidarity;

Urge upon all States to implement on an urgent basis the recommendations contained in the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and in particular to cooperate in bringing into existence as early as possible the new international institutions proposed therein, so that the problems of trade and economic development may be more effectively and speedily resolved;

Consider that democratic procedures, which afford no position of privilege, are as essential in the economic as in the political sphere;

that a new international division of labour is needed to hasten the industrialization of developing countries and the modernization of their agriculture, so as to enable them to strengthen their domestic economies and diversify their export trade,

that discriminatory measures of any kind taken against developing countries on the grounds of different socio-economic systems are contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter and constitute a threat to the free flow of trade and to peace and should be eliminated;

Affirm that the practice of the inhuman policy of apartheid or racial discrimination in any part of the world should be eliminated by every possible means, including economic sanctions;

Recommend that the target of economic growth set for the development Decade by the United Nations should be revised upwards,

that the amount of capital transferred to developing countries and terms and conditions governing the transfer should be extended and improved without political commitments, so as to reinforce the efforts of these countries to build self-reliant economies,

that a programme of action should be developed to increase the income in foreign exchange of developing countries and, in particular, to provide access for primary products from developing countries to the markets of industrialized countries, on an equitable basis and for manufactured goods from developing countries on a preferential basis,

that the establishment of a Specialized Agency for industrial development should be expedited,

that members of regional economic groupings should do their utmost to ensure that economic integration helps to promote the increase of imports from the developing countries either individually or collectively,

that the recommendation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to convene a conference of plenipotentiaries to adopt an International Convention to ensure the right of landlocked countries to free transit and access to the sea be implemented by the United Nations early next year, and that the principles of economic co-operation adopted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in relation to the transit trade of landlocked countries be given consideration;

Call upon participating countries to concert measures to bring about closer economic relations among the developing countries on a basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual assistance, bearing in mind the obligations of all developing countries to accord favourable consideration to the expansion of their reciprocal trade, to unite against all forms of economic exploitation and to strengthen mutual consultation;

Call upon the members of the "Seventy-Seven" developing countries, who worked closely together at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development of 1964 in Geneva to consult together during the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in order to consolidate their efforts and harmonize their policies in time for the next Conference on Trade and Development in 1968.

Convinced that progress towards disarmament increases the resources available for economic development;

Support proposals for the diversion of resources now employed on armaments to the development of underdeveloped parts of the world and to the promotion of the prosperity of mankind.³

3. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade Documentation No. 488-9,
August 5-20, 1970. pp.22-29

APPENDIX EDECLARATIONS OF THE THIRD CONFERENCE
OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIESDECLARATION ON PEACE,
INDEPENDENCE, DEVELOPMENT, COOPERATION
AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of the following Non-aligned countries was held in Lusaka, Zambia, from the 8th to the 10th September, 1970.

The following countries were present:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (People's Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Yemen, the Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

The following countries attended as observers:

Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, South Vietnam, Uruguay, Venezuela, Finland (non-accredited observer), Austria (non-accredited observer).

The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity also attended as an observer.

National liberation movements addressed the Conference as guests:

They exchanged views on the significance and the role of non-aligned countries in the present world, with particular reference to safeguarding and strengthening world peace and security, ensuring national independence and full sovereignty of all nations on a basis of equality, on the need to realize the fundamental right of all peoples to self-determination, as well as democratization of international relations, promoting the rapid economic growth of the developing countries and considering possibilities for greater consultation and cooperation among the non-aligned countries and strengthening the United Nations.

I

Two and a half decades ago, the peoples of the United Nations inscribed in the Charter their desire to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war; to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity of the human person, in the equal rights of nations, large and small; to establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained and to promote social progress and better standards of

of life in larger freedom for all. The intervening period has confirmed the historic merit of these ideals and aspirations but, it has likewise demonstrated that many expectations have not been fulfilled and many problems have not been solved, notwithstanding the efforts of the non-aligned countries.

