

Chapter 1

Introduction

One of the greatest challenges facing independent post-crisis societies in Africa is that of structuring sustainable systems of political and economic governance. Many political science and international relations scholars concur that military intervention in countries experiencing economic or political crisis is common. The post-colonial political path in Africa, as noted by David Zounmenou; shows complex relations between the army and ruling civilian elites.¹As such, there have been considerable military interventions in politics in some African countries. Independence in Africa was greeted with optimism and exultation. The first generation of nationalist leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Kamuzu Banda, Mobutu Sese Seko, Modibo Keita, Gamal Abdel Nasser and many others promised their people a new beginning. The citizens of these newly independent African states looked forward to enjoying the freedoms that colonial governments had denied them, however, such enthusiasm was quickly frustrated as the new leaders became despotic and personalised the national purse to benefit the ruling clique and their cohorts. Carlson Anyangwe writes that such behaviour by politicians put into motion systemic corruption that had culminated in military coups remaining an option in Sub-Saharan Africa ²(SSA).

¹ For more information on this see Francis N. Ikome's paper; "Good and Bad Coups," *Institute of Global Dialogue* (2007): 1-60.

² Carlson Anyangwe, "Revolutionary Overthrow of Constitutional Orders in Africa" (*Professorial inaugural lecture, Walter Sisulu University, South Africa, 31 August, 2010*).

It is a paradox but the legitimacy of civilian governments (CG) especially in Africa is arguably no longer being determined by the electorate but has become a prerogative of the military. While militaries in some African countries have left barracks to dislodge incumbent incompetent and corrupt governments, some have openly supported sitting presidents. What worries me is that the military which has guns obey civilian politicians who do not have guns when such politicians are regarded by many as a liability and hold the whole nation at ransom? It is in this context that Robin Luckham argues that the African state has become a major source of insecurity.³ One disturbing phenomenon that has developed is that some militaries in SSA are no longer confined to their barracks and intrusion in politics has become a central if not a permanent feature. Plausibly this is because political and economic decadence have manifested in crises that have led to militarisation of politics and subsequent politicisation of the military or vice versa.

Literature on civil-military relations, depict that some militaries in Africa have entered into marriages of convenience or have become ‘conjoint twins that have a single heart’ with politicians in their respective countries. In doing this, the military have abrogated their constitutional mandate of being apolitical. Military intervention in politics has resulted in the formation of dynamic interdependent ‘strategic interactions’ that international relations and military theorists have become very sceptical of. These interactions are beneficial to actors but detrimental to the growth and sustenance of democracy. It has been a long-held belief among ‘traditional military scholars’ that the military rarely entangle themselves in politics because their duty is to defend their country against external threats as well as

³ Robin Luckham, “The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues,” *African Studies Review* 37, no. 2 (1994): 23.

protecting its citizens. While military interpolations and interventions during crises or outright coups in Africa have happened in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and other countries; some militaries and politicians have strategically positioned themselves and cooperate with civilian politicians.

It is perplexing that politicians have not allowed Zimbabweans to enjoy stable civil-military relations from the time it gained independence; a disturbing phenomenon in the Zimbabwean civil-military relations that has permitted the uncalled-for military interference in politics. Zimbabwe has therefore not been accorded the much-needed space that would have allowed democracy to grow and has thus “not been insulated from the negative effects of national competitive politics.”⁴ From the beginning of the 21st century, Zimbabwe was gripped by an eco-political crisis that has resulted in the military being very visible in the domestic political arena. Questions abound why the Zimbabwe army generals have openly disregarded the country’s constitution and have become unprofessional by intervening in politics.

The Zimbabwean experience shows the development of a phenomenon that has been existent since independence and has continued to determine civil-military interactions. This may be because “Zimbabwe has never enjoyed the classic Clausewitzian separation of military and state.”⁵ It is beyond dispute that the military leaders and some military rank

⁴Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “A perspective on ethnic, regional and ideological dimensions of the composition of the Zimbabwean military and their implications,” *Zimbabwe’s Military: Examining its Veto Power in the Transition to Democracy, 2008-2013*, ed. Martin R. (Pretoria: The African Public Policy and Research Institute, 2013), 40.

⁵ Paul Moorcraft, *Mugabe’s War Machine* (Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012), 157.

and file soldiers in Zimbabwe have continued to exude a domineering presence be it when in the barracks or outside. They like their counterparts in the security sector (the Central Intelligence Organisation and Police) are omnipresent especially during or when an election is looming. According to Samuel Decalo “the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social organizational character of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of society.”⁶This -applied to the Zimbabwean case shows that something has gone wrong politically, thus, “the Zimbabwe of today is much like the Zimbabwe of 1979-1980 where the security-sector ‘holds’ the key to transformation,”⁷whereby the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), a military composed of educated military personnel is openly supportive of the ZANU-PF ruling political party.

The thesis explores why an outright military coup has not occurred despite severe political and economic crisis that gripped Zimbabwe. To provide an answer to this question I analyse the underlying forces surrounding interactions between key relationships: (i) the Zimbabwean civilian government (CG) and the military leaders or military elites (MLs/MEs⁸) and (ii) the MEs and the military rank and file (MR&F). In chapter Five I unravel the interactions between the politicians and the political party rank and file (PPR&F). By investigating these relationships, the research seeks to improve on the understanding of the interactions between the above set of relations. The interactions

⁶ Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints* (London: Yale University Press, 1990), 3.

⁷ Takawira Musavengana, “Security sector: No transition without transformation,” Academic article, openspace@osisa.org: 37.

⁸ I refer to Military elites as top military personnel who are still in the army or those who are now leading government parastatals or institutions having retired from the military.

involve four key actors ;(i) the Zimbabwean civilian government (ii) the military leaders (iii) the military rank and file and (iv); later on in the thesis, the political party rank and file. Below is the background to the study.

Background

When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, it was greatly admired and seen by many African leaders as a beacon of hope on the African continent. It had a strong flourishing economy that Julius Nyerere the then Tanzanian President called it the “jewel of the African continent.”⁹ The new Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe became an icon especially when he called for reconciliation and an end to all past enmity between Blacks and Whites. In his inauguration speech Mugabe had said:

If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself.... We must draw a line through the past to achieve reconciliation.... Oppression and racism must never find scope in our social and political system...An evil remains an evil whether practised by White against Black or Black against White¹⁰.

Mugabe took advantage of the Cold War politics to have a bite at the international aid cherry and told the Black and the White communities that “we are the darling of the world.....honeymoon don’t last long, we ought to take advantage of it.”¹¹

⁹ Martin Meredith, Robert Mugabe: Power, Plunder and Tyranny in Zimbabwe (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2002), 15-17

¹⁰ Ibid, 15.

¹¹ Martin Meredith, Power, Plunder, *Op. Cit.*, 15-17.

However from 2000 the Zimbabwean situation changed. Zimbabwe was ravaged by a serious economic crisis. The crisis was set in motion by war veterans' gratuities in 1997, Zimbabwe's costly intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998 and the Fast Track Land Reform. The situation was further worsened by economic sanctions and Donor fatigue. Donor countries refused to continue to give money to the Harare government.

According to Tony Hawkins:

Although the official and parallel exchange rates was devalued by 93 per cent from Z\$55 to Z\$824 to the US dollar in February 2003, by mid-year, the free market premium had risen to over 200 per cent, with a parallel exchange rate of Z\$2 500 to the US unit.¹²

By 2008 the economic and political situation was worse. It was only solved by the Southern African Development Community intervention through Thabo Mbeki that a government of National Unity came into existence in 2009. By then the crisis had already sucked in the Zimbabwean security sector.

The ZNA is playing an increased role in the political decision-making process in support of the party-state especially from 2000 to date; it has become the 'life-blood' of the ZANU-PF party and government and has become very noticeable through utterances that are made by the MEs. Unlike its southern African neighbours, Zimbabwean politics has become a "straight jacket that only fits those with nationalist or military background."¹³Put

¹² Tony Hawkins, "The Zimbabwe Crisis: Endgame Scenarios and Regional Implications," (University of Pretoria: ISSUP Bulletin, 2003), 6.

¹³ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe," *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6, no. 1 (2006): 52.

differently, the military narrow-mindedly supports the ascendancy into the office of the president, someone who participated in the Zimbabwe war of liberation against the Rhodesia Ian Smith's racist regime. Martin Meredith correctly points that the military in Zimbabwe are still operating just like what they used to do during the liberation struggle and 'still subscribe' to the views advanced by Mugabe and ZANU in 1976 when he said:

Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its guarantor. The people's votes and the people's guns are always inseparable twins.¹⁴

By saying this, Mugabe was intimating that any election that would be conducted in Zimbabwe had to be made in defence of his party's interests. As will be noted in the thesis, Tongogara had a lot of influence on the decisions made by the politicians if not that they always pandered to his wishes or dictates. Tongogara was the ZANU-PF military commander who was trained in guerrilla tactics in China. He was an intelligent and brave military strategist, the driving engine of the Zimbabwe liberation war.¹⁵ One of the valuable lessons that he learnt was that both the guerrillas and the masses had to be deliberately politicised for the ZANLA military to be able to wage a successful war against the Rhodesian regime.¹⁶ Paradoxically before the demise of Tongogara, the military were the ones who were controlling the party because "the ZANU Central Committee very much relied on the Department of Defence and the Commissariat, a legacy that haunts ZANU-

¹⁴ Martin Meredith, *Our Votes, Our Guns* (United States of America: Persus, 2003), 233.

¹⁵ Agrippa Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me* (South Africa: Helicon & Company Limited, 2014), 183.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 80.

PF to this day.”¹⁷It cannot be disputed that the MEs have actively worked for regime survival curtailing democratic growth and consolidation: an albatross phenomenon of current civil-military relations that haunt Zimbabweans.

Ironically the “winds of change” continue to blow across the African continent. The majority of the African citizenry want to have ‘more say’ in how they are governed. At the same time, the ruling elites have become more authoritarian. The role of the military has become questionable as they are used by politicians as a muscle for power retention and maintenance. Cheryl Hendricks and Lauren Hutton observed that post-colonial states in Africa have replicated colonial regime’s use of state security apparatus to protect the status quo.¹⁸This means that some of the nationalist leaders who came to power ignored the importance of military reforms to suit the aspirations of their young nations; for they deemed this a weakening of their own power base. Barbara Geddes contends that “once the military constitute the ultimate source of formal state power and politics, its policies, priorities and values begin to affect social relations ‘with’ the citizens.”¹⁹ It is therefore not surprising that the military (and quasi-militia forces) in Zimbabwe are very visible especially when an election is looming and have become notorious campaigners and protectors of those in power.

¹⁷ Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, “Discipline and Punishment in ZANLA: 1964-1979.” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37 no. (2011), 570.

¹⁸ Cheryl Hendricks, and Lauren Hutton, “Providing security and Justice for the people: Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe.” *Institute of Security Studies Paper* 199 (September 2009), 2.

¹⁹In most cases the military supports the regime that is in power rather than siding with the civilians whose well-being they are supposed to protect.

Civil-military relations in Zimbabwe differ with those of other regions in Africa. The dominant party leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe and others employ selective narratives and memories of liberation wars, 'construct and invent' a new set of traditions to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under one particular agency of forces.²⁰ This entails a deliberate onslaught on the people's mental faculties by continuously reminding them of the horrors of colonialism. These narratives are used to justify the ZANU-PF's continual hold of political office. Mugabe has thus used the armed struggle versus the colonial and neo-colonialism dichotomy to buttress the ZANU-PF government survival. ZANU-PF politicians have deliberately reignited the imagery of a country still at war being championed by regime change malcontents from within Zimbabwe and outside.²¹ The ZANU-PF government use of continuous 'propaganda war rhetoric' is clearly envisaged to inculcate a sense of belonging; 'true sons of the soil, us versus them, revolutionaries versus puppets,' the either you are with us or against us; George Bush jnr., language. ZANU-PF politicians came to the realisation that they had become unpopular especially after the formation of the vibrant Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party as it brought with it new challenges introducing a new phase in the country's political arena. It is a period that set out the contours of the crisis that was experienced in Zimbabwe from 2000 to date. Apparently the contradictions became intractable: they became

²⁰ Henning Melber, "Introduction: Limits to liberation Movements in Southern Africa," *NODLAC*, Namibia, www.edra.org.za, (July 2002): 4-6.

²¹ David B. Moore, "Democracy, Violence and Identity in the Zimbabwean war of National Liberation: Reflections from the Realm of Dissent," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 29, no. 3 (1995): 397.

‘contradictions within contradictions,’ that made intense political opposition inevitable. Brian Raftopoulos and Ian Phimster assert that the crisis was embedded in “three overlapping dimensions: that of Pan-African and Third-World solidarity in the face of renewed imperialist aggression; the breakdown of the liberation struggle consensus; and the limitations of post-colonial development in the context of globalisation.”²²

The problems of economic neo-liberalism as well as the serious democratic deficit of the party-state in Zimbabwe resulted in war veterans overtly challenging Mugabe. The urbanites who bore the brunt of the effects of the structural adjustment programmes also cried foul creating a ZANU-PF legitimacy crisis.²³ Governance problems resulted in the consolidation and entrenchment of corrupt patronage relations that culminated in the horrendous crisis that gripped Zimbabwe. The situation was further exacerbated by the gratuities paid to war-veterans, Zimbabwe’s participation in the DRC war, the War Victims Compensation Fund that benefited the military and political elites and above mentioned MDC that challenged ZANU-PF political hegemony. ZANU-PF politicians revived “a general anti-imperialist discourse, that demonised internal opposition forces as unpatriotic enemies of the state and therefore beyond the ‘dictates’ of the rule of law.”²⁴ Mugabe blamed white commercial farmers (and the MDC, Britain, the USA, the IMF and the WB) for having caused the crisis.²⁵ While addressing a rally after the rejected ZANU-PF draft

²² Brian Raftopoulos and Ian Phimster, “Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion,” *Historical Materialism* 12, no.4 (2004): 356.

²³ Ibid, 357.

²⁴ Ibid, 13.

²⁵ For more information read Darlington N. Mahuku and Bowden B.C. Mbanje, Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) and Multi-Party Politics: A New Threat to African Nationalist Parties in Zambia and Zimbabwe, *African Journal of Social Sciences* 3, no. 1 (2013).

constitution in 2000, Mugabe had no kind words for the Zimbabwean white community, he snapped;

Our present state of mind is that you are now our enemies, because you really have behaved like enemies of Zimbabwe and we are full of anger. Our entire community is angry and that is why we now have the war veterans seizing their land.²⁶

Morgan Tsvangirai the Movement for Democratic Change opposition party president and those who supported him were branded traitors and puppets wagging their tails to the dictates of the British and white settlers. The ZANU-PF position was captured in its slogan, “The land is the economy, the economy the land,” which was “translated into politics of exclusion, racial essentialism and violence.”²⁷ According to David Blair, “the propaganda was the *raison d’être* of the Mugabe regime, the defining testament of what ZANU-PF stood for. Land, the white man’s land, was at the heart of everything. Mugabe’s passionate crusade was designed to correct a monstrous injustice bequeathed by colonial history.”²⁸ It was strictly war because the white community had dared Mugabe to unleash his wrath on them and the vehicle to achieve that was the security-sector. The situation from 2000 onwards became an extension of the Chimurenga. Mugabe without ‘mincing’ words and in an ‘Ian Smith fashion’²⁹ remarked:

²⁶ Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence* (United States: Public Affairs, 2005), 703.

²⁷ Brian Raftopoulos, *Current Politics in Zimbabwe: Confronting the Future*, 17.

²⁸ David Blair, *Degrees in Violence* (London: Continuum, 2003), 156.

²⁹ Ian Smith after his declaration of independence from Britain is recorded to have said that “there would be no majority rule in a thousand years,” then later on he again said, “There will be no black majority rule in his life time.”

The MDC will never form the government of this country, never ever, not in my lifetime or even after I die, Zimbabwe will never be a colony again.³⁰

From then on ZANU-PF demonised the MDC and its western allies. Counter demonization by the MDC, Britain, the USA and the European Union were also made with the unfortunate outcome that this sucked in the Zimbabwean SS as they were deliberately politicised. Can the ZANU-PF ruling elite ideologies explain the survival of its government even during a time of intense economic hardships? To borrow from Masipula Sithole's words, politics is a socialisation phenomenon that directs social action. Arguably the Zimbabwean case may be explained through the civil-military payoffs that characterised their interactions and fit very well Harold Laswell's highly acclaimed dictum: "who gets what, when and how?"

It must be noted that the army is part of the state but can also represent national public good concerns. Eboe Hutchful submits that the military in essence represent the general interest of society: protecting its country's citizens from external threats. Notably, this is not to discount the role of the military during colonial rule. The irony of it all is that when the new African politicians were in power, they did not change the colonial functions of the military. Both politicians and military personnel as rational actors embraced maximizing strategies to accomplish their objectives. The approaches they adopt are well tailored to suit circumstances as individual actors perceive them.³¹ It is in the above context that I agree with Rupiya that the place and function of the Zimbabwean 'SS has created and continue

³⁰ Martin Meredith, "The Fate, Op.Cit" 705.

³¹ Masipula Sithole, *Zimbabwe: Struggles-within-the-Struggles* (Harare: Rujeko, 1999), 154-155.

to create' considerable tensions evidenced by the strained civil-military relations since the late 1990s.³²

The military in Zimbabwe has 'tenaciously' supported the CG during disturbances thus the military are paid to be angry and fight for the interests of the executive.³³ How did a domestic political environment embedded in an intense eco-political crisis shape the interactions of the CG, the MLs and the MR&F; the CG and the PPR&F? Why were there 'stronger temptations' for the military to 'assist' the ZANU-PF led CG to maintain the status quo? The military have not wrestled the politicians out of power to rescue the general citizenry out of the 'ruling elite-made' crisis that is 'suffocating them'. An analysis of the Zimbabwean elections since independence show that many a time Zimbabweans have in most instances voted without choosing as Zimbabwe is arguably a dictadura state with an 'elected dictatorship.'

In the thesis I investigate the relations between the Zimbabwean CG and the MLs and the MLs and the MR&F and whether they can explain the non-disintegration and collapse of the ZANU-PF government since 2000. I strongly contend that these interactions merit attention and exploration especially given the absence of outright masses and military rebellions given the political and economic crisis that have been experienced by Zimbabweans. The scope of the thesis is explaining how Zimbabwe has survived. Also in the event of the absence of an outright military coup why has there been no "populist

³² For more information see paper presented by: Martin R. Rupiya, "Civil-Military relations in Zimbabwe: Is there a Threat? At the Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe.

³³ Masipula Sithole, *Zimbabwe's Public eye: Political Essays* (Harare: Rujeko, 1998), 23.

military revolt,” as was the case in Ghana and Ethiopia. It must be pointed out that for the military not to revolt, it may first consider the pay-offs, specifically whether intervention will leave them in a better position or worse? Both the government and the military weigh the benefits of partnering or supporting each other. Consequently, interactions and partnership can be described and explained through what George Tsebelis has called a “nested game,”³⁴ that is discussed under the conceptual framework. The preceding paragraphs have highlighted the relevance of investigating the strategic symbiotic relationship between the Zimbabwean CG and the military. This study therefore specifically:

- Examine why an outright military coup has not occurred?

I break the central objective into two linked sub objectives that relate to “classic” civil-military relations and “class-based,” conflict within the military that emanates in a radical populist revolt, these two linked objectives that this thesis attempt to address are:

- Assess why the military have not seized power from civilians.
- Analyse why there has been no “populist military revolt” given the hyperinflation that has triggered such revolts in some countries.

In pursuit of the mentioned objectives, the study is guided by the following research questions:

- Why has there been no outright military coup despite the horrendous political and economic crises?

³⁴ For more information see, George Tsebelis, “Nested Games Idea,” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/193905>.

- Why did a “populist military revolt” not occur given the kind of hyperinflation that was experienced in Zimbabwe?

The thesis will also attempt to answer other sub-questions especially on the methods employed by the MLs to ensure that it maintains the organisational cohesion of the military as well as the survival strategies used by the politicians to ensure that they remain in power without permitting fissures in the military command structures and government disintegration. One very interesting aspect about the Zimbabwean case is that the military leadership is at the locus and an integral part of the political economy dynamics of ruling.

Case Selection and Significance of Study

In Zimbabwe, the economy is behaving like a person on ‘illicit drugs’ and such madness is threatening to downgrade the market, which is in a currently seemingly drunken state of casino type addiction which is destructive.³⁵

The time trend graph on military occurrences in Africa in Chapter 2 of this thesis shows that many countries have hit headlines more frequently for political disorder, decay, military revolts and outright military coups. They have experienced crises and there has been a considerable decentralization of violence. There has emerged “localised militia”-like organisations like the “defence committees” under Rawlings in Ghana and Mengistu Haile-Mariam in Ethiopia or outright guerrilla movements in Zaire during the presidency

³⁵ Gideon Gono, “Impact of Sanctions on Zimbabwe,” *Zimbabwe Saturday Herald*, 8th November, 2008, 2-3.

of Mobutu Sese Seko, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso and Uganda during Obote's presidency in 1985.

In "class-based" conflicts within the military that resulted in radical populist military revolts, governments which become unpopular suffer a backlash when they are forcefully removed from power by radical military personnel 'acting on behalf of the general populace' ³⁶ The military rank and file are negatively affected by the growing social and economic inequalities just like the general masses. When the economic deteriorations become unbearable the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) take it upon themselves to 'bring back economic order' in society. It is in this context that sitting governments are overrun and dislodged by a single military battalion rather than the whole militia of a country as it is not prudent to involve everybody when planning or executing a coup. Few scholars have grappled with trying to explain why the military intervenes in politics, and yet do not remove a kleptocratic government even during times of severe political and economic crises, an 'intriguing miracle' as is the Zimbabwean case.

From 2000 to 2009 Zimbabwe was undeniably a showcase of one of the most mismanaged economies but 'politically sheepish' country in SSA.³⁷ It is in this context that the political economy of Zimbabwe before the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 was pregnant with socio-economic conditions that have necessitated

³⁶Robin Luckham, "The Military, Militarisation and Democracy," *Op. Cit.*, 16-17.

³⁷ Despite the formation of the "transitional Government of National Unity," among the three principals, (Mugabe, Mutambara and Tsvangirai) polarization still exists; with the demise of the GNU in 2013 the economy has deteriorated to the 2007-8 levels, the ZANU-PF politicians and supporters have become kleptocrats on a looting rampage.

military coups elsewhere in Africa.³⁸Rupiya claims that although it has not been publicly acknowledged, the SS may have been hit hard by the economic crisis that affected Zimbabwe since the beginning of the 21st century but what is intriguing is that the military has ‘neither shown visible signs of fatigue in supporting the party-state nor disintegrated. What has varied across countries has been the degree to which the central security in this case the ZNA has remained loyal. Arguably this explains why Zimbabweans a country has become a site for intellectual as well as political and material contestation.³⁹How has Zimbabwe defied all odds? How do we explain the civil-military interactions before and during the “crisis” and do such interactions explain the non-disintegration or fragmentation of the military and party-state?

Paradoxically the ZNA has unequivocally supported the ZANU-PF politicians and party-state. This points to a serious problem because the same party-state is perceived by many including some PPR&F and MR&F to be responsible for their suffering. It is generally agreed that Zimbabwe endures a notable security-sector alliance with ZANU-PF⁴⁰hence the ZNA political fangs have become visible just like the Rhodesian military openly supported the Smith government. Mugabe has continued to command respect of the service-chiefs and always receives standing ovations during regional summits and yet he is supposed to be the “monster” or the “dictator” who has exploited his people while ransacking the country’s mineral resources. How has Mugabe’s person, his action and his

³⁸ Jonathan Moyo, “Four Hard Choices for Zimbabwe,” 4

³⁹ Linda Freeman, “Contradictory constructions of the crisis in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of the South African Historical Association* 50, no. 2 (2005): 1.

⁴⁰ Martin R. Rupiya, Civil-military relations in Zimbabwe: Is there a threat? Working Paper No 1, Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe, pp. 257-58 .,In the Zimbabwean case SS meddling in politics had already become visible even in the early 1980s, see Joshua Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*.

vision impacted on the service-chiefs and the MR&F as their Commander-in-chief, and the PPR&F? What motivates the ZNA to support a government that is considered by many as dictatorial? Jendayi Frazer submits that “African countries whose militaries were born of armed struggle have for the most part avoided the repeated political instability or coups d’états that have plagued much of Africa.”⁴¹ If so; what explains the military visibility, influence and de facto veto power over civilian affairs in Zimbabwe?

By year 2000, the Zimbabwean economy was “considered and objectively judged by all standards macro-and micro-economic indicators to be bankrupt and virtually collapsed..., and unsustainable.”⁴² By December 2008 it was worse and unbearable. The majority of the general Zimbabwean populace were suffering with the exception of the elites and the well-connected few. Eric Block in 2008 stated that “.... Zimbabwe’s is the world’s highest inflation, exacerbating the immense poverty afflicting most Zimbabweans”⁴³ whose inflation level was similar to Germany after world war one. By November 2008 independent economists claimed that the rate of inflation in Zimbabwe was about 500 billion per-cent which Gono the RBZ governor characterised as an “economic HIV”⁴⁴ and yet the military continued to support the status quo. This is the direct opposite of Major-General Babatunde Idiagbon’s response when asked of military functions in Nigeria; he said “Public accountability... our priority is the welfare of the common man. It is more relevant to us that the prices of foodstuffs and other essential commodities are within the

⁴¹Frazer, “Sustaining Civilian,” IV.

⁴² David Moore, “Is the Land the Economy and the Land the Economy? Primitive Accumulation in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 19, no. 2 (2001): 257.

⁴³Zimbabwe Independent, “If this is not a crisis, what is?” April 17-24, 2008, 12.

⁴⁴The Mail & Guardian, “The true cost of Living in Zimbabwe,” 14th – 19th March, 2008, 29.

reach of ordinary man...”⁴⁵ It can be noted from the above that the military during times of grave crises caused by kleptocratic politicians may be the guardian of the general populace as was the case where guardian coups have occurred. The Zimbabwean situation later deteriorated to alarming proportions that the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa referred to Zimbabwe as a “sinking titanic.”⁴⁶ It was a declining economy besieged by hyperinflation with negative downstream social and political effects on susceptible groups and the masses. This is evident in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor’s lamentation that the Zimbabwean economy had become a casino economy; thus it is imperative to explore why in Zimbabwe the military chose to continue supporting the ZANU-PF government given that politics is not a game of angels.

What is unique about the Zimbabwean scenario is the degree to which the central “security” that is the military command structures have remained intact and loyal unlike in all the other cases I have referred to. It appears Zimbabwe has shrewdly defied all odds and has maintained a momentum and resilience of its own. This is against the backdrop that the kleptocratic politicians have dismally failed to respond positively to an economic meltdown.⁴⁷ Paradoxically, observes Frazer, Zimbabwe is a peculiar case where the ZANU-PF civilian ruling elite ‘face’ many ‘serious’ challenges and yet has prevented a military takeover of government⁴⁸ or ceded power to the opposition party. A more nuanced investigation and analysis of the Zimbabwean military as a defender of the party-state

⁴⁵Hutchful, “New Elements,” *Op. Cit.*, 805.

⁴⁶The Mail & Guardian, “Out of sync with neighbours,” April 20-25, 2007, 2.

⁴⁷Rok Ajulu, “Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: What Next? Institute for Global Insight, Issue No. 12 Johannesburg, (October 2001): 1.

⁴⁸Frazer, “Sustaining,” *Op. Cit.*, 16-22.

through threats of violence targeting opposition parties, pro-democracy civic groups and the peasants is therefore required. Studies on Zimbabwe civil-military relations have also not given much attention to the strategic interactions amongst the ZANU-PF led CG and its MLs, the MLs and the MR&F and the CG and the PPR&F. This study therefore examines the preferences of all the actors that make the interactions an on-going process. It also analyses the formal and informal rules of interaction amongst the key actors and the environment in which this takes place.

In the thesis, the hypothesis is that the interactions between the military leadership and the politicians since 2000; was influenced by the military leaders' desire to maintain the organisational cohesion of the military forces. The interaction between the military leadership and the rank-and-file may also have been influenced by the military leadership's desire to position securely the forces with respect to civilian leadership. The assumption is that if the politicians do not honour the demands of the military leadership then the military rank-and-file will be like 'a dog let loose,' it revolts against both the military leadership and the politicians and stage a military coup. The rank-and-file soldiers thus have to be restrained be it by the civilian rulers or the military leaders. If the civilian government keeps its side of the bargain then the whole military institution supports the civilian government. Below I present the conceptual and theoretical framework that I employed in the thesis.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The term civil-military relations are rarely defined, often misunderstood and explains why there is no agreement among scholars on what “civil-military relations” actually mean. Vladimir Rukavishnikov and Michael Pugh connote that civil-military relations simply refer to “the relationship between civilians (people without arms) the society at large, and the military (people with arms).”⁴⁹Civil-military relations also denote the relationship between the civil leadership (politicians) in a given society and its military leaders; relations that are termed elite civil-military relations.⁵⁰Civil-military relations thus deal with the military mind-set with regards to the civilian society, and how the civilian society itself perceives the military in relation to the nation-state. It thus “highlights the complex nature of the relationship of the state and military establishment on one hand and the quest for democratisation on the other.”⁵¹

For the purpose of this study, the thesis focuses on both elite and rank-and-file civil-military relations, describing and analysing whether such loyalism to the civilian government can be explained by the militarisation of politics or the politicisation of the military. I follow Rupiya’s approach where politicisation and militarisation is a reciprocal phenomenon. In this context I argue that the arrow goes both ways. Arguably there is a patron-client interaction between the ruling elites and the military elite and military rank-and-file and between the politicians and the political party rank-and-file.

⁴⁹ Vladimir Rukanvishnikov & Michael Pugh, cited in J. Rahbek-Clemmensen, 131.

⁵⁰ Jon R-Clemmensen, *Op. Cit.*, 7.

⁵¹ Matereke and Moghazy, “Mugabe and the Military,” 251.

Like many others it is generally agreed that militarism denote not simply the development of the military as a critical ‘linchpin’ in the power relations within a state but is the acceptance by the population as a whole that the military and their values are the ultimatio ratio of politics.⁵²Robin Luckham posits that,

Militarisation refers to a multidimensional process through which a number of elements-such as an authoritarian government, ‘*a politicised military that is a muscle of a repressive state and the ruling civilian government*’, become dynamically linked both to each other and more widely to capital accumulation.⁵³

In the thesis I take militarisation as an incremental nomination of serving and retired military officers to influential positions in government or key government parastatals enhancing a phenomenon of entitlement and visibility in the Zimbabwean eco-political environment. I also follow Jocelyn Alexander’s influential paper on militarisation where militarisation cannot only be limited to the above view. Militarisation thus also involves military involvement in electoral politics as well as management. Apart from dabbling in electoral politics it also means the involvement of both serving and ex-military personnel in lucrative networks of accumulation embedded in patron-client relations in whom the military become business moguls being given tenders and contracts. Another aspect of

⁵² Amii Omara-Otununu, “The Currency of Militarism in Uganda,” in *The Military and Militarism in Africa*, ed. Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily. (Senegal: Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa, 1998), 404.

⁵³ Luckham, “The Military,” 24.

militarisation in the Zimbabwean context also shows a new form of governance “clearly embodied in the “Operation”-these operations offered opportunities for looting.”⁵⁴

According to Frazer politicisation is an attempt to homogenize the ideology, values and goals of the armed forces with those of the civilian group. Politicisation of the military involves some degree of civilian penetration into the military sphere that leads to increased military involvement in politics. There was no military fragmentation but the general populace in Zimbabwe and outsiders witnessed the military’s increased role and involvement in politics.⁵⁵In the thesis I take politicisation of the military and the militarisation of politics as an interdependent phenomenon.⁵⁶As such a government that is overtly dependent on the military and uses it for its own political survival cannot be democratic. The CG can subordinate the military through a fusion of external and internal mechanisms. External mechanisms are defined as the use of institutions to monitor and punish military actors while internal mechanisms are defined as the creation of a military culture of loyalty. The soldier can be easily subordinated if he is loyal to party-state.

A coup d’état is an unanticipated removal and capture of power by a small but well organised group that threatens, or uses force to replace those in power, ⁵⁷thus in a militarised state, the armed forces have a greater say in the decision-making process as well

⁵⁴ Jocelyn Alexander and Joann McGregor, “Introduction: Politics, Patronage and violence in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 39, no. 4 (2013): 811-812.

⁵⁵ Frazer, *Op.Cit.* 21-22.

⁵⁶ Martin R.Rupiya, “Contextualising the military in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2004 and beyond,” in *Zimbabwe, Injustice and Political Reconciliation*, eds. Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004) 79.

⁵⁷ Edward Luttwark, *Coup D’Etat: A Practical Handbook* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 12.

as unwarranted use of force to resolve differences⁵⁸ and unnecessarily militarising the public sphere. The militaristic option is nothing but the inevitable consequence of internal political contradictions.⁵⁹ Below I describe the theories applied in the thesis clearly stipulating their relevance.

As mentioned earlier, the primary concern of this study is to investigate and explain the interactions amongst the key actors (the CG and the MLs, the MLs and the MR&F) in Zimbabwe. The game theory approach starts from a compelling analytical puzzle: why would the military - which has guns - ever obey civilian politicians - who don't. The nested game approach assists me in explaining these interactions in a more well thought-out way and how they change or do not change from the "pre-crisis" period to the "crisis" period. In chapter 6, I include the "civilian game" that pits the politicians and the PPR&F. I contend that it is after the year 2000 that the PPR&F are openly used as a political matrix of power to block any ZANU-PF succession talks. Mugabe under intense pressure from the international community and the MDC-T party to quit politics; has repeatedly argued that his legitimacy to rule comes from the people because 'they still want him to rule.'

To fully fathom the interactions, it must be borne in mind that all actors involved in the security-sector and civil-military game in the "nested game," are aware that the two games are linked and that their best options in one game depend on what is happening in the other one. Arguably if the MLs are under genuine threat of a populist revolt within the military,

⁵⁸ Kayode J. Fayome, "The Future of Demilitarization and Civil-Military relations in West Africa: Challenges and Prospects for Democratic Consolidation," *Africa Journal of Political Science* no. 1 (1998): 82.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 85.

it might be able to cut a better deal than otherwise with civilian politicians in the civil-military game. The CG estimates the probability of instability, overthrow and the possible consequences; this determines whether they make any compromises with the MLs or not. It must be noted that threats can either be credible or hypothetical. A threat or a promise is therefore treated as hypothetical since it does not constitute real action. However, a bluff taken seriously is better than a serious threat taken as a bluff because a threat taken as a bluff has serious consequences. Consequently, if interactions are reciprocal, each could damage the other and itself by breaking the relationship that exists between them.

If politicians fail to fulfil promises that they make to the MEs; that is perceived a breach of agreement that may incentivise the military to go against them. The MEs are the ones who can restrain or let loose the MR&F. If the MR&F misbehave it is up to the MLs to punish them, or adopt a look and do-nothing approach; a situation that is very disastrous. A look and do-nothing approach can result in a spate of criminality, military disintegration and unprecedented violence like what happened in Zaire during Mobutu's last days in power or in Ethiopia during the Derg era.

The strategic interdependence and interactions between the civilian government and the military leadership and the PPR&F in chapter seven becomes a three player model in which focus is on the policy options that explain the interactions amongst the four key players. As already noted though the 'security-sector game' and the 'civil-military game, are taking place simultaneously the MLs are the locus of what is transpiring in both spheres and astride the interactions and have a leg in both spheres. I argue that the MLs and politicians

are bent on maximising their interests so as to maintain cohesion of the MR&F, and the PPR&F. The probabilities of political instability in Africa have remained high. Arguably this is because the militarisation of politics and politicisation of the military is continuing unabated. Collier and Hoeffler argue that in countries where there is a high risk of political instability, the military and CG may be involved in relations in which the government is the 'victim.' I contend that the military and civilian leaders are "strategically rational" and try to identify conditions under which they cooperate.

In 'normal circumstances' the MR&F are not supposed to be a threat since military law requires them to respect military hierarchy and execute duties as they are given them from above. The MLs therefore has to ensure that they are contended so that they obey and execute orders. This entails that the MLs may use them as a leverage to make sure that the CG fulfils their side of the bargain. The CG cannot be passive observers in the game and therefore use different strategies to ensure that the MLs are subordinate to their wishes and keep the MR&F in check. The CG also ensures that they must keep the MLs in check. Rational actors always endeavour to widen their 'political horizon,' and have various options to achieve this. The most important aspect of this nested game framework is that it is neither predictive nor causal but gives the analytical framework to explain the interactions of the key actors in an organised way. In the game what governs the interactions of the players is the maintenance of political relevance as the critical political vertebrae for survival. To determine whether the Zimbabwean case can be explained by either politicisation of the military or militarisation of politics this is determined by exploring;

- The role of the military outside the barracks and how they interact with the PPR&F.
- How the military resolve conflicts (are they apolitical)?
- Whether the military respect the general populace's political views and actions.
- Whether the military uphold state or party principles
- The degree of military involvement in making political and economic decisions and the positions that they occupy in the state either as serving or retired military personnel.

The “nested game” approach is blended with the Liberation Movement Model (LMM). This model is based on popular causes and mass participation and its aim is to effect radical social change. Those in leadership positions want to dominate and consolidate their positions once in power, thus, the LMM is specifically tailored to inculcate in all involved a revolutionary personality creating party cadres and a political ideological elite.⁶⁰ Indoctrination is a very central aspect of the LMM hence party supporters and those in the military are deliberately politicised and manipulated.⁶¹ Realistically in moments of crisis, the liberation movement politico-military relationship acts in support of the survival of the party-state. The PPR&F plays a pivotal role in that as the backbone of the liberation movement (in accordance to the Maoist teachings, the people are the sea and the guerrillas, the fish) they do have the capacity to influence the turn of events especially during party annual conferences or when a party congress is held. When dealing with the LMM, I probe

⁶⁰ Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1977), 229.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 230.

further the party-state's use of the liberation history as a key regional identity philosophy to justify its actions. The LMM is used to create solidarities that have an everlasting impact in people's imaginations. As a populist politician, Mugabe has repeatedly 'sloganeered' at rallies, "Zimbabwe will never be a colony again; the land is the economy and the economy the land; our fist is against white imperialism, it is a fist for the people of Zimbabwe, never a fist against them," etc.⁶² It is in this context that a disturbing unprofessional phenomenon of military elites' open intervention and partisan utterances with regard to political developments has emerged.

Robin Luckham, John Ikpuke, Rocky Williams, Chris Allen and Samuel Decalo among others have analysed why so many governments in SSA have fallen prey to the military. The gap that exists is that postulated theories have failed to account for the systematic interactions amongst key actors that have resulted in the survival of some civilian governments albeit their ineffective and incompetent performances. Also many scholars who have written on these issues have done so only as a digression in a larger study. Scholars have also downplayed the role played by the political party rank-and-file in propping up a regime. Broadly the thesis contributes to a broader regional debate by Jendayi Frazer, Martin Rupiya, Blessing Miles Tendi, Terrence Ranger, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and others on understanding civil-military relations in countries where liberation wars were fought and the emerging new forms of militarism. It attempts to explain the contestations surrounding the Zimbabwean crisis and how the political internal dynamics

⁶²These slogans and statements have been repeated time and again by President Robert Mugabe whilst addressing public rallies.

in Zimbabwe has not led to state collapse and military fragmentation despite the economic meltdown.

Research Methodology

The study is recast in a three-pronged analysis; that is the security-sector game pitting the MLs and the MR&F; the civil-military game that embroils the MLs and the politicians and later on, the civilian game that involve the politicians and the PPR&F. It is in this context that the MLs play a pivotal role in that their actions and decisions have got a bearing on decisions made by the government and the PPR&F, and the MR&F.

To explain the interactions of the four key players I employ the case study design with concentration on desktop, observations and field research. Zimbabwe is used as a case study. This is very essential as Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett among other scholars contend that a case study is a strategy for carrying out research which involves an empirical observation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence or data collection.⁶³ An in-depth case study therefore provides an opportunity for the researcher to remain focused.

The research is qualitative. This is because the data collected is opinion based, based on perceptions, opinions from different people within and outside the military and government. It is descriptive and observatory in nature. It targeted knowledgeable people

⁶³Alexander L. George, Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 67-68, 89-106.

from wide ranging sectors that include the security-sector, civil society officials, and policy makers, politicians in the inclusive government and other existing political parties, and the academia. The qualitative research method is therefore very relevant where perceptions have a greater part in explaining the interactions of the key actors being studied.

The research had a limited number of participants, i.e. soldiers, police, politicians, academics and war veterans and civil society organisations that have knowledge of the military in Zimbabwe. Interviews were conducted with various policy makers in ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations (MDC Tsvangirai and MDC Ncube) and other parties serving and retired members of the security sector and civil society officials and academics in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Participants had knowledge of the phenomena that was being investigated and were able to articulate their views well.

The researcher contacted some face to face expert opinion interviews (EOIs) with individuals who possess information about the military in Zimbabwe. These interviews were very important in that they gave this study originality. Hans Morgenthau observed that states are the most important actors in the international system⁶⁴ hence issues of security are central to state existence; information on SS operations and conduct is thus not made readily available. Noteworthy, the study was carried out when Zimbabwe is battling for the removal of sanctions that are perceived to effectuate regime change by the West in collaboration with the MDC. The party-state has maintained that ‘patriotic citizens’ must fight against the neo-colonial agenda to “recolonize Zimbabwe.” In instances where the

⁶⁴ For more information see, James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981), 98-103.

researcher was able to interview those in the military I could easily tell that some withheld vital information hence the researcher being well aware of bias analysed this information against that provided by key informants. However, the researcher experienced challenges especially to interview members of parliament in the Defence Parliamentary Portfolio Committee (DPPC) who were elusive on hearing my area of study; the political space continues to be polarised. This has been worsened by the intense factional fights within ZANU-PF especially after the expulsion of Joice Mujuru and her supporters. Factionalism has abated now pitting Mnangagwa and the (Generation 40) G40 who are alleged supporters of Grace Mugabe. As will be noted it is still arguably a civil-military confrontation, the Mnangagwa faction representing the military and the G40 the civilians.

Despite all these limitations I was able to carry out the study i.e. interviewing serving and retired key informants in the SS and others through snowballing. I also interviewed some academics and representatives of some civil society groups that have knowledge of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe and some key informants and academics that have contacts in the ZNA. Such information was analysed in conjunction with information published in independent and state controlled newspapers factoring the media polarity and bias in Zimbabwe.

I also prepared open-ended questions that were tailored to infer the ‘answers’ on reasons for military loyalism in Zimbabwe. Appropriate follow up questions were asked and were different depending with the person being interviewed. Interviews are very important in that they provided the basis for an empirically rich dissertation. I also made use of primary

documents produced by the Zimbabwean security-sector, politicians of different political parties, different civil societies, the Zimbabwean government, SADC and the African Union. I also made use of books from the University of Witwatersrand libraries, journal articles in the library and journals and articles on the internet, that is; published research on the Zimbabwean military, politics and civil-military relations. This was very economical in that data was readily available. Below I present the chapter outline.

The thesis is organised in eight chapters. Chapter one is an introduction. Chapter two discusses the literature on civil-military relations in Africa. Chapter three provides background on the military integration after independence, focusing on divisions between ZANLA and ZIPRA. Chapter four focuses on the establishment of civilian control over the military before 2000. Chapter five analyses the impact of the political and economic crisis on civil-military relations-but specifically on why the military-rank-and-file did not rise up against the military leadership and also describes the relationship between the military leaders and the military rank-and-file. Chapter six describes and discusses the relationship between the civilian politicians and the party rank-and-file. Chapter seven presents a comprehensive explanation for the absence of military coups in Zimbabwe. Chapter eight is a brief conclusion.

Chapter 2

Literature Review


In this chapter, I first discuss the causes of military coups and this will be followed by a review of the existing scholarly literature on classic “civil-military relations,” and literature that focuses on “class-based” conflict within the military. This will be followed by a review of literature that focuses on survival mechanisms that are employed by (some) African politicians to ensure that they remain in office. Special attention is given to literature that deals extensively on military ‘subordination to civilian authority.’ This literature is very essential in that it assists in discussing and analysing my case. Rationally the argument is that civilian control of the military is desirable to military control of the state. There is a decline in military coups in Africa but they still occur.

The section below commences by giving a general overview of military coups in Africa and then later on zoom in on the particular problems of countries with hyperinflation. I contend that this section is essential in that it details what has caused military coups in other African Countries. What is worrying about Africa is that though the Southern African Development Community (SADC), African Union(AU) and the United Nations(UN) are against the unconstitutional seizure of power, military coups still remain occur because some African leaders are despotic and aspire being life presidents. Anyangwe, in an inaugural lecture highlighted that 44 of the then 53 (now 54) African countries have

experienced a failed coup or a coup.⁶⁵ The 9 African countries that have not experienced a coup are; Botswana, Djibouti, Eritrea, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania.⁶⁶ The time trend graph below shows successful military coups as well as failed and attempted military coups that have occurred in Africa from 1960 to 2013, the information was derived from Barka and Ncube who traced such occurrences to the year 2012. The information that was used appears in the appendix.

Coups and Non-Coup Occurrences

Figure 2:1: Time Trend Graph Showing Military Coups in Africa



The time-trend graph above shows the frequency of coups in Africa over time without providing country level details that are presented in the appendix section. The coup year is on the horizontal axis while the numbers of coups are on the vertical axis. The blue line shows the total number of coup attempts (successful and unsuccessful and the red shows successful coups only. The occurrence or non-occurrence of military coups depends on the

⁶⁵ Anyangwe, "Revolutionary Overthrow," 5.

⁶⁶Ibid, 64-101.

civil-military relations existent in a particular nation-state. Various views have been put forward by scholars to explain why the military intervene in politics and coup a sitting government explaining why civil-military relations “represent a complex set of inter-relationships, established norms and practices between the armed forces and other social structures.”⁶⁷ A government may be deposed from power because it has failed to address a prevailing social, political or economic crisis culminating in a Hobbesian state of nature.

From the 1960s to date, SSA has witnessed unprecedented levels of conflicts that have resulted in coups in response to economic decline, hyperinflation, greedy, grievance, political and economic exclusion among other reasons. This gives way to military intervention in politics as was the case in Togo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia etc. Paradoxically, military intervention is viewed by the suffering masses and some in opposition political parties as the panacea to the above societal ills and yet the military has not been able to do any miracle to redress such societal ills. This was the case when Sani Abacha of Nigeria was encouraged by people within and outside government to seize power 1994. However as pointed by Patrick McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson coups can happen under any type of political system be it a liberalising or authoritarian government,⁶⁸ thus there are various factors that motivate the military to intervene in politics or to eventually stage a military coup. The table below gives a bird’s eye view on factors that have ignited military coups in some countries and the justifications made by coup executors.

⁶⁷ Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington, *Civil Military Relations* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 31.

⁶⁸ Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, “African Military Coups d’état and Underdevelopment: a Quantitative Historical Analysis.” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 22, no. 4 (1984): 633-666.

Table 2:1 Military Coups: Justifying the illegal⁶⁹

Justifications	Related Issues	Example
Politicians are incompetent. Corruption	• Misrule in general • Have not governed in the interest of the nation • are corrupt • are engaged in politics for self-aggrandizement	Benin (Kerekou, October 1972) Nigeria 1966, 1993
Political struggles	• Have reduced national politics to personal squabbles and machinations • Are greedy for power	Togo (Eyadema, January 1967) Ghana 1966, 1967, 1972
Corruption	• are corrupt • are engaged in politics for self-aggrandizement	Benin (Kerekou, October 1972) Ghana 1981
Economic failures	• have mismanaged the economy • have caused the rise in the cost of living • have failed to raise the standard of living • are guilty of over-spending	Ghana (Ankrah, February 1966) Ghana 1981
Lack of democracy	• are guilty of centralisation of power • have banned or obstructed opposition • have killed democracy • are ruling as dictators	Nigeria (Muhammed, July 1975)

⁶⁹ The Table has been modified by the author to include some coups not included in Wilking's table.

Source: Wiking S, *Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How to Justify the Illegal Assumption of Power* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983), 72-74.

Military intervention in African politics has become a staple diet hence one fascinating feature of military coups is that they may happen even during times of prosperity or during times when economies will be experiencing down-ward trend hence even governments that entice the military through material gains or lucrative salaries are not immune to coups. Governments that mismanage their economies unwittingly make themselves more prone to military coups. Such crises irritate the military and the masses resulting in the execution of coups.

Huntington came up with three major types of military coups namely breakthrough, guardian and veto coups. Guardian coups are executed to avert catastrophe when ‘men’ of the ‘sword,’ the soldiers, come out of their ‘tortoise shells’ because they are called to duty by circumstances beyond their own control, a noble cause to wage “a war” within certain limits, the doctrine of the “temperamenta belli.”⁷⁰ They have to protect their own interests and incidentally that of affected citizens; this is “the corrective military regime” that avails itself to resuscitate the politico-economic environment that will have engulfed the country and promote accountability in public offices,⁷¹ coup conspirators justify their actions as unfortunate inevitabilities that are temporary. Guardian and veto coups are executed by

⁷⁰Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 19.

⁷¹Eboe Hutchful, “New Elements in Militarism: Ethiopia, Ghana and Burkina,” *International Journal* 41, no. 4 (1986): 805.

senior officers while breakthrough coups are in most cases led by junior officers or Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) which result in changes in the army command structures.

Classic Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations are an issue that cannot be ignored as it has a bearing on governance issues because though the military are expected to be apolitical, this has not been the case especially in Africa where it has been very difficult to keep the military out of politics. It is a fact that the military are the servants of the state but what is intriguing is that in Africa some militaries are a threat to civilian governments. As proposed by Timothy Besley and James A. Robinson, CGs must have a strong military and must be able to control it⁷²justifying Plato's ingenious contribution that a civilian government must ensure that the military are confined to the barracks so that politics remain a preserve of the politicians since the military cannot govern.⁷³To achieve such a fit then politicians have to be aware of how soldiers conduct themselves outside the barracks, how they interact with the general populace; and whether they abide to their institution's defence act and the country's constitution⁷⁴to guard against the military becoming a law unto themselves.

Samuel Huntington provided a framework for analysing and understanding professional civil-military relations with two crucial aspects of control that are; (i) politicisation of the military by ensuring that promotion is dependent on political contacts which is "subjective

⁷² Timothy Besley and James A. Robinson, "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian Control over the Military," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8 (April-May 2010): 655.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Goodpaster and Huntington, "Civil-Military," *Op. Cit.*, 31.

control.” Such a control mechanism involves “civilianising the military making them the mirror of the state.” (ii) Through “objective control” the military are allowed some kind of autonomy over military tactical and operational details. However what Huntington did not consider was that the civilians can strategically interfere in the operations of the military at the same time leaving the military organization untainted. This is what is regarded as assertive control.⁷⁵ However these control mechanisms are dependent on the health and consistency of elite civil-military relations.⁷⁶ Literature on classic civil-military relations assists me in coming up with an analytical framework to analyse the interactions between the CG and the MLs; the MLs and the MR&F in Zimbabwe: showing how the party-state has survived. Samuel Finer, Morris Janowitz, Eliot A. Cohen among others contends that the military officers have shed the image of pure and apolitical expertise once ascribed to them thus the military are a key player especially in determining civil-military dynamics.⁷⁷ Below is a description of how I will use the “nested game” as an analytical framework.

⁷⁵ Clemmensen, *Op. Cit.*, 32.

⁷⁶ Clemmensen, *Op. Cit.*, 8-9.

⁷⁷ Bi Zhaohui, “*Coup Threat and Income Redistributive Policy of Post-Democratization*,” (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Japan): 1-4.

Figure 2:2 The 'Nested Game' Framework




Figure 2.2 above portrays the interactions between three main (sets of) actors in Zimbabwe: (1) civilian political leadership; (2) security-sector leadership; and (3) security-sector rank and file. The military and the CG are involved in interactions that can be explained as “nested games.” On one hand is the “security-sector” game which involves the MLs and the MR&F and on the other the “civil-military game” that links the MLs and the civilian political leadership. The two sets of actors are self-interested and take into account the fact that outcomes depend not only on their own behaviour but also on the behaviour of the other actor. Put another way, all actors know that the two games are linked, and that their best options in one game might depend on what is happening in the other one for example in a potential “class-based” conflict within the military, if the security-sector leadership is under genuine threat of a populist revolt within the military, it might be able to ‘cut’ a better deal than otherwise with politicians in the civil-military game. The MLs and the CG must therefore be aware of preferences of all actors involved in the “nested game” for

negotiations that benefit all involved to hold. The government can decide to give in to the demands of the military to remain politically afloat and simultaneously control the behaviour of the military. Accordingly, the politicians must not cede a lot of power to the men in uniform as this might entice them to takeover power. However, it must be pointed out that the military can be motivated to revolt if the benefits of revolting are larger than that of maintaining the status quo. However, if the government fails to manage the payoffs then this impacts ‘negatively’ on the interactions between the MLs and the MR&F and the CG and the MLs. Politicians can choose on ‘sharing power’ and resources with the MLs and the MR&F. It can also choose a strategy of reducing its dependency on the military thus “if the military is professionalised and not factionalised, commanding officers can make binding commitments on behalf of the rest of the military.”⁷⁸ The game theory approach starts by assuming that military and civilian leaders are “strategically rational” and tries to identify conditions under which they would cooperate.

Rationally when public support decreases the ruling elite becomes more dependent on the military and therefore increases the armed forces’ power in the interactions though both have bargaining power but, this is not to discount the importance of the MR&F. The MR&F must be treated with caution and sensitivity for they have the power to demand where they used to request and if their demands are not met they may capture and subject both the MLs and the politicians to MR&F wrath. Threats by the MR&F must therefore be taken as credible and commitments must always be made so that the SSR&F will not be like a mad dog let loose. Notably, when the MLs fail to control the behaviour of junior officers in the

⁷⁸ Geddes, “How the Military,” *Op. Cit.*, 12.

army then they cannot make credible promises to the politicians that they will not be exposed to the rage of the MR&F.

For politicians to be politically secure they must be prudent and pragmatic enough to direct the military without encroaching on their rights which would in the process force them to intervene in the running of state affairs. The crux of the matter is that many civilian governments derive their power from the military and therefore have to be concerned with the behaviour of the securocrats ‘at all times.’ However, the adverse effects of political and economic crises are that the military may become politicized and militarized endangering the survival of the CG thus politicians have to be active players if they are to remain in office.⁷⁹ Politicians must be very observant and tactful so that they are masters of ‘the game’ monitoring interactions between the MLs and the MR&F by meddling in decisions made by the MLs.⁸⁰

Africa has witnessed an increasing divide between ordinary civilians and the military mainly because the military are not respecting the democratic right of the masses to choose and vote for a leader of their own choice. Arguably the crusade towards the democratisation of the colonial military’s mentality and operational excesses that were firmly entrenched in extreme use of violence have continued to hold some sitting presidents ‘hostage. However, healthy civil-military interactions are maintained by implementing unobscured

⁷⁹ Daniel Sutter, A Game Theoretic Model of the Coup D’état, *Journal of Economics and Politics* 12, no. 2 (July 2000): 207.

⁸⁰ J. Rahbeck-Clemmensen, “Beyond “The Soldier and the State,” The Theoretical Framework of Elite Civil-Military Relations” (PhD Thes. London School of Economics and Political Science, August 2013). 10.

principles of interaction. Essentially though it may reflect some unequal dialogue between the military and politicians the politicians must have the final say especially with regards to political actions.

Civil-military interactions are cast in a 'superior-subordinate' relationship with specific obligations to the other. On one hand, superiors in a relationship are expected to show a selfless attitude towards those under their command and on the other hand the subordinates are also expected to respect their superiors. Ideally those in command cannot avoid reliance on those under them for support and 'advice.' This is why in democratic countries both the military and the politicians swear to uphold their respective 'institutional oaths' and countries' constitutions. Johanna M. Forman and Claude Welch assert that there is a relative distribution of power between politicians in government and the armed forces of a country. Such politico-military relations are embodied in "all aspects of the role of the military as a professional, political, social and economic institution in the entire gambit of national life."⁸¹ Notably the distribution of power is seen when one assesses the relative influence of the military and politicians in decisions that are arrived at concerning state security against foreign intrusion and military policy inter-alia.⁸² Interactions between politicians and the MLs and the MR&F are top-down, even though that relationship might seem "unnatural."

⁸¹ Matereke and Moghazy, "Mugabe and the military," *Op. Cit.*, 250.

⁸² Johanna M. Forman and Claude Welch, *Civil-Military Relations: USAID's Role* (Washington DC: Centre for Democracy and Governance, July 1998), 7.

The western model of civil-military relations connote that the military cannot openly involve themselves in politics. It must willingly and unequivocally submit itself to the civilian political elite supremacy. The separation of power between the politicians and the military is distinct as the “military’s respect for civilian control is a kind of moral obligation of soldiers.”⁸³ Political decision-making is therefore a prerogative or exclusive province that must entirely be left in the hands of politicians. If the military become partisan and embroil themselves in electoral politics trying to influence or force the citizens of their country to vote for a particular leader, they are not professional. Agbese states that the military are constrained by law such that in practice they are thus not permitted to exercise the responsibilities of politicians.⁸⁴ The minister of defence is the civilian head controlling the armed forces answerable to his country’s head of state who is the commander-in-Chief. Through training, orientation and indoctrination, the military is compelled to accept the principles of civilian supremacy over the armed forces and as professed by Huntington military professionalism predisposes the military to matters of military concern.⁸⁵ According to this model, soldiers do not aspire to rule as politicians but are ‘contented’ with just being defenders of their country against aggression. To think that the military in Africa will only be interested in defending their countries’ sovereignty and not entertain being involved in politics is fantasy hence Huntington’s proposition becomes ‘dead literature.’

⁸³ K. Klemp and C. Hurdlin, “Civil supremacy over the military: its nature and its limits,” *Armed Forces and Society* 19, no. 1 (Fall 1994) 7.

⁸⁴ Agbese, “Democratic,” *Op. Cit.*, 188.

⁸⁵ Huntington, “The Soldier,” *Op. Cit.*, 87.

The communist civil-military model is different from the Western model in that the interactions between the military officers and the politicians are firmly entrenched in the party. The military are the political muscle that assists the party-politicians to maintain hegemony of state affairs and its citizens. Amos Perlmutter correctly stresses that in communist countries it is not absurd that the military are under the state's armpit.⁸⁶ Through the party, the military participate in politics. In this model, military participation in politics is the natural state of affairs in the party system, "as a guardian of the heroic party and the ruling political ideology, and as a potential coercive instrument, the army in the party-state is ipso-facto politically oriented and dependent on the party."⁸⁷ This model does not assume the political neutrality of the armed forces as envisaged and encouraged in the Western or classic model.

Rebecca L. Schiff's concordance theory connotes a triad cooperation of the military, the ruling politicians and the citizenry. The three actors have a cooperative relationship "that may or may not involve separation of political and military institutions, but does not require it."⁸⁸ The Concordance theory thus gives premise to the contextual set up in understanding relations between the military and society and this is embedded in a country's customs, norms, military style and the involvement of the people in the day to day running of affairs of the state as partners. How this is arrived at is entirely dependent on the nature of that society, its institutions and culture,⁸⁹ thus, the concordance theory is very relevant and

⁸⁶ Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (London: Yale University Press, 1977), 324-325.

⁸⁷ Agbese, "Democratic. *Cit.*, 189.

⁸⁸ Rebecca L. Schiff, "Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism," *Armed Forces and Society* 23 (winter 1996): 277-283.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

applicable to understanding civil-military relations in Zimbabwe in which the military, the ruling politicians and the citizenry work together for the survival of the party-state.⁹⁰ Having discussed the literature on classic civil-military relations it is therefore plausible to give a bird's eye view of literature on "class-based" conflict within the military that will be buttressed by the example of Ghana's radical populist military revolt. In 1966 a coup took place in Nigeria and was executed by junior officers who removed Nnamdi Azikiwe who was the President and his Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who they accused of being corrupt. The officers were led by Major Chukwuma K. Nzeogwu whose justification for the coup was "corruption that could only be destroyed by violent means."⁹¹ Eleven senior politicians and two soldiers were assassinated. In an interview Major Nzeogwu attested that for the sake of development and stability some politicians and soldiers had to be sacrificed. The coup conspirators who were led by Nzeogwu were Majors Timoth Onwuatiegwu, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Chris Anufovo, Don Okafo, Adewale Ademoyeba, Hamphrey Chukwuka, and Captains Emmanuel Nwobosi, Ben Gbudie and Ogbu Oji. Major Nzeogwu later on surrendered to General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi and justified his action saying:

I was being sensible, there would have been a civil war, as the official head of the army he would have split the loyalty of my men. Our purpose was to change our country and make it a place we could be proud to call our home, not to wage war.⁹²

⁹⁰ Col. Dr. M. Chinyanganya, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, 14th October 2015.

⁹¹ Abusidiqu, "The Inside story of Nigeria's First Military Coup (Part 1)," [http: www.abusidiqu.com/the-inside-story-of-nigeria-s-first-military-coup-part-1/](http://www.abusidiqu.com/the-inside-story-of-nigeria-s-first-military-coup-part-1/) also see Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

⁹² Dennis Ejindu, "Interview with Major Nzeogwu," May 1967.

According to Julius Ihonvbere the ‘men of the sword’ “developed a vicious romance with politics, fell in love with it and developed very intricate networks to reproduce its hegemony and its manipulation of Nigeria’s political life.”⁹³ It was to take very long before the military returned to the barracks because of recurrent military coups (see Appendix 1). As later alluded to by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo; the reason why the military failed to break the coup cycle was that the military was too ambitious politically that it could not avoid succeeding itself. In April 1990 Lieutenant General Sani Abacha (a veteran coup plotter) foiled a coup that was attempted by junior officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Nyicom, Major Saliba Mukoro and Major Gideon Orkar who were unhappy about the treatment of some Nigerian generals who had faithfully served the Babangida administration especially General Domkat Bali. Though General Abacha thwarted the junior officers attempted coup he himself came to power in 1993 through a palace coup. Abacha’s coup came as a relief to many Nigerians who were unhappy of the conduct of politicians who were only interested in fattening their pockets as well as General Ibrahim Babangida whose tenure was characterised by severe economic deterioration and corruption.⁹⁴

In Ethiopia insurrections were triggered by the Selassie government’s failure to address the negative effects of the Wollo 1973 famine fomenting divisions within government. The situation was worsened by the rise in oil prices that culminated in hardships that drove University students and taxi drivers into the streets. On 12 January 1974 rank-and-file

⁹³ Julius O. Ihonvbere, “The Military and Nigerian Society: The Abacha Coup and Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria,” in *The Military and Militarism in Africa*, ed. Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (Senegal: CODESRIA, 1988), 508.

⁹⁴ Ihonvbere, “The Military and Nigeria,” *Op. Cit.*, 516-531.

soldiers of the Negele Boran garrison rebelled citing bad food, lack of drinking water and uninhabitable conditions in the barracks.⁹⁵ This was followed by NCOs in the Air Force and spread to other units who were unhappy about their low salaries. Haile Selassie tried to appease the mutineers by raising their salaries but teachers also began to strike and were later joined by NCOs in the Army's Second Division. The radical military officers circulated leaflets stating political demands that resonated with the general populace. They called for land reforms, multi-partyism and the arresting and trial of government and military officials involved in corrupt activities. They set up a committee to preside and oversee the implementation of their demands, thus the Derg, a committee that was an amalgam of representatives of the Armed Forces, Police and Territorial Army was established on the 28th of June 1974. NCOs and enlisted men were the majority with only 49 officers.⁹⁶

The Derg being led by Colonel Mengistu investigated abuses by senior officers. The aim of the Derg was 'to root out corruption' in the military and government. Other leaders of the Derg were Major Sisay Habte and Captain Alemayehu. Major Habte was a liberalist who was pushing for the maintenance of cordial relations with the United States of America and other capitalist countries in Europe. Captain Alemayehu Haile supported the handing over of power to a civilian government and supported the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party and detested Colonel Mengistu's naked ambition. He enjoyed the support of fellow Derg members like Colonel Asrat, Colonel Hiruy and Captain Moges. Colonel Mengistu's

⁹⁵ Theodore M. Vestal, "The Lost opportunity for Ethiopia: The Failure to Move toward Democratic Governance," *International Journal of African Development* 1, no. 1 (2013): 46-47.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 50.

support base was the rank and file members of the council whom he had promised power.⁹⁷ Many people became victims of bloody assassinations that took place in what is known as the White terror and the Red terror. These bloody skirmishes were ignited by the differences amongst the Derg leaders.

The first casualties of Colonel Mengistu's political shenanigans were Major Sisay Habte, Brigadier General Getachew Nadew and others but political differences between the Derg and Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) escalated especially after Mengistu survived an assassination attempt. There was a breakdown of law and order as opponents shot each other in broad day-light ushering in a period known as the red terror where soldiers disregard of the command was uttermost while Mengistu's killer squads battled it out in the streets with EPRP assassins. It was in February 1977 that Mengistu removed political stumbling blocks to his ascendance to power by executing Brigadier General Tefari Banti, Lieutenant Colonel Asrat Desta, Lieutenant Colonel Hiruy Halesellassie, Captain Moges Woldemichael, Captain Alemayehu Hile, Corporal Haile Belay and others. Corpses were deliberately left to rot in the street.⁹⁸ Having been able to outmanoeuvre and assassinate his enemies Mengistu became the new Ethiopian dictator. Having briefly discussed the Nigerian and Ethiopian class-based military revolts I now make a more detailed discussion of a populist military revolt in Ghana.

⁹⁷ Dawit Shifaw, *The Diary of Terror: Ethiopia 1974 to 1991* (USA & Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2012), 38-55.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

Ghana was the first country south of the Sahara to gain independence and ironically is also one of the countries that have been subjected to military coups and counter coups. Kristen A. Harkness notes that the ten military coups that occurred in Ghana culminated in social and political decadence, years of military domination; pandemonium and bloodshed.⁹⁹ Notably as depicted in table 1, she was including successful coups and failed or attempted coups. From the time Ghana got its independence it was stuck in a coup trap until recently because the different Ghanaian ethnic groups were politicised according to ethnic lines. Kwame Nkrumah being an avowed Pan-Africanist tried his best to no avail to have a political party and government institutions that transcended ethnic divisions. Albeit his laudable efforts he failed to have a practicable political solution to the ethnicity problem in Ghana. Trying to unite the political and military leaders under his authority was mere wishful thinking because “cleavages between clans, tribes and nations have been an outstanding characteristic of African political life before, during and after colonialism.”¹⁰⁰

Nkrumah faced factional resistance from the army and two elimination attempts from Ga military officers forced him to abandon the ethnic neutrality vision that he had. After having been forced by circumstances beyond his control he succumbed to benefaction politics and in an effort to secure his leadership position he started appointing and promoting soldiers who belonged to his own ethnic group and became a prisoner of patronage politics. He made the mistake of trying to personalise his rulership and made many enemies. Instead of being secure he was coupé by General Emmanuel Kotoko,

⁹⁹ Harkness, “The Origins.” 148.

¹⁰⁰ Jonathan N. Moyo, *The Politics of Administration: Understanding Bureaucracy in Africa*, (Harare: SAPES, 1992), 4.

Lieutenant General Ankra and Police Inspector-General Hardley; Ewe Officers, in 1966, ushering into Ghanaian history recurrent coups and the purging of military officers due in the main to tribal differences and unbridled overt power ambitions. The Ga, Akan and Ewe factions established a military government under the National Liberation Council (NLC) promoting Ewe dominance in the military. General Kotoka died in a coup that was lodged in 1967. Notably the coupists' motivations were 'genuinely' for corporate interests:

the gluttony of young officers at the top of the military hierarchy, a result of rounds of mass promotions, one under Nkrumah and the other immediately after the 1st coup, created a promotion blockage, likely to last quite some time. This meant that junior officers would not experience the rapid rise of the immediate superiors, who were very close in age to them, and also faced the real possibility of unending career stagnation.¹⁰¹

The coupists later admitted that they wanted to get rid of all officers above the rank of Colonel. Akan officers later seized power from Dr. Busia in 1972 and Lieutenant-Colonel Ignatius Acheampong, an Ashanti came to power. The motivations for that coup were: internal divisions within the military on tribal lines, military budget reductions and economic deterioration. Lieutenant-Colonel Acheampong later remarked, "I watched the seed of tribal conflict being slowly sown by the actions of the Busia regime and with the blood of millions of our Nigerian brothers to warn us, I acted to nip the threat in the bud."

Acheampong and his fellow coupists established a military junta called the National Redemption Council (NRC) and subsequently held a referendum to gauge the views of the

¹⁰¹ Harkness, "The Origins". *Op.Cit.* 163.

people on his intention to hand over power to a civilian government. This opened a ‘Pandora box’ as Ghanaians viewed this as a deliberate ploy by Acheampong to maintain the military regime in power. In 1978 Major General F.W.K Akuffo came into power after having “encouraged Acheampong to resign.” In 1979 Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings made two subsequent coup attempts. The 1st coup did not succeed while the 2nd was a success. The major reason behind the coup was to “clean the house.” Rod Alence states that in the early 1980s Ghana experienced a severe economic meltdown and on the 31st of December 1981 Rawlings seized power from Dr. Hilla Liman’s civilian government¹⁰² as the country experienced a severe economic meltdown. Apparently;

Persistent high rates of domestic monetary expansion fuelled inflation that hit triple digits in 1981. By that time the currency’s value had depreciated to where one-cedi and fifty-pesewa coins were worth much more as scrap metal than as legal tender.... many businesspeople lacking the patience or personal connections to acquire foreign exchange through the government’s control system instead wended their way through a labyrinth of dust alleys to haggle with illicit dealers.¹⁰³

The motivation for the coup as aforementioned was to put things right. It was clearly advanced by the prosecutor who;

Told the story of a junior officer, disillusioned about the injustices in society, more particularly under the Acheampong government.... Rawlings’s argument was that, it

¹⁰² Rod Alence, “The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Post-Colonial Ghana: Black Markets and the State, 1957-84” (PhD Thes. Stanford University, 2001). 187.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 189.

sounded rather foolish for one to ask him of his aims when people were dying of starvation in the teeth of a well-fed, who even had the chance of getting fatter.¹⁰⁴

It cannot be disputed that the military mutineers were against their superiors both in the military and government who continued to enrich themselves at the expense of the Ghanaian masses. Beneficiaries of corrupt practices were the targets; were removed from public office and were replaced with ‘patriotic Ghanaians’ who were committed to bettering the lives of the ordinary Ghanaian citizens. Rawlings’s “solution was to try to find the right people in the right places to do the right thing.”¹⁰⁵ The purges that took place showed the radical nature of the MR&F, it was a clean-up operation that was to put Ghana on a new socio-political and economic path being led by junior military personnel in an endeavour to do away with kleptocracy and in the process try to stimulate economic development. Having briefly described causes of military coups and having given Ghana as a case and example of a “class-based” conflict within the military that culminated in a radical populist military revolt; below I discuss the restraining mechanisms that can be used by politicians to ensure military loyalty.

Political upheavals in SSA have resulted in recurrent and unparalleled increases in military interventions in politics. Questions do arise whether it is the military in Africa that is refusing to transform or it is the politicians themselves who do not want the military to be reformed. As has already been pointed out it is generally agreed by civil-military scholars

¹⁰⁴Ibid, 202.

¹⁰⁵Ibid, 204-205.

that military involvement in national politics is not accidental. It is because of the ‘political push and pull factors of military interventionism’ that:

Sub-Saharan African region provides an interesting laboratory for civil-military relations innovations informed by its colonial inheritance, which significantly includes the fact that the characteristic role of the armed forces was to repress the majority peoples while supporting the status quo.¹⁰⁶

However, this is complicated since every man is a political animal and given that politics is not a game of angels. The politicians therefore need to make certain that the military cooperate and yet this is the greatest challenge.¹⁰⁷ Arguably the challenge is that it requires a lot of pragmatism to try to let the ‘political animus dominandi’ in the military personnel remain dormant hence control over the uniformed forces is done through a range of subjective interfaces and partnerships which become an expression of these power relations.¹⁰⁸ Politicians try to keep a firm grip on their military so that they are always conscious of what happens in the barracks as periods of intense eco-political crises have considerable impact on the behaviour of the military in potentially two diametrically opposed ways; that is the military can notoriously defend the CG or rebel against it.

Different mechanisms are thus employed by politicians to keep the members of the military loyal to them albeit that it differs from country to country as what works in one country

¹⁰⁶Rupiya, “The Military Factor,” *Op. Cit.*, 10.

¹⁰⁷Geddes, “Party Creation as an Autocratic Survival Strategy,” presented Conference on Dictators, Princeton University, 2008, 2-5.

¹⁰⁸Rocky Williams, “Conclusion: Mapping a new African civil-military relations architecture,” (ISS working paper), 266.

may be disastrous in another. Politicians in Africa have realised that access to the highest office through patronage or by being part of the ruling clique comes with immense benefits. This motivates politicians to devise strategies to guarantee their political survival. Survival tactics range from their maintenance of a one-party state as was the case in Zambia; rigging elections, the use of violence. At times the military are rewarded materially because civil-military relations are the ‘linchpin’ of political life in all nation-states.¹⁰⁹

Some politicians and the military may be involved in a protection racket whereby the CG “buys” the military to avert mayhem or being dislodged from power.¹¹⁰ In countries where such kind of pay-offs take place the military may become very notorious in defending the sitting government hence politicians may pay off the military as a guarantee for military loyalty.¹¹¹ Apart from an increase in military pay and benefits the politicians may co-opt the officers by promoting the military personnel’s economic interests.¹¹² Such instrumental pay-offs are done to buy the allegiance of the military by ensuring their material satisfaction and these range from farms, houses, cars and other economic resources. Interestingly enough, some members of the military are politically seduced by being appointed to ‘influential’¹¹³ government and party positions like what happened in Uganda during Milton Obote’s reign. However, such manipulation of military appointments to favour

¹⁰⁹Thomas Bruneau and F.C. Mateu, ed. *Review: Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, Routledge, (2013): 2-3.

¹¹⁰ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Coups Traps: Why does Africa have so many Coups d’état?” Preliminary *Draft*. Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, August 2005): 4-8.

¹¹¹ For more information see; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Robin Luckham, Samuel Decalo, Eboe Hutchful among others has also written extensively on civilian governments and military pay-offs.

¹¹²Frazer, “Sustaining civilian,” *Op. Cit.*, 23.

¹¹³ The emphasis is mine.

politically and ethnically reliable and ‘supportive’ forces failed to guarantee Obote’s political survival.

David Goldsworthy assert that while economic co-optation is rare; ascriptive recruitments and promotions of officers are the most used techniques to control the military¹¹⁴a perception shared by Samuel Decalo that;

Giving the military officers material benefits unites the corporate and individual financial self-interest of the military with those of the civilian authority, wards off the surfacing of political aspirations among the officer corps and unites the support of the armed forces to the survival and stability of the current civilian regime.¹¹⁵

In Ethiopia, though Mengistu had initially enjoyed a false sense of security by giving pleasantries to both the rank and file in the army and other senior officers whom he had appointed through patronage, he was deposed in a coup. Notably, though economic co-optation cannot be ruled out in CG and MLs interactions, such a restraining mechanism has increasingly become difficult especially during times of intense economic deterioration or hyperinflation. Frazer observed that in periods of low economic expansion where the economy has contracted to levels that cannot be sustainable, there are fewer resources to distribute and this has a bearing on civil-military relations.

¹¹⁴ David Goldsworthy, “Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa.” *African Affairs* 80, no. 8 (1979): 49-74.

¹¹⁵ Samuel Decalo, “Coups and Army Rule,” *Op. Cit.*, 1990, 41

Frazer's argument though appealing has got some weaknesses. The weakness of the resource distribution approach is that it is "less able to provide an account of the internal dynamics within the military."¹¹⁶ Frazer overlooked a scenario where the MEs are the only beneficiaries, and since the ordinary soldiers do not have access to keys to the munitions stores it becomes an uphill task for them to mutiny. The Zimbabwean situation therefore becomes very interesting in that given the biting sanctions, lack of financial bail-outs from international financial institutions and hyperinflation; the situation became 'grave' that many observers thought the military were going to revolt, but they have not. Something definitely dissuaded them from rebelling.

Politicians try to build credibility in the eyes of the masses and the military through wage increases, control of prices of commodities and refusal to devalue the national currency while disseminating populist rhetoric and policies among other measures. However such policies are expedient politically in the short term but in the long run they are unsustainable. This is exemplified by one of the socialist groupings that were involved in the Ghanaian economic policy debate that plausibly argued that, "price and financial irrationality has never helped any economy, but leads to instability and ruin,"¹¹⁷ as was the case in Chile and Peru under Salvador Allende and Alan Garcia whose populist policies were tragic.¹¹⁸ Even in Ghana, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, populist policies had disastrous consequences when hijacked by opportunists. Rawlings and Sankara as populists made efforts to negotiate

¹¹⁶ Chris Allen, "Warfare, endemic violence," *Op. Cit.*, 376

¹¹⁷ Rod Alence, "Colonial Government, Social Conflict and State Involvement in Africa's Open Economies; the Origins of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, 1939-1946," *Journal of African History* 42, no. 3 (2001): 187.

¹¹⁸ Rudiger Dornsbuch and Sebastian Edwards, "The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America." (Working papers, Macroeconomic Adjustment and Growth Division, Country Economics Department, World Bank, December 1986) 2. Accessed October 15, 2009.

legitimacy by setting up mass-based structures of popular power to support and defend their revolutions. It must be noted that these policies were in the long run self-defeating. In Ghana “the defence committees became the battlegrounds for different political tendencies, being penetrated by ‘reactionaries’ and ‘opportunists’ and by revolutionaries,”¹¹⁹ and in Burkina Faso it resulted in the tragic assassination of Thomas Sankara.

One other control mechanism is that of party-political interpenetration that plays a vital role in guaranteeing loyalty and subordination of the armed forces. Another control strategy that has been used by politicians is that of purging military personnel perceived rivals and covertly encouraging disunity through patronage and tribal affiliations. Sankara in Burkina Faso and Mengistu in Ethiopia gained political office and control over military by tactfully rupturing the military command structures. Once in power they strategically eliminated military officers they perceived military malcontents.

Domestic and international threats facing a government can also shape civil-military relations in a country. As already noted Mugabe has repeatedly argued that America, Britain and their allies are bent on trying to force “a regime change” on Harare; did this have a bearing on civil-military interactions in Zimbabwe? Frazer claims that:

In countries where liberation wars were fought there is provision of favourable conditions for the development of institutional mechanisms that reduce the probability of successful coups. Civilian control can be established and maintained through at least three different though interrelated methods: 1) establishing structural or institutional

¹¹⁹Hutchful, “New Elements,” *Op. Cit.*, 819

counterweights to balance and minimize military power; 2) encouraging an attitude of loyalty among the armed forces through socialization and homogenization and; 3) the leadership exercising political skill in the use of rewards and sanctions to balance contending forces within society and promote civilian authority over the armed forces.¹²⁰

Can Frazer's observation explain the Zimbabwean case? Have some army battalions or the quasi-military forces been used to act as counterweights to the Zimbabwe regular units? Questions that arise and are explored in the thesis are; how has the Zimbabwean civilian government been able to keep the military leaders; the military rank-and-file and the political party rank-and-file within defined boundaries? What socialization techniques have politicians employed to maintain 'military loyalty while making sure that there is no government or military fragmentation?

This chapter reviewed literature on "classic" civil-military relations, class-based conflicts within the military leading to radical populist revolts as well as literature on control mechanisms used by different civilian governments in Africa to ensure military subordination to the politicians. Politicians use patronage politics and at times 'buy' the military by rewarding them with pleasantries for their support but then this is not a guarantee that the military will not revolt or intervene in politics. Huntington came up with some crucial aspects of politicians' control of the military that are; politicization of the military through promotion that is dependent on presidential appointments which is characteristically "subjective control," the military are civilianised and become 'copycats'

¹²⁰ Frazer, "Sustaining civilian," *Op. Cit.*, 38-39.

of the ruling politicians. Another control mechanism is that of “objective control” where the military are allowed some kind of autonomy over military issues.

The literature has also shown that the military are not merely instruments or pawns in the political game. Regime survival can also be determined by instrumental ‘pay-offs.’ The literature has also shown that many post-independent African governments have continued to use the military as they were used during colonialism; that is enhancing regime survival. The next Chapter describes the interactions of the politicians and the military in Zimbabwe before the crisis.

Chapter 3

Civil-Military Relations before the Crisis

Soldiers occupy a very crucial position in society. As an institution, they are a pillar of government that is mandated to maintain security so that there is an enabling environment that necessitates development. The soldiers are thus expected to put the interests of the nation-state and its people ahead of their own; they ‘voluntarily give away’ certain civil rights as they become defenders of their country’s interests. From 1980 the ZANU-PF government had the task of integrating the former warring armies in an effort to build a new professional army loyal to the new government. These former adversary armies were all politicised, with the Rhodesian forces looking down upon the guerrilla armies as inferior and terrorists. The guerrilla forces viewed the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSFs) as an enemy that had been defeated and unfit to command them. As with guerrilla armies themselves, former Zimbabwe Independent People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) cadres regarded themselves superior to their Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) counterparts. ZANLA forces on the other hand saw themselves as superior by virtue of them being the governing party. How then did Mugabe manage to integrate the different armies in a way that was advantageous to his party’s interests?

To comprehend this politico-military development, it is therefore logical to explore this evolution prior to Zimbabwe becoming a sovereign nation-state governed by black African nationalists. This chapter therefore describes the relationship between the Zimbabwean civilian government and the military leaders and that of the military leaders and the military

rank-and-file before 2000. This is very essential in that it provides the much-needed background information that assists in analysing whether civil-military relations in Zimbabwe have followed a certain developmental progression. It shows the genesis and historical development of symbiotic politico-military interactions that begun before independence. I commence by outlining what is expected of military leaders and the ordinary soldiers in the execution of their duties. This is followed by a description of guerrilla armies, (ZANLA and ZIPRA), and the Rhodesian security forces before the attainment of independence, then the formation of the ZNA in 1980 and discusses how the military have interacted with the politicians before 2000.

The role of the ZDF is to defend Zimbabwe's territorial integrity, its independence and national interests. The military are thus given the impeccable task to jealously guard Zimbabwean interests. It is beyond dispute that Zimbabwe's interests have come to be defined in Mugabe's lenses. The interaction between the politicians and the military leaders is hinged on the 'reciprocal interests' of actors. It must be pointed from the outset that there must be a clear chain of command between the civilian overseers and the uniformed officers.¹²¹ In accordance to the military culture and doctrines the soldier rank-and-file and commissioned officers are mandated to follow orders from their superiors unconditionally.¹²² Rather the military has become a partisan institution devoted to upholding the supremacy of the party though it was an amalgam of national liberation armies who fought against the Smith racist regime.

¹²¹ Leonard Wong, Civil-Military Relations in a Post-9/11 World, U.S. Army War College, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Colloquium brief, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>, .1.

¹²² Michael C. Desch, "Threat Environments and Military Missions" in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, 1996, 13-14.

However, the president of any country may have a healthy relationship with the military if he takes them into his/her confidence and always makes it clear why certain decisions are made. If the president as the commander-in-chief does not closely work with parliament on defence matters, the military will have a seam to exploit as they consider themselves answerable only to the executive. Chinyanganya submits that the president of any country must work closely with parliament and a national defence team that understands the military.¹²³ A Commander-in-chief has the obligation of treating the military personnel under his command with genuine respect while holding them accountable for their actions; trying not to do so is dangerous for it destroys trust between the interacting parties explaining why few secretaries of defence survive their tenure.¹²⁴ This is because many roles of the secretaries require good relations with the president, parliament and the military. The best secretaries of defence are revolutionaries who are bent on improving the welfare of the military, team players, and problem solvers who defend the institution rather than merely advocating the president's agenda.¹²⁵

Leonard Wong contends that due to a strong "can do" spirit and a well-engrained, albeit simplistic, notion of civilian control, senior military leaders are reluctant to publicly share their disagreement with the ruling politicians. The argument is that many senior officers mistakenly believe that there are no alternatives other than silently executing orders,

¹²³ Dr. Col. Max Chinyanganya, interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, Harare, 14th October, 2015.

¹²⁴ Agbese, "Democratic," *Op. Cit.*, 189.

¹²⁵ Wong, "Civil-Military," *Op. Cit.*, 2.

resigning, or retiring.¹²⁶ But military leaders can choose among many alternatives. Before the military leaders choose a course of action to take they must first consider trust with the populace in their country, trust with civilians in parliament and the executive branch, and trust with subordinates in the profession. This in-turn guides them on whether they have to acquiesce, resign in protest or out-rightly disobey and “skin the cat” where appropriate.¹²⁷ The military leaders and the military rank-and-file adhere to a military culture. Notably ‘culture’ as an aspect of military organisation has drawn increased attention. Civil-Military researchers concur that many of the important decisions that are made by military officers and politicians are determined by their history, values and traditions that they cherish and are moulded by the societies to which they are part of. It is therefore logical to interrogate how the Zimbabwe civil-military relations have followed a ‘culture of authoritarianism’ that has had a lasting effect on the decisions made by both the politicians and the military leaders

What explains the “high visibility” of the security sector in politics may be the notion that power in politics cannot always be viewed as a zero-sum game. It is therefore important to understand both the military and civilian cultures. Serving military generals in the ZNA view their role as not only that of giving military advice, but that of ‘setting things right’. Loyalty to political leaders in the ZNA may therefore be a result of increased politicisation. Interestingly enough, the ZNA has a ‘harmonious’ relationship with the executive, and a weak relationship with Parliament, and a relationship with society that is ‘acrimonious’ a relationship characterised by fear of the military. However, one must not lose sight of

¹²⁶Ibid, 3.

¹²⁷Ibid.

Finer's observation that the military have three notable advantages over civilians and these are;

- Superiority over organisational unity
- A highly emotional symbolic status and
- Its superiority in the means of applying force.¹²⁸

It must be pointed out that despite the advantages that the military have over the civilians they have got to be highly disciplined as this calls for unquestionable obedience on the part of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers to their superiors both military and civilian. Military personnel are therefore taught that:

- Officers and enlisted officers have specific obligations towards each other.
- Commissioned officers must cherish and respect their subordinates and always take cognisance and care of their physical and psychological needs.
- The soldiers in the rank and file are taught to unconditionally obey orders and give their superiors unquestioning respect.
- The military rank-and-file must be more supportive and must execute the directives that are given them from above.

Ou Guozheng et.al succinctly summed up all the above views by submitting that:

¹²⁸Finer, "A Man," *Op. Cit.*, 6.

Respecting officers and loving enlisted personnel is the concrete embodiment of the principle of unity between officers and men. Its basic spirit is that officers should cherish soldiers, and be concerned about their maturation and advancement as well as their food and clothing and daily life; soldiers should respect officers, obey their leadership and support their work.¹²⁹

The question that arises is whether the soldiers have any options available when confronted with flawed policy formulation? How did the military elites and the ordinary soldiers not make an effort to be heard with-regards to the day to day running of the state in Zimbabwe apart from simply executing orders that they are given. Can the Zimbabwe military therefore be characterised as a dog that has not barked? To understand the Zimbabwe elite civil-military dynamics one needs to have a background knowledge of the country's complex civil-military historiography and the psyche of its people that still shape the civil-military interactions to date.

The Rhodesian Security Forces, ZANLA and ZIPRA Forces before 1980

Rupiya, Ranger, Bhebe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Kriger, Alexander Phimster, Raftopoulos and others posit that in Zimbabwe, civil-military relations cannot be explained outside the coterie of the country's colonial history and the civil war that brought independence and the risks that came with it. It is essential to 'have an idea' of the nature and role of the different militaries before attainment of independence for the purposes of fully

¹²⁹Ou Guozheng, L.Changjian and S. Gongping (eds.) *How to Be a Good NCO* (Beijing, Long March Press, 2000), 223.

understanding political-military developments in Zimbabwe after 1980. This background is important because Zimbabwe has remained an authoritarian and highly militarised state just like was the case in Rhodesia under Ian Smith. As was characteristic in all colonised countries, before the attainment of independence; the colonial military was predominantly officered by Europeans. As Sue Onslow observed, the use of violence by guerrillas and the Rhodesian forces in Southern Rhodesia left mental imprints on all those who participated in the civil war (fighting forces or collaborators) that cannot be obliterated.¹³⁰ It is in this context that the ordinary people became “man in the middle”¹³¹ who bore the brunt of armed brutality from the guerrillas and Rhodesian Front. Many were excessively tortured whilst others were maimed and killed for being alleged sell-outs. Violence was also unleashed on the civilians by Muzorewa’s “auxiliary militia” as well as Ndabaningi Sithole’s Chimwenje (Light) militia. It is such brutality that drove many young men and women to go and join the liberation struggle. Paradoxically, guerrillas at the front were also not spared such violence and purges if they were considered to be insubordinate to their superiors.¹³²

Just as the guerrillas were brutal; Smith had also created a military machine aimed at heartedly crushing any form of opposition from blacks. It is in this context that the post-independent ZANU-PF government has failed to stop using violence as a means to an end hence violence has become so entrenched in the minds of ZANU-PF politicians and their

¹³⁰ Sue Onslow, “Zimbabwe and Political Transition,” *The London School of Economics and Political Science Online* (March 2011): 1.

¹³¹ To read more on the plight of the ordinary people read, Auret, “From Liberator,” *Op. Cit.*, 33.

¹³² For more information on this See: Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, *Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, 1995; David B. Moore, “Democracy, Violence and Identity in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation: Reflections from Realm to Dissent,” 1995; Masipula Sithole, *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle*, 1979, 1999; Gerald C. Mazarire, “Discipline and Punishment in ZANLA 1964-1979,” 2011.

supporters because like the colonial military and the guerrilla armies they are politicised. Thus, by design or default the Rhodesian Front, ZANLA and ZIPRA politicians gave much power to their militaries though this was mainly because guerrilla forces operated as military-cum political units; highly politicised and indoctrinated.¹³³ The weakness of such an approach was that; had the Frontline states and Britain not intervened there was going to be a blood-bath given that military officers are trained to kill: they would thus have enjoyed having more military skirmishes at the expense of their own fighters and the civilian population. Nationalist leaders of the liberation movements at times experienced difficulties to put military officers under their control. The Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) commanders had a strong conviction that those who had received military training were superior to civilian politicians who had participated in the liberation struggle in their own fashion, be it being imprisoned or otherwise.

Violence was the hallmark and panacea of civil-military conflicts experienced within the military, thus differences were 'solved' through assassinations, detention and co-optation.¹³⁴ Coercion and co-optation was employed to ensure that the military commanders and the guerrilla/soldier rank-and-file as political subjects complied with the nationalist leaders' dictates and also during Tongogara's tenure that civilian leaders pandered to his dictates. Though the distinction between the party and its military wing was blurred it was the gun that was controlling the party.¹³⁵ The liberation struggle thus provided the bedrock of the power struggles that only triumphed after intense skirmishes that 'subdued' the

¹³³ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nationalist-Military Alliance, Op.Cit" 53.

¹³⁴ Also see, Masipula Sithole, 1979; Wilfred Mhanda, 2011; Zvakanyorwa Wilbert Sadomba, 2011.

¹³⁵ Gerald, Chikozho Mazarire. "Discipline and Punishment in ZANLA: 1964-1979." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37, no. 3 (2011): 570.

internal military insurrections. The incidences that manifested themselves in struggles for control are; the 1971 March Movement in ZAPU, the Nhari rebellion in ZANU, and the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) that involved both ZAPU and ZANU in 1975-1976. In the thesis, I consider the Nhari and ZIPA revolts because I consider them as having a bearing on the politicisation and militarisation phenomenon that has continued to haunt the post-independent Zimbabwean political environment as well as examples of "class-based" conflicts within the military during that time.

Thomas Nhari and Dakarai Badza's insurrection was a manifestation of a civil-military crisis that gripped ZANU in 1974. As the executors of the war Nhari (provincial commander), Badza (provincial political commissar) and other guerrillas who were at the front were unhappy that the weapons they were using were substandard and that Tongogara's High command was corrupt, extravagant and not concerned about the well fare of their fellow comrades at the front. When they approached the High Command they were severely beaten by Cletus Chigowe-under Tongogara's instructions- and not allowed to have audience with members of the DARE. Comrade Francis Kombani Gondo (Chimurenga name-Elias Hondo) in an interview with Munyaradzi Huni and Tendai Manzvanzvike of the Zimbabwe Sunday Mail said that Nhari and Badza were right in trying to let the High Command and DARE, the ZANU war council address the challenges they were experiencing at the front but Tongogara failed to deal with it given that he was also being implicated as this was a rear versus front antagonism.¹³⁶

¹³⁶“Tongogara Family riled over Assassination Revelations,” *The Zimbabwean*, 12th December 2016.

Nhari, Badza and their loyalists at Chifombo forcefully abducted some members of the Tongogara High Command who were in Lusaka and took them to the ZANU base at Chifombo but Tongogara was not keen to dialogue with the Nhari-Badza group. Tongogara was tasked by DARE to recapture Chifombo which he astutely did. Members of DARE erroneously allowed Tongogara to address issues that they should have resolved and did not realise that Tongogara did not clearly brief members of the war council on the grievances of those who were at the war front hence they erroneously gave the military power to control the party. Sithole asserts that:

Although the ZANU crisis of 1974-75 began essentially as a crisis in the ZANU military (Field command versus the High Command), it later deteriorated to a civilian-military crisis.... After Chitepo called the Chifombo meeting to order, Tongogara (the victorious Chief of Defence) was given the floor to deal with the issues of the meeting. He then read out names of those implicated in the Nhari rebellion and Chitepo's name was read as "only suspect, no evidence at the moment."the nervous party began to rotate around him (Tongogara) and the High Command. And there was nothing they (*'civilian leaders of DARE'*) could do about it.... they had rather become nervous and had lost control of the Party to the Chief of Defence and his men.¹³⁷

From then on rebels like Nhari, Badza and suspects like John Mataure a senior member of Dare and their sympathisers were executed including the tragic and erroneous "decision to kill Chitepo was taken by the High Command under the chairmanship of Tongogara."¹³⁸ Chitepo was assassinated on the 18th of March 1975 and this was followed

¹³⁷ Sithole, "Zimbabwe: Struggles," *Op. Cit.*, 83-84.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

by the arrest of members of the DARE and High Command by the Zambian police. Tongogara's heavy handedness was articulated by those he was with in Zambia or Mozambique. According to Comrade Hondo, if Tongogara suspected you of trying to challenge or undermine his authority he was unforgiving and would make sure that he settled his score with you, he was "ruthless with tendencies of a dictator. He used to admire leaders like Idi Amini and Samora Machel."¹³⁹ ZANU was to experience yet another military challenge to civilian politicians' authority that was once again crushed by Tongogara and Rex Nhongo after Tongogara and his alleged accomplices (accused of killing Chitepo) had been released from prison. I now turn to the ZIPA revolt and I am not going to be detailed about it.

ZIPA was an amalgam of the ZIPRA and ZANLA forces formed between 1975 and 1976. The reason for such a united force was to fight the Rhodesian forces as a single army. Had this amalgamation been supported by nationalist leaders it would have solved the ethnic problems that were later encountered in the ZNA during the early years of independence. Moore contends that "while Tongogara and his cohorts were 'managing' the war and politicking before their imprisonment in 1975, their immediate underlings were taking advanced courses.... The ZIPA commanders felt they were better trained than 'their' superiors 'and' it was a fact and not youthful arrogance."¹⁴⁰ ZIPA commanders had grasped the Soviet Union and Chinese military teachings that made them better executors of the

¹³⁹ Zumaya, "Tongogara Family," *Op. Cit.*

¹⁴⁰ David Moore, "The Zimbabwe People's Army: Strategic Innovation or More of the same?" in "Soldiers in Zimbabwe," ed. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, *Op. Cit.*, 79.

war. The nationalist leaders could not tolerate such challenges and decided that ZIPA had to be destroyed.

ZIPA commanders had denounced the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole and Mugabe. It must be pointed out that some ZIPA commanders averred that they were against the released military High Command and not the nationalist leaders who they could easily contain. They regarded themselves as the “Vashandi” or workers (the real fighters) who were fighting the war as opposed to the nationalist leaders who seldom visited the front. The ZIPA commanders proposed that the nationalist leaders of ZANU, ZAPU had to be united for the fighters did not belong to a single party. The nationalist leaders together with Tongogara did not accept this hence Mugabe, Tongogara with the assistance of Rex Nhongo conspired to do away with ZIPA: ¹⁴¹it was brutally decimated hence the crushing of ZIPA was the first of Mugabe’s purges. Fifty of ZIPA’s commanders with about ‘six hundred dissident guerrillas were arrested while others were shot.¹⁴² After the attainment of independence in 1984, Mugabe explaining how they had crushed ZIPA said:

The exercise of crushing ZIPA (and its Vashandi influence) was followed by a politicisation programme in the camps. We warned any person with a tendency to revolt that the ZANU axe would fall on their necks: Tinotema nedemo (‘we will axe you’).¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Moore in Bhebe and Ranger, “Soldiers in Zimbabwe,” *Op. Cit.*, 80.

¹⁴² Holland, “Dinner,” *Op. Cit.*, 179., and for more information also see M. Sithole, *Zimbabwe Struggle Within a Struggle* 1999, W. Mhanda, *Memories of a Freedom Fighter* 2011, Zvakanyorwa W. Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s Revolution*, Nebebe & T. Ranger, 1995. etc.

¹⁴³ Masunungure, “Travails of Opposition...,” *Op. Cit.*, 151.

From then on, the nationalist leaders ‘elevated themselves to be commanders of the military wing.’ Through Nordlinger’s “penetration model” the civil-nationalist aristocracy “wore both hats and helmets” as political leaders and commanders of the military despite their cluelessness when it came to military engagements and combat. For the civilian elites to have insight of what was taking place at the battle front, military leaders like Tongogara and Mangena (Lookout Masuku) were co-opted into the highest decision making body of their respective nationalist movements.¹⁴⁴

These experiences by default created political cultures that have continued to influence and shape the post-independence domestic political arena in Zimbabwe, thus, a strong element of “command” in Zimbabwean politics still reflects the continuing influence of the authoritarian militaristic politics of the liberation movements.¹⁴⁵ This is evident with the ZANU-PF government’s hard-handedness when dealing with dissent. It is a fact that governments may be a result of military interference in politics or of elections. Onslow posits that structural factors before the attainment of independence in 1980 explain the enduring culture of violence in Zimbabwe,¹⁴⁶ a fusion of the army and the ZANU-PF government that is traceable to the late 1970s. Joshua Nkomo in his book, *The story of my life*, lamented that one of the major handicap of the Lancaster House Conference was that though he had made repeated calls for Lord Carrington to address the military issue, it was never done and the consequences have haunted Zimbabweans all and sundry. ZANLA and ZIPRA forces regarded each other with suspicion because during the war whenever they

¹⁴⁴Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-Military Alliance,” *Op. Cit.*, 57-60.

¹⁴⁵Brian Raftopoulos, “Current politics in Zimbabwe: confronting the crisis,” in David Harold-Berry, (ed)., *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2004), 5.

¹⁴⁶Onslow, “Zimbabwe and Political,” “Op.Cit” 8.

came into contact with each other they fought and this explains why most of the ZANLA forces were concentrated in Mashonaland while ZIPRA forces operated in the Matabeleland region.

On the other hand, Smith's soldiers were apprehensive as regards the political transition that was to take place in 1979-1980. How would they as a military acclimatise to handing over power to guerrilla nationalist opponents whom they considered terrorists? The most significant step that was taken by the major 'protagonists' at the Lancaster House Conference was that they took their security personnel to be part and parcel of the deliberations that took place. This built confidence at the same time cementing the interactions of the military and the politicians. The Rhodesian Front securocrats leaders played a pivotal role in restraining their forces not to coup the nationalist government that came to power after the April 1980 elections.


The Zimbabwe National Army

Below is the structure of the Joint High Command (JHC) that was put in place to accommodate an integrated Zimbabwe National Army. This section gives a description of the newly integrated ZNA. This is necessary in explaining and understanding the behaviour or interactions between the civilian government and the military leaders as well as that between the military leaders and the military rank-and-file. The transition from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to Zimbabwe was greeted with optimism¹⁴⁷ as black Zimbabweans looked

¹⁴⁷Meredith, "The Fate," *Op. Cit.*, 683.

forward to a different lifestyle when the new nationalist leaders would fulfil the promises that they had made when mobilising the masses to support the liberation war. The British military mission in 1980 created a professional army out of the integration of 3 armies namely, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia National Army (ZRNA), the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe Independent People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). The reforming of the military was a necessity since they were coming from a war.

Figure 3:1: Hierarchical Structure of the Joint High Command (JHC)



Source: Chitiyo and Rupiya 2005: 338 (Modified)

Given that the Lancaster House Conference had not addressed the military factor, the Mugabe government had to quickly deal with this highly volatile issue. As a matter of fact the three armies were still ‘standing,’ each with its own intelligence and command-and-

control structures still intact, a hotbed for a potential for civil war if the situation was not handled dexterously.¹⁴⁸ According to Martin Rupiya, in Zimbabwe, military visibility grew gradually since independence with the military now having the “de facto veto power over civilian affairs.”¹⁴⁹ When Zimbabwe became independent the new government had to brace itself to confront head on the challenges of instability and violence that confronted it. On one hand the two liberation armies ZANLA and ZIPRA did not have a common vision apart from dislodging a common enemy; the colonial regime, explaining why during the war they always fought each other whenever they met.¹⁵⁰ On the other hand Smith had “created a military machine aimed at ‘mercilessly’ crushing” any efforts to achieve independence. Smith had categorically stated that Rhodesia would not get independence in a thousand years or in his life time. Now that Zimbabwe had become independent ‘during his life-time’ the three armies that were adversaries had according to the dictates of the Lancaster House conference, been integrated into a single national army.

The formation of the Joint Operation Command (JOC) was to come up with a security-sector that would support the new government. The three armies continued to exist as they had been prior to integration, each with its own security-sector command and control structures. This was a concoction that had the potential of exploding into another civil war if the situation was not astutely handled. The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was therefore created in the spirit of nation building. The new government had to quickly gain control of the state apparatus and machinery to give it direction. Paradoxically ZIPRA’s

¹⁴⁸Chitiyo and Rupiya, “Evolutions and Revolutions,” *Op. Cit.*, 337.

¹⁴⁹Martin R. Rupiya, “The Military Factor in Zimbabwe’s Political and Electoral Affairs,” 4.

¹⁵⁰ Michael Auret, *From Liberator to Dictator*, (South Africa: David & Philip, 2009), 57.

military loyalty lay with ZAPU, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) with the out-going Smith government and ZANLA with ZANU. Arguably, it is nothing but a myth and political naivety to talk of a neutral army in Africa. The forces from the three military establishments had been taught to hate and despise the other and therefore did not trust each other thus, “the Zimbabwe military is an anticolonial force that emerged in response to what has been described as an inhospitable colonial modernity and its corrosive effects.”¹⁵¹

Emmerson Mnangagwa was at the helm of the Joint High Command (JHC) but reported to the Prime Minister. The RSF front-man, General Peter Walls was appointed commander of JHC and his subordinates were former senior commanders of the Rhodesian air force, the other from ZANLA and the other from ZIPRA,¹⁵² Nhongo and Masuku. Mugabe as the premier wanted the army to change its organizational structure and ideological outlook¹⁵³ and this is why Mugabe proposed a national army with a semblance of and along the Maoist Chinese model that cemented the politico-military symbiotic relationship. Charles A. Alao observed that these different military units that were to be the ZNA were a “motley collection of military formations with considerable military and political differences,”¹⁵⁴ that were invariably still racially divided, highly traumatised and militarised. This meant that the new government had to be pragmatic to make sure that the

¹⁵¹ Kudzai Matereke and Niveen El Moghazy, “Mugabe and the Military Alliance: Zimbabwe’s Prospects of Democratic Transition,” in *Mugabeism? History, Politics, and Power in Zimbabwe*, ed. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (New York: Palgrave, 2015), 253.

¹⁵² Meredith, “The Fate,” *Op. Cit.*, 338-339.

¹⁵³ Peter Yates, “The Prospects for Socialist Transformation in Zimbabwe,” *Review of African Political Economy* 18 (1981): 85.

¹⁵⁴ Abiodun Alao, “The Metamorphosis of the ‘Unorthodox’: The Integration and Early Development of the Zimbabwe National Army,” in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation war*, eds. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Press, 1995): 104.

entrenched differences within all the different facets of the military personnel would be contained. Ndlovu-Gatsheni noted that the coming together of the three armies code-named “Operation Sausage Machine” militated against the creation of a united national Zimbabwean army since there was mistrust and naked animosity amongst those being integrated into the ZNA and amongst politicians themselves exacerbated by assassination attempts on Mugabe in the period between 1980 and 1982.

Members of the ZNA maintained their political ideals and loyalty to their superiors heightening the mistrust amongst the newly integrated members. Ken Flower the head of intelligence, later wrote in his memoirs, “It was a strange experience working for an African leader whom whites had been taught to hate and whose ‘rule’ we had forecast to be catastrophic.”¹⁵⁵ The proposed 35 000 men and women who made up the ZNA that was trained by the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) was an integrative success¹⁵⁶ as it was able to maintain a stable environment and security under a single unified military command.

Mugabe’s objective was to make Zimbabwe a one-party state being controlled by no other party except ZANU-PF. This was a characteristic of the majority of the first generation of African leaders who had led their countries to independence; examples are Kwame Nkrumah, Kamuzu Banda and Kenneth Kaunda among many others. This one party-state mentality partly explains why Mugabe made sure that the ZNA was dominated by the

¹⁵⁵ Meredith, “The Fate,” *Op. Cit.*, 683-84.

¹⁵⁶ Jeremiah I. Williamson, “Seeking Civilian Control: Rule of Law, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Zimbabwe,” *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 12, no. 2 (2010): 391.

Shona. Given that commanding positions were a preserve of Europeans; the Africanisation of the officer corps was a necessity. The incoming civilian government had to be guaranteed of the much needed to protection hence it had to swiftly decide on who was to be trusted to defend the state.¹⁵⁷ It is therefore not surprising that the nationalist leaders chose those they regarded loyal on the basis of political party loyalty because party-military nexus was very vital to cushion the new government against any potential military coup.

Despite that Mugabe and Nkomo had attended the Lancaster House Conference as the Patriotic Front since the inception of independence in 1980, animosity between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces was fanned by the political leaders resulting in the disastrous consequences of clashes between guerrillas at Entumbane. Nkala provocatively touted Nkomo and his supporters of being in government by grace of ZANU-PF and having thoughts of trying to assassinate Mugabe while Edgar Tekere openly poured scorn on ZIPRA saying Nkomo and his followers were like germs in 'ZANU-PF's wounds'.¹⁵⁸ He was never chastised for being openly divisive. It was thus not surprising when Mugabe later snapped that ZAPU and its leader Nkomo were like a cobra in the house and the only way to deal with such a problem was to destroy its head.¹⁵⁹ It became apparent to ZAPU members that ZANU-PF politicians' aim was to obliterate ZAPU from the political scene. Meredith argues that it became apparent that the war had been fought not for the promotion of "democracy but to gain total control." Raftopoulos opine that "the immunity given to

¹⁵⁷ Harkness, "The Origins," *Op. Cit.*, 7.

¹⁵⁸ Meredith, "The Fate," *Op. Cit.*, 685.

¹⁵⁹ Zvakanyorwa W. Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution* (Harare: Weaver, 2011), 82.

the perpetrators of this violence mirrored the action of the Smith regime and led to an intensified militarisation of violence and politics in Zimbabwe.”¹⁶⁰

After overwhelming his ZAPU rival and establishing a defacto one party state, Mugabe went on to amass huge personal power by virtue of being declared executive president. This was a result of the crafting of new laws by the Zimbabwean legal “guru” (expert) Dr. Eddison Zvobgo oblivious of the fact that this would later haunt Zimbabweans since absolute power corrupts absolutely. On the 30th of December 1987 Mugabe became an executive president with combined roles of head of state, head of government and commander in-chief of the defence forces, with power to dissolve parliament. He now could run for an unspecified number of terms in office while it entrenched a bootlicking crescendo amongst his supporters with him being the ‘political Alpha and Omega’ of ZANU-PF. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act Number 7 ‘unintentionally’ crippled the legislature which no longer had the power to hold the executive to account entrenching authoritarianism that was replicated by ZANU-PF’s intolerance of opposition. Below I describe the stipulations of the Zimbabwean constitution on civil-military relations.

The Zimbabwe military regulations of 1988 “strictly prohibit (military) partisan conduct or participation in politics.”¹⁶¹ Statutory instrument 152 of 1988, Defence (Regular Force-Officers) Regulations, Section 90 provides that:

¹⁶⁰Raftopoulos, “Current politics,” *Op. Cit.*, 7.

¹⁶¹ Dewa Mavhinga, “The Elephant in the Room: Reforming Zimbabwe’s Security Sector Ahead of Elections,” *Human Rights Watch* (May 2013): 13.

- (1) No officer shall: commit any act which is prescribed by the section as being an act constituting active participation in politics-
- (a) Canvass any person in support of or otherwise actively assist an organisation or movement of a political character;
- (b) Display or wear rosettes, favours, symbols, posters, placards or like articles having a political significance;
- (c) Attend a political meeting or assembly when wearing a uniform of the Defence Forces or any part thereof likely to identify him with the Defence Forces: provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to an officer who attends such a meeting or assembly in uniform in the course of his duties;
- (d) Publish views of a political character or causing them to be published in speeches, broadcasts, letters to the press, articles, leaflets, posters, placards, books or otherwise.¹⁶²

The 1997 amended National Defence Policy has got a clear hierarchy of governance, command and control of the military. As the commander of the ZDF, Mugabe also chairs the State Defence Council (SDC) a supreme body that is responsible for security issues in Zimbabwe. When the SDC convene meetings, the Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Finance must be in attendance including the commander of the defence forces and the secretary of defence as stipulated in the table below.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Ibid, 13.

¹⁶³ Government of Zimbabwe, "National Defence Policy," *Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe*. (Harare: Government Printers, 1997).