The policy of non-alignment has emerged as the result of the determination of independent countries to safeguard their national independence and the legitimate rights of their peoples. The growth of non-alignment into a broad international movement cutting across racial, regional and other barriers, is an integral part of significant changes in the structure of the entire international community. This is the product of the world anti-colonial revolution and of the emergence of a large number of newly-liberated countries which, opting for an independent political orientation and development, have refused to accept the replacement of centuries-old forms of subordination by new ones. At the root of these changes lies the ever more clearly expressed aspiration of nations for freedom, independence and equality, and their determination to resist all forms of oppression and exploitation. This has been the substance and meaning of our strivings and actions; this is a confirmation of the validity of the Belgrade and Cairo Declarations. At a time when the polarization of the international community on a bloc basis was believed to be a permanent feature of international relations, and the threat of a nuclear conflict between the big powers an ever-present spectre hovering over mankind, the nonaligned countries opened up new prospects for the contemporary world and paved the way for relaxation of international tension.

Our era is at the crossroads of history; with each passing day we are presented with fresh evidence of the exceptional power of the human mind and also of the dangerous paths down which its imperfections may lead. The epoch-making scientific and technological revolution has opened up unlimited vistas of progress; at the same time, prosperity has failed to become accessible to all and a major section of mankind still lives under conditions unworthy of man. Scientific discoveries and their application to technology have the possibility of welding the world into an integral whole, reducing the distance between countries and continents to a measure making international co-operation increasingly indispensable and ever more possible; yet the states and nations comprising the present international community are still separated by political, economic and racial barriers. These barriers divide countries into developed and the developing, oppressors and the oppressed, the aggressors and the victims of aggression, into those who act from positions of strength, either military or economic, and those who are forced to live in the shadow of permanent danger of covert and overt assaults on their independence and security. In spite of the great progressive achievements and aspirations of our generation, neither peace, nor prosperity, nor the right to independence and equality, have yet become the integral, indivisible attribute of all mankind. Our age, however, raises the greatest hopes and also presents the greatest challenges.

II

The immediate danger of a conflict between the superpowers has lessened because their tendency to negotiate in their mutual relations is strengthening; however, it has not yet contributed to the security of the small, medium-sized and developing countries, or prevented the danger of local wars.

The practice of interfering in the internal affairs of other states, and the recourse of political and economic pressure, threats of force and subversion are acquiring alarming proportions and dangerous frequency. Wars of aggression are raging in the Middle East and in Indo-China and being prolonged in South Vietnam and extended to Cambodia and the presence of foreign forces in Korea is posing a threat to national independence and international peace and security. The continued oppression and subjugation of the African Peoples in southern Africa by the racist and colonial minority regimes, apart from being a blot on the conscience of mankind, poses a serious threat to international peace and security. This situation is becoming dangerously explosive as a result of the collision between certain developed countries of the West and the racist minority regimes in this part of the world. The continuing arms race is causing alarm and concern and rendering nuclear détente extremely precarious and serves as a spur to limited wars. The balance of terror between the superpowers has not brought peace and security to the rest of the world. There are welcome signs of a growing détente between the power blocs but the abatement of the cold war has not yet resulted in the disintegration of military blocs formed in the context of great power conflicts.

International relations are entering a phase characterized by increasing interdependence and also by the desire of States to pursue independent policies. The democratization of international relations is therefore an imperative necessity of our times. But there is an unfortunate tendency on the part of some of the big powers to monopolize decision-making on world issues which are of vital concern to all countries.

The forces of racism, apartheid, colonialism and imperialism continue to bedevil world peace. At the same time classical colonialism is trying to perpetuate itself in the garb of neo-colonialism - a less obvious but in no way a less dangerous means of economic and political domination over the developing countries. These phenomena of the present day world tend not only to perpetuate the evils of the past but also to undermine the future; they retard the liberation of many countries still under colonial domination and jeopardize the independence and territorial integrity of many countries, above all of the non-aligned and developing countries, hampering their advancement, intensifying tension and giving rise to conflicts.