Table 3:1 The Structure and Functions of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces

Structure	Members	Functions
Defence Council	• Headed by the Commander-in Chief • Minister of Defence • Minister of Foreign Affairs • Minister of State Security • Minister of Home Affairs • Minister of Finance • Commander of Defence forces	• Formulate national security and strategy • Formulate defence policy • Determine internal and external operations • Formulate commitments and review budget • Supervise Defence Committee
Defence Committee	• Minister of Defence • Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) • Commander of the Air Force of Zimbabwe • Secretary for Defence	• Implement national security and defence strategy • Define and regulate defence policy • Procure strategic defence equipment • Review defence policy, budget and management policies • Assess the security environment
Defence Co-ordinating Committee	• Commander of Defence Forces • Secretary for Defence • Commander of ZNA • All Chiefs of Staff at Zimbabwe Defence Force Headquarters • All Department Secretaries at Minister of Defence • All Defence Groups at Minister of Defence	• Implement systems of defence issues • Daily management of defence aspects • Liaison with other ministries

Source: Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-Military Alliance,” Op. Cit., 70.

The conduct and function of the ZDF is defined in law, that is, it is guided by the Zimbabwean constitution and as shown in the foregoing; in practice the military

leadership's dabbling in politics is not to be constrained by the law. The National Defence Policy clearly stipulates the "hierarchy of authority between the Executive, Parliament and the Defence Forces."¹⁶⁴ As already noted in chapter two it is the duty of the civilian ruling elite to come up with a defence policy that is executed by the military. The President as the one at the helm of the military hierarchy has the mandate to:

- Determine the deployment of defence forces
- Determine the execution of military action

The power to appoint the commander of the ZDF and other commanders of a branch of the defence forces is vested in the president. However, this must be done in consultation with a person or authority prescribed by or under an act of parliament such as the Minister of Defence.¹⁶⁵ The Minister of Defence is also an appointee of the president who is mandated to run the day to day affairs of the military on anything that the military would have brought to his attention. The military only report directly to their commander-in-chief in cases of emergency.¹⁶⁶ Chinyanganya connote that the parliament and Zimbabwe Defence Portfolio Committee (ZDPC) 'have oversight' on the military and keep the military in check or accountable to their actions¹⁶⁷ and as such the military must be apolitical.

¹⁶⁴Hendricks and Hutton, "Providing security, Op.Cit" 4.

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nationalist-Military Alliance," *Op. Cit.*, 69.Dr. Colonel M. Chinyanganya, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, Harare, 14th October, 2015.

¹⁶⁷ Dr. Colonel M. Chinyanganya, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, Harare, 14th October, 2015.

Having given this background, it is now logical to turn to the interactions between the newly elected nationalist leaders and the military leaders. As seen from the Government of Zimbabwe Defence policy, members of the force are supposed to unwaveringly remain loyal to Zimbabwe's Constitution and the Defence Forces Act and not dabble in politics.

The Zimbabwean Civilian Government, Military leaders and Military Rank-and- File Interactions

As already noted the Mugabe led government inherited a political economy of the white settler state and its power. In it was embedded a legacy of the brutality and colonial state's use of asymmetric use of violence when dealing with opposition and dissent. When Zimbabwe became independent, the ZANU-PF was now in charge of a 'well oiled' security sector organisational structure of surveillance and control, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the Special Branch/Central Investigations Department within the British South Africa Police that was retained as the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP).¹⁶⁸ Violence had been well ingrained in the guerrilla movements hence it remained a culture of the party-state. As already noted the relationship between the ZIPRA military leadership and the ZANU-PF politicians was not cordial because the ZANU-PF politicians denigrated ZIPRA commanders and their soldiers who were indisputably highly trained and remained loyal to their civilian ZAPU nationalist leaders.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Onslow, "Zimbabwe and Political," *Op. Cit.*, 8.

¹⁶⁹ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *The Post-Colonial State, Op. Cit.*, 24.

It was apparent that the British instructors preferred to work with the ZIPRA soldiers whom they regarded as better trained since they had been trained for conventional warfare as opposed to their ZANLA counterparts who were trained for guerrilla warfare. Be that as it was, the ZANU-PF politicians wanted to do away with the ZAPU leadership, both civilian and military. The ex-ZIPRA combatants were therefore side-lined with some being forced to relinquish top military posts for their ZANU-PF counterparts. This was exacerbated by the discovery of arms caches on ZIPRA farms. Masuku and Dabengwa were detained while Nkomo fled into exile. The remaining ZIPRA commanders in the ZNA were pressured to disband and were stampeded out of the ZNA. One ex-ZIPRA combatant who held the rank of Captain when he was integrated into the ZNA, in an interview with Gatsheni-Ndlovu reiterated that,

He was one day approached by two ex-ZANLA colleagues who asked him whether he wanted to remain alive. His answer was “yes”. He was then told that the position of Captain that he was holding was only for ex-ZANLA forces, not ZIPRA. He was told to relinquish the post and to apply for demobilisation. Two of his colleagues who refused to demobilise just disappeared.¹⁷⁰

“Captain 84,” in an interview with author said that some ZIPRA commanders lost their lives when they refused to give way to the demands of ex-ZANLA forces. It cannot be denied that they were killed because they were never seen again.” Such actions were simply ‘swept under the carpet.’ No investigations were ever made to ascertain the whereabouts

¹⁷⁰Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-Military Alliance,” *Op. Cit.*, 68.

of those who disappeared never to be seen again. We know that they were killed.”¹⁷¹Nkala, a ZANU-PF politician and Minister of Home Affairs, despite being Ndebele showed his hatred for the ZIPRA civilian and military leadership when he said; “we want to wipe out ZAPU leadership. You have only seen the warning lights. We haven’t yet reached full blast.”¹⁷²This became a reality when Mugabe signed a military agreement with North Korea to train a new army brigade that came to be known as the Fifth Brigade. Meredith, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Rupiya concur that the chain of command of the Fifth Brigade bypassed the military chain of command and were answerable directly to its commander and Mugabe.

Joshua Nkomo accused Mugabe of “raising a special partisan army divorced from the national army for the possible imposition of a one party state.”¹⁷³One very intriguing thing as asserted by Rupiya is that the reconciliation and the unity forged by Mugabe and Nkomo was not extended to the army’s command that remained under ZANU-PF, with Mugabe as Commander-in-Chief of the forces, the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, State Security are all held by ZANU-PF loyalists so are the influential positions in the military and other security structures. Though Lieutenant General Philip Sibanda, a former ZIPRA combatant was later appointed commander of the ZNA, he is ‘a lone voice amongst ZANU-PF yes militia men’ hence he cannot be effectively critical of unacceptable norms sanctioned by his military superior and the political elite that the military are subordinated to.¹⁷⁴Below I describe the interactions between the military leaders and the military rank-and-file.

¹⁷¹ “Captain 84” (Retired military officer), Interview by Author, Harare, Glenview, August 21, 2015.

¹⁷²For more on this see, Martin Meredith, 2002, David Blair 2003 and Heidi Holland, 2008.

¹⁷³ Meredith, “Robert Mugabe,” *Op. Cit.*, 62.

¹⁷⁴ Rupiya, “Contextualising the Military,” *Op. Cit.*, 90.

Soldiers unquestionably follow commands given from their superiors. Military law requires all ranks be they commissioned or non-commissioned officers to follow any 'legal' order from a senior officer and when in doubt, the fall-back is to ask for the order in writing.¹⁷⁵ Notably in military institutions it is difficult for ordinary soldiers to go against orders or to ask what are right or wrong actions during times of crisis especially that which is considered a 'war situation.' Sithole described such a relationship as democratic centralism; a hierarchical structure that is pyramidal (Vladimir I. Lenin). The ZANLA civil-military way of operation (democratic centralism) did not change even when political independence was gained.

The relationship between the politicians and the military is relatively explained by the fact that those in the military structure be they civilians or military are appointed by Mugabe, who is commander-in-chief. The weakness of being an appointee is that promotion is entirely dependent on the one who appoints hence many times it may not be a result of merit but patronage. President Mugabe unilaterally reappoints the military elites (MEs), (ZDF commander, Police commissioner, Prisons services commissioner, Air force commander, ZNA commander and the CIO director) upon the expiration of their contracts. It is therefore not surprising that the MEs do the bidding of the one who appoints them. In 2012, Morgan Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube wanted to challenge Mugabe in an effort to block the reappointments of Service Chiefs upon which Mugabe's spokesperson; George Charamba was quoted in the Mail & Guardian saying:

¹⁷⁵ Geoff Hill, *What Happens After Mugabe* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005), 135.

That is a no-go area. When the president sees it fit he will extend the terms of office of Chihuri and Chiwenga. The security sector has one commander-in-chief, not one and a half. It's just one and the defence forces are not subject to interparty negotiations.¹⁷⁶

The civil-military nexus is thus embedded in complexities of appointing and being appointed, building alliances between the military elites and the executive. Under Mugabe and the civilian Minister of Defence are the MEs at the top being the commander of the ZDF General Constantine Chiwenga, followed by his subordinates, Perence Shiri, Valerio Sibanda, Paradzai Zimondi, Augustine Chihuri and Happyton Bonyongwe. Following the above military command structures are brigadiers, colonels and lieutenant colonels and captains who owe their promotions to those above them. As the military hierarchy demands unquestionable obedience to anything projected downwards, what inevitably happens is the translation of the Head of state's intensions to the commanders, even if they may not be in agreement with such decisions. More often than not the eagerness to comply with the wishes of political 'masters' or assisting in the latter's programme is regarded as "loyalty" to the government, 'quite often legitimate.'¹⁷⁷

Paradoxically once a decision is passed down the military hierarchy it has to be implemented as a defence policy or military directive. Mugabe, Mnangagwa, General Solomon Mujuru, Constantine Chiwenga, Perence Shiri and other military elites were all

¹⁷⁶Mail & Guardian, "Mugabe's strongmen likely to stay," January 27 to February 2, 2012.

¹⁷⁷Naison Ngoma, "Caging the Lions," in *Guarding the Guardians*, eds. Len Le Roux, Martin Rupiya and Naison Ngoma. (ISS, 2004), 104-5.

aware of what was going on in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces during the Gukurahundi era.

The Gukurahundi was an era of dissident problems that occurred in Matabeleland North and South and parts of the Midlands provinces from 1982 to 1987. The term Gukurahundi is a Shona word that means “rain that sweeps away chaff or rubbish.” When arms caches were discovered at PF-ZAPU farms relations between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF became acrimonious. PF-ZAPU leaders were dropped from government. This included ministers namely Joshua Nkomo the president of PF-ZAPU, Josiah Chinamano, Joseph Msika and Jini Ntuta. Dumiso Dabengwa and Lieutenant General Lookout Masuko who were senior military personnel in ZIPRA were also arrested.¹⁷⁸ Tourists and white commercial farmers were victims of dissident activities in Matabeleland. The government responded by deploying an army known as the Fifth Brigade. Civilians who were thought to harbour dissidents also became victims. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace stated in their report that about 20 000 civilians were brutally killed in cold blood by members of the Fifth Brigade.¹⁷⁹ Mugabe later refused to make public the findings of the committee tasked to investigate on the Gukurahundi massacres. The Ndebele people have never really forgiven Mugabe or the commanders who led the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade.

¹⁷⁸ Canaan S. Banana, *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990* (Harare: The College Press, 1989), 236-241.

¹⁷⁹ For more information see, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe. *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands 1980-1988* (Harare: Legal Resource Foundation, 1999), Canaan Banana, “Turmoil,” 236-241, Paul Moorcraft, “Mugabe’s War,” 104-109.

It can be argued that all the above mentioned members of the military were in agreement with the decisions that had been made to deal with the dissidents as well as the civilians who were supporters of ZAPU and a threat to ZANU-PF rule. One military rank and file soldier I interviewed said:

It was not only a dissident issue, some of us survived because though I am Ndebele, I speak Shona very fluently. It's very sad that if you are Ndebele and you were seen as a threat that was the end of you. I will not forget how Jini Ntutha and Captain Ndhela died. (You Know Ntutha or you have heard of him?) He was the Ministry of Mines deputy minister around 1984. He told Joshua Nkomo and other ZAPU senior officers that he was being followed by man he did not know. The man who killed him after having failed to engineer a car accident chased him on foot for many kilometres and shot him. The government said that he had been killed by dissidents but this was not true. We know that he must have been killed by the 5th Brigade. He had complained that the army was killing innocent civilians.¹⁸⁰

The above interview with "Captain 84" suggests that once a decision is given from above then it is very difficult for it not to be executed or it has serious consequences for those who would have been told to carry such a directive and fail to comply. Retired Lieutenant Kudzai Mbudzi in an interview with Daily News said:

We have been used to fight other people's unholy political wars, sometimes against Zimbabwean people who we purportedly claim to have liberated.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰"Captain 84" (Retired military officer), Interview by Author, Harare, Glenview, August 21, 2015.

¹⁸¹Retired Lieutenant Kudzai Mbudzi. Interview with the Zimbabwe Daily news, "Mujuru Expulsion Marks ZANU-PF's demise," October 16, 2015.

Consequently, democratic centralist military command can result in cohesion, discipline and loyalty and can at times be destructive especially in a corrupted, partisan, and politicised setup. As noted in the foregoing, ZANLA forces, members of the ZNA were already a politicised lot and some of them hated the Ndebele because of tribal differences, were more than willing to teach the Ndebele a political lesson that ZANU-PF was the governing political party. This was partly because when they were still operating as guerrillas they were actively involved in the construction of ZANU party structures¹⁸² hence they could go to any length to mete out ‘political justice’ to those regarded as opponents of the party-state. Former ZIPRA cadres who did not desert the ZNA were politically reoriented and forced to use the Shona language¹⁸³ as their medium of communication.

The Zimbabwean state is therefore a product of colonial interconnected legacies embedded in authoritarianism by both the colonial settlers and guerrilla movements hence the security-sector has had disastrous repercussions for Zimbabwe’s human rights and democratic record.¹⁸⁴ The party-state has continued to use oppressive colonial legislations, giving it power to embed itself as the only dominant party hence “the historical context of the liberation struggle, the negotiated settlement between the political elites as well as the nature of the post-colonial state,”¹⁸⁵ have all in one way or the other assisted in consolidating ZANU-PF dominance.

¹⁸² Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *The Post-Colonial State*, *Op. Cit.*, 108-109.

¹⁸³ “Captain 84,” (Retired military officer). Interview by Author, Harare, Glenview, 21 August 2015.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 111.

¹⁸⁵ Britz and Tshuma, “Heroes Fall,” *Op. Cit.*, 173.

It has emerged from this chapter that the importance of having an army is for it to be defenders of its people's interests and country's sovereignty. However, before the attainment of independence the military in Southern Rhodesia were employed for the purpose of maintaining the status quo. Notably, during the liberation struggle all the different militaries employed violence as a means to an end and were highly politicised giving allegiance to their respective superiors. As for the guerrilla armies there had been bloody skirmishes between the military and the nationalist leaders but the gun was in control of the party especially before the demise of Tongogara on the 26th of December 1979, it was only after his death that the nationalist leaders asserted their control over the military despite the military leaders maintaining considerable influence.

As has been pointed out, at the Lancaster House Conference politicians had ceded considerable power to the military leaders. Though the three armies were 'successfully' integrated in the ZNA suspicions were uttermost culminating in Mugabe, Mnangagwa and General Mujuru elbowing both remnants of the Rhodesian forces who had joined the ZNA and later on ZIPRA commanders during the Gukurahundi skirmishes. This saw the elevation of ZANLA forces to command positions in what can be referred to as the 'shonalization' and 'Zanunization' (Shona ethnic and ZANU-PF dominated) ZNA.

After the signing of the Unity accord in December 1987 some of the ZIPRA forces who still wanted to be members of the ZNA were reintegrated but many have not been able to rise to the positions that they had enjoyed under BMATT. It can also be averred from this

chapter that the Zimbabwean constitution clearly stipulates that the uniformed forces must be apolitical and have to be accountable to their civilian superiors. The fusion of the military and the politicians just like that of the ZANU-PF party and the state was already in place. Military leaders like General Mujuru acquiesced to a ZNA solely controlled by former ZANLA forces and this explains why Shiri was chosen to lead the ZANU-PF Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland from 1982-1987.

The notion of conflating the party and the state is evident in how the ZANU-PF politicians like Tekere, Nkala and Morris Nyagumbo conducted their activities. Mugabe without any feat of remorse told Joshua Nkomo that the supreme decision making board in Zimbabwe was the ZANU-PF Central Committee. The military elites are subordinate to their civilian superiors who even during the 1980s were already being rewarded with farms. The interactions between the military elites and politicians were further strengthened by the Zimbabwean military intervention in Mozambique where army commanders started enriching themselves.¹⁸⁶

As for the military rank-and-file; as required by military law they are loyal to their superiors as opposed to what had happened in the 1970s though there is evidence that there were notable voluntary and forced desertions in the ZNA of ZIPRA soldiers in the 1980s. The next chapter discusses and analyses the relationship that was existent between the military rank-and-file and the politicians and the military leaders and the military rank-and-file before the crisis.

¹⁸⁶ For more information on this see Paul Moorcraft, "Mugabe's war," Chapter 7.119-128.

Chapter 4

Contextualising Civil-Military Interactions Before 2000

The successful integration of the guerrilla and Rhodesian armies and the subsequent creation of the ZNA was one of the most positive developments in the newly established Zimbabwean state. Before his untimely death Josiah Tongogara had enjoyed immense military support from both ZANLA and ZIPRA forces and was a serious contender to being the first leader of an independent Zimbabwe. As such, it is plausible to make an academic excursion of how Mugabe succeeded in establishing strong civilian control over the military that in turn openly began to support his party. In this chapter I analyse the interactions of the military and the politicians before the crisis as this provides the much-needed background in discussing and examining the interactions of the actors during the crisis that became very noticeable in 2000.

Civil-Military Interactions

Mugabe has been regarded as a ruthless politician especially when dealing with his opponents. However before 1980 he was not in full control of the ZANLA forces because Tongogara craftily made sure that control of the ZANLA army was firmly under him and not the nationalist leaders. Tongogara has been described by those who knew him as a shrewd military strategist, an 'in-go-between' the politicians and the military; who had succeeded in making civilian members of the DARE to acquiesce to his dictates. Despite just having attained lower secondary education he was a great military strategist and commander, an ambitious general who earned the respect of the politicians because of his

military astuteness.¹⁸⁷ This political astuteness is shown by how he handled ZANU military and political affairs, especially how he dealt with all those who were a menace to his position and supremacy.¹⁸⁸ He regarded intellectual politicians as tricksters who wanted to ride on the back of the military for their own political goals. This was the Tongogara who as the Chairman of the High Command had always shown his disdain of Chitepo's handling of ZANU and ZANLA military issues explaining why some suggest that he masterminded the elimination of the latter. Chung suggests that even before his assassination Chitepo was already aware that Tongogara had given him bodyguards whose duty was to spy on him under the guise of protecting him and report his every movement to Tongogara.¹⁸⁹ He also managed to deal with the ZIPA and the Henry Hamadziripi-Rugare Gumbo insurrections.

In an interview by author, comrade "Zaa" pointed out that given that Chitepo and Ndabaningi Sithole were out of the way, Mugabe had met his match in Tongogara. The Tongogara-Mugabe alliance was one in which one slept with one eye closed with the other open.¹⁹⁰ "The partnership between 'them' was an expedient one because Tongogara saw himself as the embodiment of the military, which he considered as pivotal to the success of the liberation struggle."¹⁹¹ Lord Carrington in an interview with Holland, regarded him as ZANU-PF's Che Guevara; a charismatic personality who enjoyed playing the military man off against the politicians.

¹⁸⁷Tendi, "Ideology, Civilian," *Op. Cit.*, 838.

¹⁸⁸ For more information on this see Masipula Sithole, "Zimbabwe: Struggles," *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸⁹ Chung, "Reliving," *Op. Cit.*, 132.

¹⁹⁰ Cde "Zaa" (War veteran), interview by Author, Rusape, 6th June, 2015.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Tongogara regarded all politicians with scepticism, and certainly Mugabe was not an exception.... Tongogara had succeeded in eliminating his opponents politically if not physically... he was a serious challenger for the leadership of ZANU.¹⁹²

Comrade Hondo recalls that Tongogara was a deceiver who did not want both members of DARE and the guerrillas at the front to really know what was happening and was thus the conveyor of information whilst blocking Chitepo to have audience with soldiers at the war front. Hondo retorted that:

Tongogara did not want us to know what was discussed in this DARE. He would come to us and say “haa, povho haina zvayo zvainoziva.” Meaning-these nationalist leaders do not know anything about the military or military engagements. On the other hand when Tongogara went to see these members of DARE he would say, “haa, these fighters vanoziveiko ava-(these fighters are ignoramuses who do not know a thing apart from fighting).¹⁹³

It was through such devious and strategic control of information flow that Tongogara was able to be in charge of the party and the military and through his ruthlessness was able to do away with both his military and political challengers as exemplified by the outcome of the Nhari-Badza rebellion. Mugabe rose to political prominence in ZANU as a subordinate to the military who had become celebrities “in restoring order and cleaning up the rot in the party” thus military and politicians mistrust has remained a permanent feature of the elite civil-military DNA even after 1980.¹⁹⁴ This has resulted in the party-state devising

¹⁹²Fay Chung, “Re-living,” *Op. Cit.*, 249-50.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Mazarire, “Discipline and Punishment,” *Op. Cit.*, 570-582.

mechanisms to control the military. It is alleged that at the Lancaster House Conference (LHC);(where talks to end the Rhodesian civil war and pave way to the holding of elections were held), Tongogara told one of the participants that he saw no reason why he would not be the first president of Zimbabwe.¹⁹⁵ He had “assiduously ensured that the military would remain largely outside the control of the traditional politicians.”¹⁹⁶ Unfortunately, he died in a car accident few days after the LHC. Many Zimbabweans still have questions whether General Tongogara’s death was a genuine accident or it was engineered within ZANU-PF. His death marked the end of the dominance that the military had over the politicians; this entails that the highly politicised ZANLA army, was not under the political control of Mugabe at independence.¹⁹⁷

Zimbabwe, as has happened in many African countries upon attaining independence, also embarked on a security sector reform since the military institution had been a domain of whites. The majority of blacks who had served in the colonial armies were mainly ordinary soldiers with only a few being commissioned officers. It must be pointed from the outset that since the existent militias were coming from different backgrounds as already noted in the previous chapter, their allegiance was to their leaders and there was a lot of mistrust and animosity amongst the three existing different armies. The three armies were revamped and a professional force was created. Does the creation of the new ZNA explain why Mugabe has remained in power for more than three decades to date? Does it explain why his government has become authoritarian and established a dominant party system that is

¹⁹⁵ For more information see Masipula Sithole, “Struggles,” *Op. Cit.*, 1999.

¹⁹⁶ Chung, “Reliving,” *Op. Cit.*, 301.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 151.

openly supported by the military and other security sector institutions? If this is so, how did this come to be?

Since the 1980 elections, Mugabe exuded an intense appetite for power that he has maintained up to date; he has hung on, trampling on the democratic rights of the masses whom he purport to have liberated.¹⁹⁸ Lionel Cliffe, Joshua Mpofu and Barry Munslow, Britz and Tshuma suggest that it was the combination of electoral dominance and liberation struggle history that may have swayed ZANU-PF politicians to think that they are the ‘only legitimate’ representatives of all Zimbabweans.¹⁹⁹ They took a cue from some African governments that had become independent: a trend that engulfed nationalist leaders in SSA. As had happened in Malawi where there was a leadership cult of Bandaism, in Zaire-Mobutuism, in Egypt-Nasserism; so was Mugabeism embraced. The seeds of authoritarian politics were encouraged and fertilised. Zimbabwe travelled the same African path and though Mugabe ‘failed’ to establish a one party state he tactfully made it very difficult for the opposition to come to power. Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe were thus correct in their observation that:

The fate of the opposition was decided during the war of liberation in the 1970s. With a philosophy of annihilation, complimented with the monopoly of state power, it became impossible for the opposition ‘to contest political power’ as a viable political entity.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Annemie Britz and Josephat Tshuma, “Heroes fall, oppressors rise: Democratic decay and authoritarianism in Zimbabwe,” in *Friend or Foe? Dominant party systems in Southern Africa*, eds. Nicola De Jager and Pierre Du Toit. (South Africa: UCT Press, 2013), 171.

¹⁹⁹Ibid, 172.

²⁰⁰Ibid, Emphasis mine.

The instrument that was used to annihilate opposition was the military. The Zimbabwe military's role was therefore twofold, notably they delivered independence and were to be the guarantors of that independence,²⁰¹ the military are thus defending a process that begun during the liberation struggle. As already shown the use of violence as a means to an end had been put in motion by Tongogara and Nhongo (the ZANLA senior commanders) as they catapulted Mugabe to be the ZANU leader. Ambassador Agrippa Mutambara, Kudzai Matereke and Niveen Moghazy among other scholars, all agree that it was during the war of independence that ZANU developed a party ideology and hierarchy that has refused to fizzle out of many ex-guerrilla cadres; a dogma of maintaining a militarised state. From 1977 onwards the Commissariat department became central in directing the war effort. The organ was tasked the mandate of inculcating political ideologies to the guerrillas, new recruits and later on war collaborators and the masses.

The essence of politicising the guerrillas was the belief that “an ‘ideologically’ impoverished cadre” was not suitable to the task of holding a gun for the purpose of liberating the country²⁰² from the shackles of colonialism. The cadres had to know the reason why they became military personnel otherwise they would use the gun for criminal purposes. Under the stewardship of Mayor Urimbo the department became a propaganda organ of the party to prop up support for Mugabe. Arguably that is the time when the legacy

²⁰¹Walter Tapfumaneyi, “The Role of the Military in Nation-Building in Zimbabwe,” in *Demilitarising and Peace Building in Southern Africa* vol. (ii) eds. P. Batchelor, K. Kingma and G. Lamb. (England: Ashgate, 2004), 115.

²⁰²Gerald C. Mazarire, “Zanu-PF and the GNU,” in *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement*, ed. B. Raftopoulos. (Harare: Weaver Press, 2013), 76.

of ‘militocracy’ and the ‘Zanunization’ of the then guerrillas who later joined the ZNA became deeply ingrained in the ZANU ideology ‘hook, line and sinker.’ ‘Politicisation and militarisation became a hallmark of the Zimbabwean eco-political space. Chitiyo in a discussion with Alao claims that politicisation and militarisation of the Zimbabwean military took place during three different phases that are:

- The Entumbane riots that pitted ZANLA vs. ZIPRA forces as already shown.
- The participation of the ZNA in the DRC and
- After 2000 when the armed forces were appointed to head and run parastatals.²⁰³

Notably the irony of all that happened after 2000 was that the military elites unequivocally told the rank-and-file that the ZNA was not a place for those who sympathised with the opposition. The culture of not tolerating opposition was a product of the liberation struggle hence everyone who did not support ZANU was labelled an enemy. Kristen Harkness in her study of African civil-military relations observed that the nationalist leaders adopted new strategies for military service that were insulated in principles of inclusion and exclusion.²⁰⁴ While there are several mechanisms of guaranteeing military subordination, African nationalist leaders chose only between two options, that is; building a military on the basis of loyalty insulated in ethnic affinity or an inclusive military that is representative of all ethnic groups.

²⁰³Charles O. Alao, “Governance and the politics,” in *Zimbabwe’s Military: Examining*, ed. Rupiya. *Op. Cit.*, 24-25.

²⁰⁴Harkness, “The Origins. *Cit.*, 7.

Mugabe at first adopted a civic-nationalist approach, establishing a ZNA made up of the three different forces. Notably, this was only accommodated during the first year of independence. The civic-nationalist military model was abandoned after the Entumbane escapade. Paradoxically the combat or “battle for Bulawayo” was only quelled by the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) ²⁰⁵but the enmity between ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres persisted. However, the million-dollar question was how the ‘had-been enemies, now members of the ZNA, would co-exist and work for the good of the newly independent nation-state. The then “jewel of Africa” had to contain the internal fissures that were inherent in the armies that had been involved in the Rhodesian civil war.²⁰⁶It was difficult for the armies to overcome their intractable socio-political and cultural differences as well as absorb the geo-strategic security dynamics in Southern Africa. What enraged Mugabe and the Minister of State Security, Mnangagwa was that the BMATT selection process, that was professional and merit based, resulted in ex-ZIPRA soldiers occupying senior positions in the army.

ZANLA guerrillas who were the majority marginalised ZIPRA forces in the ZNA. The ZANU-PF government despotism and divisiveness became apparent. It was a disturbing development as the newly created state was fragile as it was built on a poor and shaky political and social foundation; explaining why the ruling elite prioritised its own security.²⁰⁷ Despite the signing of the Unity Agreement between ZANU and ZAPU in 1987, Shona dominance in the ZNA has been maintained. It is a paradox, but the security

²⁰⁵ White, “Who has ever,” *Op. Cit.*, 620.

²⁰⁶Chitiyo and Rupiya, “Evolutions and Revolutions,” *Op. Cit.*, 331.

²⁰⁷Gatsheni-Ndlovu, “The post-colonial state,” *Op. Cit.*, 21.

of Zimbabweans was sacrificed at the altar of executive security. Mugabe concluded that if political stability had to be maintained then he had to come up with an army that was loyal to his government. It was then that Mugabe started ruling through a vast system of patronage where appointments to senior defence posts were determined by loyalty to him. Such appointments were done under the guidance of both Mugabe and the new army General Solomon Mujuru while ethnicity was already having a bearing on civil-military interactions.

The animosity between ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres lay much deeper than ‘mere teething troubles of a new nation’ for these disturbances culminated in the regrettable aforementioned Gukuhurahundi massacres, a period Mugabe has characterised as a ‘moment of madness’ and yet such hatred was stirred by politicians. As already noted ZANU-PF politicians like Enos Nkala openly showed their dislike of ZAPU and ZIPRA by making very irritating remarks insinuating that Joshua Nkomo and his followers were enemies that had to be dealt with. Judith Todd noted that:

There had been warnings about possible dire consequences of the increasing acrimonious speeches made by politicians such as Nkala.....Brigadier Charles Grey of the National Army, and formerly of ZIPRA.... warned of the dangers implicit in hate speeches made by politicians inciting one faction and infuriating the other.²⁰⁸

The ZANU-PF politicians gave a deaf ear to such warnings. After surviving an assassination attempt at state house in 1981, Mugabe decided on the creation of a military

²⁰⁸Sadomba, “War Veterans in Zimbabwe,” *Op. Cit.*, 81-82.

battalion that was beholden to him. Mugabe masterminded the creation of a Chinese style military; organised more on militia and party lines than a creation of a purely professional force as envisaged by the BMATT instructors. It is therefore not surprising that the Fifth Brigade was established as a Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM) that was tasked to be the eyes and ears of the party-state justifying the notion that it was a highly politicised unit.²⁰⁹ One CIO senior officer commenting on the Fifth Brigade said:

Upon completion of their five-months training they emerged as brainwashed zombies, armed to the teeth, and with blood-lust in their eyes. All they needed was a convenient target and a venue to be set loose upon.²¹⁰

When the dissident disturbances started in Matabeleland it became an opportune moment for the deployment of the North Korean instructed and highly politicised brigade that even marched with the North Korean goosestep.²¹¹ Herein lay the now haunting characteristic where-in the military was used to silence dissent. Father Oskar Wermter claims that the Fifth Brigade was deliberately cruel far worse than the Smith militia. During the Matabeleland disturbances, innocent civilians were tortured and murdered in cold blood, while women were raped. Politicisation became a tool in the hands of the politicians explaining why Cephass Msipa argues in his book that the Matabeleland massacres (Gukurahundi) was not a moment of madness but a well calculated 'mishap' by Mugabe and his henchmen.²¹² Heidi Holland perceives that Mugabe was oblivious that he was a

²⁰⁹Chitiyo and Rupiya, "Evolutions and Revolutions," *Op. Cit.*, 340.

²¹⁰Moorcraft, "Mugabe's War," *Op. Cit.*, 10.

²¹¹*Ibid*, 102-105.

²¹²For more on this see Cephass Msipa's book: *In Pursuit of Freedom and Justice: A Memoir*, 2015.

pawn in the bigger Southern Africa power game a view corroborated by McGuinness, a former Rhodesian policeman, who made a very important observation that:

It was a lot for one inexperienced prime minister to deal with, and he was well and truly distrustful, by the time his suspicion of former rival Joshua Nkomo's intention set in, which led to the first really big blunder of his presidency, the Matabele massacres, after several assassination attempts he knew that they were after him personally, they wanted to kill him.²¹³

Mike Auret and Bishop Mutume who was head of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) raised their concerns with Mugabe concerning the formation of the Fifth Brigade to which he responded by claiming that it had been discovered that PF-ZAPU had caches of arms and ammunition that they wanted to use to overthrow his government.²¹⁴ It must also not be overlooked that before the battle for Bulawayo just like some of the ZANLA forces who had not gone into Assembly Points, there were also some ZIPRA forces who continued roaming the country side and they refused to follow orders during the ceasefire and also during the time when their ZIPRA nationalist leadership was being denigrated by the ZANU-PF government. They were thus deemed dissidents. Lieutenant General Nhongo was totally in step with Mugabe and advocated for purge tactics to end the ZIPRA problem. This was all that Mugabe needed to come up with a militia that was loyal to him if he was to survive politically. However, Dumiso Dabengwa the PF-ZAPU military intelligence supremo to this day refutes that PF-ZAPU wanted to assassinate

²¹³ Holland, "Dinner, *Op. Cit.*, 38-39.

²¹⁴ Auret, "From Liberator," *Op. Cit.*, 77.

Mugabe. He alleges that it was the CIO that buried arms on ZAPU farms to increase the tension between the two political parties so as to pave way for the creation of a one party state. Herein was sown the seeds of a completely loyal politicised ZNA. Ndlovu-Gatsheni observed that:

The military and the minister of defence usurped the police duties. While it is universally acknowledged that the military as an institution is authoritarian by nature, democratisation demands that the military is controlled by the state. The intervention of the military in civilian operations indicated beyond doubt the move by the Zimbabwean government away from legitimate and democratic rule by consent of the governed to authoritarian rule by repressive and violent means that demanded the unquestioning compliance of the governed....it also ushered in a wave of militarisation of politics that continues to negatively affect democratic governance in Zimbabwe today.²¹⁵

Though Mnangagwa, Joshua Nkomo and others had raised their displeasure with the hostilities that reared their ugly head in the newly created army Joshua Nkomo argued that it would have been prudent if the LHC had facilitated for the integration of the forces before the April 1980 elections because as it were Zimbabwe had four different armies. White argues that at this juncture the Zimbabwean problem was not the number of the armies that were there but how these soldiers perceived themselves and on whose side they were on.²¹⁶ It is a paradox, but it is a myth and political naivety and dishonest to talk of a 'neutral soldier' explaining why the ex-Rhodesian military officers as well as white soldiers in the

²¹⁵ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Post-Colonial State," *Op. Cit.*, 29.

²¹⁶ White, "Whoever Saw," *Op. Cit.*, 620-621.

military rank-and-file's loyalty were "with the departing colonialists, white racists and imperialists."²¹⁷As noted, their loyalty was to their parties and leaders and this had a tremendous bearing on interactions between the politicians and the military.

Given the suspicions between the politicians and members of the newly formed ZNA; it was challenging to smoothly mould them into a single force since they had not been established as national armies but party armies and yet the military; was to be key to having a stable political environment that would be viable for post-colonial reconstruction and development. ZANU-PF politicians were geared at nothing but to have a military saturated with its own political philosophy hence the formation of the Presidential Guard and Fifth Brigade was a deliberate move to fulfil such aspirations. Zimbabwe has failed to reform or democratise the 'colonial structures' of power, and as such violence merged very well with the accepted violent political culture of ZANU-PF²¹⁸the reason why Mugabe has at times said he has a 'degree in violence.' The enduring violence that has characterised the Zimbabwean political space can be explained by certain features within the ZANU-PF party; namely, the securitisation of the party-state in which violence is a means to enforce cohesion. When the dissident menace was eradicated the Fifth Brigade was returned to barracks but threats of the use of violence were a characteristic of the 1985 elections. The perpetuation of violence in the late 1990s was an outgrowth and direct reflection of the failed nation-building efforts associated with the looming crisis²¹⁹; so was the militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military.

²¹⁷ Yates, "The Prospects for Socialist," *Op. Cit.*, 86.

²¹⁸Onslow, "Zimbabwe and Political," *Op. Cit.*, 8.

²¹⁹*Ibid.*

ZANU-PF embarked on a nation-state building project that Kriger has termed “party-state” and “party-nation.” This is a “process of elevation of the ruling party into the centre of the state and the nation, to the extent that state and national agendas become indistinguishable from those of the ruling party,” a process that can also be referred to as the “Zanufication” of Zimbabwe in its entirety; while the military as an institution witnesses an unprecedented “Zanlafication,” within the Chimurenga ethos which formed the foundation myth of the post-colonial state.²²⁰ It was precisely at this time that the military became a party-state goblin for power retention and preservation.

Mugabe had already started ‘talk’ about ZANU-PF ruling forever. Paradoxically he allowed the emerging political and MEs to jostle for property, farms and businesses. This was another strategy that was used by Mugabe to reward those who are loyal to him. Massive wealth accumulation was allowed although it was a violation of the party leadership code.²²¹ As observed by Auret, though Mugabe had at first expressed dismay at the rate at which senior government and military officials were accumulating riches, he prudently relented as he realised that he could use this to enable and guard his political power base. One of my informants says that Mugabe uses threats of arrests and persecution to those associates who will want to criticise him or abandon the ZANU-PF ‘train.’ It was in this climate of “primitive accumulation,” exacerbated by economic mismanagement that

²²⁰ Ndlovu, “A perspective on ethnic, regional and ideological dimensions of the composition of the Zimbabwean military and their implications,” in *Zimbabwe’s Military: Examining its veto power in the transition to democracy, 2008-2013* ed. Martin R. Rupiye (Pretoria: The African Public Policy Research Institute, 2013), 41.

²²¹ Welshman Ncube, “The post-unity period: developments, benefits and problems,” in Canaan Banana, “Turmoil,” Op. Cit., 320.

there grew fierce opposition to Mugabe's rule; who responded with unwarranted despotism thus:

Zimbabwe now exhibits a form of authoritarianism that can be traced from the social transformation catalysed by the economic and moral bankruptcy of post-colonial nebula of hybrid liberal democracy.²²²

It is in the above context that the Zimbabwean government became authoritarian with ZANU-PF firmly in control. It became an 'illegitimate authoritarian regime' dispensing violence and threats of violence during elections to remain in power. Such violence was being stirred by top military personnel involved in this accumulative and aggrandising euphoria. Brigadier Mashingaidze was convinced that ZANU-PF was reneging on its commitment to the ideals of the liberation struggle by enriching themselves at the expense of those who had gallantly fought for freedom, thus he lamented, "...is this; the ZANU-PF I trusted with my life? Is this the same party that promised to care for us in our old age?"²²³

A disturbing phenomenon that has been allowed is that ZANU-PF sees itself as an epitome of political virtue, a saviour to Zimbabwean masses. However the irony is that the political and military elites continue to aggrandise state resources while the party-state continues to reward loyalty through a system of patronage. The MEs and other civil servants with connections in the party and government have benefitted from the war-victims'

²²²Sara Bracking, "Development Denied: Autocratic Militarism in Post-election Zimbabwe." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37, no. 104 (2005): 341-357.

²²³Meredith, "The Fate," *Op. Cit.*, 698.

compensation fund.²²⁴Paradoxically, no one was ever prosecuted or made to return the funds that they embezzled hence it is not surprising that with the increase of food riots in the late 1990s Mugabe did not hesitate to bring the army into the streets to quell disturbances for the first time since independence.²²⁵Below I briefly discuss how the ZNA's participation in the DRC war shaped civil-military relations in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war

It is widely known that parliamentarians were not consulted when the ZNA was deployed to participate in the DRC war. Apparently not all those who participated in the war benefited, others lost their lives yet their families never received any compensation. Chitiyo observed that it was during the DRC war that 'rotten apples' or those who were perceived vocal in the ZNA were strategically asked to go into retirement while some were "bought off by being allowed to participate in the race for wealth accumulation and self-enrichment. Some ZNA elites were involved in a racket of diamond and gold smuggling while some ZANU-PF politicians allied themselves with financial kingpins and 'business magnates' like Billy Rautenbach and John Bredenkamp, white Rhodies who had assisted Smith to burst the sanctions; to exploit the DRC's mineral wealth.²²⁶

²²⁴ Wilfred Mhanda, *Memories of a Freedom Fighter* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011), 219.

²²⁵ Meredith, "The Fate of Africa," *Op. Cit.*, 679.

²²⁶ Horace Campbell, *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation* (Cape Town: David Philip, 2003), 230-46.

The extension of military activities to profit-making business culminated in the creation of a class of military personnel that carried with it the baggage of the ‘sly’ side of business and they were not blind to the fact that some politicians were involved in the illegal plunder of DRC resources and saw the gestation of corruption within the military.²²⁷ The military leaders and some in the military rank-and-file became corruptible. This justified Lord Carrington’s later lamentation in an interview with Holland that “Mugabe gradually bought the army with spoils from the Congo; he bought them all, didn’t he?” It is a fact that both the politicians and the military were now embroiled in a web of militarism and primitive accumulation despite the negative consequences on the Zimbabwean economy. Zimbabwe had started with 3000 troops but by the end of 1998 they had 6000 troops and by the time of the siege of Ikela, Zimbabwean soldiers operating in the DRC were more than 12 000.²²⁸ Paradoxically the politicians and military leaders could not have risked such a military contingent if they were not benefiting especially given that an economic decline was already in motion. Moorcraft contends that:

The Congo offered untold riches abroad to Mugabe’s generals. The war killed hundreds of ordinary soldiers and further undermined the tottering economy, but a handful of new military millionaires laughed all the way to the bank.²²⁹

Though Zimbabwe was responding to a call by one of the SADC member state president Laurent Kabila, who was under attack from rebel groups, the war became the vehicle for shaping the politico-military economic alliance. The establishment of the Gelamines

²²⁷Rupiya, “Guarding the Guardian,” *Op. Cit.*, 106.

²²⁸ For more information on this see H. Campbell, *Reclaiming Zimbabwe* (South Africa: David Philips Publishers, 2003).

²²⁹ Paul Moorcraft, “Mugabe’s war,” *Op. Cit.*, 128

mining cooperation by Zimbabwean entrepreneurs with links to political and military leaders was a very lucrative venture hence despite human and material casualties Mugabe's generals and politicians made substantial sums of money.²³⁰ Colonel Dube the then general manager of the Zimbabwe Defence Industry (ZDI) said that Zimbabwe supplied dried fish, corn meal, uniforms, boots, bullets and mortar bombs to Kabila's forces and these goods were transported to the DRC by a company owned by the now late Major-General Vitalis Zvinavashe.²³¹

In an interview with the author, Colonel Dr. Chinyanganya argues that military presence in the DRC was above board because the military were following a directive given by the President who is the commander-in-chief, to help a fellow SADC member state after having been mandated by SADC "to thwart a possible Ugandan invasion. The army did not have any clue why we were there. Government under the auspices of SADC wanted to assist a fellow SADC country."²³² He maintains that such conduct demonstrates professional civil-military relations as the ZNA is subservient to the civilian authority just like NATO is in Europe. However, it cannot be denied that Mugabe allowed military leaders to be embroiled and become willing recipients of illicit deals. Zimbabwe's participation in the DRC war was therefore not "an ill-advised foreign policy decision but reflected a political economy process.... were participants were involved in a wholesale exploitation of the DRC's natural resources"²³³ thus the war baited the military leaders and wetted their

²³⁰ Paul Moorcraft, "Mugabe's war," Op. Cit., 128.

²³¹ Ibid, 236.

²³² Max Chinyanganya, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, 14th October, 2015.

²³³ Sandra J. Maclean, "Mugabe at War: The Political Economy of Conflict in Zimbabwe," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (June 2002): 516.

appetite to accumulate as much wealth as they could without any fear of punitive reprisal from politicians.

Material benefits brought the politicians and some military chiefs closer though some legislators, civil society groups, the general populace and other military officers complained about the ZNA's engagement in the DRC.²³⁴ Such negative sentiments impacted on the relationship between the military leaders and the politicians who were benefitting from the deals. As posited by MacLean, Zimbabwe's intervention in the DRC:

.....Was a sop to the military; an attempt to ensure its allegiance to Mugabe. The repressive and illegal measures against the personnel of the Standard (newspaper) following its report of a planned coup was a clear indication of the government's sensitivity on the issue.... the mineral trade in the DRC offered lucrative possibilities for rewarding loyal officers.²³⁵

At home the ZANU-PF politicians did not condemn rent-seeking activities by the military and political elite since this suited their 'command economy' that allowed the party's direct control of the Zimbabwean economy.²³⁶

Be that as it is though the military is at times mooted a 'silent partner' with a fairly visible presence in governance issues they remain a very important actor with regard to national political and economic developments. For a country to develop there is need for stability

²³⁴Moorcraft, "Mugabe's war," *Op. Cit.*, 128.

²³⁵Maclean, "Mugabe at war," *Op. Cit.*, 523.

²³⁶Roger Southall, "Liberation Movements," *Op. Cit.*, 275.

that can be guaranteed by the military. The military, politics and democracy are intertwined to the extent that it is almost impossible to discuss one without touching on the other. The ZNA before 2000 was considered by the majority of the Shona as practically playing only a non-existent political role. The military as afore mentioned had mainly been deployed to deal with the disturbances in Matabeleland.

Given the above assertions some might be tempted to say that the Zimbabwean forces have maintained an enviable relationship with the Zimbabwean general populace though quite different from how they are perceived in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces. Retired brigadier and war veterans permanent secretary in the War Veterans Ministry; Walter Tapfumaneyi, contends that the ZNA has been on the forefront trying to improve the lives of the general populace, through building schools, distribution of grain during droughts and demining. He argues persuasively that they have also contributed to the maintenance of political stability in the country. The military has also maintained and encouraged a sense of patriotism by adhering to a quota system of recruitment. Tapfumaneyi argues that proportional recruitment of young men and women in the ZNA is done irrespective of ethnic background; a policy not generated by central government but by the military.²³⁷

It is however not an exaggeration that from 1998 the military elites became an endemic problem in Zimbabwean politics as they became more interested in their own interests and not that of the society that they are supposed to protect and serve as their participation in politics became complex. The politicians ‘allowed them’ to dabble in politics especially

²³⁷Ibid, 132.

during elections. They began to act with impunity thus they were being unprofessional as military led operations were undertaken in Zimbabwe from 2000 to date.

Notably, civil-military relations in Zimbabwe have been impacted by military and civilian experiences during the liberation struggle. The MLs, commissioned officers, ordinary soldiers and many of those in government bear the ineffaceable scars of the Rhodesian regime brutality. It cannot be disqualifed that the liberation war continues to have a profound influence on them all. This explains Father Oscar Wermter's submission in an interview with the author that, it is because of the traumatic experiences of the Second Chimurenga that those in the military, politicians and the political party rank-and-file have continued to support each other. The revolution has thus continued to hold hostage its own children. It is therefore not surprising that those who were and are suspected of disloyalty or even those with a different opinion are abducted and even killed as was the case of Gift Tandare of the MDC, or never to be seen like Itai Dzamara or tortured like activist Jestina Mukoko among others.

The military's attempt to stay out of overt politics (if they share different views with the party-state) is therefore partly because those who participated in the liberation struggle still remember the purging of military commanders and ordinary guerrillas who were accused of criticising and hatching plans to topple the political leadership²³⁸probably explaining why generals like Gunda who was accused of plotting a coup and others died mysteriously.

²³⁸Moorcraft, "Mugabe's war," *Op. Cit.*, 159.

One notable characteristic of ZANU-PF is that anyone who opposes the party-state is an enemy and must be subjected to the ever ready ZANU-PF brutality.

The conduct of the colonial military had built a rancorous relationship between the indigenous population and the military. The military is thus still feared and loathed. Interestingly enough the Zimbabwean post-colonial government has continued to maintain such a relationship; ²³⁹the reason why soldiers who were members of the Fifth Brigade who were interviewed in the Wampoa film regret their actions and blame their commanders and politicians.²⁴⁰ The gist of the matter is that ZANU-PF politicians have succeeded in politicising the army and have thus used the ZNA personnel to do the politicians' bidding against the general populace and all its perceived enemies since the attainment of independence in 1980.

What is interesting is that the military continue to be hand in glove with the ruling elite because the interests of the military elite continue to be interwoven with the very *raison de* 'etre of the ZANU-PF ruling clique; the maintenance of a prevailing status quo to protect interests. Mugabe had always been an adherent of a one party system, the reason why he has kept the ZNA at his bosom. The fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s ushered in serious political problems, a time when Mugabe faced opposition from Edgar Tekere and a time he was at pains to embrace multi-partyism. It is therefore not surprising as suggested by Brian Raftopoulos that ZANU-PF's response to Zimbabwe's deepening crisis

²³⁹Naison, Ngoma. "Civil-Military Relations in Africa: Navigating Uncharted Waters," *Africa Security Review* 15, no. 4 (2006): 103.

²⁴⁰Sadomba, "War veterans," *Op. Cit.*, 82.

and the formation of the MDC was its all-encompassing articulation of an intolerant, selective and racialized nationalist discourse, a discourse saturated with an ideological attack on perceived internal enemies who support the MDC. This ignited an increased politicisation of the armed forces that has seriously retarded Zimbabwe's democratic growth.

Just as the Rhodesian Front had captured the state during its tenure, ZANU-PF has replicated the same showing that the state has successively been abused in the service of those in power. By not divorcing themselves from electoral politics the military generals and members of the military rank-and-file have become unprofessional. Because of politicisation, patronage politics that dispenses military rewards to loyalists the party-military nexus has once again become a phenomenon that has defied all odds and has not permitted military disintegration or state collapse. This may be because the Zimbabwe's state-military development has become unique in that the national culture that defines Zimbabwe's political space was not imposed by a central state but was a result of a nexus of "evolutionary, coercive and spontaneous factors" that determine how the military are always geared to defend Zimbabwe's national autonomy, and territorial integrity.²⁴¹

The military leaders and the politicians have therefore been involved in "nested games" that are dynamic strategic relations of both antipathy and collaboration²⁴², a situation that has mainly benefited the military and political elites. It is therefore beyond doubt that the military are part of the political equation and explains why it became necessary to hold the

²⁴¹Tapfumaneyi, "The Role," *Op. Cit.*, 116.

²⁴²For more information see Norma Kriger, "Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe," 2003a.

2002 and June 2008 elections in a politically militarised environment. Makumbe has argued that, “ZANU-PF has been thorough in ensuring that it dominates virtually every political institution in Zimbabwe.”²⁴³ This is in conformity with Colonel Max Chinyanganya’s submission that “despite being a national construct, the military swiftly became an instrument of the state and party just as the Rhodesian army had been a vehicle for the Rhodesian Front.”²⁴⁴

Before 2000 civil-military relations in Zimbabwe have not been a zero sum game as depicted by Dennis Norman in an interview with Heidi Holland that:

Money changed hands on things like tenders and Mugabe knew it, but he didn’t do anything about it because it meant challenging those loyal to him in an environment where more and more weren’t on his side anymore.... he wasn’t totally hands on the wheel anymore.... he also knew that his ministers were lying to him. When the land grabs began.... he would look shocked when I told him what was happening. “But they can’t do that, phone the police Chief or the regional officer or the CIO director.” ...He felt completely impotent; it was out of his control. ‘Other securocrats and army officers were involved,’ he had let them loose without realising it. His pre-occupation was to position himself so as to look as if he was in charge.²⁴⁵

The military had been let loose. Zimbabwe was gradually becoming a military with a state as would become apparent in 2008. Even before 2000 politics for both the military and the

²⁴³ John Makumbe, “Zanu-PF: A party in Transition? In *Zimbabwe’s Turmoil: Problems and Prospects* (ed.) Richard Cornwell. (Pretoria: Monograph no. 87, Institute for Security Studies), 34-35.

²⁴⁴ Max Chinyanganya’s forthcoming text, 94 (Author given permission to cite from the text)

²⁴⁵ Holland, “Dinner,” 2008.

politicians had now mutated into a political game of survival even for retired military officers. Former military men got involved in the political dynamics further complicating issues by being partisan as this impacted on the behaviour of those who are still serving. Some retired military personnel like General Mujuru, Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai, and Retired Brigadier Mike Nyambuya among others were given positions in the party or government, thus serving and retired military subordination to ZANU-PF politicians was buttressed by indoctrination and permeation of the military by civilians. Below I make a conclusion of my findings in this chapter.

In this chapter it has emerged that immediately after the attainment of independence the Zimbabwean government embarked on an Africanisation of the military and this was done in a bid to have a military that is beholden to the wishes of the nationalist politicians. The military and the politicians have a well-ingrained symbiotic relationship that the party has enjoyed since the days of the 2nd Chimurenga. The ZANU-PF nationalist politicians since then have thus considered themselves as the ‘only legitimate’ representatives of the people to rule Zimbabwe. Arguably the politicisation of the military that started during the liberation struggle has continued unabated.

The ZANU-PF party has continued to be a hierarchical organization made up of militarists and politicians but was under the control of the military especially during Josiah Tongogara’s tenure, a time when everything revolved around the military High Command. It was from 1980 through 1999 that the politicians came to be in firm control of the party. Solomon Mujuru and Mugabe were by then two political hands that washed the others’

“dirty,” where the latter had allowed the former to accumulate wealth whilst the former also tightened his grip on the military. The merger of the different armies that had been enemies was very important in that it created an enabling environment for the new state to base on and not to regress into civil war. The party and state became conflated, a phenomenon that has continued unabated. With the elbowing out of the former Rhodesian Security Forces and ex-ZIPRA soldiers from influential military positions in the army especially after the battle of Bulawayo and during the Gukurahundi. Interactions between the politicians and the military have remained cordial as many of those in the army are beneficiaries of the Z\$50 000 gratuities that were given to war veterans for having fought in the second liberation war.

It has also emerged that the MEs and their ZANU-PF political counterparts benefited from their intervention in the DRC war. The military were therefore more than willing partners in quelling disturbances of civilians who rioted against the government in the late 1990s. It is noted in the United Nations report on the DRC war that some Zimbabwean politicians and some military leaders benefited from the gold and diamond deals in the DRC. Such mineral wealth put into motion and cemented politico-military-business connections that did not benefit the ordinary soldiers, the masses or boost the Zimbabwean economy. It therefore can plausibly be argued that before 2000; the politicians managed to subordinate the military to their dictates.

The loyalty debate has raised questions of whether the military is loyal to the party-state or the constitution. Is Zimbabwe a state with a military or a military with a state? Questions

abound whether the military leaders and military rank-and-file are still being fearful of the ZANU-PF axe? Why did the military become so visible after the year 2000? Whose bags were and are the military carrying? Whose path are they walking? The next chapter describes and discusses the interactions between the politicians and the military leaders as well as that of the military leaders and the military rank-and-file from 2000 to 2013. It also interrogates whether the military have continued to acquiesce to politicians' subordination.

Chapter 5

The Unholy Political-Military Alliance

The quickest way to get the Chilean army unwittingly onto the side of America's agenda in 1970 was to hit them [the Chilean army] where it hurts most, the pocket.....the country's economy must scream and scream it did, with the rate of inflation that was the worst in world history, companies laying off workers, food in short supply, the collapse of social services and in Chile. (Henry Kissinger)

Zimbabwe's descent into crisis is a man-made trajectory because at the time Zimbabwe got its independence by global standards, its economy was strong. The Zimbabwean dollar was at par with that of the United States of America. Julius Nyerere among others regarded Zimbabwe as a "jewel of Africa" and warned Mugabe against mismanaging it.²⁴⁶ Though the economy had been disturbed by the civil war it was still in good shape as the country was still one of the biggest exporters of flue cured tobacco, maize, soya beans, cotton, sugar, coffee, fruit, vegetables and beef among other products. However Zimbabwe has experienced a serious economic meltdown that is shocking though it is not at war with any country.