The economic gap between the developed and the developing countries is increasingly widening - the rich growing richer and the poor remaining poor. The developing countries are being denied their right to equality and to effective participation in international progress. The technological revolution, which is now the monopoly of the rich, should constitute one of the main opportunities for progress of developing countries. World solidarity is not only a just appeal but an overriding necessity; it is intolerable today for some to enjoy an untroubled and comfortable existence at the expense of the poverty and misfortune of others.

III

Concerned by this state of affairs in the world, the participants in this Conference have agreed to take joint action, and to unite their efforts towards that end.

The participants in the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries reaffirm and attach special importance to the following principles: the right of

the peoples who are not yet free to freedom, self-determination and independence; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; the right of all sovereign nations to determine in full freedom, the paths of their internal political, economic, social and cultural development; the right of all peoples to the benefits of economic development and the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution; refraining from the threat or use of force, and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Conference declares that the following continue to be the basic aims of non-alignment: the pursuit of world peace and peaceful co-existence by strengthening the role of non-aligned countries within the United Nations so that it will be a more effective obstacle against the freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country; the fight against colonialism and racialism which are a negation of human equality and dignity; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; the ending of the arms race followed by universal disarmament; opposition to great power military alliances and pact; opposition to the establishment of foreign military bases and foreign troops on the soil of other nations in the context of and the stating of great powers conflicts and colonial and racist suppression; the universality of and the stating of strengthening of the efficacy of the United Nations; and the struggle for economic independence and mutual co-operation on a basis of equality and mutual benefit. What is needed is not redefinition of non-alignment but a rededication by all non-aligned nations to its central aims and objectives.

The participants in the Conference solemnly declare that they shall consistently adhere to these principles in their mutual relations and in their relations with other states. They have accordingly agreed to take the following measures:

- (a) To achieve full solidarity and to initiate effective and concrete measures against all forces that jeopardize and violate the independence and territorial integrity of the non-aligned countries and for this purpose to cooperate with and consult each other as and when necessary.
- (b) to continue their efforts to bring about the dissolution of great power military alliances in the interest of promoting peace and relaxing international tensions, under circumstances ensuring the security of all States and peoples; to safeguard international peace and security through the development of social, economic, political and military strength of each country,
- (c) to assert the right of all countries to participate in international relations on an equal footing which is imperative for the democratization of international relations,
- (d) to offer determined support to the intensification of the work of all international bodies concerned with problems of disarmament, particularly in the preparations for and implementation of the programme of the Disarmament Decade as an integral part of general and complete disarmament,
- (e) to intensify and unite efforts among the developing countries and between them and the developed countries for the carrying out of urgent structural changes in the world economy and for the establishment

of such international co-operation as will reduce the gap between developed and developing countries,

(f) to intensify joint efforts for the liquidation of colonialism and racial discrimination; to this end to pledge their utmost possible moral, political and material support to national liberation movements and to ensure implementation of international decisions, including measures by the Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter,

(g) to continue their efforts toward strengthening the role and efficacy of the United Nations, to promote the achievement of the universality of the United Nations and the urgent need for giving the People's Republic of China her rightful place in the organization and the admission of other countries still outside the United Nations, including those which are still divided, to participate in the activities of the Organization and its Agencies,

(h) to strengthen steadily, and expand the domain of mutual co-operation within the international, regional and bilateral frameworks,

(i) to ensure the continuity of action by holding periodic consultations of representatives of non-aligned countries at different levels and by convening summit conferences more frequently depending on the prevailing international situation.

The Heads of State or Government and leaders of participating countries resolve that this Declaration as well as the statements and resolutions issued by this Conference shall be forwarded to the UN and brought to the attention of all the member States of the world organization. The present Declaration shall also be forwarded to all other states.

The participants in the Conference appeal to all nations and governments, all peace and freedom-loving forces and to all people the world over for cooperation and joint efforts for the implementation of these objectives. At the same time, they declare that they shall support all international actions that are initiated in the interests of the progress of mankind.