The first part of this chapter analyses the interaction between party leaders and the rank-and-file members. It commences by describing the politicians and military leaders (MLs); the military leaders and the military rank-and-file (MR&F) interactions from 2000 to

²⁴⁶ Martin Meredith, "Robert Mugabe," *Op. Cit.*, 15-17.

2013. The second part of this chapter analyses the impact of the political and economic crisis on civil-military relations-but especially focusing on why the military rank-and-file did not rise up against the military leadership. Of note is an interrogation of why the military has become the principal locus of decision making on the Zimbabwean political platform.

The Zimbabwean tragedy is not that the political situation became bad and unbearable, but that the danger signals have been there since the early 1980s, clearly visible for everyone to see but little was done by either Zimbabweans or the international community to stop it.²⁴⁷ The ZANU-PF autocratic tendencies and use of the security-sector to suppress opposition is a disturbing phenomenon. Since 2000 the military leaders have openly and 'strategically' positioned themselves in the Zimbabwean eco-political matrix. It has become almost impossible to talk of Zimbabwe without taking into account the interests of the ZNA and other security institutions.

Zimbabwe since 2000 has witnessed an entrenched authoritarianism and an increased suffocation of democracy; evidenced by the increased securitisation of Zimbabwe's political and economic space. Arguably this connotes a worrying phenomenon. Zimbabwe, a country that had been hailed both regionally and internationally, became impregnably very politicised and militarised. Arguably its descent from grace did not occur in a vacuum, there were complex eco-political 'push and pull factors' that account for the Zimbabwean tragedy. If it were in some countries, the military as the 'guardians' of the

²⁴⁷ For more on this see, Geoff Hill, *The Battle for Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2003).

people would have intervened, “cleaned up the mess” and then guide the nation back to a competent and ‘uncorrupted’ rulership as was the case of Ghana under Rawlings but in Zimbabwe the military has openly supported the conflated ZANU-PF party-state. As observed by Rupiya the military has “sent signals of a lack of concern with the plight of the majority.” Before the June 2000 parliamentary elections the military had said they would not meddle in politics only to change course after ZANU-PF’s poor performance in that election.

In response to an economic deterioration and a serious political challenge from the MDC ZANU-PF has become militaristic just like what it did when it was fighting against Ian Smith’s government, thus, it is true that “the guerrillas have still not taken off their uniforms; they have not yet laid down their guns.”²⁴⁸ The security sector unleashes violence on enemies of the party-state and when violence is perpetrated on MDC supporters, they adopt a ‘watch and do-nothing approach.’²⁴⁹

The Politico-Military Alliances since 2000

Mugabe responded to the political and economic challenges of the late 1990s by proposing a new constitution. Mahmood Mamdani states that Mugabe inserted two controversial clauses in the proposed draft constitution. One gave immunity to political and military leaders who committed crimes during their tenure and allow him to stay in power for two

²⁴⁸ See John Makumbe, “Zanu-PF: A Party in Transition?” *Zimbabwe’s Turmoil: Problems & Prospects*, ed. Richard Cornwell. (Monograph, no. 87, Pretoria, ISS, 2003).

²⁴⁹For more information see Masunungure’s article “Travails of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe Since independence,” *Op. Cit.*, 147-158.

more terms whilst the other gave power to the government to seize land from white farmers without compensation.²⁵⁰ These were the proposals that the newly formed MDC party and civil society vehemently campaigned against the ZANU-PF draft constitution. The Zimbabwean electorate were bent on emulating the Zambian example where Kenneth Kaunda had been dislodged from power by Fredrick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). By rejecting the ZANU-PF government proposed constitution Zimbabwe was opening a political chapter which would leave the majority of the citizens politically and emotionally scarred.

Eldred Masunungure, Brian Raftopoulos, Ian Phimster, Martin Meredith, Stephen Chan among others who have written on Zimbabwe agree that the MDC was the first opposition party to seriously challenge ZANU-PF hegemony. The rejection of this draft constitution dampened the government's aspirations "of taming a process that had escaped its control."²⁵¹ This rejection was a rotten egg thrown in the face of ZANU-PF politicians as it was its first major defeat since 1980. Mugabe while appearing composed and 'accepting' the referendum results, blamed the deteriorating economy on white commercial farmers, industrialists, hoarders, speculators, Britain and the international financial institutions namely the IMF and WB. The ZANU-PF politicians were out of touch with reality. The Zimbabwean general populace especially the workers were unforgiving to the government for mismanaging the economy and reducing them to destitution. Victims of structural adjustment programme (SAPs) retrenchments were no longer able to support themselves

²⁵⁰ Mahmood Mamdani, "Lessons of Zimbabwe," *London Review of Books* 30, no. 23 (December 2008): 17-21.

²⁵¹ Raftopoulos, "Current politics in Zimbabwe," *Op. Cit.*, 12.

or their extended families in the rural areas. If the ZANU-PF politicians had allowed themselves to 'take in' the grievances that had ignited demonstrations in the late 1990s they would not have taken the electorate for granted hence they were astonished by the electorate's change of heart.

The ZANU-PF politicians came to the conclusion that the "No!" vote had been instigated by white commercial farmers who had many times been 'caught on camera' donating money to the MDC party and were therefore overtly supporting the dislodging of ZANU-PF from power. Mugabe was quoted in the Zimbabwean Sunday Mail newspaper saying "While 20 years ago, we fought (the whites) using AK rifles, today we are using a pen and ballot paper...but the war is no less important than in the 1970s. The enemy is the same."²⁵²

It was then that strategic political restraining mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the white commercial farmers and their workers would become politically dormant and would never be an electoral force to reckon during future elections. Land invasions known as "jambanja" (violent land seizures) were intensified. Army trucks were used to carry war veterans and some MR&F soldiers to farms that were targeted. This is not to discount the fact that some ordinary masses voluntarily participated in the land invasions. These land invasions were directed by senior ZANU-PF politicians and army commanders amongst other security sector personnel. The white commercial farmers were an enemy that had to be dealt with together with 'the enemy within,' Tsvangirai and his supporters. To get sympathy from the uniformed forces Tsvangirai was labelled a turncoat and a marionette

²⁵² Meredith, "The Fate," *Op. Cit.*, 702.

serving the interests of the British and white commercial farmers. From February 2000, there was a nuanced conflation of the party and the state which became virtually indistinguishable, a phenomenon that had begun during the early years of independence. When the party and its leadership became angry, the uniformed forces became equally angry and reacted on behalf, and often at the behest, of the party leadership.²⁵³ It is during this period that the relationship between the ZANU-politicians and the armed forces mutated into serious politicisation of the military and the militarisation of politics.

It is plausible to point out at this juncture that just a few weeks before the June 2000 parliamentary elections, the military spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Chancellor Diye made a press statement that gave many Zimbabweans a false sense of security, promise and hope. Lieutenant-Colonel Diye said that the military would work with whatever party that would be victorious in the elections.²⁵⁴ The statement had apparently made many people believe that the ZNA was apolitical and would respect any election result. Those who harboured such thoughts erroneously discounted the realist argument that in life everything revolves around power, politicians seek power and want to maintain that power. Such a view is further reinforced by David Antony who plausibly argues that:

Politicians are interested in power, wealth and office and that any social outcome in politics is incidental to profit making in economics. Even in democratic politics men are interested in their own initial outcomes and not public policy. Interest groups and

²⁵³ Masunungure, "Travails of opposition, *Op.Cit*" 156.

²⁵⁴ Rupiya, "Contextualising the military," *Op. Cit.*, 79.

political parties are not interested in realising an ideal, democratic or otherwise or in making a better society, only in office and its rewards.²⁵⁵

Zimbabweans, supporters of the MDC were still very much excited about the February referendum outcome though disturbed by the farm invasions that were taking place. Rupiya pointed out that “at the time, the country enjoyed some stable civil-military relations and the statement (by Diye) did not draw much attention or comment.”²⁵⁶ However these relations changed after the highly-contested June 2000 parliamentary poll. To ZANU-PF’s surprise the ‘still crawling’ MDC infant party did the unexpected: it won 57 of the 120 seats; 47.2 %; the electorate had once again dared ZANU-PF by voting for this less than a year-old party.

The significance of such a spirited vote and open rebuke of the ZANU-PF ‘political god’ was that though it was not enough for the MDC to form the next government, “it was indeed a strong missile to bloody the nose of the ruling party in parliament and block any further changes to the constitution.”²⁵⁷ The MDC went on to challenge the election results in 39 constituencies winning four of the challenges, bringing it almost at par with ZANU-PF.²⁵⁸ Father Fidelis Mukonori in an interview with Holland espoused how Mugabe had become out of touch with reality on what was really taking place in the country. He intimated, “I told him that the urban people were dissatisfied with the ruling party which they regarded as inept and insensitive. He said that his ministers had assured him that

²⁵⁵David Antony in Obediah Mazombwe, “Land Sovereignty Zimbabwe’s enduring legacy,” *The Zimbabwe Sunday Mail*, 16-22, March 2008. (Also, see Adam Smith’s argument.)

²⁵⁶Rupiya, “Contextualising the military,” *Op. Cit.*, 79.

²⁵⁷Hill, “The Battle for Zimbabwe,” *Op. Cit.*, 171.

²⁵⁸Raftopoulos, “Current politics in Zimbabwe,” *Op. Cit.*, 13.

ZANU-PF would win. He was shocked when he saw the results. It was a protest vote and Robert knew that.”²⁵⁹The ZANU-PF politicians should have realised that this was more than a protest vote, what the people wanted was change of government. Many people went about wearing MDC regalia emblazoned “Change” and greeted each other in the same fashion. The political environment was further worsened by continued deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy.

It is not difficult to understand why the ZANU-PF party quickly went into panic mode. Its political dominance had been seriously threatened and there were possibilities of them losing the 2002 presidential elections if it failed to reinvigorate itself or come up with a viable strategy. The ZANU-PF politicians would not dare test the political voters’ electoral current once again, it had no option but to unleash its repressive party-state machinery; the security sector (SS). Coupled with unleashing the SS on the political terrain, ZANU-PF continued with its project of reigniting its anti-imperialist project that was succinctly captured in the slogan, “The land is the economy, the economy the land,” this became the hallmark of politics of exclusion, racial essentialism, and violence.²⁶⁰ His ego was seriously bruised upon realisation that the MDC as a political party was being supported by white commercial farmers, his yesteryear enemies who had also been the backbone of Ian Smith’s racist Rhodesian Front. Mugabe affirmed, “Let the MDC side with Europeans and the British, but we will conquer them together. I am firmly asserting to you that there will never come a day when the MDC will rule this country; never-ever.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Holland, “Dinner,” *Op. Cit.*, 125.

²⁶⁰ Raftopoulos, “Current Politics in Zimbabwe,” *Op. Cit.*, 17.

²⁶¹ Dieter B. Scholtz, “Robert Mugabe: revolutionary or rebel?” in *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future*, ed. David H. Barry (Harare: Weaver Press, 2004), 29.

He warned the members of his Central Committee that it would be a serious miscalculation to take the MDC for granted. The MDC was not an ordinary party but a manifestation of the “resurgence of white power, a counter-revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday.”²⁶² It is therefore not surprising that the military, politicians and others being led by the war veterans descended on commercial farms getting hold of anything that they could lay their hands on forcefully evicting the owners. Violence was thus used to display the anger of ‘Zanuists,’ who were not in agreement with the turn of political events after the 2000 parliamentary election. The state security institutions supported the violence as the battle lines had been drawn. Sue Onslow observed that:

Centralised violence and coercion with collaboration and other violent acts from elements within the ZRP, the CID and CIO, and ZNA elements is [unofficially] sanctioned by the President, as Commander in-chief of the Zimbabwe armed forces, but who consistently tells listeners in intimate conversation that he does not know the extent of what is going on.”²⁶³

Violence against supporters of the MDC grew and became a regular occurrence especially from 2002 onwards. JOC led a political vilification exercise where supporters of the MDC were identified and were taught to be politically correct and through beatings were thus ‘persuaded’ to support ZANU-PF. Shortly before the 2002 presidential election ZANU-PF

²⁶²Meredith, “A Degree,” in “The Fate,” Meredith, *Op. Cit.*, 706.

²⁶³Onslow, “Zimbabwe and Political. *Cit.*, 9.

supporters attacked an MDC office at Msami business centre just a week after an MDC rally. Names of all those who had bought MDC cards and had been given the opposition party regalia were used to identify and locate those who supported the opposition. Teachers, Nurses and villagers whose names were on the list were rounded up and beaten by war veterans and had to be hospitalised at the Msami Mission Hospital (experiences of what the author witnessed while teaching at St Pauls Msami secondary school in Mrewa, Zimbabwe in 2002). The late ZANU-PF politician and party secretary for information, Nathan Shamuyarira had hit the political nail on the head when he stated without mincing words that, “the area of violence is an area where ZANU-PF has a very strong, long and successful history.”²⁶⁴

The violence was not only restricted to civil servants in the rural areas. The MR&F were ‘in secrecy’ tasked by their commanders to make certain a ZANU-PF victory. According to David Blair, soldiers wearing red berets of the parachute regiment were seen roaming the streets of Dzivarasekwa, Mufakose and Kuwadzana unashamedly beating up innocent civilians that they came across.²⁶⁵ This was meant to punish the urbanites; supporters of the MDC and ensure that they would not repeat such a feat of voting for the opposition. In Chitungwiza, a town where the residents had voted en-masse for the MDC; soldiers were deployed to deal with the perceived political malcontents in the ‘ZANU-PF style.’ This entailed massive beatings of the unfortunate civilians who were found at the wrong place at the wrong time. Blair gives an incident by one of his interviewees who stated that:

²⁶⁴ David Compagnon, *A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 47.

²⁶⁵ Blair, “Degrees,” *Op. Cit.*, 189.

After dark heavily armed soldiers roamed the streets, beating up everyone they found. Hundreds were victims. A brutal attack was being waged against a town that dared oppose Mugabe. In a bar near Makoni shopping centre...toting AK 47 assault rifles, they wore camouflage uniforms and red berets. The troops ordered everyone to lie on the floor and then set upon them with clubs, whips and sticks. "We are beating you because you are MDC." 'They' poured beer over their victims and after systematically assaulting everyone, the soldiers ordered them to leave the bar and, for good measure, kicked and punched them as they fled through the door.²⁶⁶

Members of the Judiciary also became victims of ZANU-PF intimidation that was encouraged by Cabinet ministers. According to Norma Kriger, Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa told a group of military officers in 2001, how Supreme Court justices with historical links to the pre-independence Smith regime "must know and must be told that their continued stay on the bench is no longer at our invitation. Their continued stay is now an albatross around the necks of our population."²⁶⁷ In this Chinamasa was openly politicising the military hence the ZANU-PF big-wigs, military commanders and the police top brass perpetrated violence without any regard to the law. Tony Reeler claims that an analysis of data on the role of the militia in farm invasions and during elections attests that it was a well thought out strategy by the state, involving the military, youth militia known as "the Green Bombers" and other state security agencies.²⁶⁸ Paradoxically everything

²⁶⁶Ibid, 219.

²⁶⁷N. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics 1980-1987*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 226-7.

²⁶⁸Tony Reeler, "The Role of Militia Groups in Maintaining ZANU-PF's Political Power," (Unpublished mimeo), quoted in B. Raftopoulos & I. Phimster, "Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion," *Historical Materialism* 12, no. 4 (2004): 365- 366.

became a political issue that could only be addressed by politicians while victims of ZANU-PF brutality who reported to the police of harassment at the hands of ‘Zanuists’ were ignored. The presidential election, a ‘battle of wits’ between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, became a must win at all costs for Mugabe and his acolytes and it is in this context that the then ZANU-PF secretary for Administration, Didymus Mutasa remarked that Zimbabwe “would be better off with only six million people, with our people who support the ‘ideals of the’ liberation struggle.”²⁶⁹ Such remarks showed that the ZANU-PF politicians were jittery and aware that they were now walking on a politically slippery terrain.

The reason why “Zanuists” were in panic was that the MDC presented itself as a new party beyond the kleptocratic practices of those in power and vowed to change the whole political and economic setup if Tsvangirai won the 2002 presidential election.²⁷⁰ It was not like other parties that had existed in Zimbabwe. It was neither a party that had blood on its hands or whose leadership, Morgan Tsvangirai, Gibson Sibanda, Welshman Ncube, and Learnmore Jongwe among others had ever been members of ZANU-PF. Masunungure concluded that their uniqueness was that they had not been corrupted and promised to make a change with the past. The widely shared view in the party was that Mugabe and his henchmen were to account for their past atrocities and a reversal of the ZANU-PF led land reform.

Wittingly or unwittingly the MDC stepped on too many sensitive toes simultaneously; that is the ZANU-politicians many of them having been in power since 1980 and the entire security-sector leadership whom they openly castigated for being partisan. According to

²⁶⁹Meredith “A Degree,” *Op. Cit.*, 711.

²⁷⁰Campbell, “Reclaiming Zimbabwe,” *Op. Cit.*, 278.

Rupiya the still-to-come presidential contest had far reaching implications. If Tsvangirai would win the election, as enshrined in the Lancaster House constitution that was still in use; the MDC would have the privilege of inviting thirty of its members to occupy seats in parliament overturning the ZANU-PF parliamentary majority. Mugabe shrewdly ‘sucked in’ the military to defend the party-state claiming that Zimbabwean independence was under siege and had to be defended, “we are in a state of political war. We are in a war to defend our rights and the interests of our people. The British have decided to take us on through the MDC,”²⁷¹he said. The political and military elites undertook an operation codenamed Operation Tsuro. This was an operation to monitor if not outmanoeuvre and paralyse the MDC before the 2002 presidential vote. It could not be fathomed in ZANU-PF political circles that Zimbabwe would become a “colony again.” It catalysed the military elites into political visibility culminating in the much touted security sector chiefs’ pronouncements. Zvinavashe, the chief of the armed forces, flanked by the security heads of different services made a televised declaration that:

We the (JOC) wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in the pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land (the presidency) is a straight jacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives

²⁷¹ Blair, “Degrees,” *Op. Cit.*, 250.

of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty.²⁷²

The above declaration was made eight weeks before the March 2002 electoral contest between Tsvangirai and Mugabe. As a matter of fact the utterances by the security chiefs were introductions to a new phenomenon where the national defence policy was being redefined as that of preserving the party-state.²⁷³ There was now a symbiotic interdependence between the military and ZANU-PF politicians. To them there was nothing wrong with the military elites' pronouncements since they regard them as the guarantors of Zimbabwean security and peace. Such security and 'peace' meant that ZANU-PF had to remain in the corridors of power. Chitiyo and Rupiya wittingly observed that the declaration by the Zimbabwean securocratic supremoes meant that "Zimbabwe essentially became a military enclosure. It was essentially a pre-emptive coup not to remove the old order, but to preserve it by toppling the opposition."²⁷⁴

It was because of the quest for political survival that ZANU-PF politicians and its intellectual supporters came up with a well thought-out strategy of indoctrinating both the MR&F and the PPR&F through "patriotic history." As noted later on in the thesis 'The ZANU-PF type of patriotic history' fanned hatred and division between Zimbabwean blacks, supporters of ZANU-PF and Zimbabwean Whites and Blacks who were now

²⁷² This statement was issued by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander, Vitalis Zvinavashe, whilst flanked by, Air Marshal Perence Shiri, Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, Retired Brigadier now Prisons Head, Paradzai Zimondi and Happyton Bonyongwe in Harare on the 9th of January 2002.

²⁷³ Chitiyo and Rupiya, "Tracking Zimbabwe's political history," in "Evolutions and Revolutions," Ed. Rupiya, *Op. Cit.*, 351.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

‘enemies within’ because of their support for the MDC. It is beyond doubt that the military leaders openly support the party-state because they are beneficiaries of patronage politics.

The ZANU-PF government had to simultaneously respond to two linked developments; the political challenges posed by the MDC and the economy that was crumbling on a daily basis forcing the Zimbabwean forces to be withdrawn from the DRC though it was partly succumbing to pressure from the international community. Given the continued mismanagement of the Zimbabwean economy coupled with the British, the USA and the EU sanctions on Harare, an already bad situation worsened. Sanctions were also extended to the military elites hence the economic downturn impacted on the behaviour of military elites and the military rank-and-file.

According to Adrienne Lebas, party supporters and activists were indoctrinated to view party rivalry “through a polarised and unyielding lens” that had too much emphasis on the language of betrayal and forgetfulness of past atrocities as a means of regurgitating unity and commitment to continued confrontation.²⁷⁵ In all this the ZDFs senior officers remained hand in glove with the ZANU-PF politicians. For Mugabe to remain politically afloat the Zimbabwean space was turned into a ‘theatre of war’ where, “military coercion became the currency of politics.” The newly appointed ZDF commander, Chiwenga embarked on a propaganda tour of barracks telling soldiers to vote for Mugabe in the forthcoming 2002 election.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ Adrienne Lebas, “Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe,” *Comparative Politics* 38, no. 4 (July 2006): 435.

²⁷⁶ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-Military Alliance,” *Op. Cit.*, 74.

The 2002 presidential election thus witnessed the intensification of overt militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military. Militarisation and politicisation have always been existent in Zimbabwe. Mugabe heavily relied on the military in preparing for the do or die presidential election. Sobusa Gula-Ndebele, a former colonel and head of military intelligence chaired the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) whilst Brigadier Douglas Nyikayaramba was appointed chief elections officer. The ESC that was ‘military infested’ was in charge of the 2002 election. To guarantee a ZANU-PF victory, every ‘hole was clogged’ and a National Command Centre (NCC) headed by Brigadier Nyikayaramba being in-turn assisted by Air vice Marshal Robert Mhlanga was established.²⁷⁷

The NCC became the nucleus from which the 2002 presidential elections were conducted. Nyikayaramba and Mhlanga ran the centre with personnel who were drawn exclusively from the army, air force, the police and the CIO. One of my informants who worked with Ndebele and Nyikayaramba at the NCC said that though they were all for a Mugabe victory at one point Gula- Ndebele man-handled Nyikayaramba for not following his directives. This shows that Nyikayaramba was at times executing directives from someone else who was not his immediate superior in the ESC. The ESC was responsible for collating data from various parts of the country. However, some scholars have maintained that despite the politicisation at the top, the lower levels of ZEC are professional in the execution of their duties.

²⁷⁷Obadiah Dodo, Interview by Author 25th August 2015, Bindura. Also, see: CZC paper; “The Military Factor in Zimbabwe’s Political and Electoral Affairs,” and Dewa Mavhinga, “The Elephant in the Room”

The political party rank-and-file who lived in the rural areas were politicised and indoctrinated and became the tenets of coercive nationalism. Mugabe won the 2002 election because of the openly securocratic bickering and the violence that was meted on all perceived supporters of the MDC. Tsvangirai decided to ‘swallow a humble pie’ and live to fight another day. However, some observers said that the 2002 presidential elections were not free and fair. The Khampepe report²⁷⁸ has also corroborated and buttressed the view that the election was neither free nor fair.

It did not come as a surprise that during the 2005 parliamentary elections the securocrats were at it again and ZANU-PF won a more than two thirds majority in parliament. The MDC party later split into two over their disagreement on participating in the senatorial elections. The main group remained under Tsvangirai and has since then been known as ‘MDC-T,’ while the other was referred to as ‘MDC-M, for Mutambara’ and is now ‘MDC-N for Ncube.’ Below I briefly discuss the economic crisis that gripped Zimbabwe. Not being an economic specialist I make use of time-trend graphs of inflation (1997-2008 and GDP (1990-2012). These will help show the phases of the economic crisis thus informing the discussion about the politics.

²⁷⁸The Mail & Guardian, “Khampepe: Zim’s election not free and fair,” 14 November, 2014.

Impact of Hyperinflation on the Military in Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean inflation and subsequent hyperinflation was a result of recurring policy failures by the Mugabe led government which ranged from gratuities given to war veterans, Zimbabwe's participation in the DRC and the violent farm invasions among other policies. The crux of the crisis is hinged on political and economic misgovernance as well as failure by the politicians to cope with the political and economic regional and global trends. Professor Tony Hawkins, in 2003 estimated that given the economic deterioration that had gripped Zimbabwe, if the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by any chance had improved "it would take at least until 2022 to return living standards to their independence levels of 1980."²⁷⁹ However, this was not the case for the Zimbabwean economy deteriorated further and reached its peak in 2008, by then the hyperinflation had reached alarming proportions being "second highest in recorded history" and yet Zimbabwe was not involved in any war.

The declining GDP was further worsened by the Fast Track Land Reform (FTLR) programme that Deon Theron the then Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) president's conservative estimates showed that Zimbabwe lost more than 33 billion because of the land invasions. Because of the foreign exchange shortages, the Zimbabwean government embarked on a money printing spree in an effort to buy United States dollars at the parallel market, thus the "exchange rate became the symbolic measure of inflation and created a

²⁷⁹ Tony Hawkins, "The Zimbabwean Crisis: Endgame Scenarios and Regional Implications." (Pretoria: Institute For Security Studies) 2.


classic inflation-devaluation spiral.”²⁸⁰The graphs below show how Zimbabwe’s inflation soared (Figure 4) and GDP declined (Figure 5) and became a head ache for the politicians. Prices of commodities ended up being changed on an hourly basis eroding the earnings of civil servants. It was actually no longer logical to continue going to work for at the end of the month the remunerations were worthless.

Groceries were no longer available in supermarkets whilst basic commodities were now only available in streets at exorbitant prices. Most people spent most of their time in queues trying to grab these basics wherever they were being sold. By 2005 the situation continued to worsen and also impacted on civil-military relations in Zimbabwe. In a SW Radio “Hot Seat” Africa interview economist John Robertson said “we have a traumatised population, believe it or not we have to print about Z\$100 000 notes every day to keep pace with the rate at which prices are increasing. That will soon become eight million notes per day. Our capacity to do that isn’t there.” The hyperinflation thus affected everybody including the military rank-and-file. It was mainly those who were involved in illicit currency trading who were benefiting from the foreign currency scarcity. People who had contacts working in banks or the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe including ZANU-PF politicians were beneficiaries of these deals. Those who were unfortunate like the deputy finance Minister

²⁸⁰Ellyne & Michael Daly, “Zimbabwe Monetary Policy 1998-2012: From Hyperinflation to Dollarisation,” Pdf file Retrieved 08 December 2016, 11. For more Information see Ellyne Mark and Michael Dally. “Zimbabwe’s Monetary Policy 1998-2012: From Hyperinflation to Dollarisation.” In *Economic Management under Hyperinflationary Environment: Lessons from Zimbabwe*, edited by George Kararach and Raphael O. Otieno, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.


Chris Kuruneri was arrested for externalising United States dollars. This government was not really concerned about plugging the externalization of foreign currency given that many ZANU-PF big wigs like Ignatius Chombo, Obert Mpofu and others were never investigated or arrested though there were rumours that they were involved in such deals.

Figure 5.1: From Inflation to Hyperinflation: Zimbabwe 1997-2008



Source: RBZ data and CPI estimates by John Robertson in Mark Ellyne and Michael Dally, "Zimbabwe Monetary policy," *Op. Cit.*, 10.

Figure 5.2: Zimbabwe's Estimated GDP 1990-2012



Source: Mark Ellyne & Michael Daly, “Zimbabwe, Monetary Policy,” *Op. Cit.*, 6.

In March 1998, the late Professor Sithole wrote an intriguing opinion piece arguing that a military coup was very unlikely in Zimbabwe contrary to the economic collapse and institutional decay theories²⁸¹ inter-alia other coup occurrence theories discussed in chapter 2. This was long before the intense economic and the political legitimacy crises that engulfed Zimbabwe during the first decade of the twenty-first millennium. ZANU-PF’s unpopularity continued to deteriorate but the uniformed forces did not ‘openly leave’ their barracks to inhabit the State House in an outright classic military coup and even in the face of this acute socio-economic crisis, Mugabe maintained that “There are no vacancies because I am still there. Can you see any vacancies? The door is closed.” If it was in other countries the military could have revolted exacerbating an already volatile political environment with dire consequences for the political leadership. The military would have engineered a regime

²⁸¹ Sithole, *Op. Cit.*, “The Public,” 52-54.

change but, they did not. The politicians made sure that there was no government fragmentation whilst the MLs also ensured that there is no military disintegration. Maintenance of such a militarised atmosphere guaranteed that political stability was upheld even during times of intense economic hardships. Mugabe, under fierce criticism at home and abroad for bad governance; told the military and the peasants through-out the country that, “we are in a state of political war. We are in a war to defend our rights and the interests of our people. The British have decided to take us through the MDC.”²⁸² The military whether by default or design became an intractable part of the political equation. This is not surprising given that during the Chimurenga, all members of the party’s fighting wing were trained for both political and military roles.²⁸³

The military now played an increasingly central role in Zimbabwean politics shown by the number of military led operations that were carried out between 2005 and 2013²⁸⁴ to make ‘things right.’ Some of these operations are: 2005, *Operation Murambatsvina* (*Operation Restore Order*), *Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle* (*stay well*); 2007, *Operation Hakudzokwe* (*you will not return*); 2008, *Operation Makavhoterapapi?’/ (Who did you vote for)*, and the 2013 operation code named *Operation Bhora musedhi / (Score the Ball)*. Before the 2005 parliamentary election the military together with the police embarked on an operation code named *Operation Murambatsvina* which I now turn to.

²⁸² David Blair, “Degrees,” *Op. Cit.*, 250.

²⁸³ For more information on this see, Sithole, *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggles*; Ngwabi Bhebe & Terence Ranger, eds. *Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1995).

²⁸⁴ CZC, “The Security-military Business,” *Op. Cit.*, 14.

Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) was put in motion in winter 2005. From a government perspective it was meant to ‘clean up’ the cities by destroying slums that had been built over the years especially from the 1990s. The after-effects of the ESAP saw many urbanites building timber ‘shacks’ that were being erected everywhere in high density suburbs and had become an ‘eye sore.’ According to Timothy Scarnecchia the Murambatsvina campaign of 2005 shows a callous disregard for the urban poor in Zimbabwe, with the politicians depicting informal traders as ‘economic saboteurs’ who were working with western imperialists to cause the crisis. The naming of the campaign had more to do with mobilising support for ZANU-PF, keeping towns and cities clean of those defined as dirty.²⁸⁵ Commissioner Chihuri reportedly said, “We must clean the country of the crawling mass of maggots bent on destroying the economy.”²⁸⁶ What Scarnecchia gave a blind eye to is that some of the ZANU-PF political party rank-and-file were also caught in the cross fire. Arguably Operation Murambatsvina was a deliberate move by politicians and the military elites to disenfranchise the MDC of voters since its electoral support base was in the urban areas.

The government was heavily criticised by the local, regional and international community for executing operation Murambatsvina.²⁸⁷ Shortly before the arrival of the UN envoy Anna Tabajuka to assess the ‘human rights abuses’ that had taken place during the operation; the MEs once again came up with a ‘military engineered’ project code named

²⁸⁵ Scarnecchia, “The Fascist Cycle,” *Op. Cit.*, 235.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ For more on this see Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope & Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements in Zimbabwe, Mrs Anna Kajumulo Tibajuka, 18 July 2005, at ww2.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf.

Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kunhle (stay well). The operation was launched after more than a month of wanton destruction of houses by the government. Under this operation those who were in transit camps were hastily given residential stands. The military were the ones contracted to build the houses under the Ministry of Housing and Amenities that was under Mnangagwa. According to a report by the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, top military officers and some well-connected members of the military rank-and-file were the beneficiaries of Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kunhle. One observer quoted by the CZC commented that of the more than seven hundred houses that were built in Cowdray Park in Bulawayo “one could easily mistake the suburb for a military barrack, soldiers appear to be occupying so many of the houses.”²⁸⁸ This was also the same scenario in other towns. Arguably the soldiers were getting preferential treatment because many of them who were lodgers were evicted by their landlords (House owners). These house owners deliberately evicted members of the security sector from their houses since they were the ones tasked to destroy houses that had all along been the source of income to the landlords who rented them.

After the 2005 parliamentary election, Mugabe came up with what he termed a “war cabinet.” ZANU-PF association with European countries and the MDC was now ‘considered a war. ‘Mugabe categorically stated that he did not want ministers who were “weak-kneed” but those who would stand up to defy the neo-imperial onslaught and bullying that Zimbabwe was experiencing from its detractors. On the other hand, the MDC called for the maintenance of ‘smart sanctions’ on Harare and the military junta whom they

²⁸⁸ CZC, “The Security-Military Business,” *Op. Cit.*, 9.

regard as ZANU-PF cohorts. The ZANU-politicians were incensed by this hence Mugabe openly went ahead with militarising politics by appointing former army personnel and posting them to Foreign missions at the same time promoting some to head government departments and parastatals organisations.²⁸⁹ Examples of military elites who were sent to represent Zimbabwe on foreign missions are Air vice Marshal Titus Abu-Basutu who is the Zimbabwean Ambassador to Japan, Major General Nicholas Dube who replaced Retired Brigadier Agrippa Mutambara in Mozambique and Brigadier General Mike Sango who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Boniface Chidyausiku in Russia. The list of military elites who were appointed to head parastatals appears in table 4 in this chapter.

The Zimbabwean party-state has increasingly become a politico-military dictatorship both in form and style culminating in the unwarranted abuse of state structures by the political and military elites. The abuse has now reached a crescendo unimaginable, a cancer in the politics of Zimbabwe that has culminated in the emergence of a securocratic state. This disturbing phenomenon ‘forced’ Tsvangirai to write a letter to Mugabe and copied the Chairman of the AU, Olusegun Obasanjo, the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan and the Chairman of the SADC, Navinchandra Ramgoolan voicing his concerns. In the letter (quoted in its entirety and appears in appendix 2) Tsvangirai complained that the Zimbabwean soldiers and police were behaving contrary to the stipulations of the country’s constitution, the Defence Act and the Police Act. Members of the security sector had openly

²⁸⁹ Kudzai P. Matereke, “One Zimbabwe Many Faces: The Quest for Political Pluralism in Post-colonial Zimbabwe,” in S. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & J. Muzondidya (eds.) *Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism? Op. Cit.*, 255.

become an appendage of the ZANU-PF party and were openly intervening in political matters in support of ZANU-PF.²⁹⁰

It is a paradox; Tsvangirai's letter was interpreted as a scathing attack on the person of the commander-in-chief and his MEs. The military and the politicians would not be voluntary servants of Tsvangirai's shenanigans hence they had to keep the 'liberation spirit alive.' Tsvangirai's continuous outbursts against the MLs' lack of professionalism by being ZANU-PF appendages only served the purpose of entrenching solidarities between the politicians and the military officers and justified violence against all those regarded as enemies of the state. On the 12th of December 2005, Major General Martin Chedondo categorically told military personnel that:

If there is any among you who are supporters or have sympathy for the MDC, then the military is not your place....it is the duty of every soldier to know the country's enemies and to protect it from them.²⁹¹

The politico-military solidarity can be discerned from such pronouncements or utterances by both the ZANU-politicians and the military leaders. The military are the bed-rock of Mugabe's rule and are therefore the corner stone on which any future political transition will be anchored on. Way before the March election in February 2008, Zimondi (Head of the Zimbabwe Prison Services and member of JOC) was quoted in the Herald newspaper saying:

²⁹⁰ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nationalist-Military," *Op. Cit.*, 50-51.

²⁹¹ Scarnecchia, "The 'Fascist Cycle,'" *Op. Cit.*, 228.

If the opposition wins the election, I will be the first one to resign and go back to defend my piece of land. I will not let it go.... I am giving you an order to vote for the President (Mugabe). Do not be distracted.... I will only support the leadership of President Mugabe.²⁹²

The above statement shows that those in the security sector are solely behind Mugabe and nothing will make them otherwise. The MLs became openly partocratic and defend their interests as illuminated by Mugabe who was quoted by the Zimbabwe Independent on one of his rallies saying “we have a job to do and that is to protect our heritage. The MDC will never rule this country. It will never ever happen. Asisoze sivume (we will not yield).”²⁹³ This was to be witnessed in the 2008 election when Mugabe lost to Tsvangirai but refused to hand over power.

The Zimbabwe March 2008 Election

The Zimbabwe 2008 harmonised elections were a watershed in the history of Zimbabwe after the year 2000. It opened a Pandora box that made Zimbabweans, the region and the international community a ‘talk-shop.’ The overt entrenched fusion of the military elites and the ZANU-PF politicians could not be concealed under a conflated party-state rug anymore. What is worrisome about the March 2008 election was that Mugabe lost the election but did not leave office. In the lead-up to the March 2008 election the military ‘had not played a dominant role’ possibly because they were still ‘excited’ by the more than

²⁹² Zimbabwe Herald Newspaper, February 2008.

²⁹³ The Zimbabwe Independent Newspaper, “Its time up Mr. President,” March 28-03 April, 2008, 10.

two thirds majority that ZANU-PF had enjoyed since the 2005 elections. However, tables turned as the two MDC formations pulled a shocker by winning a parliamentary majority.

Siphamandla Zondi commented that in March 2008, “Zimbabwe had witnessed free and fair elections for the first time in many years.”²⁹⁴ The irony is that many saw the election as free and fair because ZANU-PF lost the election and yet the electoral playing field had ‘still not been levelled.’ The ZANU-PF political architects had marked the man (Tsvangirai) but had lost sight of the electoral ball in that they ignored the divisions that were in their own camp. The divisions rocking ZANU-PF were between the Mujuru and the Mnangagwa factions. The Mujuru faction wanted Joice Mujuru to take over ZANU-PF presidency and when Mugabe was re-elected to be the ZANU-PF candidate at the Goromonzi ZANU-PF conference they came up with a strategy where constituencies would vote for a ZANU-PF member of parliament and then a presidential candidate of their choice from the 3 presidential candidates, Mugabe, Simba Makoni and Tsvangirai.

When Zimbabweans heard of the opposition parliamentary vote there was jubilation as they thought that finally Mugabe and ZANU-PF were out of the way and Zimbabwe was about to experience a new political dispensation. Unbeknown to the electorate was that they had made a grievous political error. Jocelyn Alexander and Blessing Miles-Tendi suggest that “the opposition success sparked an extremely violent reaction from the ruling party and its securocrat ideologues.”²⁹⁵ The announcement of the presidential vote was pragmatically

²⁹⁴ Siphamandla Zondi, “South Africa and SADC mediation in Zimbabwe: Still at the crossroads?” in *Zimbabwe’s Military*, ed. Rupiya, *Op. Cit.*, 49.

²⁹⁵ Jocelyn Alexander and Blessing M. Tendi, “A Tale of Two Elections: Zimbabwe at the Polls in 2008,” *Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin* no. 80 (Winter 2008): 5.

delayed and carefully engineered. The electorate turned to worry and frustration as the ZEC continued to delay announcing the results. Cities and towns were abuzz with speculation as urbanites, alleged Mugabe and family had ‘secretly fled the country to Malaysia, Singapore, or China?’ According to Alexander and Tendi:

The story that eventually emerged suggested that the JOC, made up of the army, air force, prison service, police and CIO, and reportedly led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, decided within days of the election to deploy a strategy of delay and ‘unleash’ violence in order to hold onto the all-important executive.... When Mugabe wobbled, they stepped in to ensure his and ZANU-PF survival. After more than a month of delay ZEC on the 2nd of May 2008 “confirmed Tsvangirai’s poll victory but did not give him the necessary Fifty percent plus one vote necessary to avoid a run-off.”²⁹⁶

To their amazement Zimbabweans were to ‘again prepare’ for a run-off since none of the presidential contestants had won an outright majority. The situation degenerated as political violence became the hallmark in the run-up to the presidential run-off elections. The ZANU-PF political nemeses had to be effectively dealt with so that in future they would always be politically correct by not voting against the ZANU-PF party. Serving and retired members of the military were deployed in rural areas to curtail Tsvangirai’s movement during the re-election campaign since the electorate would be forced not to attend his rallies. Mugabe upped his anti-Western rhetoric and chastised the MDC-T for wanting to undermine Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence. The message by ZANU-PF supporters was that everybody had to vote for the “fist” a symbol of Mugabe’s fight against

²⁹⁶Ibid, 10.

imperialism, Mugabe as the ZANU-PF “Cock” that had defeated Nkomo though now old had to be allowed to look after its young ones translated in Shona to: (Jongwe kana rachembera rinochengeta nhiyo). Minister Chinamasa was at it again saying:

I know he (Tsvangirai) is the front of the countries that imposed sanctions. And if those countries impose for him to win, that result will be unacceptable. We will not accept it. We will just not accept it.²⁹⁷

Mugabe tenaciously propagandised the effects of sanctions on the political party rank-and-file emphasising that it was Tsvangirai who was responsible for the West’s economic sabotage on Harare. According to Joao Gomes Porto, “the radicalisation of Mugabe’s discourse around themes that have now become all too familiar; nationalist credentials, anti-Western and the land issue resulted in a gradual entrenchment of neo-patrimonialism and clientelist relations within ZANU-PF,” shaping the interactions between the politicians, the military, and the ordinary members of the party. In the election re-run the military elites became the locus of all decisions that were being made as was depicted by the execution of Operation Makavhoterapapi? (Who did you vote for?)

The Operation code-named Operation Makavhoterapapi was strategically carried out overtly by the Zimbabwean SS being led by the military. The military elites deployed the ordinary soldiers to coerce the electorate to vote for Mugabe. ZANU-PF was the party that through the heroic sacrifices made by its living; fallen heroes and heroines; brought

²⁹⁷ Ulf Engel, “Challenges of foreign policy and international dimensions,” In M.R.Rupiya, (ed.), *Zimbabwe’s Military*, ed. Rupiya, *Op. Cit.*, 82.

independence that all Zimbabwean rural and urban folks were enjoying. This was undertaken in a strictly no-holds barred atmosphere since it was a directive from some military and political elites. According to Alexander and Tendi:

In the run-up to the run-off, ZANU-PF Publicity Secretary George Charamba wondered how ‘a mere X on a piece of paper, all done in time shorter than life-creating ecstasy, can steal a free people, steal a heritage, steal a freedom, steal a land, steal a future’; ‘we will have to shoot-yes shoot-the ballot box for the preservation of our independence.’²⁹⁸

Surrendering Zimbabwe’s future through an electoral win to an MDC-T party was a political scenario that could not be tolerated, dreamed or even contemplated by Zanuists. It would be a betrayal to all that the party-state stood for. Under the leadership of Mnangagwa (Nicknamed Ngwenya: the crocodile) the Joint Operations Command or JOC quickly came up with a plan to ensure that Mugabe would not waver. Top Military personnel were therefore deployed to ‘help’ the nonagenarian leader to win. The ZEC run by military personnel masterminded the election re-run. The Table below shows seventy eight top military personnel deployed around all the provinces to direct the ZANU-PF election campaign from April to June 2008.²⁹⁹ According to Alexander and Tendi “the JOC was intimately involved....an expanding range of decisions and actions being taken by the military, from politic strategy, formulation and implementation...Now it seemed even the ZANU-PF politburo had to follow the JOC’s lead.”³⁰⁰

²⁹⁸ Alexander and Tendi, “A Tale of two elections,” *Op. Cit.*, 12.

²⁹⁹ MDC information Department-2008, in, “The Military Factor,” *Op. Cit.*

³⁰⁰ Alexander and Tendi, “A Tale,” *Op. Cit.*, 10.

Table 5:1: Military Personnel Deployed in 2008

Rank	Number
Majors	19
Retired Major	1
Major General	1
Air Vice Marshall	4
Lieutenant Colonel	27
Colonel	10
Wing Commander	1
Squadron Leader	1
Brigadier General	4
Retired Brigadier General	2
Brigadier	2
Group Captain	1
Captain	1
CIO	2

Source: MDC Information Department-2008 in, “The Military Factor,” *Op. Cit.*

The 2008 June presidential re-election campaign was executed by the military elites who made the rural areas a no-go-area for Tsvangirai.³⁰¹ The above table shows senior military

³⁰¹ Scarnecchia, “Editorial: in the Shadow of Gukurahundi,” *Concerned Africa*,” *Op. Cit.*, 71.

personnel who were deployed from the rank of Captain. From the author's assessment of votes polled, deployments were deliberately in areas where the two MDC parties had won parliamentary seats. Those who were deployed to constituencies where ZANU-PF MPs had won it were meant to consolidate and maintain ZANU-PF hegemony. Majors, Lieutenant colonels and colonels made up the bulk of the deployments because many of them had been elevated to their current positions. They showed their gratitude to their commander-in-chief and head of state by making sure that Morgan Tsvangirai would not be permitted to campaign. Mugabe picked up the mantle in his campaign trail and declared, "We are not going to give up our country for a mere X on a ballot. How can a ballpoint pen fight with a gun?"³⁰² He clearly intimated to all and sundry that the military are the ones who determine who would occupy the highest office in the land. Major General Engelbert Rugeje while attending the burial of Brigadier Chimombe was quoted in the Financial Gazette of the 19th of June 2008 saying:

This country came through the bullet, not the pencil. Therefore, it will not go by your 'x' of the pencil. We cannot let the efforts of such people as the late Chimombe to liberate this country just go to waste. Today I came here by helicopter with the late Chimombe's body. The next time I will come next week to Jerera, the helicopter will be full of bullets. You know what you did.³⁰³

Apparently what he was referring to was that the people of Jerera had voted for an MDC candidate to represent them in parliament. They now had to show their loyalty to ZANU-

³⁰² Musavengana, "Security Sector," *Op. Cit.*, 28.

³⁰³ Musavengana, "Security Sector," *Op. Cit.*, 28.

PF by overwhelmingly voting for Mugabe. To show that he was in conformity with his generals, and though he did not plainly refer to them in his speech (The military elites are all war veterans) Mugabe was quoted saying:

The war veterans came to me and said, President, we can never accept that our country which we won through the barrel of a gun can be taken by merely an 'x' made by a ballpoint pen. *zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana ne AK?* (Will the pen fight the AK rifle?) Is there going to be a struggle between the two? *Liyekele ukhupikisana lombhobho* (do not argue with a gun).³⁰⁴

Mugabe bluntly made it known to the electorate that those who had participated in the liberation struggle and those serving in the military together with the ZANU-PF politicians would determine the path that the country would follow and there were no two ways about this. The Zimbabwean military intervention in political affairs has become toxic thus they have become the core of the political decision making processes. Army Chief of Staff Major-General Chedondo 'advised' the soldiers:

The Constitution says the country should be protected by voting and in the 27 June presidential election run-off pitting our defence chief, Cde Robert Mugabe, and Tsvangirai of the MDC-T, we should, therefore, stand behind our Commander-in-Chief. Soldiers are not apolitical. Only mercenaries are apolitical. We have signed and agreed to fight and protect the ruling party's principles of defending the revolution. If you have any thoughts, then you should remove that uniform.³⁰⁵

³⁰⁴CZC, "The Military," *Op. Cit.*, 10.

³⁰⁵*Ibid*, 11.

The utterances by the Major general are a direct contravention of the Zimbabwean constitution and the ZDFs Act. Without mincing words he was indoctrinating the soldiers to be ZANU-PF instruments tasked to defend the interests of both the political and military elite. It is therefore not surprising that during crises, military personnel go about terrorising innocent civilians as if they are above the law. They know that they can only be persecuted for their actions if they go against the directives of their military bosses. It is worth pointing out that George Charamba, Mugabe's spokesperson and the top military personnel were all responding to the press statement that had been made by Tsvangirai following his party's victory in the March 2008 election when he said:

After Saturday the 29th of March 2008, Zimbabwe will never be the same again; the people have spoken with one vote.....in these minutes inside the polling booth, each one of us rewrote the history of Zimbabwe. For that particular moment, we each held the destiny of our country in the pen we used to cast the vote. The vote cast on Saturday were for change and a new beginning.³⁰⁶

History can never be 'rewritten' in Zimbabwe. How could all that had happened during the liberation struggle be relegated to the 'historical dustbin' through a pen? Zimbabweans had to forever cling to that part of history whether they liked it or not. They had to maintain a politically correct culture. Wittingly or unwittingly they had to remain under ZANU-PF political and ideological captivity where the individual surrenders his/her life to the

³⁰⁶ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Reaping the Bitter Fruits of Stalinist Tendencies in Zimbabwe," *Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin* no. 79 (Winter 2008): 27.

‘ZANU-PF political lordship.’ The ZDF commander Chiwenga unequivocally stated four days before the 27 June election re-run that, “Our comrade, Defence Forces chief, our leader President Mugabe and comrade-in-arms will romp to victory. We say so because we have no apology to make to any house nigger and puppets.”³⁰⁷ The military had mutated into becoming the political commissar of the party as evidenced by the above table showing the numerous top military personnel who were deployed country wide to lead an unorthodox political campaign to ensure a ZANU-PF victory.

Mugabe sees himself as a God ordained ruler of Zimbabwe, such an erroneous belief has made him think that he is ‘the alpha and omega,’ of Zimbabwean politics, and up until he chooses a successor of his own choice, then no one is capable of ruling Zimbabwe. Addressing a ZANU-PF rally he said, “Only God, who appointed me, will remove me; not the MDC, not the British.”³⁰⁸ He forgets that it was the Mgagao Declaration that deposed Sithole and the support that he got from Tongogara and Nhongo that made him the leader of the party. Tsvangirai, citing the mayhem unleashed on his supporters by the military and other security sector agents withdrew his candidature just days before the poll. Mugabe ‘won’ this lone June 27 poll after which he was sworn hurriedly in the presence of the Service Chiefs. According to Campbell when Mugabe was sworn in; in June 2008 “his regime had degenerated from a party associated with the legacies of Patrice Lumumba and Kwame Nkrumah to an organization associated with the militarism and repression of Mobutu Sese Seko and Hastings Banda.”³⁰⁹ The June 27 election was condemned by the

³⁰⁷CZC, “The Military,” *Op. Cit.*, 12.

³⁰⁸Sunday Times, “Only God will remove me!,” 22 June 2008.

³⁰⁹Horace Campbell, “The Zimbabwe Working Peoples: Between a political rock and an economic hard place,” *Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin* no. 80 (Winter 2008): 47.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states culminating in the resumption of talks between the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF. Mugabe told Thabo Mbeki that:

We shall be doing this (negotiating) as Zimbabweans, entirely as Zimbabweans, with the help of South Africa. There will be no European hand here.³¹⁰

After the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on the 8th of September 2008; ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M agreed on the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU). The MDC leadership was sworn in at State House in February 2009. Tsvangirai became the new Prime Minister, while Arthur Mutambara became the Deputy Prime Minister. However, despite the formation of the GNU the military elites continued with its partisan support of ZANU-PF. The military elites continued to publicly criticise and vilify the Prime Minister and were never reprimanded by Mugabe or any of his politicians. The National Security Council (NSC) that was agreed on in the GPA to look into how they could reform the SS remained politically hand-cuffed. An MDC senior official who was interviewed by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) said:

The NSC has not had any impact on Zimbabwe's security sector as the body has remained dysfunctional owing to infrequent meetings. Instead, the Joint Operations Command (JOC), comprising Mugabe and the heads of the security forces, but without

³¹⁰Tamuka Chirimambowa, "Anti-imperialism and Schizophrenic revolutionaries in Zimbabwe," *Concerned Africa Scholars*, *Ibid*, 43.

representation from the MDC leaders, continues to discuss and decide on national security issues from a ZANU-PF perspective.³¹¹

As a matter of fact, Tsvangirai as the new Prime Minister only exercised cosmetic political powers. True power was in the hands of Mugabe and the military elites. In October 2010 Brigadier General Nyikayaramba held a meeting at 3-3 Infantry Battalion and addressed traditional chiefs, soldiers and the police. At this meeting he reaffirmed his partisan commitment to the ZANU-PF party and government by reiterating that anyone who had not participated in the liberation struggle would not rule Zimbabwe. He said “I am where I am today because of the party. Some of us actively participated in the (liberation) struggle and we cannot stand up and say we do not belong to the party.”³¹² Nyikayaramba was at it again in 2011 when he openly defended the military’s involvement in Zimbabwean politics. He said;

Tsvangirai does not pose a political threat in any way in Zimbabwe, but is a major security threat. He takes instructions from foreigners who seek to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. This is what has invited the security forces to be involved (in politics) because we want to ensure we protect our national security interests.³¹³

What Nyikayaramba was intimating was the protection of the interests of those who support ZANU-PF just as Paradzai Zimondi, a member of the military elite vowed to defend his farm if ZANU-PF lost any election. Before the 2013 election, the ZNA had long

³¹¹Mavhinga, “The Elephant,” *Op. Cit.*, 14.

³¹²*Ibid*, 17-23.

³¹³*Ibid*.

deployed soldiers across the country to run and oversee certain projects that ranged from running National Food Security projects, Community projects that varied from renovating and building schools and clinics and an Army History Research Project where soldiers went around villages asking villagers to recollect any information that they could on any battles that were encountered during the liberation struggle. However, the HRW's investigations revealed that under the guise of doing such 'noble' projects, members of the ZNA were actually campaigning for ZANU-PF.³¹⁴

The military intimidated villagers especially in areas where the MDC had won during the 2008 elections. Areas where soldiers were very notorious in threatening the people not to vote for the MDC were, Buhera, Nyanga, Chipinge, Mutare in Manicaland province; Mberengwa, Gokwe, Zhombe, Silobela in the midlands province; and Chivu, Marondera, Mrehwa and Uzumba in Mashonaland East province and others. In all these provinces members of the military rank-and-file were very visible. An example is that of soldiers who were at 3 Brigade in Mutare. They routinely jogged around residential locations allegedly singing liberation songs or 'partisan songs' that vilified the MDC and its leader Tsvangirai. According to one Mutare resident interviewed by HRW:

Hundreds of uniformed soldiers regularly 'jogged' through the city early in the morning, around 6.a.m., singing songs denigrating the MDC and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai. One such song that I have heard them sing on a number of occasions has the words: "Handizvikanganwe, zvinobhowa, zvinondifizura; kuseri kwaMorgan kune

³¹⁴Ibid.

mabhunu,” which in English is, “I will never forget, it annoys me, it incenses me; behind Morgan (Tsvangirai) are “mabhunu” (a derogatory term for white people).³¹⁵

The ordinary soldiers had no option but to follow the orders of their superiors. The HRW documented an incident where an army officer accused of being an MDC supporter wrote a letter to the ZANU-PF District chairman and absurdly copied it to the ZNA investigating officer defending himself; he wrote:

While I take cognisance of the fact that as a soldier, I was employed to serve the government and the people, and the government and the people are ZANU-PF. I have never turned my back to bite the hand that feeds me, for any opposition party, more so the opposition in the form of the MDC which is the only enemy we are fighting at this juncture and era.³¹⁶

Mugabe showed his support for these military pronouncements by strongly opinionating to the ZANU-PF Central Committee gathering in July 2011 that Zimbabwe would not allow security sector reform in Zimbabwe. He said “The so-called security sector reforms all of them emanate from Western interests, are a proposition from an enemy who wishes to weaken us. We are not in the habit of taking advice from our enemies.” The ZANU-PF senior politicians gave a blind eye and a deaf ear to any views or calls for security sector reform in Zimbabwe and branded them as utter nonsense.³¹⁷

³¹⁵Ibid.