DECLARATION ON NON-ALIGNMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, united by common political and economic aspirations,

Expressing the determination of the non-aligned countries to achieve economic emancipation, to strengthen their independence and to make their contribution to world peace and to economic and social progress for all mankind,

Reviewing the lack of progress in the implementation by the international community of the policies and objectives declared by them at Belgrade and Cairo, and those enshrined in the Charter of Algiers;

Disturbed by the rapidly widening gap between the economies of the rich and the poor nations, which constitutes a threat to the independence of developing countries and to international peace and security;

Noting with concern the negative trends which exclude developing countries from the mainstream of world economic life despite their endeavour to participate in contemporary progress;

Noting in particular the decline in the share of developing countries in world export trade from one third in 1960 to 1/6th in 1969;

Noting further with regret the decline in financial flows in terms of percentage of GNP from developed to developing countries and the increase in financial flows from developing countries by way of payments of debts, dividends, and royalties, and financial and commercial services;

Believing that the poverty of developing nations and their economic dependence on those in affluent circumstances constitute a structural weakness in the present world economic order;

Convinced that the persistence of an inequitable world economic system inherited from the colonial past and continued through present neo-colonialism poses insurmountable difficulties in breaking the bondage of poverty and shackles of economic dependence;

Realizing that the occupation of parts of territories of non-aligned developing countries and dependent nations by aggressors or minority governments deprives these groups of their resources and constitutes a hindrance to their development;

Considering that the gap in science and technology between the developing and developed countries is widening and the need for preventing the emergence of technological colonialism is pressing;

Recognizing that the massive investments in the economic and social progress of mankind can be made if agreements are reached to reduce expenditure on armaments;

Conscious of the increase since the meeting in Belgrade, in the capability of non-aligned countries to plan, organise, and manage their own economic development, both individually and within a multi-national co-operative framework, and the progress made by them during the sixties;

Convinced that the second United Nations Development Decade provides an opportunity to bring about structural changes in the world economic system so as to meet the pressing needs of poor nations, to strengthen their independence, and to provide for a more rapid and better balanced expansion of the world economy;

HEREBY:

A. PLEDGE THEMSELVES

(i) to cultivate the spirit of self-reliance and to this end to adopt a firm policy of organising their own socio-economic progress and to raise it to the level of a priority action programme;

(ii) to exercise fully their right and fulfil their duty so as to secure optimal utilisation of the natural resources on their territories and in adjacent seas for the development and welfare of their Peoples;

(iii) to develop their technology and scientific capability to maximize production and improve productivity;

(iv) to promote social changes to provide increasing opportunity to each individual for developing his worth, maintaining his dignity, making his contribution to the process of growth and for sharing fully in its fruits;

(v) to promote social justice and efficiency of production, to raise the level of employment and to expand and improve facilities for education, health, nutrition, housing and social welfare;

(vi) to ensure that external components of the developmental process further national objectives and conform to national needs; and in particular to adopt so far as practicable a common approach to problems and possibilities of investment of private capital in developing countries;

(vii) to broaden and diversify economic relationships with other nations so as to promote true inter-dependence;

8. DECIDE

to foster mutual co-operation among developing countries so as to impart strength to their national endeavour to fortify their independence;

to contribute to each other's economic and social progress by an effective utilization of the complementarities between their respective resources and requirements;

to intensify and broaden to the maximum extent practicable, the movement for co-operation and integration among developing countries at sub-regional, and inter-regional levels for accelerating their economic growth and social development and take into account the necessary measures required to guarantee that the peoples of developing countries concerned receive the benefit of the integration and not the foreign companies operating within the integrated area;

and to this end, to adopt the following Programme of Action in the field of:

I

PLANNING AND PROJECTION

(a) to identify products and countries in which production can be stimulated and expand with a view to increasing existing income and trade exchange;

(b) to identify projects and programmes for which import requirements capable of being met from developing countries are likely to arise, and

(c) to define as closely as possible financing and technological requirements to secure increases in production and to support expansion of trade flows amongst developing countries.

II

TRADE, CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

- (a) to organise exchange of information in regard to products of export interest to developing countries;
- (b) to provide adequate access to products of export interest to other developing countries, especially by preferential reduction of import duties;
- (c) to negotiate long-term purchases and sale agreements in respect of industrial raw materials and to orient policies of official procurement organizations in favour of developing countries;
- (d) to evolve payment arrangement to support expansion of trade exchange amongst developing countries;
- (e) to facilitate transit traffic for the diversification and the expansion of the external trade of landlocked countries;
- (f) to facilitate international traffic across overland transit highways crossing international borders amongst developing countries; and
- (g) to encourage travel and tourism amongst developing countries.

III

INDUSTRIAL, MINERAL, AGRICULTURAL AND MARINE PRODUCTION

- (a) to exchange information on needs and resources of different developing countries in respect of technical know-how, research, consultancy services, experts and training facilities; and
- (b) to institute and intensify programmes of co-operation at bilateral, regional and inter-regional levels to combine needs and resources of developing countries for furthering one another's production programmes and projects;
- (c) to co-ordinate through policies and measures for the utilization in their national interest their mineral and marine resources and for the protection of the maritime environment.

IV

DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE

- (a) to facilitate mutual co-operation in preparing pre-investment surveys and in executing projects for the development of one another's infrastructure in the field of road and rail communication, irrigation and power; and
- (b) to concert measures for transforming the prevailing systems of communications, transport and commercial services previously designed to link metropolitan countries to their dependent territories so as to promote direct commerce, contact and co-operation amongst developing countries.

V

APPLICATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

- (a) to organize means and measures to share one another's experience in the application of science and technology to processes of economic and social development;
- (b) to institute schemes of co-operation for the acquisition of skills relevant to their situation and in particular to promote exchange of trainees and experts and thus provide for optimum use and efficiency of their specialised technological and scientific institutions; and
- (c) to devise programmes for adoption of technology to the special needs of countries in different stages of development, and to provide for its widest possible diffusion to developing countries and for the conservation of their technical skills and personnel in consonance with their needs and conditions.

VI

MECHANISM

To facilitate contact, exchange of information, co-ordination and consultations among Governments and concerned organizations and institutions to further mutual co-operation and integration for implementing the programmes of action.

C. URGE THE UNITED NATIONS

to fulfil the objectives enshrined in the Charter "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom";

to employ international machinery to bring about a rapid transformation of the world economic system, particularly in the field of trade, finance and technology so that economic domination yields to economic cooperation and economic strength is used for the benefit of the world community;

to view the developmental process in a global context and to adopt a programme of international action for utilization of world resources in men and materials, science and technology, benefiting developed and developing countries alike;

to adopt at their Commemorative Meeting a Declaration on the international strategy providing for the following:

I

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

(a) International co-operation for economic development is not a one sided process of donor-donee relationship; the development of developing countries is a benefit to the whole world, including the more advanced nations;

(b) The aim of international economic co-operation should be to provide a dynamic combination of the world's production, market and

technological factors to promote a rational division of labour and a humane sharing of its fruits; international co-operation should strengthen the capability of developing countries to exercise fully their sovereignty over their natural resources;

(c) A rapid transformation of the world economic system should be achieved through the adoption of convergent and concomitant policies and measures so that the developing and developed countries become partners, on a basis of equality and mutual benefit, in a common endeavour for peace, progress and prosperity;

(d) The essential purpose of development is to provide equal opportunity for a better life to everyone; the aim should, therefore, be to accelerate significantly the growth of gross product per head so that it is possible to secure for everyone a minimum standard of life consistent with human dignity;

II

POLICIES AND MEASURES

(a) Since primary commodities constitute a preponderant source of foreign income for most developing countries, provision should be made for maximising their consumption, diversifying their utilisation, securing for producers a fair and equitable return, organising their production on the basis of endowment factors, and securing for developing countries an increasing share of the growth in consumption; unfinished action to conclude commodity agreements should be completed by 1972;