³¹⁶Ibid.

³¹⁷Ibid.

In October 2012 Justice Minister Chinamasa in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) vowed that even if the MDC were to win the 2013 elections the military would not accept such an electoral victory. He said:

He (Tsvangirai) cannot win. He has been campaigning and mobilising against the interests of Zimbabweans on many issues, whether talking about land, seeking to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle to gain control over our resources. Many friends died and are buried in unmarked graves. Now if anyone is going to say: “when I come into power I’m going to reverse that,” then the military have every right to say; “please you are asking for trouble. You will be asking for trouble.”³¹⁸

On the 6th of December 2012, to show their support and loyalty to His Excellency and commander-in chief of the defence forces, General Chiwenga, Army commander Sibanda, Air Force Commander Air Marshal Shiri, Police commissioner Chihuri and head of the Prisons services, retired Major General Zimondi attended the ZANU-PF annual conference in Gweru. During the same month Major General Nyikayaramba addressing people at Firimoni business centre in Chikomba, Mashonaland East province without mincing words told the gathering that voting for the MDC is selling out and the army was solely in support of Mugabe. On the 4th of May 2013 General Chiwenga dismissed allegations of having met Tsvangirai to discuss security sector reforms that the opposition leader was calling for. To show that the military did not respect Tsvangirai as the then Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, he told the Zimbabwe Sunday Mail journalist that:

³¹⁸ Mavhinga, *Op. Cit.*, 17-23.

We have no time to meet sell-outs. Clearly Tsvangirai is a psychiatric patient who needs a competent psychiatrist.... it's just not possible for me to entertain the MDC-T leader, we are different. Just like oil and water, we cannot mix. As the defence forces we will not respect or entertain people who do not value the ideals of the liberation struggle. Meeting such people will be a mockery of the thousands of people who sacrificed their lives fighting for the country's independence. Who the hell does Tsvangirai think he is? No one can make us turn our back on the ideals of the liberation struggle.³¹⁹

The politicisation of the army went hand in glove with the accelerated militarisation of the administration of the country. It was becoming the norm that those who retired from the ZDF were given influential positions in government or in the party. Such was the case of Solomon Mujuru, Josiah Tungamirai and Vitalis Zvinavashe among others. The militarisation of politics is evident in military personnel who have been appointed to head various government parastatal organisations. Below is a list of military personnel who were appointed to run key government institutions.

Table 5:2 MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE

Name	Institution	Position
Lt Gen Michael Nyambuya	Ministry of Energy	Former Minister & Former Governor of Manicaland
Brig Ambrose Mutinhiri	Ministry of Youth Development	Former Minister
Saviour Kasukuwere (Ex-CIO)	Ministry of Youth Development and Indigenisation (<i>Now Ministry of Environment</i>)	Current Minister

³¹⁹Ibid.

Lt Col Hebert Nyanhongo	Ministry of Transport and Communication	Former Deputy Minister
Col Christian Katsande	Ministry of Industry and International Trade	Former Permanent Secretary, Deputy Secretary in The OPC (<i>Now Minister</i>)
Justin Mupamhanga (Ex-CIO)	Ministry of Energy and Power Development	Current Permanent Secretary
Col. Joseph Mhakayakora	Ministry of Construction	Current Director
Maj Anywhere Mutambudzi	Department of Information	Current Under Secretary
Brig Elisha Muzonzini	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Current Ambassador, Kenya
Rtd Major George Chiweshe	Ministry of Justice	Current High Court Judge, President and Former ZEC Chairman
Maj General Edzai Chimonyo	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Current Ambassador, Tanzania
Rtd Maj Gen Paradzai Zimondi	Ministry of Justice	Commissioner of Prisons
Air Commodore Michael Karakadzai (<i>Deceased</i>)	National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ)	General Manager
Brig Gen Douglas Nyikayaramba	National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ)	Former Chairman
Col Godfrey Nhemachena	Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ)	Current General Manager
Rtd Maj Gen Jevan Maseko	Foreign Affairs	Ambassador to Cuba
Rtd Captain Noah Madziva	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA)	Board Chairman
Rtd Brig Gen Agrippa Mutambara	Foreign Affairs	Ambassador to Mozambique
Rtd Col Samuel Muvuti	Grain Marketing Board (GMB)	Former CEO
Rtd Senior Police Assistant Commissioner Albert Mandizha	Grain Marketing Board (GMB)	Current CEO
Rtd Col Nelly Abu Basutu	Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ)	Current Chairperson
Rtd Col Claudius Makova	New ZIANA	Board Member

Rtd Brig-Gen Collin Moyo	Kingstons	Board Member
Rtd Brig-Gen Livingstone Chineka	Transmedia	Board Member
Rtd Brig-Gen Felix Muchemwa	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH)	Board Member
Rtd Brig-Gen Elasto Madzingira	Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ)	Board Member
Brig-Gen Epmarcus Kanhanga	Zimbabwe Papers (ZIMPAPERS)	Board Member
Mr Alexander Kanengoni	Central Intelligence Organisation	Senior Agent
Rtd Col Nhemachena	Sport and Recreation Commission, Ministry of Education Sport and Culture	CEO
Karikoga Kaseke	Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA)	CEO
Sobuza Gula-Ndebele ex-military intelligence officer	Ministry of Justice	Former Attorney General
Brig Gilbert Mashingaidze	The Sports Commission and Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings Board	Former Board Member
Brig-Gen Happyton Bonyongwe	CIO	Director
Brig Justin Mujaji	Sports and Recreation Commission	Commissioner
Col Levi Mayihlome	NRZ	Officer
Maj-Gen Engelbert Rugeje	ZBH	Board Member
Brig-Gen Sibusiso Moyo	ZBH	Board Member
Maj Utuile Silaigwana	ZEC	Spokesperson
Brig-Gen Epmarcus Kananga	Parks and Wildlife	Deputy Director General
Maj Clive Manjengwa	Comptroller and Auditor General	Officer
Col Ronnie Mutizhe/ <i>Now Col Panganayi Kahuni</i>	Operation Maguta/Sisuthu	Head
Lt Col Arnold Hakata	Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle	Head
Lt Col Reuben Ngwayi	Potraz	Board Member

Wing Commander Kapondoro	TelOne	Board Member
(The Late) Gen Vitalis Zvinavashe	Parliament of Zimbabwe	MP, Gutu (Until March 2008)
Col Makova	Parliament of Zimbabwe	MP, Bikita (Until March 2008)
Mandy Chimene (CIO)	Parliament of Zimbabwe	Senator Mutare (Until March 2008)
Lt Col Kallisto Gwanetsa	Parliament of Zimbabwe	MP, Chiredzi South
Vivian Mwashita (CIO)	Parliament of Zimbabwe	Senator Mbare-Hatfield

Source: Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition research 2011

Table 5.2 shows that at least 50 military personnel run key state institutions (I removed some who had been repeated).

Armed Struggle versus neo-Colonialism

It must be pointed out that the Zimbabwe-Britain relations started deteriorating in the late 1990s especially when Blair became the Prime Minister. The British government suggests that the ensuing Zimbabwean crisis was a result of bad governance by the Mugabe government; that has outlived its usefulness. Mugabe was criticised both at home and abroad and to stamp down on criticism at home draconian legislations in the form of Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA) were put into use thus the vilification of Mugabe reflects a widely-held view that Mugabe is a dictator. Dr Simbi Mubako, the then Zimbabwean ambassador to the USA, commented that “the West demonised the country and portrayed Mugabe as a leader who

had developed the horns of a demon and a tail. He is called a tyrant, a thief and a corrupt monster, with all the epithets that the West heaps upon Third World leaders.”³²⁰

It would have been political naivety for Mugabe not to respond. In response, ZANU-PF accused Britain and its allies of ‘evil’ machinations and for deliberately violating Zimbabwe’s sovereignty principle as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Upon realisation that he was about to be stampeded out of the political scene he viciously fought back hence his wildly applauded proclamation in 2002 “Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe.”³²¹ The dice had been cast and from then on the Zimbabwe-Britain relations were never the same.

Brian Raftopoulos, Jocelyn Alexander, David Moore, Martin Rupiya and Blessing-Miles Tendi just to mention a few Scholars, consider that cordial relations between Zimbabwe and Britain started faltering in the late 1990s. Mugabe shrewdly cast Britain-Zimbabwe relations as a melee between Zimbabwe and an ‘evil’ neo-imperialist country bent on wanting to influence events in its former colony whilst on the other hand the British viewed Mugabe’s government as having overstayed and no longer had any clue of how to effectively manage the former jewel of Africa. The ZANU-PF politicians had pledged to right the colonial wrongs by redressing the political, social and economic inequalities. However, this was hampered by various factors ranging from the restrictions of the Lancaster House Constitution and the government’s indecisiveness and lack of political

³²⁰ Simbi Mubako’s Speech quoted by Rob Gowland, “Zimbabwe: The struggle for land, the struggle for independence,” *The Communist party of Australia* (November, 2002): 5.

³²¹ Ian Phimster, “Mugabe, Mbeki and the Politics of anti-imperialism,” *Review of African Political Economy* 31 no. 101 (September 2004), 385-400.

will to radically stick to their avowed socialist stance that they had almost gone hoarse preaching. The Zimbabwean eco-political developments embedded in the Chimurenga is a part of a history that cannot be wished away and explains why ZANU-PF is seen as representing the hopes of the masses taken advantage of by politicians in their quest to remain in power.³²²

As part of the Cold War ‘realistic pragmatism’ the ZANU-PF government had seen to it that they gained by being non-aligned (a group of countries that wanted to strategically exploit the Cold War dynamics between the East and the West). However with the end of the Cold War, this was no longer possible as Western Countries and international financial institutions (IFIs) evoked issues of good governance as conditions for financial assistance. Though the IFIs’ policies can be blamed for some poverty and unemployment; inflation and later on hyperinflation, they were also a direct result of recklessly expansionary monetary policies by the Mugabe government. With the rise of the MDC as an opposition party challenging ZANU-PF political hegemony the party-state panicked and the Central Bank went into a money printing overdrive further worsening the Zimbabwean economy in the process. In a conversation with Brian Donnelly, Dr Simba Makoni later lamented “the trouble is that half the cabinet does not understand economics, and the other half does not want to.”³²³

The situation was further worsened by the unlawful land expropriations and the Western imposed sanctions and in response to these challenges, Mugabe, members of his

³²²Britz and Tshuma, “Heroes Fall, Op.Cit,” 172.

³²³Richard Bourne, *Catastrophe: What went wrong in Zimbabwe?* (London: Zed Books, 2011), 183-84.

government and his intellectual cohorts embraced a “victimhood-cum-radical discourse.”³²⁴ Scarnecchia assumes that the political culture in Zimbabwe blended the political weapons of previous white-minority governments with the divisive and violent African nationalist politics of the 1960s.³²⁵ Mugabe made use of Pan-Africanism, calling for solidarity and empowerment of blacks who had historically endured exploitation to finish the “unfinished business” through indigenisation programmes that promoted the beneficiation of Africans from their own resources.

Mugabe, the pan-Africanist leader was under attack from his erstwhile detractors, the neo-colonialists; he thus “projected himself as the candid sentinel-in-chief against Western domination and exploitation of Zimbabwe and Africa.”³²⁶ He astutely situated his defence in the anti-colonial discourse. The Third Chimurenga became a well-executed strategic response for political survival. It was a knee-jerk radical reconfiguration of Zimbabwean politics, race relations and land ownership and Jonathan Moyo (Mugabe’s spin doctor) popularised the idea that Zimbabwe was fighting a third war of liberation against neo-colonialists and Western neo-imperialists.³²⁷

It was during the period from 2000-2013 that Zimbabwe saw the commencement of a decisive phase in the country’s political history. It was a phase that saw Zimbabwe’s colonial history being used as the most central feature in determining the interactions of

³²⁴Terence M. Mashingaidze, “What Blacks, Which Africans and in Whose Zimbabwe? Pan-Africanism, Race and the Politics of Belonging in Postcolonial Zimbabwe,” in *Redemptive or Grotesque. Nationalism? Rethinking Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe*, ed. Sabelo J. Ndlovu Gatsheni and James Muzondidya. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011), 261.

³²⁵ Timothy Scarnecchia, “The Fascist Cycle,” *Op. Cit.*, 221-223.

³²⁶*Ibid.*, 261.

³²⁷*Ibid.*

the civilian government and the military leaders; the civilian government and the political party rank-and-file; and the military leaders and the military rank-and-file. Scarnnechia states that perhaps the most dangerous anachronism of the current ideology, linked and used as a defensive mechanism with the ZANU-PF leadership, is its appeal to an older Pan-African opposition to racial subjugation. The above views were the basis of the liberation war logic that was now being recast into a global context where Tony Blair, in particular, represented an unrepentant, unyielding ‘Rhodies or Rhodesia spirit’³²⁸ bent upon keeping Zimbabweans from achieving full economic emancipation through indigenisation. Mugabe quoted in a 2002 speech stated that:

Today, Britain, America, New Zealand and Australia, what colour are they? White. They are the ones leading in the fight against Zimbabwe, the fight of resting the completion of the independence process that began in 1980. We are not made as a government in Washington. Let Mr. Bush know that. We are made as the government by our people here. Let foolish Blair also know that.³²⁹

Mugabe employed a highly politically coated moralistic language that portrayed Zimbabwe as engaged in a war against a hypocritical Western world. As pointed out in chapter one; patriotic supporters of ZANU-PF view the MDC as a neo-colonialist disciple and puppet of Britain and her allies, the enemy within.

³²⁸This “Rhodesia spirit is well captured in the book, *Rhodesia never die*.

³²⁹Scarnecchia, “The Fascist Cycle,” *Op. Cit.*, 234.

The state propagated the 3rd Chimurenga nationalism that was firmly entrenched in principles of being black. Emphasis was put on issues of patriotism and unqualified loyalty to the party-state. By being black every Zimbabwean had to be prepared to sacrifice his or her life. Anybody who went against the perceived national cause (of repossessing land) became a sell-out, an enemy of both the nation and the party. The duty of each and every 'son of the soil' is that of jealously guarding the nation's sovereignty as beholden to Zimbabweans by Zimbabwe's fallen heroes and heroines and as championed by Mugabe. Zimbabwe thus adopted a crude form of political fundamentalism that was a fusion of nationalism and the ZANU-PF elite and rank and file interests strictly rooted in either being considered a sell-out or patriotic.³³⁰ Mugabe, the security chiefs, the military rank-and-file and others, demonstrated selfless dedication by going to stare death in the face when they fought for independence, independence that the MDC was about to mortgage in their bid to gain political credit in their call for change, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The masses could only show how grateful they are by giving unconditional support to these gallant sons and daughters of Zimbabwe.³³¹ The Third Chimurenga became a means to an end, carrying the decolonising agenda to its logical end, the reason why Mugabe said;

This country is our country and this land is our land.... They think that because they are white they have a divine right to our resources. Not here. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans.³³²

³³⁰Ndlovu and Muzondidya, "Redemptive or Grotesque," *Op. Cit.*, 9.

³³¹*Ibid.*

³³² Britz and Tshuma, "Heroes Fall," in *Redemptive or Grotesque*, eds. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, *Op. Cit.*, 237-58.

By saying such racist sentiments Mugabe lost any sense of statesmanship that had been a label of his political career, for a head of state to say that Whites born in Africa were not African, was a result of sheer political selfishness and greedy meant to justify violent land seizures. By virtue of having been born in Africa and not knowing any other home, they are African. Arguably it is not very logical to call black Americans, Africans because they do not have anything in them that is African other than being black, that is why they are black-Americans. These are issues that must be accepted as they are and must not be politicised. Mugabe by declaring White-Africans as not African was therefore in-error and simply politically grandstanding whilst in the process encouraging ‘Zanuists’ to benefit from what they had not laboured for. The land discourse was thus an effective strategy for a two pronged attack on the MDC and neo-colonialism, it symbolised “a political binary in which the ruling party represented the honest ‘sons of the soil’ against the evil puppets of imperialism” and explains why Zimbabwe is a militarised form of electoral authoritarianism.³³³

For ZANU-PF politicians and their political party rank-and-file ‘state capture’ is synonymous to Francis Fukuyama’s “End of history,” and they cannot envisage relinquishing power since many in ZANU-PF are of the view that it is death that will remove Mugabe from State House. The MEs also share this view explaining their support for Mugabe. They are trapped in the patriotic narratives that defend the establishment that is intolerant of any criticisms. Mugabe has also categorically stated that nobody in ZANU-PF or outside is going to force him to relinquish power. At a luncheon after opening the

³³³Brian Raftopoulos and Ian Phimster, “Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion,” *Historical Materialism* 12, no. 4 (2004): 364.

second session of the 8th parliament on the 29th of October 2014, he said “I can assure you that we are not going to have this nonsense, some are saying Mugabe is old, and must go, my time is not yet up.” This corroborates the widely held view that Mugabe has become intoxicated with power, is the ‘dear leader’ who is deified. His control of the party has cultivated a political process that is difficult if not ‘unmanageable’ for him to fathom evacuating political office despite his advanced old age. Party supporters continue to abuse him by saying that he must continue being party and country president.

Therefore, it can be discerned that the war of liberation moulded an authoritarian culture in ZANU-PF that has refused to fizzle out. As a political party ZANU-PF is mainly interested in power retention and the benefits that come with it. The method that ZANU-PF uses to maintain its power and dominance is the manipulation of state institutions, in particular the fusion of the state structures and party that go down to the village level. The ZANU-PF party and the state have become conjoint twins with a single heart; hence the citizenry has no choice but to align themselves to the party. ‘Patriotic history’ has been instrumental in justifying ZANU-PF’s continual hold on power in Zimbabwe’s revolutionary tradition, with Mugabe and ZANU-PF as the drivers of the epic struggle.³³⁴

Mugabe’s charisma and demagoguery insulated in patriotic history has made him a political demi-god fighting for Zimbabwe’s salvation and for the military and party rank-and-file. Mugabe looms as the tormented, self-righteous messiah, a father and strong-armed figure who dedicated his life to liberating Zimbabwe and its people. Mugabe features as the

³³⁴Terence O. Ranger, “Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30 (2004): 215-234.

ultimate symbol of the heroism,”³³⁵ with support from people who experienced the brutality of colonialism. Zimbabweans must support Mugabe and going against the presidential view-point amounts to a seditious desire for the colonial past. Ideological linings determine those who support the ZANU-PF stance or those who are against. Evidence suggests that ideological affinities are a reflection of the articulations of the political elite rather than the desires of the masses. It cannot be denied that ZANU-PF has used violence to contain the restless masses who are worried about the continued economic deterioration, patronage distribution of agricultural inputs and grain.

It is conceivable that the rank-and-file in the military and party continue to support the party-state because they are beneficiaries of the system but African opposition to colonialism have continued to shape the politics of post-independent societies in SSA. The conflicting neo-liberal narrative became an influential source of policy action in the post-colonial period and became central to the local and regional responses to the Zimbabwean crisis as it played out the Land became an instrument in the hands of a populist Mugabe, the Zimbabwean ‘black Moses’ as the last card for continued political relevance. This is in tandem with the neo-Gramscian theoretical interpretations, where the ZANU-PF politicians have been able to co-opt the military elites, some ordinary soldiers and ordinary members of the party. These are ideologically in-step with the ZANU-PF politicians thus their support for the party and Mugabe is not through force but consent.

³³⁵ Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, “Introduction: Redemptive,” *Op. Cit.*, 20.

Populists always try to maintain a smooth relationship with the people who paradoxically are their political clients. Francisco Panniza submits that reference to ‘the people’ remains at the core of populist narratives, creating an ‘Us’ versus ‘them.’³³⁶ The ‘us against them,’ labels become firmly imprinted in people’s minds which in-turn ushers a completely new set of interactions usually characterised by rivalry, against perceived opponents whilst creating a sense of oneness amongst others.³³⁷ In such a political environment being impartial can be easily viewed as being in opposition. Politicians thus claim to act and speak on behalf of the people and if there is no control mechanisms it becomes totalitarianism and an albatross on the people’s necks as their destiny will be in the hands of the ruling elite hence the people are in ‘voluntary servitude.’ When populism is blended with nationalist totalitarianism it legitimises violence against those who are seen as enemies and culminates in race branding hence enemies can be annihilated with an ease of conscience.³³⁸ This was used to foster relationships between the military and political elites and the military and political party rank-and-file. One of my informants said:

As the military we have to support him (Mugabe) because the land issue was one of the reasons why we fought against the Smith regime. It would not have been logical for us to stand aside. Chemudzimu ndechekutodya uchakasvikiirwa mufana kana yasara yava homwe chete zvinenge zvave zvimwe, (if we had failed to be active participants in the land seizures this would have meant we would have been left behind by the ‘gravy train’ and we would have refused ourselves to be beneficiaries of the land

³³⁶Francisco Panizza, “Introduction: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy,” in *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, (London: Verso, 2005), 5-6.

³³⁷ Ndlovu Gatsheni and Muzondidya, “Introduction: Redemptive,” *Op. Cit.*, 244.

³³⁸*Ibid.*

reform, look at those who thought it was just a circus and would be reversed, where are they?)³³⁹

It is widely believed that in 2008, the military by supporting Mugabe and ZANU-PF made Zimbabwe a de facto military state. However, by 2000 Zimbabwe had already become a militarised state and the 2008 events were simply a consolidation of a process that had started earlier on. It is a fact that the Mugabe regime has always maintained a surveillance system by ‘planting’ operatives in the military intelligence and the CIO everywhere to make reports to government officials about whom they perceive as belonging to the opposition.³⁴⁰

To expose colonialists’ brutality war time films that showed the horrors of the 1970s bombings of African nationalist bases by the Smith regime became a diet for viewers of the Zimbabwean electronic media. They had to achieve two things simultaneously, that is to wake that African people’s emotions against whites and to show the sacrifices that were made by those who participated in the war.³⁴¹ This led Innocent Sithole to comment:

Big Brother has wrenched open the archives and history cringes into the vulnerable system of mere signs and symbols of ink on paper, of recorded image and sound on films. The nation is daily bombarded with grim images of grotesquely mutilated and decomposing black bodies from the liberation war, falling like boulders from the cliff on the television screen. (It is) an attempt to edit the nation’s collective memory in

³³⁹ Anonymous (senior military official), Interview by Author, Harare, August 21, 2015.

³⁴⁰ Britz and Tshuma, “Heroes Fall,” *Op. Cit.*, 257.

³⁴¹ Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya, “Introduction: Redemptive,” *Op. Cit.*, 22.

order to rewrite the history of the struggle for independence... Amid the choking fumes of aggressive political campaigns, history lets out a piercing wail as Big Brother relentlessly attempts to weave past, present and future into his person.³⁴²

The liberation rhetoric allegory was too much that the MLs, the PPR&F and others in the Southern African region and beyond could not avoid being captivated; they could not avoid joining 'Bob's bandwagon.' Mugabe received standing ovations when he attended Thabo Mbeki's inauguration in 2004 that Harry Mashabela exclaimed, "Mugabe is speaking for black people world-wide." In a Helen Suzman Newsletter he wrote "the applause and standing ovations (are) a tacit expression of the courageous stand Mugabe has taken in trying to resolve the critical land problems facing his country."³⁴³This was 'Mugabe the Prince,' whose ranting became accepted by certain sections and classes within and outside Zimbabwe, an African leader capable of standing up to the insincerities of drivers of regime change, thus, "the ZANU-PF ideological project suggests a similar solidarity with fascist Italy, with a re-emergence of the 'sons of the soil' notion and a strong ethnic chauvinism."³⁴⁴However, Scarnecchia's argument is weak in that he ignores that fact that in Zimbabwe there was a historical grievance of trying to right a colonial wrong, that of land restitution. ZANU-PF politicians have thus maintained hegemony though what Terence Ranger termed the Zimbabwean project of 'patriotic history.' Patriotic history removes from the historical record, contributions of non-ZANU-PF groups and individuals from nationalist history, while rewriting nationalist history from within the ZANU-PF

³⁴²Ibid.

³⁴³Christopher Alden and Ward Anseeuw, *Liberalisation versus Anti-imperialism: The Impact of narratives on Southern Africa Land Policies Since Zimbabwe's Fast Track*, Montpellier, 2006, 3.

³⁴⁴Scarnecchia "The Fascist Cycle," *Op. Cit.*, 221-227.

experience.³⁴⁵ Such historical distortions have been deliberately implanted in the minds of new military recruits hence their open support for the party-state. They are taught to be forever grateful to the party and never to bite the hand that feeds them.

Mugabe has used populist strategies as a way of maintaining support for his party-state. Such support has varied from inciting party supporters to violently seize enemy property from those who are perceived enemies of the state like what happened in Zimbabwe during the Fast Track Land Reform (FTLR). This amounts to actively mobilising people to be part of the nationalist movement and interests. The Afro-barometer survey conducted in 2004 depicted an increase in Mugabe's popularity which grew from a low 21% in 1999 to 58% in 2004.³⁴⁶ Scarnecchia suggests that popularity was attributed to propaganda and the use of laws to 'throttle' free speech and oppositional voices 'worked' for the ruling party, resulting in more support for ZANU-PF than many critics acknowledge.³⁴⁷ ZANU-PF politicians have therefore kept alive a siege mentality in the supporters of the party-state. Having described and discussed the interactions between the politicians and the military's unholy alliance and Mugabe's use of anti-neo-colonial rhetoric to buttress his waning support from 2000 to 2013, in the next chapter I discuss the relationship of the Politicians and the PPR&F.

³⁴⁵Ranger, "Nationalist Historiography. *Cit.*, 223, also see paper on autobiographies of Ndabaningi Sithole and Ian Smith.

³⁴⁶Annie Chikwanha, Tutani Sithole and Michael Bratton, "The power of propaganda: public opinion in Zimbabwe," Afrobarometer working paper no. 42, August 2004, <http://www.afrobarometer.org>, 224.

³⁴⁷ Scarnecchia, "The Fascist Cycle," *Op. Cit.*, 224.

Chapter 6

The Political Party Rank and File Interactions with Politicians

Zimbabwe presents a very interesting case especially with regard to the interactions between the ruling political elite and the political party rank-and-file (PPR&F). The interaction between the nationalist leaders and the masses was shaped by the liberation struggle. It must be pointed from the outset that political parties are a crucial component of building and entrenching democracy in all countries. Tom Lodge submits that political parties open up channels of communication between the rulers and the ruled, making the executives answerable to public concerns.³⁴⁸ He submits that a strong political party has “durable support” that is shown by smooth and effective communication on party matters across the different levels of party structures. This is akin to neo-Gramscian “hegemony,” that go beyond eco-political crises. The politicians, the military elites and some ordinary soldiers shared the “bush life” during the struggle, cementing ties that are difficult to break. It is in this context that I find it logical and crucial to examine whether the political party rank-and-file interactions with ZANU-PF elite have a bearing on decisions made by politicians.

In a democratic country, the politicians are given the mandate to rule by the electorate. As such Mugabe has always said that his legitimacy to continue as the president of the party and the state is given him by Zimbabweans who vote for him. Electoral competition thus

³⁴⁸Tom Lodge, “The ANC and the development of party politics in Modern South Africa,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 2 (2004): 189.

promotes citizen participation in the political process hence “the existence of political parties becomes the hallmark of representative democracy.”³⁴⁹Khabele Matlosa states that participation presupposes political control of the citizens over the ruling elite. However one puzzling feature of dominant political parties is that they tend to lose their strength due in the main to successive electoral victories. Party supporters gradually lose their grip on how they can continually make politicians remain accountable.

Factionalism within the party rears its ugly head, as political contenders become obsessed with power resulting in careerism, opportunism and corruption being entrenched and institutionalised.³⁵⁰In ZANU-PF, factionalism has always been existent especially after 2000. This factionalism that manifested in the Mnangagwa and Mujuru factions resulted in the elevation of Joice Mujuru to the vice-president position in 2004 against the Mnangagwa faction that had held the Tsholotsho meeting in their bid to campaign for the elevation of Emmerson Mnangagwa to a position in the presidium. Mugabe thus played these two factions against each other whilst maintaining his influence and control of party affairs.

It is in the above context that the politicians in their quest for political survival devise mechanisms that allow them to get support from party supporters culminating in the glorification of the leader. Cronyism is therefore allowed to take root and “rent-seeking becomes a strong consequence of the strong social compulsions to reward or repay

³⁴⁹ Khabele Matlosa, *Political Parties in Southern Africa: The state of parties and their role in democratization* (Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2007), 19-20.

³⁵⁰Lodge, “The ANC,” *Op. Cit.*, 190.

supporters, friends and kinsfolk.”³⁵¹This is evident in how Mugabe again used his wife Grace and the Mnangagwa faction to expel Joice Mujuru and her supporters from ZANU-PF during its congress in 2014 since he had realised that Joice Mujuru now had very strong support from the provincial governors who were likely going to call for him to relinquish power. Lies were peddled against the Mujuru cabal who were accused of trying to coup Mugabe. Godfrey Tsenangamu the former ZANU-PF youth leader has stated that:

President Mugabe was the power behind our attack on the then Vice President Joice Mujuru and her team. Before we were expelled we had a meeting with the President at state House where he gave us details of the Mujuru plan and incited us to take them head on. He gave us assurances that no harm would come to us. President Mugabe was behind the state media onslaught on his subordinates during that period unfounded treasonous allegations against his subordinates were being peddled...he was the one who originated those allegations though he had to send his wife to do the hatchet job while he watched from a distance.³⁵²

The PPR&F were hoodwinked into calling for the expulsion of Mujuru and her supporters from the party creating a one centre of power in which Mugabe used his powers to appoint his loyalists to party and state positions.

Mugabe has thus tactfully been able to maintain party cohesion by playing up different factions as shown above. Through a system of patronage and clientelism, he has been able

³⁵¹Matlosa, “Political Parties,” *Op. Cit.*, 37.

³⁵² Godfrey Tsenangamu has since made a public apology to former Vice-President Joice Mujuru for the falsehoods that they accused her leading to her expulsion from ZANU-PF.

to timeously reward his supporters while excluding will-be challengers to his control of the party. Mnangagwa's elevation in 2014 was partly because of the role he played in 2008 of coming up with a politico-military strategy that ensured that there was an election re-run in June 2008 while Mujuru and his supporters were punished for having engineered Mugabe's lose to Tsvangirai in the March 2008 election (Bhora Musango/Kick the ball into the tall grass strategy). Matlosa et-al posits that dominant political parties in Southern Africa have been infested with an internal culture known as bureaucratic-oligarchic syndrome (BOS). In a bureaucratic organisation there is a clear channel of communication that informs the flow of information and decisions up and down. This "hyper-bureaucratisation" 'becomes two sides of the same coin' that is inclusive and exclusive hence:

The inclusion and exclusion dynamic within parties centralises power in the hands of a small coterie of the party apparatchiks in control of the organisation. The centralization of power not only marginalizes the rank-and-file and support base of the party, it also breeds a personality cult whereby the party leader becomes synonymous with the party and vice versa. The party leader becomes the oligarch who is vested with enormous powers to determine the party's policy, its ideological direction and its overall governance processes.³⁵³

Patron-client relations become a phenomenon that shapes the relations between the party elites and the PPR&F. However, these patron-client relations are far from being an equal exchange of services. Mohamed Salih submits that the "client-patron relationship is fundamentally a relationship of exchange in which superior (patron) provides security for

³⁵³Matlosa, "Political Parties," *Op. Cit.*, 25.

an inferior (or client) and the client in turn provides support for the patron.” Such relations have their own disadvantages in that:

It is found in the premise of inequality between patrons and clients, and the benefits accruing to each of them from the exchange may be very uneven indeed.³⁵⁴

It is widely believed that political parties in Southern Africa are autocratic, highly hyper-bureaucratized and have a culture of secrecy especially when it comes to internal party issues. This has led to the growth of personality cults that politicians really always exploit as the omnipotent party leader. As evident in the ZANU-PF case, succession issues cannot be discussed openly. Mugabe has maintained that ZANU-PF succession issues cannot be discussed because he is still there.

It is not surprising that ZANU-PF has enjoyed overwhelming support from the rural-folk given the partisan role played by traditional Chiefs. Paradoxically, not much attention had been given to the traditional Chiefs whom the nationalist politicians regarded to have been ‘in a marriage of convenience’ with the colonial government; though they had continued on government payroll. The chiefs were only co-opted to be an oasis of rejuvenating support for ZANU-PF. The masses had come to the realisation that the politicians were only interested in their vote and not service delivery hence ‘support fatigue’ begun to creep in. Makumbe observed that:

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

Allowances were increased and electricity installed in their homes. Grateful for this unwonted generosity, chiefs helped make many rural areas ‘no-go-areas’ for the opposition during the election campaign.....traditional leaders have worked closely alongside the party and security forces in pressuring local populations to vote for ZANU-PF.³⁵⁵

Chiefs now occupy a very important position in the ZANU-PF politics of survival and have been given vast political and economic control on their people. During times of famine they are the ones who write the names of the villagers whom they think must be given food aid. Government food hand-outs are used as a political weapon; not given to non-party supporters and they therefore influence how the peasants vote during election time. During the 2008 and 2013 elections Village headman and Chiefs were instructed to ensure that they went to polling centres with ZANU-PF supporters under them. The fact that some chiefs seat in parliament mean that they are part of the patron-client relationships that have ensured Mugabe’s survival in politics. ‘Resettled farmers’ have continued to hang on to their traditional homesteads since they are not very sure of their fate in the newly resettled areas. Land is therefore used as both a carrot and a stick on the peasants; if they do not support ZANU-PF they are damned and in a quandary. As such the political party rank-and-file have become beholden to the party-government.

Those in urban areas have purportedly been given housing stands especially when an election is looming. These urbanites have at times been robbed off their hard-earned cash

³⁵⁵ John Makumbe, “Local authorities and traditional leadership”, in *Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe*, Eds. Jaap de Visser, Nico Steytler and Naison Machingauta. (Cape Town: University of Western Cape), 87-99.

when they are asked to pay money for the development of stands only to realise later that they have been conned when the stands are repossessed or the houses demolished after having been bought by some ZANU-PF bigwigs or after it will have been declared some company's property. Houses near the Harare international airport at Dunstan farm were demolished after president Mugabe said that the houses were not supposed to be there and yet people had been allocated those stands during the 2013 electoral campaigns. Houses were also destroyed in Glen Norah, High Glen and Kambuzuma and Chitungwiza among other areas. Chabal and Daloz made a very intriguing observation in that "induced poverty among the peasantry and the lumpenproletariat often maintains the elite's power."³⁵⁶ It is in the dynamic politics of survival that the political party rank-and-file are used to punish those who are suspected and accused of supporting the opposition parties; violence is thus sanctioned and unleashed on opponents. In the rural areas this has been the norm given that they stay in the same locality and those who attend opposition party rallies are easily identifiable.

As already pointed out in the previous chapter (what happened in 2008 when bases were established) politicisation sessions were held and the peasants were 'reminded' of the liberation war years and how traitors or sell-outs would be treated if they failed to vote for ZANU-PF. In urban areas where opposition legislators had won, ZANU-PF youths caused a lot of unwarranted mayhem whilst law enforcers did not move in to protect the victims of party-state tyranny. The party-state has used coercion to force the rural and urbanite population to acquiesce to their wishes. The ordinary masses are thus manipulated through

³⁵⁶ Moore, "A century," *Op. Cit*; 141.

persuasion or coercion to continue voting for the incumbent ZANU-PF party politicians and this is why “cocooned in an ideology that propelled him to power, (Mugabe) does not even have to justify his prolonged stay. If there is a rational kernel of his party continuing to support him, it is rooted in patronage and fears of implosion if Mugabe exits politics.”³⁵⁷

The above mentioned patronage interactions go beyond the interactions between the politicians and the military leaders whilst the fears of implosion can also be discerned in all involved in the nested game. The political party rank-and-file as well as the military rank-and-file also stay in constant fear that they will also be gravely affected in the event of any serious insurrection or fighting between the political contenders. Zimbabwe thus presents a fascinating case of security sector and masses loyalism. Having described and discussed the political party rank-and-file’s interactions with the politicians it is logical to briefly discuss the Zimbabwean military culture because it has a significant bearing on explaining why the Zimbabwean military is not apolitical. I also give an evaluation of the degree and nature of the militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military in Zimbabwe.

The Degree and Nature of Militarisation of Politics

It must be pointed out that in military culture, the military is mandated to execute and fulfil domestic and international obligations and responsibilities as they are directed by the commander-in-chief of the forces. The military are obliged to follow directives of their

³⁵⁷ Ibid, 144.

commander. Military culture is therefore a very important aspect in explaining military interactions with the politicians and this in turn has a strong bearing on military loyalism. Military scholars like Rupiya and Wong agree that the decisions that are made by the military personnel are rooted in their long standing values and traditions.³⁵⁸

The ZNA has got a well-knit and crafted military hierarchy of loyalties to the party-state. The ZNA elites draw their inspiration and ideological linings from the Chimurenga war of independence. The Chimurenga ethos has had a tremendous bearing on how the military leaders conduct themselves hence it is thus a significant source for heroism and unwavering support for the party-state. It is in this context that the MLs, the MR&F and the politicians base their ideological views that define patriotism and Zimbabweanness. Notably both the politicians and the military officers emulated the Chinese Liberation Movement model explaining why the party has got immense control over the military institution. The ZNA and the ZANU-PF party therefore see themselves as the beacon of Zimbabwe's moral values in defending the gains of the liberation struggle of which they are the living memories of colonial callousness. This entails that commissioned and non-commissioned officers must be exemplary, disciplined and respect the command. It is apparent that the mandate of the ZNA after 2000 is protection of the party-state, a phenomenon that has allowed them to meddle in politics. It is now logical to discuss why the ZNA is not apolitical, meddles in politics especially during elections, conduct that is not professional.

³⁵⁸Stephen Peter Resen, "Military effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security* Vol 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31.

The ZNA has never been apolitical and this is what has enhanced the continued politicisation of the military and the militarisation of politics. The late Commander of the air force of Zimbabwe, Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai was at one point recorded saying:

The creation of an apolitical army may have to wait until the generation who shared the ‘bush life’ have died or retired. But while those in parliament, in the military, and in the executive are those who shared the ‘bush life’, the possibility of an apolitical army is remote.³⁵⁹

This clearly shows that the military in Zimbabwe will continue to be a vehicle for the party-state continued rule. I consider that issues of political neutrality are complex because though the military are expected to be non-partisan and must not embroil themselves in politics in Africa that is only wishful thinking. Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen avers that genuine political neutrality can only be realised when the military have an appreciation of the democratic process prevailing in a state and when it trusts the motives and priorities of the politicians.³⁶⁰ Notably it is possible to have an army that is apolitical adhering to the country’s constitution and regulations just like the South African army that does not comment on political matters. Retired Brigadier, Ambassador Mutambara asserts that any army must give its allegiance to the president, must not discuss politics in barracks and can only exercise that right on their own and not be divisive thus even their vote must be their secret.³⁶¹ Colonel Max Chinyanganya says whilst the issue of being apolitical is debatable the military must not be partisan, they are an instrument of government and must adhere to

³⁵⁹ Alao, “The Metamorphosis,” *Op. Cit.*, 115.

³⁶⁰ Clemmensen, “Beyond “The Soldier and the state,” *Op. Cit.*, 147.

³⁶¹ Agrippah Mutambara, Interview by Author, Bindura, 1st October 2015.

national values.³⁶² However, this is not what has been happening in Zimbabwe. The military has been politicised and the political space militarised showing that the military have been sucked into the ZANU-PF political struggles in what i have regarded as “nested games.” The ZNA military elites and some ordinary soldiers are out to defend their own interests that they believe can only continue to be dispensed by the ZANU-PF party.

Evidence shows that in Zimbabwe it is increasingly difficult to downplay the military involvement in politics. The attitudes and behaviour of the military in Zimbabwe have been moulded by their experiences during the colonial period. This is the reason why ZANU-PF politicians and the military officers regard themselves as beacons of moral values in defending the gains of the liberation struggle. Professor “P” submitted that the ZNA’s interests are enshrined in the founding principles that are inseparable with the interests of our nation,³⁶³ a view also shared by Alexander Kanengoni. He argued that one cannot separate the Zimbabwean military from politics as they are the ones who fought for the politics that is taking place;³⁶⁴ a perception that is shared by the guerrillas who participated in the liberation struggle. However some politicians including Mugabe at times say the military must not be involved in politics when it suits them.

In 2008, Mugabe said that the pen could never defeat the gun clearly intimating that the military are pivotal in protecting the interests of the party-state even when the electorate have voted for change of political leadership. This is why Zimbabwe is still in a transition

³⁶² Max Chinyanganya, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, 14th October 2015.

³⁶³ Professor “P” Interview by Author, Bindura, 1st June 2015.

³⁶⁴ Alexander Kanengoni, Interview by Author, Harare, 15th August 2015.

stage because the ZANU-PF party has not allowed the country to have a change of leadership since 1980 because it has not allowed the country to have an army that is not aligned to the ruling party. The ZNA has become the watchdog of the ruling elite political survival.³⁶⁵ Past political affiliations affected military professionalism culminating in a national army dominated by Shona supporters of ZANU-PF. This also explains why there was an exodus of those who had served Rhodesia under Smith and desertions by former ZIPRA forces owing to the preferential treatment given to ZANLA forces. Just as the militarisation of politics was evident during white minority rule, politicisation of the guerrilla forces was also a hallmark of guerrilla forces.³⁶⁶

There has been a progressive politicisation of new recruits in the ZNA. These recruits have been indoctrinated to the extent that some of them have become partisan to the core and now undermine the wishes of the people by forcing them to vote for ZANU-PF party representatives and leader. One soldier rank-and-file told the author that “mukoma kana ndichinge ndatumwa nemashefu ndinonyatotsukuta munhu kusvika aibva zvinoita kuti mashefu afare and ndikwidziridzwewo/ Brother, if I am asked by my superiors I will actually beat someone ‘blue-black’ so that I can also be promoted.”³⁶⁷ This is also how the military elites behave. One senior officer, Douglas Nyikayaramba openly told the Zimbabwe independent that, “truly speaking, I am in ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF is in me and you can’t change that.” In 2012, Mugabe promoted Nyikayaramba to Major General

³⁶⁵ Gadzamoyo Dewah (President, Good People’s Movement) Interview by Author, Harare, 08th October 2015.

³⁶⁶ Campbell, “Reclaiming Zimbabwe,” *Op. Cit.*, 264.

³⁶⁷ Anonymous (Rank and File Soldier), Harare, 28th November 2015.

and Army Chief of Staff. On the 9th of May 2012, another senior military officer, Major General Martin Chedondo in an interview with the state media said:

As soldiers, we will never be apologetic for supporting ZANU-PF because it is the only political party that has national interest at heart. We cannot be seen supporting a political party that is going against the ideals of a nation, which came by as a result of a liberation struggle, which saw many of the country's sons and daughters losing their lives. As soldiers we must support ideologies that we subscribe to, I for one will not be apologetic for supporting ZANU-PF because I was part of the liberation struggle.³⁶⁸

The military leaders sentiments cited above partly explain the endurance of the Zimbabwean political establishment and the failure of the military to intervene despite the unbearable political and economic deterioration. It is in the above context that Mugabe was quoted in the daily newspaper saying “ZANU-PF is a militarised party to which the military are a part.” The Zimbabwean military has therefore been co-opted through consent. To show the party-state politico-military collusion Rugare Gumbo, a former senior ZANU-PF politician in an interview with the Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the 9th of May 2013 said:

The leaders of Zimbabwe's security forces did not just emerge out of the blue, they have history, one of the liberation struggle to overthrow the Rhodesian Colonial Regime of Ian Smith. You cannot expect them to be non-partisan and neutral. It would be unfair to say the security forces should be impartial given our history of the liberation struggle. The perception is that the MDC is sponsored by the British through

³⁶⁸ Mavhinga, “The Elephant,” *Op. Cit.*, 17-23.

the Westminster Foundation to effect regime change in Zimbabwe, so our security forces cannot be neutral in light of that.³⁶⁹

The military was thus from the start not insulated against participation in politics, a development that came into existence during the liberation struggle. The late military elite and politician Tungamirai commented that while he agreed that the creation of an apolitical army was necessary; the history of Zimbabwe made it difficult to have an army that is apolitical.³⁷⁰ In the “Western liberal democratic sense,” it is unprofessional for soldiers to involve themselves in politics and force the general populace to support an incumbent political leader because of civil-military elite shared perceptions. In current or former socialist states (Cuba and China) the military is omni-present, because of the fusion of military and civilian authorities and party-state structures. Ndlovu-Gatsheni wittingly observed that the military elites in Zimbabwe are mini-politicians who continue to politicise and militarise the military and political party rank-rank-and-file³⁷¹; actions that are unprofessional.

Just like how guerrilla commanders like Agrippa Mutambabira and others gave political lessons to other guerrillas and potential recruits, such political indoctrination has been continued in the army and other branches of the security-sector. Sam Sarkesian claims that:

Even in most developed western armies, political awareness and sensitivity create a political environment susceptible to manipulation and political gamesmanship by both

³⁶⁹ Ibid, 31.

³⁷⁰ Alao, “The Metamorphosis,” 114-115.

³⁷¹ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-Military,” *Op. Cit.*, 55.

military and political elites. Even if there is no real propensity for intervention, the character of the military institution, its competence and loyalty are a matter of political concern. The fact that the military is in command of the instrument of violence ‘gives’ it a political potential.³⁷²

In line with the above view, Mugabe was quoted by the staff reporter of the ZNA magazine saying,

The ZDF...development policy is, indeed, a confirmation and reflection of the unquestionable credentials of its commanders, Officers, men and women who have become the epitome of our unshakeable resistance to colonialism.³⁷³

Tafataona Mahoso argues that it is imprudent to have a neutral army, “even in America there is no separation between the civilian leaders and the military, read John Perkins: The Confessions of an Economic Hitman: the Americans are much more militarised than us and being professional does not mean being apolitical. Why should the ZNA be apolitical? Our military is professional and that they are not apolitical does not mean being daft, they have a military doctrine and understand politics and diplomacy. The British and Americans want to “present us with a facade of views that they want us to adopt” and yet they do not practice that in their own backyard. “Our military only intervene in political matters when they hear dangerous political ideas being said out.”³⁷⁴

³⁷²Ibid.

³⁷³ The Zimbabwe National Army Magazine, “Commander-in-Chief Commends ZDF Development Programmes,” First Edition 2014, 7.

³⁷⁴ Tafataona Mahoso, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Media House, Rainbow Towers, 18th May, 2015.

Notably, some within the military aspire that the ZNA be non-partisan. The late General Mujuru had such a vision. At one point he is recorded to have said the ZNA must be “highly efficient, well-disciplined and effective, apolitical army,”³⁷⁵ However despite its partisan nature, Mahoso argues that “the ZNA have not shade its professionalism. This he argues is evident in the proceedings of 2012-2013 because it was the military and other security structures that brought the three parties together, during the new Constitution exercise they provided the logistics and ensured that every corner of the country was reached and that there is peace. This was the same with the elections. Evidence is there for all to see,”³⁷⁶ he reiterated. Given the ZNA military elites open involvement in politics after 2000, it is evident that the degree of politicisation of the military and the militarisation of politics in Zimbabwe is very high and members of the military by dabbling in electoral politics are unprofessional.

Given the military elite’s utterances after 2000 and how they vowed not to salute anyone without war credentials, the military elites have shown their abhorrence to being led by a person not of their choice and this was a move that denied Zimbabwe’s transition to a democratic state. The ZANU-PF politicians have always ‘secretly’ unleashed the military and other security sector personnel on masses to ensure that they always vote for ZANU-PF and this why ZANU-PF loyalists including the military elites are pressuring Mugabe to hold onto power culminating in an extreme military involvement in politics. Though Rupiya claims that the military in 2008 only temporarily intervened to block Tsvangirai’s

³⁷⁵ Alao, “The Metamorphosis,” *Op. Cit.*, 115.

³⁷⁶ Tafataona Mahoso, interview by Author, Zimbabwe Media House, Rainbow Towers, 18th May, 2015.

ascendancy onto the throne whilst simultaneously giving the party-state the opportunity to revitalise itself after-which Mugabe was able to remain in power,³⁷⁷ military involvement has not been temporary.

The Joint Operation Command (JOC) plan worked since in the end it enabled Mugabe to maintain political dominance and later on ‘overwhelmingly win’ the 2013 election depicting that political and military elites feed from the same eco-political trough and as observed by one western diplomat in an interview with Weintraub; Mugabe is being held ‘hostage’ by his own military elites. The diplomat said “the generals didn’t let him go; afraid that Mr Mugabe’s departure would expose them to prosecution, they struck a deal guaranteeing his re-election.”³⁷⁸ Another Western diplomat in an interview with Catherine Philip concurred with the above view saying, “There are no tanks on people’s lawns, but the Joint Operation Command runs the country.”³⁷⁹ Tsvangirai, also shared the same views, he was quoted in the Time magazine lamenting that Zimbabwe was now under a military junta.³⁸⁰ In a somewhat theatrical presentation of opinion one analyst wrote that when Mugabe lost the vote the military elites holding him at gunpoint said:

You cannot leave us alone, if you negotiate your exit package without including us...Comrade you are not leaving State House.” Mugabe had no power to ask the

³⁷⁷ Rupiya, “Who wields. *Cit.*, 10.

³⁷⁸ Weintraub, *Op. Cit.*

³⁷⁹ London Times “Military coup’ in Zimbabwe as Mugabe is forced to cede power to generals,” June 9, 2008.

³⁸⁰ Time Magazine, 11 June 2008.

army men what they were doing. They had done his dirty work and he was prepared to protect them when their chance came to do their own dirty work.³⁸¹

The views by the two diplomats and Tsvangirai and the anonymous analyst though they may be perceived by some as an exaggeration it cannot be denied that JOC played a very important role convincing Mugabe and making sure that he did not to exit state house. The ZNA has always been an arm of the party and though it may have a *raison d'être* of its own it has been a vehicle for political support mobilisation through intimidation. This has mainly been because the National Liberation Movement's main thrust is politicisation of the military and party rank-and-file, the reason why they comply to directives given by the politicians.

Questions abound why the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) did not challenge the ZANU-PF government to relinquish power after losing to Tsvangirai and instead supported the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU?). I believe that the elite civil-military relations in Zimbabwe have been very much strengthened by the 'generational syndrome of comradeship' explaining why the JOC is a very powerful party-state organ when it comes to political issues. According to Rupiya one of the reason why neither SADC nor the AU did not try exert pressure on Mugabe to leave office was that they were in a quandary that they were not prepared to acknowledge to 'all and sundry.' The regional bodies were antagonised by an alliance of a president, his cohorts and a cabal of military elite who refused to surrender power.³⁸²

³⁸¹ The Zimbabwe Times, "Military coups come in different forms," [http: www. Thezimbabwetimes.com](http://www.Thezimbabwetimes.com), downloaded 11/24/2014

³⁸² Rupiya, "Who Wields," *Op. Cit.*, 11-12.

The AU and SADC decided not to be confrontational since they did not want to internationalise the Zimbabwean problem and therefore they proposed a power sharing deal, an elite caucus that undermined the wishes of the electorate. Mandaza argues that “It was the fear of an actual coup, as a possible option on the part of the securocrats, that...prompted Obasanjo into a hurried- and even unceremonious-approval of an electoral process so inherently flawed, President Zuma’s “profound congratulations” for President Mugabe’s “successful” re-election fall within this purview.”³⁸³ It is plausible that the AU had to accept the election result and later on exert pressure on Mugabe to agree to form a coalition government because they were not prepared to worsen the Zimbabwean problem by giving the military an opportunity to contemplate military rule.³⁸⁴ One Zimbabwe Sunday Mail newspaper blogger, who uses the pseudo name ‘Bishop,’ wrote in one of his opinion contributions that what Zimbabweans fear has already happened; the military are in power and are already ruling. He went on to note that it would be fool-hardy for them to rebel for in doing that they will be rebelling against themselves. The truth of the matter is that the military are enjoying the benefits of a lucrative interdependent relationship with the politicians in the “nested game, “the reason why the degree and nature of militarisation of politics has reached unimaginable proportions.

It cannot be denied that the military and other members of security sector institutions have been and are at the helm of the country’s decision making by consultation. The military are

³⁸³ Ibbo Mandaza, “Reflections on the Zimbabwe Elections 2013,” *Zimbabwe in Transition* (Harare: Southern African Political Economic Series, 2015), 54.

³⁸⁴ Moorcroft, “Mugabe’s war,” *Op. Cit.*, 156.

a very important and influential constituent in the ZANU-PF survival political matrix. The security sector support the party-state explaining why retired members of the security sector become senior party and government officials. The serving military elites dabble in politics and though they still claim that they do not want to embroil themselves in factional party politics, this is not the case. They are very aware that an outright acknowledgement of the existence of factionalism in the security sector is detrimental as it may end up in military disintegration where different military battalions and security sector institutions may end up fighting against their fellow colleagues and compatriots as what happened in Ethiopia, Zaire, Somalia, and Rwanda. They therefore are very cautious not to ‘openly’ divulge the political struggles within the struggle, which continue to haunt them behind the scenes. They are also aware that staging an overt classic coup would be detrimental to their own interests since the AU and SADC have clearly stated that they will not support any unconstitutional seizure of power by the military.

Zimbabwe has always experienced an ever towering gaze of military and other security sector presence in the political dynamics because the military have arguably not returned to barracks and there are no indications that they might do so soon. This is why Wilfred Mhanda lamented that though the ZANLA forces had operated under the aphorism “the party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the party,” after 1980 the dictum should have been translated to “the nation commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the nation,”³⁸⁵ but during elections the gun has commanded the nation just as what happened in 2002, 2008 and 2013.

³⁸⁵ Wilfred Mhanda, “Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe,” in *Zimbabwe in Transition*, Monograph Series no. 17 (SAPES TRUST, 30 June 2014), 21-24.

However, “despite the authoritarian nature of the Mugabe regime, it is difficult to classify the military institution explicitly as rulers since most areas of policymaking are conducted by civilianized institutions like parliament”³⁸⁶ and the Zimbabwe Defence Portfolio Committee but the gun is controlling the nation; under the directive of the politicians. They have diligently and loyally carried out operations that they have been asked to do by their superiors both in the army and the party. The military have not found it prudent to eclipse their civilian political partners hence the reason I strongly contend that the military elite and the politicians are conjoint twins that share the same ‘political heart’ in the “nested game.”

³⁸⁶Matereke and Moghazy, “Mugabe and the military,” *Op. Cit.*, 251.

Chapter 7

The Zimbabwe Military: A Dog That Did Not Bark?

Always bear in mind that people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children. (Amilcar Cabral)

This chapter analyses the interactions between the military elites and the military rank-and-file, the politicians and the political party rank-and-file; the military elites and the politicians. It must be pointed out that the locus of political power in Zimbabwe is embedded in the 'iron triangle' of the military leaders, civilian government and military rank-and-file. However, I theorise that the political party rank-and-file serve as a reservoir of political support for the civilian government, to be drawn upon when the need arises so that they give the needed legitimacy to politicians. The conflation of the party-state be it by design or not has worked to the advantage of the Zanuists and continues to be a lifeline that benefits ZANU-PF politicians. As has already been noted, General Chiwenga before the 2008 elections openly stated that "elections are coming and the army will not support or salute sell outs and agents of the West, before, during and after the elections."³⁸⁷ This invariably has made some sections of the Zimbabwean population to strongly contend that the military are ZANU-PF activists. Mugabe has maintained that:


I want to make it very clear that no one should meddle with the command.