(b) International action should be taken to promote processing of primary products in areas of production and to provide access to consuming markets of processed products, free from all tariff and non-tariff barriers;

(c) The scheme of non-discriminatory non-reciprocal preferences in favour of products of developing countries is implemented without further delay;

(d) Other measures should be undertaken to secure for developing countries an increasing share of international trade in manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, especially through adjustment of production structures in developed countries;

(e) A distinction should be made between transfer of resources intended to promote development of developing countries and commercially motivated investments;

(f) The new flow of financial transfers from developed to developing countries should correspond, by 1972, to a minimum of 1 per cent of the GNP of each developed country, 3/4 of which should be from official sources;

(g) Financial transfer for development should be united and provided on terms and conditions compatible with the efficiency of the developmental progress;

(h) Appropriate measures should be adopted to alleviate the burden

of debts on developing countries;

(i) A link between Special Drawing Rights and development finance should be established by 1972;

(j) Steps should be taken to enable developing countries to extend their merchant marines, to develop their shipbuilding industries, and to improve and modernize their ports. Urgent action is needed to restrain the alarming increase in freight rates and to eliminate discriminatory and restrictive elements from it. Consultation machinery for the solution of difficulties of shippers from developing countries needs to be improved to increase its efficiency;

(k) Concerted measures should be undertaken to bridge the widening gap in the technological skills between developing and developed countries, to facilitate diffusion of technology, patented and non-patented, on reasonable terms and conditions, and to ensure that transfers of technology are free from illegitimate restraints. An appropriate international mechanism should be devised to implement these measures;

(l) Provision should be made to expand research and development on materials with which developing countries are endowed. Arrangements should also be made for their nationals and institutions to build up scientific capabilities;

(m) Within the framework of international development strategy, special measures should be taken to improve the productive capacities and develop the infra-structure of least developed, including land-locked countries so as to enable them to drive full benefit from convergent and concomitant measures; and

(n) Mutual contact and co-operation amongst developing countries is an indispensable element in the global strategy. The developed countries should support the initiative of developing countries in this regard and pay special attention to concrete proposals that may be put forward by them to this end.

D. DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION

(a) to undertake sustained and continuous endeavours within the United Nations system to secure faithful implementation of international development policies and programmes;

(b) to further the unity and solidarity of the Group of 77 at all levels including the convening of a ministerial meeting to prepare for UNCTAD 3;

(c) to review and appraise periodically the progress of mutual co-operation in the field of development in pursuance of the programme of action; and

(d) to seek ways and means for strengthening the capabilities of the United Nations system, to fulfil its commitments to social and economic progress.⁴

4. Yugoslav Survey, V. XI (4), 1970: pp.113-124.

APPENDIX FTHE ALGIERS CONFERENCECONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

According to the official list, the following countries were represented at the conference:

Full members (76): Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia (by Prince Norodom Sihanouk), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Vietnam (PRG), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), Yemen (Democratic People's Republic, i.e. South Yemen), Yugoslavia, Zaïre, Zambia.

Observers (9): Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Guests (3): Austria, Finland, Sweden.

(Countries with observer status were entitled to participate on a consultative basis, but not to vote, and were not bound by decisions reached. Guest countries were only entitled to follow the proceedings of the conference.)

The following international organizations were also represented at the conference: the United Nations (by Dr. Kurt Waldheim, its Secretary-General), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, and the African, Asian and Latin American Solidarity Organization.

Representatives of 14 "liberation movements" recognized by the OAU were also present at the conference, as well as Mr. Yasser Arafat, of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Mr. Juan Maria Bras, of the Socialist Party of Puerto Rico.

Heads of State present included the Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, King Birendra of Nepal, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, General Gowon of Nigeria and Colonel Kadhafi of Libya, as well as President Boumedienne (Algeria), Micombero (Burundi), Ahidjo (Cameroon), Bokassa (Central African Republic), Ngouabi (Congo), (Archbishop) Makarios (Cyprus), Kerekou (Dahomey), Sadat (Egypt), Bongo (Gabon), Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Tolbert (Liberia), Moussa Traore (Mali), Ould Daddah (Mauritania), Hamani Diori (Niger), Habyalimana (Rwanda), Senghor (Senegal), Siaka Stevens (Sierra Leone), Siyad Barreh (Somalia), Nemeiry (Sudan), Assad (Syria), Nyere (Tanzania), Eyadema (Togo), Bourguiba (Tunisia), Amin (Uganda), Sheikh Zaid el Nahyane (United Arab

Emirates), Lamizana (Upper Volta), el Iriani (North Yemen), Rubai Ali (South Yemen), Tito (Yugoslavia), Mobutu (Zaire) and Kaunda (Zambia).

Prime Ministers attending the conference were: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Bangladesh), Dr. Fidel Castro (Cuba), M. Lansana Beavogui (Guinea), Mr. Forbes Burnham (Guyana), Mrs. Gandhi (India), Mr. Manley (Jamaica), Mr. Rifai (Jordan), Chief Leabua Jonathan (Lesotho), Tun Abdul Razak (Malaysia), Mr. Mintoff (Malta), Mr. Gaëtan Duval (Mauritius), Mr. Ahmed Osman (Morocco), Dr. Eric Williams (Trinidad and Tobago), and General Mercado Jarrin (Peru).

Other member-countries were represented by their Vice-Presidents, Foreign or other Ministers, or Ambassadors.

Notable absentees included King Hassan II of Morocco ("for health reasons"), King Hussein of Jordan, and Presidents Allende of Chile (who expressed regret at his inability to attend the conference because of the internal situation in his country), Sekou Touré of Guinea, and Suharto of Indonesia.

THE POLITICAL DECLARATION

The political declaration, which was largely based on an Algerian draft, dealt with the following principal points:

Détente between Big Powers. While welcoming the East-West détente, the Third World was far from assured of general peace as long as there continued to be "colonial wars, imperialist aggression and foreign occupation".

Middle East. "Israel's persistence in its defiance of the international community and the U.N. will induce the non-aligned countries to take measures (against Israel) collectively and individually." In addition to demanding "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories", the declaration referred to the non-aligned countries' undertaking to "aid Egypt, Syria and Jordan in liberating their occupied territories by all means" and demanded that the U.S.A. should "refrain from supplying Israel with arms or any political, economic or financial support enabling it to pursue its aggressive and expansionist policy".

Latin America. The conference demanded the recognition of "the inalienable right to independence of the non-aligned countries of Latin America still under colonial domination", and supported in particular "the struggle of the people of Puerto Rico for independence". It also called for the surrender to their legitimate owners of the U.S. military bases in Cuba, Panama and Puerto Rico; supported the "struggle of the Latin American countries for affirmation of their sovereignty and the recovery of their natural resources"; and in particular endorsed Panama's claim to sovereignty over the Canal Zone.

Liberation Movements. Reaffirming their solidarity with the liberation movements in Africa, the non-aligned countries denounced the "aid received by Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia from certain NATO member-countries", and expressed the view that it was "urgent to end the colonial presence in the so-called Spanish Sahara, Djibouti, the Comoro Islands, and the Seychelles".

Indo-China The conference invited the non-aligned countries to support to PRG of South Vietnam and to "proceed" immediately to recognize the Government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as "the sole legitimate and legal Government of Cambodia", while condemning "the military intervention of the United States and its allies in Cambodia".

Other Matters. The conference called for the holding of an international conference on disarmament with the participation of all States, and also "the suspension of the French nuclear tests".

The conference further endorsed the 200-mile territorial waters limit and stressed the urgency of holding the proposed Conference on the Law of the Sea.