³⁸⁷ General Constantine Chiwenga, in an interview with SWRadio Africa, 2008.

Parliament cannot be commander in Chief of the security forces. It has no business debating the conduct of individuals in command.³⁸⁸

Mugabe's utterances mean that the Zimbabwean executive does not allow parliament to hold military elites to account for their actions hence it has had a bearing on civil-military relations in Zimbabwe.

Figure 7:1 'Nested Game' Vertical Interactions



I argue that the interactions between those involved in the vertical interactions in the nested game are not wholly conflictual. The interactions are a scenario or a phenomenon whereby relations are a subtle mixture of antagonism and cooperation that have not been reduced to a zero-sum game. All actors have got an interest in the interactions that take place hence this is what shapes and controls the behaviour of each actor in the nested game. In the “nested game” vertical interactions the military elites may threaten to punish the military rank-and-file if they misbehave and at times punishment is meted on a few who will have been identified to be ‘malcontents.’ Favours are also given to those who are loyal by being

³⁸⁸The Chronicle Newspaper, “Leave my generals-President,” www.Chronicle.co.zw/leave-my-generals-president/ July 16, 2011.

earmarked for promotions, being allowed to further their studies and being beneficiaries of programmes that defence forces are involved in. On the other hand, the military rank-and-file may threaten the military leaders by not carrying out tasks that they will have been asked to do, refusing to eat food in the barracks or threatening to march into town or threatening to join the civil servants when they engage in demonstrations.

As for the interactions between the politicians and the political party rank-and-file the party supporters may threaten not to vote for party politicians if their wishes are not addressed hence they are given handouts during famines, stands etc., so that they remain loyal. The politicians may also use threats and punish those who do not remain loyal by withholding any benefits that the party gives to its supporters. The politicians also use the party supporters to go against any politicians in the party they would have deemed wayward and in extreme cases the party supporters are enticed to ask for the expulsion of such members from the party. The interactions are thus interdependent hence from 2000; there has been a gradual politicisation of the military and militarisation of civilian politics that is embedded in payoffs that can be termed “motivational dialectics.” Such “motivational dialectics” obligates the politicians (Civilian government) to politicise the military and the political party rank-and-file and also motivates the military and the latter to acquiesce to such politicisation and militarisation. As observed by Schelling, each actor’s ‘best’ choice of action is dependent on the other actor’s expectations; as such, “that strategic interdependent behaviour is concerned with influencing another’s choice by working on his expectation of how one’s behaviour is ‘beneficial’ to him.”³⁸⁹

³⁸⁹James E. Dougherty and Robert E. Pfaltzgraff., “Contending Theories,” *Op. Cit.*, 527.

The logic of any action whether political or not are rooted in what it induces by way of expectations of reciprocity between those involved. This became really entrenched in the minds and attitudes of people in Africa especially when they attained independence. Those who participated in wars against colonialism saw independence as an opportunity for them to be rewarded for the sacrifices that they had made and with this came the entrenchment of patron-client relations, a cancer that has ravaged many African countries if not all. In Africa a person's social standing in society determines the respect that he/she is accorded hence in politics interactions are determined by one's political position, relationships are therefore cast in patron-client associations determined by payoffs. According to Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz political actions are determined by thoughts and acts of reciprocity which are rooted in the here and now not a hypothetical tomorrow.³⁹⁰ This is the situation that Zimbabwe has been and is still trapped in where political office is used as a political vehicle for accumulation.

The Zimbabwean political space has thus been monopolised to guarantee control of the means of production by the political and military elites. This explains why there are always power contestations; with some refusing to exit political office, vowing to defend and uphold the prevailing status quo even through unimaginable repressions. The party has been the vehicle used to ensure that 'the true' patriotic sons and daughters are beneficiaries of the sacrifices that they made hence Mugabe and those close to him as well as military elites and politicians have accumulated a lot of wealth. At the time of his untimely death

³⁹⁰ Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (London: The International Africa Institute, 1999), 158-161.

General Mujuru is alleged to have made “multinational investments in mining, real estate, agriculture and tourism. His interests covered River Ranch Diamond Mine, Zimbabwe Mining and smelting Company, Marange Diamonds, Trojan Mine, Kulmic Investments and Ruzira Properties. At one of his farms (Ruzambo) he is alleged to have over a thousand herds of cattle and wildlife worth millions of United States dollars, houses in Harare and business complexes in Bindura, Shamva and Marondera.”³⁹¹ Ignatius Chombo’s wife Marian in an affidavit that was given to a Judicial Court when they divorced; revealed that her husband had been involved in shady diamond mining at Chiadzwa and also exposed the vast wealth that he has.³⁹² General Chiwenga’s wealth was also exposed by his wife Jocelyne when they divorced and the wife approached the courts for them to share property.³⁹³ Arguably this is just the tip of the iceberg; other senior military personnel as well as ZANU-PF politicians like Oppah Muchinguri, Didymus Mutasa, Leo Mugabe, Obert Mpofu, Saviour Kasukuwere and others own a lot of properties.

The politicians, military and political party rank-and-file as rational beings always anticipate participating in symmetrical relations that are beneficial rather than those that are asymmetrical and these determine how they interact. However bureaucratic political organisations being amenable to political abuse in the hands of pseudo-democrats where the party-government controls everything the general populace’s ability to determine their own lives is reduced.³⁹⁴

³⁹¹ The Sunday Mail, “Inside Gen Mujuru’s Empire,” March 29, 2015, 1, 4.

³⁹² New Zimbabwe.com, “Messy Divorce exposes Minister Chombo’s mega riches,” Nehanda radio.com/2010/11.

³⁹³ Zimbabwe Independent Newspaper, “Chiwenga’s vast wealth exposed,” 19th September, 2014. (Case judgement no. 463/14).

³⁹⁴ Jonathan N. Moyo, *The Politics of Administration: Understanding Bureaucracy in Africa* (Harare, Southern African Political Economic Series Books, 1992), xxiii-10.

Independent Africa has its own fair share of problems so is the Zimbabwean problem. Some of the problems were inherited from colonial rule whilst others are the creation of nationalist leaders. In line with Stephan Adebajji Ankintoye's concepts; during colonial rule Smith's Rhodesian Front government and its supporters enjoyed immense benefits and jealously guarded their positions and social standing. The Smith regime was protected by the military and other security sector branches. Upon attainment of independence in 1980 there was a change of rulers but the machinery of state power was surrendered to the incoming Mugabe government who have in turn used it to strengthen their hold on power.

Like their predecessors the current political and military elite do not tolerate political opposition explaining their heavy reliance on the security sector. As shown in the military hierarchy table as well as the military personnel deployed to campaign and coerce the electorate to vote for ZANU-PF in the June 2008 election; Zimbabwe is a mono-partocracy where political and military top positions are staffed with well entrenched systems of extended kinship and political patronage.

Samuel Huntington notes that communist governments use ideologies as a basis for legitimacy. The party is used as the springboard for mobilising support and execution of policy thus "no communist government in a modernizing country has been overthrown by a military coup d'état. They may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority, they do create governments that can govern."³⁹⁵

³⁹⁵Huntington, "*Political Order*," 8.

Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwe Liberation History and ‘The Regional Identity Philosophy’

Despite being regarded by many as an opportunist, a racist and a dictator, Mugabe has been applauded by many people inside and outside Zimbabwe’s borders. He has received standing ovations at summits and “Mugabeism” has become a political phenomenon that has denied non-recognition on the African and international political space.³⁹⁶ He is labelled a monster by many yet his supporters in the military especially former guerrillas, the ordinary masses who are the political party rank-and-file and others outside Zimbabwe still idolize him.³⁹⁷ Mugabe is thus cast as “a survivor of economic dislocations and disarticulations; targeted measures and sanctions; explicit exogenous challenges from the Global North as well as endogenous challenges from the civil society; and electoral defeats by the opposition MDC.”³⁹⁸ How has Mugabe been able to survive? Why is he a revolutionary and a villain simultaneously? How has he used liberation history to buttress his government political survival and hegemony? In this section I attempt to answer these questions as they inform the debate on politicisation of the military and the militarisation of the Zimbabwean political landscape.

The “Zanunisation” of the party-state that became very visible at the beginning of the twenty-first millennium culminated in the politicians and the military elites, coming up with mechanisms that ensured that they benefited from material rewards that the Smith

³⁹⁶ For more on this see Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, [Ed]. *Mugabeism? History, Politics, and Power in Zimbabwe* (USA, Palgrave, 2015).

³⁹⁷ Moorcraft, “Mugabe’s war,” *Op. Cit.*, 189.

³⁹⁸ Gugulethu Moyo, “Mugabe’s Neo-sultanic Rule: Beyond the Veil of Pan-Africanism,” in *Mugabeism? History, Politics, and Power in Zimbabwe*, ed. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (USA, Palgrave, 2015), 62.

regime had denied them hence they actively participated in the informalization of politics. Such informalization of politics culminated in frantic competition for wealth accumulation and personal gratification accelerated by such actions. This did not take place in an ideological vacuum. The politicisation of the military and the militarisation of the Zimbabwean political space were executed through the use of “Patriotic History.”³⁹⁹ ZANU-PF has thus embarked on a self-serving project in which they are rewriting and retelling the Zimbabwean (hi) story. History is being retold and rewritten through ZANU-PF lenses. ‘Patriotic history’ that has become a daily dose in newspapers and televisions is a falsification of the past that distorts history as it is not academic at all. It is only purported to elevate the contributions of Mugabe and his cohorts. The contributions made by other nationalists outside ZANU-PF like James Chikerema, Enock Dumbutshena, Benjamin Burombo, Edson Sithole or those who were haunted out of ZANU like Ndabaningi Sithole, Wilfred Mhanda and others is being down played.

It cannot be denied that Mugabe is a seasoned politician, orator and charismatic leader. Even his political or ideological adversaries acknowledge his political astuteness albeit his weaknesses. This is corroborated by a cable that was dispatched from the US embassy in Harare to the State Department in Washington in July 2007, via WikiLeaks. Ambassador Christopher Dell wrote this of Mugabe:

³⁹⁹ Tendi, *Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010), 2.

To give the devil his due, he is a brilliant tactician...However, he is fundamentally hampered by several factors: his ego and his belief in his own infallibility; his obsessive focus on the past as a justification for everything in the present and the future⁴⁰⁰

It is a fact that though many people in Zimbabwe no longer want Mugabe to continue in the highest office there are some who still respect him. This became apparent with the support given to the MDC from 2000 to 2008 in which elections were highly contested and in the March 2008 election ZANU-PF lost to Morgan Tsvangirai. However what cannot be denied is that Mugabe is hard on his opponents while allowing those who support him to benefit. It is just rhetoric for Mugabe to say that during times of drought food is not used as a political weapon or that the presidential import scheme benefits everybody in the rural areas.

Mugabe knows that the economic policies that his government adopted in the 1990s especially the IMF/WB SAPs programmes, made him very unpopular. The ruling elite as aptly predicted by Amilcar Cabral; allied with imperialism to preserve it.⁴⁰¹ Notably, economic mismanagement catalysed the Zimbabwean crises and exposed the economic inequalities inherited from the colonial period as well as the insatiable desire by the elite to enrich themselves. Ibbo Mandaza contends that the Zimbabwean ruling elite did not make an effort to transform the post-colonial state because they were a “caretaker” ruling elite explaining why “African economies remain inherently neo-colonial, dependent,

⁴⁰⁰ Christopher Dell, “The End is nigh,” WikiLeaks document, July 2007.

⁴⁰¹ For more information on this see Amilcar Cabral, *Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea, Revolution in Guinea: An African People’s Struggle*.

fragile, vulnerable to crises, bereft of real growth, and unable to meet the growing economic, political and the social demands of its citizenry.”⁴⁰²

Notwithstanding the formation of the MDC its performance in the 2000 parliamentary elections, Mugabe ‘saw the writing on the wall,’ he was about to exit political office in disgrace. He came up with ways to salvage his political career so that he would remain the ‘Zimbabwean political grandmaster’ as he wittingly fixed his defence in the liberation struggle discourse. Blessing-Miles Tendi argues that the rebranding of history and the racist rhetoric adopted by the ZANU-PF politicians revived the hatred between ‘patriotic blacks’ in contrast to the ‘patriotic whites’ of the Rhodesian Front era of 1965-1980 and a new version that determine a Zimbabwean national,⁴⁰³ Mugabe made use of elements of history that support his ideals whilst downplaying or misrepresenting those that undermine his rule. He argued that sanctions are responsible for the Zimbabwean crisis. The dominant narrative is ZANU-PF; the sole champion of the Zimbabwe’s sovereignty is under attack from “imperialist forces.”⁴⁰⁴

The land ownership disparities and grievances revived the embryonic colonial atrocities that were experienced during colonialism and Western double standards about human rights. Despite having made various amendments to the independence constitution the Mugabe led government effectively made use of Clare Short’s 1997 letter that ‘patriotic

⁴⁰² Ibbo Mandaza, “The Bourgeois (Post-Colonial) State without a Bourgeoisie,” in *Zimbabwe in Transition, Op. Cit.*, 1-2.

⁴⁰³ For more information see Blessing, M. Tendi, and *How Intellectuals made History in Zimbabwe*. London: Africa Research Institute, 2010.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid, Emphasis mine.

history' became difficult to challenge.⁴⁰⁵Tendi connotes that the Fast Track Land Reform (FTLR) heralded the nadir of diplomatic relations between the two countries.⁴⁰⁶Mugabe on one hand argued that his government and the landless Zimbabweans could not be constrained by law whilst his critics were adamant that his government was blatantly disregarding the rule of law. One of the reasons for the war of liberation was the unequal land distribution; a hallmark of colonialism that is one of the tragedies of history in which all Africans were victims. This explains why "it's completely understandable why Mbeki couldn't, or wouldn't criticise Mugabe. Neighbouring states in Africa couldn't and wouldn't 'think of criticising Mugabe because issues of land redistribution and restitution in Zimbabwe had to be done. It was too difficult for African leaders in the region not to support their fellow nationalist leader; the symbolism was just too strong."⁴⁰⁷

Clare Short commenting on the happenings in Zimbabwe correctly pointed out that "Mugabe was correct in his belief that the former colonist was aiding and abetting the forces that opposed him, namely the MDC in cahoots with the predominantly white Zimbabweans who organised and financed the party (even Ian Smith and the British)." ⁴⁰⁸It was therefore not surprising that the two countries became submerged in verbal political wrestling rhetoric that pushed them asunder. Such demonization was very noticeable when Tony Blair internationalised a-was supposed to be bilateral issue resulting in sanctions being imposed on Harare. Contrary to Blair's attacks Mugabe's nationalist brand could not be resisted hence his positionality against neo-imperialism was amplified. Some members

⁴⁰⁵Tendi, "Making History," *Op. Cit.*, 87-93.

⁴⁰⁶ Tendi, "Functions," *Op. Cit.*, 88.

⁴⁰⁷ Holland, "Dinner," *Op. Cit.*, 103.

⁴⁰⁸Ibid, 105.

of the security sector and the political party rank-and-file could not resist his liberation rhetoric ‘political midas touch.’ The view above though in an exaggerated form is bolstered by Ambassador Agrippa Mutambara when he says,

Comrade Mugabe was our mentor, political strategist and orator par excellence. His speeches and every interview shaped the direction of our political consciousness and became the resource pool of our political thinking. We saw the ugliness of capitalist exploitation through his eyes. We began to perceive things through his mind. The Mugabe that refused to be treated as a second class citizen that showed courage in the face of adversities.... the rebel in him became the rebel in us.⁴⁰⁹

This liberation narrative became the bedrock of ZANU-PF’s continued existence, relevance and hegemony. This therefore explains why for both the politicians and military elite the temptation to invoke the liberation discourse is too risky avoiding and is therefore used to eradicate the luxury of forgetfulness. Sue Onslow submits that through patriotic history ZANU-PF became the only guarantor of Zimbabwean independence given the regime change onslaught it has been subjected to from “devious and evil imperialist forces,”⁴¹⁰ thus, any opposition to the ZANU-PF version of history is viewed as treacherous. There are no two ways about it; you are either a ‘patriot,’ supporting ZANU-PF, or you support the MDC and branded a ‘sell-out,’ and a victim of ZANU-PF wrath. As noted by James Muzondidya and Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu, patriotic history is anchored in three important discourses:

⁴⁰⁹ Agrippah Mutambara, *The Rebel in me: A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Rhodesian Bush War, 1975-1980* (United Kingdom: Henry Ling Ltd, 2014), 85-86.

⁴¹⁰ Onslow, “Zimbabwe,” *Op .Cit.* 1-15.

Firstly, solidarity; the ZANU-PF party is considered the only rightful and legitimate heir to the colonial state by virtue of having led the struggle and the people owe it loyalty. Secondly, national identity; in the guise of nation-building the relationship between minorities and ‘authentic’ citizens is continually redefined. Third, symbolic restitution; this connote symbolic acts, such as changing place names, annual commemorations of heroes’ day, visits to national shrines and other shrines outside the country where liberation war heroes and heroines are buried and allowing a variety of elite accumulation strategies that take the form of policies of ‘Africanisation.’⁴¹¹

In line with the above “the internal rivalries and competition for scarce resources among the elite in Zimbabwe indicate a process of entropy that may lead to further destruction and suffering.”⁴¹² Notably the impunity offered Zanuists by the party-state, help to elevate these ‘patriots’ to the status of defenders of ‘true Zimbabweanness.’ Scarnecchia submits that ZANU-PF’s rhetoric about the true ‘sons of the soil’ was meant to revitalize the violence of the liberation war, mobilising the ‘Zanuists’ to fight against all those who are perceived not ‘true Zimbabweans.’ The erroneous and politically naive impression that MDC supporters are “unZimbabwean” became the accepted rhetoric of the ZANU-PF nationalist public intellectuals, the politicians, the political party rank-and-file and the military.⁴¹³

It is a paradox that though many underrated the effectiveness of patriotic history, it was attractive and appealing to some Zimbabweans and non-Zimbabweans, especially the use

⁴¹¹ For more information see Sabelo. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and J. Muzondidya [Eds]. *Redemption or Grotesque Nationalism*, *Op. Cit.*

⁴¹² Scarnecchia, “The Fascist Cycle,” *Op. Cit.*, 236, Emphasis mine.

⁴¹³ *Ibid*, 227. Also, see Tendi’s *Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe*.

of words or phrases like regime-change, neo-imperialists, puppets, our former colonisers etc.⁴¹⁴ The epithets were easily encoded in Zanuists minds because the military leaders, the ZANU-PF politicians and some political party rank-and-file share generational experiences and ideology in the process entrenching ZANU-PF hegemony. This is the inner propelling motor that drives ZANU-PF and explains why Mugabe's leadership has always retained a semblance of ideological support evident in the 40% vote he received in 2008.⁴¹⁵

The Zimbabwean military as opposed to other militaries is highly ideological. It embraced the Chimurenga ethos that is skewed to supporting the party-state hence 'patriotic history' has become the core of its ideology. The revolutionary ideology has thus been a successful instrument to co-opt critical voices and the security sector institutions without use of force. Janowitz saw at the core of military nationalism "a strong sense of national identity." Samuel Finer argues that the whole esprit de corps of the military is founded on the heavy emphasis on national identity⁴¹⁶ which implies loyalty to the civilian command. Nyanhongo, former CIO Director (in an interview with Tendi) showed this by rolling up one sleeve of his shirt to reveal a deep scar and burn marks, to which he added:

I operated the anti-aircraft equipment in the 1977 Rhodesian attack on our Chimoio camp (in Mozambique) during the liberation war. I almost died during that attack. I cannot allow this country to go to people (Tsvangirai) who do not connect to that liberation legacy.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁴ Onslow, *Op. Cit.*, 7. Emphasis mine.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid*, 3.

⁴¹⁶ Theophilus O. Odetola, "Military Regimes," *Op. Cit.*, 88.

⁴¹⁷ Sydney Nyanhongo being interviewed by Blessing Miles Tendi in "Robert Mugabe's 2013 Presidential Election Campaign," *Journal of Southern African Studies* (2013): 969.

The above citation shows the ideological affinities of ZANU-PF politicians and many of those who participated in the war. They are loyal to the party and therefore prepared to use force without any remorse against any perceived opponents to Mugabe. This explains why opposition supporters are continually branded as puppets; promoting the interests of the West under the guise of promoting human rights and democracy. Zanuists contend that the greatest democracy that is there is that which allows Zimbabweans to unconditionally support ZANU-PF and the ideals of the Chimurenga and if they are reluctant: loyalty must be foisted on them as evidenced by the Msami incident quoted earlier on. Gugulethu and Arshurst's argument is consistent with Wilfred Mhanda who regrets that the cadres, whom they had taught to love, respect and protect the masses during the liberation struggle were now "visiting abuses and atrocities on defenceless civilians."⁴¹⁸

Though the masses sympathetic to the MDC formations are coerced to vote for ZANU-PF; Mugabe shrewdly advanced the view that Western sanctions were responsible for ravaging the Zimbabwean economy and that neo-colonialist machinations were meant to derail the FTLR programme. He successfully peddled the notion that he is a victim of western countries for standing up for the economic rights of the still to benefit Zimbabweans. Who, could be so blind and myopic not to see that the political and military elites have become 'victims' of the 'we are victims syndrome?' 'We,' include 'all Zimbabweans' hence even the masses are unable to dissociate themselves from such politicisation. The ZANU-PF politicians have according to Tendi, Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndlovu et-al used

⁴¹⁸Mhanda, "Security sector," *Op. Cit.*, 22.

“exclusivist” nationalism rhetoric as a means for political survival explaining why they have used violence, militarised the electoral system and institutions so that they cannot be dislodged from power. Richard W. Johnson suggests that the:

National liberation is both the just and historically necessary conclusion of the struggle between the people and the forces of racism and colonialism. This has two implications. First NLMs-(National Liberation Movements) whatever venial sins they commit-are righteous. They do not merely represent the masses but in a sense they are the masses, and as such they cannot really be wrong. Secondly ...their coming to power represents the end of a process. No further group can succeed them for that would mean that the masses, the forces of righteousness, had been overthrown.⁴¹⁹

The nationalist politicians have thus situated the Zimbabwean problem as emanating from the colonial system and continued meddling in domestic politics of sovereign states by their former colonial masters. They view themselves as representing the wishes of the people. Any challenge to ZANU-PF rule is therefore regarded as a rebellion and a betrayal of those who lost their lives during the war and as such cannot be tolerated. Those in opposition are misfits, misguided, and maliciously intentioned. It is in this context that the party-state has denigrated and condemned all those who support the MDC-T. As has already been pointed out, the ZANU-PF party through ‘democratic centralism’ is controlled from the top by the ruling politicians. The party is therefore centralist, monopartocratic and authoritarian.

⁴¹⁹ Southall, “Liberation Movements,” *Op. Cit.*, 5-6.

Though the West cannot be exonerated from exacerbating the Zimbabwean crisis, opposition to Mugabe is a direct result of the “state’s ruinous policies and not a contrivance of Western conspiracies as ZANU-PF would like the world to believe.”⁴²⁰ ZANU-PF politicians have always concentrated on political issues for survival purposes rather than economic issues. Dumiso Dabengwa the leader of the revived ZAPU claims that ZANU-PF has become “too centralised and controlling, yet very remote from the people to the extent that there is no relationship between the government and the governed.”⁴²¹ Southall suggests that leaders in such parties have become “apparatchiks, dreary hacks who.....sacrifice their ideals to every whim of an all-powerful party in pursuit of safety, personal advantage and a career.”⁴²² The late Alexander Kanengoni, a war veteran, former CIO and novelist expressed this well in his novel, *Echoing Silences*. Departed heroes and heroines gathered to hear Chitepo address:

He saw him at last, the Chairman, on the raised platform: grey hair and fiery eyes...And then the Chairman talked angrily of a series of monumental historical betrayals and he said he and a few others were the living examples of such betrayals....and Chitepo continued...it’s shocking to see the reluctance that we have to tell even the smallest truths. Ours ‘has’ become a nation of liars.... We lie at work. We lie in parliament. We lie in cabinet. We lie to each other. And what is worst is that we have begun to believe our lies. What I fear most is that we will not leave anything to our children except lies.....we their leaders expend our energy, coining high-sounding words-

⁴²⁰Mhanda, *Memories of a Freedom Fighter* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011), 213.

⁴²¹Dumiso Dabengwa, “The National question in Zimbabwe: How far towards its resolution?” in *Zimbabwe in Transition*, ed. Ibbo Mandaza, *Op. Cit.*, 36.

⁴²²Southall, “Liberation Movements,” *Op. Cit.*, 13.

indigenization, empowerment, smart-partnership, affirmative action-with which we silence them forever. We owe the people an explanation.⁴²³

The above citation shows that some ex-guerrillas know that the revolutionary ideals have been betrayed. The politicians have gone to great length to safeguard their political survival and have continued to deliberately distort liberation history to justify their relevance. Father Oskar Wemter shares the same views and claims that Mugabe has become morally crippled as he has sold his soul to power and is now a mere dispenser of favours to party cohorts and clients while deaf and dumb to the plight of the ordinary people.⁴²⁴ It is in this milieu that the FTLR were dubbed the “Third Chimurenga” characterising ZANU-PF as the nation and the nation as ZANU-PF. Because of the conflation of the party and state, violence is state sanctioned in the full glare of SADC member countries. ZANU-PF politicians have used the liberation history as a key regional identity philosophy to garner support from some SADC member states like South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique. As a matter of fact, African leaders and many other Mugabe sympathisers across the world are “blinded by overarching historic injustices of colonialism and racism that they would rather indulge Mugabe’s tyranny than risk collusion with the old enemy condemning him.”⁴²⁵

Antony Butler quoted the then ZANU-PF party Chairman, Simon Khaya Moyo saying, “No liberation movement will ever be replaced by people coming from nowhere....Any of us who are not part of this revolutionary journey should think again.”⁴²⁶The liberation war

⁴²³ Alexander Kanengoni, *Echoing Silences* (Harare: Baobab Books, 1997), 87-88 Emphasis mine.

⁴²⁴ Fr. O. Wemter, SJ, interview by Author, Imbisa Centre, Emerald Hill, Harare. Monday 1st February 2016,

⁴²⁵ Holland, “Dinner,” *Op. Cit.*, 215.

⁴²⁶ South African Bussiness Day, “Born Frees set to repeat patterns of prejudice,” 14 October, 2011.

nationalist rhetoric has therefore been used as a discourse to justify resistance to neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism and this has had a tremendous effect especially in Southern Africa where the “region is still saturated with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist memories.”⁴²⁷ Onslow in conformity with the above view suggests that though calculations of self-interest are part of the equation; Mugabe is a political phenomenon because he has been able to manipulate the Lancaster House constitution and has in the process managed to awaken the dormant anti-colonial legitimate grievances in the former liberation fighters ‘and National Liberation Movements (NLMs) in southern Africa;’ the masses and the political antennae for populist politics.⁴²⁸ Mugabe told members of his party’s central committee:

We cannot swop our birth right for the donor’s dollar...We have positions to defend, principles and policies and on these there shall be no compromise. We must ensure the product carries and consolidates our ideals as a nationalist revolutionary party. We fought for the independence and untrammelled sovereignty of this nation. That coveted status must remain solid, secure and unshaken for all time.⁴²⁹

Mugabe astutely orchestrated and brilliantly articulated a siege mentality in Zimbabweans and the region at large. This is in conformity with Fr. Wemter’s submission that ‘Mugabe’ considers himself an infantile victim of colonialism explaining why he is very comfortable with the blame game; he has thus become more of “a political trickster than a

⁴²⁷ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe* (Johannesburg, South Africa Institute of International Relations, 2011), 16.

⁴²⁸ Onslow, “Zimbabwe and Political,” *Op. Cit.*, 4.


⁴²⁹ Southall, “Liberation Movements,” *Op. Cit.*, 193.

statesman,”⁴³⁰ the reason why ‘Zanuists’ have vowed to rule even without the mandate of the majority.

Though Tsvangirai, some civil society activists and others are still fighting for political change in Zimbabwe they must realize that politics is not a game of angels and ‘Zanuists’ are prepared to torture, maim and kill to maintain their hold on power just like what they did in the 2002 and during the 2008 electoral rerun. The victimhood mentality is also firmly entrenched in the minds of the military elites who were put on the sanctions list (Constantine Chiwenga, Valerio Sibanda, Perence Shiri, Happyton Bonyongwe, Augustine Chihuri, Sibusiso Moyo and others and politicians like Mugabe, Mnangagwa, Mutasa, Sekeramayi and others) and not permitted to visit Europe. The children of top ZANU-PF politicians were barred from attending tertiary institutions overseas and some who were already studying there were deported. It is therefore not surprising why Mugabe’s rhetoric resonated with some African leaders and masses within and outside the SADC region. Consequently, the military elites could not help going against all those who were perceived supporters of the Western imposed travel bans. This was craftily summed up in the ZANU-PF campaign poster below. It was a well thought-out politicisation poster depicting Morgan Tsvangirai as a Blair ‘servant’ giving the impression that if he won the election then the land would remain in the hands of whites. This would be a mockery to the fallen heroes and heroines who sacrificed their lives for the restitution of that land.

⁴³⁰ Fr. O. Wermter, Interview by Author, Harare, 1st February 2016.

Figure 7.2: ZANU (PF) Propaganda Campaign Poster



Source: David Moore, Zimbabwe's Triple Crisis: Primitive Accumulation, Nation State Formation and Democratization in the Age of Neo-liberal Globalization, p. 42.

The posture illustrate that Mugabe and ZANU-PF are prepared to do anything to make sure that the MDC will not rule Zimbabwe as already noted it uses intimidation, violence and 'rigs elections' just like they did during the 2002, 2008 and 2013 elections. George Charamba (Mugabe's spokesperson) wrote in an opinion piece in the Saturday herald divulging that the majority of ZANU-PF members of parliament did not even have a clue of how they won the 2013 elections,⁴³¹ thus one will not be off the mark to say that the elections were rigged.

⁴³¹ For more see story by Nathaniel Manheru "The Notion of an extended GNU had many silent proponents inside Zanu-PF."

Mugabe's other survival tactic is that he is 'Machiavellian.' Just like he did with the 2000 rejected draft constitution when he inserted clause 57 on the land issue and that on terms of office for a president without consultation thus he knew that it was going to be rejected. Zimbabwean white commercial farmers and the MDC assumed that they now had Mugabe forced in a corner. They did not realise that they had been deceived and therefore fell prey to Mugabe's political shenanigans. Moyo maintains that this was Mugabe's "strategy for survival and it worked. It kept him in office. He clung to the land issue and in fact, enhanced it as a new issue."⁴³² Mugabe is a ruthless politician whose opponents outside his party survive at his mercy and those in his party through a system of divide and rule were he has indirectly promoted factionalism evident on how he played out the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions in 2004 and 2014 to his own advantage. Mugabe rewards politicians, the military elites, war veterans and some political party rank-and-file by appointing them to positions that enable them to benefit from the ZANU-PF kleptocratic train. Through patronage, Zanuist-clients are willing to accept and support the party's grip on power. War veterans Jabulani Sibanda was expelled from ZANU-PF for having resisted Grace Mugabe's ascendancy in ZANU-PF arguing that power is not sexually transmitted so Zimbabweans had to reject this 'bedroom coup' that elevated Mugabe's wife. His committee was replaced by that of Chris Mutsvangwa which has now been also expelled from ZANU-PF for saying that Mugabe must hand over power.

⁴³² Holland, "Dinner," *Op. Cit.*, 185.

Though Mugabe has effectively used the liberation history as a regional identity philosophy for regional solidarity purposes the truth as has been observed by some scholars and political analysts is that Mugabe has been intoxicated with power, hence power is all that matters, power defines his 'political DNA (I use DNA to connote qualities of someone that are unchangeable) and everything revolves around it. Mugabe is very much irritated by the thought of losing power hence anyone who threatens his stay in power invites his wrath. Even after his 90th birthday he has maintained that he is still physically fit, has a sound mind and as long as members of his party elect him to be their candidate, he will continue to rule.

Dr Eddison Zvobgo once confided in Mandaza that Mugabe's refusal to hand over power was like "the mentality of a madman who, when given a baton in a race, flees with it into the mountains instead of passing it on."⁴³³ Zvobgo argued that, Mugabe had no thought of handing over power but would "raze the entire country to the ground in order to stay in power,"⁴³⁴ a thing he has done. Masipula Sithole likened Mugabe's mentality to that of a gambler who continues to gamble despite experiencing losses; Mugabe has thus continued to hold onto power because he sees himself as 'Zimbabwean political messiah.' This is why he castigated his opponents for trying to stampede him out of office and categorically remarked that he was not going to be "pushed out" prematurely; even after attaining the age of 92 he still lambasts those who have thoughts of succeeding him.

⁴³³ Mandaza, "Will Zanu-PF Survive After Mugabe?" in "The Day after Mugabe," Gugulethu Moyo and Mark Ashurst, eds. *Op. Cit.*, 41.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid*, 43.

Interestingly some of the Southern African Development Community member states have remained “mute” on violence in Zimbabwe and the flouting of the rule of law that many people have accused countries like Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo of supping with the devil and supporting a dictatorship at the expense of democracy. These SADC member countries have conveniently and timeously acted as the political ‘shock absorbers’ because of the African kith and kin solidarity supporting ZANU-PF kleptocratic tendencies. Arguably these member countries continue benefitting from the brain drain and economic meltdown as Zimbabwe has become a warehouse of other countries finished products (especially South Africa). Whilst SADC member states did well to give sanctuary to commercial white farmers, they have failed the Zimbabwean masses by failing to restrain Mugabe. They neutralised “Western pressure” on Mugabe to be democratic. Some SADC leaders have been infected by “Mugabeism, an anti-colonial phenomenon, inextricably intertwined with the equally complicated idea of Zimbabwe. A political phenomenon albeit one that has no coherent content. It does not exist as a coherent ideology. It is eclectic....it is a multifaceted phenomenon. It masquerades as a revolutionary phenomenon, linked to Pan-African, anticolonial, anti-imperialist decolonial project.”⁴³⁵

The Zimbabwean national and regional identity philosophy inadvertently shaped the interactions between the military leaders, the military and the political party rank-and-file with the ZANU-PF politicians. One notable shortcoming and syndrome in Zimbabwe as in Uganda, Rwanda, and Swaziland is that masses, like the biblical sheep are not questioning

⁴³⁵Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Mugabeism?” *Op.Cit.* 16.

their allegiance to the 'big man'- ruling politicians. Political parties in Southern Africa want power to be a preserve of National Liberation Movements with some leaders regarding themselves as paragons of democracy. The first generation of African leaders has been deified, with some ruling the state as personal property, hence Mugabe has often said: "My Zimbabwe."⁴³⁶ Having discussed how Mugabe has used the liberation war history as a national and regional identity philosophy to co-opt critical institutions through consent or hegemony; I now discuss the military elites and the military rank-and-file interactions after 2000 and whether they have changed or not and whether the politicisation of the military rank-and-file has been successful.


Interactions between the Military Elites and the Military Rank and File

It must be pointed as has been aforementioned 'the non-political army' formed under BMATT continued to mutate until a time whereby the upper military echelon was deliberately and strategically made up of ex-ZANLA forces. According to Charles A. Alao of the eight Brigadiers who were appointed, five were from ZANLA, and of the seventeen Colonels, eleven were from ex-ZANLA guerrillas.⁴³⁷ Given such a strategic structure of the military institution; will there be any chances for a "class-based" military revolt against the military leaders that will support the masses who will be demonstrating against continued economic deterioration in Zimbabwe?

⁴³⁶ Tendai Biti, "Whither Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe?" in "Zimbabwe in Transition," ed. Mandaza. *Op. Cit.*, 79.

⁴³⁷ Alao, "Governance," *Op. Cit.*, 27.

Figure 7:3 'Nested Game' Horizontal Interactions



In the figure above as part of the horizontal nested game, I argue that the military elites (MEs) are now involved in the political matrix of ruling. They are involved in decision making just as what happened from 2000 and became very apparent in the subsequent operations that were carried out to maintain stability in the country. The politicians also became very dependent on the MEs for survival hence they hold them with 'kid gloves' to ensure that they maintain this alliance and favours continue being dispensed to the military elite cabal.

The military elites and the military rank-and-file have to maintain a cordial relationship if they are to work smoothly with each other. It therefore becomes easier for the military elites to give directives to rank and-file-soldiers to break up demonstrations that civic groups and the urban masses might engage in to try and force the politicians to relinquish power if ordinary soldiers are benefitting from the existing status quo. On the other hand if the rank and file are fed up by the salary disparities as well as the unequal material benefits that separate the rank-and-file-soldiers with commissioned officers then they may rebel against their superiors or support the urban population when they demonstrate against the political establishment. Arguably as will be seen in the discussion the Zimbabwean rank-and-file soldiers are not able to stage a "class-based" military revolt as was the case in Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and Ghana.

It must be pointed from the outset that there have been notable disgruntlement between senior military officers and those in the rank-and-file in Zimbabwe. This was noticeable even in the 1980s when there was outright marginalisation of the ex-ZIPRA cadres who had joined the ZNA. In the late 1990s and later on after 2000 rank-and-file dissatisfaction was witnessed through desertions and some occasional episodes where they threatened to demonstrate or where they marched into town over late salaries like what they did during the peak of the hyperinflation in 2007. Notably the ZANU-PF has always been daring those who want to demonstrate as they are prepared to unleash ruthless brutality on masses who will have decided on such an action or malcontents in the military.

The members of the ZNA were not spared from the negative effects of the dwindling economy. Forty percent of the military personnel who were now residing outside barracks failed to cope with the ever rising cost of living.⁴³⁸ Ordinary soldiers felt cheated and excluded especially when they came to the realisation that “proceeds” from their involvement in the DRC were being enjoyed by the MEs and the politicians. Though this was apparent, some military rank-and-file like the ‘biblical Lazarus’ were allowed to eat the crumbs that fell from the ‘politico-military high table’ hence they attest that they were able to build houses because they got special allowances when they were in the DRC while back home their salaries were deposited in their bank accounts so everything was hinged on surviving military skirmishes in the DRC. Apart from the allowances some soldiers were also embroiled in illegal deals that involved some of their commanders. However, not

⁴³⁸ Alao, “Governance,” *Op. Cit.*, 22.

all soldiers benefited hence they voiced their displeasure in the whole engagement; with some dissenting the ZNA. Mark Chavunduka and Raymond Choto; journalists of The Standard newspaper published a story alleging that some officers had been arrested for trying to execute a coup.⁴³⁹

When the ZDFs were withdrawn from the DRC there developed an elite ZANU-PF-cum-military solidarity that responded to the MDC political challenges through beatings. It is therefore not very surprising that George Bush Jnr, branded Zimbabwe as “one of the world’s six outposts of tyranny.”⁴⁴⁰ Mugabe increasingly relied on the security forces to remain in power hence the military supervised “Operation Garikai”(Stay well) discussed in chapter 5 was meant to appease the ordinary soldiers by giving them houses. Operation Garikai degenerated into a national scandal with the constructed houses being parcelled out to members of the security sector or relatives of party loyalists who make up the bulk of the political party rank-and-file.⁴⁴¹ Consequently, not all ordinary soldiers benefited from such enticements. Arguably the security sector and the party-state are ‘political hands that wash each other’s dirty.’ There is a solid alliance between the ruling party and the military elites but does this transform to the military rank-and-file?

There were noticeable internal disagreements within the security forces given that some politicians showed an inordinate desire to use state sanctioned violence, in dealing with opposition an act that some officers view as eroding military professionalism. The

⁴³⁹ For more information on this see Professor Tawana Khupe & Ronning.

⁴⁴⁰ Moorcraft, “Mugabe’s War,” *Op. Cit.*, 148.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid*, 149.

unprecedented use of the reserve force; (war veterans) had the adverse effect of causing resentments among some members of the ZNA who joined the ZNA after having completed their advanced level hence these “lower ranks now secretly, ‘look’ to the MDC for national salvation,” while the military elites is loyal to Mugabe.⁴⁴² It is in this vein that there are different versions of the 2008 Chitungwiza incident where soldiers beat up civilians in a bar for allegedly supporting the opposition. The other version is that they beat up people and accused them of being ‘fake-MDC supporters,’ because if they had all voted then ZANU-PF would have been dislodged from power, since the soldiers themselves cannot do anything since they cast their votes in the barracks.⁴⁴³ Many of the younger recruits as depicted by one of my informants complained that promotions in the army are not a result of academic achievements but a matter of patronage; those in command participated in the liberation struggle, are politically connected or are related to the military elites. Mr “K” said:

For us to be promoted has become increasingly difficult. I have a master’s degree in political science but when it comes to promotion it’s something else. I am disappointed and now that i am almost twenty years in the service, i will quit and be given my pension and do something else. Many of those on the rank of Captain and above are war veterans, their sons or relatives. You have to know someone or be considered “extra patriotic” for you to get a recognisable rank.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴²Ibid, 146.

⁴⁴³ Mr “K” interview by Author, 13th June 2015, Harare.

⁴⁴⁴Ibid.

When I asked him what he meant by being “extra patriotic?” he laughed and said, “Eish, you have to be like a robot, you are not supposed to think but carry orders as they are given you. It is not suitable for someone who has gone to school”⁴⁴⁵In a somewhat dejected tone he said:

The reality is that in the army there is a gentocracy who think they know all because of their ‘bush’ experience and they do not trust those of us who have had access to education, they believe that ‘the young Turks’ within the army should remain subservient. This is what have apparently created fissures within the army given that recruits from “green bombers” are academically malnourished and do not know anything about military ethics and procedures.⁴⁴⁶

Junior officers’ allegiance has thus been alleged to have become questionable though many of the military leaders whom I interviewed regarded this as a media creation. However, some supporters of the opposition party maintain that if there was to be a mutiny, these junior officers would not side with the military leaders. This is in conformity with Mr “K” who was told by colonel “X” that “the situation in the barracks is very tense, we are going to work, yes, but we are always afraid that any time we might get shot, the situation is no longer predictable, everyone is angry and carry heavy faces and you no longer know who to trust in the military.”⁴⁴⁷Notably in 2008 junior officers demonstrated against lack of pay in which the state responded with typical asymmetric violence.⁴⁴⁸In April 2016 when civil

⁴⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ See story by P. Thornycroft, Mugabe regime arrests soldiers amid fears of pay revolt, www.telegraph.co.uk, Harare, 28th November, 2008

activists called for a demonstration against the introduction of bond notes some rank and file soldiers informally said that if ever they were instructed to stop the demonstrations they would join the demonstrators and even defend them against some of their own who would want to carry the order. Such sentiments had some semblance of truth given that the ZDF commander General Chiwenga later toured military barracks addressing soldiers to embrace the bond notes.

However, it is undeniable that there are sections within the army who were recruited not because of their academic qualifications but as a result of patronage, these are prepared to unleash violence on any opponents of the regime; the only way to show their loyalty to the party-state. These are the soldiers who guard and transport seeds and fertilisers that are given to military chiefs by the government, those who own farms. However, despite the power and survival consensus of the JOC, the military apparatus is not a unified body as some of the junior ranks who were increasingly becoming restless especially as hyperinflation devoured their meagre salaries.⁴⁴⁹

There were reports by the Zimbabwean newspaper that during 2007-8, senior officers were at times booed by junior soldiers in the rank-and-file.⁴⁵⁰ The rank and file soldiers are reported to have told their superiors that the hardships they were experiencing were not a result of the western imposed sanctions and when General Chiwenga accused some of them of being supporters of the MDC they are said to have shouted back that Chiwenga's ex-

⁴⁴⁹ Moorcraft, *Op. Cit.*, 167.

⁴⁵⁰ For more information read, The Zimbabwean newspaper, [www.thezimbabwean.co/2007/08/juniors-boo-commanders/Aug 16](http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2007/08/juniors-boo-commanders/Aug%2016), 2007.

wife Jocylene had at one point been a member of the MDC. It is also alleged that in 2009 more than one hundred and twenty soldiers at KGVI barracks were tortured and beaten by soldiers belonging to the military intelligence, military police and the CIO following allegations that some guns had been stolen from the armoury. It is claimed that Major Maxwell Samudzi committed suicide whilst other soldiers were reported to have died because of torture.⁴⁵¹ Notably, divisions in the army and other security sector institutions have become really visible given the factions that are haunting the ZANU-PF party. Some support Emmerson Mnangagwa, others still support Joice Mujuru, and others support the faction known as the Generation 40; whilst others confide that they support the MDC-T.

Non-commissioned officers in the ZNA have repeatedly complained that there is a huge disparity between the salaries of their superiors compared to their own. The rank-and-file soldier are said to be earning US\$340-00, whilst those in the rank of Major are earning US\$470-00, a Lieutenant Colonel's net salary is US\$1500-00 whilst Generals take home a salary in the US\$5000-10 000 range and top of the range cars.⁴⁵² This shows that as long as Mugabe has the means and power to reward the military leaders and permit them to accumulate, they will continue to support him. One senior officer said "the opposition can scream all it can, but nothing will happen as long as Mugabe looks after his own well."⁴⁵³ This then is an attestation that the military leaders may continue to 'force' their wishes on the military rank-and-file. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that political neutrality has been rendered meaningless by political manipulation thus military professionalism has

⁴⁵¹ For more information see story in the *Zimbabwean Newspaper*, "Brutality and Torture in ZNA-2009 Calls for UN intervention."

⁴⁵² *The Zimbabwean newspaper*, February 17, 2014, Zimbabwe Doc.

⁴⁵³ Moocraft, "Mugabe's war," *Op. Cit.*, 170.

been replaced by an ethos in which supporting the party-state is the essential quality in military officers. This is unprofessional.

Consequently, because of the risks that come with being regarded as insubordinate or trying to incite dissent within the military is being subjected to martial law within the military. This has precipitated the exodus of soldiers going to neighbouring countries as economic refugees. Desertions have arguably been considered a safety valve and a common phenomenon in the army; however it has also opened avenues for the recruitment of “the green bombers” into the ZNA. Given the qualifications and background of the “green bombers,” they are arguably more brain-washed and always doing the bidding of their commanders, and have become too ideological and materially committed to preserving the status quo than envisioning revolting or quitting the ZNA. Southall contends that “It was the opening of the Marange diamond fields and the access they gave the military to enormous wealth which was to guarantee that the alliance between the army and ZANU-PF would remain firm.”⁴⁵⁴ The map shows the proximity of Chiadzwa Marange diamonds to diamond dealers in Mozambique who were reported to be coming from as far as the DRC, Nigeria and China among other countries.

⁴⁵⁴ Southall, *Op. Cit.*, 171.

Figure 7:4: Map showing position of Marange diamond fields in Zimbabwe



Source: David Towriss, “Buying Loyalty,” *Op. Cit.*, 100.

The discovery of diamonds at Chiadzwa ushered in a new era in Zimbabwe, people from all walks of life rushed to the diamond fields in a bid to better their livelihoods. It was an opportunity that was supposed to prop up the Zimbabwean ailing economy, but this has not been the case as only the political and military elites have been the major beneficiaries. All those I interviewed agree that military and political elites were very much involved in clandestine diamond sales. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor Dr. John Mangudya has also raised concerns that diamond revenue is not reaching state coffers. Richard Saunders suggests that, the mining sector has been a major “source of capital accumulation, political contestation and policy intervention by the state.”⁴⁵⁵

It is not surprising why the Mugabe led government adopted a lukewarm approach to diamond mining activities in Marange. It took its time to be hands-on the diamond mining

⁴⁵⁵ Richard Saunders, “Geologies of Power: Blood Diamonds, Security Politics and Zimbabwe’s Troubled Transition,” in *Legacies of Liberation: Postcolonial Struggles for a Democratic Southern Africa*, eds. M Clarke and C Bassett. (Toronto, HSRC Press, 2010), 2.

activities because it did not want to do away with the illicit trade in diamonds but its incorporation; thus, there was an unholy alliance of the security sector and the politicians to benefit. Diamonds were ‘discovered’ at a time when Zimbabwe was being gnawed by a severe hyperinflation that ravaged and made useless the salaries of many Zimbabweans including the military rank-and-file.

The politicians and military elites sanctioned the deployment of the ZNA to evict civilians from the diamond fields in an operation code-named; Operation Hakudzokwi (No Return) replacing the ZRP failed Operation Chikorokoza Chapera hence it removed any chances for the ordinary soldiers and the masses to join hands and rebel against the military and political elites. Ambassador James MacGee observed that the military elites and politicians had already started benefiting from the police executed operation.⁴⁵⁶ Notably, ordinary soldiers became direct beneficiaries of diamond smuggling in the military led operation, “the soldiers picked up where the police had left establishing their own syndicates....”⁴⁵⁷

The covert diamond mining nature, military and politicians involvement barred transparency whilst the politico-military elites influenced the distribution of spoils and a windfall for all those involved⁴⁵⁸ at the same time sustaining a politico-military patronage arrangement. On-commissioned officers interviewed by the author told the author in confidence that military commanders chose those who were to guard the Marange diamond

⁴⁵⁶ Ambassador James MacGee quoted by David Towriss, *Op. Cit.*, 104. 10Harare36, 'http: allafrica.com/stories/201012090595.html-cable

⁴⁵⁷ David Towriss, “Buying loyalty: Zimbabwe’s Marange Diamonds,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 39, no. 1 (2013): 107-108.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 101.

fields and upon their return they had to give these military elites some germs and if they failed to do so they would not be reposted there. Some ordinary soldiers therefore competed against each other to endear their superiors so that they would be given their turn to go and guard the diamond fields. It is in this context that “unlike other notorious cases of “blood diamonds” such as Sierra Leone and Angola, where diamonds have fuelled dissent from within a legitimate government... the illegal trade strengthened militarised interests.....it sustained the ZANU-PF party consolidating an illegal and hidden political economy of accumulation.”⁴⁵⁹ This indeed heralded the “militarisation of economic and political life that, besides blurring the distinctions between state, party, and military, produced a class of citizens that both controls the levers of coercive powers and also wields private wealth, thus sustaining informal and personal networks of patronage.”⁴⁶⁰

The above occurrences ‘dovetailed’ with Masipula Sithole’s submission that during times of “crisis,” decision-making gyrates around the military where the ruling elites listen more to the military leaders as decision making begin to be gradually made by the military leaders.⁴⁶¹ The military leaders thus consciously promote their own interests including that of the politicians who in turn legitimize the actions taken by the military for it to be a win-win situation. Pay-offs therefore determined the ZNA’s involvement in the Marange diamond debacle where many civilian lives were lost. Interviews carried out by the Centre for Research and Development (CRD) show that there was a lot of ruthlessness by members

⁴⁵⁹ Saunders, *Op. Cit.*, 14. (Emphasis mine).

⁴⁶⁰ Jocelyne Alexander, “Militarisation and State Institutions,” *Op. Cit.*, 812.

⁴⁶¹ Sithole, “Zimbabwe: Struggles,” *Op. Cit.*, 106.

of the army who were at the Chiadzwa diamond fields. A member of the security sector stationed at Chiadzwa is alleged to have said:

At first two helicopters flew around the diamond fields and we just thought it was an ordinary military exercise. When the two helicopters landed, several army buses and trucks arrived. They informed the leaders of police that they had come under a directive issued by President Mugabe. Some police officers were beaten by the soldiers.⁴⁶²

However, the same soldiers are alleged to have invited and escorted the illegal panners to undertake illegal mining activities after which they would share whatever they got and the soldiers would also give some of the proceeds to their superiors. This same cycle repeated itself explaining why there was a lot of secrecy with regards to diamond sales. Chris Mushowe and Gideon Gono the RBZ governor defended soldiers' involvement that they argued would plug the illegal diamond mining and selling but this was not the case as much of the diamond revenue was not remitted to treasury.⁴⁶³

Interactions between the Politicians, the Political Rank And File: The Military Elites and the Politicians

Whether they like it or not Zimbabwean citizens are affected by the politics of the day thus loyalty to the party-state is in many respects a response to the liberation struggle and loyalty

⁴⁶² For more information read a paper by Centre Research and Development, "Operation Hakudzokwi- What happened in Chiadzwa, Solomon Mungure Masters dissertation: Africa University (2009): "The Dynamics of Conflict in illegal diamond dealing in Chiadzwa in Marange, Richard Saunders, "Geologies of Power," Op. Cit.

⁴⁶³ Tendai Biti who became the Minister of Finance during the period of the Government of National Unity reiterated that the Treasury coffers were empty in 2009.

is therefore a product of coercive and cohesive forces of change that were a product of the liberation war. Huntington observed that participation in politics may result in two notable different outcomes. Firstly, it may result in a political rigid control of the people by their own government as in totalitarian states or secondly it may augment control of the government by the people.⁴⁶⁴ The political party rank-and-file in Zimbabwe are very pivotal to the existence of the party and yet they are manipulated and politicised for the interests of the politicians. The Marxist-Leninist theory beliefs became the epicentre of military and nationalist leaders and military rank and file cadres who put party aspirations at the forefront. Through ‘guided democracy’ Zanuists are subservient and beholden to the party hence the gun is obliged to follow the party.⁴⁶⁵ Consequently the political and economic tastes of the politicians or presidency are portrayed good for the country and the people as depicted by the ZANU-PF campaign trail in 2013. At a rally in Mashonaland Central Mugabe stirred up memories of the liberation struggle categorically stating:

I heard Tsvangirai was campaigning in Mashonaland Central. Does he not know that this is Mbuya Nehanda’s province? We had the first of our star rallies here at Nzvimbo so that I could remind you that a lot of people died here during the liberation war.⁴⁶⁶ (Nehanda was the 1st Chimurenga liberation war heroine)

ZANU-PF has always endeavoured to hammer the last nails on the Western and MDC-T political coffin by mud-slinging Tsvangirai’s political standing so that he loses credibility in the eyes of the masses to trigger his descend into political oblivion. This explains why

⁴⁶⁴ Huntington, “Political Order,” *Op. Cit.*, 34-35.

⁴⁶⁵ Southall, “Liberation Movements,” *Op. Cit.*, 60.

⁴⁶⁶ Tendi, “Robert Mugabe,” *Op. Cit.*, 964.

Mugabe to ‘cap it all’ promised the people full ownership and beneficiation from the national economy. In 2013 Mugabe was all out to have a resounding electoral victory be it through fair or foul means to silence his enemies.

It is now logical to discuss what shapes the interactions between the political party rank-and-file and the politicians as this is very useful in understanding the interactions between these actors. According to Wolfgang Sachs participation is associated with desirable goals and as such participation is an accepted concept which even authoritarian regimes try to promote.⁴⁶⁷ Participation is perceived as a free exercise but this is not so in practise. More often than not the masses are forced to undertake activities that do not directly benefit them. As such contemporary mass demonstrations in favour of repressive regimes have never represented free acts of participation. An example of this is the Jabulani Sibanda’s one million-men marches across the country that endorsed Mugabe as the candidate for ZANU-PF in the March 2008 presidential election; a pretentious political ploy to make the regional and international community think that the nonagenarian still has support.