The declaration also referred to "the continuing deterioration of economic conditions in developing countries" and the "threat" to their sovereignty by "neo-colonialist exploitation, especially by multinational companies".

THE ECONOMIC DECLARATION

The economic declaration emphasized that "the determination of the large majority of the developed countries to perpetuate the economic order for their own exclusive benefit" had "practically nullified all the non-aligned countries' attempts to achieve progress". In this context the declaration noted that "the enlargement of the EEC has taken place without providing for policies and actions that benefit the less developed countries as a whole".

The declaration contained a number of proposals for a common posture of non-aligned and other developing countries to be adopted in future multilateral trade negotiations.

These proposals included: acceptance of the principles of non-discrimination and preferential treatment for developing countries; an expansion of the generalized system of preferences; and inclusion of preferential treatment for developing countries in any reform of international trade or of the rules of GATT.

The non-aligned countries, it was announced, had agreed on the following measures:

(a) The creation of an economic and social development fund open to participation by all non-aligned countries for the purpose of promoting investment and financing development projects and technical assistance.

(b) Prior authorization and government control of foreign investments, the securing of assurances that authorized foreign investments would not be prejudicial to national development plans and would generate new employment, and the limitation of foreign investments to non-strategic sectors of national economies.

(c) Reinvested profits from foreign investments to be considered as new investments subject to prior control.

(d) A "code of conduct" for the activities of "transnational and multinational companies".

(e) Reaffirmation of the right of any State to nationalize the assets of foreign companies in order to recover its natural resources.

(f) Co-ordination of the action of member-States in order to achieve a reform of the world's economic and financial system.

(g) A demand for the urgent convening of a joint conference of FAO and UNCTAD to examine the world's food shortages.

OTHER DECISIONS

Among the resolutions adopted by the conference was one calling for a boycott of Israel.

The resolution specifically welcomed "the decision of certain member-countries to break off diplomatic relations with Israel", and requested all countries "to take steps to boycott Israel diplomatically, economically, militarily and culturally, as well as in the field of air and sea transport, in accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter".

In a resolution on Cambodia, the conference recognized the "legitimacy and legality" of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Government and called upon all "peace-loving" Governments to do the same.

It was announced during the conference that Jamaica had offered U.S. \$160,000, and the United Arab Emirates \$500,000, to the "national liberation movements".

The conference also decided that the next summit conference of the non-aligned movement should be held in Colombo (Sri Lanka) in 1976, and that meanwhile the conference bureau in Algiers should serve as a co-ordinating organ. The conference thus did not agree to set up permanent organs, as suggested by Yugoslavia and other member-countries.

Among proposals submitted to the conference and not pursued was one by Libya, first made at the Foreign Ministers' meeting, and later presented to the conference by Mr. Abdel Latif Labidi, the Libyan Foreign Minister.

This proposal called for (1) a "new definition" and stricter interpretation of non-alignment; (2) the exclusion of the U.S. and Soviet navies from the Mediterranean and the removal of mines laid during "colonialist and imperialist wars"; and (3) reparations to be paid by the big Powers to their former colonial territories. The proposal had been endorsed by a small group of member-States, among them Burundi, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea and Somalia. It was pointed out that a "stricter interpretation" of non-alignment would embarrass Morocco, Ethiopia and Cyprus, which permitted Western military bases, and Syria and Iraq, which had military aid agreements with the Soviet Union.

President Boumediene declared in his closing speech: "Following the meetings in Peking, Moscow and Washington, and the European conference in Helsinki, the Algiers conference became more than ever necessary to show that decisions affecting all of us to the highest degree cannot be taken without the Third World!" The common denominator of the non-aligned countries, he said, was that they were undeveloped and relatively weak, having suffered from colonial or economic domination. Now that the great Powers had reached a détente, the non-aligned countries would

be the battlefields of future conflicts - political, economic, and military. The Third World, he affirmed, must "count on its own strength" and in the coming period it would be "the motor of history".⁵

5. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 1-7, 1973, pp.26117-26121 A-B.

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