In 2013 the ZANU-PF politicians also mobilised the people to append their signatures against the European Union (EU) imposed ‘illegal’ sanctions; a teleguided form of participation. In this, the participants do not feel they are being forced into doing something, but in actual fact they are led to take actions which are inspired or directed by centres outside their control. Such participation is dependent on the state that allows military interactions with politicians, and the political party rank-and-file. Participation has

⁴⁶⁷ Wolfgang Sachs, (ed.) *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge and Power* (London: Zed Books, 1992), 177.

thus resulted in sophisticated systems of control over their populations. It indirectly permits ‘governments’ to be present everywhere, and especially whenever power is necessary to bring about ‘democratic and orderly’ participation. In such a context, participation is easily transformed into manipulative designs totally opposed to what the people want it for. A good number of people are manipulated into supporting those in power hoping that the promised increase in the size of the national cake will ultimately trickle down to them.⁴⁶⁸

In Zimbabwe participation has become a politically attractive because ZANU-PF has learnt the art of effectively controlling participation. Political advantages are obtained through the ostentatious display of participatory intentions thus “because of the corruption of survival,” poverty among the rural folk and the urban lumpen-proletariat is a vehicle of maintaining elites’ power.⁴⁶⁹ This view is hand in glove with Sachs’ observation that because they are very poor, those in the rural areas and the urbanites sell what remains of their souls to anyone who provides them with money to eat the next meal.⁴⁷⁰ To borrow from Karl Polanyi’s description, participation has come to be ‘dis-embedded’ from the socio-cultural roots that ‘have’ always kept it alive.⁴⁷¹ It is now perceived a ‘resource’ to keep one politically and economically afloat. In Zimbabwe, political participation has been reduced to the act of partaking in the objectives of the party-state and the societal arrangements related to it. This entails that ‘a Zimbabwean’ must be a person who is part of ZANU-PF predefined political and economic project in order to qualify and benefit as a participant. This is why Mugabe and his wife Grace donated tonnes of food, fertilisers and

⁴⁶⁸Sachs, “The Development Dictionary,” *Op. Cit.*, 118

⁴⁶⁹Chabal and Daloz, “Africa works,” *Op. Cit.*, 98.

⁴⁷⁰ Sachs, “The Development Dictionary,” *Op. Cit.*, 119.

⁴⁷¹*Ibid*, 120.

maize-seed to supporters during presidential and parliamentary campaign rallies. However, despite the enormous social, political and economic hardships that have been experienced by many Zimbabweans, Mugabe will still go down in history as the man who returned land to the people.⁴⁷²

Facts on the ground show that the masses who invaded farms are still subject to inhuman treatment as they are removed from these farms when any of the politicians or the military elites wants to occupy that farm. This has been the fate of the masses who had resettled themselves in Mazowe farms that have become part of the (Mugabe) Gushungo estate. Those who had resettled themselves at Manzou Farm were removed to pave way for the first family game park.

Given the above scenario, it is evident that both the peasants and the lumpen-proletariats are ready recruits for politicians who opportunistically exploit them. This has given the ‘Zanuists’ stamina to deal with the poor in a way that they see fit. The use of the rural-folk and unemployed urbanites in the ‘participation gimmick’ is to achieve power ‘dubbed people’s power’ in defence of the politicians. The rural peasants were thus a force to reckon used during the Fast Track Land Reform while lumpen-proletariats are used to terrorise opposition party supporters. Anke Hoffler suggests that “there is thus a conservatism of the destitute as profound as the conservatism of the privileged and the former is as much a factor in the perpetuation of a social order as the latter.”⁴⁷³ This explains why after every election perpetrators of violence who belong to ZANU-PF and who will have been

⁴⁷² Hill, “What Happens,” *Op. Cit.*, 127.

⁴⁷³ Huntington, “Political Order,” *Op. Cit.*, 49-53.

‘unfortunately arrested and imprisoned are pardoned by Mugabe. “A mob is fickle, easily carried away, and hijacked by any glib-tongued, loquacious demagogue opportunistically bent on capturing or maintaining power.”⁴⁷⁴

It is in the above context that the urbanites in Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo, Gweru and other cities and towns are demanding stands from the ZANU-PF government as a guarantee for them to continue supporting the party in future elections as they become part and parcel of the ZANU-PF political gravy train. What is interesting is that “lumpen proletariats are realists on the lookout,”⁴⁷⁵ always looking for eco-political avenues that they can exploit so that they are materially rewarded. To them what counts are the pay-offs be it as it may that their patron is a dictator or not. As Huntington wittingly observed, poverty is an antidote to political instability because those who are poor concentrate on ‘wants’ as opposed to ‘needs’ hence they are not concerned about grand societal transformations as they have also been corrupted in their efforts to be rewarded with basic luxuries “there is thus corruption of the poor and the corruption of the rich. The one trades political power for money, the other money for political power. But in both cases something public (a vote or an office or decision) is sold for private gain.”⁴⁷⁶

The general populace are easily manipulated and in the process this is why wittingly or unwittingly ZANU-PF has sanctioned corruption explaining why Mugabe does not have the political will to deal with it. This has raised concerns whether Mugabe is still in control

⁴⁷⁴ Anyangwe, “Revolutionary Overthrow,” *Op. Cit.*, 63, Emphasis mine.

⁴⁷⁵ Huntington, “Political Order,” *Op. Cit.*, 280.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 53-61.

of his party's political cabal and the military or he is part and parcel of all the corrupt activities that are taking place. Zimbabwe's civil-military interactions are thus coated in the anti-imperialist garb in the process undermining national development as the executive casts a blind eye to corrupt practices done by the military and political elite and whatever Mugabe's view about it carries the day, thus "the person of Robert Mugabe has.... become an indispensable symbol-even-victim in the hands of a cartel of a small clique of securocrats and their civilian hangers-on."⁴⁷⁷

Having discussed the political party rank-and-file interactions with the ruling elite; to clearly show Mugabe's 'Machiavellian' manipulation of the military I now unpack his relationship with the military institution both as state leader and commander of the ZDF. Pugh correctly observed that the military are servants of the state and they strictly adhere to the military command hierarchical structure. This entails that they follow the commands and directives of the President who is the commander-in-chief of the defence forces thus, 'professional soldiers forgo' personal ambitions for the good that benefits the whole society.⁴⁷⁸ The military and politicians must be moral and professionals who are accountable for their actions respecting their citizens and their country's constitution. This has arguably not been the case and in Zimbabwe where the gun is subservient to the party. Such loyalty to the party is determined by the fact that those who participated in the liberation struggle are aware of the fate of their fellow comrades who tried to 'challenge' their civilian authorities disregarding the party's democratic centralism way of attending

⁴⁷⁷ Mandaza, Ibbo. "Reflections on the Zimbabwe Elections 2013," in *Zimbabwe in Transition*, ed. Mandaza (Monograph Series No. 17, Southern African Political and Economic Series, 2015), 54.

⁴⁷⁸ Emphasis mine

to issues and became victims of the party, “children of the revolution who were devoured by the revolution.”⁴⁷⁹

Consequently, any member of the military who support the MDC become enemies of the state and the fallen heroes and heroines interred at the national heroes’ acre and elsewhere. Issues of patriotism thus have a bearing on the close affinity of serving senior officers and the military rank-and-file albeit retired. Colonel Panganai Kahuni in an interview with author referred to such patriotism as “revolutionary morality,” that is firmly fixed in defending the legacy of the liberation struggle.

Zimbabweans must love their country, walking tall and proud because they defeated colonialism thus the ZNA supports any government that is in power and that government is ZANU-PF. We don’t give a damn what people say, we support the government in power and this is what Americans do. Here Mugabe is the commander-in-Chief and we won’t cut that revolutionary umbilical cord, hazviite (it will not happen).⁴⁸⁰

Most scholars consider that the military elites and politicians are glued together on the grounds that they must fall together rather than fall individually. As depicted by the (Tsvangirai) letter (see Appendix 2); the military continue to act with impunity. When some of the military elites act with impunity are they doing it under Mugabe’s orders and if not why does he not reprimand them? “Is Mugabe the puppet or the puppet master of his war

⁴⁷⁹ For more information see Masipula Sithole, “Zimbabwe: Struggles,” 1999 book, *Op. Cit.*

⁴⁸⁰ Panganai Kahuni, Interview by Author, Harare, 20th August 2015.

machine?⁴⁸¹ From 2000-2008, Mugabe is a convenient figurehead and top cover for the generals. The more opposition politicians and civic groups complained and castigated the conduct of the military elites the more they drove them into the hands of the party-state explaining why they have not supported the notion that Mugabe relinquishes power before choosing a successor who resonate with them. Kahuni argues that:

What the “military want is a loyal opposition that offers constructive criticism and not to side with those we fought yester-year for regime change. We have to be worried as a military especially if individuals are sabotaging our economic and political developments. We want people who are patriotic and our children must be taught the principles and ethos of the Zimbabwean revolution and this is why I believe that our academic institutions are sleeping on duty.⁴⁸²

Supporters of ZANU-PF have thus embraced “patriotic history” as filling the ideological vacuum created when the ZANU-PF “structures went to sleep” in 2008. Mugabe has thus rejuvenated his guerrilla leadership hence he portrays Zimbabwe as a country that is still at war against the neo-imperialist onslaught by Britain and her allies seeking to effect a regime change on Harare like what happened in Iraq, Libya, and Egypt. By resisting British and American bully tactics Mugabe has become a ‘political cat that every political dog secretly admires. ‘Third World leaders’; his security-sector, the political party rank-and-file and like-minded people outside Zimbabwe lionize him and put him in the mould of Pan-Africanist thinkers like Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, and Julius Nyerere inter-alia.

⁴⁸¹Moorcraft, “Mugabe’s war” *Op. Cit.*, 185.

⁴⁸² Panganai Kahuni, Interview by Author, Harare, 20th August 2015.

Mugabe has categorically stated that ZANU-PF as the party that brought independence to Zimbabweans, will rule for ever. This was appositely captured in Moore's paper entitled "when I am a century old: why Robert Mugabe won't go."⁴⁸³ The ZANU-PF and military institution relations are thus embedded in reciprocal favours that are part of the "nested game." In an interview with author Wesley Mwatwara submits that the military dance to Mugabe's tune because of the symbiotic relationship between the military elites and the politicians. He went further to state that there is no proper distinction between the party and government as the party sometimes acts as government pursuing party interests explaining why some generals say what they say without feeling being out of place. "Every position in state institutions is placed in a way to support the president and they owe their appointments to him."⁴⁸⁴ It is a fact that patron-client relations are not accidental and have become part of the "nested game." These relations thus developed in slow incremental steps that were maintained. Just like "the white settler colonial State.....the post independent state was, almost root and branch, an expression of that animal."⁴⁸⁵ Mugabe has continued to hold the security sector institutions close to him while using them to suppress any opposition to his rule in his endeavour to create a Mugabe dynasty. What then pushed the army generals to be 'willing pawns' in the ZANU-PF political chess game?

As has been pointed out, Ambassador Mutambara in an interview agreed with the author that the military elites and all those who were ZANLA guerrillas have always been a

⁴⁸³ For more information see David Moore, "When I am a century old: why Robert Mugabe won't go," in *Legacies of Power*, eds. Roger Southall and Henning Melber (Nordika Afrikerinstitute, 2006), 120-140.

⁴⁸⁴ Mwatwara, Interview by Author, University of Zimbabwe, 13th October 2015.

⁴⁸⁵ Mandaza, "Zimbabwe at 32: A Typical Post-Colonial Trajectory?" *Op. Cit.*, 57.

politicised lot. They were daily doused with Marxist-Leninist philosophies; a theory of political development, where party supremacy is upper-most; power is centralized and also expanded.⁴⁸⁶ Mandaza observed that:

ZANU-PF's strength lies in its conflation with the state at the level of the key leaders and access to material resources.... ZANU-PF has by design provided a framework through which Mugabe alone exercises and sustains hegemonic control.⁴⁸⁷

Mugabe's hegemony of the party-state was openly challenged by the MDC whose slogan "Chinja Maitiro, Chinja / change the way you do things, Change," and the symbolic usage of the open palm was very captivating that in the end children in the streets were heard chanting it. The political environment became very tense when MDC politicians naively joined the chorus of the West in denouncing Mugabe simultaneously campaigning for the withdrawal of the ZNA from the DRC as well as the naming and shaming of beneficiaries of the DRC illicit mineral deals. This only served to further undermine the opposition in the eyes of the military leaders, and to push them into the arms of the more amenable party-state⁴⁸⁸ explaining why the military are part and parcel of the Zimbabwean problem. Britain, America and other western countries mercilessly criticised Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC. This put the Zimbabwean government in an odious position igniting the decline in the cordial military relations that had existed between Zimbabwe and Britain.

⁴⁸⁶ Huntington, "Political Order," *Op. Cit.*, 342.

⁴⁸⁷ Mandaza, "The Bourgeois (Post-Colonial) State without a Bourgeoisie," in *Zimbabwe in Transition*, ed. Mandaza *Op. Cit.*, 6. Emphasis mine

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 85.

The Blair government refused to supply the ZDF with spare parts for Hawk jets that had been bought during Margaret Thatcher's reign. The ZDF officers who were studying in different military staff colleges in Europe were unceremoniously forced to abandon their studies.⁴⁸⁹ Zimbabwe had been indirectly coerced to withdraw from its DRC venture. It was from then on that the politico-military elite envisioned themselves under siege. Rupiya claims that it was indeed a miracle that they survived under such an onslaught⁴⁹⁰ as the British were bent on Mugabe's downfall.

Stories that were published in independent papers during Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC raised tensions within the Zimbabwean society. Grace Kwinjeh published a story of a decapitated soldier who died in combat and was brought back to Zimbabwe to be buried.⁴⁹¹ In May 2001, the British Guardian newspaper also reported of a coup plot that incriminated security-sector personnel like Air Marshal Shiri. The ZDF commander quickly responded to dispel rumours that Zimbabwe was under any kind of threat. General Zvinavashe retorted:

Those said to be coup leaders have no such plans. What is being mentioned about them is not right. There is nothing that is going to happen that way. We are one; we are going to remain united. We know what we are there for. Our responsibility is to defend this country.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁹ Rupiya, "Contextualising the military," *Op. Cit.*, 84.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 86.

⁴⁹¹ For more information on this read article by Professor Tawana Khupe and Ronning.

⁴⁹² Tendi, "Ideology, Civilian," *Op. Cit.*, 832.

It must not delude the mind that Anglo-Zim relations continued to worsen, evidenced by the British government's abrupt removal of the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) from Zimbabwe in 2001. Robin Cook (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs) was of the view that any continued link with the Mugabe government would have a backlash (on the Labour Party) on the pending British election as BMATT's continued stay could be interpreted as propping up an autocrat. BMATT's unceremonious departure was not diplomatic and left the military leaders very dejected. BMATT commander Vere Hayes said:

BMATT was pulled out and it was a difficult time when we left because I thought it was a wrong move.....We were given about three weeks to get out, which was too short. I went down to see Chiwenga to tell him we had been ordered to leave. When I did, Chiwenga turned around and said 'I know, I have seen it on television already.' So, the UK actually announced it publicly before BMATT was told. It was not good.⁴⁹³

The military leaders were embarrassed and hurt by this open 'ostracism'; at a time when the MDC had seriously dented ZANU-PF pride. It was also not certain whether Mugabe would win the 2002 presidential election, and if he did not win, would Tsvangirai not reverse the fast track land reform programme in the process eroding the benefits that the security sector chiefs had enjoyed? Tendi suggests that Joint Operation Command (JOC) saw the rejection they had suffered at the hands of the Blair government as a slight and it was apparent that Britain was supporting the MDC. The military leaders as defenders of

⁴⁹³*Ibid*, 833.

Zimbabwe's independence allied themselves with the party-state. As already stated the ever-increasing inflation and sanctions made some members of the militia to remain resolute in defending their interests. It is in this context that the service Chiefs made the much touted 2002 "straight-jacket" declaration. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni this was the time when the army and 'other security sector institutions connived to openly interfere in the civil and political life of Zimbabwe.⁴⁹⁴

Though Tendi argues that the 2002 service Chiefs outbursts "have been interpreted in selective ways," neglecting external factors that forced military leaders' intervention⁴⁹⁵ the service-Chiefs declaration was an outright disqualification of anyone who had presidential ambitions but had not participated in the liberation war. The military elites are Mugabe and ZANU-PF 'political zealots' who see themselves as 'guardians' of Zimbabwe's sovereignty. Mahoso supports Tendi's argument that Zvinavashe's outbursts were necessitated by provocations by the British and Americans who were mooting possibilities of a military invasion on Zimbabwe, something that Mbeki has already confirmed. He argues that "the military had to come in because it raised security concerns and the military are mandated by the constitution to defend the government against being forcefully removed from power."⁴⁹⁶ However this does not disqualify the view that in protecting Mugabe and defending his political stance, the military elites were also defending their own interests. Mandaza in an interview with the author intimated that in 2003, Zvinavashe was not protecting Mugabe and was actually part of a group of people who were planning

⁴⁹⁴Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nationalist-Military," *Op. Cit.*, 73.

⁴⁹⁵Tendi, "Ideology, Civilian. *Cit.*, 829. Emphasis mine

⁴⁹⁶ Mahoso, Interview by author, Monday, 9th November, 2015.

for Mugabe's safe exit.⁴⁹⁷ As will be noted with Zvinvashe's later outbursts he was mainly concerned with safeguarding his interests.

Chinyanganya has argued that the military elite's statement was within the confines of Schiff's already mentioned three partners were there is cooperation amongst the three actors (the military, politicians and the citizenry) for the good of the state. However, Mahoso points to a different type of a triad (3 units), being the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Reserve Bank and Treasury and the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. By being part of this tripod the military have a role that they must play within the system and they must reinforce each other as these relations determine how the country develops, this happens worldwide. "This tripod has links and military in Zimbabwe must not cut off the links."⁴⁹⁸ Though Mahoso and Chinyanganya refer to different triads the most important thing is that the military are central showing that the ZNA has intervened in politics. They are the ones who have come up with the characteristics that must define the occupant of the highest political office. As such Chinyanganya maintains that,

the challenges that civil-military relations face in countries like Zimbabwe are around problems of military culture and history, overlapping coordination, authority, lack of resources and institutional deficits influenced by colonial perceptions all based on western traditions.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁷Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Chinyanganya, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, 14th October 2015.

ZANLA has remained an appendage to the party-state and continues to support its leadership thus it is not a surprise that in 2008 “Zimbabwe found itself in an interregnum, where there was no legitimate government,” the securocrats availed themselves to occupy “a problematic position in ‘the Zimbabwean’ body politic through the (Joint Operation Command) JOC”⁵⁰⁰ explaining why they engineered an election re-run where they made sure that Mugabe was the winner and later when under pressure saw to it that Mugabe headed the inclusive government. This is why it is Mugabe’s prerogative to see to it that he retains military elites who are loyal and only relieve them of their duties through either death or retirement⁵⁰¹ If they retire they are co-opted into part structures as was the case with Retired General Mujuru, Retired Air Chief Marshal Tungamirai, Retired Lieutenant-General Zvinavashe, Retired lieutenant-General Nyambuya and Retired Brigadier Muchemwa just to mention a few. The military elites have an organic relationship with their commander-in-chief whom they are answerable to; “They should be loyal to their commander-in-chief and president. Should they be answerable to George Bush or Tony Blair?,”⁵⁰² rhetorically asked Mahoso. Chinyanganya posits that the ZNA adheres to military doctrine; they support government policy and failure to do so mean that the country becomes a failed state like what happened in Zaire, Somalia etc.

This strengthened the regime change view amongst the ZANU-PF politicians and the military leaders was strengthened by the refusal by international financial institutions (IFIs) to give loans to the Harare government affecting ZANU-PF politicians, technocrats and the

⁵⁰⁰ Makumbe, *Op. Cit.*, 14.

⁵⁰¹ Mookcraft, “Mugabe’s war,” *Op. Cit.*, 158.

⁵⁰² Mahoso, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Media House, Rainbow Towers, 9th November 2015.

military elites explaining why they panicked. This was replicated by Zimbabwe's security sector desecration of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). The securocrats 'without permission' opened a British 'diplomatic bag' that was to be delivered at the British embassy in Harare. The securocrats erroneously thought that the 'diplomatic bag' had arms that were to be used to dislodge the ZANU-PF government.⁵⁰³

In an interview with Tendi, the then Minister of State Security, Mutasa, said, 'the fear that Britain was planning a military operation in Zimbabwe was very real in Zimbabwe's military and intelligence services circles.'⁵⁰⁴ This was later on confirmed by Thabo Mbeki and Field Marshal Lord Charles Guthrie. "Lord Guthrie-who served as the chief of general staff from (1994-1997) and was the professional head of the of the British army, and chief of defence staff (1997-2001) exposed that in 2000 he "was asked by Number 10 (Downing Street) and the foreign office if I could look into invading Zimbabwe. I was absolutely dead set against it.... My strong recommendation was do not touch Zimbabwe."⁵⁰⁵

Coupled to the above mentioned developments that pushed the military into ZANU-PF's 'bosom' both the ZANU-PF politicians and service Chiefs were horrified when they realised the party had lost the 2008 election to MDC. The military elites were also in a quandary as they started wondering how they could preserve their wealth if Mugabe accepted defeat. Through "primitive accumulation practices," ZANU-PF politicians had cemented and consolidated patron-clientelist networks with the service Chiefs that had to

⁵⁰³Tendi, "Ideology, Civilian," *Op. Cit.*, 833.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

be protected at all costs. Independent newspapers reported that in August 2008, General Philip Sibanda and Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri were both letting it be known that ZANU-PF should go into a coalition with MDC. Sibanda was reported as saying if a coalition government was not formed, “it would be a chaotic situation” which would make all of them vulnerable, and no African country would support a forceful seizure of power; “especially if they know we have been working to destroy this African Union (AU) initiated arrangement.”⁵⁰⁶

The politico-military survival consensus was further compounded by MDC politicians like Biti whose budget as Minister of Finance deliberately favoured the health and education ministries vis-à-vis the defence ministry. In the eyes of the military elites this was a deliberate snub meant to derail military support for the party-state bringing the military closer to ZANU-PF politicians. It is also apparent that the military elites and politicians fear punishment for ‘crimes’ that they have perpetrated be it in the past or in their dealings with the MDC, they have thus been glued together by a survival consensus.⁵⁰⁷ Dodo also contends that both the military elites and politicians are very much worried about being dislodged from power because “new leaders might ask them to account for all the atrocities that they committed, they have fear of being taken to The Hague.”⁵⁰⁸ This explains why in a show of solidarity with military elites, Mnangagwa was quoted in one of the independent media addressing a rally saying “if you do not vote for us in the next election [2013] we will rule even if you do not want.” ZANU-PF is not prepared to cede power.

⁵⁰⁶ JOCsplits: www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/joint-operation-command-splits/

⁵⁰⁷ Moorcraft, “Mugabe’s war,” *Op. Cit.*, 158.

⁵⁰⁸ Obadiah Dodo, Interview by Author, Bindura, 25th August 2015.

Linda Freeman connotes that global pressures on Harare brought into contestation two fundamentally opposed dimensions. One was supportive of the ZANU-PF government and the other supportive of the MDC-T; thus, external factors also had a bearing on shaping the politicians and senior military officers' interactions embedded in notable pay-offs explaining why the military decided to support the status quo. It is therefore not surprising that the Zimbabwe Sunday mail newspaper echoed the military officers' fears when it reproduced retired General Sir Richard Dannatt's proposition of a regime change to the British parliament. Retired General Dannatt said:

Some officers in the army could do the right thing, they know what that is, we taught them...regime change! ...I often reflect that there must be a generation of Zimbabwean army officers who were trained by us in the 1980s and who know that there is a better way than that of the repressive dictatorship of Robert Mugabe. The people of Zimbabwe deserve a chance, just as the people of Northern Ireland, the Falklands, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan etc.⁵⁰⁹

What the General was insinuating was that the contingent of officers who had received professional military training after independence knew under what circumstances they could execute a "democratic coup." Jonathan Moyo lambasted him saying:

General Dannat's comments are just wishful thinking of a failed colonialist. There is nothing British in the Zimbabwean army. Our military does not operate the British

⁵⁰⁹The Zimbabwe Sunday Mail Newspaper, "Hallucinations of a Former UK army commander," March 13-19, 2011, 1-4.

way, they know what to do and they know that Zimbabwe will never be a colony again.....the army taught itself what to do during the liberation struggle. The reason why we can go to bed and have some sleep is that we know we have a patriotic military. That is a last act of complete desperation to think they can incite our army.⁵¹⁰

The dice had been cast and on one hand both the military elites and the ZANU-PF politicians knew that Britain and America had tried to evoke chapter 7 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) but this had been blocked by China and Russia. On the other hand Tsvangirai was also grandstanding intimating that if Mugabe refused to go peacefully, then he risked being removed violently as he threatened an “Arab Spring,” in Zimbabwe. Mahoso argues that an Arab Spring is actually terrorism and any military would not allow that. As a matter of fact response did not come from the military but the politicians who said that the military would respond accordingly to any mischievous machinations to forcefully remove a constitutionally elected government from power.⁵¹¹

No one knows the outcome of a radical populist revolt in which one might end up losing both life and property and this explains why Chiwenga, Sibanda, Shiri, Chihuri, Zimondi and Bonyongwe were jittery and like their ZANU-PF politicians threatened anybody who had any thought of destabilising the country in any way. Jonathan Moyo in a ‘hot-seat’ interview with Violet Gonda said “let us remember that he (Mugabe) has a young wife and a young family and he must be quite concerned about the future of that family...he will only strike a deal that would safeguard his own interest.”⁵¹²It thus cannot be discounted

⁵¹⁰Jonathan Moyo, Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Mahoso, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Media House, Rainbow Towers, 9th November 2015.

⁵¹² Jonathan Moyo, “Hot-Seat interview: What is Mugabe’s mindset? *SW Radio Africa*, July 27, 2006.


that the military elites, Mugabe and his political cohorts are all concerned about their own lives and families in a post-Mugabe scenario.

The Zimbabwean service Chiefs are very wealthy and cannot be compared to their counterparts in the SADC region, Zimbabwe has some of the richest commanders and yet the source of their riches remains a mystery.⁵¹³ It therefore does not come as a surprise that the military elites have vowed to support Mugabe and try to influence him to choose a successor who will guarantee their safety. Some of the military elites whom I interviewed intimated their support for Mnangagwa whom they say “ane banga, meaning “he can be relied on” as opposed to Joice Mujuru whom they said, “Amai Havana banga”, meaning “Mother cannot be relied on and can be easily compromised by the opposition MDC and the West.”⁵¹⁴ It is apparent that what “Cde Chii” and other generals are mainly concerned about is protection when Mugabe is gone. It is now logical to interrogate whether Mugabe is still in control of his military elites or put differently whether the party is still in control of the gun.

⁵¹³ Gwinyai Dzinesa, interview, “Fat Cat Generals Fear Loss of Assets.” *The Zimbabwe Independent*, October 19, 2012.

⁵¹⁴ “Cde Chii,” Interview by Author, Harare, 8th June 2015.

Figure 7:5 'Nested Game' Politicians Control of Political and Military Elites



The above figure depicts how the politicians with special reference to the executive especially the president has used the surveillance strategy to keep in check of activities by the military elites and the military rank-and-file. Mugabe has thus had many civilians and those in the CIO and military intelligence being tasked to monitor what will be taking place and reporting directly to him. All those who are part of this are aware that they are also under surveillance but do not know who are ‘tailing them.’ As a point of departure it is logical to reiterate that the military firmly came under the command of the politicians after 1980. Nkala, in an interview with Tendi submitted that ZANU-PF would always control the military; without remorse of the purges that took place he said:

There were some struggles between the soldiers and the politicians [in 1976] but (Samora) Machel helped us deal with these misbehaving and ambitious soldiers. They were little boys. We (the ZANU leadership) gave birth to the armed struggle when we signed the Sikombela Declaration [in 1965] while in detention, so ZANLA belonged

to us. We dealt with these boys and controlled the soldiers after that. They were not supposed to be bigger than the party.⁵¹⁵

The rebellion that Nkala was referring to was the ZIPA rebellion that I described in Chapter 3; the nationalist leaders viewed the actions by ZIPA leaders and their sympathisers as an outright rebellion hence they ruthlessly dealt with the ‘rebels.’ It must be noted that some serving members of the military have always been used to subdue some of their own. Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru) had been used to deal with malcontents in the military both real and imagined; they had effectively carried out such tasks ‘killing two birds’ with a single stone. It is thus not surprising that Mugabe no longer had anyone to challenge him to be the head of the new Zimbabwean government whilst Mujuru became the head of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. Mugabe has also maintained a very strong surveillance system that has enabled him to be abreast with the actions of his military leaders, and the military rank-and-file views. This has enabled the politicians to secure their own positions as they dispense favours to ‘loyal’ military elites and loyalists in the military rank-and-file some who are part of the military intelligence.

As noted, a client-patron system has always been at work and has continued up to this day insulated in surveillance and spying system on the opposition parties as well as within the ZANU-PF party. Mugabe had always relied on the CIO to keep him informed on all activities in and outside the party. However, because of the succession disputes within

⁵¹⁵ Tendi, “Ideology, Civilian,” *Op. Cit.*, 836.

ZANU-PF pitting the Mnangagwa and Solomon Mujuru factions, Mugabe increasingly relied on the military intelligence who also spied on CIO bosses as well as activities of those who were perceived threats to his position especially after his loss in the March 2008 elections. Mugabe under influence from the military intelligence leadership has continued to apportion blame for his loss in the election to the late General Mujuru.⁵¹⁶

The surveillance strategy has been used as a checking mechanism by Mugabe on the service Chiefs. The military elites are aware of this surveillance system but do not really know the operatives. One of my informants stated that after the 2008 elections, CIO agents became the dominant and ubiquitous organ of the state that was even deployed in the military. He dejectedly remarked, ‘there are intelligence officers within the ZNA forces... in the security forces one cannot trust anyone. If you are suspected of supporting the opposition or capable of inciting a mutiny, you disappear without a trace.’⁵¹⁷ Mugabe has various undercover informers who do not know each other and they are tasked to do the same thing simultaneously hence they spy on each other. The above informant’s revelation is consistent with Anyangwe’s description of the alleged June 2007 attempted coup and also corroborated by Captain Matapo’s account after being released from Chikurubi Maximum prison. It is alleged that 400 ZNA officers were arrested. Some senior officers were court martialled for having plotted to coup Mugabe.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁶ Tendi, “State Intelligence and the politics of Zimbabwe’s presidential succession,” *African Affairs*, (2016): 2-4.

⁵¹⁷ “Cde Chii,” Interview by Author, Harare, 9th June 2015.

⁵¹⁸ Anyangwe, “Revolutionary Overthrow,” *Op. Cit.*, 100-101. Also, see, Brigadier-General Fakazi Muleya, and Retired Major –General Gideon Lifa, <http://newzimbabwe.com/news/print> Version.aspx? NewsID=14645; Also, see <http://nehandaradio.com/2012/01/13>.

Professor Anyangwe claims the coup was supposed to have taken place on the 2nd of June 2007. Amongst those arrested and charged with treason were retired army Captain Albert Matapo, Ben Ncube, spokesperson of the ZNA, Major General Angelbert Rugeje and Air vice Marshal Elson Moyo. Retired Army Captain Matapo upon his release, 7 years after he was jailed, denied that he had plotted a coup with the likes of Brigadier-General Paul Armstrong Gunda, who he did not know. He said that he only came to know of General Gunda when he was being interrogated and tortured. “I don’t think he (Gunda) died from an accident. Something fishy must have happened,” he told an independent newspaper journalist who was interviewing him. Other generals who were linked to the plot and died under mysterious circumstances were Brigadier-General Fakazi Muleya, and Retired Major-General Gideon Lifa. Logically these purges culminated in the untimely death of General Mujuru in an inferno. Commenting on the death of General Mujuru, his second in command during the 2nd Chimurenga, Mhanda retorted “Any person who has listened to the story, who has read the papers, clearly can come to no other conclusion except that there was naked foul play...” Though people speculate on who masterminded these assassinations the truth is that those who were victims were devoured by the power struggles and contradictions within ZANU-PF or the power struggles within the succession debates struggles.

It is in the above context that Mandaza argues that the military leaders support the party because they are very fragile, they can only assert their views in future dispensation, presently they support Mugabe as a way of livelihood and because of issues of patronage and Mugabe is a symbol of their survival, they support him because of fear. However this

is not to discount the fact that the politicians do not fear a rebellion; Mugabe always wants to please “those in the military and this is why in 2007-08, Mugabe and Gono ended up bringing their own cattle to feed the soldiers in the barracks.”⁵¹⁹ The military leaders were indoctrinated and mentally saturated by the Maoist doctrine that “the Party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party,” however the tables may turn after Mugabe’s departure from the political scene because of the contradictions within contradictions in ZANU-PF succession matrix that have already reared their head through the political factions manifesting in the party. As of now, the military though they can influence certain decisions, they implement directives that are given them by the president.⁵²⁰

Mandaza in an interview with author submits that Mugabe knows fully well that his fellow politicians in the party and the military elites are cowards and will not challenge whatever he says and this explains why he at times also manipulate them. The late Retired Lt. Colonel, Kudzai Mbudzi said that the military elites’ helplessness is depicted by their inability to intervene when Joice Mujuru was expelled and ostracized together with the former generals who support her, “they did not even raise a finger to defend themselves,”⁵²¹ showing that they do not have a say in ZANU-PF politics unless allowed to do so by Mugabe. Margaret Dongo, an ex-CIO and leader of the defunct Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD) in an exaggerated fashion reiterated that ZANU-PF politicians and

⁵¹⁹ Mandaza, Interview by Author, Harare, 9th November 2015.

⁵²⁰ Chinyanganya, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, 14th October 2015.

⁵²¹ The Zimbabwe Daily Newspaper, interview with Retired Lt. Col. Kudzai Mbudzi, 16/10/2015

the military elites are “all Mugabe’s wives.”⁵²² This explains why “Mugabe has maintained divisions between the CIO and the military who are not on talking terms. This suits Mugabe’s style, elite politics surveillance. There is an uneasy relationship; Mugabe’s functional dictatorship keeps them apart. He is aware that they hate him and they are preparing for a post-Mugabe era.”⁵²³ One senior security sector officer in an informal discussion with author recounted an event when they went on an occasional briefing of the president on security issues, that he and his team were astounded to hear Mugabe telling them of “a sensitive political,” issue that they had not included in their dossier. When Mugabe quizzed them on why they were withholding such information, in their defence the officer said that, “we are aware that you had already been told about that and the reason why we have remained mum on this was to see whether you still remember what you were told,” to which Mugabe laughed and said even at his age his mind is still very sharp.

Security-sector ‘invisible hand visibility’ in the day to day running of the affairs of the country can also be seen in Tsvangirai’s remonstrance in one of his campaigns for the 2013 elections when he said:

Do you want democracy or military rule? In 2008 we beat Mugabe, he agreed on his own and he got to a point when he said, ‘guys let me just accept defeat,’ but was told [by military generals] ‘no, mudhara [old man] you ain’t going anywhere, you’ll stay there, let’s see what we can organise.’ They took five weeks to announce results whose outcome was that Tsvangirai has won but not enough to scoop the presidency. What

⁵²² For more information see story, “Dongo receives death threats,” <http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2014>, November 16th 2014.

⁵²³ Mandaza, Interview by Author, 9th November 2015.

does that mean? It means Mugabe is not his own man, there are people who are handlers behind him, he is a puppet and he knows it.⁵²⁴

Tsvangirai's assessment was based on his observation that the military elites have a history of interfering in politics and they are the power behind Mugabe. This is in blatant violation of the Zimbabwe defence Act, the ZNA has continuously directed and implemented ZANU-PF directives especially during elections, explaining why elections have been militarised. The appointment of military personnel to head strategic institutions is some kind of pay-off as a way to strengthen ZANU-PF's control of the state. One of my informants, an ex-member of the CIO avers that 40% of Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) is militarised. He worked directly under Major General Nyikayaramba and noted that ZNA personnel who are members of ZEC are Zanuists who cannot be depoliticised and during elections members of the ZNA are deployed in certain rural areas to instil fear in the electorate. This has been corroborated by ex-ZANU-PF security sector-presidential minister Didymus Mutasa, who said "we don't want to see soldiers campaigning for ZANU-PF or any other party. They must stay in the barracks, not in rural areas intimidating our villagers.....I am saying this with hindsight and experience. I know what used to happen."⁵²⁵

⁵²⁴ Ben Mananavire, Mugabe not his own man: Tsvangirai, retrieved 11/11/14; also see, B. Miles-Tendi, Robert Mugabe's 2013 Presidential Election Campaign, Ibid.

⁵²⁵ The Zimbabwe Newsday, "12 parties gang up on Mugabe," 16/08/2016

Though Mugabe's grip on his party is weakening because of his age and health and though he may be manipulated by some politicians within his party he still maintains a cordial relationship with some of his military elites. Jonathan Moyo claims that:

He (Mugabe) does not listen to people-either because they are cabinet or they are Politburo members. He ultimately and always consistently listens to the security people. His economic advisors are the security people. He is a security president and that explains why many responses of the government to economic challenges are predictable and they often take a law and order dimension. He is very much a creation and product of the security apparatus.⁵²⁶

However, Tendi contends that "Mugabe has always had his wits about him⁵²⁷ and 'is' clearly the ultimate authority over his party and securocrats as shown by the Press conference that he held on the 30th of July 2013. One journalist asked Mugabe to respond to Tsvangirai's allegation that he was a "puppet of the military elite," to which he responded:

I accused him [Tsvangirai] of being a puppet of Europe and the whites. So he has dealt me one good one in return. So it is all over now. We can shake hands. We have worked together; this was the expected. Did you think that he was not going to box me? And did you think I was going to open myself to being boxed without dealing with it in return what I learned over all these years?⁵²⁸

⁵²⁶ Jonathan Moyo, "What is Mugabe's Mindset?" interview on Hot seat with Violet Gonda.

⁵²⁷ Tendi, "Robert Mugabe's 2013," *Op. Cit.*, 967.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid*, 968.

The above response was followed by yet another question in which the journalist inferred the President's view on the threats advanced by the military leaders not to salute anyone without liberation war credentials. He retorted, "If one or two said so, it is just those two. They are not the entire army. And they are certainly not the authority anyway."⁵²⁹ Was Mugabe not simply grandstanding? One of ZANU-PF's political elites who was on the campaigning team intimated to Tendi that, "we told (the generals) if they said anything (publicly) about the election this time, (they) will be the first ones we send to jail, because their political statements would be used by Mugabe's challengers as evidence of intimidation of voters and an unfair election contest."⁵³⁰ Notably this demonstrates that covertly the military elites would continue to behave as they deemed fit to ensure that ZANU-PF would remain in power but they were not to raise the ire of the regional and international community so that the elections would be legitimated by internal, regional and international observers.

It is a paradox, but Mugabe is still in control of the military elites. This is first and foremost seen in him as the appointing authority of important positions explaining why they dance according to his political tune but "it is undisputable that Mugabe and his generals run the show."⁵³¹ Mugabe's military lieutenants are probably the most centralised, disciplined and most efficient explaining why he permits them to attend ZANU-PF yearly conferences.

⁵²⁹Ibid.

⁵³⁰Ibid.

⁵³¹Moorcraft, "Mugabe's war," *Op. Cit.*, 196.

Military influence in the absence of democracy, can maintain or restore national cohesion.⁵³²Mnangagwa clearly showed this when he remarked that:

Our army is taught to support the policies of the existing government, which is a ZANU government. Now the policies of the government are the policies of ZANU. The central committee of ZANU is who decides policy and the army is taught to support and propound these policies. So those who are of ZANLA are carrying on the ideologies they were taught before because they are the same ideologies of the government.⁵³³

The Non-Disintegration of the Zimbabwe National Army and the ZANU-PF Government

As has been mentioned earlier on in the thesis Frazer aptly observed that it is very unlikely for a coup to occur in a country where a liberation war has been fought. In Zimbabwe the politicisation of the guerrillas during the liberation struggle made them more determined to see to it that the country was freed from colonial rule and sovereignty maintained at all costs. According to Ambassador Mutambara “Death was our constant companion; too constant to bring grief and mourning, but most certain to forge oneness of purpose.”⁵³⁴As noted in the discussion this is the ‘oneness’ that has been maintained by “Zanuists” culminating in them displaying a ‘party-state-nationalistic’ stance that has made the military a pivotal force on the Zimbabwean political space. The ZNA is a cohesive force and guarantor of national stability and independence. Undoubtedly their defence of the political status quo has been applauded by some while being denigrated by others

⁵³²Ibid.

⁵³³Tendi, “Mugabe’s 2013,” *Op. Cit.*, 968.

⁵³⁴Mutambara, *The Rebel in me*, *Op. Cit.*, 261.

simultaneously and yet it is a badge that some of them have decided to wear with pride. Pye believes that the army is an unambiguous symbol of national authority hence the wholeness of a military is depicted by its radical feelings on nationhood. To clearly explain how the ZNA and the Zimbabwean government have not fallen prey to the Zairean military disintegration during the later days of Mobutu Sese-Seko; it is logical to academically dispense and interrogate factors behind this.

The ZANU-PF politicians have espoused socialist interests and made it appear a Zimbabwean universalistic interest. In Zimbabwe as the scenario in some countries in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), the military can guarantee the maintenance of the political status quo far more than it can support the growth of democracy and democratic institutions⁵³⁵ and this is what is exactly happening in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF' refused to hand over power to the MDC-T in 2008 and as early as 2002 the ZANU-PF party had made its intentions known to presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo who were trying to broker a political deal by directly telling them that its "legitimacy was not derived primarily from an electoral process but from the huge sacrifices which accompanied our rise to statehood which made the sovereignty of Zimbabwe sacred and sacrosanct, a non-negotiable issue we are duty bound to uphold, and defend at all times as Zimbabweans."⁵³⁶ This shows that Edgar Tekere was correct when he aptly stated that "democracy was in the intensive care unit," thus, "Zimbabwe falls squarely within the definition of a minimalist pseudo-democracy were legal opposition parties exist as do other constitutional features of an electoral democracy

⁵³⁵Odetola, "Military Regimes," *Op. Cit.*, 94.

⁵³⁶Raftopoulos, "The Hard Road," *Op. Cit.*, 6-7.

but they fail to engender an appropriate environment for a fair contestation where a ruling party can be turned out of power.”⁵³⁷

Notably, the Zimbabwean military as the locus of political and economic developments has got two main goals to accomplish, that is maintaining national cohesion and integration, and to defend citizens rather than defining it. The syndrome that has infected the military elites is that of being a participant political player and referee in the Zimbabwean political space and has evoked patriotism amongst the political rank-and-file through evoking issues of nationalism and the Chimurenga ethos. Odetola argues that the military in Africa has built and has promoted the strength of the state in ways that favour it in the process generating national cohesion.⁵³⁸ It is therefore in this context that both the ZANU-PF politicians and the security sector have stood firm against both internal and external regime change onslaught.

Mugabe and his henchmen were not happy to have entered into a political ‘marriage of convenience with the two MDC formations that he saw as a victory of his erstwhile detractors, the British and the Americans who were supporting the MDC formations. Tendi suggests that “For Mugabe the deepest cut was the naked reality that powerful ZANU-PF members who had forged an alliance with him from the days of the liberation struggle-chief among them Solomon Mujuru and Vitalis Zvinavashe had undermined his March 2008 election campaign because of differences over his suitability as party leader amongst

⁵³⁷ Eldred V. Masunungure, “Introduction,” in *Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections*, ed. Eldred V. Masunungure (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 3.

⁵³⁸ Odetola, “Military Regimes,” 99.

other issues...as commanders and because of their military prominence, they had significant influence within ZANU-PF during and after military service.”⁵³⁹Even now Mugabe’s utterances show that he has not forgiven the late General Mujuru.

Another issue that has not permitted military disintegration is Mugabe’s power over JOC and the entire security sector. Such power is a result of a well-structured chains of command that arrogates service Chiefs and the military rank-and-file to the commander-in-chief of the ZDF who is the civilian president; and “the hierarchical relationships among ZANU-PF members and former ZANLA guerrillas, which have their roots in the liberation war years.”⁵⁴⁰ The service Chiefs report to Mugabe and deviation from this clear line of authority is not the norm in military organisational culture. This is the reason why despite the formation of the GNU Mugabe like Smith in the late 1970s, refused to give up control of his security apparatus. Ideally it is Mugabe’s prerogative as commander- in-chief and president to renew or terminate the work contracts of military elites. This gives him enormous power as military elites owe their positions and welfare to him thus Chitiyo and Rupiya are correct to suggest that the principles inculcated in the guerrilla soldiers constitute a major explanation for the general absence of military indiscipline in Zimbabwe.

In tandem with the above argument in an interview with Tendi, British Brigadier Adam Gurdon says the “ZANLA guerrillas were directly under Nhongo, Mugabe handled politics but there was unity between them.....Nhongo had an iron grip on the army but still

⁵³⁹Tendi, “Mugabe’s 2013,” *Op. Cit.*, 964.

⁵⁴⁰Tendi, “Ideology, Civilian,” *Op. Cit.*, 837.

maintained close links with Mugabe whom he supported.”⁵⁴¹ Such close affinities were also maintained hence Nhongo and Tungamirai the air force commander were the only ones who had one leg in the military and another in the party as they were members of ZANU-PF’s central committee while they were serving military generals.⁵⁴² This assisted Mugabe to maintain a firm grip on the ZDF. The military leaders have in-turn maintained an iron hand administration of the non-commissioned officers. The military rank-and-file have registered their displeasure through desertions and have gone into neighbouring countries since they are aware that if they are caught they will be subjected to severe punishment. One of my informants, Captain “Dos” reiterated that after 2008 those in the army who decide to resign before completing their maximum years of service will do so via Chikurubi maximum prison.⁵⁴³ The civil-military historical legacy has therefore resulted in paradoxical outcomes. Firstly, it explains the entrenched modalities of civilian control. Secondly, it also explains the incestuous and non-transparent nature of civil-security sector relations that represent resistance to the introduction and evolution of mature civil-military professional relations in independent Zimbabwe. The conflation of the state and party, the military elite and the ruling elite, has resulted in retired military personnel being given influential positions in government or key government parastatals.

Mugabe has astutely been able to maintain his grip on the relations between actors on the Zimbabwean political space. The second Chimurenga politicisation has had an everlasting mental imprint on the minds of the military elites and ordinary members of the ZNA who

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

⁵⁴² Ibid, 841

⁵⁴³ Captain “Dos” interview by Author, Rusape, and 8th August 2015.

participated in it. Politicisation was “the engine or soul without which the armed struggle would fail to take root.” It was through politicisation that Mugabe became a ‘political godly figure’ and through slogans and songs he was venerated, something that Chitepo the ZANU-PF late DARE chairman had disallowed. Chitepo had maintained that only dead heroes and heroines were supposed to be honoured as such. The glorification of Mugabe through songs and slogans and party regalia has given him a formidable political stature hence he has become a hero of the second and third Chimurenga that though “in the West, Mugabe may be a monster he remains a model to some in Africa.”⁵⁴⁴ Mugabe has tactfully and deliberately “allowed complete reign of the military in the critical areas of managing the security environment within the country in favour of his party,” he has shrewdly reinvigorated a liberation narrative that has already been discussed, “appealing to war veterans, the military and the intelligence to serve a ZANU-PF party line.”⁵⁴⁵ This was thus greeted with mixed feelings at home and abroad, with Mugabe’s critics openly saying the military must not be involved in politics.

Mugabe has also always employed some uncanny form of cruelty that all those around him are aware of. This has enabled him to remain at the top of the political game both in his party and the country. Sekai Holland, a former MDC legislator in an interview with author said “Mugabe is cruel and does not forgive and always makes sure that he punishes his foes. All is there for all to see, what did he do with Joshua Nkomo, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Morgan Tsvangirai and others, he has accused them of committing treason and yet none of them were ever convicted. I once asked him why he had taken Ndabaningi and

⁵⁴⁴ Moorcraft, “Mugabe’s war,” *Op. Cit.*, 189.

⁵⁴⁵ Rupiya, “Zimbabwe’s Military: Examining,” *Op. Cit.*, 8-9.

Vesta Sithole's farms that they purchased with their own money but he failed to give me an answer."⁵⁴⁶ Lord Carrington in an interview with Heidi Holland described Mugabe as 'reptilian', a man cut off from feelings, devoid of ordinary warmth and humanity. In another interview with the same author Jonathan Moyo also voiced similar sentiments when he remarked: "He is very ruthless and mean-spirited even towards his own people. He is not moved by the plight of the Zimbabweans, by people suffering or dying. He is immune to such calls on feelings; he does not respond to pity."⁵⁴⁷ The above views are in conformity with James Chikerema, Rugare Gumbo and Dzikamai Mavhaire's perception that Mugabe is secretive, stubborn and unyielding and vindictive. Given the hero-villain character of Mugabe, how did this shape his interactions with the military and politicians and the rank and file in his party that has so far maintained Zimbabwe's stability.

The party-state thrives on the politics of control and fear for this enables them to survive politically. In his bid to try and discourage jostling for positions Mugabe has always maintained that during the struggle they never campaigned for posts but were only contented with positions that they were given or voted into. It is in such a context that Mugabe was catapulted by party admirers (if not himself through assured rewards) to a stature where everything in the party is done according to his will. He has become 'spoilt' by the obsequiousness of those around him that he has now become some kind of political god.⁵⁴⁸ His colleagues in the party failed to nip his insatiable desire for power and dictatorial tendencies in the bud when they introduced him to Lenin's democratic centralism (Tekere

⁵⁴⁶ Sekai Masikana Holland (Former MDC Member of Parliament), Harare, 31st August, 2016.

⁵⁴⁷ Holland, "Dinner," *Op. Cit.*, 187.

⁵⁴⁸ Holland, "Dinner," *Op. Cit.*, 206.

blamed Rugare Gumbo for brainwashing Mugabe with Marxist and Leninist philosophies). Whenever a meeting or a discussion was being held, Muzenda is alleged to always have said, "...there is nothing to discuss the president has spoken." It is therefore not surprising that when he became executive president he gradually mutated into a dictator. Fr. Wermter submits that "Mugabe's god is power and he does not care about the people as long as he is politically secure. He very much likes grandstanding and does not listen to advice."⁵⁴⁹ Consequently, he identifies his supporters, rewards their loyalty, and parcels out favours to those who support him uncritically, giving to some while withholding from others.⁵⁵⁰ Jonathan Moyo in an interview with Holland reiterated that "everyone in ZANU-PF is in an intricate network of patronage, if you don't have a protector you do not survive for long in ZANU-PF. You either pander to the president or one or two of his deputies or you are out."⁵⁵¹

As such an analysis of Mugabe and military elites interactions brings out very interesting issues. Mugabe has always astutely played his political cards well seeing to it that his lieutenants are in control thus:

The Zimbabwean armed forces are deliberately indoctrinated with the values of ZANU-PF as a party. All the high-ranking members of the military forces are expected to be members of ZANU-PF. As it stands today, the military is led by those who passed through the nationalist liberation war and who are thoroughly indoctrinated with ZANU-PF nationalist ideology. National service militants are another group of

⁵⁴⁹ Fr. Wermter, interview by Author, imbisa Centre, Emerald Hill, Harare, 1st February 2016.

⁵⁵⁰ Holland, "Dinner," *Op. Cit.*, 50.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid*, 186.

indoctrinated people who are now being recruited into joining the army and the police.⁵⁵²

Mugabe has also allowed politicians and military elites to wilfully plunder state resources thus his loyalists appointed to influential military and political positions almost fall on each other in an endeavour to please him. It therefore does not come as a surprise that Tony Gara a Mugabe cohort at one point referred to him as the “second Jesus.” He has thus allowed massive looting of state parastatals and has protected the perpetrators just like he did to Fredrick Shava, Dzingai Mutumbuka and others. Mugabe’s party-state is also notorious for the importation of luxurious cars that they give to military leaders and politicians. The party-state thus fits very well George Ayittey’s vampire state with a “government hijacked by a phalanx of bandits, gangsters, crooks and scoundrels who use machinery of the state to enrich themselves, their cronies, their supporters and exclude everyone else. It is an apartheid-like system based on the politics of exclusion.”⁵⁵³

Apart from material rewards Mugabe has kept close to him those who belong to the Zezuru ethnic group. Mugabe has thus always indirectly played the tribal card to maintain hegemony. This is evident in that he has always used tribal patronage as a mechanism to keep the Zezurus on influential posts and kept them close to him. The table 7.1 shows such Zezuru dominance.

⁵⁵²Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “A Perspective,” *Op. Cit.*, 43.

⁵⁵³ For more information on this see George B.N. Ayittey’s book *Defeating Dictators*.

Table 7:1 Political and Military Elite Zezuru Dominance

Robert Gabriel Mugabe	President and Commander-in-Chief	Zezuru
Emmerson Mnangagwa	Minister of Defence <i>now Vice President [Sydney Sekeramayi; a Zezuru is now the Minister of Defence: In the past he has rotationally held this post with Mnangagwa after the death of Movera Mahachi who was a Manyika.]</i>	Karanga
General Constantine Chiwenga	Commander of Defence Forces	Zezuru
Lieutenant-General Philip Valerio Sibanda	Commander Land Forces	Karanga
Air Marshal Perence Shiri	Commander of Air Force	Zezuru
Didymus Mutasa	Minister of State Security <i>now deposed and has been replaced by Kembo Mohadi a Kalang'a/Ndebele</i>	Manyika
Augustine Chihuri	Commissioner of Police	Zezuru
Paradzai Zimondi	Head of Prison Services	Zezuru

Source: Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “A perspective on ethnic, regional and ideological dimensions of the composition of the Zimbabwean military and their implications,” in *Zimbabwe’s Military: Examining its Veto Power in the Transition to Democracy, 2008-2013*, ed. Martin R. Rupiye (Pretoria: The African Public Policy and Research Institute (APPRI), 2013), 4.

It cannot be denied that Tongogara’s death culminated in a decline of the military personnel’s power and influence over Mugabe. As already noted in the thesis Nhongo was a charismatic and ruthless military leader who was suspicious of politicians and consciously always tried to outwit them. After his demise the Nhongo-Mugabe alliance saw military leaders taking a subservient role to Mugabe. Nkala, Shamuyarira and

Nhongo's security sector associates described Mujuru's alliance with Mugabe as that of a 'kingmaker,'⁵⁵⁴ evidenced by how he assisted Mugabe to become the leader of ZANU. When General Mujuru retired and became a member of the central committee he became critical of Mugabe who resisted relinquishing power as "independence of opinion was the hallmark of his life."⁵⁵⁵ Why did Nhongo support Mugabe? Arguably Nhongo was being very pragmatic given that every man is a political animal and that we do not have permanent friends or enemies but permanent interests. Arguably General Mujuru continued to have enormous influence explaining the rise of his wife and military commanders being given senior party and government positions.⁵⁵⁶ General Mujuru later became a victim of the struggle-within-the-ZANU-PF-struggles.

Another influential military leader had been air force commander Josiah Tungamirai who died in 2005. Tungamirai's wife maintains that her husband died of food poisoning.⁵⁵⁷ Many other senior politicians and senior military officers have died through mysterious car accidents. Mugabe has used purges, intimidation and torture of those in the military to maintain cohesion. One of my clergy informants revealed that a certain army general told him in confidence that there is no way those in the military can revolt against Mugabe. The traumatised informant who resigned upon coming back mentioned that during the DRC war many soldiers in command positions and some rank and file soldiers were purged. Those who 'were not fortunate' to die in combat were handcuffed, put in a

⁵⁵⁴Tendi, "Ideology, Civilian," *Op. Cit.*, 839.

⁵⁵⁵Mutambara, "The Rebel," *Op. Cit.*, 265.

⁵⁵⁶ For more information on this read story by Fortune Tazvida, "Chiwenga ordered Mujuru Assassination." <http://nehandaradio.com/2012/01/13/chiwenga-ordered-mujuru-assassination/>

⁵⁵⁷ For more information see, "Mystery Zim Car-crash deaths haunt Zanu-PF, mg.co.za/article/2013-06-27-mystery-Zim-car-crash-deaths.

helicopter and forcefully thrown into flooded rivers.⁵⁵⁸ Such cruel acts purportedly sanctioned by Mugabe as commander-in-chief served as a deterrence mechanism to all those who might have contemplated rebelling against the system.

Zvinavashe has been regarded by many as a Mugabe loyalist. However his interaction with Mugabe has been misunderstood and misinterpreted in different ways by scholars; academics and those in the military echelons because of his afore mentioned 2002 proclamations. Tendi maintains that ‘security pressures’ wittingly and unwittingly pushed the military into the arms of ZANU-PF political elites. He has it on record that Zvinavashe had actually planned with others (Colonel Lionel Dyke and Mnangagwa) to offer Tsvangirai the position of vice-president after the disputed March 2002 presidential poll. According to Colonel Lionel Dyke:

I said to Zvinavashe that the solution was to give Mugabe a chance to retire properly. ‘What if I get permission from the international community for Zimbabwe’s constitution to be changed to allow Mugabe to handpick a successor?’ Zvinavashe said if I can do it, I should do it. So I went around speaking to the (British) Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the American Assistant Secretary for Africa (Walter) Kansteiner. It was interesting, talking to the Brits and Americans that they were quite happy for ZANU-PF to continue in power as long as Mugabe was not there. I kept relaying my dealings with the Brits and Americans to Zvinavashe. Rex (Nhongo) knew what we were up to. He was thrilled with the plan for Mugabe to leave office but cold on Mnangagwa. Rex and Mnagagwa were not cosy.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁸ Anonymous (Reverend X), interview by Author, Harare, 10th February, 2016.

⁵⁵⁹ Tendi, “Ideology, Civilian,” *Op. Cit.*, 834.

The Zvinavashe et.al plan was ‘derailed’ by Tsvangirai’s lack of political vision. Tsvangirai imprudently made a press statement divulging that Dyke and others were planning (to make him vice-president) protecting Mugabe and labelled it “a dirty plan.” Dyke commented that after such a press statement Mnangagwa denied being involved whilst, “Zvinavashe fucking disappeared into the woodwork.”⁵⁶⁰ Tsvangirai did not realise that what he had said endangered the lives of Zvinavashe, Mnangagwa and Nhongo as this could be interpreted as insubordination. Mugabe was later to describe the “Zvinavashe-Dyke plans” as “foolhardy and counter-revolutionary.” One of my key informants with connections in the military said that “when the British said they had their own man in Harare (whom they were working with to facilitate Mugabe’s exit) many people thought it was Rex and yet it was the ZDF commander Chiwenga.”⁵⁶¹ However, Zvinavashe continued to display his displeasure with the ruling ZANU-PF political elite by attacking them for failing to acknowledge the crisis that was precipitated by the FTLR programme, he was quoted in the Standard newspaper saying:

What independence is that when people are hungry 25 years on? It is the system. We say we are now independent with no food. Go back to historical structures. Open the archives and see how they [white commercial farmers] used to do it. They [Zanu-PF government] are saying we are going to have a good [agricultural] harvest, but there is no diesel. Should there be an agricultural bible of Ten Commandments on what we must do?⁵⁶²

⁵⁶⁰Ibid.

⁵⁶¹Dr “M,” Interview by Author, Harare, interview by Author, 18 April 2016.

⁵⁶²Standard Newspaper, 7 January 2005 cited in Miles-Tendi, Ibid, 835.

The above statement shows that Zvinavashe like General Mujuru was not afraid of criticising not only ZANU-PF policies but Mugabe's continued reign. This is shown by his pronouncement after the MDC-T victory in the parliamentary and 'presidential' 2008 March elections. Zvinavashe said:

There is no need to fight over the results. We must accept the reality that we lost these elections to the MDC. What is important is to live together in peace, both losers and winners. We do not want violence in this area. We are relatives. Most of us lost these elections not because we are unpopular in our constituencies. We lost these harmonised elections because of one man. People rejected us because we were campaigning for Mugabe....we became collateral damage. The real problem is that man not us.⁵⁶³

It is clear from the above that some military elite's allegiance to the civilian politicians changed whilst others continue to overlook the weaknesses of the party-state as depicted by those who organised the June 2008 election re-run and the 2013 elections. Arguably though Zvinavashe criticised Mugabe it did not mean that he was no longer loyal to the party because it was the one that had made him what he had become. Zvinavashe as afore mentioned had benefited from the ZNA's involvement in the DRC. Apart from that he was a beneficiary of the land reform programme, taking land without giving compensation and also continued to occupy important positions in government and party. He was also very much concerned about protecting his interests and property.

⁵⁶³ Standard Newspaper, 28 April, 2008.

Paradoxically, following the death of Tungamirai, Zvinavashe and Mujuru and the expulsion of Gumbo, Joice Mujuru, Mutasa and others; Mugabe is now the most powerful figure in ZANU-PF. The current crop of military elites does not have the stamina to challenge any decision Mugabe makes as each one of them is concerned about his own safety. Coupled to that is the fact that these military elites no longer have positions in the party explaining why they are not very influential. Neither are they in the politburo nor in the central committee⁵⁶⁴ explaining why they are merely ‘toothless bulldogs’ surviving on Mugabe’s mercy. Below I interrogate other strategies that have been used by Mugabe to secure military and political party rank-and-file support.

Civil-military relations are also embedded in pay-offs that can be referred to as prebendalism. Prebendalism is patron-client elite relations employed by a leader who through a system of patronage rewards his acolytes by elevating them to influential state positions, which the appointees use for self-enrichment. This was achieved through appointment of serving and retired military ‘personnel’ to state posts. Zanuists benefit from prebends and have thus worked as an incentive for the military and political party rank-and-file to cushion ZANU-PF to remain in power since they will continually get significant personal privileges and recompense synonymous to the Idi Amin or Mobuto fashion. These two dictators allowed a network of corrupt activities to occur allowing their inner-circle of friends to clandestinely accumulate wealth and when they contradicted their dictates they threw them into prison or assassinated them. In a similar fashion Mugabe has baited some politicians and security sector elites strategically positioning and not renewing their

⁵⁶⁴Tendi, “Ideology, Civilian,” *Op. Cit.*, 841.

contracts when he feels they are a threat.⁵⁶⁵ Those who are no longer favoured live in constant fear of being constantly harassed and having their properties taken.

Politicisation and the indigenisation programme “have become nothing more than the instruments of the post-colonial bourgeoisie for political domination and economic accumulation,”⁵⁶⁶ explaining why military elites like General Mujuru, Shiri, Chiwenga and politicians like Chombo, Mpofu, Mugabe, Kasukuwere and Chiyangwa among others have become filthy rich. Tekere criticised such corrupt tendencies and was sacked from government for saying the ZANU-PF leadership code was just like lipstick being applied on a frog.⁵⁶⁷ Alexander Kanengoni also bemoaned how many had become rich overnight. This scenario is hand in glove with Southall’s observation that the national bourgeoisie “engage in scandalous enrichment” kleptocratic tendencies that have crippled the Zimbabwean economy.⁵⁶⁸ Empowerment policies are government policies that have been instituted to benefit the political and military elite’s as well senior public service workers and those who are well-connected politically as reward for their support. Information from government documents and audit reports show that:

Mugabe and his wife ‘own more than’ 14 farms (extending to 16, 000 hectares): his deputy, Joyce Mujuru, together with her late husband, former army General Solomon Mujuru and their relatives, own at least 25 farms; and Constantine Chiwenga, the defence Forces Commander, had two farms near Harare, including 1, 200 hectare

⁵⁶⁵ Moore, “a Century,” *Op. Cit.*, 132-133.

⁵⁶⁶ Southall, “Liberation Movements,” *Op. Cit.*, 12-13.

⁵⁶⁷ Author’s own interactions with Cde Edgar Tekere in 1990 as a ZUM polling agent

⁵⁶⁸ Southall, *Op. Cit.*, 9-10; Emphasis mine

Chakona Estates, which his 'former wife Jocelyne' allegedly seized from its former owners at gunpoint.

Overall, 90 percent of the nearly 200 army officers from the rank of Major to Lieutenant-General 'own' farms, this pattern replicate throughout the air force, police, and prisons service, and the CIO, so that there are in total some 400 officers from the security forces who are alleged to have received farms above 250 hectares, while many lower ranking officers and war veterans 'have' smaller holdings. Similarly, all ZANU-PF cabinet ministers, 56 politburo members, 98 Members of Parliament, 35 elected and unelected Senators 'have' been allocated former white farms, with many owning more than one; all 10 provincial governors 'have' seized farms, with 4 being multiple owners; and 65 percent of the more than 200 mostly partisan traditional chiefs also benefited from the land reforms....¹⁶ Supreme Court and High Court Judges, including Chief Justice Chidyausiku, 'own' large farms ranging between 540 to 1,380 hectares; and 40 serving and former ambassadors, and over two-thirds of parastatals bosses also 'own' large tracts of land.⁵⁶⁹

It is also alleged that General Mujuru was involved in diamond mining in Chiyadzwa and had an area where he alone mined. Margaret Dongo in an interview with the daily news intimated that Mugabe failed to control General Mujuru because he feared him. The military elites and rank-and-file have also been involved in the plunder of diamonds in Marange. According to Global Witness, army presence at Marange was to fulfil two major aims, that is: "to ensure control of the diamond deposits for the ZANU-PF elite and to

⁵⁶⁹Southall, "Liberation Movements" *Op. Cit.*, 255-56.

reward the army for its loyalty to this clique.”⁵⁷⁰ The Marange diamonds thus reinforced and strengthened the alliance between the military elites and politicians as the ‘discovery’ of the diamonds at Marange coincided with the unbearable economic meltdown, a time when the military would have gone aground because of lack of resources. Money to keep the military afloat was thus obtained from unlawful diamond sales and military participation in diamond mining.⁵⁷¹

Mahoso in an interview with author saw nothing unusual with military involvement at Chiadzwa. He contends that it was a crisis situation that required emergence measures. The military intervened to tell the whole world that Zimbabwe would sell its diamond despite the sabotage from our detractors, the country had to be kept going by whatever means.⁵⁷² He went further to argue that the Human rights organisations tried to paint black the ZNA by demonizing its involvement in Chiadzwa, because they wanted to destroy the good relationship between the army and the politicians as well as the general populace. This is why the military became very suspicious of NGOs and the MDC formations, the reason why they did not allow them to penetrate the rural areas in 2008. The NGOs and the MDCs wanted to destroy an organic relationship but they have not succeeded. When Tsvangirai spoke about the so called “blood diamonds,” he did not represent the masses but just an elite clique interested in power.⁵⁷³

⁵⁷⁰ Global Witness, “Return of the Blood Diamonds: The deadly race to control Zimbabwe’s new-found wealth,” 6.

⁵⁷¹ I. Mandaza, “The Zanu-PF Congress: The Triumph of the Securocratic State,” (13/12/2014 retrieved from the New Zimbabwe, 11/11/ 2015)

⁵⁷² Tafataona Mahoso, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Media House, Rainbow Towers, 9th November 2015.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

Whatever reasons there were for military involvement in Marange it does not dispel the fact that they like their ruling elite counterparts were beneficiaries of both diamond mining at Chiadzwa, the reason why the ZANU-PF leadership of the party-state has not been keen on publicising the late minister of mines Chindori Chininga's findings on the Chiadzwa diamond mining and revenue. Diamonds were a new source of wealth for the ZANU-PF politicians, the military elites and some of the military rank-and-file who were fortunate enough to be deployed to guard the diamond fields. Legislators in the MDC and those in the Ministry of finance including the Prime Minister Tsvangirai complained that there was a lot of secrecy and lack of transparency pertaining to the remittance of the proceeds of diamond sales to Treasury. Tsvangirai averred that:

While the Minister of Finance expected \$600 million from the proceeds of diamond exports in 2012, the State only received about \$41 million. This is against reported sales of diamonds running into billions of dollars every year.⁵⁷⁴

In defence to what he had said Tsvangirai pointed out that in its June 2013 report, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy stated:

From the time that the country was allowed to trade its diamonds on the world market, government has not realised any meaningful contributions from the sector. This is despite the fact that production levels and the revenue generated from exports has been on the increase. There are serious discrepancies between what government receives from the sector and what diamond mining companies claim to have

⁵⁷⁴ Tsvangirai, *Op. Cit.*

remitted.....Powerful officials, politicians and police and army commanders repeatedly tried to thwart the probe into diamond dealings.... several officials lied [‘to the Committee’] while giving evidence under subpoena, diamond earnings are being shielded from scrutiny....⁵⁷⁵

In his speech Tsvangirai said that what was perplexing was that the securocrats are not involved in any other business ventures in Zimbabwe except the diamond mining venture. This is why there is a symbiotic relationship between the politicians and the military elite culminating in the service-chiefs having greater incentive to ensure that ZANU-PF retains power at all costs.⁵⁷⁶It cannot be disputed that the securocrats support for ZANU-PF was incentivised by the Marange diamonds. This is the reason why members of the ZNA were deployed to various constituencies to ‘mobilise’ if not force the people to vote for ZANU-PF in the presidential electoral rerun in 2008 and also before the 2013 elections. The ZANU-PF ministers have remained tight-lipped and mute to diamond skirmishes that involve members of the security sector.

Tsvangirai, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee (PPC) and Mugabe have all at some time confirmed that diamond mining in Zimbabwe “is riddled with corruption.”⁵⁷⁷ According to the Global Witness, despite the government assurances that there were now companies that had been issued permits to undertake diamond mining in Marange, these companies operate in only about “3% of the diamond fields with the remaining 97% under

⁵⁷⁵Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷Ibid.

the control of the army.”⁵⁷⁸ Global Witness also went further to note that the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) CEO Dominic Mubayiwa, while giving evidence to the PPC articulated that board members who were representatives of the ZMDC were appointees of the then Minister of Mines, Obert Mpofu, people like former Air Force Vice-Marshal Robert Mhlanga and other individuals who are relatives or loyal to Minister Mpofu.⁵⁷⁹ When the PPC was not permitted to visit the Marange diamond fields by Mpofu, Moses Mare, a member of the PPC voiced his displeasure saying, “there is something they are trying to hide..... They are trying to make this a mafia industry.”⁵⁸⁰ It therefore cannot be denied that there was wide-spread diamond smuggling by politicians, the military elites, the military rank-and-file and some well-connected members of the Zimbabwean population. It thus did not come as a surprise that Mugabe in 2016 said that (US) fifteen billion dollars have not been accounted for.

Mugabe has allowed and opened the state’s door to the military and the politically connected giving them their turn to eat, and defend their entitlements from an opposition party takeover. As already pointed out Mugabe allowed the military elites to get multiple farms and as if this was not enough, his government adopted a policy that forces foreign companies, especially mining, to give 51% control to indigenous blacks. Beneficiaries of such an economic policy have mainly been politicians and military elites thus reinforcing patron-client relations. Mahmood Mamdani has argued that though authoritarian traits are noticeable in Mugabe’s rulership, he has used both coercion and consent in his

⁵⁷⁸ Global Witness, *Op. Cit.*, 7-8.

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 15.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 17.

rulership.⁵⁸¹ Arguably he downplayed the above discussed patron-client relations between the politicians, the military, the political party rank-and-file and the degree of violence that was unleashed on the masses to support the party-state hence the majority of Zimbabweans are bitter citizens rather than better citizens.

Wittingly or unwittingly the security sector like a sponge was sucked into the inner core of party-state despotism. This is the reason why in Africa, the military rather than the ballot has been the main instrument of change of government. The security sector because of their elite class interests have thus (as rightly observed by Makumbe) played into Mugabe's grand strategy since he has always preferred to run the country as though it were still at war and this is why;

The party-state 'is' a 'party machine', a vehicle for the upward mobility of party elites and for material accumulation justified ideologically by reference to the historical rightness of transformation.....the primacy of the party-state 'implies' that the 'patriotic bourgeoisie' become wedded to 'political connectivity.'⁵⁸²(Emphasis mine)

Notably corruption has remained a cancer that has corroded the Zimbabwean social, political and economic fabric. As aptly submitted by Chabal and Daloz; corruption is an outgrowth of a number of interconnected phenomena feeding logically of each other and in which search for political status nourishes a scheme by which power and authority are constantly negotiated and purchased.⁵⁸³ Thus "all political actors, from the political elites

⁵⁸¹ Mahmood, "Lessons," *Op. Cit.*, 17-21.

⁵⁸² Southall, "Liberation Movements," *Op. Cit.*, 247.

⁵⁸³ Chabal and Daloz, "Africa works," *Op. Cit.*, 104.

to the ordinary men and women, share a common notion of the undifferentiated nature of the political which they all seek to employ profitably.”⁵⁸⁴ Huntington connotes that corruption is behaviour of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve selfish individual ends. In Zimbabwe corruption is a vehicle that is used to cement patron-client relations. Like machine politics; patron-client corruption has given room for parcelling out material rewards to those involved in such interactions. Corruption has become functional for the purpose of maintaining an existing political system and this is why the party-state has allowed “primitive accumulation’ by a kleptocratic bourgeoisie engaged in parasitic and mercantile activities which became evident by the mid-2000sand has totally bankrupted the state.”⁵⁸⁵

What is worrying is that Mugabe has deliberately allowed corruption to take root and to let those loyal to him not to be punished. Apparently corruption has been allowed to thrive as a way of reducing political pressure.⁵⁸⁶ Arguably kleptocratic tendencies and economic misgovernance have increased pressure on the party-state. This plausibly explains why the ZANU-PF executive allow the military elites, some politicians and some well-connected political party rank-and-file to loot; thus many “ZANU-PF Members of Parliament, Central Committee members, and high ranking civil servants....appear on lists of board members of private companies, some just ‘eating’, some using their positions for the more vigorous pursuit of wealth.”⁵⁸⁷ The above scenario is worrying especially when the workers and the Zimbabwean masses are being used and taken for granted. The politicians and those who

⁵⁸⁴Ibid, 149.

⁵⁸⁵Southall, “Liberation Movements,” *Op. Cit.*, 248.

⁵⁸⁶ Huntington, “Political Order,” *Op. Cit.*, 59-64.

⁵⁸⁷Southall, “Liberation Movements” *Op. Cit.*, 251.

participated in the war of liberation have ransacked the country that Mr “K” in an interview with author said, “ If Zimbabwe was a country then the owner would be surprised that instead of producing milk, it is now producing blood and about to die.”⁵⁸⁸ In saying this he meant that the Zimbabwean wealth has been looted, the state coffers are running dry and Zimbabwe is hanging on a cliff edge.

It is therefore not surprising that many government parastatals being led by retired ZANU-PF appointees became dysfunctional, examples of such companies are the Grain Marketing Board, National Railways of Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority. (Table 5.1 in Chapter 5.2) This resonates with Huntington’s observation that “a pattern of top heavy corruption is maintained through upward mobility through the political machine.”⁵⁸⁹ This is in conformity with Tekere’s observation that “Mugabe ‘is’ in fact the leader surrounded by plunderers, he ‘is’ the chef (Portuguese word for chief) of the thieves, the principal thief surrounded by thieves?”⁵⁹⁰ Expropriation and nationalisation policies have been crafted and allowed by Mugabe as a means for political survival. Those close to the ‘dear leader’ have therefore been allowed to share in the spoils politics so that they remain loyal, the reason why Mugabe’s relationship with military officers is entrapped in instrumental pay-offs, the ruling party has succeeded in ‘buying’ the loyalty of the military through selective material payments and privileges.

⁵⁸⁸ Mr “K” (Military officer), Interview by Author, Harare, 20th June 2015.

⁵⁸⁹ Huntington, “Political Order,” *Op. Cit.*, 67-68.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 53.

Mugabe, his henchmen and his relatives own several luxurious houses in the capital city and eat sumptuous meals while the ordinary people are impoverished. Through the economic indigenisation programme the political and military elites have shares in key industrial and commercial enterprises, farms and ranches in the country.⁵⁹¹ Harold Laswell was correct when he advanced that politics is about who gets what, when and how. Mugabe is interested in power, keeping power and nothing matters to him except staying in power. As already noted, military elites have also been co-opted into government and party structures explaining why some become legislators, governors and party-political functionaries while some political party rank-and-file are considered the ears and eyes of the party-state.⁵⁹² Mugabe has used the military to launch his 'great escape' and guarantee his political survival.

The militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military has had an everlasting influence on the military to perceive themselves as the guarantors of Zimbabwe's independence and territorial integrity. Some analysts argue that ZANU-PF and Mugabe's heavy reliance on the military means that this is the only institution the executive can trust.⁵⁹³ It is evident that too much is at stake for either Mugabe or Joint Operation Command to wilfully surrender power be it in an election or voluntarily considering their ill-gotten wealth and issues of personal security. Mugabe, some politicians in his party and the military elites are thus prepared to terrorise all those who support the opposition and even those in ZANU-PF whom they see as threats to their hold on power like what they

⁵⁹¹Ibid, 91.

⁵⁹²Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nationalist-military," *Op. Cit.*, 75-76.

⁵⁹³For more information on this see Chitiyo and Rupiya, "Evolutions and Revolutions." 2005.

did in the 2008 election re-run and the expulsion from the party of the 'Tsholotsho gang' in 2004 and later on Joice Mujuru and her supporters, thus Zimbabweans are victims of civil and military elites' interests.

The militarisation of the Zimbabwean political space depicts that the military elites and the politicians share the same views with the political leadership. The Chimurenga ethos and pan-Africanist ideologies have had a tremendous bearing on civil-military interactions in Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni noted that the military and the politicians are nationalist in ideological orientation. The military are 'nationalists in uniform' "whose loyalty to the ZANU-PF party is beyond question."⁵⁹⁴ According to Tendi, military elites like Major General Nyikayaramba represent a section of the Zimbabwean military personnel "with profound ideological commitment to ZANU-PF and Mugabe's continued rule."⁵⁹⁵ Tendi argues that such liberation war stalwarts do not require incentives by way of prebends; they are ZANU-PF to the bone, all weather supporters of the party-state. Though what Tendi says may have a degree of truth in it, instrumental pay-offs are part of the game. General Nyikayaramba and others have been rewarded for their unwavering support of the party. As noted in the thesis Nyikayaramba was promoted for his tough stance against the MDC-T and its supporters. He and others like him are beneficiaries of the land redistribution exercise. To downplay the instrumental pay-offs that they are beneficiaries of ZANU-PF patronage politics they have coated their interests in pan-African revolutionary ideologies. It is in this context that General Chiwenga has always reminded the military to be patriotic. During a commemoration of Tongogara, Chiwenga said:

⁵⁹⁴Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Nationalist-military," *Op. Cit.*, 74.

⁵⁹⁵Tendi, "Ideology, Civilians," *Op. Cit.*, 842.

I want to say he was a true hero of the Zimbabwean revolution...A man who stood by his principle.... For those of us who got training from him, we salute him. What we can do is exactly what he taught us.... We should never tire or sell out the revolution. Never under any circumstance; it does not matter what you can be promised.⁵⁹⁶

Members of the military rank-and-file have thus been politicised and are very much involved in partisan politics and this is because patriotic history has been embraced by both politicians and military leaders as a rallying point for support from the masses and the military. The “core of patriotic history is the hagiography of ZANU-PF, ZANLA and Mugabe, the hero and revolutionary, the pan-Africanist”⁵⁹⁷Patriotic history has nationalist connotations that exude authoritarianism and commandist practice thus:

Perhaps there was something inherent in nationalism itself, even, before the wars and the adoption of socialism, which gave rise to authoritarianism. Maybe nationalism’s emphasis on unity at all costs-its subordination of trade unions and churches and all other African organisations to its imperatives-gave rise to an intolerance of pluralism. Maybe nationalism’s glorification of the leader gave rise to a post-colonial cult of personality. Maybe nationalism’s commitment to modernisation, whether socialist or not, inevitably implied a commandist state.⁵⁹⁸

It was this nationalist thrust carried to the extreme that has come to define ZANU-PF’s conduct. Anyone who does not share the so called ‘national vision’ is thus regarded as

⁵⁹⁶ The Zimbabwe Sunday Mail, “General Tongogara foresaw his own death,” 1 February 2015.

⁵⁹⁷Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-Military,” *Op. Cit.*, 42.

⁵⁹⁸*Ibid.*

‘lost’ and an enemy. It is apparent that the military elites uphold the dictates of the Zimbabwean constitution to defend the country’s territorial integrity but at the same time are very loyal to the party and President; “Mugabeism is manifest in the thinking of the top leaders of the military,”⁵⁹⁹ some of the military rank-and-file and the political party rank-and-file. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni:

The Zimbabwean military is heterogeneous rather than homogenous. It is constituted by what one could call “the old guard” and a “born-free” generation of soldiers. The “born-free” generation is complicated by the cohort coming from Border Gezi’s National Youth Service training programme, in which “the old guard” made a concerted effort to reproduce itself through highly partisan and ideologically indoctrinated soldiers loyal to ZANU-PF.⁶⁰⁰

Through state capture Mugabe has become the ‘Alpha and Omega’ of Zimbabwean politics. Though he argues that no one is bigger than the party everything revolves around him as he has created a one centre of power.

It is beyond dispute that recruitment within the security sector is embedded in loyalism. Militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military have thus been used as uninhibited vehicles to showcase party-state power so that majority support is guaranteed as violence is unleashed on purported enemies; party loyalty is paramount hence violence,

⁵⁹⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰⁰Ibid, 45.

authoritarianism and militarism became acceptable. Ndlovu-Gatsheni succinctly put it across that:

It was during the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe that the party leader and the party itself were glorified in such slogans as Pamberi NeZanu (Forward with ZANU-PF), Forward with Robert Gabriel Mugabe The glorified and worshipped nationalist leadership developed tough talk and sophisticated propaganda and political rhetoric. It also developed arrogance and self-confidence. The African patriarchal ideologies were combined with nationalist authoritarianism to produce a father figure in the nationalist leader.⁶⁰¹

Leadership cultism has thus continued to haunt Zimbabweans up to this day. It cannot be disputed that ideologically the politicians, the military and the political party rank-and-file continue to drink from the same historical cup of (Pan) African nationalism, ‘coated in one leader lordship’ with trappings in the Chimurenga laced with its lionisation of the leader and ‘religious zealotry’ to the party.⁶⁰² I concur with Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Rupiya and others that the party and the party leader are still the mobilising points and foci of all loyalty hence “personal loyalty to Mugabe has always been more important than tribal solidarity.”⁶⁰³ One of my informants noted that:

Leadership cultism has become well engrained in Zanu-PF. There exists a complex network of people who operate in a mafia like style. It is much organised than you can

⁶⁰¹ Gatsheni-Ndlovu, “Nationalist-Military Alliance,” Op. Cit, 42-43. Also see Ambassador A. Mutambara, *The Rebel in me*.

⁶⁰² Ibid, 43.

⁶⁰³ Daniel Compagnon, *A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) 17-22.

imagine and can go to any length to maintain the prevailing status quo in which they are beneficiaries.⁶⁰⁴

The political and military elites thus tenaciously hold the view that Mugabe must stay in power until he dies. This is the rational kernel in the minds of the military elites, military rank-and-file and opportunist politicians and the political party rank-and-file. Mugabe enjoys being deified hence criticising the first family is not tolerated. Moyo in an interview with Holland commented that “Mugabe is an old man, definitely not a wise old man.” Mugabe like his fellow African leaders are too security conscious, he is very secluded and relies too much on what he is told by his ‘trusted’ lieutenants and ‘SS spies’ explaining why he is out of touch with the hardships being experienced by many Zimbabweans. As has already been pointed out, Mugabe’s intolerance of criticism is evident in the demotion and later expulsion of Tekere, Dzikamai Mavhaire, and many others from the party. Mugabe has thus surrounded himself with bootlickers.

It must also be pointed that some top military personnel’s relations with Mugabe is entrapped in their fear of the non-agenarian. Be that as it may, intimidation-especially when it is employed subtly is less readily discernible to those who are outside the military institution. Such intimidation has been corroborated by Retired Brigadier Ambassador Mutambara’s outbursts when he defected to Joice Mujuru’s Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) party that “conscience forbids me from remaining in ZANU-PF given its track record of intimidation and violence.” However, this is not to discount the fact that Mugabe still

⁶⁰⁴ Anonymous (junior military officer), interview by Author, Harare, Thursday 29 October, 2015.

commands a substantial following, but the aforementioned events may have helped to enhance the perception of his popularity.⁶⁰⁵ Having won the election in 2014 ‘Mugabe’ started a ZANU-PF campaign ‘to clean up’ the party resulting in the relegation of Joice Mujuru and her supporters to the political dustbin.

Apart from loyalism being a result of fear Mandaza submits that a succinct analysis of guerrilla loyalism depicts fewer adherences by the cadres to the Marxist philosophy than adherence to the Zimbabwean traditional and supernatural beliefs. Ambuya Nehanda, Sekuru Kaguvi and Chaminuka spirit mediums were a rallying point and very inspirational “towards bravery and relentless determination in the minds and hearts of the freedom fighters. Notably such use of traditional religion has arguably been used as a subtle form of politicisation. Even up to this day some of the cadres who participated in the war of liberation see it as betrayal for them not to support the party-state. Kanengoni in an interview with author also pointed out the traditional religious aspect has also assisted in cementing military elites loyalism to Mugabe and explains why presently, the youths who in future maybe recruited in the security sector are taken for occasional visits to Chimoio and other shrines to relive the atrocities experienced by fallen heroes and heroines, a history that is always retold at independence and heroes day celebrations. The Herald newspaper has also carried stories of fresh blood being seen on the mass graves at Chimoio each time an election is looming. This has been interpreted to mean that living patriots of Zimbabwe must never sell-out or renege on the ideals of the liberation struggle. The military elites and the politicians have occasionally visited these shrines when these disturbances are

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

witnessed by the shrine attendants. Below I summarize all that has been discussed in this chapter.

It has emerged from the discussion that the politicians have unabatedly continued to use the securocrats for regime survival. The chimurenga ethos also explains the interactions between politicians and the military. The shared liberation war experiences of the military leaders, some military rank-and-file and politicians determined those who became members of the security structures and to this day influence how they interact. The politicians have partnered with the military leaders for political survival hence loyalism is rewarded through promotions and appointments in the party and in government as well as through material rewards. The military leaders have weighed the benefits of supporting the Mugabe and ZANU-PF and have seen them beneficial. By committing themselves to supporting ZANU-PF and Mugabe the military elites are guaranteed that their ill-gotten wealth is safe and they cannot be arrested for any crimes that they may have committed as long as Mugabe is still there. Material pay-offs are central in explaining the interactions amongst actors involved in the nested game. Mugabe has also used a system of surveillance to keep both the military elites and the soldier rank-and-file in check. The military in Zimbabwe remain a very central constituency as far as Zimbabwean politics is concerned and will definitely have a say or influence who will be the next ZANU-PF party leader.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

As pointed out in the introduction of the thesis, I consider militarisation and politicisation as a reciprocal phenomenon; reinforcing each other especially in a political environment where all actors are very much interested in political survival and economic well-being. This is in tandem with Chitiyo's observation that "the 'involvement' of serving or former security service personnel 'in politics' has resulted in them being sandwiched between institutional cultures of politicisation and militarisation to the detriment of professional values."⁶⁰⁶ Militarisation and politicisation thus have determined the interactions of all actors in the nested game. Notably politicisation and militarisation are very important strategies for power retention, survival and welfare of the politicians and the military. This has thus motivated the military to dabble in politics supporting the existing political status quo that has resulted in the Zimbabwe National Army going against the stipulations of the Zimbabwean constitution and the Defence Act.

For the purpose of a nuanced conclusion it is important to give a summary of the antithesis of a professional military in Zimbabwe. These features have been existent and continue to be seen in Zimbabwe's politico-economic environment. Political opposition to the ZANU-PF government has always been there since 1980 through PF-ZAPU and later on, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, led by Edgar Tekere etc., and became very noticeable after the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai.

⁶⁰⁶ K. Chitiyo, "The Case for Security Sector," *Op. Cit.*, 35.

Opposition was a result of the party-state bad governance, patronage politics and authoritarianism that culminated in the strategically interdependent interactions of the politicians and the military elites that they all acquiesce to.

The intriguing miracle has been that the military in Zimbabwe has not seized power from the civilians despite the unbearable economic and political leadership legitimacy crisis that gripped Zimbabwe from 2000 through to 2013. All actors in the “nested game” are aware of the importance of maintaining a symbiotic relationship that is not a zero-sum game. Using the “nested game” analytical frame work it has emerged that there is a degree of “fusion” between military and civilian political elites that has helped to pre-empt a conventional military coup, with partial militarisation of civilian politics and partial politicisation of the military. Since 2000 senior military officers have been appointed to senior posts in the party and government. Generals Mujuru, Josiah Tungamirai, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai Retired Brigadiers Hebert Nyambuya, Ambrose Mutinhiri, Agrippa Mutambara, Dr Samuel Undenge, Felix Muchemwa among many others were given positions in government while other were deployed to the party commissariat or posted as ambassadors. This has been done to make sure that a smooth civil-military relationship is always existent. As noted in the foregoing other retired military senior officers have continued to receive their salaries and packages as if they are still in active service in the army. Elite civil-military relations are also firmly rooted in Mugabe’s continual rewarding of his military and political acolytes allowing them head government parastatals and own multiple farms and enjoy other benefits. This has incentivised the serving and retired military elites as well as some ordinary soldiers to

support ZANU-PF to remain in power since they will continually get significant personal privileges. The securcrats are therefore simultaneously defending the Zimbabwean civilian elite's national interest and their own interests. The symbiotic alliance between the military and the ZANU-PF politicians is embedded in the party-state being able to control the means of production and its distribution. It is undeniable that the military elites and the politicians are more interested in protecting their properties that they have accumulated hence their interests shape the decisions they make and how they interact. This is why they have an interdependent relationship that i characterise as a win-win situation. Such a situation warrants the supporting of the existing and maintenance of the status quo.

The Zimbabwean case after the Fast Track Land Reform invasions was arguably a test of Zimbabwean nationalism against neo-imperialism. It is a fact that there is a fusion between the military elites and the politicians that have supported the survival of the party-state guaranteed by overt politicisation of the military and militarisation of civilian politics. ZANU-PF political ideology has buttressed the rise of an acute sense of a Chimurenga and Zanuist political solidarity between the ZANU-PF politicians, senior military officers and the military rank-and-file and the political party rank-and-file. This has provided the much needed ideological hegemony that has not allowed military disintegration or the state collapse. Mugabe has prudently been able to resist the regime change onslaught, a stance that has seen the rejuvenation of former National Liberation Movements in the Southern African region. It is thus through politicisation and militarisation of the political space during the crisis period that Mugabe and his henchmen have been able to survive.

ZANU-PF militancy and dispensation of violence has also enabled them to maintain cohesion between the military leadership and the military rank-and-file. Threats of violence and actual violence have been dispensed on military leaders and the military rank-and-file. This saw the arrest of military officers like Matapo and others and the untimely unexplained deaths of some military generals like Gunda, Lifa and Mujuru among others. Mugabe has thus maintained a well-knit and orchestrated surveillance system that the military elites, those in the rank and file of the military are fearful of. It has kept the military leaders and the military rank-and-file in check.

The militarisation of the Zimbabwean political space depicts that the military elites and the politicians share the same views with the political leadership. The Chimurenga ethos and pan-Africanist ideologies have had a tremendous bearing on civil-military interactions in Zimbabwe. Some of the military are 'nationalists in uniform' whose relationship with the ZANU-PF party and politicians is synonymous to an alligator and water. They have a deep ideological obligation to the ZANU-PF party. General Nyikayaramba, Trust Mugoba and others have been rewarded for their steadfast support of the party. They are also beneficiaries of patronage relations.

The Zimbabwean military has become the fulcrum of the Zimbabwean political matrix. It is on this basis that the ZANU-PF political survival and relevance is centred. Notably, the major preoccupation of the ZANU-PF nationalist politicians has been nothing other than the mobilisation of those who share the same views with them as reinforcements against those who are against the prevailing political status quo. More specifically politicisation

was imparted into the guerrilla soldier and the war collaborators during the war of liberation and members of the Zimbabwe National Army after the attainment of independence.

Patriotic history has become an ideological expression of civil-military relations. This has categorically facilitated the “Zanunization” of the military and the political party rank-and-file. This has resulted in the co-optation of military elites, some military rank-and-file and the political party rank-and-file through consent (what Gramsci calls hegemony) and not necessarily through coercion. The presentation of history has been critical to the survival of the ZANU-PF de-facto one-party state, since 2000. Patriotic history has become a key element of identity and solidarity. The Chimurenga ethos is therefore an important emotional symbol and source of legitimacy that has a bearing on civil-military relations in the nested game. Most of the military leaders and some soldiers who went to war as young boys, girls, men and women, encountered a lot of difficulties during the liberation war and this is the umbilical cord that binds them. They are ‘political Siamese’ twins with a conjoint heart.

It has emerged from the discussion that the Zimbabwean political environment has always been militarised hence the maintenance of ZANU-PF domination of the Zimbabwean political space has always been backed by military might. It has also emerged that the Zimbabwe National Army that is a hybrid of British and Chinese militaries (now closely aligned to the Chinese military model) involve themselves in politics as the gun is beholden to the party. Such interactions have undeniably shaped the civil-military relations in a way that ensures civilian control of the military. The military have openly intervened,

influenced and directed the outcome of elections like they did in the presidential election that was held in 2002, the infamous June 2008 election rerun and the 2013 elections.

Consequently, the announcement of the deliberately delayed Presidential election results in 2008 and the subsequent electoral rerun marked the nadir of democratic progressive elements morale. It was a dark day from which Zimbabweans have never been able to recover. At issue is the fact that the ZNA has abrogated their professionalism and professional conduct by serving the interests of the party-state. There has been no dislocation of the party-military nexus hence politicisation of the military and militarisation of politics is erroneously being viewed in the lenses of something that is normal. This has gained credence in ZANU-PF circles explaining why without any remorse Mugabe stated that Zimbabwe has always been and remains a militarised state. The military are the locus of the decision making process especially during elections resulting in the militarisation and politicisation of electoral processes.

Notably, militarisation became noticeable when ex-liberation veterans with a strong affiliation to the ZANU-PF party were elevated to senior party and state positions and government parastatals from 2000 through to 2013. In the face of a deteriorating economy and dwindling support Mugabe turned to the security sector. He and his 'inner circle' set up the Zimbabwe National Security Council (ZNSC). The ZNSC was staffed with senior military officers (mainly retired generals and brigadiers) who were appointed as directors or chief executive officers (CEOs) of parastatals, a consolidation of the intense militarisation of the Zimbabwean political and economic space. It is evident that they are

a loyal group that is prepared to maintain ZANU-PF political dominance at all costs. This explains why, ZANU-PF politicians, the military elites and some rank and file supporters of the party-state have refused to embrace present day political dialecticism that promotes good governance. The civil-military elite strategic interdependent relations are cemented by the lucrative political economy of spoils politics of patronage and primitive accumulation. This witnessed military thought-out operations that have made Zimbabwe a securocratic state. Militarisation and politicisation have therefore become a defining phenomenon of Zimbabwean politics that supports the conflated party-state, simultaneously embroiling the military in politics. ZANU-PF politicians have used the politicisation of the military and the militarisation of politics as a phenomenon for regime and military stability. This has resulted in greater cohesion.

Since 1980 some political figures have been accused of trying to execute a coup and this has been the fate of Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo, Morgan Tsvangirai and of late Solomon and Joice Mujuru and some senior military officers who support her. Anyangwe has documented information on an alleged coup attempt in 2007. It is alleged that the palace coup plot had started in 2006 with the Mujurus being rumoured to have been at the centre of the plot. It is alleged that it was the Joint Operation Command that outfoxed Mujuru and his wife hence the executive became aware of these machinations before they took place. Arguably this is the result of the surveillance system that Mugabe has used where security sector institutions have been infiltrated by spies who are the 'eyes and ears of the president.'

The ruling political elite's use or threats of violence shows that civil-military relations in Zimbabwe have remained locked up in the political colonial web. Mugabe is a political monster created by Ian Smith; an experience that has continued to influence his conduct. He is president embedded in colonial historical brutality of the colonial state that he has failed to let go; the Mugabeism political brand that has become cancerous. Mugabe has defended such militarisation of the Zimbabwean political and economic space, saying "already, we are a militarized party....so it must not come as a surprise that we assign people from the military to run public institutions."⁶⁰⁷ It is a fact that after the ZANU-PF's dismal performance in the March 2008 harmonised election was salvaged from dissenting into political oblivion by the military elites and Mnangagwa. Mugabe unsheathed his political sword: the JOC that has become pivotal of running the electoral process, mobilising and politicising voters through threats of violence or actual use of violence executed by the military and party political rank-and-file.

It has also emerged that despite Mugabe's much touted and unbending Pan-Africanist stance, he has beyond measure ransacked and destroyed Zimbabwe by allowing corruptocracy, lootocracy and kleptocracy that has greased his patronage networks that he exploits to his advantage. It is therefore not surprising that violence is unleashed by the securocrats and their party rank-and-file to protect and expand their capacity to accumulate within a historically exaggerated Pan-African ideology. The Fast Track Land Reform programme was therefore some kind of quid pro quo between politicians, military and party rank-and file supporters, a populist political ruse to win those who would otherwise vote

⁶⁰⁷ Newsday Commentary, 27, August 2013, 8.

against the party. Corruption as some kind of payoff has been allowed to go on hence it has become one of the hallmarks of government and military non-disintegration. This corruption is there for all to see but has been expended and insulated in the politicisation and militarisation of the Zimbabwean space. This is why diamonds have mainly benefited the elites and the well-connected military and party rank-and-file.

All institutions, groups and individuals involved in political activities supporting the party-state, do so with the hope that 'positive participation' will enable recognition that will translate into societal developments that will be done in their constituencies to meet their basic needs and wipe away poverty in all its manifestations. This explains why one ZANU-PF political charlatan, Philip Chiyangwa said that if one wants to be rich one must join ZANU-PF.

The irony of it all is that the external and internal pressure that was indirectly exerted on the ZANU-PF politicians and the military had the reverse effect of strengthening the interaction between the politicians and the military elites. Service Chiefs have always taken orders from the civilian leadership despite some having (at times) voiced their displeasure. Notably the ethos of civil-military relations espouse that they must trust each other and work together to solidify and maintain amicable relations. Failure to be united is a recipe for disaster for the party-state. ZANU-PF is and has long been enmeshed in a politico-military alliance in which the gun always follows the party. It seems that the military elites have lucidly buried their heads in the political sand because of massive politicisation and militarisation. One will not be off the mark to conclude that the military elites are pivotal

as power brokers and king makers ‘as individuals’ but have still not been able to eclipse their civilian political counterparts. Though the military elites are at times ‘quiet’ it does not mean that they are blind, neither are they deaf nor dumb. Chiwenga responding to the much hyped ZANU-PF factionalism is alleged to have told Sydney Sekeramayi, (defence Minister) that “the politicians must put their house in order or else?”

ZANU-PF factionalism has also continued to be a characteristic that has refused to go away. It is a civil-military antagonism pitting the military and the civilians. Those who are serving or have retired from the army are supporting Emmerson Mnangagwa who took part in the liberation war and has for some time been the Minister of Defence. The civilians are supporting Grace Mugabe who is alleged by Mnangagwa’s supporters to be the leader of the G40 being supported by Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao among others. Mugabe has also lamented the security-sector’s involvement in ZANU-PF party politics as well as the ‘unstoppable factional divisions’ that have become visible in the security-sector.

Not being pessimistic, militarisation and politicisation will definitely not be able to continue being a panacea to the avoidance of state and military disintegration in Zimbabwe especially if the founding leader of the ZANU-PF party unexpectedly exits the political scene. In the absence of a well organised opposition political party and effective leadership to spearhead the much needed political change through the ballot, the lumpen proletariats, unemployed youths and the starving masses may act as catalysts to induce political change. ZANU-PF factionalism and unending expulsions, emasculated in the “Struggles within the

succession struggles,” and contradictions within contradictions are a pointer to disaster. These struggles and contradictions have now sucked in the military and is now a well pronounced civil-military antagonism which if not handled well by Mugabe will plunge the country into bloodshed. It is very unlikely that in Mugabe exits the political scene the centre will continue to hold. The pain for resisting the ZANU-PF yoke of oppression by the majority of the Zimbabwean citizenry and even some within the security-sector is now gaining momentum. It is undisputable that the politicians have used ideology, material kickbacks and the threat of violence to ensure that a populist military revolt do not take place but the majority of Zimbabweans are bitter and not better citizens.

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List of Interviewees

- Dr Wesley Mwatwara, Interview by Author, University of Zimbabwe, Harare 13th October 2015.
- Colonel Panganai Kahuni, Interview by Author, Harare, 20th August 2015.
- Dr “M,” Interview by Author, Harare, 18 April 2016.
- Dr Tafataona Mahoso, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Media House, Rainbow Towers, Harare, 9th November 2015.
- Fr. Oskar Wemter. S.j., Interview by Author, Imbisa Centre, Emerald Hill, Harare, 1st February 2016.
- “Captain Dos” (Pseudo name, Rtd military official) Interview by Author, Rusape, 8th August 2015.
- “Cde Zaa” (Pseudo name, war veteran and former military official), Interview by Author, Rusape, 6th June 2015.
- Colonel Dr Max Chinyanganya, Interview by Author, Zimbabwe Defence College, 14th October 2015.
- Professor “P”, Interview by Author, Bindura, 1st June 2015.
- Dr. Gadzamoyo Dewa, Interview by Author, 8th October 2015
- Mr “K”(Military Officer), Interview by Author, Harare, 13th June 2015.
- Sekai Masikana Holland (Former MDC-T MP) Interview by Author, Harare, 31st August 2016.
- Dr. “Chimaz” (Lecturer), Interview by Author, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 13th October 2015.
- Cde “Sachs” (Senior military official) Interview by Author, Harare, 4th September, 2015.
- Ambassador Agrippa Mutambara, Interview by Author, Bindura, 1st October 2015.
- Obadiah Dodo (Former security sector official and Lecturer) Interview by Author, Bindura, 25th August 2015.
- Cde “Chii,” (Military Official), Interview by Author, Harare, 08th June 2015.
- Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, (Former Zanu-PF technocrat), Interview by Author, Harare, 9th November 2015
- Anonymous (Rank and File soldier), Interview by Author, Harare, 28 November 2015.
- Anonymous (Reverend X) Interview by Author, Harare, 10th February 2016.

Appendix 1

Number and Type of Military Coups in African Countries, 1960-2013

Year	Successful	Failed / Attempt
1960	1 (DRC)	1 (Ethiopia)
1961		1 (Somalia)
1962		1 (Senegal)
1963	3 (Togo, Congo, Benin)	1 (DRC)
1964		4 (Ghana, Tanzania, Gabon, DRC)
1965	5 (Benin, Algeria, DRC, Benin, Benin)	1 (Burundi)
1966	8 (CAR, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Nigeria, Burundi)	2 (Togo, Sudan)
1967	3 (Togo, Sierra Leone, Benin)	1 (Ghana)
1968	3 (Sierra Leone, Congo, Mali)	
1969	4 (Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Benin)	
1970		3 (Congo, Togo, Guinea)
1971	1 (Uganda)	4 (Sierra Leone, Uganda, Sudan, Chad)
1972	3 (Ghana, Madagascar, Benin)	2 (Congo, Benin)
1973	2 (Swaziland, Rwanda)	1 (Cote d'Ivoire)
1974	3 (Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ethiopia)	5 (Uganda, Uganda, Angola, CAR, Madagascar)
1975	2 (Chad, Nigeria)	3 (Benin, Sudan, Mozambique)
1976	1 (Burundi)	6 (CAR, Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Mali, Sudan)
1977	1 (Seychelles)	6 (Benin, Sudan, Congo, Chad, Angola, Uganda)
1978	3 (Comoros, Ghana, Mauritania)	3 (Mali, Somalia, Sudan)
1979	3 (Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, CAR)	2 (Chad, Ghana)
1980	5 (Mauritania, Liberia, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso)	1 (Zambia)
1981	2 (CAR, Ghana)	4 (Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Niger)
1982	1 (Burkina Faso)	5 (Mauritania, CAR, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana)

1983	2 (Burkina Faso, Nigeria)	5 (Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Niger)
1984	2 (Guinea, Mauritania)	2 (Ghana, Cameroon)
1985	3 (Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria)	3 (Liberia, Guinea, Liberia)
1986	1 (Lesotho)	1 (Equatorial Guinea)
1987	2 (Burundi, Burkina Faso)	2 (Sierra Leone, Comoros)
1988		1 (Uganda)
1989	2 (Sudan, Comoros)	1 (Ethiopia)
1990	1 (Chad)	2 (Nigeria, Zambia)
1991	2 (Mali, Lesotho)	4 (Djibouti, Togo, Chad, Togo)
1992	2 (Sierra Leone, Algeria)	3 (Burundi, Benin, Comoros)
1993	1 (Nigeria)	2 (Guinea-Bissau, Burundi)
1994	1 (The Gambia)	2 (Burundi, Liberia)
1995		3 (Sao Tome & Principe, Comoros, Sierra Leone)
1996	3 (Sierra Leone, Niger, Burundi)	3 (Guinea, CAR, Sierra Leone)
1997	1 (Sierra Leone)	1 (Zambia)
1998		1 (Guinea-Bissau)
1999	3 (Niger, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire)	
2000		3 (Comoros, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire)
2001	1 (DRC)	5 (Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, CAR, Burundi, Comoros)
2002	1 (Cote d'Ivoire)	
2003	3 (CAR, Sao Tome & Principe, Guinea-Bissau)	1 (Mauritania)
2004		4 (DRC, Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea)
2005	1 (Mauritania)	
2006	1 (Chad)	2 (Madagascar, Cote d'Ivoire)
2007		1 (Zimbabwe)
2008	2 (Mauritania, Guinea)	
2009		1 (Madagascar)
2010	1 (Niger)	2 (Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar)

2011		3 (DRC, Niger, Guinea-Bissau)
2012	2 (Mali, Guinea-Bissau)	
2013		

Source: Barka and Ncube, September 2012, cited in Emile Quedraogo, Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, Research Paper no. 6, Washington DC, 2014.

Appendix 2

As commander-in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), you are no doubt acutely aware of the Constitutional provisions and the relevant Acts of Parliament governing the conduct and operations of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). There are neither constitutional nor legal provisions in either the constitution or the Defence Act and the Police Act which empower you to transform these national institutions into combative political units of your political party Zanu-PF. Instead, in the constitution and relevant Acts of Parliament, an impregnable line is clearly drawn between the areas of military operations and competence and those that are within the province of competence of political and civic authorities. You are constitutionally bound to maintain and uphold the line. Where the line is drawn is not a matter of interpretation, argument or haggling. The line is cast in stone. To equivocate on this fundamental principle is to overthrow a critical provision of the constitution and subvert the relevant Acts of Parliament. The ZDF and the ZRP are specifically and explicitly barred from participating in politics and political process of the country as organised units and distinctive preferences operationalized in the context of military and police formations aligned to a particular political party. They can participate in politics as individual private citizens entitled to cast their votes in secrecy of the ballot box. This line between the military and political/civil matters is designed to ensure the perpetuation of representative civilian government as opposed to the imposition of an unrepresentative military junta. For the record, I have stated that under the MDC government, the professional standing, hierarchy and integrity of the Army and

Police will be jealously guarded. The Army and the Police will be insulated from the negative effects of competitive politics on their esprit de corps. [Tsvangirai, 2005]

Source: Sabelo Ndlovu Gatsheni, "Nationalist Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe," *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6 n0. 1 (2006): 50-51.

Appendix 3

Air Vice Marshal Michael Karakadzai	Harare Metropolitan Province
Col C. Sibanda	Bulawayo Province
Maj. J. Ndlovu & Maj. J. Ncube	Bulawayo Central
Brig. Tarumbwa	Manicaland & Mutare South
Col. M. Mzilikazi (MID)	Buhera Central
Maj. L. M. Svosve	Buhera North
Maj. D. Muchena	Buhera South
Lt. Col. Kanonge & Maj. Nhachi	Buhera West
Lt. Col. Murecherwa	Chimanimani East
Maj. Mabvuu	Chimanimani West
Col. Mutsvunguma	Headlands
Maj. V. Chisuku	Makoni North
Wing Commander Mandeya	Makoni South
Lt. Col. Tsodzai, Lt. Col. Sedze, Mandi Chimene	Mutare Central
Lt. Col. B. Kashiri	Mutare West
Lt. Col. Chizengwe & Lt. Col. Mazaiwana	Mutare North
Brig. Gen. Shungu	Mashonaland Central
Col. Chipwere	Bindura South
Lt. Col. Parwada	Bindura North
Lt. Col. Kazaza	Muzarabani North
Maj. H. Maziri	Muzarabani South
Col. F. Mhonda & Lt. Col. Betheuni	Rushinga
Lt. Col. Dzuda	Shamva North
Makumire	Shamva South
AVM Muchena, Brig. Gen. S.B. Moyo & Lt. Col. Kahuni	Midlands
Maj. T. Tsvangirai	Chirumanzu South
Col. B. Mavire	Mberengwa East
Maj. T. Marufu	Mberengwa West
AVM. Abu Basutu	Matebeleland South
Group Cpt. Mayera, Rtd. Maj. Mbedzi & Lt. Col. B. Moyo	Beitbridge East
Maj. D. J. Moyo	Gwanda South
Maj. B. Tshuma	Gwanda Central
Lt. Col. Maphosa	Matopo North
Brig. Gen. Khumalo	Matebeleland North

Maj. E. S. Matonga	Binga North
Lt. Col. Mkwanzani	Lupane East
Lt. Col. Mabhena	Lupane West
Lt. Col. Mlalazi	Tsholotsho
Lt. Col. P. Ndhlovu	Hwange Central
Maj. Gen. E. A. Rugeje, Rtd. Maj. Gen. Gibson Mashingaidze & Rtd. Brig. Gen. Rangwani	Masvingo Province
Maj. B. R. Murwira	Bikita West
Col. G. Mashava	Chiredzi Central
Maj. E. Gono	Chiredzi West
Maj. Chimedza (Medical Doctor)& AVM. Muchena	Gutu South
Lt. Col. Takavingofa	Masvingo
Lt. Col. Muchona	Mwenezi West
Maj. R. Kwenda	Zaka East
Brig. Gen. Sigauke	Mashonaland West Province
Col. Gwekwerere	Chinhoyi
Lt. Col. W. Tutisa	Chegutu East
Lt. Col. B. Mahambe	Hurungwe East
Col. C. T. Gurira	Mhondoro Mubaira
Cpt. T. Majongwe	Zvimba North
Brig. Gen. D. Nyikayaramba & Rtd. Brig. Gen. Rungani	Mashonaland East
Lt. Col. Marara	Chikomba Central
Lt. Col. Mudzimba & Maj. F. Mbewe	Goromonzi North
Maj. Gen. Chedondo (COSG)& Lt. Col. B. Kashiri	Marondera Central
Squadron leader U. Chitauo	Marondera West
Maj. Gurure	Murehwa South
Lt. Col. Mukurazhizha & Lt. Col. Chinete	Murehwa North

Source: MDC information Department-2008 in The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011.